Rorty in Dialogue with Contemporary Western Madhyamaka Interpreters on Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
Authors:   , van der Heijden Christianus Adrianus Anthonius 
Published: October 2023

This dissertation falls within the framework of philosophy. It attempts to hermeneutically relate the work of Richard Rorty (1931-2007) with specific Western interpretations of the Indian Buddhist philosophy of Madhyamaka, a tradition founded by Nāgārjuna (ca 150-250 CE). These interpretations may show how a dialogue within the scope of Western philosophy could deliver some new points of view on morality. It concerns three difficulties I have identified regarding Rorty’s moral non-foundationalism. This position boils down to the following: morality is not based upon something non-human, whether the Will of God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality; everything in the world is contingent, including language, the self, and society; the only way to deal with this is through irony; moral progress is nothing else than making society less cruel. The three problems posed by this account are: (a) it seems that an ethics is hardly possible when everything is contingent; (b) it seems that for a Rortyan ironist, solidarity is only a matter of taste; (c) it seems that Rorty’s ethnocentric approach creates obstacles to a global ethic.
My research is focused on the following question: ‘How can a hermeneutical engagement with contemporary Western Madhyamaka interpreters (Finnigan, Garfield, Harris, Huntington, Siderits, Westerhoff, and others) clarify philosophical problems around Rorty’s concepts of contingency, irony, and solidarity?’
Before solving those problems, I distinguish five sub-questions:
1. What is the historical context of Rorty’s moral non-foundationalism? (Chapter One);
2. What does “ethics” mean for Rorty and contemporary Western Madhyamaka interpreters? (Chapter Two);
3. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist emptiness clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of contingency? (Chapter Three);
4. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist wisdom clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of irony? (Chapter Four);
5. How can Western interpretations of the Madhyamakan approach to Buddhist compassion clarify problems around Rorty’s concept of solidarity? (Chapter Five).
To these questions, I answer: (ad 1) Rorty’s outlook is utilitarian without basing utility on human nature; (ad 2) although there is little that counts as ethical theory, ethics is crucial in Madhyamaka; morality, according to Rorty a result of a contingent process of development, is the willingness to be touched by the suffering of others; (ad 3) the realization of emptiness enlarges this willingness to care; (ad 4) the only wisdom with which to build a better world is irony; however, irony may lapse into cynicism; teaching the doctrine of emptiness can prevent that; (ad 5) conventional compassion is driven by the contingent presence of moral feeling; great compassion, expressed by the figure of the bodhisattva, is transmoral since it is a manifestation of the realized state of emptiness.
Regarding problem (a), I argue that Rorty’s liberal ironism can benefit from Madhyamaka since it produces an ethic from the awareness of universal connectedness; this connectedness, however, is only there in the conventional reality because, ultimately, there are no entities with an interconnection.
Regarding problem (b), I argue that solidarity, being only a matter of taste, ceases to be a problem if normativity is understood in a non-foundationalist, liberal way and if solidarity becomes “great compassion” (mahākaruṇā).
Regarding problem (c), I argue that Rorty’s ethnocentrism partly obstructs a global ethic but also that the obstruction would disappear once liberal pragmatists engage in the practice of śūnyatāvāda.
In this dissertation, I also make research suggestions to find a new way of thinking. This way might be generated by “graftage”; Madhyamaka, as interpreted by established Western Buddhist philosophers (M’), could be “grafted” upon Rortyan pragmatism (“Soterio-pragmatism”).