bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Further insight into the structural and regulatory properties of the cGMP-gated channel
Authors: Molday Robert S. , Hsu Yi-Te
Published: February 2010

Recent studies from several different laboratories have provided further insight into structure-function relationships of cyclic nucleotide-gated channel and in particular the cCMPgated channel of rod photoreceptors. Site-directed mutagenesis and rod-olfactory chimeria constructs have defined important amino acids and peptide segments of the channel that are important in ion blockage, ligand specificity, and gating properties. Molecular cloning studies have indicated that cyclic nucleotide-gated channels consist of two subunits that are required to reproduce the properties of the native channels. Biochemical analysis of the cGMP-gated channel of rodcells have indicated that the 240 kDa protein that co-purifies with the 63 kDa channel subunit contains both the previously cloned second subunit of the channel and a glutamic acid-rich protein. The regulatory properties of the cGMP-gated channel from rod cells has also been studied in more detail. Studies indicate that the beta subunit of the cGMP-gated channel of rod cells contains the binding site for calmodulin. Interaction of calmodulin with the channel alters the apparent affinity of the channel for cGMP in all in vitro systems that have been studied. The significance of these recent studies are discussed in relation to the commentaries on the target article.
The sociopath: Cheater or warrior hawk?
Authors: Bailey Kent G.
Published: February 2010

Mealey's excellent target article rests on several assumptions that may be questioned, including the overarching assumption that sociopathy reflects the failure of a small minority of males to cooperate with the larger group. I suggest that violent competition in ancestral bands – and not “cheating” in the “game” of cooperation – was the primary evolutionary precursor of sociopathy. Today's violent sociopath is far more a “warrior hawk” than a failed cooperator.
You can cheat people, but not nature!
Authors: Barresi John
Published: February 2010

The psychological mechanisms implicated in psychopathy do not limit their activity to those behaviors that support a cheater strategy in social games. They result in a number of other clearly maladaptive behaviors that do not directly involve other individuals. Thus, any gains that might arise from the use of a cheater strategy in social situations are probably lost elsewhere.
Cheaters never prosper, sometimes
Authors: Carmichael H. Lorne
Published: February 2010

In the Frank (1988) model, a small increase in the number of cheaters will soon be reversed. It is not clear that this prediction holds for sociopathy. There are also many attractive evolutionary models that do not admit a small, stable proportion of cheaters. Hence, without definitive evidence about the character of early human society, we cannot conclude that sociopathy has an evolutionary origin.
Psychopathology: Type or trait?
Authors: Eysenck H. J.
Published: February 2010

Mealey proposes two categorical classes of sociopath, primary and secondary. I criticize this distinction on the basis that “type” constructs of this kind have proved unrealistic in personality taxonomy and thatdimensionalsystems capture reality much more successfully. I suggest how such a system could work in this particular context.
“Just So” stories and sociopathy
Authors: Futterman Andrew , Allen Garland E.
Published: February 2010

Sociobiological explanation requires both a reliable and a valid definition of the sociopathy phenotype. Mealey assumes that such reliable and valid definition of sociopathy exists in her “Integrated Evolutionary Model.” A review of psychiatric literature on the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder clearly demonstrates that this assumption is faulty. There is substantial disagreement among diagnostic systems (e.g., RDC, DSM-III) over what constitutes the antisocial phenotype, different systems identify different individuals as sociopathic. Without a valid definition of sociopathy, sociobiological theories like Mealey's should be viewed as entirely speculative.
Diathesis stress model or “Just So” story?
Authors: McFall Richard M. , Townsend James T. , Viken Richard J.
Published: February 2010

Mealey's sociopathy model is an exemplar of popular diathesis-stress models. Although such models, when presented in descriptive language, offer the illusion of integrative explanation, their actual scientific value is very limited because they fail to make specific, quantitative, falsifiable predictions. Conceptual and quantitative weaknesses of such diathesis-stress models are discussed and the requirements for useful models are outlined.
Adaptive and nonadaptive explanations of sociopathy
Authors: Moore Chris , Rose Michael R.
Published: February 2010

We doubt that primary sociopathy is adaptive, for three reasons: First, its prevalence is too low to require an adaptive explanation. Second, a common sequela of damage to the orbito-frontal lobes is “pseudopsychopathy.” Any pattern of behavior that can be produced by brain damage is unlikely to be adaptive. Third, we argue that most human social behavior is not under tight genetic control, but is produced by open-ended calculation of fitness-contingencies.
Touchstones of abnormal personality theory
Authors: Neufeld Richard W. J.
Published: February 2010

Strengths of Mealey's target article are its implementation of results from game-theoretic analyses and its potential links with other formal developments. In recent dynamic decision/choice models, reduced salience of avoidance tendencies, said to typify primary sociopaths, has quantifiable consequences for response latencies and choices. Also, formal models of stress effects on information processing predict selected effects of hypoarousability.
On the brain and personality substrates of psychopathy
Authors: Panksepp Jaak , Knutson Brian , Bird Laura
Published: February 2010

Further understanding at neuroscientific and personality levels should considerably advance our ability to deal with individuals that have strong sociopathic tendencies. An analysis of neurodynamic responses to emotional stimuli will eventually be able to detect sociopathic tendencies of the brain. Such information could be used to enhance the options available to individuals at risk without limiting their personal freedoms.
Evolution, mating effort, and crime
Authors: Rowe David C.
Published: February 2010

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Unlike some psychiatric illnesses, criminal lifestyles are not reproductive dead ends and may represent frequency-dependent adaptations. Sociopaths may gain reproductively from their greater “mating effort” relative to nonsociopaths. This mating-effort construct should be assessed directly in future studies of sociopathy. Collaboration between biologically oriented and environmentally oriented researchers is needed to investigate the biosocial basis of sociopathy.
Processing attributes and judging objects
Authors: Massaro Dominic W.
Published: February 2010

Given that psychophysical responses are not a function of a single property but vary with a variety of stimulus and context variables, Lockhead has little hope for laws relating behavior to the environment. However, progress can be made with tasks that manipulate multiple sources of information to test formal information-processing models.
Bias by stimuli presented before the start of an investigation
Authors: Poulton E. C.
Published: February 2010

In his target article Lockhead calls attention to numerous complications that prevent a valid straightforward or Fechnerian interpretation of psychophysical data. Here I describe three additional sources of bias, all involving the influence of stimuli presented before the start of an investigation.
Psychophysical scaling: A conditional defense of R=f(I)
Authors: Reeves Adam
Published: February 2010

Psychophysical scales can be constructed under suitable restrictions from appropriate data, but they still do not justify privileged internal sensations.
How representation works is more important than what representations are
Authors: Edelman Shimon
Published: February 2010

A theory of representation is incomplete if it states “representations areX” whereXcan be symbols, cell assemblies, functional states, or the flock of birds fromTheaetetus, without explaining the nature of the link between the universe ofXs and the world. Amit's thesis, equating representations with reverberations in Hebbian cell assemblies, will only be considered a solution to the problem of representation when it is complemented by a theory of how a reverberation in the brain can be a representation of anything.
Not the module does memory make – but the network
Authors: Fuster Joaquin M.
Published: February 2010

This commentary questions the target articles inferences from a limited set of empirical data to support this model and conceptual scheme. Especially questionable is the attribution of internal representation properties to an assembly of cells in a discrete cortical module firing at a discrete attractor frequency. Alternative inferences are drawn from cortical cooling and cell-firing data that point to the internal representation as a broad and specific cortical network defined by cortico-cortical connectivity. Active memory, it is proposed, consists in the sustained activation of the component neuron populations of the network.
Hebb's accomplishments misunderstood
Authors: Hucka Michael , Weaver Mark , Kaplan Stephen
Published: February 2010

Amit's efforts to provide stronger theoretical and empirical support for Hebb's cell-assembly concept is admirable, but we have serious reservations about the perspective presented in the target article. For Hebb, the cell assembly was a building block; by contrast, the framework proposed here eschews the need to fit the assembly into a broader picture of its function.
An evolutionary perspective on Hebb's reverberatory representations
Authors: Krakauer David C. , Houston Alasdair I.
Published: February 2010

Hebbian mechanisms are justified according to their functional utility in an evolutionary sense. The selective advantage of correlating content-contingent stimuli reflects the putative common cause of temporally or spatially contiguous inputs. The selective consequences of such correlations are discussed by using examples from the evolution of signal form in sexual selection and model-mimic coevolution. We suggest that evolutionary justification might be considered in addition to neurophysiology plansibility when constructing representational models.
Attractors – don't get sucked in
Authors: Milner Peter M.
Published: February 2010

Every immediate memory is unique; it is therefore unlikely to consist of an attractor or even a combination of attractors. In the present state of knowledge about the chemistry of synaptic transmission, there is no reason to look beyond neurons that directly receive sensory afferents for the afterdischarges that correspond to active memories.
The problems of cognitive dynamical models
Authors: Petitot Jean
Published: February 2010

Amit's “Attractor Neural Network” perspective on cognition raises difficult technical problems already met by prior dynamical models. This commentary sketches briefly some of them concerning the internal topological structure of attractors, the constituency problem, the possibility of activating simultaneously several attractors, and the different kinds of dynamical structures one can use to model brain activity: point attractors, strange attractors, synchronized arrays of oscillators, synfire chains, and so forth.
Human consciousness: One of a kind
Authors: Lubow R. E.
Published: February 2010

To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.
Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings
Authors: Reeke George N.
Published: February 2010

Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.
Ultimate differences
Authors: Stephens G. Lynn , Graham George
Published: February 2010

Gray unwisely melds together two distinguishable contributions of consciousness: one to epistemology, the other to evolution. He also renders consciousness needlessly invisible behaviorally.
The origin and use of positional frames of reference in motor control
Authors: Feldman Anatol G. , Levin Mindy F.
Published: February 2010

A hypothesis about sensorimotor integration (the λ model) is described and applied to movement control and kinesthesia. The central idea is that the nervous system organizes positional frames of reference for the sensorimotor apparatus and produces active movements by shifting the frames in terms of spatial coordinates. Kinematic and electromyographic patterns are not programmed, but emerge from the dynamic interaction among the system s components, including external forces within the designated frame of reference. Motoneuronal threshold properties and proprioceptive inputs to motoneurons may be cardinal components of the physiological mechanism that produces positional frames of reference. The hypothesis that intentional movements are produced by shifting the frame of reference is extended to multi-muscle and multi-degrees-of-freedom systems with a solution of the redundancy problem that allows the control of a joint alone or in combination with other joints to produce any desired limb configuration and movement trajectory. The model also implies that for each motor behavior, the nervous system uses a strategy that minimizes the number of changeable control variables and keeps the parameters of these changes invariant. Examples are provided of simulated kinematic and electromyographic signals from single- and multi-joint arm movements produced by suggested patterns of control variables. Empirical support is provided and additional tests of the model are suggested. The model is contrasted with others based on the ideas of programming of motoneuronal activity, muscle forces, stiffness, or movement kinematics.
Tendon elasticity and positional control
Authors: Alexander R. McN.
Published: February 2010

The spring-like behaviour of a joint following a sudden change of torque is partly a result of the elastic properties of tendons. A large fall in a muscle with a long tendon may be accompanied by tendon recoil causing joint movements as large as 20°.
Grip force adjustments during rapid hand movements suggest that detailed movement kinematics are predicted
Authors: Flanagan J. Randall , Tresilian James R. , Wing Alan M.
Published: February 2010

The λ model suggests that detailed kinematics arise from changes in control variables and need not be explicitly planned. However, we have shown that when moving a grasped object, grip force is precisely modulated in phase with acceleration-dependent inertial load. This suggests that the motor system can predict detailed kinematics. This prediction may be based on a forward model of the dynamics of the loaded limb.
Do control variables exist?
Authors: Hatsopoulos Nicholas G. , Warren William H.
Published: February 2010

We argue that the concept of a control variable (CV) as described by Feldman and Levin needs to be revised because it does not account for the influence of sensory feedback from the periphery. We provide evidence from the realm of rhythmic movements that sensory feedback can permanently alter the frequency and phase of a centrally generated rhythm.
What can we expect from models of motor control?
Authors: Loeb Gerald E.
Published: February 2010

The lambda model of servocontrol seems superior to the alpha model in terms of dealing with the mechanical complexities of nonlinear and multiarticular muscles. Both, however, can be trivialized by noting that the “control variable” may simply be the sum of descending influences at propriospinal interneurons in the case of the lambda model or in the muscles themselves in the case of the alpha model. The notion that the brain explicitly computes output in terms of any such control variables may be an engineering metaphor, useful for conceptual understanding but not for generating predictive hypotheses about higher motor circuitry.
Kinematic invariances and body schema
Authors: Morasso Pietro , Sanguineti Vittorio
Published: February 2010

Generalizing the notion that muscles are positional frames of reference, a high-dimensional muscle space is defined for multi-muscle systems with an embedded low-dimensional motor manifold of functional articulators. A central representation of such a manifold is proposed as computational body schema. The example of the jaw-tongue system is presented, discussing the relation of functional articulators with kinematic invariances and control problems.
Equifinality and phase-resetting: The role of control parameter manipulations
Authors: van Emmerik R. E. A. , Wagenaar R. C.
Published: February 2010

It is argued that the equilibrium point model can lead to new insights regarding transition and stability processes in movement coordination. The role of movement control parameters on equifinality and phase-resetting is discussed; not only control but also external control parameters can affect the global dynamical regime.
Multiple drafts: An eternal golden braid?
Authors: Dennett Daniel , Kinsbourne Marcel
Published: February 2010

Glicksohn and Salter both raise good questions that force us to clarify our position. We agree with much of their commentary, with a few caveats. Glicksohn wrongly assumes that later drafts must be “more advanced” and Salter speaks of “recruitment into consciousness,” which invites (but does not require) a Cartesian interpretation. Their suggestions about the time course of “editorial” revision of the multiple drafts and the possibility of restoration of the information in abandoned drafts are possible extensions of the Multiple Drafts Model.
How to reconsider the base rate fallacy without forgetting the concept of systematic processing
Authors: Fernandez-Berrocal Pablo , Almaraz Julian , Segura Susana
Published: February 2010

(1) There is enough contradictory evidence regarding the role of base rates in category learning to confirm the nonexistence of biases in such learning. (2) It is not always possible to activate statistical reasoning through frequentist representation. (3) It is necessary to use the concept of systematic processing in reconsidering the published work on biases.
Judgment under uncertainty: Evolution may not favor a probabilistic calculus
Authors: Ginzburg Lev R. , Janson Charles , Ferson Scott
Published: February 2010

The environment in which humans evolved is strongly and positively autocorrelated in space and time. Probabilistic judgments based on the assumption of independence may not yield evolutionarily adaptive behavior. A number of “faults” of human reasoning are not faulty under fuzzy arithmetic, a nonprobabilistic calculus of reasoning under uncertainty that may be closer to that underlying human decision making.
P(D/H), P(D/˜H), and base rate consideration
Authors: Klar Yechiel
Published: February 2010

Failure to consider base rate is regarded as potentially hazardous, mainly because its consideration is assumed to be determined solely by P(H/D), the probability of the individuating data if the hypothesis is true, and not at all by P(D/˜H), the probability if the hypothesis is false. However, when P(D/˜H) is unconfounded from P(D/H), it turns out to be the stronger determinant of base rate consideration.
Critical and natural sensitivity to base rates
Authors: Kleiter Gernot D.
Published: February 2010

This commentary discusses three points: (1) The implications of the fact that it is rational to ignore base rates if probabilities are estimated by frequencies from samples without missing data (natural sampling); (2) second order probabilities distributions are a plausible way to model imprecise probabilities; and (3) Bayesian networks represent a normative reference for multi-cue models of probabilistic inference.
Base rates in the applied domain of accounting
Authors: Koonce Lisa
Published: February 2010

Koehler's call for a reanalysis of the base rate fallacy is particularly important in the applied domain of accounting, since base rate data appear to be an important input for many accounting tasks. In this commentary I discuss the use of base rates in accounting and explain why more flexible standards of performance are important when judging the use of base rates.
Studying the use of base rates: Normal science or shifting paradigm?
Authors: Krueger Joachim
Published: February 2010

The underutilization of base rates is a consistent finding. The strong claim that base rates are ignored has been rejected and this needs no further emphasis. Following the path of “normal science,” research examines the conditions predicting changes in the degree of underutilization. A scientific revolution that might dethrone the heuristics and biases paradigm is not in sight.
Issues for the next generation of base rate research
Authors: Koehler Jonathan J.
Published: February 2010

Commentators agree that simple conclusions about a general base rate fallacy are not appropriate. It is more constructive to identify conditions under which base rates are differentially weighted. Commentators also agree that improving the ecological validity of the research is desirable, although this is less important to those interested exclusively in psychological processes. The philosophers and ecologists among the commentators offer a kinder perspective on base rate reasoning than the psychologists. My own perspective is that the interesting questions (both psychological and normative/prescriptive) are best answered through empirical studies that use real-world performance standards.
What are “normal movements” in atypical populations?
Authors: Latash Mark L. , Anson J. Greg
Published: February 2010

Redundancy of the motor control system is an important feature that gives the central control structures options for solving everyday motor problems. The choice of particular control patterns is based on priorities (coordinative rules) that are presently unknown. Motor patterns observed in unimpaired young adults reflect these priorities. We hypothesize that under certain atypical conditions, which may include disorders in perception of the environment and in decision making, structural or biochemical changes within the central nervous system (CNS), and/or structural changes of the effectors, the central nervous system may reconsider its priorities. A new set of priorities will reflect the current state of the system and may lead to different patterns of voluntary movement. Under such conditions, changed motor patterns should be considered not pathological but rather adaptive to a primary disorder and may even be viewed as optimal for a given state of the system of movement production. Therapeutic approaches should not be directed toward restoring the motor patterns to as close to “normal” as possible but rather toward resolving the original underlying problem. We illustrate this approach using, as examples, movements in amputees, in patients with Parkinson's disease, in patients with dystonia, and in persons with Down syndrome.
Adaptive changes in postural reactions after unilateral leg amputation
Authors: Aruin Alexander S.
Published: February 2010

Changes in anticipatory postural adjustment following below-the-knee amputation may be considered as adaptive for reacquiring balance control.
Bradykinesia in Parkinson's disease and cocontraction activity in dystonia are unlikely to be due to adaptive changes in the CNS
Authors: Berardelli A. , Agostino R. , Currà A. , Manfredi M.
Published: February 2010

Latash & Anson's explanation of bradykinesia in patients with Parkinson's disease and cocontraction in dystonic patients is intriguing. However, the proposed adaptive changes in the central nervous system do not fit well with both clinical and experimental evidence of motor impairment in these patients. In particular, we question the explanation of: (1) the role of postural reactions and spatial accuracy in bradykinesia, (2) certain abnormalities during the execution of sequential and simultaneous movements, (3) the sudden changes in mobility (ON and OFF) of Parkinsonian patients, and (4) the meaning of reflex circuitry changes in dystonia.
Posturo-kinetic capacity in the disabled
Authors: Bouisset Simon
Published: February 2010

“Normal movements” in atypical populations address the question of postural control: Voluntary movement is a perturbation of body balance and cannot be executed without a convenient counterperturbation. Despite a change in the postural program in relation to the impairment (Parkinson's disease, paraplegia), the performance level is decreased. Movements are not “normal,” owing to a reduction in posturokinetic capacity.
Dynamic similarities in action systems
Authors: Burton Allen W.
Published: February 2010

Latash & Anson's contention that movement patterns that are different from those typically observed in persons without impairments should not be considered abnormal and usually should not be corrected is consistent with Davis & Burton's Ecological Task Analysis (ETA). Extending from the ETA concept of performer-scaled performance measures, the use of Froude numbers may offer insight into the global dynamics of a person's action system.
“Constraint” versus “choice” in preferred movement patterns
Authors: Holt Kenneth G.
Published: February 2010

Movement patterns in impaired gait are not selected by a smart central nervous system (CNS), but arise by virtue of mutual constraints of task, limitations in personal dynamics available for the task, and optimality criteria. An oscillatory model of gait cycle is presented that exemplifies this control and coordination scheme. Preferred gait patterns may be based on physical principles rather than CNS “coordinative rules.”
What makes a population atypical–priorities or constraints?
Authors: Klatzky Roberta L.
Published: February 2010

Priorities for movement reflect constraints deriving from the motor system, task goals, and physical environment. Atypical and typical populations alike set and reset priorities in response to constraints, and they do so at many processing loci and time scales. Efforts to understand what is atypical about a population should focus first on the constraints it encounters.
Rehabilitation promotes functional movement in atypical populations
Authors: Morris Meg , Matyas Thomas , Iansek Robert , Cunnington Ross
Published: February 2010

The suggestion that movement disorders exhibited by people with central nervous system (CNS) dysfunction should be considered normal and therefore not rehabilitated is rejected from three standpoints: (1) the CNS does not always select the best movement patterns for optimal long term outcome, (2) there is literature demonstrating that rehabilitation enhances motor function and independence, and (3) there exists a capacity for motor recovery and motor skill learning following brain damage.
Abnormal movements can be identified in “atypical” populations
Authors: Phillips J. G. , Bradshaw J. L. , Slavin M. J. , Pantelis C.
Published: February 2010

Latash & Anson's discussion of movements of “atypical” populations is potentially topical but unhelpful. Abnormal movements can be distinguished from any compensatory adjustments in Parkinson's, Huntington's, and Alzheimer's diseases and schizophrenia. To suggest otherwise may do “atypical” populations and their caregivers a disservice. It would be more meaningful to discuss the relative modularity and separability of cognitive and motor processes.
Is motor pathology associated with setting new CNS priorities or with increased difficulty in overcoming or suppressing preexisting CNS priorities?
Authors: Swinnen Stephan P. , Verschueren Sabine M. P. , Dounskaia Natalia
Published: February 2010

Whereas Latash & Anson (L&A) have underscored the rearrangement or setting of new priorities, our primary focus is on preexisting central nervous system (CNS) priorities that become even more prevalent and intrusive under pathological conditions. The adaptations observed in the disordered motor system can often be understood against the backdrop of these primary CNS constraints. Even though this perspective has not been specifically addressed in the target article, we consider it complementary and not necessarily in opposition to L&A's primary thesis.
Towards functional movement: Implications for research and therapy
Authors: Worringham C. J. , Kerr G. K. , O'Brien C.
Published: February 2010

Researchers and clinicians have different goals and constraints in trying to understand and treat movement disorders. Research on primary and secondary aspects of disorders may lead to effective treatment aimed at restoring functional movements even if the primary disorder cannot be cured. Similarly, movement patterns may be maladaptive and hence need therapeutic intervention to restore functional movement skills.
Imagination and imitation: Input, acid test, or alchemy?
Authors: Heyes C. M.
Published: February 2010

Immediate imitation is likely to be a major, direct input to Barresi & Moore's level 2 competence, but deferred imitation is unlikely to play a key role in the transition to level 3, because (1) the attribution of first person knowledge is neither a necessary cause nor an obvious consequence of deferred imitation, and (2) deferred imitation does not correlate phylogenetically with capacities that more plausibly either yield or reflect a concept of intentional agency.
Understanding minds and selves
Authors: Hobson R. Peter
Published: February 2010

Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source (rather than an outcome) of domain-general information-processing capacities.
But what is the intentional schema?
Authors: Morton Adam
Published: February 2010

The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
Four-year-old humans are different: Why?
Authors: Nelson Katherine
Published: February 2010

The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
Omitting the second person in social understanding
Authors: Reddy Vasudevi
Published: February 2010

Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
Understanding self and other
Authors: Barresi John , Moore Chris
Published: February 2010

We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
Taxing memory: Writing, memory, and conceptual change
Authors: Olson David R.
Published: February 2010

Writing is important not because it “extends memory” but because it invites new concepts. The basic cognitive resources, including memory, have remained unchanged for perhaps a million years but the objects on which it has to work have changed significantly partly because of writing which has tended to turn speech into an object of reflection and analysis.
Episodic is what apes are not
Authors: Stenning Keith
Published: February 2010

Donald presents a three-stage theory of the evolution of cognition – episodic, mimetic, symbolic. This commentary is chiefly concerned with his use of the first term “episodic” which conflicts with standard usage in the memory literature. This conflict of usage has more than terminological implications for Donald's theory.
Everyday memory and activity
Authors: Alterman Richard
Published: February 2010

The target article interprets current psychological research on everyday memory in terms of a correspondence metaphor. This metaphor is based on a reduction of everyday memory to autobiographical and eyewitness memory. This commentary focuses on everyday memory as it functions in activity. Viewed from this perspective, the joining of everyday memory to a correspondence metaphor is problematic. A more natural way to frame the processes of everyday memory is in terms of context, practice, and pragmatics.
The relation between reproductive and reconstructive processing of memory content
Authors: Bahrick Harry P.
Published: February 2010

Quantitative losses of memory content imply replicative processing; correspondence losses imply reconstructive processing. Research should focus on the relationship between these processes by obtaining accuracy- and quantity-based indicators of memory within the same framework. This approach will also yield information about the effects of task and individual-difference variables on loss and distortion, as well as the time course of each process.
The correspondence metaphor: Prescriptive or descriptive?
Authors: Bruce Darryl
Published: February 2010

Koriat & Goldsmith's abstract correspondence metaphor is unlikely to prove useful to memory science. It aims to motivate and inform the investigation of everyday memory, but that movement has prospered without it. The irrelevance of its competitor – the more concrete storehouse metaphor – as a guiding force in memory research presages a similar fate for the correspondence perspective.
Driving and dish-washing: Failure of the correspondence metaphor for memory
Authors: Karn Keith S. , Zelinsky Gregory J.
Published: February 2010

Koriat & Goldsmith restrict their definition of memory to “being about some past event,” which causes them to ignore the most common use of memory: everyday visual-motor tasks. New techniques make it possible to study memory in the context of these natural tasks with which memory is so tightly coupled. Memory can be more fully understood in the context of these actions.
Remembering as doing
Authors: Neisser Ulric
Published: February 2010

Koriat & Goldsmith are right in their claim that the “ecological” and “traditional” approaches to memory rely on different metaphors. But the underlying ecological metaphor is notcorrespondence(which in any case is not a metaphorical notion): it isaction. Remembering is a kind of doing; like most other forms of action it is purposive, personal, and particular.
Contexts and functions of retrieval
Authors: Winograd Eugene
Published: February 2010

Koriat & Goldsmith provide an excellent analysis of the flexibility of retrieval processes and how they are situationally dependent. I agree with their emphasis on functional considerations and argue that the traditional laboratory experiment motivates the subject to be accurate. However, I disagree with their strong claim that the quantity–accuracy distinction implies an essential discontinuity between traditional and naturalistic approaches to the study of memory.
How important is spatial ability to mathematics?
Authors: Dowker Ann
Published: February 2010

This commentary focuses on one of the many issues raised in Geary's target article: the importance of gender differences in spatial ability to gender differences in mathematics. I argue that the evidence for the central role of spatial ability in mathematical ability, or in gender differences in it, is tenuous at best.
On an evolutionary model of sex differences in mathematics: Do the data support the theory?
Authors: Feingold Alan
Published: February 2010

The target article draws on evolutionary theory to formulate a biosocial model of sex differences in quantitative abilities. Unfortunately, the data do not support some of the crucial hypotheses. The male advantage in geometry is not appreciably greater than the male advantagi in algebra, and the greater male variability in mathematics cited by Gear is not cross-culturally invariant.
Arithmetic and old lace
Authors: Foss Jeffrey
Published: February 2010

Geary's project faces the severe methodological difficulty of tracing the biological effects of gender on mathematical ability in a system that is massively open. Two methodological stratagems he uses are considered. The first is that pancultural sex differences are biological in nature, which is dubious in the domain of mathematics, since it is completely culture-bound. The second is that sociosexual differences are partly caused by biosexual differences, which renders his thesis unfalsifiable and empirically empty.
Mating, math achievement, and other multiple relationships
Authors: Halpern Diane F.
Published: February 2010

Although Geary's partitioning of mathematical abilities into those that are biologically primary and secondary is an advance over most sociobiological theories of cognitive sex differences, it remains untestable and ignores the spatial nature of women's traditional work. An alternative model based on underlying cognitive processes offers other advantages.
The logic of the sociobiological model Geary-style
Authors: Proudfoot Diane
Published: February 2010

Geary's is the traditional view of the sexes. Yet each part of his argument – the move from sex differences in spatial ability and social preferences to a sex difference in mathematical ability, the claim that the former are biologically primary, and the sociobiological explanation of these differences – requires considerable further work. The notion of a biologically secondary ability is itself problematic.
Genetic influences on sex differences in outstanding mathematical reasoning ability
Authors: Zohar Ada H.
Published: February 2010

Sexual selection provides an adequate partial explanation for the difference in means between the distributions, but fails to explain the difference in variance, that is, the overrepresentation of both boys with outstanding mathematical reasoning ability (OMRA) and boys with mental retardation. Other genetic factors are probably at work. While spatial ability is correlated with OMRA, so are other cognitive abilities. OMRA is not reducible to spatial ability; hence selection for navigational skill is unlikely to be the only mechanism by which males have gained an advantage in OMRA.
Is the distribution of coherence a test of the model?
Authors: Bullock Theodore H.
Published: February 2010

Does the Wright & Liley model predict: (1) that subdural and hippocampal EEGs coherence tend to rise and fall in parallel for many frequencies, (2) that it is locally high or low within 10mm and falls steeply on average or, (3) that it is in constant flux, mostly rising and falling within 5–15 sec?
Neural system stability
Authors: Freeman Walter J.
Published: February 2010

Two hypotheses concerning nonlinear elements in complex systems are contrasted: that neurons, intrinsically unstable, are stabilized through embedding in networks and populations; and, conversely, that cortical neurons are intrinsically stable, but are destabilized through embedding in cortical populations and corticostriatal feedback systems. Tests are made by piecewise linearization of nonlinear dynamics at nonequilibriumoperating points, followed by linear stability analysis.
Dynamics of the brain — from the statistical properties of neural signals to the development of representations
Authors: Oliver Andrew
Published: February 2010

The unification of microscopic and macroscopic models of brain behaviour is of paramount importance and Wright & Liley's target article provides some important groundwork. In this commentary, I propose that a useful approach for the future is to incorporate a developmental perspective into such models. This may be an important constraint, providing a key to understanding the nature of macroscopic measures of brain function such as functional measures like ERP.
Consequences of basing ethical judgments on heuristics
Authors: Lindsay R. O. , Gorayska Barbara
Published: February 2010

Baron assumes that ethical decision-making can be evaluated without specifying more general features of the cognitive system within which it occurs. It is suggested that ethical principles are heuristics employed during goal-oriented action planning. Heuristics are bound to generate suboptimal decisions in some cases. It is rational to replace a particular heuristic only when the cost of associated error exceeds the cost of constructing and installing a more successful alternative.
The behavioral economics of addiction: A comprehensive alternative
Authors: Fantino Edmund
Published: February 2010

Heyman's target article makes a strong case for a behavioral approach to addiction, yet some important assumptions require justification, and promising behavioral alternatives to the author's melioration approach should be considered. In particular, the behavioral economic approach to addiction appears well developed and comprehensive. How does the melioration approach complement or improve on a behavioral economic account?
Future directions for the melioration model of addiction
Authors: Kirby Kris N.
Published: February 2010

For use in applied settings, the melioration model will need to incorporate changes in the shapes of local value functions over time, treat current value as a continuous function of time since previous choices, and take into account discounting of the effects of current behavior on future value. The policy implications of the model for regulating drugs are limited.
Addiction as choice? Yes. As melioration? Maybe, maybe not
Authors: Vuchinich Rudy E.
Published: February 2010

Melioration is not superior and may be inferior to other extensions of behavioral choice theory to addiction studies. Progress in the addiction field will be accelerated by the demise of the disease model rather than by attempting to resolve the contradictions it has created.
Which behavioral consequences matter? The importance of frame of reference in explaining addiction
Authors: Heyman Gene M.
Published: February 2010

The target article emphasizes the relationship between a matching law-based theory of addiction and the disease model of addiction. In contrast, this response emphasizes the relationship between the matching law theory and other behavioral approaches to addiction. The basic difference, I argue, is that the matching law specifies that choice is governed by local reinforcement rates. In contrast, economics says that overall reinforcement rate controls choice, and for other approaches there are other measures or no clear prediction at all. The response also differs from the target article in that there is more emphasis on the finding that stimulus conditions determine whether choice is under local or overall reinforcement rate control.
Familial language impairment: The evidence
Authors: Gopnik Myrna
Published: February 2010

Müller argues that general cognitive skills and linguistic skills are not necessarily independent. However, cross-linguistic evidence from an inherited specific language disorder affecting productive rules suggests significant degrees of modularity, innateness, and universality of language. Confident claims about the overall nature of such a complex system still await more interdisciplinary research.
Speaking of language: Thoughts on associations
Authors: Graham Susan , Poulin-Dubois Diane
Published: February 2010

Müller attempts to downplay cases of dissociation between language and cognition as evidence against the modularity of language. We review cases of associations between verbal and nonverbal abilities as further evidence against the notion of language as an autonomous subsystem. We also point out a discrepancy between his proposal of homologies between nonhuman primates' communication and human language and recent proposals on the evolution of language.
It's a far cry from speech to language
Authors: Rivera-Gaxiola Maritza , Karmiloff-Smith Annette
Published: February 2010

We agree with Müller's epigenetic view of evolution and ontogeny and applaud his multilevel perspective. With him, we stress the importance in ontogeny of progressive specialisation rather than prewired structures. However, we argue that he slips from “speech” to “language” and that, in seeking homologies, these two levels need to be kept separate in the analysis of evolution and ontogeny.
Second language acquisition: Theoretical and experimental issues in contemporary research
Authors: Epstein Samuel David , Flynn Suzanne , Martohardjono Gita
Published: February 2010

To what extent, if any, does Universal Grammar (UG) constrain second language (L2) acquisition? This is not only an empirical question, but one which is currently investigable. In this context, L2 acquisition is emerging as an important new domain of psycholinguistic research. Three logical possibilities have been articulated regarding the role of UG in L2 acquisition: The first is the “no access” hypothesis that claims that no aspect of UG is available to the L2 learner. The second is the “partial access” hypothesis that claims that only LI instantiated principles and LI instantiated parameter-values of UG are available to the learner. The third, called the “full access” hypothesis, asserts that UG in its entirety constrains L2 acquisition.

In this paper we argue that there is no compelling evidence to support either of the first two hypotheses. Moreover, we provide evidence concerning functional categories in L2 acquisition consistent with the claim that UG is fully available to the L2 learner (see also Flynn 1987; Li 1993; Martohardjono 1992; Schwartz & Sprouse 1991; Thomas 1991; White 1989). In addition, we will attempt to clarify some of currently unclear theoretical issues that arise with respect to positing UG as an explanatory theory of L2 acquisition. We will also investigate in some detail certain crucial methodological questions involved in experimentally testing the role of UG in L2 acquisition and finally, we will present a set of experimental results of our own supporting the “Full Access” hypothesis.
Adult language acquisition and Universal Grammar
Authors: Freidin Robert
Published: February 2010

The current conception of the relation between UG and the grammar of a language rules out the no-access hypothesis, but does not distinguish between the full-access and partial-access hypotheses. The former raises the issue of why language acquisition in child and adult should be so different. The evidence presented in Epstein et al.'s target article seems inconclusive regarding a choice between hypotheses.