bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Belief, Values, and the Will
Authors: Govier Trudy
Published: May 2010

In this paper I shall presuppose that:

(1) logic and epistemology are disciplines which supply us with normative statements pertaining to states of belief.

(2) as such, logic and epistemology have implications concerning what we ought and ought not to believe.

(3) as such, logic and epistemology presuppose that there is some sense in which a person controls what he believes — some sense in which ‘can’ has a place in contexts where one comes to believe things.
George Englebretsen: Speaking of Persons
Authors: Churchland Paul M.
Published: May 2010

This is not a very strong contribution to the Monograph Series. Given the present state of the debate in the philosophy of mind, I think most readers will find this essay anachronistic in its metaphilosophy, incomplete and confused in its presentation of the issues, sloppy in its argumentation, and unimposing in its conclusions. And I think most readers will be right. Ostensibly, it is an essay in descriptive metaphysics, an essay in “conceptual geography”. In the author's words, “… this essay constitutes an attempt to map one particular area of the conceptual countryside… that surrounding the concept person.” The vintage of the metaphors aside, this does remain a worthy undertaking, for certainly the full story on our common-sense conception of persons has yet to be told. Curiously, however, Professor Englebretsen's contributions on this particular score are surprisingly slim, and we find him instead discussing and criticizing at length a variety of substantive theories as to what the things we conceive of as persons really are. This is adventurous behaviour for one whose concerns pretend a limit at the inspection, description, and explication of the current state of common-sense, and one wonders how the author supposes that mere conceptual cartography can serve to settle these apparently substantive issues.
John King-Farlow and Roger A. Shiner (Eds.): New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind
Authors: Brand Myles
Published: May 2010

It is difficult to understand why this volume is named New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Some of the essays are better classified as metaphysics, some as philosophy of science, and at least one as philosophy of language. But no matter, the name of the volume is unimportant: it is the contents that count. And the contents are very interesting. The general quality of the papers is high, higher than is often found in contemporary journals. The articles all share the methodological trait of being well-argued, and perhaps it is this trait more than anything else that unifies the volume. In what follows, I shall comment briefly on two articles on action theory, and then even more briefly on the remaining six papers.
Études sur la rhétorique aristotélicienne et médiévale
Authors: Leroux Georges
Published: May 2010

Trois parutions récentes sur la rhétorique aristolélicienne et médiévale ont fourni le contenu de cette recension. Il s'agit des livres suivants:

Keith V. ERICKSON, Editor.Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric. Metuchen, New-Jersey, The Scarecrow Press, 1974; VIII-315pp. Joseph M. Miller, Michael H. PROSSER & Thomas W. Benson. Editors.Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973; XX-299pp.

James J. MURPHY.Rhetoric in the Middle Ages. AHistory of Rhetorical Theory from saint Augustine to the Renaissance. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974; XIV-395 pp.
Philosophical Nationalism: Self-deception and Self-direction
Authors: King-Farlow John
Published: May 2010

Ladies and Gentlemen, your kindness over many years has left me feeling deeply grateful, but really embarrassed as I tried to prepare a speech for this occasion. Now I also understand better why non-legal people feel awkward in attempting to compose a Will. Nevertheless, it is curiously sweet for me to be giving this Presidential Address of 1978 in London, Ontario. The context balances and almost cancels out a sour occasion about a decade ago in London, England when I told my mother that I had decided to follow my sister and her family in 1968 to live in Edmonton, Canada. My mother, an American then living in Britain, replied with the question: “Johnny, why do you want to spend your life in a third-rate country?”. It was here in London, Ontario that Roberts Butts had already set out to build an internationally first-rate Department of Philosophy by making uncommonly intelligent use of taxpayers' money. Not far away in Stratford, Ontario a man who is rumoured to have proposed once to an aunt of mine had long since shown what uncommonly intelligent use of taxpayers' money could do for Canadian theatre.
Le développement des sciences est-il un procès normé? Faut-il choisir entre Kuhn, Feyerabend et Popper?
Authors: Lacharité Normand
Published: May 2010

Après avoir caractérisé les positions respectives de Feyerabend, Kuhn et Popper concernant la «méthodologie scientifique», je veux soutenir que ces trois positions ne sont pas aussi incompatibles que le suggère la constante polémique dans laquelle elles s'expriment et qu'en fait elles forment entre elles une structure. Cette structure est articulée sur trois constructions différentes de la science, d'une part, et de la notion de norme applicable à la recherche scientifique, d'autre part. Ces différences contribuent à la formulation de trois problèmes différents concernant la science et son développement, de sorte que la question du choix entre les trois positions, si elle se pose, concerne la légitimité des problèmes posés, et non pas la vérité de l'une de trois solutions incompatibles entre elles.
Hasards et Probabilités
Authors: Largeault J.
Published: May 2010

L'occasion de réfléchir sur le hasard m'a été indirectement fournie par le programme universitaire français pour l'agrégation (1978), qui comportait «l'idée d'ordre». Par antithèse je me suis demandé ce qu'est le désordre. Il est assez commun d'expliquer le désordre par le hasard. Dans notre pays il n'est pas rare que des ouvrages à prétention scientifique roulent sur le hasard. Il n'y avait donc qu'à lire …

En y regardant de plus près, on voit que hasard se dit de deux choses: soit (a) d'événements apparemment dépourvus de finalité ou qui nous frappent par la disproportion apparente des causes et des effets (cf. la tuile dont la chute tue un passant, l'accident automobile « idiot », etc.), soit (b) de phénomènes aléatoires (randomness) caractérisés par une irrégularité qui à la longue cède place à un ordre (cf. la chance au sens anglo-saxon).
R.G. Collingwood et la connaissance historique
Authors: Dray William H.
Published: May 2010

Lorsqu'on cherche à comprendre l'enjeu des discussions actuelles entre les philosophes anglophones de l'histoire, l'on est fatalement conduit, à un moment ou l'autre, à étudier les vues de R.G. Collingwood. Depuis la publication en 1946 de son livre posthumeL'Idée de l'histoire, les idées de Collingwood ont été à la fois un stimulant et une source de problèmes constants pour ceux qui se préoccupent de définir l'histoire comme mode d'investigation rationnelle. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, la littérature aussi bien critique qu'exégétique consacrée à son œuvre s'est développée à un point tel qu'il est devenu difficile d'ignorer ses idées.
The Virtues of Vagueness in the Languages of Science
Authors: Rosenberg Alexander
Published: May 2010

Philosophers have traditionally decried vagueness as an unmitigated evil, and natural scientists have consistently agreed with them. Nevertheless, as I hope to show, the vagueness of scientific terms has some important advantages for the theories in which these terms figure. In so arguing I do not mean to put the best face on some unpleasant facts or to make a virtue out of a necessity. I shall begin, however, by arguing that on some contemporary accounts of scientific language the vagueness of many scientific terms is unavoidable; if it is unavoidable then lamenting it is futile, and justifying it is idle. I shall go on to argue that, independent of these accounts, the advantages of exactness attained can sometimes be substantially outweighed by the disadvantages of vagueness foregone.
La foi et la vie propre de la raison: remarques sur l'ouvrage de J. King-Farlow et W.N. Christensen
Authors: Theau Jean
Published: May 2010

Résumer pour des lecteurs de langue française le noble livre qu'ont publié l'an dernier John King-Farlow et William N. Christensen sur les rapports de la foi — entendez la foi Judéochrétienne — et la raison vivante — entendez la raison telle que la cultive de nos jours la philosophic analytique — n'est certes pas chose aisée, surtout quand le rédacteur de la chronique a été nourri et éduqué, comme c'est le cas, dans la tradition de la philosophic française! En effet Faith and the Life of Reason procède d'une série d'articles qui ont paru successivement, au cours des quinze dernières années, dans d'importantes revues américaines, irlandaises ou anglaises et dont ce nouvel ouvrage constitue en quelque sorte la reprise, en même temps que la refonte (cf Préface, p. 1), selon une perspective ordonnée.
J.F.M. Hunter, “Essays After Wittgenstein
Authors: Burns Steven
Published: May 2010

Already known for his penetrating, and sometimes idiosyncratic, interpretations of the later Wittgenstein, John Hunter, of University College, Toronto, now offers eight essays on independent topics. Each of the essays stands on its own, but they are clearly the work of a single mind and together constitute a sustained contribution to current discussion of that area of metaphysics sometimes called philosophy of mind. Although the debts to, and the insight into, Wittgenstein are substantial, I do not wish to document them.
Errors and Mistakes
Authors: Theobald D. W.
Published: May 2010

Errors and mistakes are of course common enough, and as often as not have unfortunate consequences. When we fail to do something we set out to do, we sometimes feel compelled to point to the errors and mistakes we have made, or sometimes less generously to the errors and mistakes others have made. For to be able to point to an error or mistake in this way is commonly thought to provide an explanation for what went wrong, and sometimes even to offer an excuse for it. In this paper I want to explore the significance of the terms ‘error’ and ‘mistake’ when we use them to talk about our failures. There are some good reasons for being interested in these matters. For some philosophers in the past have made much philosophical mileage out of our errors and mistakes, so much so that a whole breed of thinkers, sceptics, has come into being as a result. And I shall want to examine their attitude towards errors and mistakes, for it may turn out that the serious conclusions of the philosophical sceptic cannot rest upon the existence of either errors or mistakes, and as a result, are not so compelling as they might seem at first sight. In fact, I shall argue that our common experiences of error and mistake cannot support the weight that the sceptic places upon them. I also briefly look at the connection between error and mistake as I interpret them, and philosophical determinism. I argue that the existence of errors and mistakes is incompatible with conventional determinist philosophy.
Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?
Authors: Seager W. E.
Published: May 2010

A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world situation of mutual nuclear deterrence may well provide a concrete illustration of these paradoxes. That deterrence can involve paradox may well be true, but what I wish to consider here is whether the case of nuclear deterrence is in fact an instance of “paradoxical deterrence”.
Syntaxe formelle et tableau
Authors: Meunier Jean-Guy
Published: May 2010

L'un des objectifs souvent visé par les théories esthétiques contemporaines est la compréhension de ce produit particulier de l'artiste peintre qu'est un tableau. Et, dans la recherche d'une telle compréhension, plusieurs types d'entreprises tant descriptives qu'explicatives ont déployé une diversité impressionnante de concepts et de méthodes.
What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal Theory
Authors: Copp David
Published: May 2010

An account of the ontological nature of collectives would be useful for several reasons. A successful theory would help to show us a route through the thicket of views known as “methodological individualism”. It would have a bearing on the plausibility of legal positivism. It would be relevant to the question whether collectives are capable of acting. The debate about the ontology of collectives is therefore important for such fields as the theory of action, social and political philosophy, the philosophy of law and the philosophy of social science. I hope to contribute to the debate by proposing an account of collectives, and by showing its theoretical soundness and utility. In its essentials, my proposal is that collectives are “mereological sums” of “stages” of persons linked by a “unity relation”. The influence on this account of some theories of personal identity will perhaps be obvious. But the motivation is different, for it lies at least as much in the ability of the theory to help us deal with the issues already mentioned as in problems concerning the identity of collectives over time. I acknowledge that my proposal is not commonsensical; however, I believe that no account could be both commonsensical and adequate. I will begin by introducing some constraints on a theory of collectives.
Analytical Approaches to Determinism
Authors: Odegard Douglas
Published: May 2010

Determinism in one sense is the theory that all events, including human actions, are governed by laws and hence are necessary. Some think that it can be refuted simply by identifying entrenched beliefs that contradict it, i.e., simply by establishing incompatibilism. Others think that this is not enough, that if determinists uncover the right sort of evidence, they can use that evidence against any contrary beliefs, however well entrenched. In that case, attention must be paid to contingent facts about human behaviour. Probably a combination of the two approaches is the best strategy. Obviously, ascertaining what the facts are, and what their relevance is, cannot be done independently of analysis and logic. Yet a concentration on incompatibilism seems particularly vulnerable to stalemate. Hence the need arises to investigate whether concepts formed during the analytical inquiry are actually true of anything, independently of questions of entrenchment. To confirm this suspicion about the limitations of analysis, I shall consider two perceptive and well-regarded arguments for thinking that determinism clashes with a belief in alternate possibilities.
Le problème moral comme totalisation chez Sartre
Authors: Knee Philip
Published: May 2010

Dans la perspective historique que se donne l'oeuvre de Sartre à partir de la guerre et qu'il articule théoriquement dans la Critique de la raison dialectique, il s'agit de se détourner de l'impossible quête de l'être que définissait L'être et le néant. Par l'engagement social et la lutte politique, il vise désormais un monde où l'éthique n'est plus bloquée dans la mauvaise foi, mais sera « la praxis dans son libre développement comme seule relation éthique de l'homme à l'homme en tant qu'ils dominent ensemble la matière ». Toutefois, si l'on interroge le sens et la possibilité de ce « règne humain » qui structure l'ouvrage, ce qui est en jeu c'est l'ambiguïté de toute la démarche morale de Sartre à partir de son ontologies Là, en effet, le « manque » qui définit le pour-soi aboutit à faire de tout projet un échec puisqu'il n'a de sens que par rapport à une totalité manquée: le projet d'être Dieu. Dans le cadre de cette visée d'absolu, le problème moral est finalement celui de la « conscience malheureuse ». Mais tout l'effort de Sartre à partir de la guerre est de montrer que le « manque » n'est pas nécessairement l'échec. La réalité humaine étant une question pour elle-même, ce manque peut aussi être l'occasion d'une action effective avec les autres si l'on ne se paralyse pas sur cet horizon d'absolu. La liberté peut être la quête d'une totalité non plus métaphysique mais humaine et concrète à travers la praxis de chacun.
Being-In-Itself Revisited
Authors: Holmes Richard
Published: May 2010

In the Introduction to Being and Nothingness, entitled “The Pursuit of Being”, Jean-Paul Sartre states that Edmund Husserl has misunderstood his own essential discovery of the intentionality of consciousness and that “from the moment that he makes of the noema an unreal, a correlate of the noesis, a noema whose esse is percipi, he is totally unfaithful to his principle”. In what follows I assess this claim as I explicate Sartre's development of the concept of intentionality and the basis for his claim. In addition, I show how an understanding of the views of both Husserl and Sartre reveals a basic convergence. My primary purpose in this is to further develop the correct description of the objects of the world through an analysis and elucidation of the accounts of Sartre and Husserl.
Simple réaction à un double commentaire
Authors: Lagueux Maurice
Published: May 2010

C'est un avantage appréciable, pour un auteur, que de voir son livre recensé simultanément par deux lecteurs aussi attentifs que Christopher Morris et Claude Panaccio. Les divers aspects de l'ouvrage ont alors d'autant plus de chances d'être mis en relief que chacun des lecteurs adopte habituellement une stratégie différente pour en rendre compte. C'est ainsi que, dans le cas présent, le souci d'équilibre qui semble avoir guidé Morris dans sa patiente description de chacun des chapitres du livre se trouve heureusement complété par la volonté manifeste, chez Panaccio, de faire plutôt ressortir, à partir de quelques exemples, le style d'argumentation qui le caractérise.
A Noteworthy Misconception of Jews and Jewish Philosophy
Authors: Newman Jay
Published: May 2010

Even philosophers who are unsympathetic to Thomistic philosophy generally agree that Etienne Gilson is one of the important philosophers of this century. Those who have had the privilege of meeting or hearing Gilson also know him as a man of charm, wit, and integrity. These qualities, combined with his erudition, have made Gilson one of the intellectual leaders of the Roman Catholic Church. And there is probably much truth to the claim of his student, Pégis, that, “[N]on-Catho1ic readers have seen in him a ‘liberal’ Catholic scholar, which is a remarkable tribute…”. I have long been an admirer of Gilson's work, and so I was deeply disturbed and saddened by certain passages about Jews and Jewish philosophy in Gilson's autobiographical book, Le Philosophe et la Théologie. The remarks to which I refer are in the second chapter of this book, which has been translated into English by his daughter, Cécile; and were they the remarks of a minor professor, they would not merit any attention whatsoever. But because they are the remarks of a wise man, of one of the most influential thinkers of the century, they merit a consideration which for one reason or other they have not as yet received. My aim here is to show that certain of Gilson's views on Jews and Jewish philosophy are misconceptions; and though what I say here is mainly intended for Roman Catholic readers, some of the points I make will also be of interest to non-Catholics.
Platon et la Géométrie: la construction de la Ligne en République, 509d–511e
Authors: Lafrance Yvon
Published: May 2010

Dans la seconde partie de son Prologue au Commentaire du premier livre des Éléments d'Euclide, Proclus, un néo-platonicien du Ve siècle après J.-C., a donné sur Platon un jugement qui semble avoir été accepté d'une façon assez unanime par les anciens, lorsqu'il écrit: «Après eux [Hippocrate de Chios et Théodore de Cyrène] vécut Platon qui fit prendre aux Mathématiques en général, à la Géométrie en particulier, un essor immense, grâce au zèle qu'il déploya pour elles, et dont témoignent assez ses écrits tout remplis de discours mathématiques, et qui, à chaque instant, éveillent l'ardeur pour ces sciences chez ceux qui s'adonnent à la philosophie». Les historiens modernes de la géométrie grecque ont dû nuancer ce jugement de Proclus, allant même jusqu'à parler de légende à propos des prétendues découvertes géométriques de Platonz. De fait, il semble que l'essor des mathématiques et de la géométrie au IVe siècle av.
The Synthetic Significance of Analytic Statements
Authors: Rozeboom William
Published: May 2010

In his essay “Brains and Behavior” in Analytical Philosophy, edited by R. Butler, 2nd Series, Blackwell, 1965), Putnam has contended that Logical Behaviourism is not merely dead, its corpse has become olfactorily unattractive. For, says Putnam, while the translatability of mentalistic terms into the vocabulary of overt behaviour is no longer a live issue, innocent philosophers are still being corrupted by sinful urges of a Logical-Behaviouristic sort, namely, (a) suspicion that statements relating behaviour to mental events may be more than just synthetic, and (b) the possibility that the translatability thesis breaks down purely and simply through a mismatching of vagueness in the way, e.g., that a statement about baldness fails at translation into a statement about the number of hairs on a person's head merely because of the inherent vagueness of the term ‘bald’. But while the latter version of neo-Logical-Behaviourism can be dismissed with a curt reminder of what has been learned about the observational irreducibility even of dispositional terms, I remain unconvinced that propositions linking mental and behavioural events are wholly devoid of analytic support.
L'explication en grammaire transformationnelle
Authors: Panaccio Claude
Published: May 2010

Malgré les critiques de toutes sortes dont elle fut et dont elle est encore l'objet, la grammaire transformationnelle est devenue en vingt ans, sous l'impulsion de Noam Chomsky, le paradigme dominant de la linguistique contemporaine. Et, bien sûr, l'incroyable rapidité de cette ascension s'est accompagnée de nombreuses crises de croissance. Linguistes, philosophes et psychologues, ainsi amenés à s'interroger sur les fondements épistémologiques de cette étrange discipline, se sont heurtés à de redoutables énigmes métathéoriques: de quel domaine factuel la linguistique est-elle la science? les grammaires sont-elles empiriquement falsifiables? quel rôle l'intuition du locuteur – et singulièrement celle du linguiste – joue-t-elle dans l'élaboration et la confirmation de la théorie? quelle relation y a-t-il entre règles et lois? quel est le rapport théorique de la linguistique à la psychologie, à la sociologie, à la neurophysiologie? … Ces questions et d'autres semblables ont donné lieu ces dernières années à une étonnante profusion de livres et d'articles, où, à propos d'une discipline particulière et d'exemples précis, sont discutés, souvent en profondeur, tous les principaux problemes de l'épistémologie contemporaine.
En guise d'introduction à l'utopie
Authors: Roy Jean
Published: May 2010

L'Utopie est le «negro spiritual» des intellectuels de l'Occident moderne. J. Ellul.

Je me propose de brosser ici, à grands traits, une sorte de petite histoire raisonnée de l'utopie. Bien entendu, elle ne peut être que trop rapide. Néanmoins, les quelques jalons que je pose peuvent, je crois, guider un itinéraire jusqu'au renouveau actuel de Futopisme par delà la mort de l'utopie.
Singular subjects
Authors: Slater B. H.
Published: May 2010

Consider the following argument.

(i) ‘Fa’ and ‘a’ (or ‘-Fa’) are contradictories.

(ii) So one or other of ‘Fa’ and ‘a’ must be true.

(iii) Now ‘Fa’ entails ‘(x)Fx’,

(iv) And ‘a’ entails ‘(x)x’,

(v) So one or other of ‘(x)Fx’ and ‘(x)x’ must be true.

(vi) But both of ‘(x)Fx’ and ‘(x)x’ say there is something.

(vii) So, either way, there is something, i.e. something exists.
Kant's application of the Analytic/Synthetic distinction to Imperatives
Authors: McCarthy M.H.
Published: May 2010

In the first Critique Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction and illustrated it with theoretical propositions. As his main aim in that work was to justify synthetic a priori propositions, Kant was able to bring his central questions into relief and discuss the methodology of their solution by contrasting synthetic propositions, such as: “Every event has a cause” with analytic propositions, such as: “Every effect has a cause.” Consequently, few commentators have any difficulty in stating as propositions the propositions Kant is justifying in the first Critique or in pointing out the difficulty of justifying such propositions.
St. Thomas, Ideas, and Immediate Knowledge
Authors: Dewan Lawrence
Published: May 2010

John Locke, in his Essay, poses the following problem:

It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves?
The Mind's Body: The Body's Self-Awareness
Authors: Lucash Frank S.
Published: May 2010

In order to find out how successful or unsuccessful Spinoza's philosophy of mind is, I will examine what Spinoza says about (1) the nature of mind, (2) its relation to the body, (3) its adequate/inadequate and true/false ideas. In doing so I will see what problems critics say he runs into and then find out if what they say about these difficulties can be resolved. If these difficulties can be resolved within Spinoza's own framework then his theory of mind is a success. If not, then it is a failure. I shall argue that his theory of mind is a success because the problems that his critics say he has are not really problems at all or if there are problems they can be resolved within his own system.
Acceptance and the Problem of Slippery-Slope Insensitivity in Rule-Utilitarianism
Authors: Whitt L. A.
Published: May 2010

Slippery slopes crop up with startling frequency when controversial moral issues are debated. Generally, those who mount this line of argument appeal to some grim, highly undesirable state of affairs which would—they allege—inevitably ensue were society to sanction certain activities. Their reasoning is often fallacious, offering little more than an easy out for those reluctant to address problematic moral issues with the care and honesty they demand.
The Case for Animal Rights
Authors: Lehman Hugh
Published: May 2010

In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the question of our moral obligations to animals. It is, I believe, the best book to appear on this subject to date.
Vintage Popper: The Postscript, After Fifty Years
Authors: Brown James Robert
Published: May 2010

Karl Popper is certainly one of the major philosophers of the century, and in working through the near thousand pages of his newly published Postscript one can see why. Only the big issues are dealt with; they are always treated with great clarity; and the conclusions are profound. In spite ofthis, however, these three volumes are ultimately disappointing, since they tell us little new about Popper's thinking.
Skepticism and Belief: A Reply to Benoît Garceau
Authors: Nielsen Kai
Published: May 2010

I am grateful to Professor Garceau for his thoughtful and gracious characterization and critique of my account of religion. As will become apparent, as I proceed, there is much in his account, both methodological and substantive, that I think is fundamentally mistaken, but, that notwithstanding, I very much appreciate the tone and spirit in which his critique of my work was conducted. Benoît Garceau has carefully studied my views and has in an exemplary manner tried sympathetically to understand them to capture what divides reflective and informed religious believers and reflective and informed skeptics. It is, I believe, fair enough to say that the task of trying to ascertain what most fundamentally divides contemporary literate believers and skeptics is of fundamental significance in any attempt to come to grips with the contemporary significance of religion, though it does seem to me that this task is much more problematic than is usually thought. In responding here to Carceau's specific criticisms, I shall, in the general drift of my remarks, be trying to make some contribution to the clarification of that issue. Though I shall only be able to touch on a small corner of it, I shall be concerned to examine in what way, if at all, it is possible for there to be, as Garceau would put it, a dialogue between such believers and skeptics; and I shall be concerned, as well, somewhat more broadly, to ascertain what it would be like for us, not only to understand each other, but, if indeed such a thing is possible at all, what it would be like to move a step forward in the ancient but still ongoing and developing debate concerning whether one should, all things considered, be, if one can, a believer, or a skeptic.
Analogy and Inference
Authors: Shaw William H. , Ashley L. R.
Published: May 2010

The nature of analogies, and their legitimacy in argumentation and inference, is a disputed subject. This essay is intended to shed some light on the tangle of issues that it involves. After discussing in section one the different functions of analogy, in particular in explanation and in science, we present in section two aprima faciedefense of analogical argument against those who repudiate it entirely and in section three an account of its logical structure. Section four argues that analogical inference does not collapse, as some of its critics contend, into standard induction, and section five attempts to explicate more precisely the warrant for analogical inference. We conclude in section six by suggesting a typology for arguments from analogy.
The Robbery Paradox
Authors: Vorobej Mark
Published: May 2010

James E. Tomberlin [6] has recently argued that the logical systems of conditional obligation proposed by Azizah al-Hibri [1] and Peter Mott [5] are incapable of resolving at least one variant of the notorious contrary to duty imperative paradox, formulated originally by Chisholm [2]. Tomberlin concedes that these systems offer the very best of the' “conditional obligation approach” to deontic logic and concludes his critical discussion with the pessimistic remark that “the best of this approach is simply not good enough. Deontic logic … is obliged to turn elsewhere for its proper formulation and resolution of the deontic paradoxes” ([6], 373). Below I argue that Tomberlin's three central arguments against al-Hibri and Mott are fallacious.
Rorty's Pragmatism
Authors: Prado C. G.
Published: May 2010

My objective here is to sketch a proposal against the many who insist on reading Rorty as arguing within traditional philosophy, in spite of his contentions to the contrary. I want to suggest that Rorty should be read as importantly outside the philosophical tradition and as an external critic. My proposal turns on roughing out how Rorty's brand of prag- matism differs from more familiar sorts.
John Stuart Mill's Concept of Utility
Authors: Donner Wendy
Published: May 2010

I offer here an interpretation and defense of John Stuart Mill's qualitative hedonism. One of the results of Mill's well-known mental crisis was a concept of utility substantially different from the orthodox Benthamite quantitative hedonism which Mill came to regard as being fraught with difficulties. He saw Bentham's concept as being excessively narrow, and he sought to overcome its limitations by enlarging his own concept of utility. He did this by including the quality of pleasures along with the quantity in the estimation of their worth. At the same time, Mill was highly critical of the intuitionist ethical theories of his day, and propounded utilitarianism as the rational, objective, and scientific alternative. So if Mill is to succeed in his enterprise of countering intuitionism while avoiding the pitfalls of Benthamite utilitarianism, he must retain the objectivity of Benthamism while repudiating its narrowness. Mill's critics have argued that when he opened up his concept of utility to include quality, he modified his theory so radically that he can no longer be called a hedonistic utilitarian, and that he relinquished the consis- tency and objectivity of Benthamite utilitarianism along with its weak- nesses. I argue here that Mill abandons neither hedonism nor utilitarianism, and that the objectivity and consistency of his theory are not undermined.
Liberal Rights and the Ethics of Homicide
Authors: Brunk Conrad G.
Published: May 2010

According to its author, Engineered Death is not a book about the morality of homicide but about intellectual self-consistency—in particular about the self-consistency of the “liberal” view of homicide. The “liberal” view is defined by Woods as the view that murder is morally wrong because, and only because, it is a violation of rights. He tells us that he is concerned to defend neither liberalism in general nor its notion of individual rights in particular, but only to work out the implications of these assumptions for the problems of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and senecide. It is only in this sense that Woods' disclaimer about the non-ethical nature of his book can be taken seriously. In every other respect it is a treatise on ethics. It puts forward and defends moral theses that are independent of, and in some cases even contrary to, traditional ethical liberalism.
II est impossible d'intervenir dans le cours des événements
Authors: Lane Gilles
Published: May 2010

Plusieurs L'Ont déjà dit. Marx, Freud, Lévi-Strauss, Skinner, par exemple, l'ont affirmé d'une façon ou d'une autre. On peut toutefois se demander s'ils l'ont vraiment pense, ou si, plutot, ils ne voyaient pas comment il serait possible á l'homme d'intervenir dans le cours du monde. Personne ne semble avoir voulu pousser tres loin, ni tres longtemps, 1'interrogation et la recherche a ce propos, avec le resultat qu'on s'en tient a des affirmations — tout au plus a des croyances — sur la possibilité ou, au contraire, l'impossibilité que l'homme intervienne dans le monde physique, psychologique, ou social, pour le changer.
Une contrepartie à Marx: la théorie de la justice de Rawls
Authors: Lafrance Guy
Published: May 2010

L'Ambitieux Projet du professeur John Rawls dans son important ouvrage intitulé «A Theory of Justice» consiste essentiellement dans l'élaboration d'une théorie de la justice qui prétend offrir une «solution de rechange viable» aux doctrines traditionnelles de la justice représentées par l'utilitarisme, l'intuitionisme, les théories contractuelles, etc …, mais une théorie qui, en méme temps, se présente comme une tentative pour «généraliser et porter a un plus haut niveau d'abstraction la theorie traditionnelle du contrat social telle que representee par Locke, Rousseau et Kant», de telle sorte qu'elle puisse parer aux objections les plus decisives qui ont ete faites a l'endroit de ces diverses formulations de la theorie contractuelle. En procédant ainsi, Rawls estime pouvoir offrir une approche systematique au probléme de la justice qui soit non seulement une alternative a 1'utilitarisme traditionnel, mais une synthése supérieure et plus valable pour une sociéte démocratique en méme temps qu'une approche de la justice sociale qui puisse servir de contrepartie ou de succedane a la perspective de Marx.
Will, Belief and Knowledge
Authors: Classen H.G.
Published: May 2010

In her recent paper, “Belief, Values and the Will,” Trudy Govier raises several interesting and challenging points. Most interesting is her conclusion that it is at least logically possible for a person to believe something “simply in virtue of having taken that decision,” i.e., by fiat. In otherwords, it is possible to believe something by an act of will.
The (logical) importance of not existing
Authors: R.  , Routley V.
Published: May 2010

An Adequate theory of meaning and truth is semantically important. Such a theory necessarily includes in its analysis nonentities, items that do not exist. So what is semantically, and hence logically, important is bound to include nonentities. In virtue of the modifier ‘semantically“, the first premiss is analytic (what is semantically important may not be important), and it is comparatively uncontroversial. By contrast the second premise of the syllogism, which we want to stick to, is decidedly controversial. So too is the thesis (advanced in [2] and [3] and in Chisholm [15]) – which implies the inadequacy of classical logical theories – that there are a great many natural language statements, statements an adequate theory should be able to treat of, which cannot be analysed logically, and semantically, without the equivalent of an appeal to nonentities. Defence of the thesis has been somewhat piecemeal, taking the form that all the theories so far offered which try to dispense with nonentities break down or run into insuperable difficulties, difficulties which are readily surmounted given appropriate talk about nonentities. In what follows we shall outline more general sorts of argument for the thesis, designed to show that no theory which dispenses with nonentities as objects of discourse can do justice to the data.
Modulational instability of Rossby and drift waves and generation of zonal jets
Authors: CONNAUGHTON COLM P. , NADIGA BALASUBRAMANYA T. , NAZARENKO SERGEY V. , QUINN BRENDA E.
Published: May 2010

We study the modulational instability of geophysical Rossby and plasma drift waves within the Charney–Hasegawa–Mima (CHM) model both theoretically, using truncated (four-mode and three-mode) models, and numerically, using direct simulations of CHM equation in the Fourier space. We review the linear theory of Gill (Geophys. Fluid Dyn., vol. 6, 1974, p. 29) and extend it to show that for strong primary waves the most unstable modes are perpendicular to the primary wave, which correspond to generation of a zonal flow if the primary wave is purely meridional. For weak waves, the maximum growth occurs for off-zonal inclined modulations that are close to being in three-wave resonance with the primary wave. Our numerical simulations confirm the theoretical predictions of the linear theory as well as the nonlinear jet pinching predicted by Manin & Nazarenko (Phys. Fluids, vol. 6, 1994, p. 1158). We find that, for strong primary waves, these narrow zonal jets further roll up into Kármán-like vortex streets, and at this moment the truncated models fail. For weak primary waves, the growth of the unstable mode reverses and the system oscillates between a dominant jet and a dominate primary wave, so that the truncated description holds for longer. The two-dimensional vortex streets appear to be more stable than purely one-dimensional zonal jets, and their zonal-averaged speed can reach amplitudes much stronger than is allowed by the Rayleigh–Kuo instability criterion for the one-dimensional case. In the long term, the system transitions to turbulence helped by the vortex-pairing instability (for strong waves) and the resonant wave–wave interactions (for weak waves).
Case of maxillary avascular necrosis due to oral bisphosphonates, presenting with signs of malignancy
Authors: Green R , Blackmore K , Robson A
Published: May 2010

Objective:

We report a rare case of avascular necrosis of the maxilla secondary to oral bisphosphonates.

Methods:

Case report and review of the world literature concerning avascular necrosis as a result of bisphosphonate therapy.

Case report:

A 62-year-old woman presented with unilateral nasal obstruction, swelling of the cheek and an ulcerating lesion of the upper alveolus. She had a past medical history of osteoporosis, for which she took oral bisphosphonates. Investigation revealed necrosis of the maxilla, and avascular necrosis secondary to oral bisphosphonates was diagnosed.

Conclusion:

There have been several documented cases of avascular necrosis of the mandible and maxilla following intravenous bisphosphonates or dental procedures. In our case, bisphosphonates were only taken orally and no dental work had been undertaken. This patient's clinical presentation was highly suggestive of malignancy, and we would like to communicate this unusual case to other otolaryngologists.
Influence of compact disk recording protocols on reliability and comparability of speech audiometry outcomes: acoustic analysis
Authors: Di Berardino F , Tognola G , Paglialonga A , Alpini D , Grandori F , Cesarani A
Published: May 2010

Objective:

To assess whether different compact disk recording protocols, used to prepare speech test material, affect the reliability and comparability of speech audiometry testing.

Material and methods:

We conducted acoustic analysis of compact disks used in clinical practice, to determine whether speech material had been recorded using similar procedures. To assess the impact of different recording procedures on speech test outcomes, normal hearing subjects were tested using differently prepared compact disks, and their psychometric curves compared.

Results:

Acoustic analysis revealed that speech material had been recorded using different protocols. The major difference was the gain between the levels at which the speech material and the calibration signal had been recorded. Although correct calibration of the audiometer was performed for each compact disk before testing, speech recognition thresholds and maximum intelligibility thresholds differed significantly between compact disks (p < 0.05), and were influenced by the gain between the recording level of the speech material and the calibration signal.

Conclusion:

To ensure the reliability and comparability of speech test outcomes obtained using different compact disks, it is recommended to check for possible differences in the recording gains used to prepare the compact disks, and then to compensate for any differences before testing.
Incidence of meningitis secondary to suppurative otitis media in adults
Authors: Ibrahim S I , Cheang P P , Nunez D A
Published: May 2010

Aim:

Meningitis is the commonest intracranial complication of suppurative otitis media, and carries the risk of death and life-changing morbidity. This study aimed to estimate the risk of an adult in the UK developing otogenic meningitis.

Methods:

Adults hospitalised with meningitis in Bristol from 1997 to 2002 were identified retrospectively. Cases confirmed by positive blood culture or cerebrospinal fluid investigation were studied. A case was classified as otogenic if there was coexistent evidence of ear infection.

Results:

Eighty-seven cases of meningitis were analysed. The overall mortality rate was 5.7 per cent. Acute and chronic suppurative otitis media accounted for 13 and three cases, respectively. The adult population of Bristol at the midpoint of the study was 635 976.

Conclusion:

In this study, the age-adjusted incidence of otogenic meningitis was 0.42 per 100 000 per year.
Conus jaspideus(Mollusca: Neogastropoda: Conoidea) on the Brazilian coast
Authors: dos Santos Gomes Renata
Published: May 2010

Specimens ofConus jaspideusGmelin, 1791 collected along the Brazilian coast were dissected for morphological studies of the soft parts and radula, in a recharacterization of the species. Two specimens collected in the State of Bahia, proved to be imposex. Specimens in an aquarium were photographed during the process of predation. Herein, for the first time, the atrophied penis of an imposex specimen ofC. jaspideusis illustrated, as well as the feeding process, contributing to the knowledge of the family.
The absence of conflict between paid-work hours and the provision of instrumental support to elderly parents among middle-aged women and men
Authors: VAN PUTTEN ANNE E. , VLASBLOM JAN DIRK , DYKSTRA PEARL A. , SCHIPPERS JOOP J.
Published: May 2010

This study assesses the relationship between the number of work hours and the provision of instrumental support to parents among 779 middle-aged women and men in dual-worker couples in The Netherlands. Using data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study collected during 2002–04, we estimate a simultaneous two-stage probit least-squares model, which takes into account that the competing time and financial demands of a person's engagement in paid work and parental support are endogenous. We explicitly control for the effects of partners' earnings, housework and parent-support contributions, and of co-resident children's time demands and help with domestic tasks. Contrary to expectations, the results do not reveal a conflict between paid work and giving support to parents. Several possible explanations are discussed. The results emphasise the importance of the household context, in that the work hours of both women and men depend on other household members' activities and finances, as does men's provision of parent-support. The striking lack of relationships between women's provision of parental support and any individual and contextual characteristic demonstrates the persistence of gendered roles in family members giving support.
Embedding theorems for tree-free groups
Authors: CHISWELL IAN , MÜLLER THOMAS
Published: May 2010

We establish two embedding theorems for tree-free groups. The first result embeds a group G acting freely and without inversions on a Λ-tree X into a group acting freely, without inversions, and transitively on a Λ-tree in such a way that X embeds into by means of a G-equivariant isometry. The second result embeds a group G acting freely and transitively on an ℝ-tree X into (H) for some suitable group H, again in such a way that X embeds G-equivariantly into the ℝ-tree XH associated with (H). The group (H) referred to here belongs to a class of groups introduced and studied by the present authors in [3]. As a consequence of these two theorems, we find that -groups and their associated ℝ-trees are in fact universal for free ℝ-tree actions. Moreover, our first embedding theorem throws light on the question, arising from the results of [7], whether a group endowed with a Lyndon length function L can always be embedded in a length-preserving way into a group with a regular Lyndon length function; modulo an obvious necessary restriction we show that this is indeed the case if L is free.