bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Liberty and Compulsory Education
Authors: Gardner Peter
Published: November 2010

Although it is primarily concerned with the value of liberty and the justification of compulsory education, what lies behind much of this paper is the question ‘;Why treat children like children?’ The fact is that we do not regard children as having the same rights, privileges and liberties as adults, and children may not be thought of as deserving the same degree of respect or consideration as their seniors. In the past this has led to some horrific states of affairs, and while matters have undoubtedly improved, it is still the case that most people accept what Graham Haydon describes as ‘;the assumption that one thing can go for children and quite another for adults’. One likely consequence of this, and an important example of the different treatment reserved for children is compulsory education. Illiterate and innumerate adults are not compelled to practise their letters or play with counters or watch prescribed television programmes. Even when, to quote Mill, we have an adult ‘;who shows rashness, obstinacy and self-conceit—who cannot live within moderate means—who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgencies—who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect’, we do not subject him to character-building games or uplifting scripture readings, or initiate him into the mysteries of home economics, or read Shakespeare at him. But we compulsorily do all of this and more to children. Moreover, compulsory education, as we have it, is not something from which the young can gain remission. The law that requires ‘;every child of compulsory school age…to receive an efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude’ effectively defines an approach where what counts is the arbitrariness of chronology, not standards or excellence.
Providing health information to older adults
Authors: Sadowski Cheryl A
Published: November 2010

Providing information to older adults is essential for informed decision-making and good health. Because there are significant deficits in providing information verbally, health professionals must use written information as well. Most studies have focused on the content and literacy of documents. However, the legibility and formatting are critically important for older adults, who are more likely to suffer with visual impairment. Providing written information that is tested for appropriate reading level and for presentation is necessary to ensure that older adults can use the information given. There are a number of tools available that test these aspects of written information, but not one tool that is universally accepted. Further research regarding the design and presentation of written information for older adults is necessary.
Influenza in aged care facilities
Authors: Lindley Richard I
Published: November 2010

Seasonal influenza remains a common cause of morbidity and mortality for older residents in aged care facilities. Whilst prevention is best managed by high vaccination rates for the general population, residents and aged care facility staff, new research suggests that a more active approach to surveillance and anti-viral treatment now plays an important role. The practicalities of managing an influenza outbreak are complex and best planned in advance with written protocols available. Good infection control remains a vital part of prevention and outbreak control.
The absence of public exchange banks in medieval and early modern Flanders and Brabant (1400–1800): a historical anomaly to be explained
Authors: Aerts Erik
Published: November 2010

The article aims to present an explanation for the complete absence of public municipal banks in the Southern Low Countries, and particularly in its two main principalities Flanders and Brabant, between 1400 and 1800. The reasons were complex, lying in a combination of the presence of adequate substitutes such as money changers, cashiers and town exchange offices (stadswissels) and countervailing factors (adverse economic conditions, insufficient financial resources, special interests of persons and lobbies). It is also argued that strong government control of the Antwerp urban debt prevented the local authorities from experimenting with a municipal bank.
Language, Interpretation and Worship—I
Authors: Warner Martin
Published: November 2010

‘There is a kind of eloquence’, maintained St Augustine,

which is manifestly inspired by God. Biblical writers have spoken with this kind of eloquence. … ‘On the other hand’ they have uttered some passages with a beneficial and salutary obscurity (salubris obscuritas), to exercise and, in a sense, to polish the minds of their readers, to break down aversions and spur on the zeal of those who are anxious to learn, as well as to conceal the meaning from the minds of the impious. (Augustine 1947: IV.6.9; IV.8.22, with one amendment to the translation)
Trouble with Leprechauns
Authors: Hollis Martin
Published: November 2010

The impulse to philosophy is often provided by leprechauns, mischievous little sprites who lurk at the end of fine chains of reasoning and make trouble. They delight in absurdity and paradox, and are especially happy to help ambitious thinkers dig their own graves. Philosophers spend much of their lives trying to put a stop to leprechauns or fencing them out with the aid of reason. But in truth the relationship is symbiotic. If a realm of thought can be made fully coherent, there is no work for philosophers to do in it. Science is the obvious case but the remark applies, paradoxically, to philosophy itself. A philosopher who solved all the problems of philosophy would be about as popular as a huntsman who shot the fox or a theologian who proved the existence of God. Luckily there is no serious risk. At least on the view of philosophy to be taken here, there will always be leprechauns to keep us busy.
The Roots of Philosophy
Authors: White John
Published: November 2010

Some people think that the impulse to philosophise begins in early childhood: Gareth Matthews, for instance, in his Philosophy and the Young Child (1980). His book begins ‘TIM (about six years), while busily engaged in licking a pot, asked, “Papa, how can we be sure that everything is not a dream?’” ‘Tim's puzzle,’ he tells us, ‘is quintessentially philosophical. Tim has framed a question that calls into doubt a very ordinary notion (being awake) in such a way as to make us wonder whether we really know something that most of us unquestioningly assume we know.’
Congenital Transcendentalism and ‘the loneliness which is the truth about things’
Authors: Cioffi Frank
Published: November 2010

I take the phrase ‘congenital transcendentalism’ from Santayana who defined it as ‘the spontaneous feeling that life is a dream’. ‘The loneliness which is the truth about things’ is a phrase of Virginia Woolf's. The thesis I will advance is that many expressions of doubt or denial of the shareable world are self-misunderstood manifestations of the state indicated by Woolf's expression. But the loneliness of which Woolf speaks must not be construed as the kind of loneliness which can be assuaged by family, friends, lovers or company. Nor is it the loneliness which a convinced solipsist might experience. It is rather the loneliness of ‘that “I” and that “life of mine'” which is ‘untouched whichever way the issue is decided whether the world is or is not’ (Husserl, 1970, 9.)
Beyond Representation
Authors: Palmer Anthony
Published: November 2010

So stellt der satz den Sachverhalt gleichsam auf eigene Faust dar.

Foreword. Towards the end of this paper I refer to the work of A. J. Smith who died suddenly on 11 December 1991. His last book, Metaphysical Wit, was published in January 1992 by Cambridge University Press. I would like this paper to be thought of as a small tribute to the man and his work.
Philosophy and the Cult of Irrationalism
Authors: Almond Brenda
Published: November 2010

Philosophy, as I conceive it, is a journey and a quest. Conducted individually, it is nevertheless a collective attempt on the part of human beings from differing cultures and times to make sense of the arbitrary contingency of human existence, to find meaning in life. So understood, the impulse to philosophise needs no explanation or apology. It belongs to us all, and it exerts its own categorical imperative. Here I may quote the words of a wise woman, an invented contributor to this debate, who spoke of the common mind, the common store of wisdom which has the power to outlast the individual. ‘For this’, she said, ‘is what philosophy is: not an esoteric discipline, but the common endeavour of the human race to understand and come to terms with its own perilous, fragile and ultimately ephemeral existence’ (Almond, 1990, 185).
A Tale of Three Karls: Marx, Popper, Polanyi and Post-Socialist Europe
Authors: Marquand David
Published: November 2010

The human race, to which so many of my readers belong, has been playing at children's games from the beginning… [O]ne of the games to which it most attached is called… ‘Cheat the Prophet’. [The prophets] took something or other that was certainly going on in their time, and than sait it would go on more and more until something extraordinary happened. … The players listen very carefully and respectfully to all that the clever men have to say about what is to happen in the next generation. The players then wait until att the clever men are dead, and bury them nicely. They then go and do something else.
Politics, Religion, and National Identity
Authors: Graham Gordon
Published: November 2010

This essay is not a further contribution to the debate about liberal individualism, the chief topic of discussion in political and social philosophy for the last twenty-five years or more. Nevertheless it is necessary to begin by rehearsing some features of that debate, claims that will be very familiar to contemporary political philosophers. Inspired largely by John Rawls, the modern version of political liberalism has tried to make coherent a conception of politics according to which political affairs should be separated, or at least seriously distanced, from the various moral and religious loyalties and programmes of individuals and groups of citizens. This central contention of Rawlsian liberalism has been expressed in different ways, but according to one of the commonest versions, it is to be interpreted as the view that the right must take precedence over the good. That is to say, in the political sphere, the implementation and application of impartial rules of social justice and civil liberty (the right) must take precedence over competing conceptions of what is or is not a valuable way of spending a human life (the good). Another familiar way of expressing the same doctrine says that the state must be neutral with respect to the moral alternatives with which a modern pluralistic society presents its members. This claim about state neutrality is most easily illustrated by a notable example; whether homosexuality is morally wrong or not is not the business of the legislator, and thus the goodness or badness of a gay lifestyle is a matter on which the law should be neutral.
Popular Culture and Public Affairs
Authors: Appleyard Bryan
Published: November 2010

Recently I saw a corporate TV advertisement for the American television network ABC. It showed brief shots of people in other countries—France, Japan, Russia and so on. These people were doing all kinds of things, but they weren't watching television. Americans, the commentary told us, watch more TV than any of these people. Yet America is the richest, most innovative, most productive nation on the planet. ‘A coincidence’, concluded the wry, confident voice, ‘we don't think so’.
Welfare and the State
Authors: Phillips Melanie
Published: November 2010

Once upon a time, there was a consensus in this country that the welfare state was the jewel in the crown of the post-war settlement. It was a national badge of moral worth. It was held to embody certain virtues that people told themselves were the hallmark of a civilised society: altruism, equity, dignity, fellowship. It defined Britain as a co-operative exercise which bound us together into a cohesive society. Or so we told ourselves.
Educating for Citizenship
Authors: Alton David
Published: November 2010

Two short paragraphs, 42 and 43, in the White Paper, Excellence in Schools, published in July 1997, announced the UK government's intention to educate for citizenship:

Schools can help to ensure that young people feel that they have a stake in our society and the community in which they live by teaching them the nature of democracy and the duties, responsibilities and rights of citizens.
Being Human: Science, Knowledge and Virtue
Authors: Haldane John
Published: November 2010

In February 1997, following the announcement that the Roslin Institute in Scotland had successfully cloned a sheep (‘Dolly’) by means of cell-nuclear transfer, US President Clinton requested the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to review legal and ethical issues of cloning and to recommend federal actions to prevent abuse. In the meantime he directed the heads of executive departments and agencies not to allocate federal funds for ‘cloning human beings’. The Commission consulted with members of relevant academic disciplines and other professions, representatives of interest groups and members of the general public, and received written submissions. Unsurprisingly, given the prospect of human cloning and the sensational announcement in January 1998 by the American physicist-cum-embryologist Richard Seed that he would aim to clone himself (subsequently he has decided that his wife would be a better subject), public debate in the US has been fairly voluble.
Liberal Man
Authors: Mendus Susan
Published: November 2010

I begin with two quotations: one from Anthony Crosland's Socialism Now, the other from Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. Crosland says:

experience shows that only a small minority of the population wish to participate [in politics]. I repeat what I have often said—the majority prefer to lead a full family life and cultivate their gardens. And a good thing too … we do not necessarily want a busy, bustling society in which everyone is politically active and fussing around in an interfering and responsible manner, and herding us all into participating groups. The threat to privacy and freedom would be intolerable.
Libertarianism: some conceptual problems
Authors: Barry Norman
Published: November 2010

Perhaps the most remarkable event in social thought of the last twenty years has been the resurgence of various strands of individualism as political doctrines. The term ‘individualism’ is a kind of general rubric that encompasses elements of nineteenth century classical liberalism, laissez-faire economics, the theory of the minimal state, and an extreme mutation out of this intellectual gene pool, anarcho-capitalism. The term libertarianism itself is applied indiscriminately to all of those doctrines. It has no precise meaning, except that in a general sort of way libertarianism describes a more rigorous commitment to moral and economic individualism and a more ideological approach to social affairs than conventional liberalism. I suspect that its current usage largely reflects the fact that the word with the better historical pedigree, liberalism, has been associated, in America especially, with economic doctrines that are alien to the individualist tradition.
‘The darkness of this time’: Wittgenstein and the Modern World
Authors: Bouveresse J.
Published: November 2010

In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations, written in 1945, Wittgenstein remarks that: ‘It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain or another—but, of course, it is not likely’ (PI, viii). There was quite obviously no question for him of endeavouring to dissipate the darkness of the age itself, but at the most of introducing light into a small number of receptive minds, the existence of which he considered, moreover, as problematical. In a rough draft of the preface to the Philosophical Remarks that he wrote in 1930 he says:

I realize … that the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe. (CV, 6)
Wittgenstein's Influence: Meaning, Mind and Method
Authors: Grayling A. C.
Published: November 2010

In the first and shorter part of this essay I comment on Wittgenstein's general influence on the practice of philosophy since his time. In the second and much longer part I discuss aspects of his work which have had a more particular influence, chiefly on debates about meaning and mind. The aspects in question are Wittgenstein's views about rule-following and private language. This second part is more technical than the first.
Does Popper Explain Historical Explanation?
Authors: Minogue Kenneth
Published: November 2010

It is one of Karl Popper's great distinctions that he has an intense—some would say too intense—awareness of the history of philosophy within which he works. He knows not only its patterns, but also its comedies, and sometimes he plays rhetorically against their grain. He knows, for example, that the drive to consistency tends to turn philosophy into compositions of related doctrines, each seeming to involve the others. Religious belief, for example, tends to go with idealism and free will, religious scepticism with materialism and determinism. Popper does not believe in a religion, was for long some kind of a socialist, and takes his bearings from the philosophy of science. Aha! it seems we have located him. Here is a positivist, a materialist, probably a determinist. But of course he denies he is any of these things. Again, like many modern thinkers, he wants to extend scientific method not only to the social sciences but also to history. So far so familiar, until we discover that he regards nature as no less ‘cloudy’ than human societies.
What Use is Popper to a Politician?
Authors: Magee Bryan
Published: November 2010

Some years acquire symbolic status, and one such year is 1968. All over Europe and the United States university students exploded into violent rebellion. Insofar as this would-be revolution had an ideology it was unquestionably Marx-inspired, even if the Marxism was not always orthodox. It so happens that in the years 1970–1971 I was teaching philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford. And because of Oxford University's system, almost unique, of individual tuition for undergraduates, this meant I found myself in a continuing one-to-one relationship with bright students who were in the throes of revolutionary fervour.
Ethical Foundations of Popper's Philosophy
Authors: Kiesewetter Hubert
Published: November 2010

If an economist or an economic historian speaks about ethical or moral problems, one should be suspicious. Karl Popper continually repeated that he did not want to preach, and I believe that his deep-rooted distrust of modern philosophical moralists, who usually preach water and drink cognac, led to his not writing a greater work on ethics. Nevertheless he was a moral person, and perhaps we can learn more about his cosmology, his methodology, and about his philosophy in general if we probe into some of the ethical foundations of his life and his thinking. It may become apparent to you that I do not refer primarily to Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies or other works of his political writings alone. In choosing not to do so, it is my intention to demonstrate that all his thinking is deeply rooted in ethics.
Cultural Realism: the ancient philosophical background
Authors: Evans J. D. G.
Published: November 2010

I understand Pluralism to be the doctrine that, either generally or with reference to some particular area of judgement, there is more than one basic principle. It endorses the possibility that some particular case may arise which will be adjudicated in one way if one principle is applied while another principle points otherwise and to an answer which, at least in practice, is incompatible. Thus in morality, according to pluralism there may be more than one correct answer to the question of which of the decisions available in some particular situation is the best (Kekes, 1993, esp. pp. 9–15; see also the valuable collection of essays Paul, Miller and Paul, 1994).
A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism
Authors: Bunting Harry
Published: November 2010

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense.
Rawlsians, Pluralists, and Cosmopolitans
Authors: Ingram Attracta
Published: November 2010

Some of us were introduced to political philosophy as an activity of identifying, criticising, and revising the moral basis of existing social institutions. We asked questions about the nature of the good or the just society, and some few of us thought that once we knew and advocated the truth, it would win out. We, or some appropriate revolutionary or reforming group or class, would with reason, truth, and history on our side, bring about the society of our ideals. When we first read John Rawls's A Theory of Justice we read it as continuing the traditional tasks of political philosophy. Justice as Fairness was a moral theory which addressed a political subject matter. From the moral point of view it told us what any just society aiming to realise the values of liberty and equality would be like. This comported nicely with liberal cosmopolitanism, and also with more widely shared philosophical views that the task of political philosophy is to construct a vision of an ideal society, perhaps more sensitive to justice in implementation than would be required in pre-modern, pre-democratic societies, but nevertheless an ideal which in the long run we would hope to see all societies converge on. That kind of liberalism gave those of us who think that Rawlsian justice is the right or true justice a license to go on the offensive in promoting liberal ideals and practices in our own society, and, at the very least, a critical vantage point from which to judge other societies.
Tragedy, Moral Conflict, and Liberalism
Authors: Mendus Susan
Published: November 2010

The central question of this paper is how modern liberal political theory can understand and make sense of value pluralism and the conflicts upon which it is premissed. It is a commonplace that liberalism was born out of conflict, and has been partly characterised ever since as a series of attempts to accommodate it within the framework of the nation state (Lukes, 1989, p. 139). However, it is also true that liberals have proposed many different routes to the resolution, or containment, of conflict, and these different routes are manifestations of different understandings of conflict itself both within an individual life and between lives. Thus, some assert the irreducible heterogeneity of value: John Stuart Mill famously inveighs against the attempt to model all human life on a single pattern and tells us that ‘human beings are not sheep, and even sheep are not indistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him unless they are either made to his measure or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from; and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat?’ (Mill, 1978, p. 133). On Mill's account, plurality is the natural (and indeed desirable) condition of humanity. We should neither hope for nor expect the elimination of conflict, and a world in which there is diversity is richer and better for it.
Interpretation in History: Collingwood and Historical Understanding
Authors: Gardiner Patrick
Published: November 2010

When considering a suitable topic for inclusion in this collection, it occurred to me that it might be worth discussing a writer whose interests were largely centred on themes directly related to those cited in the collection's title, and who throughout most of his philosophical career remained particularly insistent upon the need to define the boundaries separating humanistic modes of understanding from ones associated with the physical sciences. The writer in question was R. G. Collingwood. Although Collingwood has justly been credited with perceptive insights into the metaphysical origins and presuppositions of natural science, as well as with raising pointed questions concerning the nature of conceptual change in scientific thought, he had in fact little first-hand knowledge of the subject and it is not in this sphere that his chief claims to importance and originality lie. Rather, they are to be found in an area with which he was certainly intimately acquainted and in which as a practitioner he helped to make significant discoveries on the ground. That was history, a discipline requiring in his view a type of thinking that had either been ignored by his philosophical contemporaries or else misconceived and distorted by those who had troubled to consider it. Thus, as a result of making a serious effort on his own account to come to terms with what it involved, he became—in his own words at the time—‘more and more conscious of being an outlaw’.
Perictione in Colophon
Authors: Scruton Roger
Published: November 2010

The following extract comes from a recently discovered Xanthippic dialogue, which tells the story of Archeanassa's return to her native Colophon. Archeanassa travelled, it appears, as the emissary of Plato, who had instructed her to recover the manuscripts of the poet Antimachus, ostensibly for the library of the Academy, but in all probability to take revenge on the poet by burning his literary remains. (See Phryne's Symposium, 1176a, for an account of the distressing relationship between these three people.) The dialogue exists only in fragments: some concern Archeanassa's adventures on the journey, others describe the city of Colophon, now a Persian administrative centre, its Greek culture extinguished, its temples in ruins, and its streets darkened by high-rise buildings. The inhabitants visit the town either for work, or for the girls who dance in the night-clubs. One such girl is Perictione, grand-daughter of the great Perictione, whose talent as a dancer would have been famous throughout Hellas, had not her son Plato done his utmost to conceal it. How Perictione the younger came to Colophon the dialogue does not tell, although it seems that she lived well and independently, was a leading member of the Greek community, and retained the interest in philosophy which had been awakened at Phryne's symposium.
Value in Nature and the Nature of Value
Authors: Rolston Holmes
Published: November 2010

I offer myself as a nature guide, exploring for values. Many before us have got lost and we must look the world over. The unexamined life is not worth living; life in an unexamined world is not worthy living either. We miss too much of value.
Rehabilitating Nature and Making Nature Habitable
Authors: Attfield Robin
Published: November 2010

Can nature be reconstituted, recreated or rehabilitated? And would the goal of doing so be a desirable one? There again, is wild nature intrinsically valuable, or are parks, gardens and farms sometimes preferable or of greater value? This cluster of questions arises from recent debates about preservation, restoration, wilderness and sustainable development. In discussing them I hope to throw some light on both the concept and the value of nature, and in due course on the attitudes which people should have towards it, the policies which should guide their practice, and thus on the proper role of humanity with regard to the natural world.
Personalistic Organicism: Paradox or Paradigm?
Authors: Ferré Frederick
Published: November 2010

Many environmental thinkers are torn in two opposing directions at once. For good reasons we are appalled by the damage that has been done to the earth by the ethos of heedless anthropocentric individualism, which has achieved its colossal feats of exploitation, encouraged to selfishness by its world view—of relation-free atoms—while chanting ‘reduction’ as its mantra. But also for good reasons we are repelled, at the other extreme, by environmentally correct images of mindless biocentric collectivisms in which precious personal values are overridden for the good of some healthy beehive ‘whole’.
Awe and Humility: Intrinsic Value in Nature. Beyond an Earthbound Environmental Ethics
Authors: Lee Keekok
Published: November 2010

This paper will argue for a conception of intrinsic value which, it is hoped, will do justice to the following issues:

(1) that Nature need not and should not be understood to refer only to what exists on this planet, Earth;

(2) that an environmental ethics informed by features unique to Earth may be misleading and prove inadequate as technology increasingly threatens to invade and colonize other planets in the solar system;

(3) that a comprehensive environmental ethics must encompass not only our attitude to Earth, but to other planets as well—in other words, it must not simply be an Earthbound but virtually an astronomically bounded ethics.
Environmental and Medical Bioethics in Late Modernity: Anthony Giddens, Genetic Engineering and the Post-Modern State
Authors: McNally Ruth , Wheale Peter
Published: November 2010

A controversial question among contemporary scholars is whether advanced industrial societies are still in modernity, or whether they are on the threshold of, or even have entered, a new postmodern order (see, for example, Bell, 1973; Lyotard, 1986, p. 14; Lash and Urry, 1987). In The Consequences of Modernity Anthony Giddens writes: ‘Beyond modernity, we can perceive a new and different order, which is “post-modern”, but this is quite distinct from what is at the moment called by many “post-modernity”’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 3). However, he does recognize that there is something perceptibly different about the present, which he characterizes as ‘late modernity’ (or ‘high modernity'), an era in which the consequences of modernity are more radicalized and globalized than before (Giddens, 1990, pp. 3, 51).
Editor's Introduction
Authors: Walsh D. M.
Published: November 2010

The papers collected in this volume are the proceedings of the 1999 Royal Institute of Philosophy conference: the theme of the conference, the same as the title of this collection, Naturalism, Evolution and Mind. The essays collected here cover a wide array of disparate themes in philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology and the philosophy of science. They range in subject matter from the mind/body problem and the nature of philosophical naturalism, to the naturalization of psychological norms to the naturalization of phenomenal and intentional content, from the methodology cognitive ethology to issues in evolutionary psychology. They are united by the simple thought that the great promise of current naturalism in philosophy of mind resides in its potential to reveal mental phenomena as continuous with other phenomena of the natural world, particularly with other biological phenomena.
The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning
Authors: Papineau David
Published: November 2010

When I woke up a few days ago, the following thoughts ran through my mind. ‘I need a haircut. If I don't get it first thing this morning, I won't have another chance for two weeks. But if I go to the barber down the road, he'll want to talk to me about philosophy. So I'd better go to the one in Camden Town. The tube will be very crowded, though. Still, it's a nice day. Why don't I just walk there? It will only take twenty minutes. So I'd better put on these shoes now, have breakfast straight away, and then set out for Camden.’
Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality
Authors: Millar Alan
Published: November 2010

According tothe rationality thesis, the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricably tied to rationality. How in this context should we conceive of rationality? In one sense, being rational is contrasted with being non-rational, as when human beings are described as rational animals. In another sense, being rational is contrasted with being irrational. I shall call rationality in this latter senseevaluative rationality. Whatever else it might involve, evaluative rationality surely has to do with satisfying requirements of rationality such as, presumably, the following:

(1) That one avoid inconsistency in beliefs.

(2) That one not adopt new beliefs unless what one knows entails or is evidence for the truth of those beliefs.

(3) That one not have φing as a goal yet do nothing necessary for one to φ. (Means/end requirement.)
Ayer and World Views
Authors: Copleston Frederick
Published: November 2010

As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical (LTL, 2nd edn, 41). In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ (as distinct from ‘immanent’) metaphysics (Walsh, 1963). This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments.
On the relation between Common Sense, Science and Metaphysics
Authors: Körner Stephan
Published: November 2010

Among A. J. Ayer's many influential contributions to philosophy are the accounts of the nature of metaphysics which he propounded at various stages of his philosophical development. Whereas his early position is a clear version of the antimetaphysical attitude of the Viennese circle and, more generally, of logical positivism, his later position is, as he generously emphasized, in some crucial respects indebted to Peirce's pragmatism and to Ramsey's analysis of the structure of theories. His later views on the nature of metaphysics are contained in his book Central Questions of Philosophy and in his reply to my criticisms in a Festschrift, published on the occasion of his retirement from the Wykeham Chair of Philosophy at Oxford University (Macdonald, 1979). Although in this reply he describes his later account of metaphysics as ‘much too perfunctory’, it does constitute an important attempt at answering one of the central questions of philosophy.
Seeing Qualia and Positing the World
Authors: Honderich Ted
Published: November 2010

It is the business of philosophy to deal without presupposition with the question of the general nature of the world and with the question of how or indeed whether we can know that nature. These are questions to which answers are given in the realism of ordinary belief, as it can be called, the phenomenalism of Berkeley, the pragmatism and the scientism of Quine, and the varieties of scepticism. The ontological and the epistemological questions are bound up with another, that of the nature of perception—the question of what it is, in general, that happens when we perceive. What is called naive realism is an answer, as are representation theories, and phenomenalism again. If the question might be better defined, so as to distinguish it from the related scientific question, it is no matter of mere conceptual analysis. Let us start with this question of the nature of perception.
VIII. The significance of recalcitrant emotion (or, anti-quasijudgmentalism)
Authors: D'Arms Justin , Jacobson Daniel
Published: November 2010

Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises from the dominant tradition in the philosophy of emotion. We will be attempting to steer a middle course between the traditional view and some recent, empirically-minded criticism.
IX. The Logic Of Emotions
Authors: Ben-Ze'ev Aaron
Published: November 2010

The issue of whether emotions are rational (or intelligent) is at the centre of philosophical and psychological discussions. I believe that emotions are rational, but that they follow different principles to those of intellectual reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to reveal the unique logic of emotions. I begin by suggesting that we should conceive of emotions as a general mode of the mental system; other modes are the perceptual and intellectual modes. One feature distinguishing one mode from another is the logical principles underlying its information processing mechanism. Before describing these principles, I clarify the notion of ‘rationality,’ arguing that in an important sense emotions can be rational.
X. Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: November 2010

According to a traditional view of self-deception, the phenomenon is an intrapersonal analogue of stereotypical interpersonal deception. In the latter case, deceiversintentionallydeceive others into believing something,p, and there is a time at which the deceivers believe thatpis false while their victims falsely believe thatpis true. If self-deception is properly understood on this model, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves into believing something,p, and there is a time at which they believe thatpis false while also believing thatpis true.
XIV. Don't Worry, Feel Guilty
Authors: Velleman J. David
Published: November 2010

One can feel guilty without thinking that one actually is guilty of moral wrongdoing. For example, one can feel guilty about eating an ice cream or skipping aerobics, even if one doesn't take a moralistic view of self-indulgence. And one can feel guilty about things that aren't one's doing at all, as in the case of survivor's guilt about being spared some catastrophe suffered by others. Guilt without perceived wrongdoing may of course be irrational, but I think it is sometimes rational, and I want to explore how it can be.
Two Theories of Names
Authors: Segal Gabriel M. A.
Published: November 2010

The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each theory is consistent with them and goes some way towards explaining them.
Conditional Belief and the Ramsey Test
Authors: Sturgeon Scott
Published: November 2010

Consider the frame

S believes that—.

Fill it with a conditional, say

If you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke.

what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances of

S believes (A→C)?

In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple.

Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained. It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief. It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained.
Perceptual, Reflective and Affective Consciousness as Existence
Authors: Honderich Ted
Published: November 2010

One criterion of an adequate analysis of the nature of consciousness has to do with its three parts, sides or elements. These are seeing and the like, thinking and the like, and desiring and the like. The seeming natures of the perceptual, reflective and affective parts or whatever of consciousness are different despite similarity. An adequate analysis of consciousness, even if general, will preserve the differences. It will pass the test of what you can call differential phenomenology.
Minds, Persons and the Unthinkable
Authors: Phillips D. Z.
Published: November 2010

In a series of lectures on minds and persons, I am going to take advantage of the occasion to ask what kind of person should one be if one has a philosophical mind. I ask the question because it is itself a philosophically contentious issue. Indeed, I shall be offering answers in a climate which is generally hostile to them. I want to aise the issue in three contexts: first, in relation to questions which have been treated epistemologically, but which I think belong to logic; second in relation to miracles; and third in relation to moral convictions. I shall spend most of my time on the first context.
A New Look at Lunar Soil Collected from the Sea of Tranquility during the Apollo 11 Mission
Authors: Kiely Carol , Greenberg Gary , Kiely Christopher J.
Published: November 2010

Complementary state-of-the-art optical, scanning electron, and X-ray microscopy techniques have been used to study the morphology of Apollo 11 lunar soil particles (10084-47). The combination of innovative lighting geometries with image processing of a through focal series of images has allowed us to obtain a unique collection of high-resolution light micrographs of these fascinating particles. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) stereo-pair imaging has been exploited to illustrate some of the unique morphological properties of lunar regolith. In addition, for the first time, X-ray micrographs with submicron resolution have been taken of individual particles using X-ray ultramicroscopy (XuM). This SEM-based technique lends itself readily to the imaging of pores, cracks, and inclusions and allows the internal structure of an entire particle to be viewed. Rotational SEM and XuM movies have also been constructed from a series of images collected at sequential angles through 360°. These offer a new and insightful view of these complex particles providing size, shape, and spatial information on many of their internal features.
Microphotometry of Underwater Shadowing by a Moss from a Niagara Escarpment Waterfall
Authors: Swatland Howard J.
Published: November 2010

Microscope and fiber-optic spectrophotometry of transmittance and backscattering both showed moss leaves to be capable of casting strong shadows, with a single leaf blocking approximately 90% of incident light from a point source. In leaves with only one layer of cells, the transmittance through the cytoplasm of single cells was similar to that for whole leaves. Analysis of cell wall birefringence by polarized-light interferometry indicated that cell walls might normally scatter rather than transmit light. Spectra transmitted through, or backscattered from, the upper green layers of moss were dominated by selective absorbance from chlorophyll, but there was also evidence of wavelength-dependent scattering, as detected in the lower layers of brown, dead moss. Specular reflectance from moss leaves was detected by polarimetry and may have contributed to the relatively high macroscopic transmittance of stationary moss in water. Shadowing by moss leaves was confirmed by dynamic measurements of mosses in turbulent water without bubbles. Flicker patterns from leaves were superimposed on the underwater flicker pattern created at the air-water interface, thus flecks of light were reduced in intensity, increased in frequency, and decreased in duration. This was detected with both point source and diffuse illumination of samples.
Basic volcanism contemporaneous with the Sturtian glacial episode in NE Scotland
Authors: Chew David M. , Fallon Nicola , Kennelly Christine , Crowley Quentin , Pointon Michael
Published: November 2010

The Dalradian Supergroup contains three distinct glacigenic units, formerly termed ‘Boulder Beds’, which are correlated with widespread Neoproterozoic glaciations. The oldest and thickest unit, the Port Askaig Formation, marks the Appin–Argyll group boundary of the Dalradian Supergroup and has been correlated with the Middle Cryogenian (Sturtian) glaciation. The Auchnahyle Formation, a diamictite-bearing sequence near Tomintoul in NE Scotland, exhibits strong lithological similarities to the Port Askaig Formation. Both these glacigenic ‘Boulder Bed’ units contain abundant dolomite clasts in their lower parts and more granitic material at higher levels. Both metadiamictite units are overlain by thick shallow-marine quartzite units. C isotope data from Appin Group carbonate strata below the Auchnahyle Formation support this correlation. U–Pb laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) detrital zircon data from the Auchnahyle Formation metadiamictite differ slightly from the Port Askaig Formation, but are similar to detrital zircon spectra obtained from the Macduff Formation, a diamictite unit in the younger Southern Highland Group of the Dalradian Supergroup; both apparently reflect derivation from local basement rocks. No detritus younger than 0·9 Ga is observed, so the data do not constrain significantly the depositional age of the glacial strata. A thin tholeiitic pillow basalt unit in the lower part of the Auchnahyle Formation is geochemically distinct from pre-tectonic metadolerite sills and from basic metavolcanic rocks up-section. A Sturtian (c. 720–700 Ma) age for the Auchnahyle Formation metadiamictite would imply that this basaltic volcanism represents the oldest recorded volcanic activity in the Dalradian Supergroup and is inferred to represent an early, local phase of proto-Iapetan rifting within the Rodinian supercontinent.