bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Market: Freedom from Morality
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

Economics celebrates an ideal of interaction free from all constraint, an ideal found in the perfectly competitive market, where equilibrium and optimality coincide. Morality can then be thought of as arising from market failure; the perfect market itself operates as a morally free zone, because the only behaviour it makes possible excludes those features of natural interaction that prevent individuals, each acting to maximize his own utility, from achieving optimality. We examine the conditions for market success—individual factor endowments, free individual activity, private goods, mutual unconcern, and the absence of all externalities—showing that these extend the freedom of the solitary individual to the context of interaction, and exclude all free‐riding, parasitism, and any form of partiality. But we note that the initial factor endowment of each person, taken as a given in market interaction, is itself subject to rational and moral scrutiny (a matter examined in Ch. 7). The chapter concludes with a discussion of utilitarian and Marxist objections to the market, both of which we reject.
Co‐operation: Bargaining and Justice
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, we turn to cooperation as the remedy for market failure, and to justice as the rational disposition to cooperative behaviour. Instead of each person choosing her own strategy, in cooperation persons agree on a single joint strategy choice leading to an optimal outcome. We argue that such a choice results from an ideal bargain among all persons, and offer an account of bargaining, in terms of the initial bargaining position, the claims rational persons would make from that position, and the concessions they would then offer to achieve agreement on a joint strategy, yielding a fundamental principle labelled ‘minimax relative concession’. We then show that this principle is equivalent to ‘maximin relative benefit’, in which the smallest gain anyone receives, measured as a proportion of the gain he would receive from being granted his claim, is as great as possible. The principle of maximin relative benefit, we claim, captures the idea of impartiality in the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, and so is a principle of fairness or justice. Thus, rational bargaining and justice coincide. But we note that the question of determining the initial bargaining position remains to be resolved, both rationally and morally; this question is in fact the same as that of determining initial factor endowments, which we raised and deferred in the previous chapter.
Compliance: Maximization Constrained
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

Justice requires that one act on a fair optimizing strategy when one can—that is, a strategy that will yield an outcome that (nearly) satisfies the standards set by minimax relative concession and optimality. We now address the problem raised by Hobbes's Foole—be it ever so rational to agree to minimax relative concession, is compliance with it rational, as opposed to directly maximizing one's own utility? We distinguish a straightforward maximizer, who is disposed always to maximize his own utility, from a constrained maximizer, who is disposed to refrain from utility maximization in favour of fair optimality, and show that persons with the latter disposition can expect to do better so long as there is a significant proportion of them in the population and reasonably able to identify one another and to avoid misidentifying straightforward maximizers. We argue that this shows the rationality both of constrained maximization as a disposition and of the choices constrained maximizers make. We claim that a population of constrained maximizers would be rationally stable, and compare this to Robert Trivers's claim that a population of reciprocal altruists would be genetically stable.
The Initial Bargaining Position: Rights and the Proviso
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

Takes up the questions of the initial bargaining position and the initial factor endowment, raised in Chs. 6 and 4 respectively. We reject James Buchanan's identification of the initial bargaining position with the outcome of non‐cooperative interaction, and John Harsanyi's identification of it with the threat point. Instead, we argue that, as the basis of market and cooperative interaction, it must rule out all taking of advantage—bettering oneself through worsening the situation of others. We term this condition the ‘proviso’, deriving it from Robert Nozick's interpretation of Locke's insistence that in acquisition, one leave ‘enough, and as good’ for others. We show how the proviso constrains directly maximizing behaviour, and we then demonstrate its role in introducing a structure of individual rights to person and property, rights that define each person's initial bargaining position and factor endowment. We show that the proviso satisfies our standard of impartiality, and why rational persons would accept the proviso, as part of a narrow interpretation of compliance with the requirements for cooperation. We show that cooperation in the absence of the proviso tends to be unstable, and to depend on ideologies, entrenched historical factors, and differential technologies, all of which undermine the equal rationality of persons on which an impartial morality depends.
Persons, Peoples, Generations
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, we consider some of the implications of our theory. We first discuss taxation to cover the cost of supplying pure public goods, suggesting that a flat tax may best fit the requirements of the principle of minimax relative concession. We show that the right to collect factor rent is not part of the liberty assured by either the proviso or minimax relative concession. We defend the right under the proviso of individuals to appropriate productive resources originally held in common provided that in so doing they provide new and better opportunities for those affected. We discuss briefly the vexing problem of encounters between societies at very different levels of development, including the European appropriation of North America. We introduce four criteria to govern a partial ordering of ways of life in terms of advancement or human development: (sustainable) density of population; (average) duration of life; material well‐being; and most important, breadth of (effectively available) opportunity. Finally, we discuss relations among persons of different generations, showing how the principle of minimax relative concession provides a way of determining the rational rate of investment (forgoing present consumption), yielding steadily increasing well‐being.
The Ring of Gyges
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

Is a rational morality a necessary evil—a mean between what an individual would judge best—bettering his situation at whatever cost to others, and worst—having one's situation worsened at other's pleasure? It would seem that Glaucon's fable of the ring of Gyges may be applied to our account of morality. And indeed, matters may be worse—a contractarian morality such as we have developed may seem to be a tool for the clever and strong to use in domination, using the language of cooperation to conceal the reality of exploitation. If we understand ourselves on the model of economic man, treating all basic motivation as exemplifying asociality and all human relationships as contractual, we may find these conclusions hard to escape. Even though we could understand the rational arguments in support of morality, our feelings would be engaged only by our own concerns, and we would lack any affective capacity for morality.
The Liberal Individual
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

We appeal to Bernard Suits's Grasshopper to support the thesis that what has intrinsic value in human life is engagement in activities that have instrumental value. The implication of this view is that scarcity in the form of human fulfilment is necessary for human life to have point, and so is the humanly necessary evil. Participation with others to diminish scarcity has necessary instrumental value, and, we argue, for that reason has intrinsic value. A morality of agreement is the foundation of welcome participation, and so, despite its imposition of constraints, necessary to valuing participation and extending that value to one's fellow participants. We then turn to the character of an essentially just society, and show that it is a society not of ‘economic men’ but of liberal individuals, autonomous beings free to choose their own goals and their affective ties with others, and willingly maintaining the moral and social conditions that make this autonomy possible. We note certain doubts about the possibility of creating an essentially just society, but conclude with Nietzsche's account of human beings as having ‘the right to make promises’ to ‘stand as their own guarantors’, and identify this with the ability to interact with one's fellows and the world in a new and distinctive way, which we have called ‘constrained maximization’.
God and Goodness
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Proposes an abstract conception of God, which identifies the will of God with the basic facts about good and bad. I argue that this conception does justice both to the nature of goodness and to the sovereignty of God. And, while it is does not represent God as a person, it allows for the attribution to him of properties that form the key elements of many people's conception of God. I argue that a belief in God, so conceived, is a natural extension of ordinary scientific outlook and a belief in objective value. I defend this belief in objective value and claim that it is reasonable to explain the existence of the world in terms of such value. In the latter part of the book, I discuss the problem of evil, and the question of whether there are good reasons for believing in miracles. Finally, I discuss the value of rational belief in God.
Introduction
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

The introduction explains the aim of the book and provides an outline of its contents.
The Scientific Outlook
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Argues that the ordinary scientific outlook is not characterized by the sort of metaphysical hygiene and epistemological security that are sometimes thought of as the goals of empiricism. It is committed to a belief in order; it is committed to a belief in rationality—that some reasons for beliefs are good reasons, and some bad; it is committed to explanation. These commitments, I shall be arguing, provide a foundation for a belief in God.
Objective Value
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Hume thought that people's ‘beliefs’ about morality were really just feelings. I argue that people have genuine beliefs about good and bad, right and wrong. I consider arguments against the existence of objective value based on its alleged epistemological and metaphysical oddity, and the existence of disagreements. I argue that these moves can be countered, and, in particular, that for the most part such arguments would tell equally against the existence of objectively good reasons for belief.
The Possibility of Knowledge of Necessary Truths
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Concerned with the question of how our beliefs in necessary truths can be reasonable. In the course of considering this general question, I argue that our belief in objective value—that some things are good and others bad—commits us to the view that such beliefs are capable of being reliable, at least to some extent. And this belief in reliability, in its turn, commits us to the idea that value can make a difference; that the fact that it would be good that something should be so, for instance, can have a bearing on the ways things are—by having a bearing on what beliefs we form. So objective goodness can explain.
Miracles
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Discusses the relation between miracles and the laws of nature and the question of whether we could have a good reason to believe in miracles—i.e. to believe that God directly intervenes in the world. I argue that such divine intervention would not be necessary, since God could achieve his purposes through his original act of creation, but that it might, nonetheless, be good that he should respond to his creatures. I also note that, on the abstract conception of God proposed, God will constantly affect the workings of the world through our perception of his will.
The Importance of Rational Belief
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Argues that rational belief is important in so far as we are interested in the truth, and that deference to authority does not provide an attractive alternative. Also argues that it cannot be made out that it would be good to have an irrational belief in God by appealing to the importance of trust or, as Pascal's wager does, to the good consequences of belief in God, if he exists. I go on to consider the value of belief in God, when conceived in the way proposed. I conclude that, valuable as this may be, what is most valuable is the knowledge of God's will; because that is knowledge of what is good and what is bad.
From Metaphysics to Ethics
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.

I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.
Serious Metaphysics and Supervenience
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

Serious metaphysics is the business of giving an account of what our world is like, which is much more than a shopping list. A famous example is physicalism, the doctrine that our world is a huge aggregation of items that are purely physical or physical without remainder. This chapter uses physicalism to explore what such a claim comes to in terms of supervenience; how it leads to a necessitation doctrine; and how it raises the location problem—the problem of locating an item described in non‐physical terms in the physical account offered by physicalism.
The Primary Quality View of Colour
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

This chapter offers an answer to the location problem for colour via a defence of physicalism/realism about colour. However, it is set in a framework that is more subjectivist than that favoured by many realists about colour.
The Location Problem for Ethics: Moral Properties and Moral Content
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives an account of what cognitivism in ethics is and argues that the a priori global nature of the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive requires cognitivists in ethics to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones. It argues that we can locate ethical properties with descriptive ones in terms of the role ethical properties play in folk morality, a view of ethics I call, with Philip Pettit, ‘moral functionalism’.
Analytical Descriptivism
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives more detail on how to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones using the roles the former play in folk morality. The construction uses the Lewis–Carnap–Ramsey way of defining theoretical terms and implies that ethical terms are analyzable in descriptive terms. This approach is contrasted with Cornell Realism, and there is discussion of the open‐question argument and how belief about ethical properties connects with motivation on the version of analytical descriptivism being defended.
Chapter One
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I begin by raising the question whether there can be ‘absolute representations’ and explain what I mean by this. I define a ‘representation’ as anything, which has content and which, because of its content, is either true or false. I define an ‘absolute’ representation as a representation whose content can be combined with that of any other possible representation ‘by simple addition’. This contrasts with the case of a ‘non‐absolute’ or ‘perspectival’ representation, whose content may not be combinable with that of another representation until the element of perspective has been eliminated. Thus if one person says, ‘I am English,’ and another says, ‘I am German,’ it is not possible for either of those people, nor indeed for anyone else, to combine the contents of their representations by saying, ‘I am English and I am German.’
Chapter Three
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

There is a temptation associated with the question, which must be exposed before the question can be properly addressed. This is the temptation to think that there are perspectival features of reality that figure in perspectival facts, and that what makes (some) true perspectival representations true is the obtaining of such facts. I argue that this is incoherent, and that the absolute/perspectival distinction applies exclusively to representations, not to what is represented. (To argue for this, I assume the unity of reality: this is an assumption that will reappear and receive further consideration in subsequent chapters.) I also consider why the temptation exists, and how it can be resisted.
Chapter Four
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I distinguish my question from various others with which it might be confused, and then argue for an affirmative answer to it (in other words, that absolute representations are possible). My argument, which I call ‘the Basic Argument’, is an embellishment of an argument due to Williams. Its key premise, which I call ‘the Basic Assumption’, and which I express as the assumption that ‘representations are representations of what is there anyway’, involves a cluster of interrelated ideas about the unity, substantiality, and autonomy of reality. (This is the assumption I make in the argument of Chapter 3.) I end the chapter by considering the role of science, and specifically of physics, within what I have just argued.
Chapter Six
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I argue that both Kant and, in his later work, Wittgenstein (the latter in spite of himself) indicate the possibility of just such a transcendental‐idealist response to the Basic Argument. I also argue, however, that transcendental idealism, for all its appeal, is incoherent. This is because its attempt to invoke the ‘transcendent’ is an attempt to invoke that which, by definition, cannot be invoked. So, it does not provide an alternative to unregenerate endorsement of the Basic Argument after all.
Chapter Seven
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

There remains the problem of accounting for the appeal of transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealists themselves may say that there is nothing wrong with the doctrine, but only with the attempt to express it, the point being that it is inexpressibly true: but I argue that this does not extricate them from the trap of self‐stultification. An importantly different proposal, which I derive from the earlier work of Wittgenstein, is this: while we cannot coherently state that transcendental idealism is true we are shown that transcendental idealism is true, where ‘A is shown that x’ is defined as ‘(i) A has ineffable knowledge, and (ii) when an attempt is made to put that knowledge into words, the result is: x.’ I try to indicate how, provided we can make sense of (i) and (ii), this proposal has the threefold merit of: avoiding self‐stultification; being compatible with the incoherence of transcendental idealism; and providing an account of transcendental idealism's appeal.
Chapter Eight
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I argue that we can make sense of (i). I give a very general account of knowledge, and then identify ineffable knowledge as a kind of practical knowledge (though, in the course of doing this, I try to make clear that the relation between practical knowledge and the idiom ‘knows how to’ is not as straightforward as is commonly supposed). What distinguishes ineffable knowledge, on my account, is that it has nothing to answer to. Prime examples are certain states of understanding.
Chapter Nine
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I further argue that we can make sense of (ii). This requires a critique of nonsense, since, for reasons that I give, what replaces ‘x’ in the schema must be nonsense. I endorse an austere view of nonsense whereby there is nothing more to nonsense than sheer lack of sense, as in ‘phlump jing ux’. The point is this: because our ineffable knowledge is a mark of our finitude, and because we have a shared aspiration to transcend our finitude, we also have a shared temptation to put our ineffable knowledge into words, which in turn gives us a shared sense of when a piece of nonsense is ‘apt’ to replace ‘x’ in the schema, where ‘aptness’ is a quasi‐aesthetic attribute. This is enough for instances of the schema to count as true or false—and, arguably, for ‘We are shown that transcendental idealism is true’ to count as true.
Chapter Ten
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

With these ideas in place, I proceed to give further examples of things that we are shown. These concern: the nature and identity of persons; the narrative unity of an individual life; scepticism; the subject matter of mathematics, and more specifically of set theory; and the doctrine that Dummett calls anti‐realism.
Chapter Eleven
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I identify and discuss three principles that underlie these ideas: first, that we are finite; secondly, that we are self‐conscious about our finitude; and thirdly, that we aspire to be infinite. I argue that the third of these explains the value of certain things to us, and that it leads to our being shown that these things are of unconditioned value (even though they are not). Finally, by addressing the question what value our aspiration to be infinite itself has, I make some suggestions about the relationship between our ineffable knowledge and God.
Introduction
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

Outlines the standard reception of Nietzsche's work, highlights shortcomings in a representative selection of critical responses, and locates the present study in the context of prevalent scholarship, concomitantly stating its own aims and content.
Scepticism
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.
Beyond Scepticism: ‘For—There Is No “Truth” ’
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

As well as drawing sceptical conclusions, Nietzsche rejects the concept of absolute or metaphysical truth as unintelligible. Nietzsche's views are elucidated by contrasting his arguments with alternative accounts of ‘objective reality’ belonging to the philosophical canon. It ensues that Nietzsche espouses a variety of anti‐metaphysics premised on the mutual determination of reality and interest. He believes that objective reality cannot be conceived without volitional and intentional agency on the part of subjects who experience themselves as acted upon (‘resisted’) by the contents of their representations. Having elaborated and explained the prominence of Nietzsche's denial of metaphysical fact, the discussion turns to the origin and significance of the desire for metaphysical truth. In identifying the embracing of metaphysical truth for its own sake (the ‘will to truth’) with the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche intends to contrast practical engagement with the world with a preference for evaluation divorced from the subject's actual experiences and desires. Belief in objective value and ‘the will to truth’ are subsumed under a general psychological disposition designated ‘the ascetic ideal’, characterized by self‐deception or ressentiment.
Truth, Survival, and Power
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

In contrast with views that attribute the biological utility of beliefs to their truth, Nietzsche maintains that their relative utility renders them proportionately more likely to be idiosyncratic expressions of species‐relative concerns. Nietzsche's sceptical ‘argument from utility’—the inference from the practical utility of beliefs to the improbability of their being metaphysically true—is examined and rejected. It is argued that Nietzsche is an early proponent of naturalized epistemology. His objections to the ‘best explanation’ defence of metaphysical realism are discussed. It emerges that the ‘evolutionary’ strand of thought is incompatible with his other sceptical arguments. The chapter pursues Nietzsche's doctrine that the ‘ruling drives’ representing the dominant manifestation of the will to power in an individual determine the standards for validation, evidence, and truth. The discussion proceeds to an examination of Nietzsche's remarks that the external world is created in a manner depending on the specific form of the will to power instantiated by the empirical subject.
The Nature of ‘Inner Experience’
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

Argues that Nietzsche's pronouncements on psychology advert to basic facts about the constitution of inner experience and are thus incompatible with his anti‐essentialism. Nietzsche's analysis of non‐egoistic behaviour, his proto‐Freudian presentation of mental life as driven by processes inaccessible to self‐consciousness, and his analysis of the ascetic ideal, ressentiment, and self‐deception amount to a picture of human agency in which all significant aspects of inner experience are ‘in reality’ desires for the experience of power.
The Will to Power: Nietzsche and Metaphysics
Authors: Poellner Peter
Published: October 2003

Examines Nietzsche's anti‐essentialism (the denial of metaphysical truth) in the context of the metaphysics of the will to power, which posits an ontology of interactive and causally efficacious quanta of force characterized exclusively by relational properties. It is argued that this ontological model is marred by a fundamental incoherence. The concluding remarks touch upon the problem of relativism of truth and self‐reference. An attempt is made to situate the metaphysics of the will in the context of Nietzsche's whole philosophy.
Biblical Faith and Natural Theology
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Natural theology is the idea that human beings ‘by nature’, just through being human, know something of God, or alternatively that they gain such knowledge through experience of the world we live in. An opposite is revelation, a knowledge of God communicated through special channels such as the Bible. Natural theology was long accepted as a basic ingredient in theology and indeed in science, but in modern times was widely rejected, notably in Barthianism. But what if the Bible itself uses, depends on and supports natural theology? This book examines the biblical materials (Hebrew Bible, Apocrypha and New Testament) that seem to give an affirmative answer. On biblical grounds, it argues, the importance of natural theology is undeniable.
Natural Theology in This Century: Concepts and Approaches
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Briefly reviews the history of natural theology, concentrating on the twentieth century and the rejection of it by Karl Barth. Contrary example of Charles Raven. Brief survey of recent developments.
Paul on the Areopagus
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Studies Paul's speech at Athens (Acts 17) and the question whether it implies or supports natural theology.
St Paul and the Hebrew Background
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Further investigates the degree to which Paul's arguments depend on a Jewish or a Hellenistic background.
Natural Theology in the Jewish Tradition
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Studies Jewish works originating between the Old and New Testaments, some of them from the ‘Apocrypha’ but going back to early times.
Within the Old Testament
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Follows the same trail back into the Hebrew Bible itself and examines the evidences of something like natural theology in the Psalms 104, 19, 119, in the Wisdom literature, the Prophets and the Law itself.
A Return to the Modern Discussion
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

A deeper investigation of the twentieth‐century discussion and especially the influence of Karl Barth within various theological traditions, including conservative Protestantism, conflicts within Nazi Germany, Roman Catholicism, and modern biblical studies.
The Image of God and Natural Theology
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

The biblical expression that humanity is created ‘in the image of God’ has been taken as evidence in the debate about natural theology. Various interpretations, ancient and modern, are here discussed.
Science; Language; Parable; Scripture
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

The question of natural theology has a bearing on various other basic concepts, such as science and medicine, language, thought and experience, metaphor and parable, Bible and scripture.
Natural Theology and the Future of Biblical Theology
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Biblical theology has to take account of the meanings that applied within the biblical culture. The problems are illustrated from examples like the destruction of the Canaanites and the sacrifice of children.
The Thought of Thomas Aquinas
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

The aim of this book is to give a general and introductory overview of the teaching and thought of Thomas Aquinas (1224–26 to 1274), a Dominican friar, and one of the greatest Western philosophers, and Christian theologians. Books on Aquinas invariably deal either with his philosophy or his theology; Aquinas himself, however, made no such arbitrary division, and this book allows him to be seen as a whole, in introducing almost the full range of his thinking, and relating this to writers both earlier and later. The author points out that all Aquinas’ major conclusions can be found in his first important work – Commentary on the Sentences, and that he did not change his mind radically throughout his writings, although some emphases shifted. Nevertheless, in this book, Aquinas’ thinkings are followed broadly in accordance with the scheme he provides in Summa Theologiae, which is considered to be his greatest achievement and is the best‐known synthesis of his thinking. Ways in which the thinking in Summa Theologiae differs from his thinking presented elsewhere are noted, and some of the treatment is selective (for example politics and aesthetics are not dealt with directly). Discussion is also omitted of Aquinas’ contribution to thirteenth‐century debates on the legitimacy and running of certain religious orders in the Catholic Church, which is now merely of historical interest.
The Shape of a Saint
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

This first chapter gives an outline of Thomas Aquinas’ life and work. The different sections of the chapter cover his early years and his adoption of Aristotle's thinking at the University of Naples, where he also joined the Dominican Order of friars, his progression from student at Naples to teacher at the University of Paris, his life in Paris and return to Naples, and the last phase of his life. There is also a section on his character (philosopher or theologian, saint and thinker), and lastly, a discussion of the meaning of his writings today.
Getting to God
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

This chapter starts by addressing Thomas Aquinas’ idea of God, and then discusses ways in which we cannot defend belief in his existence. It goes on to expand on the basis on which we can claim knowledge of God's existence, through looking at the cause of effects that are evident to us; these are Aquinas’ ‘Five Ways’ (Quinque Viae), which are discussed in detail. Further sections of the chapter cover the existence argument, creation, and the beginning of the world.
What God Is not
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

The view of Thomas Aquinas that we can only know what God is not, rather than what he is, is discussed. The first part of the chapter outlines Aquinas’ basic position on this matter in relation to his theological background and the range of human knowledge. It then goes on to discuss the doctrine of divine simplicity, first giving the reasoning behind this, and then giving the details of Aquinas’ view on the matter. This is that God is pure form and he is his nature, so that the substance of God is his existence. Although God may be unknowable and incomprehensible, he is still there.
Talking About God
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Since Thomas Aquinas considers God to be entirely mysterious and unknowable, the question is discussed of his position on how we can think of, or indeed say anything about him. The attitude of earlier Christian writers to this matter is outlined, and then Aquinas’ thinking on the subject is discussed: he says that in talking of God in a positive way, we do, in a sense, describe him – even though God is above naming, our statements about him can signify the divine nature. This amounts to what is known as the doctrine of analogy: that words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way. In essence then, Aquinas holds to three theses: (1) We do not know what God is, for he cannot he defined and he differs quite radically from the things to which we compare him; (2) As the source of his creatures, however, God may be said to resemble them, though he lacks all creaturely limitations; and (3) There is room for arguing that certain specific predicates can be ascribed to him. The chapter ends with comments on the conclusion propounded by Aquinas that while creatures are really related to God, God is not really related to them.
Perfection and Goodness
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Thomas Aquinas thinks that God defies our comprehension, but, as has been discussed earlier in the book, he also holds that we are still able to make true statements about him. So far, the book has only looked at how Aquinas defends this thesis in general terms, but here some particulars are addressed. What Aquinas thinks that we can say of God deal with assertions of two types: (1) those that can be made and defended on rational grounds without recourse to special (Christian) revelation; and (2) those that derive from revelation. In this chapter, and the three chapters following, the first group of assertions are considered, starting with the assertions ‘God is perfect’ and ‘God is good’. The last part of the chapter discusses the ancient and much discussed problem of God and evil.
Ubiquity to Eternity
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Continuing with the theme of what can be known of God apart from Revelation, this chapter turns to three beliefs that are absolutely fundamental to the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. These are: (1) that God is everywhere; (2) that God is unchangeable; and (3) that God is eternal. The third topic is addressed in some detail, and includes discussion of Aquinas on time, and on why God is eternal (because he has no duration or temporal location). The last part of the chapter discusses Aquinas’ views on eternity in the light of contemporary criticism, indicating the objections most frequently raised, and what Aquinas might have said against these.
Oneness to Knowledge
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Thomas Aquinas accepts the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, so he believes that divinity somehow contains distinction within itself. He thinks that there are three who are God, and he also thinks that, if we ask, ‘three what?’, the answer is, ‘three persons’. However, also in line with Christian orthodoxy, Aquinas is a monotheist: he believes that there is but one, powerful, knowledgeable God. This chapter investigates why Aquinas takes the resolutely monotheistic position that he adopts everywhere, before turning in Ch. 10 to his treatment of the Trinity. The three main sections of the chapter are: God is one; God has power; and God's knowledge.
Will to Mercy
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

The book has so far shown that Thomas Aquinas had plenty to say about what we need to affirm of God from a philosophical viewpoint and without explicit reference to, or dependence Christian revelation. According to him, there are good philosophical grounds for saying that God is the creator of the world, and that he is perfect, good, ubiquitous, eternal, unique, powerful, and knowledgeable. This chapter turns to his philosophical treatment of God's will, God's love, and God's justice and mercy, for what he has to say presupposes, and connects with, much that he teaches concerning God's changelessness, power, and knowledge. His philosophical case for ascribing will to God rests, for example, on his view of God's knowledge or understanding, and he develops it by drawing on the conclusion that God is wholly immutable.
Providence and Freedom
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Thomas Aquinas maintains that God's mercy and love are aspects of his providence, but he has more to say about providence than that. In this chapter, his teaching on providence is examined, first from a general viewpoint, and then looking at the three implications of this for Aquinas – those concerning chance, the action of created secondary causes, and predestination. Finally, a look is taken at what he says on three topics that fall within the notion of providence as he, and others, have understood it – miracles, human freedom, and prayer.
The Eternal Triangle
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

For Thomas Aquinas, the heart of Christian teaching is the doctrine of the Trinity, and this is the first specifically Christian topic that he turns to in Summa Theologiae. Historically speaking, Aquinas is one of the most important writers on the doctrine of the Trinity, and it is these writings that are addressed in this chapter. Aquinas takes for granted the substance of early texts on the Trinity such as the Creed of Asthanius, so his position is thoroughly orthodox. Consequently, his own treatment of the Trinity deals with three main topics, each of which is discussed separately: (1) the relevance of philosophy to the doctrine; (2) the divine processions, and hence the relations, involved in the Trinity; and (3) the persons of the Trinity taken individually.
Being Human
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.
How to Be Happy
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

What is it that perfects and fulfils human beings and what is really good for them? To put it at its simplest, Thomas Aquinas’ answer is that we are perfect, fulfilled, and good when we are happy, the notion of happiness here being human action in pursuit of the final good, which is God. In this chapter, the concept is investigated independently of Christian revelation (the next chapter develops it with an eye on Christianity). The different sections of the chapter address happiness and God, happiness and need, practical reasoning (the fact that human actions can be arrived at rationally – synderesis, conscience, and acting morally), virtues (general, intellectual, and moral), and natural law (law derived from reason and grounded in the principles of synderesis).
How to Be Holy
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins to connect what Thomas Aquinas says about people in general with his teaching on the Trinity – his position being that the Trinity makes us divine since God, who is the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, brings us to the final or ultimate good or end of rational creatures, which is nothing less than God himself. It starts by considering Aquinas’ claim that God is the means by which we can be better than we are when considered as merely human. This raising up of people to union with God is part of a long story that he distinguishes into definite stages: the start of the human race at the time of the biblical story of Adam; the time of application of the Old Law (the Torah, or the commands and injunctions in the early books of the Old Testament); and the time of application of the New Law (which started with the sending of the Son and the Spirit, and consists chiefly of the grace of the Holy Spirit, shown by faith working through love, which the people receive through God's Son). The rest of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of grace (including theological virtues, and the fall of Adam), and of the causes and kinds of grace.
The Heart of Grace
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Aristotle speaks of virtues as dispositions that make people good and cause them to function well, and St Paul speaks in a similar way about faith, hope, and love. With these points in mind, and following the practice of his day, Thomas Aquinas asserts that the theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity; these, he says, are the means by which we come to God by grace as opposed to nature. Their presence is what chiefly allows us to say that, in the time of the New Law (which started with the sending of the Son and the Spirit, and consists chiefly of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which the people receive through God's Son), people have become sharers in the divine nature. For Aquinas, faith, hope, and charity are the heart of the life of grace. In this chapter, therefore, what he says about them is explored in some detail, with the aim of showing how it is that much of Aquinas’ thought as covered in earlier chapters comes to a kind of culmination when he turns to what, for him, is clearly the most important aspect of our lives.
God Incarnate
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Christology can be defined as the study of the person of Christ and, in particular, of the union in him of divine and human natures’. Not everyone would agree with this definition, and it cannot be said whether or not Thomas Aquinas would have agreed with it, although it might well be surmised that he would at least sympathize with it, because Christology (in the sense defined here) is his chief concern when he talks about Christ directly; it is also an area of inquiry in which he draws heavily on what he had said before he turned to the subject of Christ. Aquinas’ Christology is indebted to his teaching on God considered as Creator and Trinity. It is also bound up with what he thinks about human beings and their natural and supernatural happiness, for he conceives of Christ as the definitive means by which creatures who have come from God return to their source, and he takes him to be the point at which divinity and humanity come closest to each other. The different sections of the chapter discuss the general nature of Aquinas’ Christology, the union of divinity and humanity, and what Christ was like as Aquinas viewed him.
Signs and Wonders
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

Thomas Aquinas’ view of the Christian doctrine is a summons to respond to God and a summons to a way of life, and his view on this is in essence contained in his teaching on faith, hope, and charity. But he also has other things to say about the details of Christian life, and some of these are looked at in this chapter, which examines the sacraments – the means by which faith, hope, and charity are perfected. The first part of the chapter looks at sacraments in general, and the last part looks at the Eucharist itself.
Rawls and the Abstract Contract
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice, which attempts to derive liberal rights and rules of justice from an original position or contract among people denied full knowledge of their identities. This chapter examines problems relating to the derivation of principles from the original position, the conception of the original position itself, and the relation of self‐interest to the capacity of justice.
Gauthier and the Full‐Knowledge Contract
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

Gauthier and the Full‐knowledge Contract. This chapter examines Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, which generates principles of justice from the starting point of the individual agent as self‐interested utility‐maximizer.
An Alternative Foundation for Political and Ethical Principles
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

This chapter argues that the analysis of the previous chapters indicates the problems attached to conceiving of morality as rooted in a neutral or Archimedean point from which different principles can be assessed and validated, but that it is more fruitful to root morality within a particular tradition. The problem of moral scepticism and relativism and pluralism are discussed as well as the implications of this approach to moral theorizing for ethical political principles.