bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Predictive Inference
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

A common type of inductive problem is to predict the nature of an unobserved finite sample of a given population on the basis of an observed finite sample of the same population. More precisely, given a class of events A, we examine a sample Sn having n members, of which mi belong to the class Bi. On the basis of our knowledge that mi/n of Sn have been Bi, we attempt to predict the ratio of members of Bi to members of A in a sample Sr containing r unobserved members of A. This type of inference has been called “predictive inference” by Carnap. It is not necessary to argue that all inductive problems reduce to this form; we merely observe that such problems frequently arise, and that they have practical and theoretical importance. In The Short Run I suggested that this kind of problem could be handled by first determining the long run probability P(A, Bi) of Bi, relative to A (presumably on the basis of the relative frequency Fn(A, Bi) of Bi, to A in the observed sample Sn) and then predicting that the relative frequency of Bi within the unobserved sample Sr (the short run) will approximate P(A, Bi) sufficiently for practical purposes. The foregoing procedure requires a rule of each of two types: a rule for the ascertainment of the values of long run probabilities, and a rule for the application of knowledge of long run probabilities to predictions in the short run. The Short Run was not concerned with the nature and justification of rules of the first type, but rather sought to justify a rule of the second type on the assumption that we already possess knowledge of long run probabilities.
Professor Quine, Pegasus, and Dr. Cartwright
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

In a recent issue of this journal Dr. Cartwright attempted to defend some views of Professor Quine's by arguing that my criticism [5] of these views was based on “serious misunderstandings of Quine,” “confusions,” and “mistakes.” I shall here attempt to show that in spite of Dr. Cartwright's vigorous characterizations my criticism of Quine was well founded and neither confused nor mistaken. First, I shall briefly discuss the notion of an ideal language.
Comments on Rollo Handy's “Personality Factors and Intellectual Production”
Authors: Robinson Bryan W.
Published: November 2002

Rollo Handy's recent discussion of “Personality Factors and Intellectual Production” is interesting and timely. It seems to me that one of the things he is saying is that, since we lack objective criteria for the evaluation of the various philosophies, we may be forced, reluctantly, to judge them, at least partially, on the basis of what type of person produced them. “But since we do not have generally accepted criteria for the worth of philosophic endeavors … we should at least become aware of the possible personality determinants of one's attitude toward philosophy. If certain distinguished philosophers, appearing in a psychological clinic, would be diagnosed as having severe personality disturbances, this is something we should know. The psychologists may be wrong, but then again they may be right. To say that this has no relevance at all to the worth of the philosopher's views seems ostrich-like.”
Types and Environments
Authors: Hiż H.
Published: November 2002

It is by now a commonplace that the classification of sciences into nomological and ideographical, which originated with Windelband, is neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Rather, there are sciences in which nomothetical (law establishing) activities are prevalent and there are sciences in which ideographical (describing peculiarities) efforts dominate. A third kind of enterprise is widespread throughout most, if not all, sciences: typological undertakings. In some sciences these are the most important and dominant projects. Linguistics tries to establish types of expressions: phonemes, morphemes, syntactical categories. History of art endeavors to set up various styles, i. e., types of art. General history attempts at well founding of such notions as revolution, reaction, buonapartism, findesieclism. When a historian declares that a revolution starts when a housewife cannot buy a chicken on the market, he divides the stream of events into periods according to a criterion that seems to him important, establishes similarities between different periods, and classifies them into types. Such typological activities are common not only in social sciences and humanities but also in physics which speaks about explosions, collisions, changes from a positive to a negative acceleration. A mathematician often enters into a typological venture, e.g., when he analyzes a function as increasing in an interval or describes it as concave upward in another interval. Typology may be conceived as containing the theory of classification. But there are typological problems that are not included in the theory of classification. A classification is performed on a class when its subclasses are defined. Typology, as suggested by the examples, may take a single object and try to conceive it as a summation of its fragments. To find a segmentation suitable from some point of view is not a classification. Rather, classification presupposes segmentation.
A Reappraisal of the Conceptual Scheme of Science
Authors: Caws Peter
Published: November 2002

1. Argument. Questions that have arisen about the “existence” of elementary particles and other entities of physics have often been dismissed as unprofitable, with the tacit assumption that the categories suitable for the discussion of everyday knowledge are not suitable for the discussion of physical knowledge, which requires mathematical treatment. But for the layman who stumbles at the discontinuity between his world and that of mathematical physics, and for the physicist who wishes his knowledge of the world to have some kind of unity, a scheme which will embrace both kinds of knowledge is essential. Such a scheme is developed from a consideration of the dependence on mind, and conceptual modes of thought, common to science and all other intellectual approaches to the world, which is seen clearly in the growth of science from more primitive concepts. It begins with the concept as the most elementary category of the organization of experience, and moves to the construct, a distinctly scientific category arising out of the concept, and the isolate, corresponding to elements of reality not directly perceived. An escape from certain paradoxes generated by the incomplete nature of perceptual experience is thus provided.
Ideal Language and Kinship Structure
Authors: Gellner Ernest
Published: November 2002

This paper is inter-disciplinary. Its disadvantage is that the author is not sufficiently conversant with the disciplines it is inter. He may however, like Lord Wavell, claim that at least the thread that binds them is his own.

The paper is of philosophic interest in that it is inspired by, and hopes to shed some light on, the notion of an ideal language. It is of interest to social anthropology in that its main subject is kinship structure. It may be of interest to mathematicians in setting a task.
Pragmatism, Intuitionism, and Formalism
Authors: Patin Henry A.
Published: November 2002

“… there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.”

“… Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”

One example which Peirce chose to illustrate his pragmatic maxim as thus stated was the familiar theological distinction between transubstantiation and consubstantiation. Now (Peirce says) since these two doctrines agree in all of the effects which they conceive the sacrament to possess and which may have practical bearings, here and hereafter, it is absurd to say that there is any real distinction between the two doctrines. Peirce declares in the same passage that, having used the question as a logical example only, he does not care to pause to anticipate the theologian's reply.
A Possible Model for Ideas
Authors: Delgado Rafael Rodriguez
Published: November 2002

In order to understand man's different and often contradictory ideologies we need to explore their deeper roots, analyzing ideas. We do not comprehend the nature of ideas and yet we use and oppose them, realizing that they are wonderful and dangerous entities whose action is comparable to that of drugs. They depress or stimulate the organism, leading men toward great deeds or toward individual and collective disaster. Ideas interfere with the autonomic mechanisms of the body, and are also projected into the social world, creating machines, institutions, methods and goals. Notwithstanding, we usually pay little attention to this tool, creator of all other tools and root of human activity. Assuredly a theory of the idea and of ideologies cannot be developed without the convergent effort of scientists and philosophers, but we can glimpse the possibility of its construction, conscious nevertheless, of our shortcomings and of the provisional character of the presented synthesis.
Relativity: An Epistemological Appraisal
Authors: Margenau Henry , Mould Richard A.
Published: November 2002

This paper is the forerunner of an extensive logical analysis of the relativity idea, in which an axiomatic structure based upon the principles of topology is developed. It is meant to expose the manner in which relativity stretches from the pole of pure conception to that of factual observation, from the a priori to the a posteriori. We take pains to show, in connection with special relativity, precisely which elements are postulational and which are verifiable empirically. Our attempt can be somewhat naively characterized as an effort to show how misguided it is to “derive” relativity from such experimental facts as the Michelson-Morley experiment—as so many textbooks profess to do.
Non-Quantal Foundations of Quantum Theory
Authors: Landé Alfred
Published: November 2002

Bertrand Russell in “New Hopes for a Changing World” (1) writes the following passage:

“The science of economics has been wrapped around by the theorists in a series of many veils, which have caused the plain man to suppose that there must be something indecent about its naked form. I think that the only thing to do in view of this situation is to begin at the beginning with matters of such simplicity that the reader may be indignant at finding them mentioned …”.
The Quantum Theoretical Concept of Measurement
Authors: McKnight John L.
Published: November 2002

As a preliminary to the modern theory of measurement with which this paper is chiefly concerned, it is desirable to review a few of the characteristics and implications of classical physics to illustrate the far reaching changes that have taken place in our conception of nature as the result of the development of quantum mechanics.
Combinatory Logic and Whitehead's Theory of Prehensions
Authors: Fitch Frederic B.
Published: November 2002

In this paper I wish to reformulate in my own way some parts of Whitehead's theory of prehensions. This reformulation will deviate in various respects from Whitehead's own detailed views and terminology, but the main inspiration is from Whitehead (1).
Notes on the Verifiability of Economic Laws
Authors: Grunberg Emile
Published: November 2002

To-day economics is considered the most highly developed discipline among the social sciences. Yet, its explanatory and predictive powers are admitted by all hands to be weak compared to those possessed by the physical sciences. This weakness is still frequently explained by apologetic references to the relatively tender age of economic science. This apparently implies that in the normal course of time economics will grow up and achieve the stature and powers of say, physics. The trouble with this argument is that economics is certainly as old as physics. If it lags behind other disciplines in predictive and explanatory powers, lack of time cannot be the cause.
Knowledge and Experience: Comment on a Paper by L. von Bertalanffy on “The Relativity of Categories”
Authors: McKinney J. P.
Published: November 2002

Any discussion of the relativity of categories necessarily opens up questions of prime interest for the theory of knowledge, and it appears to me that L. von Bertalanffy's paper (Philosophy of Science Oct. 1955) points to certain implications which, though they were incidental to his particular approach to the problem, might repay further elaboration.
Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction
Authors: Brodbeck May
Published: November 2002

The Reformation, it has been said, changed the course of history. Most people would agree. At the very least, agree or not, they would hold the proposition to be one worth considering. They would be unlikely to reject it out of hand as incapable of being either true or false because it had no meaning. For, of course, “everybody knows” what the Reformation was and, elaborating a little, we can make clear what we meant by changing the course of history. Yet it is just statements of this sort that cause much methodological wrangling. Their controversial nature is due, in large part, to controversy over the status of such terms as “the Reformation” and, generally, group or macroscopic concepts. Since not only history, but sociology, political science, social psychology, and economics also widely use concepts referring to groups and their properties, rather than to individuals, the controversy has wide ramifications. And because there are, as it were, so many vested interests involved, the dispute also tends to acquire an ideological tone not altogether consonant with dispassionate inquiry. Bad temper and mutual recrimination in scientific discussion are generally a sign that ideological defenses are being shored up. Just possibly, a philosopher whose substantive concern in any empirical field is minimal may hope to be considered above the battle, as one who, having no private axe to grind, can be concerned only with clarifying the logical issues involved. In this hope, I wish to explore as systematically as possible the tangled web of issues woven about the status of group concepts and their relationship to those referring to individuals. Intertwined in this controversy are two different issues. One has to do with the nature of the terms or concepts of social science; the other with the nature of its laws and theories and their relationship in turn to those in other areas. The first issue is one of meaning, the second of reduction. Success in unsnarling the various strands of this web may alone help abate the fury of the controversy.
Philosophical Problems Concerning the Meaning of Measurement in Physics
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

The trouble with the idea of measurement is its seeming clarity, its obviousness, its implicit claim to finality in any inquisotory discourse. Its status in philosophy of science is taken to be utterly primitive; hence the difficulties it embodies, if any, tend to escape detection and scrutiny. Yet it cannot be primitive in the sense of being exempt from analysis; for if it were every measurement would require to be simply accepted as a protocol of truth, and one should never ask which of two conflicting measurements is correct, or preferable. Such questions are continually being asked, and their propriety in science indicates that even measurement, with its implication of simplicity and adroitness, points beyond itself to other matters of importance on which it relies for validation.
The Objectivity of History
Authors: Hinshaw Virgil
Published: November 2002

Can history be objective? Is history a science or humanistic discipline? What is its subject-matter? These three questions are variations on a single theme—the objectivity of history—which I want to explore. Faced with the welter of claims and counter-claims regarding objectivity in history, there is need to be explicit about one's approach to these claims. My prime endeavor in this paper is to reformulate these questions from my scheme of reference. I want to consider the objectivity of historical knowledge from a framework that does justice both to philosophic and methological issues and to historical knowledge-claims themselves. How this philosophic framework be labeled is immaterial. What is alone important is that it does distinguish philosophy proper from both science and its methodological analysis. Confusion between the three, I believe, frequently generates problems out of whole cloth. The result is that obfuscation of issues present in much recent literature concerning history.
History and Science in Anthropology
Authors: Swartz Marc J.
Published: November 2002

The basic issues which this paper will be concerned with are: how has history been defined, what has been asked about history, and what sort of answers have been found. These questions may also be stated as: what is the nature of historical theory (since “theory” here will mean any set of definitions, assumptions, and operating hypotheses) and how do different theories affect what may “be done” with history.
Phenomenological Idiom and Perceptual Mode
Authors: Myers Charles M.
Published: November 2002

When phenomenological descriptions of perceptual experience are given it often seems that the distinction between mode and content of perceptual experience is not given the attention it deserves and that consequently certain philosophical difficulties develop which might have been avoided. While it will no doubt be admitted that the distinction between the “how” and the “what” of appearing is of importance in the phenomenology of perception, at first sight the making of such a distinction may seem so simple as to be hardly worth discussing. It may seem to involve a mere matter of distinguishing modifiers of the verb “to perceive” from this verb's direct objects and their modifiers, but further consideration shows the situation is not that simple. In some cases there are alternative ways of phenomenological description such that what one description seems to indicate to be content is what the other description seems to indicate to be mode, and yet the two descriptions are seen to be equivalent in intent. If we analyze one expression in accordance with its grammar then the alternative expression must be considered idiomatic, that is, not analyzable in accordance with its grammar, for otherwise the two expressions could not be considered compatible.
A Theory of Evidence
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

This is a study of the logic of the concept of evidence. Two distinct concepts of evidence will be explicated and analyzed: confirming evidence by means of which an hypothesis is established, and supporting evidence which does not establish the hypothesis, but merely renders it more tenable. The formal characteristics of each of these concepts of evidence will be examined in detail in Part II. (Part I deals with the auxiliary notion of evidential presumption.) In Part III these considerations are used as a basis for a survey of rules of evidence in order to establish the systematic character of the evidential relationship from the standpoint of formal logic. Finally, the Conclusion appends a brief indication of the methodological bearing of the logical theory of evidence.
Value, Fact and Science
Authors: Hartman Robert S.
Published: November 2002

Professor Everett W. Hall's new book, Modern Science and Human Values, one of the most important to have appeared in the field of Value Theory in the last ten years, shares in rich measure the common characteristic of so many other “prolegomena” to the future discipline of values: it is almost maddeningly frustrating. It sees with crystal clearness the essence of the scientific method and describes it in brilliant detail, from Galileo to Einstein; but it fails to draw a positive moral for value theory. On the contrary, its thesis is thoroughly negative: although value must be known as thoroughly as fact if the world is to survive, the scientific method that has brought us knowledge of fact can never bring us knowledge of value. For fact and value are fundamentally different, fact is known by science in a way that excludes value, and hence, whatever may be the way by which value is to be known, it cannot be science. It is true, science has given the most powerful and incisive formulation to fact while value theory has done nothing of the sort for value. Value theory, therefore, must be brought up to the level of science, otherwise there is danger that we may perish under the impact of science. But how to bring this about, how to construct a value theory as powerful and as representative of value as science is of fact, that is the question which the book can only ask but not answer.
The Incongruity of Counterparts
Authors: Mayo Bernard
Published: November 2002

When a body is turned through 180°, reversal occurs in two dimensions. If it is turned about the vertical axis, then left and right sides change places, and also front and back. If it is turned about the horizontal axis which runs from side to side, then top and bottom change places, and also front and back. If, finally, it is turned about the horizontal axis which runs from front to back, then left and right change places as well as top and bottom. All this appears to follow from the properties of three-dimensional space and of rigid bodies. If XOX' is the axis of rotation of a three-dimensional structure, then there are two axes YOY' and ZOZ' at right angles to XOX', and if one of these moves round 180°, then so must the other. It follows that a body is always reversed in two dimensions whenever it is turned about an axis in the third. It follows also that there are always two ways of turning a body in space so as to reverse it in a given dimension: namely by turning it about either of two axes perpendicular to the given dimension.
Formalization of the Concept “About”
Authors: Putman Hilary
Published: November 2002

The question, what a given statement is “about,” often occurs in philosophic discussion. I shall use this question in the hope of illustrating how a relatively simple application of symbolic logic can clarify a problem which might otherwise turn into a maze of complications.
Some Considerations Concerning “Interpretative Systems”
Authors: Stopes-Roe Harry V.
Published: November 2002

In 1954 Hempel wrote “Once the idea of a partial specification of meaning is granted, it appears unnecessarily restrictive, however, to limit the sentences effecting such partial interpretation to reduction sentences in Carnap's sense. … Generally, then, a set of one or more theoretical terms, t1, t2 ⃛, tn, might be introduced by any set M of sentences such that (i) M contains no extralogical terms other than t1, t2 ⃛, tn, and observation terms, (ii) M is logically consistent, and (iii) M is not equivalent to a truth of formal logic. The last two of these conditions serve merely to exclude trivial extreme cases. A set M of this kind will be referred to briefly as an interpretative system, its elements as interpretative sentences.” This is the last move in a process in which the idea of definition has been widened beyond the explicit or equivalence definition which was the basis of earlier thought on the subject of introducing new words into a language. It would seem that the scheme proposed by Hempel must represent the final move, for it would seem difficult to conceive any more liberal description of a purely direct and verbal scheme (that is, one excluding watching, and processes of suggestion). Among the predecessors of Hempel in this liberalising movement I will mention Ramsey and Braithwaite whose views stem ultimately from Campbell, and are based on the idea that the “interpretative system” is essentially a scientific theory, and Carnap who introduced the particular notion of a “reduction sentence” (mentioned in the quotation above), and who was more directly the source of Hempel's own ideas.
The Means End Relation and its Significance for Cross-Cultural Ethical Agreement
Authors: Fontaine William T.
Published: November 2002

Radical ethical relativism as presented in Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture not only denies absolute values, its thesis of the incommensurability of cultural configurations precludes possibility of any agreement on values by individuals of different cultures. This fact provides the proper perspective from which to judge the current controversy between radical and “modified” ethical relativists. A double error is committed, therefore, by those who contend that there has been no reduction of the “area of indeterminacy” existing between the ethical principles of different cultures since, despite the newer developments in the social sciences, there are still no absolutely valid ethical values. Not only is the term “validity” vague and in need of reinterpretation, but, in assuming the denial of absolute values to be the distinguishing characteristic of radical relativism, they actually identify this theory with modified relativism. This brief paper attempts to prove the untenability of the denial of cross cultural agreement on ends and means by treating the question first, from the point of view of C. L. Stevenson's Dewey-inspired notion of the derivation of ends from means, and, second, from that of Stevenson's more original idea, complex ethical agreement.
Ethics and Esthetics on a Biological Basis
Authors: Bachem A.
Published: November 2002

Most philosophical systems of ethics are based upon the reciprocity principle as expressed by the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you!” The same idea underlies Kant's categorical imperative: “Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law!” Here, the individual act is generalized into, and considered as the specific application of the general law of ethics.
Philosophic Conceptions in Mendeleev's Principles of Chemistry
Authors: Kultgen J. H.
Published: November 2002

Dmitri Mendeleev, while not creatively a philosopher of science, nor a student of systematic philosophy, was eminently a philosophical scientist. Concern about the nature and foundations of his science is evident throughout the text and footnotes of the Principles of Chemistry. One has to presume that his conclusions provided him with some direction for “the study of his great generalizations” in chemistry, especially for the greatest fruit of his efforts, the Periodic System of the Elements. At least it is apparent that somehow he acquired a much greater confidence in the feasibility of systemizing extant chemical knowledge than almost any of his contemporaries.
Scientific Naming
Authors: Kent William
Published: November 2002

Theory and Practice; Precision and Vagueness. There has long been a conflict between the theory and the practice of scientific naming. The theory expressed both by working scientists and by philosophers has almost always been that precision is an essential part of the scientific attitude and of the procedures and results of science. Theoretically, metaphors have been scorned as belonging to poetry or to philosophy rather than to science. In scientific practice, however, vagueness and metaphor are constantly present; and they are particularly evident at the advancing frontiers of any science, whether mathematical, natural, or social.
Biologische Erkenntnis und Moderne Physik
Authors: Itō Schuntaro
Published: November 2002

Die neuere Naturwissenschaft trat im 17. Jahrhundert zuerst als “Physik” auf. Man soll sich an die Gründung der modernen Dynamik von Galileo und Newton erinnern.

Die methodisch-allgemeine Grundlegung dieser neuen Wissenschaft wird in der Cartesischen Philosophie am klarsten ausgedrückt.
Some Remarks on the Logic of Explanation
Authors: Skarsgård Lars
Published: November 2002

These considerations on Carl G. Hempel's and Paul Oppenheim's lucid article “Studies in the Logic of Explanation'”—LE for short—are an attempt to exploit some of the considerable advances made there. I wish to show how these advances may be incorporated into a technique for the investigation of problems of the philosophy of science, which has been calleddiscourse-analytic.This discipline consists essentially in a technique of examining actual texts provided by specialists, such as physicists, psychologists, historians, etc., the task being to discover fundamental logical and semantical features in the discourses under investigation. I am preparing a book on historical explanation, which will contain such case studies of historical texts.
An Extended Latency Interpretation of Quantum Mechanical Measurement
Authors: McKnight John Lacy
Published: November 2002

(1) the author has outlined several of the more important interpretations of measurement in quantum mechanics and discussed the problems arising from them. Particular attention was paid to the work of Bohr, Heisenberg and von Neumann and a tentative proposal was made for a possible interpretation which would mitigate some of the problems and dilemmas. This interpretation was essentially that proposed by Margenau (2) in terms of latent variables. He defines measurement to be any operation with physical apparatus which results in a number, including in this, of course, yes and no answers as well as conventional numerical answers. Further he makes the distinction between the preparation of a state and the measurement of the state (3). A preparation puts the quantum system into a particular state whereas the measurement frequently destroys the state in question. This paper presents several criteria to help in the evaluation of the alternatives presented in the first paper and carries further the suggested interpretation mentioned at the end of that paper.
Flexible Scientific Naturalism and Dialectical Fundamentalism
Authors: Riepe Dale
Published: November 2002

By dialectical fundamentalism I mean the view that maintains the inerrancy of the orthodox classical scriptures of dialectical materialism; by flexible scientific naturalism I mean the view recognizing the past heuristic value of dialectical materialism, but also the realization for the need to develop and change it along lines suggested by complementary philosophies relevant to the scientific outlook.
Scarcity and the Concepts of Ethics
Authors: Walsh V. C.
Published: November 2002

Moral philosophers have often felt the need of a concept which would cover all those cases where we are prevented from achieving our ends through no fault of our own: a criterion for saying when failure is not blameworthy. The deontologists thought we were not to blame for actions done in genuine ignorance of the facts. Kant declared in a famous passage that we were not morally responsible for failures due to the “niggardliness of stepmother nature.” In this article I want to introduce into moral philosophy a new concept for clarifying the failures for which we are not to blame: the notion of scarcity, taken from economic theory.
Representation of Sequential Circuits in Combinatory Logic
Authors: Fitch Frederic B.
Published: November 2002

We will be dealing with “sequential circuits” in the sense of E. F. Moore and G. H. Mealy. Each such circuit is assumed to have a finite number of input wires (possibly none) and a finite number of output wires (but at least one). Each element of such a circuit will be assumed to be an and-circuit, an or-circuit, a not-circuit, or a delay circuit, for some specified temporal delay. Each element has one output wire which, however, may branch in order to serve several purposes simultaneously. (Similarly the inputs of the total circuit may be allowed to branch.) The and-circuits and or-circuits have two input wires each, while the not-circuits and the delay circuits have one input wire each.
The Burali-Forti Paradox
Authors: Copi Irving M.
Published: November 2002

The year 1897 saw the publication of the first of the modern logical paradoxes. It was published by Cesare Burali-Forti, the Italian mathematician whose name it has come to bear. Burali-Forti's own formulation of the paradox was not altogether satisfactory, as he had confused well-ordered sets as defined by Cantor with what he himself called “perfectly ordered sets” (“Classe parfettamente ordinata”). However, he soon realized his mistake, and published a note admitting the error and making the correction. He concluded the note with the observation that his result could be established on the basis of the correct definition of well-ordered set as easily as for the “perfectly ordered sets” for which it had first been obtained. We shall reproduce his results in their corrected form.
Retardation in Cosmology
Authors: Moon Parry , Spencer Domina Eberle
Published: November 2002

Of the many cosmological models developed during the past forty years, none is completely satisfactory; so work continues in the development of new models and in the checking of their predictions against the growing mass of experimental evidence. The validity of a model rests on its agreement with experimental data, particularly the data on distribution of galaxies and on redshifts.
The Evolution of a Human Nature
Authors: Williams Thomas Rhys
Published: November 2002

This discussion recounts the development of several anthropological definitions of human nature. It then examines conclusions of studies in other disciplines that make possible a revised empirical definition of human nature and which have led to reexamination of paleoanthropological data classed as unimportant under the rubrics of precceding studies. Finally, this discussion appraises certain of these data, as they pertain to the question: “Do empirical evidences suggest that a human nature, as well as a human structure, may be the product of evolutionary processes ?”
On the Confirmation of Laws
Authors: Darlington Jared
Published: November 2002

The author discusses some difficulties involved in the application of “degree of confirmation” to the confirmation of lawlike-statements. An alternative analysis is proposed, which is based on interval estimation. It is argued that this analysis is superior to the criticized method, in that it is better able to show how instantial confirmations are inductively relevant to a law, and in that it requires fewer undesirable extra-logical assumptions.
Confirmation and Hypothesis
Authors: Resnick Lawrence
Published: November 2002

This article consists in a critical examination of an argument which purports to prove that many scientific hypotheses held to be probable are actually certain. The argument rests on the assumption that since the nonphilosopher would say of many scientific hypotheses that they are certain and would deny that the best-established hypotheses are merely probable, philosophers who say that no scientific hypotheses are certain must be mistaken. Examination reveals that the argument fails to take account of the technical nature of the claim that even the best-established hypotheses are probable.
Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
Authors: Bork Alfred Morton
Published: November 2002

The methodology of the empirical sciences is treated from a set-theoretical point of view. Starting from Tarski's formulation of the methodology of the deductive sciences, a relation between terms, called degree of centrality, is introduced. Epistemic correlation, and therefore the notion of interpretative system, is defined using this relation.
Rejoinder on the Principle of Simplicity
Authors: Feuer Lewis S.
Published: November 2002

There are three points which Professor Schlesinger makes in his criticism of my discussion of the principle of simplicity.

(1)

He holds that the principles of simplicity and verifiability may in actual use contradict each other. The simpler hypothesis will be rejected, he maintains, if it leads to unverified consequences.

(2)

He holds that it is legitimate to add auxiliary hypotheses to one's theory, if it is desired to allow, let us say, for the creation of the universe by a deity, or to exclude the possibility for all time of such events as a pail of water freezing on fire.

(3)

He maintains with Bridgman that the cosmogonists' use of the simple notion that the same laws of nature hold throughout space-time leads to “perfectly hair-raising extrapolations” which a verificationist will reject.
Toward a Clarification of System Analysis in the Social Sciences
Authors: Blalock H. M. , Blalock Ann B.
Published: November 2002

This paper attempts to outline some of the important concepts and ideas used in system analysis which is taken to be a general mode of analysis used in all sciences. Systems are seen from three perspectives: (1) that involving the relationship between system and environment, (2) that involving interaction between several systems, and (3) that involving one type of system composed of other types of systems. The writers also discuss the concepts “structure” and “equilibrium” as they apply to system analysis, the point being made that the use of these concepts in the social sciences has often been vague or even incorrect.
Physicalism, Behaviorism and Phenomena
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

The issue of materialism has recently been raised again. Mr. Putnam argues against philosophical behaviorism [4]. Such a position holds, as he construes it, that statements like ‘Jones is angry’ can be analyzed in solely behavioral terms. When one argues against philosophical behaviorism, he might be expected to distinguish this metaphysical position from behavior science. Putnam, however, does not make the distinction. Consequently he argues against both. I shall first state the distinction between these two different things, namely, philosophical behaviorism and behavior science, as I see it. The behavior scientist adopts the thesis that in principle it is possible to predict future behavior on the basis of data concerning environmental, behavioral, and physiological variables. All three of these he considers in physical terms. The behavior scientist thus speaks about physical objects and properties of such. Talking in such terms, he believes that it is in principle possible to coordinate to statements asserting that person X has or is in state of mind Y another statement, employing only the above mentioned physical terms, such that either both are true or both are false. The reasons for the behavior scientist's program are the well known quandaries involved in the observation of other people's minds and the need for intersubjective verification in science. One can further distinguish between a narrower and a broader view of behavior science. The former restricts itself to environmental and behavioral variables at what some call the macro level; the latter includes, or even concentrates upon, physiological variables. As scientists neither the behaviorist nor the physiologist asks or answers philosophical questions, either epistemological or ontological, about minds, bodies, and mental contents.
History, Freedom, and Responsibility
Authors: Raab Francis V.
Published: November 2002

Professor Isaiah Berlin has written an extremely lively polemic against those metaphysical theories of history which by regarding all human actions as inevitable, make it morally improper to censure the actors. Such theories attempt to give a comprehensive explanation of historical change in terms of some abstraction such as The Masses, The Absolute Spirit, Tradition, etc. which is supposedly the real dynamism or determinant of human history. What he opposes in these theories is that they seem to entail that individuals are at the mercy of forces they are not aware of, much less understand; they have no choices or alternatives, for their actions are predetermined by the necessity of the fulfillment of some over-all Plan or Realization. Such a view if taken seriously would make it improper for the historian or anyone else to blame, say, Napoleon, or claim that he could have pursued a different policy.
Mach's Principle
Authors: Moon Parry , Spencer Domina Eberle
Published: November 2002

Recession of the galaxies indicates a repulsive force and suggests that Newton's formulation of gravitation is not complete. A possible modification is proposed, and this Neo-Newtonian equation allows a quantitative treatment of Mach's principle. It also limits the velocity of matter to c and gives a correct prediction for the perihelion of Mercury.
The Resolution of the Clock Paradox
Authors: Builder Geoffrey
Published: November 2002

Two ideal standard clocks, effectively isolated from interaction with other physical systems, and in a region of the universe free of gravitational fields, are assumed to move in any arbitrary manner so that they coincide on at least two occasions. In general, the reading of one of them will become retarded relative to the other in the interval between successive coincidences. This relative retardation is predicted by the restricted theory of relativity, taken together with the assumption that the ‘rate’ of a clock depends only on its velocity and not on its acceleration. The recognized procedure for calculating the retardation in terms of clock ‘rates’ is set out, and is illustrated by its application to a simple hypothetical experiment in which one clock remains at rest and the other travels away from and back to it with constant speed in a straight line.

There is nothing paradoxical in the predicted retardation as such. The so-called 'clock paradox' arises because an alternative, and apparently valid, calculation procedure, also based on clock 'rates', leads to a contradictory result. The term ‘paradox’ is something of a euphemism since the two predictions are contradictories.

It is shown that the paradox does not arise when direct use is made of the Lorentz transformation without introducing the additional, and non-essential, step in reasoning involved in utilizing the clock ‘rates’. It is then shown that the paradox arises only through using these clock ‘rates’ without due regard to the exact significance of the quantities so described; once this is recognized the paradox is resolved completely within the framework of the restricted theory, which then provides a unique and unambiguous prediction of the relative retardation.

Once the paradox is thus resolved, the general theory of relativity can add nothing significant to the analysis. It is shown that the application of the principle of equivalence is essentially trivial; in effect, Einstein and Tolman evaded the real logical issue raised by the contradictory predictions by denying the applicability of the restricted theory and then utilizing, by means of the principle of equivalence, results obtained from it. This tortuous procedure succeeded in evading the paradox rather than in resolving it; it would obviously be quite invalid were the restricted theory indeed inapplicable to the problem.
The Clock Paradox and Thermodynamics
Authors: Rosen Philip
Published: November 2002

The twin paradox of relativity theory is reviewed. A distinction is made between physical clocks and biological ones. It is suggested that metabolic activity might be a better measure of aging than physical time. Further it is suggested that entropy changes representing metabolic activity would be a good way to describe aging. Using the above criterion it appears that a traveling twin will be older than his brother.
Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies
Authors: Leonard Henry S.
Published: November 2002

This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false.

The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, declarative, interrogative, or imperative. The analysis aims to show that meaning is to be attributed to the uttered or written sentence-token, rather to the thereby exhibited sentence-type. Further, the meaning of the sentential token is to be identified with a purpose of the speaker, that the speaker would reveal to the addressee by uttering the sentence.

The to be revealed purpose is analysed into two components: an ultimate concern (that the addressee stand in such and such a relation—e.g., of believing, or informing the speaker about, or making it true that) and an ultimate topic of concern (the state of affairs, i.e., proposition, relative to which the speaker would have the addressee stand in the specified relation).

Sentential utterances “signify” different purposes by “expressing” different ultimate concerns and “indicating ”different ultimate topics of concern. Variations in expressed concern are correlated with variations in sentential form, such as declarative, interrogative and imperative. Variations in indicated topic of concern are correlated with variations in the subject and predicate of the uttered sentence. Thus, for example, utterances of “Johnny will jump in the lake,” “Will Johnny jump in the lake?” and “Johnny, go jump in the lake! ” all indicate one and the same ultimate topic of concern but express different ultimate concerns with this topic.

A sentential utterance is true or false according as its indicated topic of concern is true or false. Hence, declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives may all be classified as true or as false. But honesty or dishonesty is a function (explained in the paper) of the expressed concern, rather than of the topic of concern. Hence, although utterances of all sentential forms are honest or dishonest, their honesty or dishonesty is logically independent of their truth or falsity.
Peirce's Theory of Methodology
Authors: Bird Otto
Published: November 2002

Peirce conceived of methodology, or methodeutic, as he preferred to call it, as one of the three major parts of logic taken broadly—the other two being the theory of signs and formal logic. Unlike these two, however, his theory of methodology remained mostly programmatic, and there is little more than fragmentary suggestions about it scattered through his writings. But by gathering them together and pursuing their insights, it is possible to indicate how he might have divided and developed it: 1) The nature of scientific discourse and how it differs from non-scientific. 2) The logic of inquiry, both heuristic and systematic, according to the modes of argument as deductive, inductive, or abductive (i.e. hypothesis) or a combination or all three. 3) The assurance of science considered in the factors that thwart or promote inquiry.
The Functions of Definition in Science
Authors: Caws Peter
Published: November 2002

Definition is viewed in this paper as a cohesive element of theory, providing links between scientific constructs. The problem is approached first in terms of three orders—the historical, the logical, and the heuristic—in which the structure of science may be put together; a study of these is necessary if difficulties about priority of definition are to be resolved. The main part of the paper is devoted to an exercise in theory-construction which illustrates the five principal functions of definition—the grounding of constructs in observation, their descriptive interrelation, the development of logico-mathematical calculi, the interpretation of these calculi, and the provision of precise, quasi-mathematical relations between the constructs themselves. Reference is made throughout to the many names for the defining process found in earlier works, and problems of contextual definition, reduction, stipulative and lexical definition, etc., are dealt with briefly. The theory thus constructed is represented diagrammatically. It is shown that the analysis may be simplified, in general terms, by the use of two new categories, “internal” and “external” definition; and that this innovation may prove helpful in clarifying some traditional obscurities, and in preserving a necessary balance between a purely logical and a purely empirical approach to the philosophy of science.