bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Socrates' Method
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The goal of chapter 2 is to analyse Socrates’ method. Firstly, it is argued that theSocratic method is not able to reach definitive conclusions. Secondly, it is shown that this occurs because of the use of real rather than nominal definitions. Finally, it is noted that, although this method cannot provide any proper knowledge, it constitutes a very good starting point to address moral problems with great care.
Socrates' Arguments About the Virtues
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The main task of chapter 3 is to consider how Socrates regards virtues. To start with, the aporetic character of Plato’s early dialogues is recalled. Then, it is investigated why Socrates refuses to define virtues in moral terms and rather prefers non-moral terms. Finally, a careful consideration of how Socrates evaluates some virtues and how he defines them is offered.
Difficulties for Socrates
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The core of the fifth chapter is the study of the problems that appear to be involved in Socrates’ prospective. After a consideration of the difficulties that seem to emerge from Socrates’ instrumentalist approach to happiness, attention is devoted to the role played by the craft analogy. According to this analogy, virtue is similar to a craft since a knowledge of the means is necessary for a separate end. This doctrine is illustrated making reference to Aristotle because, although used by Socrates, the craft analogy is never defined in the dialogues.
The Argument of The Gorgias
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The purpose of chapter 7 is to outline the role played by the Gorgias in the development of Plato’s ethical views. To start with, the characteristics and the peculiarities of rhetoric are evaluated. Then, it is presented how Socrates, although he attacks Callicles’ hedonism, maintains an instrumentalist conception according to which virtues are means for achieving happiness. In conclusion, Socrates’ adaptive doctrine of happiness, which appears to imply that happiness consists in the satisfaction of one’s desires, is discussed.
Implications of The Gorgias
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

Chapter 8 contains a detailed discussion of the consequences that may be inferred by the doctrines discussed in the Gorgias. The position of the Gorgias recalls that of the Protagoras. Then, it is claimed that, although the Gorgias tries to refute the earlier dialogue’s hedonist view, Plato nevertheless still holds that happiness is the state in which all desires are fulfilled. Consequently, virtues are considered valuable only because they are means to attain a further end. Finally, it may be suggested that the Gorgias makes a sort of transition from the early dialogues to the mature position of the Republic.
Socratic Method and Socratic Ethics: The Meno
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to this distinction, Plato can indeed dismiss the theory according to which virtues are only instrumental. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the theory of virtue of the early dialogues is the result of having knowledge of the importance of virtues but not a proper and true knowledge of them.
The Theory of Forms
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

With chapter 10, the author starts the long study of the Republic, which lasts for 9 chapters. This chapter discusses the relevance of the theory of forms for Plato’s ethics. Considering the crucial passages of the Republic book V but also of the Phaedo, it is argued that the distinction between sensibles and forms is significant for ethics. Socrates fails to provide proper definitions in ethics because, lacking the theory of forms, he unsuccessfully tries to make the definitions fit with sensible properties.
Republic IV: The Division of the Soul
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the moral relevance of the theory of the division of soul. Firstly, it is examined why it is impossible to reconcile this doctrine with instrumentalism. Secondly, how the desires of the three different parts of the soul may be harmonised is investigated. Thirdly, after an elaborate study of the different parts of the soul, the reasons for this tripartition of the soul are introduced. Finally, it is examined whether or not the partition of the soul results in different kinds of happiness.
Republic IV: The Virtues
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The mature version of Plato’s doctrine of the virtue is examined through a detailed study of the several virtues. The theory of virtues expressed in the Republic represents a definitive improvement of the position of the early dialogues. Plato does not reduce any more virtues to something else but rather considers them as ends in themselves. This change is due to the different perspective according to which the definitions of the virtue have not to be expressed in non-moral language. Moreover, a key role is played by the doctrines of the tripartition of the soul, which suggests virtue to be the condition of the soul in which each part acts properly.
Republic VIII–IX on Justice
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

This chapter studies the later books of the Republic in order to see how the distinctions between the different kinds of justice, presented in previous chapter, work in the last part of the dialogue. To start with, it is demonstrated that deviant souls are “c-unjust,” while democratic souls are “p-unjust.” Then, the rational part of the soul is extensively analysed in order to explain why it is the more comprehensive. Finally, it is underlined that the just man is the one in whom prevails the rational soul, which is the only one able to provide a good balance to the all human beings.
Pleasure, Intelligence, and the Good
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

This chapter focuses on how some crucial doctrines of the Republic are then developed in the Philebus. Firstly, the problem of whether pleasure or intelligence is the good in a more articulated way than the one of the Republic is treated. Secondly, the different types of knowledge and their role in the good life are examined. Thirdly, more generally, it is discussed how the Philebus presents a more exhaustive and precise account of what are, in Plato’s view, intelligence, pleasure, and good. Finally, it is underlined how the Philebus is important for understanding the connection between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics.
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.

Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.

Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
Gettier Problems
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so. This is how Gettier understands justification. A person can also be justified in the sense that he commands grounds or reasons that establish the truth of p. Knowledge claims are, however, sensitive to levels of scrutiny. What counts as adequate grounds in one context may not in another because of its nonstandard features. Gettier problems in all their forms arise when a person, S, responsibly judges that p, but in a context where we, who are privy to information S lacks, see that his grounds do not meet the standards appropriate for the situation he in fact is in.
Fourth‐Clause Theories
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is justified true belief. The common feature in all Gettier examples is that S's claim to know that p is defeated by some fact he is not privy to (though not negligent in failing to check on it). To avoid such defeators, an indefeasibility clause is added to the standard definition. This produced a long series of new and more complex fourth clauses that were met with new, more exotic counterexamples. The chapter examines the contributions of Lehrer, Paxson, Swain, and Pappas in this endeavor.
Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins with an examination of Dretske's important article “Conclusive Reasons.” Dretske's key move is to offer a subjunctive analysis of his notion of a conclusive reason: “R is a conclusive reason for P if and only if R would not be the case unless P were the case.” It seems, however, that a counterexample produced by Martin shows that while this biconditional holds left to right, it does not hold right to left. Dretske uses his analysis conclusive reasons to deny the principle of epistemic closure under known implication. He then uses this result in a response to skepticism. Reasons are given for rejecting his argument against epistemic closure. Nozick offers essentially the same subjunctive analysis that Dretske did, wrapped in possible‐world semantics. It is rejected on similar grounds.
Agrippa and the Problem of Epistemic Justification
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy (differences of opinion), regress ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis (mere assumption), and circular reasoning. In the Pyrrhonist's hands, these five modes are used (either singly or in concert) to show that any effort at justifying philosophical beliefs is bound to fail. On the contemporary scene, three of these modes, arbitrary assumption, infinite regress, and circular reasoning are set up as a challenge to be met by a theory of justification. We get various kinds of theories of justification depending on how this challenge is met.
External Coherentism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines Davidson's attempt to develop a coherentist response to skepticism within an externalist or reliabilist framework. His position has two main components. The first depends on the principle of charity: In interpreting the utterances of others, we must assume that most of that person's beliefs are true. It thus makes no sense to attribute massive error to people whose utterances we are trying to interpret. (The third‐person argument.) For similar reasons, it is incoherent to entertain the possibility that one's own beliefs are massively in error. (The first‐person argument.) The second component in Davidson's response to skepticism involves his externalist semantics. In a context where one person is acquiring a concept from someone who already possesses it, the conditions for a belief's being the belief it is can be the same as the conditions for the belief's being true. Beliefs of this kind, Davidson thinks, are immune to skeptical attack. In response, the chapter challenges the transition from the third‐ to the first‐person argument and notes that the semantic argument provides only limited protection from skepticism.
Pyrrhonism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

The central thesis of Part 2 of this study is that no justificatory theory seems to show any prospects of solving the Agrippa problem. Does this show that there is no fact of the matter in knowing? At restricted levels of scrutiny, there are facts of the matter in knowing. However, if the Agrippa problem cannot be solved, then in the sense in which philosophers have sought a fact of the matter, it seems that there is none. Pyrrhonism or Neopyrrhonism seems to be the terminating point of the epistemological enterprise. As indicated in the introduction, Pyrrhonism is taken to be urbane, not rustic. The Pyrrhonist is not concerned with the everyday use of words like “know,” “certain,” and “justified,” which are not freighted with extreme philosophical commitments. He can use them as freely as anyone.
Morality and Rationality
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Commonsense views about practical rationality are self‐other asymmetric in a way diametrically opposed to the asymmetry involved in commonsense or Kantian morality. What is likely to harm others does not count as irrational in the same fundamental way that what is likely to harm oneself does. Commonsense or Kantian morality is agent sacrificingly asymmetrical, whereas commonsense rationality is agent favouringly asymmetrical. This means that these two parts of ordinary thinking tug in opposite directions, but a virtue‐ethical approach that focuses exclusively on commonsense thinking about what is admirable or counts as a virtue lacks this sort of tension, and such greater unity counts in its favor.
Incoherence in Kantian and commonsense Moral Thinking
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or personal terms. The latter is commonsensically explained by the claim that it is natural or inevitable that we should care about those closer to us more than about those less close to us, but this seemingly plausible assumption tends to undercut the justification that is typically and intuitively offered for self‐other asymmetry, namely, that we naturally care more about ourselves than about others, so that there is no need to assume any duty to avoid harming oneself. A commonsense ethics of virtue avoids this and other incoherences or tensions in Kantian and commonsense moral thinking.
Utilitarianism
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Utilitarianism does best to approach justice, rationality, and various virtues in symmetric and impartialist fashion. A scalar form of utilitarianism that makes only comparative judgments of better and worse may be preferable for abstract theoretical purposes, though not in practice.
Virtue Rules
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Virtue ethics allows general rules, and these can cover both perfect and imperfect duties in Kant's sense – though the concepts used are not the specifically moral notions of rightness and wrongness, but rather such notions as what is admirable/deplorable or counts as a virtue/vice.
Virtue‐Ethical Luck
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can evaluate such traits in virtue‐ethical terms without blaming or condemning those, e.g., whom we wish, in favored terms, to criticize. This approach is very reminiscent of Spinoza.
Virtue in Friends and Citizens
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

The value of personal relationships and of political involvement can be understood in virtue‐ethical terms, but it is not clear that a good friend who prefers his friends is morally superior to someone who is always impartial.
Virtue Ethics, Imperatives, and the Deontic
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Terms like ”admirable” and ”a virtue” are not specifically moral, but they allow imperatives and the use of ”should” as readily as moral terms do. This allows our commonsense virtue ethics to say, overarchingly, that we should balance concern for ourselves with or against concern for others considered as a class.
Reduction vs. Elimination
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Most utilitarianism is reductionist in character, reducing virtue and morality to terms of human or sentient well‐being; but an eliminative form of utilitarianism that simply refuses to make moral judgments and focuses exclusively on what produces better or good consequences is also possible. The virtue‐ethical approach of the present work is eliminative of moral terminology, though not of all aretaic evaluations.
Utilitarian Underdetermination
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Utilitarianism is also underdetermined as a theory. It must be stated either in actualist form (where rightness depends on actual consequences) or in some sort of expectabilist terms. But neither choice seems preferable to the other, and this makes it difficult to settle on and defend any particular version of utilitarianism.
Forms of Pluralism
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Even though commonsense virtue ethics is less unified than utilitarianism, various forms of pluralism are inherent in utilitarianism.
The Motive of Duty
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

This chapter starts with Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to justification, and then considers its connection to his famous principle of universalizability, his account of the absolute value of the goodwill, and his analysis of the motive duty as the determining ground of goodwill. Kant's argument, if it succeeds, rules out externalist theories of justification and also mere natural inclination, even mere sympathy, as a determining ground of goodwill. It does not, however, rule out a consequentialist account of the normative content of morality.
Formal Principles and Objective Ends
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kant argued at length against the idea that moral principles could be “material” principles, but consequentialist principles presuppose a theory of the good and thus seem to be material principles. After a careful explication of Kant's distinction between formal principles and material principles, especially as it is developed in The Critique of Practical Reason, we see that a consequentialist principle can indeed be a formal principle, and that they can even pass the universalizability test for moral principles. The formula of universal law is compatible with consequentialism.
The (Not So) Imperfect Duty of Beneficence
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kant's own application of the categorical imperative reflects his strong deontological intuitions. Unfortunately, Kant's own interpretation of the limits on the duty of beneficence, and his various distinctions – between perfect and imperfect duties, narrow and wide duties, duties of virtue and duties of justice, maxims of actions and maxims of ends – simply reflect but do not support his intuitions. Contemporary Kantians follow Kant in this regard but replace their own intuitions about what is right with Kant's more extreme and unpalatable views. Yet, they too assume what needs to be shown. This chapter focuses on Thomas Hill, Jr.'s influential account of Kant's account of imperfect duties and supererogation, and argues that Kant's theory supports a robust principle of beneficence but that Kant (or Hill) does not, in fact, provide any deontological constraints on the principle of beneficence.
Respect, Dignity, and the Kingdom of Ends
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that there are general conceptual difficulties with Kantian responses to consequentialism, and Kantian consequentialism in particular. We consider, first, the significance of the Kantian deontologist emphasis on the principle of respect for persons. Second, we explore the relevance of Kant's distinction between price and dignity, his conception of the dignity of humanity, and Hill's interpretation of the dignity principle. Third, and last, we focus on Kant's related formula of the kingdom of ends, and consider Rawls’ development of Kant's idea in his hypothetical social contract theory and more general Kantian constructivist conception of moral reasoning.
The Sacrifices of the Innocent
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that (at least in principle) it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both positive and negative duties. The problem at issue is thus the competing demands of the conflicting duties, or grounds of obligation, that confront us when the only way to save some involves sacrificing others. In these types of tragic cases, a commitment to the equal unconditional value of all persons should lead moral agents to recognize the legitimacy of their own sacrifice to save others. If a sacrifice is rationally defensible to the sacrificed, then it also respects human dignity and treats rational nature as an end‐in‐itself. This chapter also discusses the limits of beneficence, self‐sacrifice, and the nature of justified coercion.
The Morality of Happiness
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

The book examines the major traditions of ancient ethical theory, showing that they share a common theoretical structure. They are examples of eudaimonism, a type of ethical theory in which the basic concepts are those of happiness and virtue. The book looks at the way this type of theory is articulated in Aristotle, and then at the differing versions of it to be found in Epicurus, the Stoics, and Academic and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. We find a common structure: we all implicitly seek a final end in all our actions, but different theories offer rival accounts of what this consists in. To gain a proper understanding of the ancient debates, we have to examine the basic concepts of happiness and virtue, which in modern ethical theories are often subject to misunderstanding. The book first aims to recover the ancient understanding of these basic notions, then examines the role of nature in ancient ethical justification, the role in eudaimonism of other‐concern, and finally the extent to which the ancient theories demand revision and transformation of everyday ethical thought.
Aristotle: Nature and Mere Nature
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Aristotle argues that the virtues develop from nature as matter (mere nature) to nature as form, an ideal. Nature is also, however, what is ‘always or for the most part’. These points are linked to Aristotle's controversial uses of nature in discussing the city‐state, slavery, and moneymaking; on this issue, his arguments are inconsistent.
Antiochus: The Intuitive View
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Antiochus’ is a hybrid theory, seeking convergence between Aristotelian and Stoic accounts of nature. He aims to retain the Stoic developmental account of virtue as the culmination of a natural progression, but tries to make the result more intuitive, arguably not successfully.
The Sceptics: Accepting What Is Natural
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient sceptics, both Pyrrhonian and Academic, cannot appeal to nature as other philosophers do without falling into the commitment to beliefs that they seek to avoid. Nonetheless, they rely on nature in an undogmatic way as support for life and action, when argument on both sides of a case has produced suspension of judgement. Tensions arise when this undogmatic reliance takes the form of a structured theory, as in Sextus Empiricus.
Finding Room for Other‐Concern
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

The Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.
Justice
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Justice is a virtue of both character and institutions. Epicurus treats these separately but, it is argued, consistently. The Stoic theory of natural law arguably depoliticizes institutional questions, treating politics as merely one concern of an individual among others. Aristotle deals with both issues of justice separately; later Aristotelians, influenced by the Stoics, have little to say about institutions.
Self‐Interest and Morality
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient ethical theories do not, like many modern ethical theories, recognize a gap in the theory between morality and self‐interest. Rather, self‐interest, developed into an appropriate concern with one's happiness, will already incorporate other‐concern, which in the different theories has different scope.
Aristotle: An Unstable View
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Aristotle, in making virtuous activity necessary but not sufficient for happiness, tries to do justice to the intuitive requirement that the content of happiness not be revised so as to shock our intuitions that happiness involves worldly success and enjoyment. But he also tries to do justice to the theoretical pull: happiness must involve virtuous activity over one's life as a whole. Aristotle runs into difficulties over the level of external goods required for the virtuous life to be happy, as well as the results when the virtuous happy person loses external goods.
Happiness and the Demands of Virtue
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient ethical theories produce differing accounts of happiness, depending on their position on the nature and importance of virtue. These are important debates, recognizably on the same topic as modern debates about the nature and importance of morality. In the ancient debates Aristotelian and Stoic views can both draw on compelling arguments, and no simple resolution is obvious.
The Advancement of Science
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.
Legend's Legacy
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

Begins with an outline of the major characteristics of the dominant conception of science offered by logical empiricism. Then explains how this view was criticized.
Varieties of Progress
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

The notion of a scientific practice allows for an approach to the concept of progress. Progress can occur with respect to any of the components of a practice. The root notion concerns the development of language and the acceptance of statements in that language that permit the answering of significant questions. The account tries to make sense of the intuitive idea that we make progress by coming to understand the structure of the natural world.
Realism and Scientific Progress
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

The account of progress is defended against a number of objections. Some of these are offered by philosophers who are sceptical of realism in the philosophy of science; others are urged by historians and sociologists of science.
Dissolving Rationality
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

The approach to progress allows an apparently simple analysis of scientific rationality: a transition in practice is rational just in case it is generated by some procedure that would be expected to yield progressive modifications of practice. It is shown how this standard can be articulated in a number of different ways. The issue of the rationality of scientific revolutions is then posed, and addressed by developing a compromise model that draws both from the logical empiricist tradition and from the historical objections to it.
The Organization of Cognitive Labor
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

Ends with an attempt to construct a formal model of knowledge for scientists working together in a community of inquiry. It is shown how the questions of social epistemology can be conceived in terms of optimal strategies for the attainment of the goals of science, and how particular social schemes for organizing research approximate the optimal results. Specific problems considered include those of the division of cognitive labour and of the role of authority in scientific research.
Modalities and Intensional Languages
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

In this paper, quantified modal logic is defended against criticisms concerning identity and substitution, the interpretation of the existential quantifier, and the commitment to essentialism. The paper includes two appendices: the first is a record of the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper in 1962, and includes Quine and Kripke among the discussants; the second is a review of A. Smullyan's “Modality and Description.”
Iterated Deontic Modalities
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

In this paper, a confusion between evaluative and prescriptive uses of “ought” is located, and the prescriptive use of deontic operators is then recommended.
Essential Attribution
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper contributes to an account of modes of essentialism within the framework of quantified modal logic. It distinguishes between “Aristotelian” and “individuating” essentialism, and argues that Aristotelian essentialism may be best understood on a “natural” or “causal” interpretation of the modal operators. The paper includes an appendix entitled “Strict Implication, Deducibility and the Deduction Theorem.”
Classes, Collections, Assortments, and Individuals
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

Set theory obscures ordinary distinctions between assortments, collections, and classes. This paper argues that the puzzles generated by assimilating ordinary collections to classes reflect the same difficulties as the puzzles that result from equating proper names with definite descriptions. It is then shown how these ordinary distinctions can be articulated within an alternative logical framework, namely, the intensional modal system S42.
Does the Principle of Substitutivity Rest on a Mistake?
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper upholds Fitch's suggestion that it is reasonable to suppose that names of identified objects should be everywhere intersubstitutable when they are being used as names (the principle of substitutivity). Counterexamples provided by R. Cartwright are diagnosed as trading on the inevitable ambiguities of natural languages, and it is argued that the principle of substitutivity should therefore be tested with respect to statements in logical form.
Rationality and Believing the Impossible
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper defends the view that one cannot believe an impossibility. It examines Kripke's puzzle about belief, and argues that assent to a sentence that is false in all possible circumstances does not carry over into belief. This is shown to have consequences for theories about epistemological attitudes and rationality.
Spinoza and the Ontological Proof
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper attempts to characterize the “ontological proof” for the existence of God. It discusses Wolfson's analysis of the proof and argues that his characterization is not mistaken but insufficient. It is then argued that the characterization here proposed provides a good account of Anselm's and Descartes’ proof, but shows that there is no “ontological proof” in Spinoza. The paper concludes by identifying a confusion between metaphysical and epistemological notions, which conflates very different arguments under the heading “ontological proof.”
Equality and Partiality
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

Thomas Nagel addresses the conflict between the claims of the group and those of the individual. Nagel attempts to clarify the nature of the conflict – one of the most fundamental problems in moral and political theory – and argues that its reconciliation is the essential task of any legitimate political system.
The Moral Division of Labor
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

The general form of solution to the problem of reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual is through the design of institutions, which penetrate and in part reconstruct their individual members, by producing differentiation within the self between public and private roles, and further differentiation subordinate to these roles. In a sense, the aim is to externalize through social institutions the most impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint, but our support of those institutions depends on an internal differentiation, which exploits the natural complexity of the self.
Nietzsche's System
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

My overall project is to show that Nietzsche's ideas do cohere into a philosophical system comparable to his predecessors’ – despite his own strong attacks on the system, and on these predecessors. This system centers around his view of the world as will to power. I work to make this notion conceptually precise, and to show how it extends into his wealth of other thoughts, including his analysis of the basic types of persons and societies, his insistence that the world is “not being but becoming,” his values of individuality and self‐creating, his attacks on morality, and his critique and affirmation of truth. The claim that Nietzsche promotes such a systematic view seems inconsistent with his well‐known “perspectivism”; I argue that the latter issues from his conception of these wills to power as perspectives, and that this source shows us both the forces and limits of that doctrine.
Being
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

This chapter develops the core idea that “the world is will to power” – what I call Nietzsche's “power ontology.” I give careful analyses of “will” and “power,” and clarify how he thinks these are things’ essence or being. I distinguish between two basic forms that will to power can take – the active and the reactive – which will lie at the root of his values. The chapter then shows how this notion of will to power grounds Nietzsche's conception of persons as systems or syntheses of such wills (or drives), as well as his distinction of three basic types of persons – master, slave, and overman – each clarified as a specific way such a system of drives can be organized.
Becoming
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines how this power ontology could be compatible with Nietzsche's frequent assertion that the world is “not being but becoming.” That appears to rule out any ontology – understood as a “theory of being” – but I argue that it instead expresses a surprising new ontology, which insists on process (what's real are processes not states) and contextuality (what's real are relations not individuals). I develop this theory of becoming in relation to Plato's formative discussion of being/becoming, arguing that Nietzsche retains far more than we expect or he implies. The chapter then returns to other parts of his system to show their temporal content. For example, the types master–slave–overman each involves a specific temporal stance – in particular the overman's stance involves willing or embracing eternal return.
Golden Fetters
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

The gold standard and the Great Depression might appear to be two very different topics requiring two entirely separate books, and the attempt to combine them here reflects Barry Eichengreen's conviction that the gold standard is the key to understanding the Depression. The gold standard of the 1920s set the stage for the Depression of the 1930s by heightening the fragility of the international financial system, and was the mechanism that transmitted the destabilizing impulse from the USA to the rest of the world and magnified that initial destabilizing shock; it was the principal obstacle to offsetting action, and the binding constraint preventing policymakers from averting the failure of banks and containing the spread of financial panic. For all these reasons, the international gold standard was a central factor in the worldwide Depression; recovery proved possible, for these same reasons, only after abandoning the gold standard. The gold standard also existed in the nineteenth century, of course, without exercising such debilitating effects – the explanation for the contrast lies in the disintegration during and after World War I of the political and economic foundations of the prewar gold standard system. The dual bases for the prewar system were the credibility of the official commitment to gold and international cooperation: the credibility induced financial capital to flow in stabilizing directions, buttressing economic stability; the cooperation signaled that support for the gold standard in times of crisis transcended the resources any one country could bring to bear. Both were eroded by the economic and political consequences of the Great War, and the decline in credibility rendered cooperation all the more vital – when it was not forthcoming, economic crisis was inevitable. The decline in both credibility and cooperation during and after World War I reflected a complex confluence of domestic and international political changes, and economic and intellectual changes. This book attempts to fit all these elements together into a coherent portrait of economic policy and performance between the wars. The goal is to show how the policies pursued, in conjunction with economic imbalances created by World War I, gave rise to the catastrophe that was the Great Depression. The argument is that the gold standard fundamentally constrained economic policies, and that it was largely responsible for creating the unstable economic environment on which the policies acted.
Introduction
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

The gold standard is conventionally portrayed as synonymous with financial stability, and its downfall, starting in 1929, is implicated in the global financial crisis and the worldwide depression. A central message of this book is that precisely the opposite was true: far from being synonymous with stability, the gold standard itself was the principal threat to financial stability and economic prosperity between the World Wars I and II. To understand why, it is necessary first to appreciate why the interwar gold standard worked so poorly when its prewar predecessor had worked so well, next, to identify the connections between the gold standard and the Great Depression, and finally, to show that the removal of the gold standard in the 1930s established the preconditions for recovery from the Depression. These are the three tasks undertaken in the book (which is arranged chronologically), and they are summarized in the sections of this introductory chapter.
The Classical Gold Standard in Interwar Perspective
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This book is organized chronologically to convey a sense of how events appeared to those who made the critical decisions that led toward the Great Depression. Chapter 2 begins with the prewar gold standard. Besides documenting the role of credibility and international cooperation in the operation of the system, it highlights differences in the functioning of the gold standard at the center (in Britain, France and Germany) and the periphery (North and South America, Australia and New Zealand). It is shown that the smooth operation of the prewar system hinged on a particular conjuncture of economic and political forces – forces that were in decline even before the outbreak of World War I. The chapter finishes by explaining why interwar observers failed to appreciate the tenuous basis of the prewar system.
The Legacy of Hyperinflation
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This chapter and the next describe the fiscal war of attrition that fueled inflation in the 1920s. That war proved most intractable in Germany, where it was fought internationally as well as on the domestic front. The German hyperinflation that resulted from this deadlock is the subject of Ch. 5. The different sections of the chapter look at the background (the post World War I reparations tangle), the transition to hyperinflation, the impact of inflation on the German economy, the stabilization that followed the revaluation of government reserves and pegging of the exchange rate in November 1923, and the implications for international monetary relations.
Reconstructing the Facade
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This chapter (like the previous one) looks at the fiscal war of attrition that fueled inflation in the 1920s; here, inflationary chaos elsewhere in Europe is contrasted with the experience of countries that repelled the inflationary threat. The different sections of the chapter discuss the first (failed) attempts to restore the gold standard after World War I and the failure to provide a framework for international cooperation, deflationary paths (in Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands), inflation (in Belgium), the inflationary crisis in France, and the enduring effects of these. Recovery was more rapid in countries that experienced inflation and depreciation (notably France, Belgium, and Italy) than in those that had pursued deflation in order to stabilize their currencies and restore the prewar gold price. In countries where the fiscal war of attrition had been most destructive, political leaders and their constituencies insisted on going to exceptional lengths to prevent the ceasefire from breaking down. The gold standard was the white flag emblematic of the truce, and policy makers continued to wave it even after political economic circumstances had changed fundamentally and an entirely different policy response was required.
The Dollar and the World Economic Conference
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This chapter analyzes the critical period in the spring of 1933 when American policy was reversed and the dollar devalued. Roosevelt's abandonment of gold coincided with the World Economic Conference, which was held in London in June 1933, in a last attempt to respond cooperatively to the economic crisis. The connections are traced between the dollar's depreciation and the London Conference and an explanation given of why the latter failed. The different sections of the chapter discuss the background to the negotiations, the conference itself, the international monetary repercussions, and the impact of devaluation of the dollar.
Conclusion
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

The legacy of the gold standard and the Great Depression continued to influence both the economic behavior of individuals and the policies of governments through the remainder of the interwar years. That influence persisted into World War II, into the postwar period, and indeed to the end of the twentieth century. This concluding chapter describes some of the implications of that persistence for the postwar international economic order.
The Concept of Human Nature
Authors: Hurka Thomas
Published: October 2003

Discusses different possible understandings of human nature, e.g., that it consists in the properties distinctive of humans, essential to them, or distinctive –and essential. In the end, it defends a version of perfectionism mandating the development of those properties essential to humans and conditioned on their being living things. It then uses this version to answer standard objections to perfectionism, e.g., that human nature includes trivial or morally repellent properties; it also rejects the traditional view that each person's perfection necessarily involves acting morally or virtuously toward others.
Accretions and Methods
Authors: Hurka Thomas
Published: October 2003

Many formulations of narrow perfectionism supplement the basic ideal of developing human nature with further claims about reality, freedom, desire, and, especially, teleology. This chapter argues that these claims are unhelpful accretions that should be set aside; doing so simplifies the theory and saves it from needless objections. The chapter also argues that perfectionism should reject metaethical naturalism, the view that claims about human nature entail claims about value. Instead, it presents itself as a substantive moral view, to be defended by substantive argument. The chapter concludes by discussing the epistemology of essential properties, arguing that they can be discovered either through intuition about thought‐experiments or by examining explanatory theories.
The Human Essence
Authors: Hurka Thomas
Published: October 2003

Argues for two claims about human essential properties that together constitute an “Aristotelian” theory of human nature. The first is that humans essentially have a physical nature involving circulatory, digestive, and other physiological systems; their functioning to a high degree constitutes good health and, beyond that, athletic excellence. The second is that humans are essentially rational, both theoretically (in how they form beliefs) and practically (in how they act). This last claim yields the two main “Aristotelian” values of theoretical and practical perfection, which develop theoretical and practical rationality. The claim is defended both intuitively, in thought‐experiments, and by the analysis of psychological explanation, in which rationality plays a central role.
Aggregation
Authors: Hurka Thomas
Published: October 2003

A time‐ and agent‐neutral perfectionism must aggregate values both across times in a life and across persons in a society or in the whole world. This chapter examines a series of ways of doing so, arguing that different principles are attractive given perfectionist rather than nonperfectionist values. It rejects additive principles for implying “repugnant conclusions” that are even more repellent for perfectionist than for other values, and defends a diminishing marginal value view that is intermediate between the additive view and averaging. It also examines Nietzsche's antiegalitarian maximax principle, which says society should maximize the excellence of its few most excellent individuals, and a single‐peak view that values the first achievement of a perfectionist good above any subsequent achievements.