bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Optimal EEG Segmentation for Microsleep Detection Based on Machine Learning
Authors: Pauli Martin Patrick , Pohl Constantin , Golz Martin
Published: September 2022

Paroxysmal brain state changes, such as microsleep events in drivers, are presumably subcortically induced and accompanied by cortical processes. This raises questions of how stable and persistent are the cortical processes that can be observed with EEG in real time. For this purpose, recordings of four night-driving simulation studies including 79 subjects are used to analyze how large the time window and how the temporal offset of the EEG segment must be to achieve maximum classification rate. From each EEG segment, power spectral densities were estimated using modified periodogram method and averaged in narrow spectral bands. They were then processed using gradient boosting machines in order to map them to one of two brain state types: microsleep or sustained attention. Segment length and offset were found to have moderate and dramatic effects on recognition rate, respectively.
Scaling Methods of the Pelvis without Distortion for the Analysis of Bone Defects
Authors: Micheler Carina M. , Lang Jan J. , Wilhelm Nikolas J. , Lazic Igor , Hinterwimmer Florian , Fritz Christian , Eisenhart-Rothe Rüdiger von , Zäh Michael F. , Burgkart Rainer H. H.
Published: September 2022

For the development of new types of hip implants for acetabulum revision, it is beneficial to analyse the acetabular defects of the indication group in advance. In order to be able to specially compare the bone defects with each other, a normalisation and accompanying scaling of the pelvis is necessary. Uniform scaling is required so that the bone structures are not distorted. In the following study, three scaling methods based on the minimal bounding box and sphere principle are compared with a method using 14 landmarks on the pelvis.The landmark method is applied to determine the true scaling factor. For the comparison of the different methods, 40 female pelvic models with an acetabular defect are analysed. In the comparison of the scaling methods, the method using minimal bounding spheres shows the least deviation from the landmark method (mean difference 3.30 ± 2.17 %). Due to the fact that no preprocessing (definition of the landmarks) is required and the fast implementation of the algorithm, the minimal bounding sphere is to be preferred to the landmark method for a fast size estimation.
A Dedication to Classics Scholarship
Authors: Liu Jiahe , Tong Xue
Published: September 2022

Classics scholarship was discontinued during China’s pre-modern era and in the recent century or more its value has yet to be recognized and rehabilitated. The paper examines the issue in four segments, with the expectation to provide a contribution to its revival. (a) A tentative exegesis of classics scholarship. The Chinese word jing (“classics,” “canons,” or “sutra”) refers to the constant Dao (Way); it may also serve as a verb meaning “to regulate” or “to govern.” The same is true with classics scholarship, which denotes the study of Confucian classics. Of the Six Classics, The Book of Songs, The Book of History, and The Book of Rites form the kernel of canonical Confucian texts. (b) The rise and fall of classics scholarship and its historical lessons. In ancient China, classics scholarship underwent six stages of development, before it suffered two fatal blows, respectively during the New Cultural Movement (early 20th century) and during the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976). History has taught us that classics scholarship can be used but not overexploited. (c) Rationalism and tradition. Tradition is by no means the enemy of reason. Whereas the Western Enlightenment thinkers pitted tradition against reason, Chinese classics scholarship, exhibits historical reason, which is exemplified by the historical necessity of all of its specific traditions. (d) The significance of contemporary classics scholarship. China’s cultural genes are deeply rooted in classics scholarship. The two major concepts of classics scholarship: Ren and Li complement each other, bringing harmony and unity to Chinese society. Classics scholarship should involve study of ancient texts, phonology, semantics, as well as history, and undertake the mission to resist unilateralism and clash of civilizations.
A Review of Classicism, the Imperial Civil Examination System, and Cultural History: Selected Works of Benjamin A. Elman
Authors: Bei Chengxi
Published: September 2022

In his personal collection of writings titled Classicism, the Imperial Civil Examination System, and Cultural History: Selected Works of Benjamin A. Elman, Elman reveals the cultural-historical orientation of his research on classicism and imperial examinations. Through his own “contextualization” research, Elman re-examines the changing of the academic paradigmatic shift of Chinese classicism and the shift in the themes and content of the Imperial Civil Examination System. He discovers that the popularity of textology dispelled the ideology shaped by Neo Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, which contributed to the ideological liberation and scientific consciousness of scholars in the Qing Dynasty. The Imperial Civil Examination System, as an institution that shaped the value identity of the cultural elite, also showed the gradual dismantling of the dominant discourse in the Qing Dynasty. The thematic changes also indicated the gradual deconstruction of the dominant discourse of the Qing, and the abolition of the Imperial Civil Examination System signified the collapse of imperial ideology. Ultimately, Elman reflects on the role of Confucianism, concluding that it was involved in the complex transformation of China from ancient times to the present, and that its own vicissitudes played a crucial role in the turn of China’s modernization.
The Confucian Ethics Curriculum in Singapore
Authors: Neo Peng Fu
Published: September 2022

In Singapore, the Confucian Ethics Curriculum was introduced between 1984 and 1992 as an elective subject of the moral education curriculum for secondary three and four students. The Singapore government put the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore (“the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore”, hereinafter referred to as “CDIS”) under the Ministry of Education in charge of developing a set of textbooks called Confucian Ethics and training teachers to teach them in schools. The textbooks were used in all secondary schools nationwide to fulfill the objective of teaching Confucianism. The attempt of systematic introduction of Confucianism to students as young as 15 or 16 years old through a formal curriculum in the public education system by the state is probably rare even in current Chinese societies, not to mention that the project was implemented nearly 40 years ago. The introduction of this curriculum in Singapore is of some significance for the preservation and promotion of Confucianism. This paper examines the Chinese textbooks of the curriculum in terms of background, objectives, systems, content, characteristics, and inspiration for future generations.
Sind Wissenschaftstreibende für die Verwertung ihrer Forschungsergebnisse verantwortlich?
Authors: Neumaier Otto
Published: September 2022

Are Scientists responsible for the usage of the results of their research? Scientists belong to the most favourite group of people who are declared to be responsible for many various things. On the other hand, there is severe disagreement with regard to the question what it is that scientists are responsible for. According to some people, scientific responsibility essentially covers the correct acquisition, processing and publication of information, whereas others make scientists responsible for almost all consequences of their research, even if they cannot influence them. This disagreement is exemplified by the attitudes towards Otto Hahn’s research on nuclear fission which range from blaming him for the development of the nuclear bomb to acquitting him from any responsibility because of the (alleged) lack of knowledge on the possible consequences of his research. In order to (dis-) solve this problem it is necessary to formulate clearly the conditions for ascribing responsibility to someone. By doing so, it is shown in the present paper, (i) that it is indeed possible to ascribe to scientists responsibility for certain consequences of their research (including the usage of its results), and (ii) that, as a matter of fact, it is implausible to make Hahn responsible for the nuclear bomb, but that it isn’t justified either to regard him as a kind of “naive country scientist”, because there is a lot of information he could and should have had as a (responsible) scientist.
“Ontology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Nihilism. Essay on Nietzsche and Heidegger”
Authors: Daigle Christine
Published: September 2022

When one undertakes research on Nietzsche, a confrontation with Heidegger’s interpretation of his philosophy is almost unavoidable. Widely known, particular and influent, this interpretation is nevertheless problematic and its analysis, particularly of its occurence in Holzwege, leads to a questionning of the generally admitted notions of ontology, metaphysics, ethics, and nihilism. These notions are an integral part of the philosophical vocabulary and never seem to pose a problem. I am claiming here that, although they might seem quite univoqual and clear, these terms do pose a problem, at least when one wants to analyse Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. I will divide this paper according to the following plan. I will begin by presenting Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche as it appears in Holzwege. This interpretation will lead us to the first question: how to define “ontology”, “metaphysics”, and “ethics” and how to relate them. From this question, and its tentative answer, I will move to the question of Heidegger’s possible nihilism. This discussion will lead us to another question: what is nihilism exactly? With my answer to this question, the circle will be closed and I will determine whether there is nihilism in Nietzsche, as Heidegger claims
From the indirect confirmation of theories to theory unification
Authors: Moretti Luca
Published: September 2022

Theory unification is a central aim of scientific investigation. In this paper, I lay down the sketch of a Bayesian analysis of the virtue of unification that entails that the unification of a theory has direct implications for the confirmation of the theory’s logical consequences and for its prior probability. This shows that scientists do have epistemic, and not just pragmatic, reasons to prefer unified theories to non-unified ones
Über die Voraussetzungen der Erfahrungserkenntnis aus der Sicht des Operationalismus
Authors: Essler Wilhelm K.
Published: September 2022

It is shown that-at least in contemporary physics-the single measuring results are completely irrelevant w.r.t. testing a metric law. As a consequence, laws are neither gained by induction nor rejected by falsification. Even statistical generalizations of measuring values, when-in the sense of some philosophers-falsifying laws are not always regarded as falsifying instances by physicists
Must We Know What We Mean?
Authors: Cheng Kuang-Ming
Published: September 2022

In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses- that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean.
Virtue Foundherentism
Authors: Lightbody Brian
Published: September 2022

Foundherentism is a new and promising theory of epistemic justification that has not received its due in the secondary literature. Accordingly, in this paper, I will examine foundherentism with three principal concerns in mind. First, I explain the epistemic components of foundherentism. Second, I defend foundherentism against the charge of reliabilism. While third and finally, I argue that foundherentism needs to be supplemented with a virtuous component
Theorie der Konsequenzoperationen und logische Unabhängigkeit
Authors: Wallmann Christian
Published: September 2022

This article deals with algebraic logic. In particular, it discusses the theory of consequence operations and the general concept of logical independency. The advantage of this general view is its gr- eat applicability: The stated properties of consequence operations hold for almost every logical system. The notion of independency is well known and important in logic, philosophy of science and mathematics. Roughly speaking, a set is independent with respect to a consequence operation, if none of its elements is a consequence of the other elements. The property of being an independent set guarantees therefore that none of its elements is superfluous. In particular, I'm going to show fundamental results for every consequence operation, and hence for every logic: no infinite independent set is finite axiomatizable, and every finite axiomatizable set has relative to a finitary consequence operation an independent axiom system. The main result is that in sentential logic every set of formulas has an independend axiom system.
Rudolf Carnaps verschiedene Scheinproblemkonzeptionen
Authors: Cordes Moritz
Published: September 2022

This paper is a review of Rudolf Carnap's changing attitudes to- wards the conceptualisation of pseudo-problems. For that purpose his early works (until 1935) are divided into four phases each of which display subtle differences with respect to the role pseudo-problems play in Carnap's epistemology and philosophical methodology. Based on a number of short texts by Carnap, an attempt

is made to give provisional definitions of `pseudo-problem' and related expressions.
A New Approach to the Grounding of Abstract Concepts
Authors: Seuchter Tim
Published: September 2022

A central problem of theories of grounded cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts in sensorimotor representations. The paper aims at providing a new basis for a theory of cogni-tive abstraction mechanisms. The focus will be on the notions of causal indexicals and affordances, understood as action related concepts that show different degrees of abstraction. Abstraction

mechanisms will be characterized that allow the transformation of such obviously "grounded" concepts into more abstract ones. In this way, the relation between sensorimotor processes and abstract concepts will be described in detail, and general principles of abstraction will be determined.
How Are Semantic Metarepresentations Built and Processed?
Authors: Bremer Manuel
Published: September 2022

This paper looks at some aspects of semantic metarepresentation. It is mostly concerned with questions more formal, concerning the representation format in semantic metarepresentations, and the way they are processed. Section 1 distinguishes between metacognition and metarepresen- tation in a narrow and broad sense. Section 2 reminds the reader of some main areas where metarepresentations have to be used. The main part considers the ways that metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 3 introduces some general ideas how semantic metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 4 looks at some recent theories about ways that semantic metarep- resentations are built and processed.
Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation
Authors: Benovsky Jiri
Published: September 2022

In this article, I am interested in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise in the case of all kinds of counterpart theories, independently on modal realism), and a very similar worry can also arise against modal realism itself or against an ersatzist theory of possible worlds itself. For similar reasons, in similar situations, a similar objection will arise. What is interesting is that it is not the case that a similar response can be given in all of these similar cases. So, in the end, we will see what dissimilarities there are and how and why they are relevant. In particular, we will see the di erences there are between alethic modalities and temporal modalities. In the case of alethic modalities (metaphysical necessity and possibility), the objection can be answered by appealing to the notion of representation, while this does not work very well in the case of temporal modalities.
Semantische Aspekte pluraler prädikatenlogischer Sprachen
Authors: Lukic Jonathan
Published: September 2022

Plural constructions in mathematical speech are no rarity. E.g., when we want to say that the real numbers are the basis on which we construct Calculus (cf. [16], p. 6), and that the integers are an integral domain (cf. [14], p. 237), we are not talking about one thing, namely the set of the real numbers and the set of the integers, respectively, but we are talking about several things, namely the real numbers and the integers, respectively. In the present paper, we introduce a semantics which takes the use of plural constructions in mathematical speech as a basis and thus avoids sets and attributes.
Truthmaking as an Account of How Grounding Facts Hold
Authors: Yip Jack
Published: September 2022

Grounding, as a way to articulate ontological dependence, faces the problem of what grounds grounding facts themselves (such as the fact that the singleton of Socrates is grounded in Socrates). This problem stems from the need to account for the holding of grounding facts, which generates the hierarchical structure of ontological dependence. Within the grounding framework, grounding facts are either ungrounded or grounded. I will first argue that neither option can provide us with a satisfactory account. The main reason is that non-fundamental entities have to be counted as

fundamental or involved in the essences of fundamental entities in order for either of the two options to work-the non-fundamental is being smuggled into the fundamental. My suggestion is to appeal to the notion of truthmaking and tackle the problem about the holding of grounding facts outside the grounding framework|-instead of asking what grounds grounding facts, I ask what makes grounding claims true.

Truthmaking is a prima facie relation holding between the representational and the non-representational such that the latter makes the former true. With the principle 'if hpi is true, then it is

a fact that p,' we can account for the holding of grounding facts in a derivative sense. As a proposition contains the information about its truthmaker, the nature of grounding claims will tell us how grounding facts hold. I accept a realm of concepts which make up propositions (which might be needed already if there are propositions and propositions are compositional). These concepts will act as part of the truthmaker for grounding claims (in addition to the non-conceptual fundamental entities)-the

concept of the ground must figure in the concept of the grounded. For a concept to figure in another, it is to be involved in the constitutive essence of the latter (analogous to Kit Fine's idea that the ground of a grounded entity figures in the essence of the grounded entity). This account will not smuggle anything

non-fundamental into the fundamental realm. The implication is that ontological dependence stems from our different kinds of conceptualisations (perhaps of the same stuff, as in the concepts of water and H2O), which justifies metaphysicians' armchair method.
Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics
Authors: Paár Tamás
Published: September 2022

Those who I call meta-skeptics in my paper argue that one should suspend judgment about every philosophical question. Most often they use the argument from disagreement to show that the suspension of our philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation. In the present paper I argue against the main motivation for this view and show that since even the meta-skeptics' stance is a contested philosophical one, their argument cannot succeed without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed counter- objections to this self-refutation objection. I consider here Jason Brennan's quite simple and Bryan Frances's more sophisticated counter-objections. Their proposals are even more interesting because they di er from the typical points of meta-skeptics: Brennan argues for outsider skepticism, that is non-philosophers should suspend judgment about philosophical issues, and Frances relies on the notion of epistemic superior instead of epistemic peer. I consider their points in two ways: whether their counter-objections can help regular meta-skepticism and whether their skepticism can stand on its own. In my replies to these proposals I show why both are problematic in each of these two ways. Brennan says that widespread disagreement is a sign of philosophy's unreliability. Yet, he can only address the charge that his point is a philosophical one and not the objection that there can be disagreement about it. And since there is good reason to think that even his position is subject to disagreement, it is self-undermining. Furthermore, Brennan does not give any reason why any first-order philosophical theory must lack the virtues that his argument displays. Frances argues that even if the argument from disagreement is self-refuting and meta-skeptics have to suspend judgment about it, they might still remain skeptics after all. In my reply I show how Frances's defense of his position still relies on principles that could be the objects of further arguments from disagreement.
The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach
Authors: Fischer Enno
Published: September 2022

In the near future we may be able to manipulate human embryos through genetic intervention. Jürgen Habermas has argued against the development of technologies which could make such intervention possible. His argument has received widespread criticism among bioethicists. These critics argue that Habermas's argument relies on implausible assumptions about human nature. Moreover, they challenge Habermas's claim that genetic intervention adds something new to intergenerational relationships pointing out that parents have already strong control over their children through education. In this paper a new approach to Habermas's theory is suggested which makes clear that he has a strong point against genetic intervention. A more charitable reading of Habermas with respect to his assumptions concerning human nature is presented. Moreover, Habermas's assumption concerning the power of genetic controlling is evaluated. By means of a close comparison of genetic and educational control it is shown that Habermas's argument relies on much weaker assumptions than generally understood.
Defining Original Presentism
Authors: Mulder Jesse M.
Published: September 2022

It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege's atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form|in particular, by their form of predication.
Austin on Literal Meaning
Authors: Al Zoubi Odai
Published: September 2022

In this paper, I examine the debate between Alice Crary and Nat Hansen concerning Austin's view of `literal meaning'. Crary suggests that Austin thinks that there is no literal meaning, while Hansen thinks that for Austin there is literal meaning. I will argue that for Austin there is indeed a literal meaning, a fixed meaning, which sentences carry across all occasions of use, however, such meaning does not suffice to determine whether, independent of these occasions, the sentences can be used to say something true or false. Thus I suggest a middle ground between the two readings. My reading highlights the importance of Austin's claim that `true' is a dimension-word, which both Crary and Hansen overlook.
Present Rights for Future Generations
Authors: Unruh Charlotte
Published: September 2022

In this paper, I defend the view that within a rights-based ethical framework, the moral status of future generations is best under- stood as that of present rightsholders. I argue that in this way it can be justified that we have obligations towards future generations. This justification in turn is of great relevance for many issues in moral theory and applied ethics. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the fact that future persons will have rights in the future cannot fully account for present obligations. The missing link in this argument cannot be provided by approaches that infer those obligations mediately. In the second part of the paper, I argue that existing is not a necessary condition for being a rightsholder. First, our own future selves should be said to have rights even though they do not exist at present. Second, even at present, uncertainty challenges the relationship between rightsholders and obligation bearers: of- ten enough, obligations depend on presuppositions or suspicions about other persons' existence. In light of these cases, we should conceive of rightsholders as place holders, that is, sets of (actual) individuals whose existence or identity can be unknown or indetermined, with specific properties. Therefore, future generations can coherently be said to have rights now that correspond to our present obligations towards them.
The Future of Epistemic Possibility
Authors: Phillips Meagan Lowell
Published: September 2022

I am concerned with epistemic possibility expressions (EPEs) such as \It might be raining." Much of the discussion of EPEs has concerned the fact that a given EPE can seem true in one context and false in another. Motivated by this data, contextualists have argued that modal expressions are sensitive to information at a context of use. Contextualist analyses encounter problems when it comes to disagreements centered on EPEs. Relativists such as John Mac- Farlane argue that epistemic modals are sensitive to information available to an assessor at a circumstance of evaluation. I side with a relativistic account of epistemic possibility, on which the truth conditions of EPEs depend not only on a context of use but also as on a context of assessment. The stipulation of contexts of assessments explains why third parties can judge an interlocutor's utterance false, and why the interlocutor will retract her previous utterance. However, judgements of falsity and retraction seem to be absent in future-oriented EPEs such as \It might rain tomorrow." I propose an amendment to John MacFarlane's semantics that better models this quirk of epistemic possibility expressions
Expressives, Majoratives, and Ineffability
Authors: Mildenberger Carl David
Published: September 2022

The purpose of this essay is to argue that not all instances of expressive language suffer alike from the problem of descriptive ineffability. Descriptive ineffability refers to the problem that speakers are never fully satisfied when they are asked to paraphrase sentences containing expressive terms such as `damn' using only descriptive terms. It is commonly assumed that descriptive ineffability is an important feature of all kinds of expressive language - derogatory language just as commendatory or valorizing language. However, I find that majoratives, i.e. the positive counterpart to negative expressives (pejoratives), do not exhibit the characteristic of descriptive ineffability. This finding is important both to clarify what kind of data competing theories of expressives have to explain and to shed further light on the wider phenomenon of ineffability.
The Logic of Intending and Predicting
Authors: Botting David
Published: September 2022

Can human acts be causally explained in the same way as the rest of nature? If so, causal explanation in the manner of the Hempelian model shouldn’t the human sciences and the natural sciences equally. This is not so much a question of whether the Hempelian model is a completely adequate account of causal explanation, but about whether it is adequate or inadequate in the same way for each: if there is some unique feature of human acts that dictates that they are to be explained differently from natural events, then it is reasonable to suppose that this feature will be revealed by consideration of Hempelian explanations whether this is our final account of explanation or not, and if no such feature is revealed then it is reasonable to suppose that there are no fundamental differences between the human and natural sciences in how causal explanations proceed, whether this explanation is Hempelian or of some other kind. Two arguments have been given for there being such a feature. One - the well-known "Logical Connection Argument" - states that there cannot be a causal relation between a human action and the intention to perform that action. If this argument succeeds, then our ordinary explanations of human acts in terms of psychological states like intentions are not causal explanations at all. Although this does not mean that no causal explanation is true, we have the problem of finding appropriate causal antecedents of the acts. The other - the anti-predictionist argument - concludes from the fact that at least some human acts cannot be predicted that they cannot be causally explained. I wish to disarm the force of both of these arguments, and thus argue for explanatory monism: we do not need to adopt a mode of explanation for human sciences distinct from that of natural sciences.
Two Conceptions of Legitimacy: A Response to Fabian Wendt's Moralist Critique of Political Realism
Authors: Aytaç Uğur
Published: September 2022

Fabian Wendt [20] argues that political realism is not capable of explaining how the state's moral right to rule over its subjects is generated. I believe that Wendt's criticism is not sound because his position relies on the false implicit assumption that realism and moralism ask the same philosophical questions on state authority. I contend that it is fallacious to evaluate the realist account of legitimacy by the standards of moralism, and vice versa, as these two accounts arrive at different conceptions of legitimacy by raising different sets of philosophical questions. The two sets of philosophical questions are not reducible to each other. The realist account of legitimacy does not aim to explain what the moralist account of legitimacy aims to explain.
Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions
Authors: Franken Dirk
Published: September 2022

In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects
Revisiting Kumm's Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism
Authors: Fenner Maximilian
Published: September 2022

In this paper, I revisit Mattias Kumm's work on a `cosmopolitan conception of law'. I make two claims: First, I claim that although some criticism can be resisted by Kumm, under closer methodological scrutiny there are flaws in his theory. Second, I claim that these flaws challenge Kumm's approach when reading the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) as a `global constitution'. This also has pertinent practical implications for the functioning of the United Nations. This contribution does not take a stance on the nature of law but focuses on this conception in the context of politics and law. In a first section, I recount Kumm's cosmopolitan conception of law. In a second section, I claim that implicit monism in the relationship between national and international law and theoretical idealization pose serious dificulties to the cosmopolitan approach. In a third section, I claim that these flaws pose a challenge to the United Nations when considering the UN Charter as a `global constitution'. I sum up my findings in a final section and reflect on a future outlook for research on global constitutionalism in political philosophy.
Conditions of Rationality for Scientific Research
Authors: Weingartner Paul
Published: September 2022

The purpose of this paper is to discuss conditions of rationality for scientific research (SR) where "conditions" are understood as "necessary conditions". This will be done in the following way: First, I shall deal with the aim of SR since conditions of rationality (for SR) are to be understood as necessary means for reaching the aim (goal) of SR. Subsequently, the following necessary conditions will be discussed: Rational Communication, Methodological Rules, Ideals of Rationality and its Realistic Aspects, Methodological and Ontological Conditions (Universality, Rules for Experiments, Causality), and Metaphysical Presuppositions and Extrapolations.
Towards a Unified Interpretation of Bernard Williams's Philosophical Projects
Authors: Pijas Pawel
Published: September 2022

This article proposes an interpretive key to Bernard Williams's philosophy. It posits the idea that at its core, his philosophy consists in the following interconnected epistemological and metaphysical views: (1) scientific realism, (2) metaphysical naturalism, (3) methodological pluralism, (4) anthropological contingentism and (5) a post-analytical/humanistic under- standing of philosophy. These are extracted in the first two sections. The third section provides a demonstration of how this interpretation can be applied vis-a-vis Williams's critique of morality. The text concludes with some critical remarks on Williams's metaphilosophical position.
Normativity as a Kind of Conformity: Towards a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity
Authors: Müller Basil
Published: September 2022

There seem to be things we ought not to believe and others we are permitted to believe. Belief is treated as a normative phenomenon both in everyday and academic discourse. At the same time, normativity can be seen as a threat to a naturalistic understanding of the world. Whilst naturalistic claims are of descriptive nature, norms are prescriptive. It is usually held that they cannot be reduced to statements of fact. This problem is also pertinent to the normativity of belief. How is such a phenomenon to be understood within a naturalist framework? Sullivan-Bissett provides a naturalistic account of epistemic normativity in which she explains epistemic normativity in terms of biological functions of belief-producing mechanisms. Importantly, her account is error-theoretic: She argues that we mistake doxastic strategies, which are at best normative in a hypothetical sense, to be categorical epistemic norms. In continuation of Sullivan-Bissett's account, I draw attention to one of the belief-producing mechanisms which is responsible for bringing about these mistaken beliefs. I claim that normative conformity { a social-learning mechanisms { brings about our beliefs in the existence and categorical validity of epistemic norms. Keeping with the evolutionary perspective employed by Sullivan- Bissett, I answer questions about the function and phylogeny of our mistaken beliefs in epistemic normativity by means of normative conformity and in line with Sullivan-Bissett's account.
Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's Views on Ontology
Authors: Kosecki Artur
Published: September 2022

This article will address the views of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz - the leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will present arguments proving that the Polish philosopher could have anticipated contemporary metaontological discussions. In the first part, I will provide a profile of Ajdukiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I will outline the assumptions of his metaepistemological projects: radical conventionalism and semantic epistemology. In the second part, I will argue that the former project resulted in views on existence similar to Hilary Putnam's and Eli Hirsch's, whereas the outcomes of the other project are views similar to those of Amie Thomasson and her easy ontology project.
The Consequence of the Consequence Argument
Authors: Hausmann Marco
Published: September 2022

The aim of my paper is to compare three alternative formal reconstructions of van Inwagen's famous argument for incompatibilism. In the first part of my paper, I examine van Inwagen's own reconstruction within a propositional modal logic. I point out that, due to the expressive limitations of his propositional modal logic, van Inwagen is unable to argue directly (that is, within his formal framework) for incompatibilism. In the second part of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a first-order predicate logic. I show, however, that even though this reconstruction is not susceptible to the same objection, this reconstruction can be shown to be inconsistent (given van Inwagen's own assumptions). At the end of my paper, I suggest to reconstruct van Inwagen's argument within a quantified counterfactual logic with propositional quantifiers. I show that within this formal framework van Inwagen would not only be able to argue directly for incompatibilism, he would also be able to argue for crucial assumptions of his argument.
On the critical fractional Schrödinger-Kirchhoff-Poisson equations with electromagnetic fields
Authors: Zhang Zhongyi
Published: September 2022

This paper intend to study the following critical fractional Schrödinger-Kirchhoff-Poisson equations with electromagnetic fields in

R

3

{{\mathbb{R}}}^{3}

:

ε

2
s

M

(

[

u

]

s
,
A

2

)

(

−
Δ

)

A

s

u
+
V

(

x

)

u
+

(

∣
x

∣

2
t
−
3

∗
∣
u

∣

2

)

u
=
f

(

x
,
∣
u

∣

2

)

u
+
∣
u

∣

2

s

∗

−
2

u
,

x
∈

R

3

.

{\varepsilon }^{2s}{\mathfrak{M}}\left({\left[u]}_{s,A}^{2}){\left(-\Delta )}_{A}^{s}u+V\left(x)u+\left(| x\hspace{-0.25em}{| }^{2t-3}\ast | u\hspace{-0.25em}{| }^{2})u=f\left(x,| u\hspace{-0.25em}{| }^{2})u+| u\hspace{-0.25em}{| }^{{2}_{s}^{\ast }-2}u,\hspace{1em}x\in {{\mathbb{R}}}^{3}.

Under suitable assumptions, together with the concentration compactness principle and variational method, we prove that the existence and multiplicity of semiclassical solutions for above problem as

ε
→
0

\varepsilon \to 0

.
Inverse design of perimeter-controlled InAs-assisted metasurface for two-dimensional dynamic beam steering
Authors: Sabri Raana , Mosallaei Hossein
Published: September 2022

The current commercially viable light detection and ranging systems demand continuous, full-scene, and dynamic two-dimensional point scanning, while featuring large aperture size to ensure long distance operation. However, the biasing architecture of large-area arrays with numerous individually controlled tunable elements is substantially complicated. Herein, inverse design of a perimeter-controlled active metasurface for two-dimensional dynamic beam steering at mid-infrared regime is theoretically presented. The perimeter-control approach simplifies biasing architecture by allowing column-row addressing of the elements. The metasurface consists of a periodic array of plasmonic patch nanoantennas in a metal-insulator-metal configuration, wherein two active layers of indium arsenide are incorporated into its building block. The metasurface profile facilitates wide phase modulation of

≈
355
°

$\approx 355^{\circ} $

on the reflected light at the individual element level through applying independent voltages to its respective columns and rows. The multi-objective genetic algorithm (GA) for optimizing user-defined metrics toward shaping desired far-zone radiation pattern is implemented. It is demonstrated that multi-objective GA yields better results for directivity and spatial resolution of perimeter-controlled metasurface by identifying the design tradeoffs inherent to the system, compared to the single-objective optimizer. A high directivity and continuous beam scanning with full and wide field-of-view along the azimuth and elevation angles are respectively maintained.
Crystal structure of catena-poly[(5,5′-dimethyl-2,2′-bipyridine-κ
2
N,N′)-(μ
3-hydrogen-1,1′,1″-(1,3,5-triazine-2,4,6-triyl)tris(piperidine-4-carboxylato)- κ
5
O:O,O′:O″,O‴)-cadmium(II)], C33H40CdN8O6
Authors: Zhang Hua-Xiang
Published: September 2022

C33H40CdN8O6, triclinic,

P

1
‾

$P\overline{1}$

(no. 2), a = 10.6468(11) Å, b = 11.6739(9) Å, c = 14.5312(9) Å, α = 93.976(5)°, β = 102.005(7)°, γ = 111.827(8)°, V = 1618.4(2) Å3, Z = 2, R
gt(F) = 0.0480, wR
ref(F
2) = 0.1102, T = 293(2) K.
The crystal structure of poly[6,6′-oxybis(4-(pyridin-1-ium-1-yl)-1,3,5,2,4,6-trioxatriborinan-2-olate)], [B6O9](C5H5N)2
Authors: Qiu Qi-Ming , Yan Li , Song Jian-Biao
Published: September 2022

[B6O9](C5H5N)2, monoclinic, P21/c (no. 14), a = 15.0450(11) Å, b = 5.8526(4) Å, c = 17.9672(13) Å, β = 92.768(2)°, V = 1580.2(2) Å3, Z = 4, R

gt
(F) = 0.0367, wR

ref
(F
2) = 0.0855, T = 296 K.
Nada, nadie: A Study of Negative Concord in L2 Spanish
Authors: Yamada Aaron
Published: September 2022

Research in Second Language Acquisition (SLA) has studied negation in a wide variety of languages but has mainly focused on the acquisition of clause negation, or the negation of finite verbs in main clauses (Dimroth, Christine. 2008. Age effects on the process of L2 acquisition? Evidence from the acquisition of negation and finiteness in L2 German. Language Learning 58(1). 117–150). The present study discusses the acquisition of negative concord (NC) in L2 Spanish, from both a syntactic and a lexical approach to the analysis of learner production data. The results of a structured oral elicitation task indicate that learners produce NC with the negative concord items (NCIs) nada ‘nothing’ and nadie ‘no one’ in argument position, and also ascertain their appropriate usage contexts, with greater accuracy as their L2 proficiency increases. These findings are discussed in relation to studies of NC in English and English First Language Acquisition (FLA), and also to recent work in English SLA on the acquisition of negative polarity items (NPIs) (Gil, Kook-Hee, Heather Marsden & Melinda Whong. 2019. The meaning of negation in the second language classroom: Evidence from ‘any. Language Teaching Research 23(2). 218–236; Marsden, Heather, Melinda Whong & Kook-Hee Gil. 2018. What’s in the textbook and what’s in the mind: Polarity item “Any” in learner English. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 40(1). 91–118; Puig-Mayenco, Eloi & Heather Marsden. 2018. Polarity-item “anything” in L3 English: Where does transfer come from when the L1 is Catalan and the L2 is Spanish? Second Language Research 34(4). 487–515). Ultimately, this study aims to contribute to further research in the literature on complex negation constructions in SLA and underline the interplay of syntactic, semantic, and lexical issues in the acquisition of these structures.
Prohibited Mixtures: Mixed Clothing and Social Class
Authors: Campbell Nicholas J.
Published: September 2022

Prohibiting mixed fabric in Leviticus 19:19d and Deuteronomy 22:11 has often been interpreted as maintaining the created order or avoiding a holy mixture. However, weaving together two kinds of cloth does not make a hybrid that disrupts cosmic order. Also, the consecration ritual is the origin of holiness in the priestly clothing. I argue that mixed clothing is prohibited because the priestly class is strictly inherited. I will show how the Israelites must wear the national/ethnic clothing, tassels with a cord of blue, but cannot wear the clothing of the solely inherited class, mixed fabric.
Multiple strongly coupled antiferromagnetic spin S = 1/2 dimers in liroconite Cu2Al(As,P)O4(OH)4·4H2O
Authors: Kremer Reinhard K. , Bette Sebastian , Brücher Eva , Nuss Jürgen , Schulz Armin , Whangbo Myung-Hwan , Koo Hyun-Joo
Published: September 2022

We report on the magneto-structural properties of the rare copper aluminum hydroxo-arsenate mineral liroconite with chemical composition Cu2AlAs1−x
P
x
O4(OH)4·4H2O (x ≈ 0.2). In order to characterize the natural mineral sample chemical analyses, X-ray single crystal and powder diffraction, heat capacity and crystal water desorption, anisotropic thermal expansion and Raman scattering and magnetic susceptibility investigations have been carried out. The magnetic properties are well described by two discrete oxygen bridged Cu2+ spin S = 1/2 dimers with antiferromagnetic spin exchange ranging between −320 K and −136 K, depending on to which group-15 five-valent cation, As5+ or P5+, the dimer bridging oxygen atoms coordinate to. Accordingly the temperature dependence of the magnetic susceptibilities can be well fitted to a sum of two Bleaney–Bowers type spin S = 1/2 dimer susceptibilities suggesting that the dimers show negligible mixed coordination to (AsO4)3−/(PO4)3− tetrahedra. DFT + U calculation confirm the ratio of the spin exchange parameters of the (AsO4)3− or (PO4)3− coordinated Cu2+ – Cu2+ dimers. Inter dimer spin exchange is about two orders of magnitude smaller than intra dimer exchange.
Angloscene: Compromised Personhood in Afro-Chinese Translations
Authors: Ke-Schutte Jay
Published: September 2022

Angloscene examines Afro-Chinese interactions within Beijing’s aspirationally cosmopolitan student class. Jay Ke-Schutte explores the ways in which many contemporary interactions between Chinese and African university students are mediated through complex intersectional relationships with whiteness, the English language, and cosmopolitan aspiration. At the heart of these tensions, a question persistently emerges: How does English become more than a language—and whiteness more than a race? Engaging in this inquiry, Ke-Schutte explores twenty-first century Afro-Chinese encounters as translational events that diagram the discursive contours of a changing transnational political order—one that will certainly be shaped by African and Chinese relations.
Computer simulation in lignocellulosic biomass conversion processes: A review
Authors: Kong Yi , Fu Shiyu
Published: September 2022

Much attention has been paid to the solubilization and conversion processes of cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin to produce high value-added chemicals and fuels. Computer simulation shows great potential in understanding the conversion process of plant biomass. This paper reviewed the solubilization processes, catalytic conversion, and pyrolysis of cellulose, hemicellulose, and lignin by density functional theory and molecular dynamics. The authors also provide prospects for the challenges and future developments in this area.