bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Predictors of delayed onset of lactation
Authors: Scott Jane A. , Binns Colin W. , Oddy Wendy H.
Published: May 2007

The objective of this study was to identify biomedical and hospital‐related factors associated with the delayed onset of lactation (>72 h postpartum) in a population of Australian women. Subjects were 453 women participating in the second Perth Infant Feeding Study. Information on mothers’ perception of the timing of the onset of lactation and associated explanatory factors was collected in a questionnaire completed by women prior to or shortly after discharge from hospital. Multivariate logistic regression was used to identify those factors independently associated with delayed lactation. Risk factors for delayed lactation were being primiparous (adjusted OR 3.16, 95% CI 1.58–6.33) and having delivered by caesarean section (adjusted OR 2.40, 95% CI 1.28–4.51). We failed to find a negative association with maternal body mass index reported in previous studies. While a greater proportion of women who experienced delayed lactation were overweight or obese compared with those who did not experience delayed lactation (40.8% vs. 32.1%), this difference was not statistically significant.
Tumor suppressor p16INK4a − modulator of glycomic profile and galectin‐1 expression to increase susceptibility to carbohydrate‐dependent induction of anoikis in pancreatic carcinoma cells
Authors: André Sabine , Sanchez‐Ruderisch Hugo , Nakagawa Hiroaki , Buchholz Malte , Kopitz Jürgen , Forberich Pia , Kemmner Wolfgang , Böck Corina , Deguchi Kisaburo , Detjen Katharia M. , Wiedenmann Bertram , von Knebel Doeberitz Magnus , Gress Thomas M. , Nishimura Shin‐Ichiro , Rosewicz Stefan , Gabius Hans‐Joachim
Published: May 2007

Expression of the tumor suppressor p16INK4a after stable transfection can restore the susceptibility of epithelial tumor cells to anoikis. This property is linked to increases in the expression and cell‐surface presence of the fibronectin receptor. Considering its glycan chains as pivotal signals, we assumed an effect of p16INK4a on glycosylation. To test this hypothesis for human Capan‐1 pancreatic carcinoma cells, we combined microarray for selected glycosyltransferase genes with 2D chromatographic glycan profiling and plant lectin binding. Major differences between p16‐positive and control cells were detected. They concerned expression of β1,4‐galactosyltransferases (down‐regulation of β1,4‐galactosyltransferases‐I/V and up‐regulation of β1,4‐galactosyltransferase‐IV) as well as decreased α2,3‐sialylation of O‐glycans and α2,6‐sialylation of N‐glycans. The changes are compatible with increased β1‐integrin maturation, subunit assembly and binding activity of the α5β1‐integrin. Of further functional relevance in line with our hypothesis, we revealed differential reactivity towards endogenous lectins, especially galectin‐1. As a result of reduced sialylation, the cells' capacity to bind galectin‐1 was enhanced. In parallel, the level of transcription of the galectin‐1 gene increased conspicuously in p16INK4a‐positive cells, and even figured prominently in a microarray on 1996 tumor‐associated genes and in proteomic analysis. The cells therefore gain optimal responsiveness. The correlation between genetically modulated galectin‐1 levels and anoikis rates in engineered transfectants inferred functional significance. To connect these findings to the fibronectin receptor, galectin‐1 was shown to be co‐immunoprecipitated. We conclude that p16INK4a orchestrates distinct aspects of glycosylation that are relevant for integrin maturation and reactivity to an endogenous effector as well as the effector's expression. This mechanism establishes a new aspect of p16INK4a functionality.
Estimation of TDS in Sand Aquifer Water Through Resistivity Log
Authors: Guo Yao An
Published: May 2007

An empirical relationship between aquifer resistivity and total dissolved solids (TDS) in ground water of sand aquifers has been observed. Aquifer resistivity is determined through resistivity log in lateral array with electrode spacing of 2.5 meters. Using the relationship, the TDS in each aquifer can be estimated separately from its resistivity log curve. The TDS values thus arrived at since 1968, when compared with actual TDS content in ground water of more than a thousand sand aquifers encountered in 400 wells drilled in North China Plain, showed errors ranging up to ± 0.3 gram per liter, except in the case of two wells where it was 0.8 and 0.9 gram/liter, respectively.
Vertical Flow in Heavily Exploited Hard Rock and Alluvial Aquifers
Authors: Rushton K. R.
Published: May 2007

This paper examines the flow in heavily exploited alluvial and hard rock aquifers and demonstrates that vertical components of flow are of great importance. In a typical example of an alluvial aquifer it is shown that most of the discharge from tube wells originates from the phreatic surface flowing vertically through clay layers to the well screens. A second study of a hard rock aquifer indicates that a tube well in a fractured zone draws water horizontally from the fractured zone but this water is supplied by vertical flow from the weathered zone. The suitability of different types of mathematical models to represent heavily exploited hard rock and alluvial aquifers is also considered.
Deterministic Modeling of Dispersion in Heterogeneous Permeable Media
Authors: Davis Arden D.
Published: May 2007

Numerical experiments show that variations of an order of magnitude in transmissivity or hydraulic conductivity can cause significant dispersion even when relatively small values of dispersivity are assumed. Such variations should be represented in a deterministic model of solute transport in order to describe the flow field adequately and to realistically simulate dispersion. In an example of a field application to an alluvial aquifer, a satisfactory match to observed field data was obtained using a small (0.01 m) value of longitudinal dispersivity and a grid spacing fine enough to show field‐scale alluvial heterogeneities. When large (~30 m) values of longitudinal dispersivity were used, computed solute concentrations were about half of observed values in parts of the aquifer. Modeling efforts with grid spacings two to six times wider than alluvial channels in the aquifer produced ground‐water flow and solute‐transport simulations which did not adequately match field data.
Hydrodynamic Behavior of the Puelche Aquifer in Matanza River Basina
Authors: Auge Miguel P.
Published: May 2007

An analysis is presented for the hydrodynamic behavior of the Puelche aquifer in the Matanza River basin, Buenos Aires, Argentina, relative to the section overlying it or Epipuelche aquifer which contains the water table.

By comparison between the isophreatic and isopiestic contours, a general similarity exists between the potentiometric levels, the hydraulic gradients, and the distribution of local recharge and discharge areas of both aquifers. Also, a coincidence occurs between the surface‐ and ground‐water divides, the latter acting as a hydrological barrier which prevents ground‐water inflows to the Matanza basin from neighboring basins.

The volume of water flowing away from the Puelche aquifer by underground lateral movement in the northeastern section of the basin is 20,000 cu m/d (5.3 Mgal/d). This yield is supplied by the Epipuelche aquifer through vertical downward leakage, because the Puelche: (1) does not crop out within the study area, (2) does not receive water recharge from underground flows from neighboring basins, and (3) is a semiconfined aquifer.

From comparison between piezometric and phreatimetric maps, curves of equal difference of hydraulic head between both aquifers can be constructed. From this analysis it is determined that the Puelche potentiometric surface is lower than the Epipuelche (water table) in 75% of the ground‐water basin area. Therefore, of the total of the ground‐water basin area (1,600 km2= 620 mi2), the Puelche is recharged by the Epipuelche over 1,200 km2 (465 mi2). In 25% of the area (400 km2= 155 mi2), the Puelche exhibits positive levels relative to the Epipuelche, hence discharging into the latter.

Finally, from the analysis of the relation between the vertical transmissivity of an aquitard (T′) and the storage coefficient of a semiconfined aquifer (S) related to the former, it may be concluded that when a considerable difference of ground‐water levels occurs, T’is less or equal in equivalence than S.

The mean storage coefficient of the Puelche obtained by pumping tests is 5 × 10−4. If a vertical regional transmissivity equivalent to 5 × 10−4 day−1 is assumed, it would be necessary to have a mean hydraulic head difference of only 5 cm (2 in.) along the remaining 800 km2 (310 mi2), for the Puelche to receive from the Epipuelche 20,000 m3/d, which constitutes its effective recharge. The remaining area (800 km2) appears as a difference between the recharge and discharge areas of the Puelche aquifer.

If the mean vertical transmissivity of the aquitard were 5 × 10−5 day−1, the effective recharge of the Puelche would be supplied by the Epipuelche with 50 cm (1.6 ft) of hydraulic head differential. The latter value seems to be more accurate than the former, taking into account the difference of hydraulic head measured in both aquifers.
Leaking Pipes Recharge Ground Water
Authors: Lerner David N.
Published: May 2007

Water is piped beneath cities in water mains, sewers, and storm drains. Most, if not all, of these pipe networks leak. Evidence from a ground‐water resources study for Lima, Peru and a slope stability study in Hong Kong is presented to show that leakage losses recharge ground water. The contribution of leakage to recharge is shown by ground‐water levels, ground‐water chemistry, and by water balance and ground‐water modeling studies. Estimates of the leakage quantities involved can be developed from water balance and modeling studies, and from analysis of conventional leakage detection tests carried out by water‐supply authorities. In Lima, about 40% of the average supply became recharge. Maximum areal rates of recharge for both cities were about 3000 mm/yr.
A COMPUTER PROGRAM FOR GENERATING TWO‐DIMENSIONAL FIELDS OF AUTOCORRELATED PARAMETERS
Authors: El‐Kadi Aly I.
Published: May 2007

Abstract. This paper presents a computer program for generating two‐dimensional fields of autocorrelated parameters. The program is written for parameters which are log‐normally distributed such as hydraulic conductivity of aquifers. A specific form for the autocorrelation structure is included. Generating a parameter field represents an important step in the stochastic analysis of ground‐water flow and mass transport via the Monte‐Carlo technique. The program is written in FORTRAN for both the IBM PC and the VAX 11/780 and runs interactively to allow easy use. The program listing as run on the IBM PC is included.
Philosophical Issues Arising from Experimental Economics
Authors: Ernst Zachary
Published: May 2007

Human beings are highly irrational, at least if we hold to an economic standard of ‘rationality’. Experimental economics studies the irrational behavior of human beings, with the aim of understanding exactly how our behavior deviates from the Homo economicus, as ‘rational man’ has been called. Insofar as philosophical theories depend upon rationality assumptions, experimental economics is the source of both problems and (at least potential) solutions to several philosophical issues. This article offers a programmatic and highly biased survey of some of these issues, with the hope of convincing the reader that experimental economics is well‐deserving of careful study by philosophers.
The Search for Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Authors: Hohwy Jakob
Published: May 2007

The science of consciousness begins with the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. I explain this notion and give examples of research in the field. I then discuss how differentconceptionsof consciousness may influence the search for the neural correlates. This includes the distinctions between access and phenomenal consciousness, and between conscious states and unified conscious fields, as well as phenomenological conceptions. Finally, I discuss what finding the neural correlates may imply for themetaphysicsof consciousness, in particular for the theory that conscious states are identical to brain states.
Changes in attitudes toward wildlife and wildlife meats in Hunan Province, central China, before and after the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak
Authors: YANG Daode , DAI Xiaofeng , DENG Yiping , LU Weiquan , JIANG Zhigang
Published: May 2007

Two surveys of opinions about wildlife conservation were carried out in Hunan Province, China, before and after the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Hunan is the northern neighbor of Guangdong Province, where the first SARS case was reported. The custom of consuming wild meat was not common in Hunan 30 years ago. However, in recent years, consumption of wildlife such as snakes has spread to northern China. We handed out 1300 questionnaires between 22 February and 10 May 2002, before the SARS epidemic. Survey sites included the provincial capital, major cities, towns, and villages in Hunan. Another 1300 questionnaires were distributed between 10 March and 10 May 2004, after the SARS epidemic. The 2004 survey covered the same sites as the 2002 survey. Questionnaire recovery rates for the 2002 and 2004 surveys were 81.2% and 84.6%, respectively. The valid return rate was 73.0%. Frog, snake, hare, and pheasant were the wild meats most frequently eaten by local people. At the time of the first survey, more than 80% of interviewees claimed to have eaten frogs. That number had reduced to 60% by the time of the second survey. Monkey, Chinese pangolin, and bear paw were the wild meats least frequently eaten. Although palm civet was suspected to be the carrier of SARS, it was interesting to note that, after the SARS epidemic, the proportion of people surveyed who ate palm civets had declined only slightly. The results of the surveys indicate a low level of conservation consciousness; however, after the SARS and bird flu epidemics, there were obvious changes in the conservation consciousness of people in Hunan Province. We recommend some measures that could be taken to change the habits of people who consume wildlife.
GETTING RELUCTANT SUBSTANCE ABUSERS TO ENGAGE IN TREATMENT/SELF‐HELP: A REVIEW OF OUTCOMES ANDCLINICAL OPTIONS
Authors: Stanton M. Duncan
Published: May 2007

This review examines the results from 19 outcome studies, involving 1,501 cases, within 10 different clinical approaches to getting alcohol or drug abusers to engage in treatment or self‐help. Each approach is summarized and its “success rate(s)” presented. Comparisons are made across various subcategories, such as alcohol vs. drug abusers, adolescents vs. adults, and experimental conditions vs. controls. A distinction is drawn between “Dual‐Purpose” approaches, which combine engagement with counseling of the concerned person who originally sought help for the substance abuser; and “Engagement‐Primary” approaches, which generally confine their efforts (through working with family members and others) to getting the substance abuser into treatment/self‐help. “Best bet” clinical options are presented in terms of which particular approach appears to have the edge with which kind of substance abuser.
Temporal Phase Pluralism*
Authors: BRADDON‐MITCHELL DAVID , WEST CAROLINE
Published: May 2007

Some theories of personal identity allow some variation in what it takes for a person to survive from context to context; and sometimes this is determined by the desires of person‐stages or the practices of communities.

This leads to problems for decision making in contexts where what is chosen will affect personal identity.

‘Temporal Phase Pluralism’ solves such problems by allowing that there can be a plurality of persons constituted by a sequence of person stages. This illuminates difficult decision making problems when persons have to choose between different life‐altering choices.
Two Conceptions of the Physical
Authors: STOLJAR DANIEL
Published: May 2007

The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory‐based conception, it is plausible that (2) is true and (3) is false; on the object‐based conception, it is plausible that (3) is true and (2) is false. the paper also defends and explores the version of physicalism that results from this strategy.
Postmodernism's Use and Abuse of Nietzsche
Authors: GEMES KEN
Published: May 2007

I focus on Nietzsche's architectural metaphor of self‐construction in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche misunderstand his various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving the way for acceptance of a self characterized by fundamental disunity. Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic metaphysics is a call to engage in a purposive self‐creation under a unifying will, a will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to “the problem that we are”. Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that unity is not a pre‐given, however he would disavow their rejection of unity as a goal. Where the postmodernists celebrate “the death of the subject” Nietzsche rejects this valorization of disunity as a form of Nihilism and prescribes the creation of a genuine unified subjectivity to those few capable of such a goal. Postmodernists are nearer Nietzsche's idea of the Last Man than his idea of the Overman.

I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta‐narratives.

Jean‐François Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition.

When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life.”
Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue
Authors: SOBEL JORDAN HOWARD
Published: May 2007

Moral properties would supervene upon non‐moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral properties and their conceptual autonomy from at least total non‐moral properties entail not only for Intuitionists, who ‘knew this all along,’ but for all moral realists, that there are synthetic necessary moral principles? There is for all moral realists the problem of explaining ‘what in the world’makes possible these necessities.
Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness
Authors: HIERONYMI PAMELA
Published: May 2007

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness (proposed by David Novitz in the June 1998 issue of this journal) which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. the account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps.
The Non‐conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain
Authors: KELLY SEAN D.
Published: May 2007

I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non‐conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is non‐conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over‐emphasis on the “fine‐grainedness” of perceptual content ‐a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non‐conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is non‐conceptual. These features are 1) the dependence of a perceived object on the perceptual context in which it is perceived and 2) the dependence of a perceived property on the object it is perceived to be a property of.
Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs
Authors: FEIT NEIL
Published: May 2007

The author presents and defends a general view about belief, and certain attributions of belief, with the intention of providing a solution to Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief. According to the position developed in the paper, there are two senses in which one could be said to have contradictory beliefs. Just one of these senses threatens the rationality of the believer; but Kripke's puzzle concerns only the other one. The general solution is then extended to certain variants of Kripke's original puzzle, which have to do with belief attributions containing empty names and kind terms.
Donnellan on Neptune*
Authors: JESHION ROBIN
Published: May 2007

Donnellan famously argued that while one can fix the reference of a name with a definite description, one cannot thereby have a de re belief about the named object. All that is generated is meta‐linguistic knowledge that the sentence “If there is a unique F. then N is F” is true. Donnellan's argument and the sceptical position are extremely influential. This article aims to show that Donnellan's argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellan's scepticism that the reference‐fixer cannot secure the relevant de re belief faces a serious problem: Millianism about names plus scepticism about the reference‐fixer's de re belief conflicts with what seems to be an analytical thesis about the relationship between semantic content and understanding. The upshot is that the Millian has good reason to seek an alternative to scepticism.
Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification
Authors: LOEB LOUIS E.
Published: May 2007

Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined—though without his remarking on this fact—with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions (not lively ideas), nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise.
On Making Sense (and Nonsense) of Heidegger
Authors: CARMAN TAYLOR
Published: May 2007

Herman Philipse's Heidegger's Philosophy of Being is an attempt to interpret, analyze, and ultimately discredit the whole of Heidegger's thought. But Philipse's reading of the texts is uncharitable, and the ideas he presents and criticizes often bear little resemblance to Heidegger's views. Philipse relies on a crude distinction between “theoretical” and “applicative” interpretations in arguing that Heidegger's conception of interpretation as a kind of projection (Entwurf) is, like the liar's paradox, formally self‐defeating. But even granting the distinction, the charge of reflective incoherence is fallacious and question‐begging. Finally, Philipse advances the astonishing “interpretive hypothesis” that the seemingly morbid existential themes in Being and Time were part of a deliberate “Pascalian strategy” to win converts to Heidegger's own idiosyncratic “postrnonotheist worship of Being.” In short, notwithstanding its nearly comprehensive coverage of Heidegger's works, the book does not represent a sufficiently serious effort to understand the complexities and obscurities of Heidegger's thinking.
Inconsistent Languages
Authors: EKLUND MATTI
Published: May 2007

The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in both conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.
Reliability and the Value of Knowledge*
Authors: RIGGS WAYNE D.
Published: May 2007

Reliabilism has come under recent attack for its alleged inability to account for the value we typically ascribe to knowledge. It is charged that a reliably‐produced true belief has no more value than does the true belief alone. I reply to these charges on behalf of reliabilism; not because I think reliabilism is the correct theory of knowledge, but rather because being reliably‐produced does add value of a sort to true beliefs. The added value stems from the fact that a reliably‐held belief is non‐accidental in a particular way. While it is widely acknowledged that accidentally true beliefs cannot count as knowledge, it is rarely questioned why this should be so. An answer to this question emerges from the discussion of the value of reliability; an answer that holds interesting implications for the value and nature of knowledge.
Vagueness and Margin for Error Principles*
Authors: GÓMEZ‐TORRENTE MARIO
Published: May 2007

Timothy Williamson's potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut‐off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so‐called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation (on the meaning of ‘knowable’) seems to underlie his justification for both kinds of principles. Besides, the margin for error principles of the first kind can be used in the derivation of unacceptable consequences, while the margin for error principles of the second kind can be shown to be compatible with the falsity of epistemicism, under a number of assumptions acceptable to the epistemicist.
Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kan's Moral Philosophy
Authors: GOWANS CHRISTOPHER W.
Published: May 2007

Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework.

After briefly explaining Korsgaard's understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person's practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to “constructivism” and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people's actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it.
Humean and Anti‐Humean Internalism About Moral Judgements1
Authors: Van Roojen Mark
Published: May 2007

Motivational internalism about moral judgements is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgement is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self‐effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context. Such values can only be attained indirectly. After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that Anti‐Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight.
At “Permanent Risk”: Reasoning and Self‐Knowledge in Self‐Deception
Authors: SCOTT‐KAKURES DION
Published: May 2007

In this essay, I defend the following two claims: (1) reflective, critical reasoning is essential to the process of self‐deception; and (2), the process of self‐deception involves a certain characteristic error of self‐knowledge. By appeal to (1) and (2). I hope to show that we can adjudicate the current dispute about the nature of self‐deception between those we might term “traditionalists,” and those we might term “deflationists.”
The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism
Authors: FELDMAN FRED
Published: May 2007

What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, his receipt of that pleasure seem not to make the world better.

It is important to keep in mind that hedonism is a theory about the value of a person's life for the person who lives it, and not for the world or for others. It is also important to distinguish between sensory hedonism and attitudinal hedonism.

“Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism” appears to be immune to objections (a) and (b). A variant appears to be immune to all of them. Perhaps it is the answer to the question about the value of a life.
Greco's Agent Reliabilism
Authors: COHEN STEWART
Published: May 2007

John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.
Color and Similarity1
Authors: BYRNE ALEX
Published: May 2007

Similarity claims about the colors, for instance that blue is more similar to purple than to yellow, are Sometimes held to pose a serious problem for physicalism about color: the view that colors are physical properties of some kind. I examine various responses to this problem, find them wanting, and give my own solution, which appeals to the way colors are visually represented. Finally, I argue that the proposed account removes the principal motivation for Lewis's and Walker's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein, in terms of “natural” properties.
Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism
Authors: KOISTINEN OLLI
Published: May 2007

This paper consists of four sections. The first section considers what the proof of necessitarianism in Spinoza's system requires. Also in the first section, Jonathan Bennett's (1984) reading of lpl6 as involving a commitment to necessitarianism is presented and accepted. The second section evaluates Bennett's suggestion how Spinozamighthave been led to conclude necessitarianism from his basic assumptions. The third section of the paper is devoted to Don Garrett's (1991) interpretation of Spinoza's proof. I argue that Bennett's and Garrett's interpretations of Spinoza's necessitarianism have shortcomings which justify an attempt to offer an alternative proof. In the proof given in the fourth section, it is argued that Spinoza derived necessitarianism from the conjunction of the following principles: (i) necessary existence of the substances; (ii) substance‐property ontology; (iii) superessentialism; and (iv) the ‘no shared attribute’thesis.
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Semantic Self‐Knowledge
Authors: NETA RAM
Published: May 2007

Stephen Schiffer has argued that contextualist solutions to skepticism rest on an implausible “error theory” concerning our own semantic intentions. Similar arguments have recently been offered also by Thomas Hofweber and Patrick Rysiew. I attempt to show how contextualists can rebut these arguments. The kind of self‐knowledge that contextualists are committed to denying us is not a kind of self‐knowledge that we need, nor is it a kind of self‐knowledge that we can plausibly be thought to possess.
Realism and Human Kinds
Authors: THOMASSON AMIE L.
Published: May 2007

It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.
Sympathy, Discernment, and Reasons
Authors: CULLITY GARRETT
Published: May 2007

According to “the argument from discernment”, sympathetic motivation is morally faulty, because it is morally undiscriminating. Sympathy can incline you to do the right thing, but it can also incline you to do the wrong thing. And if so, it is no better as a reason for doing something than any other morally arbitrary consideration. The only truly morally good form of motivation–because the only morally non‐arbitrary one–involves treating an action's lightness as your reason for performing it. This paper attacks the argument from discernment and argues against its conclusion.
Kantian Morals and Humean Motives
Authors: CLARK PHILIP
Published: May 2007

The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.
Rule‐Following and Externalism*
Authors: MILLER ALEXANDER
Published: May 2007

John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's “sceptical paradox” about rule‐following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, 1 argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule‐following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem*
Authors: KLEIN PETER D.
Published: May 2007

There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima facie justified.2 Another reason that some give for rejecting normative foundationalism is that it leads directly to skepticism.3 There is no way, they claim, to move from so‐called basic propositions (typically given as first person introspective reports) to “external world” propositions by employing normatively acceptable principles of reasoning.4 Still others have thought that the invention of a nonrea‐soned reason was as ad hoc as the invention of an unmoved mover.5
Temporally Incongruent Counterparts
Authors: HUDSON HUD
Published: May 2007

Despite its first page this paper is not yet another piece on Kant! Rather, the paper is a contribution to the literature on incongruent counterparts. Specifically, it concerns the question of whether we can construct a temporal version of the puzzle of incongruent counterparts—a question which (as far as 1 can tell) has been thoroughly neglected. I maintain that we can construct such a version of the puzzle, and that this temporal variant on the phenomenon has something to teach us about popular arguments for the possibility (or even actuality) of four‐dimensional space.
Global Supervenience and Dependence1
Authors: BENNETT KAREN
Published: May 2007

Two versions of global supervenience have recently been distinguished from each other. 1 introduce a third version, which is more likely what people had in mind all along. However, I argue that one of the three versions is equivalent to strong supervenience in every sense that matters, and that neither of the other two versions counts as a genuine determination relation. I conclude that global supervenience has little metaphysically distinctive value.
Nondoxastic Perceptual Evidence
Authors: MARKIE PETER J.
Published: May 2007

How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, “[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that 1 see something green?” Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for us that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience.
Indicator Reliabilism
Authors: CHASE JAMES
Published: May 2007

In ‘Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology’Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the primary epistemic norm of believing truths and not falsehoods. A theory of justification along these lines is then given, and its prospects of handling the evil demon objection to reliabilism are assessed.
On the “Gray's Elegy” Argument and its Bearing on Frege's Theory of Sense
Authors: LEVINE JAMES
Published: May 2007

In his recent book, The Metaphysicians of Meaning (2000), Gideon Makin argues that in the so‐called “Gray's Elegy” argument (the GEA) in “On Denoting”, Russell provides decisive arguments against not only his own theory of denoting concepts but also Frege's theory of sense. I argue that by failing to recognize fundamental differences between the two theories, Makin fails to recognize that the GEA has less force against Frege's theory than against Russell's own earlier theory. While I agree with many aspects of Makin's interpretation of the GEA, I differ with him regarding some significant details and present an interpretation according to which the GEA emerges as simpler, stronger, and more integrated.
Imagining Possibilities1
Authors: GREGORY DOMINIC
Published: May 2007

This paper argues that the imaginability of propositions of a certain kind under certain special circumstances implies their possibility. It then attempts to use that conclusion in doing some modal epistemology. In particular, the paper argues that the conclusion justifies some ascriptions of possibility and that it promises to justify some ascriptions of impossibility.
Defeating Dr. Evil with Self‐Locating Belief
Authors: ELGA ADAM
Published: May 2007

Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself is that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self‐locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and self‐locating skeptical hypotheses.
It Adds Up After All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic1
Authors: ANDERSON R. LANIER
Published: May 2007

Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is “contained in” the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. Kant's thesis then amounts to the claim that no concept hierarchy conforming to division rules can express truths like ‘7 + 5=12.’ Kant is correct. Operation concepts (> 7+5 >) bear two relations to number concepts: >7< and >5< are inputs, >12> is output. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic.
Quantification and Realism*
Authors: GLANZBERG MICHAEL
Published: May 2007

This paper argues for the thesis that, roughly put, it is impossible to talk about absolutely everything. To put the thesis more precisely, there is a particular sense in which, as a matter of semantics, quantifiers always range over domains that are in principle extensible, and so cannot count as really being ‘absolutely everything’. The paper presents an argument for this thesis, and considers some important objections to the argument and to the formulation of the thesis. The paper also offers an assessment of just how implausible the thesis really is. It argues that the intuitions against the thesis come down to a few special cases, which can be given special treatment. Finally, the paper considers some metaphysical ideas that might surround the thesis. Particularly, it might be maintained that an important variety of realism is incompatible with the thesis. The paper argues that this is not the case.
Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location1
Authors: Egan Andy
Published: May 2007

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.
Was Hume a Proper Functionalist?
Authors: Meeker Kevin
Published: May 2007

Nicholas Wolterstorff has claimed that David Hume hinted at a proper functionalist account that anticipates the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In this paper, I shall argue that we should refrain from attributing a proper functionalist epistemology to Hume. I shall first raise doubts as to how one could fit a notion of proper functioning into Hume's descriptive project. Next, I shall argue that adopting a proper functionalist epistemology would undermine some of Hume's most famous claims about causal inferences.
Friction Induced Vibrations in Moving Continua and Their Application to Brake Squeal
Authors: Hochlenert Daniel , Spelsberg-Korspeter Gottfried , Hagedorn Peter
Published: May 2007

Considerable effort is spent in the design and testing of disk brake systems installed in modern passenger cars. This effort can be reduced if appropriate mathematical–mechanical models are used for studying the dynamics of these brakes. In this context, the mechanism generating brake squeal in particular deserves closer attention. The present paper is devoted to the modeling of self-excited vibrations of moving continua generated by frictional forces. Special regard is given to an accurate formulation of the kinematics of the frictional contact in two and three dimensions. On the basis of a travelling Euler–Bernoulli beam and a rotating annular Kirchhoff plate with frictional point contact the essential properties of the contact kinematics leading to self-excited vibrations are worked out. A Ritz discretization is applied and the obtained approximate solution is compared to the exact one of the traveling beam. A minimal disk brake model consisting of the discretized rotating Kirchhoff plate and idealized brake pads is analyzed with respect to its stability behavior resulting in traceable design proposals for a disk brake.