bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Social Roles And Moral Responsibility
Authors: Downie R. S.
Published: February 2009

The concept of moral responsibility has many applications. We speak, for example, of a person's responsibilities, and mean his professional or domestic commitments. In this sense a person can be said to have too many responsibilities, or none at all, and he can be said to be responsible to or for another person. Again, we can speak of the person himself as being responsible or irresponsible, and mean that he is conscientious and trustworthy in the performance of his duties or that he has a sense of responsibility. Finally, we can speak of a person as accepting responsibility for an action or another person. A thorough analysis of these complexities of usage would require the investigation of a number of background concepts, but in this paper I have the more limited object of classifying some of the usages. I propose to do this by constructing three analytical models based on the concept of a social role.
The Disunity of Plato's Thought or: What Plato did not say
Authors: Bambrough Renford
Published: February 2009

When Mr. Apollinax visited the United States, his laughter tinkled among the teacups. When Professor Ryle published Plato's Progress, his paradoxes clattered through the china shops (ὠ τς καινότητος. Ἡράκλεις τς παραδοξολογίας. Ẻυμήχανος ἄνθρωπος).
On Confidence
Authors: Rotenstreich Nathan
Published: February 2009

Confidence or trust is obviously a sort of reliance or dependence. Confidence is related to fiducia, which in turn is related to fido and to the Greek peitho. The latter term implies persuasion or persuasiveness. If we follow, as we should, the nuances hidden in these terms, we may assume that confidence is a reliance stemming from persuasion or accompanied by it. Confidence may be related to a person, including oneself, and in this sense we speak of self-confidence; or it may be related to another person, either in the singular or in the plural, or even perhaps to the course of events at large, to history, to the cosmos, to God etc. It is in this sense that confidence is the opposite of or contradictory to fear. And Aristotle indeed placed the brave man between the two poles of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward.
Hegel, Luther, and the Owl of Minerva
Authors: Mure G. R. G.
Published: February 2009

For a century or so after his death Hegel's system excited, if not wider diversity of interpretation and more bitter controversy, then certainly more bewilderment, than had ever before befogged the battlefields of speculative thought. A few fervent disciples maintained that their master had achieved a system substantially if not in all detail final and complete, a philosophy destined to set at rest forever all serious philosophic doubt. Others agreed that this claim to finality was inherent in the system, but mocked openly, proclaiming Hegel an arrogant megalomaniac.
The Limits of Historical Explanations
Authors: Skinner Quentin
Published: February 2009

Although the literature on the logic of historical enquiry is already vast and still growing, it continues to polarise overwhelmingly around a single disputed point—whether historical explanations have their own logic, or whether every successful explanation must conform to the same deductive model. Recent discussion, moreover, has shown an increasing element of agreement—there has been a marked trend away from accepting any strictly positivist view of the matter. It will be argued here that both the traditional polarity and the recent trend in this debate have tended to be misleading. The positiviste (it will be conceded) have been damagingly criticised. But their opponents (it will be suggested) have produced no satisfying alternative. They have tended instead to accept as proper historical explanations whatever has been offered by the historians themselves in the course of trying to explain the past. But a further type of analysis must be required (and will be attempted here) if some account is to be given of the status, and not merely the function, of the language in which these explanations are offered. Such an analysis, moreover (it will finally be suggested) has implications of some importance in considering the appropriate strategy for historical enquiries.
Pascal's Wager
Authors: Cargile James
Published: February 2009

A. Pascal's statement of his wager argument is couched in terms of the theory of probability and the theory of games, and the exposition is unclear and unnecessarily complicated. The following is a ‘creative’ reformulation of the argument designed to avoid some of the objections which have been or might be raised against the original.
Optimism
Authors: Boden Margaret A.
Published: February 2009

The optimist may be secretly envied, but he is publicly despised. His pronouncements are regarded as expressions of simple-minded blindness or as cynical propaganda. Optimism is not regarded as intellectually respectable. It was not always so: there have been times when optimism was not merely considered worthy of rational argument, but was widely accepted by thinking men. Now, however, we react with a growing embarrassment to passages such as these:

The time will therefore come when the sun will shine only on free men who know no other master but their reason;… All the causes that contribute to the perfection of the human race, all the means that ensure it must by their very nature exercise a perpetual influence and always increase their sphere of action … the perfectibility of man is indefinite.
Existentialism
Authors: Coates J. B.
Published: February 2009

If one takes a course in philosophy to-day at a British university, a discreet silence is usually observed about existentialism. Often the professors understand little of its methods or its doctrine. If their excuse in part is the inaccessibility in English of standard existentialist texts, it is true also that philosophers trained in the “critical philosophy” now in vogue feel a certain aversion to existentialism or, at all events, to the notion they have formed of it. If Christianity was a scandal to the Greeks and remains a scandal, as Dr. Brunner has recently told us, to contemporary humanists, existentialism is a scandal to the positivists. The latter are aware that the existentialists habitually trespass in the fields of religion, ethics, aesthetics and psychology, fields which, on the positivist view, should be reserved to other disciplines than philosophy, which has its own distinctive subject-matter and approach. They know that certain existentialists, notably Heidegger, provide a happy hunting ground for examples of “metaphysics.” They have heard that existentialism has sought to turn the tables on positivism by accusing it, if not of metaphysics, at all events of a barrenness of significant content, of a preoccupation with mere logistics which removes philosophy completely from men's business and bosoms. If the positivist accuses the existentialist of perpetrating “nonsense” in a technical sense, the latter retorts by accusing the positivist of reducing philosophy to nonsense in a pragmatic sense.
Images, Supposing, and Imagining
Authors: Flew Annis
Published: February 2009

In this paper I shall do three things. Firstly, I shall distinguish between three senses of “imagine”: one in which (the context makes clear that) the word is used to report the occurrence of mental imagery; a second in which “imagined” is used as substantially equivalent to “thought”; and a third in which “imagine” is used as substantially equivalent to “suppose.” (And I shall argue that in neither of the two latter senses does imagining necessarily involve imagery.) Secondly, I shall discuss Hume's thesis about imagination: both because, although this is set out as a plausible (but mistaken) generalization about psychology, it nevertheless seems to me that Hume dealt with a central philosophical problem concerning imagination—the relation of descriptions to imagery—in a way that is suggestive and fruitful; and—the main reason for mentioning Hume—because a study of the relation between imagining (when this is imaging) and imagining (when this is supposing) will help us to reinterpret his thesis from a mistaken one about psychology into a correct one about logic and language. Thirdly, I shall give the
central arguments and the conclusion of the chapter on Imagination in The Concept of Mind, and comment on them.
Volition
Authors: Vesey G. N. A.
Published: February 2009

‘Let us not forget this: when “I raise my arm”;, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from that fact that I raise my arm?’
The Concept of Justice
Authors: Ginsberg Morris
Published: February 2009

Since the war there has been a revival of interest in the idea of justice and its relation to law. The main contributions have come from the side of jurisprudence among which may be mentioned Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Aspects of Justice (1958); Potter, The Quest of Justice (1951); Friedmann, Legal Theory (1944); Stone, Province and Function of Law (1947); Paton, Textbook of Jurisprudence (1946); Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law (1953); H. L. Hart, The Concept of Law (1962); E. Dowrick, Justice According to English Common Lawyers (1961); there have also appeared English translations of important continental contributions, such as the translation by Campbell of Del Vecchio's Justice (1935); by C. D. Broad of Axel Hägerströms's Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals (1953) and the work by Alf Ross On Law and Justice (1958).
Omnipotence
Authors: Geach P. T.
Published: February 2009

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘pantokratōr’; and both this Greek word, like the more classical ‘pankratēs’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘pantocratōr’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything.
Alienation and Self-realization
Authors: Nielsen Kai
Published: February 2009

Self-realizationist theories are among the classical attempts to develop a comprehensive normative ethical theory. Plato and Aristotle, in giving classical statements of such theories, argue that a man's distinctive happiness, a man's distinctive flourishing, will only be realized when he realizes himself, i.e. when he achieves to the fullest possible degree his distinctive function. And to achieve one's function is to develop to the full those capacities which are distinctive of the human animal. In doing this we are being most truly ourselves and in doing this we are doing what it is our own nature to do. Men who cultivate to the fullest that which men and only men have will be the happiest men and in so acting they will realize themselves most fully; they will achieve their maximum potential or their fullest distinctively human growth. To so realize oneself is the final end of all moral activity. It defines what is to constitute ‘the good life’ and what is to count as ‘a good man’.
Scepticism and Morality
Authors: Cherry Christopher
Published: February 2009

In an article called ‘Moral Scepticism’ Professor R. F. Holland displays in a pointed and often impressive way both the virtues and the vices of a tempting approach to certain fundamental issues in moral philosophy. The appeal to sanity and honesty may, when directed towards chronic philosophical perplexity, cease to be a virtue and become the vice of disingenuousness. And when a philosopher writes that ‘no clear idea is available to us of what moral scepticism amounts to’, that moral scepticism would, if it were possible at all, have to be a ‘specially cooked-up affair’ by contrast with other varieties of scepticism, it is hard not to accuse him of just such a vice.
The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Behaviour
Authors: Midgley Mary
Published: February 2009

Every age has its pet contradictions. Thirty years ago, we used to accept Marx and Freud together, and then wonder, like the chameleon on the tartan, why life was so confusing. Today there is similar trouble over the question whether there is, or is not, something called Human Nature. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of animal behaviour studies, and comparisons between animals and men have become immensely popular. People use evidence from animals to decide whether man is naturally aggressive, or naturally territorial; even whether he has an Aggressive or Territorial Instinct. On the other hand, many sociologists and psychologists still seem to hold the Behaviourist view that man is a creature entirely without instincts, and so do existentialist philosophers. If so, all comparison with animals must be irrelevant. (To save space, I have had to simplify both these party lines here, but if anyone thinks I am oversimplifying the behaviourist one, I can only ask him to keep on reading New Society). On that view, man is entirely the product of his culture. He starts off infinitely plastic, and is formed completely by the society in which he grows up.
Punishment and Retribution
Authors: Maclagan W. G.
Published: February 2009

There are many difficulties connected with the notion of punishment, but perhaps it is not disputed that it is at least a deliberate infliction of pain of one kind or another. Of course, that is not an adequate description of its nature, but so far as it goes it seems to be a true one.1 And the idea that it could be morally right deliberately tp inflict pain on another, unlike, for example, the idea that it is morally right to tell the truth, is so manifestly intolerable unless we look beyond the infliction of pain itself that we are tempted to leap forward to the question, “What is the justification of such action?” before making quite explicit to ourselves what it is, over and above its being the deliberate infliction of pain, that constitutes the action punishment at all. The questions “Why hurt?” and “Why punish?” are confused with one another. No doubt some distinction between them is present vaguely in everyone's mind and the confusion may not be in fact serious: but anyhow it is a defect and should be remedied.
Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics—I
Authors: Walsh W. H.
Published: February 2009

What is the Critique of Pure Reason about? The terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the subjectivity of space and time, the existence and objective validity of a number of a priori concepts or categories, the falsity of the arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most widely favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century; but though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the wood for trees; and in this case the fault is more excusable than in most, for the individual trees each demand so much attention and are so difficult to get round that it is all too easy to forget the very existence of the wood. At the worst, one may think that there is no wood at all; only a miscellaneous aggregate of individual trees which have nothing to do with each other.
Kant's Philosophy of Religion
Authors: MacKinnon D. M.
Published: February 2009

It was in 1792 that Kant published the first Book of his most important single work on the philosophy of religion—Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. But it was his very interesting treatment of the biblical material in the second Book that involved the philosopher in his one serious conflict with official authority. Greene and Hudson give a good account of this conflict and its effect on the work as a whole in the introduction to their translation of Religion in the Harper Torchbook Series (1960).
Popper's Account of Scientific Method
Authors: Passmore J. A.
Published: February 2009

Professor Karl Popper has had a great deal to endure: “expositions” of his ideas which were mere travesties, “refutations” which he had already answered, by anticipation, or which entirely missed the point at issue. One can easily understand why, when he came to publish an English translation of his Logik der Forschung, he decided to keep to the original text; it should at last be clear exactly what he had—and had not—said in 1934. Yet his thinking had by no means stood still since that time; quite naturally, too, he wished to emphasize as much.
Science and Spirit
Authors: Norburn Gkeville
Published: February 2009

The purpose of this important series of Gifford lectures is to give an account of science; to show its method, its aims, its metaphysical presuppositions, and in what social context it may best flourish.
Austin's ‘Philosophical Papers’
Authors: Ambrose Alice
Published: February 2009

The essays collected in this volume, appearing between the years 1939 and 1958, include all of the late Professor J. L. Austin's published papers, and in addition two unpublished papers, ‘The Meaning of a Word’ (1940) and ‘Unfair to Facts’ (1954), as well as an unscripted talk, ‘Performative Utterances’, given in the Third Programme of the B.B.C. in 1956. The editors, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, have performed a real service in making these papers available in one volume; for the cumulative impact of the method Austin pursued in doing philosophy, and the questions this method raises, can be felt and appreciated more fully when a considerable assemblage of illustrative papers is brought together. The debt Austin owes to the tradition to which G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein contributed is quite clear, and the divergences from them are equally clear. In reviewing the contents of the ten articles in this volume I shall try to single out what is unique about his contribution, in particular what features of his procedure, falling as it does under the general classification ‘linguistic analysis’, were so distinctive as to win for it the attention accorded to a new departure.
Austin on Perception
Authors: Hardie W. F. R.
Published: February 2009

‘After it, the philosophy of perception cannot be discussed in ways it usually was discussed before.’ This is said about Sense and Sensibilia by Mr Bernard Williams in an article, ‘J. L. Austin's philosophy’, published in the Oxford Magazine of 6 December 1962. It is not quite clear what Mr Williams means by the remark. It might be understood as an endorsement of Austin's insistence that philosophers have lapsed into crudity and error through their neglect of distinctions marked by the rich variety of linguistic expressions in ordinary use. But Mr Williams himself in his article makes some effective criticisms of Austin's opinion that ordinary language is a reservoir of philosophically significant distinctions, and points out also that Austin's own practice in these lectures did not exhibit any close connection between his survey of the variety of the uses of such words as ‘look’, ‘seem’, ‘appear’, and his criticism of theories of perception.
On Having One's Reasons
Authors: Brown Robert
Published: February 2009

The question of what we are doing when we give an explanation in terms of the agent's reasons for his behaviour is both familiar and complicated. The question I shall raise here, however, is somewhat more limited. It is that of what is involved in making use of such explanations once we have some cursory acquaintance with their structure. In particular, I wish to draw attention to some relations between explanations in terms of intended goals and relations in terms of the agent's reasons for an act.
Morality and the Assessment of Literature
Authors: Pole David
Published: February 2009

At the beginning of The Principles of Literary Criticism I. A. Richards complained of the chaos of critical theories—a complaint that we hear pretty often, generally from theorists about to add to it, each making his small contribution. Richards' own contribution was a plan for reckoning the merit of poetry in terms of the more or less organised psychological state that it serves to induce in its readers: for poetry, he held, organises our ‘attitudes’—a term that may be taken in different ways. The theoretical picture that Richards connects with it, a vivid enough picture in its way, is of a kind of stock exchange of neural impulses; but perhaps in his practical criticism the word reverts to its ordinary sense. And surely the practical criticism, not the neurological speculation, is what has served to keep Richards' work alive. This is the aspect, at least, to which I shall confine my attention here; my concern is with the use of these and similar concepts in the practical business of criticism. For here we have critical approach, a technique and an orientation, that has in point of fact increasingly established itself. And the fact is one, surely, that aesthetics cannot ignore; a general theory should take notice of practice. But if this is only to add still more to the notorious chaos, I cannot see any alternative course short of abandoning the subject altogether; and that alternative, at least for those who are instinctive theorists and generalisers, is an impossible one.
The Complexity of the Concepts of Punishment
Authors: McGloskey H. J.
Published: February 2009

Many contemporary philosophers writing on punishment seek to show that much of the dispute between retributionists and utilitarians springs from a failure on the part of both parties to elucidate the concept of punishment. The writers are usually utilitarians who seek to show that what is true in the retributive theory is simply a point about the concept of punishment, and that for the rest, the morality of punishment is to be explained in terms of the utilitarian theory. Those who attempt to destroy the retributive theory by reducing its element of truth to a mere conceptual point about the concept of punishment, seek to argue that the notion of being guilty of an offence is part of the concept of punishment. Against this kind of approach, I wish to consider whether a general theory of punishment is possible, and if so, what are its basic concepts—punishment, deserving of punishment, deserved, or justifiable punishment—and how they are to be elucidated. I shall be concerned to argue that much contemporary writing on punishment commits the Platonic fallacy of assuming that there is a single, core, paradigm use of ‘punishment’ which is to be found by elucidating the concept of legal punishment.
Hobbes's Grounds for Belief in a Deity
Authors: Brown K. C.
Published: February 2009

I Propose to re-explore here some aspects of a very shop-worn question: ‘Was Hobbes in any sense an atheist?’ Three centuries ago, Hobbes's personal security in part depended on the way his contemporaries answered this question; today, the validity of several current accounts of his philosophy are similarly bound up with it. These accounts vary extraordinarily, all the way from Polin's confident assertion that ‘pour qui sait lire entre les lignes, … c'est ľatheísme qui triomphe implicitement’, to Taylor's equally firm belief that ‘a certain kind of theism is necessary to make [Hobbes's] theory work.’1 And now the latest of the Taylorians, Prof. Howard Warrender, has published his book The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, in which Hobbes's statements regarding the place of God are again treated as an essential part of his theory; and the charge explicitly made, that there are no sound grounds for regarding them as ‘the product of confusion or pretence on Hobbes's part’.
Relativity in Ethics
Authors: Ross G. R. T.
Published: February 2009

It is fairly clear that, when I say “I like this” and “This is good,” I do not mean the same thing. Even though I should reverse the position of the two relata in my expression of the former proposition and state the non-symmetrical relation intended in the equivalent form, “This is liked by me” unidiomatically or, in good English, by “This pleases me,” the meaning of what I assert would not be logically equivalent to “This is good.” True, it is certain that, if I actually believe the latter, I also believe the former; this must please me in some way: I approve of it. Here, however, we have only one-sided implication, not equivalence; B implies A, but A does not imply B.
Right Actions and Motives
Authors: Leon P
Published: February 2009

CAN actions be right irrespective of the motives from which they come? Can an action be right though coming from a bad or an ‘indifferent’ motive?
Everyday Philosophy of the Turkish People in Stambul
Authors: Ōmer A. Hilmi
Published: February 2009

Until the very recent days of the Turkish Republic, when every effort is being made to adopt the ways of Western civilization, it has been the picturesque and wellnigh universal custom for shops to carry on their walls small placards, usually framed, and these placards have contained in beautiful Arabic writing verses from the Quran, traditions of Muhammed, rhymed and unrhymed sayings which have for generations been passed down from father to son. Coffee-houses, barber shops, booksellers, grocery stores, pharmacies, candy stores, fruit-stands, private houses even, all have decorated their walls with more or less artistically copied bits of wisdom from the past. In general there is no record of the authors or sources from which the sayings have come. They reflect in some measure also the thought of Turkish society as that thought has been passed on through the centuries. In order to get a picture of social relationships in the old Ottoman state it will perhaps be of value to study these texts and learn what we can from them of the social life and ideals of everyday folk in Constantinople from the earliest days down to the period which is just passing. There was a close relationship between these mottoes and their owners. The mottoes reflected in the first place the life philosophy of those who wrote them, and they served to mould the attitude toward life of successive generations. Not only religious belief, but attitudes toward the world and its problems, toward methods and standards of business dealing, are all touched upon in these texts.
On the Nature of Political Obligation
Authors: D'Entrèves A. P.
Published: February 2009

The phrase, ‘political obligation’, is far more popular in English than in other European languages. Whether this may be due to historical circumstances, or to a peculiar bent of the English mind, is a fascinating question; but it is not the one which I propose to discuss here today. I am mentioning it only to explain the choice of my subject, a subject which would probably sound rather uncommon to an Italian audience, but which, I am sure, has a familiar ring to English ears. My subject, I would like to emphasise, is the nature of political obligation; my approach will be analytical rather than historical; and indeed, let me say at once that this lecture is a kind of examen de conscience in which I am myself involved, since I feel personally responsible for having introduced the phrase into my own native language, and for having used it during a life-time as if its meaning were self-evident, without ever raising the questions which I want to raise today.
Mercy
Authors: Smart Alwynne
Published: February 2009

A theory of punishment should give some account of mercy and yet it is true to say that very little has been said about it at all. It is commonly regarded as a praiseworthy element in moral behaviour—something to be practised occasionally both for the good of the one who punishes and the one who is punished. The suffering that punishment involves is unpleasant for all concerned, and if it is possible to avoid it or lessen it without moral injustice, then it is desirable to do so. We condemn as hard and unbending the judge who never shows mercy and the suggestion is that the poor unfortunates whose lot it is to be judged by him are poor unfortunates indeed. This is reflected in the fact that the opposite of merciful—merciless—means cruel. Presumably there are occasions when it is appropriate to show mercy to an offender, and other occasions when it is not. What are the conditions for the appropriate exercising of mercy, how do we decide how much mercy is appropriate, and when is a judge morally obliged to be merciful, if ever?
The Logic of Tacit Inference
Authors: Polanyi Michael
Published: February 2009

I propose to bring fresh evidence here for my theory of knowledge and expand it in new directions. We shall arrive most swiftly at the centre of the theory, by going back to the point from which I started about twenty years ago. Upon examining the grounds on which science is pursued, I saw that its progress is determined at every stage by indefinable powers of thought. No rules can account for the way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry; and there are no firm rules either for the verification or the refutation of the proposed solution of a problem. Rules widely current may be plausible enough, but scientific enquiry often proceeds and triumphs by contradicting them. Moreover, the explicit content of a theory fails to account for the guidance it affords to future discoveries. To hold a natural law to be true, is to believe that its presence may reveal itself in yet unknown and perhaps yet unthinkable consequences; it is to believe that such laws are features of a reality which as such will continue to bear consequences inexhaustibly.
On Having in Mind
Authors: Findlay J. N.
Published: February 2009

Sir David Ross, Ladies And Gentlemen: I Have chosen as the topic of this inaugural lecture that of “having in mind,” the manner or manners in which things come before us in consciousness, are present to our thoughts, or are in some way “there for us.” Alternatively, I might say that I want to consider whatever may be involved in saying that we can turn our thoughts in this or that direction, that we can let them dwell on this or that actuality or possibility, whether what we thus concern ourselves with be picked out from our present environment, or reached for beyond it. I like this second “active” way of describing my subject-matter much less than my first, impersonal way of speaking, for reasons that I shall try to make plain in the course of this lecture. I wish, in short, to give you a tentative anatomy of our conscious life, and to sketch the fundamental dimensions into which it may be differentiated. This task is important, since the puzzles which concern the presence of objects to our minds are of a peculiarly deep-seated and refractory sort: they are also puzzles which infect our treatment of practically all other philosophical questions. It is not that certain arbitrarily chosen ways of speaking confuse us, which could be readily bettered by keeping our eyes on the facts: it is rather as if our subject-matter itself confused us, and tempted us to describe it in ways which only serve to deepen mystery and perplexity, and which ultimately plunge us into nonsense.
Berkeley and the External World
Authors: Brunton J. A.
Published: February 2009

There are so many logical systems that it is difficult to find any criteria to which they must all conform. It is, however, generally agreed that all logical systems, however diverse in character, must avoid falling into contradiction. Internal consistency would, indeed, inevitably form part of any definition of what is meant by a logical system.
The Plurality of Moral Standards
Authors: Horsburgh H. J. N.
Published: February 2009

Reinhold Niebuhr, approaching the ethical field as a theologian rather than as a philosopher, has maintained that the Christian ethic is not single and indivisible, but that, on the contrary, it consists of what one might call an absolute ethic (‘the law of love’) and a kind of interim ethic in which the notion of justice is prominent. Without commenting on Niebuhr's work I wish to put forward a view which, although more general than his, is perhaps not without a superficial resemblance to it.
Great Thinkers: (VIII) Spinoza
Authors: de Burgh W. G.
Published: February 2009

The student of Spinoza is faced by a peculiar difficulty. On opening the Ethics—Spinoza's chief work, completed for publication shortly before his death in 1674—he finds a system of metaphysics set forth in geometrical form, starting from definitions, axioms, and postulates, and advancing synthetically from first principles to a detailed interpretation of the universe. The difficulty lies not in the language— Spinoza's Latin is easy to construe, and there are translations—nor in the lack of literary graces; his style indeed is singularly impressive in its austere dignity. It lies rather in this, that the method of exposition conveys a misleading suggestion of dogmatism and finality, and conceals almost all traces of the patient inquiries that issued in the finished structure. If once the principles of the system are admitted, the rest appears to follow by logical necessity. But by what processes of thought was Spinoza led to those principles? This is the problem that besets the reader: in order to understand the Ethics, he must penetrate behind the text of the propositions to their significance as answers to the questions that were stirring in Spinoza's mind.
Some Implications of a Passage in Plato's Republic
Authors: Foster M. B.
Published: February 2009

In Book VII, p. 520, Socrates describes the arguments by which the philosophers must be induced to “return to the cave,” that is to say, to resume the practical business of politics from which they have escaped into the better life of contemplation. They must be shown that this sacrifice is a debt which they owe to the city in return for the opportunity which it has afforded them of becoming philosophers. “Will our pupils,"1 he continues, “when they hear this, refuse to share in turn the toils of state, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of ideas?” “Impossible,” Glaucon replies; “for they are just men, and the commands which we impose on them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not like our present ministers of state’.
Life and Meaning
Authors: Dilman Ilham
Published: February 2009

People sometimes ask whether their lives are meaningful or not, whether or not their lives add up to anything. Sometimes they also ask whether life as such is meaningful or not. These are not unconnected questions. Still they are not questions which everyone asks himself. Nor do we always readily recognise what one who asks these questions wants to know. There are some people who will not even find such questions sensible. Some will regard them not as questions but simply as symptoms of something having gone wrong somewhere. Thus in the Diary of the Student Kostya Ryabtsev we find the following words:
ON DISCRETE SAMPLING OF TIME-VARYING CONTINUOUS-TIME SYSTEMS
Authors: Robinson Peter M.
Published: February 2009

We consider a multivariate continuous-time process, generated by a system of linear stochastic differential equations, driven by white noise, and involving coefficients that possibly vary over time. The process is observable only at discrete, but not necessarily equally-spaced, time points (though equal spacing significantly simplifies matters). Such settings represent partial extensions of ones studied extensively by A.R. Bergstrom. A model for the observed time series is deduced. Initially we focus on a first-order model, but higher-order models are discussed in the case of equally-spaced observations. Some discussion of issues of statistical inference is included.
Interrogating spaces Viewpoints on architecture, the city, and society
Authors: Hvattum Mari
Published: February 2009

I've always thought that Leibniz's monadology offers comfort during parallel session conferences. Assuring us that each monad reflects the whole, although from its particular point of view, Leibniz makes the sanguine case that one can make sense of things even if one's viewpoint is sadly singular. In the mad rush from one paper session to the next, knowing that at best one gets to hear a third of what is being said, it helps to invoke a bit of Leibnizian optimism. And indeed, Dublin seemed like a best possible world during the three days of the Defining Space conference taking place in October 2007. Generously hosted and meticulously organised, the University College Dublin-led event succeeded not only in attracting more than eighty papers that contributed to elucidate the concept of space in relation to architecture, art, and the city, but also in creating an atmosphere of conviviality and intellectual generosity which gave the event an unusual sense of sharing.
Words and objects in transposing desire and making space
Authors: Awan Nishat
Published: February 2009

In this article I will explore the relationship between space, language and
objects and interrogate the role of language as a signifier for the
transformation of space through cultural difference. My work is informed by the
context and the methods of postcolonialism and specifically the notion of
hybridity. If the hybridity of a postcolonial identity is acknowledged, then the
space where these identities are negotiated could also be seen as sharing
qualities of overlap and mixing. Influenced by psychoanalytic theories of the
self and its relation to others, postcolonial theory has used strategies of
‘mimicry’ and ‘hybridity’ as motifs
to provide a vocabulary that shifts colonial relations out of the dialectic of
oppressor and oppressed. But following Lefebvre's idea that all space
is social space, and Foucault's spatialisation of power, the move
from the historic preoccupation with time to a spatialisation of the processes
of knowledge production, allows postcolonial thinking to go beyond the
complicities of identity politics, which has been one of the major criticisms of
this mode of thought. As an architect, this opens up certain possibilities of
interrogating postcolonial subjectivity through the spaces that are occupied and
used by those who are implicated within it. This paper will focus on one such
space: a park in East London.
The healthful ambience of Vitaglass: light, glass and the curative environment
Authors: Sadar John
Published: February 2009

In the mid 1920s, a physiologist, a glass technologist, and a zoo embarked on an exciting new venture which promised to turn buildings into therapeutic devices. Their project was to devise an architectural glass which would admit the beneficial, therapeutic ultraviolet spectrum of sunlight into the building; they called their invention ‘Vitaglass’. Vitaglass was the first ultraviolet ray glass – one of the more curious products to emerge from the 1920s architectural glass industry. Its distinguishing feature was that it enabled the invisible ultraviolet radiation of the sun to be admitted into the building; its refined chemistry promised to ‘let health into the building’ where ordinary soda-lime glass had blocked it out [1]..
The Crystal Palace, environmentally considered
Authors: Schoenefeldt Henrik
Published: February 2009

In the nineteenth century, horticulturists such as John Claudius Loudon and Joseph Paxton, aware of the new environmental possibilities of glasshouses that had been demonstrated in the context of horticulture, contemplated the use of fully-glazed structures as a means to creating new types of environments for human beings. While Loudon suggested the use of large glass structures to immerse entire Russian villages in an artificial climate, Henry Cole and Paxton envisioned large-scale winter parks, to function as new types of public spaces. These indoor public spaces were intended to grant the urban population of London access to clean air, daylight and a comfortable climate. Although glasshouses had only been experienced in the immediate context of horticulture, designed in accordance with the specific environmental requirements of foreign plants, rather than the requirements of human comfort and health, they were perceived as a precedent for a new approach to architectural design primarily driven by environmental criteria. The environmental design principles of horticulture were discussed extensively in nineteenth-century horticultural literature such Loudon's Remarks on the Construction of Hothouses (1817), Paxton's Magazine of Botany (1834-49) and the Transactions of the Horticultural Society of London (1812-44). Since the purpose of glasshouses was to facilitate the cultivation of an increasing variety of foreign plants in the temperate climate of Northern Europe, the creation of artificial climates tailored to the specific environmental needs of plants became the primary object of the design.
Atmospheres of space: the development of Alvar Aalto's free-flow section as a climate device
Authors: Passe Ulrike
Published: February 2009

This paper is part of a broader research agenda, which aims at an environmental re-reading of selected icons of Modern Architecture that share one characteristic, the development of a free-flow open section. The complex relationship between spatial composition and thermal and climatic conditions within buildings is explored both qualitatively, using analytic drawing, and quantitatively, using simulations with computational fluid dynamics. I am seeking patterns common to both and the work has become an investigation of the concept of architectural space at the intersection between art, technology, climate and perception. Most architects of the Modern Movement addressed this relationship in one way or another. They either praised technology and the emerging ‘machine age’ or rejected it. Today most architectural production appears to have an ambivalent and sometimes contradictory position on technology.
An Emergent Perioperative Nursing Regime?
Authors: Smedley Pat
Published: February 2009

What was it like to be an early Nightingale probationer as St. Thomas' hospital in the 1870's? While much has been written about the administration of the Nightingale Training school, this author wanted to examine the actual experience of the probationers themselves - how did it differ from that of the modern nurse? The author used the ward diaries of three sets of probationers, from 1870 — 1890, together with the lecture notes of Mr Croft, the senior surgeon at St. Thomas' who delivered weekly lectures from 1872 onwards, to investigate the hospital routine of these women.
The Acute Pain Service in Australia
Authors: Day Jill
Published: February 2009

Last November I was fortunate enough to be given the opportunity to visit the Royal Adelaide Hospital (RAH), South Australia. I had been invited by Dr Pam Macintyre who had spoken at the 1997 South Thames Acute Pain Conference. I spent two interesting weeks observing the Acute Pain Team to see how their service was managed.
An analysis of the scientific knowledge underpinning a clinical nursing skill: using pulse oximetry effectively in patient care.
Authors: Prowse Morag A.
Published: February 2009

Pulse oximeters are widely used in nursing practice. They are easy to read, need no user calibration and are simple to operate. The ease of use may give rise to the view that nurses have no difficulties using pulse oximetry monitoring in patient care because it is straightforward and only requires the ‘application’ of bioscientific knowledge gained in pre-registration education.
Discussion of the relevance and practicality of taking a Post-Anaesthetic Care Unit nurse into the era of nurse consultants posts.
Authors: Bateman Inge D.
Published: February 2009

The reason for choosing this subject is because it is highly relevant since Trusts are currently in the process of establishing posts in accordance with the National Health Service (NHS) ‘Executive's Health Service Circular 217’ (1999). The political background for setting up these posts stems from the document ‘Making a Difference: Strengthening the nursing, midwifery and health visitor contribution to health and healthcare’ (Department of Health 1999a). It is also relevant in connection with nurses in general, as they are not being recognised nor rewarded for their abilities. This is especially so in PACUs where the nurse's image is low and PACU nursing is not a recognised speciality, such as Intensive Care Unit (ICU) nursing, Coronary Care Unit (CCU) nursing, High Dependency Unit (HDU) nursing and so forth. From personal experience, it has been observed that well qualified and highly experienced staff leave the clinical environment for positions in management, sales or even leave nursing altogether when no further career advancement is possible in the clinical field.
Chicago 2000!
Authors: Smedley Pat
Published: February 2009

Chicago Illinois, home to both IFNA and AANA, this year hosted the 6th world congress for nurse anaesthetists. The largest convention for this nursing speciality the world has ever seen. Over 3000 delegates from over 22 countries attended this 5-day conference, encompassing clinical workshops/ presentations, management/education forums, political debates together with an impressive commercial exhibition and a poster presentation. I was fortunate indeed to replace Clara Bradshaw on this occasion as the UK National Representative and it was an experience that I will not forget.
Thoughts
Authors: Jane Agency
Published: February 2009

Jane Bovey has long been a member of BARNA, and has recently left her job in the private sector as a recovery nurse to work with an agency. Jane decided to write a column in the journal to express concerns felt by many nurses working in anaesthetics and recovery. Jane also wanted to promote debate on some contentious issues, and welcomes replies to her column. If you have a reply, send to E Mail: theeditor.bjarn@k-2.org.uk or BJARN, 6 Bromyard Avenue, Walmley, Sutton Coldfield, B76 IRQ. The views expressed in this column are entirely of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those held by the British Anaesthetic & Recovery Nurses Association.
Trained And Unqualified
Authors: Heap Catherine
Published: February 2009

In a recent publication by the National Association of Theatre Nurses (NATN); their Chairman Vincent (1996, p.3) suggested “Support workers, when appropriately trained, provide tremendous support to operating department professionals, assisting with the provision of a good, cost effective service, cooperating to develop new ways of working in this rapidly changing environment to respond to the needs of the patient and the service.”
Analgesics: the Dawn of a New Era?
Authors: Rowbotham David J
Published: February 2009

Iam fortunate, if that is the correct word, to have several responsibilities other than those of my day job. One of these is Chairman of the Scientific Programme Committee of the Pain Society. Indeed, as I sit writing this missive with one hand, the other hand is busy packing my bags for this year's annual 4–day meeting in York. The General Synod of the Church of England hold their meeting on the University of York campus every year, so it will be no surprise for those of you who know any members of the Pain Society that it is perfect for their needs.
Audit of Adverse Clinical Incidents in the Anaesthetic Recovery Room
Authors: Hapgood A. , jankowski S. , Vaughan L. , Hyslop P.
Published: February 2009

In view of recent events regarding paediatric cardiac surgery in Bristol, the medical and nursing profession have been encouraged to embrace clinical governance. Clinical governance ranges from departmental to hospital level and encourages all hospital staff to examine clinical practice by setting standards and measuring up to those standards. Clinical audit can help to achieve this aim