bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Unconscious intuition or conscious analysis? Critical questions for the Deliberation-Without-Attention paradigm
Authors: Aczel Balazs , Lukacs Bence , Komlos Judit , Aitken Michael R. F.
Published: January 2023

The Deliberation without Attention (DWA) effect refers to apparent improvements in decision-making following a period of distraction. It has been presented as evidence for beneficial unconscious cognitive processes. We identify two major concerns with this claim: first, as these demonstrations typically involve subjective preferences, the effects of distraction cannot be objectively assessed as beneficial; second, there is no direct evidence that the DWA manipulation promotes unconscious decision processes. We describe two tasks based on the DWA paradigm in which we found no evidence that the distraction manipulation led to decision processes that are subjectively unconscious, nor that it reduced the influence of presentation order upon performance. Crucially, we found that a lack of awareness of decision process was associated with poorer performance, both in terms of subjective preference measures used in traditional DWA paradigm and in an equivalent task where performance can be objectively assessed. Therefore, we argue that reliance on conscious memory itself can explain the data. Thus the DWA paradigm is not an adequate method of assessing beneficial unconscious thought.
Threshold models of recognition and the recognition heuristic
Authors: Erdfelder Edgar , Küpper-Tetzel Carolina E. , Mattern Sandra D.
Published: January 2023

According to the recognition heuristic (RH) theory, decisions follow the recognition principle: Given a high validity of the recognition cue, people should prefer recognized choice options compared to unrecognized ones. Assuming that the memory strength of choice options is strongly correlated with both the choice criterion and recognition judgments, the RH is a reasonable strategy that approximates optimal decisions with a minimum of cognitive effort (Davis-Stober, Dana, & Budescu, 2010). However, theories of recognition memory are not generally compatible with this assumption. For example, some threshold models of recognition presume that recognition judgments can arise from two types of cognitive states: (1) certainty states in which judgments are almost perfectly correlated with memory strength and (2) uncertainty states in which recognition judgments reflect guessing rather than differences in memory strength. We report an experiment designed to test the prediction that the RH applies to certainty states only. Our results show that memory states rather than recognition judgments affect use of recognition information in binary decisions.
Fast Acceptance by Common Experience: FACE-recognition in Schelling's model of neighborhood segregation
Authors: Berg Nathan , Hoffrage Ulrich , Abramczuk Katarzyna
Published: January 2023

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) observed that macro-level patterns do not necessarily reflect micro-level intentions, desires or goals. In his classic model on neighborhood segregation which initiated a large and influential literature, individuals with no desire to be segregated from those who belong to other social groups nevertheless wind up clustering with their own type. Most extensions of Schelling’s model have replicated this result. There is an important mismatch, however, between theory and observation, which has received relatively little attention. Whereas Schelling-inspired models typically predict large degrees of segregation starting from virtually any initial condition, the empirical literature documents considerable heterogeneity in measured levels of segregation. This paper introduces a mechanism that can produce significantly higher levels of integration and, therefore, brings predicted distributions of segregation more in line with real-world observation. As in the classic Schelling model, agents in a simulated world want to stay or move to a new location depending on the proportion of neighbors they judge to be acceptable. In contrast to the classic model, agents’ classifications of their neighbors as acceptable or not depend lexicographically on recognition first and group type (e.g., ethnic stereotyping) second. The FACE-recognition model nests classic Schelling: When agents have no recognition memory, judgments about the acceptability of a prospective neighbor rely solely on his or her group type (as in the Schelling model). A very small amount of recognition memory, however, eventually leads to different classifications that, in turn, produce dramatic macro-level effects resulting in significantly higher levels of integration. A novel implication of the FACE-recognition model concerns the large potential impact of policy interventions that generate modest numbers of face-to-face encounters with members of other social groups.
Reconciling pro-social vs. selfish behavior: On the role of self-control
Authors: Martinsson Peter , Myrseth Kristian Ove R. , Wollbrant Conny
Published: January 2023

We test in the context of a dictator game the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to act selfishly and the better judgment to act pro-socially. We manipulated the likelihood that individuals would identify self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strategies. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between trait self-control and pro-social behavior in the treatment where we expected a relatively high likelihood of conflict identification—but not in the treatment where we expected a low likelihood. The magnitude of the effect is of economic significance. We conclude that subtle cues might prove sufficient to alter individuals’ perception of allocation opportunities, thereby prompting individuals to draw on their own cognitive resources to act pro-socially.
Naturalness judgments by lay Americans: Process dominates content in judgments of food or water acceptability and naturalness
Authors: Rozin Paul
Published: January 2023

This study directly tests the hypothesis that, at least within the domains of food and drink for Americans, the judgment of naturalness has more to do with the history of an object, that is the processes that it has undergone, as opposed to its material content. Individuals rate the naturalness and acceptability of a natural entity (water or tomato paste), that same entity with a first transformation in which a natural substance is added (or some part removed), and then a second transformation in which the natural additive is removed (or the removed part is replaced). The twice transformed entity is stipulated to be identical to the original natural entity, yet it is rated much less natural and less acceptable. It differs from the original entity only in its history (the reversed processes it has experienced). The twice transformed entity is also rated as less natural than the once-transformed entity, even though the former is identical to the original natural entity, and the latter is not. Therefore, naturalness depends heavily on the process-history of an entity.
“Decisions from experience” = sampling error + prospect theory: Reconsidering Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004)
Authors: Fox Craig R. , Hadar Liat
Published: January 2023

According to prospect theory, people overweight low probability events and underweight high probability events. Several recent papers (notably, Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004) have argued that although this pattern holds for “description-based” decisions, in which people are explicitly provided with probability distributions over potential outcomes, it is actually reversed in “experience-based” decisions, in which people must learn these distributions through sampling. We reanalyze the data of Hertwig et al. (2004) and present a replication to determine the extent to which their phenomenon can be attributed to sampling error (a statistical rather than psychological phenomenon) versus underestimation of rare events (i.e., judgmental bias) versus actual underweighting of judged probabilities. We find that the apparent reversal of prospect theory in decisions from experience can be attributed almost entirely to sampling error, and are consistent with prospect theory and the two-stage model of decision under uncertainty (Fox & Tversky, 1998).
Amos Tversky’s contributions to legal scholarship: Remarks at the BDRM session in honor of Amos Tversky, June 16, 2006
Authors: Brest Paul
Published: January 2023

Together with his long-time colleague Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, provided the intellectual infrastructure for contemporary behavioral law and economics. Prospect theory undermines the Coase Theorem, which is the bedrock of traditional law and economics; and the heuristics and biases research questions the fundamental idea of a rational self-interested decisionmaker, which is also challenged by subsequent studies of the role of affect in judgment and decisionmaking.
Challenging some common beliefs: Empirical work within the adaptive toolbox metaphor
Authors: Bröder Arndt , Newell Ben R.
Published: January 2023

The authors review their own empirical work inspired by the adaptive toolbox metaphor. The review examines factors influencing strategy selection and execution in multi-attribute inference tasks (e.g., information costs, time pressure, memory retrieval, dynamic environments, stimulus formats, intelligence). An emergent theme is the re-evaluation of contingency model claims about the elevated cognitive costs of compensatory in comparison with non-compensatory strategies. Contrary to common assertions about the impact of cognitive complexity, the empirical data suggest that manipulated variables exert their influence at the meta-level of deciding how to decide (i.e., which strategy to select) rather than at the level of strategy execution. An alternative conceptualisation of strategy selection, namely threshold adjustment in an evidence accumulation model, is also discussed and the difficulty in distinguishing empirically between these metaphors is acknowledged.
The importance of learning when making inferences
Authors: Rieskamp Jörg
Published: January 2023

The assumption that people possess a repertoire of strategies to solve the inference problems they face has been made repeatedly. The experimental findings of two previous studies on strategy selection are reexamined from a learning perspective, which argues that people learn to select strategies for making probabilistic inferences. This learning process is modeled with the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that people develop subjective expectancies for the strategies they have. They select strategies proportional to their expectancies, which are updated on the basis of experience. For the study by Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003) it can be shown that people did not anticipate the success of a strategy from the beginning of the experiment. Instead, the behavior observed at the end of the experiment was the result of a learning process that can be described by the SSL theory. For the second study, by Bröder and Schiffer (2006), the SSL theory is able to provide an explanation for why participants only slowly adapted to new environments in a dynamic inference situation. The reanalysis of the previous studies illustrates the importance of learning for probabilistic inferences.
An ecological perspective to cognitive limits: Modeling environment-mind interactions with ACT-R
Authors: Gaissmaier Wolfgang , Schooler Lael J. , Mata Rui
Published: January 2023

Contrary to the common belief that more information is always better, Gigerenzer et al. (1999) showed that simple decision strategies which rely on little information can be quite successful. The success of simple strategies depends both on bets about the structure of the environment and on the core capacities of the human mind, such as recognition memory (Gigerenzer, 2004). However, the interplay between the environment and the mind’s core capacities has rarely been precisely modeled. We illustrate how these environment-mind interactions could be formally modeled within the cognitive architecture ACT-R (J. R. Anderson et al., 2004). ACT-R is an integrated theory of mind that is tuned to the statistical structure of the environment, and it can account for a variety of phenomena such as learning, problem solving, and decision making. Here, we focus on studying decision strategies and show how the success of theses strategies in particular environments depends on characteristics of core cognitive capacities, such as recognition and short term memory.
Disentangling the effects of alternation rate and maximum run length on judgments of randomness
Authors: Scholl Sabine G. , Greifeneder Rainer
Published: January 2023

Binary sequences are characterized by various features. Two of these characteristics—alternation rate and run length—have repeatedly been shown to influence judgments of randomness. The two characteristics, however, have usually been investigated separately, without controlling for the other feature. Because the two features are correlated but not identical, it seems critical to analyze their unique impact, as well as their interaction, so as to understand more clearly what influences judgments of randomness. To this end, two experiments on the perception of binary sequences orthogonally manipulated alternation rate and maximum run length (i.e., length of the longest run within the sequence). Results show that alternation rate consistently exerts a unique effect on judgments of randomness, but that the effect of alternation rate is contingent on the length of the longest run within the sequence. The effect of maximum run length was found to be small and less consistent. Together, these findings extend prior randomness research by integrating literature from the realms of perception, categorization, and prediction, as well as by showing the unique and joint effects of alternation rate and maximum run length on judgments of randomness.
Coherence and correspondence in engineering design: informing the conversation and connecting with judgment and decision-making research
Authors: Katsikopoulos Konstantinos V.
Published: January 2023

I show how the coherence/correspondence distinction can inform the conversation about decision methods for engineering design. Some engineers argue for the application of multi-attribute utility theory while others argue for what they call heuristics. To clarify the differences among methods, I first ask whether each method aims at achieving coherence or correspondence. By analyzing statements in the design literature, I argue that utility theory aims at achieving coherence and heuristics aim at achieving correspondence. Second, I ask if achieving coherence always implies achieving correspondence. It is important to provide an answer because while in design the objective is correspondence, it is difficult to assess it, and coherence that is easier to assess is used as a surrogate. I argue that coherence does not always imply correspondence in design and that this is also the case in problems studied in judgment and decision-making research. Uncovering the conditions under which coherence implies, or does not imply, correspondence is a topic where engineering design and judgment and decision-making research might connect.
Decision making under hypoxia: Oxygen depletion increases risk seeking for losses but not for gains
Authors: Pighin Stefania , Bonini Nicolao , Savadori Lucia , Hadjichristidis Constantinos , Antonetti Tommaso , Schena Federico
Published: January 2023

We report a preliminary study that compared decisions made in an oxygen depleted environment with those made in a normoxic environment. Participants were presented with a series of choices that involved either losses or gains. For each choice they were forced to choose between a sure thing and a gamble of the same expected value. For choices involving losses, participants were more risk seeking in the oxygen depleted environment; for those involving gains, no difference was found.
Belief bias and representation in assessing the Bayesian rationality of others
Authors: Anderson Richard B. , Leventhal Laura Marie , Zhang Don C. , Fasko Daniel , Basehore Zachariah , Gamsby Christopher , Branch Jared , Patrick Timothy
Published: January 2023

People often assess the reasonableness of another person’s judgments. When doing so, the evaluator should set aside knowledge that would not have been available to the evaluatee to assess whether the evaluatee made a reasonable decision, given the available information. But under what circumstances does the evaluator set aside information? On the one hand, if the evaluator fails to set aside prior information, not available to the evaluatee, they exhibit belief bias. But on the other hand, when Bayesian inference is called for, the evaluator should generally incorporate prior knowledge about relevant probabilities in decision making. The present research integrated these two perspectives in two experiments. Participants were asked to take the perspective of a fictitious evaluatee and to evaluate the reasonableness of the evaluatee’s decision. The participant was privy to information that the fictitious evaluatee did not have. Specifically, the participant knew whether the evaluatee’s decision judgment was factually correct. Participants’ judgments were biased (Experiments 1 and 2) by the factuality of the conclusion as they assessed the evaluatee’s reasonableness. We also found that the format of information presentation (Experiment 2) influenced the degree to which participants’ reasonableness ratings were responsive to the evaluatee’s Bayesian rationality. Specifically, responsivity was greater when the information was presented in an icon-based, graphical, natural-frequency format than when presented in either a numerical natural-frequency format or a probability format. We interpreted the effects of format to suggest that graphical presentation can help organize information into nested sets, which in turn enhances Bayesian rationality.
Welfare effects of nudges: The emotional tax of calorie menu labeling
Authors: Thunström Linda
Published: January 2023

Traditionally, information has been assumed to never harm consumers, a notion recently challenged. Salience nudges have been argued to evoke negative emotions, therefore acting as “emotional taxes”. I design a hypothetical restaurant meal experiment to analyze the emotional and short-term consumer welfare impact of a calorie salience nudge (calorie menu labeling) – a policy implemented nationwide in the U.S. in 2018. I find that a calorie salience nudge may act as an emotional tax, but only for some – there is considerable heterogeneity in the emotional response to the nudge. In particular, the nudge emotionally taxes people with low eating self-control, while it emotionally subsidizes those with higher levels of eating self-control. It therefore emotionally taxes the “right” people. However, people with lower levels of self-control may experience fewer benefits from the nudge – the nudge causes them to adjust their high calorie meal consumption by less than do those with higher self-control. It is therefore unsurprising that consumers with lower self-control attach a lower (a negative) value to the calorie salience nudge. Overall, the calorie salience nudge positively affects consumer welfare, although heterogeneity over consumers is substantial – the consumer value ranges from positive to negative. I find no distributional effects over income from the calorie salience nudge.
Thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection performance in schizotypy
Authors: Broyd Annabel , Ettinger Ulrich , Thoma Volker
Published: January 2023

Schizotypy refers to the continuum of normal variability of psychosis-like characteristics and experiences, often classified as positive schizotypy (‘unusual experiences’; UE) and negative schizotypy (‘introvertive anhedonia’; IA). Here, we investigated the link between schizotypy and cognitive processing style and performance. A particular focus was on whether schizotypy is associated more with Type 1 (automatic/heuristic) than Type 2 (reflective/effortful) processes, as may be expected from findings of impaired top-down control in schizophrenia. A large sample (n = 1,512) completed online measures pertaining to schizotypy (Oxford-Liverpool Inventory for Feelings and Experiences; O-LIFE), thinking style (Rational Experiential Inventory-10, Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale), and reasoning performance (Cognitive Reflection Test). Higher positive (UE) and negative (IA) schizotypy were associated with more pronounced Type 1 processing, i.e. greater self-reported Faith in Intuition (FI), lower Need for Cognition (NFC), lower Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), and lower cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores. Canonical correlation analysis confirmed a significant association between UE and increased FI, lower AOT and lower CRT performance, accounting for 12.38% of the shared variance between schizotypy and thinking dispositions. IA was more highly associated with reduced NFC. These findings suggest that schizotypy may be associated with similar thinking dispositions to those reported in psychosis, with different patterns of associations for positive and negative schizotypy. This result informs research on reasoning processes in psychosis and has clinical implications, including potential treatment targets and refinements for cognitive therapies.
Information search with situation-specific reward functions
Authors: Meder Björn , Nelson Jonathan D.
Published: January 2023

The goal of obtaining information to improve classification accuracy can strongly conflict with the goal of obtaining information for improving payoffs. Two environments with such a conflict were identified through computer optimization. Three subsequent experiments investigated people’s search behavior in these environments. Experiments 1 and 2 used a multiple-cue probabilistic category-learning task to convey environmental probabilities. In a subsequent search task subjects could query only a single feature before making a classification decision. The crucial manipulation concerned the search-task reward structure. The payoffs corresponded either to accuracy, with equal rewards associated with the two categories, or to an asymmetric payoff function, with different rewards associated with each category. In Experiment 1, in which learning-task feedback corresponded to the true category, people later preferentially searched the accuracy-maximizing feature, whether or not this would improve monetary rewards. In Experiment 2, an asymmetric reward structure was used during learning. Subjects searched the reward-maximizing feature when asymmetric payoffs were preserved in the search task. However, if search-task payoffs corresponded to accuracy, subjects preferentially searched a feature that was suboptimal for reward and accuracy alike. Importantly, this feature would have been most useful, under the learning-task payoff structure. Experiment 3 found that, if words and numbers are used to convey environmental probabilities, neither reward nor accuracy consistently predicts search. These findings emphasize the necessity of taking into account people’s goals and search-and-decision processes during learning, thereby challenging current models of information search.
Decision theory as an aid to private choice
Authors: Brown Rex V.
Published: January 2023

A wise decider D uses the contents of his mind fully, accurately and efficiently. D’sidealdecisions, i.e., those that best serve his interests, would be embedded in a comprehensive set of totally coherent judgments lodged in his mind. They would conform to the norms of statistical decision theory, which extracts quantitative judgments of fact and value from D’s mind contents and checks them for coherence. However, the most practical way for D to approximate his ideal may not be with models that embody those norms, i.e., with applied decision theory (ADT). In practice, ADT can represent only some of D’s judgments and those imperfectly. Quite different decision aid, including intuition, pattern recognition and cognitive vigilance (especially combined), typically outperform feasible ADT models—with some notable exceptions. However, decision theory training benefits D’sinformaldecisions. ADT, both formal and informal, should become increasingly useful and widespread, as technical, cultural and institutional impediments are overcome.
On making the right choice: A meta-analysis and large-scale replication attempt of the unconscious thought advantage
Authors: Nieuwenstein Mark R. , Wierenga Tjardie , Morey Richard D. , Wicherts Jelte M. , Blom Tesse N. , Wagenmakers Eric-Jan , van Rijn Hedderik
Published: January 2023

Are difficult decisions best made after a momentary diversion of thought? Previous research addressing this important question has yielded dozens of experiments in which participants were asked to choose the best of several options (e.g., cars or apartments) either after conscious deliberation, or after a momentary diversion of thought induced by an unrelated task. The results of these studies were mixed. Some found that participants who had first performed the unrelated task were more likely to choose the best option, whereas others found no evidence for this so-called unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The current study examined two accounts of this inconsistency in previous findings. According to the reliability account, the UTA does not exist and previous reports of this effect concern nothing but spurious effects obtained with an unreliable paradigm. In contrast, the moderator account proposes that the UTA is a real effect that occurs only when certain conditions are met in the choice task. To test these accounts, we conducted a meta-analysis and a large-scale replication study (N = 399) that met the conditions deemed optimal for replicating the UTA. Consistent with the reliability account, the large-scale replication study yielded no evidence for the UTA, and the meta-analysis showed that previous reports of the UTA were confined to underpowered studies that used relatively small sample sizes. Furthermore, the results of the large-scale study also dispelled the recent suggestion that the UTA might be gender-specific. Accordingly, we conclude that there exists no reliable support for the claim that a momentary diversion of thought leads to better decision making than a period of deliberation.
Psychological aspects of the rejection of recycled water: Contamination, purification and disgust
Authors: Rozin Paul , Haddad Brent , Nemeroff Carol , Slovic Paul
Published: January 2023

There is a worldwide and increasing shortage of potable fresh water. Modern water reclamation technologies can alleviate much of the problem by converting wastewater directly into drinking water, but there is public resistance to these approaches that has its basis largely in psychology. A psychological problem is encapsulated in the saying of those opposing recycled water: “toilet to tap.” We report the results of two surveys, one on a sample of over 2,000 Americans from five metropolitan areas and the second on a smaller sample of American undergraduates, both assessing attitudes to water and water purification. Approximately 13% of our adult American sample definitely refuses to try recycled water, while 49% are willing to try it, with 38% uncertain. Both disgust and contamination sensitivity predict resistance to consumption of recycled water. For a minority of individuals, no overt treatment of wastewater will make it acceptable for drinking (“spiritual contagion”), even if the resultant water is purer than drinking or bottled water. Tap water is reliably rated as significantly more desirable than wastewater that has undergone substantially greater purification than occurs with normal tap water. Framing and contagion are two basic psychological processes that influence recycled water rejection.
Tailored proper scoring rules elicit decision weights
Authors: Carvalho Arthur
Published: January 2023

Proper scoring rules are scoring methods that incentivize honest reporting of subjective probabilities, where an agent strictly maximizes his expected score by reporting his true belief. The implicit assumption behind proper scoring rules is that agents are risk neutral. Such an assumption is often unrealistic when agents are human beings. Modern theories of choice under uncertainty based on rank-dependent utilities assert that human beings weight nonlinear utilities using decision weights, which are differences between weighting functions applied to cumulative probabilities.

In this paper, I investigate the reporting behavior of an agent with a rank-dependent utility when he is rewarded using a proper scoring rule tailored to his utility function. I show that such an agent misreports his true belief by reporting a vector of decision weights. My findings thus highlight the risk of utilizing proper scoring rules without prior knowledge about all the components that drive an agent’s attitude towards uncertainty. On the positive side, I discuss how tailored proper scoring rules can effectively elicit weighting functions. Moreover, I show how to obtain an agent’s true belief from his misreported belief once the weighting functions are known.
The nonsense math effect
Authors: Eriksson Kimmo
Published: January 2023

Mathematics is a fundamental tool of research. Although potentially applicable in every discipline, the amount of training in mathematics that students typically receive varies greatly between different disciplines. In those disciplines where most researchers do not master mathematics, the use of mathematics may be held in too much awe. To demonstrate this I conducted an online experiment with 200 participants, all of which had experience of reading research reports and a postgraduate degree (in any subject). Participants were presented with the abstracts from two published papers (one in evolutionary anthropology and one in sociology). Based on these abstracts, participants were asked to judge the quality of the research. Either one or the other of the two abstracts was manipulated through the inclusion of an extra sentence taken from a completely unrelated paper and presenting an equation that made no sense in the context. The abstract that included the meaningless mathematics tended to be judged of higher quality. However, this “nonsense math effect” was not found among participants with degrees in mathematics, science, technology or medicine.
The impact of near-miss events on betting behavior: An examination of casino rapid roulette play
Authors: Sundali James A. , Safford Amanda H. , Croson Rachel
Published: January 2023

We examine how almost winning in roulette affects subsequent betting behavior. Our main finding is heterogeneity in gambler behavior with some gamblers less likely to bet on numbers that were near misses on the prior spin and other gamblers more likely to bet on near miss numbers. Using a unique data set from the game rapid roulette, we model the likelihood of a gambler betting on a near miss number while controlling for the favorite number bias and the likelihood of a number being a near miss. We also find no evidence that near misses in roulette leads to gamblers extending the time spent gambling or to the placing of more bets.
Maximize when valuable: The domain specificity of maximizing decision-making style
Authors: Zhu Minfan , Wang Jun , Xie Xiaofei
Published: January 2023

The maximizing decision-making style describes the style of one who pursues maximum utility in decision-making, in contrast to the satisficing style, which describes the style of one who is satisfied with good enough options. The current research concentrates on the within-person variation in the maximizing decision-making style and provides an explanation through three studies. Study 1 (N = 530) developed a domain-specific maximizing scale and found that individuals had different maximizing tendencies across different domains. Studies 2 (N = 162) and 3 (N = 106) further explored this mechanism from the perspective of subjective task value through questionnaires and experiments. It was found that the within-person variation of maximization in different domains is driven by the difference in the individuals’ subjective task value in the corresponding domains. People tend to maximize more in the domains they value more. Our research contributes to a comprehensive understanding of maximization and provides a new perspective for the study of the maximizing decision-making style.
Belief in the unstructured interview: The persistence of an illusion
Authors: Dana Jason , Dawes Robyn , Peterson Nathanial
Published: January 2023

Unstructured interviews are a ubiquitous tool for making screening decisions despite a vast literature suggesting that they have little validity. We sought to establish reasons why people might persist in the illusion that unstructured interviews are valid and what features about them actually lead to poor predictive accuracy. In three studies, we investigated the propensity for “sensemaking” - the ability for interviewers to make sense of virtually anything the interviewee says—and “dilution”—the tendency for available but non-diagnostic information to weaken the predictive value of quality information. In Study 1, participants predicted two fellow students’ semester GPAs from valid background information like prior GPA and, for one of them, an unstructured interview. In one condition, the interview was essentially nonsense in that the interviewee was actually answering questions using a random response system. Consistent with sensemaking, participants formed interview impressions just as confidently after getting random responses as they did after real responses. Consistent with dilution, interviews actually led participants to make worse predictions. Study 2 showed that watching a random interview, rather than personally conducting it, did little to mitigate sensemaking. Study 3 showed that participants believe unstructured interviews will help accuracy, so much so that they would rather have random interviews than no interview. People form confident impressions even interviews are defined to be invalid, like our random interview, and these impressions can interfere with the use of valid information. Our simple recommendation for those making screening decisions is not to use them.
Choice blindness in financial decision making
Authors: McLaughlin Owen , Somerville Jason
Published: January 2023

Choice Blindness is an experimental paradigm that examines the interplay between individuals’ preferences, decisions, and expectations by manipulating the relationship between intention and choice. This paper expands upon the existing Choice Blindness framework by investigating the presence of the effect in an economically significant decision context, specifically that of pension choice. In addition, it investigates a number of secondary factors hypothesized to modulate Choice Blindness, including reaction time, risk preference, and decision complexity, as well as analysing the verbal reports of non-detecting participants. The experiment was administered to 100 participants of mixed age and educational attainment. The principal finding was that no more than 37.2% of manipulated trials were detected over all conditions, a result consistent with previous Choice Blindness research. Analysis of secondary factors found that reaction time, financial sophistication and decision complexity were significant predictors of Choice Blindness detection, while content analysis of non-detecting participant responses found that 20% implied significant preference changes and 62% adhered to initial preferences. Implications of the Choice Blindness effect in the context of behavioural economics are discussed, and an agenda for further investigation of the paradigm in this context is outlined.
Posthumous events affect rated quality and happiness of lives
Authors: Rozin Paul , Stellar Jennifer
Published: January 2023

Diener and colleagues (2001) illustrated that individuals rely heavily on endings to evaluate the quality of a life. Two studies investigated the potential for posthumous events to affect rated life quality, calling into question the intuitive “ending” of a life at death. Undergraduates read a series of short life narratives to assess the consequences of posthumous reversals of fortune on judgments of the goodness and happiness of the life. In a 2x2 within-subjects design, lives positive and negative in valence were displayed twice: once from birth to death and once each life was followed by a posthumous event of opposite valence. Results demonstrated that posthumous reversals of fortune shift judgments of the goodness and happiness of the life in the direction of the valence of the posthumous event. These effects were not related to an individual’s religiosity or the degree to which the life made an engaging story. We suggest that the posthumous happy effect may be a case of a more general process, which we call retroactive re-evaluation.
Selective information sampling: Cognitive coherence in evaluation of a novel item
Authors: Fraser-Mackenzie Peter A. F. , Dror Itiel E.
Published: January 2023

This study investigates the amount and valence of information selected during single item evaluation. One hundred and thirty-five participants evaluated a cell phone by reading hypothetical customers reports. Some participants were first asked to provide a preliminary rating based on a picture of the phone and some technical specifications. The participants who were given the customer reports only after they made a preliminary rating exhibited valence bias in their selection of customers reports. In contrast, the participants that did not make an initial rating sought subsequent information in a more balanced, albeit still selective, manner. The preliminary raters used the least amount of information in their final decision, resulting in faster decision times. The study appears to support the notion that selective exposure is utilized in order to develop cognitive coherence.
Biases in choices about fairness: Psychology and economic inequality
Authors: Michaelson Zachary
Published: January 2023

This paper investigates choices about “distributional fairness” (sometimes called “distributive justice”), i.e., selection of the proper way for resources to be distributed in group. The study finds evidence that several of the same biases of risky decision making also apply to choices about distributional fairness, in particular focusing on the key biases that lead to prospect theory. This finding is achieved by introducing a novel thought experiment regarding the fairness of resource distributions, then manipulating the percentage of individuals who gain or lose in these distributions, and changing the sizes of gains and losses. Shared biases may mean similar heuristics are being employed. The mechanism behind this result leaves room for future exploration, as do the implications of the finding for related applications in inequality research.
Are complex decisions better left to the unconscious? Further failed replications of the deliberation-without-attention effect
Authors: Calvillo Dustin P. , Penaloza Alan
Published: January 2023

The deliberation-without-attention effect occurs when better decisions are made when people experience a period of distraction before a decision than when they make decisions immediately or when they spend time reflecting on the alternatives. This effect has been explained (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004) by the claim that people engage in unconscious deliberation when distracted and that unconscious thought is better suited for complex decisions than conscious thought. Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B in this study included a dominant alternative and failed to find evidence for this effect. Experiment 3 removed the dominant alternative and manipulated mode of thought within-subjects to eliminate alternative explanations for the failed replication. In all experiments participants did not make better decisions after unconscious thought; decisions were consistently better than chance when made immediately after the encoding of information. Encouraging people not to think about complex decisions appears to be unwarranted.
New designs for research in delay discounting
Authors: Doyle John R. , Chen Catherine H. , Savani Krishna
Published: January 2023

The two most influential models in delay discounting research have been the exponential (E) and hyperbolic (H) models. We develop a new methodology to design binary choice questions such that exponential and hyperbolic discount rates can be purposefully manipulated to make their rate parameters orthogonal (Pearson’s R = 0), negatively correlated (R = –1), positively correlated (R = +1), or to hold one rate constant while allowing the other to vary. Then we extend the method to similarly contrast different versions of the hyperboloid model. The arithmetic discounting model (A), which is based on differences between present and future rewards rather than their ratios, may easily be made orthogonal to any other pair of models. Our procedure makes it possible to design choice stimuli that precisely vary the relationship between different discount rates. However, the additional control over the correlation between different discount rate parameters may require the researcher to either restrict the range that those rate parameters can take, or to expand the range of times the participant must wait for future rewards.
Measuring Social Value Orientation
Authors: Murphy Ryan O. , Ackermann Kurt A. , Handgraaf Michel J. J.
Published: January 2023

Narrow self-interest is often used as a simplifying assumption when studying people making decisions in social contexts. Nonetheless, people exhibit a wide range of different motivations when choosing unilaterally among interdependent outcomes. Measuring the magnitude of the concern people have for others, sometimes called Social Value Orientation (SVO), has been an interest of many social scientists for decades and several different measurement methods have been developed so far. Here we introduce a new measure of SVO that has several advantages over existent methods. A detailed description of the new measurement method is presented, along with norming data that provide evidence of its solid psychometric properties. We conclude with a brief discussion of the research streams that would benefit from a more sensitive and higher resolution measure of SVO, and extend an invitation to others to use this new measure which is freely available.
The endowment effect in the genes: An exploratory study
Authors: Hou Xingrong , Zeng Jianmin , Chen Hong , Su Li
Published: January 2023

The endowment effect is a well-documented decision phenomenon, referring to a tendency that people price a commodity higher when selling it than when buying it. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a sort of inertia, an unwillingness to make a change, or in other words an attachment to the status-quo. People with autism dislike social interaction, and are thus probably less willing to buy and sell items and more attached to the status quo. Previous research revealed that T-carriers of a single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) of the dopamine beta-hydroxylase (DBH) gene, rs1611115 (C-1021T), are associated with autism and difficulty in social interaction. Therefore, rs1611115 may modulate the endowment effect. In the current study, the subjects sold and bought lotteries with various probabilities of winning money and provided saliva for genotyping. We found that T-carriers (people of CT genotype in this study) exhibited greater endowment effects compared to people of CC genotype. We discuss another two possible explanations of our results: empathy and loss aversion. This is the first attempt to research the endowment effect from the perspective of genes. The result indicates that an SNP of genes (an innate factor) can exert an observable effect on human market activities.
The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game
Authors: Capraro Valerio , Vanzo Andrea
Published: January 2023

Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades. For example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results. Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets $0.50 and the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N=221) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from “extremely wrong” to “extremely right”. We find that these moral judgments can explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language.
How well can adolescents really judge risk? Simple, self reported risk factors out-predict teens’ self estimates of personal risk
Authors: Persoskie Alexander
Published: January 2023

Recent investigations of adolescents’ beliefs about risk have led to surprisingly optimistic conclusions: Teens’ self estimates of their likelihood of experiencing various life events not only correlate sensibly with relevant risk factors (Fischhoff et al., 2000), but they also significantly predict later experiencing the events (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Using the same dataset examined in previous investigations, the present study extended these analyses by comparing the predictive value of self estimates of risk to that of traditional risk factors for each outcome. The analyses focused on the prediction of pregnancy, criminal arrest, and school enrollment. Three findings emerged. First, traditional risk factor information tended to out-predict self assessments of risk, even when the risk factors included crude, potentially unreliable measures (e.g., a simple tally of self-reported criminal history) and when the risk factors were aggregated in a nonoptimal way (i.e., unit weighting). Second, despite the previously reported correlations between self estimates and outcomes, perceived invulnerability was a problem among the youth: Over half of the teens who became pregnant, half of those who were not enrolled in school, and nearly a third of those who were arrested had, one year earlier, indicated a 0% chance of experiencing these outcomes. Finally, adding self estimates of risk to the other risk factor information produced only small gains in predictive accuracy. These analyses point to the need for greater education about the situations and behaviors that lead to negative outcomes.
Downside financial risk is misunderstood
Authors: Newall Philip W. S.
Published: January 2023

The mathematics of downside financial risk can be difficult to understand: For example a 50% loss requires a subsequent 100% gain to break-even. A given percentage loss always requires a greater percentage gain to break-even. Instead, many non-expert investors may assume for example that a 50% gain is sufficient to offset a 50% loss. Over 3,498 participants and five experiments, the widespread illusion that a sequence of equal percentage gains and losses produces a zero overall return was demonstrated. Participants continued to err frequently, even with percentage returns of +/-100%, or when financially incentivized. Financial literacy, numeracy, and deliberation were all shown to independently contribute to accurate performance. These results have implications for promoting the understanding of downside financial risk.