bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Past
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

Understanding statements containing the past tense involves tacit knowledge of the generalization of such principles as this: ‘Yesterday it rained’ is true if and only if yesterday had the same property as today is required to have for a present‐tense thought ‘It is now raining’ to be true when evaluated with respect to today. This is a variant of the truth‐value link. This tacit knowledge integrates with realism about the past because present‐tense statements are as categorical as their past‐tense counterparts and cannot be reduced to counterfactuals without circularity. An externalist model of the perception of temporal properties and relations can be given, one involving a constitutive sensitivity to instances of those temporal properties and relations themselves. This can contribute to an explanation of how memory supplies knowledge of the past.
Necessity
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

There is a set of principles, the Principles of Possibility, that constrains whether a description picks out a genuinely possible world. To grasp the concept of metaphysical necessity is to have tacit knowledge of this set of Principles and to apply them in evaluating modal statements and thoughts. For a statement to be necessary is for it to hold in all descriptions that are not excluded as possible by the principles of possibility. This integrates the metaphysics and epistemology of necessity, without collapsing into mind‐dependence and without a commitment to modal realism. The treatment of the metaphysics validates the modal systems T and S4.
Self‐Knowledge and Intentional Content
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

A conscious occurrent propositional attitude contributes to the content of consciousness by occupying attention, rather than by being its object. Externally individuated concepts contribute to the nature of this conscious occupation of attention. Those same externally individuated concepts are redeployed when the occurrence of these conscious states gives a subject a reason for self‐ascribing a propositional attitude. This account, involving both conscious states and conceptual redeployment, steers a middle course between accounts of self‐ascription that involve introspection and those accounts under which a subject does not have reasons when she makes such a self‐ascription.
Self‐Knowledge and Illusions of Transcendence
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

Thinkers who have postulated a transcendental subject of experience have responded to an epistemological insight about first‐person thought with a metaphysical error. The distinctive features of the first person that has produced the illusion is not immunity to error through misidentification, but a certain kind of representational independence. Representationally independent uses of the first person are those in which the thinker rationally forms a present‐tense first‐person belief, but not by endorsing the content of some conscious state, which itself has a first‐person representational content. Mis‐characterization of this phenomenon provides an explanation of the source of the illusion that there is a transcendental subject of experience.
Freedom
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

A reflective person is free to do something just in case there is a close possibility in which he tries to do it, and he would do it if he tried to. On this account, it can be shown that this inference is invalid: ‘If someone is not free not to be F, and it is causally necessary that if he is F, then he is G, then: he is not free not to be G’. This account of freedom is compatibilist, and attributions of freedom involve a substantive metaphysical commitment, rather than being a non‐factual or practical matter.
Concluding Remarks
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

The objectivity of some area of thought can often be acknowledged without postulating an exotic metaphysics. Statements that may seem to be the merest truisms may have previously hidden metaphysical or epistemological significance. No conclusions about the mind‐dependence of some subject matter can be drawn from the fact that in certain circumstances, it is a priori that a thinker will be right about that subject matter. The notion of an implicit conception with a certain content looms large in an account of understanding. We can learn more about metaphysics and epistemology by considering them not in isolation, but in the light of the relations they must bear to one another.
Ethics, Evil, and Fiction
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

The main thesis of this book is that literature can enrich the study of ethics, because it provides the resources for the study of ethical problems that contemporary analytical moral philosophy fails to address. In Chapters 2 and 3, McGinn offers a discussion of analytical moral philosophy, in which he argues that moral goodness is an objective fact, and furthermore that ethical knowledge is not inferior to scientific knowledge. In Chapter 4, drawing on Hermann Melville's Billy Budd, McGinn proceeds to examine the nature of the evil character. In Chapter 5, McGinn discusses the notion of the Beautiful Soul, and he sets out his ‘aesthetic theory of virtue’, or the theory that aesthetic properties supervene on ethical attributes. Chapters 6 and 7 consist of close readings of two literary works, Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, respectively. In his conclusion, McGinn reiterates his view that moral philosophy is too narrow in its focus. It investigates words and propositions, using what McGinn calls the ‘commandment’ paradigm. McGinn advocates that the study of ethics pursues the ‘parable’ paradigm, as afforded by works of fictional narrative.
Introduction: The Scope of Moral Philosophy
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

McGinn argues that there are important ethical questions, such as the moral psychology of evil, which are unsuited to study according to the bipartite division of contemporary analytic moral philosophy into metaethics and normative ethics. McGinn's thesis is that the best way to approach such problems is by appealing to literature, which presents ideal conditions for the study of moral character. McGinn is also interested in the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, and in whether ethical questions might be explicable in terms of aesthetics. However, before turning to these topics, McGinn presents, in chapters 2 and 3, an analytical discussion of ethical knowledge in which he defends an objectivist or ‘cognitivist’ view of moral truth.
Goodness
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

This chapter is an extensive critique of the thesis of moral psychologism. Appealing to the Naturalistic Fallacy, McGinn argues that moral psychologism, as instanced in emotivism, the dispositional theory of goodness and relativism, confuses what ought to be the case with what is the case, psychologically. After a discussion of moral intentionality, McGinn concludes that goodness and other moral values are not mental properties but conceptually primitive, evaluative properties that have no place in an empirical science like psychology.
Knowledge of Goodness
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, McGinn argues that ethical knowledge belongs to a distinct epistemological category from scientific knowledge. Pursuing an analogy with mathematics and modern linguistics, McGinn argues that ethical truths are a priori, innate truths, and in this respect ethics is at least as respectable as science; indeed, epistemologically, it is on a par with logic and mathematics. A key difference between science and ethics is that moral truth, unlike scientific truth, is not coercive. Therefore, moral truth has no pragmatic justification but is something we pursue for its own sake. McGinn concludes the chapter with the suggestion that our moral sensibility is a by‐product of our innate grasp of folk psychology.
The Evil Character
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

The Evil Character, e.g. Claggart in Melville's Billy Budd, is one who derives pleasure from other people's pain, and pain from their pleasure. The attraction of Sadism is that, by causing pain, one has the power to subvert the victim's basic principles and values, the ultimate goal being to destroy the victim's will to live. Although envy is often a source of evil, McGinn argues that, from the point of view of folk psychology, an evil disposition is a primitive fact that does not require a special explanation. McGinn considers two possible origins of evil: (1) violent entertainment, and (2) group behaviour. The prevention of evil lies in breaking the hedonic link or the link between pleasure and the evil act.
Beauty of Soul
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

The ‘aesthetic theory of virtue’ or ATV, is the thesis, partly inspired by Thomas Reid, that virtue coincides with beauty of soul and vice with ugliness of soul. The basic idea of ATV is that for a person to be virtuous is for his soul (character or personality) to have certain aesthetic properties, which are necessary and sufficient conditions for personal goodness. The relation between morally aesthetic properties and moral attributes is one of supervenience of the former upon the latter. McGinn cites the film Brief Encounter to illustrate the concept of the beautiful soul, and he also draws upon Nabokov's discussion of the aesthetic in Lolita. A morally bad character, McGinn argues, cannot have a beautiful soul, nor can a morally good character have an ugly soul.
The Picture: Dorian Gray
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray, McGinn argues, presents in an extreme and exemplary form, the power of the aesthetic to conceal and to express evil; it shows us what happens if the aesthetic is allowed to dominate over the moral. The character of Dorian has an exterior beauty, which is taken as a sign of virtue, but he has an inner ugliness or an ugliness of soul, which is identified as moral depravity. The lesson of Dorian Gray , McGinn argues, is that the aesthetic and the moral are inseparable, and it is only the concept of the beautiful soul that can keep the aesthetic impulse under control.
Who Is Frankenstein's Monster?
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, McGinn begins with a study of the meaning of monstrosity, in which he considers the view set out in the previous chapters that evil is ugliness of soul. Monsters seem to be visible embodiments of evil: however, the connection between physical ugliness and ugliness of soul is not logically necessary. To pursue this point, McGinn presents a close study of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. McGinn interprets the novel as a metaphorical depiction of the human condition. He argues that the life of Frankenstein's monster can be understood as a model of human life.
Conclusion: Stories and Morals
Authors: McGinn Colin
Published: October 2003

In the conclusion, McGinn distinguishes the ‘commandment’ paradigm and the ‘parable’ paradigm of ethical reflection, and argues that analytical moral philosophy, despite its emphasis on moral language, tends to follow the former. In this book, McGinn has argued that the latter, as exemplified in fictional narrative, with its appeal to our aesthetic sensibility, is the true vehicle of moral thought and persuasion. The fictional world is ideal for the exploration of ethical questions and the acquisition of ethical knowledge.
Self and World
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

The thesis of this book is that it is a necessary condition of self‐consciousness that one is intuitively aware of oneself, qua subject, as a physical object. Intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object involves various forms of bodily awareness in which one is presented to oneself, qua subject, as shaped, solid, and located. These forms of bodily self‐awareness are required for self‐consciousness because they are necessary for consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different representations, and for consciousness of these representations as representations of an objective world. This account of self‐consciousness helps undermine various forms of idealism and reductionism about the self.
Self and World
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

The Exclusion Thesis states that the self is not an object among others in the world. This chapter examines and rejects two arguments for the thesis, the Abstraction Argument, and the Self‐Consciousness Argument. The Abstraction argument claims that the metaphysical subject, which is not an object among others in the world, is an abstraction from the empirical self. The Self‐Consciousness argument claims that the cognitive subject cannot, on pain of circularity, become an object for itself.
The Objectivity Argument
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines two versions of the Objectivity Argument. The concept version asserts that in order to think of one's perceptions as perceptions of objects in the weighty sense, one must conceive of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version maintains that in order to think of one's perceptions as perceptions of objects in the weighty sense, one must be intuitively aware of oneself as a physical object. The concept version is rejected, but the intuition version is claimed to be more successful.
The Identity Argument
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines two versions of the Identity Argument. The concept version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires the conception of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version is shown to be plausible. Kant's defence of consciousness of the identity of the self is shown to be unsatisfactory.
Reductionism
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

Derek Parfit's Reductionist view of persons is a combination of reductionism about personal identity and the impersonal description thesis. This chapter argues against the impersonal description thesis, the thesis that it is possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. It considers whether reductionism can accommodate the epistemological primacy of memory and the fact that it is not possible to give a full specification of the content of an I‐thought without ascribing it to a particular person.
Aesthetic Concepts
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Here, Frank Sibley illuminates what it is for a term or an expression to be an aesthetic term or expression, i.e. in his view, a term that is such that taste or perceptiveness is required in order to apply it. He emphasises the natural basis of responses of various kinds without which aesthetic terms could not be learned, such as similarities of various sorts, notable colours, shapes, scents, size, and intricacy. Such natural responses enable us not only to learn aesthetic terms often by a metaphorical shift, but are also used subsequently to evaluate and illuminate works of art. It is in this sense that critics reinforce the relation between aesthetic terms and their natural bases.
Aesthetics and the Looks of Things
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

‘Aesthetics and the Looks of Things’ examines the view that aesthetic vision is justifiably juxtaposed to ordinary vision and that a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the former is that it is concerned always, if not only, with an object’s ‘appearing so-and-so’ rather than ‘being so-and-so’. Sibley first clarifies how such a view can be understood. He then broadens the debate beyond looks to include sounds, tastes, feels, smells, and so forth. Sibley finally argues that only a certain family of such appearances can be admired for themselves or serve as ultimate goods for aesthetic admiration. The tentative characterisation of the latter is that they are vitally involved in human experience.
Aesthetic and Non‐Aesthetic
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Sibley distinguishes aesthetic judgements, non-aesthetic judgements, and verdicts. Verdicts are purely evaluative, while the (initially intuitive) distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic judgements demarcates, barring expected borderline cases, the subject matter of aesthetics. Chapter 3 is concerned with illuminating this distinction, by outlining how aesthetic judgements are made, justified, and explained. Sibley further disentangles the various, conceptual and contingent, relations and dependences of aesthetic and non-aesthetic judgements, concluding that the truth of aesthetic judgements cannot be verified, confirmed, or supported mechanically or by appeal to rules.
About Taste
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

The programmatic 2-page Ch. 4 reinforces the importance of taste as an ability to discern the aesthetic qualities of things and taste as an ability to recognise aesthetic merit and make judgements of aesthetic worth.
Colours
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Attempts to illuminate the question of what is involved in our being able to say that things have colours. Sibley argues that imaginable contingent changes could give rise to extensive disagreements, difficulties, and complexities in stating and applying decision procedures, and, consequently, apparent grounds for scepticism, even with matters as objective as colours or tastes. In non-aesthetic realms, however, this possibility does not rule out truth and falsity of attribution, and thereby does not exclude objectivity. This may give some weight to the belief that aesthetic objectivity can be defended along parallel lines.
Objectivity and Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Concerned with the objectivity of aesthetic descriptions. The approach is schematic: starting from certain paradigms of properties and retaining certain similarities, Sibley adds differences of kind and degree which results in concepts less rigid than those paradigms and closely akin to aesthetic properties. He then poses the question of why these concepts should not be said to concern objective matters. Sibley argues that if we are justified in believing that in actual practice we do manage to give aesthetic terms a partial but not unsuccessful run as property terms, we will not need to abandon all claims to objectivity.
Particularity, Art, and Evaluation
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Poses the question of whether there are criteria of aesthetic merit. Sibley argues that there are such criteria, in the sense that, if merit-terms are applicable to a thing, it has thereby some aesthetic merit. However, there are at best few criteria of merit in aesthetics, if that means that there are determinable descriptions of properties responsible for a merit-term being applicable, which can serve as criteria or justifications for the application of a merit-term. Sibley further argues that if there is a certain particularity about aesthetic assessment, it concerns the nature of and relation between the neutrally descriptive properties of a thing and its possession of aesthetic merit-qualities.
General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Discusses Beardsley’s ‘generalist’ view that in criticism there can be and are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, a view that Sibley shares. Sibley defends this generalist position by exposing the ‘extreme and heroic’ nature of Beardsley’s view, which he subsequently demonstrates to be unnecessary to defeat the particularist. Sibley further argues that the nature of Beardsley’s position makes it inadequate to establish the deeper claim that the ultimate criteria of aesthetic merit can be isolated from ultimately negative aesthetic criteria, an assumption that some objections against the generalist position are based on.
Arts or the Aesthetic—Which Comes First?
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Deals with the question of the genesis of the concept of the aesthetic: where does it originate? In partial response to this question, Sibley attempts to show just how widespread the aesthetic interests of ordinary people are, especially if juxtaposed to the fairly restricted, minority interest in the highly developed arts, and emphasises the natural basis of our primitive aesthetic responses. Sibley concludes that, while the project of determining the logical priority of either the artistic or the aesthetic may be confused, investigations in aesthetics should focus at least as much on the nature and origins of primitive aesthetic satisfactions as on the more recherché questions about arts.
Making Music Our Own
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Chapter 11 is about descriptions, particularly figurative ones, and their relevance to, the understanding and interpretation of music. Drawing on certain common descriptions by musicians and critics, Sibley questions the coherence of certain purist positions and of the notion of understanding or experiencing ‘in purely musical terms’. He further explores the possibility that an important element in the proper interpretation of music is covertly extra-musical, and argues that extra-musical phenomena are not merely peripheral except to programme music.
Adjectives, Predicative and Attributive
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Discusses Geach’s contrast between ‘logically predicative’ and ‘logically attributive’ adjectives. Sibley argues that Geach conflates two distinctions, one of which, between those predicates that can be split up and those that cannot, are of high relevance to the nature of aesthetic terms. Thus ‘x is a red car’ splits into a pair of predications ‘x is red’ and ‘x is a car’, whereas ‘x is a big flea’ does not split up into ‘x is big’ and ‘x is a flea’. While Sibley rejects Geach’s own umbrella test for essentially attributive adjectives, he proposes, rather tentatively, that in the proposition ‘x is A’, when ‘A’ is an essentially attributive adjective, one must understand some class of things, without necessarily knowing the noun by which they are called.
Some Notes on Ugliness
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Discusses the notion of ugliness, a notion that Sibley believes to be of considerable interest to aestheticians, even if seldom discussed. Sibley attempts to clarify the concept and argues, with the general argument of Ch. 12 and the background view that ‘beautiful’ is not always attributive, established in Ch. 13, that ‘ugly’ is indeed attributive and not merely a tacit comparison.
Tastes, Smells, and Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Tackles the neglected question of whether tastes and smells can be objects of aesthetic interest, appreciation, satisfaction, and value. Bypassing the question of whether the objects of tasting and smelling are works of art, Sibley states that it is not the case that tastes and smells are wholly excluded from the realm of the aesthetic, that is to say, that they do not necessarily lack those features that would make them eligible in such a way that aesthetic judgements or descriptions of them are possible. Sibley offers a variety of considerations in favour of the view that tastes and smells meet some of the demands we typically impose on objects if viewed in the context of aesthetic evaluation. Since, furthermore, no suitable candidate presents itself to serve as a criterion of demarcating the aesthetic and the sensuous, and since, consequently, these domains have to be understood as merging along a continuum, the diverse intersections between the two permit of some aesthetic evaluation of the sensuous.
Why the Mona Lisa May not Be a Painting
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Challenges the assumption that paintings and sculptures are identical with physical objects and that, as a consequence, they are not subject to the type-token distinction. Since our knowledge and appreciation of vast ranges of art depends upon copies, on prints, on illustrated art books that most lovers of painting own, on colour slides and television programmes, it seems that there is no strong case for denying that reproductions of the Mona Lisa are tokens of a type. This claim goes beyond the view that with increasing accuracy in reproduction of art objects, the closer we get to what is valuable – Sibley thinks we are already there. He concludes that either the concept we have of a painting may be internally inconsistent or that there may be two concepts of painting, one in which the work of art is identical with a physical object and the other in which it admits the type-token distinction.
Doing Harm
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

Defenders of ordinary morality must establish the existence of constraints, including a constraint against harming. This chapter distinguishes between two basic ways that this particular constraint can be characterized – either as a constraint against doing harm, or as a constraint against intending harm – and then focuses on the first. A constraint against doing harm presupposes a distinction between doing harm and allowing harm. But although we can provide some intuitive motivation – in terms of the idea of interfering – for viewing this distinction as morally significant, when we try to carefully articulate this distinction we end up sorting cases in a way that is intuitively unattractive. In any event, attempts to defend the relevance of the distinction are ultimately unsuccessful, as are attempts to show that the distinction would truly support a constraint against doing harm.
Avoiding the Appeal
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

Even if the existence of constraints is granted, if only for the sake of argument, the need to defend options still remains. This chapter turns to that defence. It considers three arguments that attempt to establish options – given the existence of constraints – without appealing to the cost to the agent of promoting the good. The first argument holds that unless there are options, agents unavoidably violate constraints when they impose sacrifices upon themselves. The other two arguments hold that the existence of constraints entails the existence of rights, which in turn entails the existence of options. But none of these arguments succeeds.
The Negative Argument
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

There are two distinct ways of elaborating the thought that only moral systems with options adequately reflect the nature of the personal point of view. This chapter evaluates the first of these – the negative argument – which holds that a general requirement to promote the overall good will inevitably lack the motivational underpinning necessary for genuine moral requirements; options are thus a concession to the nature of persons. Examination of an analogous argument with regard to the requirements of prudence reveals the potential significance of vivid belief in providing motivation. Reason is then given for thinking that despite the bias in favour of one's own interests, people are, in principle, capable of being moved to promote the overall good.
The Positive Argument
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

According to the positive argument, the personal point of view is not a mere hindrance to moral action, but a source of genuine and distinct values. There are thus reasons for the agent to act in keeping with the subjective point of view, and if morality is to provide space to do this, it must include options. If successful, this argument might provide a justification not only for options but for constraints as well (given the appropriateness of reflecting the patient's point of view, and not only the agent's point of view). But it is far from clear that there are any genuine values that cannot be adequately accommodated within the objective standpoint; and even if there were subjective reasons of this sort, they would simply ground new moral requirements, rather than options.
Extraordinary Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

If options cannot be defended, then there is a general requirement to promote the good. Appropriate political and social structures have an important place in seeing to it that this requirement is met, and in somewhat reducing the nature of the sacrifices that may be required in meeting it; but there is no getting around the fact that morality can demand a significant overall sacrifice of one's interests. However, moral agents are free, and we are required to use this freedom to change ourselves so as to better meet the demands of morality.
Introduction
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

I lay out the argument of the book and point to Aristotle's focus on ethics of character and good living. I claim that Aristotelian character cannot be understood apart from a conception of practical reason and that the overall aim of the Nicomachean Ethics is to produce a practical theory that will be a guide for good living.
Discerning the Particulars
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

Here I consider the way in which practical reason involves a discrimination of salience. My concern is thus with practical reason as a kind of perception and sensitivity to changing particulars. I first introduce the issue in the context of Aristotle's discussion of equity (epieikeia) and flexible and fair judgement of cases in the law. I then extend the discussion by considering what Aristotle might regard as lacking in a Kantian account of moral choice that emphasizes universalizability. From here I turn to Aristotle's substantive account, and his view of perception as both an affective and cognitive capacity.
The Shared Life
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

In Aristotle's view, the good life is a life lived amongst friends, and in particular, amongst friends of virtue or good character. I contrast this emphasis on attachment and intimacy with the themes of a more impartialist ethics, such as Kant presents. I then discuss friendship as a relational form of external good and discuss issues relating to both chosen friendships and natural philia.
The Habituation of Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

According to traditional interpretations, the habituation of character is a mechanical process that chronologically precedes more reflective and cognitive moral development. I challenge this view, arguing that habituation is primarily a form of critical practice dependent on cognitive capacities of choice, perception, and deliberation. We are not children and then, at once, at the age of majority, reflective adults. Rather, as children we are gradually and incrementally, in the process of becoming reflective adults. A developmental account of this sort is requisite if we are to understand Aristotle's claim that the person of good character is at once the person of practical wisdom.
The Kantian Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Kant's theory of the sublime has become one of the most keenly studied elements in both his own aesthetics and aesthetic theory in general. This book offers a sustained analysis of Kant's theory of the sublime as found throughout his critical philosophy but, of course, gives closest and most sustained attention to the Critique of Judgement's ‘Analytic of the Sublime’. More specifically, the book offers first an overview of Kant's general aesthetic theory and then a detailed analysis of the structure of argument in Kant's accounts of the mathematical and dynamical sublime, and the feeling of ‘respect’. Various difficulties are identified. The theory is then reconstructed in a more viable form, and extended into the sphere of art by means of the notions of ‘aesthetic idea’ and ‘genius’.
Kant's Critical Ethics and the Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Outlines Kant's basic epistemological position and also that of his moral philosophy. Attention is then paid to the way in which the sublime functions—via the notion of respect—in this philosophy. It is seen that, for Kant, the moral law is that which is most worthy of respect, and which is thence worthy of the epithet ‘sublime’.
Kant's Aesthetic Theory and Its Moral Significance
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Presents a detailed overview of Kant's aesthetic theory, focusing on the first four moments of the Analytic of the beautiful. The notions of nature, the judgement of taste, ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘finality’ are given close attention. There is an extended discussion of Kant's ‘Deduction’ of the pure aesthetic judgement's claim to universality. The argument is shown to be unviable.
Kant's Analytic of the Sublime: From the Preliminary Sections to the Mathematical Mode
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Offers a sustained and close reading of Kant's complex arguments concerning the mathematical sublime. This is based on our aesthetic response to overwhelming magnitude—in terms of vastness or size. Offers two different accounts of Kant's position. An ‘austere’ approach holds that it is when the imagination is overwhelmed by its attempts to comprehend the unity of vast phenomenal items or states of affairs that is the basis of the mathematical sublime. A more ‘baroque’ line of argument involving infinity as a ‘measure’ is also shown to be consistent with Kant's position. Argues that the former approach is the more viable.
From the Dynamical Mode of Sublimity to the Deduction, and an Overall Critical Review
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Pays detailed attention to Kant's understanding of the dynamical sublime. This is shown to involve a state of moral resistance to mighty phenomena that are perceived to be overwhelming in terms of power and destructiveness. Viewed from a position of safety, such phenomena invite us to become aware—through an aesthetic response to nature—of the superiority of our moral over our sensible being. This experience is shown to embody ‘respect’—a mode of feeling that involves a ‘mental movement’ from pain to pleasure, and that was earlier also shown to loom large in Kant's moral philosophy.
A Reconstruction of Kant's Theory of the Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Offers a critical appraisal of both major components in Kant's theory of the sublime, and identifies major difficulties with them. However, also offers a more viable reconstruction of his theory based on the ‘austere’ interpretation of the mathematical sublime—extended so as also to encompass the dynamical sublime. Broadly speaking, the theory now holds that phenomena that are overwhelming in size or power cannot be comprehended as unities in terms of imagination , but can be in rational terms. The scope of reason is thereby exemplified in aesthetic terms.
Sublimity, Art, and Beyond
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Applies the reconstructed version of Kant's theory in a context that he does not, officially, consider an appropriate place for the sublime—namely, in the experience of art. It is shown that, by modifying his notions of ‘genius’ and the ‘aesthetic idea’, it is possible to formulate a complex and distinctively artistic version of sublimity. This converges on a works capacity aesthetically to illuminate the overwhelming scope or universal significance of its subject matter.
Realism in Mathematics
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

Many mathematicians understand their work as an effort to describe the denizens and features of an abstract mathematical world or worlds. Most philosophers of mathematics consider views of this sort highly problematic, largely due to two stark difficulties laid out by Benacerraf: first, if mathematical things are abstract, and thus not to be found in space and time, how can we come to know anything about them? Second, how can mathematics be the study of certain particular things, when all that seems to matter mathematically are various structural features and relations? The goal of this book is to develop a philosophically defensible version of the mathematician's pre‐theoretic realism (sometimes called ‘Platonism’) about mathematical things. Beginning from an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Quine's and Gödel's versions of mathematical realism, I propose an alternative called ‘set theoretic realism’ and argue that it avoids both of Benacerraf's problems. In their place, I raise a new problem: given that some open questions of mathematics (like Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis) cannot be settled on the basis of the standard axioms, how are we rationally to evaluate new candidates for axiomatic status (such as Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility or various large cardinal axioms)? Set theoretic realism and its realistic cousins are not the only positions that face this important new challenge—various popular versions of nominalism and structuralism do as well—which suggests that it taps into a fundamental issue.
Realism
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

The early sections describe the pre‐theoretic realism of the mathematician, survey the basic forms of realism in philosophy, and attempt to disentangle the issues of realism from debates over the nature of truth. The final section begins by laying out traditional Platonism, intuitionism, and formalism. Quine's famous critique of Carnap's conventionalism then leads to Quine's realism, and Putnam's developments thereof, while a different sort of mathematical realism is found in Gödel's writings. Set theoretic realism emerges as an effort to build on the strengths of Quine's and Gödel's realisms, while avoiding their weaknesses and filling in their lacunae.
Perception and Intuition
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

Begins with a presentation and elaboration of Benacerraf's epistemic challenge to realism: how can we gain knowledge of an acausal world of non‐spatio‐temporal abstracts? I then outline a theory of perception based in part on neurological theories of Hebb and developmental evidence from Piaget, and I argue in these terms that we can, in fact, perceive sets of medium‐sized physical objects. This account of perception is elaborated into an account of physical and mathematical intuition, faculties that produce various rudimentary beliefs that underlie the simplest physical and set theoretic assumptions (e.g. that physical objects generally look different from different points of view, or that any two objects can be collected into a set). I conclude by comparing and contrasting this epistemology with some controversial passages from Gödel's writings.
Numbers
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

Begins with a review of Benacerraf's metaphysical challenge to mathematical realism based on sets: how, for example, can number theory be the study of particular sets when other sets with the same structural relations would seem to do just as well? The set theoretic realist gives the straightforward response that numbers are not particular sets, but properties of sets. I close with a digression on the prospects for ‘Frege numbers’—i.e. numbers construed as proper classes.
Monism and Beyond
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

Outlines a physicalistic version of set theoretic realism (a sort of monism), and compares and contrasts it with Field's nominalism, with structuralism, and with modalism. I conclude that, despite metaphysical differences, versions of all these views share the new challenge raised in Ch. 4: how are new axiom candidates to be rationally evaluated?
Aspects of Reason
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

This book, based on Grice's 1979 Locke Lectures at Oxford and published posthumously, elaborates the notions of reasons, reasoning, and rationality, with particular emphasis on the unity of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning. It begins with a look at the nature of ordinary reasoning and distinguishes between ‘flat rationality’, the formal capacity to apply inferential rules, and ‘variable rationality’, the excellence or competence of good reasoning (Ch. 1). Grice then proposes an ‘Equivocality Thesis’, arguing that a structural representation can be given for justificatory (normative) reasons that allows for modals (ought, must, etc.) to be used univocally across the alethic/practical divide in terms of general acceptability statements (Chs. 2–3). In addition, he shows that valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements (Ch. 4). Finally, Grice provides a characterization of happiness as it features in practical thinking, and suggests it to be an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of other ends that are desirable for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness (Ch. 5). An extensive introduction by Richard Warner provides a helpful summary and explanation of key aspects of the book.
Reason and Reasoning
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is either suppressed or expected to exist), and ‘too good to be reasoning’ (valid reasoning that is ‘uninteresting’ because it is merely mechanical, aimless, or overly detailed). The last two kinds of reasoning, Grice argues, suggest a distinction between ‘flat rationality’ (the formal capacity to apply inferential rules common to all human beings) and ‘variable rationality’ (the excellence or competence of good reasoning, which we have to different degrees).
Practical and Alethic Reasons: Part I
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

Grice continues his project of proving the univocality of common modals (the ‘Equivocality Thesis’) by showing how a univocal structural representation can be applied to a certain (non‐moral) class of alethic and practical acceptability statements that are at least sometimes (informally) valid, subject to license of the involved transitional inferences from a ‘Principle of Total Evidence’. Grice also shows that these acceptability statements can be modified to account for defeasible (ceteris paribus , degrees of probability/desirability) and non‐defeasible (‘unqualified’) generalizations, which in turn can be utilized to account for a univocal set of modals such as ‘ought’ and ‘must’. The chapter closes with a discussion of the ‘Principle of Total Evidence’.
Practical and Alethic Reasons: Part II
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

This chapter first shows how—given certain circumstances—valid inferences can be drawn from alethic to practical acceptability statements. For this, Grice tries to establish an acceptability statement of the form ‘it is acceptable that if (on the alethic side) A only if B, then (on the practical side) one should A only if one should B’. He then turns to a discussion of the characteristics of practical thinking other than the application of means–ends reasoning. Such practical thinking, Grice suggests, includes the determination of antecedently indeterminate desires and intentions, contains systems of priorities, and often is revisionist and comparative.
Some Reflections About Ends and Happiness
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

Grice discusses happiness as an end, and its relation to other ends, as it would feature in practical reasoning. He begins by analysing Aristotle's claims towards the self‐sufficiency and finality of happiness as an end, and defends the thesis that happiness is an ‘inclusive end’, consisting of the realization of various other ends that are desirable for their own sakes as well as for the sake of happiness. Grice then briefly discusses the possibility that the components of happiness may not be certain universals (power, honour, etc.) or states of affairs but the desires for such universals or states of affairs. He ends with the suggestion that happiness can be characterized as a system of ends that is suitable for the guidance of life, and hence must be marked by features that are conducive to its stability and flexibility.
Introduction
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

The opposition between empiricism and realism with respect to science is old: it appeared clearly in the seventeenth century sense of superiority of the ‘mechanical philosophy’ to Scholastic metaphysics, and continued for the next three centuries’ debates over the philosophical foundations of physics. Empiricist views developed by the logical positivists of Vienna and

Berlin were defeated by the emergence of scientific realism in the mid‐twentieth century. This defeat was largely due to the inadequacy of the positivist theories of meaning and language. To present a viable empiricist account of science, we need conceptions of theory structure, truth, and empirical adequacy that are essentially independent of a theory's linguistic formulation. Correlative to this discussion of the relationship between theory and world is the question what it is to accept a scientific theory––how much belief is involved? And what is involved other than belief? The position to be developed here (given the momentary name ‘constructive empiricism’) will view scientific activity as one of construction rather than discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to the observable phenomena, and not discovery of the truth about postulated unobservable parts of nature. Acceptance of a scientific theory so viewed will have an irreducible pragmatic dimension in addition to involving only a modest amount of belief.
Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines and criticizes the main arguments offered for scientific realism, here identified as the following view: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true. In contrast, constructive empiricism, which also opts for a literal understanding of scientific language, is the following view: Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate (but also has a pragmatic dimension, to be elucidated). Topics examined include the ’theory/observation dichotomy’, observable versus unobservable entities, epistemology and the epistemic community, inference to the best explanation, principle of the common cause, and fictionalism. The views of Smart, Sellars, Reichenbach, Putnam, and Dummett are considered. It is argued that the arguments offered for scientific realism, though telling against logical positivism, do not support it over and against constructive empiricism.
To Save the Phenomena1
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

What is the empirical content of a theory? If a theory is identified with one of its linguistic formulations, the only available answers allow for no non‐trivial distinction between empirical and non‐empirical content. The restriction of such a formulated theory to a narrow ‘observational’ vocabulary is not a description of the observable part of the world but a hobbled and hamstrung description of its entire domain, still with non‐empirical implications. Viewing a theory as identified through the family of its models––the structures it makes available for modelling the phenomena––yields a new approach. The distinctions so made are illustrated with Newton's physics, absolute versus relative motion, nineteenth‐ century ether theory of electromagnetism, and quantum mechanics. A hermeneutic circle in the interpretation is noted, and the theory‐independence of the observable/unobservable distinction maintained.