bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
“People's War under Modern Conidtions”: Wishful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent?
Authors: Jencks Harlan W.
Published: March 2009

For millennia China's enemies have come chiefly out of northern and central Asia. In the 1980s, after a historically anomalous century during which most of her enemies came from the sea, China's defences once again are orientated north and west. The military threat of the 1980s is more complex than that posed by the barbarian nomads of old. The Soviet armed forces can launch land-air battles simultaneously all along the 10,000-kilometre Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, time and space factors which long shielded the interior of China provide little protection in the missile age.
Taiwan's International Status Today
Authors: Weng Byron S. J.
Published: March 2009

In the past three decades Taiwan has gained in terms of its economy but has substantially waned in terms of its international status.

Economically, Taiwan has performed so impressively that it has become one of the newly industrialized countries (NICs) that are the envy of many developing nations. Its sustained high growth rate over a fairl, long period commands respect from economists all over the world. In 1983 the GNP of the country approached US$50 billion and its per capita income reached US$2, 444. It is one of the world's top 15 trading nation" and has enjoyed a favourable balance of payments for many years. The 1983 exports and imports were valued at US$25, 117 million and 20, 285 million, respectively.
Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?
Authors: Winckler Edwin A.
Published: March 2009

Much has occurred in Taiwan's domestic politics sinceThe China Quarterlylast reviewed them in December 1975. Taiwan has completed one cycle of succession in the leadership of its governing institutions and is now beginning another. Following his father's death in 1975 Chiang Ching-kuo achieved both firm control over the Nationalist political establishment and apparent popularity with the Taiwanese public. Now, in the mid 1980s, President Chiang continues to maintain an intricate balance between the generally conservative senior generation still in power and the somewhat progressive junior generation he is positioning to succeed them.
Taiwan: Rural Society Stuart
Authors: Thompson Stuart E.
Published: March 2009

Owen Rutter's somewhat idyllized picture of an essentially agricultural Taiwan could have portrayed the 1950s, or, equally, Taiwan at any time in the more than 300 years of Chinese settlement there. Most of the Chinese who crossed the Taiwan Straits to settle in Taiwan were peasant farmers, and, as they had done on continental China, they made their living by agriculture. In 1945, when the island reverted to China after 50 years as a Japanese colony, agriculture was still very much the predominant sector, and the majority of the population continued to rely on farming. But, from the late 1950s onwards, in the space of less than three decades, the pattern of more than three centuries has been radically altered. Industry has burgeoned to replace agriculture as the key sector, and, concomitantly, Taiwan's population is no longer characteristically rural. A massive outflow of rural people into the cities has left only one person in four living in the countryside
An Analysis of Chinese Data on Root and Tuber Crop Production
Authors: Stone Bruce
Published: March 2009

Soon after the People's Republic of China resumed publishing economic data series in the late 1970s it became clear that current definitional conventions for statistical categories often differed from those of the 1950s. For example, tractor stock, in standard 15 horse-power units from the 1950s, was recorded in series linked with current physical unit data. Sporadic efforts have been made clearly to define categories in different periods, pin down transition dates, and occasionally develop consistent series. In some instances, Chinese statistical organizations have produced series making adjustments for specific inconsistencies in previously published data. Soybeans, for example, are now included in the entire official series for foodgrain production and sown area from 1949 to the present; they were previously excluded from 1949–57 data. Articles by Walker and by Field and Kilpatrick were among attempts to correct for this inconsistency, considerably pre-dating the official published adjustment. At around the same time several researchers noted that roots and tubers were valued at one-fourth natural weight in the 1950s, but one-fifth under current convention. For a few years the transition date was open to question and arguments were tendered in support of 1977, 1970 and 1964. Members of a United States Department of Agriculture delegation to China seem to have ended the debate by simply asking their Chinese hosts. They were told categorically that the official change was in 1964, although it is always possible that the effective date differed somewhat among reporting units or even among provinces. Some four years later the date was confirmed in the 1983 Statistical Yearbook.
The Monetary Framework Underlying the Hong Kong Dollar Stabilization Scheme
Authors: Greenwood John
Published: March 2009

The currency stabilization scheme announced by the Hong Kong Government on 15 October 1983 and implemented from 17 October represents a return to the modified colonial currency board system which had operated in Hong Kong from 1935 until June 1972, which in turn was a modified version of the currency system that had operated in Hong Kong from the earliest days of British administration up to 1935. Before describing the new system it is useful to review briefly the various systems that have operated in Hong Kong in the past: the silver standard, which existed almost from the outset and continued until 1935; the sterling standard, maintained from 1935 to mid 1972; the short-lived quasi-US dollar standard in operation from July 1972 to November 1974; and the floating exchange rate system or pure Hong Kong dollar standard, which survived from November 1974 until October 1983. Emphasis throughout will be placed on the determination of the quantity of money or money supply in circulation.
Who Won the “Wool War”?: A Case Study of Rural Product Marketing in China
Authors: watson Andrew , Findlay Christopher , Yintang Du
Published: March 2009

The absence of a systematic programme has been a distinctive feature of China's economic reform process. The Chinese did not set out to develop a step-by-step plan of reform to be phased in over a period of years. Instead they adopted a number of strategic goals, and in 1978 launched incremental and pragmatic changes aimed at realizing them. Essentially the strategy adopted had four main aspects: a shift from economic growth expressed mainly through statistical targets towards an emphasis on satisfying the consumption needs of the population; a change from extensive development based on new investment towards intensive development through greater efficiency; an acceptance of greater economic autonomy for producers, with a broader mix of methods of economic management and types of ownership; and the adoption of a much more open economy. The reforms adopted over the succeeding years have all been consistent with these objectives, but they have not been implemented through a carefully planned series of stages. Overall the process has been marked by different rates of reform across sectors, by occasional pauses and even retreats, and by problems generated by the interaction of the differing rates of reform. Enterprise managers, for example, have found that plan controls over their production or sales have disappeared at a faster rate than controls over their supply of inputs. Given the dual price system and the continuing role of the central government in the supply of strategic materials and energy, the impact of the uneven pace of change on managers’ behaviour has therefore been very complex.
From Lin Biao to Deng Xiaoping: Elite Instability and China's U.S. Policy
Authors: Ross Robert S.
Published: March 2009

In the field of Chinese foreign policy, the debate continues over the importance of domestic and international factors in policy–making. Scholars arguing in favour of the special importance of domestic politics in the formulation of policy point to the existence of elite differences over foreign policy and contend that the shifting fortunes of individual leaders and the leadership turnover associated with succession politics can significantly shape China's security policy. Other scholars stress the importance of such international factors as shifting global balances of power, changing alliance patterns, and relative bargaining strengths in Beijing's foreign policy.
China's Higher Curricular Reform in Historical Perspective
Authors: Hayhoe Ruth E. S.
Published: March 2009

The educational reform document of May 1985 has set the policy framework for a transformation of the structure and organization of knowledge in the Chinese higher curriculum that may have far-reaching consequences. It has been the tradition in research on Chinese education to interpret educational reform movements in relation to broad political changes, policy debates among factions within the communist leadership and changing economic strategies represented in successive Five-Year Plans. More sociologically oriented studies have focused on issues such as access to higher education and changes in the composition of those who found their way into the upper echelons of the formal educational system in terms of social class background. These approaches have shed considerable light on aspects of China's modern educational development and their conclusions are of primary importance in seeking an understanding of the wide-ranging reforms announced in the document of May 1985.
Communist China's Foreign Policy: The Recent Phase
Authors: Halpern A. M.
Published: March 2009

If one were to choose a single adjective to apply to the pattern of Communist China's foreign relations since the Moscow declaration of 1960, “reactive” would be as nearly accurate a choice as any other. China's circumstances during 1961 and 1962 provide ample reasons for a reactive posture. The crisis in the economy, though not exactly measurable, has been evident. The course of internal politics has been less clear. The dominant trend has been a controlled retreat from the organisational methods of the Great Leap Forward. In the course of this manoeuvre, the role of the Party and its relation to non-Communist elements hi the population, organised or unorganised, has had to be redefined. What may be more diagnostic of this period, however, is a serious decline of public morale and of confidence in the régime.
Press Communiqué on the National People's Congress
Authors: Document
Published: March 2009

The Second National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China held its third session in Peking between March 27 and April 16. Before this, a preparatory meeting was held on March 22.

At the beginning, the session heard a report on the work of the Government made by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council.

Premier Chou En-lai's report fell into two parts. The first dealt with the international situation and China's foreign policy, and the second part discussed the domestic situation and the tasks of the Chinese people.
Rural Administration in Communist China
Authors: Hofheinz Roy
Published: March 2009

Since the Ch'in dynasty first divided the area under its control into forty administrative districts, the Chinese countryside has experienced a bewildering variety of units of local organisation. Although beneath this variety there is a discernible continuity (for example in the maintenance of the provincial level of organisation since Han times), the student is often hard put to give adequate explanations of the changes which have occurred. This is particularly true of the Republican period, when local governmental organisation was not only a topic of heated discussion but also a focus of considerable explicit experimentation.
China, Russia, and the Third World
Authors: Adie W. A. C.
Published: March 2009

Nearly all Chinese, and many foreign students of China, will have it that China has never been, and is now unlikely to become, an expansionist power. A recent article in The Times said that China, being land-based rather than maritime, “never developed any sense of international relations”; instead of a Foreign Office, the old China had until 1842 an office for the management of barbarians, “whose respect for Chinese supremacy was demanded or exacted.” In other words, China's non-aggressiveness contains an element of semantic jugglery. How could China “expand,” and how could there be international relations when the Emperor was already regarded as ruler of the world? It is worth recalling that when the Ming fleets visited places as distant as Aden to “make known the Imperial commands,” this concept was in fact extended to peoples overseas; on their return, the envoys announced: “The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects … the barbarians from beyond the seas … have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.”
Peasant Nationalism Revisited: The Biography of a Book
Authors: Johnson Chalmers
Published: March 2009

It is now 15 years since Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power was first published and became known as a controversial book. However, when in the autumn of 1960 I began writing my doctoral dissertation in political science at Berkeley, it never once crossed my mind that I was writing something controversial or even publishable. For the previous two years I had been reading Japanese Government archives concerned with the Japanese war in China, 1937–45, archives that had been obtained for the Berkeley libraries by Professor Robert Scalapino from Hatano Ken'ichi, one of Japan's leading specialists on China and a Japanese governmental adviser during the so-called “China Incident.” These archives impressed me with a point that I thought was already widely accepted among scholars interested in the Chinese Revolution – namely, that the Japanese army had created conditions of such savagery in the Chinese countryside that the peasantry in overwhelming numbers had given their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party as the only true leader of anti-Japanese guerrilla resistance. Because the Communist Party had openly championed resistance to Japan, it had won the “hearts and minds” of a significant proportion of the rural population, an achievement that guaranteed that in the postwar world it could no longer be regarded by the Kuomintang (KMT) as merely a “rebel faction”. When the Nationalists precipitated a civil war with the Communists after Japan's defeat, it was only natural that the mass of the population in the formerly occupied areas supported the Communists, and it was this factor of popular support, as in most other civil wars, that contributed most to the communist victory of 1949.
An Interview on Changes in Chinese Education After the “Gang of Four”
Authors: Pepper Suzanne
Published: March 2009

The following is an abbreviated account of a three-hour interview with Chang Hsüeh-hsin of the Higher Education Bureau of the Education Ministry in Peking. The interview took place on 19 July 1977. My purpose in requesting it was to discover the policy changes that were being contemplated by the new Chinese administration in the controversial field of education. Few concrete details on the subject had appeared in the press up to that time, although renewed emphasis on science and technology, together with travellers' tales and other informal sources of information, all suggested that major changes were in the offing. Comrade Chang confirmed that such changes were underway, although not finally decided upon. The announcement by People's Daily on 22 October that the college entrance examination would be unified and that all candidates should be senior middle school graduates or the equivalent, indicates two decisions taken after the interview.
The “Next Generation” of Chinese Communist Leaders
Authors: Klein Donald W.
Published: March 2009

The question of who will succeed Mao Tse-tung is a fascinating and important question. The related question of the composite group of leaders which will emerge in about a decade is, if less fascinating, of at least equal importance, particularly given the increasing complexities of an industrialising society on the China mainland.

Are we actually nearing a period when the present hierarchy will begin to fade away? Seemingly we are, as a quick flashback to 1949 will illustrate. When the Chinese Communists came to power thirteen years ago, they were rightfully considered a young group of leaders. Their triumphant general in the field, Lin Piao, was just over forty, Chou En-lai just over fifty, and Mao himself in his mid-fifties. Among his international peers, Mao was fifteen years younger than Stalin, eleven younger than Attlee, and almost ten younger than Truman. To emphasise their youth hi another way, only two men among the forty-four elected as full Central Committee (CQ members hi 1945 died a natural death from that time until 1960.
The Rectification Campaign at Peking University: May—June 1957
Authors: Goldman René
Published: March 2009

In a previous article I outlined briefly the development of the situation on the campus of Peking University (Pei-Ta) before, during and after the momentous events of the spring of 1957, the period of the “rectification campaign.”

The sequence of events in the past four years permits us to view the rectification campaign as a dividing date in the history of Communist China. The rectification campaign was the culminating point of a period that had seen the post-revolutionary reorganisation of the country, the assertion by the Communist Party of total control over the political, economic and ideological life of the nation and, following a campaign of liquidation of counter-revolutionary elements in the summer of 1955, a sudden “thaw.”
Communist Language Policies for China's Ethnic Minorities: The First Decade
Authors: Schwarz Henry G.
Published: March 2009

When the Chinese Communists spelled out their policy of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, it appeared to many observers that a significant break with the past had been made. Throughout China's modern history, central governments sought to amalgamate the various ethnic minorities with the dominant Han group. Now, hi 1949, it seemed as if, for the first time, a central Chinese government was determined to end this process of sinification and to give its non-Chinese subjects a degree of autonomy. This self-rule, as outlined hi official documents of the Peking regime, included the administrative, economic, educational and cultural spheres of life.
Local Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam since 1954 (Part I)
Authors: Ginsburgs George
Published: March 2009

When the Geneva agreements of July 1954 at Jast brought a measure of peace back to Indo-China, the Viet-Minh régime found itself in legal and recognised possession of that section of the country which lay north of the seventeenth parallel and which is officially known today as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. By then, part of this area, comprising the Viet-Minh's war-zones I, II, III and most of IV, thirty-three provinces in all, had already long been held by Ho Chi Minh's troops and in much of it a semblance of the new order's system of local government had been in regular operation for some years back. In a good deal of the rest, clandestine and fragmented centres of rebel control had perilously co-existed throughout the war with the old administration maintained at great cost by the French authorities. Finally, in many places, particularly the urban concentrations, no appreciable degree of Viet-Minh influence had managed to last out the conflict.
North Korea's Industrial Development during the Post-War Period
Authors: Kuark Yoon T.
Published: March 2009

Since the end of the Second World War, which brought the division of the country into northern and southern halves, North Korea has become a thoroughly orthodox Communist state with but few deviations from the Russian type. The “Marxist-Leninist line” has been followed with fidelity and enthusiasm in the field of economic planning and organisation as laid out in both the early Five-Year Plans of Soviet Russia and in the similar pattern of socialisation in Red China. What deviation exists is said to be characteristic of the transitional period in building Socialism or a “people's democracy,” where exploiting elements still exist, as contrasted with the Soviet Union, where it is claimed “Socialism” is a reality. The government so far has launched the two One-Year Plans of 1947 and 1948, the first Two-Year Plan of 1949–50 with emphasis on Soviet assistance, the Three-Year Plan of 1954–56, the first Five-Year Plan of 1957–61, and the Seven-Year Plan of 1961–67.
The North Korean People's Army and the Party
Authors: Chung Kiwon
Published: March 2009

When a revolutionary movement seizes power, a Communist one no less than others, it faces the extra-revolutionary task of establishing a loyal and efficient military organisation to consolidate its conquests. In order to ensure unchallenged loyalty, the leaders of the revolution must, first of all, fill the army with their supporters. In order to secure an efficient phalanx, they are at the same time compelled to professionalise their fighting force. However, in the midst of a profound sociopolitical upheaval, these two objectives are not easily fused into one. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA), however, was in a unique position for its strengthening processes from its foundation in 1945. First of all, the NKPA did not need to fight against well-equipped Japanese forces. Secondly, it did not face such complex problems as the dispersal of enemy officer cadres, the securing of enemy loyalty and sympathy, a Civil War and its aftermath, all of which had caused considerable worries to the Communists in the Soviet Union and China. When absolute loyalty is doubtful, officers' professional qualifications are a dubious asset. The Party can never relax its leadership for the sake of a more professional army.
The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930 (Part I)
Authors: Harrison James P.
Published: March 2009

It is the aim of this paper to examine the Chinese Communist movement in 1930 and in particular the policies which bore the name of Li Li-san. The Li Li-san “line” was essentially an attempt to use the rural based Red Army to gain an urban base for the Communist revolution in China. As such it marked a transitional period between the emphasis on urban uprisings of earlier years and complete withdrawal to the countryside after this period. Similarly it was a transitional period in the relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist International (CI), moving from the complete direction of the CCP from Moscow to the relative seclusion of the CCP in the 1930s.
Local Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam since 1954 (Part 2)
Authors: Ginsburgs George
Published: March 2009

Despite the noticeable progress registered since 1954 in the reorganisation of a civilian administrative structure in North Vietnam, after three years much still remained to be done. In particular, while the régime had, from the very start, repeatedly pledged itself to hold popular elections at the earliest possible opportunity to all organs of government, these promises had never been kept, probably out of a desire not to upset the delicate political balance between North and South engineered by the Geneva agreements and to give the South a convenient pretext for repudiating them. But, when the deadline set at Geneva for a referendum in both halves of the divided land on the question of re-unification had expired and it became apparent to Hanoi that it could no longer hope to gain control of South Vietnam at the polls, the last reason for postponing unilateral action in the North vanished. By 1957, official sources in the D.R.V. were openly acknowledging that the situation with regard to elections had indeed become anomalous and even admitting that

the state apparatus had not yet become sufficiently strong; in many places organs of people's power had not been re-elected for a long time. In some areas people's Councils have almost not been functioning at all or have functioned only formally. Some administrative committees were being appointed by higher organs, whereas they had to be elected by people's Councils.
Khrushchev's Image inside China
Authors: Schecter Jerrold L.
Published: March 2009

In the November 9, 1962, issue of the People's Daily, a cartoon shows President Kennedy seated at a restaurant table waving a broken missile on the end of a fork and giving his order to a bald, obsequious waiter who stands with pad and pencil in hand. The caption: “His Appetite Grows With The Eating.” Kennedy says “I'll have fried Il-28 bombers next and sugar machete for the sweet course.” The waiter can hardly be mistaken for anybody but Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev.
Some Impressions of Formosa
Authors: Mirsky Jonathan
Published: March 2009

In Taipei a pedicab driver, living on a dollar a day, waves a cheerful greeting. When he knows you better, he will roll up his sleeve and show the scars won by 28 years in the army—with never a victory in sight. Roast Peking duck, as succulent as ever, is brought to the table by a shouting waiter. Round the corner in the police station a twelve-year-old boy is beaten with bamboo rods for pilfering. Nearby lives one of the most famous Chinese scholars of the century. He would like to go on studying the ancient documents, but at eighty-eight he finds riding the rickety bus to the Academia Sinica a little too much. He totters in with tea and talks awhile with his guests. In his quiet moments he likes to write out classical poetry hi ancient calligraphy.
Sinkiang and the Soviet Union
Authors: Wheeler Geoffrey
Published: March 2009

The two stretches of Sino-Soviet frontier which lie on either side of the Mongolian Republic differ from each other in at least one important respect: whereas the Soviet population on the eastern stretch is predominantly Russian, or at any rate non-Asian, and faces the solidly Asian population of Manchuria, that of the western stretch is predominantly Turkic-Muslim and faces the predominantly Turkic-Muslim population of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region formerly known as the Province of Sinkiang.
Chinese Migration to North-West China and Inner Mongolia, 1949–59
Authors: Schwarz Henry G.
Published: March 2009

During the first decade of their mainland rule, the Chinese Communists sent considerable numbers of people from the densely populated provinces to develop China's frontier regions and to ensure that the minority peoples there were assimilated into the new Chinese Communist order of things. While some Chinese were sent to the minority areas of the southwest, the overwhelming majority migrated to the North-West and Inner Mongolia. From examining the available evidence, which has not been used comprehensively before, it becomes clear that the pattern of migration is essentially the same for each region in the three phases of migration which took place during the period under consideration—the small scale migration until 1955; the first organised mass migration which coincided with the Leap Forward of 1956 and the subsequent period of consolidation in 1957; and the migration during the Great Leap Forward of 1958.
Development of Transportation in Communist China
Authors: Lippit Victor D.
Published: March 2009

Ambitious aspirations for railway development in China had long antecedents prior to the establishment of communist rule in 1949. During the First World War, Sun Yat-sen presented a programme calling for the construction of 100,000 miles of railroads. A quarter of a century later, in 1943, Chang Kia-ngau, Kuomintang Minister of Communications, presented a ten-year plan for railroad construction. He called for 14,300 miles of railroads to be built within ten years following the end of the war. The new lines he envisioned were to be added to a total of 12,036 miles of railroad which had been built by 1942. Of this meagre existing mileage, “3,726 miles were lost through the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and 6,566 miles were lost or destroyed during the first five-and-one-half years of the Sino-Japanese war.” While lines lost but not destroyed could presumably be utilised after the war, the scope of his programme, as can be seen from comparison with the existing mileage, was considerably beyond what China could hope to achieve with her own resources. Like Sun Yat-sen before him, Chang Kia-ngau hoped that massive conversion of Western war industries to the production of construction goods would provide the material inputs to make his programme feasible. A plan based on the expectation of a beneficence the West has yet to display to the underdeveloped world was of course foredoomed to failure.
A Note on Tibet's Population
Authors: Orleans Leo A.
Published: March 2009

Remote and sparsely settled Tibet is a most unlikely region for demographic analysis. In view of the complete absence of current population statistics from China, however, the recent publication of a few figures for Tibet make it unique among Chinese provinces. Nonetheless, the figures themselves are only of secondary importance. Their primary significance is in the indirect commentary on the general handling of population statistics by the Chinese Communists.
The Chinese Economy in 1976
Authors: MacDougall Colina
Published: March 2009

The year 1976 was the most traumatic for China since the foundation of the People's Republic, and so it is hardly surprising that the economy suffered. The death of Premier Chou En-lai in January and the declining health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung intensified a power-struggle that swiftly came to a peak when the chairman died in September. How to run the economy was one of the main issues disputed by the so-called radicals and moderates among the leadership, though there is no evidence that the radicals, Chiang Ch'ing and her associates, ever gave much real thought to the practical side of production. Both the power-struggle itself and the relaxation of authority that resulted from it did considerable harm to the economy. This was aggravated by the disastrous Tangshan earthquake in July which severely damaged the immediate area. Thereafter, relief and repair work put a great strain on rail services, fuel resources and factories elsewhere in China.
The Sale of a Hen
Authors: Wei Shu
Published: March 2009

A young girl was walking along the road to Hung-wu-chen, the road which led to market. You would say she was about seventeen or eighteen, and clasped in her arms she carried a white hen. Trotting by her side was a little girl of seven or eight who had come along to buy some little cakes and see what was going on. They were sisters, and their names were Kai-kai and Eh-eh. The sisters talked as they went.
Lu Hsün and the Communist Party
Authors: Mills Harriet C.
Published: March 2009

In terms of his impact on the young intelligentsia of China, particularly in the 1930s, and of the emotional symbolism as patriot and reformer with which his name is charged, Lu Hsün (1881–1936) was the most powerful figure in modern Chinese letters. For the last seven years of his life he was openly identified with Communist-led left-wing cultural movements in China. Today he is honoured by the Chinese Communist Party as the great cultural hero of the Chinese Revolution. His homes have become museums, jiis tomb a shrine. He is presented as a Communist in everything but name.
The 1960 Moscow Statement
Authors:   Document
Published: March 2009

Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties have discussed at this Meeting urgent problems of the present international situation and of the further struggle for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.
China and the Global Revolution
Authors: Boorman Howard L.
Published: March 2009

The man who faces his typewriter to set down a thousand words of coherent comment on the Communist revolution in China confronts not only a massive experiment in social engineering but also the fact that his interpretation of that experiment will expose as much of the author as it does of the revolution. Some observers, moved by a deep attachment to the distinctive cultural unity of China and by an antiquarian admiration for the achievements of her traditional elite, seek, as if by public subscription, the preservation of China's relics. Others, more concerned with Communism than with China, see in Mao Tse-tung's progress only the relentless efforts of a new, technological despotism to mould man to the purposes of the totalitarian state. In this revolution, as in others before, the contemporary observer is prone to apply his own measure and thus to fall victim to his own distortion.
Order, Power and Modernisation
Authors: Fitzgerald C. P.
Published: March 2009

A few days after the Japanese occupied Peking in the early days of July 1937, the correspondent of a leading British newspaper wrote his verdict on these events. “With the Japanese occupation,” he said, “the fate of Peking and China has been settled for at least a hundred years.” At that time many would have agreed. China had been drifting to disaster for forty years, and few believed that the Chinese people had the energy, courage or ability to reverse the course of events. Today, more than twenty years later, and after ten years of the Communist régime, the question is no longer what some outside power may do to China, but what China may do to her neighbours. The disorderly aftermath of the Chinese Empire has been settled, the state is once more all too powerful; enormous changes have taken place in the economy and social system. These changes have been initiated and carried through by the Communist régime, in the name of the Chinese people, but in accordance with the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism. The Chinese Communists will be the first to claim that this is so, even if, here and there, the facts do not always support such a claim.
Agrarian Policy and Communist Motivation
Authors: Lindsay Michael
Published: March 2009

What is the best hypothesis to explain the development of the Chinese People's Republic since 1949? Perhaps that, in the view which has dominated the Chinese Communist leadership, the policies of the Yenan period (1935—45) were a deviation from the preferred line of development; the true road was that along which the Party had started in the period of the Chinese Soviet Republic (1931–34) and to which it returned as soon as its power was sufficiently consolidated. This can explain both the considerable practical differences between Chinese-style and Russian-style Communism during the Yenan period and also the failure of predictions based on the assumption that the trends of the Yenan period would continue.
Communist China and Nuclear Warfare
Authors: Hsieh Alice Langley
Published: March 2009

The Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centres, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernised, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power.
The Use of Radio in China
Authors: Howse Hugh
Published: March 2009

The very size of China has imposed on all who would rule it the twin problems of unification and control. Indeed the very first Chinese Emperor, as opposed to Kings among Kings, Ch'in Shih-huang (d. 210 b.c.) achieved the hegemony and his right to this title by being the first to solve these problems. Their continuing intractability in China, despite the mould of history and the unifying cement of the Chinese script, is reflected in Sun Yat-sen's description of the Chinese people more than 2,000 years later as “loose sand.” Ch'in Shih-huang had the stern admonitions of the Legalists as his aid to unification and Sun Yat-sen revolutionary fervour as his. There is no doubt that both or, for that matter, any other would-be ruler in between these two ends of the time scale in China, would have seized on radio as an additional aid, had its potentialities been available to them. Given this basic Chinese problem of unification and control, the failure of the Kuomintang to exploit radio on any effective scale is therefore surprising. China's latest rulers, faced not only with this old problem but also with a new ideology to spread and a new orthodoxy to engender, have naturally sought to exploit it to the full.
The Maoist Legacy and China's New Industrialization Strategy
Authors: Kueh Y. Y.
Published: March 2009

Any attempt to evaluate China's achievements in industrialization during the past four decades must confront three crucial issues. They are: first, to what extent industrial success was gained at the expense of slower agricultural growth as a result of the Soviet-style, forced industrialization strategy. Secondly, whether in view of the perceived need to narrow the gap between the under-developed interior and the more advanced coastal areas, Chinese leaders have succeeded in correcting regional imbalances in industrial production. Thirdly, whether advances in the modern industrial sector have benefited traditional, small-scale industries. This last question is an important one in the light of the experience of other industrialized countries, highlighting the “spill-over” effects of technical change from modern to traditional sectors.
40 Years On: Provincial Contrasts in China's Rural Economic Development
Authors: Walker Kenneth R.
Published: March 2009

The main contrast between official discussions of China's rural economic development that took place nearly 40 years ago and those of the late 1980s is not to be found in the identification of the problems themselves, but in the policies proposed for their solution. Then, as now, stress was placed on the problems arising from the adverse man-land ratio; on the crucial importance for China's industrial development of securing adequate supplies of grain; on balancing the latter consideration with the need to supply the light industries with agricultural raw materials such as cotton; on developing the livestock sector of agriculture (particularly pigs) in the interests of consumption and of soil fertility; and on the investment requirements of agriculture, especially in the realm of water conservation and irrigation. These have been the constant factors in discussions throughout the past 40 years.
Chinese Social Welfare: Policies and Outcomes
Authors: Davis Deborah
Published: March 2009

China in the 1980s is in the midst of a social revolution as far–reaching as either Land Reform or the early years of the Cultural Revolution. After four decades of championing the superiority of state monopolies and the evils of private ownership, the leaders of the Politburo have decollectivized agriculture, advocated commodification of land values, encouraged private trade and investment, and explicitly agreed that it is good if a few get rich first. Rural citizens in particular have responded with alacrity to this privatization of work and the retreat of the Party and the state from the daily management of agriculture. The household farm has become the basic unit of production for the first time since 1952, and private entrepreneurs have transformed the structure of rural commerce and manufacturing. Average incomes in rural areas trebled in the decade after 1977 and the economic gap between rural and urban citizens noticeably narrowed.
The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition
Authors: Hook Brian
Published: March 2009

In the course of the development of Hong Kong from an over-populated refuge to an international city of state dimensions, its government and political institutions have seldom been the object of detailed analysis by outside observers. One explanation may be that hitherto foreigners have been interested mainly in the performance of the economy to the exclusion of other considerations; now that external factors are influencing the internal affairs of Hong Kong and affecting prospects for growth, the local reaction to the possibility of hard times may be carefully scrutinized. Another, equally plausible, explanation is that since the government is colonial in style with no political parties mutually contesting at regular intervals to form a new administration, the political scene lacks the punctuation marks which would stimulate outside interest. Further consideration of this latter feature suggests that while senior civil servants and appointed representatives may govern impeccably they perforce avoid public debate, and in their public appearances are in any case no substitute for the charismatic leader when it comes to attracting foreign attention. At home, the Government of Hong Kong and its political institutions do not escape scrutiny so easily. Both universities have scholars working in this field and vigorous popular comment and debate is a daily characteristic of the mass media. From a local vantage point, contrary to what may be the view from abroad of an unchanging government and political institutions, significant changes have taken place as Hong Kong has undergone rapid physical development. Although they are changes within an established tradition of government, and do not therefore constitute a fundamental reform, they represent an important advance in community involvement in the administration of Hong Kong.
Growth, Public Policy and Hong Kong' Economic Relationship with China
Authors: Howe Christopher
Published: March 2009

Variations in economic performance have in recent years been subject to increasingly sophisticated analyses; but the chemistry of growth remains mysterious. Although we can usually measure the physical contributions to increased output, these variations rarely explain everything we wish to understand. This is unfortunate because it makes prediction hazardous, particularly in situations where basic parameters are changing. Nonetheless, the requirements of policy require an effort to be made, and it is the purpose of this article to describe and explain the changing economic scene in Hong Kong and thereby to draw attention to some of the economic dimensions of the changing relationship between Hong Kong and China. The main thesis of the article is that Hong Kong is already passing over an economic watershed, and that present and future relations with China must be seen in that light.
The Role of the Higher Education Sector in China's Research and Development System
Authors: Conroy R. J.
Published: March 2009

Since 1978 science and technology (S&T) have been officially seen as the motors of future growth and modernization of the Chinese economy. Much effort has been devoted to the formulation and implementation of policy to reform the S&T sector to ensure that it will contribute much more than it has in the past to social and economic development. One objective of the reforms has been to mobilize under-utilized resources to expand research and develop ment (R&D) activities. It is in this context that policy-makers in China started to focus their attention on the higher education sector (HES). The sector's potential role as an important R&D performer has been progressively articulated over time in breadth and depth as policy-makers’ concerns have expanded, to examine the relationship between training S&T personnel and scientific research in the context of the rapid changes wrought by the “new technological revolution” (xin jishu geming).
Shifting Journalistic Paradigms: Editorial Stance and Political Transition in Hong Kong
Authors: Chan Joseph Man , Lee Chin-Chuan
Published: March 2009

Since the signing of Sino–British Joint Declaration in September 1984 Hong Kong has entered a transitional phase, preparing for its ultimate return to China in 1997. This transition is characterized by a drastic redistribution of power and authority, and a realignment of social forces. Most significantly, a dualistic power structure has emerged, signifying a rapid decline of traditional British colonial dominance and a corresponding rise in the influence of the People's Republic of China in Hong Kong.
Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978–83
Authors: Lardy Nicholas R.
Published: March 2009

Marxist economists and socialist planners share the view that the major objective of socialist economic development is to meet the needs of mass consumption. During the debates that followed the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 there was a searching examination of the extent to which development policy in the previous two or more decades had succeeded in raising living standards. A central premise of the policies of reform and Readjustment that emerged by the late 1970s from this debate was that consumption growth since the 1950s had been too slow. What was the evidence to support this contention? In what ways has policy since 1978 sought to redirect economic growth towards increased levels of consumption? Have these policies been successful and to what extent are they likely to continue to raise living standards?
Economic Reform in China at the Xian Level
Authors: Kueh Y. Y.
Published: March 2009

In the terminology of Chinese planning the “state plan” (“guojia jihua”) embraces both the central and provincial plans, while the “local plan” (“difang jihua”) refers exclusively to the one for the xian (county) and its administrative equivalent, namely the provincial municipality. This distinction is seldom made in relevant western studies. The prevalent practice is to regard provincial and local planning as synonymous, in contrast to central planning. As a result, the xian as a separate planning authority has scarcely received any attention, except for some sporadic references made in connection with studies on local, especially rural, industries.
The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model
Authors: Halpern A. M.
Published: March 2009

As we all know only too well, the American student of Chinese Communist affairs must rely heavily on the recorded public utterances of representatives of the régime. The interpretation of such data is of course subject to a number of uncertainties. The ways in which public political statements can be used to deceive, to mislead, or to bargain are not always obvious. Even when a statement embodies a real calculation or the speaker's genuine perception of the world, the motive for making it may lie in the passing demands of small-scale tactics, or it may be of extreme subjective import to the speaker. One of the more favourable situations for analysis of this kind of material is found when linked propositions concerning a unitary topic are reiterated over a fairly long tune period, so that they occur in varying environmental contexts, with qualitative or quantitative variations in content, and with fluctuations of frequency or emphasis. The problem under examination here— the way the Chinese Communists have represented the significance for others of their experience in achieving power by revolutionary means— fits these last specifications.
Population Growth: Evidence and Interpretation
Authors: Aird John S.
Published: March 2009

A quarterof the human race resides hi Communist China, the largest population under a single authority in the world, and it has been growing. No one is likely to quarrel with that statement. But there are differences of opinion over just how large the population of China is and how rapid its rate of growth. This article will not attempt to review the technical aspects of these differences or to set one view against another, but will try to indicate what the range of opinion is, how the differences arise, why they cannot presently be resolved, and what they mean for those who wish to use Chinese population data.