bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Symmetries of Probability Kinematics
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

While it was argued earlier in the book that no rule‐governed notion of rational opinion change could be adequate, there are certainly patterns of normal opinion change (updating in response to new data or new constraints accepted in response to experience), which have a rule‐following form. The basic example is Simple Conditionalization (often characterized as the application of Bayes's rule or Bayes's theorem, sometimes called Bayesian Conditionalization, and sometimes accepted as the sole admissible form of opinion change), but more advanced patterns (beginning with Jeffrey Conditionalization) have been described in the literature, as well as challenged there, e.g. by Isaac Levi. The question of what can justify such rules is addressed using symmetry arguments, and the (hidden or explicit) premises of such arguments analysed. Probability kinematics, as formulated initially by Richard Jeffrey, is the general theory of rules for changing a (‘prior’) probability function, subject to given or imposed constraints, into a new (‘updated’, ‘posterior’) function. Such constraints can take various forms, and the rules offered for them can be limited by symmetry considerations but may not be uniquely determined.
Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

This book presents an analysis of Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. It is divided into three parts. The first begins with a study of the development of Sidgwick’s thought up to the time when the main positions of the Methods were formulated, including a review of British moral philosophy in the 19th century. It then discusses why Sidgwick made his philosophy a synthesis of the work of his predecessors. The second part involves a commentary on the main topics of Methods, emphasizing the underlying argument connecting the different parts of the book. The third part examines Sidgwick’s critique of the two main ethical theories that developed following the publication of his work.
The Aims and Scope of The Methods of Ethics
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics was a technical work aimed at treating ‘ethical science’ with ‘the same disinterest curiosity to which we owe the great discoveries of physics’. He also meant the book to be systematic — a direct opposition to Grote’s rejection of system in moral philosophy. To understand the way in which the Methods is systematic, it is important to clarify what it is and is not intended to cover and to establish.
The Examination of Common‐Sense Morality
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

Two discussions on common sense morality in Book III of Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics are examined. These chapters are among the most valuable of Sidgwick’s contributions to ethics given their attention to detail, nicety of discrimination, and breadth of perspective on ordinary moral concepts and maxims. Attention is given to Sidgwick’s specific analysis of moral rules, since his conclusions about them establish the main features of common-sense morality which any ethical theory must be able to explain.
Sidgwick and the Later Victorians
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

In the latter part of his life, Sidgwick critiqued two schools of thought: the evolutional and the idealistic. He viewed these as two types of ethical thought moving away from his own. Bradley’s attack on Sidgwick, which had many objectives in which T. H. Green agreed, is examined. Sidgwick’s analysis of Green’s positive views is then discussed. Although Green agreed with Bradley on a Hegelian conception of nature and limits of moral philosophy, he had a more Kantian moral outlook. Sidgwick saw in Green the one serious effort to spell out a real alternative to his own.
Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Centres on Schopenhauer's conception of the self and how it relates to the world, primarily dealing with his book The World as Will and Representation. It locates Schopenhauer in relation to Kant, of whom he was both a follower and a critic. While accepting Kant's transcendental idealism and the associated notion of the ‘I’ as a pure subject of knowledge distinct from the world of objects, Schopenhauer undercuts this notion with a conception of the self as will. The self as will is primarily active, embodied, organic, and manifests pre‐rational ends and drives. The book shows how Schopenhauer arrives at a position in which idealism and materialism are correlative positions, but where a metaphysical account of the thing in itself as will takes primacy. It explores Schopenhauer's arguments that willing is identical with acting, and that at the level of individual willing there is no freedom. The book assesses the relevance of Schopenhauer's conception of the self to recent philosophical debates, and explores its influence on Wittgenstein and on Nietzsche.
The Development of Schopenhauer's Philosophy
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Schopenhauer's philosophy was formed during the years 1810–18. This chapter looks at the influences that shaped it, principally Kant, but also Plato, and the Upanishads. Schopenhauer aimed at a synthesis of these influences. Although indebted to Kant for the framework of his thought, he developed a conception of metaphysics and a ‘better consciousness’ of objective reality that would be free from the limitations imposed by Kant. Schopenhauer's antagonistic relationship with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is also mentioned.
Kantian Objects
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Kant's central contribution to theoretical philosophy was the position he called ‘transcendental idealism’. Schopenhauer also adopted transcendental idealism, though he wanted to modify Kant's position considerably, as evidenced in his long ‘Critique of the Kantian Philosophy’ appended to The World as Will and Representation. This chapter outlines Kant's idealism, comparing it with the idealism of Berkeley, examining the limitation of knowledge to appearances as opposed to the thing in itself, and the a priori principles that govern the world of empirical objects. Schopenhauer's often critical reception of these notions is emphasized, against the background of problems with transcendental idealism that had been raised by Kant's immediate successors.
Idealism
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Discusses Schopenhauer's claim that his idealism unites insights of Kant and Berkeley, and contrasts his position on the subject–object relation with that of Fichte. The question whether his idealism is solipsistic is raised. Schopenhauer's arguments that idealism is the only viable alternative to scepticism, and that the existence of a world of objects except for a representing subject is inconceivable are also critically analysed.
Materialism
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Schopenhauer argues that the world of objects must be material, and that the only use for the concept of substance is that of matter. He argues that materialism is correlative with idealism. Even the brain functions of the subject are material processes. However, materialism is one‐sided because it does not account for the point of view of the consciousness of the subject of knowledge, from which idealism indispensably starts.
Freedom from Will
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Outlines the ways in which Schopenhauer alleges that value is to be attained by an escape from or denial of the will that is our essence. Schopenhauer's pessimism involves a negative assessment of the life of insatiable striving and egoism to which the will condemns the individual. Aesthetic experience provides an escape into a will‐less state of consciousness. Ethics is founded on the recognition that individuation is basically illusory and egoism an erroneous impulse to action. Finally, Schopenhauer speaks of a mystical vision in which one does not distinguish oneself as an individual from the whole, a state in which one reaches denial of the will.
Self and World
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without needing to identify oneself as an object in the world. He also provides a prototype of the thought that the ‘I’ cannot be conceived wholly as a disembodied or transcendental pure subject, but must be an active and embodied agent. Schopenhauer's dichotomy of subjective and objective viewpoints is argued to be parallel to the conceptions developed by Thomas Nagel.
Conclusions
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Resumes the salient features of Schopenhauer's philosophy dealt with in the book. These include his dichotomy of subject and object, the correlativity of subjective and objective viewpoints, and the primacy of the will in accounting for the self. It concludes that Schopenhauer is helpful in uncovering two mysteries: that a ‘blind’ nature should produce a being with self‐consciousness, and that this being should be capable of understanding itself as a product of nature.
Beyond Evolution
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: October 2003

The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in language, we give ourselves ideals that cannot be justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage. Evolutionary theory is unable to give satisfactory accounts of such distinctive features of human life as the quest for knowledge, our moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty. At most, it can account for their prefiguration at some earlier stage of development than the human. In all these areas we transcend our biological origins, and such mechanisms as genetic survival, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. But because of our rationality we can also transcend our cultural inheritance explanation of which in terms of memes is both hollow and misleading. We are rooted both in our biology and in our cultural inheritance; but, sociobiology and sociology notwithstanding, we are prisoners neither of our genes nor of the ideas we encounter as we each make our personal journey through life.
Immanent and Transcendent Dimensions of Reason
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: October 2003

There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs and practices, we cannot live as if these doubts were true. It is plausible that some of these deeply held beliefs and practices are so embedded because they promote survival and this might give rise to a Humean view that Nature is too strong for Reason. However, our nature as transcendently self‐conscious rational agents means that we should not abandon all thought of justifying our most basic beliefs in favour of a purely instrumental account of reason. Reason, for self‐conscious agents, has a vertical aspect enabling us to step outside our beliefs and practices and question their validity.
Evolutionary Epistemology
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: October 2003

There is a distinction between the true—what we ought to believe—and the useful—what would be useful to believe. Our cognitive powers are the product of evolutionary development and natural selection is responsive to what is useful rather than to what is true. This can lead us, for good evolutionary reasons, to err on the side of caution with respect to toxicity of possible foods, e.g.—there can be beneficial false beliefs. Furthermore, Peter Munz has pointed out that idiosyncratic community‐wide false beliefs can have high utility from the point of view of social bonding and integration. Plato, Hayek, and Roger Scruton have also questioned the social value of rationality. As self‐conscious beings, we do seem to be concerned with truth as well as the merely useful. However, it remains open whether the search for truth is long‐term beneficial.
Evolution and Epistemological Pessimism
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: October 2003

Science can show how our beliefs are produced by our interactions with the material world. Explaining how, e.g. we might have experiences of secondary qualities and why such experiences might be useful from an evolutionary standpoint even if, strictly speaking, they have no existence independent of us. Selection, as described in the previous chapter, only ensures that our cognitive abilities will be survival‐promoting rather than truth‐delivering. Science, however, must be responsive to observation and be intelligible to us and observability and intelligibility look like they are also relative to our natures. Science, as van Fraassen, Hacking, and Cartwright point out, also involves the production of artificial phenomena through experiment and involves a degree of idealization. Science, on this account, is a process by which embodied beings explore their world and, in being susceptible to a naturalistic explanation, is no different from our other methods of belief formation. Secondary qualities, given this, are no less real and science no more objective. A naturalistic evolutionary perspective on knowledge while not justifying our basic non‐sceptical epistemic standpoint also does not lead inevitably to scepticism.
Beauty and the Theory of Evolution
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: October 2003

Given the remarkable transition over human history from the caveman to the painter of icons, what is the source of our aesthetic sensibility? Biologists can disagree about whether non‐human animals display a genuine aesthetic sense, as Darwin claimed, or whether, as Wallace argued, apparently aesthetic choices may simply reflect underlying pragmatic considerations. Even allowing for this, humans display the sort of features—reflectiveness, universality, disinterestedness, etc.—that Kant singles out as hallmarks of the aesthetic whereas non‐human animals do not. Contrary to Hume and Kant, however, we ought not to see aesthetic judgements as based on purely emotional responses to objects but rather as reflections of underlying objective facts about the world which, nevertheless, require a specific human sensibility to pick out. This explains, e.g., why aesthetic judgements can appear to converge across cultures and across time and why aesthetic judgements can appear to have a normative dimension.
Introduction: The Passions and Philosophy
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

This introductory chapter surveys some of the central themes that shaped seventeenth‐century discussions of the role of the passions in body and mind, and in reasoning and action, with which the book as a whole is concerned. It stresses that although the passions were regarded as turbulent and dangerous, the therapeutic benefits of understanding them were widely appreciated. The study of the passions in this period challenges a number of entrenched historical claims about the development of philosophy in this period, and also informs our contemporary understanding of the emotions.
Passion and Action in Aquinas
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

The Aristotelian analysis discussed in Ch. 2 is taken up by Aquinas, who adapts it to fit a Christian framework. Aquinas modifies and elaborates Aristotle's account of the active and passive aspects of the soul, and produces a novel analysis of its passions. This continued to exert an enormous influence on seventeenth‐century theorists, who did not altogether reject the assumptions of their Scholastic predecessors.
Negotiating the Divide: Descartes and Malebranche
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

Among seventeenth‐century philosophers who produced novel and systematic theories of the passions, two of the most important are Descartes and Malebranche, who attribute the physical and psychological aspects of the passions to the dual substances of body and soul. The first part of this chapter examines Descartes’ attempt to deal with the Aristotelian heritage; it concentrates on his reconfiguration of the soul, his account of the function of the passions, and his analysis of their physical and psychological aspects. The second part shows how these themes are developed by Malebranche, for whom the passions are social phenomena designed by God to realize our collective good.
Mental and Bodily Passions Identified: Hobbes and Spinoza
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

The dualist framework used by Descartes and Malebranche to explain the passions is challenged in different ways by Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes develops a materialist account of our passions as manifestations of an underlying striving for power. Spinoza develops this view into a monist analysis that breaks with strands of Aristotelianism, which are still to be found in Cartesianism, and makes space for a new conception of the distinction between active and passive thoughts.
Passion and Error
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

Alongside their frequent invocations of the distinction between reason and passion, seventeenth‐century philosophers have a sophisticated grasp of the role of the passions in the acquisition of knowledge. This chapter opens the discussion of Part III by examining the ways in which our passions are thought to give rise to error. As Hobbes and Spinoza explain, they encourage projection. They also make us inconstant. Above all, they distort our sense of time and scale, thus giving rise to a corrupting esteem for grandeur and contempt for petitesse, a phenomenon treated at length by Malebranche.
Dispassionate Scientia
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

Because scientific knowledge must be free from error, those who seek it must somehow avoid the mistakes to which our passions expose us. Some seventeenth‐century philosophers taken an optimistic view of this problem. A number of them argue that we can escape from the passionate realm of the senses to a realm of the intellect in which reason holds sway. Others, including Descartes and Spinoza, argue that reasoning is sustained by emotions that are nevertheless not passions. This chapter examines these two strategies.
Knowledge as Emotion
Authors: James Susan
Published: October 2003

Alongside the view that we need passion to motivate us to acquire knowledge, we find in the seventeenth century the idea that knowledge itself—and especially practical knowledge—has an emotional dimension. Practical knowledge consists in an ability to act in certain ways, which in turn depends on certain motivating passions that are often conceived as forms of love. This conviction draws on Platonism and Augustianism, and is taken up by both Protestant philosophers such as the Cambridge Platonists, and Catholic ones such as Pascal. The emotional changes that knowledge is understood to produce are widely seen as giving us a form of protection against passions that can infiltrate our bodies and shape our characters, from the time we are in the womb.
What Is Mathematical Realism?
Authors: Resnik Michael D.
Published: October 2003

Talk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.
The Case for Mathematical Realism
Authors: Resnik Michael D.
Published: October 2003

The application of mathematics to science and the enormous success that derives from it is, perhaps, the strongest evidence in favour of mathematical realism. Quine and Putnam have taken the indispensability of mathematics in doing science as the main premise in an argument for both the truth of mathematics and the existence of mathematical objects. This argument has been criticized, among other things, for presupposing a realist position with regard to science. In this chapter, I propose a new argument, the pragmatic indispensability argument that avoids the problem by failing to presuppose that our best scientific theories are true. I argue that the justification for doing science also justifies our accepting as true, the mathematics that science uses.
Holism: Evidence in Science and Mathematics
Authors: Resnik Michael D.
Published: October 2003

I present a theory of justification for mathematical beliefs that is both non‐foundationalist, in that it claims that some mathematics must be justified indirectly in terms of its consequences, and holistic, in that it maintains that no claim of theoretical science can be confirmed or refuted in isolation but only as a part of a system of hypotheses. Our evidence for mathematics is ultimately empirical because the mathematics that is part of theoretical science, is, in principle, revisable in light of experience and confirmed by experience. Following Henry Kyburg, I develop this idea by claiming that in science we use combinations of mathematical and scientific principles to develop models (mini‐theories) that allow us to calculate values that we then compare with the data. ‘Separatists’ objections to holism revolve around the claim that holism fails to respect our intuitions about mathematics, e.g. that mathematics is clearly distinct from science and that mathematical evidence comes from proofs, rather than from experience. My response to these objections is that holism can accommodate these intuitions by appealing to pragmatic rationality that, on the one hand, underwrites the special role of mathematics and bids us to treat it as if it were a priori, and, on the other, justifies, on the grounds of simplicity and success, a local conception of evidence according to which data can confirm specific hypotheses.
Positing Mathematical Objects
Authors: Resnik Michael D.
Published: October 2003

If, as I grant, mathematical objects are abstract entities existing outside of space and time, and if the idea of supernaturally grasping abstract entities is scientifically unacceptable, then we need to explain how we can attain mathematical knowledge using our ordinary faculties. I try to meet this challenge through a postulational account of the genesis of our mathematical knowledge, according to which our ancestors introduced mathematical objects by first positing geometric ideals and then postulating abstract mathematical entities. Since positing involves simply introducing a discourse about objects and affirming their existence, positing mathematical objects involves nothing more serious than writing fiction. For this reason, postulational approaches seem better suited for conventionalists; so in the second part of this chapter, I explain how positing in mathematics is different from positing in fiction, and how we can gain knowledge from the former. Finally, I try to make sense of the idea that mathematical postulates are about an independent mathematical reality and that we can refer to that reality through them, by giving an immanent and disquotational account of reference and contrasting it with a transcendent/causal account.
What Is Structuralism? and Other Questions
Authors: Resnik Michael D.
Published: October 2003

I explore the relation between structuralism and other theses that I have presented in the rest of the book, in particular, my holism, realism about mathematical objects, and the disquotational account of truth. In developing my theory, I have claimed that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the patterns that the various mathematical theories describe are themselves mathematical objects, so I first try to explain what the locution ‘there is no fact of the matter’ means. Next, I discuss the relativity of key structuralist concepts like sub‐pattern and pattern equivalence, and then explore the possibility of formulating structuralist versions of mathematical theories. Even if my holism precludes me from drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and science I do not regard my structuralism as a mathematical theory but rather as a philosophical account of mathematics that tries to achieve a deeper understanding of the epistemology and ontology of mathematics. My structuralism is epistemic rather than ontic because it is not an ontological reduction or a foundation for mathematics but a philosophical view about the nature of its objects. So when it is combined with realism concerning mathematical objects, it need not commit one to the existence of structures.
Entity and Identity
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

‘No entity without identity’. If interpreted liberally as ‘No entity that is not in principle identifiable’, the slogan is acceptable. If interpreted strictly as ‘No entity that does not belong to a sort such that there exist clearly stateable general criteria of identity for all entities of that sort’, then it is unacceptably exclusive; for it excludes not only the general properties exemplified by individual particulars but even most of the general kinds or sorts, the concepts of which constitute individuating principles of identity for the particulars that fall under them, and hence threatens the status of those particulars themselves.
Concepts and Propertiesor Predication and Copulation
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

Wiggins maintains that the general term that combines with some copulative device to form a properly predicative expression signifies a concept but not a property. The argument for this denial is unsound: the general term signifies a property. The defence of the copula is correct.
Reference and Its Roots
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

Quine claims to investigate the process by which the learner progresses from a grasp of simple observation‐terms to mastery of objective reference and predication. By manipulating the notions of ‘compound observation‐term’ and ‘occasion’, his account represents this achievement as unrealistically deferred.
Logical Form and Logical Constants
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

A general characterization of the constants of standard logic is achieved by following the suggestion, inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus, that the meanings of these constants can be fully explained by reference to no more than two essential features of empirical statements; all such statements must possess excluding power and at least some must exhibit a certain duality. The sufficiency of these terms is demonstrated and the results are related to some earlier insufficient attempts at such a characterization.
May Bes and Might Have Beens
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

Epistemic possibilities, the ‘might have been's of the past and ‘may be's of the future, are examined and analysed. The former relate to points in the past regarding which presently available knowledge does not show the then prevailing situation to be such as to exclude the particulars concerned acting or suffering differently from the ways in which they actually did; the latter relate to what present knowledge makes likely or does not wholly exclude. Various extensions, refinements, and objections are considered.
Austin and ‘Locutionary Meaning’
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

Progressively richer senses of the expression ‘the meaning of what was said’ as applied to an utterance made on some occasion are distinguished. An unsuccessful attempt at elucidating Austin's notion of the content (meaning) of a ‘locutionary act’ in the light of these distinctions is followed by a proposed (imposed) solution that depends on the notion of statements or propositions as candidates for truth‐evaluation. Austin's general reasons for reservations about ‘true’ are questioned, and their extension to reservations about distinguishing truth‐evaluation from other dimensions of assessment is shown to be unsound.
Meaning and Context
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

A distinction is drawn between the ‘linguistic meaning’ (A), ‘linguistic‐cum‐referential meaning’ (B), and ‘complete meaning’ (C) of what is said by a serious utterance of a sentence. The questions considered are: What are the determining effects that context of utterance may have on the content and relations of A, B, and C? When are these effects governed by rule or convention and when not? The complex answers to these questions are set out and explained. The general moral drawn is that a satisfactory theory of meaning must take account of the aim of communication.
Kant's New Foundations of Metaphysics
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

Some muted echoes of Kantian idealism are to be found in the work of many twentieth century philosophers (e.g. Putnam, Davidson, Quine, Dummett, Wittgenstein) who would readily describe themselves, like Kant, as ‘empirical realists’ but dismiss the notion of a reality in principle inaccessible to human cognitive capacities; only muted echoes, therefore, since Kant holds to a belief in precisely such a reality. The crucial distinction lies in the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time.
Sorting Out Ethics
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.
Intuitionism
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one person's intuition may differ from another's, and the theory offers no way to decide between them. Intuitionism, Hare argues, is really a kind of Subjectivist Naturalism, or Subjectivism; and, as with Naturalism, it also leads to relativism. Therefore, because it is exhausted by these two theories, descriptivism in general must be abandoned if we are to attain the sort of objectivity that will allow us to avoid relativism.
Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Hare questions the claim made by modern intuitionists and deontologists that Kant is their ally against utilitarianism. The core of the chapter is a discussion of Kant's Categorial Imperative, which is shown to be compatible, in its various formulations, with utilitarianism. Conspicuously anti‐utilitarian elements of Kantian ethics, Hare argues, are based on principles extrinsic to, and sometimes incompatible with, Kant's moral theory. In answering possible objections to his interpretation, Hare firstly distinguishes pure from applied ethics, which includes an important distinction between Kant's notions of Wille and Willkür; and, secondly, he argues that Kant can be understood as a consequentialist.
Hume's Problem
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.
Hume's Argument
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.
Reliabilism
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.
Probabilism
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Considers whether probability theory offers a way round Hume's argument, as has sometimes been contended. There are theorems of formal probability theory that appear to show that suitable evidence must increase the probability of the predicting theory, though when these theorems are examined they are all seen to have substantive assumptions, usually that some putative law has non‐zero prior probability. As such, they merely corroborate Hume's thesis that any inductive argument will contain explicitly or implicitly at least one inductive premise.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.
Coda: ‘Of Miracles’
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

The coda discusses Hume's famous account of miracles in the Enquiry, and his criterion for belief in miracles, and shows that it amounts to a simple argument in the probability calculus.
The Idea of Hellenic Harmony
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

The historiography of Greek ethics has, since the days of Winckelmann, Schiller, and Hegel, been shaped by an effort to use it in modern debates. Kantians believed that the Greeks ignored the notion of morality. Hegelians by contrast thought that they understood how to show that one's own happiness is compatible with the happiness of others and conformity to ethical norms—either through inclusivism (the view that the first includes the other two) or fusionism (the view that the former is identical with their combination).
Imperatives in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

A common theme in the historiography of Greek ethics says that modern ethics is characterized by imperative notions such as ‘duty’—and with a Judeo‐Christian notion of imperatives or commands issued by god—whereas ancient ethics supposedly deals mainly with ‘attractive notions such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue’. This thought is often juxtaposed with the idea that imperative notions betoken a conflict between one's duty and one's good, because an imperative seems to be required only to command people to do what they do not wish to do, which is felt to be inappropriate to the supposed eudaimonism of Greek ethics. In fact Greek ethics makes substantial use of imperative notions, and does not attempt to show that attractive notions are more basic or preferable in ethics.
The City‐State in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

One of the main vehicles for the reconciliation of individual and social happiness that has supposedly been characteristic of Greek ethics is the concept of the polis. In the Hegelian tradition it has been thought that the Greeks reduced all norms and values to standards laid down by and for the city‐state, and that this fact made it possible for them to hold that the well‐being of an individual is entirely compatible with the well‐being of his fellow‐citizens and of the city‐state as a whole. However, the Greeks were familiar with and attached substantial weight to non‐polis‐based norms and values, even universalist ones like the Golden Rule, and made ample conceptual room for conflict between the happiness of a citizen and that of his community. Moreover, Greek attitudes on this issue were variegated, not uniform.
Time, Tense, and Causation
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones.

The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.

Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority.

The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections.

It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.
The Nature of Time: Alternative Accounts and Basic Issues
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Formulates the central claim to be defended in the book, which is a conjunction of two theses. First, tenseless concepts and facts are more basic than tensed concepts and facts. Second, the world is dynamic: while the past and the present are real, the future is not. The chapter also outlines the role of causation on this account: the direction of time is defined in terms of the direction of causation, and causation can exist only in a dynamic world.
Temporally Relative Facts and the Argument from Preventability
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Discusses an argument from preventability to the effect that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. The argument draws on an analysis of ‘It is a fact that p at time t’ as ‘p, and it is logically impossible for there to exist anyone who would have been able, at t, to prevent it from being the case that p’. However, there are two strong objections to the argument from preventability, one relating to backward causation and causal loops, and one relating to the truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals.
Facts, Causation, and Time
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Takes the objections that were discussed in the previous chapter as a starting‐point for arguing in favour of the dynamic view of the world that is defended in the book.

It argues that satisfactory truth conditions for counterfactuals can only be given if the world is a dynamic one. Further, an argument from causation can be put forward in favour of the dynamic view:
Truth and Truth at a Time
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Defends both the concepts of truth at a time and of truth simpliciter.

It rejects arguments against truth at a time, according to which this concept involves a confusion between propositions and propositional functions. It argues that tensed views of time should employ three valued logics, and that alleged problems with the latter can be overcome by distinguishing between factual truth and logical truth. Finally, the chapter defends the concept of truth simpliciter: Tensed views of time still require this concept so as to apply it to propositions involving atemporal entities.
Summary and Conclusions
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Gives a brief summary of the results reached in the book and their advantages. It recapitulates the differences between the dynamic view of the world defended in the book and traditional tensed conceptions of time. While the latter hold that tensed facts are fundamental, the former holds that tensed facts reduce to tenseless facts even in a dynamic world, where what tenseless facts there are depends on what time it is. The different roles of causation for the present approach are summed up: Causation defines the direction of time, and can be used to analyse temporal relations; There can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.
Introduction
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This introductory chapter explains and defends the ‘collegial’ approach to philosophers of the past, in which one treats them as colleagues, collaborators, pupils, and antagonists. It is maintained that an error by a great philosopher may be as instructive and illuminating as his true insights.
Descartes on Causation
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Gives the source of Descartes's view that a cause must in some way resemble its effect. The concept of a trope, or property‐instance, and the theory that causation is trope‐transfer and Descartes's rejection of this is discussed. His theory that substances endure only with help from God and his differing treatments of causal action of body on body, body on mind (including sense perception), mind on body, and mind on mind are explained. Reveals his lack of any robust concept of, or analytic theory of, causation.
Desire in Descartes and Spinoza
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Descartes tries to keep teleology out of his account of desire. Spinoza often seems to do likewise: he equates desire with ‘appetite’, which he firmly defines in non‐teleological terms. His extraordinarily ingenious and equally fallacious attempt to prove the ‘conatus’ doctrine—that everything strives to preserve its own being—is analysed and criticized. If enough allowances are made, the argument takes him to a kind of pseudo‐egoism, which he invalidly equates with egoism.
Leibniz Arrives at Monads
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Leibniz held that there are no material substances (because of divisibility), and that there are immaterial substances, which he called ‘monads’. They are absolutely real; bodies are appearances of monads, and are phenomenal; space and time are ideal. Leibniz is not an idealist. His reasons for holding that all minds are monads and his further reason (his gradualism) for holding that all monads are mindlike are also given.
Leibniz's Contained‐Predicate Doctrine
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

What the contained‐predicate doctrine (CPD) is, and its source in Leibniz's problem about individual reference—one he could have solved better if he had allowed inter‐substance causation and indexicals is covered. Gives his attempt to reconcile the CPD with there being contingent subject–predicate propositions; and infinite analysis. Leibniz's great mistake of construing the CPD as though it were causal rather than logical, and his attempt to reconcile it with human freedom are also dealt with.
Descartes's Search for Security
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Examines the search for security, for immovable foundations, that is conducted in Descartes's Meditations, centring on the Cogito. Topics discussed include the role of the omnipotent Deceiver, the truth rule, God's role in all this, the supposed Cartesian circle, and Bréhier's failed attempt to remove it.
Descartes's Stability Project
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Presents and defends the thesis that in his Cogito‐related pursuit of security in the Meditations, Descartes is searching not only for (1) certainty, understood normatively but also, and perhaps dominantly, for (2) stability of beliefs, understood psychologically. Much of what is most problematic in the work makes better sense related to 2 than related to 1.
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.