bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Reality in Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

The philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been conceived by physicists as a collection of dogmas concerning what can be measured, observed and known. To this branch of dialectics the present paper does not attempt to contribute, chiefly because it is written from the conviction that no part of science, nor any philosophy, can safely predict what may be feasible or knowable. Rather, this brief essay endeavors to expose the epistemology of quantum physics in a way which allows it to be recognized as an extension of the ordinary processes of cognition, as the continuation of a line which starts in sensory perception, leads straight through the methods of classical physics into quantum mechanics and shows no signs of terminating even there.
The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory
Authors: Menzel Donald H. , Layzer David
Published: November 2002

Modern physics, which had its beginnings in the inclined-plane experiments of Galileo, deals with the measurable aspects of the world about us. The laws and definitions of classical physics are, at least superficially, differential equations in which each variable represents the result of a particular kind of measurement. These variables are usually called physical quantites. Starting from a few general laws and definitions we can derive formally further relations between the physical quantities and their rates of change in space and time. If the original definitions are self-consistent and the original laws accurate, the relations we derive from them should enable us to predict what the numerical result of a certain measurement will be whenever certain other measurements have yielded specified numerical results.
A Resolution of the “East-West Problem” by Way of a Scientific Humanism
Authors: Reiser Oliver L.
Published: November 2002

In October 1946 the U. S. Government summoned the representatives of Labor and Management to meet in Washington to try and find a basis for cooperation which would make possible increased productivity. For two days two hundred of the outstanding individuals in this field talked and debated. The results were hardly worth the efforts. The most appropriate summary of the “results” of these meetings was provided by Fortune magazine when it characterized the whole affair as a “meaningless squabble.“
A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy
Authors: Geiger George R.
Published: November 2002

There is a notion, cataleptic in its effects, that discussion in ethics and values must ultimately be blocked by the “naturalistic fallacy.” We can go so far in analyzing the categories of “good,” “right,” “ought,” “valuable,” and the like, but never so far as to embark from the field of logic or general philosophy and enter the alien provinces of science—at least with a visa. To think to reduce moral problems to those of psychology or biology or (in Northrop's amendment) to those of “culture,” is The Fallacy, insensitivity to which brands one as a positivist, a dupe of “scientism,” or at least a sympathetic fellow-traveller. Though the vocabulary of The Fallacy is not old—G. E. Moore and his earnest commentators will date it—the idea is almost as antique as philosophy itself; indeed, it is one of the prime devices whereby philosophy has managed to rationalize its subject-matter as something more than an historical accident.
An Epistemological Basis for Quantum Physics
Authors: Werkmeister W. H.
Published: November 2002

Philosophy of science and, more specifically, philosophy of quantum physics can be but special fields of a general philosophy of knowledge; and the problems arising in these fields can be evaluated properly only when they are seen under the perspective of the whole range of human knowledge. This paper deals with problems of quantum physics and, in particular, with the problem of scientific objects in quantum physics from the epistemological point of view previously defined in the author's books, A Philosophy of Science (1940) and The Basis and Structure of Knowledge (1948). The argument of the paper, however, has not been stated before in the direct and concise manner here attempted and may therefore contain elements of novelty even for those readers who are familiar with the books just mentioned.
Realism and Neo-Kantianism in Professor Margenau's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Professor Margenau's paper presents an analysis of physical theory which has the great merit of exhibiting classical physics and modern quantum mechanics as different aspects of the same epistemological and methodological framework.

By maintaining that “there is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave length and my construct of it” he is denying that the constructs of ordinary common sense and, a fortiori, the theoretical constructs of the physical sciences denote entities existing independently of our rational manipulation of them. This denial then enables him to treat constructs like “tree” and “electric current” exactly on a par with the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics not only methodologically but also ontologically. Once this is granted, he has prepared the ground for his synthesis of classical physics with quantum mechanics and is justified in inferring that “In quantum mechanics, then, the basic mode of description has remained unaltered while the rules of correspondence have undergone radical changes.”
Existential Hypotheses
Authors: Feigl Herbert
Published: November 2002

The intention of the present essay is to urge a reconsideration of the Realism-Phenomenalism-Issue, mainly and primarily in regard to the interpretation of scientific hypotheses; secondarily also relating to the basic problems of epistemology.
Impertinent Reflections on History of Science
Authors: Bridgman P. W.
Published: November 2002

History of Science is a many-sided subject, permitting approach from the point of view of various human interests, and presenting a wide variety of problems, many of them paradoxical and perhaps not capable of satisfactory solution. In the following it will probably seem to the reader a number of times that I am talking at cross purposes. Anything that I can say is of necessity limited by my background as a physicist.
On the Confirmation of Scientific Theories
Authors: Freund John E.
Published: November 2002

It has been questioned whether it is at all possible to give the term “probability” one uniform and consistent interpretation not merely in mathematics, statistics, evaluation of evidence, testing of hypotheses but also in any situation where we want to express a degree of belief. The question itself of assigning a probability to our belief in a scientific theory has raised important questions of an epistemological as well as mathematical nature.
The Scientist—Technician or Moralist?
Authors: Simpson George
Published: November 2002

The position that science is a technique establishing the means to achieve any stipulated end has now fanned out and been defended by social scientists as well as by natural scientists. It is the thesis of this paper that the bifurcation of science and morality derives from the social status of both science and scientists today, and involves, wittingly or unwittingly, an uncritical acceptance of dominant social values. Science is thus not non-moral, as is claimed, but rather appropriates conventional morality. Certain conditions have brought about this role for science and scientists.
Order and Surprise
Authors: Gardner Martin
Published: November 2002

“We are in the position of a little child,” said Einstein in a press interview twenty years ago, “entering a huge library whose walls are covered to the ceiling with books in many different tongues. … The child does not understand the languages in which they are written. He notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books, a mysterious order which he does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects.”
A Five-Fold Skepticism in Logical Empiricism
Authors: Berenda Carlton W.
Published: November 2002

It is essentially a truism that the natural sciences have little or no place for dogmatism; to the contrary, there is an underlying skepticism pervading all scientific propositions. Any philosophy which pretends to provide an adequate philosophy of science, should, it seems to me, exhibit epistemologically a corresponding skepticism. At the very least, such a philosophy should demonstrate a skepticism in its views of the “truth” of scientific statements.
The Behavioral Dimension of Prediction and Meaning
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

Here we will discuss the necessary relationship between both prediction and human behavior and meaning and human behavior. The main assumption upon which our thesis rests is that knowing is for the sake of acting and that, consequently, the symbolic process is continuous with overt bodily behavior and with the environment of the knower. A corollary to this assumption is: the locus of meaning is in behavior. Possibly after reading the article it will be clear that meanings presuppose conduct of which we can take cognizance, and that there is a difference between behaving and taking cognizance of behavior (both actual and possible). And although the locus of meaning is in behavior, meanings emerge only in relation to the symbolic process. In a sense we suffer, endure, live through behavior, but in the bare suffering of it there may be no meaning, for meaning requires also the symbolic process.
Whitehead's Method of Extensive Abstraction
Authors: Lawrence Nathaniel
Published: November 2002

The death of Alfred North Whitehead late in 1947 was a double loss. Those who knew Whitehead, even slightly, feel keenly the loss of a warm and stimulating personality, which in the last years of his retirement had mellowed to a benign radiance. The wider circle of students and teachers of philosophy who knew him through his writing alone regret the passing of the man who, many thought, was the most capable cosmologist of our time.
Comments on Realistic Versus Phenomenalistic Interpretations
Authors: Frank Philipp
Published: November 2002

The issue “realism vs. phenomenalism” or “realism vs. positivism” has been widely discussed during the last fifty years. The issue has even become a political and social one in Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocricism, which is built entirely around this topic. He calls “positivism” bluntly a “reactionary philosophy” because it supposedly denies the reality of the world which is described by science. M. Schlick devoted to this issue the paper “Realism and Positivism” which was published recently (in English) with an introduction by D. Rynin. It should, therefore, be welcomed, that Professor Feigl attacked this problem by the methods of modern semantics. This is an attempt to solve a question by precise logical argument which has been frequently treated in a way that provided more heat than light. It is certainly very desirable to scrutinize Feigl's argument carefully and to find out exactly its contribution to our conception of scientific method.
A Note on Semantic Realism
Authors: Hempel Carl G.
Published: November 2002

Professor Feigl's admirably lucid and concise appraisal of the major considerations which are still significant in the controversy between realism and phenomenalism includes the important reminder that the problem at hand should be viewed as concerning, not the truth or falsity of two conflicting hypotheses, but rather the comparative adequacy of two alternative proposals for the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge. Feigl advocates the approach of semantic realism in preference to a phenomenalistic type of reconstruction on the grounds that in his critical examination, the latter has been “found wanting,” whereas semantic realism—and only semantic realism—can provide a satisfactory systematic account of the meaning and the experiential foundation of scientific hypotheses. While I fully agree with Feigl's general appraisal of the issues involved, I have doubts as to the superiority of the proposed realistic interpretation, and I should like to state these here in outline.
Science and Semantic Realism
Authors: Nagel Ernest
Published: November 2002

A special merit of Professor Feigl's stimulating essay lies in the clarity with which he draws the issue between phenomenalistic and realistic interpretations of science as one concerned entirely with the evaluation of their relative adequacy as analytic reconstructions of empirical knowledge. Responsible and fruitful discussion of these interpretations cannot therefore be a debate over the truth or falsity of scientific theories. For as he carefully notes, the differences between these alternative analyses are not “pragmatic differences” of the ordinary sort, since no differences in regard to any observable consequences that could weigh for or against a scientific theory can be associated with them. Feigl's own rejection of phenomenalism and his espousal of semantic realism must in consequence also be judged in terms of the standard he himself has recognized as alone relevant in this discussion.
On Feigl's “Existential Hypotheses”
Authors: Ramsperger A. G.
Published: November 2002

The literature of science speaks of many things in the heavens and on earth that neither the man in the street nor the scientist in his laboratory, can directly see with his eyes or touch with his fingers. Scientific hypotheses refer to atoms and genes, cosmic rays and electrostatic charges. No one can deny the importance of these hypothetical constructions; without them we could neither understand nor manage the world which we directly experience. They simplify the system of laws that relate observable variables to one another. They suggest further research and enable us to predict what will be found if certain operations are carried out. The sporadic and disjointed collection of observed objects and events, and the occurrence of the unusual ones which we call illusions, are explained by correlating them with a hypothetical physical or physiological state of affairs that has order and spatio-temporal continuity.
Logical Reconstruction, Realism and Pure Semiotic
Authors: Feigl Herbert
Published: November 2002

In this rejoinder to the critical comments elicited by my essay “Existential Hypotheses,” I propose to deal first with the challenge coming from the avowedly different philosophical outlook of Professor Churchman. My other critics, Professors Frank, Hempel, Nagel and Ramsperger, on the whole, share my basic conception of the tasks of philosophy of science and epistemology, even if they dissent in one important respect or another from the special solution I suggested. But since I discern even in Professor Nagel's remarks (and possibly also between the lines of Professor Ramsperger's comments) a pragmatist or instrumentalist strain akin to the major contentions of Professor Churchman, it will be well to begin with a defense and further clarification of my underlying point of view. Only after this restatement of my platform will I undertake to defend semantic realism against the specific criticisms advanced by the last four authors.
Logical Simplicity: A Challenge to Philosophy and to Social Inquiry
Authors: Fries Horace S.
Published: November 2002

In part one of this paper we shall elucidate an operational concept of logical simplicity as it seems to function in natural science. Although this is a tentative and exploratory formulation, its novelty, relative to the great European philosophical tradition, seems to require a preliminary warning about misunderstandings.

In Part Two we shall apply the formulation to social inquiry and make a positive suggestion for further development of the proposal.
A Sociological Evaluation of The Meeting of East and West
Authors: Hartung Frank E.
Published: November 2002

A major problem of the philosophy of science is the construction of a comprehensive science of man and the universe. The sociology of science has a part to play in this tremendous task by indicating the extra-scientific influences bearing upon science at any given period, assisting, in this way, in developing a self-consciousness of science. It is believed that this self-consciousness is necessary to a scientific appraisal of the method of scientific inquiry, as well as being necessary to any attempt to direct the development of science as an institution. This paper is to be regarded as a sociological evaluation of a work in the field of the philosophy of science, namely, F. S. C. Northrop's The Meeting of East and West.
Is a Science of Ethics Possible
Authors: Hartman Robert S.
Published: November 2002

“The age-long endeavour to find an intellectual basis for ethics is an enterprise of such importance, and of such difficulty, that any explorer of that country must always be glad to hear the voices of his fellow-travellers. ‘This,’ Wittgenstein once said to me, ‘is a terrible business—just terrible! You can at best stammer when you talk of it.’”

With these words Waddington introduces his symposium Science and Ethics, a “communal, perhaps even co-operative stammering,” as he calls it. Also the present contribution to the “terrible business” cannot be more than a stammering; The business is so terrible today not only because of its inherent difficulties, but because of the tremendous odds which are at stake. When the Renaissance philosophers built the science of material nature they were fired by an enthusiasm of cosmic exploration. Today we are frozen in awe of a cosmic explosion. When Galileo pioneered his new science he knew that he was in the possession of the truth and that his opponents, steeped in error and superstition, would have to give way—eppur si muove! Today, building the science of ethics, we are neither equally sure nor equally confident. Our science is not yet formulated. Our opponents, though not right, may yet conquer before we have had time to develop the new science. We are not sure whether what was true for physics three hundred years ago is true for ethics today.
The Principle of Limits: With Special Reference to the Social Sciences
Authors: Henry Jules
Published: November 2002

The following paper is a continuation of an attempt (2) to explore the possibility of intensifying sociological analysis through the development of heuristic devices. The value of heuristic devices lies, so it seems to me, in their essential simplicity and the consequent broadness of their applicability. A heuristic device differs from a law in that it is not an if, then type of proposition. It is a guide to analysis rather than a statement of the necessary issue of the analysis. It suggests how the analysis may be carried forward rather than states how it must come out. The principle of limits as presented below is an attempt to show how this relatively simple heuristic device may be used in a variety of areas of social analysis.
Class-Membership and the Ontological Problem
Authors: Feibleman James K.
Published: November 2002

Professor Quine in recent articles has raised an old question, an ontological one, concerning the status of universals. It is interesting to note that the same positions recur in symbolic logic that have appeared so often in the past in less exact language. There can be little doubt that the question he raises is crucial; and if the issue is not yet settled, there is at least some hope that it may be clarified. Propositions are required to make propositions clear.
Towards a Formalization of Hull's Behavior Theory
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. , Barry Gladys
Published: November 2002

This paper is a tentative step toward formalizing in symbolic logic some of the central assumptions of Clark L. Hull's theory of behavior. There will be noticeable deviations from Hull's own terminology and form of statement, but this will be largely in the interest of greater logical simplicity. The notation of symbolic logic will not be used, but the behavioral axioms will be so stated as to admit of easy translation into such notation. Such easy translatability seems to be a prerequisite if theorems are to be derivable with genuine deductive rigor.
Bertrand Russell on the Justification of Induction
Authors: Hay W. H.
Published: November 2002

“Nay, I will go farther, and assert, that he could not so much as prove by any probable arguments, that the future must be conformable to the past. All probable arguments are built on the supposition, that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never prove it. This conformity is a matter of fact, and if it must be proved, will admit of no proof but from experience. But our experience in the past can be a proof of nothing for the future, but upon a supposition, that there is a resemblance betwixt them. This therefore is a point, which can admit of no proof at all, and which we take for granted without any proof.”

David Hume, An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature p. 15

In Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits Bertrand Russell recognizes and attempts to deal with what is one of the central questions of philosophy since Descartes, “The relation between individual experience and the general body of scientific knowledge.” He states that his purpose is “to discover the minimum principles required to justify scientific inferences.” The search for such principles arises from his belief that “data are private and individual.” He has only scorn for those who, “finding these problems distasteful” have “tried to deny that these problems exist.”
Some Basic Methodological Difficulties in Social Science
Authors: Levy Marion J.
Published: November 2002

Often scholars who call themselves social scientists have not meant by the term science the sort of activity which has generally concerned those calling themselves natural scientists. In the latter sense very little of what has been called “social science” can also be called scientific. The term “social science” as used here refers primarily to the studies which have gone under such titles as Politics (or Government, or Political Science), Sociology, Anthropology, Social and Clinical Psychology, and Economics. To some degree much of what will here be said does not apply with equal justice to the field of Economics. It has a more highly developed system of general abstractions and considerably more precise techniques of analysis than have generally characterized the other social sciences. The difference, however, is one of degree not kind. Many of the difficulties mentioned below certainly plague the field of Economics as well as the others.
On Definitions
Authors: Leblanc Hugues
Published: November 2002

Present-day logic regards definitions as syntactical devices of abbreviation. This view, summed up in the terse adage: “To define is to eliminate,” obscures the vital part played by definitions in deductive sciences. Abstract calculi, to become noetic tools, must be interpreted; so the richer the interpretation, the more efficient the tool. But most calculi are based on a restricted number of primitives; they thus embrace, at the outset, a restricted number of concepts and can be appraised through and only through the definitions they eventually yield. In a word, the richness of a calculus lies in its defining virtualities. The whole of PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA would be a futile game of chess, did it not embody all our mathematical concepts; none of these being assumed as primitive, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA owes its momentous significance to its definitions and to its definitions only.
Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purposefulness
Authors: Taylor Richard
Published: November 2002

In a highly original and provocative essay entitled “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology”, published a few years ago, Professors Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow attempt to indicate the scientific importance and usefulness of the concepts of purpose and teleology. Since this essay appeared the suggestions it contains seem to have acquired a significance which was not wholly apparent at that time. This is due primarily to the fact that a somewhat novel and, it appears to some, revolutionary approach to certain problems has arisen in the sciences, an approach which is more or less loosely referred to as “cybernetics,” and among whose outstanding spokesmen are to be found the very authors of this essay—particularly Professor Wiener, whose recently published Cybernetics has been claiming the attention of an increasing number of scientists and non-scientists alike. In his book, it may be noted, Professor Wiener, in tracing the development of cybernetics over the past few years, gives a good indication of the importance he attaches to the earlier essay. He writes, with reference to it: “The three of us [Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow] felt that this new point of view merited a paper, which we wrote up and published. Dr. Rosenblueth and I foresaw that the paper could only be a statement of program for a large body of experimental work, and we decided that if we could ever bring our plan for an interscientific institute to fruition, this topic would furnish an almost ideal center for our activity” (p. 15). It would seem, then, that an examination of the contents of this essay should not be without interest at this time.
Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder
Authors: Taylor Richard
Published: November 2002

In their penetrating and admirably lucid discussion, “Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior,” Professors Rosenblueth and Wiener have considerably clarified the point of view expressed in their earlier paper dealing with the conception of purpose, and recently criticized by me. But while their discussion thus removes some of the difficulties which, I think, stood in the way of acceptance of their position, there yet remain fundamental questions which I do not believe have been adequately dealt with.

These authors rebuke me, with justice, for not indicating my own conception of purposiveness, and they add that this omission weakens my criticisms of their view. That the omission detracts from the interest of my paper is doubtless correct, but that it weakens my criticisms of their position is not similarly obvious. I shall, at any rate, attempt to rectify this defect in the present discussion.
On Scepticism About Induction
Authors: Wang Hao
Published: November 2002

In mathematics we have demonstrably insoluble problems, one example being that of trisecting an arbitrary angle in elementary geometry. Every now and then, we encounter engineers and others who offer solutions of the insoluble and make some stir. To those who feel convinced of the demonstration of insolubility, these claimed solutions do not seem to deserve any serious considerations. In fact, such solutions have long since ceased to attract attention from mathematicians.

The situation in philosophy seems different. Here we do not possess demonstrations as clear and distinct as in mathematics. For example, it has been a fashion among philosophers for two centuries or so to answer Hume's scepticism concerning induction. Although, presumably, there never has been any answer or solution which is as widely accepted among philosophers as Hume's sceptical argument, yet philosophers continue to enjoy elaborating arguments for and against Hume's scepticism. And people who feel convinced by Hume's resaoning often find it difficult to understand why philosophers persist in trying to contradict Hume flatly instead of seeking for some more devious way out.
The Concept “Disposition to Respond” in a Behavioral Semiotic
Authors: Phillips Jean
Published: November 2002

There has recently been considerable controversy in the literature over the concept “disposition to respond” as used by Charles Morris in his criterion by which it is to be determined whether or not something functions as a sign. It is often assumed that this concept serves as a means for broadening a strictly behavioral criterion through the introduction of something which is a characteristic of sign situations when behavior is not. But dispositions have no practical value in this respect, for Morris's criterion can not be used to obtain sign knowledge about situations not giving rise to overt behavior. However, dispositions do have a practical function in Morris's criterion, a function which has been overlooked in these discussions.
A Postulate Set For Experimental Jurisprudence
Authors: Cowan Thomas A.
Published: November 2002

The device of setting forth an argument in the form of a postulate set, while not unknown to jurisprudence, is nevertheless sufficiently novel to justify a brief account of the process. At one time human thought took axioms and postulates for avowals of unalterable truth, but the nineteenth century made common the practice of speculating with alternative presuppositional systems, so that deeper insight into the nature of this scientific device revealed it as merely a method among many for clarifying and fecundating thought.
A Systematics for Problems of Action
Authors: Alderson Wroe
Published: November 2002

Bertrand Russell, in one of his gentler jibes at the pragmatists, says that this school would obviously prefer Othello, the man of action to Hamlet, the man of thought. This figure is singularly inept since Hamlet brought about the death of six people through violent action. That more than equalled the score rolled up by the presumably more active Othello. What Hamlet lacked was not the power to act but an adequate theory of action. Having first attempted to avoid the issue presented by the murder of his father, he is swept up in a gale of violence because of that very attempt at avoidance.
Value Decisions
Authors: Cerf Walter
Published: November 2002

I should like to begin with a remark which, although personal, is not without relevance both to the special topic of this paper and the general purpose of an International Congress of Philosophy. Having had the opportunity of studying and teaching philosophy in various countries of the Western World I have come to realize strongly the enormous power of national traditions in philosophy. Much more so than scientific research and, I believe, even the arts, our philosophizing is tied down to and captivated by particular spiritual climates, particular national traditions. Notwithstanding the apparatus of international congresses, the various personal and professional contacts between philosophers of different nationality, and the translation of at least the most important works into other languages, there is, I have come to feel, a mutual contempt, a mutual misunderstanding, a mutual intolerance, that are frightening. You will remember Nietzsche's sarcasms concerning English philosophy. I have heard Heidegger say that the only language in which one can really philosophize, besides Greek, is German. The German contempt for French clarity and English factuality is equalled by the irony which French and English philosophers show towards German “depth.” The examples could be multiplied. Scrutinize your university programs and I am convinced you will be startled by the enormous emphasis upon philosophers of your own nationality. I know German Ph.D.s who have never read more than 200 pages of English and French philosophy. Courses in contemporary philosophy give usually 90 percent of their time to the philosophical scene in the particular country to which the teachers belongs and only the small remainder to the international scene.
Science as an Institution
Authors: Hartung Frank E.
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is to present an initial sociological analysis of science as an institution. This kind of analysis has long been made of other aspects of culture: of the family, the state, religion, economic enterprise and the like. An institution, as the term is used here, is simply

… a definite and established phase of the public mind … often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence. (6, p. 313)
Method In Cultural Anthropology
Authors: Weakland John Hast
Published: November 2002

Those—other social scientists as well as laymen—who have read recent studies of national character and culture by anthropologists, while not having had experience in this field themselves, often seem to believe that the results which such anthropological investigators obtain are interesting, but that the methods used were intuitional, magical, or just invisible. The status of the work is cast in doubt, as falling short of an ideal that scientific description and analysis must be reproducible by any observer to whom a set of techniques of the discipline has been communicated. This paper attempts to show why and how such a belief is erroneous, and then to describe some of the fundamentals of method in current cultural anthropology as used in research and as related to the general structure of scientific method today.
The Classical to the Classical
Authors: Martin Norman M.
Published: November 2002

In books on the calculus of probability, there have been many accounts as to what is the meaning of the term “probable.” We can readily divide them into three groups. The first sometimes defines probability in terms of the ratio between the number of cases favorable to an event and the number of equally possible cases. Sometimes probability is defined in some way other than this, but the above formulation, or one similar to it is used to describe the “measure of probability.” This concept is what is called “the classical concept” of probability and was held by the great workers in the field of probability from the beginning of the eighteenth and opening of the nineteenth centuries, including James Bernoulli (1713), Thomas Bayes (1763), and the Marquis de Laplace (1812). The second conceives of probability as a logical relation between hypothesis and evidence. Following this conception, one could identify “probability” with “degree of confirmation.” We will term this the “logical concept.” The third group identified probability with the relative frequency with which a property occurs in a specified class of elements. We will call this the “frequency concept.”
The Logic of Psychological Concepts
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to provide a methodological rather than, strictly speaking, a philosophical discussion of its subject, the logic of concept formation in psychology. But even a treatment of this kind cannot entirely avoid matters of a more general nature, some of them logical, some epistemological. By insisting on the limitations of this essay I merely wish to caution the reader in three respects. First, those more general matters, logical and epistemological, will be kept at a minimum. Second, no attempt will be made to state them with the degree of precision and all the qualifications which are in order in a paper that addresses itself exclusively to logical analysts. Third, I shall for the most part content myself with stating them, without defending them in the way and in the sense in which a technical philosopher who speaks to his colleagues must defend what he asserts.
On the Heuristic Value of Scientific Models
Authors: Meyer Herman
Published: November 2002

Preliminary Remarks: Before entering into the subject matter of the paper, it may be useful to present American readers with a sketchy outline of present-day European philosophy of science, as it appeared to me at the International Congress of Philosophy of Science, held in Paris at the Sorbonne on October 15–22, 1949. The sections of which I can give a first hand impression and which are of particular interest for our subject, are those of physical science and of probability.
Normative Propositions and the Ideal of an Integrated and Closed System
Authors: Werkmeister W. H.
Published: November 2002

In a paper recently published in this quarterly I argued that modern quantum physics, as an integrated system of laws, supplements and completes in purely quantitative terms the fragmentary order of first-person experience, removing in a unique way ambiguities otherwise encountered at the level of common-sense things; and I contended that the choice of a different selective operator—purpose or value, let us say, rather than quantity—might entail an entirely different range and system of order. It is now my intention to follow up this contention and to indicate at least in outline form some of the implications and possibilities of such a program; for it is possible that this undertaking may bring into new perspective some of the crucial problems which have vexed philosophers at all times when they have dealt with normative propositions and moral judgments.
Science As Morality
Authors: Simpson George
Published: November 2002

If, as may be generally agreed upon, the term science is to be taken to mean verified knowledge, then it has three attributes: (1) the logical and methodological; that is, how we arrive at verified knowledge; (2) the epistemic; that is, the bodies of verified knowledge that have been arrived at; and (3) the sociological; that is, the organization of men by means of which the bodies of knowledge have been arrived at and the method prosecuted.
The Physical to the Physical
Authors: Yaker Henri Marc
Published: November 2002

Scholasticism, with its intense rational method and its fervent intellectual spirit, virtually disappeared from the general consideration of Natural Philosophy at the coming of the Reformation and the subsequent Newtonian Revolution. Only in this century has it seemed to merit any reconsideration.
Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior
Authors: Moulyn Adrian C.
Published: November 2002

May I suggest that there is an angle to the problem of purposeful and non-purposeful behavior which has been overlooked in the recent discussions in this journal (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 17, Nr 4, pp. 310–332), namely, the psychological side of the problem.
Relativism and Experimental Inference
Authors: Will Frederick L.
Published: November 2002

The task of the philosophy of science, according to Churchman, is twofold. It is, one, “to determine the ideal of science by scientific methods,” and, the other, “to describe the manner in which science can most efficiently approach its ideals” (190). The primary purpose of this book on experimental inference is to deal with these two subjects as they bear upon what is commonly called material or empirical science, rather than upon formal or analytic science, though it is recognized that no absolute separation can be made between these two different types of science, or between the performance of the above tasks in connection with each. The kind of science, then, whose objective and methods are to be elucidated is the kind in which in some broad sense of these terms decisions are necessarily made on the basis of empirical observation and testing. Some observation or series of observations is made, and it is the task of the scientist to make an inference based upon these observational data. What is his aim in doing this, and what are the most efficient ways in which he can proceed?
Professor Margenau and the Problem of Physical Reality
Authors: Werkmeister W. H.
Published: November 2002

A publication by Professor Margenau is always of interest to persons concerned with philosophy of science. This is especially true, however, of his recently published book, The Nature of Physical Reality; for this book, dealing with basic epistemological problems arising from the development of modern quantum mechanics, is the most comprehensive and most systematic formulation of its author's philosophical position and is at the same time conceived as a “challenge” to “uncritical realism, unadorned operationalism, and radical empiricism”—to points of view, that is, which Professor Margenau regards as “outmoded and in disharmony with the successful phases of contemporary physics” (v).
Biology and Unitary Principle
Authors: Lillie Ralph S.
Published: November 2002

The candid student of scientific method will recognize that biology is not entirely a physical science, while acknowledging that it owes its present state of development largely or mainly to physical conceptions and methods. It is clear that the constant features of vital organization and activity presuppose the physical constancies as basis. Nevertheless the living organism has proved in many ways refractory to a purely physical analysis. This is not merely because the higher organisms have their psychical side and that psychological method differs from physical method; conceivably a properly unified science might apply equally to the physical and the psychical sides of nature. Nor is it entirely because vital behaviour is more individualized and less predictable than physical behaviour. It is rather that certain fundamental features of natural process, largely neglected by physics, are just those which are of chief importance in those flux-like entities which are living organisms. The traditional methods of physics, which analyze nature into combinations of invariant elements and processes, are ill-adapted to deal with the fluid, asymmetrical and largely indeterminate features of process as displayed so conspicuously in living organisms. This, put briefly, is the contention of L. L. Whyte, physicist and author of the recent remarkable book on the relations between physics and biology. In the present paper I propose first to consider especially those sections of the book which bear more particularly on the fundamental problems of biology; this part is paraphrase and commentary rather than summary, although never departing far from the subject of unitary principle as defined by Whyte. Later I shall consider some philosophical implications which seem important. For the details of Whyte's exposition the reader should refer to his book, which is notably clear, concise and critical in style and treatment, as well as comprehensive and fully realistic in its point of view.
Relativity and Representativeness
Authors: Hammond Kenneth R.
Published: November 2002

Certain suggestions recently made by Brunswik (2) concerning the design of experiments in psychology seem to have far reaching implications. Indeed, Brunswik's suggestions appear to the writer to be congruent with Einstein's General Theory of Relativity. Congruences between such diverse disciplines as psychology and physics bear watching if for no other reason than the fact that psychologists frequently point to the physicist as the ideal scientist. Unfortunately, in the writer's opinion, the ideal which the psychologist still admires is the classical, or Newtonian, physicist rather than the modern, or Einsteinian, physicist—the psychologist's outlook being concomitantly distorted. Brunswik's theories of experimental design in psychology, however, are appealing for the very reason that they do not fit the mold of the classical physical experiment, but do seem to be congruent with Einstein's physical theories—with concomitant expansion of scope.
Note on Hammond's Analogy Between “Relativity and Representativeness”
Authors: Brunswik Egon
Published: November 2002

The editor of this Journal has asked me to comment on the preceding paper by Professor Hammond (5) in which certain parallels are drawn between relativity physics and my own suggestions concerning the establishment of “representative design” in psychological experimentation (1). Since I find little basis for criticism of Dr. Hammond's major line of reasoning, I shall concentrate on anticipating possible objections to Hammond's comparison as well as on elucidating my point of view by means of examples, both old and new, that seem pertinent in the present context.
Contemporary Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
Authors: Adams John Stokes
Published: November 2002

It may be that the overworn analogy between the history of philosophy and a river system has still a value, and if so, it is a value beyond that usually claimed for it. The grosser likenesses between the stream of history and the stream of geography have been, it is true, too often pointed out, while the subtler similarities are neglected. For instance, there are points in both kinds of stream where it runs deep, others where it is shallow; at one point it may run swiftly, as through a gorge, and at another the valley may be wide and the stream broad, and sluggish. However, whereas in the stream of science the running waters often purify themselves, in that of philosophy there are many stagnant pools where the current of criticism has never set in. Further, there are discernible here and there canalizations by which arid plains are artificially irrigated. And it must be admitted that, at other points, outhouses have been built over the stream and its waters sullied.
Form and Content In Empirical Science
Authors: Searles Herbert L.
Published: November 2002

Philosophers investigating the nature of knowledge from Bacon and Descartes to logical empiricism, have sought to understand its character by means of the distinction between the content of knowledge, and the abstract logical and mathematical principles which regulate its structure or form. The nature of the distinction, the relative roles of content and form, and the relationships between the two, however, have been given widely divergent interpretations.
Mechanism, Organism, and Society: Some Models in Natural and Social Science
Authors: Deutsch Karl W.
Published: November 2002

Men think in terms of models. Their sense organs abstract the events which touch them; their memories store traces of these events as coded symbols; and they may recall them according to patterns which they learned earlier, or recombine them in patterns that are new. In all this, we may think of our thought as consisting of symbols which are put in relations or sequences according to operating rules. Both symbols and operating rules are acquired, in part directly from interaction with the outside world, and in part from elaboration of this material through internal recombination. Together, a set of symbols and a set of rules may constitute what we may call a calculus, a logic, a game or a model. Whatever we call it, it will have some structure, i.e., some pattern of distribution of relative discontinuities, and some “laws” of operation.
The Experiment and its Role in the Theory of Knowledge
Authors: Fiala Silvio
Published: November 2002

The theory of knowledge is justified only by its results. Each of its statements is essentially an hypothesis, valuable in so far as its practical purpose is fulfilled. Consequently, the same speculative characteristics common to all natural sciences, must be attributed also to the theory of knowledge.
Cooperative Research in the Science of Religion
Authors: Rusk George Y.
Published: November 2002

Science is based upon the supposition that planning is essential to and effective in the discovery of truth,—planning within and between the minds of individuals. If planning is so, then the cooperative planning of scientific research in the field of the science of religion would contribute to the discovery of truth. The symposia which the Philosophy of Science Association has authorized be published in its journal and the papers on E. S. P. and upon psychoanalytical theory which it secured for its recent national meeting reveal, it seems to the present writer, that the Association recognizes the value of cooperative planning in the discovery of truth, specifically in the field of the science of religion.