bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
RESEÑA A EL MOSAICO CHIAPANECO. ETNOGRAFÍA DE LAS CULTURAS INDÍGENAS, 2012, DE ANDRÉS FÁBREGAS PUIG
Authors: Gutiérrez Alfonzo Carlos
Published: March 2017

Reseña a El mosaico chiapaneco. Etnografía de las culturas indígenas, 2012, de Andrés Fábregas Puig, Comisión para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas – Delegación Chiapas, México, ISBN 978-607-7811-22-0.

 

FUENTES DE CONSULTA

Esponda, Víctor Manuel (comp.), 1993, La población indígena de Chiapas, México, Instituto Chiapaneco de Cultura (serie Nuestro Pueblos 11).

Fábregas, Andrés, Juan Pohlenz, Mariano Báez y Gabriel Macías, 1985, La conformación histórica de la frontera sur, México, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social-Sureste/Secretaría de Educación Pública (cuadernos de la Casa Chata 124).

Fábregas Puig, Andrés, 1992, Pueblos y culturas de Chiapas, México, Gobierno del estado de Chiapas-Miguel Ángel Porrúa. Fábregas Puig, Andrés, 2006, Chiapas antropológico, México, Gobierno del estado de Chiapas, Lecturas para entender a Chiapas. Fábregas Puig, Andrés, 2008, Chiapas: culturas en movimiento, México, Editorial Viento al Hombro.

Fábregas Puig, Andrés, 2011, Configuraciones regionales mexicanas. Un planteamiento antropológico, tomo II, México, Universidad Intercultural de Chiapas
Buttercups, GNP's and Quarks: Are Fallacies Theoretical Entities?
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

Buttercups, GNP's and Quarks: Are Fallacies Theoretical Entities?
The Human Image System and Thinking Critically in the Strong Sense
Authors: Freeman James B.
Published: March 2017

The Human Image System and Thinking Critically in the Strong Sense
An Informal Logic Bibliography
Authors: Hansen Hans V.
Published: March 2017

An Informal Logic Bibliography
Rules for Plausible Reasoning
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

This article evaluates whether Rescher's rules for plausible reasoning or other rules used in artificial intelligence for "confidence factors" can be extended to deal with arguments where the linked-convergent distinction is important.
The Point of Interpreting Arguments
Authors: Berg Jonathan
Published: March 2017

It is wrong to think that questions of interpretation are significant in informal logic only to the extent that they contribute to the assessment of an argument's conclusion. For one thing, logic is essentially about validity, about that in virtue of which conclusions do or do not follow from given premises, and not about the truth or falsity of conclusions by themselves. Secondly, the evaluation of a given argument requires first determining what the given argument is. Moreover, since arguments are given in rational discourse in order to persuade-in order to arrive, by reason, at agreement-it is necessary to address the very arguments that arguers actually intend.
Supposition, Conditionals and Unstated Premises
Authors: Brandon E.P.
Published: March 2017

Informal logicians recognise the frequent use of unstated assumptions; some (e.g. Fisher) also recognise entertained arguments and recommend a suppositional approach (such as Mackie's) to conditional statements. It is here argued that these two be put together to make argument diagrams more accurate and subtle. Philosophical benefits also accrue: insights into Jackson's apparent violations of modus tollens and contraposition and McGee's counterexamples to the validity of modus ponens.
Testing for the Disposition to Think Critically
Authors: Norris Stephen P.
Published: March 2017

In order to tesl for critical thinking dispositions, the presence of the requisite critical
thinking abilities must first be established. Otherwise, it is always a plausible counterexplanation of failure to use certain abilities that they were not possessed. If a person spontaneously uses some ability on a task, then it is often legitimate to conclude that the person has both the ability and the disposition to use it. However, if the person does not use the ability spontaneously, the conclusion is ambiguous. The person might not have the ability, or might have the ability but not the disposition to use it, or not the disposition to use it in the specific circumstances of the presented task. This paper proposes methods of critical thinking testing designed to deal with each of these possibilities.
Legitimation Inferences: An Additional Component for the Toulmin Model
Authors: Goodnight G. Thomas
Published: March 2017

This paper argues that the choice of backing to certify the authority of a warrant requires a legitimation inference. When brought into question, such an inference becomes a claim
defended by showing sound reasons for the selection of backing pertinent to a shared context. Legitimation controversies ensue when an attributed consensus meets objection. It is argued that attention to legitimation controversies renders the
Toulmin model a more useful critical paradigm for investigating the development and risks of communicative reasoning in a public forum. The nomination of John Tower as Secretary of Defense is employed to illustrate how critical analysis of legitimation controversies reflexively expands the domain of inquiry for informal reasoning.
It's All Very Well for You to Talk! Situationally Disqualifying Ad Hominem Attacks
Authors: Krabbe Erik C. W. , Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

The situationally disqualifying ad hominem attack is an argumentative move in critical dialogue whereby one participant points out certain features in his adversary's personal situation that are claimed to make it inappropriate for this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain criticisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem argumentation are discussed as well and compared with the situationally disqualifying type. The socalled Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger of unconditionally condoning ad hominem arguments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstantial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem arguments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious.
What is an Assumption?
Authors: Fuller Steve
Published: March 2017

The concept of an 'assumption' is discussed, and it is suggested that the psychological model implied by normal usage is misleading. A new model is proposed which distinguishes between 'assumptions', as constraints upon the thinking process, and 'postulates', as corresponding potential or actual propositional vocalizations. Some evidence for this model is provided, and its implications, particularly for the process of assumption identification, are discussed. It is suggested that assumption identification requires lateral thinking, and needs to be separated from problem-solving. The discussion is offered as an instance of an appropriate type of fusion of psychological and informal-logical approaches.
The Status of the Propaganda Theorist: A Rejoinder
Authors: Cunningham Stanley B.
Published: March 2017

The concept of an 'assumption' is discussed, and it is suggested that the psychological model implied by normal usage is misleading. A new model is proposed which distinguishes between 'assumptions', as constraints upon the thinking process, and 'postulates', as corresponding potential or actual propositional vocalizations. Some evidence for this model is provided, and its implications, particularly for the process of assumption identification, are discussed. It is suggested that assumption identification requires lateral thinking, and needs to be separated from problem-solving. The discussion is offered as an instance of an appropriate type of fusion of psychological and informal-logical approaches.
The Case of the Missing Premise
Authors: Levi Don S.
Published: March 2017

This paper suggests that the flaw in the enthymeme approach to argument analysis is in the requirement, as I come to formulate it, that an argument be restated as a premises-and-conclusion sequence. The paper begins by investigating how logicians show that there are problems with the enthymeme approach. That investigation reveals a failure on the part of logicians to appreciate the importance of the rhetorical context of an argument. This failure, it is argued, is a consequence of what I refer to as the Premise-Conclusion Requirement.
A World of Difference: The Rich State of Argumentation Theory
Authors: Van Eemeren Frans H.
Published: March 2017

This paper surveys the contributions to the study of argumentation in the two decades since the work of Toulmin and Perelman. Developments include Radical Argumentativism (Anscombre and Ducot), Communication and Rhetoric (American Speech Communication Theory), Informal Logic (Johnson and Blair), Formal Analyses of Fallacies (Woods and Walton), Formal Dialectics (Barth and Krabbe), and Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst). From the survey it is concluded that argumentation theory has been considerably enriched. If the contributions can be made to converge, a sound basis will be created for developing educational methods for producing, interpreting and evaluating argumentative discourse. Thus, argumentation theory may be instrumental in improving the quality of democracy by furthering a reasonable management of differences of opinion.
Why Should Educators Care about Argumentation?
Authors: Siegel Harvey
Published: March 2017

Educators who are reflective about their educational endeavours ask themselves questions like: What is the aim of education? What moral, methodological, or other constraints govern our educational activities and efforts? One natural place to look for answers is in the philosophy of education, which (among other things) tries to provide systematic answers to these questions. One general answer offered by the philosophy of education is that the aim of education consists in fostering the development of students' rationality. On this view, education has as its fundamental task both the development of students' reasoning ability, and also the fostering of a complex of attitudes, habits of mind, dispositions and character traits, such that students are not only able to reason well; they also care about reasons, and organize their beliefs, judgments and actions in accordance with the deliverances of the reasoned evaluation of reasons. Argumentation theory is also concerned with the analysis of the power and convicting force of reasons. When do reasons for a claim warrant acceptance of that claim? By what criteria are reasons evaluated? How are these criteria themselves justified? Such questions as these are the meat and potatoes of argumentation theory, which, in pursuing these questions, promises to shed light on the character of rationality as the aim of education. Rationality, which links education and argumentation theory, provides educators with a reason to care about argumentation-if rationality can be cogently defended as an educational ideal. In this paper I will try to provide such a defense, and in doing so explain why educators should care about argumentation. The defense will be a moral one: I will argue that we are morally obliged to endeavour to foster the rationality of students, because that is what is required to meet our obligations to treat students with respect as persons. I will also consider some general criticisms of the Enlightenment ideal of rationality, offered by Feminist, Multiculturalist, and Postmodemist scholars. If these criticisms are cogent, then both argumentation theory and the view that the aim of education is the fostering of rationality are threatened. I will argue that the criticisms, while important and instructive, are not so destructive of the ideal of rationality as some contemporary scholars suppose.
The Case That Alternative Argumentation Drives the Growth of Knowledge-Some Preliminary Evidence
Authors: Missimer Connie
Published: March 2017

Argumentation theorists can make a much larger case for the significance of their discipline than they appear to do. This larger case entails asking the overarching question, "How is knowledge driven?" and seeking the answer in arguments for which there is near universal agreement that they drove the growth of knowledge. Three such benchmark arguments are Newton's on motion, Darwin's on evolution, and Mill's on women's intellectual equality to men. These and other seminal historical arguments suggest that alternative argumentation in light
of evidence is the mechanism which drives the gro\';1h of knowledge. There are also a number of surprising results, among them that even the most epistemically salient arguments contain significant errors and that what is "reasonable" is a constantly changing intuition which is biased against superior but nove! ideas. This approach suggests a new fallacy as well, the intuitive fallacy of believing that plausibility is evidence for likelihood.
The Abduction of the Atom: An Exercise in Hypothesizing
Authors: Novak Joseph A.
Published: March 2017

The paper attempts to schematize, in the form of abductive inferences, the major changes in the developing picture of the atom during the modem period of scientific investigation. The aim of this presentation is to enable students in logic or the philosophy of science to see how a sustained application of abduction might be seen as operative in the development of changing conceptions of the atom, a development which may well be seen as a scientific revolution. The sustained example also illustrates, in pedagogic fashion, the role of images in abduction, the theory-observation distinction, and the analytic-synthetic distinction.
Analysis of Argument Strategies of Attack and Cooption: Stock Cases, Formalization, and Argument Reconstruction
Authors: Ben-Zeev Aaron
Published: March 2017

Three common strategies used by informal logicians are considered: (1) the appeal to standard cases, (2) the attempt to partially formalize so-called "informal fallacies," and (3) restatement of arguments in such a way as to make their logical character more perspicuous. All three strategies are found to be useful. Attention is drawn to several advantages of a "stock case" approach, a minimalist approach to formalization is recommended, and doubts are raised about the applicability, from a logical point of view, of a principle of charitable construal in the reconstruction of arguments.
Did Jesus Commit a Fallacy?
Authors: Ben-Zeev Aaron
Published: March 2017

Jesus has been accused of committing a fallacy (of denying the antecedent) at John 8:47. Careful analysis of this text (1) reveals a hitherto unrecognized valid form of argument
which can superficially look like the predicate-logic analogue of denying the antecedent; (2) shows that determining whether a published text can be fairly charged with committing a fallacy may require (but often does not get) extensive and detailed analysis; (3) acquits Jesus of the charge; and thereby (4) conflnns a claim by Michael Burke that published arguments can seldom be fairly charged with denying the antecedent, or analogous fallacies.
The One Fallacy Theory
Authors: Powers Lawrence H.
Published: March 2017

My One Fallacy theory says there is only one fallacy: equivocation, or playing on an ambiguity. In this paper I explain how this theory arose from rnetaphilosophical concerns. And I contrast this theory with purely logical, dialectical, and psychological notions of fallacy.
On Logic and Moral Voice
Authors: Orr Deborah
Published: March 2017

This paper explores some aspects of the concept 'logic' and its relation to moral voice, and argues that Menssen uses it too narrowly in her respone to Orr's "Just the Facts. Ma'am" and the work of Carol Gilligan. Grounded in the work of the later Wittgenstein, it is argued that formalized logic misses much of natural logic: the concept of 'moral talk' is developed to theorize Gilligan's ethic of care; it is argued that this form of moral deliberation is not argumentation in the formal sense; and the relationship between logic and epistemology is
explored through the consideration of moral talk as a language-game which is woven into gendered forms of life. Finally, it is argued that the notion of a universal logic is the product of an oppressivc patriarchal culture and should not be defended by feminists.
Charity and the Reiteration Problem for Enthymemes
Authors: Jacquette Dale
Published: March 2017

Any enthymeme can be made logically valid by adding as a suppressed premise a conditional that reiterates the argument's stated content and inferential structure in if-then form, We cannot blanketly prohibit reiteration to avoid this sort of trivialization, because some enthymemes legitimately require completion by reiterative conditionals, The solution proposed here is to allow reiterative expansions, but to rank them, other things being equal, as less charitable than nonreiterative expansions. Reiterative expansions can then be chosen as the most charitable only when all nonreiterative expansions have been eliminated for independent reasons. This pluralistic model encourages experimentation with a number of different permissible expansions in evaluating enthymemes, from the least controversial or problematic to the most trivializing and the least charitable.
Helping to Undo the Past: Teaching Critical Reasoning in South Africa
Authors: De Wijze Stephen
Published: March 2017

In this paper I discuss the opportunities and difficulties of teaching critical reasoning in a rapidly transforming society such as South Africa. I argue that the real benefits for students of such courses outweigh the pessimism of John McPeck and Richard Paul that they do little, if any, good. This paper is based on my experience of having taught critical reasoning at school and university level in South Africa during the early 90's.
Dialectical Relevance in Persuasion Dialogue
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

How to model relevance in argumentation is an important problem for informal logic. Dialectical relcvance is determined by the use of an argument for some purpose in different types of dialogue, according to the ncw dialectic. A central type of dialogue is persuasion dialogue in which one participant uses rational argumentation to try to get the other participant to accept a designated proposition. In this paper, a method for judging relevance in persuasion dialogue is presented. The method is based on using the technique of argument diagramming.
The Problem With Percy: Epistemology, Understanding and Critical Thinking
Authors: Bailin Sharon
Published: March 2017

Most current conceptions of critical thinking conceive of critical thinking in terms of abilities and dispositions. In this paper I describe a common type of problem students experience with critical thinking and argue that conceptualizations in terms of abilities and dispositions do not provide a way to understand this problem. I argue, further, that a useful way to think about the problem is in terms of epistemological understanding, and that this way of thinking about the issue can provide both pedagogical and conceptual grounding to efforts to foster critical thinking.
The Thomas-Nolt Dispute: Some Lessons about Induction
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

I resolve an apparently unresolved dispute about how probable uniform experience makes an extrapolation from it, and draw some general lessons about such enumerative induction. Uniform experience does not necessarily confer a high probability on an extrapolation of or generalization from that experience. Rational extrapolation or generalization typically involves a lot of specific background information, though not necessarily a general assumption that nature is uniform or that the future will resemble the past. And new evidence which is highly likely on one hypothesis but highly unlikely on any of its competitors does not necessarily make the former hypothesis highly probable.
A Preferred Treatment of Mill's Methods: Some Misinterpretations by Modern Textbooks
Authors: Van Heuveln Bram
Published: March 2017

A number of modern logic books give a misrepresentation of Mill's Methods as originally conceived by Mill. In this paper, I point out what I believe is a better presentation of Mill's Methods. This treatment is not only historically more accurate, but it also represents a better conceptual introduction to Mill's Methods in general.
How Philosophical is Informal Logic?
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

Consider the proposition, "Informal logic is a subdiscipline of philosophy". The best chance of showing this to be true is showing that informal logic is part of logic, which in turn is a part of philosophy. Part 1 is given over to the task of sorting out these connections. If successful, informal logic can indeed be seen as part of philosophy; but there is no question of an exclusive relationship. Part 2 is a critical appraisal of the suggestion that informal logic is applied epistemology. Part 3 examines the claim that informal logic has failed to penetrate into mainstream philosophy, and suggestions for amelioration are considered.
Belief and Negation
Authors: Adler Jonathan E. , Blair J. Anthony
Published: March 2017

This paper argues for the importance of the distinction between internal and external negation over expressions for belief. The common fallacy is to confuse statement like (1) and (2): (1) John believes that the school is not closed on Tuesday; (2) John does not believe that the school is closed on Tuesday. The fallacy has ramifications in teaching, reasoning, and argumentation. Analysis of the fallacy and suggestions for teaching are offered.
Revision and Immortality in Philosophical Argumentation: Continuing Thoughts on the Rhetorical Wedge
Authors: Mifsud Mari Lee
Published: March 2017

This essay explores Johnstone's idea that "rhetoric is a wedge." In particular, it explores the place of this idea in Johnstone's philosophy of argument, the need to confront this idea with argument, and ways of confronting it with ad rem and ad hominem arguments.
Why Percy can't think: A response to Bailin
Authors: Hatcher Donald L.
Published: March 2017

In "The Problem with Percy: Epistemology, Understanding and Critical Thinking," Sharon Bailin argues that critical thinking skills do not generalize because students do not understand the larger epistemological picture in which to situate the importance of arguments and reasons. More plausible explanations are: (I) instructors across the disciplines do not give assignments requiring critical thinking (CT) skills, (2) single courses in CT have little effect, (3) pragmatic arguments showing the effectiveness of CT are more effective than epistemological arguments with the average student. So to achieve the generalization of the logical skills and intellectual dispositions inherent in CT courses, CT thinking cannot be departmentalized.
Classifying and Analyzing Analogies
Authors: Waller Bruce N.
Published: March 2017

Analogies come in several forms that serve distinct functions. Inductive analogy is a common type of analogical argument, but critical thinking texts sometimes treat all analogies as inductive. Such an analysis ignores figurative analogies, which may elucidate but do not argue; and also neglects a priori arguments by analogy, a type of analogical argument prominent in law and ethics. A priori arguments by analogy are distinctive, but--contrary to the claims of Govier and Sunstein-they are best understood as deductive, rather than a special form of non deductive reasoning.
What Should We Do With Traditional Logic?
Authors: Bohl Jesse P.
Published: March 2017

There is a clash between some people's positive logical intuitions about traditional or Aristotelian logic and the assessment ofthat logic made by modem logic. In response to the clash, four sorts of reasons that might be given for referring one logic to the other are considered, but it is argued that none of them provides a decisive reason in favor of one rather than the other. A reformist and a radical response to the apparent inability to give reasons to prefer one logic to the other are considered and reasons given for preferring the radical response.
How to Improve the Convergent Argument Calculation
Authors: Tyaglo Alexander V.
Published: March 2017

Quantitative apparatus for assessing strength of an argument was improved in the article. A probative generalisation and verification of the R.Yanal's algorithm to calculate convergent argument were proposed. The generalization obtained deals with both quantity (or number) and quality (or truth-values) of the argument's reasons.
The Cogent Reasoning Model of Informal Fallacies Revisited
Authors: Boone Daniel N.
Published: March 2017

The author designed the Reasoning Analysis Test to provide empirical support for the CRM analysis of informal fallacies. While informal, the results provide presumptive evidence that those committing informal fallacies may tacitly reason as predicted by CRM. Davis has argued persuasively that Gricean theory has not lived up to expectations, In light of his critique, the CRM analyses of Begging the Question and Equivocation are amended. Johnson has provided standards for judging any theory of informal fallacies. It is argued that CRM survives the Standard Critique and sufficiently meets Johnson's other criteria.
Informal Logic, Argumentation Theory and Artificial Intelligence
Authors: Gilbert Michael A.
Published: March 2017

Informal Logic, Argumentation Theory and Artificial Intelligence
Towards Computational Rhetoric
Authors: Grasso Floriana
Published: March 2017

The notions of argument and argumentation have become increasingly ubiquitous in Artificial Intelligence research, with various application and interpretations. Less attention has been, however, specifically devoted to rhetorical argument The
work presented in this paper aims at bridging this gap, by proposing a framework for characterising rhetorical argumentation, based on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric. The paper provides an overview of the state of the art of computational work based on, or dealing with, rhetorical
aspects of argumentation, before presenting the characterisation proposed, corroborated by walked-through examples.
The Public Metonym
Authors: Cramer P.A.
Published: March 2017

One of the central critiques of the bourgeois conception of public holds that, in its implicit claim to universality, it fails to account for the material particularities of social groups and for the variety of possible rationalities. Some theorists have aimed to solve this problem by describing particular publics and particular rationalities based on racial, ethnic, gender, or political identities. While particularist public models represent difference in protest of the totalizing and counterfactual valence of a bourgeois conceptualization of public, they fail to acknowledge that glossing difference is fundamental to the function of and the authorizing power of public, as it is marshalled by speakers. By analogizing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's universal audience with public, this paper (a) introduces the public metonym, a rhetorically productive counterfactual totality that glosses the material particularities of social groups, (b) critiques the particularist approach to the paradox of public, (c) introduces the resistance metonym as a rhetorically-minded alternative, and (d) clarifies distinctions among projects that claim to address a common object called pUblic.
Computational Agents as a Test-Bed to Study the Philosophical Dialogue Model "DE": A Development of Mackenzie's DC
Authors: Yuan Tangming , Moore David , Grierson Alec
Published: March 2017

This paper reports research concerning a suitable dialogue model for human computer debate. In particular, we consider the adoption of Moore's (1993) utilization of Mackenzie's (1979) game DC, means of using computational agents as the test-bed to facilitate evaluation of the proposed model, and means of using the evaluation results as motivation to further develop a dialogue model, which can prevent fallacious argument and common errors. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of human computer dialogue, and help to illuminate research issues in the field of dialectics itself.
Mapping the Structure of Debate
Authors: Yoshimi Jeff
Published: March 2017

Although debate is a richly structured and prevalent form of discourse, it has received little scholarly attention. Logicians have focused on the structure of individual arguments-how they divide into premises and conclusions, which in turn divide into various constituents. In contrast, I focus on the structure of sets of arguments, showing how arguments are themselves constituents in high-level dialectical structures. I represent debates and positions by graphs whose vertices correspond to arguments and whose edges correspond to two inter-argument relations: "dispute" and "support," respectively. On this basis I develop a theory of the structure of debate.
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
Authors: Turner Dale , Wright Larry
Published: March 2017

Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along with some ofthe detail we add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some useful light on the project of informal logic.
Norms and Functions in Public Sphere Argumentation
Authors: Blair J. Anthony
Published: March 2017

This paper is a commentary on the articles by William Rehg and Robert Asen in this issue of Informal Logic. It compares the subject matter of the two papers, offers an interpretation of and commentary on each paper separately, then discusses their overlapping problematic: the importance of public sphere argumentation.
Limits of Truth: Exploring Epistemological Approaches to Argumentation
Authors: Hoffmann Michael
Published: March 2017

Some proponents of epistemological approaches to argumentation (Biro, Siegel, Lumer, Goldman) assume that it should be possible to develop non-relative
criteria of argument evaluation. By contrast, this paper argues that any evaluation of an argument depends (a) on the cognitive situation of the evaluator, (b) on background
knowledge that is available for this evaluator in a certain situation, and (c)--in some cases--on the belief-value-system this person shares.
Useful Advice and Good Arguments
Authors: Feldman Richard
Published: March 2017

Brian Huss argues that the consensus theory of argumentation is as good as, or better than, the epistemological approach at giving useful real-world advice about arguments. I describe these two ways of theorizing about arguments, describe the advice that Huss thinks the two theories can offer, make a case largely by means of examples for the view that the epistemological approach does yield useful real world advice, and then formulate and respond to Huss's arguments. I conclude with a few brief comments on consensus and arguments.
Three Naturalistic Accounts of the Epistemology of Argument
Authors: Weinstein Mark
Published: March 2017

Three contrasting approaches to the epistemology of argument are presented. Each one is naturalistic, drawing upon successful practices as the basis for epistemological virtue. But each looks at very different sorts of practices and they differ greatly as to the manner with which relevant practices may be described. My own contribution relies on a metamathematical reconstruction of mature science, and as such, is a radical break with the usual approaches within the theory of argument.
Advances in the Theory of Argumentation Schemes and Critical Questions
Authors: Godden David , Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

This paper begins a working through of Blair’s (2001) theoretical agenda concerning argumentation schemes and their attendant critical questions, in which we propose a number of solutions to some outstanding theoretical issues. We consider the classification of schemes, their ultimate nature, their role in argument reconstruction, their foundation as normative categories of argument, and the evaluative role of critical questions.We demonstrate the role of schemes in argument reconstruction, and defend a normative account of their nature against specific criticisms due to Pinto (2001). Concerning critical questions, we propose an account on which they are founded in the R.S.A. cogency standard, and develop an account of the relationship between critical questions and burden of proof. Our ultimate aim is to initiate a reconciliation between dialectical and informal logic approaches to the schemes.
Defeasibility in Judicial Opinion: Logical or Procedural?
Authors: Godden David , Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

While defeasibility in legal reasoning has been the subject of recent scholarship, it has yet to be studied in the context of judicial opinion. Yet, being subject to appeal, judicial decisions can default for a variety of reasons. Prakken (2001) argued that the defeasibility affecting reasoning involved in adversarial legal argumentation is best analysed as procedural rather than logical. In this paper we argue that the defeasibility of ratio decendi is similarly best explained and modeled in a procedural and dialectical framework. We propose that appeals are best understood as meta-dialogues about the reasoned dialogue occurring in the initial trial.
Weighing and Balancing in the Justification of Judicial Decisions
Authors: Feteris Eveline
Published: March 2017

In legal theory, it is widely claimed that decisions in hard cases are based on weighing and balancing. However no reconstructions are given of the deep structure of the complex argumentation underlying the justification of these decisions. The author develops a model for the analysis of weighing and balancing of arguments in the justification of judicial decisions that are based on teleological-evaluative considerations. The justification is reconstructed as a complex argumentation that consists of different levels of argumentation and it is explained how these levels of argumentation relate to the burden of proof of a judge who gives a decision that is based on a weighing and balancing in which teleological-evaluative considerations are invoked.
Confrontation and Ridicule
Authors: Van Laar Jan Albert
Published: March 2017

Ridicule can be used in order to create concurrence as well as to en-hance antagonism. This paper deals with ridicule that is used by a critic when he is responding to a standpoint or to a reason advanced in support of a standpoint. Ridicule profits from humor’s good repu-tation, and correctly so, even when it is used in argumentative contexts. However, ridicule can be harmful to a discussion. This paper will deal with ridicule from the perspective of strategic maneuvering between the individual rhetorical objec-tive of effecting persuasion and the shared dialectical objective of resolving the dispute on its merits. In what ways can ridicule be used in strategic maneuvering and under what conditions are these uses dialectically sound?
Logic as (Normative) Inference Theory: Formal vs. Non-formal Theories of Inference Goodness
Authors: Bermejo-Luque Lilian
Published: March 2017

I defend a conception of Logic as normative for the sort of activities in which inferences super-vene, namely, reasoning and arguing. Toulmin’s criticism of formal logic will be our framework to shape the idea that in order to make sense of Logic as normative, we should con-ceive it as a discipline devoted to the layout of arguments, understood as the representations of the semantic, truth relevant, properties of the inferences that we make in arguing and reason-ing.
What is a “Real” Argument?
Authors: Goddu G.C.
Published: March 2017

Numerous informal logicians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments?Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put.
Resources for Research on Analogy: A Multi-disciplinary Guide
Authors: Guarini Marcello , Butchart Amy , Smith Paul Simard , Moldovan Andrei
Published: March 2017

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well.
Belief-Overkill in Political Judgments
Authors: Baron Jonathan
Published: March 2017

When people tend toward a political decision, such as voting for the Republican Party, they are often attracted to this decision by one issue, such as the party’s stance on abortion, but then they come to see other issues, such as the party’s stand on taxes, as supporting their decision, even if they would not have thought so in the absence of the decision. I demonstrate this phenomenon with opinion poll data and with an experiment done on the World Wide Web using hypothetical candidates. For the hypothetical candidates, judgments about whether a candidate’s position on issue A favors the candidate or the opponent are correlated with judgments about other positions taken by the candidate (as determined from other hypothetical candidates). This effect is greater in those subjects who rarely make conflicting judgments, in which one issue favors a candidate and another favors the opponent. In a few cases, judgments even reverse, so that a position that is counted as a minus for other candidates becomes a plus for a favoredcandidate. Reversals in the direction of a candidate’s position are more likely when the candidate is otherwise favored. The experiment provides a new kind of demonstration of “beliefoverkill,” the tendency to bring all arguments into line with a favored conclusion.
Differentiating Theories from Evidence: The Development of Argument Evaluation Abilities in Adolescence and Early Adulthood
Authors: Barchfeld Petra , Sodian Beate
Published: March 2017

An argument evaluation inventory distinguishing between different levels of theory-evidence differentiation was designed corresponding to the levels of argument observed in argument generation tasks. Five scenarios containing everyday theories about a social problem, and arguments to support those theories were presented to 170 participants from two age  groups (15 and 22 years) and different educational tracks. Participants had to rate the validity of arguments proposed by a story figure, to support the theory, to choose the best argument, and to justify their choice. The rating task proved to be very difficult for all age groups, with only 49% of the university students consistently rating valid evidence-based arguments higher than flawed arguments. Competence improved with age and educational level. In the choice task more than 80% of the adults preferred an argument that reflected theory-evidence differentiation over mere theory elaboration or flawed reasoning. However, only adults with a university education were able to also explicitly justify their choice. Overall, these findings imply that laypersons have similar conceptual problems in differentiating theory from evidence as it has been reported for evidence generation tasks (Kuhn, 1991). Performance on the choice task suggests that some implicit awareness of differences between theory and evidence may precede a full, explicit understanding. Implications for education are discussed.
Argument Explanation Complementarity and the Structure of Informal Reasoning
Authors: Mayes Gregory Randolph
Published: March 2017

Abstract: Argument and explanation are distinct forms of reasoning with an underappreciated complementary relationship. In this essay I define these terms precisely, identify the mischief that results from conflating them, elucidate their complementary relationship and employ this relationship to provide a fruitful approach to analyzing the logical structure of the common editorial.

Keywords: argument, evidence, explanation, cause, complementarity, editorial.
Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
Authors: Walton Douglas , Macagno Fabrizio
Published: March 2017

We contend that it is possible to argue reasonably for and against arguments from classifications and definitions, provided they are seen as defeasible (subject to exceptions and critical questioning). Arguments from classification of the most common sorts are shown to be based on defeasible reasoning of various kinds represented by patterns of logical reasoning called defeasible argumentation schemes. We show how such schemes can be identified with heuristics, or short-cut solutions to a problem. We examine a variety of arguments of this sort, including argument from abductive classification, argument from causal classification, argument from analogy-based classification and arguments from classification based on generalizations.
Systematically Distorted Communication: An Impediment to Social and Political Change
Authors: Gross Alan G
Published: March 2017

I define and refine Habermas’s notion of systematically distorted communication by means of focused, structured comparison among three of its instances. Next, I show that its critique is possible within the confines of his theory by recourse to a minimalist concept of rationality and a version of the truth that avoids the unwelcome metaphysical baggage of truth with a capital T. For critique to be complete, however, it must be supplemented by the full range of rhetorical proofs. Even so, there are limits to the power of critique. In the end, only social and political action can alter oppressive institutional arrangements.
Attacking Character: Ad Hominem Argument and Virtue Epistemology
Authors: Battaly Heather
Published: March 2017

The recent literature on ad hominem argument contends that the speaker’s character is sometimes relevant to evaluating what she says. This effort to redeem ad hominems requires an analysis of character that explains why and how character is relevant. I argue that virtue epistemology supplies this analysis. Three sorts of ad hominems that attack the speaker’s intellectual character are legitimate. They attack a speaker’s: (1) possession of reliabilist vices; or (2) possession of responsibilist vices; or (3) failure to perform intellectually virtuous acts. Legitimate ad hominems conclude that we should not believe what a speaker says solely on her say-so.
A Bayesian Approach to Absent Evidence Reasoning
Authors: Stephens Christopher Lee
Published: March 2017

Under what conditions is the failure to have evidence that p evidence that p is false? Absent evidence reasoning is common in many sciences, including astronomy, archeology, biology and medicine. An often-repeated epistemological motto is that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Analysis of absent evidence reasoning usually takes place in a deductive or frequentist hypothesis-testing framework. Instead, I develop a Bayesian analysis of this motto and prove that, under plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence, the absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
Argument Schemes in Computer System Safety Engineering
Authors: Yuan Tangming , Kelly Tim
Published: March 2017

Safe Safety arguments are key components in a safety case. Too often, safety arguments are constructed without proper reasoning. To address this, we argue that informal logic argument schemes have important roles to play in safety argument construction and reviewing process. Ten commonly used reasoning schemes in computer system safety domain are proposed. The role of informal logic dialogue games in computer system safety arguments reviewing is also discussed and the intended work in this area is proposed. It is anticipated that this work will contribute toward the development of computer system safety arguments, and help to move forward the interplay between research in informal logic and research in computer system safety engineering.
Diagramming Objections To Independent Premises
Authors: Woods Cathal
Published: March 2017

Arguments with what are called "independent" or "convergent" premises are typically diagrammed by using an arrow between each premise and the conclusion. This makes diagramming objections to the reasoning difficult. It also obscures differences in argument structure. I suggest that a single arrow should be used for such arguments and that this is so even in the extreme form of independent premises when the argument is entirely unstructured. I then discuss the diagramming of objections.
Critical Thinking and Informal Logic: Neuropsychological Perspectives
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: March 2017

This article challenges the common view that improvements in critical thinking are best pursued by investigations in informal logic. From the perspective of research in psychology and neuroscience, hu-man inference is a process that is multimodal, parallel, and often emo-tional, which makes it unlike the linguistic, serial, and narrowly cog-nitive structure of arguments. At-tempts to improve inferential prac-tice need to consider psychological error tendencies, which are patterns of thinking that are natural for peo-ple but frequently lead to mistakes in judgment. This article discusses two important but neglected error ten-dencies: motivated inference and fear-driven inference.
Arguments as Abstract Objects
Authors: Simard Smith Paul L. , Moldovan Andrei
Published: March 2017

In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambigu-ity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argu-ment’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?
Speech Act Rules for Burden of Proof in a Modified Hamblin Dialogue System
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

In his book on fallacies, Hamblin built a very simple system for argumentation in dialogue he called the Why Because System with Questions. In his discussion of this system, he replaced the concept of burden of proof with a simpler concept of initiative, which could be described as something like getting the upper hand as the argumentation moves back and forth in the dialogue between the one party and the other. No doubt he realized that the concept of burden of proof was too complex a matter to be dealt with in the limited scope of his chapter on formal dialogue systems. In this paper is shown how an extended version of Hamblin’s dialogue system provides a nice way of modeling the phenomenon of shifting of burden of proof in a dialogue, yielding a precise way of distinguishing between different kinds of burden of proof, and dealing with fallacies like the argumentum ad ignorantiam (argument from negative evidence).
Whither Consequence?
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

There are passages in Fallacies suggesting a skeptical attitude to the very idea of inductive arguments, hence to the existence of inductive fallacies. Although the passages are brief and few in number, it would appear that Hamblin’s resistance stems from doubts about the existence of relations of inductive consequence. This paper attempts to find a case in which such skepticism might plausibly be grounded. The case it proposes is highly conjectural, but important if true. Its greater importance lies in the threat it creates for the whole class of nonmonotonic logics.