bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
China's Nuclear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental?
Authors: Hsieh Alice Langley
Published: March 2009

The 1965 debate between Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao over the question of priorities in national defence policy, which was prompted by the threatening situation created by the bombing of North Vietnam in February of that year, as well as hints appearing in 1969 during the more critical months of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, suggest that strong differences still exist amongst China's policy-makers as to whether priority should be accorded to quick-fix types of conventional defence or to establishing a sound economic and scientific-technological basis for the long-term development of China's national defence programme. This issue, which usually comes to the surface at a critical juncture in Chinese decision-making or in a crisis situation, is frequently difficult to identify since it may be indirectly expressed in other debates, no less real, regarding the emphasis to be accorded political as against military training, or over the best strategic defence for China. The interlocking nature of these issues cannot be ignored. Moreover, it is usually in the broad context of such debates that hints appear suggesting that China's political and military relationship with the Soviet Union remains a latent source of dissention within the Chinese leadership.
Documents on the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution
Authors: Isaacs Harold R. , Treint Albert
Published: March 2009

The following two sets of notes from my files bear on the role of the Communist International in China in the 1920s. The references to them in my book, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, have been so frequently cited that I must assume that their full text will be found of some value by interested scholars. This is especially true of the first one, a memorandum based on an interview I had on 19 August 1935 with H. Sneevliet, the Dutch left-wing socialist who, under the name of Maring, went to China in 1921 as a representative of the Comintern. The second is a set of notes written at my request in Paris in 1935 by Albert Treint, who represented the French Communist Party on the Chinese sub-committee of the Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in Moscow in May 1927.
Small Industry and the Chinese Model of Development
Authors: Riskin Carl
Published: March 2009

In the shadow of the industrialization programme directly carried out by the Central Government of the Chinese People's Republic over the past two decades, there has occurred a less visible effort at industrial development under the auspices of the provincial governments and other local authorities. Widely dispersed throughout China, yet the origin of over half the nation's gross industrial output in the 1950s, local industries must have significantly affected popular understanding of the development process and popular reaction to it. At times they have even been the focus of debate over alternative approaches to the problem of achieving rapid industrialization in Chinese conditions. More intimately associated with the process of industrialization than individual handicrafts, they are capable, because of their relatively simple technology and small scale, of providing a medium for alleviating a number of problems left unsolved by large-scale and technologically advanced industries. Over a period of 20 years, such problems have run the gamut from shortages of high-grade materials required by the technologically demanding large-scale sector, to the inequalities in living standards, cultural levels and life styles created or aggravated by the development of large-scale industries concentrated in urban areas.
The Otto Braun Memoirs and Mao's Rise to Power
Authors: Heinzig Dieter
Published: March 2009

One of the crucial problems in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which must still be considered as unsolved is the question of how Mao Tse-tung managed to seize the leadership of the Party. Mao's rise to power has for a long time been linked with the mysterious Enlarged Session of the Politburo which took place in January 1935, and has come to be known as the Tsunyi Conference. Despite the fact that it is shrouded in an aura of secrecy, the Conference is assumed to have been the turning point in Mao's Party career.
The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence
Authors: Hsiao Gene T.
Published: March 2009

The Nixon administration's new China policy has had many political repercussions in the world, among the most important being the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. From a long-term point of view, such a rapprochement would, of course, have occurred regardless of the Nixon policy. As early as 1951, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida made the realistic remark: “Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbour. Geography and economic laws will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.”
Political Profiles: Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-sheng
Authors: Chang Parris H.
Published: March 2009

The spectacular rise of Wang Hung-wen, who was elected as second Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 and now officially ranks number three in the Party hierarchy behind only Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the first Vice-Chairman, Chou En-lai, has aroused a great deal of speculation. The biographical sketch below is an attempt to consider, and answer where possible, some of the questions raised about his personal and political background.
The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question
Authors: Wich Richard
Published: March 2009

There were several peculiar features of the Chinese Communist Party's 10th Congress, held from 24 to 28 August 1973, which in themselves introduce the question of the purpose of the Congress. One of the oddities, as measured by the CCP's previous practice as well as that of other ruling parties, was that there was no prior announcement or Central Committee plenum setting the stage for the Congress. The first official announcement was a press communique issued on 29 August, the day after the Congress closed. Another surprising feature was the unusual brevity of the Congress, which lasted only five days. And even that short time was not totally devoted to Congress proceedings; a ceremony marking the opening of a tricontinental table tennis tournament drew a full turnout of currently active leaders on the evening of the Congress's second day. More strikingly, the Sinkiang regional party chief, Saifudin, who was to be elected an alternate member of the Politburo at the plenum held two days after the Congress, was present at his distant home base to attend the Sinkiang trade union and women's Congresses while the national Party Congress was in session. He may not have missed very much: unlike previous congresses, no speeches were reportedly made other than the official Central Committee documents submitted on the first day.
Urban Youth in the Countryside: Problems of Adaptation and Remedies
Authors: Bernstein Thomas P.
Published: March 2009

Since the Cultural Revolution, 12 million urban youths, for the most part graduates of secondary schools, have been resettled in the countryside under the programme of “up to the mountains and down to the villages” (shang-shan hsia-hsiang). Urban youths have been sent to the countryside for three reasons. First, the transfer seeks to alleviate difficulties in finding employment for them in the urban sector, as well as to contribute to China's goal of limiting urban growth. The second reason is ideological: because urban opportunities are limited, the values and expectations of young urbanites have to be changed and it is hoped that the experience of the transfer will lead to attitudinal change. More broadly, the programme is seen as contributing to such ideological goals as the restriction of “bourgeois rights” and as the elimination of the “three great differences” (between town and country, worker and peasant, and manual and mental labour). The third goal of the transfer is that it should contribute to the development of the rural areas, including particularly those of frontier provinces such as Heilungkiang.
The Teaching of History to Foreign Students at Peking University
Authors: Brook Timothy , Wagner René
Published: March 2009

In 1974, for the first time since the Cultural Revolution, two dozen Second World students were admitted to the Department of History at Peking University. The Department offered two one-year courses, separate from the courses given to the Chinese students. One was in modern and contemporary history and the other in classical history before 1840. Since 1975 these courses have been combined into a single programme.
The China-Watchers Tested
Authors: Chao Kang
Published: March 2009

After the severe economic setback in 1959–61 the Chinese Government decided to blackout virtually all economic statistics. The policy was so thoroughly executed for 17 years that during this period China-watchers outside the country were forced to engage in a guessing game to estimate how well the Chinese economy had performed. Through a variety of procedures they derived numerous estimates for important products and major economic indicators. Since most of the estimates differed considerably from each other, people who were interested in the economic development of China and hoped to gather information from the studies of China-watchers often found themselves in a state of deep confusion. They did not know which set of estimates they should accept as representing, or nearly so, the true situation in the country. It is only in recent months that the Chinese authorities haverelaxed their information control, with scattered economic statistics gradually appearing in Chinese newspapers and other publications. Some of these statistics concern current production while others refer to previous economic performance. It is possible now to compare the official figures for early years with the western estimates to see how close they are. In other words, assuming that these official figures are the nearest we shall get to the truth for some time, they give us an opportunity for the first time to rate the performance of the China-watchers.
Communist Strategy by 1928: The Mobilization of Discontent
Authors: Ristaino Marcia R.
Published: March 2009

The years 1927 and 1928 are crucial in the history of the Chinese Communist Movement. But because of the lack of primary source material in the past, these years have not received adequate attention from scholars, and therefore have not been well understood. In contrast, the years up to 1927 have received extensive scholarly treatment, because of the availability of key policy documents for the Communist movement during that period. Similar conditions apply concerning the study of the movement beginning in 1930. Rich primary materials exist illuminating internal policy debates and political struggles that helped shaped Communist programmes and actions during those later years.
Research on the World Economy in China
Authors: Qihua Qiu
Published: March 2009

Since the founding of The People's Republic of China, research on the world economy has been developed on an unprecedented scale, although not without setbacks. The Cultural Revolution and the activities of the “ gang of four ” seriously affected such research and virtually brought it to a halt for 10 years. However, the removal of the “ gang of four ” has meant that work on the world economy has revived and reached a completely new stage of development.
Basic Commodity Distribution in the People's Republic of China
Authors: Chinn Dennis L.
Published: March 2009

The functions of any commodity distribution system include balancing of supply and demand and allocating available supplies among individual consumers on the basis of some acceptable criterion. In an unregulated market system, both functions are handled by the free movement of price. Short supply relative to demand results in higher market prices which both reduce demand and stimulate increased supply. The criterion upon which available goods are allocated is purchasing power as determined by income level. As prices rise those with relatively low purchasing power will be deterred or will purchase inferior substitute commodities to fulfil their needs. In poor countries in which basic commodities require a high proportion of household income, fluctuations in the prices of these commodities of the magnitude required to balance availability with requirements often have serious consequences for the welfare of poorly endowed groups.
Back to the City: The Return of Shanghai's Educated Youth
Authors: Gold Thomas B.
Published: March 2009

Bands of young men took to the streets of Shanghai in late 1978, shouting slogans, vandalizing stores, putting up wall posters, imprisoning municipal officials in their offices and disrupting rail traffic. To many Shanghainese, it was déjà vu, a replay of Red Guard activities during the Cultural Revolution (CR), and small wonder, as the participants were those same youths who had rampaged through the city and then foresworn the urban security of Shanghai to go up to the mountains and down to the countryside to build socialism. Now, a decade later, disillusioned, alienated, in dire economic straits, unmarried and abandoned, they had ridden a “back to the city wind” and were determined to stay.
The Structure of Technological Information Dissemination in China: Publication of Scientific and Technological Manuals, 1970–1977
Authors: Baark Erik
Published: March 2009

The People's Republic of China has recently embarked upon a giant programme of modernization, and in the formulation of policies concerning, this industrial development, its leaders have repeatedly stressed the raising of the scientific and technological level of the personnel involved in Chinese industry as a prerequisite to the successful attainment of the desired goals. While the education of scientists and engineers in universities has been the subject of much attention in western studies, the widespread dissemination of scientific and technological information, a fundamental issue in the process of training personnel for industry, has been discussed mainly by the Chinese policy-makers themselves.
Planned Birth in Tianjin
Authors: Lyle Katherlne Ch'iu
Published: March 2009

Studies on China's birth planning programmes have elicited certain variations and themes of the First Campaign (1954–57) and the Second Campaign (1962–65). Birth planning activities have rarely been reported during the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–69). From my earlier analysis of China's health and population policy it is evident that both the First and the Second Campaigns coincided with the bureaucratic ascendance of the Ministry of Public Health and the dominance of the professional model of health system. However, inadequate organization and co-ordination was evidenced by the lack of one single central agency, either as a supra-agency above the Ministry of Public Health or as a bureau agency under the ministry for birth planning work. In addition, the rationale for birth planning, especially during the Second Campaign, was for maternal and child health alone. Thus, the impact of both campaigns, in demographic terms, was limited.
New Tensions in Army-Party Relations in China (1965–1966)
Authors: Halperin Morton H. , Lewis John Wilson
Published: March 2009

In 1958, the Chinese Communist leadership agreed on a revised set of basic principles governing the relationship between the Party and the Army, These principles, which involved a move away from the professionalisation of the Army, became summarised in the slogans “politics in command” and “the Party commands the gun. The changes reflected a decision to continue to rely on a revolutionary strategy based on people's war despite the decision to devote substantial resources to nuclear weapons. After a bitter dispute between the Party and the Army, Mao decided to reject Khrushchev's proposals for a unified nuclear command and to rely on an expanded military force to deter an American attack. Moreover, the Party emphasised the need to put military units to work in the economy. It thus turned the Army away from increased professionalism and technical training towards organising the militia and participating in economic construction work. Like other salient features of the Maoist view revealed at that time the 1958 guide lines for Party-Army relations assumed that a satisfactory balance could be achieved between professional modernisation and the role of the expert, on the one hand, and political mobilisation or “revolutionisation” (ideological “redness”), on the other. It was the Army's resistance to these moves that led to the purge of major military leaders, including P'eng Teh-huai in 1959.
Witch Hunt among the Guerrillas: The Min-Sheng-T'uan Incident
Authors: Lee Chong-Sik
Published: March 2009

One of the most notorious episodes in the history of the communist movement in Manchuria, and one that involved both the Chinese and the Korean Communists, was the so-called Min-sheng-t'uan incident of 1933–36. In today's North Korean régime, where some of the veterans of the Manchurian guerrilla activities hold positions of leadership, the incident is often cited as a prime example of incorrect handling of enemy infiltration of the revolutionary ranks. Many years after the incident Premier Kim Il-song stated: “The Japanese set up an anti-revolutionary organisation called the Minsaengdan and infiltrated its members into the revolutionary district in Chientao. The object of the scheme was, through this organisation, to estrange the Koreans from the Chinese and to incite the Koreans to fight among themselves. Temporarily deceived by the trick, [we] engaged in murders within our ranks and many innocent people were sacrificed.” Indeed, the incident had a grave impact upon the Korean Communists and eventually upon the communist movement in Manchuria as a whole.
Policy and Power: The Career of T'ao Chu 1956–66
Authors: Moody Peter R.
Published: March 2009

“Kremlinological” approaches to the study of contemporary Chinese politics are sometimes criticized for seeming to embody the “rather crude view of politics being concerned with factional strife and power politics.” Certainly, for most politicians most of the time, it would be wrong as well as cynical to regard “power” as being the ultimate goal. On the other hand, few would deny that politics does, in part, involve factional strife and power politics, and some political scientists believe that political behaviour may be best explained through a focus on the play of power. Thus, Joseph Schlesinger explains certain aspects of American politics by what he calls “ambition theory”: “A politician's behavior is a response to his office goals.” Anthony Downs works out a good deductive explanation of the behaviour of political parties in a democracy by starting with the hypothesis that politicians act in a rational manner, espousing ideologies and policies which enable them to maintain or expand their power. The point of these hypotheses is not that politicians are an unusually venal race of men; the hypotheses do not purport to be accurate descriptions of political motivations. Rather, the assertion is that whatever the ultimate motives of political actors, an approach which hypothesizes that they will behave as though power were their goal does yield helpful and concise explanations of their behaviour. This article about the political career of one Chinese politician, T'ao Chu, from 1956 through 1966, will attempt to see how far hypotheses concentrating on “pure power” provide a useful explanation of events in comparison with those which give more weight to stated political opinions.
A Hungarian View of China's Economy
Authors: Klatt W.
Published: March 2009

So little detailed information on the Chinese economy is available, even in the present relatively relaxed atmosphere, that readers of The China Quarterly may well be interested to hear about the attempt of Mr G. Hidasi, an East European “China-oriented economist,” to give his own account on the basis of data available to him. Mr Hidasi published his findings last year in the journal sponsored by the Academy of Sciences in Budapest.1 In his paper, he not only gives his assessment of China's economic performance from 1952 to 1970, but even ventures to guess what things will be like by the end of 1975: a unique undertaking for a foreigner who does not seem to have been in direct contact with Chinese economic reality. Like many other commentators, Mr Hidasi admits to suffering from a lack of data on targets planned and results achieved and he does not claim to have had any access to information other than that generally available to those interested in Chinese affairs. Nor does he say which of the internationally available sources, such as, for instance, the American Congressional reports or the volumes published under the auspices of the American Social Science Research Council, he has consulted. Indeed, the lack of a list of sources used somewhat weakens the author's otherwise interesting and complex “correlation calculations.” Nevertheless, they certainly merit a close examination and a comparison with communist and non-communist compilations of a similar kind.
Reconstruction and Rectification of the Communist Party in the Shanghai Underground: 1931–34
Authors: Sullivan Lawrence R.
Published: March 2009

Recently scholars have shown that Mao's accusations against the Russian Returned Students stemmed from his need to bolster his own legitimacy by discrediting their role in the 1931–34 period. According to the 1945 “Resolution on questions in the history of the Party,” the Returned Students were “doctrinaire sectarians” whose “‘offensive line’ for the Party” and “repeated failures in political work” caused “serious damage to the Party in the White areas.” But closer investigation indicates that in the bastion which they are accused of weakening and decimating, the Returned Students devoted considerable attention to strengthening Party organization, educating cadres and mobilizing mass support. Although factional struggles and aggressive tactics characterized the policies of the Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks in the 1931–34 period, their contributions to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) eifort to maintain a viable organization in the cities cannot be ignored. That the urban Party, hurt severely by the Kuomintang (KMT), survived at all can be attributed to efforts that Mao later denigrated.
The Concept of Decentralization in Document No. 1, 1984
Authors: Kallgren Joyce
Published: March 2009

H. F. Schurmann observed in his classic work Ideology and Organization in Communist China, “economics in a Communist country means political economics hence administration.” This observation directs our attention to two specific aspects of Document No. 1, 1984: first, the possible political consequences of decentralization and secondly, some administration reforms that have accompanied the adoption of the agricultural responsibility system. A close relationship obviously exists between the two aspects, the emphasis here being placed on the political side.
Urban School-leavers and Unemployment in China
Authors: Emerson John Philip
Published: March 2009

What is unemployment in China? For 20 years after the Great Leap Forward was officially credited with having achieved full employment in 1958, this question could not even be raised in the People's Republic of China. From the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and up to 1958 unemployment problems had been prominently featured in the Chinese press. In 1978 unemployment again became a topic of discussion. The reappearance of unemployment as an acceptable subject of debate was a further indication of how much of Maoist ideology had been officially discarded since the death of Mao Zedong two years earlier. One Chinese summed up these changes as they related to employment problems in this way2: Employment is a major economic as well as a major social problem. But from 1958 until the destruction of the “gang of four,” problems of employment virtually constituted a taboo which could not be discussed in public. After the smashing of the “gang of four” and especially after the third plenary session of the 11th Party Congress (December 1978), a new employment policy was decided on. This was a strategic decision of immense significance.
The Staff of Life: Living Standards in China,
Authors: Klatt W.
Published: March 2009

“Living standards have improved, but levels are low and not even.” These words are contained in an appraisal by two senior members of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China, which seems to be the first detailed account in years, written for the benefit of foreigners who are interested in the well-being of the people of China. Other, briefer statements have been available lately, but none of such authenticity. In this respect, December 1978 can be taken as the point of departure: since then, not only have major political and economic changes occurred, but the non-Chinese world has been allowed to participate in these changes and to take account of their successes and failures. Even the language in which official reports are made astonishes. Admittedly, reforms had preceded the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in December 1978. The plenum was the occasion when China's policies underwent a dramatic shift from Hua Guofeng's doctrinal concept to a more “pragmatic” approach, with problems being tackled as they arose. Strategy and tactics were revised, following a re-evaluation of major political events, organizational change at the highest political level, a reassessment of Mao's role in the history of the People's Republic and the revision of economic targets. A stable future seemed to be guaranteed by the election of Hu Yaobang to the Politbureau and – a little later – the appointment of Zhao Ziyang as premier in overall charge of modernization, as Deng Xiaoping interpreted this concept. Within a few months Hua Guofeng's modernization projects suffered some drastic amendments and his 10-year Plan in particular was abandoned. In its place, the plenum considered the “eight-character charter” of readjustment, reform, consolidation and improvement. In the countryside, which still provides work and a home for the largest number of men and women, agriculture was given the highest priority - but this time in earnest and not, as during the previous two decades, merely as a slogan.
Film-making in China: From the Cultural Revolution to 1981
Authors: Clark Paul
Published: March 2009

It is difficult to be objective about the Cultural Revolution. Difficulties were encountered during the event itself (which is variously defined as the years 1966–69 or, less usefully, the whole period 1966–76) by its proponents and its victims. With the reversal of the political fortunes of the victims, objectivity seemed even more unlikely. But as 1976 (or 1969) moved further into the past, even in China a more measured assessment of the significance of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath began to be made at all levels (both official and unofficial) of the political public.
Post–1978 Rural Economic Policy and Peasant Income in China
Authors: Travers Lee
Published: March 2009

Per capita peasant income in China rose only 0·5 per cent per year over the two decades prior to 1978. Rural income growth was not only slow, it also lagged far behind the 1·7 per cent per year rate of the urban sector, which had started from a higher base. In December 1978 participants at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ratified major policy changes designed to increase peasant income substantially. These and ensuing changes have raised the profitability of agriculture and altered production and marketing patterns. Before evaluating the magnitude and sources of income growth it will be useful to outline the major policy changes.
A Reminiscence of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean War
Authors: Farrar-Hockley Anthony
Published: March 2009

On the night 13/14th October 1950 soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the Yalu river from north-east China into Korea. In the 10 weeks of operations that followed, these men, with others crowding in behind them, threw back the powerful divisions of the United Nations Command, ejecting them from the territory of North Korea and, further, seemed capable of driving them from the whole Korean peninsular. No doubt the government in Beijing believed for a time that its soldiers were once more about to deliver an immense political prize to Party and state. They were wrong. If the intervention of the PLA changed the course of the Korean war initially much as Mao Zedong intended, it changed also the outlook of the PLA, led to factionalism among the military leadership, which persists and, arguably, accelerated the subsequent rift between China and the Soviet Union.
“Economics in Command?” Ideology and Policy Since the Third Plenum, 1978–1984
Authors: Schram Stuart R.
Published: March 2009

In this article, I shall attempt to give an overview of the most important political and ideological developments during the past six years, and in this context, to assess current trends in China. The three-word title is, of course, deliberately modelled on the Great Leap slogan “Politics in command”, and is intended to evoke the problem of whether or not policy-making since 1978 has been largely shaged by economic realities, and/or by the economic goals of the, leadership I have placed a question mark after it because, though I shall certainly express some opinions on this topic before I have done, I doubt that the issue can as yet be regarded as finally settled.
Networks and their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan
Authors: Greenhalgh Susan
Published: March 2009

Just below the glass-sheathed surface of Taiwan's modern cities, urban life is structured by webs of social ties that may be among the closest knit and farthest flung in the world. Family-centred, these personal networks bind urban residents to one another, to kin in the countryside, and to kin all over the globe, obliterating the neat social distinctions between urban and rural, domestic and foreign. Family networks undergird both the society and the economy of Taiwan. Over the past 35 years Taiwan's families have been if not the island's greatest, certainly its least appreciated resource. Family mobility strategies have both speeded development and tempered disparities due to ethnicity, class and spatial location. Yet these same families may be the greatest obstacle to further, capital-intensive development, for they are insular and atomistic, and their resources are limited and subject to periodic break-up. However, social change is underway that is likely to reduce the size of the family per se, and increase the importance of supra-family kinship networks. Such shifts would have far-reaching effects on the society and economy of the island.
Factory and Manager in an Era of Reform
Authors: Walder Andrew G.
Published: March 2009

Just over three decades ago Joseph Berliner, in his bookFactory and Manager in the USSR, explored the world of the socialist manager. Drawing on interviews with Soviet emigres, he illuminated a world of informal management behaviour hidden beneath the seemingly formidable confines of a highly centralized system. The Soviet manager of the 1930s and 1940s employed a number of deceptive strategies made rational by a taut system of output planning and by chronic supply shortages: hoarding of plant capacity, labour and inventories; “storming” at the end of plan periods, in order to meet quotas; neglect of customer needs in favour of products easy to produce; and an overriding concern with the procurement process, relying heavily on procuring agents(tolkachi)who employed personal connections(blat)at other plants in order to secure inputs. Despite extensive social and economic change in the Soviet Union since that time, this pattern of managerial behaviour has survived, albeit in slightly altered form, into the 1980s.
Images of Women in the Fiction of Zhang Jie and Zhang Xinxin
Authors: Roberts Rosemary A.
Published: March 2009

Zhang Xinxin and Zhang Jie are two contemporary Chinese women writers. They began to publish in the post–Cultural Revolution era, and became well–known in the early 1980s for their fictional depiction of the problems of urban intellectual women attempting to resolve conflicts between love and career, love and marriage, and ideals and reality. Although the works of both authors present a limited challenge to traditions they believe have served to oppress women, a clear generational difference is perceptible in the attitudes they each express through their characters. Zhang Jie, born in 1937 and reaching adulthood in the idealistic climate of the 1950s, presents characters strongly influenced by both Confucian morality and socialist ideals, while Zhang Xinxin, who was born in 1953 and grew up during the Cultural Revolution period (a disillusioning experience for most of her generation), presents characters who show little enthusiasm for political ideals and are less constrained by traditional morality.
Aspects of Political Development in Macao
Authors: Shiu-hing Lo
Published: March 2009

Under the terms of a secret agreement reached between China and Portugal in 1979, Portugal was to continue administering Macao but sovereignty was transferred to China. Eight years later however, the Sino–Portuguese agreement on Macao's future was signed, which stipulated that it would become a Chinese Special Administrative Region on 20 December 1999. Whereas the transitional stage from Portuguese to Chinese administration began in 1987, political development started in 1976 when the principle of democracy was introduced into the colonial legislature (two years after a military coup had toppled the regime of Marcello Caetano in Portugal). This article will explore aspects of Macao's political development since the Portuguese revolution in 1974.
China and the European Community
Authors: Wilson Dick
Published: March 2009

”France and China,” said Alain Peyrefitte, the Gaullist leader, in Peking two years ago, “ are objective allies.” In a broader sense it could be said today that China and the European Community are objective allies - even though they do not yet enjoy a formal relationship. The Chinese leadership has consistently and strongly supported the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) which from the beginning of 1973 has joined Great Britain, the Irish Republic and Denmark to the original six founders (Belgium, France, West Germany, Holland, Italy and Luxembourg) in a venture which promises at long last an institutional framework within which Western Europe could move towards economic and political unity.
Before Silence: Qin Zhaoyang'
Authors: Børdahl Vibeke
Published: March 2009

The Chinese author, Qin Zhaoyang (b. 1916) belongs to the “lost generation” of writers who were silenced as early as 1957, after the Hundred Flowers Movement. Although he is best known for his literary criticism in the famous article “Xianshizhuyi - guangkuo de daolu” (“Realism - the broad path”), published in Renmin wenxue (People's Literature) in September 1956,1 the most important part of his creative work consists of short stories and novels. During the 1940s and 1950s Qin produced some of his finest stories with a humour and personal tone that are unusual for mainland literature of the period.
China's National Security Research Bureaucracy
Authors: Shambaugh David L.
Published: March 2009

How does one define the ”national security research bureaucracy” (NSRB) in the Chinese context and are there enough empirical data to sustain an article on this topic? The definition one chooses directly determines the data base one uses and, in turn, answers the question of the viability of the topic.
Peking and the Laotian Crisis: A Further Appraisal
Authors: Crozier Brian
Published: March 2009

In an “interim appraisal” of Peking's interest in Laos, which appeared inThe China Quarterlylast autumn, I expressed the view that China's security would be better served by the creation of a neutral buffer state in Laos than by the imposition of a Communist one, which would tempt the United States to intervene. Though we are here, of course, in the realm of reasoned speculation, recent events have seemed to confirm both halves of this proposition. That the Chinese Communists believe a neutral Laos would be the best way of getting the Americans out is suggested by their readiness to accept some of the more controversial provisions for Laotian neutrality that were agreed on July 23 at the Geneva International Conference on Laos. That the danger, from Peking's point of view, of an American military intervention is a real one was shown in May when the United States decided to strengthen its force in Thailand. Various other developments, however, suggest that the Chinese are taking an increasingly direct interest in Laos.
The Reform of Peking Opera under the Communists
Authors: Yang Richard F. S.
Published: March 2009

Among all dramatic and operatic forms in China, Peking Opera is perhaps the most popular one, and has been enjoyed by the people for more than a hundred years. The name “Peking,” however, does not really suggest the origin of this opera. Its Chinese name is p'i-huang, or erh-huang, which does indicate the origin of the opera. The word “p'i” in Chinese means “tunes,” and the character “huang” refers to one or two districts located in Hupeh province (the other name “erh-huang” means “two Huangs”) where this kind of music first originated, although the district of Huang-kang is generally believed to be the birthplace of this opera. Apparently this new kind of music soon spread to other districts of Hupeh, as well as to the adjacent provinces including Anhwei. The popularity of this new opera form encouraged and justified professional organisations, and troupes brought the opera to Peking, then the capital city of the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty. However, credit went to the Four Great Anhwei Troupes for their role in establishing this opera in the capital during the waning years of the Ch'ing period. The patronage of official circles, especially the royal clans in the Manchu court, helped tremendously in gaining fame and position for this new opera form. The Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, so enjoyed this opera form that she ordered private theatres built in the palaces for her own enjoyment. (One of such theatres is still standing in the Summer Palace today.) As a result, the new operatic form was given a new name, ching-hsi (“Capital Opera”). And since Peking was the capital then, it was nicknamed the “Peking Opera” which subsequently has become the recognised name for it.
The Nanchang Uprising
Authors: Guillermaz J.
Published: March 2009

August 1, 1927, is one of the big days in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It marked the opening of a military phase which was to last more than twenty years and was to leave a deep mark on the Party and the present régime both in their outlook and their structure. Symbolically, it is the birthday of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese Red Army, and it is as such that it is celebrated every year. It would perhaps be worthwhile after thirty-five years to make an accurate assessment of this event and first to place it in the political context of the time.
Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics
Authors: Williams Lea E.
Published: March 2009

Chinese diplomatic interest in Indonesia has been developing for three-quarters of a century. The past dozen years since the completion of the military phases of the revolutions in the two countries have heard both harmonious pledges of amity and, not altogether paradoxically, the grating sound of national purposes crossing. In most exchanges, the Peking Communists and the Djakarta nationalists have bubbled with friendship; on one occasion, however, this duologue became sensationally antagonistic. In South-East Asia, as in other regions, China has not yet worked out a diplomatic means for the full reconciliation of continuing national interests with the demands of revolutionary strategy. The survey to follow forms a fever chart recording a steady rise in Sino-Indonesian warmth, a plunge to racking chills, and, for the moment, convalescence.
South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes
Authors: Chiu Hungdah
Published: March 2009

Until recently few international law scholars and governments have paid much attention to the special sea law problems concerning mid-ocean archipelagos. The question of whether a group of islands can be considered as a unit in delimiting territorial sea has, according to most authorities, been adequately solved by general rules concerning the delimitation of the territorial sea of the mainland or island. The 1929 Harvard Draft on the Law of Territorial Sea contains no provision relating to groups of islands or archipelagos. Article 7 of the Draft provides that the territorial sea of islands should be measured in a similar way to that of the mainland. It is a contention of this article that no different rule should be established for groups of islands or archipelagos, except that, if the outer fringe of islands is sufficiently close to form one complete belt of marginal sea, then the waters within such a belt should be considered as territorial waters.
Chiang Village: A Household Survey
Authors: Croll Elisabeth J.
Published: March 2009

The data presented in this paper are drawn from observations and materials that I acquired as the result of a short visit to Kwangtung Province in April 1977. During that time I was able to travel as an individual and undertake 10 days of concentrated interviewing on the composition of the household, marriage and kinship relationsin a selection of rural villages and urban neighbourhoods. During this visit I specifically set out to test the correlation between differing patterns of marriage with the structure and functions of households and primary groups that I had already developed from a study of the documentary sources. In making these correlations from documentary sources, I found that I was far from clear about questions such as household composition, post-marital residential arrangements and relations between households and kin groups in rural villages. I hoped that my visit might allow me to make an inquiry into the structure of domestic groups and the nature of primary kin groups in rural and urban areas. Restricted by time, I had to be less concerned with the actual marriage patterns themselves and with other areas of interest, such as the relation of kin groups to leadership patterns. My collection of data is, therefore, directly relevant to a very limited subject area. The materials collected from one village have been published here because the opportunities to acquire a survey of, or more comprehensive materials from, a single village are still limited, and previous such collections stand out as land-marks in the history of the study of social institutions in China.
Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage
Authors: Lee Chong-Sik
Published: March 2009

If one were to believe the official histories written in North Korea during the past few years, political developments in North Korea after 1945 and even the entire history of the Korean Communist movement would seem to have been relatively simple. According to North Korean historians, the new proletariat took over the leadership of the struggle for national liberation after the bourgeois-led March First Movement of 1919 had failed. The Korean Communist Party, first organised in 1925, ceased to operate in 1928 because the sectarians in the Party leadership failed to establish a link with the surging movement of the workers and peasants. The national liberation movement recovered its vigour and direction in the 1930s only because Kim D-song, whose strategy and tactics were the most scientific and most in accord with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, provided leadership. Kim Il-song became the “beacon” of the revolutionary movement, and the Korean People's Revolutionary Army under him fought against the Japanese “shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army.”
The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea
Authors: Paige Glenn D. , Lee Dong Jun
Published: March 2009

The establishment of Communist power in North Korea represents one more example of the triumph of purposive political behaviour over impersonal economic and social forces and as such merits the attention of all those who are concerned about the survival of the theory and practice of a free society in a shrinking world. If purposive Communist behaviour can become the prime mover of history, then so can the dedicated efforts of those with different conceptions of ends and means in the solution of human problems.
North Korean Educational System: 1945 to Present
Authors: Yang Key P. , Chee Chang-Boh
Published: March 2009

An examination of the educational objectives of North Korea and the system which implements these objectives reveals the true image of a country only dimly perceived since it disappeared behind the Bamboo Curtain after its liberation from the Japanese in 1945.
Fung Yu-Lan: A Biographical Profile
Authors: Lee Robert H. G.
Published: March 2009

A leading figure in the field of modern Chinese philosophy, Fung Yu-lan (Feng Yu-lan) has lived and worked amidst the intellectual and political tensions which have characterised the recent history of his country. His major work, Chung-kuo Che-hsueh Shih (History of Chinese Philosophy), was published in the 1930s, and is known in the West through the monumental translation into English prepared by Professor Derk Bodde of the University of Pennsylvania. Fung's technical philosophical theories were defined and articulated in his wartime writings during the 1940s. Like many of the leading Chinese intellectuals, he has now embraced Marxism-Leninism, the new orthodoxy which provides the doctrinal creed for contemporary China even as Confucianism did for the scholar-officials of the imperial period.
Politics on Formosa
Authors: Israel John
Published: March 2009

Though Chiang Kai-shek may vow to “sleep on faggots and drink gall” until the mainland is liberated, he has some reason to rest more easily today than at any time in his long career as Nationalist leader. On the mainland his government never clearly controlled more than one of China's three “key economic areas” (the Yellow River plain, the Yangtze valley, and the Szechuan basin). At least he can effectively control Formosa, a realm 1/260th the size of the mainland. Nationalist cells permeate schools, factories and government bureaux. Local police organisations, semi-autonomous in mainland days, are now under the central control of loyal mainlanders. The powerful security force, the Formosa Garrison Command (FGC), operates under martial law. The two minority parties are as impotent as their mainland counterparts. There are no treaty ports to harbour leftist critics and the mountainous half of the island is effectively patrolled by government forces painfully aware of the dangers of banditry and rebellion.
Some Aspects of Formosa's Economic Growth
Authors: Glass Sheppard
Published: March 2009

Fourteen years have elapsed since a shattered Nationalist Government fled to Formosa with the hope of reorganising and revitalising its forces and of building an effective base for a counter-attack against the Chinese Communists. At that time it appeared to have little chance of survival. However, because of changing international conditions and Formosa's impressive domestic economic performance, the Nationalist Government has been able to re-establish itself as an effective political force. Formosa's economic achievements have given the Government a certain international prestige and, combined with military assistance from the United States, have allowed it to maintain a large, well-equipped military establishment.