bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior
Authors: Naughton Barry
Published: March 2009

Between 1964 and 1971 China carried out a massive programme of investment in the remote regions of south-western and western China. This development programme – called “the Third Front” – envisaged the creation of a huge self-sufficient industrial base area to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of China being drawn into war. Reflecting its primarily military orientation, the programme was considered top secret for many years; recent Chinese articles have discussed the huge costs and legacy of problems associated with the programme, but these discussions have been oblique and anecdotal, and no systematic appraisal has ever been published.2 Since Chinese analysts have avoided discussion of the Third Front, western accounts of China's development have also given it inadequate emphasis, and it has not been incorporated into our understanding of China during the 1960s and 1970s. It is common to assume that the “Cultural Revolution decade” was dominated by domestic political conflict, and characterized by an economic system made dysfunctional by excessive politicization, fragmented control, and an emphasis on small-scale locally self-sufficient development. The Third Front, however, was a purposive, large-scale, centrally-directed programme of development carried out in response to a perceived external threat with the broad support of China's national leaders. Moreover, this programme was immensely costly, having a negative impact on China's economic development that was certainly more far-reaching than the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.
Policing Modern Shanghai
Authors: Wakeman Frederic
Published: March 2009

We have found that along the banks of the Hu, Chinese and foreign residents mix together in great numbers. Their style of life has traditionally been frivolous and flashy. There is mutual competition for profit, owing to the convenience of communications and the crass materialism. Since this is a centre where Chinese merchants are gathered together, it is a carefree place, where gentlemen and ladies take their pleasure. If one is of the upper classes, then luxurious desires are fully realized and there are many instances of behaviour overstepping proper boundaries. If one is a worthless fellow, then when he sees something different and thinks of moving ahead, he has a disproportionate expectation. He might well wait until the seas are drained and the mountains are worn down and yet still lack the craft to carry out [his plans]. Nonetheless he walks straight into danger without hesitation and willingly engages in illegal behaviour. Furthermore, Communists take advantage of the situation and think of intimidating robbers, kidnappers and bandits to wait in secret for an opportunity to behave outrageously.
Developments in Tibetan Studies in China Today
Authors: Grunfeld A. Tom
Published: March 2009

In July and August 1987 I spent several weeks in Beijing engaged in lengthy discussions with scholars and officials whose work concerns Tibet.

The most prominent of these people were Wang Furen, chairman of the Department of Ethnology at the Central Institute of Nationalities (CIN); Wang Xiaoyi, associate research fellow at CIN; Huang Hao, associate research fellow at the Institute of Nationalities of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Liu Shengqi, research fellow at the Institute of Nationalities of CASS; Yao Zhaolin, chief of the Tibetan Section of the Ethnology Department of CIN; Pan Naigu, chairman of the Department of Sociology at Beijing University; and Dorji Tseten, former head of the Tibet Autonomous Region and currently the chairman of the China Tibetology Research Centre.
China's Third Five-Year Plan
Authors: W. K.
Published: March 2009

Economists have come to depend on reports to the National People's Congress for details on China's past performance and future expectations. On the eve of the third five-year plan the National People's Congress did not meet, as had been the case in the previous year. Something seems to have gone wrong with the time-table, if not the substance, of political decisions.
China and Afghanistan
Authors: Dai Shen-Yu
Published: March 2009

When China and Afghanistan signed a Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression Treaty in 1960, they called it “a new Silk Road,” evoking nostalgic memories of a link between the two countries established 2,100 years ago. The old “Silk Road” stretching from China to Rome was opened by Chang Chien, a special envoy of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (140 B.C.), who was seeking a military ally against the Hsiung-nu tribesmen in China's northwest. The Ta Yueh-chih people, then living in the Afghanistan area, originally lived in the Kansu area of China but migrated towards the Oxus River valley under pressure from the Hsiung-nu tribesmen. The Hsiung-nu, therefore, gave Chinese and early Afghans a common cause for alliance in the following century. As early as 104 B.C. an official envoy from the Afghan kingdom travelled the Silk Road to the Chinese Imperial Court.
The Reinstatement of Economics in China Today
Authors: Lin Cyril Chihren
Published: March 2009

The singular importance attached to the pedagogical functions of economics in socialist countries where the ruling Marxian ideology seeks to correlate each and every aspect of society's “superstructure” with the peculiarities of its “economic base” leads curiously, but logically, to a periodic negation and thrashing of economics itself.
The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 196–1979: An Obituary
Authors: Goodman David S. G.
Published: March 2009

On 26 June 1979 Peng Zhen, in a report to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, announced that as from 1 January 1980 Local Revolutionary Committees are to be replaced by local people's governments and the posts of provincial governors, mayors, chairmen of the autonomous regions, prefects of the autonomous prefectures and county heads restored accordingly.
Prospects for Chinese Industry in 1981
Authors: Field Robert Michael , Noyes Helen Louise
Published: March 2009

Between mid-1977 and mid-1979, the average annual rate of growth in Chinese industry fell below 5 per cent, and it appeared that the Chinese would not be able to fulfil the annual plan for 1979, especially in light industry.1 As it turned out, however, output surged in the second half of the year and the targets shown in Table 1 were met easily.
Facilities Offered for Research on Contemporary China by the National Library of Beijing
Authors: Walter Carl E.
Published: March 2009

The National Library of Beijing is the largest library in China currently open to foreigners. During 1979 and 1980 I used this library while carrying out research on the People's Bank of China and its role in industrial enterprise decision-making. Consequently, this report, in so far as it deals with the materials available, will focus only on those which are broadly related to the field of economics. It.is not, therefore, an account of all the Library's holdings, just a small part of them.
Eyewitness of the Cultural Revolution—
Authors: “Foreign Expert“
Published: March 2009

Drawing a picture of China on the basis of personal experience alone presents several problems. First, “foreign experts” generally did not have access to much more material or information than did foreign journalists; when the movement began to make itself felt in foreign language institutes, in March or April, we were told categorically that it had nothing whatever to do with foreigners. Second, our outstanding advantage as observers–contact, and on the whole good relations, with students–was in general little exploited, in the beginning because we did not appreciate the importance of what was happening, and later, for fear of provoking our employers. Third, much of the most interesting “news” came as rumour from somewhere within the large body of foreigners living in the Friendship Hostel, and these sources were inevitably imprecise in their dating.
Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy
Authors: Barnett A. Doak
Published: March 2009

One significant trend in the Chinese political system in recent years has been the growth of complex bureaucratic patterns of social stratification, even within the ranks of the Party cadres in Communist China. The Party has tried in many ways to resist these trends—for example, by promoting physical labour by cadres, sending personnel to work in rural areas and taking such drastic steps as abolishing ranks within the army but as the égalitarian heritage of active revolutionary struggle has tended to recede into the background, deep-rooted authoritarian and bureaucratic predispositions—especially the tendency to differentiate people on the basis of rank—have reasserted themselves. Consequently, virtually all cadres in Communist China today can be labelled and placed fairly accurately in the hierarchy of power and prestige on the basis of seniority in the Party, salary grade and job rank. Significantly, while formal salary and job ratings are very important, informal ratings based on length of service in the Party appear to be of equal importance, and in fact the former tend to be equated with the latter. The growth of these patterns of social stratification has been a major factor contributing to the steady bureaucratisation of the regime and the erosion of the élite's revolutionary character.
Contracts in China Revisited, With a Focus on Agriculture, 1949–63
Authors: Pfeffer Richard M.
Published: March 2009

For A Western-trained lawyer considering contracts within the context of a planned economy, three caveats are in order at the outset. First, plans inevitably involve consultation, which easily shades over into negotiation at the stages of formulation and implementation (the latter often requiring re-formulation). In this sense, plans are not wholly antithetical to the concept of agreement between concerned parties. Second, subject to that qualification, a primary function of contracts in a planned economy is to implement the planners’ preferences. Consequently, it is to be expected that the degree of private autonomy associated with contracts in the West will be restricted. Finally, in Western societies also the parties are limited, to a lesser degree to be sure, in the terms they may incorporate in a contract; e.g., minimum wage laws set limits on wage provisions. Thus, in the theoretical spectrum from wholly unrestrained, enforceable agreements to pure commands, both plans and contracts in practice fall somewhere in the middle in all societies.
Red and Expert: The Revolution in Education at Shanghai Teachers’ University, 1975–76
Authors: Kent Ann
Published: March 2009

Educational policy is of central significance in revolutions because it determines both the nature of the leadership and the policies to promote social change. It has been an explosive issue in China where a Marxist revolution has predated the establishment of a developed economic base and a mature urban proletariat.(The “red versus expert” debate which has reverberated in China since 1949 has been a by-product of the struggle to promote the growth of the economic infrastructure while maintaining radical political institutions and attitudes)1 In Mao Zedong's view this struggle represented not the conflict of two irreconcilable principles but the dynamic relationship between two complementary ingredients of China's educational process.2
North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking
Authors: Kun Joseph C.
Published: March 2009

Since the ousting of Khrushchev in October 1964, North Korea's relations with her neighbours have undergone a radical change. The warmth that the North Korean leaders demonstrated towards Communist China earlier has all but evaporated. The staunch anti-revisionism which used to characterise North Korean speeches and statements has given way to increasingly frequent warnings about the dangers of left opportunism, dogmatism and sectarianism. The economic and political ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Soviet Union which were seriously damaged during the Khrushchev era have now been more or less re-established.
China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part II)
Authors: Wilson David A.
Published: March 2009

The Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung in April 1955 presented a rare occasion for diplomatic contact between the People's Republic of China and Thailand, and represents a milestone if not a watershed in China's Asian relations, including those with Thailand. According to one well-informed commentator on the conference, a mutual educative process for both communist and anti-communist participants lay behind the purposes set forth by the sponsoring Colombo Powers, a process which “would serve both to enlighten the Chinese as to the realities of their international environment and to educate leaders of those non-communist Asian and African states which had little or no contact with Communist China as to the actual attitudes of Peking's leaders towards both non-communist Asia and the West.” It was assumed that although China was genuinely devoted to a policy of peace for a number of years to come, a genuine and not entirely unfounded fear of China as a threat to national independence existed among certain Asian powers.
Mao's Wife—Chiang Ch'ing
Authors: Chu Hao-Jan
Published: March 2009

Chiang Ch'ing was born Li Yun-ho in 1913 in Chiucheng, Shantung Province. When she was very young her parents separated and her mother took her with her elder sister to the provincial capital of Tsinan. At the end of her primary education Chiang was sent to the Provincial Vocation School for Performing Arts in Taian, a boarding school with tuition provided free by the government as her father was no longer contributing to the support of the family. In Teturn for free education the students were obliged upon graduation to join the experimental troupe as unpaid apprentices for an unspecified period. While a student at the school Chiang had an affair with the principal, Chao T'ai-mou, who in 1930 took her to Tsingtao when he went to teach in the newly-founded National Tsingtao University. Unqualified for acceptance as a student, Chiang found a post in the university library as a junior assistant copying index cards.
The Red Guards in Historical Perspective: Continuity and Change in the Chinese Youth Movement
Authors: Israel John
Published: March 2009

Although organised by students and young intellectuals, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has had a love-hate relationship with these groups. Throughout most of a quarter century of rural insurgency, the CCP was hard put to manipulate political activities among individualistic young urban intellectuals. In the mid-twenties, the Communist Youth League (YCL) resisted the Stalinist directives of Party leaders. During the war against Japan, thought reform was deemed essential to insure the loyalty even of those who had undertaken the arduous trek to the Border Regions. Furthermore, the CCP laboured under a doctrinal handicap: although students were invaluable for organising intellectuals, workers and peasants, it was embarrassing for the party of the proletariat to have to rely upon this educated eélite. During the united front periods of the mid-20s and after 1937, students were defined as “petit bourgeois,” which made them acceptable allies. After the CCP's break with Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, a more radical party line blamed these petit bourgeois for such Stalinist follies as the Canton Commune. Throughout the “united front from below” of the early 30s, students were divided into “progressive” proletarian and “reactionary” bourgeois elements, the former to be utilised, the latter to be excluded. The ideological conundrum remains even today.
Philippine Communism and the Chinese
Authors: Van Der Kroef Justus M.
Published: March 2009

During his visit to the United States in September 1966, President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines declared in a nation-wide television interview that he knew “for a fact” that the recent resurgence of Huk guerrilla activity in his country was assisted by “agents” from Peking. A year earlier, Philippine armed forces intelligence had reported the discovery of military training centres in Bicol and the Visayas run by Chinese Communists. According to the same report, some 3,000 Chinese “subversives” in the Philippines were working closely with the Huks. Philippine constabulary chief, Brigadier General Flavio Olivares, termed the threat posed by the Chinese Communist infiltrators as more serious than that of the Huks. He noted that lax enforcement of immigration laws facilitated the entry of Chinese Communists and added that in recent years some 1,000 Chinese had gone to China, ostensibly for sentimental reasons, but had come back to the Philippines as agents. Despite the frequently partisan and self-serving complexion of some official Philippine pronouncements on the communist danger, it is impossible today to discount the significance of communist activity in the Philippines or to minimise the related problem of illegal Chinese immigration.
China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part I)
Authors: Wilson David A.
Published: March 2009

Political relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China are conditioned by important historical, geographical and social facts. While Thailand and China are situated in close proximity to each other on the north and south-west respectively, they do not have a common border; a narrow strip of both Burma and Laos joins to form an intervening corridor. This border region shared by the four countries is an area of rugged mountains and primitive communications. Neither railroad nor all-weather highway connects China with Thailand. The most effective form of land communication between Chiengrai in north Thailand and Che-li in China's southern province is by horseback. The possibility of the movement of heavy traffic over difficult terrain cannot be denied since the experience of the siege of Dien Bien Phu. There are roads of some sort from Yunnan through Burma to Chiengrai, and also (and probably more importantly) from Vietnam through Laos to Nongkhai and Nakhon Phanom.
Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies
Authors: Eastman Lloyd E.
Published: March 2009

“To tell the truth, never, in China or abroad, has there been a revolutionary party as decrepit (tuitang) and degenerate (fubai) as we [the Guomindang] are today; nor one as lacking spirit, lacking discipline, and even more, lacking standards of right and wrong as we are today. This kind of party should long ago have been destroyed and swept away!”1
The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders
Authors: Manion Melanie
Published: March 2009

Post-Mao politics in the People's Republic of China has been largely the politics of reform. Probably crucial to the success of all other reforms is the major effort to restore and develop the Party's cadre management system. Indeed, this very argument is reflected in the recent official appreciation in China of Stalin's dictum “cadres decide everything,” accompanying the recognition that the current modernization drive requires massive qualitative elite transformation and that deficiencies in the cadre system have prevented such a transformation.
Economics as an Academic Discipline at Nanjing University
Authors: Herschede Fred
Published: March 2009

The Department of Economics at Nanjing University (NanDa) was established over 60 years ago. In 1952, however, when China's universities and colleges were restructured along the Soviet pattern, the department was merged with Fudan University's Economics Department. The combined department was housed in Shanghai. In 1978, after some 26 years, a department was reinstated at NanDa, but none of the university's former faculty returned. At present NanDa has the only Economics Department in Jiangsu Province. Furthermore, there are no institutes of economics and finance in the province as there are in many other provinces and municipalities.
A Preliminary Model for Grain Production in China, 1974
Authors: Stavis Ben
Published: March 2009

Claims by the Chinese authorities that annual grain production has been in the region of 250 or more million tons in the past few years have been greeted with scepticism by some foreign analysts. However, this level of grain production is now possible because of agro-technical change in “high and stable yield” areas ana regions with improved agriculture.
Recent Chinese Grain Claims
Authors: Field Robert Michael
Published: March 2009

The Chinese have released a new figure for grain output in 1974 that is far larger than output claimed for any previous year. At an FAO conference held in Rome in mid-November 1975, the vice-minister of agriculture and forestry, Yang Li-kung, reported that total grain output was 274.9 million tons. And a 10 December Reuters dispatch from Peking speculated on the basis of this 1974 figure that China's 1975 harvest could be more than 280 million tons.
Intercessor Roles in Migration: Recruitment Processes in Rural Hong Kong
Authors: Aijmer Göran
Published: March 2009

The study of migration is generally conducted along the lines of communication theory and it is assumed that we deal with a source, a medium of transfer and a receiver. An investigation of a particular migratory movement should ideally embrace two discrete geographical territories and their socio–cultural contents, and the means providing passage from one to the other. The communication model provides an overview understanding. However, when anthropologists have scrutinized migratory movements, the clear–cut categories of source and receiver have turned out to be less obvious. In this paper it is my intention to give an ethnographical account for the “end” of a channel in a process of migration, the final stage of a transfer in which people who are on the move reach their destinations. It is obvious that “destination” is not the same thing as “terminal.” Often people move in stages, and it is quite possible that what we regard as a destination in one study would turn out to be a stage in a chain of stages in a future enquiry.
Growth and Structural Changes in the Chinese Machine-building Industry, 1952–1966
Authors: Cheng Chu-Yuan
Published: March 2009

The machine-building industry is one of the newest branches of modern industry in China. Even as late as 1949, machinery accounted for only 2·7 per cent. of the nation's gross industrial output value. Since 1952, however, the industry has been given a high priority in development plans; in official statements, it is often referred to as “the basis for technological transformation of the national economy” and “the pillar of national defence.” By 1966 the relative share of machinery production in total gross industrial output value had increased to 12 per cent., making it one of the most dynamic branches of Chinese industry. A study of this industry not only serves as a gauge of China's potential economic and military strength but also illustrates the role of machine-building in the development of an under-developed economy.
The Taoist Tradition in Taiwan
Authors: Saso Michael R.
Published: March 2009

Taiwan>, a fertile island lying approximately 120 miles off the coast of Fukien Province in South China, cut in half by the Tropic of Cancer, has recently come to the notice of western sinologists as a rich source for the study of traditional Chinese life and customs. Prior to the Second World War, during the Japanese occupation, the scholars of that learned nation devoted much effort and printed space to the study of the folk religion, customs and folklore of the Taiwanese, works which can still be purchased in the second-hand bookshops of Taipei. These works were perhaps the first to take notice of the existence of Taoism and Taoist priests in Taiwan, alongside Buddhism and “Confucianism.” But the reports were scanty, only a few pages being devoted to the two kinds of Taoists, “Red-head” and “Black-head,” and the rituals they performed. By far the greater part of the Japanese research was devoted to the “popular religion,” that nameless entity which the masses of China's peasants traditionally believed in, sometimes described as the “Three Religions in One,” an irenic mixture of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism.
Recent Russian Material on Soviet Advisers in China: 1923–1927
Authors: Jacobs Dan N.
Published: March 2009

China in the 1920s, in spite of the significant and painstaking study that has been devoted to it, remains very imperfectly researched and analysed. In large part this is to be attributed to the great number and complexity of forces involved—warlord, nationalist, imperialist and communist; operating alone or in rapidly fluctuating alliances.
Notes on Hua-tung Commune
Authors: Morehouse Ward
Published: March 2009

This report is based on a visit to Hua-tung people's commune in Kwangtung province. The visit was arranged as part of the programme of the New York State Study Group on Modern China, which travelled in China during July 1973.
The Peita Debate on Education and the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing
Authors: Zweig David S.
Published: March 2009

During the two years I spent as an exchange student in the People's Republic of China, from October 1974 to July 1976, under the auspices of the Sino-Canadian Student Exchange Programme, I was witness to such major political events as the convening of the Fourth National People's Congress, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat Campaign and the Campaign to Criticize Water Margin. This report focuses on the events that occurred in the last 10 months of my stay, and most particularly on the Educational Debate of late 1975, the passing of Chou En-lai, the campaign against Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the events surrounding the T'ien An Men Incident. My sources include personal observations: in the first few months of 1976 I witnessed the uneven unfolding of the “Educational Debate,” and I was in T'ien An Men Square on 3 and 4 April, when the first open attacks against the “Shanghai four” took place, on the eve of the riot of 5 April; material I collected from posters at Peita and in Shanghai; conversations with other foreign and Chinese students; and various contacts with Chinese teachers and officials. I also had contact with some members of the foreign community.
Enterprise Autonomy Policy in Post-Mao China: A Case Study of Policy-making, 1978–83
Authors: Lee Peter Nan-shong
Published: March 2009

Analysts and observers expect a faster pace and a greater magnitude of change in China's economic system in the post-Mao era than was achieved in earlier decades. Yet contrary to this view researchers have found that reform between 1978 and 1983, in the genuine sense of the word, was limited. Moreover, changes that have occurred appear to have resulted from proposals made in the 1950s to 1960s. Additionally, it took eight years (from 1976 to 1984) for Chinese policy-makers to advocate reforms of any significance. In fact the Party's resolution on the reform of the economic system was not put forward until the Third Plenum of 12th Party Congress in October 1984.
The Performance of Industry During the Cultural Revolution: Second Thoughts
Authors: Field Robert Michael
Published: March 2009

Mao Zedong, dissatisfied with the growing ossification of the Party and government bureaucracies, in the spring of 1966 launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He believed that China's youth required a “revolutionary experience” to renew their faith in a revolution that had taken place before most of them had been born or were old enough to remember. The Cultural Revolution (1966–76) quickly became a period of widespread, often violent, social upheaval that affected the performance of industry.
A View of Cancer Treatment in the People's Republic of China
Authors: Pettit George R.
Published: March 2009

Prior to the mid-1950s, infectious diseases, including venereal disease (now essentially eliminated), were the main causes of Chinese mortality. In 1951 cancer was ninth on the list of fatal diseases. Presently, in some areas of China it has become first. For example, in the northeast there are very distinct pockets of carcinoma of the oesophagus. In southern areas (e.g. Kwangchow) one finds high incidences of carcinoma of the nasopharynx and in eastern China a high incidence of liver cancer. Cancer investigation in these three areas is organized and pursued, for example, by the staff of the Peking Tumour Institute and Hospital.
Between Generations: Activist Chinese Youths in Pursuit of a Political Role in the San-fan and in the Cultural Revolution
Authors: Raddock David M.
Published: March 2009

This paper attempts to assess just how much and in what ways behaviour has changed between the generation that experienced the Son-fan, Wu-fan Campaign in 1951–52 and the generation that pitched itself into the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69. We focus in the first instance on the confluence of the San-fan with a thought reform movement in the schools in 1951–52, in which students “drew a clear line of demarcation between self and family,” often denouncing their parents, and in which a youth vanguard forced their teachers as well to criticize themselves. Impressionistic comparisons between that campaign and the Cultural Revolution of the ways in which adoles-cents tried to establish continuity between patterns of behaviour learned in childhood and adult social-political roles may reveal differences in the direction and nature of their rebelliousness and may reflect changes in family relationships and in socialization patterns.
The Kuomintang Regime and the Shanghai Capitalists, 1927–29
Authors: Coble Parks M.
Published: March 2009

“The reorganized Kuomintang [of 1927] established itself on a new social base – the Shanghai bankers, the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie of the cities, and the landlords in the country.” Such was the view of the allegedly leftist editor Frederick Spencer writing in 1934, and his opinion has been shared by writers of a variety of political persuasions and backgrounds. T. A. Bisson, a research associate for the Foreign Policy Association, observed in 1933 that the Nanking regime's “most powerful supporters have been the Shanghai bankers.” Robert W. Barnett, writing in 1941 for the Institute of Pacific Relations, argued that after 1927 “a progressive but anti-revolutionary Chinese bourgeoisie provided the ruling Kuomintang with its principal source of inspiration and support.” Ch'en Po-ta wrote that the Nanking regime was “a counter-revolutionary military dictatorship of the big compradors and big landlords. It was formed with the Shanghai, or the ‘Kiangsu-Chekiang,’ gangster ring of comprador–financiers at its core.”
Mass Campaigns and Earthquakes: Hai-Ch'eng, 1975
Authors: Bennett Gordon
Published: March 2009

The Chinese term pu-cho (“catch”) an earthquake expresses the Chinese Government's resolve to save lives and property by applying the political techniques of mass mobilization to improve upon the predictive accuracy achievable with fine instruments and professional methods alone. To be more specific, during the most critical stage of the shortrange prediction process the public can contribute large numbers of useful observations not requiring ultra-sensitive instruments.
Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indo-China, 1954–55
Authors: Shao Kuo-kang
Published: March 2009

A vital key to Zhou Enlai's diplomacy in Indo-China during 1954 and 1955 was his systematic effort to “neutralize” the region. Zhou, as Chinese premier and foreign minister, laid the foundations of China's approach to Indo-China. Subsequently, his policy of neutralization and its application to Indo-China focused on the enlargement of the “area of collective peace” along China's southern frontiers. This general formula reflected Zhou's primary concern for China's territorial security and economic development. In Zhou's estimation the immediate western military threat to China's security could be curbed effectively if Indo-China became a “neutralized” region in which the three local states, that is, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, were not allowed to enter into alliances with any outside major powers. Only by terminating French colonial domination in Indo-China and restraining major-power interference in the internal affairs of these three states could the peace and stability of Indo-China be secured.
Planned Fertility and Fertility Socialization in Kwangtung Province
Authors: Ng Pedro Pak-tao
Published: March 2009

This is a report on some aspects of the publicity activities of the “planned fertility” (chi-hua sheng-yu) campaign in parts of Kwangtung Province. I shall make special reference to three rural communes, namely, Huan-ch'eng (population: 59,000) of Hsin-hui Hsien, Ta-li (population: 68,000) of Nan-hai Hsien, and Ch'ang-sha (population: 59,500) of K'ai-p'ing Hsien, each of which I visited in December 1976 as a member of the research team of the Social Research Centre of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Based on personal observations and conversation with various individuals during that trip, including officials and ordinary peasants, I propose to describe in some detail the ways in which the principles of planned fertility are transmitted to the masses.
Conceptual Difficulties in Measuring China's Industrial Output
Authors: Hung Fred C. , Wu Yuan-Li
Published: March 2009

A sharp contrast stands between the mood of optimism in 1958 and 1959 when official as well as unofficial reports of industrial progress continued to pour out of Communist China and the silence and complete black-out of statistical information which has characterised the Chinese scene since 1960. If the principal landmarks are retraced, the first major sign of a change in official policy appears to have come in early 1961 when the Chinese Communist Party decided to reverse the policies which had characterised the “leap forward” of 1958–59. This was followed by a drastic policy of retrenchment in investment and reorientation of industrial production during the latter part of 1961 as the economic crisis deepened. Since then the new slogan has been “adjustment, consolidation, reinforcement, and improvement”; the new order of priorities is agriculture, light industry and heavy industry; the new approach is to regard agriculture as the economic base and industry as the “leading factor.”
Work incentive Policy in Communist China
Authors: Hoffmann Charles
Published: March 2009

In their concerted and ardent efforts to industrialise and develop the economy rapidly, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have given work incentives an important role—a role which operates narrowly within the limits set by economic necessity and ideology. The pendulum has swung from an emphasis on material incentives (First Five-Year Plan, 1953–57) to a stress on non-material incentives (1957–60) and back again (1960 on). These major changes in incentive policy have reflected the significant turns in the grand socio-economic strategy of the Chinese Communist Party.
China's Economic Planning and Industry
Authors: Donnithorne Audrey
Published: March 2009

Economic planning in China was pioneered by Kao Kang, Chairman of the North-East Administrative Area in the early days of the Communist régime, who controlled the region formerly known as Manchuria. This was the region which the Japanese had developed into China's foremost centre of heavy industry. It came under Communist rule before most of the country and as early as 1949 the North-East Financial and Economic Commission had made a rough plan for rehabilitating its industry. Two years later a regional planning commission was established.
Changes in the Location of China's Steel Industry
Authors: Hsia Ronald
Published: March 2009

The importance of examining the location of China's steel development is not confined solely to the steel industry. It reflects to a large extent, the Communist policy on industrial location in general. The new steel centres have been planned to form the nuclei of industrial complexes. To counteract the pre-Communist concentration of industry in the coastal areas, the Communist régime has emphasised from the beginning that a wide dispersion of industry is desirable from the standpoint of economic development and national defence. In planning new capital construction, therefore, regional development constitutes a key-note while sources of raw materials and fuel supply, consumption centres, future mechanisation of agriculture and national security become the major determinants of industrial locations. As a result of adherence to this policy, a new pattern has emerged for the location of China's steel industry.
A Study of the Rouble-Yuan Exchange Rate
Authors: Chao Kang , Mah Feng-Hwa
Published: March 2009

It is generally known that the exchange rates in Soviet-type economies are disequilibrium exchange rates in the sense that without controls they do not tend to lead to a balance on the international current accounts. Of the two economies involved, it is also known that these exchange rates are unrealistic, in the sense that they have no relation to the gold content of currencies involved, if the currencies have a gold content, and that these rates do not reflect the relative domestic purchasing power of the two currencies on internationally traded commodities. In the case of the exchange rate between the Soviet rouble and the Communist Chinese yuan, even this disequilibrium and unrealistic exchange rate has in the main been veiled in secrecy since 1950. This secrecy has caused considerable difficulties in working with the Communist foreign trade statistics.
The Conflict between Old and New in the Chinese Army
Authors: Joffe Ellis
Published: March 2009

One of the most pressing needs of the Chinese Communists when they established their régime, was to convert the sprawling semi-guerrilla force which had brought them to power into a modern army capable of maintaining that power. China's leaders were acutely aware of this need and they lost little time in launching the armed forces on the long march to modernisation. No modernisation, however, could have succeeded without large numbers of officers skilled in running a complex military establishment. The Red Army commanders, though resourceful and battle-tested, were by and large not equipped for this task. It was necessary, therefore, to develop a professional officer corps.
The ‘Learn from the Army’ Campaign
Authors: Gittings John
Published: March 2009

Perhaps the most significant development affecting the Chinese army in recent months has been the campaign to “Learn from the Experience of the People's Liberation Army in Political and Ideological Work” launched by the People's Daily editorial of February 1, 1964. In the context of the nation-wide emulation movement, the Liberation Army's achievements in this field of political work make it a model for the whole nation to “learn from, study and compare with.” Industries, commercial enterprises, government departments, trade unions, rural work cadres and other important sections of the community are reported to have taken up the challenge to “learn from the People's Liberation Army.” At the same time there has been an exceptional quantity of news about the political achievements of the Army and of its model soldiers and companies.
On Contradiction in the Light of Mao Tse-tung's Essay on “Dialectical Materialism”
Authors: Doolin Dennis J. , Golas Peter J.
Published: March 2009

The Chinese Communists have not hesitated to alter their Party documents—in effect rewriting history—when such changes have seemed desirable for political purposes. It is well known, for example, that the texts of various documents in Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works differ significantly from the originals. In this article we offer evidence suggesting that a fundamentally important Party document—On Contradiction (Mao-tun Lun)—was not written in the summer of 1937, as Party history asserts. Rather, it was composed at a much later date, copying the theses of Stalin and Zhdanov. By thus falsifying the date of composition, the Chinese Communists could bolster their covert assertion of Mao Tse-tung's primacy as a Marxist theoretician.
Tung Pi-wu: A Political Profile
Authors: Boorman Howard L.
Published: March 2009

The counterpoint of radical change and durable continuity which has characterised the Communist upheaval in China is nowhere so marked as in the ambivalent attitudes towards youth and age. Traditional China was a backward-looking civilisation, espousing a view of life and of history which esteemed past over present, age over youth, authority over innovation. The twentieth century has seen a definite, often violent, conflict between the generations, with the revolt of 1911, the May Fourth movement, and the Northern Expedition each expressing an aspect of the upsurge of youthful aspiration. The emergence of a Communist government has been marked by a drastic change in the official attitude, a new preoccupation with the future rather than the past, and sustained attention to the organisation of the youth of China, from which group will come the national leaders of the generation ahead.
The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement
Authors: Hindley Donald
Published: March 2009

Until late in 1961, the leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party gave no public indication of the conflict within the international Communist movement. That they were aware of the worsening dispute is evident: for example, from 1958 to 1961, inclusive, they sent an average of five delegations to the Sino-Soviet bloc each year. But they chose to concentrate their energy on strengthening and guiding their own Party. This they had built into the largest Communist Party outside the bloc, with a membership at the end of 1961 of almost two millions, and with a network of mass organisations claiming over ten million members. After the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress, however, the existence of conflict was public knowledge. D. N. Aidit, the Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party, who had led his Party's delegation to the congress, felt compelled to explain the Party's position.
Factionalism Observed: Behind the “Face” of Harmony in a Chinese Community
Authors: Pillsbury Barbara L. K.
Published: March 2009

The importance of “face” (lien or mien-tzu) has long been recognized as a prime determinant of Chinese behavioural patterns whether those of an individual or of a group. We also know that the Confucian emphasis on “harmony” (ho-p'ing) has long constituted a basic ideal in Chinese inter-personal relations. Recently social scientists have drawn attention to “impression management” and to the relatively great disparities in some societies between an individual's or group's “front region,” “front-stage” or “public sphere” behaviour and the contradictory “back region,” “back-stage” or “closed sphere” behaviour. Applying these concepts in a Chinese society which still purports to uphold Confucian ideals we find that the front-stage impression a group seeks and often manages to convey is one of unity and harmony. Closer inspection may reveal, however, that, back-stage, factionalism is rife.
The Election of Production Team Cadres in Rural China: 1958–74
Authors: Burns John P.
Published: March 2009

Although the People's Republic of China attaches little importance to elections in parliamentary democracies, elections are seen as important in societies going through the transition between capitalism and communism.1Elections of local level leaders were carried out in the CCP-controlled base areas before 1949, and throughout the period after Liberation. The attention devoted to election propaganda and voter turn-out attest to the importance placed on mass electoral participation by the Chinese leadership.2* I wish to express my gratitude to Thomas Bernstein, Steven Butler, Victor Falkenheim, Andrew Nathan, Brian Shaw, and David Strand for reading earlier drafts of this paper and providing many useful suggestions for its revision. Needless to say, all errors are the responsibility of the author.
Mao and Liu in the 1947 Land Reform: Allies or Disputants
Authors: Kyoko Tanaka
Published: March 2009

The Civil War period from 1945 to 1949 is one of the least studied periods in Chinese Communist history. Even such fundamental facts as the formal organizational structure of the Party and government and holders of official positions in the leadership have not been well established. Nor has one of the most important policies of the Party at the time, agrarian reform, been sufficiently investigated. The alleged leadership split over important policy issues in the period constitutes another area which deserves more scholarly attention than has been given.
China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies
Authors: Fitzgerald Stephen
Published: March 2009

The Chinese Communist Party and the “Overseas Chinese Problem”

The “Overseas Chinese problem” in South-East Asia is most commonly understood to be a problem which confronts the governments and indigenous peoples of the region, or other governments which have an interest in South-East Asia, or sometimes the Overseas Chinese themselves. It is seldom perceived as a “problem” for the Chinese Government, except in so far as China is thought to have encountered certain obstacles to political and economic exploitation of a relationship which appears deceptively simple, and which seems to offer very considerable advantages to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet the evolution of China's Overseas Chinese policy since 1949 reveals a growing awareness on the part of the CCP that there were many intractable problems associated with its overseas population, both in the pursuit of foreign policies in South-East Asia and in the very nature of the Overseas Chinese relationship with China.
Evidence from Chinese Medical Journals on Current Population Policy
Authors: Orleans Leo A.
Published: March 2009

China's bitter population dilemma is clearly summarized in just one short statement from the People's Daily: “We insist on family planning, but generally speaking we think it is a good thing to have a large population.” For the past two decades China's population policy has been shrouded in secrecy, has been expressed only through Communist polemic and has suffered from apparent indecision and consequent vacillations. Official thinking on this subject is almost never expressed in direct statements and proclamations. It must be gleaned from casual remarks by Chinese leaders, from newspaper and magazine articles and official radio broadcasts, which usually discuss implementation but omit reference to the initial decision, and from visitors to China who describe the visible signs that suggest a particular policy is currently in effect.
Chinese Politics in Malaya
Authors: Gungwu Wang
Published: March 2009

During the past 20 years, the politics of the Chinese in Malaya has been a subject of international interest.The Malayan Communist Party has been predominantly Chinese; it was Chinese politics in Singapore (briefly part of Malaysia) which produced the phenomenon of Lee Kuan Yew; and the Kuala Lumpur riots of May 1969 are widely thought to have been efforts to stem a Chinese challenge to Malay supremacy. The Chinese in West Malaysia, especially when taken together with those in Singapore, have earned the attention of governments, journalists and scholars alike. They form the largest concentration of Chinese outside of Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong; their economic life is among the most sophisticated in Asia; their social and cultural life probably the most complex that Chinese anywhere have ever known; and, above all, their political life has been more open and exposed than that of any other kind of Chinese. This last, their political life, has been difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. The main reason is that two contradictory views about them have long prevailed: that the Chinese are non-political and that the Chinese are political in a secretive and inscrutable way. These views are based on a concept of politics in the democratic tradition and are either anachronistic or misleading. Chinese, Malay and colonial political systems have been, in varying degrees, authoritarian, and Chinese political life must be seen in that context except in the period 1957–69.