bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Hegel's Correspondence Theory of Truth
Authors: Harris H S
Published: August 2016

“The world”, said Wittgenstein, “is the totality of facts, not of things”. According to the “correspondence theory”, therefore, “the truth” will be the totality of assertions that state “the facts”. In Hegel's mature theory of “truth”, this is not “philosophical truth” at all, but the ideal limit of “correct statement”.

“Philosophical truth” however – like Wittgenstein's Tractatus – is a rather special subset of “the truly assertible facts”. It is the set that contains all of the true assertions about the logical structure of human cognitive experience. Thus, it is a set of “logical facts”; and if we are to know scientifically, what “human knowledge” is, we must be able to state these “facts” correctly. Hence Hegel's theory of “truth” is not independent of his theory of “correctness”. He has a “correspondence theory” of “truth”; but “Truth” is a property of assertions about “knowledge”, not of assertions about “the world”. For this reason, the theory of “truth” becomes a complex and interesting topic in Hegel's view, and not the boringly simple matter already disposed of in the formal definition of “correctness”. What is called “the correspondence theory” does not deserve the honorific name of “theory” at all. It is a formal logical truth that can be stated in a single sentence. Only in Hegel's theory of “experience” does “correspondence” become, for the first time, interesting.
Rupture, Closure, and Dialectic
Authors: Flay Joseph C
Published: August 2016

The general intent of this paper is to examine Hegel's preoccupation with the question of beginnings. To anticipate, in Hegel's view every account in respect to its beginning – indeed, everything in respect to its beginning – is both immediate and mediated. All things therefore begin having already begun; all things begin in medias res. But if all things begin having already begun, all things begin as a rupture of one sort or another.

This necessity of rupture puts the problematic of beginnings for Hegel into clear focus: system, in order to be system, must involve closure; but because of the nature of beginnings, system must also involve rupture. A judicious view of the texts show, I think, that Hegel is not willing to give up either thesis. Consequently, if the system is to be viable, the rupture cannot efface the closure; but if the system is to begin, the closure must not efface the rupture. Rupture and closure must coexist. Hegel's concern with beginning, then, is a concern with how legitimately to initiate the system without either ignoring or effacing rupture, and without preempting the possibility of closure.

In Parts One and Two I will establish Hegel's clear awareness of rupture and of the part it plays in the system. If we examine the Preface and Introduction to the Science of Logic and to the Phenomenology of 1807 we find Hegel discussing a series of ruptures – indeed a circle of ruptures – which begin with a rupture at the beginning of the Science of Logic. There is first this rupture in the system as system, instantiated in the necessary reference by the Logic back to the Phenomenology. Behind this, there is a rupture in the Phenomenology itself in its own mediated beginnings, a rupture rooted in the immediate experience of natural consciousness. Behind this second rupture there is a third, a rupture in the contemporary Zeitgeist as it is instantiated in the natural attitude of natural consciousness. This rupture takes the form of the loss in natural consciousness of traditional certitude, a loss brought about by the incursion of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy on this natural, everyday consciousness. If we reflect back to the first rupture noted – that at the beginning of the Logic and put it into the context of this causal chain of ruptures, we see that philosophy in fact experiences a self-caused rupture. This self-caused rupture is due to philosophy's own effects on the Zeitgeist as internalized by natural consciousness at the end of the eighteenth and in the first half of the nineteenth centuries.
British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?
Authors: Stern Robert
Published: August 2016

Of all the major episodes in Hegel's Rezeptionsgeschichte, British Hegelianism can seem the most foreign and outmoded, to have the least relevance to our current understanding of Hegel's thought. Even today, we are lead back to the Young Hegelians for the problems they pose in reading his work; we can sympathise with the concerns of Peirce, Royce and Dewey that drew them to him, and the interpretative picture they developed; we can take seriously the attempts by Croce and Gentile to bring about their “reforms”, given our contemporary ambivalence to his project; and we can see how in different ways the influence of Hegel on Kojève, Sartre, Lukács and the Frankfurt School have made some of his ideas central to our times. But few feel this sense of identification and illumination on encountering the work of Hegel's British interpreters from the turn of the century; rather, in their writings we seem to find a Hegel that is darker, more distant, more difficult for us to relate to contemporary concerns.

This is not true in every respect, of course. In particular, several recent commentators have stressed how far it is possible to find here a reading and assessment of Hegel's political thought that does connect directly with many current issues, and that in this respect the thought of T H Green, Bernard Bosanquet and Henry Jones is not dead, either as a tradition within political philosophy, or as an interpretative approach to Hegel's theory of the state. Nonetheless, even those who seek to defend the importance of British Hegelianism in this regard clearly recognize that this is a fairly modest claim: for it fails to resurrect and revitalize the more fundamental aspect of the their encounter with Hegel, which was with his metaphysics – on which, as for Hegel, their political theories were based, rather than being primary in themselves. Those concerned with the political thought of the British Hegelians have not tried to take on this wider issue, leaving unchallenged the assumption that in their appropriation of his metaphysics, the British Hegelians have little to offer us either interpretatively or philosophically.
T H Green's Doubts About Hegel's Political Philosophy
Authors: Nicholson Peter
Published: August 2016

In this paper I look at T H Green's use of Hegel, with specific reference to political philosophy. I try to assess in particular the limits which Green set to his use of Hegel. I begin by considering briefly Green's knowledge of Hegel, and the extent to which Hegel's ideas can be discerned in his writings. Then I discuss a famous passage which is usually cited as expressing a serious reservation about Hegel's view of politics. I conclude that it is by no means clear how Hegelian Green is: and that this is not a question which Green would have thought important.

Green died suddenly, weeks before his forty-sixth birthday. He left no autobiography to help us trace his intellectual debts, and we have to rely on the evidence of his writings together with the recollections of his friends. Consequently it is impossible to be certain how much of any particular author Green read. Writers on philosophy were not then generally expected to support every statement with references. Green himself seldom appends footnotes which reveal his sources. Furthermore, his friend and first biographer Nettleship tells us, Green

never overcame his native repugnance to wide reading. He liked, as he used to say, to ‘browse’ amongst books, and it was by brooding over the great sayings of philosophers rather than by traversing their systems in detail, that he seemed to get most of his intellectual nourishment. His mind was reflective, not accumulative.
Collingwood's Reform of Hegelian Dialectic
Authors: Peters Rik
Published: August 2016

The relation between Collingwood and Hegel has been mentioned very often but so far it has seldom been the subject of a thorough inquiry. Collingwood himself is for a large part responsible for this situation because he never expressed his debts to Hegel's philosophy. In the Idea of Nature and in the Idea of History, both published posthumously, Collingwood confines himself to a critical account of Hegel's philosophy of nature and history. The quality of Collingwood's interpretations in both works however, leads one to suspect that Collingwood had a very profound knowledge of Hegel's philosophy. This suspicion is confirmed by Collingwood's manuscripts in the Bodleian Library which show clearly that Collingwood studied Hegel much more thoroughly and continuously than his interpreters have assumed so far. In the manuscripts we find long and profound commentaries on Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, on his Science of Logic and on all parts of the Encyclopedia. The material in the Bodleian is so abundant that a whole book would be needed to interpret it satisfactorily. In this paper, however, I will restrict myself to the kernel of the Hegel's and Collingwood's philosophies which is the dialectic.

It needs no comment that Hegel's system is thoroughly dialectical. About the dialectical character of Collingwood's philosophy, however, many interpreters have their doubts and even when they admit, always after long discussion, that some parts of Collingwood's thought are dialectical, they immediately claim that these parts are not the best.
McDowell's Kant: Mind and World
Authors: Bird Graham
Published: August 2016

McDowell's Mind and World is a commentary on a traditional, dualist, epistemology which puzzles over, and offers accounts of, a fundamental division between mental, subjective items, and non-mental, objective items in experience. The principal responses to that tradition which McDowell considers are those of Davidson's coherentism, Evans's form of realism, and Kant; but it is Kant's famous B75 text which occupies centre stage:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.

(Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind).

I shall unfortunately say nothing of the philosophical import of McDowell's reflections on these positions, for my aim here is to focus on his account of Kant. My view is that his account is fundamentally mistaken, and I can indicate the points of disagreement in two related ways. First, as McDowell stresses, his Kant is Strawson's Kant. But, as I have argued elsewhere Strawson's Kant is not Kant, and so McDowell's Kant is not Kant either. Second, more specifically, Strawson's Kant has notoriously two sides, light and dark, insightful and monstrous, in which the dark side, the so-called ‘Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism”, cannot be eliminated, and McDowell follows Strawson in this. Indeed in Strawson's The Bounds of Sense that dark side has equal status with the more promising insights, although more recently he has modified that strong view. My claim is that this bizarre dualism, and especially the dark side which McDowell unwisely calls the “transcendental story” (MW p 41), are not present in Kant in anything like the way that Strawson and McDowell suppose.
The Reciprocity Thesis in Kant and Hegel
Authors: Patten Alan
Published: August 2016

Following Henry Allison's terminology in his book Kant's Theory of Freedom I shall take the reciprocity thesis to be the thesis that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts. To be free, the reciprocity thesis claims, is to be subject to the demands of morality; to be subject to the demands of morality is to be free.

Despite quite different understandings of the domains of ethics and morality, Kant and Hegel both affirm versions of the reciprocity thesis. Kant's best known statement of the thesis can be found at the beginning of Chapter III of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: “a free will and a will under moral laws”, he asserts, “are one and the same. Consequently if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality, together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the concept of freedom”. This assumption of reciprocity is an explicit premise in the subsequent argument that, since a rational agent must take himself to be free, he must consider himself subject to the moral law. And it reappears again in the Critique of Practical Reason's reversal of this argument, which claims that, since a rational agent has a sense of himself as subject to the moral law (the so-called “fact of reason”), he therefore has a consciousness of his freedom. Finally, it is worth noting that something like the reciprocity thesis underlies much of the argument of Chapters I and II of the Groundwork as well as the opening arguments of the second Critique: for in these texts Kant frequently moves directly from the proposition that the moral will must be determined independently of all of its desires and inclinations (it is free) to the conclusion that it must be subject to the moral law.
Beauties of Nature and Beauties of Art: On Kant and Hegel's Aesthetics
Authors: D'Oro Giuseppina
Published: August 2016

This paper is an attempt to sketch the general framework of Kant and Hegel's Aesthetics, which are dealt respectively in sections I and II.

The first section considers Kant's stated aims in the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, his location of judgments of taste within the problematic of reflective judgment, his treatment of reflective aesthetic judgments in the analytic of the beautiful and the distinction between objective reality and subjective universal validity. The second section provides a sketch of Hegel's division of artistic beauty into symbolic, classical and romantic art in the attempt to explain how Hegel's restriction of the subject matter of aesthetics to fine art, may shed light on his critique of Kantian ‘subjectivism’.

Kant's discussion of aesthetics is located within the problematic of reflective judgment in general, that is, within a discussion of the suitability of nature for cognition. Reflective judgments are first contrasted with determinant judgments and then divided into two kinds, aesthetic and teleological. The distinction between aesthetic and teleological reflection, captures the distinction between a kind of pleasure which arises from the conformity or harmony of imagination and the understanding, and a kind of pleasure which arises from the conformity or harmony of the understanding with reason. The fact that pleasure arises in reflective judgments in general, and is not an exclusive feature of aesthetic reflection, is not transparent from Kant's introduction, but is suggested by the claim that although the acknowledgment that the various empirical laws of nature are amenable to systematic categorization, no longer gives rise to pleasure, this is simply due to the fact that the repeated experience of the systematic unity of empirical laws, is no longer an occasion for surprise:

It is true that we no longer notice any decided pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature, or in the unity of its divisions into genera and species, without which the empirical concepts, that afford us our knowledge of nature in its particular laws, would not be possible. Still it is certain that the pleasure appeared in due course, and only by reason of the most ordinary experience being impossible without it, has it become gradually fused with simple cognition, and no longer arrests particular attention.
Kant and Hegel: Their Religious Philosophies Compared
Authors: Crichlow Harold E
Published: August 2016

Despite the existence of a Promethean strain in the history of western thought from the Pre-Socratics down to the time of Kant and Hegel, it is fair to say that mankind generally had some kind of belief in the Gods or the one God. Even before recorded history began, people felt surrounded on all sides by superior supernatural beings who inspired terror and who could only be placated by sacrifice – human, animal and plant – the stage of animism. Since Kant and Hegel, despite the rapid and growing secularisation of society and the decline of overt acts of religion in European societies which lead the word in freedom and material development, census figures show that a large number of people still hold some kind of religious belief.

The subject of religion in Kant and Hegel is too wide to be dealt with comprehensively in a paper of this kind, and I shall be looking very briefly at three areas, viz, epistemology where God is presupposed in both systems, freedom through which the religious dimension in human life is expressed, and the possibility of an after-life traditionally treated under the title of the immortality of the soul. God, Freedom and the Immortality of the Soul have been the fundamental issues that have engaged the minds of the great system-builders in philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel.
Hegel in France
Authors: Regnier Marcel
Published: August 2016

‘Hegel in France’ is a title which poses two questions: (i) the extent of French acquaintance with Hegelian thought, (ii) the influence exercised by Hegel on French philosophy. Initially it is necessary to recall what Hegel's personal contacts were with the French and the time he spent in France.

In 1818 Victor Cousin (1792–1857), who had already been to Germany in 1817, suggested going to Munich. He wrote to Hegel asking him for letters of introduction. Hegel was still at Heidelberg, but had just been named Professor at Berlin and he replied on the 5 August 1818. Cousin thus met Hegel at Heidelberg. In 1824 while accompanying the Duke of Maitebello's son in Germany he was arrested in Dresden by Saxony police at the request of the Prussians who then imprisoned him in Berlin. Hegel intervened on his behalf to free him. In 1827 Hegel visited him in Paris, a visit about which Hegel wrote extensively to his wife, and Cousin followed him back to Germany.

To what extent had Cousin, who exercised a wide influence on French universities himself, been an Hegelian and would he have contributed to the diffusion of Hegelian philosophy in France? In the important year 1828 when the change of government allowed him to take up his teaching again, he declared: ‘In Germany, a philosophy which draws its glory fran calling itself the philosophy of nature, has succeeded subjective idealism and in France if not on the ruins of, at least in the face of empiricism, a philosophy has developed which certainly has pronounced spiritual dimension. What can we conclude from these changes?
What is Living and What is Dead in Croce's Interpretation of Hegel
Authors: Bellamy Richard
Published: August 2016

Croce's appreciation of Hegel was always as ambivalent as the title of his famous study suggests. Indeed, although related to two of the major 19th century exponents of Italian Hegelianism – Bertrando and Silvio Spaventa his first encounter with Hegel had been one of almost total rejection. As he wrote to the philosopher Donato Jaja in 1892, ‘I believe that the fundamental principles, and especially the method, of that system are entirely erroneous; and the damaging consequences of this error will become plain when applied to particular disciplines’. The study of Marx and the influence of Gentile and Labriola, however, led him to review his earlier position and in 1906 to translate the Encyclopedia and to write the accompanying book What is living and what is dead in the Philosophy of Hegel. Thereafter Croce, who had already completed his Aesthetic (1902) and the first edition of the Logic (1905), was increasingly to present his own philosophy as a sustained commentary on, and development of, Hegel's philosophy. An examination of his classic study of Hegel thus provides an important insight into salient features of Croce's own philosophical system as it later developed.
Hölse, System and Subject
Authors: Pippin Robert B
Published: August 2016

Hegel, the philosopher most responsible for linking philosophy to history, appropriately argued that in his own day there simply could not be Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, or Epicureans, that one could not bring back an earlier stage of thought. In this massive two volume study Vittorio Hösle argues that, in the spirit of Hegel himself, there also cannot be contemporary Hegelians. But there can be “philosophers who attempt to mediate the tradition of objective idealism from Plato to Hegel with post-Hegelian philosophy and with contemporary science”, (p 57n) In the past many of the philosophers who have attempted such a “mediation” have concentrated on one or another aspect of Hegel's project, usually his philosophical anthropology, his social theory or political theory, his critique of modernity, theory of alienation, etc. Hösle ambitiously takes up what looks to be the most unlikely candidate for any “contemporary mediation,” Hegel's entire systematic attempt to link together “Logic”, “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit”.

Often Hösle's study is simply a survey of Hegel's systematic enterprise, providing paraphrase and plausibility where possible, summarising claims, excusing or pointing out excesses, pausing to debate other commentators, or complain about prominent mis-readings. He introduces his account with a long historical and theoretical discussion of Hegel's Encyclopedia system, and then offers a running commentary on its three major parts, devoting the largest blocks of attention to the Logic and the philosophy of objective spirit in the Rechtsphilosophie. But there is throughout one great thematic problem at issue that sets the tone of the book at the beginning and is returned to again and again.
Hegel and the New Historicism
Authors: Stern Robert
Published: August 2016

… intellectual and moral process (is) a history of increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how things really are.” (Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 9)

In an engaging recent paper, Ian Hacking has argued that Hegel is “speaking to us” once again, after a long period (in Anglo-American philosophy, at least), in which he appeared to be speaking to another audience, located in another world. He has our ear once more because our philosophical thought has once again begun to incorporate Hegelian themes, after decades in which our respective paths did nothing other than diverge. The aim of much Anglo-American philosophy has been to combine a Kantian “conceptual scheme” idealism with a late Wittgensteinian picture of the individual subject as embedded within a system of shared norms, practices and understandings; this has meant that it is now receptive to a form of “internal realism”, which also has a social, historical, contextual dimension, and it is this that many claim to have found in Hegel. As Richard Winfield has noted recently, after decades in the wilderness, Hegel is now an inspirational figure for the anti-foundationalism, anti-Cartesianism and anti-realism of the “new orthodoxy”:
Hegel's Ethical Thought
Authors: Houlgate Stephen
Published: August 2016

It is often assumed that Hegel's philosophy contains no practical dimension, no doctrine of how human beings should live, but is concerned exclusively with showing that human existence, as the product of reason, is already fully rational. As a consequence, even though Hegel's social and political thought (which is set out mainly in his Philosophy of Right) has been the subject of extensive and detailed study over the years, few commentators have ever tried to develop a Hegelian ethical theory to place alongside those of Aristotle, Kant and Mill. In his book, Hegel's Ethical Thought, Allen Wood has set himself the task of remedying this situation and, in my view, has succeeded in producing one of the most thoughtful, informative and provocative accounts of Hegel's Philosophy of Right to date.

Wood's achievement is extraordinary. He offers a coherent and sophisticated account of virtually all the major elements of Hegelian “objective spirit”, including freedom, happiness, recognition, right, property, punishment, morality, conscience, civil society, poverty, the state and history; and in the process he engages Hegel in a fascinating and highly instructive dialogue with a whole host of thinkers, including Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Fichte, J F Fries and J S Mill, in a way that exceedingly few commentators have succeeded in doing (or have even tried to do). As a result, I believe that Wood has shown conclusively that Hegel is an ethical theorist who is every bit as sophisticated as Aristotle, Kant and Mill, and whose contribution to ethical theory can no longer continue to be disparaged or ignored (as is largely the case) by contemporary students of the subject.
Hegelianism in Slovenia: A Short Introduction
Authors: Vezjak Boris
Published: August 2016

My modest aim and scope in this article is to outline the present philosophical situation in Slovenia, inasmuch as it is linked with the development of Hegelian thought and influenced by the work of Hegel. I will briefly discuss some historical characteristics of its origin, with no attempt to depict “ethnographic” features of it or to show its ideological basis. Later on I will introduce some aspects of Hegel's philosophy, as understood by Slovenian lacaniens, trying to summarize their reading of Hegel and consequently point out how deeply their work on Lacan is inspired by him. My hidden and not explicitly discussed assumption throughout this paper will be that their research, although manifestly concerned with Lacan, is for the most part inspired by Hegel, and therefore Slovenian Lacanians are actually Hegelians. I will, however, try to avoid disputing and making comments on the main views of their orientation and how they concur with Hegel — this would require an extra space for comparison of both standpoints and be too complicated hermeneutically.

Slovenia, which used to be a part of Yugoslavia, grew up in a-rigorous tradition of communist thinking with Marxism as a systematical ideological basis. This happened in almost all Eastern European countries, which shared the same destiny till the fall of the Berlin wall.

The ideological restrictions behind the so-called “iron curtain”, so typical and easily recognizable within all these countries, caused a total eclipse of almost every non-Marxist philosophy in Slovenia up to the sixties.
The Hegel Archive and the Hegel Edition
Authors: Rameil Udo
Published: August 2016

The Hegel Archive was established in 1958 by Land Nordrhein-Westphalia as the workplace for the historical-critical edition of Hegel's works, originally commissioned by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Since 1968-69, when the Archive moved from Bonn to Bochum, it has been connected with the Ruhr University. The main task of the Archive is to provide all the requirements for the edition of Hegel's collective works and to secure the continuity of planning, methodological reflection and steady execution of the editorial enterprise. For that purpose the Archive has assembled a complete (according to the present state of our knowledge) collection of works published by Hegel, his manuscripts and transcripts of his lectures, many of them in the original but most, as working material, in photocopies. Besides this collection the Archive is steadily developing a specialized Hegel library which comprises all the literature which Hegel himself possessed or knew as well as the steadily rising tide of literature on Hegel. Beyond that the Hegel Archive aims at contributing to the coordination of Hegel research, which is becoming less and less easy to survey. This happens in the first place through the annual Hegel-Studien which provide a survey of newly published Hegel literature by means of reports, reviews of books on Hegel and short summaries of essays. Beside bibliographical reports the Hegel-Studien contain contributions to historical–philosophical and systematic-philosophical Hegel research. The Beihefte (supplements) of the Hegel-Studien publish longer documents, monographs and reports of conferences organized by the International Hegel Society. To guests from abroad – on the average ten to fifteen researchers from various continents – the Hegel Archive offers a place of work.
Hegel's Last Year in Berlin
Authors: Jaeschke Walter
Published: August 2016

Hegel's last year in Berlin, the last year of his life, shows the philosopher at the height of his literary output and his influence. Since his summoning from Heidelberg to the newly established University of Berlin, his philosophical system had received detailed elaboration in the course of his intensive lecturing activity. Parallel to this inner development of Hegel's philosophy ran a growth of its external influence. The first of Hegel's Heidelberg and even Berlin students were already lecturing at Berlin and other Prussian universities. In 1827 the journal Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik was founded, which, precisely because it did not present itself as a mere organ of the school, provided Hegel's philosophy with an influence that reached beyond the subject borders of philosophy as well as beyond the borders of the Prussian state. At the threshold of his last year Hegel also reached the formal climax of his academic career: he was elected Rector. Not just Rector of any university, but of that university which stood at the centre of the newly constituted Prussian state and which, on the basis of a conception impressed upon it by Wilhelm von Humboldt, had already gained an outstanding position among German universities.. This is especially remarkable if one considers that Germany in those years, as in most years of its history, did not constitute a united nation, but was divided into several independent states. It has been said, not without justification, that in those years the German universities were the only link between the German states, cultural unity was a substitute for political unity.
The Origins of Hegel's Knowledge of English
Authors: Waszek Norbert
Published: August 2016

A detailed and full-scale study of “Hegel and the ‘Gelstesleben’ of Great Britain” is still lacking. What we have, Instead, are either rough sketches for a later painting, or individual pieces for a mosaic, of which plenty of stones have not yet been produced. It has become clear, however, that any full-scale study would Involve at least five major areas:

a) Hegel's interest in and reaction to the political life of Great Britain, from the allusion to Pitt's politics of the 1790s to the Reform Bill article of 1831;

b) Hegel's indebtedness to Scottish political economy and theory of civil society (Ferguson, Hume, Steuart, Smith);

c) Hegel's assessment of British works of art (e.g. Shakespeare, Milton, Scott) and aesthetic theories (Shaftesbury, Kames);

d) Hegel's discussion of British philosophers in the History of Philosophy (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkely, Hume, Scottish School);

e) Hegel's study of British historians (Gibbon, Hume) and his description of England's role in world history.

For the extent and dates of Hegel's contacts with these British sources, and to compare and identify them with certain passages from Hegel's writings, ths question of his knowledge of English is of considerable importance, rather than being a matter of mere biographical curiosity. However, before raising expectations too high, it must be emphasized that the present article does not provide, nor indeed pretend to provide, an ultimate answer to this question: a watertight proof has not yet come to light. What is hoped to be achieved is, firstly, to bring together the available direct and indirect evidence on the issue. Secondly, to draw some conclusions from the admittedly inconclusive material. These conclusions should be seen as first hypotheses which any scholar can scrutinize on the basis of the evidenoe presented. The greatest reward for the present attempt would be to spark off further research which eventually might result in finding further evidence.
Hegel's Political Philosophy in Italy
Authors: Magazzeni Gianni
Published: August 2016

The political philosophy of Hegel, in particular his concept of the state, acquired new impulse early in the 1930a. The crisis of the perlimentary system in Italy or rather of its liberal cultural tradition was apparently the reason for it. Yet this return to Hegel also brought about an improved ability of Italian philosophers to face the mushrooming trends of historical materialism, sociology, socialism and, of course, nationalism. They were all legacies of the very end of the past century which became realities to be deal with just afterwards. They demanded a more appropriate hermeneutic than could be provided by the spiritualism of Platonic origin or by the neo-Kantism previously dominant. Quite simply, Hegel came to be the answer of the Italian academia to a period of intense change and crisis in both political and cultural spheres. Hegel supplied a systematic rational framework within which experience could find the deeper understanding that the time seemed to require. Nonetheless his philosophy unified and internationalised the Italian cultural scene. Unification here does not imply a homogeneity of interpretation. Hegel's system had not been thoroughly mastered and so a ‘true’ understanding could not be possible. Single parts of Hegel's philosophy were not read or interpreted in keeping with the whole system, and connection, when realised, coincided more with the belief of the reader than with the intentions of the author.
Hegel, Marxism and Mysticism
Authors: Fraser Ian
Published: August 2016

Marx's comments on Hegel's philosophy have left an ambiguous legacy for Marxism. One pervasive theme, though, is the interpretation of Hegel's idealist philosophy as being shrouded in mysticism. Marx's main contribution, according to this view, was to demystify Hegel's thought through a more materialist dialectical approach. At the same time, however, there have been those who have sought to rupture this Hegel-Marx connection and purge Hegelianism from Marxism altogether. Appropriate and expunge have therefore been the two main responses to Hegel's influence on Marxism. I will argue against these traditions, however, to assert a more direct relationship between Hegel's and Marx's dialectic. To do so, I want to identify some of the main Marxist thinkers that can be linked with the two main schools above. I will term these the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist Appropriators and the Idealist Expungers. In contrast I put forward the Hegelian-Marxist Materialist school which states that ultimately the dialectic of Hegel is the dialectic of Marx. Before this, I begin by considering some examples of Marx's critique of Hegel. The leitmotif of this critique is a depiction of Hegel's dialectic as mystical or idealistic in contrast to Marx's more materialist dialectic. As we shall see, such a criticism was begun by Marx, perpetuated by Engels as ‘orthodox’ Marxism and ultimately accepted even by those who sought to place themselves within an Hegelian-Marxist tradition.
Art as Made and Sensuous: Hegel, Danto and the ‘End of Art’
Authors: Gaiger Jason
Published: August 2016

Hegel's lectures on aesthetics embrace the world history of art in its broadest sense, encompassing the advanced cultures of Asia, Egypt, and Mesopotamia as well as the specifically European tradition that extends from Classical Antiquity through to the art of the Nazarenes and the burgeoning Romanticism of his own day. This attempt to bring the different stages and forms of art into a coherent system and to tell the story of their successive unfolding from the standpoint of philosophy lies at the very heart of Hegel's aesthetics. Indeed, the detailed attention that Hegel pays to the historical development of art has led Ernst Gombrich to recognise him as the founding father of the modem discipline of art history, with all the ambivalence that this expression conveys. In this paper, however, I am concerned less with the way in which Hegel's aesthetics have informed, and continue to inform, our ongoing attempts to understand the art of the past than with the relevance that his ideas still possess in relation to the art of the present. I shall argue that Hegel's aesthetics can tell us a great deal about contemporary art and that, read in the right way, his views provide an important corrective to a significant strand of contemporary art theory.

I want to start by addressing something that must be regarded as a considerable obstacle to any such endeavour: Hegel's theory of the ‘end of art’. If, as popular conceptions of this theory would have it, Hegel saw the development of art as in some way a completed historical enterprise superseded in his own time by the new science of philosophy, not only would there seem to be little meaningful role left for art to play in his larger philosophical system but also little that such a philosophy of art can contribute to helping us understand the new and unexpected directions that art has taken, and continues to take, right up to the present day. This interpretation of Hegel's views remains highly problematic and anyone familiar with Hegel's method of argumentation will remain dissatisfied with such a one-sided representation of his position. Nonetheless, the extant text of the Lectures on Aesthetics does appear to offer some support to such claims.
This Site is Under Construction: Situating Hegel's Plato
Authors: Eckert Maureen
Published: August 2016

In this paper, I examine broad features of Hegel's interpretation of Plato from his Lectures on the History of Phihsophy, noting how these features resonate with current views of Platonic philosophy. Hegel formed his interpretation of Plato under very different circumstances than those of today. Serious study of the Platonic dialogues had come to the forefront in German Idealist philosophy. As Rüdiger Bubner notes: ‘It was this tradition of thought that discovered, in an original way of its own, the authentic Plato in place of the various mediated substitutes of before, and indeed saw him as a thinker who was to provide continuing inspiration to the needs of post-Kantian philosophy’. We find Hegel holds Plato in high esteem, most famously as a ‘teacher of the human race’ alongside Aristotle. His Plato is one who is fundamentally significant in the development of philosophy, raising it to the status of science, although not in a fully systematic manner. At the same time, Hegel distinguishes his Plato from the projects of his contemporaries, Tennemann's esoteric Plato and Schleiermacher's aesthetic Plato. Hegel also forms his view of Plato at a time just prior to the development of stylometric studies of the dialogues, begun in its earliest form by K. F. Hermann (1839) and pushed forward by Lewis Campbell and Friedrich Blass in the later half of the 19th century. (This is not to claim that questions regarding the ordering of the dialogues did not arise earlier than 1839, but that they became scientific and central in Platonic interpretation with Hermann.) The pressures Hegel negotiates in his interpretation are quite distinct, especially in this last respect, yet not altogether alien. There are, I think, interesting reasons for this. (One might think that given Hegel's strong opposition to Schleiermacher (and Hegel's disposition towards development), he might have been inclined towards a developmental reading of Plato. One also might think that given his opposition to Tennemann's esotericism, he might have had more doubts about discerning a system within Plato's unsystematic dialogues. But one would be wrong on both counts.)
The Spirit of Place: The Columbia River Watershed Letter and the Meaning of Community
Authors: Burton-Christie Douglas
Published: August 2016

This article examines the theological and ecological significance of the International Pastoral Letter on the Columbia River Watershed issued by the U.S. and Canadian Bishops in 2001. It argues that through its inclusive, participatory process, its emphasis on the watershed as a significant locus for theological reflection, and its strong moral, spiritual vision regarding what a watershed is and can be, the Letter makes a significant contribution to Catholic teaching on the environment. However, the article also claims that due to its generalizing rhetorical style, its weak vision of spirituality and its lack of a critical, prophetic edge, the Letter fails to realize its full potential. The article poses questions about the central meaning and purpose of such pastoral letters and about what the Roman Catholic community can learn from the present Letter that might strengthen future attempts to address environmental or other pressing concerns.
Hollywood's Absent, Impotent, and Avenging God in the Classroom
Authors: O'Keeffe Michael E. , Waller Kathleen
Published: August 2016

The focus of this article is twofold. First, recognizing the influence of the mass media on the religious views of many undergraduate students, it examines the negative depiction of God in several popular American films and concludes that the image of God as absent, impotent and demonic ought to be addressed in the classroom. The second issue concerns the use of film in the classroom—both to encourage students to sharpen their understanding of contemporary theology, and to then use this theology as a basis for understanding and evaluating the religious messages carried by contemporary films. The films explored are What Dreams May Come, Dogma, The End of the Affair, The Rapture, and Stigmata.
Catholicism & Sexuality: The Sounds of Silence
Authors: McCormick Patrick T.
Published: August 2016

The episcopal silence and secrecy associated with the recent pedophilia scandal echoes a larger inability of the Catholic episcopal hierarchy to enter into open and honest dialogue about a wide range of sexual issues. For more than three decades the chasm between official teachings on sexuality and gender and the belief and/or practice of the majority of Catholic laity, clergy and theologians (and an unknown number of bishops) has been growing. Still, attempts to address or bridge this divide have met with a fourfold silence. It is a silence that has kept bishops from speaking their true minds, a silence sought by restricting, investigating and sanctioning theologians, a silence that renders pastors mute or covert on sexual matters, and a silence that ignores the experience and voices of women. Such a silence undermines magisterial authority and deprives Catholics of a useful and persuasive sexual ethic, while marginalizing those willing to speak out and demoralizing those who feel they cannot.
Public Theology, Private Religion?
Authors: Loewe William P.
Published: August 2016

What does one say in a presidential address? First of all, and as always, it is good, and very good, for us to be here as we come together to renew the bonds of collegial respect and affection that make our Society unique. Looking back on the events of the past two years, however, “difficult” hardly begins to describe them. That short period saw the bishops of the United States acquiesce to Rome's demand for a juridical implementation of canon 812, and we have been wrestling both individually and as a society with the ramifications of that decision. Then, dwarfing all else, there burst upon us the towering horror of 9/11 with its awful images of fiery destruction and plummeting human bodies. Where that leaves us as a nation remains to be seen, but the specious practicality of Realpolitik seems to be the order of the day. An Afghan wedding party becomes “collateral damage,” while a spiral of violence sweeps over the Holy Land, engulfing even Bethlehem, birthplace of the Prince of Peace. At the same time the church that looks to him as its founder staggers through a sordid scandal of clerical sexual abuse and hierarchic cover up. We mourn and lament as even our heroes sink into the quagmire. On a personal level, this two-year term began with news that my father had fallen ill, and I attended his deathbed shortly before our board meeting last November. These have been a difficult two years.
Teilhard's Vision and the Environment
Authors: Hill Brennan R.
Published: August 2016

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin was a pioneer in integrating modern science and Christian theology. He was also a mystic who throughout his life and writings attempted to share the ways in which the divine was the source, power and goal of all creation and to point out how spirit glowed within all of matter. Teilhard's vision of the earth can be most helpful today as we attempt to restore and sustain our environment. In this article I will explore Teilhard's deep reverence for the cosmos and humanity, as well as his views on how God's power works through Christ and the church. Along the way I will suggest how this vision might be linked to our contemporary concerns for our environment. I will close with some recommendations for updating Teilhard's vision so that it might better serve our present day needs.
Theology in a Catholic University: Newman's Significance for Today
Authors: Connolly John R.
Published: August 2016

The article presents an analysis of Newman's understanding of theology and its role in the Catholic University of Ireland. In explaining Newman's understanding of university theology, the article focuses on two elements of Newman's thought. The first is Newman's understanding of theology as a form of liberal knowledge. An application of the elements of liberal knowledge to theology reveals the main characteristics of Newman's understanding of university theology. The second is Newman's understanding of the relationship between the church and the university. Newman distinguishes between the mission of the Catholic Church and the mission of the Catholic university. The distinct mission of the university indicates that the objective of university theology is different from the teaching mission of the magisterium. In the final section, the article examines the significance of Newman's ideas for Catholic universities in the United States today.
Continuity Amidst Disruption: The Spirit and Apostolic Succession at the Reformation
Authors: Thompson-Uberuaga William
Published: August 2016

What light might a greater attentiveness to the role of the Holy Spirit radiate over the tangled question of apostolic succession and the validity of orders? Here I have in mind the question of orders in the Protestant communities, as understood from a Roman Catholic perspective, although the question is relevant to some of the Eastern Orthodox and other Eastern Christian churches as well. For although it is commonly held, given the teaching of Vatican II (Unitatis Redintegratio, Decree on Ecumenism, no. 15) and later papal teaching (John Paul II, Ut Unum Sint, no. 50), that Catholics recognize the validity of orders of the Orthodox, the recognition is not always mutual.

The typical Roman Catholic view of the “Protestant question,” if I may abbreviate it in this way, is that an unbridgeable break—a radical disruption—occurred at the Reformation in both the form and the matter of apostolic succession. That is, the teaching (or doctrine) about orders, as well as the concrete, institutionalized forms of its presence in the threefold diaconate-priesthood-episcopacy, were fatally disrupted at the Reformation. Apostolic succession was thereby fatally flawed, at least as regards ordained ministry. And this fatal flaw was in turn reflected in the liturgical rites and larger ecclesial institutional forms of the Protestant communities.
Towards a Comparative Christology
Authors: Carmody John
Published: August 2016

This article speculates on opening Christology to categories from the comparative study of religion. First, it describes the taxonomical work of scholars like R. Otto, M. Eliade, and G. Van der Leeuw, suggesting how such might be applied to New Testament data. Next, it studies Jesus as a numinous figure, concluding that he manifests the holy in the peculiar modality of love. “Holy Love” to Jesus' signal relation with God. It concludes that such insights are complementary, if not superior, to those from ontological approaches.