bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Translation, cross-cultural adaptation, and reliability, of the Italian version of the Passive Risk Taking (PRT) Scale
Authors: Riva Silvia , Gorini Alessandra , Cutica Ilaria , Mazzocco Ketti , Pravettoni Gabriella
Published: January 2023

The concept of “passive risk taking”, which refers to the risk brought on or magnified by inaction, has recently appeared in the literature on risk taking. Keinan and Bereby-Meyer (2012) have developed a scale to measure the personal tendency for passive risk taking (PRT); the scale has criterion validity and high test-retest reliability; it correlates with reported passive risk taking in everyday life and with the DOSPERT scale. Furthermore, it presents divergent validity from classic risk-taking constructs such as sensation seeking, and convergent validity with procrastination and avoidance. In this paper we propose a validation of the PRT scale in Italian. We performed the linguistic adaptation to Italian via the five steps suggested by Guillemin and colleagues (1993) and Beaton and colleagues (2000); we then submitted the derived questionnaire to a 297-adult sample. Results show that two out of three factors from the original scale were confirmed. However the third factor, originally composed of 6 items, was not consistent. We present the scale derived from such results, and discuss the differences with the original scale.
Weighted Brier score decompositions for topically heterogenous forecasting tournaments
Authors: Merkle Edgar C. , Hartman Robert
Published: January 2023

Brier score decompositions, including those attributed to Murphy and to Yates, provide popular metrics for estimating forecast performance attributes like calibration and discrimination. However, the decompositions are generally limited to situations where forecasters make successive forecast judgments against the same class of substantive event (e.g., rain vs. no rain). They do not readily translate to common situations where: forecasts are weighted unequally; forecasts can be made against a range of heterogeneous topics and events over varying time horizons; forecasts can be updated over time until an event occurs or an event deadline is reached; or outcome alternatives can vary in number and nature (e.g., ordered vs. unordered outcomes) across forecast questions. In this paper, we propose extensions of the Murphy and Yates decompositions to address these features. The extensions involve new analytic expressions for the decompositions of weighted Brier scores, along with proposed resampling methods. We use data from a recent forecasting tournament to illustrate the methods.
Money makes the world go round, and basic research can help
Authors: Erev Ido
Published: January 2023

As the adage goes, “money makes the world go round” – but which direction does it spin? This analysis considers how basic decision research can help us work out how to answer this question. It suggests that the difficulty of deriving clear predictions based on existing decision research is at least partly rooted in two restrictive conventions. The first is the focus on deviations from rational choice, and the effort to capture observed deviations by assuming subjective value functions. While it is difficult to reject the hypothesis that choice behavior reflects the weighting of subjective values, it is not clear that it advances the derivation of useful predictions. A second restrictive convention is the focus on objective hypothesis testing, which favors analyses that evaluate small refinements of the popular models. The potential benefits of relaxing these conventions are considered, with reference to recent choice prediction competitions that facilitate the exploration of distinct assumptions and model development techniques. The winners in these competitions assume very different decision processes than those assumed by the popular “subjective functions” models. The relationship of the results to the big data revolution is discussed.
“Isn’t everyone like me?”: On the presence of self-similarity in strategic interactions
Authors: Rubinstein Ariel , Salant Yuval
Published: January 2023

We propose that in strategic interactions a player is influenced by self-similarity. Self-similarity means that a player who chooses some action X tends to believe, to a greater extent than a player who chooses a different action, that other players will also choose action X. To demonstrate this phenomenon, we analyze the actions and the reported beliefs of players in a two-player two-action symmetric game. The game has the feature that for “materialistic” players, who wish to maximize their own payoff, there should be negative correlation between players’ actions and the beliefs that they assign to their opponent choosing the same action. We first elicit participants’ preferences over the outcomes of the game, and identify a large group of materialistic players. We then ask participants to choose an action in the game and report their beliefs. The reported beliefs of materialistic players are positively correlated with their actions, i.e., they are more likely to choose an action the stronger is their belief that their opponent will also choose the same action. We view this pattern as evidence for the presence of self-similarity.
The effect of perceived advantage and disadvantage on the variability and stability of efficacy beliefs
Authors: Ganzach Yoav
Published: January 2023

We examined the effect of perceptions of advantage and disadvantage on the variability and stability of efficacy beliefs in a competition. Perceptions of advantageous or disadvantageous opening position were experimentally manipulated (keeping the actual positions equal) and pre- and post-competition efficacy beliefs were observed. Perceiving an advantage resulted in more variability and less stability in efficacy beliefs. These results are explained by the higher sensitivity of the advantaged to the experiences of the competition.
Is justice blind or myopic? An examination of the effects of meta-cognitive myopia and truth bias on mock jurors and judges
Authors: Pantazi Myrto , Klein Olivier , Kissine Mikhail
Published: January 2023

Previous studies have shown that people are truth-biased in that they tend to believe the information they receive, even if it is clearly flagged as false. The truth bias has been recently proposed to be an instance of meta-cognitive myopia, that is, of a generalized human insensitivity towards the quality and correctness of the information available in the environment. In two studies we tested whether meta-cognitive myopia and the ensuing truth bias may operate in a courtroom setting. Based on a well-established paradigm in the truth-bias literature, we asked mock jurors (Study 1) and professional judges (Study 2) to read two crime reports containing aggravating or mitigating information that was explicitly flagged as false. Our findings suggest that jurors and judges are truth-biased, as their decisions and memory about the cases were affected by the false information. We discuss the implications of the potential operation of the truth bias in the courtroom, in the light of the literature on inadmissible and discredible evidence, and make some policy suggestions.
Moral preferences in helping dilemmas expressed by matching and forced choice
Authors: Erlandsson Arvid , Lindkvist Amanda , Lundqvist Kajsa , Andersson Per A. , Dickert Stephan , Slovic Paul , Västfjäll Daniel
Published: January 2023

This paper asks whether moral preferences in eight medical dilemmas change as a function of how preferences are expressed, and how people choose when they are faced with two equally attractive help projects. In two large-scale studies, participants first read dilemmas where they “matched” two suggested helping projects (which varied on a single attribute) so that they became equally attractive. They did this by filling in a missing number (e.g., how many male patients must Project M save in order to be equally attractive as Project F which can save 100 female patients). Later, the same participants were asked to choose between the two equally attractive projects. We found robust evidence that people do not choose randomly, but instead tend to choose projects that help female (vs. male), children (vs. adult), innocent (vs. non-innocent), ingroup (vs. outgroup) and existing (vs. future) patients, and imply no (vs. some) risk of a harmful side-effect, even when these projects have been matched as equally attractive as, and save fewer patients than the contrasting project. We also found that some moral preferences are hidden when expressed with matching but apparent when expressed with forced choice. For example, 88–95% of the participants expressed that female and male patients are equally valuable when doing the matching task, but over 80% of them helped female patients in the choice task.
Procedural and economic utilities in consequentialist choice: Trading freedom of choice to minimize financial losses
Authors: DeCaro Daniel A. , DeCaro Marci S. , Hotaling Jared M. , Johnson Joseph G.
Published: January 2023

Work on procedural utility suggests that decision makers derive more value from outcomes earned with freedom of choice. We experimentally tested tradeoffs between procedural and outcome utility, examining financial losses as an important boundary condition. Participants completed a simulated consumer sales task (Exp. 1) or card task (Exp. 2) with or without choice. Participants reported their satisfaction with monetary outcomes. When given choice, participants reported greater self-determination. Participants also reported higher outcome satisfaction, but only for gains. Choice did not influence satisfaction for losses. In Experiment 2, Participants also preferred choice when selecting between financial gains. However, when choice was costly (large disparity in pay) or posed losses, most participants sacrificed choice for better payoffs. Results are consistent with a cognitive model in which participants shift their attention from procedural utilities to financial outcomes when faced with losses. Financial outcomes may take precedence over choice when financial outcomes are threatened.
The psychology of task management: The smaller tasks trap
Authors: Rusou Zohar , Amar Moty , Ayal Shahar
Published: January 2023

When people are confronted with multiple tasks, how do they decide which task to do first? Normatively, priority should be given to the most efficient task (i.e., the task with the best cost/benefit ratio). However, we hypothesize that people consistently choose to address smaller (involving less work) tasks first, and continue to focus on smaller tasks, even when this strategy emerges as less efficient, a phenomenon we term the “smaller tasks trap”. We also hypothesize that the preference for the smaller tasks is negatively related to individual differences in the tendency for rational thinking. To test these hypotheses, we developed a novel paradigm consisting of an incentive-compatible task management game, in which participants are saddled with multiple tasks and have to decide how to handle them. The results lend weight to the smaller tasks trap and indicate that individual differences in rational thinking predict susceptibility to this trap. That is, participants low in rational thinking preferred to start with a smaller (vs. larger) task and focused more on the smaller tasks regardless of their efficiency. Consequently, their overall performance in the task management game was significantly lower. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings and suggest possible interventions that may help people improve their task management.
May the odds — or your personality — be in your favor: Probability of observing a favorable outcome, Honesty-Humility, and dishonest behavior
Authors: Schild Christoph , Moshagen Morten , Ścigała Karolina A. , Zettler Ingo
Published: January 2023

In the light of the potential negative consequences of dishonest behaviors for individuals and societies, researchers from different disciplines have aimed to investigate situation and person factors shaping the occurrence and extent of such behaviors. The present study investigates the roles of a situation factor, the baseline probability of observing a favorable outcome, and a person factor, trait Honesty-Humility from the HEXACO Model of Personality, in shaping dishonest behavior. Next to main effects, a person-situation interaction between these factors was tested. Across three studies with 5,297 participants overall, we find that a higher baseline probability of observing a favorable outcome and lower levels in Honesty-Humility are linked to more dishonest behavior, whereas there was no strong evidence for an interaction between these factors. By testing the assumed effects in two different cheating paradigms, this study additionally allows to disentangle previously found effects of (a) the distance between an observed and the favorable outcome and (b) the baseline probability of observing a favorable outcome.
The price of not putting a price on love
Authors: McGraw A. Peter , Davis Derick F. , Scott Sydney E. , Tetlock Philip E.
Published: January 2023

We examine financial challenges of purchasing items that are readily-available yet symbolic of loving relationships. Using weddings and funerals as case studies, we find that people indirectly pay to avoid taboo monetary trade-offs. When purchasing items symbolic of love, respondents chose higher price, higher quality items over equally appealing lower price, lower quality items (Study 1), searched less for lower priced items (Study 2) and were less willing to negotiate prices (Study 3). The effect was present for experienced consumers (Study 1), affectively positive and negative events (Study 2), and more routine purchase events (Study 3). Trade-off avoidance, however, was limited to monetary trade-offs associated with loved ones. When either money or love was omitted from the decision context, people were more likely to engage in trade-off reasoning. By abandoning cost-benefit reasoning in order to avoid painful monetary trade-offs, people spend more money than if they engaged in trade-off based behaviors, such as seeking lower cost options or requesting lower prices.
How economic success shapes redistribution: The role of self-serving beliefs, in-group bias and justice principles
Authors: Dorin Camille , Hainguerlot Marine , Huber-Yahi Hélène , Vergnaud Jean-Christophe , de Gardelle Vincent
Published: January 2023

In the face of economic inequalities, redistribution of wealth is a key debate for society, and understanding the reasons why individuals may support more or less redistribution can inform this debate. Here we investigate the mechanisms by which experiencing success in a task decreases the support for redistribution of the wealth generated by the task, such that overachievers favor less redistribution than underachievers. In a laboratory experiment, we replicate this effect and explore how it that may be mediated by an in-group bias, or by changes in individuals’ principles of redistributive justice. Critically, both in-group favoritism and self-serving adjustments of justice principles partially accounted for the effect of status on redistribution choices. Our study thus sheds new light on the various ways by which economic experience affects support for redistribution.
Apparent age and gender differences in survival optimism: To what extent are they a bias in the translation of beliefs onto a percentage scale?
Authors: Comerford David A.
Published: January 2023

A standard way to elicit expectations asks for the percentage chance an event will occur. Previous research demonstrates noise in reported percentages. The current research models a bias; a five percentage point change in reported probabilities implies a larger change in beliefs at certain points in the probability distribution. One contribution of my model is that it can parse bias in beliefs from biases in reports. I reconsider age and gender differences in Subjective Survival Probabilities (SSPs). These are generally interpreted as differences in survival beliefs, e.g., that males are more optimistic than females and older respondents are more optimistic than younger respondents. These demographic differences (in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing) can be entirely explained by reporting bias. Older respondents are no more optimistic than younger respondents and males are no more optimistic than females. Similarly, in forecasting, information is obscured by taking reported percentages at face value. Accounting for reporting bias thus better exploits the private information contained in reports. Relative to a face-value specification, a specification that does this delivers improved forecasts of mortality events, raising the pseudo R-squared from less than 3 percent to over 6 percent.
More time, more work: How time limits bias estimates of task scope and project duration
Authors: Goswami Indranil , Urminsky Oleg
Published: January 2023

We propose that externally induced time limits on a task overly affect predictions of other people’s completion times for that task, due to an over-generalized association between the time available and inferred task scope. We find higher estimates of the time needed to complete a given task by another person when the time limit is longer. While such predictions could be normative when time limits are informative, the effect persists even when the decision-maker knows that the limit is arbitrary and is unknown to the other person, and therefore, cannot affect behavior. Perception of task scope mediates the relationship between time limits and completion time estimates, and weakening the association between time limits and task scope attenuates the effect. The over-learned cognitive bias persists even among experienced decision-makers making estimates in a familiar setting. Our findings have implications for people who make decisions that use judgments of others’ task completion time as an input.
Veil-of-ignorance reasoning mitigates self-serving bias in resource allocation during the COVID-19 crisis
Authors: Huang Karen , Bernhard Regan M. , Barak-Corren Netta , Bazerman Max H. , Greene Joshua D.
Published: January 2023

The COVID-19 crisis has forced healthcare professionals to make tragic decisions concerning which patients to save. Furthermore, The COVID-19 crisis has foregrounded the influence of self-serving bias in debates on how to allocate scarce resources. A utilitarian principle favors allocating scarce resources such as ventilators toward younger patients, as this is expected to save more years of life. Some view this as ageist, instead favoring age-neutral principles, such as “first come, first served”. Which approach is fairer? The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by reducing decision-makers’ use of potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning to the COVID-19 ventilator dilemma, asking participants which policy they would prefer if they did not know whether they were younger or older. Two studies (pre-registered; online samples; Study 1, N=414; Study 2 replication, N=1,276) show that veil-of-ignorance reasoning shifts preferences toward saving younger patients. The effect on older participants is dramatic, reversing their opposition toward favoring the young, thereby eliminating self-serving bias. These findings provide guidance on how to remove self-serving biases to healthcare policymakers and frontline personnel charged with allocating scarce medical resources during times of crisis.
Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss
Authors: Sun Qingzhou , Guo Haozhi , Wang Jiarui , Zhang Jing , Jiang Chengming , Liu Yongfang
Published: January 2023

In social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.
Risky choice framing with various problem descriptions: A replication and extension study
Authors: Zhou Lei , Liu Nan , Liao Ya-Qiong , Li Ai-Mei
Published: January 2023

In “Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory”, Kühberger and Tanner (2010) examined the impacts of removing stated zero/non-zero complements of risky options on the gain/loss framing effect. They also tested two rival theoretical explanations for this effect: prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence provided by Kühberger and Tanner by precise replication in Study 1. The original findings were reported for conditions in which the probability of the risky option was fixed, and the expected value of the two alternatives was approximately equivalent. The present study also aimed to examine the generality of their findings under additional conditions in which large, medium and small probabilities of the risky option were assigned, and the expected value of the certain or risky options differed. The main findings of Kühberger and Tanner (2010) were successfully replicated and confirmed under the original and additional conditions. The implications of these findings are discussed.
Inference and preference in intertemporal choice
Authors: Skylark William J. , Farmer George D. , Bahemia Nadia
Published: January 2023

When choosing between immediate and future rewards, how do people deal with uncertainty about the value of the future outcome or the delay until its occurrence? Skylark et al. (2020) suggested that people employ a delay-reward heuristic: the inferred value of an ambiguous future reward is a function of the stated delay, and vice-versa. The present paper investigates the role of this heuristic in choice behaviour. In Studies 1a–2b, participants inferred the value of an ambiguous future reward or delay before the true value was revealed and a choice made. Preference for the future option was predicted by the discrepancy between the estimated and true values: the more pleasantly surprising the delayed option, the greater the willingness to choose it. Studies 3a–3c examined the association between inference and preference when the ambiguous values remained unknown. As predicted by the use of a delay-reward heuristic, inferred delays and rewards were positively related to stated rewards and delays, respectively. More importantly, choices were associated with inferred rewards and, in some circumstances, delays. Critically, estimates and choices were both order-dependent: when estimates preceded choices, estimates were more optimistic (people inferred smaller delays and larger rewards) and were subsequently more likely to choose the delayed option than when choices were made before estimates. These order effects argue against a simple model in which people deal with ambiguity by first estimating the unknown value and then using their estimate as the basis for decision. Rather, it seems that inferences are partly constructed from choices, and the role of inference in choice depends on whether an explicit estimate is made prior to choosing. Finally, we also find that inferences about ambiguous delays depend on whether the estimate has to be made in “days” or in a self-selected temporal unit, and replicate previous findings that older participants make more pessimistic inferences than younger ones. We discuss the implications and possible mechanisms for these findings.
Denotative and connotative management of uncertainty: A computational dual-process model
Authors: Hoey Jesse , MacKinnon Neil J. , Schröder Tobias
Published: January 2023

The interplay between intuitive and deliberative processing is known to be important for human decision making. As independent modes, intuitive processes can take on many forms from associative to constructive, while deliberative processes often rely on some notion of decision theoretic rationality or pattern matching. Dual process models attempt to unify these two modes based on parallel constraint networks or on socially or emotionally oriented adjustments to utility functions. This paper presents a new kind of dual process model that unifies decision theoretic deliberative reasoning with intuitive reasoning based on shared cultural affective meanings in a single Bayesian sequential model. Agents constructed according to this unified model are motivated by a combination of affective alignment (intuitive) and decision theoretic reasoning (deliberative), trading the two off as a function of the uncertainty or unpredictability of the situation. The model also provides a theoretical bridge between decision-making research and sociological symbolic interactionism. Starting with a high-level view of existing models, we advance Bayesian Affect Control Theory (BayesACT) as a promising new type of dual process model that explicitly and optimally (in the Bayesian sense) trades off motivation, action, beliefs and utility. We demonstrate a key component of the model as being sufficient to account for some aspects of classic cognitive biases about fairness and dissonance, and outline how this new theory relates to parallel constraint satisfaction models.
Nudging freelance professionals to increase their retirement pension fund contributions
Authors: Rubaltelli Enrico , Lotto Lorella
Published: January 2023

People do not save enough for retirement and this can have serious repercussions on their well-being. We tested an intervention in a large field study (N = 20,507) with the goal of nudging a population of freelance workers to save more for the future. First, we changed the default from the earlier contribution rate of 10% to a contribution rate of 20%, but left people free to choose how much they wanted to contribute. Second, those who reduced their contribution were reminded that they would receive a lower pension as a result. Third, we informed people about how much tax they would save as a result of their contribution. This nudging intervention proved to be a cost-effective, yet powerful way to remind people about the long-term implications of their savings decisions. It was also successful at counteracting the temptation to keep as much money as possible for present consumption while losing out on the long run. Overall, we were able to increase cash flow to the fund by more than eight million Euros (in addition to the roughly 50 million collected in the previous year), with an almost seven-fold increase in the number of people who chose to contribute more than the minimum.
Time-varying risk behavior and prior investment outcomes: Evidence from Italy
Authors: Lippi Andrea , Barbieri Laura , Piva Mariacristina , De Bondt Werner
Published: January 2023

Risk behavior can be capricious and may vary from month to month. We study 62 clients of a private bank in Northern Italy. The individuals are of special interest for several reasons. As active traders, they manage the value-at-risk (VaR) of a portion of their wealth portfolios. In addition, they act alone, i.e., without input from a financial adviser. Based onVaR-statistics, we find that, in general, the subjects become more risk-averse after suffering losses and more risk-seeking after experiencing gains. The monthly gains and losses that alter investor risk behavior represent true changes in wealth but are “on paper” only, i.e., not immediately realized. Our results allow several interpretations, but they are not at odds with a house money effect, or the possibility that overconfident investors trade on illusions. Rapidly shifting risk behavior in fast response to unstable circumstances weakens individual risk tolerance as a deep parameter and key construct of finance theory.
Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games
Authors: Verbrugge Rineke , Meijering Ben , Wierda Stefan , van Rijn Hedderik , Taatgen Niels
Published: January 2023

People model other people’s mental states in order to understand and predict their behavior. Sometimes they model what others think about them as well: “He thinks that I intend to stop.” Such second-order theory of mind is needed to navigate some social situations, for example, to make optimal decisions in turn-taking games. Adults sometimes find this very difficult. Sometimes they make decisions that do not fit their predictions about the other player. However, the main bottleneck for decision makers is to take a second-order perspective required to make a correct opponent model. We report a methodical investigation into supporting factors that help adults do better. We presented subjects with two-player, three-turn games in which optimal decisions required second-order theory of mind (Hedden and Zhang, 2002). We applied three “scaffolds” that, theoretically, should facilitate second-order perspective-taking: 1) stepwise training, from simple one-person games to games requiring second-order theory of mind; 2) prompting subjects to predict the opponent’s next decision before making their own decision; and 3) a realistic visual task representation. The performance of subjects in the eight resulting combinations shows that stepwise training, but not the other two scaffolds, improves subjects’ second-order opponent models and thereby their own decisions.
Making good cider out of bad apples — Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders
Authors: Nagatsu Michiru , Larsen Karen , Karabegovic Mia , Székely Marcell , Mønster Dan , Michael John
Published: January 2023

The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and proposesolution thinkingas the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.
The effects of communicating scientific uncertainty on trust and decision making in a public health context
Authors: Schneider Claudia R. , Freeman Alexandra L. J. , Spiegelhalter David , van der Linden Sander
Published: January 2023

Large-scale societal issues such as public health crises highlight the need to communicate scientific information, which is often uncertain, accurately to the public and policy makers. The challenge is to communicate the inherent scientific uncertainty — especially about the underlying quality of the evidence — whilst supporting informed decision making. Little is known about the effects that such scientific uncertainty has on people’s judgments of the information. In three experimental studies (totalN=6,489), we investigate the influence of scientific uncertainty about the quality of the evidence on people’s perceived trustworthiness of the information and decision making. We compare the provision of high, low, and ambiguous quality-of-evidence indicators against providing no such cues. Results show an asymmetric relationship: people react more strongly to cues of low quality of evidence than they do to high quality of evidence compared to no cue. While responses to a cue of high quality of evidence are not significantly different from no cue; a cue of low or uncertain quality of evidence is accompanied by lower perceived trustworthiness and lower use of the information in decision making. Cues of uncertain quality of evidence have a similar effect to those of low quality. These effects do not change with the addition of a reason for the indicated quality level. Our findings shed light on the effects of the communication of scientific uncertainty on judgment and decision making, and provide insights for evidence-based communications and informed decision making for policy makers and the public.
Thinking, good and bad? Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect
in charitable giving
Authors: Moche Hajdi , Gordon-Hecker Tom , Kogut Tehila , Västfjäll Daniel
Published: January 2023

Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive
(i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct
two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation,
unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect
(i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive
giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply
think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the
guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different
prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find
that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no
longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims.
Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation
only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation
affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response,
especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single
victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation
significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the
group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate
thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower
overall valuation of people in need.
Recalibrating probabilistic forecasts to improve their accuracy
Authors: Han Ying , Budescu David V.
Published: January 2023

The accuracy of human forecasters is often reduced because of incomplete
information and cognitive biases that affect the judges. One approach to
improve the accuracy of the forecasts is to recalibrate them by means of
non-linear transformations that are sensitive to the direction and the
magnitude of the biases. Previous work on recalibration has focused on
binary forecasts. We propose an extension of this approach by developing an
algorithm that uses a single free parameter to recalibrate complete
subjective probability distributions. We illustrate the approach with data
from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the
European Central Bank (ECB), document the potential benefits of this
approach, and show how it can be used in practical applications.
Belief in karma is associated with perceived (but not actual)
trustworthiness
Authors: Ong How Hwee , Evans Anthony M. , Nelissen Rob M. A. , van Beest Ilja
Published: January 2023

Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad
outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may
have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American
Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust)
interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized
study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in
karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were
more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual
behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness.
These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to
predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so.
Both better and worse than others depending on difficulty: Replication
and extensions of Kruger’s (1999) above and below average effects
Authors: Korbmacher Max , Kwan Ching (Isabelle) , Feldman Gilad
Published: January 2023

Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when
comparing oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves
as above average for easy abilities and below average for difficult
abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered replication of Kruger’s
(1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon
(N = 756, US MTurk workers). Extending the
replication to also include a between-subject design, we added two
conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original
ability domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring
perceived difficulty. We observed an above-average-effect in the easy
extension and below-average-effect in the difficult extension, compared to
the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions were perceived
as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude
strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with
boundary conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both
generalizability and robustness of the phenomenon.
Gender differences in lying in sender-receiver games: A meta-analysis
Authors: Capraro Valerio
Published: January 2023

Whether there are gender differences in lying has been largely debated in the past decade. Previous studies found mixed results. To shed light on this topic, here I report a meta-analysis of 8,728 distinct observations, collected in 65 Sender-Receiver game treatments, by 14 research groups. Following previous work and theoretical considerations, I distinguish three types of lies: black lies, which benefit the liar at a cost for another person; altruistic white lies, which benefit another person at a cost for the liar; and Pareto white lies, which benefit both the liar and another person. The results show that: males are significantly more likely than females to tell black lies (N=4,173); males are significantly more likely than females to tell altruistic white (N=2,940); and results are inconclusive in the case of Pareto white lies (N=1,615). Furthermore, gender differences in telling altruistic white lies are significantly stronger than in the other two cases.
The role of character strengths in economic decision-making
Authors: Jordan Matthew R. , Rand David G.
Published: January 2023

We aggregated data from 28 studies (total N=13,386) to assess the relationship between individual differences in character strengths, as described by the VIA model of character, and economically-relevant behaviors and cognition. Factor analyzing the character strength inventory responses revealed four factors – Caring, Leadership, Inquisitiveness, and Self-control – each of which correlated with a variety of measures. Caring was associated with the willingness to pay costs to benefit others, as well as reliance on intuitive decision-making; Leadership was associated with inefficient, anti-social behaviors, risk taking, and trusting one’s intuitions while also liking to reason; Inquisitiveness was associated with efficient behaviors in both the social and risk domains, and reliance on deliberative decision-making; and Self-control was associated with delaying gratification, risk aversion, and a reliance on reason. These results help shed light on the relationship between character – and personality more generally – and economic behaviors. In doing so, we give some indication of which types of people will be most successful in which decision-making contexts.
The endowment effect in the future: How time shapes buying and selling prices
Authors: Yamamoto Shohei , Navarro-Martinez Daniel
Published: January 2023

Previous research has focused on studying the endowment effect for transactions that take place in the present. Many real-world transactions, however, are delayed into the future (i.e., people agree to buy or sell, but the actual transaction does not materialize until a later time). Here we investigate how transaction timing affects the endowment effect. In five studies, we show that the endowment effect systematically increases as transactions are delayed into the future. Specifically, buying prices significantly decrease as the transaction is delayed, while selling prices remain constant, resulting in an amplified endowment effect (Experiment 1). This pattern is not produced by a discounting of the money involved in the transaction (Experiment 2), and it holds across different types of items (Experiment 3). We also show that the phenomenon cannot be explained by sellers anticipating becoming increasingly attached to the items over time (Experiment 4). Finally, we demonstrate that this increased endowment effect in the future holds in the field, in the context of a real market and with real transactions (Experiment 5).
Pledging one’s trustworthiness through gifts: An experiment
Authors: Danese Giuseppe , Mittone Luigi
Published: January 2023

Ethnographers have recorded many instances of tokens donated as gifts to attract new partners or strengthen ties to existing ones. We study whether gifts are an effective pledge of the donor’s trustworthiness through an experiment modeled on the trust game. We vary whether the trustee can send a token before the trustor decides whether to transfer money; whether one of the tokens is rendered salient through experimental manipulations (a vote or an incentive-compatible rule of purchase for the tokens); and whether the subjects interact repeatedly or are randomly re-matched in each round. Tokens are frequently sent in all studies in which tokens are available, but repeated interaction, rather than gifts, is the leading behavioral driver in our data. In the studies with random pairs, trustors send significantly more points when the trustee has sent a token. Subjects in a fixed matching achieve comparable levels of trust and trustworthiness in the studies with and without tokens. The trustee’s decision to send a token is not predictive of the amount the trustee returns to the trustor. A token is used more sparingly whenever salient — a novel instance of endogenous value creation in the lab.
Sample decisions with description and experience
Authors: Klingebiel Ronald , Zhu Feibai
Published: January 2023

Decision makers weight small probabilities differently when sampling them and when seeing them stated. We disentangle to what extent the gap is due to how decision makers receive information (through description or experience), the literature’s prevailing focus, and what information they receive (population probabilities or sample frequencies), our novel explanation. The latter determines statistical confidence, the extent to which one can know that a choice is superior in expectation. Two lab studies, as well as a review of prior work, reveal sample decisions to respond to statistical confidence. More strongly, in fact, than decisions based on population probabilities, leading to higher payoffs in expectation. Our research thus not only offers a more robust method for identifying description-experience gaps. It also reveals how probability weighting in decisions based on samples — the typical format of real-world decisions — may actually come closer to an unbiased ideal than decisions based on fully specified probabilities — the format frequently used in decision science.
Pretrial release judgments and decision fatigue
Authors: Shroff Ravi , Vamvourellis Konstantinos
Published: January 2023

Field studies in many domains have found evidence of decision fatigue, a
phenomenon describing how decision quality can be impaired by the act of
making previous decisions. Debate remains, however, over posited
psychological mechanisms underlying decision fatigue, and the size of
effects in high-stakes settings. We examine an extensive set of pretrial
arraignments in a large, urban court system to investigate how judicial
release and bail decisions are influenced by the time an arraignment occurs.
We find that release rates decline modestly in the hours before lunch and
before dinner, and these declines persist after statistically adjusting for
an extensive set of observed covariates. However, we find no evidence that
arraignment time affects pretrial release rates in the remainder of each
decision-making session. Moreover, we find that release rates remain
unchanged after a meal break even though judges have the opportunity to
replenish their mental and physical resources by resting and eating. In a
complementary analysis, we find that the rate at which judges concur with
prosecutorial bail requests does not appear to be influenced by either
arraignment time or a meal break. Taken together, our results imply that to
the extent that decision fatigue plays a role in pretrial release judgments,
effects are small and inconsistent with previous explanations implicating
psychological depletion processes.
The prominence effect in health-care priority setting
Authors: Persson Emil , Erlandsson Arvid , Slovic Paul , Västfjäll Daniel , Tinghög Gustav
Published: January 2023

People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.