Redefining the Status of Philosophical Statements
Authors: Trebaul Dewi ,   Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Published: March 2024

In his foreword to the Philosophical papers by Hans Hahn, Karl Menger mentions a controversy about the possibility or impossibility to speak about language within the Vienna Circle in the early 1930’s. He then adds: “Waismann proclaimed that one could not speak about language. Hahn took strong exception to this view. Why should one not – if perhaps in a higher-level language – speak about language? To which Waismann replied essentially that this would not fit into the texture of Wittgenstein’s latest ideas.”1 Thanks to the publication of the protocols of the Vienna Circle by Friedrich Stadler in his book The Vienna Circle – Studies in the origins, development and influence of logical empiricism, we have access to some discussions within the circle in the years 1930 and 1931, that allow us a partial reconstruction of the controversy. In these minutes we attend a very lively discussion on the topic of ‘talking about language’. We would like to make more explicit the tenets of this controversy, starting from the discussions within the circle. We will then focus on the evolution of the positions of different members of the Circle, that reflect different attitudes towards this problem, that are expounded in articles published until 1936. Although its members strived to stay the closest, they could to the landmarks laid down by the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, some of its members broke with them in many respects. The need to admit the possibility of talking theoretically about language became more pressing as the works of Tarski and Godel began to exert an influence on the researches of its members. Two options emerged: talking about a language in another language (Hahn) or in the same language (Carnap). Hahn’s positions, despite their originality, stand close to those of Carnap, who presents in 1931 his meta-logical project. Disagreements with Waismann occured frequently. Neurath remained skeptical about such a development that could, according to him, lead back to metaphysical considerations. The protocols by Rosa Rand give us precious insights on the premises of this debate, symptomatic of the diversity of the positions and of the fruitfulness of the exchanges within the Vienna Circle at that time. However, this debate takes place in a broader setting, namely the discussion of the status of philosophical statements once the rejection of metaphysics is accomplished. The answers provided reflect strong dissenting currents within the circle. For Neurath, to conceive of philosophy as providing elucidations is mistaken. Science shall take the form of an encyclopedia, that contains heterogeneous discourses – exact formulated sentences, as well as piece of ordinary language – and is taken in a dynamic process. No discourse outside science can be accepted. For Schlick and Waismann, there is still room for philosophy as providing elucidations about language. For Carnap, the aim is to attain a logically suitable language for science; discussions in a natural language have only a provisional role, in order to attain an adequate language, in which the logic of science can be formulated.