bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
In Congress Reassembled: Reconciliation and the Legislative Process
Authors: Schick Allen
Published: April 2006

Reconciliation forces Congress to consider issues in redistributive terms and alters traditional roles and relationships, but this legislative technique may be short-lived.

The 1981 battle of the budget might leave a deeper imprint on legislative behavior than on federal programs and expenditures. The process that produced the omnibus reconciliation bill was extraordinary in its scope and in its integration of diverse legislative activities. More than 30 House and Senate committees were drawn into the reconciliation process and more than half of the Members of Congress participated in the conferences that resulted in the reconciliation decision. The outcome was not a perfectly consistent set of budget decisions, but for a legislature that thrives on the dispersion of power, reconciliation demanded much more cohesion and coordination than Congress normally achieves.

It is too early to determine whether reconciliation will become a permanent feature of the congressional budget process or whether it will be applied as extensively in the future as it was in 1981. If it were confined to a few committees and only changed the budget at the margins, reconciliation might not affect basic legislative roles and relationships. But if it continues to demand the active cooperation of numerous committees and tries to change major parts of the budget, reconciliation would certainly lead to a redistribution of legislative power.
America's Declining Industrial Competitiveness: Protectionism, the Marketplace and the State
Authors: Walters Robert S.
Published: April 2006

A rising protectionist tide is threatening to undermine the domestic political foundation necessary to sustain America's liberal trade posture through the 1980s. U.S. trade officials and recent administrations remain committed to a liberal trade order, but severe crises in key economic sectors of the economy, regionally concentrated in the traditional industrial region of the country, are cutting the ground from beneath them internationally and domestically.

At the recent GATT ministerial meeting in Geneva, for example, the United States pressed hard for expanding international trade liberalization in agriculture, services, and high technology industries—all areas of economic activity in which the United States enjoys a strong competitiye position and trade surpluses. American trade officials in Geneva had the burden of advancing their arguments for further trade liberalization against the backdrop of recent U.S. actions, taken in response to domestic pressures, which imposed import quotas on European steel and Japanese automobiles and which adopted a more restrictive trade regime for textiles and apparel in the renewal of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. While the GATT meeting was in progress, the U.S. Congress was considering a domestic content bill that would require auto-makers selling over 900,000 vehicles in the American market to use 90 percent U.S. labor and parts by 1985. U.S. trade representative William Brock III called this “the worst piece of economic legislation since the 1930s.” The House passed the bill with 215 votes, but it died in the Senate. The bill will certainly be re-introduced in the more protectionist 98th Congress.
To Run or Not to Run: Estimates of a Black Contender's Delegate Strength at the 1984 Democratic Convention
Authors: Lengle James I.
Published: April 2006

The possibility of a black contender for the Democratic presidential nomination has raised many interesting questions. Has the Democratic Party and its past nominees taken the black vote for granted? Can the black community reach a consensus on a black issue agenda? Can it agree on a candidate? Could a black candidate actually hurt black interests by dividing the liberal vote and throwing the nomination to a more conservative Democratic contender? Could the strategy seriously backfire in other less obvious ways? Do the presumed benefits, both symbolic and real, outweigh the potential costs? Could the threat of a candidacy be just as beneficial to black interests as the candidacy itself? Are there other strategies during the nomination process that could enhance black political power even more?

Although the debate has covered a wide range of questions, one crucial question has been ignored: how many delegates could a black presidential contender conceivably win in 1984? While few experts believe that a black contender could win a majority of delegates, many argue that, if the contest is close between two other contenders, blacks could be “kingmakers,” crowning the nominee in exchange for major policy concessions, patronage appointments, and, conceivably, the vice-presidency. If the nomination is not close, then a group of black delegates, at a minimum, would increase substantially black influence on important rules and platform decisions. Hopes based on these or any other convention scenario the mind can devise, however, depend on how well a black contender fares in the race for delegates. The larger his delegation, the more power he can potentially wield at the convention. Conversely, the smaller his delegation, the less power he will have.
The Revival of Political Science in China
Authors: Baoxu Zhao , Chu David
Published: April 2006

As an independent basic social science, the study of politics occupies an important position among all the social sciences. In 1952, however, China abolished political science teaching and research. This was a mistake which is now being corrected. China has reestablished the field of political science in recent years.

When a historical event is shown to be mistaken, people often like to describe the reasons for its having taken place as very absurd and unimaginable, as though to demonstrate how confused people were at that time compared with how smart we are now. Such a simple attitude, however, will not help us in understanding the realities scientifically nor will it help us in learning from the lessons of history, and is therefore to be avoided.

This essay describes both objective conditions and the way people thought, both in the early 1950s and after 1976. It deals with two opposite events: first, the abolition of political science in China three decades ago, and second, its current revival.
The Teaching of Citizenship
Authors: Mansfield Harvey C.
Published: April 2006

The teaching of citizenship might seem inappropriate for a political scientist. Such teaching is normative, it might be said, but political science is empirical. And, it might be added, citizenship is a parochial concern for the good of one's own country, whereas political science is based on a universal love of truth. These objections will have to be made more precise, even recast; but insofar as they suggest that good citizen and good political scientist may not be the same thing, they are perfectly reasonable.

The distinction between empirical and normative, or fact and value (which cannot be explored theoretically here), means that a political scientist, as political scientist, cannot tell citizens whether citizenship is a good thing, or say that political science is a good thing and ought to be welcomed or tolerated by citizens. A political scientist might perhaps remark empirically, or half-empirically, that love of one's country animates the citizens as citizen and love of truth inspires the political scientist as political scientist. But instead of leading to conflict between citizens and political scientists and hence to a problem for political scientists, who must be both, this observation is made to yield a queer harmony between the two. It is thought that since political scientists cannot pronounce upon the worth of citizenship, they do not get in the way of citizens. Their work is neutral to that of citizens. Love of truth does not interfere with love of country because all loves, being “values,” are incommensurable. Thus, the methodology of the fact-value distinction provides a lefthanded endorsement of (at least democratic) citizenship.
The Changing Structure of Party Identification
Authors: Epstein Laurily K.
Published: April 2006

However one wishes to characterize Walter Mondale's campaign for the presidency, his loss was only the latest in a series of Democratic presidential candidate defeats beginning in 1968. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey got 43 percent of the popular vote. In 1972, George McGovem received 38 percent of the popular vote. And in both 1980 and 1984, the Democratic presidential tickets got 41 percent of the popular vote. Only in 1976 did a Democratic presidential candidate receive a (very slim) majority of the popular votes cast. Indeed, Democratic presidential candidates have received only 42 percent of the total votes cast between 1968 and 1984.

Although Democratic presidential candidates have not been faring well for 16 years, party identification has remained about the same—with the Democrats as the majority party. Until 1984. And that is what makes the 1984 election interesting, for in this election the voters finally seemed to change their party identification to correspond with what now appears to be their habit of electing Republican presidents.

In 1980, when Jimmy Carter received the same proportion of the total votes cast as did Walter Mondale in 1984, self-styled Democrats were still in the majority. But, by 1984, Republicans and Democrats were at a virtual tie nationwide, as these figures from NBC News election day voter polls demonstrate.
Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate Were They?
Authors: Lewis-Beck Michael S.
Published: April 2006

One autumn out of four, election forecasting surpasses baseball as America's national pastime. Then, everyone wants to know who will win, and everyone has a guess. Now, with the ballots carefully counted, forecasters await their awards. Below, I evaluate the quality of a wide range of 1984 presidential and congressional forecasts. The evaluation proceeds from nonscientific to scientific approaches, although this distinction is sometimes blurred. To lower the level of suspense, I should say that some forecasts turned out to be quite good. By way of conclusion, I offer a set of rules for selecting a high-quality forecasting instrument.

Lucky Guesses

Many popular election forecasting rules take advantage of chance, which has been working in their favor. Perhaps the most famous is the World Series forecast, which says, “If the American League wins the World Series, then the Republican presidential candidate will win.” This technique was accurate from 1952 to 1976, missed in 1980, but worked again in 1984 with the victory of the Detroit Tigers. A lesser known rule of this type, which is my personal favorite, is based on the Beaujolais wine harvest. Accordingly, “If the Beaujolais vintage looks bad, then the Republican will take the presidency.” This has held post-1960, and continues to do so with the poor 1984 crop (yielding a wine too light, with little color). There are other such rules that relate more directly to the candidates themselves and, in that sense, have more verisimilitude.
Young vs. Old in 1984: Generations and Life Stages in Presidential Nomination Politics
Authors: Beck Paul Allen
Published: April 2006

Amidst changing voter preferences and unexpected volatility in candidate fortunes, the 1984 contest for the Democratic presidential nomination contained at least one constant. From Iowa and New Hampshire through “Super Tuesday” and the middle round in big industrial states to the early June finale, voter preferences among the major contenders for the Democratic nomination diverged sharply by age.

Gary Hart enjoyed his greatest support among young voters, while Walter Mondale's strength was drawn from older voters, especially those over 65. The appeal of Jesse Jackson varied by age as well. Young blacks flocked to the Jackson banner. Older blacks, perhaps no less excited by the presence of an attractive black candidate for president, were more reluctant to follow, giving a greater share of their vote than did young blacks to Walter Mondale. Not since the protest candidacies of McCarthy and Kennedy in 1968 or the more successful insurgency of McGovern in 1972 has so much attention been paid to the contrasting responses of Americans of different ages to candidates for the presidency.

Popular accounts of the relationship of age to presidential choice in 1984 have treated these differences as indicative of generational conflict. The epicenter of the Hart constituency is located in the “Vietnam” or “baby boom” generation, while Mondale's generational home base has been placed among voters who came of age politically during the New Deal. The implication is that Mondale represented vestiges of the old Democratic New Deal coalition, whereas Hart was the candidate of Americans for whom the New Deal is only an historical footnote. Simply put, the 1984 Democratic battle commonly has been described as pitting the old coalition against the new ideas.
Politics: American and Non-American
Authors: Berger Suzanne
Published: April 2006

Tocqueville, considering how Americans compare their nation with others, observed that general ideas about politics testify to the weakness of human intelligence. “The Deity does not regard the human race collectively.… Such is, however, not the case with man. … Having superficially considered a certain number of objects, and remarked their resemblance, he assigns to them a common name, sets them apart, and proceeds onwards.”

As it is for human beings, so, too, for political scientists. And of the generalizations which have helped Americans and American political scientists organize the confusing mass of differences and similarities between this country and others, none has been more important and enduring than the notion of the uniqueness of the American political community. This conception is reflected in the split within the discipline between those who study the U.S. political system and those who study comparative politics, a field understood to encompass various foreign countries. The rubric that in the American Political Science Review until the 1950s used to read “Foreign Governments and Politics” has been replaced by a subsection of the book reviews that is entitled “Comparative Politics.” But today as in the past, it is rare to find teaching or research in political science that truly integrates the analysis of American politics within a comparative framework.

Why this should remain the case is difficult to understand, for over the past half-century there have been many shifts in the discipline and in the world that challenged the premises of research based on American exceptionalism. Already in the interwar period, significant work in political science was moving beyond configurative case studies of individual countries. C. J. Friedrich's important Constitutional Government and Democracy (1937), indeed, included the United States in its examination of how well certain general political theories explained the experiences of major political systems. Whatever reservations one might have had about the methodologies of comparative research on which Friedrich relied, the broad influence of his work promised a new integration of American politics into an expanded field of comparative politics.
Political Scientists as Professional Observers
Authors: Shafer Byron E.
Published: April 2006

Walter Beach has provided a roster of political scientists as delegates and alternates to national party conventions and short essays by a number of them. Elaine Kamarck and John Bibby have contributed some more extended thoughts on political scientists as campaign operatives and party officials at national party conventions. And I have been asked to add a few words on political scientists as, well, political scientists in the same locale.

I doubt that many political scientists who have been convention delegates would trade the experience. Delegate status is not a particularly good way to observe the full convention as an institution, or to get a sense of the convention in the larger political system. But it is the best means for examining the micropolitics of the convention, i.e., the small discussions and bargains, or the utilization of a delegate's time, and it is perhaps the quintessential way to develop an appreciation for the impact of the convention as a social context—as a peculiar, small, short-lived world unto itself.
Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Congressional Elections
Authors: Jacobson Gary C. , Kernell Samuel
Published: April 2006

Common to both political folk wisdom and political science is the idea that the mid-term congressional election is a referendum on the performance of the current administration. The more popular a president and the more successful his policies, the better his party does at the midterm. The president's party almost invariably loses some congressional seats in off-year elections (since the Civil War the president's party has added House seats only once—in 1934—though it occasionally picks up Senate seats). But the extent of its losses varies widely (from one to 56 House seats in postwar midterms), depending, so the theory goes, on how the electorate rates the administration's performance.

The 1982 congressional elections will, in this view, be a referendum on President Reagan's administration and in particular on his economic policies, which have been the focus of political attention since inauguration day. If this is true, then economic conditions prevalent through the spring of 1982 (a potentially devastating combination of deep recession, high unemployment, and high interest rates) and Reagan's shaky support in the polls (less than 50 percent approving his performance in all Gallup surveys during the first four months of 1982), portend a Republican disaster of major proportions in the fall.

Remarkably, almost no one is seriously predicting anything of the kind. And it may indeed be a mistake to bet on enormous Republican losses—partly, we will argue, because they are not widely anticipated.
Building Support for the ERA: A Case of “Too Much, Too Late”
Authors: Boles Janet K.
Published: April 2006

A case can be made that non-ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a classic example of “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” After all, the ERA had received overwhelming support in both houses of Congress, passing by a vote of 354 to 23 in the House and 84 to 8 in the Senate. Both major political parties had repeatedly supported the ERA in their national party platforms; not until 1980 did one party (the Republican) adopt a stance of neutrality. Every President from Truman to Carter had endorsed the amendment. And, by the end of the campaign for state ratification, more than 450 organizations with a total membership of over 50 million were on record in support of the ERA. While the amendment was before Congress in 1970-72, lobbying for the ERA was heavy and well-organized, and no countervailing forces were ever mobilized in any effective way. In view of this broad base of political and public support for the amendment, and little visible opposition, a reasonable prognosis in 1972 was that it would be ratified by the required 38 states long before the original deadline of March 22, 1979, set by Congress.

However, the ratification process was far more complex than either political observers or amendment supporters recognized initially. Although an intensive lobbying effort had been waged to push the amendment through Congress, supporters naively believed that it would be quickly ratified in the absence of pre-existing state groups poised to press for passage and without major allocation of national organizations' resources.
The Washington Restaurant: A Socio-Economic Congestion Strategy
Authors: Crutcher Anne
Published: April 2006

As any political scientist knows, it isn't just the formal institutions of government that make a society go; it's the mediating structures. Such as restaurants.

Washington, D.C., once a wasteland of southern hotel food redeemed only by Chesapeake Bay crabs and oysters, is now a city where not even the most fastidious need brown-bag it to feel well fed. There's a restaurant for every taste and budget. What's more, there's Metro and a pretty good supply of taxis for getting to them. Some are within walking distance of the Hilton.

A few words of general counsel. If invited to the White House, the Senate dining room, the House restaurant, the Cosmos Club or the National Press Club, go, but for the company rather than the cuisine. Among these, culinarily speaking, the White House is the best and the Press Club the worst.
The Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movements
Authors: Mandelbaum Michael
Published: April 2006

Of all modern machines, indeed of all the artifacts of modern culture, the bomb is the most frightening. It is the most dangerous of all human inventions. The American, European, and Soviet people have always known how dangerous it is. They have, nevertheless, left nuclear weapons in the hands of the nuclear priesthood. (In the Soviet Union this has not been a matter of choice.) In the 1980s some in the West resolved to take control of the bomb. They began to demand that disarmament replace deterrence as the principal nuclear business of the Atlantic alliance.

Probably from 1945 onward the average American or European would, if asked, have said that he wanted to do away with all nuclear arsenals rather than refine or increase them. But the average Westerner was not asked, and did not say so, at least not in any way that influenced public policy. In the 1980s citizens of the West did begin to say so, publicly, loudly, and in growing numbers. For the first time, a mass movement dedicated to shaping the nuclear future appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.

In this, as in other things, the North American and the European wings of NATO differ. Opposition to the alliance's nuclear weapons policies made itself known earlier in Europe than in the United States. Both European and American anti-nuclear weapons activists aimed ultimately to lift the nuclear siege that the world must endure as long as these weapons exist. But each rallied around a more immediate issue, and the issues were different. The Europeans opposed the stationing of 572 intermediate-range missiles on the continent, which the NATO governments deemed necessary to offset comparable Soviet weapons. In the United States a proposal to freeze the deployment, testing, and manufacture of all weapons by both superpowers attracted wide support.
Black and Hispanic Power in City Politics: A Forum
Authors: Browning Rufus P. , Marshall Dale Rogers
Published: April 2006

The number of blacks and Hispanics elected to office in American cities has grown dramatically. The media frequently report on their victories in local elections and run features on black and Hispanic mayors. From none in 1960, there are now 27 black and three Hispanic mayors of cities with populations over 50,000 (Joint Center, 1985; National Association of Latino Elected Officials, 1986).

The trend is obvious, its significance disputed. Is it likely to continue, or can we already see signs of reversal? How much power do local black and Hispanic officials have? How was it achieved? And what difference does it make in any case? Can blacks and Hispanics in office strike a better bargain with the investors and financial institutions they depend on for development than previous administrations? In a period of fiscal stringency and reduced federal spending, can they carve out a larger piece of the municipal pie for minority populations? Can minority officeholders make any headway against the growing tide of unemployment and poverty, as help from the federal level is dismantled? Although the growing number of minority officials suggests political integration and racial/ethnic succession, do the limited powers of cities in a federal system and a capitalistic society render that apparent gain more symbolic than real?
Is Anything Enough?
Authors: Browning Rufus P. , Marshall Dale Rogers
Published: April 2006

Is anything enough? The authors of this forum are in agreement that the political incorporation of blacks and Hispanics achieved thus far is not enough. Not only is protest not enough: they question whether any of the political arrangements by which members of these groups have been brought into city governments are sufficient to meet the goals of the civil rights movement—political equality and the alleviation of poverty. They have much to say about ways in which the incorporation of blacks and Hispanics falls short and about the conditions that block further strengthening of their position.

Is any theory enough—the theory of Protest Is Not Enough, in particular? The answer to the particular question is partly Yes, but the articles of this forum suggest qualifications and additions; we discuss these below. There are two answers to the general question, both of them No. No, because a theory of variations across cities does not fully meet the need for an understanding of possibilities or of leadership, agenda, and strategy over time in a particular city. And No, because the largest cities must be understood on their own terms, as we would seek to understand a nation or a war on its own terms.

Nevertheless, a theoretical structure of the sort in Protest is useful to practitioners and researchers because it focuses attention on a limited number of main factors and relationships, permits systematic and standardized comparisons between groups of cities, provides a way to summarize the main structure of causal factors and conditions in a given city, and allows us to estimate the levels of minority mobilization and incorporation and of governmental responsiveness that we should expect in a city on the basis of the experience in other cities.
Excerpts from First Declaration of Bernard Grofman in Badham v. Eu
Authors: Grofman Bernard
Published: April 2006

1. I am a professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine.

… I am thoroughly familiar with the congressional districts delineated in Assembly Bill 2X as implemented with the so-called March 17, Technical Changes. The congressional districts of A.B. 2X (Plan II, passed in 1983) as implemented constitute an egregious form of partisan gerrymandering.

Methods of Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering is a technique which operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population by one or more of the following twelve methods:

(1) Packing the voting strength of a group to insure that much of its voting strength is wasted in districts which are won by lop-sided margins—in particular, packing its strength to a greater extent than is true for the voting strength of the group controlling the district.

(2) Fragmenting or submerging the voting strength of a group to create districts in which that group will constitute a permanent (or near certain) minority.

(3) Reducing the re-election likelihood of some of a group's representatives by altering district boundaries to put two or more representatives from the group into the same district.

(4) Reducing the re-election likelihood of some of a group's representatives by altering district boundaries to cut-up old districts so as to make it impossible for these representatives to continue to represent the bulk of their former constituents.
Postscript
Authors: Baker Gordon E.
Published: April 2006

Subsequent to the filing of Badham v. Eu, the 1984 California elections provided classic examples that pervasive gerrymandering has become the newest form of voting dilution. On a statewide basis, Republican congressional candidates in California captured a clear majority of the two-party vote, yet won only 18 of the 45 seats (or 40 percent). Congressional district lines were drawn by incumbent Democrats in Congress and ratified by the heavily Democratic California legislature.

It is probably little exaggeration to term the California legislature a self-perpetuating oligarchy, accountable primarily to itself by the act of carefully fencing voters in and out of districts calculated to preserve the status quo, regardless of all but monumental shifts in voter sentiment or population mobility. In other states (e.g., Indiana) the legislative oligarchies are Republican.

Does this type of voter debasement call for another bold move—as in 1964—by the United States Supreme Court? To many, this understandably seems to be the thorniest part of the “political thicket” that the late Justice Frankfurter had cautioned his colleagues to avoid. But, having entered it in 1964 and after, can the judiciary now ignore this new dimension of malapportionment? It is tempting to leave the problem to the “give-and-take” of the political process. But the process itself is closer to one of monopoly than of free competition. A quarter century ago the problem of malapportionment (geographically defined) was virtually immune from political remedies for much the same reasons.
The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to Rehnquist
Authors: O'Brien David M.
Published: April 2006

Changes in the composition of the Supreme Court perhaps inevitably invite speculation about whether and how the Court will change, and what direction it will take in the future. The move of William Rehnquist from associate justice to chief justice and the addition of Antonin Scalia certainly alters the chemistry of the Court. These changes may also have a profound impact on the Court's place in American government during the rest of this century.

There is no doubt that the Court will change. Differences are already apparent during oral arguments. Rehnquist is sharper, more thoughtful, more commanding and wittier than his predecessor in the center chair. And from the far right of the bench, Scalia almost bubbles over with energy and questions for counsel. No less revealing is that in the week before the start of the 1986–87 term on the first Monday in October, Rehnquist managed to get the justices to dispose of over 1,000 cases (granting 22 and denying or otherwise disposing of the rest). He did so in only two days, whereas it usually took Burger more than twice as long to get through about the same number.
Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State
Authors: Galston William A.
Published: April 2006

During the past generation, the view has arisen that a liberal polity must remain systematically neutral on the widest possible range of moral and religious questions. During this same period, religious fundamentalism has attained an influence not seen in the United States for more than half a century. It is my thesis that these two developments are intimately related and that, considered together, they have much to teach us about public morality in a liberal society.

Early liberal theorists worked to disentangle civil society from destructive religious quarrels. But they nevertheless assumed that civil society needed morality and that publicly effective morality rested on religion. Juridical liberalism, which focused on the exercise of liberty and the limits of government, presumed a foundation of individual moral restraint. While the civil authority in a liberal society need not directly enforce this moral code in most cases, it should certainly encourage that morality—at the very least, by refraining from utterances and policies that undermine it.

This understanding of the proper relation among politics, morality, and religion dominated the American Founding. It suffused Tocqueville's analysis. In clearly recognizable form, it survived well into the twentieth century. In the past generation, however, this understanding came under attack, and the delicate balance between juridical liberalism and its social preconditions was disrupted. Influential philosophers argued that the essence of liberalism was public neutrality on the widest possible range of moral issues.
Reforming the Presidency: Nonproblems and Problems
Authors: Rockman Bert A.
Published: April 2006

Riddle: Why is political reform like a clear mountain lake? Answer: When we look into both we see ourselves.

The Means and Ends of Reforms

What should be the ends of presidential reform? Obviously, such a question assumes that something is wrong and can be remedied through reform, which I define here as an intentional act (or acts) of institutional engineering to restructure incentives in the political system. Naturally, any effort to engage in reform, therefore, raises numerous issues. What are the purposes of reform? What are the problems a reform proposal or package of proposals presumes to address and to remedy? What are the feasibilities for implementation? What are the consequences and implications of reform? Will its purported benefits be larger than the costs incurred? To what extent does thinking about reform help lead to or clarify a theory of the presidency and, more generally, a theory of government? To what extent, above all, when thinking about reform can we escape the time warp in which our present preferences or momentary dissatisfactions lie? A would-be reformer must struggle to disassociate short-term preferences and judgments about an incumbent from longer-term conceptions as to how institutions should operate. In this regard, a would-be reformer must think like a constitution-maker. Is this the system one would prefer under worst case conditions?
Progressivism and Anarchism: Judge Henry D. Clayton and the Abrams Trial
Authors: Polenberg Richard
Published: April 2006

A highly symbolic confrontation occurred in a New York City courtroom on October 21, 1918. On the witness stand was Jacob Abrams, a thirty-two year old Russian immigrant, an alien, a Jew, a dedicated anarchist. On the bench sat Henry DeLamar Clayton, Jr., a sixty-one year old federal judge, a man who had represented Alabama in Congress for eighteen years, and who was an ardent Wilsonian progressive. Abrams, who came from Uman, a village near Odessa, had landed at Ellis Island in 1908. He worked as a bookbinder, and lived, in 1918, in a teeming, largely Jewish ghetto in East Harlem. Clayton's ancestors had emigrated to the colonies before the American Revolution. A fifth-generation American, he had lived, for most of his life, on his plantation near Eufala, a small town on the west bank of the Chattahoochee River. Now, Clayton was questioning the witness and Abrams was defending his anarchist beliefs. ‘This Government was built on a revolution’, Abrams said, ‘…When our forefathers of the American Revolution—’ That was as far as he got. ‘Your what?’ Judge Clayton interrupted. ‘My forefathers’, Abrams replied. ‘Do you mean to refer to the fathers of this nation as your forefathers?’ Clayton asked. Abrams said that indeed he did, that ‘we are all a big human family’ and ‘those that stand for the people, I call them father'. But the judge had made his point, and the jury had no doubt gotten it.
Social Federalism: The Constitutional Position of Nonprofit Corporations in Nineteenth-Century America
Authors: Campbell Bruce A.
Published: April 2006

The importance of voluntary associations is apparent to all who study the development of American society in the nineteenth century. Observations made by the perceptive nineteenth-century traveler Alexis de Tocqueville have become an obligatory cliché in historical writing on the subject:

Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies,… but associations of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.
Child Custody and the Decline of Women's Rights
Authors: Spring Eileen
Published: April 2006

Wright's article has two themes running through it: a discussion of the meaning of De Manneville and a history of custody in England from medieval times onward set against historians' theories of family development. Comment on her article then is best divided into two parts. I begin with her wide-ranging history, for here she makes an indisputable contribution to women's history that needs only notice and emphasis.
Writing Constitutional History beyond the Institutional/Ideological Divide
Authors: Desan Christine A.
Published: April 2006

History is a strange medium: it carries the most contemporary debates onto the most distant terrain. Both Bruce Mann and David Konig focus on the notions of change and context that undergird the forum essays. Those issues, more than any moment in early New York, link the articles and the comments. By exploring the way we defined “constitutions,” “constitutionalism,” and “constitutional history,” the commentators open up a large and current question. They invite a discussion about approaches to constitutional change.
A “Jewish State…to Be Known as the State of Israel”: Notes on Israeli Legal Historiography
Authors: Lahav Pnina
Published: April 2006

In 1953 a musical titledThe Adventures of Nasseradinopened in Tel Aviv. One of its tunes, the “Song of Law,” had music and lyrics so appealing that overnight it became the most popular song in Israel. The subject of the lyric was a tyrant, the Emir of the Kingdom of Buchara. Two brothers were arguing over a pot, and the Emir in his capacity as judge, presided over their trial. His decree: plaintiff and defendant should be executed and the pot thrown into the royal treasury.
Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange Bedfellows
Authors: Wilkins David B.
Published: April 2006

Susan Carle has given us a fascinating, thoroughly researched, and well-argued examination of the early history of the modern civil rights movement. She frames her inquiry of this rarely investigated period in terms of the tension between the NAACP's litigation tactics during the early part of the twentieth century and the professed ethics of the establishment lawyers who authored and approved these controversial measures. How, she asks, could leading corporate lawyers such as Charles Boston justify authorizing the NAACP's concerted campaign to solicit plaintiffs and create test cases while at the same time serving on ethics committees that expressly condemned such practices?
Rejoinder to Gordon Wood
Authors: Slonim Shlomo
Published: April 2006

Gordon Wood mentions that in 1987, as part of the Hebrew University's program of events marking the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, he delivered the annual Samuel Paley Lectures in American Civilization at the University in Jerusalem. If I, as chairman of the Department of American Studies was, as he says, a gracious host, he was no less a gracious guest and, moreover, a fascinating lecturer. A synopsis of his remarks is included in the volume that I edited, The Constitutional Bases of Political and Social Change in the United States, comprising lectures delivered at a bicentennial conference later that year and attended by prominent American and Israeli constitutional scholars, including Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Aharon Barak, now President of the Israeli Supreme Court.
Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of Immigration Regulation
Authors: Steinfeld Robert J.
Published: April 2006

Kunal Parker's “State, Citizenship, and Territory” can be read in at least two ways. Read one way, it tells an important story about how regulation of the poor was driven upward in Massachusetts during the nineteenth century, from the localities to the state. In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts had imposed primary responsibility for care of the poor on its towns. But during the eighteenth century, with the growth of a landless, wandering population, town poor relief budgets came under increasing pressure. The towns responded by lobbying the Massachusetts legislature to pass a series of statutes that made it more and more difficult to acquire a town settlement. People who fell into need in Massachusetts but who had not acquired a town settlement became state paupers for whom the state, rather than any town, was fiscally responsible. As it became more and more difficult to acquire a town settlement, the number of state paupers increased, shifting a portion of the fiscal burden of poor relief from the towns onto the state.
Policing in a Penal Colony: Governor Arthur's Police System in Van Diemen's Land, 1826–1836
Authors: Petrow Stefan
Published: April 2006

In eighteenth-century England the rule of law was “the central legitimizing ideology, displacing the religious authority and sanctions of previous centuries.” Arising out of struggles between the monarchy, Parliament, and the courts, the rule of law sought to protect individual liberty and private property by placing constraints on arbitrary authority. The ruling class used the rule of law ideology to enhance their power, but it also acted as a check on that power. All citizens from the monarch to the poorest citizen became bound by the rule of law and could settle their disputes in the courts presided over by judges, who were independent of manipulation.
“The Principle of the Codification We Recommend Has Never Yet Been Understood”
Authors: Farmer Lindsay
Published: April 2006

The words of Henry Bellenden Ker, Law Commissioner, quoted as the title of this response, were truer than he knew. In protesting that the commissioners' project was less radical than was alleged by the opponents of codification, he sought principally to gain parliamentary time and space for consideration of the commissioners' work. However, his words contain a deeper vein of truth. The work of the law commissioners has been praised and criticized, celebrated and ignored, over the past one hundred and fifty years, but never yet properly understood. Even as the commissioners' reports have been plundered by successive generations of legal scholars in search of doctrinal and theoretical support for their own very contemporary concerns, there has been a continuing neglect of the commissioners' overall project and little attempt to link it to the significant transformations in punishment and the administration of criminal justice that were occurring in the same period. Accordingly, any reassessment of the commissioners' work should address these two issues: understanding their project as a whole and placing codification within the general historical context of the modernizing of the state and institutions of criminal justice. It is these two concerns that the commentators address in their responses.
“Law and Neoclassical Economics”: A Response to Commentaries
Authors: Hackney James R.
Published: April 2006

I first want to thank all of the commentators for their insights on, and criticisms of, my article, as well as thank the editors of Law and History Review for the opportunity to respond. Rather than addressing each comment individually, I will structure my response along conceptual issues raised by all three, although the three comments each have different emphases. The two conceptual categories I use are “technical criticisms” and “historiographical criticisms.” Under the category of technical, I include criticisms of my characterization of neoclassical economics theory and my analysis of particular texts. The historiographical category encompasses substantive historical issues, including which authors should be included in my accounting of law and neo-classical economics as it relates to the reconfiguration of tort law theory. However, it also touches upon broader methodological issues of how one goes about doing intellectual history(ies).
Seen from Afar: An Outsider's Response to the Hurst Symposium
Authors: Duncanson Ian W.
Published: April 2006

Given the large body of expert writing about Hurst's scholarship in the United States, including the contributions to the present symposium, the most useful course for an outsider seems to me to be to ask a type of Foucauldian question: what is it about the fact of Hurst's writing what he did, at the time he did, that is strange to one foreign to the tradition to which Hurst and his commentators and critics belong? Why was a lawyer in the U.S., so long before legal scholars elsewhere in the Anglophone world, able to see the necessity of conceiving law in context, perhaps moving, as Novak suggests “from constitutional history toward historical sociology”? We can not proceed too abruptly to a conclusion, as if there were a single answer to the question. After all, lawyers such as Hurst, the Legal Realists, and the Supreme Court were involved in the New Deal. By contrast, while the professional social reformer and the professional lawyer might, just, have coexisted in the same British person at this time, the two commitments would have been cordoned off from each other.
A New S4‐Ligated Zinc–Peptide 1 : 2 Complex for the Hydrolytic Cleavage of DNA
Authors: Reddy Pulimamidi R. , Mohan Sepuru K. , Manjula Pallerla , Chakraborty Tushar K.
Published: April 2006

A new sulfur‐ligated Zn–peptide 1 : 2 complex, [ZnII(Boc‐NH‐Cys‐Gly‐Cys‐OMe)2]2− (2), was prepared, characterized, and tested for its DNA‐binding and ‐cleavage properties. Complex 2 was found to cleave DNA hydrolytically. The negative charge in 2 reduces the affinity of the complex for DNA, and enhances its binding specificity.
Comorbidity: concepts, claims and choices
Authors: Rutter Michael
Published: April 2006

The presence of comorbidity may distort research findings but, if properly dealt with, it also provides important research opportunities to test hypotheses about causal mechanisms. Seven possible sources of artefactual comorbidity are noted. Five key alternative bases for apparent comorbidity are discussed, using medical examples to illustrate the different processes that they may represent. They are that the apparent comorbidity: (1) represents two manifestations of the same disorder; (2) reflects two stages of the same underlying condition; (3) arises from the same or correlated risk factors; (4) represents a nosologically distinct condition; and (5) is due to one condition predisposing to the other. All possibilities, however, have to start with demonstration of the distinctiveness of the two syndromes involved in the comorbidity. Such evidence may be provided by differences in: (1) pathophysiology or pathopsychology; (2) correlates likely to reflect aspects of causal processes; or (3) treatment responses and adult outcome. Copyright © 1997 Whurr Publishers Ltd.
Microwave‐Assisted Synthesis of 2,5‐Piperazinediones under Solvent‐Free Conditions.
Authors: Lopez‐Cobenas Alberto , Cledera Pilar , Sanchez J. Domingo , Lopez‐Alvarado Pilar , Ramos M. Teresa , Avendano Carmen , Menendez J. Carlos
Published: April 2006

ChemInform is a weekly Abstracting Service, delivering concise information at a glance that was extracted from about 200 leading journals. To access a ChemInform Abstract, please click on HTML or PDF.
Norbornane Mimics of Distorted β‐D‐Glucopyranosides – Inhibitors of β‐D‐Glucopyranosidases?
Authors: Buser Stephan , Vasella Andrea
Published: April 2006

The racemic gluco‐configured norbornanes 4 and 16 were prepared and tested as inhibitors of β‐glucosidases. The known alcohol 5 was deprotected to provide the triol 6. Silylation (→ 7), monobenzoylation (→ 8/9), and oxidation provided the regioisomeric ketones 10 and 11. Reduction of 10 gave the desired endo‐alcohol 13, albeit in low yield, while reduction of the isomeric ketone 11 provided mostly the altro‐configured endo‐alcohol 12. The alcohol 13 was desilylated to 14. Debenzoylation to 15 followed by hydrogenolytic deprotection gave the amino triol 4 that was reductively aminated to the benzylamine 16. The amino triols 4 and 16 proved weak inhibitors of the β‐glucosidase from Caldocellum saccharolyticum (4: IC50 = 5.6 mm; 16: IC50 = 3.3 mm) and from sweet almonds (16: IC50 = 5.5 mm). A comparison of 4 with the manno‐configured norbornane 3 shows that 3 is a better inhibitor of snail β‐mannosidase than 4 is of β‐glucosidases, in keeping with earlier results suggesting that these β‐glycosidases enforce a different conformational itinerary.