bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Nuts, metabolic syndrome and diabetes
Authors: Kendall Cyril W. C. , Josse Andrea R. , Esfahani Amin , Jenkins David J. A.
Published: May 2010

The ability of nuts to improve the blood lipid profile and reduce the risk of CHD is now well established. The interest that health effects of nuts have gained recently has brought the possible benefits of consuming nuts, such as improvement in the conditions of the metabolic syndrome, and their potential to prevent and control diabetes into focus. Results from cohort studies have associated nut consumption with a reduced risk of developing diabetes and CVD. However, few randomised controlled trials have assessed the effect of nuts on diabetes control, and those that have been undertaken have shown improvements in blood lipids but not in the glycaemic control. Diabetes agencies are increasingly recognising the importance of controlling postprandial glycaemia fluctuations. Acute feeding studies indicate that nuts have minimal effects on rising postprandial blood glucose levels when eaten alone, and diminish the postprandial glycaemic response when consumed with high-glycaemic index carbohydrate foods in both normoglycaemic and type 2 diabetic individuals. Nuts have a healthy nutritional profile, high in MUFA and PUFA, are a good source of vegetable protein and are rich in fibre, vitamins and minerals. Incorporation of nuts in the diet may therefore improve the overall nutritional quality of the diet. While more research is required to establish the ability of nuts to improve glycaemic control in the long run, early data indicate that the inclusion of nuts in the diets of individuals with diabetes and the metabolic syndrome is warranted, in view of their potential to reduce CHD risk.
Consistency of vitamin and/or mineral supplement use and demographic, lifestyle and health-status predictors: findings from the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-Heidelberg cohort
Authors: Li Kuanrong , Kaaks Rudolf , Linseisen Jakob , Rohrmann Sabine
Published: May 2010

Cross-sectional studies suggest that dietary supplement use is associated with favourable demographic and lifestyle factors and certain health conditions. However, factors that affect the consistency of supplement use have not been investigated in prospective cohort studies. The aim of the present study was to seek baseline demographic, lifestyle and health-status predictors of subsequent consistent vitamin and/or mineral supplement use. A total of 8968 men and 10 672 women of the European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition (EPIC)-Heidelberg cohort, who answered the supplement-use questions in the baseline survey and two follow-up surveys, were categorised into three groups: consistent, inconsistent and never users. At baseline, 28·5 % of men and 38·6 % of women reported vitamin and/or mineral supplement use. After a median follow-up of 8·5 years, 14·6 % of men and 22·9 % of women were consistent users. During follow-up, 36·0 % of male and 26·6 % of female initial users stopped supplement use, whereas 27·8 % of male and 39·4 % of female initial non-users started supplement use. Women were more likely to be consistent users than men. Older age ( ≥ 50 years), lower BMI ( < 25 kg/m2) and self-reported hyperlipidaemia were common predictors of consistent use for both sexes. Additional predictors included higher educational level for men, and being more physically active and higher lifetime alcohol consumption for women. Consistent users had the highest intake of dairy products, fish, fruits and vegetables, and wine but the lowest intake of total meat. We concluded that supplement use is a fairly unstable behaviour in free-living individuals. Individuals with a favourable lifestyle and healthier diet are more likely to show consistent supplementation.
Functionalism, Homunculi-Heads, and Absent Qualia
Authors: Elugardo Ray
Published: May 2010

It has recently become quite fashionable for one to defend a functionalist theory of mental states. However, as with most trends, functionalism has come under fire in certain philosophical quarters. In this paper, I shall not take up the question of whether any version of functionalism is true. I shall instead discuss a particular objection to a specific brand of functionalism.
Hunter's Thoughts on Sex and Love
Authors: Gallop David
Published: May 2010

This book deserves far more attention from philosophers and from the general public than it has so far received. Perhaps it is too much to hope that the hoary old myths about Philosophy having no practical relevance will ever be completely exploded. But if a sizeable number of thinking adults were to read this succinct and readable work, it might go a long way towards their demolition.
Reply to David Gallop
Authors: Hunter J. F. M.
Published: May 2010

Gallop's criticisms are so extensive and so vigorous that one may wonder how he could mean it when he praises my book in the ways he does at the beginning and end of his notice. In the hope of making it believable that some at least of the praise is deserved, I will try to show that much of the criticism is not as damaging as it may at first appear. Most of what I say will be of a rather general nature, and that is perhaps unfortunate when Gallop has gone into so many interesting questions of detail; but one of my general defences will be that this discussion of particular questions not only does not, but could not, support the objection that the decision procedure that is illustrated in the book is incapable of dealing with all too many of the moral dilemmas an average person is likely to have to face.
La notion de problème moteur principal en contexte de recherche (première partie)
Authors: Lacharité Normand
Published: May 2010

Un problème est dit ici «mouvoir» la recherche, quand c'est sur lui que se concentre l'énergie du chercheur et que c'est son traitement qui fait «avancer» la recherche.

Une entreprise de recherche, une « e-r »,commej'écrirai souvent, est considérée ici comme une unité individuée et je postule qu'il y a toujours au moins un « niveau » où l'on peut se placer pour qu'il soit légitime de considérer une e-r comme une unité individuée.
La genèse de la connaissance selon Aristote
Authors: Brunet Louis
Published: May 2010

Les travaux de Jean Piaget sur le développement cognitif ont largement mis en relief ce que comporte de génétique toute acquisition de connaissance sensible ou intellectuelle. Bien plus: le pere de la psychologie dite justement genetique voit dans la genése, entendue au sens de processus selon lequel le sujet connaissant construit l'objet, ce qui definit essentiellement toute connaissance. On sait que cette these piagetienne s'oppose á l'enseignement d'Aristote, qui conçoit la connaissance comme adaptation sui generis d'une faculte a un objet donne independamment du sujet et voit l'essence du connaitre dans une simple copie des choses, dans un acte ou l'intelligence devient l'objet. Ne serait-ce qu'en raison de cette opposition, on n'aura pas tort de qualifier d'anti-genetique la psychologie de la connaissance d'Aristote. D'autant plus que la psychologie aristotelicienne n'est pas une psychologie scientifique au sens moderne du terme, de sorte qu'on y chercherait en vain des concepts a caractere operationnel tel le concept piagetien de genese. Pourtant, comme cet article tachera de le mettre en evidence, Aristote est loin d'avoir neglige l'aspect genese (sinon au sens piagétien, du moins au sens qui releve de l'experience commune et de la reflexion philosophique) que comporte la connaissance sensible et intellectuelle. Conjointement a ses prises de position sur la nature de la connaissance, on trouve chez Aristote une description des activites sensibles et intellectuelles qui laisse au sujet bien plus d'initiative et s'avere bien plus « genetique » qu'on ne le suppose habituellement.
McTaggart, Mereology, Substance and Change
Authors: Rankin K. W.
Published: May 2010

McTaggart maintained that, without the kind of change (henceforth A-change) which events undergo in passing from the future through the present into the past, how things are would be fundamentally different from how they appear. More particularly

(1) Without A-change there could be no change at all (#311).

(2) Without any change there could be no time (#309).

(3) Without A-change there could be no time (#312).
Names and Indefinite Descriptions in Ontological Arguments
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: May 2010

So begins a recent ontological argument. But what if there are no most perfect beings? Letting God be one, that is, letting “God” name one at the very beginning seems premature. Clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until one is in a position to introduce him by existential instantiation, or, by further argumentation, to identify him with a most perfect being: clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until it has been established that there is a most perfect being.
Justified Inequality?
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: May 2010

The overall objective of my current researches is to formulate and defend a variant of contractarian moral and social theory. Only a contractarian theory is, I claim, compatible with—and indeed required by—the theory of rational choice. I say “a variant” of contractarian theory because, for reasons I sketch in my paper “The Social Contract as Ideology”, there is a deep danger inherent in contractarian theory, the danger that it may be supposed that all human relationships are to be rationalized as contractual. The prevalence of this view—and it is, I believe, increasingly prevalent—would return us to the natural condition of humankind envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, the war of all against all. But this is contractarianism carried to excess; I want to argue, although assuredly not here, that satisfaction of a contractarian requirement is not only rationally necessary, but also necessary if our moral and social practices are to yield that true and complete human sociability integral to any life worth living, and fundamental to a community of free and equal persons.
Peuples sans Etat et sans histoire; réflexions sur le conservatisme et sur Rousseau
Authors: Pestieau Joseph
Published: May 2010

Des contraintes qui relèvent du conformisme moral et idéologique s'imposent là où il n'y a pas de pouvoir étatique. La survie de l'humanité et la culture ne requièrent pas nécessairement l'Etat, contrairement à ce que pensait Hobbes, mais elles ne vont pas sans normes contraignantes. Celles-ci s'imposent d'autant mieux qu'elles paraissent liees à l'ordre du monde. Dans cet article, j'envisagerai d'abord comment les sociétés sans Etat conservent scrupuleusement les coutumes qui les régissent. C'est le conservatisme des traditions qui permet à ces sociétés de se passer d'un pouvoir séparé d'elles-mêmes. C'est leur refus de reconnaître un tel pouvoir qui les oblige au conservatisme. Je verrai ensuite comment Rousseau qui voulait établir un contrat social sans Léviathan, en arrive également à refuser l'évolution historique et à vouloir instituer ou maintenir une organisation sociale et morale capable d'auto-régulation.
Aristotle's Ethics and Plato's Republic: A Structural Comparison
Authors: Sparshott Francis
Published: May 2010

The architectonic of the Nicomachean Ethics, as that has come down to us, corresponds closely to that of Plato's Republic. That the substance of the Aristotelian ethic, both in its main orientations and in the texture of its argumentation, is Platonic through and through, is of course not in dispute. What appears not to have been noticed is the correspondence between the ways in which the two works are organized. The correspondence is so extensive that it seems hard to doubt that Aristotle (or whoever put the Ethics together) hung his work on Plato's armature. If that is the case, much light should be shed on the later project by divergences between the tactics of the two works at the main points of coincidence. On the assumption that the Republic is a highly structured work and the Ethics is not evidently so, the procedure followed is analogous to that recommended and followed by Socrates in the Republic (368D): confronted by two apparently similar messages, one hard and one easy to read, we should read the easy one first and then look to see if the hard one says the same.
Une approche extra-philosophique de l'histoire de la philosophie
Authors: Brisson Luc
Published: May 2010

Inclassable. C'est le qualificatif qui vient à l'esprit de celui qui s'interesse à l'oeuvre de Pierre Vidal-Naquet. Pierre Vidal-Naquet est et se veut avant tout historien. Mais il ne s'agit pas là d'une étiquette qui l'enferme dans une période donnée, dans un genre déterminé. S'attachant à des domaines aussi différents que l'économique, le social, le politique, le religieux et le philosophique, l'intérêt de Pierre Vidal-Naquet va de l'antiquité aux derniers rebondissements de l'actualité, de la Grèce ancienne à la France actuelle et à l'Etat d'Israël.
An Indexical Theory of Conditionals
Authors: Warmbrōd Ken
Published: May 2010

Language theorists have recently come to have an increasing appreciation for the fact that context contributes heavily in determining our interpretation of what is said. Indeed, it now seems clear that no complete understanding of a natural language is possible without some account of the way in which context affects our interpretation of discourse. In this paper, I will attempt to explore one facet of the language – context relationship, namely, the relation between conditionals and context. The first part of the paper develops an account of truth for conditionals which allows them to depend on momentary features of the context in which they are uttered. In the second half of the paper, comparisons with other recent theories of the conditional will be considered. Particular attention will be given to the problem of whether the conditional really violates classical inferences such as Hypothetical Syllogism and Contraposition as has often been claimed in recent years.
Aboriginal Rights: Gauthier's Arguments for Despoilation
Authors: Griffin Nicholas
Published: May 2010

In a recent review David Gauthier presents two arguments designed to support the eminently comforting belief that, while recognizing aboriginal rights in Canada will entail some costs for the dominant European community, these costs will be of a comparatively modest nature, and certainly far less than the sort of compensation currently claimed by the indigenous peoples themselves. Unfortunately for the Europeans, but fortunately for the indigenes, there seems to be no moral justification whatsoever for the arguments he adduces. In fact, the only way his arguments can be made to work is by assuming that radically different sets of moral principles operate for different peoples. As usually happens in such cases, the Europeans get better protection from the moral principles designed for them, than the aborigines do from the principles designed (as it happens, by the Europeans) for them.
Sens et pratique
Authors: Santamaria Ulysses
Published: May 2010

Lorsqu'on pense au rapport qu'entretient la théorie révolutionnaire de Marx avec la philosophie allemande, et plus particulièrement avec l'ldéalisme allemand, on ne s'interroge, le plus souvent, que sur le problème de la Dialectique: l'Idéalisme allemand est réduit « depuis Kant » à la conclusion de ce mouvement philosophique qu'est la philosophie hégélienne. Mais comment critiquer l'Idéalisme de la philosophie hégélienne, tout en conservant le contenu à savoir la dialectique, ou comment faire passer la dialectique du camp de l'ldéalisme à celui du matérialisme? Tel serait l'intérêt d'une étude sur la relation de Marx et de l'Idéalisme allemand, tel pourrait être l'enjeu d'une critique de la philosophie hégélienne.
National Philosophy
Authors: Sparshott F. E.
Published: May 2010

Four years ago, the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada asked Professor T.H.B. Symons, an historian and a former President of Trent University, to undertake a study of “the state of teaching and research in various fields of study relating to Canada at Canadian Universities.” The first two volumes of his report have now been published under the title To Know Ourselves. In his Preface, the President of the AUCC observes that few reports commissioned by his organization have been more eagerly awaited by the university community. That is the ideology of Cloudcuckooland. In reality that community, except that part of it that comprises deans and their assistants and the assistants to the assistants of deans, awaits no report of any body with eagerness: it awaits them rather as our forefathers looked forward to the annual descent of the passenger pigeon, and believes that reading and writing reports unfits a person for teaching and scholarship. But this report is one that takes notice of what we are doing and not doing and urges us to change our ways, and the aspects of our practice it considers are ones which in any case a responsible teacher will from time to time pass under review. Others will read the report, if we do not, and will ask themselves and us how we stand on it: it will become part of the background against which we are judged. So it seems fitting to use this occasion to say something about the report, “Though for no other cause, yet for this: that posterity may know we have not loosely through silence permitted things to pass away as in a dream…”. It is the occasion, and no skill or interest of the speaker, that determines the subject; for by an unhappy accident the office that goes with this address is filled this year by one who has concerned himself less with public policy than any of his recent predecessors. But if the occasion thus leads the speaker to mouth ignorant and disconnected platitudes instead of philosophizing to some purpose, that in itself may serve either to point Professor Symons' moral or to exemplify the bad effects of reports on academic life.
Donnellan's Theory of Names
Authors: Canfield John V.
Published: May 2010

Keith S. Donnellan and, independently, Saul Kripke have presented counterxamples to that fregean theory of proper names associated with Strawson, Searle and others. As well, Donnellan has put forward a rival theory to the Fregean one. It is not fully worked out, and is obscure; but it is not empty and, in contrast to Kripke's positive account of names, is not meant to be a mere “picture”.
Performative and Existential Self-Verifyingness
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: May 2010

I think I am not alone in being troubled on whether existen-tial self-verifyingness and performative self-verifyingness are really two distinct concepts, or what the difference exactly between them is supposed to be as they are utilized by Hintikka in his celebrated analysis of Descartes' cogito argument. My attempts to classify and clarify some permutations on these concepts may therefore be of general interest, given the acknowledged importance of Hintikka's analysis.
Scepticism and Hegelian Science
Authors: Webb Thomas R.
Published: May 2010

One of the greatest difficultiess in the understanding Hegel is the notorious obscurity of his terminology. Even a sympathetic reader faces the problems that in seeking clarification of one term he is led to another which is equally obscure and which often presupposes an understanding of the first. But Hegel himself described the structure of his system as circular and stressed the contextual nature of his terminology. Indeed, he insisted that only a philosophy which is so structured could be worthy of the name “science.” The difficulty in understanding Hegel is thus not merely a terminological one. It is primarily the difficulty of understanding why Hegel conceived philosophical science as he did, and why the problems which confront Hegel's enterprise arise in the first place. For unless we can make the problems of the Hegelian philosophy our own, in the minimal sense of understanding why they arise, our appreciation of Hegel will be limited to “the repetition and inspired variation of Hegel's theses or their criticism from a distance which blurs their structures.” What is needed is an “unscientific” introduction to Hegelian science which provides insight into the motivation for Hegel's standpoint precisely because it does not presuppose it. Hegel himself suggested that such an introduction could be found in scepticism. However, Hegel declined to provide a sceptical introduction to science on the grounds that it would be unscientific. For Hegel, the path to science was already science.
La conscience de l'observateur: de la physique théorique à la logique mathématique
Authors: Provençal Yvon
Published: May 2010

Cet article a pour but de faire connaître au lecture une approche théorique de la réalité physique différente de celle communément admise depuis les débuts de la science physique. On y montre d'abord comment l'approche traditionnelle traite avec une notion de l'événement physique et des étres physiques en ǵenéral qui laisse systématiquement de côté ces éléments de complexité considérés trop facilement comme superflus, mais qui appartiennent à la réalité physique et en constituent la trame. On proposera alors une nouvelle approche qui s'avérera complémentaire de l'approche traditionnelle, en mettant en jeu la notion d'événement singulier, caractérisé par son unicité dans l'espace-temps tout comme un fait historique muni de toute sa richesse factuelle qui est la base de son individualité.
Indétermination de la traduction et indétermination de la référence: quelques remarques sur les quatre premiers essais du recueil Ontological Relativity
Authors: Largeault Jean
Published: May 2010

Pour notre excuse, Quine est un auteur difficile. Si la version française de Word and Object (en abrégé WO), annoncée chez Payot, est correcte, elle rendra service, car il est malaisé de lire Quine dans le texte.
Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: May 2010

Maximizers in isolated Prisoner's Dilemmas are doomed to frustration. But in Braybrooke's view maximizers might do better in a series, securing Pareto-optimal arrangements if not from the very beginning, at least eventually. Given certain favourable special conditions, it can be shown according to Braybrooke and shown even without question-begging motivational or value assumptions, that in a series of Dilemmas maximizers could manage to communicate a readiness to reciprocate, generate thereby expectations of reciprocation, and so give rise to optimizing reciprocations which, in due course, would reinforce expectations, the net result of all this being an increasingly stable practice to mutual benefit. In this way neighbours could learn to be good neighbours: they could learn to respect each other's property, to engage in reciprocal assistance, and perhaps even to make and keep promises covering a range of activities. So maximizers are, Braybrooke holds, capable of a society of sorts. Out of the ashes they might build something. But even under favourable conditions they could not build much and most conditions would defeat them almost entirely, for many-person Dilemmas whether isolated or in series would be quite beyond them, question-begging motivational assumptions aside. In settings at all like those in which we live, utility maximization assuming only ‘traditional’ motivation is self-defeating without remedy, and most certainly not an adequate basis for social life.' The probable inference from as a conception of individual rationality: for surely truly rational agents would be if not perfectly well designed at least better designed for communal living than utility maximizers would be assuming only ‘traditional’, non-question-begging values or motivation. Or, if this inference is denied and maximization is not challenged as a conception of rationality, we can conclude instead, Braybrooke has more recently suggested (p. 34, this issue), that the advice, ‘Be rational,’ is incomplete, and when addressed to groups should be supplemented by, ‘And be somewhat ‘untraditional’ in your values; respect at least some rules that would make coordination and cooperation possible even in many-person interaction problems.’
La Critique de la philosophie de l'État de Hegel par K. Marx
Authors: Lafrance Yvon
Published: May 2010

Le manuscrit sur la Critique de la philosophie de l'État de Hegel fédigé par Marx à l'été de 1843 est demeuré inconnu de la tradition marxiste jusqu'en 1922, date ou le savant russe, David Rjazanov, l'a decouvert dans les archives du Parti Social-Démocrate à Berlin. Dans l'édition critique allemande de Dietz, le texte occupe 130 pages. II s'agit d'un texte ardu, difficile, voire meme rébarbatif. Marx recopie les paragraphes 261–313 de la Philosophic du Droit de Hegel pour en faire une critique détailléè, quelquefois brillante, souvent obscure et nebuleuse. Le texte peut etre divisé en quatre parties: la critique de la conception générate de l'État (Par. 261–274), la critique de la monarchic (Par. 275–286), du pouvoir exécutif (Par. 287–297) et du pouvoir legislatif (Par. 298–313). Mais comme l'écrit Marx dans une lettre en date du 5 mars 1842 à Arnold Ruge «le fond en est la réfutation de la monarchie constitutionnelle comme une chose bâtarde, contradictoire et qui se condamne elle-même». Notre propos prendra appui sur la premiere partie du texte, mais les conclusions auxquelles nous arriverons pourront s'étendre a l'ensemble du manuscrit.
Remarks on Bertoldi's Time in the Phenomenology of Perception
Authors: Joos Ernest
Published: May 2010

In the Dialogue of December 1974, Eugene F. Bertoldi presents an analysis of Merleau-Ponty's dialectic of time. His article is stimulating and I am tempted to raise several issues, but in the context of this discussion I would limit myself to the dialectic of time only. Bertoldi concludes his investigation with the following criticism: “…Merleau-Ponty's investigation fails to achieve its stated goals: more specifically, as a result of the foregoing criticism, it becomes evident that the dialectical form of the investigation should be abandoned in favour of a rigorous phenomenological explication of temporal ex- perience…” (p. 785)
La métaphore vivede Paul Ricoeur
Authors: Brisson Luc
Published: May 2010

Ce Livre de P. Ricoeur constitue, en fait, comme son titre l'indique une prise de position contre ceux qui, à l'instar de J. Derrida, font des concepts philosophiques des métaphores mortes, abolissant ainsi la spécificité du discours philosophique. Á la métaphore morte, «celle qui ne se dit pas, mais qui se dissimule dans la «releve» du concept qui se dit», P. Ricoeur oppose la metaphore vive qu'il définit ainsi: «La métaphore n'est pas vive seulement en ce qu'elle vivifie un langage constitué. La métaphore est vive en ce qu'elle inscrit l'élan de l'imagination dans un « penser plus » au niveau du concept. » Les positions sont done claires: d'un côté, la métaphore morte qui dissout le discours philosophique, et de 1'autre, la métaphore vive qui en constitue le fondement dynamique.
Philosophie silencieuse ou Philosophie muette: (À propos du dernier ouvrage de J.T. Desanti)
Authors: Gauthier Yvon
Published: May 2010

Ne Fait Pas taire qui veut la philosophic à moins d'être sourd… Ou encore la philosophie est silencieuse qui ne parle plus à personne. On aurait bien du mal à faire renaÎtre la voix de ces philosophies de la science que Desanti n'a pas de peine ' étouffer dans son dernier ouvrage où sont recueillis quelques textes auparavant disséminés dans des revues ou encyclopédies.
Entre la sociologie comprehénsive et la sociologie behavioriste
Authors: Kaufmann J. N.
Published: May 2010

Une Théorie générale de l'action est-elle possible? Voilà une question dont l'examen permettra de réfléchir sur l'état de l'élaboration théorique en sociologie qui voudrait éviter des positions extrêmes et qui se cherche dès lors une nouvelle voie notamment entre une sociologie compréhensive de type phénoménologique et une sociologie positiviste de type behavioriste. Pour des raisons évidentes, il ne sera pas possible de traiter le thème par rapport à l'ensemble des travaux disponibles le concernant. On pourra par contre prendre à témoin un auteur qui passe aujourd'hui pour le théoricien en sociologie. II s'agit de Talcott Parsons. Pourquoi Talcott Parsons?
The Consistency of Hume's Position Concerning Women
Authors: Lacoste Louise Marcil
Published: May 2010

As Professor Burns has shown, even though Hume did not offer an explicit, exhaustive treatment of “The Women Question”, there are many (and, I would add, much more than three) passages in which he explains principles or facts related to the status of women. Generally speaking, and on this I fully agree with Professor Burns, the “Humean Female” qualifies as an expression of what we call today a male chauvinist position.
Joseph Margolis: Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Nonreductive materialism
Authors: Churchland Paul M.
Published: May 2010

As the sixteenth Century drew to a close, the human race teetered at the brink of an unprecedented intellectual revolution. The Aristotelean conception of a small, spherical, Earth-centered cosmos ceased to confine the imagination of an increasing number of thinkers; the recently proposed Copernican system, problematic though it was, sketched a provocative alternative with some real explanatory advantages (e.g., its uniform explanation of the existence, amount, and timing of retrograde motions); and distinct intellectual currents converged in the growing search for a new dynamics that would encompass at once all motion, superlunary and sublunary. In the event, the cosmology, the planetary astronomy, and the dynamics finally came together in Newton's uniquely coherent synthesis, and by the dawn of the eighteenth century we had exchanged the dubious comfort of Aristotle's enveloping egg for the more chilling contemplation of a spatially infinite universe.
An Interpretation of Part of the Transcendental Deduction
Authors: Dryer D. P.
Published: May 2010

No one should be put off from reading Miles' Logik undMetaphysik bei Kant by his telling us that he is following the ‘phenomenological-philological method’ Heidegger practiced, as shown in his Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, his earliest work on Kant and his last to be published. I do not claim to understand Miles' conception of this method. Whatever it be, what Miles actually presents is a careful examination of a number of crucial passages in Kant's first Critique in Kantian terms. From it even the most seasoned student of the Critique will find light.
Pourquoi faut-il qu'Émile soit borné?
Authors: Marcil-Lacoste Louise
Published: May 2010

Dans les études consacrées aux écrits politiques et éducatifs de Rousseau, on a beaucoup insisté sur la loi qui commande son anthropologie, à savoir que l'altérité corrompt. Cependant, on a moins insisté sur une notion fondamentale de cette anthropologie, celle des bornes et des places, ce qui explique un certain nombre de malentendus quant au caractère plus ou moins pessimiste ou conser vateur des écrits de Rousseau. Pourtant, un lien existe entre la loi de l'altérité et le concept des bornes, car ne corrompt chez Rousseau que le type de comparaisons qui refusent l'ordre d'un tout et qui, de ce fait, situent l'individualité et l'altérité en dehors de leurs bornes.
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting
Authors: Hooker C.A.
Published: May 2010

The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited in scope – roughly, to intertheoretic reduction among empirical theories – and informal in presentation – not least because a satisfying formal account of theories has yet to be offered. And despite the length, the treatment is still condensed; often corroborating and/or intuitively helpful detail has had to be consigned to footnotes or omitted. I approach the problem from within my own naturalistic realist philosophy of science and formal analysis of abstract hierarchy in theory. The sources for the former are [25], [29], [31], and [32] and those for the latter essentially [27] and [30]. Hierarchical notions played a significant role in the already published [34].
Kant and Direct Duties
Authors: Broadie Alexander , Pybus Elizabeth M.
Published: May 2010

The Aim of this paper is to argue the case for a moral philosophical doctrine which, while Kantian in spirit and in much of its detail, permits an easier accommodation with certain widely held moral judgments than Kant's theory allows. The point at issue is Kant's doctrine of direct duties, namely, that any duty is ultimately to a person; indirectly a duty may be to a non-person, but if the duty in question has moral force it is by virtue of the fact that it is sanctioned or underpinned by a duty to a person. To take a conspicuous example: Kant does not believe animals to be persons, for he holds that a person is essentially rational and that animals lack rationality. Yet he accepts that we have certain duties with regard to animals, in particular a duty not to maltreat them. Kant's solution to this problem is to say that our real duties are to persons, and that it is by virtue of our duties to persons that we are morally required to set restrictions on our behaviour towards animals. It is for the sake of people that we must be kind to animals and never treat them cruelly.
Splitting the Difference: Killing and Letting Die
Authors: Walton Douglas N.
Published: May 2010

Routinely, in Arriving at decisions on what treatments to recommend in intensive care wards, the moral presumption is that there is an intrinsic difference between the positive duty to save lives and the negative duty not to take lives. The discontinuation of treatment – say stopping chemotherapy or removing a ventilator – is thought of as a “negative” action, an allowing to die, not “positively”, say as an act of suicide by the patient, or a killing by the hospital staff. But the distinction between “positive” and “negative” here, despite its grave ethical import, is elusive and difficult to grasp firmly. St. Anselm of Canterbury was fond of citing the trickiness of the distinction between “to do” (facere) and “not to do” (non-facere). In answer to the question “What's he doing?” we say “He's just sitting there.” (positive), really meaning something negative: “He's not doing anything at all.” Sometimes the “negative” action is described in “positive” terms, or vice versa, and that makes one wonder if the distinction might be somehow trivial, a bit of jesuitry too insubstantial to bear much serious ethical weight.
Inference and Conditional Knowledge
Authors: Dayton Eric
Published: May 2010

It is often said that knowledge is justified true belief. But when is a belief justified? Again, it is often said, that belief is justified when it is entailed by something I know. As a definition of knowledge, this account is circular and generates a regress. So much then for justified true belief. Still, knowledge must certainly be true and believed, so – grasping at straws – we ask whether some kinds of beliefs may be known without justification. As the history of epistemology shows, this question is more dangerous than a mine field, and many philosophers have thrown up their hands and gone on to knitting or backgammon.
Sociobiology and Materialist Theories of Mind
Authors: Prado C.G.
Published: May 2010

I Want to argue in this paper that the optimism with respect to scientific development that has been shown by materialists since Place and Smart is in the process of being vindicated. What I shall attempt is to indicate one way in which the fledgling science of sociobiology complements Central State materialism. A secondary objective is to get philosophers to take sociobiology seriously, even if they are not materialists.
Commerce et diplomatie dans des sociétés sans Léviathan
Authors: Pestieau Joseph
Published: May 2010

Dans cet article, j'envisagerai quelques voies par lesquelles des sociétés dites primitives surent éviter et la soumission à l'État et la guerre généralisée.

On comprend que pour opposer un front commun à leurs ennemis, des hommes soient amenés à s'allier et, pour ce faire, échangent de bons precédés, des biens et des femmes. Ainsi, les nécessités de la guerre entraîneraient la formation d'alliances.
Peirce and Rescher on Scientific Progress and Economy of Research
Authors: Goudge Thomas A.
Published: May 2010

Charles Peirce had a flair for asking fruitful questions and for proposing answers that did not block the way of inquiry. Typical examples occur in his philosophy of science where he raises issues that are still very much alive. They include such items as the nature and conditions of scientific progress, the grounds of human success in formulating theories, the completability of scientific knowledge, and the limits imposed by the economy of research. Because these are living issues, Peirce's ideas about them invite examination as if he were our philosophical contemporary. Nicholas Rescher so examines them in his compact, timely book. His treatment is sympathetic but by no means uncritical, as might have been expected in view of the similarities and differences between his own position of methodological pragmatism and the pragmaticism of Peirce. The ensuing discussion thus seems to me worth looking at in a bit of detail.
The Principle of Continuity and the Evaluation of Theories
Authors: Seager William
Published: May 2010

Perhaps the Clearest and most impressive use of the Principle of Continuity by Leibniz in the evaluation of a theory is that offered in refutation of the Cartesian laws of motion, as given in his Critical Remarks Concerning the General Part of Descartes' Principles. With regard to the Cartesian laws of impact Leibniz says:

On Article 49. Rule 4. If B, which is moving, is smaller than C, which is at rest, B will be reflected with the velocity it had before the shock while C will remain at rest.
Taking Reflective Equilibrium Seriously
Authors: Cooper W.E.
Published: May 2010

In the essay “Justice and Rights” of his bookTaking Rights SeriouslyRonald Dworkin puts forward an account of reflective equilibrium which has become an orthodoxy in interpreting John Rawls' theory of justice. My purpose here is to challenge this account, on the grounds that it presupposes an untenable view of the relation between belief and choice.
Taine: positiviste ou idéaliste?
Authors: Desan Philippe
Published: May 2010

A part l'ouvrage de Colin Evans qui date de 1975, nous pouvons dire que, de 1950 à nos jours, pratiquement rien n'a été publié sur la pensée de Taine. De 1880 à 1950, la question, pour les critiques de Taine, fut de savoir si ce dernier devait être classé parmi les positivistes ou les idéalistes. Tous ces auteurs, eux-mêmes influencés par l'incompatibilité intellectuelle entre Allemands et Anglais déjà constatée par Taine, se sont efforcés de placer Taine dans un de ces deux groupes et de démontrer que c'était bien là sa place.
Wittgenstein and the Logic of Inference
Authors: Zwicky Jan
Published: May 2010

TheTractatusfirst appeared in 1921, the same year that Post's “Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions” appeared in theAmerican Journal of Mathematics. As the latter is the first piece clearly to present and exploit the distinction between a deductive system and a truth-functional interpretation of such a system, we may conclude that Wittgenstein's views had been arrived at somewhat before a variety of logical concepts had received the clarification and refinement incipient on the now taken-for-granted distinction between proof and model theory. One such concept, of considerable interest to Wittgenstein, was that of inference. The following constitutes an attempt to explicate his notion. In particular, I shall attempt to show that his repudiation of “laws of inference” is closely tied to his rejection of logical constants; and that both can be seen as the product of what might be termed a “metaphysics of completeness”—before, of course, any (presently recognizable) notion of completeness had achieved a measure of precision or currency.
The Argument of the Protagoras
Authors: Cobb William S.
Published: May 2010

It is widely assumed that the arguments tendered by Sokrates in the Protagoras involve serious logical fallacies. My contention is that this view is mistaken, and I shall argue that Sokrates makes no significant logical errors in this dialogue. I shall begin with a few general assertions about the dialogue as a dramatic whole, since I believe that a grasp of the general theme and character of the dialogue is essential for understanding the argumentation.
On the Supposed Indispensability of Deception in Social Psychology
Authors: Patten Steven C.
Published: May 2010

In 1977 the Consultative Group on Ethics with Respect to Research Involving the Use of Human Subjects submitted its report to the Canada Council. Shortly thereafter the report was published under the title Ethics: Report of the Consultative Group on Ethics. Upon publication it was distributed to academic institutions in Canada with an invitation for reaction and response.
«L'espèce de cercle dont, à ce qu'il semble, il n'y a pas moyen de sortir”
Authors: Laberge Pierre
Published: May 2010

Dans le troisième paragraphe de la troisième section de la Grundlegung, Kant dénonce une «espèce de cercle dont, à ce qu'il semble, il n'y a pas moyen de sortir» (450, 18–19, 187). Indispensable à l'interprète de cette section, l'identification de ce cercle s'annonce cependant difficile. En effet, l'objet du débat, la justification de l'éthique, suggère déjà des cercles possibles. On n'évitera donc d'en prêter trop rapidement, par respect ou par vanité, la dénonciation à Kant qu'en s'accrochant à ses ipsissima verba: «Nous nous supposons libres dans l'ordre des causes efficientes afin de nous concevoir dans l'ordre des fins sous (unter) des lois morales, et nous nous concevons ensuite soumis (unterworfen) à ces lois parce que nous nous sommes attribué (beigelegt haben) la liberté de la volonté» (450, 19–23, 187).
Grammaire et Logique: Une théorie archaïque des relations
Authors: Auroux Sylvain
Published: May 2010

Le Thème de cet article est assez vaste : il s'agit de reconsidérer un des lieux communs de l'épistémologie historique des sciences du langage concernant les rapports de la logique et de la grammaire générale. Nous le restreindrons en étudiant seulement l'état auquel parvient cette dernière discipline dans l'œuvre de Nicolas Beauzée (1717–1789), collaborates important de l'Encyclopédie de Diderot et d'Alembert ; sa Grammaire Générale (1767) constitue sans doute la perfection du genre inauguré par Port-Royal.
Piaget et Kuhn sur l'evolution de la connaissance: une comparaison
Authors: Gagnon Maurice
Published: May 2010

Les Œuvres respectives de Piaget et de Kuhn sont des études sur l'évolution d'un certain type de connaissance: la connaissance enfantine chez Piaget, la physique et la chimie chez Kuhn. Dans les deux cas, on essaie d'analyser les facteurs qui déterminent les changements des contenus de la connaissance, et les relations qui existent entre ces divers contenus successifs. Il nous semble qu'une comparaison de ces deux études révèle des convergences intéressantes pour la théorie de la connaissance.
Abortion and Tinkering
Authors: Schedler George , Kelly Matthew J.
Published: May 2010

Recent defences of abortion on demand have located the morally relevant difference between normal adult human beings and non-viable fetuses in the possession of personhood by the former but not by the latter. It is, so the story goes, morally wrong to kill innocent human beings because they are persons, but non-viable fetuses, though they be biologically human, are nevertheless not persons and may therefore be killed without doing anything morally wrong.
Analysing with Subjunctives
Authors: MacKenzie Nollaig
Published: May 2010

It would not be surprising to find a philosopher deploying subjunctive conditionals in defence of a position or as part of an analysis of a concept. One might defend the view that events in the far past, or objects on the other side of the moon, are observable in principle by pointing out that if an observer had been present, or if an observer were on the other side of the moon, he would have made, or would make, certain observations. Similarly, someone might argue that a statement to the effect that there are mountains on the other side of the moon simply means “If there were an observer on the other side of the moon, he would have such and such experiences” (no doubt the claim would be that this subjunctive and many others gave the meaning of the original statement). In the same vein, one might argue that “x wants Φ” means “If such and such were the case, x would do A”.
Reflexive Consciousness
Authors: Prado C. G.
Published: May 2010

A persistent and objectionable claim is that there are states of consciousness attainable wherein there is consciousness of consciousness per se through the absence or diminution of the ordinary objects of consciousness or awareness. The claim is made by phenomenologists, religious thinkers and mystics, and some psychologists.
The Categories and Aristotle's Ontology
Authors: Matthen Mohan
Published: May 2010

What were Aristotle's aims in theCategories? We can probably all agree that he wanted to say something about different uses of the verb ‘to be’ – something relevant to ontology. The conventional interpretation goes further: it has Books Γ and Z of theMetaphysicssuperseding theories put forward in theCategories. We should expect then that theCategoriesand these books of theMetaphysicstry to do the same sort of thing. Most exegetes do indeed ascribe to the earlier work fairly elaborate ontologies, though they are in disagreement as to what theory Aristotle held while writing it. I shall argue in this paper that the whole enterprise of reconstructing the ontology of theCategoriesfrom its small stock of clues is misguided; that the business of theCategoriesis to set out data for which theMetaphysicstries to account. This view is not without consequences relevant to some widely held theses. I shall claim that the differences between theCategoriesand theMetaphysicscannot uncritically be used to trace the development of Aristotle's ontology, that the differences between the two doctrines has been greatly exaggerated. More of this later: let me first explain the distinction on which I shall depend.
Où est la vérité?
Authors: Franck Robert
Published: May 2010

En Europe au seizième siècle, la vérité siège dans l'Autorité. Mais à l'aube du dix-septième siècle elle vient s'établir du côté de la Raison de l'Homme, et choisit la Nature pour seconde résidence. Prenant goût à la Nature, la vérité finit par s'y loger pour de bon. Mais aujourd'hui on ne sait plus où la trouver. Et certains pensent qu'il est devenu désuet de la chercher.
La violence et l'idéologie
Authors: Reboul Olivier
Published: May 2010

Violence, Idéologie: les deux termes ont au moins ceci de commun qu'on les emploie à propos de tout, c'est à dire finalement de rien. Si l'on met dans le même bateau l'agent de police et le tortionnaire, l'enseignement de l'instituteur et le lavage de cerveau, on accuse tout le monde et Ton excuse tout le monde ! Si tout est idéologie, il n'y a plus d'idéologie. Si tout est violence, la violence n'est plus rien du tout.