bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts
Authors: Battaglini Marco
Published: December 2005

We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to models with perfectly informed experts, because of this trade-off, full revelation of information is never possible. However, almost fully efficient information extraction can be obtained in two cases. First, there is an equilibrium in which the outcome converges to the first best benchmark with no asymmetric information as we increase the precision the experts' signals. Second, the inefficiency in communication also converges to zero as the number of experts increases, even when the residual noise in the experts' private signals is large and all the experts have significant and similar (but not necessarily identical) biases.
Backward Induction and Model Deterioration
Authors: Squintani Francesco
Published: December 2005

The issue of how players' model of a game may evolves over time is largely unexplored. We formalize this issue for games with perfect information, and show that small-probability model deterioration may upset the complete-model backward induction solution, possibly yielding a Pareto-improving long run distribution of play. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the robustness of backward induction. These conditions can be interpreted with a forward-induction logic, and are shown to be closely related to the requirements for asymptotic stability of the backward induction path under standard evolutionary dynamics.
Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
Authors: Guriev Sergei
Published: December 2005

We study an incomplete contract model where both contracting parties can invest, and the investments have both self- and cross-effects. We analyze the performance of non-contingent contracts, message games, option contracts and property rights. We find that the first best is implemented if (i) the cross effects are negative or weaker than self-effects; (ii) the strength of cross-effects relative to self-effects is symmetric across parties. If either of these conditions is violated, even message contingent revelation mechanisms fail to provide efficient incentives. For this case, we obtain a number of results characterizing the second best. We find that property rights outperform contracts and partially relax the symmetry constraint. In either first best or second best, the stronger the cross-effects, the lower the value of contracting. The optimal allocation of property rights assigns ownership to the party with stronger cross-effects.
Optimal Dynamic Portfolio Risk with First-Order and Second-Order Predictability
Authors: Gollier Christian
Published: December 2005

We consider a two-period portfolio problem with predictable assets returns. First-order (second-order) predictability means that an increase in the first period returns yields a first-order (second-order) stochastically dominated shift in the distribution of the second period state prices. Mean reversion in stock returns, Bayesian learning, stochastic volatility and stochastic interest rates (bond portfolios) belong to one of these two types of predictability. We first show that a first-order stochastically dominated shift in the state price density reduces the marginal value of wealth if and only if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger than unity. This implies that first-order predictability generates a positive hedging demand for portfolio risk if this condition is met. A similar result is obtained with second-order predictability under the condition that absolute prudence be uniformly smaller than twice the absolute risk aversion. When relative risk aversion is constant, these two conditions are equivalent. We also examine the effect of exogenous predictability, i.e., when the information about the future opportunity set is conveyed by signals not contained in past asset prices.
A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities
Authors: Park In-Uck
Published: December 2005

Customers of network commodities face coordination problems due to adoption externalities that give rise to multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. We investigate the extent to which the coordination problem can be resolved by inducement schemes when agents' preferences are private information. Specifically, we show that all symmetric ``cutoff strategy'' profiles constitute the set of profiles uniquely implementable under an inducement scheme. We derive the ex ante cost of implementing each such profile and characterize simple inducement schemes of the following form that implement it: each scheme specifies a fixed fee that every adopter pays, and a fixed gross subsidy/prize to be randomly allocated to the adopters. We discuss the implications of these findings on the design of optimal schemes for different network organizers. We extend the analysis to preference revelation mechanisms and prove a revenue equivalence result and characterize optimal mechanisms, but find that unique implementation is no longer possible.
Utility Equivalence in Auctions
Authors: Hon-Snir Shlomit
Published: December 2005

Auctions are considered with a (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model of valuations. It shall be demonstrated that a utility equivalence principle holds for an agent if and only if she has constant absolute risk aversion.
Forward Discount Bias, Nalebuff's Envelope Puzzle, and the Siegel Paradox in Foreign Exchange
Authors: Edlin Aaron S.
Published: December 2005

The bias of forward exchange rates as a predictor of future spot rates is typically explained or decomposed as (1) a risk premium and (2) a convexity term which accounts for the fact that, when there is stochastic inflation, nominal gains from forward currency speculation are higher than real ones and correspondingly losses are smaller. We use Nalebuff’s envelope puzzle to explain a third source of bias which involves real profits from foreign exchange speculation. Both the "real profit" bias and stochastic inflation bias arise from convexity of g(s)=1/s and so derive from Jensen's inequality as observed by Siegel (1972).
Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
Authors: Feinberg Yossi , Tennenholtz Moshe
Published: December 2005

We consider a single indivisible object auctioned in an ascending bid English auction. Two variations of this auction are compared with respect to the seller's revenue. In the first mechanism the participants observe the identity of a bidder that drops from the auction while in the second variation they only observe that someone has dropped, however this bidder remains anonymous. We show that the anonymous mechanism could yield a higher expected revenue to the seller and that, generically, neither auction format dominates the other with respect to revenue maximization.
Non-robustness of some economic models
Authors: Prasad Kislaya
Published: December 2005

This paper considers the robustness of optimal decisions in a model of monopoly and a model of competitive equilibrium in a securities market. Robustness, defined as payoffs being continuous with respect to perturbations in the underlying model, fails to hold for either model. Decision rules are made robust by appropriately "smoothing" the problem, and by decreasing the weight given to small details of belief that can cause large changes in optimal payoffs.
On Non-responsiveness in Adverse Selection Models with Common Value
Authors: Morand Pierre-Henri , Thomas Lionel
Published: December 2005

In common value models, it is possible that the full information efficiency and the incentive constraint require the quantity of full and asymmetric information to move in opposite directions with the type. This conflict is called non-responsiveness. Most of those models share the features that when there is conflict, the optimal contract is pooling otherwise it is separating. In this note, we will show that, in fact, the robustness of the links between the conflict and separating contracts is not a general consequence of the common value models: it depends crucially on the assumption made in all those models that the principal's marginal benefit from trade with full information is not distorted by the presence of informational rents.
A Theory of Vague Expected Utility
Authors: Manzini Paola , Mariotti Marco
Published: December 2005

We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which combines an 'economic' view of decision making - based on a rational, though incomplete, ordering - with a 'psychological' view - based on heuristics. This theory can explain observed violations of EU theory, namely all cyclical patterns of choice as well as violations of independence.
Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
Authors: Gill David , Sgroi Daniel
Published: December 2005

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
Auctions and Posted Prices in Directed Search Equilibrium
Authors: Julien Benoit , Kennes John , King Ian Paul
Published: December 2005

We compare equilibrium allocations in directed search models where prices are determined alternatively by posting and by competing auctions, with the following results. With finite numbers of players, sellers' expected payoffs are higher when all sellers auction than when all sellers post. This difference is largest in the 2-by-2 case, where payoffs to sellers are 1/3 higher if they auction. The difference in the payoffs decreases rapidly with market size and vanishes in the limit "large" economy. When sellers can choose whether to post prices or auction in the 2-by-2- case, all combinations (auction-auction, post-post, and auction-post) can occur in equilibrium if sellers choose mechanism and price simultaneously. However, if sellers choose mechanism before price then the dominant strategy equilibrium has both sellers auctioning.
The Relationship between Stock Prices, House Prices and Consumption in OECD Countries
Authors: Ludwig Alexander , Sløk Torsten
Published: December 2005

This paper analyzes the relationship between stock prices, house prices and consumption using data for 16 OECD countries. The panel data analysis suggests that the long-run responsiveness of consumption to permanent changes in stock prices is higher for countries with a market-based financial system than for countries with a bank-based financial system. Splitting the sample into the 1980s and 1990s further shows an increased sensitivity in the 1990's of consumption to permanent changes in stock prices for both countries with bank-based financial systems as well as countries with market-based financial systems. The relationship between changes in consumption and changes in house prices is positive for the second sample period across all specifications and financial systems.
A Simple Locally Interactive Model of Ergodic and Nonergodic Growth
Authors: Corradi Valentina , Ianni Antonella
Published: December 2005

In this paper we provide a simple locally interactive dynamic model of technology choice and output production. We assume a Cobb-Douglas type production function for two available technologies. The returns to technology 0 are not affected by local spillovers. Technology 1 is more costly, as there is an overhead cost, but it has a higher marginal productivity with respect to net capital. The superiority of technology 1 positively and monotonically depends on the fraction of neighbours using it. We study the aggregate process of technology choices in a model with countably many firms and repeated choices. The model explains: (i) persistent aggregate fluctuations in the presence of only idiosyncratic shocks, (ii) cross sectional heterogeneity along the dynamics and (iii) the possibility of multiple equilibria. The main contribution of the paper over the existing literature is that the model explains the endogeneous formation of large areas, homogeneous in terms of technology choice and output level, that look stationary along the dynamics.
Strictly Endogenous Growth with Non-renewable Resources Implies an Unbounded Growth Rate
Authors: Groth Christian
Published: December 2005

Conventional endogenous growth theory relies on the assumption of constant returns to "broad capital". As Solow pointed out, the strength of this assumption is revealed by recognizing that even the slightest touch of increasing returns creates explosive growth: infinite output in finite time! But Solow's observation ignored natural resources. What happens if non-renewable resources enter the "growth engine"? In this case (strictly) endogenous growth requires the technology to be such that there is no upper bound on the sustainable per capita growth rate. This corroborates Solow's skepticism.
The Output Gap, Expected Future Inflation and Inflation Dynamics: Another Look
Authors: Mehra Yash P
Published: December 2005

The empirical test of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is often implemented by estimating a hybrid specification that includes both lagged and future inflation and then by examining whether the estimated coefficient on future inflation is significantly larger than the one on lagged inflation. This article presents evidence that supply shocks matter. Results in previous research – the output gap is irrelevant and expected future inflation is the major determinant of inflation – arise if the hybrid specification is estimated omitting supply shocks and/or lagged inflation. With supply shocks included, the output gap is significant and the estimated coefficient on lagged inflation is significantly larger than the one on future inflation. The estimated coefficient on lagged inflation is unity if in the hybrid specification inflation responds also to a change in the output gap. Together these results suggest that expected future inflation is not the major determinant of current inflation.
Assessing Aggregate Tests of Efficiency for Dynamic Economies
Authors: Barbie Martin , Hagedorn Marcus , Kaul Ashok
Published: December 2005

In a seminal contribution Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser (1989) show that from an aggregate dynamic perspective the US economy is Pareto efficient. We argue that, when applying their test, they implicitly make strong assumptions about the economy's future behavior. We show how time series evidence may easily lead to wrong conclusions about the welfare properties of real world economies.We present a test criterion based on Zilcha (1991) and robust evidence that the US economy does not overaccumulate capital. Our contribution highlights that the distinction between efficient capital accumulation and Pareto efficiency is empirically relevant. The latter efficiency benchmark - encompassing also risk sharing issues - cannot be rigorously tested based on available approaches in the literature.
The Scope of Monetary Policy Actions Authorized Under the Federal Reserve Act
Authors: Small David H. , Clouse James
Published: December 2005

The Federal Reserve Act authorizes the Federal Reserve to undertake various types of discount window loans and open market operations. While the Federal Reserve generally has not found it necessary to use all types of such authority, there could be circumstances in which the Federal Reserve might need to consider utilizing its statutory authority more broadly than it has in the past.We examine the limits imposed by the Federal Reserve Act along two dimensions: those types of counterparties and financial instruments with which the Federal Reserve may conduct monetary policy. In doing so, we develop a theme not commonly pursued in the literature -- the ways and extent to which the Federal Reserve Act limits the Federal Reserve from taking credit risk onto its balance sheet.We also provide some historical perspective on how the current powers of the Federal Reserve came to be authorized.
Non-Scale Models of R&D-based Growth: The Market Solution
Authors: Steger Thomas M.
Published: December 2005

The market solution of a general R&D-based endogenous growth model is developed. The model is general in two respects: First, general formulations are used and restrictions are only introduced provided that these become necessary. Second, each factor of production (labour, capital and technological knowledge) is allowed to be productive in each sector (final output, capital goods and R&D). Since the resulting R&D-based growth model encompasses a large number of specific models, it can be viewed as a summary of this strand of the literature. The complete dynamic system as well as the balanced growth rates are derived. By employing numeric techniques, the gap between the decentralised and the centralised balanced growth path as well as the transitional dynamics implications are investigated.
Hiccups for HIPCs? Implications of Debt Relief for Fiscal Sustainability and Monetary Policy
Authors: Burnside Craig , Fanizza Domenico
Published: December 2005

In this paper we discuss fiscal and monetary policy issues facing heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPCs) who receive debt reduction via the enhanced HIPC initiative. This debt relief program is distinguished from previous ones by its conditionality: freed resources must be used for poverty reduction. We argue that (i) this conditionality severely limits the extent to which the initiative provides significant debt relief; (ii) depending on the response of monetary policy to an increase in social spending there could be a short-run increase in inflation in HIPC countries and (iii) the keys to long-run fiscal sustainability in the HIPCs are significant fiscal reforms by their governments, and the effectiveness of their poverty reduction programs in raising growth.
Bailouts and Bank Runs in a Model of Crony Capitalism
Authors: Femminis Gianluca , Ruggerone Luigi
Published: December 2005

We present a simple multiple equilibria model that incorporates the functioning of crony capitalism. We find that a government which is keen to support the interests of the élite is ready to stand the risk of a bank run since this is part of an equilibrium where investments are heavily subsidized, which favors the élite. However, we find that the liaison between the government and the business community is not per se sufficient to induce vulnerability of financial institutions to panic: the willingness to favor the élite also provides an incentive to rescue the banking system in the event of a run. This stabilizing effect dominates when the élite is relatively large. We also study how a policy of banks recapitalization may contribute to the stability of the banking institution. In fact, such a policy can make credible an ex post recovery of the financial system, thus preventing the panic from generating a self-fulfilling bank crisis.
Explaining Speculative Expansions
Authors: Xiao Wei
Published: December 2005

In this paper we use a modified neoclassical business cycle model to test two competing explanations of the expansion of the 1990s. The model can have indeterminate, multiple equilibria that give rise to expectation-driven business cycles. We fit into the model series of estimated speculative and productivity shocks and compare its predictions with empirical data. Our results suggest that the speculation hypothesis has more explanatory power than the productivity hypothesis in terms of matching the data. Speculative behavior of investors, therefore, may have contributed to the investment boom, the prolonged expansion, and the subsequent recession of the period 1991-2001.
The Effects of Reducing Firing Costs in Spain: A Lost Opportunity?
Authors: Osuna Victoria
Published: December 2005

In the mid 80's, many European countries liberalized the use of fixed-term (temporary) contracts in order to lower firm's non-wage labor costs, instead of reducing firing costs associated with indefinite duration (permanent) contracts. This policy generated segmented labor markets. The Spanish case is the most striking, with a share of temporary employment of 33% by the mid 90's. Since then, several reforms have been suggested and in this paper I quantify some of their effects. First, I build a model of job creation and destruction of the search and matching type that is able to generate the main properties of a segmented labor market like the Spanish one. Then, I use his model to quantify the effects of removing procedural wages, and further reductions in firing costs associated with permanent contracts. The main results are: (i) a small increase in permanent job destruction, (ii) a significant reduction in temporary job destruction, mainly driven by the increase in job conversions from temporary contracts into permanent ones, and (iii) a significant reduction in labor market segmentation measured as the reduction in the wage gap of temporary versus permanent workers.
The Effects of Industrialization on Education and Youth Labor in Indonesia
Authors: Federman Maya , Levine David I.
Published: December 2005

This study examines the relationship between growth in manufacturing employment and youth outcomes in Indonesia from 1985 to 1995, a time of rapid industrialization. In comparison with cross-national studies, this study has a larger sample size of regions, defines data more consistently, and conducts better checks for causality and specification. We also distinguish between the effects of manufacturing employment in the region and in the household and explore potential causal mechanisms underlying the observed correlations. Overall, manufacturing employment in the region modestly increases enrollment and decreases labor force participation for male and female young teens. At the household level, employment of adult females in manufacturing is associated with lower enrollment and higher labor force participation for young women relative to young men.
International Currency
Authors: Wright Randall , Trejos Alberto
Published: December 2005

We develop a two-country, two-currency, search-theoretic model of monetary exchange, extending previous such models by endogenizing prices using bargaining theory. We analyze features of the environment that make it more likely that a given money circulates internationally. We show the value of a given currency rises if it circulates abroad, and falls if foreign money circulates locally. Also, we show that international monies have more value at home than abroad. These results help to explain the otherwise anomalous observation that the US dollar is an outlier in the empirical relationship between income and PPP deflators.
Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games under Uncertainty
Authors: Blanchard Olivier , Weil Philippe
Published: December 2005

In a dynamically efficient economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.
Is Fair Dealing a Workable Concept for European Contract Law?
Authors: Hoch Marjorie
Published: December 2005

In this paper I will try to determine whether good faith and fair dealing make a couple or whether fair dealing has its own existence and, if not, to which concepts it can be linked. I will also try to determine whether fair dealing can be or become one of the common principles of European contract law. In order to decide whether fair dealing is a workable concept for European contract law, it is first necessary to determine whether it is a workable concept for English law. I will first try to determine whether fair dealing is a concept at all and whether it is necessary. Then I will demonstrate to what extent a general concept of fair dealing would constitute a legal irritant to the legal structure of English law and still to what extent fair dealings substance might fit the evolutionary spirit of English law. As a result, I will be able to determine to what extent fair dealing is a workable concept for future European contract law.
Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining
Authors: Helpman Elhanan , Persson Torsten
Published: December 2005

We examine the effects of the interaction between lobbying and legislative bargaining on policy formation. Two systems are considered: a US-style congressional system and a European-style parliamentary system. First, we show that the policies generated are not intermediate between policies that would result from pure lobbying or from pure legislative bargaining. Second, we show that in congressional systems the resulting policies are strongly skewed in favor of the agenda-setter. In parliamentary systems they are skewed in favor of the coalition, but within the coalition there are many possible outcomes (there are multiple equilibria) with the agenda-setter having no particular advantage. Third, we show that equilibrium contributions are very small, despite the fact that lobbying has a marked effect on policies.
Does Federal Research Funding Increase University Research Output?
Authors: Payne A. Abigail , Siow Aloysius
Published: December 2005

This paper estimates the effects of federal research funding on research outcomes at 68 research universities. We provide a new interpretation of the instrumental variable estimate of the coefficient in a regression of the output of an institution on an input. Absent parameter heterogeneity, it captures the total change in output when an institution obtains an additional unit of the input that may be correlated with the other inputs that affect the output measure. Our instrument for research funding is alumni representation on U.S. Congressional appropriations committees. Our results suggest an increase of $1 million in federal research funding (1996$) to a university results in 10 more articles and 0.2 more patents. The change in citations per article is negative but very small and imprecisely measured. As a first approximation, increasing federal research funding on the margin results in more, but not necessarily higher quality, research output.
A Laboratory Study of Customer Markets
Authors: Cason Timothy N. , Friedman Daniel
Published: December 2005

In our laboratory customer markets, sellers post price and buyers incur cost (controlled at zero, low and high values) when they switch to a new seller. Sellers’ production costs follow various random walks in 28 sessions, each with 50-100 trading periods.

We find that prices are sticky, and sellers absorb almost half of their cost shocks. Transaction prices are about 10 percent higher when buyers face positive switch costs, and trading efficiency is slightly impaired. Experienced buyers switch about 10 percent of the time with either high or low switch costs. Buyers switch more often when they face a higher posted price, have a lower valuation for the good, face lower switch costs, have more time remaining, and have more favorable information on alternative prices. Sellers price higher when they have more attached buyers, when buyers have less information on rivals’ prices, when rivals post higher prices, and when less time remains.
The Value of Information in International Trade: Gains to Outsourcing through Hong Kong
Authors: Feenstra Robert C , Hanson Gordon H. , Lin Songhua
Published: December 2005

In this paper, we estimate the benefits to countries that purchase goods from China by having access to intermediary services provided in Hong Kong. Traders in Hong Kong supply information on markets and producers in China, which provides welfare gains to foreign firms using these services. During the 1990s, Hong Kong intermediated about one-half of the goods that China exported to the rest of the world. Using constant elasticity demand curves, we find that the gains to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong are roughly equal to the value of these Hong Kong re-exports, and four to five times larger than the markups earned in Hong Kong. Using a linear approximation to the demand curves instead, we find that the gains are one-quarter as much as the value of re-exports, or slightly larger than the markups.
Protection and the Business Cycle
Authors: Bagwell Kyle , Staiger Robert W.
Published: December 2005

Empirical studies have repeatedly documented the countercyclical nature of trade barriers. In this paper, we propose a simple theoretical framework that is consistent with this and other empirical regularities in the relationship between protection and the business cycle. Focusing on self-enforcing trade agreements, we find theoretical support for countercyclical movements in protection levels. The fast growth in trade volume that is associated with a boom phase facilitates the maintenance of more liberal trade policies than can be sustained during a recession phase in which growth is slow. We also find that acyclic increases in the level of trade volume give rise to protection, implying that whether rising imports are met with greater liberalization or increased protection depends on whether they are part of a cyclic upward trend in trade volume or an acyclic increase in import levels.
The Unintended Disincentive in the Clean Air Act
Authors: List John A. , Millimet Daniel L , McHone Warren
Published: December 2005

The Clean Air Act and its subsequent amendments have been lauded as the primary stimulant to the impressive improvement in local air quality in the US since 1970. A key component of these regulations is the New Source Review (NSR) requirement, which includes the contentious stipulation that when an existing plant seeks to modify its operations, the entire plant must comply with current standards for new sources. This requirement was included to improve air quality in dirty areas, and prevent a deterioration of air quality in clean areas. Yet, whether NSR provides the proper plant-level incentives is unclear: there are strong disincentives to undertake major plant modifications to avoid NSR. In our examination of more than 2500 and 2200 plant-level modification decisions and closures, respectively, we find empirical evidence suggesting that NSR retards modification rates, while doing little to hasten the closure of existing dirty plants.
Unilateral Emission Reductions and Cross-Country Technology Spillovers
Authors: Golombek Rolf , Hoel Michael
Published: December 2005

With limited participation in an international climate agreement, standard economic analysis suggests that a unilateral action taken by a group of countries in order to reduce its emissions is likely to be undermined by increases in emissions from other countries (carbon leakage). While analyses of carbon leakage typically have regarded the technology in each country as given, abatement technologies are in reality endogenous, and thus technology development may be affected by environmental policies. We demonstrate that with endogenous technologies and technology diffusion between countries, it is no longer obvious that reduced emissions in some countries will increase emissions in other countries. We identify cases in which reduced emissions in some countries might reduce emissions also in other countries.
Aggregation of Non Stationary Demand Systems
Authors: Adda Jérôme , Robin Jean-Marc
Published: December 2005

This paper studies under which conditions a cross-sectional regression yields unbiased estimates of the parameters of an individual dynamic model with fixed effects and individual-specific responses to macro shocks. We show that the OLS estimation of a relationship involving non stationary variables on a cross-section yields estimates which converge to the true value when calendar time tends to infinity. We then consider the particular case of an AI demand model, and we show, using French quarterly aggregate time-series, that budget shares, relative prices and the log of real total expenditure are I(1) and form a cointegrated system. We compare these macro estimates to estimates obtained from three Family Expenditure Surveys and find large differences.
Optimal Liability for Libel
Authors: Bar-Gill Oren , Hamdani Assaf
Published: December 2005

Although courts justify the constitutional law of libel with consequential reasoning, the true consequences of liability for harmful speech have never been fully explored. We construct an analytical framework for studying libel law, emphasizing both the positive and negative externalities generated by the publication of information. Our model highlights two distinct decisions that a publisher faces, the verification decision and the publication decision. We first demonstrate that a single damage measure for publication of false libelous information, such as the damages equal harm measure, cannot simultaneously induce socially optimal decisions regarding verification and publication. We then argue that the damage measure should depend on the efficacy of the verification process. Interestingly, when verification is reasonably effective, the damage award should be set equal to the social benefit from truthful publication. Our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for important elements of current libel law. It also suggests practicable avenues for reform.
The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Exploring a Fresh Specification
Authors: Bradford David F. , Fender Rebecca A , Shore Stephen H. , Wagner Martin
Published: December 2005

The objective of this paper is primarily methodological. Using a new specification, we reanalyze the data on worldwide environmental quality investigated by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger in their well-known paper on the environmental Kuznets curve (which postulates an inverse U-shaped relationship between income level and pollution). This new specification avoids using nonlinear transformations of potentially nonstationary regressors in panel estimation, which is a major unresolved econometric problem plaguing much of the existing literature. We furthermore draw conclusions from fixed effects estimation, which had eluded Grossman and Krueger. Our estimation results indicate the presence of an EKC for only six of the fourteen pollutants, whereas Grossman and Krueger find support for all but one pollutant.
Endogenous Preferential Trade Agreements: An Empirical Analysis
Authors: Magee Christopher S
Published: December 2005

This paper provides one of the first assessments of the hypothesis that two countries are more likely to form a preferential trade agreement (PTA) if they are already major trading partners. The paper also tests a number of predictions from the political economy literature about which countries are expected to form regional agreements. The results show that countries are more likely to be preferential trading partners if they have significant bilateral trade, are similar in size, and are both democracies. Finally, the paper measures the effect of preferential agreements on trade volumes while, unlike previous studies, treating PTA formation as endogenous.
Oligopoly Deregulation and the Taxation of Commodities
Authors: Metcalf Gilbert E. , Norman George
Published: December 2005

We examine market structure and optimal commodity taxation in a world in which firms produce differentiated products and can exert some degree of market power. Building on Kay and Keen (1983), we model two forms of product technologies, two forms of market entry structures, and two forms of pricing. This yields eight models providing a richer analysis of the role of taxes as regulatory tools than could be provided in Kay and Keen's analysis. In the presence of price discrimination, tax policy loses much of its effectiveness at serving as a substitute for direct regulation. Moreover, in cases where taxes can influence market structure, subsides rather than taxes may be required to achieve optimum market structure. Our results should remove the presumption that has developed over the past twenty years that the ad valorem tax rate should be positive to discourage excess entry in imperfectly competitive markets.
Quantity Controls, License Transferability, and the Level of Investment
Authors: Krishna Kala M , Tan Ling Hui , Ranjan Ram
Published: December 2005

This paper models investment/entry decisions in a competitive industry that is subject to a quantity control, either on output or on a production input. The quantity control is implemented via the sale of licenses for the restricted output/input. We show that liberalizing the quantity control could reduce investment in the industry under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the level of investment in the industry is different depending on whether the licenses are tradable or not. Key factors to consider are the elasticity of demand for the final good and the degree of input substitutability. Two examples are presented to illustrate the results.
Cost Recovery, Efficiency, and Economic Organization for Water Utilities
Authors: Loehman Edna T.
Published: December 2005

This paper describes a new method of utility pricing  Variable Unit Pricing (VUP)  that results in both economic efficiency and cost recovery for a variety of supply situations faced by water utilities. The main advantage of VUP  compared to Increasing Block Rates  is that its parameters can be objectively determined from demand and cost information.The theoretical support for VUP is a welfare economics paradigm that integrates pricing with economic organization. VUP is shown to achieve social efficiency for a fixed-fee contractual arrangement between a profit-maximizing water utility and a public agency.Public involvement is required to express equity concerns, demand for public goods such as water quality and security, and to identify appropriate supply limits for conservation.
Pricing Coordination Failures and Health Care Provider Integration
Authors: Eggleston Karen , Norman George , Pepall Lynne Marie
Published: December 2005

The rise of managed healthcare organizations (MCOs) and the associated increased integration among providers has transformed US healthcare and at the same time raised antitrust concern. This paper examines how competition among MCOs affects the efficiency gains of improved price coordination achieved through integration. MCOs offer differentiated services and contract with specialized and complementary upstream providers to supply these services. We identify strategic pricing equilibria under three different market structures: overlapping upstream physician-hospital alliances, upstream-downstream arrangements such as Preferred Provider Organizations, and vertically integrated Health Maintenance Organizations. The efficiency gains achieved depend not only on organizational form but also on the toughness of premium competition. We show that, contrary to popular thinking, providers and insurers do not earn maximum net revenue when they are monopolies or monopsonies, but rather at an intermediate level of market power. Furthermore, closer integration of upstream and downstream providers does not necessarily increase net revenues.
A Minimum of Rivalry: Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth
Authors: Carlin Wendy , Schaffer Mark , Seabright Paul
Published: December 2005

This paper examines the importance of competition in innovation and the growth of firms. We make use of the large-scale natural experiment of the shift from an economic system without competition to a market economy to shed light on the factors that influence innovation by firms and their subsequent growth, thereby alleviating problems due to non-random clustering of innovation opportunities in mature market economies. We find evidence that monopolies innovate less and have weaker growth than firms facing a minimum of rivalry. The presence of competitors has both a direct effect on performance, and an indirect effect, through improving the efficiency with which the rents from market power in product markets are utilised to undertake innovation. There is also some less clear-cut evidence of an 'inverted-U', namely that the presence of a few rivals is more conducive to performance than the presence of many competitors.
Threats Without Binding Commitment
Authors: Shavell Steven , Spier Kathryn E.
Published: December 2005

This paper explores the power of threats in the absence of binding commitment. The threatener cannot commit to carry out the threat if the victim refuses payment, and cannot commit not to carry out the threat if payment is made. An important assumption of the model is that once the threat is carried out it cannot be repeated. If exercising the threat is costly to the threatener, then the threat cannot succeed in extracting money from the victim. If exercising the threat would benefit the threatener, however, then the threat's success depends upon whether the threat may be repeated after a payment is made. In the equilibrium of a finite-period game, the threat is carried out and the victim makes no payments. In an infinite-horizon game, however, it is an equilibrium for the victim to make a stream of payments over time. The expectation of future payments keeps the threatener from exercising the threat.
Is More for the Poor Less for the Poor? The Politics of Means-Tested Targeting
Authors: Gelbach Jonah B. , Pritchett Lant
Published: December 2005

Standard economic analysis suggests that when the budget for redistribution is fixed, income transfers should be targeted to (i.e. means-tested for) those most in need. However, both political scientists and economists long have recognized the possibility that targeting might undermine political support for redistribution. We formalize this recognition, developing a simple economy in which both non-targeted (universally received) and targeted transfers are available for use by the policymaker. When the budget can be taken as fixed, full use of the targeted transfer is optimal. However, when we allow the budget to be determined through majority voting (with the policymaker choosing the share of the budget to be spent on each type of transfer), the optimal degree of targeting is zero. More strikingly, we show that if the policymaker naively ignores political considerations, the resulting equilibrium actually minimizes not only social welfare, but also the welfare of poor and middle income agents. Thus political considerations cannot generally be regarded as simply another “small" extension of standard models. As a result, future models and actual policies advocating the use of targeting through means-testing should account explicitly for the role of political considerations.
The Uncertain Wage - Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy
Authors: Gan Li
Published: December 2005

In this paper, we introduce uncertainty into Akerlof and Yellen (1990)'s fair wage effort hypothesis. In this uncertain fair wage hypothesis, employers do not have perfect information concerning an employee's perception of a fair wage, but assume the perceived fair wage is distributed as a random variable with a known distribution. Our wage model, built on this hypothesis, is applied to analyze the widely adopted policy of wage secrecy, suggesting a wage secrecy policy is more likely to produce higher satisfaction for employees and higher profit for employers.
System Components, Network Effects, and Bundling
Authors: Clements Matthew T.
Published: December 2005

I investigate the competition between suppliers of components of a system for which there are network effects among users. Bundling one of these components with an outside good reduces the cost to consumers of using the system. This cost reduction is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, and bundling can also reduce welfare by decreasing innovation incentives. The model is used to evaluate Microsoft's bundling of Windows with Internet Explorer and its effect on competition with Netscape.
How Should Unemployment Benefits Respond to the Business Cycle?
Authors: Kiley Michael T.
Published: December 2005

Unemployment insurance programs balance the benefits of consumption smoothing against the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits. This balance is likely sensitive to the cyclical state of the economy, and hence the generosity of benefits should also respond to the business cycle. The nature of such responses in an optimal unemployment insurance (UI) program is analyzed in a simple model. The results suggest that an optimal UI program would increase the initial level of benefits and probably extend higher benefits over time in response to a recessionary shock. In the simple model, an extension of benefits, such as exists automatically in the system in the United States, provides poorer insurance and poorer incentives than the optimal program, and does so at a higher cost. Moreover, the UI system in the U.S. provides a substantially higher level of welfare to workers who lose jobs during tight labor markets.
The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems
Authors: Gans Joshua S , King Stephen P
Published: December 2005

There has been considerable public debate over the effect of interchange fees on credit card transactions. Regulators in Australia and Europe have argued that these fees can be set by banks to have an anticompetitive effect. In the US, it has been argued that these fees, together with a rule that prevents a surcharge for credit purchases, might create a cross subsidy between cash and credit customers. Academics have noted that, in particular circumstances, interchange fees have no real effects in the absence of such a no-surcharge rule. This paper demonstrates that the potential neutrality of interchange fees is a general result. We show that in the absence of a no surcharge rule or, alternatively, if there is perfect competition at the merchant level, interchange fees can be changed without leading to any real effects. This result does not depend on the degree or nature of competition at either the bank or the merchant level. We conclude that the elimination of no surcharge rules may provide practical policy solutions for authorities concerned about the level of interchange fees.
Do Long Work Hours Contribute to Divorce?
Authors: Johnson John H.
Published: December 2005

Despite frequent claims in the popular press that Americans are working longer hours to the detriment of their families, little academic research has directly tested this proposition. I provide new descriptive evidence on the link between work hours of married couples and the likelihood that a couple will get divorced. Using samples of working couples from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, I uncover several key facts: First, the incidence of divorce is much greater when both spouses are working than when only one spouse is employed. Second, the work hours of women are more highly correlated with divorce than are the work hours of men. Finally, despite these robust correlations, it is difficult to attribute a causal effect of work hours to divorce propensity.
WTO Negotiations on Market Access in Agriculture: a Comparison of Alternative Tariff Cut Proposals for the EU and the US
Authors: Bureau Jean-Christophe , Salvatici Luca
Published: December 2005

This paper provides a summary measure of the possible new commitments in the area of agricultural market access undertaken by the European Union and the United States, using the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) as the tariff aggregator. We take the 2001 bound tariffs as the starting point and attempt to assess how much liberalization in agriculture could be achieved in the European Union and the United States as a result of the present negotiations. We compute the index for 20 agricultural commodity aggregates under the actual commitments assuming a specific functional form for import demand. We compare the present levels of the TRI with three hypothetical cases: a repetition of the same set of tariff cuts commitments of the Uruguay Round according to a EU proposal prior to the 2003 WTO ministerial meeting, a uniform 36% reduction of each tariff, an harmonization ( "Swiss" ) formula based on the initial US proposal.