bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Labeling TiO2 Nanoparticles with Dyes for Optical Fluorescence Microscopy and Determination of TiO2–DNA Nanoconjugate Stability
Authors: Thurn Kenneth T. , Paunesku Tatjana , Wu Aiguo , Brown Eric M. B. , Lai Barry , Vogt Stefan , Maser Jörg , Aslam Mohammed , Dravid Vinayak , Bergan Raymond , Woloschak Gayle E.
Published: February 2009

Visualization of nanoparticles without intrinsic optical fluorescence properties is a significant problem when performing intracellular studies. Such is the case with titanium dioxide (TiO2) nanoparticles. These nanoparticles, when electronically linked to single‐stranded DNA oligonucleotides, have been proposed to be used both as gene knockout devices and as possible tumor imaging agents. By interacting with complementary target sequences in living cells, these photoinducible TiO2–DNA nanoconjugates have the potential to cleave intracellular genomic DNA in a sequence specific and inducible manner. The nanoconjugates also become detectable by magnetic resonance imaging with the addition of gadolinium Gd(III) contrast agents. Herein two approaches for labeling TiO2 nanoparticles and TiO2–DNA nanoconjugates with optically fluorescent agents are described. This permits direct quantification of fluorescently labeled TiO2 nanoparticle uptake in a large population of living cells (>104 cells). X‐ray fluorescence microscopy (XFM) is combined with fluorescent microscopy to determine the relative intracellular stability of the nanoconjugates and used to quantify intracellular nanoparticles. Imaging the DNA component of the TiO2–DNA nanoconjugate by fluorescent confocal microscopy within the same cell shows an overlap with the titanium signal as mapped by XFM. This strongly implies the intracellular integrity of the TiO2–DNA nanoconjugates in malignant cells.
Aqueous‐Phase Synthesis of Highly Luminescent CdTe/ZnTe Core/Shell Quantum Dots Optimized for Targeted Bioimaging
Authors: Law Wing‐Cheung , Yong Ken‐Tye , Roy Indrajit , Ding Hong , Hu Rui , Zhao Weiwei , Prasad Paras N.
Published: February 2009

Semiconductor quantum dots (QDs) have traditionally been synthesized in organic phase and transferred to aqueous solution by functionalizing their surface with silica, polymers, short‐chain thiol ligand, or phospholipid micelles. However, these complex steps result in i) a reduction of the quantum yield (QY) of QDs, ii) partial degrdation of the QDs, and iii) a drastic increase in the hydrodynamic size of QDs, which may hinder their biomedical applications. In this work, the fabrication and applications of cysteine‐capped CdTe/ZnTe QDs, which are directly synthesized in aqueous media, as optical probes for specific targeting of pancreatic and esophageal cancer cells in vitro are reported, as well as their capability for in vivo imaging. The CdTe/ZnTe QDs are synthesized in a one‐pot method and capped with amino acid cysteine, which contains both carboxyl and amine functional groups on their surfaces for bioconjugation. The fabricated QDs have an ultrasmall hydrodynamic diameter (3–5 nm), possess high QY (52%), and are non‐toxic to cells at experimental dosages. Confocal imaging is used to demonstrate a receptor‐mediated uptake of antibody‐conjugated QDs into pancreatic cancer cells in vitro. In vitro cytotoxicity studies (MTS‐assay) show that the IC50 value of these QDs is ≈160 µg mL−1, demonstrating low toxicity. In addition, the QDs are used for small‐animal imaging where the in vivo biocompatiblity of these QDs and their clearance following systemic injection is studied.
Analysis of current controllers for active power filters using selective harmonic compensation schemes
Authors: Bojoi Radu , Limongi Leonardo R , Profumo Francesco , Roiu Daniel , Tenconi Alberto
Published: February 2009

This paper presents a frequency response analysis of current controllers based on selective harmonic compensation schemes for three‐phase voltage–source shunt Active Power Filters (APFs). To perform this analysis, the time delay introduced by the inverter and the sampling is taken into account in the current controller closed loop transfer function. Doing this, the differences among the schemes are pointed out, demonstrating the importance and effectiveness of the delay compensation to maintain the whole system stability. In addition, the performance of each current controller is evaluated by means of the total harmonic distortion of the mains line current and time response for fast load variations. The main goal is to identify the most suitable solution in terms of current controllers based on selective harmonic compensation for an industrial implementation. All the considered current control schemes have been tested on the same digital platform. Experimental results are presented for a 25‐kVA shunt APF prototype compensating a nonlinear inductive load. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Modeling and compensation for angular transmission error in harmonic drive gearings
Authors: Yamamoto Masafumi , Iwasaki Makoto , Hirai Hiromu , Okitsu Yoshifumi , Sasaki Kozo , Yajima Toshio
Published: February 2009

This paper presents a novel modeling and compensation approach for the angular transmission error in harmonic drive gearings. In the modeling, physical phenomena of the transmission error due to nonlinear elastic deformations in micro‐displacement region are especially dealt with, as well as the synchronous component which has been discussed in a variety of conventional studies. On the basis of the analyses of the phenomena, the nonlinear elastic component is mathematically modeled by applying a modeling framework for the rolling friction with hysteresis attributes. The proposed transmission error model has been adopted to the positioning system as a model‐based feedforward compensation manner. Experimental results using a prototype show the effectiveness of the proposed modeling and compensation. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Vision‐based motion control for robotic systems
Authors: Oda Naoki , Ito Masahide , Shibata Masaaki
Published: February 2009

The paper presents recent advances of vision‐based motion control for robotic systems. The visual feedback loop is very effective for increasing the dexterity and flexibility of robot's task. With the development of vision and computer technology, the visual feedback applications are remarkably expanded for various robotic systems. In the paper, at first, a variety of vision‐based approaches in Japan are overviewed from the viewpoint of motion control scheme, and fundamental formulations of visual servo controller are described. And two kinds of visual feedback applications are introduced with several experimental evaluations. The first one is non‐delayed visual tracking approach using active stereo vision. It is found that the target motion estimation is an important issue for fast tracking. The other is the motion controller for wheelchair‐type mobile robots based on optical flow field. The vision‐based feedback controller conducts the force‐related motion. Then, the vision makes dynamic environmental change transmitted to human operator through force interaction. The validity of these approaches are evaluated by experimental results. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
A motion control for two‐wheel inverted pendulum type of mobile manipulator
Authors: Murakami Toshiyuki , Sasaki Koji
Published: February 2009

Two‐wheel inverted pendulum type of mobile manipulator has no casters and it is expected that quick and robust motion may be realized according to road surface. However the dynamical behavior is so complicated from a viewpoint of motion stability. To address this issue, this paper describes a motion control strategy to realize a stable pushing operation of the two‐wheel inverted pendulum type of mobile manipulator. Here the manipulator platform is considered as a passive joint and a stabilization control of the passive joint is achieved by using null space motion of the mobile manipulator. Then workspace observer is also employed to obtain the robust null space motion.The proposed approach is verified by several numerical and experimental results. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Control of biped walking robot for human living environment
Authors: Fujimoto Yasutaka , Imai Taichi , Kawamura Atsuo , Asano Yosuke
Published: February 2009

This paper introduces biped robot adaptation to human living environment from viewpoints of battery operation time extension and environmental recognition. These issues are important when robots actually work at home. First, in order to extend battery operation time, we propose energy‐saving bipedal locomotion gait. The problem is formulated as an optimal control problem, which is conventionally hard to solve when a target system is complicated. In this paper, partial derivatives appeared in optimal control problem are implicitly represented by using automatic differentiation technique. This approach enables complicated optimal control problem solvable. In combination with receding horizon control, its computation cost is also reduced. Second, we introduce the biped walk tracking based on the camera image mounted on the walking robot, and the visual servoing by the posture change for the purpose of the target image tracking in the camera frame. We propose a new control law to track the rotated target object using the characteristic of the walking, which considered the interference between translational motion and rotational motion. The decoupling is realized by simulations and experiments. As a result, the walking robot tracked the translated and rotated target object without a practical issue. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
New estimation method for the electric potential of the human body under perfect noncontact conditions
Authors: Kurita Koichi
Published: February 2009

We have developed an effective noncontact technique for the measurement of the electric potential of the human body when performing a stepping motion. This technique is based on the detection of an electrostatic‐induced current generated by the stepping motion. The electric potential of the subject is determined by integrating the electrostatic‐induced current flowing through an electrode that is placed at a distance of 1.5 m from the subject with respect to time. The values of the estimated electric potential are qualitatively in good agreement with those obtained in previous experiments by using an ordinary contact‐type hand electrode. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
3‐Hydroxy‐3‐methylglutaryl‐coenzyme A lyase deficiency: Initial presentation in a young adult
Authors: Reimão S. , Morgado C. , Almeida I. T. , Silva M. , Real H. Corte , Campos J.
Published: February 2009

3‐Hydroxy‐3‐methylglutaryl‐coenzyme A (HMG‐CoA) lyase deficiency is a rare inborn error affecting leucine catabolism and ketogenesis, usually presenting in the neonatal period. Late forms of the disease have been detected in infancy and childhood, but not in adults. We report a case of HMG‐CoA lyase deficiency with initial presentation in a 29‐year‐old adult with no prior history of the disease, which to our knowledge is the first case described with presentation at this age.
Aristotle and the Concept of Law
Authors: von Leyden W.
Published: February 2009

These then are the four main strands in Aristotle's thought concerning the law, or in other words, the four elements he might have distinguished in his conception of law. The analysis I have attempted seems to me to reflect both Aristotle's view of the complex nature of law and also what he would look upon as the different grounds for its validity. I think that the several elements in his doctrine are fundamentally independent of one another, and similarly that they do not compete with one another since they embody answers to different questions concerning law. Also the recurrent theme of my own comments has been the assumption that 'law' is a complex term, comprising in its application a number of different definitions concerning rules and validity, authority and obligation, sources of law, and the like. In my opinion it is the merit of Aristotle's conception of law that he appears to recognise the multiple meaning of the word ‘law’ and, accordingly, the need for a multiple definition.
Malcolm and Smart on Brain-Mind Identity
Authors: Hoffman Robert
Published: February 2009

In ‘Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory’ Malcolm argues that Smart's brain-mind identity theory is not even false, but is unintelligible. I want to comment on his arguments.
Ethical Intuitionism II
Authors: Lucas J. R.
Published: February 2009

South. So we have agreed to bury intuitionism. Well, I dare say it is right. But we ought to bury some of the grave-diggers too. Some of the things that Ross said are no doubt wrong, or at least misleading: but they are a lot less wrong than most of the things said since the war.
Justice: Distributive and Corrective
Authors: Lamont W. D.
Published: February 2009

In this paper I shall explain what I take to be the nature of justice; and the method which I shall follow is that of attempting to infer the essential nature of justice from an examination of its actual practical operation. Perhaps the reader will be able to follow the drift of the argument more easily, and be more on his guard against possible misstatements of fact or erroneous inferences, if I mention at the outset the main conclusions to which I hope to lead him.
Laus Belli: The Praise of War: An Appeal to the Natural Man
Authors: Mahu
Published: February 2009

At this splendid moment my august Master has commissioned me, together with my colleague Modo, to make an authoritative statement on the meaning and value of War and, if possible, to clear up the long misunderstanding which has existed between us and mankind. When I speak of an authoritative statement I cannot, of course, claim absolute authority. Shakespeare was quite wrong in identifying Modo and me with our sublime Prince. We may indeed be gentlemen. The word has several different senses. We are at any rate very subordinate gentlemen among his innumerable attendants. If we are commissioned to speak at this moment, it is because just now, through a chain of events in which our Master played a supreme part, the world seems to have been handed over to us to do what we like with. It is up to us to explain what we like, why we like it, and why we confidently expect the general sympathy of mankind.
The Philosophical Issues Involved in the War
Authors: Stace W. T.
Published: February 2009

We are familiar with the statement that the present world-conflagration is, or involves, a struggle between two different philosophies. Obviously the statement is very vague, and it is exceedingly difficult to say exactly what it means. But if it has any meaning at all, a professional philosopher ought to be supremely interested in it. Philosophers are too apt to sit in their ivory towers, weaving curious distinctions and debating strange intellectual puzzles, without any consideration of their implications for humanity. For even the most abstract questions invariably have, in the end, important practical bearings. And we are apt to forget that, in the last analysis, philosophers are the uncrowned rulers of the world. For their ideas, secretly infiltrating among the masses, are among the forces which drive civilizations. Plato has had more influence on the destiny of man than the inventor of the steam engine. And so I make no apology for attempting to discuss here the question whether the two great nations now engaged in war, Germany and Britain, represent any philosophical ideas, what the philosophical issues of the war are, and where, in those issues, the truth, or the greater degree of truth, lies. And the paper will have two parts. In the first I shall try briefly to state what I believe the issues to be. In the second I shall attempt to discover whether there is any rational ground for preferring the philosophy of the one side to that of the other.
Kierkegaard and the “Existential” Philosophy
Authors: Emmet Dorothy M.
Published: February 2009

It is a wise child who knows his own father; and the climate of thought of a generation may be subtly changed without conscious recognition of the formative minds which have been, if not the parents, at least the godparents of that change. That is to say, they have sponsored the baptism of ideas which would only be safe so long as they renounced the world, the flesh, and the devil; but, as is so often the case, when the offspring grow up they form a pact with those very powers. To make Søren Kierkegaard spiritually responsible for the present war would have as little, and perhaps as much, truth in it as the facile explanations which made Hegel responsible for the last one. But it is part of the demonism of policies of power and ambition to be able to pervert to their own ends religious ideas which in their intention are a protest against those very ambitions; and, by so doing, to win a response from people who, in a dim, unconscious way, are feeling after the ideas themselves, but have neither the powers of self-criticism nor of radical thinking to resist travesties of them which appear to justify their own self-assertion. When Hitler informed Sir Nevile Henderson that he was a man of “ad infinitum decisions” we may question the extent of his knowledge either of the Latin language or of the existential philosophy; but the phrase awakes an echo of the religious philosophy of circles far removed from National-Socialism. Both Nazi apologists and their Confessional or independent opponents are consciously or unconsciously moved by a way of thinking which puts the decision of the individual, made in the concrete moment, above any objective or universal norm of ethics or of reason by which it can be either justified or criticized.
Kant's Concept of Appearance-II
Authors: Cousin D. R.
Published: February 2009

In an illusion, if what has been said in the earlier part of this section is right, the essential thing is the presence to the mind of some false proposition, which may be affirmed or denied according as we are or are not deceived. But what precisely is this false proposition in each case? And, a second question, on what grounds do we entertain it?
Duty and Interest—(II)
Authors: Lamont W. D.
Published: February 2009

Real and Personal Rights.—In different systems of legal nomenclature the term “right” has different meanings, some writers applying it in a restricted, and others in a wider, sense. I shall use it in its wider sense as including “personal rights,” “proprietary rights,” “powers,” “liberties,” “licences,” and so on. The precise meaning of these various kinds of right need not be discussed here, because all legal rights can be broadly divided into two main classes—“personal rights” and “real rights.” As reference will occasionally be made to this broad distinction, a brief explanation of its character is necessary. According to Gloag and Henderson, the difference between real rights and personal rights is correlative to the distinction between duties and obligations. Thus, if I have the full proprietary right in a certain article, including possession and use, this is called a Real Right; and I can make the demand against men in general, or “the world at large,” that my possession and use should not be interfered with. The world at large owes me the Duty of non-interference. I may, however, lend my property to someone for a stated period; and at the end of this period I have the right that he in particular should perform the specific act of returning my property to me. Here it is said that I have a Personal Right against him, and that he has an Obligation to perform this specific act.
The Intelligibility of History
Authors: Walsh W. H.
Published: February 2009

In this paper I wish to discuss a problem which, though it has not in the recent past attracted the attention of many philosophers, nevertheless, in my opinion, belongs quite clearly to that branch of the subject which should rightly be called “philosophy of history”: the problem, namely, of history's intelligibility. Two main questions can be asked about this which it is important that philosophers should answer. The first is that of whether history is intelligible in the sense that we can find intelligible connections bètween all or any of its parts. The significance of this question is apparent enough; for has not one of the philosopher's most pressing problems since Hume's time been that of whether any such connections are traceable in the world of fact? It is true that almost every theory on this subject has been put forward after a consideration of the sphere of physical nature only; but because this procedure has been universally followed, it is not therefore to be accepted as right. For history too offers us facts, and it is at least possible that these differ in important ways from those to be met with in nature, with the result that we can discover other sorts of connection between them than those which the physical sciences recognize. The possibility would seem to be worth investigation, and it is with it that I shall be concerned in the first part of my paper. In the other half I deal with the second main question about historical intelligibility. Supposing that we can (as I argue we can) find some cases of historical events being intrinsically, i.e. intelligibly related, we can go on to ask whether history is intelligible in a more ultimate sense. Is history, we can now inquire, a thing which is essentially rational, or is the rationality we can find in it of a merely superficial character? To put the problem somewhat more fully, is the historian able to do more than see intrinsic connections between the events (or some of the events) which he investigates: can he go further and understand the course of history as a whole, so that he is able to say, in the popular phrases, that history “makes sense,” is “meaningful” and “has rhyme and reason” in it? It seems to me that this is a matter which certainly ought to be discussed by philosophers, if only for the assertion of history's rationality which some philosophers have made.
Richard Price: A Neglected Eighteenth Century Moralist
Authors: Barnes Winston H. F.
Published: February 2009

Over ten years ago Professor A. E. Taylor pointed out that one of the most unfortunate effects of that philosophical conquest of England by Germany in the nineteenth century was the almost complete neglect of the great line of British moralists from Cumberland to Price. Little has been done since then to remedy this defect. There is a widespread study of Bishop Butler by students in our Universities, but as regards the other members of the series, there appear no signs of a renaissance. The selections of Mr. Selby-Bigge are admirable, but they serve, as all selections from the authors of a period must, to focus attention on historical similarities, not to stimulate to an examination of individual philosophies.
Is Liberty Compatible with Organization?
Authors: Turner J. E.
Published: February 2009

It is frequently contended that one of the gravest dangers of the future of civilization is that the organization of society will be carried so far as to imperil, if not indeed to destroy, social and individual liberty. If this is actually true, we seem compelled to choose between these two ends—either, that is to say, to subordinate or sacrifice freedom, or to minimize organization.
Learning from Experience
Authors: Budden E. S.
Published: February 2009

The following is an attempted answer to the question: in what kind of world is learning from experience possible? The method is to build up imaginatively a world until what has in general outline been constructed is such as to permit the kind of learning by experience with which we are all familiar. We may hope that some interesting facts even now may emerge from a consideration of this trite subject. Not all that we know has been learnt from experience, though, no doubt, anything we know, if it has come to our notice, has done so in the course of experience. With this truth we are not concerned. Our subject is what is called “empirical science”; but by sometimes calling it by the homelier name appearing in the title of this paper, we may remind ourselves that we are not dealing with a specialist branch of knowledge or a technical subject, but with what is a necessary feature of even the most commonplace experience.
Kant's Doctrine of “Perpetual Peace”
Authors: Bourke John
Published: February 2009

There are two main questions which it is possible to ask about war. The first is, whether it is inevitable; the second, whether it is desirable. The former question is one of fact, the latter one of value. In the discussions of ordinary conversation the two are frequently-confused and obscured; arguments to prove war desirable may be heard based upon the supposed fact of its inevitability, and conversely. It is worth while considering how the two are related.
Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes
Authors: Gewirth Alan
Published: February 2009

Descartes's general rule that “whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true” has traditionally been criticized on two closely related grounds. As Leibniz, for example, puts it, clearness and distinctness are of no value as criteria of truth unless we have criteria of clearness and distinctness; but Descartes gives none. And consequently, the standards of judgment which the rule in fact evokes are purely subjective and psychological. There must hence be set up analytic, logical “marks” by means of which it can infallibly and without arbitrariness be recognized whether any ideas or propositions are or are not clear and distinct.
The Later Thought of Plato
Authors: Conacher H. M.
Published: February 2009

C. One is familiar by this time with the distinction drawn by some Platonists between the dialogues written by Plato while he was still under the influence of Socrates, and the later ones alleged to contain the fruits of his own independent thought. Even if, however, we accept this distinction, for me there would still remain a question as to the emancipation of Plato from other thinkers than Socrates.
Bishop Butler's Refutation of Psychological Hedonism
Authors: Jackson Reginald
Published: February 2009

To the question ‘Why do you try to realize this?’ your answer may be ‘Because I desire that and I think that the realization of this would involve the realization of that.’ Or your answer may be ‘Because I desire this.’ If ‘Why?’ is interpreted as ‘Desiring what?’ the question ‘Why do you desire this?’ is improper. The word ‘desire’ is, however, frequently used in such a way as to countenance the impropriety. It is so used not only when what is pursued only as a means is said to be desired, but also when a desire for what possesses one character is said to be a desire for what possesses a a concomitant character. Strictly, perhaps, an object of desire is describable in terms only of the character immediately relevant to the desire. The expression ‘to desire what is X qua X’ is perhaps redundant; and the expression ‘to desire what is X qua Y’ is perhaps self-contradictory. But those who think, so must admit that such expressions are current among even careful speakers.
Chance, Free Will and The Social Sciences
Authors: Mess Henry A.
Published: February 2009

Auguste Comte, writing of one of his forerunners, Montesquieu, said that the great merit of the latter's memorable work L'Esprit des Lois appeared to him to be in its tendency to regard political phenomena as subject to invariable laws like all other phenomena. Comte himself writes with regard to sociology: “the philosophical principle of the science being that social phenomena are subject to natural laws, admitting of rational prevision, we have to ascertain what is the precise subject, and what the peculiar character of those laws.” “Such prevision,” says Comte in another place, “is a necessary consequence of the discovery of constant relations between phenomena, and it is the unfailing test which distinguishes real science from that erudition which mechanically accumulates facts without aspiring to deduce them one from another.” Elsewhere he speaks of “rational prevision, the principal characteristic of true science.” And Branford and Geddes quote his saying: “Savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pourvoir.”
Our Knowledge of One Another
Authors: Aaron R. I.
Published: February 2009

There can be no doubt that we do know one another. We know that others exist and we know a good deal about others. The question is how we know others. To say that others do not exist would be to assert a solipsism—a theory which no serious philosopher has ever maintained. Solipsism is absurd. Not because it is self-contradictory, for there is nothing self-contradictory in the notion that I alone exist having the experiences and thoughts which I do have and that apart from me nothing and no one else exists. It is absurd simply because others do exist and I know this; because, that is to say, it contradicts the known evidence. This is the sole—but the adequate—ground for concluding solipsism to be absurd. Any discussion of this present problem, therefore, must begin with, the recognition of the fact that knowledge of others occurs.
The Relations between Science and Philosophy
Authors: Hardie C. D.
Published: February 2009

This paper has been written in the light of recent discussions on the relevance of the New Physics to Philosophy, and with particular reference to a symposium held at the Royal Institution on May 19, 1943. It seemed to me that, at the symposium, there was some misunderstanding both on the part of the scientists and on the part of the philosophers, mainly due to the fact that neither quite realized what the opposite side considered to be the function of science and philosophy. One of the few things that emerged clearly was that the scientists thought the new physics (by which was meant the developments in physics associated with the names Einstein, Planck, Rutherford, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac) had very definite relevance for philosophy, while the philosophers thought that it had no relevance at all. It would seem that such disagreement could be due only to disagreement about what the new physics attempts to do, or to disagreement about what philosophy attempts to do. I shall consider each of these in turn.
Whitehead's Philosophy: Theory of Perception
Authors: Hooper Sydney E.
Published: February 2009

When the weather is fair, it is the custom of the writer to take a walk across the common which abuts on to his house and garden. This morning he observed the fresh green of the spring grass, and at the same time heard from an adjacent hawthorn bush the cheerful song of the thrush. As he proceeded, the scent of burning brushwood in a clearing near by was smelt. He picked up a stick lying on the grass and used it as a staff. Within a few minutes he had enjoyed sense experience through eyes, ears, nose and hands. In the autumn he hopes to gather from the bushes a handful of blackberries, as he has done in many previous years, and enjoy their luscious taste.
Scientific Method in Social Studies
Authors: Ritchie A. D.
Published: February 2009

There is a short answer to the question, whether scientific method can be applied to the study of the social relations of men, or, whether social sciences are possible; it is that these sciences exist and are in fact among the most ancient. Their success has perhaps been less startling than that of the physical sciences and they have perhaps been pursued with less enthusiasm. But there are reasons for this inherent in the nature of the social sciences, as I shall try to show.
Martin Buber's ‘I and Thou’
Authors: Wodehouse Helen
Published: February 2009

Reading and re-reading the difficult and important small book I and Thou, by Professor Martin Buber, which Mr. Ronald Gregor Smith has translated with so much care and skill, and trying to make it clearer to myself in words of my own, I find myself at odds on the threshold with the translator's Introduction. He is explaining the title and the general theme of the book:—

“There is, Buber shows, a radical difference between a man's attitude to other men and his attitude to things. The attitude to other men is a relation between persons, to things it is a connexion with objects. In the personal relation one subject—I—confronts another subject—Thou; in the connexion with things the subject contemplates and experiences an object. These two attitudes represent the basic twofold situation of human life, the former constituting the ‘world of Thou,’ and the latter the ‘world of It’” (p. vi).
Pantheism in Spinoza and the German Idealists
Authors: Copleston F. C.
Published: February 2009

In an essay on pantheism Schopenhauer observes that his chief objection against it is that it says nothing, that it simply enriches language with a superfluous synonym of the word “world.” It can hardly be denied that by this remark the great pessimist, who was himself an atheist, scored a real point. For if a philosopher starts off with the physical world and proceeds to call it God, he has not added anything to the world except a label, a label which, if we take into account the ordinary significance of the word “God,” might well appear unnecessary and superfluous: one might just as pertinently say that the world is the world as that the world is God. Neither the Jew nor the Christian nor the Moslem understand by “God” the physical world, so that, if someone calls the physical world God, he cannot be taken to mean that the world is God according to the Jewish or Christian or Moslem understanding of God. Does he mean any more than that the physical world is ultimately self-explanatory, that no Cause external to the world, no transcendent Being is requisite or admissible, i.e. that there is no God? If that were all there is in pantheism, the latter would indeed be indistinguishable from atheism, and those who called Spinoza an atheist would be fully justified.
Whitehead's Philosophy: The Higher Phases of Experience
Authors: Hooper Sydney E.
Published: February 2009

In my last article I described fully the important type of entity in Whitehead's philosophy called “propositions,” and explained the part they played in conscious experience. We learnt that “consciousness” was a certain kind of emergent quality associated with the late phase of concrescence of some high-grade actual entities. It was pointed out that whenever consciousness was present in experience, this proved to be the subjective form of an integral synthetic feeling composed of (1) a physical feeling and (2) a pro-positional feeling. This integral feeling was said to be a feeling of contrast between “actuality” and “ideality,” between a fact and a possibility. That is to say consciousness is the subjective form of the feeling of a contrast between what actuality is, and might not be, or what actuality is not, and yet might be. We can now proceed to deal with a number of higher phases of experience such as “belief,” “conscious perception,” “judgment,” together with experiences termed by Whitehead “physical purposes.”
Memory as Accompaniment
Authors: Rowell E. M.
Published: February 2009

Our memories are private and particular; when you and I share an experience our experience is yet in the very moment of sharing different for you and for me, and our two memories of an event in the past are still more disparate. For memories are shaped and constrained by the deep-lying organic stress of what we have lived through, of our actual living, in the interval between then and now. A memory follows the solitary track of our individual experience, and, like the particle in modern Physical theory, is changed in and by the route it has traced.
The Psychology of “Mine”
Authors: Litwinski Leon
Published: February 2009

(1) Property a psychic link. W. James on self and mine. (2) Acquisition and conservation in the light of expectation. (3) Expectation in philosophy and psychology. (4) Baldwin and property. (5) Bentham. (6) Why acquisitions are conserved. (7) Property as the basis of expectation and as witness of foresight. (8) Possessive pronouns. (9) Animals and children. (10) Property viewed objectively by Petrucci and subjectively by Bentham.
Psychology and the Moral Problems of Our Time
Authors: Sprott W. J. H.
Published: February 2009

The title of this lecture, as it stands now, is “Psychology and the Moral Problems of Our Time.” When I received the extremely flattering invitation to address you, the proposed title was “Light from Psychology on the Moral Problems of Our Time,” and as I am not by any means sure that Psychology throws a very clear light upon our problems, I begged that the title might be toned down. I say this at the outset, because I am afraid that you may be disappointed by the emptiness of the psychological cupboards—at any rate so far as illumination upon the moral problems of our times is concerned, and if I were to appear before you claiming to be a torchbearer, you would be justified in accusing me of false pretences.
Spinoza's Doctrine of God in Relation to his Conception of Causality
Authors: Forsyth T. M.
Published: February 2009

In a previous article I considered Aristotle's view of God as final cause and its relation to the philosophy of Plato; and at the end of the article I remarked on the affinity of both doctrines with that of Spinoza. The present paper is concerned with Spinoza's doctrine of God as it is related to his conception of causality and seeks, inter alia, to show that his explicit rejection of final causes does not prevent his philosophy from having in it something like the true principle of final causation. In each section I first quote the chief relevant definitions or propositions in Spinoza's Ethics, and then state what seems needful in the way of interpretation or comment.
Nature's Education of Man Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Wordsworth
Authors: Clarke C.
Published: February 2009

The essence of Wordsworth's creed appears, at first glance, to be simple and unambiguous: if we train the eye and ear to become receptive to the influence of natural objects, we come in time to receive “authentic tidings of invisible things,” intuitive knowledge of a Spirit which informs both Nature and the mind of man. This Spirit is a source of spiritual power; communion with it brings serenity and joy. But for all the apparent simplicity of this creed, we are soon forced to ask difficult questions about it. For example, how, precisely, are we to conceive of this universal Spirit? It is “a motion and a spirit” which informs all things; but what else is it? If it can elevate the thoughts of man, is it itself possessed of moral attributes? Is it, for instance, a Spirit of Love? In order to understand more precisely how Wordsworth believed the Spirit, particularly as it manifested itself in the works of Nature, could influence and shape the mind of man, it will be necessary to turn chiefly to The Prelude and, by reference to it, to endeavour to answer the following questions:

(1) What, besides motion and infinitude, did Wordsworth consider the properties of the Universal Spirit to be?

(2) How did he believe man acquires knowledge of it? And

(3) In what precise sense did he maintain that Nature can educate man morally?

All quotations from The Prelude, unless otherwise stated, will be drawn from the 1805–6 version of the poem.
The Parmenidean Dogma
Authors: Stace W. T.
Published: February 2009

By the Parmenidean dogma I mean the proposition that “something cannot come put of nothing.” If you like to add the other half of the common statement it is that “something cannot become nothing.” But in this paper I shall be thinking mainly of the first proposition. I call it the Parmenidean dogma because, although it may have been implicit in much human thought before Parmenides, it was he, so far as I know, who first made it explicit in the form of an abstract metaphysical proposition.
The Organic State
Authors: Mure G. R. G.
Published: February 2009

Is the State organic? Does it, or should it, in some way transcend the individual natures of its citizens, so as itself to be an individual more complete and of higher value than the singular individuals who compose it? Is it thus in some sense an organism, and are its citizens in some sense organs of it which gain for themselves a higher value and significance in subserving it?
Bishop Butler's View of Conscience
Authors: Raphael D. Daiches
Published: February 2009

In this article I propose to examine Bishop Butler's view of the nature of moral judgment, the epistemological problem which so greatly exercised some of the British moralists of his age. I have discussed the views of four of them in The Moral Sense. The problem seems to have been peculiarly lacking in interest for Butler. This may seem at first sight an odd statement: the moral faculty, or conscience, it would be said, is the chief subject of Butler's moral writings. This is true enough. But although Butler's description of the working of conscience is unsurpassed, he gives no clear definition of the faculty. That is, he does not clearly consider the question whether the moral faculty can be said to be identical with some faculty usually called by another name, or whether it is sui generis.
Causality, Determinism and Probability
Authors: Moyal J. E.
Published: February 2009

The prediction of future events from our knowledge of past events is one of the main functions of Science. Such predictions are made possible by inferring causal relations between events from observed regularities. These relations are then codified into “laws of nature,” and it is through knowledge of these laws that prediction becomes possible. The concept of “causal relation” is thus a fundamental one in the structure of science. Now recent advances in physics have led scientists to modify considerably their views of this concept. It has been found necessary to abandon the idea of rigidly deterministic causal relations, and substitute in its stead relations that are only determined with a certain degree of probability. The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the meaning of these changes in our concepts of causality.
Values in Speaking
Authors: Findlay J. N.
Published: February 2009

I am addressing you this evening in a somewhat unfamiliar theme: that of “logical values” or “values in speaking.” I do so since the points I want to raise come up very constantly in contemporary discussion, and yet are seldom made the object of explicit reflection. There are, it is plain, a large number of qualities which appeal to us in our utterances, whether in the setting forth of our notions in words, or in the weaving of such words into sentences. And they may be said to appeal to us in a peculiar manner, and to satisfy a special set of interests in us, which we may group together as the “logical side” of our nature. Thus most people would say that clarity, relevance, coherence, solid significance and simplicity were merits in speaking, and that so also was truthful conformity to the facts of experience, whether in their general outline or their concrete detail. And everyone would admit readily that such excellences “belonged together,” that they were somehow akin, and that they differed profoundly from such virtues in speaking as poetic felicity, practical helpfulness, or moral and religious inspiration. And most people would also be willing to say, with a great deal of obscurity and most puzzling conviction, that the appeal of such qualities wasn't “merely momentary and personal,” but had something “solid” and “universal” about it, that a man would be foolish not to value such qualities, and that he couldn't help valuing them if he only thought of them sufficiently. And we should recommend such qualities to the approval of others with an air of earnestness and authority, setting them on a level, in this respect, with those other excellences that are called “ethical” and “aesthetic.” But while we could back our recommendation in the last two types of case with a great deal of systematic doctrine, built up in centuries of reflection, we should have little to bring forward in the former case, since the excellences that I want to call “logical,” though often acknowledged, have seldom been made the objects of systematic reflection. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the “true” has generally been ranged alongside of the “good” and the “beautiful” as a species of “ultimate value.”
Reason and Conduct
Authors: Smart J. J. C.
Published: February 2009

The title of this paper is in many ways a bad one, but it does have the advantage of familiarity, and so indicates a well-known group of questions. The questions which philosophers who have talked about “Reason and Conduct” have really been discussing and which they help us to answer have been these: “What are the various ways in which the words “reasonable,” ‘wise,’ ‘foolish,’ etc., are used?” “In what senses may actions and choices be called ‘reasonable,’ and are these senses of ‘reasonable’ connected in any way, and if so in what way, with the senses in which beliefs and inferences may be called ‘reasonable’?” In other words our questions are, in a broad sense of the word, logical questions, not empirical ones. It is misleading to say, therefore, as philosophers commonly do, that we are discussing the relationship between Reason and Conduct, or that we are going into the question of whether Reason can or cannot be practical. Reason is the faculty of acting reasonably. If under “acting reasonably” we include only “inferring properly,” then Reason can only be logical. If under “acting reasonably” we also include making correct inductions and concocting good theories then Reason can also be scientific. If under “acting reasonably” we include “acting morally” or “doing one's duty,” then Reason can be practical. The dispute about whether Reason can be practical is not merely verbal but trivial, and only appears not to be trivial when we hypostatize this faculty Reason and suppose it to be a thing. It then looks as though our dispute is an empirical one about what this thing Reason can do.
“Time is the Mind of Space”
Authors: Emmet Dorothy
Published: February 2009

It is a sobering experience to be giving my first Sir Samuel Hall Oration in the line of succession of Samuel Alexander. Some of his Sir Samuel Hall Orations have been published in his book on Beauty and the Other Forms of Value and the Philosophical and Literary Pieces, and they must indeed have been a joy to his audiences. I think it is fitting that I should devote this first lecture to Samuel Alexander, taking one of the central ideas of his philosophy and considering it. If some of what I have to say is critical, I think he would have thought that was all in order. “Pitch into me,” he used to say. After all, the best tribute one can pay to a philosopher is to try to go on with one's own thinking helped by the stimulus of his ideas, and often not least helped by finding oneself impelled to criticize them.
Some Recent Interpretations of John Stuart Mill
Authors: Halliday R. J.
Published: February 2009

It is usual to interpret Mill's understanding of liberty in terms deriving from his distinction in On Liberty between self-regarding and other-regarding conduct. Granted this distinction and Mill's genuine concern to define and defend it, it remains a relevant question why he attached so much importance to it. This raises a less familiar theme in Mill, namely the inter-connection of self-regarding and other-regarding conduct. An uncommitted reading of the main texts suggests an equivalent value is attached to this. Mill clearly and constantly asserts a close connection between each person's own attempt to improve himself, to cultivate his ‘affections and will’, and the social and political structure in which he acts. Self-regarding virtue and responsible social conduct are interdependent; the quality of each depends upon the quality of the other. A fuller recognition of this and its central place in Mill's revision of Bentham may be of help in examining some of the particular problems raised by recent scholarship on Mill.