bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Creativity Techniques in Germany
Authors: Geschka Horst
Published: October 2006

The article gives an overview of the development of creativity techniques in Germany starting with the routes in the 1960s. Typical German methods are described; namely: Brainwriting, Visual Confrontation and Morphological Techniques. Also a software‐tool supporting the process of creative problem solving in all phases is presented. The last section deals with a survey in German industry showing significantly that companies applying creativity techniques more frequently and more systematically realize higher levels of business success.
Managing Diverse Groups for Creativity
Authors: Chee Ling Sing , Phuong Ta Huu
Published: October 2006

A case study suited for practising creative problem‐solving is presented. Results obtained in dealing with the case are examined using a conflict‐resolution framework, demonstrating the relative absence of collaborative ideas. The case can be used to sensitise groups to possible biases in idea search, and to suggest ways of compensating the bias.
Creative Relationship‐Focused Negotiations in International Business
Authors: Li Ji , Labig Chalmer E.
Published: October 2006

In the international business arena, negotiators are advised to use creative strategies and tactics that are directed toward enhancing relations among the parties rather than use cooperative tactics to the exclusion of competitive ones. International negotiations are usually of a mixed‐motive nature, i.e. they involve issues which inherently and appropriately elicit both cooperative and competitive intentions and behaviours, often referred to as win‐win and win‐lose tactics. However, the popular literature on negotiation fails to consider this reality and often ignores the critical role of relationship building. Lack of focus on relationship building in negotiation can lead not only to inappropriate uses of problem solving techniques but also to unsuccessful outcomes. Various creative techniques appropriate for competitive situations are proposed that can enhance or, at least, maintain positive relationships.
The Torrance Phenomenon: Extended Creative Search for Lord Vishvakarma
Authors: Raina M.K.
Published: October 2006

With grateful acknowledgement to a prepublication release by Georgia Studies of Creative Behavior (1994).
Process: Learning, Working and Innovation
Authors: Henderson John C. , Lentz Christine M.A.
Published: October 2006

Worldwide the environment in which IT initiatives are deployed is changing. Increasingly, IT investments are being made to produce market outcomes as well as internal operating efficiencies. Learning about the linkage between the IT investments and business value is a critical challenge in the service sector for industries such as financial services, transportation and retailing where IT is endemic to the products and services delivered to customers [1]. Using a case study in a large North American insurance company and recent theory [2] as our guide, we identify ways in which Information Systems (IS) organizations can become more innovative by using learning as the bridge between working and innovation.
POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
Authors: Hillman Arye L. , Riley John G.
Published: October 2006

A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political influence and low lobbying and other influence‐seeking outlays relative to the value of politically allocated prizes.
REVENUE SEEKING AND METZLER PARADOXES
Authors: Yabuuchi Shigemi
Published: October 2006

Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) demonstrated the interesting possibility that once revenue seeking is introduced the Metzler paradox may arise even for a small country: that is, a tariff will decrease the output of the inportable good. In this note, we establish the conditions under which the Metzler production paradox will arise and discuss the relation between the importable‐good and the exportable‐good production paradoxes.
ROEMER ON MARX ON EXPLOITATION
Authors: Foley Duncan K.
Published: October 2006

John E. Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988.
THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT*
Authors: Glazer Amihai
Published: October 2006

It is widely believed that the free‐rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that benefit the public at large may defeat a candidate who depends on the support of special interests. Moreover, even if the latter candidate can win, he must use a publicity strategy which allows any voter to hear of proposals that benefit groups other than the voter's.
EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY*
Authors: Sheffrin Steven M.
Published: October 2006

This paper provides new tests of the recently developed theory of rational partisan business cycles. According to the theory, resolution of uncertainty about electoral consequences and partisan differences in economic behavior produce downturns following victories of conservative parties and booms following victories of liberal parties. The first tests utilize the behavior of financial markets to reassess the evidence for the United States. We provide evidence that the stock market does have predictive power for output and estimate an econometric relationship which is then used to gauge the extent to which the recessions are anticipated after elections. The second test uses an international sample of democracies in the postwar era to examine the theory outside the United States using time series models and political variables. The results of the tests provide little support for a strict interpretation of the theory.
PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT PROTECTION*
Authors: Kaempfer William H. , Tower Edward , Willett Thomas D.
Published: October 2006

In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy maker: aggregate welfare versus industry profits, output and imports; and trade barrier revenue versus industry profits and domestic price. In all cases considered, performance contingent protection which takes the form either of a tariff which depends on domestic output or a quota which depends on the price charged is generally superior to a fixed tariff or quota and is sufficient to achieve optimality.
PERESTROIKA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY
Authors: Davies R.W.
Published: October 2006

Abel Aganbegyan, The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika. London: Hutchinson “Second World” Series, 1988. xxvii + 248 pp.

Padma Desai, Perestroika in Perspective: the Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1989. ix + 138 pp.

Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform Process, 1985–88. London: Pinter, 1989. x + 218 pp.
PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*
Authors: Ursprung Heinrich W.
Published: October 2006

The early literature on rent seeking presumed that total expenditures in the rent‐seeking process would equal the value of a contested prize. Subsequent analysis has shown, however, that a number of circumstances give rise to underdissipation of the contested rent—imperfectly discriminating contests, risk‐aversion, or where individuals' valuations of the prize are not identical. This paper shows how underdissipation is associated with the public‐good character of contested rents. In particular, total rent dissipation is demonstrated to be less than the average stake of the individual contenders. In addition to assessing rent dissipation in contests for public‐good allocations, the paper also endogenizes the value of the prize by placing the rent‐seeking contest in a setting of candidate competition.
A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION*
Authors: Grossman Herschel I. , Noh Suk Jae
Published: October 2006

We develop a positive theory of kleptocracy, in which the incumbent ruler's concern about his survival probability can induce him to pursue relatively benevolent policies. But, this effect can lower the equilibrium tax rate only until the time‐consistency requirement becomes a binding constraint on the equilibrium tax rate. The minimum time‐consistent tax rate in a reputational equilibrium is lower the more that the ruler values prospective future revenues, but the value of prospective future revenues itself depends on the ruler's survival probability. The analysis reveals that, if a relatively benevolent tax policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability, then equilibrium tax policy is relatively benevolent.

Until two or three hundred years ago, it was characteristic almost
DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE*
Authors: Feenstra Robert C. , Lewis Tracy , McMillan John
Published: October 2006

In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.
VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS*
Authors: Mayer Wolfgang , Riezman Raymond
Published: October 2006

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.
DISTRIBUTING THE GAINS FROM TRADE WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*
Authors: Feenstra Robert C. , Lewis Tracy R.
Published: October 2006

We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. Using a model where agents have private information about their endowments, we solve for the optimal government policy subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade, the incentive compatibility constraint, and the government's budget constraint. We find that the optimal policy takes the form of nonlinear tariffs. These tariffs are never complete, in the sense of bringing prices back to their initial level, but always allow some individuals to be strictly better off than at the initial prices.
VOTING AND THE INTERTEMPORAL SELECTION OF TAX RATES IN A MACRO‐ECONOMY*
Authors: Hess Gregory D.
Published: October 2006

This paper presents a macroeconomic model where governments are motivated both by their ideological preference for alternative fiscal policies that vary in their short run and long run consequences and by their reelection prospects. I prove that a sequential equilibrium exists in which moderate incumbents compromise their ideologies in order to get reelected, while extreme governments forego reelection but tie the hands of their successors. The view implied by this model is that incumbent governments, in order to get reelected, do not ideologically differentiate themselves from one another since such behavior is likely to result in loss of office. Alternatively, governments that are either subsequently not reelected or are lame ducks pursue ideologically preferred policies since they are less constrained by the electorate.
ORDERLY MARKETING ARRANGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GATT REGIME*
Authors: Ono Yoshiyasu
Published: October 2006

When a country faces a sudden surge of import, GATT allows it to impose an import quota to protect its domestic import‐competing firms. Nevertheless, various types of OMAs (orderly marketing arrangements) are often utilized instead of import quotas. This paper shows that the threat of the exporting country's retaliation approved by GATT makes it advantageous for both the exporting and importing countries to establish an OMA. By designing an OMA under which its deadweight loss is appropriately distributed to them, they avoid the retaliation approved by GATT which causes an additional deadweight loss.
LOCAL BENEFIT‐SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS*
Authors: Zupan Mark A.
Published: October 2006

In prior work, I proposed a prisoner's dilemma theory for the partisan pattern that political ticket splitting has taken in the United States: where Republicans, since 1932, have done consistently better in races for the White House than in contests for Congressional seats. The theory relies on the key assumption that Democratic legislative representatives are more willing to engage in local benefit‐seeking. By examining the personal staffing decisions made by members of the House this paper provides some empirical support for such an assumption. Relative to their Republican counterparts, Democratic legislators both hire more personal staff and allocate a higher percentage of the staff hired to district rather than Washington offices.
RENT SEEKING AND SOCIAL INVESTMENT IN TASTE CHANGE*
Authors: Guttman Joel M. , Nitzan Shmuel , Spiegel Uriel
Published: October 2006

We study the social allocation of resources to the alteration of preferences. Such taste changes are Pareto‐preferred if, according to both the original and the new taste regime, the resource allocation resulting from the taste change constitutes an improvement. According to this criterion, a degree of altruism is in general Pareto‐preferred, because it reduces socially wasteful activities, such as lobbying, bargaining and other rent seeking activities designed to increase one agent's expected share of the contested rent. We present a stylized model that captures the role of education in generating altruism and thus reducing the expenditure on rent seeking.
OF TIME AND POWER: LEADERSHIP DURATION IN THE MODERN WORLD
Authors: O'Flaherty Brendan
Published: October 2006

Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, Of Time and Power. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING
Authors: KLElN DANIEL B.
Published: October 2006

Reputation is possible in a small community, but in the Smith‐Lippmann‐Hayekian Great Society people are mainly strangers. I model credit reporting as a system of formalized and surgically‐precise gossip. In the Great Society credit reporting makes possible reputations, which make possible credit relationships. But forming a credit reporting system is no simple matter. Historically it has been local gossip in the small community that has made possible credit reporting “gossip” in the Great Society.
FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE*
Authors: SHACHAR RON
Published: October 2006

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non‐economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycle.
THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES*
Authors: HIBBS DOUGLAS A.
Published: October 2006

The “Partisan Theory” of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left‐party governments being more inclined than right‐party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex‐post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political‐economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within‐sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties.
A RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS POLITICIANS
Authors: REED W. ROBERT
Published: October 2006

This paper extends the performance‐based voting models of Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Austen‐Smith and Banks (1990) by including heterogeneous politicians. The introduction of heterogeneous politicians has three major implications. First, the act of voting must now simultaneously address both “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” problems. Accordingly, this paper demonstrates that voters will usually have to trade off the twin goals of (i) securing the optimal performance from a given type of politician, and (ii) insuring that only the best types of politicians are selected to office. Second, both equilibrium reelection rates and the tenure‐performance relationship are shown to depend on the value of holding office. For example, when the value of holding political office is large relative to other employment opportunities. incumbents will experience very high reelection rates: and longer‐serving politicians will perform poorer, on average, than shorter‐serving politicians. Finally, we demonstrate the surprising result that increased heterogeneity of politicians can make voters worse off.
INTEREST GROUPS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*
Authors: MAYER WOLFGANG , LI JUN
Published: October 2006

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee‐Brock‐Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.
TRADE POLICY AND INDIRECT RENT SEEKING: A SYNTHESIS OF RECENT WORK†
Authors: Leidy Michael P.
Published: October 2006

This paper synthesizes a body of work in trade theory and commercial policy. A common theme unifies this literature: Theprospectof protection, institutionalized in the policy formation process and the rules for administered protection, can induce real changes in economic activity independent of whether actual barriers to trade have been imposed. These changes are designed to indirectly manage policy outcomes by either encouraging or defusing protectionist pressures. Thus firm conduct may be distorted by incentives to optimize on a politically‐determined margin and the evolution of protectionist events may be shaped by more than the direct lobbying efforts of interest groups.
VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†
Authors: Breyer Friedrich
Published: October 2006

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle‐aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump‐sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.
WORDS AND DEEDS: SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND DECISION MAKING AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE
Authors: Granato Jim , West William
Published: October 2006

The Fed has often been accused of using ambiguity, concealment, and deception when it is subject to intense scrutiny and pressure. We investigate this issue by examining the relationship between the Fed's policy statements and its subsequent use of a key policy instrument, the federal funds rate. Our analysis shows that the Fed usually does what it says it will do during times of economic distress (recessions), but that its actions are more inclined to diverge from its stated intent when a sluggish economy coincides with presidential elections.
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, FINANCIAL ADAPTATION AND DELAYED STABILIZATIONS
Authors: Labán Raúl , Sturzenegger Federico
Published: October 2006

In this paper we model delayed stabilizations as the rational outcome of a distributional conflict between two risk averse groups in the presence of post‐stabilization payoff uncertainty and costly policy reversion. We show that in the initial stages of an extreme inflation episode there is a bias towards maintaining the current inefficient (but certain) revenue collection system which prevents the adoption of the required fiscal adjustment program. The access by those with higher income to a financial adaptation technology increases the average rate of inflation through time for any given government deficit, raising the welfare costs of not reaching an agreement and increasingly redistributing the burden of inflation to those with lower income. This process, if strong enough, will eventually trigger the necessary political support for the required fiscal adjustment. Delayed stabilizations will, nevertheless, induce the poor into accepting conditions that they did not find optimal before.
POLITICAL CYCLES
Authors: Roemer John E.
Published: October 2006

A model of elections is put forth in which there are two parties, each representing a different constituency of voters (the poor and the rich). The political issue is the choice of a proportional tax rate on income, revenues from which are used to finance a public good. There is a stochastic element in which party wins the elections, due to party uncertainty concerning voter preferences, or due to uncertainty concerning which voters will show up at the polls. A political equilibrium in one period consists in a tax policy put forth by each party, and a probability that each party wins. A long series of elections is simulated (100 periods). Voter preferences for the public good change adversely as a function of length of time the incumbent party has been in power and the level of the public good in the last period. Thus, if the party in power funds high levels of the public good, preferences start to move against the public good. This model generates dramatic political cycles, and it is argued that these cycles are of fundamentally different origin from that discussed in the realignment literature.
INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS
Authors: Gradstein Mark
Published: October 2006

In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders’expenditures.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH ENDOGENOUS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Authors: Ades Alberto
Published: October 2006

This paper combines two approaches to the relationship between economics and politics. The first, standard in the economic literature, takes political arrangements as exogenous and examines the way in which different political regimes influence economic performance. A second approach, normally followed by political scientists, takes economic performance as exogenous and analyzes the way in which the political structure of society responds to it. I integrate both approaches in a simple model that provides a framework to think about the observed correlations between income per capita and political participation. Extensions to the basic model show the possibility of multiple equilibria, and are used to analyze totalitarianism and the role of urbanization.
INTEREST GROUPS, INFLUENCE AND WELFARE
Authors: Ball Richard
Published: October 2006

This paper examines the social costs and benefits of special interest group political influence activities. It is commonly recognized that, to the extent that such activities induce legislators to choose policies that favor the interest group at the expense of society at large, they can reduce welfare. It may also be the case, however, that lobbying can convey information held by interest groups to policy‐makers. When costless announcements would not be credible, interest groups can signal their private information through costly influence activities. To the extent that this information enables governments to choose better policies, lobbying can enhance welfare. A simple game between a special interest group and a policy‐maker that captures this tradeoff between the distortionary costs and the informational benefits of political influence activities is developed. Welfare properties of the equilibria are analyzed, and conditions are derived under which social welfare is greater when lobbying occurs than it would be if lobbying were prohibited. In conclusion, the phenomenon analyzed in this paper is related to Bhagwati's taxonomy of DUP activities.
COMPULSORY VOTING AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Authors: O'Toole Francis , Strobl Eric
Published: October 2006

Crain and Leonard (1993) examine the effects of compulsory voting on the scale of government spending. The purpose of this comment is twofold. First, problems in the Grain and Leonard's approach are identified. The choice of government consumption, rather than expenditure, as representative of government spending is inappropriate and the classification of non‐voters as net beneficiaries of government spending is questionable. Second, the composition of government expenditure is examined. Cross‐country data tentatively suggests that voters benefit, relative to non‐voters, from government expenditures on defence and economic services while non‐voters benefit from government expenditure on health.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEGAL SEGREGATION: JIM CROW AND RACIAL EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS
Authors: Anderson Gary M. , Halcoussis Dennis
Published: October 2006

Legal segregation was a fact of life for blacks in the American South during the first half of the present century. These laws are sometimes compared to South African apartheid. However, there seems to be one important difference: Jim Crow, unlike apartheid, did not directly hamper the ability of blacks to compete with whites in labor markets. Our paper explores this problem. We report evidence which suggests that, in spite of the absence of direct labor market restrictions confronting blacks subject to Jim Crow, these laws nevertheless reduced the ability of blacks to compete with whites for jobs.
ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS*
Authors: Smith Alastair
Published: October 2006

The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.
Strategic returns to international diversification: An application to the equity markets of Europe, Japan and North America
Authors: Ammer John , Mei Jianping
Published: October 2006

We undertake a decomposition of the risk factor loadings of 15 national stock market returns from 1972 to 1990, using a variant of the Campbell‐Shiller (1988) linearisation. (Campbell, John Y. and Shiller, Robert J., ‘The dividend‐price ratio and expectations of future dividends and discount factors’, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 1, 1988, pp. 195–228.) We find considerable variation among countries in the relative importance of a cash flow component and a discount rate component in determining the beta with the world equity index return and with other risk factors. Also, the substantial international heterogeneity in factor loadings suggests that a global portfolio allows ample hedging opportunities, presumably deriving from differences in underlying economic structure.
Adverse selection, volume and transactions around dividend announcements in a continuous auction system
Authors: Rubio Gonzalo , Tapia Mikel
Published: October 2006

We show that liquidity providers do not significantly respond to changes in information asymmetry risks, at least when we analyse their trading behaviour around dividend announcements of a representative sample of stocks in a continuous auction trading mechanism. the implicit bid‐ask spread does not seem to change beyond what is normally conveyed through an increased number of transactions. We also document that the information in the trading behaviour of investors is primarily contained in the number of daily transactions.
Stock prices and the flow of information in the Athens Stock Exchange
Authors: Phylaktis Kate , Kavussanos Manolis G , Manalis Gikas
Published: October 2006

The paper investigates the dynamics of price changes and information flow to the market in the Athens Stock Exchange in Greece using daily data over the period 1988 to 1993. A generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model in stock returns is shown to reflect time dependence in the process generating information flow to the market. Using daily trading volume or value as proxies for information flow, we find them to be significant in explaining the variance of daily returns and to reduce GARCH effects substantially. This has implications for the informational efficiency of the market.
Eva®*: An integrated financial management system**
Authors: Stern Joel M. , Stewart G. Bennett , Chew Donald H.
Published: October 2006

Both the rise of hostile takeovers and the phenomenal success of LBOs in the 1980s can be explained in part as capital market responses to the shortcomings of the top‐down, EPS‐based model of financial management that has long dominated corporate America. the EVA financial management system, which presents the 1990s most serious challenge to the dominance of the EPS model, borrows important aspects from the LBO movement, particularly its focus on capital efficiency and ownership incentives. Unlike the LBO movement, however, the EVA system accomplishes such goals without the high leverage and concentration of risk that limit LBOs to the mature sector of the US economy.
Using futures contracts for corporate hedging: The problem of expiry and a possible solution
Authors: Neuberger Anthony
Published: October 2006

Companies using futures contracts for hedging purposes need to roll over their contracts if the maturity of their exposure exceeds that of the futures contracts. This entails basis risk that can reduce significantly the effectiveness of the hedge. In this paper an alternative form of futures contract is proposed. the contract never expires and can be used for long‐term hedging without the need for rolling‐over into a new contract. the contract is shown to be equivalent to a portfolio of conventional futures contracts of differing maturities. Its price is determined by arbitrage against the underlying asset.
Testing the bivariate mixture hypothesis using German Stock market data
Authors: Jung Robert C. , Liesenfeld Roman
Published: October 2006

According to the bivariate mixture hypothesis (BMH) as proposed by Tauchen and Pitts (1983) and Harris (1986, 1987) the daily price changes and the corresponding trading volume on speculative markets follow a joint mixture of distributions with the unobservable number of daily information events serving as the mixing variable. Using German stock market data of 15 major companies the distributional properties of the BMH is tested employing maximum‐likelihood as well as generalised method of moments estimation techniques. In addition to providing a new approach for the pointwise estimation of the latent information arrival rate based on the maximum‐likelihood method, we investigate the time‐series properties of the BMH. the major results can be summarised as follows: (i) the distributional characteristics of the data (especially leptokurtosis and skewness in the distribution of price changes and volume respectively) cannot be explained satisfactorily by the BMH; univariate mixture models for price changes and trading volume separately reveal a possible specification error in the model; (ii) a univariate normal mixture model can account for the observed distributional characteristics of price changes; (iii) the estimated process of the latent information rate cannot fully explain the time‐series characteristics of the data (especially the volatility clustering or ARCH‐effects).
VALUE FOR MONEY AUDITING ‐ AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW AND COMPARISON
Authors: Glynn J. J.
Published: October 2006

This paper considers the application of value for money auditing in six countries. It is hoped thereby to instil a greater realization of what is done and what might be done. Approaches vary, they can be structured or highly unstructured. Some countries offer their auditors less restrictive mandates than others. To date, despite a wealth of international practical experience, no standard approach has been adopted which adequately covers all the varied aspects of value for money auditing.
BRITISH UNIVERSITIES' RESPONSES TO EVENTS LEADING TO GRANT REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED IN JULY 1981
Authors: Sizer John
Published: October 2006

This paper arises from a research project funded by the Department of Education and Science (DES). It relates an analysis of the events leading to the announcement of significant recurrent grant reductions by the University Grants Committee (UGC) on 1st July 1981 to the responses of nine universities to these events. It draws policy implications for the DES and the UGC, or the proposed Universities Funding Council (UFC), and an important managerial lesson for university managements, i.e. the need to respond positively to warnings of reductions in grants.
MONITORING AND AUDITING VALUE FOR MONEY IN THE UK: THE SCOPE FOR QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS ‐ A COMMENT
Authors: Tomkins Cyril
Published: October 2006

Despite Anand's comments (1988), this author still believes that there is much scope for employing naturalistic methods in the evaluation of public sector effectiveness, although he also recognises that it is also eminently sensible to try to develop new performance measures in statistical form where they can be shown to be appropriate. Look to the quotation at the end of the paper. Stoppard says it all!
The New Public Management Reform and Governance in Asian NICs: A Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore1
Authors: LEE ELIZA W. Y. , HAQUE M. SHAMSUL
Published: October 2006

This article compares the New Public Management (NPM) reform in Hong Kong and Singapore. First of all, it highlights how the macroeconomic environment, the political system, and state traditions, factors that are commonly identified as affecting the pattern of NPM reform in western liberal democracies, assume different contexts and significance in affecting reform in Asian states. With these general factors, we further compare the NPM reform of these two Asian newly industrialized countries in the areas of economic, administrative, and social governance, and identify the similarities and differences in the objectives of reform, the levels of reform, and the factors affecting such reform in these two cases.
Intergovernmental Innovation and the Administrative State in Canada
Authors: JOHNS CAROLYN M. , O’REILLY PATRICIA L. , INWOOD GREGORY J.
Published: October 2006

Canadian federalism has experienced considerable pressure for change and innovation in recent years. There have been calls for more collaborative federalism and demands for public sector reforms consistent with the precepts of New Public Management. This article examines the hypothesis that these pressures might be expected to have resulted in some intergovernmental institutional innovation in the arena of federal–provincial–territorial relations. Using a conceptual distinction between federalism, intergovernmental relations, and intergovernmental management (IGM) as the basis of analyzing institutional innovation at six levels in the Canadian intergovernmental administrative state, the authors find a differentiated impact with more institutional innovation evident at the micro levels of IGM and innovation more constrained at the macro levels of the administrative state by the traditional institutional infrastructure of executive federalism.
Technovation in Taiwan: Implications for Industrial Governance
Authors: WONG JOSEPH
Published: October 2006

No longer able to compete with China and Southeast Asian economies on the basis of cheap skilled labor, Taiwan has begun to explore new industrial sectors, such as biotechnology and the life sciences more generally, as key areas for development. The notion that biotech has been “targeted” by the government naturally conjures up images of the postwar developmental state and its mechanisms for industrial governance. Indeed, the resiliency of the East Asian developmental state model has been the focus of much recent debate (Wong 2004), which begets the question: Does the developmental state still matter in Taiwan, and if so, specifically what role can it play? The government’s current effort in facilitating biotech industrialization provides an idea case through which to reappraise the developmental state, and specifically its role in leading industrial transformation in this uniquely knowledge‐intensive sector.
SOCIAL ASSETS*
Authors: Mailath George J. , Postlewaite Andrew
Published: October 2006

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.
THE ROLE OF PREFERENCE SHOCKS AND CAPITAL UTILIZATION IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION*
Authors: Weder Mark
Published: October 2006

The article examines the proposition that preference shocks play a central role in our understanding of the Great Depression. I identify a series of unusually large negative shocks that destabilized the U.S. economy during the 1930s. When the artificial economy is paired with variable capital utilization and mildly increasing returns to scale in production, it is able to account for most of the decline in economic activity and it predicts a tepid recovery.
Integrating Information Technology into International Crisis Management and Policy
Authors: Comfort Louise K.
Published: October 2006

Decision processes in disaster environments pose a special challenge to rational problem solving. The urgency, complexity and uncertainty of disaster environments test the limits of human capacity for seeking, processing and disseminating information to support coordinated action. Current information technology offers a means of extending human problem solving capacity through an interactive, intelligent, spatial information system, if it is supported by a parallel organizational system designed to facilitate coordinated action.

A preliminary model of organizational problem solving is proposed, focusing on the global problem of seismic risk. The model relies on the function of information technology to reduce uncertainty by increasing the timeliness and accuracy of information to disaster managers, thereby improving coordination in organizational performance. The model links information technology to organizational structure in ways that create feedback channels, improve organizational learning and increase capacity to correct organizational mistakes. The model is presented in terms of structuring technical and organizational conditions to support improved capacity for organizational problem solving in communities vulnerable to seismic risk. Illustrative data from a series of seven earthquake disasters demonstrate an evolving receptiveness to the integration of information technology into international crisis policy and practice.
Community Crises: An Exploratory Comparison of the Characteristics and Consequences of Disasters and Riots
Authors: Quarantelli E.L.
Published: October 2006

Some social science literature conceptualizes disasters and riots together, treating the two phenomena as involving but one relatively homogeneous type of social crisis. This is only valid if the pre‐, trans and post‐impact behaviours in such consensus and conflict occasions are roughly the same. This assumption is examined by comparing the similarities and differences between what occurs in community disasters and riots as these have been reported in empirical studies, looking at behaviours appearing at the individual, organizational and community levels. Significant differences have been found supporting the notion that consensus‐type crises such as disasters ought to be conceptualized as a different social category than riots.
The Management of Civil Emergencies in Northern Ireland
Authors: Birrell Derek
Published: October 2006

Ireland has experienced some twenty years of violent incidents and such incidents can be interpreted as a series of small disasters. Emergency services in Northern Ireland have developed plans and strategies to cope with the consequences of these events. This experience can be related to a number of more general issues about the management of civil emergencies, including the conceptualization of the planning process; the routinization of emergency procedures; the desirability of flexible planning and central coordination and the role of counselling and voluntary activity. It has to be noted that the nature of civil conflict in Northern Ireland also results in certain unique features in the management of emergencies.
Prioritizing Regulatory Policy in Pipeline Safety
Authors: Perry Wayne D. , Haynes Kingsley E.
Published: October 2006

This paper presents a regulatory priority model and its operationalization for pipeline safety. It begins with a brief discussion of pipeline systems and regulatory legislation associated with pipeline safety. The systems transport natural gas, liquid crude oil, gasoline and other liquid hazardous petroleum products. The regulations relate to technologies to be used, human factors, research requirements and environmental protection considerations. The legislative focus is on public safety, property damage and, most recently, environmental protection. Using a risk assessment approach to operationalize the model requires integration of concepts from engineering, economics and ecology. The specific measures applied include reliability, vulnerability and resiliency. Congressional, private industry and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulatory priorities are compared. The paper concludes with the risk assessment implementation strategy by the DOT Office of Pipeline Safety.
Whistleblowing on Crises and Disasters
Authors: Vinten Gerald
Published: October 2006

This is the excellent foppery of the world … we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon and the stars, as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves and treachers by spherical predominance, drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence – Edmund, bastard son of Gloucester (Shakespeare, King Lear, 1 ii. 132 quoted in Wells and Taylor, 1987: 1239).
Deaths in the Workplace and the Dynamics of Response
Authors: Sinclair Amanda , Haines Fiona
Published: October 2006

Deaths in the workplace are traumatic events from which most organizations involved recoil rather than scrutinise. This paper explores workplace fatalities in multiple employer worksites over a year in Victoria, Australia. Individuals and organizations involved demonstrate conscious and unconscious defences in order to distance themselves from the trauma and deal with anxiety. Legal processes introduce a new set of defences in displacement of responsibility and blaming. Most involved in fatality fail to confront the crisis and to learn from it. In contrast, in a few cases, managers and organizations exhibit reflective responses which enable them to examine the circumstances of the death, deal with legal proceedings and initiate organizational changes. To enhance reflectiveness, a combination of managerial, organizational and legal remedies are described. In particular, the development of organizational cultures which promote safety is argued but in ways which recognise the complex cultures and subcultures of worksites where many fatalities occur.
Software and Contingency: The Text and Vocabulary of System Failure?1
Authors: Turner Barry A.
Published: October 2006

This paper discusses some general issues relating to limitations upon the use of software for control of hazardous contingencies. The approach taken considers how far a given piece of software can be regarded as having the properties of a literary ‘text’, a fairly abstract discussion which leads on to quite practical implications, for example, in current studies of the malfunctioning of computer‐controlled machines used for medical radiation treatment. Successful accident avoidance relies upon control, but the degree of control possible within a software package is limited because the meaning of any particular section of software is not absolute, but is understood in relation to its context. When the context changes, meaning may shift and control may lapse. The question is also raised of how far similar analyses and similar limitations might apply to analyses of systems of technology and to systems of management considered as text‐like systems.