Centralization and the development potential of peripheral areas
Authors: Pálné Kovács Ilona 
Published: December 2021

Asymmetrical power relations between centre and periphery have been analysed for decades by scholars, who pointed out the cumulative advantages of centres and the social, political and economic disadvantages of the dependent peripheries. The common element of centre periphery theories with a multidisciplinary approach is that the centre tends to keep the periphery dependent by draining its resources. At the same time, the positive mission of the centre is to provide services and job opportunities for the periphery, to accelerate its modernization and catching up and to act as a mediator towards the dynamizing networks. Developmental disadvantages of peripheries have sparked academic interest by asking whether and how disadvantages in power and space can be compensated for.
In order to answer this question, this paper analyses the role of the state, the central government in shaping the centre-periphery relationship. In systems that are based on centralized redistribution and subsidies, the fate of both the periphery and the centre depends on their ‘designated’ place, which is determined by a public planning process at best, and by personal, informal power assertion situations at worst. We have much less knowledge about whether the peripheries’ own local activity can change this pre-assigned position and the disadvantages caused by peripherality, and if so, what governance conditions and public policy interventions are necessary to achieve this.
The issue is particularly topical in light of the fact that in Hungary the relationship between the central government and local governments has become particularly controversial over the past decade. Local governments are steadily losing their position and resources. It is clear that peripheral municipalities have the narrowest room for manoeuvre, as they are unable to mobilise their own resources and are far from development and power centres. While the government has announced an ambitious rural development strategy, resource-strapped municipalities are unable to act as real partners. The theoretical part of the study draws on analyses employed by the EU-funded RELOCAL project while the empirical study relies on the first findings of an ongoing research programme funded by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office.
The theoretical chapters review the main findings of different disciplines that analyse the peripheral situation and centre periphery relations from the perspective of the power-institutional context. The empirical chapters present preliminary empirical research results of an ongoing research project. So far findings have only partially highlighted correlations between power position and development trajectories. This has drawn our attention to aspects that were previously ignored, and which will influence the direction of further research. In light of data on local government elections in the county understudy, it seems that voter behaviour is not necessarily determined by the ‘losing’ or ‘winning’ position of a settlement or region. There is no significant divergence from national trends: opposition-led municipalities are a few (besides the county capital), and in particular in small municipalities, multiple re-election of leaders is common. Contrary to our preliminary assumptions, the majority of respondents belonging to the local elite consider local visibility and personal qualities more important than connections with higher levels of government in spite of their perception that the majority of development funding comes from national and EU sources. These results of course require further interpretation. It seems that people's political sensitivity is less dependent on the territorial location and the &success! of the municipality. It is also possible that the role of information transfer, communication, political socialisation and local networks is more important than local, personal and existential circumstances.