bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Materialism and Evolution: A Reconsideration
Authors: Martin Robert M. , Rosenberg A.
Published: June 2016

In “Physicalism and the Evolution of Consciousness” Roland Puccetti argues that the simultaneous isomorphism between mental and physical events required by the identity theory confers no selective
advantage on organisms manifesting it, and in consequence is
rendered at least implausible, if not simply false, by the theory of natural selection. We shall try to show that his arguments are defective.
Foreknowledge and Possibility
Authors: Helm Paul
Published: June 2016

Professor Holt's comments fall into two parts. He begins by raising some objections to the tentative rejection, in my paper, of the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts. He then goes on to offer an argument to show that my defence of the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom fails, or is at least seriously questionable. For brevity I shall concentrate on his remarks on foreknowledge as I do not think that his interesting discussion of the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts vitally affects the question about divine foreknowledge, the main point at issue.

So I shall deal with Holt's claim that one can have the power to undo the fact of foreknowledge retroactively and argue that one can no more retroactively bring it about that God did not know than one can retroactively bring it about that he did know.
Alain et sa philosophie de la religion
Authors: Theau Jean
Published: June 2016

Philosophy of religion has become in our days a considerable part of philosophy. Alain's books on religion, published in the early thirties, remain among the most valuable which have been ever written by philosophers on this subject, but unfortunately they are scarcely known to-day, at least in North America. The most important of them — Les Dieux — has recently been translated in English: The Gods, Richard Pevear, New York, New Direction, 1974. Although inspired by Hegel, Alain's method and ideas really are very original as well as profound, because Alain's style and doctrine deeply differ from Hegel's. They differ no less from analytical philosophers’ models, because Alain never argues with religion but reflect on it, in order to draw a true picture of man. The following essay tries to indicate both the contents and the main features of this philosophy.
Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?
Authors: Warren Mary Anne
Published: June 2016

By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people.
The “Many” in Republic 475a - 480a
Authors: White F. C.
Published: June 2016

In this paper I wish to argue for a view that, despite its traditional standing, has not yet in any detail been defended. The view is briefly that in the Republic, at the point where Plato is engaged in contrasting the true philosopher with the “lover of sights and sounds”, he characterises sensible particulars — referred to as “the many” — as being bearers of opposite properties in so radical a manner that they can be said neither to be nor not to be: they lie somewhere between being and utter non-being.

There are two related reasons why this traditional view should now be closely scrutinised. The first is that, whatever the outcome, the passage of the Republic in question — 475a-480a — is quite crucial to our understanding of the development of Plato's thought about sensible particulars. The second’ is that it has been suggested recently, and ably argued, that Plato is not in fact talking about particulars at all; rather about types or sorts of particulars.
Marx's Concept of Truth: A Kantian Interpretation
Authors: Myers David B.
Published: June 2016

It would be misleading to make any reference to Marx's “theory” of truth-for nowhere in the corpus of Marx's writings will one find an essay dealing with truth in a thematic way. Marx's scattered remarks on truth occur within the context of discussions of social questions. What one can pull together on the topic of truth amounts at most to the sketch of a concept which applies to social knowledge and not knowledge in general. My aim will be to reconstruct Marx's concept of social truth on the basis of his writings on society and social theory.

Those who want a systematic essay developing a general Marxist theory of knowledge have, of course, Lenin's classical formulation of Marxist epistemology in Materialism and Empiriocriticism. We also have Leszek Kolakowski's bold and heretical attack on Lenin's interpretation in “Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth” where we find the astounding claim that Marx's view of truth is closer to that of William James than to that of Lenin.

Kolakowski's essay has been the subject of numerous attacks both by predictably indignant true believers and by independent, creative Marxists.
Rawls on Method
Authors: Delaney C. F.
Published: June 2016

It is my conviction that much of the criticism of John Rawls’A Theory of Justicemisses its mark precisely because of a failure to appreciate the distinctive methodological structure of this work. I have three types of criticisms specifically in mind. First, the critic whose ultimate weapon is the counterexample. Secondly, the critic who focuses on one aspect of Rawls’ project without taking into account the whole theory. And thirdly, the critic who attempts to assess the theory absolutely rather than as one member of a set of welldefined alternatives. In this paper I hope to exhibit why these kinds of criticisms miss the mark, and I propose to do this indirectly by focusing on Rawls’ conception of philosophical method. Once this is exhibited, the relevance and irrelevance of certain kinds of criticisms becomes obvious. In my attempt to explicate Rawls’ conception of method, I will begin with his early methodological papers as providing the context within which the methodological structure ofA Theory of justiceshould be viewed.
Berkeley's Ontology and the Epistemology of Idealism
Authors: Muehlmann Robert
Published: June 2016

Berkeley's idealism consists of the following claims. Objects such as chairs, apples, mountains, and our bodies are combinations of sensible qualities. Sensible qualities and combinations of such are ideas or sensations. In the philosophical sense of ‘substance’ there is no such entity as a substance. There are minds which perceive and will: When a mind perceives it has sensations or ideas; and when a mind wills it produces or causes sensations or ideas. These claims are grounded in the ontological and epistemological framework of assumptions, distinctions and arguments informing Berkeley's doctrine thatesse est percipi aut percipere.The purpose of this paper is to explore and expose the main features of that framework.

What is the ontological force and import on Berkeley's claim thatesse est percipi?One influential recent suggestion1 is this: Berkeley holds that (1) material substances do not exist, (2) the analysis of sensible things yields nothing but sensible qualities, (3) minds are mental substances and (4) no sensible quality or collection of sensible qualities can exist without inhering in some substance.
On Behalf of the Materialist
Authors: Pearce Glenn
Published: June 2016

Suppose we are able to transplant Jones's pain centres into Smith's brain. Half way through the operation we test the pain centres by stimulating them electrically in vitro. Would there be pain? Roland Puccetti argues that there would not be. Because (a) pains must have owners and (b) the only available candidate for that role — the excised tissue — is logically unfit to play it. He concludes that the firing of such centres in a normally functioning brain cannot be pain either and that, therefore, materialism is false.

So far as I can see, Puccetti's “refutation” is a series of nonsequiturs from start to finish, and that is what I mainly want to show. It will not follow, of course, that materialism is true. Indeed, I think the view which Puccetti attacks under that name is too naive to be taken seriously by anyone.
On the Reality of Existence and Identity
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: June 2016

“The confusion of a logical with a real predicate,” according to the Critique of Pure Reason, “is almost beyond correction” (A598/B626). Kant did not assert that existence is no predicate, but that it is only a “logical” one, and not a “real” one. Much the same thing has been said about identity, although Kant himself thought it is real and not logical. We have long lacked a rigorous criterion to distinguish real from logical predicates, and hence have not been able to say why the difference matters. This paper has two objects. First it provides a demarcation between real and logical predicates that confirms Kant's dictum that existence is only “logical.” Secondly it states the theory of a “logical” (but not “real”) relation of identity. Perhaps this is not the only identity relation. I show only that once it has been precisely defined in the right setting, there are definite answers to a number of disputed questions about identity. Maybe there are other concepts of identity for which different answers are to be given, but I shall not discuss that disagreeable prospect here. A third application concerns the ontological argument.
Dworkin, Rights, and Persons
Authors: Haworth Lawrence
Published: June 2016

In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin defends the thesis that some, at least, of the rights people have, and in particular the most fundamental rights such as free speech and religious freedom, are “rights against the state”. By this he means that they identify modes of action that (a) individuals ought to be permitted to carry out, and (b) interference with which ought to be banned, even if a majority in the society prefer that the actions be prohibited or prefer some other condition achievement of which would require prohibiting them.
Frege’s Horizontal
Authors: Heck William C. , Lycan William G.
Published: June 2016

Frege begins his exposition of the symbol system employed in his Begriffsschrift by introducing the sign ⟝, whereby, he says, “[a] judgment is always to be expressed” (p. 1 ).

[The judgment sign] stands to the left of the sign or complex of signs in which the content of the judgment is given. If we omit the little stroke at the left of the horizontal stroke, then the judgment is to be transformed into a mere complex of ideas; the author is not expressing his recognition or nonrecognition of the truth of this. (Pp. 1–2)
Ethical Intuitionism and Naturalism: A Reconciliation
Authors: Smith M. B. E.
Published: June 2016

Intuitionism is most commonly defined in terms of various strong epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions, e.g., that true moral principles are synthetic a priori propositions, known by some special faculty of moral reflection, and the like. I shall not here be concerned with such views. Rather my focus will be upon the program for normative investigation which I have elsewhere argued is implicit in the intuitionists’ writings and which I take to be intuitionism's salient characteristic.
Course of Action Utilitarianism
Authors: Dayton Eric B.
Published: June 2016

The way individual actions enter into larger courses of action often has an effect on the utility of those individual actions. This simple fact has motivated recent discussions about the intelligibility of act-utilitarianism. (See [1], [2], [4], [5], [6], [7], [10] and [11].) It has become clear that act-utilitarianism is incomplete, if not intelligible, without an account of the utility-making properties of courses of action taken as a whole. In this paper I offer a brief discussion of the difficulties of a simple act-utilitarianism and then offer three complementary principles in which the utility of an action is made to depend upon the courses of action of which it may be a constituent. I hope that the discussion will be of interest not only to committed act-utilitarians but to its sympathetic critics as well.
Justice, Liberty, and the Principle of Utility in Mill
Authors: Dryer D. P.
Published: June 2016

Mill is neither an act-utilitarian nor a rule-utilitarian. Although he professes to regard “utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions”, he in fact makes no appeal to it in determining in Utilitarianism what actions are “of more absolute obligation than any others”. Nor does he appeal to it in his arguments for the two main conclusions of his essay, On Liberty.
Utilitarianism: Moral Principles and Conceptual Defences
Authors: Kasachkoff Tziporah
Published: June 2016

Considerations of Justice and their place in the ethical evaluation of human behavior is the focus of almost all criticism of utilitarianism as an adquate and self-sufficient criterion for determining the morality of human action.

In turn, the historical turns of utilitarianism—the move from a criterion which evaluates individual acts according to their utility to a criterion which evaluates acts in accordance with their conformity to de facto or ideal utilitarian rules, the presentation of utilitarianism as a logical thesis rather than a normative principle, the argument by some philosophers that the utilitarian consequences which Justify actions must be optimific in terms of happiness produced rather than mere pleasure experienced, and, by others, that the Justifying utilitarian consequences must be even more broadly construed as “instrinsically worthwhile“—all represent attempts by utilitarians to overcome, in one way or another, the charge of injustice.
Does Marx Have an Ethic of Self-Realization? Reply to Aronovitch
Authors: Allen Derek P. H.
Published: June 2016

There are some Marxist moral philosophers who think that a distinctive and defensible ethic can be unearthed from Marx's writings. The task of unearthing it must, of course, be kept distinct from the task or elaborating and defending it. Professor Aronovitch undertakes both tasks in his paper, but he does not always succeed in keeping them apart. As a result, I believe, damage is done to the exegetical side of his project.

The question of whether there is a Marxian ethic is a problem both of textual interpretation and of moral philosophy. Consider, for instance, the claim that Marx has an ethic whose centrepiece is a principle of selfrealization. It is an exegetical problem to provide evidence that a principle of self-realization is to be found in Marx and to explain how he understands it.
More on Marxian Morality: Reply to Professor Allen
Authors: Aronovitch Hilliard
Published: June 2016

Professor Allen acknowledges that Marx's writings underdetermine the nature of his ethical views and that, with due caution, "the attribution of ethical views to Marx will have to be inferential; they will not be supportable merely by direct quotation" (p. 379). I am therefore rather puzzled by Allen's unease with the general nature of my project and by his repeated insistence for more direct texts. I confess that I am also somewhat surprised that Allen's exegetical concern has led him in dealing with the moral theory I have adumbrated to ask for the most part just, Is it Marx? and not also, in any detail, Is it true? I think it is clear though, by inference, that Allen has his doubts on the latter score, but what I must deal with are the various questions or problems Allen has regarding my attributions to Marx and the implications I find in his texts. There are as I see it four such questions, though each is perhaps the heading for a cluster of ones.
A Defense of the Traditional Position Concerning Aristotle's Non-substantial Particulars
Authors: Granger Herbert
Published: June 2016

In this paper I shall defend the traditional claim that Aristotle's nonsubstantial particulars discussed in the second chapter of the Categories are unsharable particulars against G. E. L. Owen's claim that they are sharable universals. I shall proceed by presenting first a sketch of the traditional position that makes explicit why it holds that non-substantial particulars are unsharable particulars. Secondly, I shall sketch Owen's position and recount how it differs in certain important respects from the traditional position. Thirdly, I shall present some of my own considerations that I believe support the traditional position at the expense of Owen's position. Finally, I shall offer what I take to be the primary reason Aristotle was committed to the existence of such odd items as non-substantial particulars.
Les Deux ldentités de La Personne Humaine
Authors: Longeart-Roth Maryvonne
Published: June 2016

La logique intervient doublement dans les discussions sur l'identité personnelle. D'une part, certaines théories de l’identité personnelle ont été critiquées pour ne pas respecter les propriétés logiques de l’identité, d'autre part, l’identité personnelle a été présentée comme un contreexemple à Ia logique de l’identité, justifiant une révision radicale de celle-ci.

Ainsi, Ia logique de l’identité est le garde fou des théories de l’identité personnelle et l’identité personnelle est Ia pierre d'achoppement de Ia théorie logique de l’identité.

L’identité logique est caractérisée par le fait d'être une relation d'équivalence, et par le principe de substitutivité. Or certaines situations comme par exemple les cas de dedoublement de personnalité, semblent déroger à ce principe. Si l'on peut dire que a et b sont le même homme mais pas Ia même personne, alors le principe, selon lequel si deux individus sont identiques ce qui est prédicable de l'un est prédicable de l'autre, ne s'applique plus.
An Intentional Fallacy in Epistemology
Authors: White Alan R.
Published: June 2016

In Chapter 5 of his book, Res Cogitans (1972), Zeno Vendler argued for the thesis that what we know when we know that p, e.g. that Los Angeles is south of San Francisco, and what we believe when we believe that p cannot be the same despite being expressed in the same words, on the ground that ‘believe’ is what he called a subjective verb and ‘know’ what he called an objective verb. For this he gave two main criteria (1) that subjective verbs can take only ‘subjective that- clauses,’ by which he means clauses which express propositions, whereas objective verbs can take only ‘objective that-clauses,’ by which he means clauses which express facts; (2) that subjective verbs cannot take, whereas objective verbs can take, wh- nominalisations - in practice these are the interrogatives what, who where, when, how - which Vendler also takes as a mark of the objective.
Persuasive Argument and Disagreements of Principle
Authors: Dayton Eric B.
Published: June 2016

It is commonly said that ethical disputes either involve disagreements of fact or disagreements of principle and that while disagreements of fact can be overcome by rational means, disagreements of principle cannot. The difficulty is supposed to be this: for an argument to be rationally persuasive it must appeal to premises already accepted by the person to be persuaded, and if the premises include the principle in question then they will not be acceptable to that person; however, if the premises do not include the principle in question the argument cannot succeed because the conclusion can only validly be inferred from premises which do include the principle in question. While this doctrine is appealing to philosophers who find the idea of ultimate disagreement in ethics comforting, it is a visciously skeptical view which can be generalized to cover all systematic areas of human knowledge. As ‘disagreements of principle’ can appear in almost any domain of human inquiry, the hidden cost of this doctrine is terribly high.
Side Constraint Morality
Authors: Neumann Michael
Published: June 2016

The Bible does not in general tell us to maximize or minimize anything. The Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount do n·ot, for example, tell us to maximize the glory of God. Instead they say, do this, don't do that, where ‘this’ and ‘that’ are replaceable by the name for such categories of action as stealing, committing adultery, and loving thy neighbour.

Until recently, at least, non-maximizing moralists have appeared irrational when confronted with such questions as: what if stealing or lying will save a life? Because they exclude consideration of particular circumstances, the dicta of traditional morality seem myopic and prejudiced next to ‘end-state’ doctrines like utilitarianism, which require that careful empirical investigation accompany virtually every moral decision. To many, traditional morality seems sincere and straightforward, but lacking in intellectual respectability.
Who is a Rational Agent?
Authors: Ben-Zeev Aaron
Published: June 2016

Answering the question, ‘Who is a rational agent?’ is of utmost importance for all moral theories which conceive of the rational agent as their basic moral unit (I call these theories ‘the rational theories of morality’). Surprisingly enough, these theories do not pay much attention to this question, and assume, without offering detailed discussions, certain characterizations of the rational agent. In this paper, I examine what kind of attribute ‘rational’ is. In light of this examination I claim that the rational moral theories are based on a mistaken characterization of the rational agent.
Freud, Self-Knowledge and Psychoanalysis
Authors: Szabados Béla
Published: June 2016

I put down my cup and examine my own mind. It is for it to discover the truth. But how? What an abyss of uncertainty whenever the mind feels that some part of it has strayed beyond its own borders; when it, the seeker, is at once the dark region through which it must go seeking, where all its equipment will avail it nothing. Seek? More than that: create. It is face to face with something which does not so far exist, to which it alone can give reality and substance, which it alone can bring into the light of day.
The Private Language Passages
Authors: Schachter J.P.
Published: June 2016

Discusssion of passages 243 et. seq. of Wittgenstein's Philosophical lnvestigations tends to concentrate on the argument supporting the thesis that a logically private language is impossible. When the discussion becomes broader, the presumption is generally that this thesis is one premifs of an argument against solipsism. I believe that the passages will support a valid argument that might, at first glance, give comfort to someone in the egocentric predicament, but that this comfort would quickly grow cold on closer examination. I do not mean to suggest that Wittgenstein offers no escape from the predicament, only that the escape (if successful) will not be a consequence of the pluralism necessary to the existence of language, but rather a byproduct of his discussion of the logic of mental discourse. In this paper (sees. II through VI), I state an alternative to the contra-solipsist reading of the passages, taking Wittgenstein there to be reflecting a three part dispute, the other participants of which are a skeptic and a philosopher I'll call ‘the Realist'.
Eternal Recurrence
Authors: Small Robin
Published: June 2016

The doctrine of eternal recurrence, the claim that everytning that occurs does so not only once but infinitely many times, figures in the writings of Nietzsche in several forms, and it can be understood in different ways. Here I shall show that one of these approaches allows us to see the doctrine as a philosophical theory about the nature of reality: that is, as an ontological doctrine. The interpretation is worth exploring because it allows us not only to see what Nietzsche's arguments really are, but also to bring to light problems and objections that go unnoticed in most accounts of the idea.
Ambiguity vs. Generality: Removal of a Logical Confusion
Authors: Roberts Lawrence
Published: June 2016

Ambiguous terms (e.g., ‘bank,’ ‘pen’) are applicable to different kinds of things, but so are general terms, since a general kind (e.g., ‘animal’) may include various species. Thus a bank may be the side of a river or a certain kind of financial institution, and an animal may be a dog or a cat. Similarly, an ambiguous sentence is true in different kinds of situations, and so is a general sentence in that different specific situations may make the same general sentence true. Thus the sentence, The bank collapsed yesterday,’ can be true of different varieties of banks, and the sentence, The animal is untrained,’ can be true of different varieties of animals. These similarities of ambiguity and generality have led many linguists and philosophers to confuse the two. Basic to this confusion is a failure to notice a difference in the scopes of disjunctions involved in ambiguity and generality.
The Moral Status of Apartheid: Can the Presence of Foreign Corporations in South Africa Be Morally Justified?
Authors: Mccauley Robert N.
Published: June 2016

Since the international community has offered their nearly unanimous condemnation of the system of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, the topic of this essay might seem moot. However, the involvement and cooperation with the South African government of numerous governments, businesses, and other institutions suggest that those condemnations do not constitute the final word - certainly not politically, nor, perhaps, morally.
Reid on Testimony and Perception
Authors: Lehrer Keith , Smith John-Christian
Published: June 2016

Reid defended common sense against scepticism by appeal to the claim that our faculties should be considered trustworthy until some argument proves them to be untrustworthy. He believed, of course, that no such argument would be forthcoming. In this paper, we shall investigate Reid's defense of the faculty of perception and the evidence of the senses by analogy with the faculty of language and the evidence of testimony. Reid argued that the evidence of testimony should be trusted unless there is reason to think it untrustworthy and by analogy, that the evidence of the senses should be trusted unless there is reason to think it untrustworthy. He admitted the fallibility of such evidence but contended that such fallibility is characteristic of all our faculties. Moreover, and perhaps most important, Reid developed a psychological theory of the faculties of perception and language that showed the analogy between these two faculties to be very exact indeed.
Capitalists and the Ethics of Contribution
Authors: Arnold N. Scott
Published: June 2016

To paraphrase Freud, what do socialists really want? It is undoubtedly difficult to give a complete answer to this question that all socialists would be satisfied with, but there are some common elements that can hardly be denied. First and foremost among these is the elimination of capitalism; the elimination of capitalism would seem to require the elimination of capitalists (qua capitalists). Why might that be desirable? Well, many reasons might be offered, but one is suggested by the very nature of capitalism.
Personal Identity Revisited
Authors: Coburn Robert C.
Published: June 2016

In recent years work on the topic of personal identity has flourished. Much of it is ingenious and some of it is quite dazzling. Despite the brilliance of the literature, however, the topic itself continues to be wrapped in darkness and its capacity to baffle and perplex is as great as ever. In the present paper, I will attempt to make clear that and why this is so. I shall begin by showing why the most recent virtuoso performance in the area leaves everything as obscure as before. I shall then develop a version of what appears to me to be the most viable alternative to both the bankrupt view just unmasked and its equally bankrupt congeners, and indicate why it too is less than fully satisfactory. The upshot will be that we seem to be faced with three possible conclusions, each moderately compelling, but none obviously correct or altogether happy.
Omniscience, Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
Authors: Ramberan Osmond G.
Published: June 2016

One argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom runs as follows:

(a) God is infallible.

(b) God knows the outcome of human actions prior to their performance.

(c) Therefore, no human action is free.

In other words it is argued that if an essentially omniscient being (God) believes prior to the actual performance of a certain action that that action will be performed at a particular time the action in question cannot be a voluntary action. The crucial premise in the argument, it seems to me, is (b) the assumption that an essentially omniscient being can know the outcome of human actions in advance of their performance, or more simply put, that essential omniscience implies knowledge of future free acts. My purpose here is to argue that this assumption is self-contradictory.
Misfortune And Injustice: On Being Disadvantaged
Authors: Snare Francis
Published: June 2016

We can enjoy and suffer many kinds of human goods and evils. The goods (or benefits) include not only experiences and enjoyments but also the having and exercise of various talents and abilities, the receipt of recognitions and rewards, successes, employments, opportunities. The evils (or harms) include not only pains and frustrations but also defects such as ugliness, disabilities such as paralysis or retardation, lack of standard opportunities such as unemployment, financial loss, failure, disgrace. It is tempting to say that wherever a person has a good he has an advantage and when he suffers an evil he is, in that respect, disadvantaged. However this usage can make it look as if all human goods and evils are subject matter for distributive justice. In fact that is not the conventional view.
Intentionality and Causality in John Searle
Authors: Thompson David L.
Published: June 2016

Intentionality, as Brentano originally introduced the term in modern philosophy, was meant to provide a distinctive characteristic definitively separating the mental from the physical. Mental states have an intrinsic relationship to an object, to that which they are ‘about.’ Physical entities just are what they are, they cannot, by their very essence, refer to anything, they have no ‘outreach,’ as one might put it. Mental states have, as it were, an incomplete essence, they cannot exist at all unless they are completed by something other than themselves, their object. Brentano's position is opposed to all theories which represent the mental as only extrinsically related to the world, that is, to all theories in which mental states are themselves self-sufficient for their own existence and only secondarily relate to the world by means of something external to their nature, e.g., neurological causation, divine intervention, or preestablished harmony.
Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction
Authors: Cohen S. Marc
Published: June 2016

Not the least among the many puzzling features of the fourth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics is his discussion of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (hereafter ‘PNC’). Even leaving aside the obvious difficulty of determining what his arguments succeed in showing about PNC, we face the more fundamental problem of figuring out what he takes them to show. For he proceeds in such a way as to suggest that he is not always completely clear about what he is up to.

Aristotle seems to be offering arguments in support of PNC. Yet to do so would be to try to demonstrate something he considers indemonstrable, to prove a first principle, to treat an ultimate explanans as also an explanandum – and to try to explain it. These maneuvers fly in the face of the teachings of the Organon, which allow no room for a demonstration, or proof (apodeixis), of PNC.
A Note on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction
Authors: Furth Montgomery
Published: June 2016

In what follows I will say little if anything about the animadversions vis-à-vis Irwin and Lukasiewicz and Owen, because there is so much of such greater interest in what Code has told us about Aristotle, the great preponderance of which, in my opinion, is true (that is, true about Aristotle). I will review some of this truth, specify one place where I have trouble reconciling his account with the evidence, and then try to give a better account that I think is entirely compatible with the rest of what he has given us.
Basic Theistic Belief
Authors: Johnsen Bredo C.
Published: June 2016

In several recent writings and in the 1980 Freemantle Lectures at Oxford, Alvin Plantinga has defended the idea that belief in God is ‘properly basic,’ by which he means that it is perfectly rational to hold such a belief without basing it on any other beliefs. The defense falls naturally into two broad parts: a positive argument for the rationality of such beliefs, and a rebuttal of the charge that if such a positive argument ‘succeeds,’ then a parallel argument will ‘succeed’ equally well in showing that belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic. (It is taken as obvious that ‘the Great Pumpkin objection,’ unrebutted, would constitute a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the positive argument had succeeded in proving anything at all.) In this essay I shall argue both that Plantinga has partially misconceived the objection, and that he has not succeeded, indeed cannot succeed, in rebutting it, for the objection does in fact constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his position. For the sake of ease of exposition, I shall first provide a bare sketch of the positive argument, though I shall discuss it directly only as it bears on the attempted reductio.
The Rationality of Collective Suicide
Authors: Chomsky Noam
Published: June 2016

Surveying the historical record, we can find examples of societies so organized that they drifted towards catastrophe with a certain inevitability, systematically avoiding steps that could have changed this course. Our own society is an example, except that in this case the catastrophe that lies ahead involves national and perhaps global suicide. It is hardly unrealistic to surmise that we may be entering the terminal phase of history.

The course that we pursue is deeply rooted in our social institutions and relatively independent of the choice of individuals who happen to fill institutional roles in the political or economic system. Furthermore, the steps taken towards destruction have a certain short-term rationality within the framework of existing institutions and the kind of planning they engender. Such planning is largely a matter of short-term calculation of gain; this is entirely natural in competitive societies, where those who contemplate the longer term are unlikely to be in the competition when it arrives, and this natural framework of planning carries over to the political system that is, overwhelmingly, under the influence of those who own and manage the private society.
Moral Approaches to Nuclear Strategy: A Critical Evaluation
Authors: Sterba James P.
Published: June 2016

In the current debate over nuclear strategy, various moral approaches are simply taken for granted. This is unfortunate because the particular strategic recommendations that are endorsed frequently depend upon the particular moral approach that is assumed. Obviously, if we are to rid this debate of its question-begging character, we need to evaluate critically the principal alternative moral approaches to nuclear strategy. I propose to begin this task by describing what is essential to a moral approach to nuclear strategy (Part I). I will then consider the three principal alternative moral approaches to nuclear strategy, the Utilitarian Approach, the Human Nature Approach and the Social Contract Approach (Part II), and relate them to just war theory, indicating why the Social Contract Approach should be favored over the other two (Part III). I will then conclude with some practical implications for nuclear strategy (Part IV).
On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence
Authors: Narveson Jan
Published: June 2016

War winning, however, is impossible precisely because of the fact that there is no defense now against all-out nuclear use and probably not for the foreseeable future. A nuclear war could therefore be controlled and won only if one side consciously chose to lose the war, an event as unlikely in the future as it has been rare or nonexistent in the past. It is not necessary to win a nuclear war in order to deter it; one has only to ensure that both are likely to lose it.

It takes (at least) two to make a war, and of those combatants, one (at least) must start it. If nobody starts the war, there won't be a war. This is as true in the nuclear era as it ever was. But if any given party is certain that he would lose any war initiated by him, then presumably he would not initiate a war. One way for A to make certain that B would lose any war B starts is by having an unstoppable superpowerful weapon of retaliation at hand.
Individual Responsibility, Nuclear Deterrence, and Excusing Political Inaction
Authors: Patten Steven C.
Published: June 2016

‘The circle of responsibility is drawn around all who have or should have knowledge of the illegal and immoral character of the war.’

--Richard Falk

Jonathan Schell's The Fate of the Earth, is in a large part an earnest, aphoristic essay on individual responsibility in these times. Consider a representative passage: ‘With the generation that has never known a world unmenaced by nuclear weapons, a new order of the generation begins. In it, each person alive is called on to assume his share of the responsibility for guaranteeing the existence of all future generations.’ I have no doubt that many people in most countries — citizens of representative democracies in particular — know this call and feel in some dim and tentative way that there must be special individual responsibilities that have evolved with that defensive, strategic and political doctrine we know as nuclear deterrence. And how could we expect otherwise?
Rationality and Revolution: A Response to Holmstrom on the Logic of Working Class Collective Action
Authors: Johnson James
Published: June 2016

In ‘Rationality and Revolution’ Nancy Holmstrom addresses an issue that has gained considerable currency among social and political theorists. She asks what insight, if any, Marxists might glean from rational choice accounts of radical working class collective action. The purpose of this comment is to argue that Holmstrom’s unfavorable estimation of rational choice accounts is ill-conceived.

Holmstrom raises two basic objections to rational choice explanations of working class collective action. First, she contends that such accounts are limited, inadequate or incomplete and indicates several manifestations of this purported deficiency. Second, Holmstrom alleges that rational choice accounts are ideologically suspect and, as such, fundamentally at odds with Marxist explanations of revolutionary action. Holmstrom appears to believe that this second line of criticism ‘follows’ (309, 318) in some sense upon the first. H so, it would be sufficient to establish the error of her initial line of argument. Because neither of her criticisms can withstand scrutiny, however, independent reasons will be advanced for rejecting each.
Enlightenment and the Spirit of the Vienna Circle
Authors: Scott Stephen
Published: June 2016

I have two aims in this paper. My wide one is to discuss what it is for philosophy to enlighten. I am using the same concept of enlightenment that Kant wrote about: It is what brings a rational outlook to social and political life, in opposition to superstition, self-deception and other forms of immaturity. If philosophy is to do this, it is not sufficient for it to have a rational theory about society, nor is having such a theory even necessary, since philosophers can try to make a community more reasonable without formulating a social philosophy. The Vienna Circle is an example. The point of enlightenment is to change society rather than to develop research programs. The difference is between involvement with real life on the one hand and an idle theory on the other.

My narrow aim is to display the self-image of the Vienna Circle as philosophers of enlightenment. They agreed that the important task of any philosophical school was to enlighten and that positivism did so because it expressed the scientific spirit. This is the second concept I discuss. I will show that what they meant by ‘the scientific spirit’ was a moral outlook present in socialism and hostile to fascism. This is not what people usually understand by it. I am also not giving the received historical view of the Circle. Rather the English and American idea is that positivism was entirely an academic movement. The social concerns of its advocates were incidental to its philosophical significance. The Frankfurt School's view is that it had a hidden alliance with technology. My purpose is to counter both these misinterpretations.
The Bearing of Discovery on Justification
Authors: Leplin Jarrett
Published: June 2016

The point of the traditional distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification is to insist on the normative character of epistemology. The point is not to dismiss from epistemology merely the genesis of ideas; into the context of discovery go also descriptions of evaluative practices and decisions. However ideas are created, scrutinized, and judged, it is only the approbation to which they are entitled, accorded or not, that allegedly matters to epistemology. The criticism, familiar since N.R. Hanson's Patterns of Discovery, that philosophy ought not to ignore the genesis of ideas is ironically conservative. If what is not normative epistemology is to be ignored, then the distinction would have us ignore even the reception and appraisal of scientific ideas.
Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labor
Authors: Schwarzenbach Sibyl
Published: June 2016

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls fromwithinhis own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longerwhether‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what preciseformsuch a socialism should take.
Women and Moral Madness
Authors: Morgan Kathryn Pauly
Published: June 2016

In one of Marge Piercy’s poems, ‘For Strong Women,’ we find the following verse:

A strong woman is a woman in whose head

a voice is repeating, I told you so,

ugly, bad girl, bitch, nag, shrill, witch,

ballbuster, nobody will ever love you back,

why aren’t you feminine, why aren’t

you soft, why aren’t you quiet,

why aren’t you dead?

Similarly, we might say that amoral womanis a woman in whose head a voice is repeating words like ‘immature,’ ‘pathological,’ ‘inadequate,’ ‘immoral,’ ‘evil.’ What I explore in this paper are various ways in which a woman’s moral voice and her sense of moral integrity can be twisted and destroyed by patriarchal ideology and lived experience.
Newcomb's Problem: The $1,000,000 Solution
Authors: Bach Kent
Published: June 2016

The more you think about it, the more baffling Newcomb's Problem becomes. To most people, at first it is obvious which solution is correct (not that they agree on which one), but their confidence can be eroded easily. Only a puzzled few are torn between the two right from the start, and for years so was I. But at last, thanks to a certain metaargument, one solution came to seem obvious to me. And yet, imagining myself actually faced with Newcomb's choice, I started to worry that I might experience just enough last-minute ambivalence to unsettle my confidence in that argument. Fortunately, I have found a strategy to ensure making the right choice when the chips are down.

Not only is Newcomb's Problem puzzling in its own right, it is philosophically significant. The appeal of both solutions reflects a conflict between two plausible conceptions of rational choice. In making a decision, should one consider all of its probabilistic consequences or only its causal consequences? Each conception has its supporters, but some philosophers find them both defensible and see no hope of resolving the conflict. I think the conflict can be resolved, at least in the context of Newcomb's Problem, by properly assessing the relevant counterfactual conditionals.
Autonomy, Want Satisfaction, and the Justification of Liberal Freedoms
Authors: Scoccia Danny
Published: June 2016

By ‘Liberalism’ or ‘a liberal-democratic theory of justice’ I understand the thesis that a modern, affluent society is just only if it respects and enforces certain rights. Among these are rights to free speech, the liberty to make one's own self-regarding choices (free from excessive paternalistic meddling by the state), privacy, due process of law, participation in society's political decision-making, and private property in personal posessions. By a ‘justification’ of these core rights of liberalism I understand a moral theory (plus necessary empirical assumptions) from which they are derivable. A moral theory which justifies the core rights will, ipso facto, condemn slavery, totalitarianism, and other social arrangements incompatible with a liberal-democratic constitution. What shape that moral theory should have is a matter of some dispute. According to philosophers like Ronald Dworkin it must be ‘rights-based.’ The core rights of liberalism in his view are derivable from the fundamental human right to ‘equal respect and consideration.’ A widely held alternative view is that the core rights are simply social rules the existence of which promotes human welfare.
Conceptual and Logical Aspects of the ‘New’ Evolutionary Epistemology
Authors: Thompson Paul
Published: June 2016

The implications of evolutionary theory for a theory of knowledge have been explored by numerous writers in the period since Darwin. (See, for example: Spencer [1857]; Toulmin [1967, 1972]; Popper [1965, 1972, 1974]; Campbell [1974].) In general, these writers have developed theories of knowledge development by analogy with evolutionary theory. That is, they have developed theories which apply the mechanism of differential selection on variation to the growth of knowledge. In this sense knowledge is seen to be a function of success (often understood in pragmatic terms) in a field of alternative ideas. Knowledge evolves in much the same way as organisms with more robust ideas or ideas with greater verisimilitude or greater explanatory power or greater problem solving ability, etc. surviving from one generation to the next in the struggle for acceptance. Hence, the title ‘evolutionary epistemology.’