bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Japanese Attitudes and Policies towards China in 1973
Authors: Hudson G.
Published: March 2009

The Tanaka visit to Peking in September 1972 and the subsequent opening of regular diplomatic relations between Japan and the Chinese People's Republic represented a turn of foreign policy which was strongly supported by most sections of Japanese public opinion. The policy of following the American lead in refusing de jure recogmtion to the government in Peking and confining diplomatic relations to the Chinese Nationalist regime in Taiwan had always been unpopular in Japan, on the Right as well as on the Left of the political spectrum, for, while the Left was influenced by sympathies for the social aims of Communist China and resentful at what was seen as the subservience of Japan to American imperialism, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was affected by the view prevailing in Japanese business circles that Japan was being kept out of a large and lucrative trade by conformity with a policy made in Washington, After the President of the United States had himself made the journey to Peking, there was no longer sufficient ground for the Japanese government to pursue a policy which the Americans themselves had repudiated, and there was even an opportunity for Japan to move ahead of the United States in conciliation with Peking, since the United States was still encumbered by a military alliance with Taiwan, as Japan was not. Thus Japan was able to open full diplomatic relations with Peking while the United States had to be content with a “liaison mission.” It remained to be seen, however, how the new Sino-Japanese relations would develop in terms of concrete agreements between the two countries and, on surveying the progress made over the year that has passed since Tanaka went to Peking, the actual results of the new policy must be reckoned some-what disappointing. There are, in fact, two considerable obstacles to the attainment of genuinely intimate and harmonious relations between Tokyo and Peking: one is the continuation of certain Japanese ties with Taiwan and the other is the Japanese effort, as part of the new so-called “balanced diplomacy,” to develop relations with the Soviet Union simultaneously with the approach to Peking.
The Structural Evolution of ‘Criticism and Self-Criticism’
Authors: Dittmer Lowell
Published: March 2009

“ Criticism and self-criticism,” or inner-Party struggle as it is sometimes called, has always been a major mechanism of inner-Party decision making and discipline among Chinese political elites, but during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution it emerged as a form of mass mobilization and education as well. I shall argue here that this came about as a result of political decisions made in the context of a series of non-reversible structural changes in the Chinese system of communications.
New Light on Mao: 2. His views on the Soviet Union'sPolitical Economy
Authors: Levy Richard
Published: March 2009

Although much has been written about Maoist economic theory (about the role of material and moral incentives, for instance, and about the relation between industry and agriculture), the recent appearance of the two volumes entitledMao Tse-tung ssu-hsiong wan-suiand in particular five pieces therein (“Reading notes on the Soviet Union'sPolitical Economy,” the three critiques of Stalin'sEconomic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.and Mao's comments on Stalin's “Reply to Comrades Sanina and Venzher”), permits analysis to push beyond “Maoist” economics into the theory of Mao himself. In fact these pieces in theWan-suion political economy may well be compared to Mao's public speeches and theSelected Worksas Marx'sGrundrisseis toDas Kapital.
An Interview with Chinese Legal Officials
Authors: Ruge Gerd
Published: March 2009

The following interview took place in Canton on 13 May 1974, where my wife and I met five leading members of the Kwangtung Institute of Law and Political Science – Mr Kao Kun-feng, chairman, Mr Chiang Chun-chin, Mr Koo Yue-hua, Mr Wang Tieh-hsing and Mr Hsin Ban-chi. Most of the information was supplied by Mr Kao Kun-feng, whom some embassy experts in Peking believe to be – or to have been – the president of the intermediate court in Canton. The Institute of Law and Political Science of Kwangtung Province was described as a mass organization for research into law and for facilitating meetings with foreigners. It was compared to the law department of the Academy of Sciences in Peking which, however, was said to have more specialized sections than this provincial institute.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Through the Eyes of a Visiting Sinologist
Authors: White D. Gordon
Published: March 2009

I paid a two-week visit to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or North Korea) in April–May last year. Being a Sinologist by training, the standards I used to evaluate what I saw there were those of a person steeped in the study of Mao's China. If I had brought with me a background in Soviet or Japanese and, most importantly, Korean studies, I would have had more insight into the distinctive characteristics of the Korean road to socialism. But the contrasts between North Korea and China are so startling in many fields and the implications for the wider study of socialist societies so important that I intend to couch this paper in terms of a comparison between the two systems.
Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-Political Change
Authors: Tien Hung-mao
Published: March 2009

President Chiang Kai-shek's death on 16 April and President Gerald Ford's announcement that he would visit Peking in the autumn of 1975 once again direct attention to the political future of the Republic of China and the 16 million inhabitants of Taiwan. Progress towards diplomatic normalization between the United States and the People's Republic of China has been slower than many would have expected following President Nixon's visit to the mainland in February 1972. For the island's inhabitants any dramatic change in their political status may spell a permanent alteration in their life style, which has become substantially different from that of the mainland. Precisely because of this, one needs to look closely at their political aspirations and the socio-political changes that have occurred. Any political solution for Taiwan's future should be analysed with respect to its impact on these vital human interests.
The Production and Application of Chemical Fertilizers in China
Authors: Chao Kang
Published: March 2009

The production of chemical fertilizers has been one of the most successful industries in China in the past two decades. It has not only manifested a remarkable long-term growth rate but also avoided shortterm fluctuations. During the crisis years of the early 1960s when virtually all industries suffered set-backs, the production of fertilizers managed to progress steadily. Its success is attributed to a number of favourable factors. First of all the importance of chemical fertilizers in developing China's agriculture was fully recognized by all leaders in the Party after their early policy of reliance on the mobilization of natural fertilizers had failed. Consequently, in spite of the frequent power struggles, the chemical fertilizer industry has received uninterrupted emphasis and support. Secondly, the technological problems in producing fertilizers are less formidable than in some other industries so that in a relatively short period the Chinese have learned the basic methods of producing fertilizers and of manufacturing new equipment for this industry. Thus, production has been able to expand whether under the foreign embargo or under the self-imposed policy of self-reliance. Finally, there is no serious resource barrier in the provision of key materials for the production of fertilizers.
The Chinese Army after the Cultural Revolution: the Effects of Intervention
Authors: Joffe Ellis
Published: March 2009

Whatever may have been the objectives of the principal participants in the Cultural Revolution, there can be little doubt that they did not include what turned out to be, at least in the short term, the most striking and significant outcome of the upheaval: the rise of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to a pivotal position in China's power structure. Compelled to intervene in the political process when the disruptive effects of the struggle reached dangerous dimensions, the army gradually ascended to the commanding heights of political power in the provinces, and acquired a substantial voice in the policy-making councils of Peking. When the Ninth Congress of the Party finally met in April 1969 to write the epilogue to the Cultural Revolution, it was the PLA rather than the Party that held most of the key positions of power in China.
The Malleability of Man in Chinese Marxism
Authors: Munro Donald J.
Published: March 2009

“Human nature changes” – a vague statement acceptable to Marx and to Engels, to Stalin and to Mao. The point is: what is it that changes, under what conditions does it change, and what is the nature of the change? The article that follows is a case study of the interaction between the concrete cultural and social dimensions of a given country and a philosophical concept that has made its way into that country's official ideology. It examines the idea of the malleability of human nature in contemporary China. The concept is of monumental importance in Chinese Marxism, and examination of its evolution and implications will illuminate the Chinese definition of social class, and the causes of a nationwide crisis in the educational system in 1958 that foreshadowed the dramatic 1966 closing of all schools and their subsequent restructuring. Most important, the analysis clarifies the meaning of a term so often used in discussions of Chinese thought and so rarely understood.
The Yenan Revolution in Mass Education
Authors: Seybolt Peter J.
Published: March 2009

During the eight years of war with Japan, the strategy and tactics of the Communist movement in China matured to become a viable revolutionary programme. Recent scholarship leaves little doubt that in these years the Communists were successful in winning the allegiance of the majority of the people in areas under their control and in mobilizing them for the further pursuit of revolutionary goals.
The Particle of Art
Authors: Birch Cyril
Published: March 2009

“Where ideology restricts, art frees …”: the opening section of T. A. Hsia's paper provides an eloquent statement of a fundamental distinction, a distinction which is at the centre of a dilemma. How is a group of men whose inclinations and commitments are to literature as art to approach a literature which is ideological in inspiration and intent? For this, we agreed, is a fair statement of the nature of Chinese Communist literature. It is more than a matter of guidance, or direction or control. It is not at all to be taken for granted that control is disastrous for literature. Great works of literature emerged in the past from under the control of despotic monarchs and authoritarian religions. Dante did not necessarily understand the authority of the Church to impose some kind of fetter on his work; it was a measure of restricted freedom that Chinese writers of the past knew and felt at home in. Great literature endures, as Mao Tun maintains, “not because literature is independent of politics but because it serves in a way much more profound than can be assessed at the moment.”
Metaphor and the Conscious in Chinese Poetry under Communism
Authors: Chen S. H.
Published: March 2009

Commenting on literature as a human record, Goethe once called it “The fragment of fragments: The smallest part of what has been done and spoken has been recorded; and the smallest part of what has been recorded has survived.” I find this observation a very sobering and instructive reminder for a discussion of Chinese poetry under Communist rule. Goethe was speaking of literature in general. And poetry, formally at least, being but one of its branches, is by deduction a fragment of “the fragment of fragments.” Over a decade many things have been accomplished under the régime. Many deeds have been done, immense work of material reconstruction has been completed, and more is in process, on the débris of destruction of comparable quantity; and unfathomable tribulations, pains and frustrations in soul and body are felt and muttered, as well as the hue and cry of zeal and enthusiasm exclaimed among massive crowds.
Archaeology in Communist China
Authors: Te-K'un Cheng
Published: March 2009

Archaeology has a long history in traditional China where it served as the handmaiden of history, lexicography and geography, as well as preserver of art and literature. References to ancient material remains are common in the early Chinese literature. In the early fifth century b.c. Feng-hu-tzu, presumably after a study of early implements, proposed a four-stage sequence for the ancient period, each characterised by a weapon made of stone, jade, copper and iron, respectively. The grand historian of the second century B.C., Ssu-ma Ch'ien, made special efforts to visit as many ancient sites and monuments as possible to substantiate his records. In the second century a.d. Hsü Shen compiled a dictionary of 10,516 characters, many of which were drawn from ancient bronze and stone inscriptions. In the sixth century Li Tao-yuan wrote his commentaries on the Book of Rivers, which was fully documented with archaeological data. Throughout the ages many important discoveries were recorded and large numbers of ancient art objects and literature preserved. By the twelfth century Chinese archaeology had become a specialised subject, known as Chin-shih-hsueh, literally, a study of bronze and stone objects. A vast literature began to accumulate, reaching its height in the last two centuries.
Chinese Communist Treatment of the Origins and the Foundation of the Chinese Empire
Authors: Hulsewé A. F. P.
Published: March 2009

In antiquity, China was far from being the China we know today, neither in extent, nor in political and social organisation. To the south it did not extend beyond the Yangtze River, to the north it stopped short of the Mongolian steppe, to the north-east, only a small part of the south Manchurian plain was included, whereas in the west it merely went up to the easternmost part of what is now Kansu Province; the Szechwan plain was only included at the end of the fourth century B.C. Politically, the King of Chou was theoretically the overlord of most of this area, but in actual practice, independent rulers reigned over a congeries of larger and smaller states. As a result of wars of conquest, seven large states had come to be formed by the middle of the fifth century B.C. and these were engaged in a ceaseless struggle for supremacy. The time between the middle of the fifth century and 221 B.C., when the western state of Ch'in finally conquered all its rivals, is known as the period of the Warring States.
The Chinese Middle Ages in Communist Historiography
Authors: Flitzgerald C. P.
Published: March 2009

Historical writing in China today, whether by scholars who are members of the Communist Party, or academic writers who are not themselves Communists, has paid scant attention to the long period of time which may be called the Chinese Middle Ages, roughly from A.D. 316, the date of the partition of north and south following the nomad invasions, down to the end of the Sung Dynasty in A.D. 1278. This period of nearly a thousand years is considered by the Communist philosophy of history to be “feudal” and no real change in the social structure is supposed to have taken place under the long succession of “feudal” dynasties. Compared with the important transformation of ancient “slave society” to serf-owning feudalism, which is considered to have been completed somewhat before the Han Dynasty came to power, this long interim of feudalism drags on until, with the Ming, the first signs of nascent capitalism are to be detected, ushering in the still more dramatic events of imperialist aggression, revolution and the final triumph of the Communist Party. The scheme is not Chinese; it was borrowed, or adopted, from the Russians, who in turn seem to have based it upon a reference of Marx, contained in one of his letters, to the view that the general progression from primitive society to slave-owning monarchies, and then to feudalism, appeared to be a law of history. It may well be that this scheme is roughly applicable to several Western societies, but it is very hard to thrust Chinese history onto this procrustean bed—and still make sense of it.
The Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism
Authors: Wilhelm Hellmut
Published: March 2009

As in all living scholarly traditions one can see in traditional Chinese historiography a wide range of divergent opinion as to what history is and how it should be written. On one point, however, all schools of Chinese historiography agree, and this is the clear awareness of the evaluative character of their trade. The historian of every school was an arbiter who, by passing judgment assessed the value of, and gave meaning to, events. This consciously evaluative character of Chinese historiography demanded self-reliance and courage on the part of the historian, who was not only the keeper of documents and the recorder of events; his assessments assumed normative status like the sentences of a judge.
Fertiliser Application in Communist China
Authors: Liu Jung-Chao
Published: March 2009

In recent years, Communist China has been advocating chemical fertiliser application as a means of raising land yield for grains and cotton in order to feed her growing population and to provide sufficient raw materials for light industry. Domestic production of chemical fertiliser increased fivefold during the First Five Year Plan period of 1953–57 and again expanded threefold during the Second Five Year Plan period of 1958–62. More than one half of the total consumption of chemical fertiliser has been imported mainly from Western European countries and Japan. The average rate of consumption per hectare is still low in comparison with other agriculturally advanced countries but the rate of increase has been impressive. On the other hand, such a drastic increase must be exerting great pressure on agricultural practice in China. What incentive, if any, does the government provide to encourage the application of chemical fertiliser? How high is the fertiliser price? How much can fanners expect to gain from an increase in fertiliser application? Does the government gain tax revenue from promoting fertiliser application?
China's Role in the Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Authors: Pringsheim Klaus H.
Published: March 2009

On September 15, 1965, Mr. B. K. Nehru, India's Ambassador to the United States, told the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.: “What seems impossible to deny is that the Chinese and the Pakistanis are working in the closest possible co-operation to increase the military and economic pressure on India and to encourage internal disorder with a view to weakening, and if possible causing the break-up of, the Indian Union.” There has indeed been evidence of Sino-Pakistani co-operation in recent years, though the use of the words “closest possible” might be questioned. Strangely enough the United States, by her arms aid to India since 1962, became at least partly responsible for one of the more successful phases of Chinese Communist diplomacy since the inception of the People's Republic in 1949.
The Ninth Central Committee
Authors: Klein Donald W. , Hager Lois B.
Published: March 2009

In the half-century history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), only nine congresses have been held. Since six of these were convened during the first seven years, only three congresses have been held since the Sixth Congress in 1928. If the Seventh Congress in 1945 can be characterized as the consolidation of Mao's rule over the CCP, and the Eighth Congress in 1956 as the consolidation of the CCP's mastery over the China mainland, then the Ninth Congress, held in 1969, is the story of the victors and victims of the Cultural Revolution.
Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China
Authors: Djerassi Carl
Published: March 2009

It is remarkable how little is known about current contraceptive practice, family planning, and population growth in the People's Republic of China. Since so little is published by the Chinese themselves - virtually nothing since the mid 1960s - nearly all western literature on these topics comes from professional “China-watchers” (primarily social scientists) and from occasional first hand reports of travellers. This latter group has not included experts in contraception and family planning nor, with one notable exception, have physicians who have recently written on medicine in China addressed themselves to the topic of fertility control, so that, until now, hardly anybody seems to have bothered about “contraceptive hardware” especially of the sophisticated type such as steroid oral contraceptives. Yet this is precisely the area where one could gain a real insight into Chinese chemical and clinical competence. Indeed, if production figures of such contraceptives could be ascertained, this would be the first hard numerical evidence about the extent of contraceptive practice in the People's Republic. I am convinced that, at this stage, it is impossible to write a definitive treatise on contraceptive practice in China. The country is too large, national statistics are unavailable, many areas are not yet open to foreigners and the extent of contraceptive usage - qualitative and quantitative - is still very uneven. The current need is for individual reports by professionally qualified observers citing data which, as far as possible, are backed up by hard facts. Once a sufficient number of such studies has appeared, then the time might be ripe for someone, ideally a Chinese author, to discuss the topic authoritatively from a national perspective.
A New Model for Chinese Legislation: The 1972 Shipping Regulations
Authors: Dicks Anthony
Published: March 2009

Foreigners, whether inside China or abroad, have been left in ignorance of the fate of the Chinese legal system during and after the Cultural Revolution. In particular, with the exception of a few obviously temporary decrees of the Cultural Revolution period, virtually no major legislation of any kind has reached the outside world or even been mentioned in the Chinese press. The appearance of a pamphlet published by the Ministry of Communications in February 1972 and containing theRegulations for the Carriage of Goods by Water(hereafter referred to as theRegulations) is therefore an event of some interest.
“Revolution in Education” Committees
Authors: McCormick Robert
Published: March 2009

During March 1973, I was part of a study tour visiting, as is common with such groups, a variety of units in China. My own particular subject is education and I was therefore particularly interested in the various educational institutions we visited as a group: such as the Canton Medical College, Peking University, Nanking University, Futan University, Canton Province Teachers’ Training College and middle and primary schools. At Nanking and Futan universities I was also able to have discussions, separately from the main group, on purely educational issues
National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought
Authors: Dirlik Arif
Published: March 2009

Studies of communism in China reveal a strong element of nationalism in the acceptance and interpretation of communism from Li Ta-chao to Mao Tse-tung. The concern of Chinese Communists with the plight of the Chinese nation has led to two significant revisions of communism in its Marxist-Leninist form: the elevation of national over class struggle and the consequent eclipsing of the proletariat by the “people.” Maurice Meisner says of Li Ta-chao, whom he regards as the forerunner of Mao, “Li no doubt attached considerable importance to the organization of the proletariat, but he was predisposed from the beginning to look to the potential revolutionary forces of the whole ‘proletarian’ nation rather than of a single social class forming only a tiny portion of the nation.”
Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in China
Authors: Kraus Richard Curt
Published: March 2009

Western curiosity about the distribution of inequalities in contemporary China is not easily satisfied. The most obvious impediment to our understanding is that the government of the People's Republic does not publish even the most elementary social statistics, so that our efforts to gauge the shape of Chinese social stratification are by necessity impressionistic and often unsatisfying. The best recent assessment, offered in this journal by Martin King Whyte, draws upon an impressive (and an imaginatively motley) array of sources in support of well-reasoned, yet tantalizingly tentative conclusions.
Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?
Authors: Pepper Suzanne
Published: March 2009

Of all the sayings attributed to Deng Xiaoping, his commentary on the colour of cats is surely the most famous. Thanks to the radical campaign against him in 1976, all of China was reminded that Deng did not care whether a cat was black or white – so long as it could catch mice it was good enough for him. This was said to demonstrate his lack of commitment to political principle. As a consequence he was hailed outside China as a pragmatist and a moderate bent on seeking the shortest, quickest route towards his country's modernization, s of the political or ideological implications of the means adopted.
China: The Provincial Distribution of Population
Authors: Jowett A. John
Published: March 2009

It is now possible to present official Chinese population figures for the end of 1978 and to set them against previous western estimates. In Table I attached to this note columns A and B give the provincial distribution of population in China at the end of 1978. The data therefore refer to the system of provincial boundaries which existed prior to the reorganization of July 1979 in which Inner Mongolia expanded to its pre-1969 configuration at the territorial expense of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia and Gansu.
Professional Military Education in China: A Visit to the Military Academy of the People's Liberation Army
Authors: Heaton William R.
Published: March 2009

A key to understanding the armed forces of any nation may be found in the manner in which it selects and trains its senior military officers. Although China's military forces are unique in many respects, they are similar to those of other countries in that a great deal of emphasis is placed on professional military training for the officer corps. Comparatively little is known about precisely how the Chinese conduct this education.
Central Broadcasting and Television University
Authors: McCormick Robert
Published: March 2009

In May 1979, while on a private visit to China, I was fortunate to be able to meet staff of the Television University (Zhongyang guangbodianshi daxue). A visit to the Open University in Britain of a delegation from China's Preparatory Committee for a National Audio-Visual Centre made us aware of the establishment of the Television University. Its opening on 6 February 1979 was announced in the Beijing Review and in broadcasts.
The Politics of Demobilized Soldiers from Liberation to Cultural Revolution
Authors: White Gordon
Published: March 2009

Demobilized soldiers have been widely regarded, by political analysts and politicians alike, as a distinctive political group of considerable importance. Politicians in a number of countries have been acutely aware of the ambiguous potential of ex-soldiers and have striven to mobilize them under their own colours. In several western countries, notably the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, veterans' organizations have often been a powerful bulwark of conservatism, advocating the virile values of patriotism, sanctifying the status quo and supporting the political forces of the right. During the Vietnam War, on the other hand, the anti-war movement in the United States realized the political potential of Vietnam veterans and effectively mobilized a section of them in opposition to official war policy.
Overseas Chinese in China's Policy
Authors: Chang C. Y.
Published: March 2009

During the first decade of the People's Republic of China from 1949, overseas Chinese affairs were considered important to the national interest of China, and a special department called the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But during the period from 1967–69, when the Cultural Revolution was caught in the wild wind, overseas Chinese and their institutions, particularly the ones at home, were considered ideologically suspect and undesirable because of their allegedly bourgeois background and foreign connexions. The privileges previously given to them as a cushion to adjust themselves gradually to the socialist system were repudiated and removed. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission was disbanded.
The Procurement of Grain
Authors: Maxwell Neville , Nolan Peter
Published: March 2009

Information obtained during a research tour of communes in rural China in the summer of 1979 clarified, among other things, the structure of grain marketing by production teams and other basic units of production. Explanations advanced by officials at various levels above and within the communes Showed that the grain sold by units to the state included a tranche, named “ discussion grain ” (yigou), Which was unfamiliar to us although it was said to have been introduced generally in 1972–73, and in Guangdong Province as early as 1963. We obtained the following understanding of the system currently in operation throughout China.
Some Problems Concerning the Chinese Economy
Authors: Fureng Dong
Published: March 2009

The Chinese people are entering the eighth decade of the 20th century full of confidence and with a firm belief that they are moving towards the goal of modernization. In 1979, as the first of the battles for the realization of this goal, China put into practice the policy of “ readjustment, reform, rectification and improvement ” of the national economy. “ Readjustment ” means essentially changing the national economic structure and eliminating serious imbalance of ratios in order to remove obstacles to the further development of the national economy. “ Reform ” means chiefly reform of the economic system.
Students and Class Warfare: The Social Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou (Canton)
Authors: Chan Anita , Rosen Stanley , Unger Jonathan
Published: March 2009

Until recent years, scholars of modern China had generally assumed that in the Cultural Revolution violence of 1966–68 young people were almost arbitrarily joining one or the other of the opposing Red Guard groups. Only within the past few years have researchers begun to unveil the antagonism among students early in the Cultural Revolution over “class” issues and the resulting differences in the composition, tactics and goals of the Red Guard factions.
Craft Development: Socialist and Capitalist
Authors: Cooper Eugene
Published: March 2009

The post-war development of the art-carved furniture and camphorwood chests manufacturing industry of Hong Kong was the direct result of the relocation of large numbers of workers and entrepreneurs in the trade from Shanghai to Hong Kong in the wake of China's 1949 socialist revolution. In a brief visit to a carved-furniture factory in Shanghai in late 1978, I was able to gather data which provide the opportunity to compare in several crucial respects developments in the wood carving craft in post-revolutionary Shanghai with the results of an earlier study I made of the craft's development in Hong Kong, and to reflect on the fate of a single industry undergoing parallel development under socialism and capitalism between 1949 and 1978.
Some Thoughts on the Current State of Sino-Tibetan Historiography
Authors: Grunfeld A. Tom
Published: March 2009

Dawa Norbu's contribution to these pages (“The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion: An Interpretation,”The China Quarterly, No. 77, March 1979, 74–93) bears a significance beyond its purely academic insights and its subsequent expansion of our knowledge of a major event in Sino-Tibetan history. Mr Norbu's presence among the scholarly ranks represents a noteworthy turning-point in the direction the historiography of this field of study is heading and consequently how future scholars will view Sino-Tibetan history. Before commenting directly on his article, I would like to make some observations on the state of the discipline itself.
A Tenth Aniiversary Appraisal: Collectivisation in Retrospect: The “Socialist High Tide” of Autumn 1955–Spring 1956
Authors: Walker Kenneth R.
Published: March 2009

In July 1955 Mao Tse-tung made one of his rare public policy statements when he addressed party secretaries of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions “on the question of co-operativisation.” It proved to be one of the most important speeches in recent Chinese history, terminating a dispute about the nature and timing of agricultural socialisation which had been going on inside the Chinese Communist Party for three years. Coming from Mao, this was not merely a contribution to the debate, but the final, authoritative pronouncement on what policy should be. Its impact was swift and dramatic. At that time only 16.9 million (14·2 per cent.) of the 120 million peasant families in China were members of co-operatives, almost all of which were semi-socialist in character. Hardly any fully socialist collectives existed. But between autumn 1955 and spring 1956, a “high tide of socialism in the countryside” transformed most of Chinese agriculture, replacing the traditional small privately-owned farms by large co-operatives and collectives. By May 1956,91·2 per cent. of China's rural households had joined co-operatives, 61·9 per cent. of them collectives.
Urban Rationing in Communist China
Authors: Huenemann Ralph W.
Published: March 2009

From an economic point of view, a ration coupon can serve at least three purposes: it can control the movement of people from one place to another, thereby easing employment, housing and transportation problems; it can distribute basic necessities, such as foodstuffs, more evenly in times of scarcity; and it can shift purchasing power away from certain goods, thus helping to maintain stable prices on these goods during periods of inflationary pressure. However, while each of these goals can be analysed in a narrowly economic framework, it is important to consider their political consequences as well. Inflation, for example, may cause political discontent even before it brings about economic dislocation. Any consideration of Peking's rationing policies, therefore, must touch on both the economic and non-economic aspects of the problem.
Chinese Criticism of Humanism: Campaigns Against the Intellectuals 1964–1965
Authors: Fokkema D. W.
Published: March 2009

During the heyday of the Hundred Flowers period the Chinese literary rebels sought their models outside China. They understood that, if liberalisation were to have any chance at all, it should reach China via the communist countries and not via the Western world. Therefore many Chinese writers studied Soviet literature, and made no secret of their admiration for those Soviet writers who had presented unorthodox views, or views that, though correct in the Soviet Union, seemed to be unorthodox in the Chinese context. Zoshchenko, Ehrenburg, Galina Nikolayeva, Ovechkin and Simonov were admired by the very Chinese writers who were later labelled as major “rightists,” such as Liu Pin-yen, Ch'in Chao-yang and Huang Ch'iu-yün. Several liberal Chinese writers also readily adopted the Soviet habit of extolling the Russian classics as literary models. Thus, in 1956, during the Chinese commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of Dostoyevsky's death, one Chinese critic spoke of “humanism” (jen-tao-chu-i) as one of Dostoyevsky's contributions. Feng Hsüeh-feng praised the humanistic spirit of the old Russian literature and criticised contemporary Chinese works as untruthful. Hsiao Ch'ien, another major “rightist,” in an essay on short story writing advocated the style of Chekhov and I. A. Bunin. One dogmatic Party leader, moreover, was criticised by the non-conformists for having a low opinion of Chekhov's Uncle Vanya.
Men of the Moment (III)
Authors: Klein Donald W.
Published: March 2009

Hsiung Hsiang-hui, Peking's Chargé d'Affaires in London, is one of the extremely few American-educated Chinese Communists. Now in his mid-forties, Hsiung comes from a large and well-to-do gentry family (his father was once a district judge) in which, as the second son, he bridled under the petty tyrannies of his elder brother. By the mid-1930s he was a student in one of China's finest universities, Tsinghua, where he first came into contact with left-wing elements. After the war broke out in 1937, he studied briefly in Changsha but then joined the First Army of Hu Tsung-nan, a top KMT general. After a year's schooling in the Central Cadets School in Sian, Hsiung became aide-de-camp to General Hu, a post he held from about 1940 to 1943. Hu began to suspect him of being a communist and, to get him out of the way, assigned him back to the Cadets School. Towards the end of the war Hsiung attended a training course established by Hu in preparation for taking over areas held by the Japanese. After this, Hsiung took and failed a government scholarship examination. But then Hu provided the necessary funds for Hsiung to study in the U.S.
The “Agrarian Reformer” Myth
Authors: Shewmaker Kenneth E.
Published: March 2009

Much nonsense has been written about the “agrarian reformer” myth. A retired American diplomat maintains that the agrarian reformer slogan was a clever artifice devised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to mask its intentions and affiliations. Allen Dulles, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has gone a step further. He contends that One of the most successful long-range political deceptions of the Communists convinced gullible people in the West before and during World War II that the Chinese people's movement was not Communistic, but a social and “agrarian” reform movement. This fiction was planted through Communist-influenced journalists in the Far East and penetrated organisations in the West.
Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution
Authors: Bennett Gordon
Published: March 2009

During the Cultural Revolution, “Party life” (tang ti sheng-huo) was temporarily interrupted when leading members of Communist Party organizations at all levels were called (or “dragged”) out to defend themselves against the criticisms of revolutionary mass factions. As these issues were resolved, new coalitions formed and Party organs were carefully restructured to reflect the new distribution of power. The analysis here is of the 158 secretaries and deputy secretaries elected by the new provincial committees of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 4 December 1970 and 24 August 1971. It yields some unexpected findings.
Report from China: Political Rehabilitation of Cadres in China: A Traveller's View
Authors: Chang Parris H.
Published: March 2009

When a memorial service was held in Peking on 14 December 1972 for the deceased Teng Tzu-hui, member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party and formerly Vice-Premier and Director of the Party's Rural Work Department, among those present to pay their last respects were a dozen or so veteran cadres making their first known public appearance for several years. Likewise, some 30 ranking civilian and army officials appeared publicly for the first time since the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at a Peking reception given by the Ministry of Defence on the eve of Army Day, 31 July 1972. These men were among the victims of the Cultural Revolution – they were accused of a variety of serious political crimes, humiliated in public, and dismissed from their posts in the Party, government, or army. However, their appearance in public now, even on such purely ceremonial occasions, serves to indicate that they have been restored to good political standing. Some of them have already been assigned to new posts, but the present positions of most others have not yet been revealed.
“Temporary Residence Certificate” Regulations in Wuhan, May 1983
Authors: Solinger Dorothy J.
Published: March 2009

In mid May 1983 the Wuhan Public Security Bureau posted a notice along the walls of Hankow on “temporary residence certificates” for non-native personnel coming into the city to work. Since a check of theState Council Bulletinand thePeople's Dailyfor the months surrounding this time (from 1 January through 31 July 1983) turned up no similar central-level document, one must conclude that the source for this circular was local. Also, in the period since (through the time of final preparation of the present manuscript, late March 1984), those sources have still not published any authoritative rulings on this matter, insofar as I have been able to verify. Moreover, recent press accounts pertaining to city household registration describe decisions about this work as if they were taken by the municipalities themselves. Thus, the regulations translated and analysed below may only represent the situation and its handling in one particular region. Nonetheless, their intrinsic interest, their broader implications and their import reach far beyond this one case.
The Economics of the “Second Land Reform” in China
Authors: Kueh Y. Y.
Published: March 2009

For peasants who have been collectivized for nearly three decades, the national campaign initiated by the Party Central Committee's Document No. 1, 1984 to promote the reparcellization of collective farmland, by extending the peasants' leasehold right to over 15 years (para. 3–1), is certainly not less spectacular than the land reform of 1949–52, when land was confiscated from the rich for redistribution among poor peasant families. This “second land reform” has now firmly consolidated the long-fought policy of Deng Xiaoping for a decentralized approach towards rural management. All the cats – “black or white” – seem to have now been totally unleashed to run after their best catch. This stands in sharp contrast to the uneasy equilibrium of the “two-line struggle,” which existed throughout the entire 20-year period following the abortive communization drive of 1958/1959. Nevertheless, while probably no Chinese leader today can afford to play the role of Mao's Liu cum Deng, one wonders whether, for economic reasons, the present rural institutional solution as envisaged in Document No. 1 will mark the end of the perennial Chinese search for an “optimum” level of decentralization. In a way, the agricultural reform of recent years has begun with the drastic increases, decreed in 1979, in state farm procurement prices, averaging 25 per cent. For a regime very much obsessed with the value imperative of modernization, the farm price increases should clearly be construed as income incentives for promoting agricultural production to ease the economic constraints on industrialization. This is nothing new but is exactly the policy developed by the prominent Chinese economist, Ma Yinchu, some 25 years ago in his then much condemned “balanced growth model” for China. Thus the strategy fits in well with a western analytical model formulated by Chiang and Fei in 1966, for a “maximum-speed development through austerity.” The model postulates that under socialism, a consumption policy which imposes an “optimum” rather than maximum degree of austerity, may induce greater labour effort and thus an output growth more than proportionate to the required marginal consumption expenditure. It follows that not only will the rate of capital accumulation not be depressed by increased consumption, but it may even accelerate and thus help to sustain a higher overall income growth rate.
Einstein and Mao: Metaphors of Revolution
Authors: Friedman Edward
Published: March 2009

From 1955 onwards Mao Zedong developed a philosophical justification for his explosive interventions in Chinese politics by grounding his concepts in a peculiar Einsteinian epistemology. In retrospect, it is likely that already in the May Fourth period Mao Zedong understood the epistemological significance of the Einsteinian revolution in a peculiarly optimistic manner.
Age at Marriage in the People's Republic of China
Authors: Tien H. Yuan
Published: March 2009

China's Marriage Law of 1980 went into effect on New Year's Day 1981, permitting women and men to marry at 20 and 22, respectively. This contrasts sharply with the late marriage requirements of the 1970s, whichstipulated 23 and 25 years for women and men in the rural areas and 25 and 28 years for their urban sisters and brothers. The new legal minimum ages for marriage caused an instant upsurge in the numbers of young people getting married in China. One scholar estimated that as many as 30 million marriages would take place in 1981 as millions of young women and men took advantage of the new legal minimum. It was later officially projected that first marriages in 1981 would probably reach at least 14 million, more than twice the number in 1980. And, because of the “baby boom” of the 1960s marriage rates are likely to remain high through the mid 1990s.
Higher Education Policy Changes and Stratification in China
Authors: Broaded C. Montgomery
Published: March 2009

This paper will examine changes in seven aspects of higher education policy in the People's Republic of China during the 1970s and, based on the experience of the Soviet Union and the East European socialist states, will explore the implications of these changes for the structuring of social inequality in contemporary Chinese society.
Changing Policy and Practice in Chinese Rural Education
Authors: Mauger Peter
Published: March 2009

During April and May 1981, at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and with the help of a British Council travel grant, I visited educational institutions at all levels in Beijing and in the provinces of Anhui, Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong to discuss the changes in educational policy since the fall of the “gang of four” in 1976. In addition to visiting schools, colleges and universities I was given extensive interviews with leading officials at the Ministry of Education in Beijing and at the Education Bureaus of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong.
China's Economic Growth Since 1949 – An Assessment
Authors: Ishikawa Shigeru
Published: March 2009

Western economists who are interested in the analysis of the contemporary Chinese economy are currently confronted with challenging analytical tasks arising from two remarkable events. The first is the new post-Mao government's attempt to reform the economic system of centralized, physical planning that characterized the Mao regime in the direction of a system of decentralized and market-orientated planning (referred to as “reform” policy). Side by side with this systemic reform, the previous development policy of high growth and high investment, which gave top priority to heavy industry, is being replaced by a new one which aims at securing a steady increase in personal consumption and in which investment allocation is weighted in favour of light industry and agriculture. Of these new strategies, the latter is already being rigorously put into force (and even accompanied by a drastic deflatory effect), starting with an interim measure to reduce the over-inflated production of heavy industry in favour of raising that of light industry and agriculture (referred to as “adjustment” policy). The former component for the systemic reform of the economy is still at an experimental stage, but Chinese planners and economists appear to be very busy in discussing and preparing even more comprehensive reforms.