bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Foundationalism and the Justification of Religious Belief
Authors: Gowen Julie
Published: October 2008

Alvin Plantinga, in some essays recently published and presented, defends the rationality of a belief in the existence of God on the grounds that it is foundationally justified. Though this belief does not appear to be justified were we to adopt what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, there are other, less restrictive (and presumably at least equally plausible) versions of foundationalism. Plantinga urges that we recognize that a belief in the existence of God can be warranted within one of these frameworks.
Is the Argument from Evil Decisive?
Authors: Gordon David
Published: October 2008

Dale Lugenbehl, in ‘Can the Argument from Evil Be Decisive After All?’ provides a powerful defence of the argument from evil against several theistic objections to it. In my opinion, however, he has failed to prove his case. The question of the consistency of the amount of evil existing in the world with the existence of God remains, after Lugenbehl's argument, exactly where it was before – in a state of uncertainty.
St Augustine and the problem of deception in religious persuasion
Authors: Brinton Alan
Published: October 2008

A substantial body of literature has been produced in the twentieth century by religious and philosophical writers on the ethics of belief. Discussion of this topic has generally focused on the processes leading up to belief within the individual, so that it would not be inaccurate to say that for most of these writers ‘the ethics of belief’ means ‘the ethics of coming–to–believe’. There has been little attention among these writers, however, to the moral questions which surround the production or inducement of beliefs in others, to the ethics ofpersuasion. An extension of the ethics of belief to cover moral issues which arise in connection with persuasion seems reasonable; the ethics of belief, widely construed, might be said to encompass questions about both the production of beliefs within oneself and the inducement of beliefs in others.
Resurrection and the ‘replica objection’
Authors: Dilley Frank B.
Published: October 2008

Resurrection has been used as the conceptual basis for attempted solutions to two problems that occur in the context of western theism, the problem of cognitive meaning and the problem of theodicy. Because John Hick has proposed resurrection as a solution to both problems so extensively, and because Antony Flew and Terence Penelhum have examined those solutions so strenuously, I will use their writings to lay out the problem. My aim is to improve upon Hick by overcoming a weakness in his defence of resurrection. My narrower focus will be on resurrection and the ‘replica objection’, rather than the wider use of resurrection to solve problems of evil or the meaningfulness of theistic discourse, but some brief remarks on the wider problems will be necessary to set the stage.
Perishability, the actual world, and the existence of God
Authors: Oakes Robert
Published: October 2008

In this paper I shall formulate and defend what I take to be a fresh argument for the rationality of theistic belief. Specifically, I propose to establish the reasonableness of believing the following proposition to be true: Every possible world that includes the existence of perishable objects includes the existence of God. Success in this endeavour would, of course, ensure the reasonableness of believing that the possible world which happens to be actual – including, as it does, the existence of perishable objects – includes the existence of God. I intend to show that the reasonableness of believing the aforesaid proposition to be true is consequent upon careful scrutiny and explication of a doctrine that constitutes an absolutely indispensable ingredient of theistic metaphysics.
Our Experience of the Ultimate
Authors: Smart Ninian
Published: October 2008

My title is of course a variation on Professor H. D. Lewis' well-known Our Experience of God. There he expounded a variety of religious intuitionism, which stands in the line of Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto and Martin Buber. These and other writers have characteristically made ‘the move to experience’, as a new blend of natural and revealed theology. The move makes a great deal of sense. On the one hand it grounds belief at a time when the older natural theology apparently had crumbled. On the other hand, it points to the dynamics of religious inspiration and gave a new perspective on revelation. It softens both reason and faith, of course, but it also provides a defence against skepticism. It fits well with a liberal attitude to scriptures and tradition. So there are manifest advantages of the move to experience, for those who wish to make it in the context of the Western theistic tradition. The writers I cited above, and Professor Lewis himself, have discussed religious experience from a mainly Western and theistic angle – even Otto with his great comparative concerns did so; and more needs to be said about the nature of religious experience in the broader context of Eastern and other religions. Lewis, however, paid attention to this wider problem, for instance in his 1963 article ‘Buddha and God’. In some respects this issue of the relationship of apparently non-theistic religions to theism is the most important one in contemporary crosscultural philosophy of religion.
On Mistranslated Booktitles
Authors: Smith Wilfred Cantwell
Published: October 2008

Of the pungent aphorism traduttori traditori, one of the inherent delights is that the phrase itself cannot be translated into other languages without betrayal; at the least, of its pithy charm. All language is imperfect, a reader (or hearer) always understanding what is said in a way that leaves out something of what the writer (or speaker) means, and a way that adds something of what the reader (or hearer) supposes, or imposes, Ortega y Gasset has thoughtfully argued. I agree with this, yet hold that this characteristic of the human situation need not dishearten. We do better to marvel at how much the written or spoken word succeeds in communicating among persons – succeeds in building community between and among persons – than to bemoan that it does not succeed flawlessly.
The External and Internal Odyssey of God in the Twentieth Century
Authors: Smith John E.
Published: October 2008

Some decades ago in his intriguing book on Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller used to great effect the device of supposing a two-fold biography of Edwards, an external one consisting of the historical record embracing the major events of his life and times, and an internal one aimed at an interpretation of the mind of Edwards and the development of his thought.
Identity and Identification
Authors: Findlay J. N.
Published: October 2008

Professor Lewis and I have some important differences of opinion regarding the identity and distinctness of conscious persons, which it will be well to try to clarify on the present occasion, first of all by enumerating a number of points on which we are, I think, in agreement. Both of us believe in the existence of individual persons, each of whom can be said to live in a ‘world’ of his own intentional objectivity, a world ‘as it is for him’, which differs in a considerable extent, both in content and emphasis, from the world as it is for anyone else. Both of us further believe that all these intentionally objective worlds for a large part coincide in content, and are in fact excerpted from a more comprehensive real world which is common to us all, and which, in addition to in some sense including all such intentionally objective worlds, also includes many real material objects which exist regardless of our intentionality, and which further includes our own material bodies, which appear in so central a manner in each of our intentionally objective worlds. Both of us believe in matter as a transcendent reality, as well as an intentional object, and are content to accept the dicta of science as to the most probable view of its structure. We are in fact quite Cartesian and Lockean in our belief in the primary and secondary qualities of matter. We believe further that our intentional subjectivity is geared causally into our material objectivity, and that the gearing takes place, in some inscrutable manner, in our nervous systems. We both also believe that our intentional subjectivity transcends bodily mechanisms and instrumentalities, and can be liberated from the latter, but that, when thus liberated, our subjectivity may still affect some sort of an intentionally objective material body such as we wear in dreams, a body in which it will manifest itself to itself and to others much as we do in our dreams and fantasies.
God and the Issue of Being
Authors: Leclerc Ivor
Published: October 2008

There is a long tradition in Western philosophical theology of conceiving God as ‘a being’. It dates back to the Hellenistic period, more particularly to the conjunction of Greek philosophy and the Hebrew religion in Alexandria with Philo, and it became orthodox in the Christian tradition through Augustine. In our time most aspects of this religious tradition have been subjected to a salutary re-examination, but in this the concept of God as ‘a being’ has been relatively neglected. After such a long acceptance of so fundamental a doctrine, it is liable largely to have sunk to the status of a presupposition, entailing a loss of intellectual awareness of what precisely it implies. Even where the Augustinian philosophical argument upon which this concept is based is recognized, as it has been in the long Neoplatonic tradition, it has come to appear as essentially self-evident and thus has not been subjected to fundamental critical examination. Significant of this is that even where the personalistic conception of God has been abandoned, e.g. by the idealist philosophy of the Absolute, the conception nevertheless persists of God as ‘a being’.
Law, Morality and Religion in a Christian Society
Authors: Roberts T. A.
Published: October 2008

The publication in 1957 of the Wolfenden Report occasioned a celebrated controversy in which profound theoretical issues concerning the relation between law and morality, and the legal enforcement of morality were discussed. The principal disputants were Lord Justice Devlin (Sir Patrick Devlin as he then was) and Professor H. L. A. Hart. It is by now well known that the main recommendation of the Wolfenden Report was the reform of the criminal law so that homosexual behaviour in private between consenting male adults should no longer be a criminal offence. As homosexual behaviour in Christendom was at the outset punishable in the ecclesiastical courts, and subsequently, with the demise of the ecclesiastical courts, in the secular courts, the Wolfenden recommendation on homosexuality marked a major departure from the prevailing state of affairs in which the precepts of Christian morality, especially relating to sexual morals, were at first enforced by the ecclesiastical courts, and then by the secular courts.
On the Limits to the Use of Force
Authors: Miles T. R.
Published: October 2008

In this paper I shall examine a variety of situations in which human agents make use of force. Section I will be concerned with the use of force in medical contexts, Section Ii with the use of force in defence of property, and Section in with the use of force in resolving international disputes. I shall argue that the boundary between what is and is not morally permissible needs to be, drawn more stringently than is commonly supposed. While agreeing that in some medical contexts and in some situations where defence of property is involved the use of force may be necessary and even morally required, I shall suggest that in the absence of any suitably constituted world court the use of force in attempting to resolve international disputes creates a morally different situation.
Sin and Freedom
Authors: Trigg Roger
Published: October 2008

What is the relationship between the concept of sin and that of freedom? There is a powerful tradition in European thought linking the idea of moral evil with human freedom. Only with a broadening of consciousness, with the awareness of alternative possibilities, did man become able to choose between good and evil, and was responsible for that choice. The myth of the Fall, it seems, shows that eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil gave man the ability to sin, because the awareness of alternatives allowed man to pursue one rather than the other. Without that freedom thus acquired man was innocent and incapable of moral evil.
Divine Impeccability
Authors: Brümmer Vincent
Published: October 2008

In the Christian tradition it has generally been claimed that God, being perfectly good, has the attribute not only of impeccantia (freedom from sin) but also of impeccabilitas (inability to sin). Thus, for example, Aquinas held that ‘God is unable to will anything evil. Hence it is evident that God cannot sin’; and according to the Westminster Confession, ‘God,…being holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin’.
Paul Helm on God and the Approval of Sin
Authors: Brümmer Vincent
Published: October 2008

I'm very grateful for the opportunity to reply to Paul Helm's perceptive remarks on my paper about divine impeccability, for, in dealing with his criticism, I can further clarify some points in my paper, and in discussing his alternative solution to the problems I raised, I can as yet deal with some important aspects I had ignored. Helm's paper is divided into three sections. The first two contain his criticism of my position, and the third his alternative solution. I will deal with these in turn.
The Morality of Sins
Authors: Attfield David G.
Published: October 2008

Once upon a time, at an examination for Fellowships at All Souls, there was a three-hour essay paper. When the eager candidates turned over their question-papers, on the reverse they found a blank expanse of whiteness with one little word in the centre for them to write about: the word was ‘SIN’.
Wainwright on Mysticism
Authors: Lewis Delmas , Griffiths Paul
Published: October 2008

Professor Wainwright's recent book is the first attempt at a systematic and rigorous assessment of mystical experience since the publication of W. T. Stace's influential Mysticism and Philosophy more than twenty years ago. It is also the first work in English during the period of the critical study of mystical experience inaugurated by Richard M. Bucke and William James at the beginning of this century to adequately formulate and extensively discuss the philosophical problems involved in assessing the cognitive value of mystical experience. Wainwright's conclusions are not unproblematic, but the publication of his work does provide an ideal opportunity for a review of the central problems associated with the assessment of mystical experience. In this paper, therefore, we wish to delineate and discuss the two major areas of difficulty, and to extend and amend some of Wainwright's suggestions in these areas.
Professor Mackie and the KalĀm cosmological argument
Authors: Craig William Lane
Published: October 2008

Like David Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, J. L. Mackie's most potent blast against the rationality of belief in God, his The Miracle of Theism, appeared after his death. The book is a broadside against not only the traditional arguments for God's existence, such as the onto-, cosmo-, and teleological arguments, but also against proofs from consciousness, miracles, the idea of God, and so forth, and against the validity of religious experience and faith without reason, and it presents as well negative arguments against divine existence. The book will no doubt supply much grist for the mill of future discussions, but in this piece I should like to focus on Mackie's analysis of one particular argument, the kalām cosmological argument. For his discussion at this point seems to me to be superficial, and I think it can be shown that he has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument.
Divine transcendence
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L.
Published: October 2008

Christians hold that God is transcendent, that He is other than all else that exists. For example, Paul Tillich claims,

The divine beings and the Supreme Being, God, are representations of that which is ultimately referred to in the religious act. They are representations, for the unconditioned transcendent surpasses every possible conception of a being, including even the conception of a Supreme Being … It is the religious function of atheism ever to remind us that the religious act has to do with the unconditioned transcendent, and that the representations of the Unconditioned are not objects concerning whose existence … a discussion would be possible.
Regenerating narrative: the gospels as fiction
Authors: Wright T. R.
Published: October 2008

To read the gospels as fiction, as Frank Kermode does in The Genesis of Secrecy, the Charles Eliot Norton lectures delivered at Harvard in 1977–8, does not require the abandonment of all concern for ‘history’ or for ‘truth’, two other fictions which are essential for faith. Nor, In Defence of the Imagination, the title Dame Helen Gardner gave to her Charles Eliot Norton lectures of 1979–80, need apologists for Christianity commit themselves to a wholesale rejection of literary critical methods such as structuralism, as she suggests. There is a middle ground which can accept many of the methods of structuralism and even of post-structuralism without sharing the anti-theological assumptions of some of their practitioners. Structuralist analysis aims for objectivity, a scientific description of the processes at work in the production of meaning, a systematic articulation of the ‘grammar’ of narrative. It is therefore neither for nor against Christianity. Kermode's book, I argue, helps to show how the gospels function as narrative, revealing their capacity to ‘redescribe life’. In recognising their fictive nature, however, we need not consign ourselves with him to ‘endless disappointment’. For the gospels have aregenerating power which can transform our lives.
Berkeley, scientific realism and creation
Authors: Byrne P. A.
Published: October 2008

‘That a corporeal substance, which hath absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing by the mere will of a spirit hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated amongst the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought matter co-eternal with the Deity.’
A defence of Pascal's wager
Authors: Brown Geoffrey
Published: October 2008

Pascal's Wager, and the issues raised by it, have, despite a few notable exceptions, been an object of some neglect in recent Philosophy of Religion. Whether this neglect is from an assumption that the argument requires no comment, or from a feeling that there is something not quite academically respectable about it, I have come to believe that it is undeserved. One reason why the argument is deserving of attention from the theologian is that Pascal has managed to put his finger on just the sort of consideration which, rightly or wrongly, is capable of exercising a powerful influence over the ordinary mind – the sort of problem which, in short, keeps people awake at nights. A reason why it should be of interest to the philosopher is that it possesses that characteristically philosophical quality of appearing obviously invalid in some lights, and in others (rather like the Ontological Argument) manages to slip past every supposed disproof, and annoy us with the suspicion that it may, after all, be valid. These reasons alone are sufficient to justify the philosopher of religion in attempting a careful analysis of Pascal's case in the light of which its cogency can be assessed. In this paper, I shall attempt such an analysis, and shall proceed to argue that, correctly understood and within its proper limitations, Pascal's argument is indeed valid.
Coleridge's philosophical and theological thinking and its significance for today
Authors: Roberts Martin
Published: October 2008

He went like one that bath been stunned.

And is of sense forlorn:

A sadder and a wiser man.

He rose the morrow morn.

(The Rime of the Ancient Mariner)

In this paper I wish to explore Coleridge's approach to the study of philosophy and theology and ask whether and in what respects it can contribute to present discussions about the nature and the possibility of a philosophical theology.
The Role of the Traditional Sciences in the Encounter of Religion and Science – An Oriental Perspective
Authors: Nasr S. H.
Published: October 2008

Whenever the discussion of the relation between religion and science or science and faith arises in circles imbued with various trends of modern thought, immediately the history of the confrontation of the Church with Galileo or of Protestant theology with Darwinianism comes to mind and the problem is viewed from the particular vantage point of the West. Those who have kept pace with the most current speculations of certain scientists in quest of a new world view may point to the fact that there are more recent works which compare the movement of electrons with the Dance of Shiva or speak of the search for the Tao of modern science. But even in such works which are becoming popular, although reference is made to Oriental doctrines, these teachings are usually viewed in separation from the traditional universe to which they belong and the philosophical and scientific framework remain Western. In the modern world the usual background for the understanding of the relation between religion and science continues to be the Western experience from the revolt of modern science against its scholastic theological background during the Renaissance and the seventeenth century to the final abdication by religion from the domain of nature and its surrender to the scientific enterprise and the latter's particular methodology and philosophy for the study of the natural world. Even when certain works step outside the Western world view in search of a rapprochement with certain Oriental doctrines, science remains Western science and the suppositions made upon the nature of Reality do not change in an ultimate way.
Human Diversity and Salvation in Christ
Authors: Jantzen Grace M.
Published: October 2008

What must I do to be saved? And is what I must do the same as what you must do? The Philippian jailor in the book of Acts received a most peculiar answer to the question: ‘Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ’, said St Paul, ‘and you will be saved.’ In the context, this hardly seems appropriate. The jailor was not asking how he could be assured of a place in the next world, or how he could be reconciled to God or have his sins forgiven. His was a cry of quite unreligious desperation: was there any alternative to suicide, now that his prison was no longer secure and he had failed in his duty? The curious thing about the story is that it is recorded, not as an example of over–zealous bad manners, but as ultimately the right answer for even the jailor's situation. When Paul instructed him further, he and his household were baptized: the writer clearly intended the story to show that Paul's initial response was exactly right, and that belief in Christ brought salvation to the jailor and his family.
On Certainty and Religious Belief
Authors: Martin Dean
Published: October 2008

Logical positivism and its derivatives cast a sustained philosophical shadow over religious faith and theological reflection. Any number of issues continue to surface in explicit and subdued forms, all of them relating to the status of religious beliefs. In fairly recent years, much fruitful discussion is dependent on the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's last notes, collected in On Certainty, are still largely unmined by those wishing to gain clarity about religious belief. It turns out, however, that these pages promise to be among the most helpful. In what follows, therefore, there is first offered a summary of the dominant themes of On Certainty – Wittgenstein's critique of G. E. Moore and his treatment of Moore's truisms of common sense. By a painstaking analysis, Wittgenstein shows that the truths defended by Moore are among any number of other fundamental propositions which have an extraordinary logical role in our language and judgements about the world. Next, partly by reference to Wittgenstein's lectures on religious belief and other collected notes, it is argued that many beliefs in Christianity share significant logical features with those fundamental propositions. Not least is the fact that, like the latter but unlike scientific hypotheses, Christian beliefs are removed from the ordinary traffic of verification and falsification. Despite the likenesses, notice is also taken of various dissimilarities which further set the peculiarity of Christian articles of faith into bold relief. The disparities, however, do not impugn the logically fundamental role which those beliefs have in the language and lives of those who embrace the faith.
Predetermination and Free Will in the Teaching of Ramana Maharsi (1879–1950)
Authors: Sharma Arvind
Published: October 2008

Ramana Maharsi is one of the lesser lights of modern Indian thought but a major figure in the context of modern Advaitic thought in Hinduism. Modern Indian thought in general is distinguished by a robust confidence in the efficacy of effort as an expression of free will, a confidence it shares with the temper of the West in general and which it may have imbibed by coming in contact with it. Modern Advaitic thought, as represented by its popular modern exponents such as S. Radhakrishnan and T. M. P. Mahadevan, shares this confidence. Ramana Maharsi, however, strikes, at least at first glance, a somewhat discordant note. The purpose of this paper is to present his view on the time–honoured debate between predeterminism and free will and to analyze its philosophical implications.
The Reasonableness of Agnosticism
Authors: Brinton Alan
Published: October 2008

Agnostics often hold that, since there is not a clear preponderance of evidence either in favour of theistic belief or against it, their position of suspended belief is more rational than either theism or atheism. I would like to examine an objection raised recently by Clement Dore against the agnostic's reasoning on this matter.
Rammohun Roy and the Baptists of Serampore: Moralism vs. Faith
Authors: Chatterjee Shyamal K.
Published: October 2008

Some historians of modern Indian religious thought claim that, in respect of a pure monotheism free from pagan or polytheistic myth and a morality free from taboos and superstition, Rammohun was indebted to the Christian missionaries of his time and more particularly to the Baptists of Serampore. Thus, E. Daniel Potts, in his British Baptist Missionaries in India, 1793–1837, observes:

The Brahmo Samaj or Sabha (or Theistic Society) founded by him [Rammohun] in 1828 after he disassociated himself from Adam's Unitarian Association used a congregational form of worship utterly unknown to the ancient form of Hinduism he believed he was restoring; any many of its teachings, particularly ethical, were drawn from those of the Precepts of Jesus. Related organizations to reform Hinduism sprang up in the 1830–s and after, and in the process propagated, though their leaders would not always admit this, the idea of Christian morality – both enterprises begun by Roy's direct response to missionary and particularly Baptist endeavours.’
Theology and the Intellectual Endeavour of Mankind
Authors: Hudson W. D.
Published: October 2008

At the beginning of his book, Principles of Christian Theology, John Macquarrie says that theology ‘implicitly claims to have its place in the total intellectual endeavour of mankind’. The question I want to discuss is this: in what terms, if any, can that claim be justified?
The Slippery Slope of Religious Relativism
Authors: Kellenberger J.
Published: October 2008

Among the questions facing the religious there is one that is becoming particularly pressing in our contemporary world of mingled cultures. Expressed as religious people sometimes put it to themselves, it is: How does my religion relate to other religions? There are two very different answers abroad. One is: mine is true and all others, to the extent that they depart from mine, are false and are to be rejected. The other is: mine is valid-for-me, and those of others are valid-for-them. The first answer has the virtue of being utterly straightforward and not mealy-mouthed, but it seems parochial and myopic, for, as John Hick points out:

In the great majority of cases, the tradition within which a religious person finds his relationship to the Real depends to a very great extent upon where and when he or she is born…In view of this situation, can one be unquestionably confident that the religion which one happens to have inherited by birth is indeed normative and that all others are properly to be graded by their likeness or unlikeness to it?
Tolstoy's God Sees the Truth, But Waits: A Reflection
Authors: Archer Dermot J.
Published: October 2008

It is well known that in the latter half of the 1870s Tolstoy suffered an arrest of life. He relates in A Confession that the attempt to find a meaning in life that would be immune to death had almost led to his own suicide. He asks: ‘Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death awaiting me does not destroy?’
Miracles and Testimony
Authors: Ward Keith
Published: October 2008

Is it ever reasonable to accept the claim that a miracle has occurred? At least for fairly traditional Christians, this question has a special point, since their faith is centred upon acceptance of a miracle, the resurrection of Jesus from death. If it is unreasonable to accept any claim to the occurrence of that miracle, then their faith is ipso facto unreasonable. J. L. Mackie has recently propounded an argument, based closely on David Hume's essay on miracles, in part 10 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, which provides, he says, ‘a very powerful reply to any claim that a miracle has been performed’ (The Miracle of Theism, 26). My aim is to examine his argument, and to make some comments on his understanding of the notion of miracle and its place in religious belief.
Descartes through the Looking–Glass: Is it Possible to Believe What is Contradictory?
Authors: Lawhead William F.
Published: October 2008

My text for this paper is taken from Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass. It is that well–known passage where Alice is having a frustrating conversation with the White Queen. Alice responds to some of the Queen's absurd statements by saying, ‘One can't believe impossible things.’ At which point the Queen snaps back: ‘I daresay you haven't had much practice. When I was your age, I always did it for half–an–hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.’
Revelation, Disagreement and Obscurity
Authors: Downing F. Gerald
Published: October 2008

‘Revelation’ has not appeared at all frequently in the titles of contributions to this journal (nor, from memory, has it at all often been their unannounced subject matter). On the other hand, neither does it seem to have been formally banished. The term is occasionally used, still, without any obvious sign of unease. Perhaps the majority of contributors have tacitly abandoned it, as incompatible with a broadly phenomenological approach to religions. It is possible to describe expressions of religion (including claims to ‘revelation’) and analyse their doctrinal statements (including assertions that they contain a given knowledge of deity); but to use the term in description or analysis might seem to concede too much. If there is a revealed religion, the others might hardly seem worth describing or dissecting.
Can Theism Survive Without the Devil?
Authors: Murphree Wallace A.
Published: October 2008

As the title suggests, the thesis of this essay is that any view which would affirm the orthodox concept of a theistic God and yet deny the existence of a devil is inherently untenable; or, alternatively put, that ‘fundamentalism’ (if it may be so called), which affirms the existence of both God and a devil, and atheism, which denies the existence of both, are the only viable options with respect to the question of the theistic God. The support for this conclusion comes from the problem of evil, together with considerations drawn from common sense.
On God and Mann: A View of Divine Simplicity
Authors: Morris Thomas V.
Published: October 2008

One of the most difficult and perplexing tenets of classical theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Broadly put, this is generally understood to be the thesis that God is altogether without any proper parts, composition, or metaphysical complexity whatsoever. For a good deal more than a millennium, veritable armies of philosophical theologians – Jewish, Christian and Islamic – proclaimed the truth and importance of divine simplicity. Yet in our own time, the doctrine has enjoyed no such support. Among many otherwise orthodox theists, those who do not just disregard it completely explicitly deny it. However, in a couple of recent articles, William E. Mann has attempted to expound the idea of divine simplicity anew and to defend it against a number of criticisms. He even has gone so far as to hint at reaffirming its importance, suggesting that the doctrine may have a significant amount of explanatory power and other theoretical virtue as part of an overall account of the nature of God, by either entailing or in other ways providing for much else that traditional theists have wanted to say about God. In this paper, I want to take a close look at Mann's formulation of the doctrine and at a general supporting theory he adumbrates in his attempt to render more plausible, or at least more defensible, various of its elements and implications. As Mann has made what is arguably the best attempt to defend the doctrine in recent years, I think that such an examination is important and will repay our efforts.
Adler and the Ethical: A Study of Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation
Authors: Hustwit Ronald
Published: October 2008

In the second of his three prefaces to On Authority and Revelation, Kierkegaard writes: ‘“My reader”, may I simply beg you to read this book, for it is important for my main effort, wherefore I am minded to recommend it’ The question I will put to myself to begin my reflections on the book is: why should Kierkegaard recommend it so strongly? What is Kierkegaard doing in this book? One notices in his recommendation that it is addressed to his reader who, presumably, is not simply the reader of this book but the reader of his other books as well. The Concluding UnscientUc Postscript was being published about the same time (1846), and so the reader may well have been familiar with most of Kierkegaard's main philosophical works. The recommendation then is set in this context. The book is, on the face of it, so unlike the other works, concerned with certain odd claims to a revelation by a Danish pastor named Adler. Much of the book discusses the details of a deposition of Adler given to the local bishop and some details of later defences which Adler gave of his revelation in several works and sermons. It appears to be a local squabble of no general interest and certainly not the sort of thing that had occupied Kierkegaard's philosophical attention to this point. The book, then, stands in need of a recommendation to Kierkegaard's reader who is not otherwise prepared for this genre. But the recommendation does not say, ‘Try this, though quite different, you may like it.’ It says rather that the reader should read it, and later he adds read it carefully, because it is ‘important for my main effort’. So the book is to be seen as of a piece with the other main works of Kierkegaard. This is what I should like to understand in the following discussion: how is this book important for Kierkegaard's main effort?
Buddhist Belief ‘In’
Authors: Hoffman F. J.
Published: October 2008

Recent articles inReligious Studieshave underscored the questions of whether Buddhism presents any empirical doctrines, and whether, if it does, such doctrines are false or vacuous. In what follows I want to sketch an interpretation of Buddhism according to which it does not offer doctrines which are empirically false, on the one hand, or trivially true on the other. In doing so I take my cue from an earlier, and by now classic, paper by H. H. Price. For the exposition of Buddhism I take the PaliNikāyas, the single most significant collection of texts in the Buddhist tradition. The particular doctrine which is the focus of discussion here is thekammavāda(Pali) or‘karmaview’ of early Indian Buddhism, for it is the focus of much of the recent literature cited above and a doctrine which some have thought amenable to statement in empirical terms.
Blood Symbolism in African Religion
Authors: Nabofa M. Y.
Published: October 2008

Symbolism has found spontaneous expression in several religious and secular practices among many different peoples of Africa. These expressions can be seen in religious emblems, ideograms, rituals, songs, prayers, myths, incantations, vows, customary behaviour and personifications. The under-standing of these religious symbols lends itself to rapid comprehensive and compact use; not only that, it also helps understanding and concentration. In fact, Mary Douglas expresses the view that such symbols, especially rituals, aid us in selecting experiences for concentrated attention, creative at the level of performance, and can mysteriously help the co-ordination of brain and body (1966, p. 63). Conversely, religious symbols have their ambiguities, and these could shroud their true meaning to the unwary. A religious symbol could also represent a complex set of ideas at different levels which gives room to diverse theological, philosophical and psychological interpretations. While we may agree with Raymond Firth (1973, p. 32) that an anthropologist is concerned primarily with the public use of the symbolic, and his aim is to separate symbols from referent so that he may describe the relations between them, we are of the view that those who are in the field of psychology of religion will be most concerned with how symbols influence the mind of the believer and thus understand the faith of the devotee better. In fact, it was the non-understanding of traditional African religious symbols and ideas that partly contributed to the way in which some of the early Western and Arab scholars, investigating African thought forms, looked at the African indigenous beliefs in a derogatory manner. As a method of scholarly research, a careful and meaningful study of the religious significance of certain ritualistic elements and behaviour enables us to understand and appreciate the more why certain things are treated in some special way by the believers, and thus helps to deepen our knowledge of that very faith. It helps us to grasp the essence of the religion rather than its incidentals. In order, therefore, to help comprehend some of the practices in African traditional religion attempts will be made in this paper to discuss the central significance of blood in African belief. Although I consulted the works of some anthropologists and theologians on African religions and philosophy of life, the bulk of the ethnographic materials used in this paper are mainly drawn from my fieldwork (1975–82) among some groups of Nigerians; and a great deal of my interpretations are surrounded by the theories propounded by Mary Douglas and Raymond Firth.
No Heaven Without Purgatory
Authors: Brown David
Published: October 2008

If Purgatory is given a role at all in modern conceptions of the after–life, it is likely to be at most of the kind found in Hick and Rahner, in providing a second chance for those of whom it might be argued that they have had no proper opportunity in this life. Apart from its intermediate character, however, this account has very little in common with the traditional conception, whereas it seems to me that philosophical reasons, partly conceptual and partly moral, compel assent to something very much more like the traditional view. This I take to have had two essential features: (a) that it was a place of moral preparation (not trial) for those whose lives and decisions had already destined them for Heaven and(b)that this moral preparation involved some kind of purgatorial (i.e. purifying) pain that was seen as a necessary consequence of the rectification of moral wrong–doing. Three arguments in defence of (a) are offered below. These will help to provide an appropriate framework for the brief defence of(b)which then follows. For convenience these three arguments may be labelled the temporal argument, the identity argument and the self–acceptance argument.
Buddhism in Recent British Philosophy and Theology
Authors: Collins Steven
Published: October 2008

One of the more popular bedtime stories in our house just now is Horton Hears a Who by Dr Seuss. Horton is an elephant, and unlike the other animals in the jungle, he is capable – thanks doubtless to his large ears – of hearing the faint sounds made by some minute beings called Whos, who live in a town called Whoville on a tiny speck of dust. The other animals think Horton is mad when he talks to the Whos: they take the speck of dust from him and attempt to get rid of it. After a series of adventures Horton retrieves the speck of dust, gets the Whos to shout loudly enough to be heard by the other animals, and so everyone lives happily ever after. In the course of the story, before the speck of dust is taken from him, Horton is walking along and worrying:

‘Should I put this speck down?…’ Horton thought with alarm.

‘If I do these small persons may come to great harm.

I can't put it down. And I won't! After all

A person's a person, no matter how small.’
Romans 7: 14–25 and the Problem of Akrasia
Authors: Beld Dr A. Van Den
Published: October 2008

Romans 7: 14 if. has traditionally been one of the most frequently discussed passages in the whole of the Pauline Corpus. Nevertheless, this pericope has attracted attention more because it is consistently regarded as a crucial part of Paul's theology, than because of its intrinsic exegetical problems. The main issue is whether the ‘split personality’ and the weakness of will (to which explicit reference is made in verse 19: ‘For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do’) should be regarded as essential to the life of the believing Christian; or, rather, as characteristic for those who are not ‘in Christ’ and therefore beyond the power of his Spirit. For the systematic theologian, the question of whether the first person singular in these verses should be understood in an autobiographical sense is a subordinate one. However this particular question is answered, we are still confronted by the main issue.
The Morality of Religious Belief
Authors: Nabe Clyde
Published: October 2008

Van Harvey's The Historian and the Believer appeared nearly a century after W. K. Clifford's ‘The ethics of belief’. Harvey is critical of the epistemological supports of religious belief in a way strikingly similar to Clifford's criticisms. But Clifford's view did not go uncriticized in the intervening period. William James for instance used Clifford's essay as a foil for his argument in ‘The will to believe’. Now here is Clifford's argument again offered in twentieth century garb in Harvey's book. That a view so similar to Clifford's can arise again a century later, and after strong criticism, suggests that there is some important integrity to that view, and that that view strikes a responsive chord in the ear of many contemporary human beings. This paper intends therefore to examine Clifford's and Harvey's works in order to uncover what makes their shared view attractive.
The Euthyphro Objection to Divine Normative Theories: A Response
Authors: Faber Paul
Published: October 2008

The ethical theories often called divine command theories have a long philosphical history. As early as Plato's dialogue Euthyphro, persons – in this case, Euthyphro – were advocating theories that claim such things as whatever is morally obligatory is obligatory because and only because God commands it. There is a range of such theories, however, and offering one description that adequately characterizes them all is very difficult. Some theorists focus on the moral obligatoriness of actions, others on the moral virtue of traits of character, and still others on the moral goodness of states of affairs. Some theorists take God's commanding as creating the obligation (or whatever), others think God's willing an action creates the obligation. Theories concentrating on God's loving, his preferring, and perhaps other states, too, could be advanced. Paul Helm in the introduction to his anthology Divine Commands and Morality regards this sort of theory as holding’…that God does issue commands and that these commands are to form the basis of a believer's morality.…’ And Janine Marie Idziak in the introduction to her Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings writes, ‘Generally speaking, a ‘divine command moralist’ is one who maintains that the content of morality (i.e. what is right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, and the like) is directly and solely dependent upon the commands and prohibitions of God.’ Rather than spend much time attempting to develop necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing all such theories, however, let us label them all ‘divine normative theories’ and hope that the basic nature of divine normative theories is relatively clear.
Gandhi's Concept of Truth and the Advaita Tradition
Authors: Richards Glyn
Published: October 2008

It is difficult to understand Gandhi's philosophy without some kind of idea of what he means by Truth. When I put the question of what he meant by Truth to some of his followers in India the replies I received showed quite clearly that his concept of Truth was linked to the concepts of dharma and rta. What this would seem to point to is that his understanding of Truth is something that is acquired within his own form of life and that his experiments with Truth are ultimately determined by his understanding of the Hindu religious tradition. This is not to say that insights from other religious traditions did not influence his apprehension of Truth: his acknowledgement of those influences is sufficient in itself to substantiate that claim. But it is clear that it would not be possible to understand his concept of Truth without some understanding of the tradition in which he was nurtured and which determined his way of life.
St John of the Cross and the Mystical ‘Unknowing’
Authors: Green Deirdre
Published: October 2008

This paper is concerned with the nature of mystical knowledge in the higher stages of mystical realization, with particular reference to the teachings of St John of the Cross. Correspondences and parallels with the writings of other mystics may be noticed, but it is not the purpose of this discussion to elucidate these in detail.
A Primordial Reply to Modern Gaunilos
Authors: Downey James Patrick
Published: October 2008

Donald R. Gregory has recently argued that the monk Gaunilo's response to St Anselm's ontological argument succeeds in showing what is fundamentally wrong with any ontological argument, including modern modal versions. He holds that the Gaunilo strategy in fact demonstrates what it alleges, that reasoning which parallels the form and intent ofAnselm's reductio argument can ‘prove’ a priori the existence of quite unacceptable entities.