A Role to Play for Interest Groups in EU Foreign and Security Policy: The Case of Migration Focused EU - Libya Policies
Authors: Atak Erman 
Published: June 2022

Following the fall of Gaddafi, Libya has fallen apart, and this vast and resource-rich country with around 1,800 km coastline to the southern side of the central Mediterranean has become a failed state. The crisis stemming from Libya has significant impact on the EU: Not only for irregular migration but also due to its security, economic and geopolitical importance to EU. Despite this multifaceted significance, EU Libya poli- cies have been focusing on the migration dimension of the crisis and making use of non-functioning Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions as the primary policy tool. That is why the EU missed the oppor- tunity to solve the crisis from an early age and has been sidelined with the escalating conflict. In the absence of EU, rival international actors took over the Libya dossier and started to shape the developments per their interests. If the EU does not take lessons from previous mistakes, it will soon lose its influence over Libya, which might turn out to be quite detrimental for its interests. As this is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional web of relations, the policy paper at hand focuses explicitly on the “migration” dimension and makes infer- ences based on this narrower scope. Interest Groups (IGs) are prominent actors in the migration dimension of the Libya crisis. This policy paper depicts that there are at least 738 IGs concerned with European or global level migration & asylum policies, and they have had hundreds of interactions with members of the EU Commission and Parliament. IGs have been spending money, energy and other resources to influence the EU policies in this field. However, up to now, just like EU Libya policies, their efforts on migration-related problems stemming from Libya has failed. Following a comprehensive description of the current status of migration dimension of EU Libya policies together with the role of various IGs, this policy brief examines the causes of (in)effectiveness of IGs’ efforts in influencing EU policies. It argues that public salience, internal security concerns of the member states and highly politicised nature of the migration issue makes it difficult for IGs to be influence. Irregular migration is not a matter on its own; it is a consequence of a causal link. In solving the issue, the EU needs a multifaceted approach, which considers IGs an integral partner and utilises IGs soft power, knowledge and expertise to increase the EU’s leverage. The policy paper at hand recommends EU and IGs to develop a partnership model which requires coordi- nation and assistance in Libya matters, without damaging the neutral interlocutor position of the IGs. This new model foresees IG support in handling IDPs, refugees/irregular migrants, training and monitoring of the Libyan officials, or in reporting about the humanitarian aspects. Requires EU to utilise IGs in addressing the sources of grievances between local ethnic, tribal and religious groups, or facilitating the truth-seeking ven- tures and repairing the relations between rival groups. IGs can support EU policies by providing mentorship to sovereign economic, financial, auditing institutions or misfunctioning judiciary, public health or education institutions. EU should benefit from IGs in the prevention of radicalisation/extremism, as well. For the sake of preventing the emergence of several and conflicting member state Libya policies, EU su- pranational bodies should lead to the process vis á vis overall EU interests. To save IGs from the complex power-sharing structure, European External Action Service should undertake the one single coordinator role with IGs. EU officials should encourage or —if need be— stipulate Libyan authorities to cooperate with IGs in their operations for Libya. EU may consider using military CSDP operations or EU battlegroup to protect the peace process from spoilers or destructive foreign meddling or defend the governing institutions from the impact of various militia groups and enforce the arms embargo. EU should also activate a competent sanctions policy against the spoilers of the process. Another crucial task for the EU will be the construction of a unified and reliable security apparatus. IGs can build the support that the EU requires on the ground. EU requirements overlap with IGs interests; they both need to construct a thriving society, inclusive politics, and good governance, which will make Libya a hard-to-find neighbour/ally to the EU.