bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Heaven and the Problem of “Irredeemable” Evil
Authors: Walls Jerry L.
Published: October 2003

Arguments are then put forward to show that heaven is an essential resource for a satisfactory theodicy, and for making sense of, and resolving horrendous evil. The central issue is that of how God can be perfectly good even though he created a world in which terrible things happen that have a permanent place in history. It is contended that none of these evils are in principle irredeemable, even though the fixity of such evils is a problem, since Christians are encouraged to hope that not even evils with deep roots in the permanence of the past are beyond the resolution of God's grace; in heaven God will wipe every tear from the eyes of the redeemed. At the heart, the case made is the basic Christian notion that true happiness is found in a relationship with God, and nothing that happens to us on earth can separate us from God or destroy this relationship, which is entered into by accepting the grace of Christ, and allowing him to transform us into persons who will eventually be perfect like him. These truths provide the framework that makes it possible for us to forgive the things that have been done against us, even things of extreme wickedness or cruelty.
Heaven and Visions of Life After Life
Authors: Walls Jerry L.
Published: October 2003

An examination is made of data from near‐death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology, and arguments are presented that they offer positive evidence for life after death (heaven). Among the persons whose work on near‐death experiences is discussed are Raymond Moody, Allan Kellehear, Carol Zaleski, Susan Blackmore (a critic who believes that near‐death experiences can be explained in purely naturalistic terms), Bruce Greyson, Alvin Plantinga, and William Alston. The views of Carol Zaleski (who offers a sympathetic account of near‐death experiences intended as an alternative to naturalistic approaches), and of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston (who are leading Christian epistemologists) are examined in detail.
Conclusion
Authors: Walls Jerry L.
Published: October 2003

The arguments presented in the book are briefly summarized, pointing out that what has been defended is a Christian vision of reality (focusing on heaven) that is profoundly more hopeful than that of secular accounts, whether modern or postmodern. The conclusion is that we profoundly need to recover the hope (belief) of heaven in order to recover our very humanity.
The Theory of Natural Knowledge
Authors: Vinci Thomas C.
Published: October 2003

Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.
Socrates Dissatisfied
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

The personified Laws in the Crito who make the case for Socrates' remaining in prison and accepting his execution rather than fleeing at the urging of his friend Crito, speak not, as is generally thought, for Socrates, but represent instead the city of Athens and its laws. The Laws are, indeed, in style and substance, Socrates' adversaries: whereas Socrates defends dialectically the claim of the individual to exercise and follow his own reason, the Laws defend rhetorically the absolute authority of law. Socrates has his own reasons for remaining in prison—escape would involve him and his friends in unsavory and unworthy activities and would violate Socrates' publicly announced agreement to “abide by” his penalty (Ap. 39b)—but Crito cannot accept reasons of this kind. Caring most about helping his friend and not allowing his friends' enemies to win, Crito flouts the law in his willingness to engage in bribery and stealth. Recognizing the utterly unphilosophical nature of his friend, Socrates works to repay Crito's friendship by bringing him up to the level of law‐abidingness, hardly the highest level of morality but at least not the very lowest. The speech of the Laws that Socrates fashions to this end has the same effect on Socrates as Corybantic rites do on those exposed to them; it does not, however, provide a rationally convincing argument.
Running the Risk for Friendship
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

Crito is Socrates' friend. Though Crito laments the possible loss of an irreplaceable friend, he worries too about the bad reputation he will surely acquire should he not help his friend to escape death. Crito is unphilosophical: he cares about life, money, reputation, and family. Moreover, he cares neither about law nor about justice except in the most vulgar sense of “helping friends and harming enemies.” Although Crito will risk everything to save his friend, he is a friend to Socrates' body—not to his soul.
The Philosophical Argument Against Escape
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

Socrates' reasons for remaining in prison appeal to old logoi, to principles that affirm the value of justice, the greater importance of the soul as compared with the body, and hence the lesser evil of death as compared with injustice. Socrates' reasons for not escaping are made explicit before the Laws make their speech. Because escape defies the will of the Athenians, it requires stealth and bribery, shameful practices that are unjustified in the current situation. By escaping, Socrates will hurt himself and his friends insofar as they will be compelled to engage in practices whose injustice will harm their souls. Moreover, he will violate his just agreement with the city of Athens to abide by his penalty.
“Whatever We Bid”
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

The Laws admit finally that Socrates is innocent. For them, however, Socrates' escape would nevertheless be unjust since justice requires the unqualified submission of the citizen to the city and its laws: the citizen is the city's child and slave; in addition, the citizen has agreed to do “whatever we bid.” The tone of the Laws' speech is sarcastic, bitter, and mocking. Their paramount concern is with their own survival: their demand for absolute obedience derives from this overriding concern. For Socrates, law derives validity only from its fostering of justice; mere survival, whether of the individual or of the Laws, cannot supersede the claims of justice.
The Corybantic Cure
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

Although Socrates acts as the Laws recommend, their reasons are not his reasons. The Laws' speech holds for Socrates no rational appeal: its effects are merely Corybantic. Its booming loudness produces a deafening effect that makes it difficult for Socrates to hear: it is for this reason that he advises Crito not to continue to speak. To be sure, Socrates will, in refusing to escape, be following the lead of “the god”; to him, however, what this means is that he will be doing as his own principled reasoning directs: what his god commands of him is to pursue justice and to practice philosophy.
A Fool Satisfied
Authors: Weiss Roslyn
Published: October 2003

Since Crito proves himself to be thoroughly unphilosophical and Socrates' argument against escape fails to persuade him, Socrates tries in a nonphilosophical way to persuade Crito of the rightness of his decision not to escape. The speech of the Laws speaks to Crito in terms that Crito can understand: it respects Crito's concerns for life, money, reputation, friends, family, and power. And it protects him: it scolds only Socrates. The Laws even address Socrates in a tone similar to the one Crito used. Yet, in the long run, Socrates seeks through the Laws' speech to benefit his friend: the life of uncritical obedience to the law is a less corrupt life than the one Crito currently leads, a life in which he cares for neither justice nor law.
Introduction
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Starts with an outline of the book, and then discusses the philosophical approach taken in it. Three methods used by philosophers to approach problems are considered: the first is a theory whose correctness is immediately apparent to the philosopher concerned, and whose implications for any particular cases will be accepted, even if they lead to uncomfortable results; in the second case, the philosopher starts with a theory, but one to which commitment is not so great, and whose implications for particular cases may be examined, and if they conflict, lead to alterations in the theory; and the third starts with responses to cases (practical or theoretical) with just enough detail for philosophical purposes, rather than total or tentative commitment to a theory. The method used in this book is closer to the third than any other, and is outlined.
Is It Worse if More Die: Agent Relative or Non‐Relative Views?
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Considers arguments for the following radical claim: the fact that we could save a greater number of lives is not a reason to save some people rather than others when we cannot save everyone. Against this view, an argument is presented that claims to prove that it is worse if more die than if fewer do, but then a counterargument is given that considerations of justice and fairness might stand in the way of preventing this worse state of affairs, requiring us to give to a group with the greater number of people and to a group with the smaller number equal chances to be saved. This means there would be a conflict between considerations of the right (e.g. justice, fairness), and considerations of the good (e.g. maximizing lives saved). The arguments offered are based around the claims of John Taurek on conflict situations in which some can be helped and some cannot: his brand of consequentialism, which involves an evaluation of outcomes relative to an individual's interests combined with an agent‐neutral theory of permission to act. The aspects addressed all centre around the aggregation argument — aggregation vs non‐aggregation.
Is It Right to Save the Greater Number?
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

In the situation that we have to choose between the numbers of lives saved (is it right to save the greater number?), Ch. 6 argues against the existence of the conflict between considerations of the right (e.g. justice, fairness) and considerations of the good (e.g. maximizing lives saved). This is the aggregation argument put forward in Ch. 5. The argument is presented in two ways: the modest way is to show that considerations of the right do not demand equal chances; the strong way is to show that considerations of the right require us to count numbers of lives in order to save the greater number and to engage in substitution of lives that are equivalents from a certain perspective. In discussing the modest approach, consideration is given to what makes a policy unfair and the significance of the distinction between direct and indirect need for aid.
Ideal Procedure, Nonideal Alternatives, and Proportional Chances
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Examines two alternatives to the ‘majority rule’ situation described in the Ch. 7, i.e. that numbers count in any consideration of saving lives. It looks at two procedures that, other than straightforwardly saving the greater number of lives, still consider the number of people that can be saved. The first is what the author calls the ‘Ideal Procedure’ for non‐Taurek situations, in which some compromise between conflicting groups is possible; this can only be used when there is some chance of saving everyone. The other procedure is an alternative way to give numbers weight: distribution by proportional chances. Finally, the difference that present vs future need may make is considered.
Sobjectivity: The Anatomy of the Subjective and Objective in Moral Judgment
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Looks at a two more approaches to justifying the Principle of Irrelevant Utility advanced in Ch. 8 with respect to the question of saving different groups of lives. Once again, it involves combining objective and subjective views. Here the combinations are designated ‘Sobjectivism2’ and ‘Sobjectivism3’. Sobjectivism2 differs from Sobjectivism1 (which was presented in Ch. 8), in that it pits the various subjective points of view against each other differently, taking into account each person's moral responsibility, rather than only his interests or desires. Sobjectivism3 provides an alternative principled distinction between losses of lives in order to distinguish relevant from irrelevant utilities: that certain utilities would be irrelevant in a life‐saving choice situation if they would receive no proportional weight on their own, no matter how many individuals were involved.
Distribution of Resources: Need and Outcome
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Begins the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book by analysing factors that may be relevant in three situations: true scarcity of resources, temporary scarcity of resources, and uncertainty as to the type of scarcity. The first two sections of the chapter consider the different concepts of need and urgency and their relation to each other: what makes one person needier than another and why is greater need a factor that should give one person a stronger claim to resources? Arguments are presented for and against the view that the younger are needier than the older, and proposals offered concerning a possible diminishing marginal utility of life and diminishing marginal value of life, fairness, and the relation between helping the worst off and equality. The last section of the chapter starts by examining the concept of outcome with an eye to deciding what effects of a transplant and differential effects between potential recipients are morally relevant and irrelevant. It then considers the relation between the factors of need and outcome, and presents several rationales for procedures that give outcome more weight relative to need — moving away from the maximin approach (that of aiding the much worse off before the better off).
Distribution of Resources: Urgency and Outcome
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Continues the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book. Discusses the relative weight that should be assigned to urgency and outcome when need is constant, although the discussion also bears on the relation of need to outcome. Various hypothetical cases are presented that involve varying outcomes in absolute numbers of years, and these are discussed in the contexts of a determining organ distribution by a maximin approach (the approach of aiding the much worse off before the better off) that is modified so that consideration is given to outcome. Aspects addressed include unavoidable inequality, chances, lending organs, and various alternatives to the modified maximin approach — Dan Brock's proposal of chances proportional to outcome, multiplying outcomes, and outcome as sole determinant. The last section of the chapter looks at the justification for moving from the maximin approach to the modified maximin approach and then even further toward an approach that shows an even greater concern for outcome.
Procedures for Distribution
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Brings to a close the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book. Presents the argument against using procedures in determining the distribution of resources, and then goes on to give a critical examination of two possible procedures for determining the distribution of organs: that of John Kilner, and that of T. Starzl (this is a points system for determining kidney distribution in which no one factor has lexical priority over another that is used in a major transplant centre); some modifications are suggested to the Starzl procedure. Next, an alternative distribution procedure is described for application in conditions where resources are scarce. The final section of the chapter moves on from discussing the situation where the decision to be made is which of two (or more) people should receive one organ, to the choice of situation where the choice is whether to assign multiple organs to one person or each of those multiple organs to other people.
A History of the ṣaḍ‐Aṅga‐Yoga of the Kālacakratantra and Its Relation to Other Religious Traditions of India
Authors: Wallace Vesna A.
Published: October 2003

A brief history is given of the history of the ṣaḍ‐aṅga‐yoga (six‐phased yoga) of the Kālacakratantra, and its relation to other religious traditions in India (Hindu, and various Buddhist traditions) is discussed. Details are given of the variant types and components of the various ṣaḍ‐aṅga‐yogas. These are couched within different theoretical and practical frameworks, but all share some commonalities.
The Nature of Syncretism in the Kālacakratantra
Authors: Wallace Vesna A.
Published: October 2003

The Kālacakratantra has a prominent, syncretistic character, although close examination of the tantra and its commentarial literature shows that the Kālacakra tradition has preserved a distinctively Buddhist orientation, and that its affiliation with non‐Buddhist Indian systems is in form rather than content. The syncretism of this tantric system is a self‐conscious absorption, or appropriation, of the modes of expression that are characteristic of the rival religious systems of India. This self‐conscious syncretism variously permeates several areas of the Kālacakratantra, such as its theoretical system, language, medicine, and cosmology; it is also often inextricably related to Buddhist tantric conversionary efforts. The conversionary mission of the Kālacakratantra is not the sole basis of its syncretistic character; the growing pluralism within the inner life of Indian Mahayana communities could have been another contributing factor. The different sections of the chapter look at the theoretical syncretism of the Kālacakratantra, the syncretism of Kālacakratantra practice, and the syncretism of the Kālacakratantra's language.
The Cosmic Body
Authors: Wallace Vesna A.
Published: October 2003

The Kālacakratantra's cosmology is structured on several theoretical models. In its interpretation of the conventional nature of the cosmos, the Kālacakratantra combines to some degree the Vaibhāṣika atomic theory, the Sāṃkhya model of the twenty‐five principles of the puruṣa, and prakṛti, and Jaina and Purāṇic cosmographies, with its own measurements of the cosmos (loka‐dhātu) and its own theories of the nature of the cosmos and its relation to the individual. The Kālacakra tradition intentionally uses this form of syncretism in order to provide a useful theoretical model of the Buddhist tantric view of the cosmos that will accord with its interpretation of the individual and with its model of practice. The different sections of the chapter look at different aspects of the cosmos in relation to the individual; these include the origination and dissolution of the cosmos, the configuration and measurements of the cosmos, the three realms of cyclic existence, the wheel of time, and time in the cosmos.
The Social Body
Authors: Wallace Vesna A.
Published: October 2003

The two sections of this chapter discuss the individual in relation to society and the individual as society. The Kālacakratantra's views of the individual's place in society and of the individual as society are closely interrelated and provide a sociological framework for the traditional interpretation of the Kālacakratantra's history and for its eschatology and soteriology. The Kālacakra tradition's interpretation of social relations and its sharp criticism of caste divisions and social bias have multiple goals and practical applications, some of which are unique to the Kālacakra tradition and some of which are characteristic of all Indian Buddhist systems. For the Kālacakra tradition, the individual is not merely a member of the vajra (indestructible or indivisible)‐family or the society but is the vajra‐family and the society itself, and is the microcosmic manifestation of the social and religious bodies of the Buddha in both their phenomenal and ultimate aspects. The Kālacakra tradition interprets the individual as the embodiment of its society in various ways, and while doing so, utilizes a conventional classification and characterization of the social classes of India at that time and reinterprets them in the light of its broader theory of the nature and composition of the individual.
Understanding Truth
Authors: Soames Scott
Published: October 2003

Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
Tarski's Definition of Truth
Authors: Soames Scott
Published: October 2003

This chapter provides a detailed explanation of Tarski's definition of truth for formalized languages. It begins by indicating how he conceived the problem, how his criterion of adequacy guarantees that any definition satisfying it introduces a predicate that applies to all and only object‐language truths, and how he approached the technical problem of formulating a definition that would allow him to derive what he regarded as a “partial definition” of truth for each sentence of the object language. Next, the formal techniques employed in his inductive definitions are explained, along with the method of turning those definitions into explicit definitions (where possible), and the way in which his definitions can be shown to be materially adequate. The explication concludes with a discussion of the relationship between truth and proof in the language of arithmetic, and the outlines of Tarski's theorem of the arithmetic indefinability of arithmetical truth.
Truth, Paradox, and Partially Defined Predicates
Authors: Soames Scott
Published: October 2003

Presents a philosophical model of partially defined predicates, illustrates how a language could come to contain them, and provides a natural way of understanding the truth predicate in which it conforms to this model. On this view, there are sentences, including Liar sentences like this sentence is not true and “Truth Tellers” like This sentence is true, about which the rules determining whether or not a sentence is true provide no result (either to the effect that it is true, or to the effect that it is not true) – thereby blocking the usual derivation of the paradox. However, despite these promising results, it is shown that a general solution to the Liar paradox is not forthcoming, since the very activity of solving the paradox in a particular limited case provides material for recreating it in a new and strengthened form. In the second half of the chapter, it is argued that this philosophical model provides the best way of understanding Saul Kripke's formal theory of truth (despite certain uncharacteristically misleading remarks of his to the contrary). In addition to laying out the philosophical basis for Kripke's theory of truth, explanations are given of his basic technical apparatus and formal results – including fixed points, minimal fixed points, monotonicity, intrinsic fixed points, ungrounded sentences, and paradoxical sentences.
Vagueness, Partiality, and the Sorites Paradox
Authors: Soames Scott
Published: October 2003

Presents a theory of partially defined, context sensitive, vague predicates, each of which is associated with a default determinate‐extension – i.e., a set of things to which the rules of the language determine that it applies – and a default determinate‐antiextension – a set of things to which the rules of the language determine that it does not apply. Since these sets do not exhaust all cases, speakers have the discretion of adjusting the extension and antiextension of such a predicate F so as to include initially undefined cases – often by explicitly characterizing an object o for which F is initially undefined as being F, or as being not F. When a speaker does this, the extension (or antiextension) of F is adjusted so as to include o plus all objects indistinguishable, or virtually indistinguishable from o. This analysis is used to illuminate and defuse the Sorites paradox, the main lesson of which is taken to be that the boundary lines fixing the extensions and antiextensions of many vague predicates are inherently unstable. Although this is not a practical problem for speakers in ordinary situations, and although it does not represent any theoretical incoherence in the meanings of vague predicates, it does explain the discomfort typically generated by standard versions of the Sorites paradox.
Preparing for the Journey
Authors: Cladis Mark S.
Published: October 2003

Provides a survey of Rousseau and the issues that pertain to the relation between the public and private life. Rousseau has presented many faces: the social theorist, ethicist, political and religious philosopher, pedagogue, novelist, literary critic, psychologist, musician, and botanist. These faces we will meet, these disciplines we must cross. Additionally, not only Rousseau but the topic – the relation between public and private – cuts across many diverse fields and issues: women studies, democratic theory, modern European history, social theory, philosophy of religion, reproductive rights, social justice, privacy laws, solitude, and community. Although the book is written for many, the principal audience are members of liberal democracies with interests in social theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion.
Revisiting the Garden's Solitaires
Authors: Cladis Mark S.
Published: October 2003

Explores in detail why neither happiness nor virtue can take root in Rousseau's account of the state of nature. The Solitaires are moral insofar as they do no harm (and hence they could be considered moral compared to the nasty and brutish creatures that populated Thomas Hobbes's state of nature); yet Rousseau was not satisfied with such minimal notions of morality, and hence I argue that his Solitaires should ultimately be considered amoral. And if happiness pertains not only to the satisfaction of needs but also to the quality or nature of them, then the Solitaire's tranquil psychology is not a sufficient condition for human happiness.
The Rush to Slavery
Authors: Cladis Mark S.
Published: October 2003

Discusses how the precarious joy and liberty of the Second Garden (as discussed in the previous chapter) collapsed and paved the road to the pain and slavery of the corrupt City. From the division of labor came the multiplication of commodities and complex systems of exchange; from these came a heightened sense of private property and public justice; and from rules of justice came conventions of inequality and the attending humiliation. This genealogy of sorrow is driven by both psychological and sociological developments, chiefly the progression of amour‐propre (anxious self‐love) and the division of labor.
Reconciling Citizen and Solitaire
Authors: Cladis Mark S.
Published: October 2003

Highlights the religious dimensions of Rousseau's thought on the middle way. Rousseau associated the deepest aspects of the public and private life with religion, and he employed a religious vocabulary when he articulated their potential reconciliation and conflict. He maintained that freedom, equality, and individual rights require support not only from law but also from shared traditions and commitments – from something like a common, secular faith. Moreover, he held that freedom of religion is necessary for individuals to flourish as human beings and as citizens. A cultivated interior life can bring personal fulfillment, and it can enable a person to become ”self‐possessed,” i.e., capable of autonomous deliberation in private and public domains. Rousseau's middle way sought to capture both the public and private aspects of religion: to champion a unifying, common faith as well as to protect private projects. In Rousseau's view, however, the success of the middle way is doubtful.
Residual Conflict
Authors: Cladis Mark S.
Published: October 2003

Focuses on the residual friction between the public and private life: private perfection versus public compromise, self‐reliance versus social dependence, self‐love versus love of the common good, private contentment versus public felicity, self‐esteem versus public pride, fidelity to a universal deity versus loyalty to a provincial civil religion. Rousseau recognized this friction, yet he refused to surrender either side of the conflict, preferring to keep them together, precariously, in spite of the tension. He went a long way, to be sure, to mitigate the polarization, and this was often achieved by his religious vocabulary. Yet the tension never disappeared in his work. In the end, his refusal to evade the tension may be his greatest contribution to modern social thought. For, determination to wrestle with such tension, without denying or eliminating it, is a hallmark of modern, democratic societies.
The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998
Authors: Hermann Tamar
Published: October 2003

In the late 1960s, and especially after the 1973 war, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) concerned to resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict, peacefully began to emerge in Israel, and in the 1980s, P/CROs became an integral, although mainly unpopular part of Israeli political life. P/CROs’ activities included consciousness raising and protest, dialog promotion, some professional service provision, and the articulation of propeace arguments. Discord amongst P/CROs over the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the conservative turn taken by the Israeli government and society after Rabin's assassination, left Israeli P/CROs weak and ineffectual by the mid 1990s. Furthermore, they had always been hamstrung by the public's perception of the P/CRO political agenda as naïve and idealistic, by their extraparliamentary status in a country that prioritized parliamentary politics, and by their homogeneous membership – older, middle class, highly educated, urban, secular Ashkenazi Jews, many of them born in the USA. While the Israeli government ultimately took advantage of the propeace attitude fostered by the P/CROs and adopted much of the program advocated by P/CROs, it consistently denied them any credit for or role in the peace process.
NGOs in the Context of National Struggle
Authors: Hassassian Maanuel
Published: October 2003

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began to develop in Palestine after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, but only a few of these can be considered peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs). P/CRO growth was hindered by the culture of antagonism with Israel, the neopatriarchal structure of Palestinian society and the autocracy of the Palestinian Authority, and the Israeli occupation's stifling effect on civil society, and many Palestinians have preferred armed resistance. P/CROs were usually internally democratic; ideology played an important role in success or failure, most relied on international funding, and all either regarded themselves as complementing the Palestinian Authority or monitoring it. P/CRO activities included human rights advocacy, the representation of Palestinian interests to the international community, and domestic consciousness raising. However, the P/CRO contribution to peace building has been insignificant, and the true Palestinian “peace camp” is the Palestinian Authority.
A Comparative View: Peace and Conflict‐Resolution Organizations in Three Protracted Conflicts
Authors: Meyer Megan
Published: October 2003

Most peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) were founded between 1980 and 1990, in response to heightened conflict in their regions; charismatic leaders – usually highly educated and politically astute – and local networks played instrumental roles. Most P/CROs relied on international funding. South African P/CROs received funding from foreign governments, international multilateral agencies, and religious institutions, Israeli/Palestinian P/CROs from private foreign donors and foundations, and Northern Irish P/CROs mainly from the UK and the European Union. All P/CROs used a variety of tactics, but emphasized a package of tactics that fit their members’ beliefs, interests, and skills; there was only slight variation in tactics across regions, but political context did play a small role in determining “tastes in tactics.” Almost all P/CROs, whatever their initial aspirations, became somewhat formalized as they aged. P/CROs in Northern Ireland tended to frame the conflict in terms of personal attitudes; in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, P/CRO frames emphasized systemic factors.
Introduction
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

The chapter shows how the issue of free will and determinism (including questions about necessity, fate, predestination, and related topics) arose historically in various traditions of Eastern and Western philosophy. It also shows how the traditional problem of free will has been transformed in modern times as a result of new developments in the sciences and humanistic studies. Four questions are introduced about free will that have come to the fore as a result of these new developments and will be discussed in the remainder of the book: (The Compatibility Question) Is free will compatible or incompatible with determinism? (The Significance Question) Why do we want free will? (The Intelligibility Question) Can we make sense of an indeterminist or incompatibilist free will? (The Existence Question) Can such a free will exist in the natural order and if so, how?
Will
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

The notion of “will” is analyzed from a historical and contemporary perspective along with a cluster of closely related notions: practical reason, choice, decision, intention, motives, acts of will, free judgments of the will (libera arbitria voluntatis), and the notion of the “voluntary.” Three senses of “will” are distinguished: “desiderative will” (what one wants, desires or prefers), “rational will” (what one chooses, decides or intends), and “striving will” (what one tries, endeavors or makes an effort to do). It is argued that the “will” in all three of these senses must be involved in an adequate account of “free will.”
Ultimate Responsibility
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

This chapter turns to the second and (I argue) the more important criterion for free will, namely, ultimate responsibility (UR). A series of theses are defended that explain what this criterion entails and why it is incompatible with determinism. In the process, the chapter critically examines new compatibilist accounts of free will, such as the “hierarchical theories” of Harry Frankfurt and others (involving second‐ and higher‐ order desires and volitions). The chapter also discusses the notion of “covert non‐constraining (CNC) control,” the kind of hidden control of human behavior that one encounters in scientific utopias like that described in B. F. Skinner's Walden Two. The notion of “self‐forming actions” (SFAs) is defined and shown to be pivotal to understanding what it means to say that something is done “of one's own free will.”
Significance
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

Discusses what I call the “Significance Question” for free will: Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? I argue that there are a number of things that we do, and should, want when we want genuine free will and that these things, properly understood, require an incompatibilist or nondeterminist account. They include (1) genuine creativity, (2) autonomy or self‐legislation, (3) true desert for achievements, (4) moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, (5) being suitable objects of reactive attitudes such as admiration, gratitude, resentment and indignation, (6) dignity or self‐worth, (7) a true sense of individuality or uniqueness as persons, (8) (freely given) love and friendship, and others. The chapter introduces what I call a “dialectic of selfhood” in order to show why these traits require an incompatibilist account of free will.
Plurality and Indeterminism
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

We turn to the “Intelligibility Question” about free will: How, if at all, can one make sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism? If free choices are not determined, they must be undetermined. But undetermined events, it is often argued, occur by chance; and choices or actions that occur by chance would be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “random,” “irrational,” and not under the control of agents – hence not responsible actions at all. These familiar charges are traced to “plurality conditions” for free will: free agents must not only be able to choose and choose otherwise, they must be able to choose and choose otherwise, either way rationally, voluntarily, intentionally, and having voluntary control over their choices. In order to satisfy these plurality requirements, traditional incompatibilist or libertarian theories of free will have usually appealed to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation, which are problematic for a number reasons discussed in the chapter.
Moral and Prudential Choice
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

An attempt is made in this chapter and the following two to give an incompatibilist or indeterminist account of free will that is consistent with current scientific knowledge without assuming any obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation. A number of topics are discussed in the process of constructing this theory: self‐forming actions (SFAs) or willings (SFWs), moral and prudential choice, divided will, indeterminate efforts, chaos theory, non‐equilibrium thermodynamics, quantum physics, neural networks, weakness of will, mind and body, plural voluntary control, choosing for reasons, consciousness and purpose, self‐networks, chance, folk psychology and the brain, value experiments, and others.
Objections and Responses
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: October 2003

The indeterminist theory of free will presented in Chs. 8 and 9 is further developed in this chapter by responding to a series of objections. The issues raised by these objections involve indeterminacy and possible worlds, explanation and probability, non‐deterministic causation, rational explanation of actions, character building and the historical dimension of responsibility, strength and weakness of will, choice, responsibility and indeterminism, action and indeterminism, control and responsibility, agent causation, and self‐determination.
American Methodist Worship
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

This book offers a comprehensive examination and analysis of American Methodist worship, tracing its evolution from John Wesley to the end of the twentieth century. Attention is paid to the officially approved liturgical texts of ten American Methodist denominations. Yet, these texts do not reveal the full complexity of Methodist worship – leaders of worship have always had the freedom to depart from the established forms, and some characteristically Methodist worship services were organized without official texts. Therefore, other sources are scrutinized to provide a broader assessment. This book draws upon personal diaries and journals, church and secular newspapers, and materials from local church archives, thus exposing the processes and influences – ecclesiastical, social, and cultural – that motivated Methodists to rethink their theology of worship and to reorganize their worship praxis. Such an approach permits consideration of the nontextual matters of liturgical space, choreography, and ritual performance. Methodist worship's interactions with the wider society and cultures are addressed, and an evaluation is made of how particular factors and developments evident in national life affected liturgy and the performance of worship in what may be identified as the “Americanization” of Methodist worship.
The Lord's Day
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

Lord's Day worship in a Methodist congregation consisted of invariable components (“ordinary”) as well as variable components (“propers”). Invariable components that are spoken in the language or particular vocabulary of the people may include prayer, scripture readings, psalmody, preaching, creeds, and benedictions. Variable components may be linked with the Christian year, the denominational calendar, or civil and local celebrations. The selection of ordinary and propers, along with interpretations of the significance of Sunday, contribute to what it means to be Methodist on the Lord's Day.
The Great Festivals of the Mlinethodists
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

Methodists developed several “peculiar” services of worship connected with admission and integration into, or maintenance of, the Christian (Methodist) community. These extraliturgical events, most of which were not original to the Methodists, included the love feast, watch night, renewal of the covenant, quarterly meeting, camp meeting, protracted meeting, and revival. Once identified as the “great festivals” of Methodism, these services eventually diminished in frequency, although they never entirely disappeared.
The Rites of Christian Initiation
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

Tensions occur when a church practices infant baptism but also expects personal faith or even an experience of conversion from its members. Methodists in America struggled theologically with the meaning and purpose of baptism for both infants and adults, especially regarding the issues of original sin, baptismal regeneration, and the connection between baptism and church membership. The theological positions reached on the sacrament were often honed from controversies with other Christians, who pressed the Methodists regarding the subjects and modes of baptism. Methodist baptismal rites saw significant alterations, and new rites related to Christian initiation developed for membership, confirmation, and baptismal renewal.
Methodist Funerals
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

Compared with marriage rites, Methodist burial rites and performances of funerals changed relatively slowly over two centuries. Such conservatism, however, masks the shifts in pastoral and theological understandings of bereavement, dying, death, resurrection, and eschatology that took place during that time among Methodists and within the wider society. These adjustments can be measured by the contents of funeral sermons, topics addressed in hymnals, changes in funerary customs for both the living and the dead, and alterations in the ritual text.
Devotion and Discipleship
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

From the earliest days, Methodists were exhorted to practice works of piety and works of mercy in order to nurture both inner religion and social holiness. These works of piety include family worship, public prayer (often manifested during the week as the “prayer meeting”), and fasting. The visitation of the sick and ministries of healing numbered among the means of caring for others. Eventually, these services of prayer and acts of discipleship, which were understood as essential occasions for worship and channels of grace, came to be regarded as no more than personal options.
Roles in Public Worship
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

The leadership of Methodist worship has always involved men and women, lay and clergy, although there have been limitations placed upon certain categories of people at different times. Unordained preachers served Methodism from its beginnings, and laity has always had roles as class leaders, exhorters, stewards, stewardesses, and song leaders. Deaconesses assisted or led in worship to the extent that any layperson could. The principal liturgical ministers were the elders and, to a much more limited extent in terms of sacramental presidency, the deacons. The only distinct liturgical role of the general superintendent or bishop came at services of ordination.
American Methodist Worship
Authors: Tucker Karen B. Westerfield
Published: October 2003

More than a summary, the final chapter synthesizes the revisionary processes already examined and identifies particular factors that have contributed to the evolution of Methodist worship as a whole. On the one hand, Methodists were retrospective in ordering their worship and looking to their immediate past, to their founder John Wesley, and also beyond that to apostolic Christianity and to scripture. On the other hand, Methodists were prospective and strove to offer worship fitting for the present in order to maintain a viable community of faith for the ages yet to come. Both approaches reveal the Americanization of worship that was set in motion from the founding of the various Methodist denominations.