bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The proposal and realization on more exact modeling of COIL performance
Authors: Li Shouxian , Shu Xiaojian , Du Yanyi , Su Hua , Li Yan , Yu Zhen
Published: April 2013

The chemical oxygen–iodine laser (COIL) is the shortest-wavelength high-power chemical laser that has been demonstrated. The characteristics, such as good atmospheric propagation, short wavelength and excellent transmission through optical fibers, make the COIL a good candidate for high-power laser application. To model the complete COIL lasing interaction, a three-dimensional formulation of the fluid dynamics, species continuity and radiation transport equations is necessary. The computational effort to calculate the flow field over the entire nozzle bank with a grid fine enough to resolve the injection holes is so large as to preclude doing the calculation. The approach to modeling chemical lasers then has been to reduce the complexity of the model to correspond to the available computational capability, adding details as computing power increased. The modeling of lasing in the COIL medium is proposed, which is coupling with the effects induced by transverse injection of secondary gases, non-equilibrium chemical reactions, nozzle tail flow and boundary layer. The coupled steady solutions of the fluid dynamics and optics in a COIL complex three-dimensional cavity flow field are obtained following the proposal. The modeling results show that these effects have some influence on the lasing properties. A feasible methodology and a theoretical tool are offered to predict the beam quality for large-scale COIL devices.
Development of high-power laser coatings
Authors: Qi Hongji , Zhu Meipin , Fang Ming , Shao Shuying , Wei Chaoyang , Yi Kui , Shao Jianda
Published: April 2013

Laser resistance and stress-free mirrors, windows, polarizers, and beam splitters up to $400~\mathrm{mm} \times 400~\mathrm{mm} $ are required for the construction of the series SG facilities. In order to improve the coating quality, a program has been in place for the last ten years. For the small-aperture pick-off mirror, the laser-induced damage threshold (LIDT) is above $60~\mathrm{J} / {\mathrm{cm} }^{2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns), and the reflected wavefront is less than $\lambda / 4~(\lambda = 633~\mathrm{nm} )$. The Brewster-angle polarizing beam splitter ($\Phi 50\times 10~\mathrm{mm} $) shows the best LIDT result, up to $29. 8~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 10 ns) for a p-polarized wave in the 2012 damage competition of the XLIV Annual Boulder Damage Symposium. For the larger-aperture mirror and polarizer, the LIDT is above $23~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns) and $14~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns), respectively. The reflected wavefront is less than $\lambda / 3~(\lambda = 633~\mathrm{nm} )$ at the used angle.
‘The British boss is gone and will never return’: Communist takeovers of British companies in Shanghai (1949–1954)
Authors: HOWLETT JONATHAN J.
Published: April 2013

In May 1949 the Chinese Communist Party seized Shanghai. Rather than being elated at the prospect of harnessing the economic power of China's largest city to complete the revolution, the Communists approached it cautiously. How would the Chinese Communist Party set about transforming this free-wheeling port city with a ‘semi-colonial’ past into an orderly and socialist city? How would it balance ideology and pragmatism in reshaping Shanghai? This paper uses the takeover of two British companies as case studies to explore these issues at the ground level. It is argued that the means by which these companies were transformed tell us much about the Party and its state-building policies. When cadres entered foreign companies, their priority was not radical change and anti-imperialism, but rather fostering a sense of stability and unity to avoid disrupting production. Their gradual approach was due in large part to the Party's awareness of its own limited skills, resources and manpower, but also to its leaders and cadres recognizing that before they could remake Shanghai anew they had first to deal with the material and human legacies of the past.
Shari'at and Muslim community in colonial Punjab, 1865–1885
Authors: IVERMEE ROBERT
Published: April 2013

This paper argues that concerns for the government appointment of qazis, officers for the administration of Muslim law, and the greater application of shari'at critically shaped Muslim community formation in later nineteenth century Punjab. Between 1865 and 1885, Punjabi Muslim elites attested the necessity of qazis being appointed by government and Muslim law being administered in the colonial judicial system. With the support of Gottlieb Leitner, registrar of the Punjab University College, Muslim parties used the emergent associations of Punjab civil society, including the Anjuman-i-Punjab (Lahore) and Anjuman-i-Islam (Lahore), to assert the indispensability of religious law. In doing so, they challenged the Anglo-Indian decision to prioritize customary law in the Punjab and advanced the religious group as the basic social unit of Punjab society. In Punjab public spaces, the relevance of Islam was proclaimed, challenging the professed Anglo-Indian distinction between private and public, religious and secular spheres. However, demands for qazi appointment and the administration of shari'at problematize well-rehearsed arguments about the relationships between family, community, state and religion in colonial Punjab. Only through an enquiry into the two decades after 1865 may later political campaigns for the application of shari'at be understood.
Reciprocal effects of stable and temporary components of neuroticism and affective disorders: results of a longitudinal cohort study
Authors: Spinhoven P. , Penelo E. , de Rooij M. , Penninx B. W. , Ormel J.
Published: April 2013

Background

Cross-sectional studies show that neuroticism is strongly associated with affective disorders. We investigated whether neuroticism and affective disorders mutually reinforce each other over time, setting off a potential downward spiral.

Method

A total of 2981 adults aged 18–65 years, consisting of healthy controls, persons with a prior history of affective disorders and persons with a current affective disorder were assessed at baseline (T1) and 2 (T2) and 4 years (T3) later. At each wave, affective disorders according to DSM-IV criteria were assessed with the Composite Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI) version 2.1 and neuroticism with the Neuroticism–Extraversion–Openness Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI).

Results

Using structural equation models the association of distress disorders (i.e. dysthymia, depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder) and fear disorders (i.e. social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia without panic) with neuroticism could be attributed to three components: (a) a strong correlation of the stable components of distress and fear disorders with the stable trait component of neuroticism; (b) a modest contemporaneous association of change in distress and fear disorders with change in neuroticism; (c) a small to modest delayed effect of change in distress and fear disorders on change in neuroticism. Moreover, neuroticism scores in participants newly affected at T2 but remitted at T3 did not differ from their pre-morbid scores at T1.

Conclusions

Our results do not support a positive feedback cycle of changes in psychopathology and changes in neuroticism. In the context of a relative stability of neuroticism and affective disorders, only modest contemporaneous and small to modest delayed effects of psychopathology on neuroticism were observed.
Selling the President: Stand-Up Comedy and the Politricks of Indirection in Ghana
Authors: Donkor David A.
Published: April 2013

On 15 May 1995, the Alliance for Change (AFC), a coalition of opposition leaders in Ghana, organized a demonstration that came to be known by the name Kume Preko (which translates as “Kill me once and for all”) to protest the government's new value-added tax (VAT) policy. During the demonstration, armed supporters of Jerry Rawlings, Ghana's president, set upon the marchers, killing four people, including a fourteen-year-old boy. The AFC charged that members of the ruling party were implicated in the killings. It also dismissed a police report on the incident as a “cheap and fraudulent cover-up” that was “contradicted by the abundant evidence.” An article in the leading opposition newspaper, theGhanaian Chronicle, criticized Rawlings's government for flouting the constitutional right to public dissent and called the violence against the demonstrators “Hitlerism in Ghana.” The Kume Preko violence dealt Rawlings a political blow: it dented his image as a man of the people and the credibility of his commitment to a new liberal democratic political regime in Ghana.
The Theatrical Scrapbook
Authors: Marcus Sharon
Published: April 2013

Librarian's nightmare or researcher's dream? Theatre historians frequently use and librarians happily acquire the rare theatrical scrapbook related to a single famous individual, but many undervalue and overlook ordinary theatrical albums, and with good cause: the ordinary theatrical scrapbook's provenance is often unclear, its compilers are usually unknown, and its contents are typically heterogeneous, commonplace, and decaying. The cracked bindings and flaking newsprint characteristic of such scrapbooks frustrate conservation, while their clippings, programs, and images pose serious cataloging challenges, shorn as they often are of identifying information. Finally, at least some of the material in these albums (such as newspaper clippings) is often duplicated elsewhere, making their contents easily seem redundant.
The Urban Plan ofVenta Icenorumand its Relationship with the Boudican Revolt
Authors: Bowden William
Published: April 2013

The idea that the town ofVenta Icenorum(Caistor-by-Norwich) was laid out in the early Flavian period, as part of the Roman reaction to the Boudican revolt, has become canonical in literature on Roman Britain. Drawing on the results of recent excavations, this paper re-evaluates the evidence relating to the establishment of the street grid and questions the idea that the town reflects a coherent act of urban planning. It concludes by arguing that previous interpretations of the site within a ‘Boudican’ paradigm are fundamentally flawed.
Hegel and Lukács on the Novel
Authors: Speight Allen
Published: April 2013

That Hegel was a significant influence on the young Georg Lukács' Theory of the Novel is a point few would dispute. Lukács himself insisted that the first part of TN represented his own transition from Kantian to Hegelian theory, and most critics have subsequently affirmed the importance of Hegel to Lukács' pre- (or, depending on one's view, proto-) Marxist argument in TN. Yet the two are in some ways strange to take together in the context of novelistic theory. Despite the profusion of novelistic literature in his own time and his own significant appropriation of it for the limning of essential moments of the development of the world-historical spirit, Hegel's official Aesthetics hardly presents what one could claim to be an especially worked-out theory of the novel. The Aesthetics takes up literature in general primarily under the rubric of providing a theory of the genres of poetry — epic, lyric and dramatic — and what relatively few words Hegel actually devotes to the novel and prose literature in the lectures are tucked in corners: at the end of the discussion of the development of the epic, in the discussion of the historical form of the romantic, and in scattered comments elsewhere. As for TN, despite the strong connections some have drawn between Hegel and Lukács — Peter Demetz said that Lukács was ‘in a certain sense … the last Hegelian in the grand style’ (Demetz 1967: 215) — others have questioned whether Lukács' work should be regarded primarily as making a contribution to the philosophy of literature in the tradition from which Hegel writes.
The Man Who Mistook his Handlung for a Tat: Hegel on Oedipus and Other Tragic Thebans
Authors: Sandis Constantine
Published: April 2013

Throughout his work Hegel distinguishes between the notion of an act (Tun) from the standpoint of the agent (behaviour in so far as it relates to one's own foreknowledge, purpose, intention, and knowledge) and that of all other standpoints (e.g. legal, scientific, cultural, etc.). He terms the former Handlung (action) and the latter Tat (deed). This distinction should not be confused with the contemporary one between action and mere bodily movement. For one, both Handlung and Tat are aspects of conduct that results from the will, viz. Tun (LA 1160ff.). Moreover, Hegel's taxonomy is motivated purely by concerns relating to modes of perception. So whereas theorists such as Donald Davidson assert that all actions are events that are intentional under some description, Hegel reserves the term ‘action’ for those aspects of behaviour that are highlighted by a specific (albeit contested) set of agent-related descriptions. This is not an ontological category, since there are no such objects as actions-under-specific-descriptions (see Anscombe 1979).

Sophocles's Theban Trilogy reveals the central role that these notions must play in any Hegelian understanding of tragic drama. Indeed the contrasts that matter most to Hegel's general take on both epic and tragic poetry are more closely related to the study of action than the standard theory attributed to Hegel would seem to allow. It is more fruitful, then, to incorporate Hegel's insights into such tragedies to the model of action employed by him than it is to try to make them fit whatever ‘theory’ of tragedy might appear to be hinted at in his Aesthetics.
Art and Ethical Life: The Social and Historical Background to Hegel's Reflections on Ancient and Modern Literature in the Mit- and Nachschriften of his Lectures on Aesthetics
Authors: James David
Published: April 2013

In 1835, a few years after Hegel's death, one of his students, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, put together the first printed edition of the lectures on aesthetics, using Hegel's own lecture notes, which have mostly disappeared, and various student transcripts (Mit- and Nachschriften) of the lectures that Hegel gave on the philosophy of art in Berlin in 1820/21, 1823, 1826 and 1828/29. Hotho made some minor revisions to this edition in 1843 and in the following year. The revised edition of the lectures has until recently formed the basis of all subsequent editions of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics and, consequently, of most previous interpretations of his aesthetics. Hotho's edition of the lectures, however, has been shown to be highly problematic. To begin with, there are the various editorial interventions that Hotho made in order to give Hegel's lectures on aesthetics the systematic form he thought they lacked, while other interventions include various evaluative judgements concerning particular works of art and even some of Hotho's own ideas concerning art.

As regards the systematic structure of Hotho's edition of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, this edition divides the lectures into three main parts, whereas the available student transcripts of the lectures show that only the last series of lectures from 1828/29 were given such a three-part structure by Hegel himself.
Normativity and the Acquisition of the Categories
Authors: Callanan John J.
Published: April 2013

It is quite common when explicating the nature of Kant's break with the preceding Early Modern tradition to cite his attitude towards the acquisition and deployment of concepts. It is claimed that Kant sought to distinguish two tasks that had become unfortunately intertwined and conflated — explaining how we come to acquire our concepts on the one hand and showing how we are justified in deploying them in judgement on the other. This conflation can be expressed in terms of a conflation of the natural and the normative, of descriptive and prescriptive questions. The topic of the conditions of concept-possession, i.e. how we have come to possess the concepts that we do, is an entirely psychological inquiry, involving ‘natural’ descriptive inquiries. The topic of concept-deployment, the story about how we use our concepts in veridical judgements about the world, is an entirely philosophical question, since it involves the question of how we ought to deploy those concepts in judgement. The fundamental distinction between the natural and the normative is drawn by Kant, it is claimed, in order to distinguish these two practices of acquisition and deployment.

The manner in which this claim is expressed is through Kant's distinction between the question of fact (quaestio facti) and the question of right (quaestio juris). I want to claim that a proper understanding of this distinction doesn't support this notion of Kant's ‘normative turn’. In fact, the distinction is best understood within an interpretation whereby Kant is understood as continuing to endorse the Early Modern conviction that the provision of a concept's possession-conditions is sufficient to determine that concept's deployment-conditions, and that the task of the Transcendental Deduction is to determine the possession-conditions for the Categories.
Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel
Authors: de Boer Karin
Published: April 2013

Kant's philosophy is generally known as transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism, terms often thought to describe the inquiry into the subjective conditions of empirical knowledge carried out in the Critique of Pure Reason. On this conception of transcendental philosophy Kant is seen to pursue a project very different from both Wolffian metaphysics and Hegelian speculative science. This view is confirmed by scholars who compare Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy to the Scholastics' conception of ‘transcendentals’ such as unity, truth, and perfection. On their account, there remains a puzzling gap between, on the one hand, the scholastic conception of the most general determinations of all beings and, on the other hand, Kant's investigation into the conditions of possibility of experience.

In this article I want to challenge this common view of Kant's transcendental philosophy for two reasons. The first reason concerns the question of how the Critique of Pure Reason itself should be read. I take the view that in the first Critique Kant's primary aim is to determine the conditions of synthetic a priori knowledge rather than to identify the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge. Since metaphysics was traditionally considered to be the discipline that possessed a priori knowledge of things, this view makes good sense of Kant's presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a work intended to transform metaphysics into a science. In this article I hope to clarify the nature of this transformation by determining the elements which Kant's transcendental philosophy has in common with Wolff's ontology, as well as the respects in which Kant turns against Wolff. I thus hope to solve some of the riddles posed by Kant's use of the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Hegel on the Nature of Scepticism
Authors: Heidemann Dietmar H.
Published: April 2013

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.

In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.
Hegel's Contradictions
Authors: Palm Ralph
Published: April 2013

Perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Hegel's Science of Logic is his treatment of contradiction. If each moment of Hegel's logic is understood to constitute a sort of proof and since contradiction itself is presented as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a proof of contradiction as such? It is difficult to formulate this in any way that does not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not just at odds with our ordinary way of thinking but also with the overwhelming majority of the Western philosophical tradition. The basic problem, essentially, is this: if Hegel's logic includes contradiction as one of its moments, then how is Hegel's entire philosophical project not simply incoherent?

In the first part of this article, I will attempt to demonstrate one way in which Hegel's treatment of contradiction could in fact be considered coherent, through a close reading of the relevant passages. In this reading, I will particularly focus on the function of Hegel's dialectical concept of sublation (aufheben), and attempt to show (by example) how analysing Hegel's nuanced use of sublation can help us to work through some of his logic's complexities. The overall purpose here will be to present a systematic (as opposed to historical) exposition of Hegel's concept of contradiction and to illustrate the important role that this concept (as the contradiction of contradiction) plays in Hegel's logical method.
Logical Form and Ethical Content
Authors: Hahn Songsuk Susan
Published: April 2013

Hegel's empty formalism charge is taken, virtually without exception, as a serious objection to Kant's categorical imperative and a powerful refutation of his formalist ethics. The dominant interpretation is represented by Bradley, Paton, Mill, Korsgaard, Guyer, Wood, Schneewind, Sedgwick, more recently, Freyenhagen, and others. So far, the dominant interpretation has remained powerfully influential and virtually unchallenged.

However, the dominant interpretation tends to take Hegel's empty formalism in isolation from other texts in the corpus, his holistic system, and dialectical method in general. What makes this non-contextualised approach problematic is that it ignores his remarks on formalism in other texts where his use of dialectical and sceptical method is more in evidence. Hegel's emptiness remarks span his entire career, from their appearance in Jena right up to the end of his career in Berlin. In Jena, his views on formal thinking in a logical sense developed alongside his views on formalism in ethics. Prima facie, the arguments bring together two subject matters that seem to have nothing to do with one another. This may explain why no one has given an interpretation that brings the two domains together. But it is worth noting that Kant himself brings logical considerations to bear on his conception of the moral principle. His distinction between the form of a moral principle and its empirical content recalls his characterisation of logical laws in the first Critique (B77-B78/A53-A54).
Empty, Useless, and Dangerous? Recent Kantian Replies to the Empty Formalism Objection
Authors: Freyenhagen Fabian
Published: April 2013

Like two heavyweight boxers exchanging punches, but neither landing the knock-out blow, Kantians and Hegelians seem to be in a stand-off on what in contemporary parlance is known as the Empty Formalism Objection. Kant's ethics is charged with being merely formal and thereby failing to provide the kind of specific guidance that any defensible ethical system should have the resources to provide. Hegel is often credited with having formulated this objection in its most incisive way, and a wealth of Kantian responses has been deployed to answer it. In this paper, I take up the objection as it appears in §135R of Elements of the Philosophy of Right in order to scrutinise the contemporary debate between the two camps. I propose that there are, in fact, three different, albeit connected objections and examine (what I take to be) the best Kantian replies to them. I will not adjudicate which of these replies is the most accurate interpretation of Kant's texts, nor trace the particular historical context in which Hegel takes up Kant's ethics, nor the way the Empty Formalism Objection fits into Hegel's wider system. This is partly because of constraints of space, and partly because many of the contemporary Kantian replies — for better or for worse — treat the Empty Formalism Objection as a self-standing philosophical problem, irrespective of its historical context or systematic place in Hegel's theory. My limited aim here is to show that, even if one grants — for argument's sake — the legitimacy of such a non-contextual approach, significant difficulties remain.
Systematicity and Symbolisation in Kant's Deduction of Judgements of Taste
Authors: Rueger Alexander
Published: April 2013

Kant's characterisation of judgements of taste, as expressing a disinterested pleasure and as being independent of concepts, defines the framework in which he attempts to justify or ‘deduce’ their claim to universal and necessary validity. In §38 of the Critique of Judgement, the ‘official’ deduction, the problem is to find a balance between the aim of grounding the judgements' validity on their relation to cognition and the danger of collapsing these aesthetic judgements into cognitive ones. Apparently, Kant's intention is to show that even though judgements of taste are not cognitive judgements, they are close enough to the conditions employed in all cognition to legitimize their claim to universal validity. Yet, in §59 of the Dialectic Kant seems to attempt another justification, this time by relating judgements of taste to morality. The problem now is to specify this relation so as to avoid reducing aesthetic to moral judgements. The justificatory projects in §38 and §59 are usually considered to be quite different. My aim in this paper is to clarify the relation between the two projects on the basis of an interpretation of what the pleasurable state of mind consists in, that is, the free harmonious play of the faculties in which everyone ought to share in the presence of beautiful objects. In the light of this interpretation I shall give a reconstruction of the argument of §38 which reveals its connection and contrast with §59.
How biological is human history? Kant's use of biological concepts and its implications for history as moral anthropology
Authors: Vanhaute Liesbet
Published: April 2013

This article concerns a specific shift in Kant's use of biological concepts in his theory of history. As I argue in the first section, biological concepts play an important role in Kant's early theory of history. However, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicitly separates history from biology: history and biology become fundamentally different forms of teleological explanation. In the second section, I examine Kant's reasons for the separation of history from biology. I conclude with a discussion of the moral implications of this modification in his historical writings.

Kant's main concern in his philosophy of history is the intelligibility of history. How should history be understood, given the fact that it appears to be a mere amalgam of contingent human actions?

The reason why historical facts are so confusing and unsystematic is that human behaviour is not fully determined by any particular factor. It is underdetermined by animal instinct, but it is not completely guided by principles of reason either. To address this randomness, philosophers of history must actively search for coherent structures. They must look for concepts and assumptions that help them to grasp the phenomena in a systematic way. Kant suggests that assuming a predisposition which unfolds throughout history is inevitable in this regard. A predisposition is understood as a natural tendency of the human species, which is initially hidden but manifests itself gradually and continually.
Self-Knowledge, Action and the Language of Confession in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Authors: Schlösser Ulrich
Published: April 2013

This paper offers an outline of the central issue Hegel is concerned with in his discussion of spirit. The issue is: how can we possibly confirm our basic and comprehensive claims to validity? In the ‘Spirit’ section of the Phenomenology, Hegel focuses on what we nowadays would call ‘thick conceptions’. The corresponding claims to knowledge relate (a) to a general worldview and (b) to the objective norms embedded in this worldview. Furthermore, they also include (c) a claim to self-knowledge, which is correlated to both.

Hegel suggests that if we want to validate these claims we should not look at merely given facts but at the actions performed on the basis of these claims — it's the deed that matters. But in making claims, we are also addressing others. The resulting questions are: How can they possibly recognise the action as a manifestation of the underlying principles? What follows for my self-knowledge if I accept that the judgement of others contributes to what the action really is and thus what it says about me?

The first part of the paper explores the general framework underlying Hegel's discussion of spirit. The second part exemplifies Hegel's conception by referring to different cultural realisations of spirit put forward in the sixth chapter of his Phenomenology: the focus will be on Hegel's interpretation of Sophocles' tragedy, Antigone. In the brief, final part I would like to point to three features of Hegel's account of spirit that I take to be still worthy of consideration.
Celebrity Election versus Lottery Selection: A Reconsideration
Authors: Rapp Carl
Published: April 2013

In The Just State, Richard Dien Winfield has completed his exposition of the immanent logic of ethical life, the earlier parts of which are developed in his books The Just Economy, The Just Family, and Law in Civil Society. The purpose of his exposition is not to discuss isolated or miscellaneous topics pertaining to politics or ethics. Instead, his goal from the beginning has been to show objectively what justice looks like when it is fully embodied in a state's political and social institutions. The just state, as he presents it, is simply the largest possible political framework for maintaining equitable arrangements within a country's already established civil society, a framework that permits civil society to adjust to new contingencies as they arise, be they domestic or international. The purpose of the just state is to preserve, not to tamper with, the political and nonpolitical freedoms of its citizens. The essence of these freedoms is that they are all modes of self-determination, whereby what one does is freely determined by oneself and not by the arbitrary controlling authority of others. An individual whose life is determined by family, by tradition, or by commandment, is unfree. A state whose people are imposed on by a leadership class, or by any authority other than that of the people themselves, is likewise unfree. In order to establish freedom and justice, the citizens of a sovereign state must codetermine their own institutions. In accordance with this purpose, their institutions must be constructed in a particular way, which is the subject of The Just State.
Normativity, Equal Opportunity, and the Adjustment Problem in The Just State
Authors: Berman Robert
Published: April 2013

The Just State, as Richard Winfield notes at the outset, is the culmination of an ambitious project devoted to limning the contours and content of a systematic philosophy of right. Apart from its value as a substantial contribution to the understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The Just State offers its own self-standing, content-rich account of political justice. Winfield's book is overflowing with argument and analysis, which calls for careful, detailed consideration, and the brief set of comments that follow cannot possibly do it full justice. It is useful, however, to focus on a specific topic concerning normativity discussed in the ‘Introduction’. In particular, I would like to raise some questions about the principle of equal opportunity and the adjustment problem that arises from it.

Before turning to those questions, it might be helpful to offer an overview of the overarching structure of The Just State. The ‘Introduction’ and eight chapters can be clustered thematically into three parts. The ‘Introduction’ has the important task of clearing away the obstacles thrown up by sceptical arguments against the very possibility of a normative theory of political justice. Chapters 1-3 set the stage for the account of political justice proper, which then takes up the remainder of the book, chapters 4-8. So the argument starts, in the ‘Introduction’, with a refutation of the sceptical denial of the project of political philosophy understood as the normative theory of political justice. This is important because the positive upshot of this anti-sceptical argument is the identification of a singular normative criterion: self-determination.
Thom Brooks and the ‘Systematic’ Reading of Hegel
Authors: Wood Allen
Published: April 2013

Hegel was a systematic philosopher, who grounded his system on a speculative logic. But his greatest philosophical contributions lie in his reflections on human culture: ethics, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, religion and the philosophy of history. This fact poses a problem for anyone who accepts it and then attempts to provide a philosophical discussion of Hegel's thought with the aim of making it available to a later age.

There can be no doubt that any authentic treatment of Hegel's social and political philosophy must take account of Hegel's explicit intention to ground it in his logical system of thought-determinations. But if we simply take that intention at face value, we make our appropriation of Hegel hostage to his philosophical system and speculative logic, which now are at best outdated and, though they may themselves contain some insights of lasting philosophical value, are not of nearly as much philosophical interest as Hegel's thoughts about human culture, society and history. A Hegel whose ethical, social, historical and cultural insights could be appropriated only by those who accept his speculative logical system would be a Hegel few would ever read or learn from.

The other horn of the same dilemma is that those interpreters who are honest enough that they don't accept uncritically Hegel's own account of the structure of his philosophical accomplishments will inevitably be charged with doing violence to Hegel's thought, ignoring its true structure and unity. To quote a passage from Fred Beiser, which Thom Brooks uses to pillory all such Hegel scholarship: ‘We make Hegel alive and relevant, a useful contributor to our concerns; but that is only because we put our own views into his mouth.
Two Dialectics of Enlightenment
Authors: Maker William
Published: April 2013

In 1807 Hegel published the Phenomenology of Spirit which calmly asserted that philosophy had, at long last, ceased to be merely the love of knowing and had finally consummated its lust for truth, giving birth to ‘strenge Wissenschaft’ in logic and the system (Hegel, 1807: 3). In 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno circulated mimeographed copies of Dialectic of Enlightenment, ominously asserting that the same process of reason's self-clarification which Hegel described brings us, not, as he claimed, to truth and freedom, but to barbarism. Somehow critical reflection's efforts to liberate humanity from superstition, darkness, and oppression has lead instead to Auschwitz.

A crucial aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of enlightenment is the notion that enlightenment and its seeming antithesis, myth, are inextricably linked. In the Phenomenology Hegel had already investigated the underlying link between the rationality of the Enlightenment period and faith, its ostensible arational other, in Chapter VI. In various places Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge the influence of Hegel, and they make suggestive passing references to the Phenomenology. Obviously, their connecting of enlightenment and myth bears more than a family resemblance to Hegel's pairing of enlightenment and faith. Just as Hegel disclosed that enlightenment and faith have more in common than usually thought, Horkheimer and Adorno aim to show that there is an important aspect of enlightenment already in myth and further, that enlightenment has itself fallen back into the essential features of myth it purports to be have overcome.
Naturalism in Ethics and Hegel's Distinction between Subjective and Objective Spirit
Authors: Moyar Dean
Published: April 2013

It is widely acknowledged that Hegel's ethical thought moves in a naturalistic direction away from the pure practical reason of Kant's moral philosophy. But the exact character of that naturalistic turn has proven elusive, in part because Hegel so insistently foregrounds the theme of freedom. He often opposes self-determination through freedom to being determined merely by nature, and while Hegel's incorporation of the natural into his theory of freedom has been emphasised by many recent commentators, there remains a fundamental lack of consensus about how nature and freedom intersect in Hegel's ethics. My goal is to shed light on this issue by examining Hegel's distinction between Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit. This distinction between two domains of inquiry and two perspectives on human action is fundamental for understanding his views about the natural and the normative in ethics. My central claim is that by advocating a division of labor between these domains, and by showing how they are integrated, Hegel is able to capture the best elements of naturalistic inquiry into human psychology and to preserve the distinctive character of the ethical domain.

This paper aims to open an avenue for future research into Hegel's naturalism and to demonstrate Hegel's relevance for contemporary debates. In focusing on the difference between Subjective Spirit and Objective Spirit, I am already taking on a large topic for a single essay, and there are many related issues in Hegel that will necessarily go untouched. Some of these are worth mentioning up front. First, one would expect a paper about Hegel's naturalism to explore Hegel's view on nature in general, namely, the content of the Philosophy of Nature which forms the middle part of the Encyclopaedia. Without an account of how Hegel conceives of nature, it seems that we have to assume a conception of nature foreign to his system, and using that to measure his views would seem to violate a number of hermeneutical strictures. While I admit that this is a problem, it is simply beyond the scope of this paper, and I hope that using an intuitive account of the natural, and Hegel's claims about human nature, is enough at least to get this project going. The project itself can then provide a further spur to examining Hegel's views on non-human nature.
Kant's Account of Motivation: A Sartrean Response to Some Hegelian Objections
Authors: Baiasu Sorin
Published: April 2013

Ethical motivation represents an important aspect of Kant's practical philosophy, one without which much of Kant's distinctive position would be lost. Not surprisingly, it is also one of those aspects of Kantianism to which Hegelian criticism directs its focus with predilection. Central to Kant's account of moral motivation is the distinction between acting merely in accordance with duty and acting from duty. When he introduces this distinction, in the Groundwork, Kant also points to the epistemic difficulties of properly drawing the distinction. A key concept here is, without any doubt, that of duty, and Kant begins with a preliminary definition: the notion of duty is a notion ‘which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances’ (G: 4: 397).

What this definition tells us is that, although beings which are only governed by practical reason without any admixture of inclinations and sensuous drives, that is, purely rational beings, will also have a good will, such beings do not have duties precisely because they lack the ‘subjective limitations and hindrances’ of sensuous motivating forces, such as desires, passions, habitual responses. If a person spontaneously and necessarily acts as duty requires, then it does not make sense to talk about an obligation for this person to act as duty requires. Such a person must be a purely rational person, since only she can always and necessarily act as (practical) reason requires. By contrast, beings with limitations and hindrances, like us, act spontaneously and necessarily as natural laws require and, hence, it does not make sense to talk about our obligation or duty to observe the laws of nature.
Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism
Authors: Zambrana Rocío
Published: April 2013

The Science of Logic is perhaps Hegel's most notoriously impenetrable work. Despite well over a century of commentaries as well as the recent proliferation of scholarship, there exists little agreement concerning the text, whether with regard to particular details or the project of speculative logic in general. Nonetheless, the Logic has often been regarded as exemplifying totalizing metaphysics at its worst. Contemporary philosophers concerned with overcoming metaphysics have thus sought to show not only the incoherence of speculative logic but also the perils of Hegel's supposedly totalizing philosophy.

In contrast, showing the continuity between Kant and Hegel has been the strategy for establishing a ‘non-metaphysical’ view of Hegel's speculative logic. Against readings of Hegel as a metaphysical monist who defends the reality of the Absolute Idea developing in nature and spirit, speculative logic is presented as the absolute-idealist successor to Kantian transcendental logic. Hegel's speculative logic is an ‘idealist logic’, since it aims at expounding the conditions necessary for the determinacy of any possible object of thought. Speculative logic thus clarities that experience is dependent on non-empirical concepts and, ultimately, on selfconsciousness. Along this interpretative line, Hegel's Science of Logic offers an account of thinking as a norm-based activity, and of concepts as rules for fixing determinacy. The great insight of Hegel's Logic is, on this view, twofold. First, Hegel's notion of the concept [der Begriff] is understood as a holistic-inferential system of logical concepts, since it provides an account of conceptual content as determined by every other possible content. Second, Hegel's analysis of the actualization of the concept — of the concept that has ‘made itself the foundation’, in Hegel's obscure phrasing — provides an account of the fundamental role of authority involved in the process of fixing determinacy. To be bound to a rule is to acknowledge it as having authority over us and at the same time to institute it as authoritative over the states of affairs that we seek to determine. That Hegel spoke of the freedom of the concept is, therefore, crucial. It suggests that determinacy is ultimately a matter of the authorization of reason, of establishing one way of fixing intelligibility over against others.
Not ‘Just Another Brick in the Wall?’ The Symbolism of Groundstone Tools in Natufian and Early Neolithic Southern Levantine Constructions
Authors: Rosenberg Danny
Published: April 2013

A phenomenon noted in early sedentary and semi-sedentary settlements in the southern Levant is the use of groundstone tools as ‘building material’ incorporated into structure walls. It is argued in this article that these artefacts should not be perceived merely as construction material, but rather they should be seen as having a symbolic purpose owing to the social and economic significance that groundstone tools acquired during the transition to agriculture and the growing importance of food processing. This assumed symbolic purpose may also originate from ritual contexts in which these artefacts processed foodstuffs and other substances, thereby becoming ‘positive’ symbols of prosperity and success. Such symbolic content may result from their economic significance interlaced with their association with specific persona and familial and personal heritage. It is suggested that the qualities of the tools lent an element of potency to these artefacts and probably led to their inclusion in structure walls. The linkage between persona, space and positive potency may have granted status or protection to the structures and also may have assisted in marking ownership of the property.
Intersecting Generations: Burying the Old in a Neolithic Hunter-fisher Community
Authors: Fahlander Fredrik
Published: April 2013

This article explores the potential of studying the social dimensions of old age and aged bodies in the past. Because old age is relative to life-expectancy figures, diet and lifestyle, calendric years are avoided when defining old age. Instead a composite approach is advocated that includes, for example, traces of wear and joint diseases to identify a threshold between adulthood and a period of seniority. The approach is applied to the Middle Neolithic burial ground Ajvide on the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea. Eleven individuals (six men, five women, or 18 per cent of the 62 analysed burials) are regarded as ‘aged bodies’. At Ajvide a majority of these individuals are buried in graves that overlap earlier burials containing younger individuals of the same sex. It is argued that this pattern is due to eschatological ideas of ‘generational merging’ of bodies. This practice changes over time, which is suggested to be a part of the overall hybridization processes at the site.
The Performance of Building and Technological Choice Made Visible in Mudbrick Architecture
Authors: Love Serena
Published: April 2013

In a densely packed, streetless village such as Neolithic Çatalhöyük in central Anatolia, it is argued in this article that variations in mudbrick recipes were used to mark social identity and autonomy through the performance of building. Geoarchaeological analysis of mudbricks established that cultural modifications were used to create social differences between neighbouring houses. Although mudbricks were ultimately invisible objects, hidden behind multiple layers of plaster, the processes of mudbrick manufacture and house construction were performed in the public domain allowing opportunities for individual expression. These results are situated within a larger practice of hiding and burying meaningful objects at Çatalhöyük, where unseen objects had as much power and affect as any object on display.