bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Effective Theory Approach to Direct Detection of Dark Matter
Authors: Hisano Junji
Published: August 2020

It is now certain that dark matter exists in the Universe. However, we do not know its nature, nor are there dark matter candidates in the standard model of particle physics or astronomy However, weakly interacting massive particles (WIMPs) in models beyond the standard model are one of the leading candidates available to provide explanation. The dark matter direct detection experiments, in which the nuclei recoiled by WIMPs are sought, are one of the methods to elucidate the nature of dark matter. This chapter introduces an effective field theory (EFT) approach in order to evaluate the nucleon–WIMP elastic scattering cross section.
The Phenomenon of Conversational Pressure
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C.
Published: August 2020

This chapter aims to characterize the nature of what the author calls ‘conversational pressure’. It conceives of such pressure in terms of a distinctive class of normative expectations that are generated by the performance of speech acts in the course of a speech exchange. After making the case that this constitutes a distinctive phenomenon in its own right, the chapter argues that such pressure bears not only on audiences but on speakers as well. It goes on to provide the framework in terms of which the author pursues this topic in the remainder of the book.
Your Attention Please!
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C.
Published: August 2020

There are various ways through which we try to capture another person’s attention. One of these ways is to address them. After trying to highlight what it is to address another person, the chapter argues that doing so generates a reason (for you, as addressee) to attend to the act. When the act of address is a speech act, matters are further complicated by the expectations parties bring, and are entitled to bring, to an (anticipated) speech exchange. If this is correct, then the act of address itself generates the most basic form of conversational pressure: in cooperative exchanges speakers who address an audience have a claim on the audience’s attention. To fail to attend to a speaker who addresses you and whose claim on your attention is part of a (would-be) cooperative exchange, the chapter argues, is to disrespect her as a rational subject.
Conversational Pressures, Interpersonal and Epistemic
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C.
Published: August 2020

This chapter identifies a form of conversational pressure that is downstream from one’s recognition of being addressed: the pressure that is brought to bear on one when one is addressed by a speaker who advances a claim. It argues that this pressure doesn’t ultimately depend on one’s being addressed at all; rather, it is a normative pressure that obtains whenever one observes an assertion being made. The normative pressure in question is of two main types: interpersonal and epistemic. The chapter goes on to identify five constraints that any adequate account of this pressure will need to address.
How to Treat a Testifier
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C.
Published: August 2020

This chapter offers a positive account of the speaker’s expectation of proper treatment (when she testifies that p). It does so in terms of the job that the speaker purports to be performing qua testifier, and the expectations she is entitled to have in virtue of the purport of that act. After noting that assertion is the speech act tailor made to enable a speaker to perform the type of job associated with acts of testifying, the chapter argues that it is the expectations one is entitled to have in making an assertion that generate the relevant conversational pressures. This makes clear how the pragmatic and interpersonal dimensions of this type of act interact with the epistemological dimension of testimonial transactions.
Introduction
Authors: Graham Florence Lydia
Published: August 2020

This chapter defines key terminology used throughout the text: loanword, turkism, borrowing, cultural and core loans. It also provides background information on the Order of the Bosnian Franciscans (Bosna Srebrena), the Bulgarian Franciscans (Paulicians) and their respective Catholic communities, Ottoman presence in Bosnia and Bulgaria in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as short biographies of each of the writers whose works are analysed. Lastly, it discusses dialect, phonology, and South Slavonic orthographies, namely latinica, Cyrillic, and bosančica.
Existing Studies and the Problem of Dating
Authors: Graham Florence Lydia
Published: August 2020

This chapter focuses on the complications regarding establishing earliest attestations for turkisms occurring in seventeenth and eighteenth century. Whilst Bosnian has an attestational dictionary, namely Rječnik hrvatskog illi srpskog jezika, it is not equally thorough in providing attestations. Bulgarian has no such dictionary. Particular attention is given to dating Turkish and Slavonic derivatives against their roots, dating different parts of speech, core loans and cultural loans, and a comparative analysis of the earliest attestations of Bosnian and Bulgarian turkisms.
Conclusion
Authors: Graham Florence Lydia
Published: August 2020

The conclusion addresses how morphology, semantics, motivation, and context relate to the borrowing chronology of turkisms in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bosnian and Bulgarian texts, how these areas differ from language to language—as well as from genre to genre—and directions for further study in Slavonic–Turkish, language contact.
Introduction
Authors: Shaheen Aaron
Published: August 2020

The introduction examines the concept of spirit, which, thanks to psychologists like Gordon Allport and theologians like Winifred Kirkland, had become synonymous with the term “personality.” Thus, to the extent that prostheses were regarded as spiritual extensions of their wearers, they could reveal the fuller dimensions of amputees’ personalities—their emotional and spiritual strivings, not just their practical or vocational aspirations. These prosthetic designs were in keeping with vitalist Henri Bergson’s hope that the war would instill in the Allied forces not a “mechanization of spirit,” but rather a “spiritualization of matter.” Then drawing on prosthetic theories outlined by Vivian Sobchack, the introduction articulates the book’s thrust: designed and depicted to transcend their materiality in the hopes of offering disabled veterans a new start in the postwar world, prostheses often possessed the insidious potential to physically and psychically mechanize their wearers. Finally, the introduction offers a chapter-by-chapter summary.
From the Civil War to the Great War
Authors: Shaheen Aaron
Published: August 2020

The chapter first shows how the spiritualized version of prosthetics originated in the Civil War, which rendered approximately 60,000 veterans limbless. Prominent physicians such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. and S. Weir Mitchell postulated that artificial limbs gave both physical and emotional solace to shattered soldiers, especially among those who suffered phantom limb syndrome. The devices’ “spiritual” potential proved limited, if not illusory; in fact, they were often so fragile, cumbersome, and painful that amputees simply preferred to go without them. Upon entering World War I, the United States created a rehabilitation and vocational program that aided injured veterans to reenter the workforce. Reflecting the way in which “personality” had come to replace a more traditional notion of spirit, orthopedists such as Joel Goldthwait and David Silver, both employed at Walter Reed Hospital, designed artificial limbs for both physical and psychological compatibility.
Medieval Departures
Authors: Shaheen Aaron
Published: August 2020

Using John Dos Passos’s first novel, One Man’s Initiation: 1917, the chapter explains how facial prosthetics were complicit in the unravelling of the Christian concept of the soul. Drawing on the author’s time in France as a volunteer ambulance driver, the novel shows a clear preoccupation with faces—faces of soldiers with prosthetic noses and jaws to cover the ones blown off in battle as well as those donning hideous masks as protection from chemical warfare. Such preoccupation calls into larger question what really is at the core of human identity. As protagonist Martin Howe adjusts to the realities of war on the Western Front, his recognition of different faces aids him in understanding that America, by joining the conflict in 1917, has itself undergone an initiation, wherein the Platonic and Christian idealism that once guided the western world since the Middle Ages has given way to a soulless materialism.
Reality and Morality
Authors: Dunaway Billy
Published: August 2020

This book develops and defends a framework for moral realism. It defends the idea that moral properties are metaphysically elite, or privileged parts of reality. It argues that realists can hold that this makes them highly eligible as the referents for our moral terms, an application of a thesis sometimes called reference magnetism. And it elaborates on these theses by introducing some natural claims about how we can know about morality, by having beliefs that are free from a kind of risk of error. This package of theses in metaphysics, meta-semantics, and epistemology is motivated with a view to an explanation of possible moral disagreements. Many writers have emphasized the scope of moral disagreement, and have given compelling examples of possible users of moral language who appear to be genuinely disagreeing, rather than talking past one another, with their use of moral language. What has gone unnoticed is that there are limits to these possible disagreements, and not all possible users of moral language are naturally interpreted as capable of genuine disagreement. The realist view developed in this book can explain both the extent of, and the limits to, moral disagreement, and thereby has explanatory power that counts significantly in its favor.
Contemplating Historical Actors in Context
Authors: Bloxham Donald
Published: August 2020

Part 1 Contemplating Historical Actors in Context This Part of the book takes seriously the historian’s imperative to do justice to different ways and circumstances of life in the past. One of the greatest obligations historians bear is not to caricature or traduce the historical objects of their investigations, and this obligation is honoured by care in depicting what one infers about the beliefs, motives, intentions, and situations of historical actors. The same obligation ought to be honoured for any actor under scrutiny, whether from a millennium ago or last year, whether Gulag guard or inmate. The discussion paves the way for greater clarity and consistency in contextual understanding by bringing into focus what the practice of contextualization implies and examining the logics of different sorts of contextualization. It is a guide to what it means to deliver on the commitment to take historical actors on their own terms, and it highlights the unavoidable evaluative implications of the process. It has implications for revising how certain historians have evaluated and how others might yet evaluate, but it is the general fact of evaluation rather than the direction of any particular evaluation that is central.
Justifying Judgement on Things Past
Authors: Bloxham Donald
Published: August 2020

Part 3 Justifying Judgement on Things Past Part 3 moves from describing features of works of history to underwriting a range of judgements that are currently outlawed not just by advocates of neutralism and moral contextualism, but, finally, by the doctrine of moral relativism. This Part of the book legitimates some of the apparently presentist value judgements that many historians already make and establishes criteria according to which other judgements can be formed or criticized. It is the longest section of the work because it has to dig so deep through layers of occidental thought to trace the growth and flaws of an influential though never uncontested cluster of moral theories. The point of the opening three historical sections is to use historical investigation to undermine some of the prevailing standards of the disciple of History, showing that far from being self-evident for a properly scholarly undertaking, those standards emerge from particular, contestable standpoints in theology, strands of philosophy, and even theories of nationalism and raison d’état. Three concluding sections summarize the major issues at stake and address them from a more purely philosophical perspective.
History, Identity, and the Present
Authors: Bloxham Donald
Published: August 2020

part 4 History, Identity, and the Present Part 4 considers the role of historical consciousness in shaping present-day identity. It is critical of prejudicial ‘Identity History’ while enjoining historians to embrace their roles in historical arguments pertaining to identity. The first section clarifies what falls outside the definition of ‘Identity History’, noting that much excellent scholarship pertains to identity and even serves identity goals without being prejudicial. The second section highlights where historians working on identity matters are likely to fall into conceptual difficulty. Is the relationship between past ‘them’ and present ‘us’ a matter of identity or difference or a bit of both? Identity History is inconsistent here, with different attitudes taken depending on whether that past behaviour was good or bad by present lights. There are consequences for the historian’s engagement with past rights and wrongs, harms and benefits, because claims on these matters constitute stakes in the identity game whose winner gets to decide what is desirable in the here and now. The third section develops such themes and distinguishes between more and less appropriate idioms for characterizing the relationship between contemporary polities and groups on one hand and the deeds of relevant ‘forebears’ on the other hand. It is a mistake to talk of contemporary guilt, or for that matter virtue, in light of what one’s predecessors did, but the language of shame or pride may be appropriate. The fourth section addresses the material legacies of past action, considering matters of compensation and redistribution. The concluding section returns to broader principles.
Hamilton and the Complex Stories of Public Credit
Authors: Hewitt Elizabeth
Published: August 2020

This chapter argues for the importance of narrative form to Alexander Hamilton’s writing on behalf of public credit and the establishment of the Bank of the United States. Hamilton attempts to explain the emerging economy of the United States as a complex set of embedded dependencies, and his own narrative style is designed to reproduce mimetically the extensive relations and contingencies that make up financial and commercial markets. Hamilton establishes this approach from his reading of a new literary form, the eighteenth-century economic encyclopedia, especially that of Malachy Postlethwayt. The chapter also explains how Hamilton’s writing is subject to a stylistic critique by his political antagonists, which renders narrative complexity as financial malfeasance. It concludes with an extensive discussion of the two different theories of literary meaning that animate constitutional debates about the establishment of the Bank of the United States.
Stories without Plots
Authors: Hewitt Elizabeth
Published: August 2020

This chapter explains how the eighteenth-century genre of the periodical essay describes the modern economy as a complex system. Specifically distinguishing itself from the novel, the periodical (or Addisonian) essay narrates economic causality as multiplex and contingent: economic relations cannot be plotted around individual protagonists. The chapter offers a history of the importance of the periodical essay in American literature, and specifically focuses on the examples of the genre by Philip Freneau, Judith Sargent Murray, and Charles Brockden Brown. Although these writers represent very different ideological positions, they each use the generic affordances of the periodical essay to depict the intricate dependencies that constitute global capitalism. The periodical essay thus presents a belletristic form that functions similarly to Hamilton’s policy writing: speculative fictions that narrate the possible consequences that descend from individual moments of production, exchange, and consumption.
The Slave as System
Authors: Hewitt Elizabeth
Published: August 2020

This chapter concentrates on the relationship between eighteenth-century political economic theory and chattel slavery in the Americas. It begins by explaining how British, French, and American economic theorists asserted the inefficiency of slave labor even as the institution was sustained within the global market. This orthodox belief in the incompatibility between the free market and the legalization of slavery was crucial both to abolitionism and economic liberalism, inoculating capitalism from the moral degradations of slaveholding and slave trading. A very different economic argument emerges in the narratives of Black Atlantic authors who construct their life stories as “it-narratives,” precisely designed to reveal the mutualism between the global capital economy and the slave trade. The chapter provides close readings of the narratives of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Venture Smith, and Boyrereau Brinch, emphasizing their work as economic treatises and not autobiography.
Conclusion
Authors: Hewitt Elizabeth
Published: August 2020

This chapter turns to the twenty-first century to study the implications of narrative form to the representation of contemporary fiscal catastrophe. It argues that the legacy of the narrative dispute between the Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians can be seen in contemporary explanations of the Great Recession, including the 2011 report generated by the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis and two Hollywood films, The Wolf of Wall Street and The Big Short. All three texts are shaped by both the imperative to represent the complexity of global finance and the impulse to offer a simple explanation.
Prime Minister
Authors: Brazier Rodney
Published: August 2020

This chapter looks at the ways in which a politician becomes Prime Minister after a General Election. The voting system is briefly analysed because it is through its operation that a Prime Minister has the constitutional right to hold office—but by a method that is flawed. The significance of party manifestos is examined. While an election that gives one party a majority in the Commons is a simple concept, hung Parliaments have caused constitutional and political problems in the past. Such results in 1910, 1923, 1929, and 1974 are explained. The formation of the Coalition Government in 2010 is analysed, and the effect of methods codified in The Cabinet Manual on the consequences of the 2017 hung Parliament is assessed in detail. The obligations of a sitting Prime Minister when a hung Parliament is returned are explored.
So What Are the Rules?
Authors: Brazier Rodney
Published: August 2020

The rules and processes that govern and guide how Prime Ministers lose office, and how Prime Ministers take it over, are many, scattered, uncodified, and therefore not easy to access. This is a constitutional lacuna for those who operate the system, and for citizens who wish to understand it. This chapter considers for the first time the arguments for and against reducing all that into a readable, coherent, and authoritative document. The issues that would arise if such a project were to be undertaken are set out. The chapter concludes with a unique draft code on choosing a Prime Minister. It sets out in direct language the rules about the office, the qualifications required, the right to be Prime Minister, a coalition government, deputizing for a Prime Minister, and resignation.
Introduction
Authors: Dodd Julian
Published: August 2020

This chapter sets the scene by introducing authenticity in performance as a way in which a performance is faithful to something. Work authenticity in performance is then characterized as faithfulness to the work. Score compliance authenticity and interpretive authenticity are then introduced as two different kinds of work authenticity. Already, merely by describing the kinds of performances that seem to matter most to us, it starts to look like it is interpretive authenticity that is work performance’s most fundamental norm. The chapter ends by laying out the structure of the book, explaining the key theses and arguments of each chapter.
Historicizing Score Compliance Authenticity
Authors: Dodd Julian
Published: August 2020

This chapter returns to an issue shelved in Chapter 2: whether we should historicize score compliance authenticity, thereby construing it as historical authenticity. An alternative, tradition-based account of score compliance is introduced, according to which we interpret the demands of such compliance in terms of the conventions and practices in place at the time of performance, not the time at which the work was composed. This is an inclusive position, in which both mainstream performance practice and historical such practice figure as stylistic options. It is argued that the tradition-based account of score compliance is preferable for two reasons: first, it grants the performer greater artistic freedom, thereby giving her a better chance of performing with the musicality, imagination, and conviction necessary to evince a profound understanding of the works performed; second, it better sits with Wittgenstein’s considerations on following a rule.
Against Personal Authenticity
Authors: Dodd Julian
Published: August 2020

For a musician to perform a work with personal authenticity is for her performance to be faithful to her musical personality: her musical tastes, values, and ideals. Contra Peter Kivy, this chapter argues that such authenticity is not a performance value within Western classical music: a performance is not better for being more personally authentic, other things being equal. In examining our critical practice and, especially, the work of great performers such as Alfred Brendel, Dinu Lipatti, and Mitsuko Uchida, it becomes clear that performers are most in tune with the norms governing work performance when they give themselves over to the work itself. In doing this, a performer deploys her musical personality, not as something to which her performance is supposed to be faithful, but as a conduit to performing the work with understanding. A performer’s musical personality, functioning properly in performance, determines a route to the work’s meaning.
Afterword
Authors: Dodd Julian
Published: August 2020

In this brief Afterword the author addresses the question of whether the picture of work performance recommended here is consistent with the ontological proposal for musical works elaborated and defended in his Works of Music (2007). It might be supposed that there is an irresolvable tension between that book’s account of musical works—as sempiternally existent, temporally and modally inflexible entities, individuated purely in terms of how they sound—and the claims made here about the norms governing our practice of work performance. Carefully distinguishing evaluative questions from ontological ones, the sources of this suspicion are brought out into the open and dispatched.
Reason and Respect
Authors: Walden Kenneth
Published: August 2020

This chapter develops and defends an account of reason: to reason is to scrutinize one’s attitudes by consulting the perspectives of other persons. The principal attraction of this account is its ability to vindicate the unique of authority of reason. The chapter argues that this conception entails that reasoning is a robustly social endeavor—that it is, in the first instance, something we do with other people. It is further argued that such social endeavors presuppose mutual respect on the part of those participating in them. The account therefore yields a form of Kantian constructivism: we have an unconditional duty of respect for persons because such a duty is implicit in the very nature of reasoning.
The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons
Authors: Coetsee M.
Published: August 2020

Huckleberry Finn believes that by helping Miss Watson’s slave Jim escape to freedom, he is doing something wrong. But Huck does it anyway—and many want to give him moral credit for this choice. If Huck is to be worthy of such moral esteem, however, it seems there must be some implicit way of appreciating and responding to considerations as moral reasons that does not involve explicitly believing that those considerations are moral reasons. This chapter argues that an agent like Huck can implicitly appreciate a consideration as a moral reason to φ by presenting it under the light of a particular phenomenologically-mediated mode of presentation: one that presents that consideration via the light of a felt directive force “pointing” towards φ-ing—lending weight to it, or soliciting it—in a particular authoritative way. Thus, I suggest, Huck may be understood on analogy with a young jazz piano virtuoso. As she may appreciate that the G-seventh chord having been played just so constitutes an aesthetic reason for her to ease into the C-major-seventh chord just so by virtue of experiencing the former as pointing or directing her to the latter, so also, I propose, Huck may appreciate the considerations speaking in favor of helping Jim as moral reasons to help Jim by virtue of experiencing them as pointing or directing him to help Jim. The chapter also examines and rejects four alternative proposals for how to account for implicit reasons-appreciation: first, a de re account of appreciation and then three additional accounts of appreciation derived from major theories of mental representation (inferentialist, causal tracking, and functionalist theories).
Who’s on First?
Authors: Wodak Daniel
Published: August 2020

“X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t X-Firsters. Hence the chapter’s two main goals. First, to provide a simple argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain, which starts with the observation that analogous views have dubious merits in analogous domains. Second, to offer an alternative view—taking normativity to be a determinable explained in terms of its determinates—that offers an interesting way to think about the structure and unity of normativity.
Resisting Reductive Realism
Authors: Laskowski N. G.
Published: August 2020

Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. Influential proponents of reductive views themselves admit as much. Ethicists also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why ethicists resist reductive views and why ethicists have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures shores up new evidence for various theses about the distinctiveness of our use of normative concepts. This chapter builds on previous work to make a cumulative case for the view that what it is to use a normative concept is to use an unanalyzable natural-cognitive concept that is related to noncognitive elements of our psychology.
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
Authors: Fogal Daniel , Risberg Olle
Published: August 2020

This chapter defends the view that general moral principles play an ineliminable role in moral explanations. More specifically, it argues that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. The chapter considers two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles: (i) “the nomic view,” on which moral principles are laws of metaphysics of the same broad kind as the laws that (plausibly) figure in metaphysical explanations more generally; and (ii) “moral platonism,” on which moral principles are facts about kind-applying (as opposed to particular-applying) moral properties. Along the way, the chapter criticizes the competing view that moral principles are not explanatory in the way just suggested. The chapter also considers a number of related issues, such as the distinction between metaphysical grounding and metaphysical analysis. It concludes by discussing the sense in which moral principles obtain of necessity.
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
Authors: Korman Daniel Z. , Locke Dustin
Published: August 2020

Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g. safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. The authors argue that the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. They then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (both in ethics and elsewhere).
Introduction
Authors: Batt Jennifer
Published: August 2020

This book begins by exploring how the labouring-class poet Stephen Duck came to be used as a cautionary tale to warn against the dangers of social mobility. Duck’s story was a remarkable one: he was an agricultural labourer from Wiltshire whose writing, in 1730, won him the patronage of Queen Caroline. He wrote repeatedly about the pleasures of finding contentment in one’s current position, as well as of the dangers of ambition, but the circumstances of his life and death suggest he lived at odds with such ideas. This introduction explores how Duck’s life and writing have been read from the eighteenth century through to the present day, and sketches out the ways in which this book’s arguments complicate and challenge the accepted narratives of Duck’s life and death.
‘For Duck can thresh, you know, as well as write’
Authors: Batt Jennifer
Published: August 2020

This chapter explores how Stephen Duck’s public identity as ‘the famous Threshing Poet’ was forged as much by what was written about him as it was by anything he wrote himself. In the weeks and months after Queen Caroline’s patronage was announced, the poetic abilities of the agricultural labourer were debated in pamphlets, newspaper articles, poems, essays, and even dramatic scenes. What did the emergence of such a poet mean for contemporary literary culture? Could a labourer really merit the extraordinary acclaim that Duck had received, or was his present fame a symptom of a worrying decline in standards? Was he an isolated and unique case, or just the most visible exemplar of a growing group of ambitious and talented labouring-class men and women? And if there were more labouring-class poets like him, was that prospect to be welcomed or feared? This chapter explores how Duck’s contemporaries sought to answer these questions. For some, the thresher poet was an ill-educated rustic whose startling rise to fame was symptomatic of a debased literary sphere; for others, though, Duck was an important figurehead of an emerging movement of labouring-class writing.
‘The Duty of a grateful Muse’
Authors: Batt Jennifer
Published: August 2020

This chapter explores how Stephen Duck adapted to life as a poet at the court of George II and Queen Caroline. The patronage that Queen Caroline extended to Duck in 1730 transformed his life and opened up remarkable new opportunities to him. This chapter explores how Duck strove to repay her generosity. Tentatively at first, and then with more confidence, Duck developed into a reliable Hanoverian panegyrist, ready and able to dispense verse on royal birthdays, weddings, and funerals. Duck performed this role with increasing ambition until the Queen’s death in 1737 brought his close association with courtly pageantry to an abrupt end.
‘A very agreeable Conversation’
Authors: Batt Jennifer
Published: August 2020

This chapter explores how Stephen Duck used his increasing proficiency in classical learning to position himself in relation to male patrons and friends, including Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston, and Joseph Spence. The various models offered by Horace were particularly useful to Duck in this process. Initially, by imitating Horace’s odes Duck crafted non-threatening reflections on his achievements which were couched in a language of contentment and moderation. Later, with more daring, Duck adopted the Horatian satirical mode in order to reflect on his place in literary culture. The example of Horace enabled Duck to develop a confident poetic voice. By the early 1740s, his earlier, earnest sincerity was displaced by a witty willingness to make fun of his labouring-class origins.
Conclusion
Authors: Batt Jennifer
Published: August 2020

The concluding chapter explores how the narratives that developed around Stephen Duck’s life and works impacted upon subsequent labouring-class writers. As the eighteenth century progressed and increasing numbers of labouring-class men and women sought to publish their own verse and develop their own literary careers, Duck’s example was invoked again and again, by the poets themselves, their patrons, their reviewers, and their readers. Although the comparison was seldom intended as a compliment, these repeated references back to Duck cemented his position at the head of a developing tradition of labouring-class poetry. As Duck had throughout his life, so too after his death did he provide both opportunity and provocation for thinking through the contested and complex relationships that existed between class, patronage, and poetry in Hanoverian England.
Suppose and Tell
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

The book argues that our use of conditionals is governed by imperfectly reliable heuristics, in the psychological sense of fast and frugal (or quick and dirty) ways of assessing them. The primary heuristic is this: to assess ‘If A, C’, suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’. This heuristic yields both the equation of the probability of ‘If A, C’ with the conditional probability of C on A and standard natural deduction rules for the conditional. However, these results can be shown to make the heuristic implicitly inconsistent, and so less than fully reliable. There is also a secondary heuristic: pass conditionals freely from one context to another under normal conditions for acceptance of sentences on the basis of memory and testimony. The effect of the secondary heuristic is to undermine interpretations on which ‘if’ introduces a special kind of context-sensitivity. On the interpretation which makes best sense of the two heuristics, ‘if’ is simply the truth-functional conditional. Apparent counterexamples to truth-functionality are artefacts of reliance on the primary heuristic in cases where it is unreliable. The second half of the book concerns counterfactual conditionals, as expressed with ‘if’ and ‘would’. It argues that ‘would’ is an independently meaningful modal operator for contextually restricted necessity: the meaning of counterfactuals is simply that derived compositionally from the meanings of their constituents, including ‘if’ and ‘would’, making them contextually restricted strict conditionals.
The Suppositional Rule
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

The chapter describes the role of suppositions in conditional thinking, from everyday decision-making to mathematical proof, and the cognitive role of imagination in developing the consequences of suppositions. It proposes that the primary way of assessing a conditional ‘If A, C’ is to suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’; this corresponds to the Ramsey Test or Suppositional Rule. Such offline assessment’s similarities to, and differences from, online updating on new information are discussed. Other ways of assessing ‘If A, C’ are also considered, including experimental testing by making A true, and reliance on memory or testimony without new first-hand testing.
Conditionals and Abduction
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

The chapter gives a preliminary sketch of some cognitive differences between indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals relevant to the testing of hypotheses by experiment. They especially concern cases where the indicative conditional can be decided without new evidence while the counterfactual conditional cannot. They also show that the antecedent of a ‘counterfactual’ conditional need not be presupposed to be false. Differences connected with the past tense morphology of ‘would’ are explored. Cases are given where the morphology should be understood as expressing a ‘fake past’, modal rather than temporal.
The Interaction of ‘If’ and ‘Would’: Semantics and Logic
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

This chapter argues that the difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals traces to the overt difference in verb forms and not to any alleged covert ambiguity or context-dependence in ‘if’. ‘Would’ has a life beyond conditionals; the best hypothesis is that it is a necessity modal restricted to contextually relevant worlds. In standard counterfactual conditionals, ‘would’ scopes over ‘if’; given the invariant truth-functional semantics of ‘if’, the compositional semantics then makes counterfactual conditionals contextually restricted strict conditionals. The chapter explores the consequences of this for the logic of counterfactuals: principles such as transitivity, contraposition, and strengthening the antecedent hold, with appearances to the contrary being explained by context-shifting caused by the application of the suppositional heuristic. However, modus ponens fails because the contextual restriction may exclude the actual world.
The Interaction of ‘If’ and ‘Would’
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

The chapter argues that ‘would’ is associated with a suppositional heuristic analogous to that for ‘if’ but sensitive to the contextual restriction on ‘would’. This heuristic has structurally analogous consequences to those for ‘would’; in particular, it generates the appearance that ‘would’ commutes with negation, and correspondingly that counterfactuals obey the principles of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) and Conditional Non-Contradiction (CNC). However, to play its central cognitive role properly, ‘would’ must be able to generalize over more than one world at a time, thereby invalidating CEM, which is thus an artefact of the heuristics (as is CNC). Connections between ‘would’, ‘will’, ‘might’, and ‘not’ are explored. In particular, the relation between ‘will’ and ‘would’ corresponds to the relation between online prediction and offline imagination.
Is ‘Would If’ Hyperintensional?
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

This chapter responds to Fine’s arguments that counterfactual conditionals are hyperintensional because the result of substituting a truth-functionally equivalent antecedent can change the truth-value of a counterfactual. Fine’s descriptions of his alleged examples of hyperintensionality are inconsistent but seem consistent as a result of contextual shifts between different components, for which there is independent evidence, and which can be explained by the application of the suppositional heuristic, which makes some worlds verifying the antecedent relevant. Different senses of ‘hyperintensional’ are distinguished, one based on sameness of intension, another on logical equivalence, but the objection to Fine’s arguments works for both.
More on the Interaction of ‘Would’ with Context
Authors: Williamson Timothy
Published: August 2020

This chapter discusses the contrast between Sobel sequences of counterfactuals and reverse Sobel sequences, where adding a conjunct to the antecedent generates an apparent counterexample to the (valid) principle of strengthening the antecedent, but subtracting it again does not. The difference corresponds to the pragmatic difference that adding items to the contextually relevant domain (here, of worlds) is easier than taking them away again. The pressure to add worlds is explained by the use of the suppositional heuristic, which makes some worlds verifying the antecedent (if there are any) relevant. For indicative conditionals, similar apparent counterexamples arise, for the difference in suppositions remains even in the absence of a context-sensitive element in the semantics: the basic explanation of the apparent counterexamples is cognitive rather than semantic. However, a recent attempt by Moss to explain the difference on epistemic grounds in a way consistent with a Lewis-style semantics is shown not to cover all the data.
The Green’s function in linear elasticity
Authors: Sutton Adrian P.
Published: August 2020

The elastostatic Green’s tensor function is the solution of a differential equation for the displacement field created by a unit point force in an infinite continuum. Its symmetry is derived using Maxwell’s reciprocity theorem. A general integral expression is derived for the Green’s function in anisotropic media. The Green’s function in isotropic elasticity is derived in closed form. The relation between the elastic Green’s function in a continuum and in a harmonic crystal lattice is shown. The application of the Green’s function to solving displacement fields of point defects exerting defect forces on neighbouring atoms leads to dipole, quadrupole, octupole, etc. tensors for point defects. Eshelby’s ellipsoidal inclusion problem is solved in isotropic elasticity. Using perturbation theory analytic expressions for the Green’s function in a weakly anisotropic cubic crystal are obtained in problem 3 of set 4. The derivation of the elastodynamic Green’s function in isotropic elasticity is outlined.
Post-Liberal Competitions?
Authors: Davies William
Published: August 2020

Competitions have a “liberal” quality, where the traits they measure or reward have some connection to broader moral virtues, beyond the frame of a contest, and where they have transparency surrounding their norms and metrics of evaluation. This allows competitions to serve as consensus-forming procedures, which establish differentials of value in a publicly agreeable fashion. However, competitions can also be organized for the benefit of the organizer, in order to acquire information about participants and accrue competitive advantage in some larger competition. In the age of the digital platform, competitive performance is constantly monitored, but in ways that don’t produce public results or consensus. As in randomized controlled trials, the “world” as encountered by the participant looks very different from the one seen by the observer. This produces a format of “post-liberal competition,” in which (in Goffman’s terms) the “front stage” and “back stage” are radically split from each other.
The Function of Cynicism at the Present Time
Authors: Small Helen
Published: August 2020

Cynicism is usually seen as a provocative mode of dissent from conventional moral thought, casting doubt on the motives that guide right conduct. When critics today complain that it is ubiquitous but lacks the serious bite of classical Cynicism, they express concern that it can now only be corrosively negative. The Function of Cynicism at the Present Time takes a more balanced view. Re-evaluating the role of cynicism in literature, cultural criticism, and philosophy from 1840 to the present, it treats cynic confrontationalism as a widely employed credibility check on the promotion of moral ideals—with roots in human psychology. Helen Small investigates how writers have engaged with Cynic traditions of thought, and later more gestural styles of cynicism, to recalibrate dominant moral values, judgements of taste, and political agreements. The argument develops through a series of cynic challenges to conventional moral thinking: Friedrich Nietzsche on morality; Thomas Carlyle vs. J. S. Mill on the permissible limits of moral provocation; Arnold on the freedom of criticism; George Eliot and Ford Madox Ford on cosmopolitanism; Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Laura Kipnis on the conditions of work in the university. The Function of Cynicism treats topics of present-day public concern: abrasive styles of public argument, debasing challenges to conventional morality, free speech, moral controversialism, the authority of reason, and the limits of that authority, nationalism and resistance to nationalism, and liberty of expression as a core principle of the university.
On Nietzsche and Doing Less with Cynicism
Authors: Small Helen
Published: August 2020

This chapter looks to provide a more thorough account than has yet been offered of how far, and to what ends, Friedrich Nietzsche’s sceptical ‘realism’ was fashioned with an eye on Cynic styles of argument. Starting with the reappearance of Diogenes of Sinope in The Gay Science, it explores the histrionic characterization of der tolle Mensche and his ‘untimeliness’ in ways that open up Nietzsche’s sense of the typology and stylistic gambits of Cynicism as helpful but inadequate models for the lived practice of philosophy. The focus then moves to how Cynicism helps to drive Nietzsche’s thinking in two main respects: first, his attempts to articulate what may be required to be ‘free-spirited’ in one’s philosophizing and fashion a philosophical style in the assumption of that freedom; and, second, the important role of Cynicism in the articulation of the genealogy of morality.
Speech Beyond Toleration
Authors: Small Helen
Published: August 2020

This chapter treats one of the great confrontations in the history of British public moralism between cynical provocation and a more ‘responsible’ approach to freedom of expression: Thomas Carlyle’s deliberate offences against progressive sentiment in his ‘Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question’ (1849) and John Stuart Mill’s swift and uncharacteristically angry response. Nietzsche (in pursuit of higher values and still freer speech) thought that Carlyle did not go nearly deep enough in the challenges he posed to conventional political morality—but the ‘Occasional Discourse’ went far enough to make Carlyle’s own name a byword, still, for moral and political provocateurship. The chapter argues that his cynicisms and Mill’s astringent reply provide a helpful historical basis from which to consider similar challenges today to normative views of public argument and styles of expression.
In Praise of Idleness?
Authors: Small Helen
Published: August 2020

This chapter turns to the university, deepening the critical-historical focus on the institutional settings within which cynicism (for all its anti-institutionalism) resides as a modern critical practice. The primary concern here is with the university as a forum in which debate about the importance of, and the constraints on, free speech has in recent years generated unhappy and (in the USA) occasionally violent levels of conflict. Attending closely to advocacy for professional freedom of expression in the work of Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, and Laura Kipnis (the latter operating in the context of Title IX legal disputes and the #MeToo movement), the chapter examines the ways in which each of them has deployed cynicism in the course of advocacy for an ideal of the university as a place of free expression, while also anticipating and controlling charges of ‘mere’ cynicism.