bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Ethics and Marginal Cases: the rights of the mentally handicapped
Authors: ROOSE FRANK DE
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Some beings, including children, animals and the mentally handicapped, seem to deserve moral consideration, despite the fact that they are not rational or moral agents. These so‐called marginal cases create a problem for theories that heavily stress the role of moral and/or rational agency in ethics: the latter seem unable to account for the former's moral status. This paper discusses the recent and original attempt of Loren Lomasky to solve this problem. It is argued that Lomasky's arguments are self‐defeating because they can only succeed by relying on common‐sense morality and, thus, by giving up the heavy stress on the role of rational agency in ethics.
Capitalism, Freedom and Rhetoric: a reply to Tibor R. Machan
Authors: HAWORTH ALAN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Tibor R. Machan's ‘The virtue of freedom in capitalism’, which recently appeared in this journal, seeks to defend the currently fashionable view that capitalism and freedom are closely linked. I concentrate upon three aspects of his argument. First, Machan holds that capitalism is the only system capable of facilitating the exercise of moral responsibility effectively. Against this, I show that his argument rests upon a systematic confusion between two distinct theses. Secondly, I deal with his attempt to rest an argument upon the allegedly ‘uncoercive’ nature of market exchanges. Thirdly, I show that his analysis of the concept of freedom, which closely follows Hayek, logically cannot be deployed in support of the free market. Machan has a tendency to appeal to ‘tradition’, and so, in conclusion, I briefly consider his relation to the ‘analytic’ movement in philosophy.
The Market for Bodily Parts: Kant and duties to oneself
Authors: CHADWICK RUTH F.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  The demand for bodily parts such as organs is increasing, and individuals in certain circumstances are responding by offering parts of their bodies for sale. Is there anything wrong in this? Kant had arguments to suggest that there is, namely that we have duties towards our own bodies, among which is the duty not to sell parts of them. Kant's reasons for holding this view are examined, and found to depend on a notion of what is intrinsically degrading. Rom Harré's recent revision of Kant's argument, in terms of an obligation to preserve the body's organic integrity, is considered. Harré's view does not rule out all acts of selling, but he too ultimately depends on a test of what is intrinsically degrading. Both his view and Kant's are rejected in favour of a view which argues that it does make sense to speak of duties towards our own bodies, grounded in the duty to promote the flourishing of human beings, including ourselves. This provides a reason for opposing the sale of bodily parts, and the current trend towards the market ethic in health care provision.
Sociobiology and Concern for the Future
Authors: JOHNSON ANDREW
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Despite its excesses, sociobiology can make a useful contribution to ethics, if it is recognised that it need not impinge on free‐will, and if the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ can be avoided. This contribution is the central concept of evolutionary stability, and the implication which can be drawn from it, that concern for the future is a basic part of human nature. In stable societies, such concern is manifested as fear of change, or strict adherence to tradition, but modern ideas of progress have engendered a cavalier attitude to the more distant future, and current ethical systems cannot get to grips with duties towards future generations. It is suggested that the popularity of sociobiology and the present‐day interest in conservation both reflect an aspect of human nature which has too long been neglected by moralists.
The Morality of Refusing to Treat HIV‐positive Patients
Authors: SILVER MITCHELL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Do physicians and nurses have an obligation to treat patients who are HIV‐positive? Although an initial review of the possible sources of such an obligation yields equivocal results, a closer examination reveals a clear obligation to treat. The current risk of job‐caused HIV‐infection is not sufficient to warrant a refusal to treat. This is so because there exist rationally justified, general social, as well as specific peer expectations, that health care professionals treat HIV‐positive patients. These expectations impose moral obligations on doctors and nurses. Moreover there is no sound libertarian argument entitling doctors and nurses to refuse to treat HIV‐positive patients. A morally appropriate identification with his or her role would disincline a health care professional to refuse treatment to an HIV‐positive patient. The likely source of such refusal is occupational alienation and an irrational reaction to AIDS symbolism.
The Rights of Future People
Authors: ELLIOT ROBERT
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  It has been argued by some that the present non‐existence of future persons entails that whatever obligations we have towards them are not based on rights which they have or might come to have. This view is refuted. It is argued that the present non‐existence of future persons is no impediment to the attribution of rights to them. It is also argued that, even if the present non‐existence of future persons were an impediment to the attribution of rights to them, the rights they will have when they come into existence constitute a constraint on present actions. Both arguments build on a suggestion of Joel Feinberg's. Next, three arguments are considered which, while they do not highlight the non‐existence issue, are related to it. The view that the causal dependence, of (some) future people on present policies, erodes or weakens the claim that rights considerations should constrain our present actions concerning them, is considered and rejected. The view that future people can only have rights to what is available at the time at which these people come into existence is considered and rejected. So too is the view that the attribution of rights to future people involves, in virtue of resource scarcity, an unacceptable arbitrariness.
Aesthetic Protectionism
Authors: GODLOVITCH S.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Aesthetic protectionists think nature worth preserving and protecting from harm on aesthetic rather than moral grounds. Their outlook can be compared with the drive to shelter and sustain artworks. As such, protectionists seem rather like curators. However, this kind of attention to natural objects leads to a minimisation of the significance of the naturalness of those objects. This raises questions about the protectionist's real regard for nature. By examining what in nature is aesthetically worthy of protection, and then asking how far one is entitled to go in one's protective mission, it transpires that protectionists have no special stake in sustaining the independence of nature. Indeed, its independence often conspires against their aims. Since that very independence is essential to the natural, protectionism is exposed as having no intrinsic regard for nature.
‘Self‐exploitation’ and Workers' Co‐operatives—or how the British Left get their concepts wrong
Authors: CARTER ALAN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  In this article I examine the concept ‘self‐exploitation’ and its use in criticising workers' co‐operatives. I argue that the concept is incoherent and that the kind of exploitation which members of workers' co‐ops actually face is ‘market‐exploitation’. Moreover, some of the criticisms of workers' co‐ops which are made by those who employ the confused concept ‘self‐exploitation’ are shown to be inapposite when ‘market‐exploitation’ is recognised to be the real problem. I conclude with a discussion of the reasons for the acceptance of the misguided concept ‘self‐exploitation’ by a number on the Left in Britain today.
Affirmative Action and the Doctrine of Double Effect
Authors: COONEY WILLIAM
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  This article attempts to show that affirmative action can be supported by the doctrine of double effect which recognises distinctions between desired and unintended effects such that the responsibility for acts falls on the side of the former rather than the latter. With this doctrine it may also be seen why affirmative action programmes cannot be simply equated with numerical quota systems, nor can they be called discriminatory, at least not under the definition of discrimination utilised.
Agriculture. A War on Nature?
Authors: SURGEY JOHN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Agriculture, in the ubiquitous debate concerning the environment, is often accused of being environmentally destructive as if farmers are waging a war on nature. The article discusses the role of aggression, competition and killing in agriculture and concludes that those warlike characteristics are a necessary part of agricultural practice. The article stresses, however, that agriculture is not literally a war on nature and points to a number of unwarlike characteristics that also belong to agriculture.
Ranken on Disharmony and Business Ethics
Authors: GIBSON KEVIN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  This article is a response to Nani Ranken's paper ‘Morality in business: disharmony and its consequences’ (Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 41). There she attacked the analogy sometimes made between businesses and persons, and concluded that businesses cannot be regarded as moral agents. Her thesis relies centrally on a very strict notion of a person's ‘true good’. By exploring and expanding the concepts of ‘true good’ and ‘moral agency’ we are able to recover a sense in which businesses are indeed members of the moral community. Moreover, admitting businesses to the moral community also provides a working framework to examine the claim that what is good for business is in harmony with the dictates of morality.
The Life Principle: a (metaethical) rejection
Authors: PASKE GERALD H.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  In Respect for Nature Paul W. Taylor argues that there is a moral obligation to respect all living things. I argue that there is no such obligation. Taylor presents three basic premises for his position. The first two are shown to be mistaken but not necessary for Taylor's argument. The third, that being a nonsentient teleological centre of life confers moral significance, while necessary, fails to be rationally compelling. I argue: (1) The relevant concept of teleology as readily applies to inanimate objects as it does to nonsentient life forms. (2) The inanimate–nonsentient distinction (at the relevant molecular level) is founded upon a continuum which offers no basis sufficient to justify The Life Principle. (3) The concept of teleology, as used by Taylor, is too unclear and ill‐founded to serve as the basis for a rationally compelling argument.
Justice between Age‐groups: a comment on Norman Daniels
Authors: McKERLIE DENNIS
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Norman Daniels suggests that the just distribution of resources between different age‐groups is determined by the choice a prudential agent would make in budgeting resources over the different temporal stages of a single life. He calls this view the “prudential lifespan account” of justice between age‐groups. Daniels thinks that the view recommends a rough kind of equality in resources between age‐groups. I argue that in the case of a single life prudence would choose an unequal distribution of resources. Consequently, using prudence to model distribution between age‐groups might severely restrict the share of resources assigned to the elderly. If we think that extreme inequality between age‐groups would be unjust, we should continue to think of justice between age‐groups as a problem concerned with the relationship between different lives. But we should apply the requirement of equality to the temporal parts of lives, not just to complete lives.
Community and Civil Strife
Authors: GILBERT PAUL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT What kind of threat does terrorism pose to a community? Two models of terrorism are introduced. The Unjust War model views terrorism as an attack on the innocent, but thereby misidentifies its criminal character. The Political Crime model regards it as violence for political ends, by‐passing democratic channels. This misconstrues the terrorist's aim of waging war against a state whose legitimacy he contests. Associated with the models of terrorism are two conceptions of community, the Communitarian and the Hobbesian, respectively. While the Communitarian conception sees the community as independent of the state, the Hobbesian identifies them, thus assimilating an attack on the state to a threat to the community. The Hobbesian conception, however, even when amplified by democratic theory, provides inadequate resources to rebut a challenge to the state's legitimacy, in particular one concerning territorial boundaries. Arguments for permitting secession are discussed. The Communitarian conception may be able to ground legitimacy claims; but it may also justify some terrorist campaigns as needed to preserve communities.
Market Equality and Social Freedom
Authors: HOLLIS MARTIN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Conflicts between the good of each and the good of all are often presented in terms of freedom versus equality, with liberals pulled one way by libertarians and the other by social democrats. When we distinguish between negative and positive notions not only of freedom but also of equality, the liberal freedom ‘to pursue our own good in our own way’is a positive freedom involving a negative idea of equality (or ‘equity’). Yet ‘equity’is not strong enough to deal with the problem of public goods. Trust is a public good, essential if markets are to work and dependable only where there is a moral commitment to a positive basic equality among citizens.
A Fortnight of My Life is Missing: a discussion of the status of the human ‘pre‐embryo’
Authors: HOLLAND ALAN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Summed up in the coinage of the term ‘pre‐embryo’is the denial that human beings, as such, begin to exist from the moment of conception. This denial, which may be thought to have significant moral implications, rests on two kinds of reason. The first is that the pre‐embryo lacks the characteristics of a human being. The second is that the pre‐embryo lacks what it takes to be an individual human being. The first reason, I argue, embodies an untenable view of what it is to be human. The second reason exploits certain logical difficulties which arise over the possibility of twinning. I question the relevance of the appeal to such difficulties and conclude that there is no good reason for denying that a human being begins to exist from the moment of conception.
Freedom and Authenticity
Authors: BEEHLER RODGER
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The essay enquires whether action that authentically expresses the self who acts constitutes freedom. Features of authentic action that tempt toward this assimilation are identified, and a recent theory of freedom that propounds the assimilation is examined. An illustrative example of authentic action in conditions of unfreedom is discussed. Reasons are proposed for judging the equation of freedom with authenticity a mistake. Noted in particular is the error of confusing the subjective condition of authentic choice with the objective circumstance of unconstrained interpersonal relations.
Honesty in Marketing
Authors: JACKSON JENNIFER
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT To what extent is honesty or truthfulness morally obligatory in trade and advertising practices? It is argued here what while we have a general right, in business as elsewhere, not to be lied to, we have no general right, either in our business or other pursuits, not to be deliberately deceived. Certain restrictions on deceptive practices in trade and advertising, even unintentionally deceptive practices, are, even so, morally defensible: viz. where the practice would mislead reasonable people to a material degree or where it would mislead especially vulnerable people who are predictably unreasonable. It is suggested that a code of practice for trade and advertising which exaggerates the degree of truthfulness which is morally obligatory may actually be corrupting in effect.
Journalists: a moral law unto themselves?
Authors: HARRIS NIGEL G. E.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Journalists often take themselves as having a moral duty to protect their sources. If the sources in question leak information from government departments, government ministers will consider themselves as having the moral right to demand that the journalists disclose the identity of those sources. This creates conflicts of value between what journalists and ministers consider to be right. It is argued not only that traditional moral theories cannot resolve such moral conflicts, but that they are in a sense a good thing. A world in which the conflicts occur may be considered to be better than one in which they are prevented from occurring, for one can expect to have both effective journalism and effective government only in the former. The most important consequence of this view is that it makes the professional ethics of journalism (and, by implication, those of other professions) into something more than the mere application of universal moral rules to the various situations in which those who work in the profession are liable to find themselves.
Nozick on Self‐esteem
Authors: MASON ANDREW
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper considers Robert Nozick's account of self‐esteem, as presented in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I criticise three aspects of it. First, the claim that people gain self‐esteem only when they believe that they possess greater quantities than others of some valued talent or attribute. Secondly, the view that there will always be a conflict of interests between people over the acquisition of self‐esteem. Thirdly, the proposal that the most promising way to improve levels of self‐esteem across a society is to educate people so that they value a number of different activities and attributes. I argue against Nozick that there are non‐comparative standards of doing something well or successfully that provide a person with a means of self‐assessment; there is no necessary conflict of interests over the acquisition of self‐esteem; reforming basic social and economic institutions is a promising way for a society to increase levels of self‐esteem.
The Chinese Moral Ethos and the Concept of Individual Rights
Authors: TAO JULIA
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the contrast in views between traditional mainstream Chinese philosophy and Western liberal individualism on the importance of the concept of individual rights in social and political thought. The contrast is striking because, whereas individual and political rights have long featured in public discourse in the West, in China, mainstream social and political thought has developed without a notion of individual rights. In search of the significance of this major difference, the paper traces ideas of the self in China through Confucian ethics, and compares the Confucian conception of the self with the deontological liberal conception of the subject as a bearer of rights in the West. Having established that the Chinese way of thinking about the self and about moral agency is in stark contrast to the image of the self as a bearer of rights in the deontological conception, the paper goes on to discuss the inadequacy of the moral individualism of a rights‐based morality and argues for an alternative view of morality which places importance on the intrinsic value of collective goods and on membership in a society.
What Is Terrorism?
Authors: PRIMORATZ IGOR
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non‐violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.
Mental Handicap and Citizenship
Authors: SPICKER PAUL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Mentally handicapped people have been taken in philosophical work as an obvious exception to the canons which are applied to other, ‘rational’individuals. This paper argues that mentally handicapped people should be accorded the same rights as others. If there are human rights, then mentally handicapped people are entitled to them as humans; and if there are rights which apply in general to citizens, the same rights apply equally to mentally handicapped people. The argument for the inclusion of mentally handicapped people as citizens is first, that there is a presumption of inclusion: if citizenship is accorded to all other individuals, there is no reason why citizenship should not be accorded to mentally handicapped people on the same basis as others. Second, mentally handicapped people cannot successfully be excluded without effectively challenging the presumption of inclusion applied to other groups. Third, and perhaps most important, there are positive reasons why mentally handicapped people, as a particularly vulnerable group, need to have rights to protect them against particular abuses.
Parallel Governing
Authors: SCALTSAS THEODORE
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Parallel processing systems can carry out computational tasks which would be impossible to be carried out by sequential systems. Cognitive psychologists are discovering that brains do not operate on a sequential ordering of tasks, but along parallel processing models. Sequential ordering is abandoned in the new generation computers, which are being designed on evolving parallel processing models. My proposal consists in applying the parallel processing principles to the state, creating a ‘parallel governing’model for the decision‐making procedures at the political level, in place of the present sequentially ordered procedures. I describe the main principles of current parallel processing models, and use them towards the creation of a parallel governing system. The most fundamental principle is the ‘De‐Centralisation Principle’, which requires that there be no centralised unit with special rights to information, or to policy‐, and decision‐making authority. In parallel governing, political and moral principles are built into the structure of the system, which consists of units of specialised interests and powers, with specialised channels of communication between them. I close by delineating the main differences between parallel governing and Nozick's utopia and Hayek's neo‐libertarianism.
Self‐defence and National Defence [1]
Authors: ROOSE FRANK DE
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The paper begins with the suggestion that the aura of respectability that surrounds the notion of self‐defence may render that notion suitable as a rallying point for agreement on the ethical legitimacy of warfare. I first argue that self‐defensive killing by a person X is morally justified if three conditions obtain: (1) X is together with at least one other person in a situation in which one of the persons will be killed through actions of the other person(s); (2) X is not responsible for bringing about that situation; (3) unless X kills another person, X him‐ or herself will be killed. Next, I show that on the basis of this principle military operations are morally justified only if there are no alternatives to executing them that would save more lives or prevent the total loss of freedom for people. The paper concludes with the observation that the morality of individual self‐defensive killing is unable to justify most of current national defence policies.
Surrogate Motherhood
Authors: PROKOPIJEVIC MIROSLAV
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In the first part of this article I discuss some objections which assert that surrogacy is primarily—but not exclusively—harmful in a moral sense. After examination of mainly but not exclusively morality‐dependent harms (objections from similarity with prostitution, exploitation, etc.) and after the discussion of possible non‐morality‐dependent harms (baby, couple, surrogate mother, agency, etc.), I argue, in the second part, that no one reason supports the possible prohibition of surrogacy. In the last part I try to show why moral reasons alone could not be sufficient to criminalize any kind of activity—including surrogacy—in a liberal order.
Child Abuse: parental rights and the interests of the child
Authors: ARCHARD DAVID
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT I criticise the ‘liberal’view of the proper relationship between the family and State, namely that, although the interests of the child should be paramount, parents are entitled to rights of both privacy and autonomy which should be abrogated only when the child suffers a specifiable harm. I argue that the right to bear children is not absolute, and that it only grounds a right to rear upon an objectionable proprietarian picture of the child as owned by its producer. If natural parents have any rights to rear they derive from duties to bring their children into rational maturity where they can exercise rights for themselves. The presumption that natural parents are best suited to rear their own children should be discounted, as should the assumption that alternatives to natural parenting are unacceptably bad. I reject the suggestion that parents should be ‘licensed’but argue for a much closer monitoring of the family. Familial privacy, which such monitoring breaches, is shown to have a culturally specific and, given the facts of abuse, dubious value. In conclusion, I briefly specify the forms of monitoring I approve.
A Case for Apathy
Authors: NEUMANN MICHAEL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Apathy may be a Bad Thing, but it is not always bad in the cases and ways it is alleged to be. The charge that the apathetic are irrational often stems from an oversimplification of political decision‐making techniques. The apathetic need not, for example, simply deny the possibility of getting one's goals, or simply ignore the benefits of action. They may, instead, have learned from experience that an avidly desired and pursued goal is always more valued before than after its attainment, and that setting a low initial value on a goal may actually increase its final value. If the values of various alternatives are adjusted in the light of such knowledge, apathy looks much more rational. But that is not the end of the story. The adjustments may be either (i) a conventional and involuntary discounting and surcharging of existing alternatives in the light of known preference patterns, or (ii) a ‘voluntary decision’to value or devalue a goal in order to obtain a certain result. The latter sort of adjustment requires the introduction of new alternatives into the decision problem, and revisions to our notion of when inaction is irrational.
Nozick's Identity Crisis
Authors: LUCY W. N. R.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Both the general structure of Nozick's entitlement theory of justice and the particular arguments he directs against Rawls presuppose a conception of the person. The essay argues that this initial conception of the person is flawed and that Nozick must amend it. However, those amendments lead either to an equally flawed conception or to a conception which is substantially similar to that which Rawls invokes. On either possibility the entitlement theory is weakened. The argument has two steps. First, the initial conception of the person which emerges from Anarchy, State and Utopia is stated. Second, the problems with that initial conception lead to the elucidation of subsequent conceptions, only the last of which is capable of avoiding those problems. The cost of avoidance is, however, a high one for Nozick's arguments against Rawls, in particular, and the entitlement theory in general.
The Doctrine of Double Effect and Affirmative Action
Authors: JORDAN JEFF
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued (The Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by‐product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate.
Global Responsibility
Authors: AGASSI JOSEPH
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Concern with global responsibility for survival as such invites the creation of a specific international organization. The new body should adjudicate as to which disputes are open (such as, for example, concerning the advisability of building nuclear plants) and which are not (for example, white supremacy); most significantly, the new body should carefully guard its credibility by sticking to veracity, by avoiding deceit even in extreme situations. In particular it behoves us all to confess that we have no solution to our most urgent problems.
Whose Life is it Anyway?
Authors: TRUSTED JENNIFER
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a current confusion in debates on the morality of experimentation on human pre‐embryos: the confusion that arises from ambiguity in the sense of ‘human being’. We may quite legitimately decide to apply the term ‘human being’to all entities with human DNA but in that case we should not then imply that all human beings are as much objects of moral concern as the fetus or a post‐parturate human being. It is argued that whatever classifying terms we use, potential entities need to be distinguished from actual entities and that the very notion of potentiality rests on this distinction. The paper does not offer an argument in favour of experimentation, rather it appeals for clear thought. Moral attitudes to experimentation on pre‐embryos are varied and attempts to analyse issues through implicit appeal to emotionally ambiguous terms do not help the moral debate.
Letting in the Jungle
Authors: SMITH MICHAEL F.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The destruction of the environment is a matter for moral concern and cannot be halted in the long term by appeals to human utility. However, the inadequacy and naïvety of humanist styles of ethical argument become apparent when attempts are made to extend them to environmental issues. They usually abstract certain supposed features of natural objects, e.g. sentience, and reify these as essential characteristics which operate to carry or ground ethical values. These arguments necessarily lead to the exclusion of objects which are, in fact, ethically valued or entail an unacceptably expansive egalitarianism. Such egalitarianism is often followed by a return to human‐centred prejudices opposed to the originally stated aims of ‘biocentric’ethicists like Taylor. Similarly, those physical and ecological holisms which rely not upon shared ‘natural’features, but upon sharing in nature itself cannot solve this dilemma as they are incapable of explaining differential ethical values. The attempt to place boundaries on moral considerability should be abandoned in favour of an ethical pluralism which places emphasis on the context of valuations.
Putting Them Out on the Ice: curtailing care of the elderly
Authors: BAUMRIN BERNARD
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Curtailing health care for the very old promises to free resources that can be devoted to others. Such self‐conscious limit‐setting, leading to premature death, requires both a moral justification and a change in the paradigm of physician obligation. This paper argues that the moral justification for curtailing care is absent, and that the paradigm of the physician as a servant of life, and the patient's agent, is worth preserving. Finally, it is suggested that, if the ailing old need to be deprived of life‐extending care, then the state should undertake the task of killing them. Physicians should not undertake this role, for it is the state that may gain an advantage it seeks by saving money, not the physicians.
The Fallacy of all Person‐denying Arguments for Abortion
Authors: COONEY WILLIAM
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This article attempts to show that arguments in favour of abortion which deny personhood to the fetus (person‐denying arguments) do not work. Several very common person‐denying arguments for abortion are dealt with, and an analysis is provided of two well known person‐denying arguments; those from the philosophers Mary Ann Warren and Michael Tooley. The result is that these fare no better. The conclusion is that there is a fallacy in person‐denying arguments in general.
Professions, Trades, and the Obligation to Inform
Authors: DAVIS JOHN K.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The concept of a ‘professional’, as distinguished from that of a ‘tradesman’, encompasses both white collar workers and those who produce excellent work in any occupation. These divergent meanings have a common philosophical source in the way workers justify their work. A worker becomes a professonal by professing reasons for doing his work in a certain way. A worker is a tradesman if the value of his work in trade is the sole justification for the way it is done. Workers can be both professionals and tradesmen, unless what the consumer will buy and what is proper are different, placing ‘reason value’and ‘trade value’into conflict. Value conflicts are most likely in occupations involving a high level of theoretical knowledge, where the consumer has trouble judging what is proper. Thus, we say that professional persons work in white collar occupations, but that is misleading, for ‘professional’is a way of handling value conflicts, not a kind of work. In value conflicts the worker has an obligation to inform the consumer—to profess reasons—about what is proper work.
Who are the Mentally Handicapped?
Authors: BODDINGTON PAULA , PODPADEC TESSA
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In this paper we compare philosophical and contemporary psychological approaches to mental handicap. Careful comparison between the disciplines reveals major differences and indicates that much further work is needed which would be fruitful for both sides.

The two disciplines concentrate on different questions: philosophy tends to look chiefly at mental handicap in relation to issues of personhood and is not very clear about what mental handicap is; psychology on the other hand is much more specific about mental handicap, but shows little concern with critically examining value issues. Our main intention is to explore the different ways in which mental handicap is defined and seen as a class.

We conclude that class definition embodies a significant normative component and a large element of social construction. To ignore this and attempt to make normative judgements on the basis of class membership is thus highly problematic. Since within philosophy, these normative issues are often discussed in terms of personhood, this category is also critically examined and the conclusion is reached that it too has normative and social components which can lead to ethically dubious judgements being made about ‘the mentally handicapped’.
Supererogation and Business Ethics
Authors: MELLEMA GREGORY
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT It is occasionally said of individuals or groups of individuals that they have gone beyond the call of duty in certain of their business practices. Not only have they fulfilled or satisfied the requirements of duty, but they have risen above the level of duty in performing various meritorious or praiseworthy actions. Such acts, called acts of supererogation, are never required of moral agents; indeed, it is never morally blameworthy to refrain from them. However, they are morally good to perform and those who perform them are doing that which is morally worthy of praise or approbation. In this essay I begin with some examples of business practices which can plausibly be construed as acts of supererogation. I then discuss some general features of supererogation and draw some conclusions in the form of advice for persons who have a genuine concern to practise good ethics in their business or professional lives. The advice can be summed up as follows: although acts of supererogation are optional, good ethics requires that one should not take a complacent or indifferent attitude toward performing them.
How Competition Goes Wrong
Authors: McMURTRY JOHN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The article begins by identifying a set of hitherto undisclosed contradictions of meaning and value attributed to a basic structure of our existence—competition. It seeks to resolve these contradictions by showing that there are two basic forms of competition not previously distinguished: (1) the dominant model of competition in which pay‐offs extrinsic to the activity itself are conferred on one party at the expense of others; and (2) the submerged, spontaneous form of competition in which no structure of extrinsic and exclusionary pay‐offs is imposed on the action. Illustrating in terms of a paradigm example, ice‐hockey, the analysis shows that the well‐known and systematic pathologies of competitive conflict—violence, cheating, authoritarianism, sexism, drug‐taking and so on—are a law‐like consequence of the dominant structure of competition and not a problem of competition as such.
Complexity and the Value of Lives—some philosophical dangers for mentally handicapped people
Authors: FAIRBAIRN GAVIN J.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In his book The End of Life James Rachels argues that in a situation of forced choice if we must choose between a more and a less complex human being we have good reason to choose in favour of the normal human. He argues also that since some humans have less complex mental abilities than some animals it will sometimes be right to choose a non‐human animal in preference to a human being.

I do not consider Rachels’belief that sometimes non‐human animals are to be preferred to retarded humans; I focus rather on the seemingly less contentious belief that in situations of forced choice, we should choose human beings with more rather than less complex lives. I reject this contention both because Rachels does not seem to have offered a worthwhile argument in its favour and also because I find his cavalier approach to the lives of people with intellectual disabilities morally offensive. En route I argue against his simplistic separation of human lives into the categories ‘simple’and ‘complex’on the basis of whether the individuals in question fall into what he seems to take as given—the clear cut categories ‘mentally retarded’and ‘normal’[1] [2].
Philosophical Counselling
Authors: SCHUSTER SHLOMIT C.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT A new phenomenon in the philosophical discipline, philosophical practice—or counselling—is introduced to the reader through the description of three different approaches to philosophical practice. What is common to these approaches is that an academically trained philosopher philosophises together with a ‘sane’person—the visitor—on questions and problems relevant to the visitor. The essential difference between this and psychological counselling is that philosophers do not use therapeutic methods or make diagnoses. The philosophical practitioner triggers in his dialogue partner a didactic philosophical process, which enables the visitor to become an authentic thinker and eventually to arrive at philosophical answers by her/himself. The effectiveness of the language used in philosophical practice is not so much in applying philosophical ideas or theories as in the philosophical knowledge, skills and attitudes attained by the visitor.
Freedom and Respect in a Multicultural Society
Authors: NAYLOR FRED
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Martin Hollis, in Market Equality and Social Freedom [1], used the Dewsbury case to illustrate the tension between individual freedom and the public good. Like others engaged in the public debate on multicultural education in general, and Dewsbury in particular, Hollis avoided the main issue: “What should be the curriculum in a school attended by pupils from different cultural backgrounds?’’Rational debate in this highly controversial area requires an analysis of two fundamental concepts—multicultural education and respect. The former can take three forms, each corresponding with a distinctive curriculum model. One—the Equality option—is inimical to parental rights as guaranteed under the European Convention, but it attracts support because of a widespread failure to recognise that one can respect someone's right to hold and propagate a particular faith (or opinion) without necessarily respecting that faith (or opinion).

It is shown that this failure has come about through very lax usage of ‘respect’. It is argued that by respecting persons whatever their values the potential conflict between liberty and equality can be resolved in a free society.
Exploitation and Workers’Co‐operatives: a reply to Alan Carter
Authors: O'NEILL JOHN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In a recent paper Alan Carter argues that the claim that workers’co‐operatives merely replace exploitation by employers with ‘self‐exploitation’is nonsense: the term ‘self‐exploitation’is self‐contradictory. He maintains that the only form of exploitation to which a workers’co‐operative may be said to be subject is ‘market‐exploitation’by dominant economic actors who are external to the co‐operative. I argue that these conclusions are mistaken. While the concept of ‘market‐exploitation’is not without value, it is difficult to operationalise. While the concept of ‘self‐exploitation’is, understood literally, incoherent, the claims defended by some of the users of this term can be made conceptually respectable.
Speaking about the Unspeakable: genocide and philosophy
Authors: FREEMAN MICHAEL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Genocide is a political catastrophe. Yet it has not received much academic attention. A few social scientists have studied it. Philosophers have largely ignored it. There is a large literature on the Holocaust, but there is little agreement as to how this should be related to other genocides. Some have argued that the Holocaust represented a crisis of Western culture, but that Western culture has not responded adequately for the lack of the appropriate self‐understanding. This crisis has been attributed to the predominance of scientistic models of rationality in our culture. Social‐scientific approaches to genocide have been criticised because of their commitment to logical empiricism, which is held to be epistemologically and ethically inadequate. Ethical approaches based on liberal humanism have been criticised by post‐Nietzschean philosophers for their attachment to allegedly outworn metaphysical assumptions. However, the deconstruction of social science and liberal ethics leads in the direction of relativism and nihilism, which are either useless or dangerous in the face of evils such as genocide. The arguments against conventional social science and ethics are examined, and a counter‐critique made of post‐modern philosophy in order to clear the ground for constructive thinking about genocide.
Is there an Ethics of Computing?
Authors: BROWN GEOFFREY
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  The article constitutes an attempt to answer the question contained in the title, by reference to three example topics: individual privacy, ownership of software, and computer ‘hacking’. The ethical question is approached via the legal one of whether special, computer–specific legislation is appropriate. The conclusion is in the affirmative, and rests on the claim that computer technology has brought with it, not so much the potential for committing totally new kinds of crimes, as a distinctive set of linguistic and conceptual apparatus which makes it necessary to describe computer–related activity in special ways.
For One Concept of Liberty
Authors: BEEHLER RODGER
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  The essay enquires whether a negative concept of liberty suffices for political and legal discourse. A contemporary argument alleging the inviability of a negative concept of liberty is examined and exposed as wanting, while street‐smart claims on behalf of a ‘positive’ concept of liberty are shown to be deployments of the negative concept, misdescribed. The truth that lack of money is lack of freedom in societies with a money economy and coercively enforced property rights is established with supporting examples, and its implications for need satisfaction assessed. Judgment is concluded that the negative concept of liberty is both the only viable concept of liberty and demonstrably adequate for morally sensitive engagement with political life.
Moral Responsibility, Psychiatric Disorders and Duress
Authors: ELLIOTT CARL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  The paper is a discussion of moral responsibility and excuses in regard to psychiatric disorders involving abnormal desires (e.g. impulse control disorders such as kleptomania and pyromania, psychosexual disorders such as exhibitionism, obsessive‐compulsive disorder and others). It points out problems with previous approaches to the question of whether or not to excuse persons with these disorders, and offers a new approach based on the concept of duress. There is a discussion of duress in regard to non‐psychiatric cases based on the core notion of duress involving a choice between undesirables, and the paper concludes with an argument that moral blame for individuals with these sorts of disorders should often be lessened and in some cases removed entirely.