bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Critical Thinking, A Deflated Defense: A Critical Study of John E. McPeck's Teaching Critical Thinking: Dialogue and Dialectic
Authors: Adler Jonathan E.
Published: March 2017

A critical study of McPeck's recent book, in which he strengthens and develops his arguments against teaching critical thinking (CT). Accepting McPeck's basic claim that there is no unitary skill of reasoning or thinking, I argue that his strictures on CT courses or programs do not follow. I set out what I consider the proper justification that programs in CT have to meet, and argue both that McPeck demands much more than is required, and also that it is plausible that this deflated justification can be met. Specitically, I argue that it is reasonable to expect transfer of learning for basic logical skills. Additional topics covered include: the relation ofliberal education to critical thinking, argument analysis, testing for CT, and the value of conceptual or linguistic analysis.
On the Distinction between Convergent and Linked Arguments
Authors: Conway David A.
Published: March 2017

Most recent writers of informal logic texts draw a distinction between "linked" and "convergent" arguments. According to its inventor, Stephen Thomas, the distinction is of the utmost importance; it "seems crucial to the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in natural language." I argue that the distinction has not been drawn in any way that makes it both clear and of any real originality or importance. Many formulations are obscure or conceptually incoherent. One formulation of the distinction does seem tolerably clear and I develop another, but neither promises to make it matter much. We can well do without it.
The Enthymeme Buster: A Heuristic Procedure for Position Exploration in Dialogic Dispute
Authors: Gilbert Michael A.
Published: March 2017

Positions in dialogic dispute are presented enthymematically. It is important to explore the position the disputant holds. A model is offered which relies on the presentation of a counter-example to an inferred missing premiss. The example may be: [A+J embraced as falling under the rule; [A-] rejected as basically changing the position; or, [R] rejected as changing the proffered missing premiss. In each case the offered model indicates the next appropriate action. The focus of the model is on uncovering the position actually held by the disputant as opposed to identifying the "logically correct" enthymematic premiss.
Argument Evaluation Contest Results
Authors: Adler Jonathan E.
Published: March 2017

In Vol. XI, No.1, this journal announced an argument analysis contest. Two eminent colleagues agreed to serve as judges-Professor Henry W. Johnstone, Jr. and Professor Michael Scriven. In short order, four entries were received and sent off to the judges, who had no knowledge of the contestants' identities, and in due course the judges' verdicts were delivered. Immediately below we have reproduced the argument which was to be analyzed, along with the rules of the contest, followed by the four entries. Thereafter we present the judges' rulings.
Rational Inconsistency and Reasoning
Authors: Brown Bryson
Published: March 2017

Nicholas Rescher has argued we must tolerate inconsistency because of our cognitive limitations. He has also produced, together with R. Brandom, a serious attempt at exploring the logic of inconsistency. Inconsistency tolerance calls for a systematic rewriting of our logical doctrines: it requires a paraconsistent logic. However, having given up all aggregation of premises, Rescher's proposal for a paraconsistenl logic fails to account for the reductive reasoning Rescher appeals to in his account of inconsistency tolerance. A non-adjunctive logic developed by P.K. Schotch and RE. Jennings provides just what Rescher's logic is lacking: It allows a tolerant
attitude toward inconsistency while giving an account of reductive reasoning.
Rescher on the Justification of Rationality
Authors: Siegel Harvey
Published: March 2017

In his recent book Rationality, Nicholas Rescher offers a provocative attempt to justify rationality. In this paper I critically assess that attempt. After clarifying the philosophical problem at issue, I examine Rescher's effort to solve it. I argue that Rescher's justification succeeds, but that he mistakenly characterizes it as pragmatic. It succeeds only if it is understood non-pragmatically. Consequently, Rescher must give up either his justificatory argument, or his commitment to a pragmatic justification.
The Ad Baculum Re-Clothed
Authors: Brinton Alan
Published: March 2017

In several recent articles, Michael Wreen has given a plausible account of the structure of ad baculum argument and argued that it is neither inherently fallacious nor even commonly so. He has also, arguing mainly in terms of examples, attempted to show that a number of common assumptions about the ad baculum are incorrect. Most controversially, he argues that the ad baculum is not essentially dialectical and that it does not essentially involve threatening. I argue that the genuineness of his examples as cases of ad baculum is doubtful, except insofar as they do at least implicitly have these features. I argue further that the stock cases used by Copi and other textbook writers extensionally define the ad baculum, which is a strategy already familiar to students from ordinary life, which is essentially first personlsecondperson, and which does essentially involve a threat.
Defining Deduction
Authors: Vorobej Mark
Published: March 2017

This paper defends the view that the classification of an argument as being deductive ought to rest exclusively upon psychological considerations; specifically, upon whether the argument's author holds certain beliefs. This account is justified on theoretical and pedagogical grounds, and situated within a general taxonomy of competing proposals. Epistemological difficulties involved in the application of psychological definitions are recognized but claimed to be ineliminable from the praetice of argumentation. The paper concludes by discussing embryonic arguments where the author's relevant beliefs are not sufficiently fine-grained so as to accord the argument deductive or inductive status.
The Limits of Critical Thinking
Authors: Levi Don S.
Published: March 2017

This paper examines Robert Fogelin's suggestion that there may be deep disagreements, where no argument can address what is at issue. A number of possible bases for Fogelin's position are considered and rejected: people sometimes do not have enough in common for reasons to count as reasons; doubt is possible only against the background of framework propositions; key premises may be inarguable; argument must occur within a conceptual framework. The paper concludes by reflecting on why it is important to have a point of view when thinking critically about an argument and whether that fact constitutes a limitation as to what can be achieved by critical thinking.
Not by Skill Alone: The Centrality of Character to Critical Thinking
Authors: Siegel Harvey
Published: March 2017

Connie Missimer (1990) challenges what she calls the Character View, according to which critical thinking involves both skill and character, and argues for a rival conception-the Skill View-according to which critical thinking is a matter of skill alone. In this paper I criticize the Skill View and defend the Character View from Missimer's critical arguments.
Defining the Term "Argument"
Authors: Chittleborough P. , Newman M.E.
Published: March 2017

Informal logic has expanded the concept of an 'argument' beyond that presented traditionally by formal logicians-to include arguments as encountered in 'real-life'. Existent definitions
of argument structure are argued to be inadequate by failing to fully recognise that, ultimately, arguments have a human source. Accordingly, a new definition is proposed which appeals to relevant cognitive and behavioural factors. The
definition retains some traditional concepts, but introduces the term 'supportive' as a modification to 'premiss'. The concept of a 'persuader' is also developed. The definition is argued to capture more fully the intricacies, subtleties and rich diversity of informal arguments.
The Appeal to Tradition: Cultural Evolution and Logical Soundness
Authors: Harpine William D.
Published: March 2017

The Appeal to Tradition, often considered to be unsound, frequently reflects sophisticated adaptations to the environment. Once developed, these adaptations are often transmitted
culturally rather than as reasoned argument, so that people mayor may not be aware of why their traditions are wise. Tradition is more likely to be valid in a stable environment in which a wide range of variations have been available for past testing; however, traditions tend to become obsolete in a rapidly changing environment.
Denying the Antecedent: A Common Fallacy?
Authors: Burke Michael B.
Published: March 2017

An argumentative passage that might appear to be an instance of denying the antecedent will generally admit of an alternative interpretation, one on which the conditional contained by the passage is a preface to the argument rather than a premise of it. On this interpretation. which generally is a more charitable one, the conditional plays a certain dialectical role and, in some cases, a rhetorical role as welL Assuming only a very weak principle of exigetical charity, I consider what it would take in a given case to justify accepting the less charitable interpretation. I then present evidence that those conditions are seldom met. Indeed, I was unable to find a single published argument that can justifiably be charged with denying the antecedent.
Rationality, Judgment, and Argument Assessment
Authors: Healy Paul
Published: March 2017

In contrast to approaches to critical thinking which emphasize the importance of rules, strategies and criteria for the analysis and evaluation of arguments, this paper seeks to vindicate
the central role which judgment plays in the assessment process. To counteract charges of arbitrariness or subjectivism in the exercise of judgment, individual and intersubjective constraints are outlined which can ensure its reliable exercise.
The contextuality of argumentation, as it affects judgment, is discussed, and some conclusions are drawn about how acknowledgment of the role of judgment in argumentation can influence our conception of the reasoning process.
The Deductive/Inductive Distinction
Authors: Bowles George
Published: March 2017

In this paper I examine five distinctions between deductive and inductive arguments, concluding that the best of the five defines a deductive argument as one in which conclusive favorable relevance to its conclusion is attributed to its premises, and an inductive argument as any argument that is not deductive. This distinction, unlike its rivals, is both exclusive and exhaustive; permits both good and bad arguments of each kind; and is both useful and needed in evaluating at least some arguments.
Critical Thinking, Postmodernism, and Rational Evaluation
Authors: Hatcher Donald L.
Published: March 2017

In this paper, after showing how the postmodern critiques of Enlightenment rationality apply to critical thinking, I argue that a critical discussion on any subject must assume specific principles of rationality. I then show how these principles can be used to critique and reject postmodern claims about the contextual nature of rationality.
Analyzing Conversational Reasoning
Authors: Salmon Merrilee H. , Zeitz Colleen M.
Published: March 2017

This work discusses an empirical study of reasoning as it occurs in conversations. Reasoning in this context has features not usually accounted for in standard methods for describing argumentation (e.g., Toulmin, (1964), Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik (1984)). For example, insufficient attention has been paid to challenges which can be used to shift the ground of an argument and to the development of multiple conversational grounds. Moreover, even though the value of cooperative efforts in building arguments is widely recognized, more needs to be said about analyzing co-constructed arguments. This empirical work was primarily descriptive and concerned with how people construct arguments in conversations, but one goal of the study was to lay groundwork for comparing the quality of reasoning in conversations which differ with respect to whether the arguments they contain are primarily the contributions
of individuals or are genuinely co-constructed arguments.
Introduction
Authors: Hansen Hans V. , Tindale Christopher W.
Published: March 2017

Introduction
Argumentation, Education and Reasoning
Authors: Binkley Robert
Published: March 2017

To find the place of Argumentation (argumentation theory) in education one must sort out its relationship to Logic. The key point is that the two stand in different relations to reasoning. Logic is the normative study of reasoning, and provides the standards for correct reasoning. Argumentation studies the activity of arguing, and is related to reasoning only in that arguing involves the attempt to get an audience to reason in a certain way; correctness is not essential. Reasoning is here understood as the process of organizing one's thoughts into a structure here called a reckoning. This may be done privately by an individual, or several people may
collaborate on a reasoning project, in which case there occurs the social activity of dialogue. Confusion between dialogue and arguing is a source of confusion between Logic and Argumentation. Reasoning and dialogue on the one hand, and arguing on the other, are both worthwhile, and education in Logic and Argumentation can help people to do them better. But the educating should be done in a way that maintains the distinction between them.
Reflective Reasoning in Groups
Authors: Slade Christina
Published: March 2017

The conception of reflective reasoning, like that of higher order thinking, has been informed by a Cartesian view of the self. Reflection is conceived of as a solipsistic process, in which persons consider their own thoughts in isolation. Higher order thinking has equally been represented as a single thinker considering thoughts at a meta-level. This paper proposes a different conception of reflection and higher order thinking, in which reflective dialogue is seen as the fundamental context in which reflection is possible and higher order thinking engendered. The very process of dialectic defines what it is to be reflective and to think critically. Learning to reflect alone is a consequence of internalising the discourse.
Inconsistency, Rationality and Relativism
Authors: Pinto Robert C.
Published: March 2017

In section I, I argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. In section 2, I argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. The argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. In section 3 I describe two cases in which it is best from an epistemic point of view to knowingly retain inconsistent beliefs. In section 4 my goal is to put into perspective the charge that relativism ought to be rejected because it involves one in inconsistency.
There is no Fallacy of Arguing from Authority
Authors: Coleman Edwin
Published: March 2017

I argue that there is no fallacy of argument from authority. I first show the weakness of the case for there being such a fallacy: text-book presentations are confused, alleged
examples are not genuinely exemplary, reasons given for its alleged fallaciousness are not convincing. Then I analyse arguing from authority as a complex speech act. Rejecting the popular but unjustified category of the "part-time fallacy", I show that bad arguments which appeal to authority are defective through breach of some felicity condition on argument as a speech act, not through employing a bad principle of inference.
Distinguishing Practical and Theoretical Reasoning: A Critique of Deanna Kuhn's Theory of Informal Argument
Authors: Wilks Keefer Matthew
Published: March 2017

Deanna Kuhn's theory of informal argumentation (1991) evaluates arguments according to a theory/evidence model where subjects first articulate a theory and then must provide critical testing of alternatives on the basis of evidence. Using this model, Kuhn reports that many subjects fail to supply adequate evidence for their 'theories' and are often unable or unwilling to generate alternatives. In this paper an account of practical reasoning is provided that suggests an alternate interpretation for Kuhn's subjects' poor perfonnance. It is argued that treating practical arguments as failed theoretical justifications causes Kuhn to misrepresent the contribution
of many of her subjects' arguments.
Computational Uses of Philosophical
Dialogue Theories
Authors: Moore David , Hobbes Dave
Published: March 2017

The research discussed in this paper concerns an investigation of logical dialogue games as a vehicle for enhanced human-computer communication. The need for a dialogue capability in computer systems is argued, and a prima facie case made for dialogue games, in particular Mackenzie's "DC", as a suitable dialogue model. Empirical work concerning DC is outlined, and strategies for adoption by the computer are presented. A user interface, software architecture and conceptualised example are discussed. The hope is that the paper will help bring together two groups of workers-philosophers of dialogue and designers of computer systems-to the mutual benefit of each.
Attributed Favourable Relevance and Argument Evaluation
Authors: Allen Derek
Published: March 2017

I criticize a case made by George Bowles for a certain theory pertaining to the evaluation of arguments on which the (degree of) attributed favourable relevance of an argument's premises to its conclusion is relevant to its evaluation, but nevertheless argue that such favourable relevance is indeed
relevant to an argument's evaluation.
Does Scientific Realism Beg the Question?
Authors: Gorham Geoffrey
Published: March 2017

In a series of influential articles, the anti-realist Arthur Fine has repeatedly charged that a certain very popular argument for scientific realism, that only realism can explain the instrumental success of science, begs the question. I argue that on no plausible reading ofthe fallacy does the realist argument beg the question. In fact, Fine is himself guilty of what DeMorgan called the "opponent fallacy."
The Cogent Reasoning Model of Informal Fallacies
Authors: Boone Daniel N.
Published: March 2017

An infonnal fallacy is a reasoning error with three features: the reasoning employs an implicit cogent pattern; the fallacy results from one or more false premises; there is culpable ignorance or deception associated with the falsity of the premises. A reconstruction and analysis of the cogent reasoning patterns in fourteen standard infonnal fallacy types plus several variations are given. Defense of the CMR account covers: a general failure to apply the principle of charity in informal fallacy contexts; empirical evidence for it; how it explains Walton's point that there are both fallacious and non-fallacious instances of fallacy types; how it avoids most "relevance" problems, pennits clearer taxonomizing, and promises pedagogical advantages; how it solves a "demarcation problem."
A Misuse of Bayes's Theorem
Authors: Levin Michael
Published: March 2017

In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered challenge to oversimplified accounts of how an argument can go bad.
The Fallacy of Treating the Ad Baculum as a Fallacy
Authors: Levi Don S.
Published: March 2017

The ad baculum is not a fallacy in an argument, but is offered instead of an argument to put an end to further argument. This claim is the basis for criticizing Michael Wreen's "neo-traditionalism," which yields misreadings of supposed cases of the ad baculum because of its rejection of any consideration of what the person using the ad baculum, or someone who refers to that use as an "argument," is doing. The paper concludes with reflections on the values that should inform talk of a fallacy in an argument such as the one that Wreen is giving.
Puzzle for Analysis: Find the Fallacy
Authors: Woods John , Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

Puzzle for Analysis: Find the Fallacy
The Significance of Informal Logic for Philosophy
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

Informal logic is a new sub-discipline of philosophy, roughly definable as the philosophy of argument. Contributors have challenged the traditional concept of an argument as a premiss-conclusion complex, in favour of speech-act, functional and dialogical conceptions; they have identified as additional components warrants, modal qualifiers, rebuttals, and a dialectical tier. They have objected that "soundness" is neither
necessary nor sufficient for a good argument. Alternative proposals include acceptability, relevance and sufficiency of the
premisses; conformity to a valid argument schema; conformity to rules for discussion aimed at rational resolution of a dispute. Informal logic is a significant part of philosophy.
The Lord Scroop Fallacy
Authors: Stark Herman E.
Published: March 2017

In this paper I identify a fallacy. The fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. First, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-especially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. Second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered challenge to oversimplified accounts of how an argument can go bad.
New Dialectical Rules For Ambiguity
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

A set often rules is proposed for dealing with problems of ambiguity when interpreting a text of argumentative discourse. The rules are based on Grice's pragmatic rules for a collaborative conversation and on principles and maxims used to deal with ambiguity in interpreting legal and religious writings. The rules are meant to be applied to a given argument used in a given case, and to resolve (or at least deal with) an ambiguity in the argument (or affecting the argument) by using evidence derived from the text and context of dialogue surrounding the argument in the case.
The Origin of the Justification of the Two-Wrongs Argument: A Conjecture
Authors: Wertz S.K.
Published: March 2017

Different analyses of two-wrongs reasoning are presented and provide relief for the Groarke, Tindale, and Fisher analysis which is suggestive of the origin of this type of reasoning in Bentham and Mill. Aquinas's doctrine of double effect is entertained as a possible counterexample (which it is not). Two-wrongs reasoning can be either acceptable (reasonable) or unacceptable, and there are conditions that can be laid down for both situations in discourse. A negative version of the utilitarian principle assists us in understanding two-wrongs reasoning in moral contexts.
The 'Most Important and Fundamental' Distinction in Logic
Authors: Angell Richard B.
Published: March 2017

Personal reflections on the philosophical career of Henry Johnstone, B.S. Haverford College, 1942, and Ph.D. Harvard, 1950, professor at Williams College 1948-1952 and Pennsylvania State University, 1952 - 2000. Founder and editor of Philosophy and Rhetoric, Johnstone wrote eight books, including two logic texts, three monographs, and over 150 articles or reviews. The focus is on his efforts to resolve problems stemming from the conflict between the logical empiricism Johnstone embraced in his dissertation, and the arguments of his absolute idealist colleagues at Williams, efforts he pursued in Philosophy and Argument (1959), and Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (1978).
Valid Ad Hominem Arguments in Philosophy: Johnstone's Metaphilosophical Informal Logic
Authors: Finocchiaro Maurice A.
Published: March 2017

This is a critical examination of Johnstone's thesis that all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. I clarify his notions of valid, philosophical, and ad hominem. I illustrate the thesis with his refutation ofthe claim that only ordinary language is correct. r discuss his three supporting arguments (historical, theoretical, and intermediate). And r criticize the thesis with the objections that if an ad hominem argument
is valid, it is really ad rem; that it's unclear how his own theoretical argument can be ad hominem; that if an ad hominem argument is really valid, it would have to be based on the proponent's own assumptions; and that the thesis is not true of philosophical arguments that are constructive rather than critical.
Henry Johnstone, Jr.'s Still-Unacknowledged Contributions to Contemporary Argumentation Theory
Authors: Goodwin Jean
Published: March 2017

Given the pragmatic tum recently taken by argumentation studies, we owe renewed attention to Henry Johnstone's views on the primacy of process over product. In particular, Johnstone's decidedly non-cooperative model is a refreshing alternative to the current dialogic theories of arguing, one which opens the way for specifically rhetorical lines of inquiry.
Shaping the Adversary Culture
Authors: Gaskins Richard H.
Published: March 2017

Our varied communities of discourse face a rhetorical future shaped by juridical styles reminiscent of the "adversary culture" postulated by post-war American critic Lionel Trilling. Itself the subject of litigious debate. the adversarial spirit today shows few signs of weakening, but its influence
can be better understood and guided along certain tracks. To influence this adversarial style in coming decades, we need
to explore the difference between evidencebased reasoning, which draws on the sensationalist logic ofinduction. and reflexive reasoning, which draws on the second-order logic of presumption. Understanding the structures and dynamics of this reflexive style forces us to address our responsibilities as speakers, as we seek to shape our rhetorical future. Close examination of adversarial contlict may lead us toward useful consensus on how the new game should be played.
Reasoning Under Uncertainty: The Role of Two Informal Fallacies in an Emerging Scientific Inquiry
Authors: Cummings Louise
Published: March 2017

lt is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or nonfallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages ofinquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in
contexts of epistemic uncertainty.
Agreeing to Differ: Modelling Persuasive Dialogue Between Parties With Different Values
Authors: Reed Chris
Published: March 2017

In some cases of disagreement, particularly in ethics and law, it is impossible to provide any conclusive demonstration. The role of argument in such cases is to persuade rather than to prove. Drawing on ideas ofPerelrnan, we argue that persuasion

in such cases relies on a recognition that the strength of such arguments will vary according to their audience, and depends on the comparative weight that the audiences gives to the social values that it advances. To model this, we introduce the notion of Value-based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs),

an extension of Argumentation Frameworks as originally introduced by Dung. We then describe a dialogue game based on VAFs, designed to model persuasive argumentation, which we illustrate with a widely discussed ethical problem.
Pollock on Practical Reasoning
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

The epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock's model of practical reasoning,
which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock's model of practical reasoning is incomplete
in at least three respects: it is solipsistic, it is egoistic and it is unsocial.
E-motion: Moving Toward the Utilization of Artificial Emotion
Authors: Gilbert Michael A. , Bench-Capon T.J.M.
Published: March 2017

During human-human interaction, emotion plays a vital role in structuring dialogue. Emotional content drives features such as topic shift, lexicalisation change and timing; it affects the delicate balance between goals related to the task at hand and those of social interaction; and it represents one type of feedback on the effect that utterances are having. These various facets are so central to most real-world interaction, that it is reasonable to suppose that emotion should also play an important role in human-computer interaction. To that end, techniques for detecting, modelling, and responding appropriately to emotion are explored, and an architecture for bringing these techniques together into a coherent system is presented.
Argument Representation for Dependable Computer-Based Systems
Authors: Gurr C.
Published: March 2017

Society is becoming increasingly reliant upon the dependability of computerbased systems. Achieving and demonstrating the dependability of systems requires the construction and review of valid and coherent arguments. This paper discusses the
need for a variety of classes of arguments in dependable systems and reviews existing approaches to the representation of arguments in each of these classes. The issues surrounding the certification of safety critical systems demonstrate the current need for richer representations of dependability
arguments which support tools for their construction and review. The paper discusses how a meta-logical framework, informed by aspects of both formal and informal logic, offers a rich and unified means of representing dependability arguments and of thus addressing this need.
Dialectics, Evaluation, and Argument
Authors: Finocchiaro Maurice A.
Published: March 2017

A critical examination of the dialectical approach, focusing on a comparison ofthe illative and the dialectical definitions of argument. I distinguish a moderate, a strong and a hyper dialectical conception of argument. I critique Goldman's argument for the moderate conception and Johnson's argument for the strong conception, and argue that the moderate conception is correct.
An Epistemological Approach to Argumentation
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: March 2017

The evaluation of arguments and argumentation is best understood epistemologically. Epistemic circularity is not formally defective but it may be epistemologically objectionable. Sorenson's doubts about the syntactic approach to circularity are endorsed with qualifications. One explanation of an argument's goodness is its ability to produce justified belief in its conclusion by means of justified belief in its premises, but matters are not so simple for interpersonal argumentation. Even when an argument's premises and conclusion are justified for a speaker, this justifiedness may not be transmissible to every hearer. Still, an epistemic approaeh is instructive. Arguing in enthymemes can be legitimate, e.g., because enthymemes can help produce justified persuasion in an audience that supplies the missing premises .
A Dialectical Tier Within Reason
Authors: Ohler Amy J.
Published: March 2017

The first part of this essay argues that the specification of rationality operating in Manifest Rationality does not allow for the inclusion of the dialectical tier as a necessary component of a rational product. It next considers Perelman's conception of "reasonableness" as an alternative to Johnson's structural sense of rationality. Adopting a contextually rich conception of rationality, like that of Perelman, allows Johnson to insist that a rational product must consist of both an illative core and a dialectical tier.
Habermas, Argumentation Theory, and Science Studies: Toward Interdisciplinary Cooperation
Authors: Rehg William
Published: March 2017

This article examines two approaches to the analysis and critical assessment of scientific argumentation. The first approach employs the discourse theory that Jurgen Habermas has developed on the basis of his theory of communicative action and applied to the areas of politics and law. Using his analysis of law and democracy in his Between Facts and Norms (1996) as a kind of template, I sketch the main steps in a Habermasian discourse theory of science. Difficulties in his approach motivate my proposal of an alternative approach that starts not with a theory of communicative action but with some broad categories drawn from argumentation theory. Using these categories, one can survey the various conceptions of scientific argumentation that have already emerged in the multi-disciplinary field of science studies. The more flexible, open-ended theoretic categories put one in a better position to'develop cooperative interdisciplinary studies that can inform the critical assessment of scientific argumentation.
Reasoning in Theory and Practice (OSSA 2005 Keynote Address)
Authors: Toulmin Stephen
Published: March 2017

As my book The Uses of Argument pointed out, we must look and see how our critical standards vary from one area or activity to another-e.g. from politics to aesthetics. Hence we need to explore how these critical standards evolve. and how the most reflective and best-informed people in any area of experience refine those standards. We cannot understand where we are now unless we understand how we got here, even in a field like mathematics. Hence we must modestly recognize that the best we can do now is the best we can do now; and that those who come after us will move beyond our ideas. There is much contingency in these historical developments.
Argument and Its Uses (OSSA 2005 Keynote Address)
Authors: Blair J. Anthony
Published: March 2017

Do not define argument by its use to persuade. for other uses of arguments exist. An argument is a proposition and a reason for it. and argumentation is an interchange involving two or more parties resulting in the assertion of one or more arguments coupled with anticipated or actual critical responses. A logically good argument has grounds adeq uate for the purposes at hand (true, probable, plausible, acceptable to the audience) and the grounds provide adequate support for the conclusion. The norms for good logic in arguments are different from the norms for the good use of arguments.
A Defense of Non-deductive Reconstructions of Analogical Arguments (AILACT Essay Competition Winner)
Authors: Guarini Marcello
Published: March 2017

Bruce Waller has defended a deductive reconstruction of the kinds of analogical arguments found in ethics, law, and metaphysics. This paper demonstrates the limits of such a reconstruction and argues for an alternative. non-deductive reconstruction. It will be shown that some analogical arguments do not fit Waller's deductive schema, and that such a schema does not allow for an adequate account of the strengths and weaknesses of an analogical argument. The similarities and differences between the account defended herein and the Trudy Govier's account are discussed as well.
The Effectiveness of Computer Assisted Instruction in Critical Thinking
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

278 non-freshman university students taking a l2-week critical thinking course in a large single-section class, with computer-assisted guided practice as a replacement for small-group discussion, and all testing in machine-scored multiple-choice format, improved their critical thinking skills, as measured by the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Forms A and B), by half a standard deviation, a moderate improvement. The improvement was more than that reported with a traditional format without computer-assisted instruction, but less than that reported with a format using both computer-assisted instruction and essay-type assignments. Further studies are needed to test hypotheses suggested by these results.
Knowing when Disagreements are Deep
Authors: Adams David M.
Published: March 2017

Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when (if ever) to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have reasons to act as if they can be rationally resolved even if they are deep. Fogelin's analysis is thus of limited value as regards the practical moral demand of addressing concrete moral dilemmas.
Pluralism, Disagreement, and the Status of Argument in the Public Sphere
Authors: Asen Robert
Published: March 2017

Argument teachers and scholars have frequently invoked external justification-impressing one's viewpoint upon another-as the primary social
function of argument. Pluralism and fundamental disagreement in contemporary democratic societies raise questions regarding the status of argument, including the functions argument should serve. In this
essay, I suggest alternatives of agenda expansion, responsibility attribution, and identity formation as important functions of argument in diverse societies. These
alternative functions are especially important under conditions of social inequality, since they allow less powerful individuals and groups to confront more powerful actors in situations where decision
making is not open to all.
Psychological Research and the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation
Authors: Weinstock Michael P.
Published: March 2017

Much psychological research on argumentation focuses on persuasion and pragmatics. However, one strand investigates how average people understand the nature of knowledge and knowing, and how these epistemological orientations underlie skilled argumentation. The research reviewed addresses the question whether the normative emphasis of the philosophical epistemological approach to argumentation matches psychological findings. The empirical research reviewed concerns the relationship between personal episte- mological understanding and three aspects of argument: argument construction, identification of informal reasoning fallacies, and orientation toward explanation or evidence. Findings suggest that people develop an epistemological approach toward argumentation in which beliefs about knowledge justification requirements are related with skilled argumentation.
Dissent in the Midst of Emotional Territory
Authors: Carozza Linda
Published: March 2017

This paper focuses on disagreement spaces fused with emotion.

Following Gilbert’s emotional mode of argumentation (1997), further expansions of the mode are made here, specifically for the

purposes of being able to classify different types of emotional arguments. First, general concerns with arguments that stray from the traditional approach are addressed. Then a classification system for different types of emotional arguments is developed. Some of

the criteria that help determine emotional arguments include dialogue types, arguers involved, as well as the use of emotion.
Making it Public: Testimony and Socially Sanctioned Common Grounds
Authors: Olmos Paula
Published: March 2017

Contrary to current individualistic epistemology, Classical rhetoric provides us with a pragmatical and particularly dynamic conception of ‘testimony’ as a source made available for the orator by the particular community in which she acts. In order to count as usable testimony, a testimony to which one could appeal in further

communications, any discourse must comply with specific rules of social sanction. A deliberate attention to the social practices in which testimony is given and assessed may offer us a more accurate view of its epistemological role.
Beyond Reasonable Doubt: An Abductive Dilemma in Criminal Law
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

In criminal cases at common law, juries are permitted to convict on wholly circumstantial evidence even in the face of a reasonable case for acquittal. This generates the highly counterintuitive—if not absurd—consequence that there being reason to think that the accused didn’t do it is not reason to doubt that he did. This is the no-reason-to-doubt problem. It has a technical solution provided that the evidence on which it is reasonable to think that the accused didn’t do it is a different subset of the total evidence from that on which there is no reason to doubt that he did do it. It lies in the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings in the common law tradition that the subsets of the total evidence on which counsel base their opposing arguments are themselves different from and often incompatible with one another. While this solves the no-reason-to-doubt problem, it does so at the cost of triggering a second problem just as bad. It is the no-rival problem, according to which incompatible theories of the case based on incompatible subsets of the evidence cannot be rivals of one another. If neither party’s case contradicts the other’s then, by the burden of proof requirement, criminal convictions are impossible. Once having generated the dilemma, the object of the paper is to determine how it might be escaped.
Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin’s Thesis on Deep Disagreement
Authors: Phillips Dana
Published: March 2017

Robert Fogelin claims that interlocutors must share a framework of background beliefs and commitments in order to fruitfully pursue argument. I refute Fogelin’s claim by investigating more thoroughly the shared background required for productive argument. I find that this background consists not in any common beliefs regarding the topic at hand, but rather in certain shared pro-cedural commitments and competencies. I suggest that Fogelin and his supporters mistakenly view shared beliefs as part of the required background for productive argument because these procedural com-mitments become more difficult to uphold when people’s beliefs diverge widely regarding the topic at hand.
Persuasive Definitions: Values, Meanings and Implicit Disagreements
Authors: Macagno Fabrizio , Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

The purpose of this paper is to inquire into the relationship between persuasive definition and common knowledge (propositions generally accepted and not subject to dispute in a discussion). We interpret the gap between common knowledge and persuasive definition (PD) in terms of potential disagreements: PDs are conceived as implicit arguments to win a potential conflict. Persuasive definitions are analyzed as arguments instantiating two argumentation schemes, argument from classification and argument from values, and presupposing a potential disagreement. The argumentative structure of PDs reveals different levels of disagreement, and different pos-sibilities of resolving the conflict or causing dialogical deadlock.
Analogies and Other Minds
Authors: Benham Bryan
Published: March 2017

The argument by analogy for other minds is customarily rejected as a weak inference because the argument is based on a single instance. The current paper argues that this objection  fundamentally misunderstands the inferential structure of analogies and so misrepresents the role analogy plays in the  justifycation of belief in other minds. Arguments by be uniquely suited to draw inferences from single instances. This defense does not remove all difficulties faced by the argument by analogy for other minds.
What Does an Argument Culture Look Like?
Authors: Zarefsky David
Published: March 2017

A strong argument culture is characterized by at least five productive tensions, between: commitment and contingency, partisanship and restraint, personal conviction and sensitivity to the audience, reasonableness and subjectivity, and decision and non-closure. Differences in how communities manage these tensions explain why there are multiple argument cultures and, hence, why we need to understand arguing both within and among different cultures. The paper elaborates these five productive tensions, offers some examples of argument cultures that negotiate them in various ways, and considers what it means to argue across cultures in a world that is both increasingly diverse and increasingly atomized.
What Constitutes Skilled Argumentation and How Does it Develop?
Authors: Goldstein Marion , Crowell Amanda , Kuhn Deanna
Published: March 2017

We report our efforts to assess the skill of contemplating and evaluating argumentation. An adaptive forced-choice instrument was developed and administered to 6th grade students, 7th grade students who had participated in a year-long intervention that successfully strengthened their argumentation production skills, and expert arguers. The instrument was sensitive enough to detect differences in skill level across these groups. Despite their gains in production skill, however, 7th graders showed only modest superiority over the untrained 6th graders and performance well below that of experts. Meta-level demands involved in evaluation but not present in production, we propose, may make evaluation more difficult.
Deliberation versus Dispute: The Impact of Argumentative Discourse Goals on Learning and Reasoning in the Science Classroom
Authors: Felton Mark , Garcia-Mila Merce , Gilabert Sandra
Published: March 2017

Researchers in science education have converged on the viewthat argumentation can be an effective intervention for promoting knowledge construction in science classrooms.However, the impact of such interventions may be mediated by individuals’ task goals while arguing. In argumentative discourse, one can distinguish two overlapping but distinct kinds of activity: dispute and deliberation. In dispute the goal is to defend a conclusion by undermining alternatives, whereas in deliberation the goal is to arrive at a conclusion by contrasting alternatives. In this study, we examine the impact of these discourse goals on both content learning and argument quality in science.
Ignoratio Elenchi: The Red Herring Fallacy
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

Ignoratio Elenchi: The Red Herring Fallacy
The Value of Genetic Fallacies
Authors: Ward Andrew C
Published: March 2017

Since at least the 1938 publication of Hans Reichenbach’s Experience and Predication, there has been widespread agreement that, when discussing the beliefs that people have, it is important to distinguish contexts of discovery and contexts of justification.  Traditionally, when one conflates the two contexts, the result is a “genetic fallacy”.  This paper examines genealogical critiques and addresses the question of whether such critiques are fallacious and, if so, whether this vitiates their usefulness.  The paper concludes that while there may be one or more senses in which genealogical critiques are fallacious, this does not vitiate their value.