bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
Authors: Russo J. Edward , Corbin Jonathan C.
Published: January 2023

We demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.
Process dynamics in delay discounting decisions: An attractor dynamics approach
Authors: Scherbaum Stefan , Frisch Simon , Leiberg Susanne , Lade Steven J. , Goschke Thomas , Dshemuchadse Maja
Published: January 2023

How do people make decisions between an immediate but small reward and a delayed but large one? The outcome of such decisions indicates that people discount rewards by their delay and hence these outcomes are well described by discounting functions. However, to understand irregular decisions and dysfunctional behavior one needs models which describe how the process of making the decision unfolds dynamically over time: how do we reach a decision and how do sequential decisions influence one another? Here, we present an attractor model that integrates into and extends discounting functions through a description of the dynamics leading to a final choice outcomewithina trial andacrosstrials. To validate this model, we derive qualitative predictions for the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions and for the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions that are unique to this type of model. We test these predictions in four experiments based on a dynamic delay discounting computer game where we study the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions via mouse tracking and the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions via sequentially manipulated options. We discuss how integrating decision process dynamics within and across trials can increase our understanding of the processes underlying delay discounting decisions and, hence, complement our knowledge about decision outcomes.
Developing expert political judgment: The impact of training and practice on judgmental accuracy in geopolitical forecasting tournaments
Authors: Chang Welton , Chen Eva , Mellers Barbara , Tetlock Philip
Published: January 2023

The heuristics-and-biases research program highlights reasons for expecting people to be poor intuitive forecasters. This article tests the power of a cognitive-debiasing training module (“CHAMPS KNOW”) to improve probability judgments in a four-year series of geopolitical forecasting tournaments sponsored by the U.S. intelligence community. Although the training lasted less than one hour, it consistently improved accuracy (Brier scores) by 6 to 11% over the control condition. Cognitive ability and practice also made largely independent contributions to predictive accuracy. Given the brevity of the training tutorials and the heterogeneity of the problems posed, the observed effects are likely to be lower-bound estimates of what could be achieved by more intensive interventions. Future work should isolate which prongs of the multipronged CHAMPS KNOW training were most effective in improving judgment on which categories of problems.
Less cognitive conflict does not imply choice of the default option: Commentary on Kieslich and Hilbig (2014)
Authors: Myrseth Kristian Ove R. , Wollbrant Conny
Published: January 2023

Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccessfully.
Others’ opinions count, but not all of them: anchoring to ingroup versus outgroup members’ behavior in charitable giving
Authors: Hysenbelli Dorina , Rubaltelli Enrico , Rumiati Rino
Published: January 2023

Because of the large amount of information and the difficulty in selecting an appropriate recipient in the context of charitable giving, people tend to make extensive use of heuristics, which sometimes leads them to wrong decisions. In the present work, we focused on exploring how individuals are influenced by anchoring heuristics and how group membership interacts with this heuristic. In Experiment 1, two different groups of participants were informed about low versus high average donations of other people, and a third control group did not receive any information about the others’ donations. The results showed that participants were willing to donate significantly more in the high-anchor condition compared to the low-anchor condition, as well as about the same amount of money in the low-anchor condition and no-anchor condition. Experiment 2 and 3 showed that high anchors are more effective when the information about others’ donations reflects members of the ingroup rather than the outgroup. Other variables related to these results are further discussed.
Risk perception and risk attitudes in Tokyo: A report of the first administration of DOSPERT+M in Japan
Authors: Schwartz Alan , Yamagishi Kimihiko , Hirahara Norimichi , Onishi Hirotaka , Barnes James , Rosman Adam , Garcia Maggie , Lee Sam , Butler Shoshana
Published: January 2023

Background:

The Domain-Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT) has been used to measure risk perceptions and attitudes in several nations and cultures. Takahashi translated DOSPERT to Japanese but DOSPERT responses from Japan have never been reported. Butler et al. (2012) developed an additional medical risk domain subscale to be added to DOSPERT to form DOSPERT+M.

Objective:

To describe the translation of the medical risk domain subscale to Japanese and to characterize domain-specific risk attitudes in Tokyo.

Methods:

Members of a probability-weighted online panel representative of the Tokyo metro area were randomized to complete pairs of DOSPERT+M tasks (risk attitude, risk perception, benefit perception). We explored relationships among domains through correlational and factor analysis; we tested the hypothesis that the medical risk domain and DOSPERT’s health/safety domains were uncorrelated.

Participants:

One hundred eighty panelists.

Results:

Six of the original DOSPERT items (two each in the ethics, health/safety, and financial domains) are not useable in Japan according to the Japanese Marketing Research Association code because they ask about participation in illegal activities; we thus used abbreviated versions of those domains leaving out these items. The DOSPERT+M items generally did not cluster cleanly into the expected domains, although items within the same domain usually were intercorrelated. Participants demonstrated domain-specific conventional risk attitudes, although nearly half of those assessed were perceived-risk neutral in all domains. Unlike our recently reported findings in the U.S. population, DOSPERT+M medical domain scores were associated with health/safety domain scores, although they were often more strongly associated with scores in other domains, such as recreational activities.

Conclusion:

The DOSPERT (and DOSPERT+M) instruments are problematic in Japan but Japanese citizens may also differ from those of other nations in their risk attitudes and perceptions.
The potential relationship between spicy taste and risk seeking
Authors: Wang Xue , Geng Liuna , Qin Jiawen , Yao Sixie
Published: January 2023

We conducted three studies to examine the relationship between spicy tastes and risk seeking. In Study 1, results from a personality judgment task indicated that people were more inclined to attribute a higher level of risk seeking to individuals who enjoy spicy foods. The second study examined whether people who like spicy foods are actually more risk seeking. In fact, people who reported a preference for spicy tastes scored higher on risk taking, as assessed via the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (Chinese version). Finally, Study 3 employed an experimental design to manipulate risk-seeking tendencies by having participants experience spicy food tastes in the lab. Momentarily savoring spicy foods increased participants’ risk taking in the Iowa Gambling Task. The present findings suggest that preferences for spicy tastes could relate to risk-seeking tendencies and subsequent risk-seeking behaviors.
Trade-upgrade framing effects: Trades are losses, but upgrades are improvements
Authors: Sun Yan , Mellers Barbara
Published: January 2023

In two studies, people were reluctant to trade items they own, but glad to accept upgrades with identical end states. The framing of the transaction makes a difference. A mediational analysis suggests that the relationship between the frame of the transaction and measures of value (willingness to accept, WTA) depends on perceived losses. Losses are perceived as greater when the transaction is a trade than as an upgrade. We manipulated perceptions of loss across descriptions of transactions and found that, when the difference in perceptions of losses with trades versus upgrades was large, framing effects were strong. But when the difference was small, framing effects disappeared. These framing effects with identical end states influence WTA because trades are associated with perceived losses, while upgrades are associated with perceived costs.
Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
Authors: Capraro Valerio , Giardini Francesca , Vilone Daniele , Paolucci Mario
Published: January 2023

Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players’ past decisions, reputations in real life are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. We found that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputations are not taken into account by subjects for orienting their choices. Reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights about the characteristics of reputation and about the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners, and also when knowing that they will be selected.
The effect of interruption on the decision-making process
Authors: Nicholas Cheryl A. , Cohen Andrew L.
Published: January 2023

Previous research has shown that interruptions can lead to delays and errors on the interrupted task. Such research, however, seldom considers whether interruptions cause a change in how information is processed. The central question of this research is to determine whether an interruption causes a processing change. We investigate this question in a decision-making paradigm well-suited for examining the decision-making process. Participants are asked to select from a set of risky gambles, each with multiple possible stochastic outcomes. The information gathering process is measured using a mouse-click paradigm. Consistent with past work, interruptions did incur a cost: An interruption increased the time and the amount of information needed to make a decision. Furthermore, after an interruption, participants did seem to partially “restart” the task. Importantly, however, there was no evidence that the information gathering pattern was changed by an interruption. There was also no overall cost to the interruption in terms of choice outcome. These results are consistent with the idea that participants recall a subset of pre-interruption information, which was then incorporated into post-interruption processing.
An exploration of the motivational basis of take-some and give-some games
Authors: Haesevoets Tessa , Hiel Alain Van , Assche Jasper Van , Bostyn Dries H. , Folmer Chris Reinders
Published: January 2023

Surprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way.
A hard to read font reduces the causality bias
Authors: Díaz-Lago Marcos , Matute Helena
Published: January 2023

Previous studies have demonstrated that fluency affects judgment and decision-making. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the effect of perceptual fluency in a causal learning task that usually induces an illusion of causality in non-contingent conditions. We predicted that a reduction of fluency could improve accuracy in the detection of non-contingency and, therefore, could be used to debias illusory perceptions of causality. Participants were randomly assigned to either an easy-to-read or a hard-to-read condition. Our results showed a strong bias (i.e., overestimation) of causality in those participants who performed the non-contingent task in the easy-to-read font, which replicated the standard causality bias effect. This effect was reduced when the same task was presented in a hard-to-read font. Overall, our results provide evidence for a reduction of the causality bias when presenting the problem in a hard-to-read font. This suggests that perceptual fluency affects causal judgments.
Limited resources or limited luck? Why people perceive an illusory negative correlation between the outcomes of choice options despite unequivocal evidence for independence
Authors: Marciano Déborah , Krispin Eden , Bourgeois-Gironde Sacha , Deouell Leon Y.
Published: January 2023

When people learn of the outcome of an option they did not choose (the alternative outcome) before they know their own outcome, they see an illusory negative correlation between the two outcomes, the Alternative Omen Effect (ALOE). Why does this happen? Here, we tested several alternative explanations and conclude that the ALOE may derive from a pervasive belief that good luck is a limited resource. In Experiment 1, we show that the ALOE is due to people seeing a good alternative outcome as a bad sign regarding their outcome, relative to seeing a neutral alternative, but find no evidence for seeing a bad alternative outcome as a good sign. Experiment 2 confirms that the ALOE replicates across tasks, and that the ALOE cannot be explained by preconceptions regarding outcome distribution, including: 1) the Limited Good Hypothesis (zero-sum bias), according to which people see the world as a zero-sum game, and assume that resources there means fewer resources here, and/or 2) a more specific assumption that laboratory tasks are programmed as zero-sum games. To neutralize these potential beliefs, participants had to draw actual colored beads from two real, distinct bags. The results of Experiment 3 were consistent with a prediction of the Limited Luck Hypothesis: by eliminating the value of the outcomes we eliminated the ALOE. Taken together, our results show that either the limited good belief is so robust that it defies strong situational evidence, or that individuals perceive good luck itself as a limited resource. Such a limited-luck belief might have important consequences in decision making and negotiations.
High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too. A commentary on: “Valuing bets and hedges: Implications for the construct of risk preference”
Authors: Newall Philip W. S. , Cortis Dominic
Published: January 2023

Frederick, Levis, Malliaris & Meyer (2018) report a package of laboratory studies where participants underestimate the value of “hedges”: Risky bets which cancel out the risk of another presently-held bet. However, it might be questioned to what extent laboratory findings predict field behavior. People might better understand hedges when more money is at stake, or when they have more time to reflect. We discuss three gamblers who, instead of hedging, used a costly “cash-out” option to eliminate the risk of their bets on Leicester FC’s improbable victory in the 2015/2016 English Premier League soccer season. The decision to cash-out rather than to hedge led to individual losses of up to £8,000, and did not seem plausibly explained by rational economic factors. High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too.
A response to Mandel’s (2019) commentary on
Authors: Lehner Paul , Stastny Bradley
Published: January 2023

Stastny and Lehner (2018) compared the accuracy of forecasts in an intelligence community prediction market to comparable forecasts in analysis reports prepared by groups of professional intelligence analysts. To obtain quantitative probabilities from the analysis reports experienced analysts were asked to read the reports and state what probability they thought the reports implied for each forecast question. These were calledimputed probabilities. Stastny and Lehner found that the prediction market was more accurate than the imputed probabilities and concluded that this was evidence that the prediction market was more accurate than the analysis reports. In a commentary, Mandel (2019) took exception to this interpretation. In a re-analysis of the data, Mandel found a very strong correlation between readers’ personal and imputed probabilities. From this Mandel builds a case that the imputed probabilities are little more than a reflection of the readers’ personal views; that they do not fairly reflect the contents of the analysis reports; and therefore, any accuracy results are spurious. This paper argues two points. First, the high correlation between imputed and personal probabilities was not evidence of substantial imputation bias. Rather it was the natural by-product of the fact that the imputed and personal probabilities were both forecasts of the same events. An additional analysis shows a much lower level of imputation bias that is consistent with the original results and interpretation. Second, the focus of Stastny and Lehner (2018) was on the reports as understood by readers. In this context, even if there was substantial imputation bias it would not invalidate accuracy results; it would instead provide a possible causal explanation of those results.
Cultural differences in responses to real-life and hypothetical trolley problems
Authors: Gold Natalie , Colman Andrew M. , Pulford Briony D.
Published: January 2023

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.
Foreground-background salience effect in traffic risk communication
Authors: Hu Tian-Yi , Jiang Xin-Wen , Xie Xiaofei , Ma Xiao-Qin , Xu Chao
Published: January 2023

Pie charts are often used to communicate risk, such as the risk of driving. In the foreground-background salience effect (FBSE), foreground (probability of bad event) has greater salience than background (no bad event) in such a chart. Experiment 1 confirmed that the displays format of pie charts showed a typical FBSE. Experiment 2 showed that the FBSE resulted from a difference in cognitive efforts in processing the messages and that a foreground-emphasizing display was easier to process. Experiment 3 manipulated subjects’ information processing mindset and explored the interaction between displays format and information processing mindset. In the default mindset, careless subjects displayed a typical FBSE, while those who were instructed to be careful reported similar risk-avoidant behavior preference reading both charts. Suggestions for improving risk communication are discussed.
Cognitive reflection predicts the acceptance of unfair ultimatum game offers
Authors: Calvillo Dustin P. , Burgeno Jessica N.
Published: January 2023

In the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.
Maximizing as a predictor of job satisfaction and performance: A tale of three scales
Authors: Giacopelli Nicole M. , Simpson Kaila M. , Dalal Reeshad S. , Randolph Kristen L. , Holland Samantha J.
Published: January 2023

Research on individual differences in maximizing (versus satisficing) has recently proliferated in the Judgment and Decision Making literature, and high scores on this construct have been linked to lower life satisfaction as well as, in some cases, to worse decision-making performance. The current study exported this construct to the organizational domain and evaluated the utility of the three most widely used measures of maximizing in predicting several criteria of interest to organizational researchers: job satisfaction, intentions to quit the organization, performance in the job role, and income. Moreover, this study used relative weight analyses to determine the relative importance of maximizing and two dispositional variables (conscientiousness and core self-evaluations) that are traditionally used to predict these criteria in the organizational literature. Results indicate that relationships between maximizing and these criteria are influenced by the way in which maximizing is measured. Yet, regardless of how it is measured, maximizing is not a particularly strong predictor of these criteria compared to traditional organizational predictors. Limitations and future research directions are discussed.
The time-saving bias: Judgements, cognition and perception
Authors: Eriksson Gabriella , Svenson Ola , Eriksson Lars
Published: January 2023

Biases in people’s judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers’ time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.
Success-slope effects on the illusion of control and on remembered success-frequency
Authors: Ejova Anastasia , Navarro Daniel J. , Delfabbro Paul H.
Published: January 2023

The illusion of control refers to the inference of action-outcome contingency in situations where outcomes are in fact random. The strength of this illusion has been found to be affected by whether the frequency of successes increases or decreases over repeated trials, in what can be termed a “success-slope” effect. Previous studies have generated inconsistent findings regarding the nature of this effect. In this paper we present an experiment (N = 334) that overcomes several methodological limitations within this literature, employing a wider range of dependent measures (measures of two different types of illusory control, primary (by self) and secondary (by luck), as well as measures of remembered success-frequency). Results indicate that different dependent measures lead to different effects. On measures of (primary, but not secondary) control over the task, scores were highest when the rate of success increased over time. Meanwhile, estimates of success-frequency in the task did not vary across conditions and showed trends consistent with the broader literature on human memory.
Learning to reason: The influence of instruction, prompts and scaffolding, metacognitive knowledge, and general intelligence on informal reasoning about everyday social and political issues
Authors: Perkins David
Published: January 2023

Twelve experiments examined ways of improving informal reasoning, as assesed by presenting students with accessible, current, and interesting social and political issues, eliciting reasoning about them, and scoring the reasoning for quality of argument. The experiments addressed: (1) the impact of established instructional programs that emphasized critical thinking (Experiments 1–4); (2) the impact of an investigator-designed high school level minicourse (Experiments 5–7); (3) the responsiveness of subjects to prompts that asked them to develop arguments more fully, and the relation of their responses to general intelligence (Experiments 8–10); (4) checks on the validity of the testing methodology (Experiments 11–12). Two of the established instructional programs had a beneficial effect. The minicourse had a particularly large effect on students’ attention to the other side of the case, the most neglected aspect of informal reasoning. The prompting studies showed that subjects could develop their arguments far more than they normally did. Finally, subjects with higher intelligence were actually somewhat more biased in their reasoning. In summary: people can reason much better than they typically do on the sorts of issues posed; people are not performing near the limits of their abilities; strategies and standards of good reasoning can improve reasoning; and education can develop students’ reasoning much further than education typically does.
Descriptive norms for me, injunctive norms for you: Using norms to explain the risk gap
Authors: Zou Xi , Savani Krishna
Published: January 2023

People are more likely to rely on descriptive norms (i.e., what their peers are doing) when deciding whether to take a risk themselves than when deciding whether to recommend others to take a risk. We proposed and found that people also attend to normative information when making risk recommendations to others, but in this case they attend to a different type of normative information — injunctive norms (i.e., whether their peers approve of this behavior). Descriptive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s own decisions, whereas injunctive norm plays a bigger role in influencing people’s recommendations to others. This research demonstrates the importance of differentiating descriptive versus injunctive norms in risky decision-making and provides further evidence that perceived norms significantly influence risky decision-making.
Reflection increases belief in God through self-questioning among non-believers
Authors: Yilmaz Onurcan , Isler Ozan
Published: January 2023

The dual-process model of the mind predicts that religious belief will be stronger for intuitive decisions, whereas reflective thinking will lead to religious disbelief (i.e.,the intuitive religious belief hypothesis). While early research found intuition to promote and reflection to weaken belief in God, more recent attempts found no evidence for the intuitive religious belief hypothesis. Many of the previous studies are underpowered to detect small effects, and it is not clear whether the cognitive process manipulations used in these failed attempts worked as intended. We investigated the influence of intuitive and reflective thought on belief in God in two large-scale preregistered experiments (N= 1,602), using well-established cognitive manipulations (i.e., time-pressure with incentives for compliance) and alternative elicitation methods (between and within-subject designs). Against our initial hypothesis based on the literature, the experiments provide first suggestive then confirmatory evidence forthe reflective religious belief hypothesis. Exploratory examination of the data suggests that reflection increases doubts about beliefs held regarding God’s existence. Reflective doubt exists primarily among non-believers, resulting in an overall increase in belief in God when deciding reflectively.
The Lie Deflator – The effect of polygraph test feedback on subsequent (dis)honesty
Authors: Peleg Dar , Ayal Shahar , Ariely Dan , Hochman Guy
Published: January 2023

Despite its controversial status, the lie detection test is still a popular organizational instrument for credibility assessment. Due to its popularity, we examined the effect of the lie-detection test feedback on subsequent moral behavior. In three studies, participants could cheat to increase their monetary payoff in two consecutive phases. Between these two phases the participants underwent a mock polygraph test and were randomly given Deception Indicated (DI) or No Deception Indicated (NDI) assigned feedback. Then, participants engaged in the second phase of the task and their level of dishonesty was measured. Study 1 showed that both NDI and DI feedback (but not the control) reduced cheating behavior on the subsequent task. However, Study 2 showed that the mere presence of the lie-detection test (without feedback) did not produce the same effect. When the role of the lie detector as a moral reminder was cancelled out in Study 3, feedback had no effect on the magnitude of cheating behavior. However, cheaters who were given NDI feedback exhibited a lower level of physiological arousal than cheaters who were given DI feedback. These results suggest that lie detection tests can be used to promote honesty in the field, and that, while feedback type does not affect the magnitude of cheating, NDI may allow people to feel better about cheating.
Approximating rationality under incomplete information: Adaptive inferences for missing cue values based on cue-discrimination
Authors: Jekel Marc , Glöckner Andreas , Bröder Arndt , Maydych Viktoriya
Published: January 2023

In a highly uncertain world, individuals often have to make decisions in situations with incomplete information. We investigated in three experiments how partial cue information is treated in complex probabilistic inference tasks. Specifically, we test a mechanism to infer missing cue values that is based on the discrimination rate of cues (i.e., how often a cue makes distinct predictions for choice options). We show analytically that inferring missing cue values based on discrimination rate maximizes the probability for a correct inference in many decision environments and that it is therefore adaptive to use it. Results from three experiments show that individuals are sensitive to the discrimination rate and use it when it is a valid inference mechanism but rely on other inference mechanisms, such as the cues’ base-rate of positive information, when it is not. We find adaptive inferences for incomplete information in environments in which participants are explicitly provided with information concerning the base-rate and discrimination rate of cues (Exp. 1) as well as in environments in which they learn these properties by experience (Exp. 2). Results also hold in environments of further increased complexity (Exp. 3). In all studies, participants show a high ability to adaptively infer incomplete information and to integrate this inferred information with other available cues to approximate the naïve Bayesian solution.
Subjective but not objective numeracy influences willingness to pay forBRCA1/2genetic testing
Authors: Miron-Shatz Talya , Hanoch Yaniv , Doniger Glen M. , Omer Zehra B. , Ozanne Elissa M.
Published: January 2023

A positive test result forBRCA1/2gene mutation is a substantial risk factor for breast and ovarian cancer. However, testing is not always covered by insurance, even for high risk women. Variables affecting willingness to pay (WTP) have implications for clinic-based and direct-to-consumer testing. The relative impact of objective and subjective numeracy on WTP, in the context of worry, perceived risk (of having the mutation and developing breast cancer) and family history, was examined in 299 high-risk women, not previously tested forBRCA1/2. Objective and subjective numeracy correlated positively with one another, yet only subjective numeracy correlated (positively) with WTP. This could not be explained by educational level or worry. In line with the numeracy result, other objective factors including family history, age, and Ashkenazi descent were not correlated with WTP. Perceived risk of having a mutation was also correlated with WTP, though perceived risk of developing breast cancer was not, perhaps because it lacks direct connection with testing. Thus, subjective confidence in the ability to interpret test results and perceived risk of a positive test result are more important drivers in paying for BRCA1/2 testing than factors more objective and/or further removed from the testing itself (e.g., perceived risk of developing cancer, family history). Findings underscore the need for genetic counselling that makes probabilistic information accessible and intelligible, so as to build confidence and promote accurate perception of mutation risk and ultimately better decision-making.
Effects of induced moods on economic choices
Authors: Stanton Steven J. , Reeck Crystal , Huettel Scott A. , LaBar Kevin S.
Published: January 2023

Emotions can shape decision processes by altering valuation signals, risk perception, and strategic orientation. Although multiple theories posit a role for affective processes in mediating the influence of frames on decision making, empirical studies have yet to demonstrate that manipulated affect modulates framing phenomena. The present study asked whether induced affective states alter gambling propensity and the influence of frames on decision making. In a between-subjects design, we induced mood (happy, sad, or neutral) in subjects (N=91) via films that were interleaved with the framing task. Happy mood induction increased gambling and apparently accentuated framing effects compared to sad mood induction, although the effect on framing could have resulted from the fact that the increased tendency to gamble made the framing measure more sensitive. Happy mood induction increased gambling, but not framing magnitude, compared to neutral mood induction. Subjects experiencing a sad mood induction did not exhibit behavioral differences from those experiencing a neutral mood. For those subjects who experienced the happy mood induction, both gambling propensity and framing magnitude were positively correlated with the magnitude of the change in their mood valence. We discuss the broader implications of mood effects on real-world economic decisions.
Cooperative preferences fluctuate across the menstrual cycle
Authors: Anderl Christine , Hahn Tim , Notebaert Karolien , Klotz Claudia , Rutter Barbara , Windmann Sabine
Published: January 2023

Social Value Orientation (SVO) refers to an individual’s preference for the division of resources between the self and another person. Since evidence suggests that hormones influence several facets of human social behavior, we asked whether SVO might fluctuate across the female menstrual cycle. Using self-report data obtained in two independent online studies, we show that cooperative preferences, as indexed by SVO, are indeed significantly more prosocial in the early follicular compared to the midluteal phase in naturally ovulating women. Furthermore, when estimating hormonal variations from norm data, we found estradiol, but not progesterone or testosterone, to be a significant predictor of SVO across the menstrual cycle in both studies, with a negative correlation. Our findings provide evidence that the willingness to cooperate varies across the natural female menstrual cycle and highlight the potential of investigating psychological effects of ovarian sex hormones.
Strategies for exploration in the domain of losses
Authors: Krueger Paul M. , Wilson Robert C. , Cohen Jonathan D.
Published: January 2023

Many decisions in everyday life involve a choice between exploring options that are currently unknown and exploiting options that are already known to be rewarding. Previous work has suggested that humans solve such “explore-exploit” dilemmas using a mixture of two strategies: directed exploration, in which information seeking drives exploration by choice, and random exploration, in which behavioral variability drives exploration by chance. One limitation of this previous work was that, like most studies on explore-exploit decision making, it focused exclusively on the domain of gains, where the goal was to maximize reward. In many real-world decisions, however, the goal is to minimize losses and it is well known from Prospect Theory that behavior can be quite different in this domain. In this study, we compared explore-exploit behavior of human subjects under conditions of gain and loss. We found that people use both directed and random exploration regardless of whether they are exploring to maximize gains or minimize losses and that there is quantitative agreement between the exploration parameters across domains. Our results also revealed an overall bias towards the more uncertain option in the domain of losses. While this bias towards uncertainty wasqualitativelyconsistent with the predictions of Prospect Theory,quantitativelywe found that the bias was better described by a Bayesian account, in which subjects had a prior that was optimistic for losses and pessimistic for gains. Taken together, our results suggest that explore-exploit decisions are driven by three independent processes: directed and random exploration, and a baseline uncertainty seeking that is driven by a prior.
Hold on to it? An experimental analysis of the disposition effect
Authors: Ploner Matteo
Published: January 2023

This paper experimentally investigates a well-known anomaly in portfolio management, i.e., the fact that paper losses are realized less than paper gains (disposition effect). I confirm the existence of the disposition effect in a simple risky task in which choices are taken sequentially. However, when choices are planned ahead and a contingent plan is defined, a reversal in the disposition effect is observed.
Home bias in sport betting: Evidence from Czech betting market
Authors: Staněk Rostislav
Published: January 2023

In sport betting, bettors exhibit home bias when they tend to bet on their home team more often. The paper offers a straightforward method of empirical identification of the home bias in the real-world betting market. Using Czech betting data on the league and the national ice-hockey matches, the paper provides support for the existence of the home bias in the Czech betting market.
Memory retrieval processes help explain the incumbency advantage
Authors: Spälti Anna Katharina , Brandt Mark J. , Zeelenberg Marcel
Published: January 2023

Voters prefer political candidates who are currently in office (incumbents) over new candidates (challengers). Using the premise of query theory (Johnson, Häubl & Keinan, 2007), we clarify the underlying cognitive mechanisms by asking whether memory retrieval sequences affect political decision making. Consistent with predictions, Experiment 1 (N= 256) replicated the incumbency advantage and showed that participants tended to first query information about the incumbent. Experiment 2 (N= 427) showed that experimentally manipulating participants’ query order altered the strength of the incumbency advantage. Experiment 3 (N= 713) replicated Experiment 1 and, in additional experimental conditions, showed that the effects of incumbency can be overridden by more valid cues, like the candidates’ ideology. Participants queried information about ideologically similar candidates earlier and also preferred these ideologically similar candidates. This is initial evidence for a cognitive, memory-retrieval process underling the incumbency advantage and political decision making.
On the psychology of self-prediction: Consideration of situational barriers to intended actions
Authors: Poon Connie S. K. , Koehler Derek J. , Buehler Roger
Published: January 2023

When people predict their future behavior, they tend to place too much weight on their current intentions, which produces an optimistic bias for behaviors associated with currently strong intentions. More realistic self-predictions require greater sensitivity to situational barriers, such as obstacles or competing demands, that may interfere with the translation of current intentions into future behavior. We consider three reasons why people may not adjust sufficiently for such barriers. First, self-predictions may focus exclusively on current intentions, ignoring potential barriers altogether. We test this possibility, in three studies, with manipulations that draw greater attention to barriers. Second, barriers may be discounted in the self-prediction process. We test this possibility by comparing prospective and retrospective ratings of the impact of barriers on the target behavior. Neither possibility was supported in these tests, or in a further test examining whether an optimally weighted statistical model could improve on the accuracy of self-predictions by placing greater weight on anticipated situational barriers. Instead, the evidence supports a third possibility: Even when they acknowledge that situational factors can affect the likelihood of carrying out an intended behavior, people do not adequately moderate the weight placed on their current intentions when predicting their future behavior.
Moral pluralism on the trolley tracks: Different normative principles are used for different reasons in justifying moral judgments
Authors: Aktas Büsra , Yilmaz Onurcan , Bahçekapili Hasan G.
Published: January 2023

The psychological correlates of utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are contentious. In the literature, some research (Greene, et al., 2001) suggested that utilitarianism requires analytic thinking while other research (Kahane et al., 2015) showed that utilitarianism is correlated with psychopathy. In the present research, we looked at the relation of several normative views with analytic cognitive style (ACS), psychopathy and real-world utilitarianism in three Turkish samples. In Study 1 (n= 269), we used four ethical dilemmas and asked participants to select one normative principle as the grounds for their judgment in the dilemma: fatalism, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and amoralism. The results showed that the majority selected the deontological principle. Additionally, there was a considerable amount of fatalistic and virtue ethical justifications. Utilitarianism and psychopathy had a significant positive correlation. In Study 2 (n= 246), we replicated Study 1 and showed a significant relation between ACS and moral minimalism (the view that the sacrificial act is permissible but not necessary). In Study 3, the results showed that the utilitarian option in the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated with both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy, but the latter two variables were not correlated with each other. All in all, the results suggest that some people choose the utilitarian option in moral dilemmas from psychopathic tendencies (as Kahane argued), while others due to real-life utilitarian reasons (as Greene argued). The findings also indicate that virtue ethical and fatalistic justifications cannot be ignored in understanding lay people’s moral judgments.
The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration
Authors: Haran Uriel , Ritov Ilana , Mellers Barbara A.
Published: January 2023

Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant information. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts.