bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Logical Positivism and the Function of Reason
Authors: Phillips Bernard
Published: February 2009

Metaphysics as a human enterprise is for ever called upon to vindicate its claim to be entitled “knowledge.” Sometimes the challenge is issued in the name of irritated common sense. Sometimes metaphysics is relegated into insignificance by a supercilious estheticism. Sometimes metaphysics is excommunicated for daring to trespass on the holy domain of religion. Here its death sentence is pronounced by an all-embracing scepticism, and there by the confident faith in the universal adequacy and exclusive validity of the methods of science. The attacks on metaphysics throughout the ages have been so numerous and so severe that one would expect the victim to have expired long ago. Yet the inextinguishable will-to-live exhibited by metaphysics has been as remarkable a phenomenon as the perennial tenacity of her would-be executioners. And although the bells have been tolled many times for metaphysics, she is still able to announce with Mark Twain that the rumours of her demise have been slightly exaggerated. In the long run, history seems to reveal a singular indocility with respect to the arguments of the enemies of metaphysics, and as Gilson has pointed out, one of the lessons to be derived from the study of the history of philosophy is that metaphysics always buries its undertakers.
Morality and Religion
Authors: Lewis H. D.
Published: February 2009

Belief in the ultimacy and distinctiveness of ethical principles has been challenged in many ways to-day. The advance of science, especially in the fields of psychology and anthropology, has provided the relativist and the sceptic with many new weapons to put in their armoury; and the positivist has launched a very subtle attack. The present state of society, both in the internal affairs of the peoples of the world and in their inter-relations, has brought many moral principles into contempt. But there have also been notable advances, especially where more self-effacing virtue is concerned. Philosophers have also rebutted the attacks of the sceptic with peculiar incisiveness and vigour; indeed we know better to-day than at any other time just what we must hold if the objectivity of ethics is to be maintained. How the battle is going is by no means easy to determine. But there is one corner of the field, and that the one from which the most powerful attack of all may be delivered, which the upholder of the ultimacy of moral truths has left almost wholly undefended, so lightly does he estimate the danger from that quarter. That is the religious one. Account has been taken of the arguments of the sociologist and the Freudian psychologist, but it has been assumed, with astonishing naïveté, that religion is an ally to be wholly relied upon. But morality and religion have often been in conflict, and they seem to be so as much as ever to-day. For some of the most powerful forces in our religious life, and those which are in some ways most attuned to our needs, seem to be wholly inimical to the moral life. It is with this aspect of the vast problem of morality and religion that we can best concern ourselves in a course with the general title of “Moral and Political Conflicts of Our Time.”.
A Challenge to Philosophers in the Atomic Age
Authors: Schilpp Paul Arthur
Published: February 2009

Philosophy, I know, is philosophia perennis. A “dated” philosophy, therefore, would appear almost to amount to a contradiction in terms. In this sense the “challenge” implied by the title of this paper seems out of place. A challenge to philosophers—well, perhaps. But a challenge to philosophers in the atomic age (or, for that matter, in any specific age)—no!

In general such an objection is well taken. But we are, of course, never confronted with a situation “in general,” but always with a very specific—and to-day, moreover, with a unique—situation. It is a situation which has changed radically even since the close of official hostilities at the so-called end of World War II. True enough, the history of the two world-wars had already brought home to us the fact that, with the accelerating development of applied science and technology, wars were rapidly approaching a tremendous scale of destructive power. Thus it became difficult to imagine any possibilities of still more powerful implements of devastation.
Philosophy and Psychiatry
Authors: Lewis Aubrey
Published: February 2009

I Am grateful for the honour of being invited to give the second Manson Lecture. Dr. Manson believed that the study of sick people leads into the widest fields of thought, but that increasing specialization within medicine diverts the doctor from seeing man and his nature whole: the chief question seems to be (he wrote in 1930), “whether medicine is in the bondship of practice, whether it is a skilled art, or whether it can emerge to give its own contribution to abstract thought and philosophy.” Indeed, pleading with doctors to join this Institute of Philosophy, he declared that medicine should be the most philosophic of the professions. In this he was reviving an ancient claim: the arguments for it have lately been restated with much Aristotelian piety by Scott Buchanan. Now here I find myself in a difficulty at the outset: I am to speak of the relationship between philosophy and medicine, at a lecture founded by a passionate believer in their conjunction, yet I am engaged in a particular branch of medicine which was for longer than any other preoccupied with philosophy and dependent on it, but had so little profit from its fidelity that it reckons progress from the time when it struggled away from this allegiance. Psychiatry has not been able to refrain since then from many a backward glance at the older philosophy she once swore by, and she has been much influenced by the philosophies of later times: she has—doubtless in punishment for her defection—become entangled now and then in bad, unrecognized philosophy of her own making. She has, at all events, never achieved more than a temporary indifference to philosophic thought.
The Verb “To Cause”
Authors: Abrahams Gerald
Published: February 2009

If I utter the sentence: Hitler caused the outbreak of the second world war, some interested logician may translate my sentence into the words: Hitler necessitated the outbreak of the second world war, If that translation be made I do not accept it, unless the dragoman makes it clear to me that by the word “necessitate” he means nothing more than I mean by the word “cause.” In which case I can dispense with his services. But if he is embodying in his translation the thought that the outbreak of war followed from the existence of Hitler at a given moment of time, as the equality of the angles in a triangle follows from the equality of the sides (I assume that that follows), then I repudiate his translation, because I do not agree that a statement or proposition such as event x caused event y is a hypothetical proposition of the type if x then y. A fortiori it cannot be regarded by me as a reciprocal hypothetical proposition: if x then y if y then x; nor, to complete the possibilities, can I infer what I call the cause from the effect.
Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality
Authors: Gallie W. B.
Published: February 2009

One Morality or many? Liberal morality and Socialist morality; bourgeois morality and Georges Sorel's “morality of producers”; Protestant morality and Catholic; Greek morality and Christian; “aristocratic” morality and “slave” morality, “open” morality and “closed” morality—what, if any, is the relevance of such distinctions as these to moral philosophy?
The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy
Authors: Copleston Frederick C.
Published: February 2009

I. In the early part of the sixth century a.d. Boethius defined the person as “an individual substance of rational nature” (rationalis naturae individua substantia). This definition, which became classical and was adopted by, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, obviously implies that every human being is a person, since every human being is (to employ the philosophical terms of Boethius) an individual substance of rational nature. If one cannot be more or less of a human being, so far as “substance” is concerned, one cannot be more or less of a person. One may act as a human person ought not to act or in a way unbefitting a human person; one may even lose the normal use of one's reason; but one does not in this way become depersonalized, in the sense of ceasing to be a person. According to St. Thomas, a disembodied soul is not, strictly speaking, a person, since a disembodied soul is no longer a complete human substance; but every complete human substance is always and necessarily a person.
Moral Intuitions
Authors: Corkey R.
Published: February 2009

In all ethical discussion there is an implicit assumption that in our everyday experience we are often able to recognize, as if by direct perception, that the situation confronting us is indubitably bad or unquestionably good in an ethical sense. If, e.g., on a bright afternoon we meet a capable Scout leader with a troop of healthy-minded boys on a hiking expedition through a beautiful district, sharing with one another as they go botanical information, and all obviously happy together, we know without question that the situation, as we see it, is good. We are as certain about that fact as we are that the sun is shining and the grass green. If, however, on another occasion we witness an act of wanton cruelty perpetrated on a small boy by a bully, we immediately and indubitably see that the situation presented to us is bad. Here again we are as certain of the ethical character of what we see as we are of the fact that two people are involved in the mischief. It would be superfluous to quote illustrations to show that moral philosophers, in seeking to establish their conclusions, invariably rely on their judgment regarding the ethical character of situations such as these, the ethical character of which is so perspicuous that, to deny it would be, in Bishop Butler's phrase, “too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.”
The Claims of Reason
Authors: Campbell C. A.
Published: February 2009

I have chosen my topic for this evening with an eye to something rather more than its intrinsic philosophical interest. Modern man, as we are all painfully aware, is facing a crisis of peculiar gravity. Perhaps the odds are not so very heavy against a third world war followed by world collapse into anarchy and barbarism. At such a time the philosopher is bound to ask himself whether there is no contribution which his science can make towards the succour of civilization.
Objectivity in Morals
Authors: Kneale William
Published: February 2009

It is remarkable that we have to-day a number of philosophers who call themselves subjectivists in moral philosophy. For, although the name “subjectivist” is by no means new, philosophers have reserved it hitherto for their opponents, and usually for imaginary opponents at that. Perhaps the chief cause of the change which has taken place in recent years is the discovery of a distinction between descriptive and emotive meaning. In the past the only form of subjectivism considered by writers on moral philosophy was the suggestion that moral sentences such as “You ought to do that” were statements about the speaker's own attitude; and it was easy to refute this by pointing out that we discuss questions of morals in a way which would be unintelligent, and even unintelligible, if moral judgments were only reports of introspection. But those who now call themselves subjectivists maintain that the peculiarity of moral words is their expressive and evocative power. According to their analysis, a speaker who uses one of these words in an indicative sentence may be stating nothing at all, but is undoubtedly trying to influence others (and perhaps also himself) to adopt a certain attitude. This, they say, explains how there can be genuine disagreement about questions of morals and why discussion may produce results. If A tries to evoke one attitude in his hearers and B tries to evoke an incompatible attitude, their utterances are opposed, not indeed like contradictory statements, but rather like the efforts of men engaged in a tug-of-war.
Creative Evolution in its Bearing on the Idea of God
Authors: Forsyth T. M.
Published: February 2009

In two previous articles I have considered (1) the significance of Aristotle's conception of God and its relation to the philosophy of Plato and (2) Spinoza's central doctrine as related to his view of causation. Both articles were especially concerned with the question of the relation of God to the World or Universe. The purpose of the present paper, which is the concluding one of the series, is to inquire what contribution toward a solution of the problem is made by the theory of Creative Evolution.
Sins and Crimes
Authors: Lough A. R.
Published: February 2009

A law, say, prohibits homosexual conduct or punishes the prostitute for plying her trade. According to some it is a bad law, according to others a necessary one. Those who argue that it is a bad law do so on a variety of grounds—that it is sheer folly to try to change human nature by law, that such legislation can only be effective at the price of the right to privacy, that the punishment of acts arising from compelling desires is cruel and excessive, that the law has no business meddling in what people do to others with their consent. Those who argue that it is a necessary law do so on one ground, that the act in question is immoral, and that what is wrong must be punished, lest the law itself fall into disrepute by failing to carry out a consistent campaign against wrong-doing.
Warrender and His Critics
Authors: Barry Brian
Published: February 2009

The decade of criticism directed at The Political Philosophy of Hobbes has found the critics united in rejecting many of Warrender's conclusions, but it has not produced a generally accepted alternative interpretation. I shall argue in this paper that this has happened because the critics have not been searching enough in their criticism. Often they have taken over without discussion two crucial but highly questionable features of Warrender's book: first, his ignoring the definition of ‘obligation’ given in Leviathan; and, second, his presentation of logically independent conclusions about Hobbes's theory as if they were related. As a result of the first, Warrender's critics have sometimes followed him into error; and, as a result of the second, they have sometimes been led to dismiss correct conclusions in the belief that these were logically bound up with other conclusions that really were wrong. Too often they have thrown out the baby and kept the bathwater.
Misleading Questions and Irrelevant Answers in Berkeley's Theory of Vision
Authors: Best A. E.
Published: February 2009

Berkeley's essay on vision was published in the spring of 1709. It was recognised at once as a book of considerable importance, and there was a second edition within the first year. The author was still only 24. His design, he wrote, was to show the ‘manner we perceive by sight the distance, magnitude and situation of objects’. Hitherto, writers on optics had ‘proceeded on wrong principles’.
Berkeley, The Sun that I see by Day, and that which I imagine by Night
Authors: Woolhouse Roger
Published: February 2009

On A number of occasions in the Principles, Berkeley defends himself against the possible objection that

‘by the foregoing principles, all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world; and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind.… What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? … Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy ?’
Popper's Falsifiability and Darwin's Natural Selection
Authors: Lee K. K.
Published: February 2009

Popper Proposed the criterion of falsifiability as a solution to the problem of demarcation i.e. of distinguishing science from pseudo-science and not, as many of his contemporaries in the Vienna Circle mistook it to be, a solution to the quite different problem with which they themselves were preoccupied, viz. of providing a criterion of meaning to distinguish the meaningful from the meaningless. While the positivists were concerned to damn metaphysics and exalt science, by identifying the empirically verifiable with the meaningful, Popper was concerned to separate science from scientism, to damn astrology and to extol astronomy. In other words his preoccupation belongs not to the philosophy of language but to the philosophy of science.
“False Consciousness”
Authors: Runciman W. G.
Published: February 2009

It may be as well to begin from the locus classicus, Engels to Mehring, July 14th, 1893: “Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process”.
Humour and Incongruity
Authors: Clark Michael
Published: February 2009

The question “What is humour?” has exercised in varying degrees such philosophers as Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer and Bergson and has traditionally been regarded as a philosophical question. And surely it must still be regarded as a philosophical question at least in so far as it is treated as a conceptual one. Traditionally the question has been regarded as a search for the essence of humour, whereas nowadays it has become almost a reflex response among some philosophers to dismiss the search for essences as misconceived. Humour, it will be said, is a family-resemblance concept: no one could hope to compile any short list of essential properties abstracted from all the many varieties of humour— human misfortune and clumsiness, obscenity, grotesqueness, veiled insult, nonsense, wordplay and puns, human misdemeanours and so on, as manifested in forms as varied as parody, satire, drama, clowning, music, farce and cartoons. Yet even if the search for the essence of humour seems at first sight unlikely to succeed, I do not see how we can be sure in advance of any conceptual investigation; and in any case we might do well to start with the old established theories purporting to give the essence of humour, for even if they are wrong they may be illuminatingly wrong and may help us to compile a list of typical characteristics.
“Both God and Man”
Authors: Graham J. C.
Published: February 2009

“All verbal forms of statement,” says Whitehead, “that have been long before the world disclose ambiguities, and sometimes the ambiguities strike at the very heart of the meaning. The effective sense in which a doctrine has been held in the past cannot be determined by a logical analysis of statements made in ignorance of the logical trap.... Religion collapses unless its main positions command immediacy of assent.”
The International Congress on Philosophy
Authors: Walker Leslie J.
Published: February 2009

Its broad, winding river, crossed by a multitude of bridges; its surrounding hills, amongst which stands conspicuous the long line of the Hradcine, topped by a continuous stretch of stately buildings with the cathedral of St. Vitus towering above them; the wide expanse of its numerous streets, over which rise the spires of many churches, ancient towers, and the lofty walls of numerous municipal and university buildings; the long history to which its architecture bears everywhere striking witness and of which its inhabitants are justly proud, rendered the city of Prague a no less fitting background for the eighth philosophical Congress than that which Oxford provided four years ago for the seventh. Nor was the hospitality which Czechoslovakia offered to its members a whit less cordial or less generous than that of England. The delegates who gathered together from all parts of Europe, from America, China, and from Japan, were welcomed both by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Beneš by the Minister of Public Instruction, Dr. Krčmář, by the Mayor of Prague; and, were it not for his unfortunate illness, would have been received by the President of the Republic himself. The Společenský club was placed at their disposal. They were entertained at the Foreign Office to tea, and at the palace of the President to supper by his daughter, Dr. Alice Masaryk. Their railway fares and even their tram fares were considerably reduced. On Thursday they were conveyed by motor-cars to Konopišté, a beautiful castle, soaring above pine forests and overlooking an extensive lake, formerly the residence of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, now taken over by the State, but maintained exactly as it was when the unfortunate heir of the Emperor Franz-Joseph was living there. The arrangements for the Congress were excellent, thanks to its President, Dr. Rádl, and to an extremely efficient organizing committee which placed itself unreservedly and unremittingly at the disposal of the 350 active and 150 associated members who attended the various meetings.
The Meaning of άγαθόν in the Ethics of Aristotle
Authors: Prichard H. A.
Published: February 2009

I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.
On Value
Authors: Laing B. M.
Published: February 2009

No one who is interested in the problem of value and attempts to read through the literature on the subject can fail to be struck by the extraordinary diversity of opinion. Some of this difference of view is traceable to ambiguities in language; there are various terms employed, each of which, of course, may or may not express any
valid idea—terms like value, values, kinds of value, sorts of things that have value, value-objects, things that have value. The terms value and values are subject to and lead to much confusion, even on the part of those who are aware of the existence of such a danger. Much of the difference may probably be due to two other important
factors: first, the education and training in earlier years whereby emotional reactions to words instead of intelligent understanding of their meaning and validity are induced, and, second, the continual reliance upon moral experience, which reliance may seem to be necessary, but which may be invalidated by the consideration, generally overlooked and unappraised, that moral, like social, experience might not be what it is if certain views were not entertained
and did not prevail. The latter possibility would put moral and social studies on a plane quite different from that of physical investigations, for the moral and social inquirer would always have to bear in mind that the facts with which he is confronted, and to which he seeks to appeal, may exist to confront him and his fellowmen only in the sense that they arise from the acceptance and effectuation of a belief or theory, and would not be but for the effectuation of the belief or theory. The other factor, that of the influence of education and training upon emotional reactions, is also important in relation to a study of value, for it is necessary to be on guard against confusing reactions to words and reactions to objects, things, or situations.
From Disenchantment to Construction
Authors: Kaye Michael
Published: February 2009

Notwithstanding persecution, the Jews have clung staunchly to God. But so have others. And is there any man's life which is free from the persecution of Death, which is not finally futility? “Surely every man walketh in a vain show”; “his days are as a shadow that passeth away.”
Qualitative and Quantitative: How and Why
Authors: Turner J. E.
Published: February 2009

Not in the lay mind only, but also to a wide extent throughout the realm of Science itself, there exists the belief that no matter how thoroughly research is pursued, it can never yield anything more than descriptions of whatever it may be concerned with. Undeniably, such descriptions are becoming so complicated in detail, and at the same moment so far-ranging in their applications, that they inevitably assume the aspect of more or less final explanations; and previous investigators often regarded them as being actually explanatory, finding indeed in this supposed result one of the most powerful impulses to carry their inquiries to their utmost limit. This however, it is frequently contended, is at best a short-sighted error and at worst a misleading superstition; the truth, no matter how unwelcome it may seem, being that explanation is unattainable because it is a wholly non-scientific category and ideal. If then we wish to discover any sufficient reason, any ultimate ground, any final solution, we must turn from Science to Philosophy; and even so, many sceptics do not hesitate to add, we are foredoomed to disappointment.
Knowledge, Action and Religion
Authors: Quick Oliver
Published: February 2009

The relation of knowledge to action and of theory to practice constitutes one of the most vital problems for human thought to-day. The classical philosophy, which the Catholic Church has inherited from the master-minds of ancient Greece, tends on the whole to rank theory above practice, and to maintain that ultimately we act for the sake of knowing. Characteristically modern thought, on the other hand, in most of its multifarious forms, inverts this order of precedence. We are commonly taught to-day that knowledge exists for the sake of action, and that theories are to be judged true or false according to their tendency to promote or hinder those severely practical aims, the attainment of which must constitute the main business of living. It is with the causes of this change of mind, and the judgment which we ought to pass upon its general value, that I propose to deal in this article.
Our Present Outlook in Speculative Philosophy
Authors: Mackenzie John S.
Published: February 2009

Speculative Philosophy, or Pure Metaphysic, stands at the present time in a very interesting position. There is perhaps some degree of slackening in the construction of elaborate systems, though, with the recent examples of McTaggart and Professor Alexander before us, this may be open to some question. But at least we probably realize, more fully than was possible in previous generations, the exact nature of the problems with which pure metaphysic is concerned. Its work has been more and more clearly marked off from that of the empirical sciences (including even the more detailed aspects of psychology), and from that of the mathematical sciences (including even the quasi-mathematical aspects of formal logic); and its province can now be definitely confined to the general theory of knowledge and the light that is thrown by this upon the structure of reality. It is my object in this paper to indicate briefly the chief problems that appear to fall within its scope and the chief directions in which we may look for light upon them. It is well to admit, however, that metaphysical problems are difficult, and that any statements that are made about them, unless expressed in language of a somewhat technical character, are very liable to be misunderstood. I must try to avoid both the Scylla of obscurity and the Charybdis of superficiality.
The Progress of Physical Science
Authors: Brown G. B.
Published: February 2009

Popular interest in the progress of physical science has increased very rapidly in the last few years. Perhaps the spectacular ‘mysteries’ of wireless and the intriguing paradoxes of the theory of relativity are the chief causes. For every home now has its Magic Box—a piece of pure physics; there is not a familiar thing in it, not even that sine qua non of all things that ‘work’—a wheel, only mysterious parts called condensers, grid-leaks, inductances, and thermionic valves. And surely, when a Sunday newspaper produces a facsimile page of Einstein’s recent paper in German containing abstruse tensor equations, reverence for the mathematical physicist is nearing its zenith.
The Status of Physical Concepts
Authors: Begg John C.
Published: February 2009

Contemplatingcertain residual mists, the net proceeds of a material world exploded and disintegrated by the relentless penetration of scientific intellect, the more advanced physicist has been led in recent times to co-operate with the philosopher on a common plane. Not so long ago, and not always without reason, the philosopher was regarded somewhat askance. It is the old antithesis between the practical man and the theorist, the scientific man himself having been regarded for long as a dreamer. All depends upon the level of action. Operating in the wilds the black tracker has nothing to gain by pausing for the slow, if sure, dictum of the scientist; and if a Mercator projection of the world, or a sextant, were offered to a primitive navigator of well-known home waters, these important aids to the sailor of longer voyages would probably be thrown in a corner, if not overboard. The launching forth on to wide oceans created the occasion for, and proved the value of, such products of exact thought. Thus, in his highest abstractions, the physicist must perforce become a philosopher. At the very least, the need of review and evaluation from a more general standpoint will be conceded.
Philosophy as Action
Authors: Scott J. W.
Published: February 2009

In studying the problems of philosophy, it is commonly considered an advantage to approach them through the history of philosophy, But to be compelled to spread one's sails, and take one's solitary course, “as if no Plato or Kant had ever existed,” has perhaps its advantages too.
Progress and Spiritual Values
Authors: Radhakrisnan Sarvepalli
Published: February 2009

The catchwords of our age, evolution and progress, sound very attractive so long as we do not pause to inquire into their significance. They are the delight of the sophist and the despair of the thinker. When we speak of progress we have in mind the human species. It is not easy to define what exactly the goal of human progress is. Even the leaders of the federation of progressive societies will find it difficult to give an adequate answer to the question of the end towards which we are actually progressing. They will find it more difficult to frame an ideal of human evolution which will be equally acceptable to, say, the monks of Mount Athos, Christian
Philosophy in Germany
Authors: Schrader F. Otto
Published: February 2009

Thepurpose of Wissenschaft und Weltanschaunng,1 by Aloys Wenzl, is to provide a rational explanation of the world which shall give us greater insight into its nature than either common sense or the natural sciences can give us. Philosophy, Professor Wenzl says in his introduction, springs from the desire for a weltanschaunng, for insight into the significance of life. But it also springs from a desire for rational explanation, and aims at objective validity. It proposes to give a truer, more complete, and more intelligible account of reality than appearances provide. This idea of a more intelligible explanation underlies the whole of Professor Wenzl's book. We want more than knowledge of empirical facts, we want knowledge of reasons (verstehen aus dem Grund), or, as he often puts it, insight (einsichtig verstehen). We want to see that though things seem to be contingent, they are really necessary.
Logic and Mathematics
Authors: Joseph H. W. B.
Published: February 2009

It is often said to-day that mathematics is nothing but an extension or development of logic; indeed, the identity of logic and pure mathematics is alleged so confidently by persons whose mathematical attainments entitle them to consideration when they talk about the subject-matter of mathematics, as to be in danger of being ranked with the truths that an educated man should accept on the authority of the specialist. Yet a little reflection might at least make one hesitate. For whatever else may be said about logic, it is generally allowed to study thinking. Some would say merely that it studies inference; but inference is thinking. Now the mathematician thinks and infers, but he does not study the activity of thinking and inferring; and a study of that activity would never make the discoveries credited to the mathematicians.
The Problem of Value
Authors: Turner J. E.
Published: February 2009

Few current problems have become so confused as that of Value. Its increasing importance in all departments of modern thought has made it the focal point of so many diverse aspects that the result seems a mass of formidable contradictions. But these can never be overcome by attempting to simplify the situation, which must on the contrary be recognized from the outset as presenting an extreme complexity that will inevitably advance pan passu with the advancing complexities of human experience. If, then, simplification is impossible, the only alternative is to attempt to grasp the salient features and present these in their true relation, in the same way that an invading army seizes the principal bases of hostile territory.
The Philosophy of a Business Man
Authors: Hicks G. Dawes
Published: February 2009

English Philosophy owes much that is most characteristic of it to the assiduous toil of men whose vocation has not been that of academic teaching and research. Many of them have been engulfed in the routine of business life, and such hours as they could devote to philosophic reflexion have been snatched from intervals of leisure which the majority of business men relinquish to recreation and rest. The friend to whose memory I wish to pay my humble tribute would not have claimed for himself, nor have permitted his associates to claim for him, the distinction of having initiated a new line of speculative reflexion. But, if he did not propound any original metaphysical theory, he possessed, in quite unusual measure, the
Meaning
Authors: Drever James
Published: February 2009

Probably no psychologist is really satisfied at heart with the present position as regards the psychology of Meaning. A similar situation existed not so very long ago—and in a measure still exists—with respect to the psychology of the emotions. But the difficulties with regard to Meaning are even more formidable than those with regard to Emotion. In both cases the difficulties are of the most fundamental character, and may be said to involve the very foundations of the science itself. In both cases also the difficulties are to some extent of the same kind, and have their origin in analogous conditions.
Where is Philosophy Going?
Authors: Muirhead J. H.
Published: February 2009

Some years ago Max Planck published a small book with the titleWhere is Science Going?in vigorous protest against the idea that the doctrine of relativity in general and the new quanta physics in particular mean that “the quest of the absolute becomes eliminated from scientific progress.” That it seems to be time to raise a similar question with regard to philosophy was suggested to me at a recent conference held at Farnham Castle on the relation between science and philosophy, at which the new school of logical positivism was strongly represented by some of the ablest of the younger men.
Great Thinkers
Authors: Laing B. M.
Published: February 2009

DavidHume, a member of the well-known Border family of Home, was born on April 26, 1711. After a period of preparatory training he matriculated at Edinburgh College in 1723, although he may have entered earlier. His course during this period is obscure; according to his own statement the curriculum was mainly literary; on leaving College he records that his interests lay predominantly in this direction, and, being left to his own choice, he was able to indulge his inclinations. An attempt to train him for a legal career ended in failure; and he continued to live at his ancestral home of Ninewells, to the west of Berwick, for some years, devoting himself
The Appeal to Common Sense
Authors: Price H. H.
Published: February 2009

Thus we cannot simply dismiss the principles of common sense as invalid or fictitious. What attitude, then, ought we to adopt towards them? There are two obvious suggestions.
Religion without God
Authors: Garvie A. E.
Published: February 2009

(I) The poet’s words: “A man’s reach should exceed his grasp” are not merely a command of whatought to be, they are a description of what is. (a) Man has always been stretching himself beyond his own measure. He has a sense of the Infinite: Eternity has been set in his heart: he has not been content to look only on the things seen, his gaze has ever been towards the Unseen. Whatever stage of development he may have reached, he seeks for, and strives after, what is above and beyond himself and his world. In science he tries to get behind thephenomenalreality as his senses apprehend it, to thenoumenal, mind. In philosophy he endeavours to bring the multiplicity of his experience, outer and inner, into a unity that will evidence itself to his reason as coherent, and not contradictory. In morality he is not content with the customs and standards of the society of which he is a member; but conscious of their inadequacy, he conceives and aspires to realize an ideal adequate to his nature; hisought to beis always challenging hisis. The impulse or motive (theélan vital) of progress in all spheres of human interest and activity is “the best is yet to be.”
Historical Causes
Authors: Coates Adrian
Published: February 2009

The question in philosophy of whether History is a Science is rather like the question in Politics of the expediency of a Channel Tunnel: it is one which provides a perennial subject for debate, there is no indication that it will ever be decided one way or the other, and it does not after all seem to matter much even if it never is decided; we can get along well enough by neglecting it altogether. One might argue indeed that the dispute is not much more than a matter of words, of the intension and extension of terms. It is evident that the method and aim of the historian differ widely from those of the physicist, and on the other hand resemble closely those of the geologist. Why trouble to go splitting hairs?
Modernism in Science and Philosophy
Authors: Urban Wilbur M.
Published: February 2009

There can be little doubt, I think, that the quality and texture of recent scientific and philosophical thought mark a greater break with the past than any innovations such as were introduced by a Gallileo or a Newton, a Descartes or a Kant. The switch over from the logicality and essential rationality of these men to the irrationalisms, the anti-intellectualisms, and the new logics of the moderns, is not at all on the same footing as that deepening of our concepts of knowledge and reality which we associate with the masters of thought, more particularly with the critical philosophy of Kant. Strong and significant as these earlier changes were, they marked but the onward strides of an art of thinking which remained in its essence the same in spite of them. But the thinkers in the public eye to-day are exploring in unknown regions, and it may turn out that they have got beyond their depth. Whatever their fate, it seems undeniable that the experiments that they have made and are making constitute, at points at least, and for the time being, a veritable revolution.
The Rational and Empirical Elements in Physics
Authors: Dingle H.
Published: February 2009

Itis a platitude that thought implies a subject and an object: the subject is the thinker, or the thinking mind, and the object is that which is thought about. This is probably the most elementary fact of consciousness, comprehensible alike to the child, the unreflecting man of affairs, and the philosopher, and it forms the natural startingpoint for philosophy. And indeed, one of the great divisions between philosophical systems is that which separates subjectivism on one hand from objectivism (more often called by the indefinite and overburdened name, realism) on the other. Subjectivism professes to interpret the object in terms of the subject, and objectivism professes to interpret the subject in terms of the object.
An Outline of an Order Philosophy
Authors: Kamiat Arnold H.
Published: February 2009

Throughoutthe history of philosophy the concept of unity has presented a problem. What does it mean to say that the cosmos is one, that a thing is one, that an organism is one, that a nation is one, that mind and body are one, that knower and known are one? Exactly what is it that is denoted when unity is postulated of anything? And when two or more entities are conceived as subsisting in unity, exactly what is the relation between that unity on the one hand, and its correlative duality or plurality on the other?
The Concepts of Politics
Authors: Mabbott J. D.
Published: February 2009

A recent letter to the Press counselled caution on the return of the German colonies on the grounds that Germany was a notoriously ungrateful nation. A few years after we presented Heligoland to her, the Kruger telegram showed her ready to encourage our enemies. Why should we now make her further gifts which would merely render more effective similar treachery? Clearly behaviour like this by an individual would warrant such an attitude. If I give a man a present on Monday and on Tuesday he stabs me in the back,
Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds
Authors: Price H. H.
Published: February 2009

Inordinary life everyone assumes that he has a great deal of knowledge about other minds or persons. This assumption has naturally aroused the curiosity of philosophers; though perhaps they have not been as curious about it as they ought to have been, for they have devoted many volumes to our consciousness of the material world, but very few to our consciousness of one another. It was thought at one time that each of us derives his knowledge of other minds from the observation of other human organisms. I observe (it was said) that there are a number of bodies which resemble my own fairly closely in their shape, size, and manner of movement; I conclude by analogy that each of these bodies is animated by a
Great Thinkers: (XIII) Immanuel Kant
Authors: Hicks G. Dawes
Published: February 2009

The close proximity of the nineteenth century to our own age is an impediment in the way of tracing with confidence the lines of its intellectual development, and more especially of estimating the significance of its philosophical speculation. Certain characteristics of the latter are, however, already sufficiently obvious. It is clear, at any rate, that the chief attempts at philosophical construction in the nineteenth century were the outcome of German reflexion; it is clear also that the great thinker who died in 1804 set the current of speculative activity upon a course markedly distinguishable from any that had been followed in preceding centuries. As a philosophical
Art and Science
Authors: Alexander S.
Published: February 2009

The thesis which I wish to recommend to you is that science is a form of art though not of fine art: that like art, it is a human invention, not less real for that, and having value, or being valuable, partly if not mainly because of that. I mean to indicate by this statement that for me at least a better insight can be got into the nature of science by considering it as a form of art, and asking how it differs from and how it resembles fine art.
Emotion and Instinct
Authors: Ginsberg Morris
Published: February 2009

Many contributions have been made in recent psychological literature to the study of the nature of emotion, yet profound differences of opinion remain both as to the aetiology and function of emotional states. I propose in this paper to inquire whether a consistent theory can be put forward which would do justice to all the facts that recent investigations have brought to light. It would appear that the defects of most of the theories of emotion are due to the fact that they exaggerate some aspect or phrase of emotion and claim for it exclusive or predominant value.
The Purpose of Philosophy
Authors: Jevons F. B.
Published: February 2009

Plato, in one of his dialogues (Theœtetus, 155 C–D), says: “ The feeling of wonder is the genuine mark of the philosopher; for philosophy has its origin in wonder.” What Plato here says may be accepted as true: the philosopher does wonder. But the philosopher is not the only man who wonders about things. It might perhaps be going too far to say that all men experience the feeling, for some men seem to plod on their weary round without curiosity enough to wonder at anything, whilst others, being comfortable, are satisfied to take things for granted, and never think of wondering at them.
Abstracts of Some Lectures Perception
Authors: Russell Bertrand
Published: February 2009

The words “mind” and “matter” are used glibly, both by ordinary people and by philosophers, without any adequate attempt at definition. Philosophers are much to blame for this. My own feeling is that there is not a sharp line, but a difference of degree; an oyster is less mental than a man, but not wholly un-mental. And I think “ mental ” is a character, like “ harmonious ” or “ complicated,” that cannot belong to a single entity, but only to a system of entities. But before defending this view, I wish to spend some time on traditional theories.
The Definition and Scope of Psychology
Authors: Pear T. H.
Published: February 2009

The general goal of psychology is usually the understanding of human behaviour.
Abstraction and Science
Authors: Stebbing L. S.
Published: February 2009

The man in the street to-day is aware that recent developments in the physical sciences have necessitated a fundamental revision of the concepts of physics; he finds that Einstein is no less upsetting to his ideas than was Copernicus to those of his own time or than Darwin was to Bishop Wilberforce. The plain man who has “ philosophical leanings ” is aware that questions previously regarded as metaphysical—and about which philosophers have written much that is unintelligible—are now recognized as falling within the scope of physics. Every reader of this Journal is aware that the criticism to which the main concepts of physics—space, time, matter—have been subjected is so fundamental that it is no longer possible to
say that there are material bodies in space, which have events happening to them at a given time. We must substitute the conception of a fourfold continuum within which space, time and matter are inextricably involved. Finally, we are told that this new way of regarding the classical trinity suggests the consequence that we know nothing about the “ inner nature ” of the terms with which we deal, we can make no assertions as to the ultimate nature of that to which they may refer. In this respect the prevailing temper of the present-day scientist is to be contrasted with the cocksureness of most nineteenth-century physicists l who, even if they did not go so far as to say “ we know what matter is,” at least suggested that only the metaphysician had, or could have, any doubts as to its nature and reality^
The Social Philosophy of Smith's “wealth of Nations”
Authors: Laird John
Published: February 2009

When Adam Smith, at the age of forty, resigned his professorship in Glasgow and devoted himself, after three years of travel, to the composition of his Wealth of Nations, he set himself to elaborate the sociological portion of his course on Moral Philosophy. Indeed, at the conclusion of his Moral Sentiments, written during the tenure of his professorship, he had promised “ another discourse ” on the “ general principles of law and government,” including a historical treatment and an account of “ police, revenue and arms.” To be sure, when the work appeared, it was not, in essentials, a continuation of the researches of Montesquieu, and had no authentic connection with Smith’s earlier treatise on morals, Instead, the bulk of it was a strict, and as we should say, a scientific (not a philosophical), inquiry into the
origin and conditions of opulence in human communities. Nevertheless, it expounds and is even dominated by a certain social philosophy which is not too convincing when nakedly put. Smith's abiding fame, accordingly, rests more upon the strict scientific analysis of his book than upon its implicit philosophy. Still, the philosophy was there. It had, and it still has, influence. A short discussion of it, therefore, is likely to have something more than historical interest.