bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Pragmatic Ethics
Authors: Wallace James D.
Published: January 2013

Pragmatic ethics, propounded in the works of William James (seeJames, William) and John Dewey (seeDewey, John) and in those of some later writers, is distinctive in making the following claims. Norms – knowledge of how properly to do things – are discovered by people as they solve practical problems. This is true of moral as well as nonmoral norms. Our knowledge of ethical norms and goods is derived from our experience in resolving problems encountered in living with one another and pursuing common practices and goals; it is our knowledge of how to live with one another. The knowledge isa posteriori– based on experience (seeA Posteriori Ethical Knowledge). Since the world and our lives change continually, ethical norms properly undergo change, although the change is generally gradual and incremental. Changes are effected as people resolve problems involving conflicts among practices and their constituent norms and share with others what they have learned. Some or all of the norms in conflict are modified so that they can be followed in concert.
Practical Virtue Ethics
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: January 2013

Renewed attention to virtue and vice has resulted in a wealth of “virtue ethical” articles which deal with, for example, environmental virtues and vices, and the notion of the virtuous lawyer or doctor (such as “the lawyer as friend”). This development is to be applauded, for it greatly enriches the moral landscape and focuses attention on the ethical nature of agents in their aspects as beings of character (seeCharacter; Moral Character; Virtue). Nonetheless, to explicate specific virtues and vices is notipso factoto proffer a distinctively virtue ethical approach to applied ethics. Thus, the question of what counts as virtue ethics is important in the practical application of virtue ethics as a distinctive type of moral theory (seeVirtue Ethics).
Schleiermacher, Friedrich
Authors: Louden Robert B.
Published: January 2013

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834), “the father of modern theology,” founder of modern hermeneutics, translator of Plato into German (seePlato), cofounder (with Wilhelm von Humboldt) of the University of Berlin, and early advocate of equality for both women and Jews, is today justly celebrated for his outstanding accomplishments in multiple areas of human endeavor. But among Anglophone readers his extensive and significant work in ethics has only recently begun to be acknowledged. The neglect of Schleiermacher's moral theory is all the more surprising in light of the facts that his earliest writings focused exclusively on themes in moral philosophy, that ethics remained a central concern throughout his writing and teaching career, and that many scholars (particularly in Germany, but, increasingly, elsewhere as well) have argued that Schleiermacher's work on ethics constitutes his most outstanding intellectual achievement.
Cryoethics
Authors: Shaw David M.
Published: January 2013

Cryoethics is a new theme within bioethics (
see
bioethics
) concerned with the ethics of cryonic storage. Cryonics, which is also erroneously referred to as “cryogenic” technology, offers people the option of having their bodies or brain‐stems preserved at very low temperatures after death in order to be revived at some point in the future when technology is sufficiently advanced to enable reanimation, and possibly immortality. The main issues in cryoethics center around whether it is ethical to use this technology, and whether it is prudent to do so (
see
PRUDENCE
). While there are several prudential and ethical arguments against cryonic storage, there is only one argument in favor, but it is quite powerful: the possibility of cheating death for a few years, or even forever if technology advances enough in the time before revival (Shaw 2009).
Sartre, Jean‐Paul
Authors: Sherman David
Published: January 2013

Following World War II, Jean‐Paul Sartre (1905–80) emerged as the leading existentialist philosopher in France (seeExistentialism), and he subsequently became one of the most important philosophers working in the Western Marxist tradition (seeMarx, Karl). Sartre was also a novelist and playwright, as well as the personification of the public intellectual. Ethical considerations pervaded Sartre's thought, but the ethical concerns raised in his existentialist works are not clearly reducible to the kinds of concerns raised by the standard ethical theories, and his Marxist works do not appear to raise any ethical concerns at all. Nevertheless, as is reflected in various unpublished writings, Sartre continued to raise ethical concerns after his turn toward Marxism, and the ethical concerns he raises throughout his oeuvre are often motivated by the kinds of concerns that motivate the standard ethical theories.
Free Riding
Authors: Cullity Garrett
Published: January 2013

“Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.
Nonidentity Problem
Authors: Roberts Melinda A.
Published: January 2013

Thenonidentity problemis widely considered to challenge theperson‐affecting intuition. According to that intuition, an act can be wrong only if that actharms, or will or can be expected to harm,some person. “What is bad must be bad for someone” (Parfit 1987: 363).
Nonviolence in Religions
Authors: Hahn Tapper Aaron J.
Published: January 2013

The twentieth century saw more human‐perpetrated death and destruction – violence – than any previous period in history. Simultaneously, it saw the rise and spread of new developments in the field of nonviolence, arguably a more powerful force. But since it was birthed, “nonviolence” has had numerous incarnations; it has not had any single meaning. Commonly used as a synonym for peace, this religio‐political notion is incredibly complex, having been associated with the following ideas, for example:ahimsa,satyagraha, truth, peace,salam,shalom, love, civil disobedience, pacifism, and passive resistance (seeLove; Civil Disobedience; Pacifism). This essay briefly examines how “nonviolence” is understood in the Hindu (seeHindu Ethics), Buddhist (seeBuddhist Ethics), Jain (seeJain Ethics), Jewish, Islamic (seeIslamic Ethics), and Christian (seeEarly Christian Ethics) religious traditions. Though there is no doubt that important figures such as the Dalai Lama (the spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhist community), Guru Nanak (the founder of Sikhism), and Confucius (the founder of Confucianism;seeConfucian Ethics), among others, should likewise be included in this essay, their approaches to nonviolence have been omitted for reasons unrelated to their supreme importance to this topic.
Ecological Restoration
Authors: Glazebrook Trish
Published: January 2013

Ecological restoration is the practice of ecosystem management that alters an ecosystem, site, or area in order to return it to an earlier state. Restoration is most commonly intended to reestablish conditions at a site prior to a specific human intervention, especially resource extraction, by changing a degraded system's structure, function, diversity, and/or processes so that the system appears less disturbed and is self‐sustaining. Elements of an ecosystem usually managed during restoration include surface and groundwater, soil, rocks, and vegetation, although further biodiversity may also be included. Projects vary widely from removing an invasive species to reconstruction of an entire landscape.
James,William
Authors: Pihlström Sami
Published: January 2013

William James (1842–1910), one of the most important American philosophers and psychologists, was among the founders of the philosophical tradition ofpragmatism, emphasizing the intimate connection between philosophical (and generally intellectual) theory and reflection, on the one side, and human action and practices of life, on the other (James 1975 [1907], 1977a [1909];seePragmatic Ethics; Pragmatic Theory of Action; Praxis). James's psychological work (culminating in James 1981 [1890]) played a crucial role in the emergence of scientific psychology. His explorations of the psychological and philosophical dimensions of religious experience (James 1985 [1902]) have gained recognition across disciplinary boundaries. Trained as a medical scientist, James was an original thinker with an unusually broad scope, ranging from psychology and philosophy to religious studies and even psychical research.
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Authors: Lovin Robin W.
Published: January 2013

Reinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) was a leading American theologian and political thinker. Born into a German–American family, Niebuhr grew up in Missouri and Illinois and followed his father into the Protestant ministry in the German Evangelical Synod, a denomination that is now part of the United Church of Christ. After serving as a pastor in Detroit for more than a decade, Niebuhr joined the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York in 1928. The racial tensions and labor unrest he had experienced in Detroit, together with the general deterioration of the global economic and political situation, led him to abandon the optimistic expectations of liberal Protestantism in favor of a more sober assessment of human possibilities known as “Christian realism.” Niebuhr's theological, historical, and cultural arguments for this realism proved highly persuasive to a generation seeking a plausible moral case for democracy during World War II and the Cold War that followed, and his sermons, lectures, and writing had wide influence not only among theologians and philosophers, but also among politicians, diplomats, and policymakers.
Buber, Martin
Authors: Wood Robert E.
Published: January 2013

Martin Buber (1878–1965) was a Jewish philosopher who responded to the struggle between Haskalah or Jewish Enlightenment and Hasidism or Jewish mysticism by assimilating both. He developed a universal philosophy that was linked to the mysticism of the everyday promoted by Hasidism. His basic ethical orientation confronts both morality and religion: “Just as there is nothing that can hide from us the face of our fellow man so much as morality can, so there is nothing that can hide from us the face of God as religion can” (1961: 18). For Buber, morality and religion are intimately tied together.
Goodness, Varieties of
Authors: Österman Bernt
Published: January 2013

The term “good” is used in many different contexts, both as an adjective and as a noun. Goodness may be attributed to a wide range of different objects. Most philosophers seem to agree that it is possible to draw a distinction between moral uses and nonmoral uses of the term. When we speak of a good man, a good motive, a good action, or refer to something as a “good thing,” the use is obviously moral. It seems equally clear that good laptops, good soccer balls, and good dentists, generally at least, are good in a nonmoral sense.
Retribution
Authors: Bennett Christopher
Published: January 2013

Some people think that, if punishment can be justified at all, then it can only be justified because it has some good future effects, such as deterring potential criminals (Bentham 1907: Chs. 13–14). We could call this position atechnocraticposition on punishment: it sees punishment as a particular technique that might rationally be adopted for bringing about some desirable results – though only if there are no better nonpunitive alternatives. Others suspect that this cannot be all that there is to the importance of punishment. What about the case of holding to account a sex murderer who is now elderly and unlikely to be a danger to the public? It might seem as though something in oursense of justiceapplauds the fact that this person, having got away with it for so long, will now get his just deserts (seePunishment; Justice). You might experience the same feeling at the end of a film in which the bad guy finally gets his comeuppance. This sense of justice can be thought of as a desire forretribution. The idea of retribution is the idea that it might be important that a person be punished, or made to suffer, or have something bad happen to them, not simply (as in the technocrat position) because it is an efficient way to bring about some desirable results, but rather because of something bad or wrong that they did in the past. Whereas the technocratic position takes the importance of punishment to derive from future benefits, the idea of retribution is sometimes said to be backward‐looking: it sees the punishment as essential to “do justice to” some previously committed wrong.
Pragmatic Theory of Action
Authors: Kilpinen Erkki
Published: January 2013

Human beings are creatures of habit. That only a being with habits could have a mind like ours is a recently established finding in cognitive science (Noë 2009). It supports the original thesis of classic pragmatism that human life as we know it would be impossible without habits. Pragmatism is a philosophy of action, but a curious one in that it refers to human doings by the term “habit,” and less by “action” (Kilpinen 2009a, 2009b). Having said this, one must hasten to make the next important point. In pragmatist discourse about action, the central term is old and established, but its underlying meaning is radically new; so new that it has never received its full due attention. Every school in philosophy and the human sciences is aware that the phenomenon of habit exists – i.e., repetitive action that operates before we have time for reflection, as David Hume once said (
see
Hume, David). In this sense the term is traceable to ancient Greece and medieval Scholasticism (Camic 1986). In modern times it has received an equivalent appellation: routine. A point that cannot be overemphasized is that this is not the pragmatist meaning of the term. The pragmatist meaning is more comprehensive and advanced, in which the habitual action process – which does not have to be merely repetitive – is,
pace
Hume, within the reach of reflection. Pragmatism maintains that these two phenomena, reflection and ongoing action, can overlap, even mix with each other. This does not concern merely everyday routines, but also those modes of action that traditionally have been taken to be the most important: the intelligent and the rational. According to pragmatism, we do not just slavishly follow our habitual routines, although this phenomenon is real and is to be included in the treatment of action. More importantly, we can be discursively aware of our own habits, even during their occurrence, distance ourselves from them, and objectify them for scrutiny. This is a novelty in the pragmatist conception of action. A simple example would be about how to drive a car. If there is a bend in the road, we must turn the steering wheel, and this needs to be done automatically, without pondering whether or not to. However, merely turning the wheel is not enough. If the road is slippery, we had better make a smooth turn, not turn the wheel too abruptly, whereas on a dry road this is less important. And we are supposed to know all this, both discursively and as physical skill, and negotiate our bends accordingly.
Good and Good for
Authors: Rønnow‐Rasmussen Toni
Published: January 2013

Intuitively, if, in a tennis match betweenaandb,aplayed while injured and therefore lost, the following three claims would make sense: the injury was not good for persona; the injury was good forb; and it is not good, period, that the match was settled in this unfair way. In philosophy, there is a long tradition of treating as two separate inquiries the questions “what things aregood, period?” and “what things aregood forus (either in general or for some particular person)?” The former involves what has generally been considered an impersonal, moral, nonrelational value, the latter a personal (prudential or subjective) relational value: a “value for someone.” Just how far back the tradition stretches remains to be examined, though. For instance, it is still a matter of interpretation whether ancient Greek philosophy acknowledged the two varieties of good. In this essay focus is on “good for” and how it relates to “good, period.” However, it should be stressed that philosophers distinguish between several other kinds of good (seeGoodness, Varieties of).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Authors: Harcourt Edward
Published: January 2013

For a philosopher best known for his work outside ethics and whose best‐known view about ethics is that ethics “cannot be put into words” (Wittgenstein 1974 [1922]: 6.421), there is a surprising amount to say about Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and ethics. The subject can be divided into two: Wittgenstein's ethics, and developments in ethics under Wittgenstein's influence. The subject of Wittgenstein's ethics itself subdivides into Wittgenstein's explicit writings on ethics, and the ethical significance which his work, even when not explicitly concerned with ethics, has widely been thought to bear.
Social Contract
Authors: Fabre Cécile
Published: January 2013

Contrast the following two political communities: one is governed by rulers who have not at any point elicited their subjects' consent to their rulership; the other is governed by rulers who would not be in power were it not for the consent of those who are subject to their laws. According to social contract theory, the former rulers are illegitimate, precisely in so far as they do not govern with the consent of the governed, whereas the latter are legitimate, precisely insofar as they govern with such consent (seeConsent).
Collective Responsibility
Authors: Shockley Kenneth
Published: January 2013

Groups of people can be responsible for what they do. When two people rob a bank, or work together to build a charity center, they are responsible for what they do. But can a group, apart from the individuals in it, be responsible? Can we hold a corporation or a nation responsible? Can we hold such groups
morally
responsible? Or are such appeals to responsibility merely shorthand for the attribution of responsibility, moral or otherwise, to individual members of such groups in virtue of their membership? This essay will examine the philosophical issues underlying these questions, and consider some of the arguments for versions of collective responsibility.
Omissions
Authors: Persson Ingmar
Published: January 2013

Omissions to act are primarily of ethical interest because of the deontological act‐omission doctrine (
see
Deontology). Roughly, this doctrine is to the effect that it is harder to justify morally the (active) causing of certain kinds of harm, for example death, than letting them happen by omitting to act in some way. Suppose that whenever you omit doing some action, you allow something to be the case, or let it be the case, for example let some state or process continue. Suppose also that whenever you allow something to be the case, it occurs by your omitting to do some action. Then the act‐omission doctrine would be equivalent to a doctrine of doing and allowing (
see
Doing and Allowing). However, some philosophers claim that you can allow something to be the case by acting rather than merely by omitting to act, and some other philosophers claim that by omitting to act, you can
do
things rather than allow them to be the case. If either of these views is right, omissions might be of less moral interest than allowings, so I shall begin by critically examining these views before defining the concept of an omission.
Moral Reasoning
Authors: Black Sam
Published: January 2013

The most fundamental disagreement about moral reasoning is whether moral wisdom is necessary for good moral reasoning, and if so, how. This controversy dates back to the origins of Western philosophy. According to Plato in theRepublic, moral reasoning resembles reasoning in geometry, with one major difference. Geometrical reasoning is said to regard its axioms as beyond critical scrutiny, whereas knowledge of the highest good is attained through the method of philosophical dialectic. For Plato, wisdom is knowledge of the highest good. Once that knowledge has been acquired, moral reasoning proceeds, like geometry, to deduce rules and to resolve particular cases through application of those rules (Plato 1992: Pt. 7, Bk. 6). In theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle disavows this model of moral reasoning, maintaining that unlike precise sciences such as geometry, all general rules in ethics have exceptions. The notion that good moral reasoning is the derivation and application of clear‐cut rules is consequently misguided (Aristotle 2000: Bk. 1.3). For Aristotle, wisdom resembles the practical skills found among master craftsmen. Wisdom must be acquired from worldly experience and not from dialectic alone. And because wisdom requires training at the hands of those who are skilled it is accessible only to people who have the good fortune to be well brought up.
Conscientious Objection
Authors: Coady C. A. J.
Published: January 2013

Conscientious objection to state commands is not a wholly modern phenomenon. In the early phase of Western civilization, the Greek philosopher Socrates, now a revered figure in our culture, refused an order from political authority to carry out an immoral action. Socrates was commanded, along with four others, to arrest Leon of Salamis, so that the latter could be put to death (seeSocrates). The tyrants wanted men of repute to carry out this command because this would have given their regime of terror more public standing. But Socrates ignored the order and simply went home.
Smith, Adam
Authors: Garrett Aaron
Published: January 2013

Adam Smith's main work of moral philosophy,The Theory of Moral Sentiments(TMS), first appeared in 1759. It was Adam Smith's favorite among his works, was one of the major works of the Scottish Enlightenment, and is again being seen as one of the most important works of moral philosophy of the eighteenth century. Smith was born in Kircaldy, Scotland in 1723 and educated first at Kircaldy and then Glasgow and Oxford. In Glasgow he studied with Francis Hutcheson (seeHutcheson, Francis), the leading figure in the rise of Moderate religious and intellectual culture in Scotland and one of the greatest influences on Smith as a moral philosopher. Smith found Oxford to be intellectually impoverished and upon leaving he returned to Scotland where he lectured on rhetoric at Edinburgh. He was then called to the Chair of Logic in Glasgow in 1751 and soon after the Chair of Moral Philosophy, which had been held by Hutcheson. Smith resigned in 1763 to travel to Europe as the tutor to the Duke of Buccleuch. He published theWealth of Nations(WON) in 1776 to great acclaim. Smith also planned to produce works on natural law which would provide a bridge between the moral theory of theTMSand the political economy ofWON, but the manuscripts and notes were destroyed after Smith's death in 1790, although student notes from the courses which Smith gave on natural law have been preserved.
Offense
Authors: Shoemaker David
Published: January 2013

Philosophical interest in offense is a relatively recent phenomenon, and it has focused almost exclusively on whether or not offensive conduct ought to be restricted by the liberal state. This essay will explore the nature of offense, its distinction from harm, and the philosophical case for the restriction of offense in public life, primarily by focusing on the pioneering work of Joel Feinberg (1926–2004;seeFeinberg, Joel).
Communitarianism
Authors: Muirhead Russell
Published: January 2013

Communitarianism affirms that the community rather than the individual should be the primary focus of philosophic and political attention. For contemporary communitarians, individuals remain important, but the moral significance of individual lives is inextricably bound to communities. In its recent iteration, communitarianism refers to a development in political theory in the 1980s and 1990s associated most prominently with such philosophers as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. But in the most general sense, communitarian ideas can be traced back to Aristotle, whosePoliticsasserts that the full development of individual capacities presupposes a certain kind of political community, and that in this respect “the city is prior to … each of us” (I.2 p. 37: 1253a20;seeAristotle). Among modern philosophers, communitarianism has an affinity with Hegel's thought, which explains moral ideals by reference to social conventions, orsittlichkeit(seeHegel, Georg Willhem Friedrich).
Eastern Orthodox Ethics
Authors: Hamalis Perry T.
Published: January 2013

The term “Eastern Orthodox Ethics” carries two common meanings. First, it refers to a normative way of life that reflects the teachings of the Eastern Orthodox Church about how to live, about right and wrong, and about the meaning of human flourishing. Second, it refers to the discipline of scholarly inquiry and application practiced by religious ethicists working within the tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Before considering the term's two meanings in greater detail, a brief overview of the Eastern Orthodox Church will orient and ground the topic.
Doctrine of Double Effect
Authors: Marquis Don
Published: January 2013

The doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE) is so called because it is concerned with the moral permissibility of actions that have both a good effect and a bad effect. DDE is an important part of standard Catholic moral philosophy and also has been defended by some philosophers outside the Catholic tradition. It consists of criteria for the moral permissibility of actions that are typically morally wrong. Joseph Mangan's (1949: 43) statement of DDE is best known:
Fatherhood
Authors: Hubin Donald C.
Published: January 2013

While fatherhood has received significantly less philosophical attention than motherhood (seeMotherhood), spurred by advances in reproductive technologies and changes in social arrangements for raising children, interest in both the concept of fatherhood and the basis of paternal rights and responsibilities has increased in recent years. Despite this increased attention, there remain significant disagreements concerning both topics. These disagreements raise serious problems for law and social policy. (See Anderson 1992; Shanley 1995a, 1995b; Cannold 2002; Hubin 2003: 50–60.)
Grotius, Hugo
Authors: Viner Steve
Published: January 2013

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) (Huig de Groot), born in Delft, Holland on April 10, 1583, was a preeminent figure of the seventeenth century. He has been called the “father of international law” and the “father of modern natural law” (Vreeland 1917: 164–72; Schneewind 1998: 66). While titles can be controversial, Grotius made an enormous contribution to ushering in what is commonly referred to today as international law. With his great work of 1625,De Jure Belli ac Pacis(On the Law of War and Peace), Grotius became famous for invoking a natural law theory in defense of a set of moral rules, called natural laws, that govern the relations of states and their rulers (seeNatural Law). Grotius' natural law theory was a forerunner and influential in that it emphasized that persons by nature possess rights and liberties similar to states (seeRights), and it was only through the transfer of these natural rights that states received their authority and power (seeSocial Contract). Grotius' natural law theory then was one of the earliest and most influential to champion natural rights as an actual moral quality or power of persons and to make states subject to rational, moral principles derived from nature and the natural rights of persons. Regarding the title “father of international law,” scholars also have pointed out other formidable contenders, such as Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, and Alberico Gentili. In addition, scholars disagree on how much these three influenced Grotius, as well as whether Grotius, who clearly relied upon them and numerous others, was mostly a compiler of their work (Vreeland 1917: 168–71; Lee 1930: 50–1; Tierney 1997: 316–42).
Testimony, Moral
Authors: O'Brien Dan
Published: January 2013

We often acquire beliefs on the say‐so of somebody else and in many cases it is plausible that we also acquire knowledge in this way – testimonial knowledge. I come to know that there has been good snowfall in the Alps this year by reading that this is so or by hearing someone's spoken testimony. It is widely accepted that empirical knowledge can be acquired in this way, but can moral knowledge?
Sophists
Authors: Santas Gerasimos
Published: January 2013

The Greek Sophists were self‐proclaimed experts who taught wealthy young men how to conduct themselves successfully in the affairs of their cities. They taught and practiced the art of rhetoric, much prized in ancient participatory democracies such as Athens, where civic leadership depended on the ability to persuade one's fellow citizens in the Assembly, the Council and the Jury Courts. In these institutions decisions were made by vote after speeches pro and con on substantial issues, such as forming alliances, building fortifications or temples, trying and punishing accused citizens, or going to war. Some Sophists also had substantial views about the nature of reality, knowledge, and value. Here we focus on the two most famous Sophists, Protagoras and Gorgias, and the implications of their views for ethics: Protagoras' most famous doctrine, that man is the measure of all things, and its implication that values are subjective and relative; and Gorgias' theory of rhetoric, its aims and methods, and the ethics of rhetoric.
Cloning
Authors: Harris John , Pacholczyk Anna
Published: January 2013

The birth of Dolly the sheep, the first adult mammal to be successfully born as a result of somatic cell nuclear transfer, was announced in 1997 (Wilmut et al. 1997), triggering widespread concern, and in many quarters panic, over the ethics of cloning, particularly with reference to the cloning of humans. Many commentators called for a ban on cloning. This concern was echoed in a cascade of international documents proclaiming human reproductive cloning to be ethically unacceptable. In 1999 the World Health Organization stated that “cloning for the replication of human individuals is ethically unacceptable and contrary to human dignity and integrity.” In UNESCO's Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights a ban on “practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning” is recommended. The Council of Europe's European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine prohibits human cloning in one of its additional protocols. Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union deals with the “right to the integrity of the person” and explicitly prohibits reproductive human cloning. How valid was this concern?
Twin Earth, Moral
Authors: Horgan Terrence , Timmons Mark
Published: January 2013

The Moral Twin Earth (MTE) argument, inspired by Hilary Putnam's well‐known Twin Earth argument in connection with the semantics of natural‐kind terms such as “water,” was developed by Terrence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of articles (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1996a, 1996b, 2000, 2009), which they have used as a basis for challenging versions of naturalist moral realism (seeNaturalism, Ethical; Realism, Moral; Semantics, Moral). Such realist views require a semantic construal of moral terms according to which (roughly) moral terms such as “right,” “wrong,” “good,” and “bad” (and the concepts they express) denote or refer to objective natural properties, and so, for example, moral judgments of the form “X is wrong” have objective truth conditions and are true just in case the item denoted by “X” has whatever natural property is denoted by the term “wrong” (or some word in another language that is translatable by the English term “wrong”). Such realist views are thus meant to be incompatible with versions of moral relativism.
Reasons: Holism and Atomism
Authors: McKeever Sean , Ridge Michael
Published: January 2013

Holism and atomism offer competing views about the context sensitivity of reasons. According to holism about reasons, as it is typically formulated, whether some consideration is a reason may depend upon the presence (or absence) of various background conditions. These background conditions, in turn, need not themselves be reasons, or even parts of reasons. According to atomism, by contrast, a consideration that is a reason in one setting will similarly be a reason in any other setting.
Rashdall, Hastings
Authors: Skelton Anthony
Published: January 2013

Hastings Rashdall (1858–1924) was educated at Oxford University, and he then taught at St. David's University College and Oxford, among other places. He produced seminal works in history and theology. His most important contribution to ethics is his articulation and defense of ideal utilitarianism, which he expressed inThe Theory of Good and Evil(1907) andEthics(1913).
TRIPS
Authors: Ashcroft Richard E.
Published: January 2013

TRIPS is the universally used acronym for the Agreement on Trade‐related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994. This is a binding legal instrument of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that legally obliges all its members to adopt and implement the TRIPS agreement, to bring its provisions into effect in domestic law, and to abide by judgments of the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism in respect of alleged breaches of its provisions (seeWorld Trade Organization).
Praxis
Authors: McBride William L.
Published: January 2013

The philosophical importance of this term is traceable in the first instance to Aristotle (seeAristotle), in the English translations of whose writings it is often rendered as “action.” He distinguishespraxisfrom two other concepts of comparable generality:poiesis, which means making or producing, andtheoria, contemplation. Ethics, for Aristotle, is the study of practical activity with a view to becoming good, and not for the sake of achieving theoretical knowledge. This contrast betweentheoriaandpraxis, theory and practice, has served as aleitmotifthroughout much of the history of Western philosophy.
Compensatory Justice
Authors: Boxill Bernard R.
Published: January 2013

Fully compensating the victims of misfortune is making them no worse off than they would have been but for the misfortune (Nozick 1974: 57). Misfortunes may be the result of luck, accident, nature, or transgression and include losses, privation, pain, disability, malfunction, incapacity, deformity, disadvantage, bodily and mental injury and harm, and damage to or theft of property; the victims of misfortune include individuals and certain collectivities of individuals such as nations, states, races, universities, firms, and clubs.
Siting
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove
Published: January 2013

Siting is the choice of a location for a human activity or construction. The object of siting can be some service facility or other positive resource for the neighborhood. Alternatively it can be an activity with negative impact on the immediate environment, such as a landfill or a power plant. Most discussions of siting have focused on the latter category, i.e., facilities that are perceived as negative by a large proportion of potential neighbors. There are two major classes of such facilities. In the first of these some
technology
is perceived to have negative local impact. Common examples are chemical industries, pipelines, nuclear power plants, wind farms, bioenergy plants, landfills, incinerators, railways, roads, and airports. The second class comprises facilities that bring in
people
whose presence is perceived as a threat. The siting of prisons, apartments for the mentally ill or retarded, rehabilitation centers for addicts, and housing for asylum seekers has often been met by local opposition.
Pufendorf, Samuel von
Authors: Seidler Michael J.
Published: January 2013

Samuel (Freiherr) von Pufendorf (1632–94) was ennobled (by Charles XI of Sweden) at the end of his life mainly for his historical works, yet he was as well or better known by then for his moral and political thought. He was the main German representative of so‐called modern natural law (Tuck 1987;
see
Natural Law), whose articulate, systematic elaboration of the genre also made it serviceable more broadly in many other national contexts. His works appeared in hundreds of editions and translations in the major European languages, both before and after his death, spawning multiple commentaries, refutations, and imitations; and his ideas shaped intellectual discourse, academic pedagogy, and even politics for over a century.
Enhancement, Biomedical
Authors: Douglas Thomas
Published: January 2013

Biomedical technologies can increasingly be used not only to combat disease, but also to augment the capacities or traits of normal, healthy people – a practice commonly referred to as biomedical enhancement. Perhaps the best‐established examples of biomedical enhancement are cosmetic surgery and doping in sports. But most recent scientific attention and ethical debate focuses on extending lifespan, lifting mood, and augmenting cognitive capacities.
Torts
Authors: Zipursky Benjamin C.
Published: January 2013

“Torts” is the word used to denote the subject covering the principles and rules governing lawsuits by one person alleging that another has wrongfully injured him or her and seeking compensation from the wrongdoer. Lawyers and courts for the past several hundred years have subdivided various bases that would justify such a demand, distinguishing different categories of legal wrongs, or torts. The oldest wrongs, dating back in the English legal system to the 1200s, fell under the category of “trespass with force and arms.” Included in this category were: a direct physical contact (not necessarily intentional) with someone's person or land, the holding of a person in confinement against his will, and the threatening of another with imminent violence. In ensuing centuries, English law recognized torts such as libel, slander, deceit, and assumpsit (breach of an undertaking) under the generic heading of “trespass on the case.” By the mid‐nineteenth century, as commerce, industry, and travel by rail, ship, and carriage expanded, injury‐causing accidents emerged as the most important source of tort litigation. In turn, courts began to treat all instances of accidentally caused personal injury (whether or not forcibly or directly caused) in terms of a new generic tort of “negligence.”
Value Realism
Authors: Oddie Graham
Published: January 2013

Value realism, roughly speaking, is the thesis that value claims (such asfriendship is goodandburning baby's feet for fun is bad) can be literally true or false; that some such claims are indeed true; that their truth is notsimplya matter of any individual's subjective attitudes or even of the attitudes of some larger collective; and that facts about value enjoy a certain metaphysical independence from other matters of fact. As this first rough characterization might suggest, realism about value is a matter of degree. While the robust value antirealist will reject all four claims, there are a variety of realist positions from weak objective idealist views, to mind‐independent naturalist views, and finally robustly non‐naturalist views of value.
Prudence
Authors: Bykvist Krister
Published: January 2013

To be prudent, in a general sense of the term, is to show foresight in your deliberations and take into account the effects your actions will have on the future. In this general sense, you can be prudent about the future finances of your business, or your children's future well‐being. However, to be prudent is often understood, more narrowly, as being concerned with one'sownfuture well‐being. Indeed, in the philosophical discussion it is often understood, more demandingly, as being concerned with one's own well‐being while attaching no intrinsic significance to thetimingof a certain benefit or harm in one's life, whether it is in the past, present, or the future. But do we really have reason to be prudent in this more demanding sense?
Commitment
Authors: Gilbert Margaret
Published: January 2013

Everyday discourse suggests that commitments are a central feature of human lives. Many refuse invitations citing prior commitments. Some are said to fear commitment. Others are praised for taking their commitments seriously. Not surprisingly, commitment is frequently referred to in the human sciences and in those branches of philosophy concerned with human action, including ethics. Authors often fail to explain what they mean by “commitment” and there is no one explicit account of commitment to which everyone clearly refers. This discussion construes one's commitments as
facts about one's normative situation
– about what one has reason to do (
see
Normativity). One's normative situation can be affected by many factors. One factor is the exercise of one's will, as when one decides not to make a certain phone call, agrees to marry someone, or resolves to live an honorable life. In such cases one can be said to have produced a
commitment of the will
. This discussion focuses on such commitments. It distinguishes between personal commitments such as that arising from a person's decision, and joint commitments, which can be argued to be the outcome of the making of agreements and promises, among other interpersonal transactions. If some such proposal is correct and if, as some believe, those rules of conduct we call moral have their source in an agreement or something similar, then we cannot understand morality without understanding commitment (
see
Contractualism).
Plato
Authors: Bobonich Chris
Published: January 2013

Plato (427–347
BCE
) was born to a rich and aristocratic Athenian family. In his youth, Plato associated with Socrates who, although he intensively investigated a wide range of ethical topics, wrote nothing. Plato is the first Western philosopher to write systematically on ethics and is, with his student Aristotle (
see
Aristotle), the founder of virtue ethics (
see
Virtue Ethics).
Feminist Bioethics
Authors: Dodds Susan
Published: January 2013

Feminist bioethics is an area of applied philosophy that explores ethical issues arising from healthcare, medical technology, or health policy from a feminist perspective. It is a subfield of both bioethics (seeBioethics) and feminist ethics (seeFeminist Ethics), and extends into sociology, law and history, and philosophy of science and medicine. Feminist bioethics was originally identified with works relating to the ethics of abortion (seeAbortion) and ethical issues surrounding reproduction technology (seeBirth Control; Embryo Research; Reproductive Technology; Surrogacy). The scope of feminist bioethics has extended into bioethics and health policy more generally because of its feminist concern to challenge oppression, subordination, and disadvantage as they relate to healthcare, health policy, and biotechnology (seeBiotechnology; Discrimination; Healthcare Resources, Distribution of; Sexual Equality).
Life, Value of
Authors: MacLean Douglas
Published: January 2013

Peter Singer has famously written, “People often say that life is sacred. They almost never mean what they say” (1993: 83). If by life we meanalllife, and if calling life sacred implies that it is always wrong intentionally to destroy a living individual, then Singer is surely correct. For taking life to be sacred in this sense would mean that it is wrong to kill a chicken or a flea and wrong to pull up a carrot to eat. Nevertheless, many people believe that at least human life has special or sacred value, although it is far from clear what this means or why human life should be singled out in this way.
Mill, John Stuart
Authors: Ryan Alan
Published: January 2013

Although J. S. Mill (1806–73) was the most important British philosopher of the mid‐nineteenth century, he was not a professional philosopher. His successor as the leading utilitarian ethicist of Victorian England was Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), who was Knightbridge Professor in the University of Cambridge (seeSidgwick, Henry). Mill never attended university; he worked for the East India Company until its dissolution in 1858, and was prominent as an economist, a political commentator, a Member of Parliament, and a polemical writer on progress, democracy, socialism, the decline of religion, and the emancipation of women.
Religion and Global Ethics
Authors: Schweiker William
Published: January 2013

Religion can be a destructive as well as a positive force in the world. Religious disagreements often breed distrust, hatred, and violence. However, the religions also promote peace, advocate for human rights, and offer relief to those in need. The effects of religion are nowhere more apparent that in the global arena (seeGlobalization). We need to understand, and ultimately shape, the actions of religious adherents in order to ensure that religious convictions are more positive than negative in our global times. The contribution of religion to global ethics and, conversely, the importance of global ethics for religious practice is the topic of this essay. Insofar as global ethics conceives of the scope of moral responsibility to include present and future life not limited by specific relations or communities, then several questions come to the fore (seeResponsibility). What do the religions think are substantial obligations to distant and future others? What is the content of those obligations? How demanding are they and how are they justified, religiously and ethically? How well do the religions fulfill ethical responsibilities?
Birth Control
Authors: Bennett Rebecca
Published: January 2013

“Birth control” is a term that covers a number of different drugs, devices, and procedures that aim to allow individuals to control their fertility and prevent unwanted pregnancies and births. As such this term covers all contraceptives, including barrier methods such as the male and female condom and the diaphragm and drugs taken to prevent conception (the contraceptive pill and longer‐acting drugs administered as implants or injections). Sterilization, another form of birth control, is a medical procedure that aims to prevent pregnancy occurring either by closing the fallopian tubes (in women) or by cutting and closing the vas deferens (in men). Other birth control methods aim to end or prevent gestation rather than prevent conception. These methods include intrauterine devices, the morning‐after pill, and abortion (
see
Abortion).
Prescriptivism
Authors: Boisvert Daniel R.
Published: January 2013

Prescriptivism is a theory of moral language and thought. Its main thesis is that moral sentences like (1) are used primarily to prescribe what a speaker thinks is morally appropriate, much like one would use imperative sentences (2) or (3):
Economics and Ethics
Authors: Brennan Geoffrey , Moseley Daniel D.
Published: January 2013

At first glance, the disciplines of ethics and economics seem to be two ships passing in the night – or if not “passing,” then perhaps on collision course. One might wonder whether, if the ships did actually collide, many in either discipline would notice or even care. But what seems indisputable is that economics and ethics relate (where they do) under a cloak of darkness. They pass, or collide, mostly “at night”! Our aim here is to bring their relations into the light of common day.
Human Rights and Religion
Authors: Twiss Sumner B.
Published: January 2013

Human rights and religious traditions have had a long history of interaction, ranging from the medieval period to contemporary times. Since both are deeply implicated in not only violent conflict but also efforts to establish a more peaceful and just world, it is important to gain a synoptic understanding, both conceptually and in practical terms, of their interaction. The basic terms for this essay – “religion” and “human rights” – are themselves contested, and it is therefore necessary to assign them working definitions before examining some of the complexities of their relationship.