bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Women Mystics in a Male‐Dominated Culture
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

Concerned that educated women would threaten male authority in religion and politics, a misogynous culture of male domination emerged to subordinate and restrict women's lives. Still concerned with potential heterodox threats, the church found itself in the paradoxical position of needing to enforce a conservative orthodoxy while at the same time not wanting to alienate those followers of popular religious trends who were also devoutly Catholic. As such, many women mystics who were prominent in popular movements were supported and even canonized. The spiritual piety of these women achieved greater and greater recognition and their writings flourished. Many, however, were wholly dependent upon their male spiritual advisors who had the power to determine their success or failure as mystics.
The Officially Approved Woman Mystic and Her Supporters
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

As the convent increasingly became a venue of ‘aristocratization’, those mystics who received ‘official’ approval tended to be women from privileged and educated families. Further, convents themselves began to mirror the existing social class hierarchy. While women from poorer backgrounds could achieve an ‘official’ mystic status, only rarely could they attain the position of convent abbess. Also, their educational achievements were attributed to divine intervention rather than natural intellectual gift. Approved mystics, especially those women of high social standing, had a well‐developed support system and knew that to maintain their positions it was necessary to staunchly uphold orthodox tenets and to uncompromisingly support the church's hierarchy, particularly the authority of bishops.
Sainthood Denied
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

In a society that valued social status, lower‐class mystics tended to be regarded as ‘false.’ They were frequently subjected to the Inquisition, and, as many were uneducated and thus illiterate, they were not well acquainted with orthodox catechism and were often accused of heresy. Further, these ‘false’ mystics rarely benefited from the instruction and support of an elite spiritual advisor. Rather, the poorer mystics tended to have an unstable relationship with their confessors, who often were not well educated themselves. While some ‘false’ mystics found supporters within the aristocracy, they rarely secured support from the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
An Uncertain Sword
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

Without questioning the existence and validity of genuine divine revelation, the Inquisition nonetheless concerned itself with the problem of fraudulent mystical experiences, which were understood to be demonic in origin. Women were especially vulnerable to ‘false’ mysticism because of their perceived emotional frailty and temptation to the sin of pride. To distinguish between ‘false’ and authentic divine communication, the Inquisition created a set of criteria by which to judge a visionary's claim. Women who were charged with ‘false’ mysticism were subjected to a process of imprisonment, trial, and sentencing by the Inquisition, although generally, those found guilty were not severely punished but rather subjected to corrective education and curtailment.
A Counter‐Reformation Childhood
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

Families during the Counter‐Reformation were characterized by intense piety and harsh discipline. Frequently motivated by economic restraints, parents subjugated children to a home life resembling the convent where strict religiosity and punishment were enforced and deprivation far outweighed affection. This context provided a psychological breeding ground for young girls to escape into a world of religious fantasy and mystical experience.
Adolescence and the Struggle for Self‐Assertion
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

Throughout their lives, adolescent women often continued to be subjected to the abuse they endured in their younger years. Their behavior was closely monitored on account of their sexual maturity, and many were forced into convent life against their will, especially if financial conditions restricted a family's ability to pay a dowry. Other young women voluntarily sought lives of spiritual growth and freely made the choice to enter the convent. Given that homes frequently modeled themselves after convent life, such choices were not very surprising. Convents also could be venues of abusive behavior.
Adulthood
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

Despite the restraints placed on women in the Counter‐Reformation era, many women mystics developed strategies to achieve recognition as leaders. These included exercising harsh moral authority, using their visions to gain power and instill fear, and becoming adept at performing the sufferings of Christ and the perils of demonic possession. Once leadership was attained, the women sought to gain a positive reputation with the aristocracy through assuming a life of severe austerity and writing autobiographies and devotional works. Even with their success, however, many women suffered from intense self‐loathing, possibly associated with their repression of sexuality, and developed serious illnesses. The mystical life was understood to be one that detached itself from the world and helped ensure a good death.
The Perception of Sanctity
Authors: Haliczer Stephen
Published: October 2003

In order to ensure that canonization would be a possibility, woman mystics intentionally created a cult of veneration, which acknowledged that they were indeed recipients of God's favor. This was achieved by demonstrating, for instance, that they had experienced the pain of suffering of Christ's passion and could effect miraculous deeds, including healings. Further, it was necessary to build support networks within their communities and among politicians and ecclesiastical authorities. Upon their deaths, their communities would continue the quest through elaborate funerals and public veneration. Still, it was those who did not threaten the male‐hierarchy who were most likely to achieve canonization.
Introduction
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

Provides a preview of the book's four main parts: (1) “Motivation and Action”; (2) “Motivation and Normativity”; (3) “Strength and Control” (more precisely, motivational strength and self‐control); and (4) “Decision, Agency, and Belief.” The chapter also identifies popular theses in motivational psychology, identifies a central element of the causal theory of agency to be defended, and explains why behavioral flexibility is a mark of motivation.
Reasons for Action and Action for Reasons
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

Investigates the connection between motivation and reasons for action. It begins with a sketch of Donald Davidson's influential version of the view that reasons for action are states of mind. It then undermines some criticisms of a broadly Davidsonian view of action explanation, including objections by Rosalind Hursthouse and T. M. Scanlon. Finally, it builds a theoretical bridge between work on its central topic by two groups of theorists: those guided primarily by a concern with the evaluation of actions or their agents (“evaluators”), and those primarily guided instead by an interest in the explanation of intentional actions (“explainers”). Motivational and normative notions of reasons for action are distinguished.
The Motivational Power of Practical Reasoning
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

Examines the motivational power of practical reasoning. Two views are distinguished: “the antecedent motivation theory,” according to which, in actual human beings, all motivation nonaccidentally produced by practical reasoning issuing in a belief favoring a course of action derives, at least partly, from motivation already present in the agent; and “the cognitive engine theory,” according to which, in actual human beings, some instances of practical evaluative reasoning nonaccidentally produce motivation that does not derive at all from motivation already present. The former view is defended and the latter is criticized. Bernard Williams's defense of the former view is argued to be unsuccessful; alternative arguments for it are advanced.
Moral Motivation and Moral Ought‐Beliefs
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

This chapter's topic is moral motivation. It is argued – against John McDowell, David McNaughton, Thomas Nagel, and others – that no plausible cognitivist moral theory will include the strong “internalist” thesis that moral ought‐beliefs essentially encompass motivation to act accordingly or even Jonathan Dancy's more modest thesis that some such beliefs are “intrinsically motivating.” The argument features an examination of depression or listlessness. An alternative, causal view of the connection between moral judgments and motivation is proposed. It is argued that this view supports the practical function of morality.
Motivational Strength
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.
Control and Self‐Control
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

The primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis about the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leaves ample room for self‐control. Aspects of Libet's interpretation of his data are criticized, but Libet's work does give us a sense of how much time might elapse between the acquisition of a desire to do something straightaway and the beginning of an overt action motivated by that desire. More important, it gives us a sense of possibilities for practically relevant motivational change during that span and adds to the extant case for the view that a plausible principle of the kind at issue does not place agents at the mercy of their strongest desires.
Deciding
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

This chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.
Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations
Authors: Mele Alfred R.
Published: October 2003

Drawing on work in cognitive and social psychology, this chapter explains the bearing of motivationally biased beliefs on the project of producing an account of motivational explanation. It is argued that the core of ordinary motivational explanations is the following compound feature: motivation‐constituting items make a causal contribution to the explanandum that (1) helps to explain the explanandum at least partly by revealing (sometimes in conjunction with an instrumental belief) an agreeable feature, from the perspective of the agent's desires, either of the explanandum itself or of its object and (2) is of such a kind that our learning of contributions of that kind tends to improve our folk‐psychological understanding – that is, the understanding we have in, roughly, commonsense psychological terms – of why the explanandum came to be.
Natural Goodness
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Philippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism.
A Fresh Start?
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical rationality that nevertheless still meets this requirement. Foot also denies that moral evaluation is opposed to descriptive statements, or matters of fact, as the non‐cognitivists argue; it has to do rather with facts about a particular subject matter, i.e. human life. Her main argument, which she will pursue throughout the book, is that the grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in these facts, or in what Elizabeth Anscombe refers to as ‘Aristotelian necessities’, i.e. the moral virtues; and thus the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and of the life of our species.
Natural Norms
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and argues that such judgements of goodness and badness are normative and indeed evaluative. Thus, Foot shows that these norms can be explained in terms of facts about natural things, i.e. without recourse to speech acts or the expression of psychological states. Natural goodness, Foot argues, is attributable only to living things themselves and their parts, characteristics, and operations; it is an intrinsic or autonomous goodness that depends directly on the relation of an individual to the life form of its species.
Transition to Human Beings
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care to distinguish this from utilitarianism. The same normative pattern, that of natural normativity, Foot concludes, is to be found in the evaluations of plants, animals, and human beings; although human good is different to the good in the world of animals and plants, nevertheless there is a common conceptual structure.
Practical Rationality
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues that an objective theory of morality can establish an intelligible connection between objective moral evaluations and what we have reason to do as individuals. Rational choice is an aspect of human goodness, and at the heart of the virtues, rather than set apart from it as something to which goodness should conform.
Human Goodness
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which they share a common conceptual structure. Foot discusses and criticizes J. S. Mill's understanding of the word ‘moral’, as an example of the modern view that contrasts ‘moral’ and ‘prudential’ considerations. Thus, Foot denies the expressivist view that moral evaluation must be understood in terms of the expression of special mental states such as approval, or mental acts such as endorsing. Drawing upon Aquinas's theory of the sources of good and bad actions, Foot argues that there is no reason to think that Mill's ‘moral’ evaluations should be treated differently from other evaluations concerning the human will.
Happiness and Human Good
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about special objects, is in error because happiness does not have the same logical grammar as words like excitement or pleasure. Foot concludes that happiness is a protean concept, appearing in many different forms; however, happiness may be thought of as humanity's good in such a way that combining happiness with wickedness is ruled out a priori. This understanding of happiness as humanity's good is close to Aristotle's eudaimonia, insofar as it means operation in conformity with the virtues; as Foot understands the term, happiness is the enjoyment of good things, meaning the pursuit and attainment of right ends.
Words and Ideas
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but concludes it, as part of a deliberate attempt to explain how at least some of our thoughts succeed in referring to the world. For Berkeley, representation—the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought—is sometimes a matter of resemblance.
Simple Ideas
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

Many empiricists, among them Locke and Hume, make a distinction between simple and complex ideas. Berkeley refuses to do so, because he finds connections—objective connections incompatible with simplicity—even among the ‘simplest’ of ideas. Simple ideas, in his view, are illegitimately abstract.
Necessity
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

I suggest that in his early, unpublished notebooks, Berkeley experimented with a radically formal conception of necessity, according to which necessity is nothing more than the inclusion of one idea within the definition of another. Berkeley's experiment was defeated by the same objective connections (and oppositions) that rule out the existence of simple ideas. Although Berkeley was left without an understanding of the nature of necessity, he never wavered in his conviction that necessity is something objective—that ideas and the world have an inherent, inescapable structure.
Immaterialism
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

This chapter reviews and assesses Berkeley's main arguments for immaterialism, his arguments against the existence of matter or material substance. I place particular emphasis on the themes of earlier chapters: intentionality, abstraction, necessity, and intelligibility. My aim is to show that Berkeley's thinking about these topics made a powerful contribution to his immaterialism, even if they seem, on the surface, to be distant from it. I provide an account of immediate perception as Berkeley understands it, and emphasize the phenomenalist elements in Berkeley's development of immaterialism.
Unperceived Objects
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

This is the first of three chapters examining the consequences of Berkeley's immaterialism and the problems to which it gives rise. In the present chapter, I defend a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley on unperceived objects. Appealing to his denial of blind agency, I show that a phenomenalist interpretation can be reconciled with texts that seem to go against it. I provide a modest interpretation of Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes, and argue briefly that even in Siris, Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes is unambitious and not especially Platonic.
Corpuscularianism
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

After describing the corpuscularian background of Berkeley's work (in, for example, the writing of Boyle, Newton, Locke, and Malebranche), I consider whether Berkeley can endorse the existence of immaterial atoms or corpuscles. I suggest that he hopes to avoid a definite commitment. He wants his position to ‘float’, its level to be determined by the kind of empirical evidence that would strike materialists and immaterialists with equal force. This chapter foregrounds the role played by the notion of intelligibility, both in the defence of modern corpuscularian science (including the distinction between primary and secondary qualities) and in Berkeley's critical response to it.
Spirit
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P.
Published: October 2003

I offer an interpretation and partial defence of Berkeley's belief that he is a mind or spirit—a spiritual substance—distinct from his ideas. I argue in particular that the arguments examined in earlier chapters, particularly the account of representation or intentionality developed in Ch. 1, and the immaterialist arguments reviewed in Ch. 6, do not force Berkeley to conclude that spiritual substance is no less impossible than matter.
The Rejection of Consequentialism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank states of affairs from an impersonal standpoint and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Many philosophers have criticized and rejected consequentialist theories, but Scheffler wishes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He begins by discussing two objections to consequentialism, one having to do with the integrity of agents and the other with distributive justice. From there, he outlines a hybrid moral theory that avoids these two objections. Scheffler's hybrid theory agrees with consequentialism in so far as it always permits agents to produce the best states of affairs, but it departs from consequentialism by including an ‘agent‐centred prerogative’, allowing each agent to assign greater weight to his own interests than to those of others. Scheffler argues that this prerogative rests on a principled rationale—namely, that it is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. But this rationale does not support ‘agent‐centred restrictions’—norms that sometimes forbid agents from doing what would have the best outcome overall. Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a separate rationale for agent‐centred restrictions.
The Project and Its Motivation
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank overall states of affairs and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Bernard Williams and others have criticized consequentialism, saying that it undermines agents’ integrity by requiring them to view cherished personal projects from an impersonal perspective. In addition, the most well‐known consequentialist theory, classical utilitarianism, can be criticized for its insensitivity to questions of distributive justice. Scheffler examines these two objections and proposes that the first might be avoided by a hybrid theory—one that agrees with consequentialism in so far as it rejects agent‐centred restrictions and permits agents always to produce the best available outcomes, but that departs from consequentialism by including an agent‐centred prerogative. To avoid the second objection, a hybrid theory must employ a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good.
Outline of a New Theory of Normative Ethics
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Provides an outline for a hybrid moral theory of the sort described in Ch. 1; Scheffler calls this theory the ‘distributive hybrid’. In order to accommodate concerns about agents’ integrity, the distributive hybrid incorporates an agent‐centred prerogative, allowing each agent to assign proportionately greater weight to his own interests than to those of other people. In order to accommodate concerns about distributive justice, the distributive hybrid incorporates a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good. Scheffler points out that some forms of consequentialism also incorporate distribution‐sensitive conceptions of the good.
The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Explores the considerations underlying an agent‐centred prerogative and the considerations underlying a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good. Scheffler argues that, whether or not the integrity‐based objection to consequentialism succeeds, that objection nevertheless reveals a principled rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative: the prerogative is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. (Scheffler calls this strategy the ‘liberation strategy’, and he contrasts it with a ‘maximization strategy’, which tries to accommodate the personal point of view within the framework of a sophisticated consequentialism.) The personal point of view and the distinctness of persons also provide a principled rationale for favouring distribution‐sensitive conceptions of the overall good.
The Defence of Agent‐Centred Restrictions: Intuitions in Search of a Foundation
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a principled rationale for including agent‐centred restrictions in a moral theory. He considers and rejects rationales that appeal to the disvalue of violating agent‐centred restrictions, to the independence of the personal point of view, and to other features of victims and agents. Overall, the chapter is a defence of what Scheffler calls the ‘independence thesis’, which holds that Ch. 3's principled rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative is consistent with the rejection of agent‐centred restrictions. Scheffler's arguments may also lend support to the ‘asymmetry thesis’, which denies the possibility of grounding agent‐centred restrictions in a rationale comparable to that which grounds an agent‐centred prerogative.
The Project Reconsidered
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Defenders of agent‐centred restrictions might respond to the arguments of Ch. 4 by questioning the whole enterprise of trying to find a principled rationale for agent‐centred restrictions. Specifically, they might argue that the very idea of ranking states of affairs is flawed, and thus no rationale is required for agent‐centred restrictions. Scheffler responds that the idea of ranking states of affairs is not misguided, and that even if it were, there would still be a basis for questioning the rationality of agent‐centred restrictions. Along these same lines, Scheffler maintains that the search for a rationale for agent‐centred restrictions does not reflect an antecedent bias in favour of consequentialism. It is much easier, he argues, to find a rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative than for agent‐centred restrictions.
The Christian God
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed for this purpose – substance, cause, time, and necessity. Part 2 (Ch. 6 to 10) begins by setting out some of the different ways in which the doctrine that there is a divine individual (an individual with the traditional divine properties) can be developed. There can be more than one divine individual so long as a first such individual is necessarily the cause of the existence of the others. Given the supreme moral goodness of cooperating with one individual in sharing everything with a third individual, it follows that if there is one divine individual, there will be three and only three such individuals; hence the necessity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – that there is one God consisting of three divine persons. One of these persons may choose to become incarnate, i.e. human, and there are reasons why he would do so.
Substances
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

A substance is a concrete individual thing that exists all at once. Although the world can be cut up into substances in different ways, any full description of the world will include both material objects and immaterial souls as substances. Souls have essentially mental properties, ones to which the subject has privileged access such as thoughts and sensations. The essential part of a human being is a human soul, one with a structure and a capacity for logical thought, moral belief, and free will, and (typically but not necessarily) certain limited powers exercised through a human body. No human being is essentially human.
Thisness
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

An individual has thisness if there could be a different individual who had all the same properties (in a very wide sense of ‘property’) – i.e. if the identity of indiscernibles does not apply to it. Souls have thisness, material objects might have thisness, but times and places do not have thisness.
Causation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is reducible to talk of the causal powers and liabilities of substances. A perfectly free (and so rational) agent will inevitably do only (what he believes to be) good actions – the best action or one of a number of equal best actions, if there are such.
Time
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Everything that happens, happens over a period of time, and never at an instant. Time must have a topology, but it only has a metric if there are laws of nature. The future is what we can causally affect; the past is what causally affects us (and so neither backward nor simultaneous causation are possible). There are both indexical and non‐indexical temporal facts (the A‐series of events is not reducible to the B‐series.) Necessarily, time has no beginning and no end.
Necessity
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Sentences can be thought of as expressing propositions or statements. The logical nominalist is right, against the logical Platonist, to hold that propositions and statements are not really existing things but mere useful fictions. A sentence is logically necessary if its negation entails a contradiction, given that its referring expressions in fact pick out the objects that they do. A sentence's entailments are a matter of the human conventions for the use of that sentence. There are kinds of necessity other than logical necessity. In particular, there is what I call ‘ontological necessity’ – everlasting uncaused existence; and what I call ‘metaphysical necessary’. Something is metaphysically necessary in my sense if either it is ontologically necessary or it is inevitably caused to exist everlastingly by something ontologically necessary.
Divine Properties
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Analyses the divine properties, which all (including perfect goodness) follow from eternal omnipotence, omniscience and perfect freedom. ‘Eternal’ must be understood as ‘everlasting’. A divine individual cannot have a beginning; but in the absence of a temporal metric, there is no difference between such an individual existing for only a finite time and existing for an infinite time. A divine individual is not a logically necessary being.
The Divine Nature
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

All the divine properties follow from one essential property of having pure limitless intentional power. An individual with this property will be metaphysically necessary. Aquinas was right to hold that what binds the divine properties together was causal power, and not – as Anselm held – being the greatest conceivable being. A divine individual is simple and does not have thisness.
The Trinity
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

There can be more than one divine individual if any others are dependent for their existence on a first one and if it is supremely good, act to cooperate with a second individual to share all that they have with a third individual. In that case, God will be a Trinity, three divine persons, the others deriving ultimately from one of these, ‘The Father’. The Nicene creed and other Christian doctrinal statements of the doctrine of the Trinity can be seen to fit this account, if we bear in mind that the words of Greek and Latin, translated into English as ‘God’ are ambiguous between a name, ‘God’ and ‘a divine being’. We do not need the notion of relative identity to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity.
The Evidence of Incarnation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

God does not need to become incarnate, i.e. human, to forgive us, but it is good that he should do so to make his forgiveness available to us by means of an atonement for our sins; and also for many other reasons – to identify with our sufferings, show us how much he loves us, and reveal truths to us. Evidence that Jesus was God Incarnate is provided by the kind of life he led, and its culmination in the Resurrection. Other accounts of the ‘incarnation’ – monophysitism, Nestorianism, the Kenotic Theory, and modern humanistic Christologies – are less probable than the Chalcedonian one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the Virgin Birth, and the Ascension of Christ.
Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

Concepts as central theoretical constructs in cognitive science. Theories of concepts and theories of concept possession. Representational. The place of concepts in `representational theories of mind’. Basic assumptions of the discussion to follow: Psychological explanations are typically nomic; mental representations are the primitive bearers of intentional content; concepts are the constituents of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires; thinking is computing; meaning is information; concepts are the typical proximal causes of behavior. Concepts as `Modes of Presentation of objects and properties’.
Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

Adequacy conditions on a theory of concepts: Concepts are mental particulars; they function as perceptual and cognitive categories; they are compositional; many of them are learned; they are typically public (i.e. shared by many minds). Satisfying the publicity condition presupposes a notion of conceptual identity (mere similarity won’t do).
The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

A consideration of `linguistic’ evidence for and against the view that typical concepts of `middle‐sized’ objects (DOG, CHAIR, UNCLE, DOORKNOB) are complex definitional constructions out of more primitive concepts. Critical analysis of arguments by Ray Jackendoff, Steven Pinker, and others.
The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

A consideration of `philosophical’ evidence, the view that typical concepts are complex. Connections with questions about analyticity and learnability. The alternative view (`conceptual atomism’)‐that typical concepts are primitives‐is introduced and defended. The importance of distinguishing the semantic issues about conceptual atomism from the epistemological ones.
Prototypes and Compositionality
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

A consideration of the view, widely held in cognitive science, that typical concepts are complex statistical structures (`bundles of subjective probabilities’). The crucial difficulty: since probabilities don’t compose, the productivity and systematicity of conceptual systems is inexplicable. The `pet fish’ problem and its variants. The `theory theory’ about concept possession.
Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

The `standard’ argument against conceptual atomism: primitive concepts must be innate (i.e. common ground between empiricists and rationalists). So, if conceptual atomism is true, concept nativism must be true. Is this a reduction? The main objection to a pervasive concept nativism is that typical concepts are acquired from experience with their instances. This is explicable on the assumption that such concepts are learned. An alternative explanation is proposed, which turns on the suggestion that typical concepts express mind dependent properties.
Innateness and Ontology, Part II: Natural Kind Concepts
Authors: Fodor Jerry A.
Published: October 2003

Natural kind properties are not mind dependent. So why are concepts such as WATER, GIRAFFE, etc. acquired from their instances? Critical discussion of the view that concepts of natural kinds are the models on which psychological theories of concepts should be constructed.
Pragmatics
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

Pragmatics—the study of language in relation to the uses of language and the context of its use ‐ is distinguished from semantics—the study of the propositional content of what is expressed in language. Pragmatic presupposition is distinguished from semantic presupposition. The apparatus developed is used to clarify Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
Pragmatic Presuppositions
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

Argues that the distinction between what is asserted and what is presupposed in a statement should be described and explained pragmatically, in terms of what the speaker takes to be the background information, or common ground, shared between speaker and audience. The pragmatic notion of presupposition is used to explain two kinds of linguistic facts: first, facts about the relation between the presuppositions required by complex sentences and the presuppositions required by their constituent sentences (the projection problem) and second, facts about the behaviour of different kinds of factive verbs.
Indicative Conditionals
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

Aims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is explained in terms of different constraints imposed on the contexts relative to which the different forms of conditionals are interpreted. A pragmatic concept of reasonable inference is defined and contrasted with semantic entailment. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.
Assertion
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

An account of the speech act of assertion is proposed. Three technical notions—proposition, propositional concept, and speaker presupposition are defined and used to characterize the effect of an assertion on the context. Some constraints on the appropriateness of assertion are proposed and used to resolve some puzzles about identity statements and negative existential statements using proper names.
On the Representation of Context
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

A discourse context is identified with the set of possible worlds that represents the shared information that is available to the participants in the discourse for the interpretation of speech acts. Two ways in which a speech act changes the context are distinguished. The notion of accommodation is examined, and a problem about this representation of context, raised by Hans Kamp, is addressed. The apparatus developed is applied to some problems about indefinite reference and anaphoric pronouns.
Indexical Belief
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

A puzzle about indexical or self‐locating belief is discussed. It is argued that with the help of the apparatus of propositional concepts and diagonal propositions developed in ch. 4 (’Assertion’) and 6 (Semantics for belief’), the phenomena can be reconciled with the doctrine of propositions—the thesis that the objects of belief are impersonal and timeless propositions. Alternative accounts of indexical belief, proposed by John Perry and by David Lewis are criticized.
Belief Attribution and Context
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

It is argued that belief attributions are context‐dependent. To interpret the sentential clauses embedded in statements attributing belief, we need a derived context, different from the basic context relative to which the statement as a whole is interpreted. Derived contexts are defined, and the apparatus is used to defend a pragmatic account of de re belief attributions.
Twin Earth Revisited
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

It is argued that externalism about the contents of propositional attitudes is supported not only by examples and thought experiments, but also by an intuitively plausible theoretical account of intentionality: the idea that the contents of intentional mental states should be explained in terms of the information that those states are disposed to carry. The theoretical account helps to bring out what is paradoxical about the externalist's thought experiments, and to show why attributions of content are essentially context‐dependent.
The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: October 2003

Formal theories of knowledge, belief, and partial belief usually make the idealizing assumption that an agent's knowledge or beliefs are closed under logical consequence—that knowers or believers are logically omniscient. This paper aims to clarify the nature of and motivation for this idealization. It is argued that it is more difficult than is sometimes supposed to give an adequate representation of belief or knowledge that avoids this idealization. Different ways of distinguishing implicit from explicit belief are distinguished. It is argued that while one can avoid logical omniscience by building linguistic structure into the contents of belief and knowledge, this fails to address the underlying problem, which is a problem about the accessibility or availability of information to influence action.
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.
First Person Authority
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Attempts to explain the assumption that a speaker's sincere self‐attribution of propositional attitudes is justified, while such justification is lacking if the attribution is done by somebody else. By tracing the source of first‐person authority, the justification of such self‐attribution, to a necessary feature of language, Davidson offers both an original solution to the authority‐problem and an escape from sceptical solutions to the problem of other minds.
Knowing One's Own Mind
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of ‘objects before the mind’, for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.
The Myth of the Subjective
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter is a direct attack on the idea of a subjective–objective dichotomy resulting in a fundamental distinction between uninterpreted experience and an organizing structure of concepts. Consequently, Davidson attacks the foundation of all metaphysical and epistemological dualisms and the philosophical stances based upon them. He attempts to make a case for their replacement by a view that combines the denial of objects before the mind with the claim that empirical knowledge does not and need not have an epistemological foundation.
What Is Present to the Mind?
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter is a further attempt to exorcise the traditional belief that in experiencing objects, there must be objects present to the mind. Davidson further illuminates and restates the arguments in the two preceding papers and offers more illuminating examples to make his case. He concludes that in experiencing objects, there are no objects before the experiencer's mind, for the attributes of such objects could not be hidden from the agent.