bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Definability and definable groups in simple theories
Authors: Pillay Anand
Published: May 2006

We continue the study of simple theories begun in [3] and [5]. We first find the right analogue of definability of types. We then develop the theory of generic types and stabilizers for groups definable in simple theories. The general ideology is that the role of formulas (or definability) in stable theories is replaced by partial types (or ∞-definability) in simple theories.
Automorphisms moving all non-algebraic points and an application to NF
Authors: Körner Friederike
Published: May 2006

Section 1 is devoted to the study of countable recursively saturated models with an automorphism moving every non-algebraic point. We show that every countable theory has such a model and exhibit necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of automorphisms moving all non-algebraic points. Furthermore we show that there are many complete theories with the property that every countable recursively saturated model has such an automorphism.

In Section 2 we apply our main theorem from Section 1 to models of Quine's set theory New Foundations (NF) to answer an old consistency question. If NF is consistent, then it has a model in which the standard natural numbers are a definable subclass ℕ of the model's set of internal natural numbers Nn. In addition, in this model the class of wellfounded sets is exactly.
Witnessing functions in bounded arithmetic and search problems
Authors: Chiari Mario , Krajíček Jan
Published: May 2006

We investigate the possibility to characterize (multi)functions that are-definable with smalli(i= 1, 2, 3) in fragments of bounded arithmeticT2in terms of natural search problems defined over polynomial-time structures. We obtain the following results:

(1) A reformulation of known characterizations of (multi)functions that areand-definable in the theoriesand.

(2) New characterizations of (multi)functions that areand-definable in the theory.

(3) A new non-conservation result: the theoryis not-conservative over the theory.

To prove that the theoryis not-conservative over the theory, we present two examples of a-principle separating the two theories:

(a) the weak pigeonhole principle WPHP(a2,f, g) formalizing that no functionfis a bijection betweena2andawith the inverseg,

(b) the iteration principle Iter(a, R, f) formalizing that no functionfdefined on a strict partial order ({0,…, a},R) can have increasing iterates.
Extenders, embedding normal forms, and the Martin-Steel-theorem
Authors: Koepke Peter
Published: May 2006

We propose a simple notion of “extender” for coding large elementary embeddings of models of set theory. As an application we present a self-contained proof of the theorem by D. Martin and J. Steel that infinitely many Woodin cardinals imply the determinacy of every projective set.
Changing cardinal invariants of the reals without changing cardinals or the reals
Authors: Mildenberger Heike
Published: May 2006

We show: The procedure mentioned in the title is often impossible. It requires at least an inner model with a measurable cardinal. The consistency strength of changingandfrom a regularκto some regularδ<κis a measurable of Mitchell orderδ. There is an application to Cichoń's diagram.
Relational semantics and a relational proof system for full Lambek calculus
Authors: MacCaull Wendy
Published: May 2006

In this paper we give relational semantics and an accompanying relational proof theory for full Lambek calculus (a sequent calculus which we denote by FL). We start with the Kripke semantics for FL as discussed in [11] and develop a second Kripke-style semantics, RelKripke semantics, as a bridge to relational semantics. The RelKripke semantics consists of a set with two distinguished elements, two ternary relations and a list of conditions on the relations. It is accompanied by a Kripke-style valuation system analogous to that in [11]. Soundness and completeness theorems with respect to FL hold for RelKripke models. Then, in the spirit of the work of Orlowska [14], [15], and Buszkowski and Orlowska [3], we develop relational logic RFL. The adjective relational is used to emphasize the fact that RFL has a semantics wherein formulas are interpreted as relations. We prove that a sequent Γ → α in FL is provable if and only if a translation,t(γ1● … ● γn⊃ α)ευu, has a cut-complete fundamental proof tree. This result isconstructive: that is, if a cut-complete proof tree fort(γ1● … ● γn⊃ α)ευuis not fundamental, we can use the failed proof search to build a relational countermodel fort(γ1● … ● γn⊃ α)ευuand from this, build a RelKripke countermodel for γ1● … ● γn⊃ α. These results allow us to add FL, the basic substructural logic, to the list of those logics of importance in computer science with a relational proof theory.
An absoluteness principle for Borel sets
Authors: Hjorth Greg
Published: May 2006

The purpose of these notes is to describe an absoluteness principle due to Jacques Stern and discuss some applications to the general study of Borel sets. This paper will not be engaged in independence results, but in proving outright theorems about the Borel hierarchy.

Roughly speaking, Stern's absoluteness principle states that if a certain set can be introduced into the universe by forcing, then it can be introduced by some small forcing notion.

The notation , and so on, will be defined in Section 1; this gives a notational system for describing the complexity of Borel sets beyond Fσ or Gδ. The “universe” refers to the totality of all sets. “Forcing” refers to Paul Cohen's technique for, in some sense, changing this totality by the introduction of new sets. Here “small” means relatively small cardinality.

The size of this small forcing notion is roughly the ath iteration of the power set operation. Just to get an idea of what this theorem might be saying, we can argue that under certain conditions, if a closed set can be introduced by forcing, then it exists already. There are a number of other qualifications that need to be made to this rough description, and we will come to them later.

Unlike, say, Shoenfield absoluteness, Stern's absoluteness can only be made understood in the terminology of forcing. Since forcing is typically associated with the pursuit of independence results, we could easily assume that Stern's work has little relevance in proving positive theorems about the Borel hierarchy.

However, this would be untrue. Using abstract and indirect metamathematical arguments, and availing ourselves of Stern's absoluteness principle, we will prove a string of ZFC theorems for which no direct proof is known.
Frege proof system and TNC°
Authors: Takeuti Gaisi
Published: May 2006

A Frege proof systemFis any standard system of prepositional calculus, e.g., a Hilbert style system based on finitely many axiom schemes and inference rules. An Extended Frege systemEFis obtained fromFas follows. AnEF-sequence is a sequence of formulas ψ1, …, ψκsuch that eachψiis either an axiom ofF, inferred from previous ψuand ψv(= ψu→ ψi) by modus ponens or of the formq↔ φ, whereqis an atom occurring neither in φ nor in any of ψ1,…,ψi−1. Suchq↔ φ, is called an extension axiom andqa new extension atom. AnEF-proof is anyEF-sequence whose last formula does not contain any extension atom. In [12], S. A. Cook and R. Reckhow proved that the pigeonhole principlePHPhas a simple polynomial sizeEF-proof and conjectured thatPHPdoes not admit polynomial sizeF-proof. In [5], S. R. Buss refuted this conjecture by furnishing polynomial sizeF-proof forPHP. Since then the important separation problem of polynomial sizeFand polynomial sizeEFhas not shown any progress.

In [11], S. A. Cook introduced the systemPV, a free variable equational logic whose provable functional equalities are ‘polynomial time verifiable’ and showed that the metamathematics ofFandEFcan be developed inPVand the soundness ofEFproved inPV. In [3], S. R. Buss introduced the first order systemand showed thatis essentially a conservative extension ofPV. There he also introduced a second order system(BD).
Wadge hierarchy and Veblen hierarchy Part I: Borel sets of finite rank
Authors: Duparc J.
Published: May 2006

We consider Borel sets of finite rank A ⊆ ∧ω where cardinality of Λ is less than some uncountable regular cardinal . We obtain a “normal form” of A, by finding a Borel set Ω, such that A and Ω continuously reduce to each other. In more technical terms: we define simple Borel operations which are homomorphic to ordinal sum, to multiplication by a countable ordinal, and to ordinal exponentiation of base , under the map which sends every Borel set A of finite rank to its Wadge degree.
On the convergence of query-bounded computations and logical closure properties of c.e. sets
Authors: McNicholl Timothy H.
Published: May 2006

Call a set A n-correctable if every set Turing reducible to A via a Turing machine that on any input makes at most n queries is Turing reducible to A via a Turing machine that on any input makes at most n-queries and on any input halts no matter what answers are given to its queries. We show that if a c.e. set A is n-correctable for some n ≥ 2, then it is n-correctable for all n. We show that this is the optimal such result by constructing a c.e. set that is 1-correctable but not 2-correctable. The former result is obtained by examining the logical closure properties of c.e. sets that are 2-correctable.
Implication with possible exceptions
Authors: Jurjus Herman , de Swart Harrie
Published: May 2006

We introduce an implication-with-possible-exceptions and define validity of rules-with-possible-exceptions by means of the topological notion of a full subset. Our implication-with-possible-exceptions characterises the preferential consequence relation as axiomatized by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor, 1990]. The resulting inference relation is non-monotonic. On the other hand, modus ponens and the rule of monotony, as well as all other laws of classical propositional logic, are valid-up-to-possible exceptions. As a consequence, the rules of classical propositional logic do not determine the meaning of deducibility and inference as implication-without-exceptions.
A note on existentially closed difference fields with algebraically closed fixed field
Authors: Pillay Anand
Published: May 2006

We point out that the theory of difference fields with algebraically closed fixed field has no model companion.
Finite variable logic, stability and finite models
Authors: Djordjević Marko
Published: May 2006

We will study complete Ln-theories and their models, where Ln is the set of first order formulas in which at most n distinct variables occur. Here, by a complete Ln-theory we mean a theory such that for every Ln-sentence, it or its negation is implied by the theory. Hence, a complete Ln-theory need not necessarily be complete in the usual sense. Our approach is to transfer concepts and methods from stability theory, such as the order property and counting types, to the context of Ln-theories. So, in one sense, we will develop some rudimentary stability theory for a particular class of (possibly) incomplete theories. To make the ‘stability theoretic’ arguments work, we need to assume that models of the complete Ln-theory T which we consider can be amalgamated in certain ways. If this condition is satisfied and T has infinite models then there will exist models of T which are sufficiently saturated with respect to Ln. This allows us to use some counting types arguments from stability theory. If, moreover, we impose some finiteness conditions on the number of Ln-types and the length of Ln-definable orders then a sufficiently saturated model of T will be ω-categorical and ω-stable. Using the theory of ω-categorical and ω-stable structures we derive that T has arbitrarily large finite models.

A different approach to combining stability theory with finite model theory is made by Hyttinen in [9] and [10].
A note on equational theories
Authors: Junker Markus
Published: May 2006

Several attempts have been done to distinguish “positive” information in an arbitrary first order theory, i.e., to find a well behaved class of closed sets among the definable sets. In many cases, a definable set is said to be closed if its conjugates are sufficiently distinct from each other. Each such definition yields a class of theories, namely those where all definable sets are constructible, i.e., boolean combinations of closed sets. Here are some examples, ordered by strength:

Weak normality describes a rather small class of theories which are well understood by now (see, for example, [P]). On the other hand, normalization is so weak that all theories, in a suitable context, are normalizable (see [HH]). Thus equational theories form an interesting intermediate class of theories. Little work has been done so far. The original work of Srour [S1, S2, S3] adopts a point of view that is closer to universal algebra than to stability theory. The fundamental definitions and model theoretic properties can be found in [PS], though some easy observations are missing there. Hrushovski's example of a stable non-equational theory, the first and only one so far, is described in the unfortunately unpublished manuscript [HS]. In fact, it is an expansion of the free pseudospace constructed independently by Baudisch and Pillay in [BP] as an example of a strictly 2-ample theory. Strong equationality, defined in [Hr], is also investigated in [HS].
Actions of non-compact and non-locally compact Polish groups
Authors: Solecki Sławomir
Published: May 2006

We show that each non-compact Polish group admits a continuous action on a Polish space with non-smooth orbit equivalence relation. We actually construct a free such action. Thus for a Polish group compactness is equivalent to all continuous free actions of this group being smooth. This answers a question of Kechris. We also establish results relating local compactness of the group with its inability to induce orbit equivalence relations not reducible to countable Borel equivalence relations. Generalizing a result of Hjorth, we prove that each non-locally compact, that is, infinite dimensional, separable Banach space has a continuous action on a Polish space with non-Borel orbit equivalence relation, thus showing that this property characterizes non-local compactness among Banach spaces.
Stable theories with a new predicate
Authors: Casanovas Enrique , Ziegler Martin
Published: May 2006

Let M be an L-structure and A be an infinite subset of M. Two structures can be defined from A:

• The induced structure on A has a name Rφ for every ∅-definable relation φ(M) ∩ An on A. Its language is

A with its Lind-structure will be denoted by Aind.

• The pair (M, A) is an L(P)-structure, where P is a unary predicate for A and L(P) = L ∪{P}.

We call A small if there is a pair (N, B) elementarily equivalent to (M, A) and such that for every finite subset b of N every L–type over Bb is realized in N.

A formula φ(x, y) has the finite cover property (f.c.p) in M if for all natural numbers k there is a set of φ–formulas

which is k–consistent but not consistent in M. M has the f.c.p if some formula has the f.c.p in M. It is well known that unstable structures have the f.c.p. (see [6].) We will prove the following two theorems.

Theorem A. Let A be a small subset of M. If M does not have the finite cover property then, for every λ ≥ ∣L∣, if both M andAindare λ–stable then (M, A) is λ–stable.

Corollary 1.1 (Poizat [5]). If M does not have the finite cover property and N ≺ M is a small elementary substructure, then (M, N) is stable.

Corollary 1.2 (Zilber [7]). If U is the group of wots of unity in the field ℂ of complex numbers the pair (ℂ, U) isω–stable.

Proof. (See [4].) As a strongly minimal set ℂ is ω–stable and does not have the f.c.p. By the subspace theorem of Schmidt [3] every algebraic set intersects U in a finite union of translates of subgroups definable in the group structure of U alone. Whence Uind is nothing more than a (divisible) abelian group, which is ω–stable.
Antonin Scalia, William Brennan, and the Politics of Expression: A Study of Legal Violence and Repression
Authors: Brisbin Richard A.
Published: May 2006

The study of legal politics often attends to the description and explanation of the instrumental politics of legal change or to the mobilization of rights by individual citizens as an act of empowerment beneficial to their individual liberty. Drawing far less attention from the discipline is the privileged construction of a discourse or set of attitudes about rights by the judiciary. I present a case study of the First Amendment opinions of two members of the Supreme Court of the United States to criticize the range of their attitudes about rights and to illustrate how their opinions help construct and legitimate the disciplinary actions that provide order in the modern liberal regime. To preserve order, the justices are shown to use the language of rights as an instrument for the facilitation of violence, repression, and subjection against some litigants, rather than as an instrument for the enhancement of expressive liberties.
Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five
Authors: Thompson Dennis F.
Published: May 2006

The Keating Five case exemplifies a form of a political corruption that is increasingly common in contemporary politics but frequently neglected in contemporary political science. I focus on this form by developing a concept ofmediated corruption, which links the acts of individual officials to effects on the democratic process. Unlike conventional corruption, mediated corruption does not require that the public official act with a corrupt motive or that either public officials or citizens receive improper benefits. The concept of mediated corruption provides not only a more coherent account of the case of the Keating Five but also a more fruitful way of reuniting the concepts of systematic corruption in traditional political theory with the concepts of individual corruption in contemporary social science.
Schumpeter, the New Deal, and Democracy
Authors: Medearis John
Published: May 2006

Joseph Schumpeter is known to American political scientists as the originator of an elite conception of democracy as a political “method,” a conception found in hisCapitalism, Socialism and Democracy(1942). But I show in this paper that in Schumpeter's study of the development of liberal capitalist societies, he also treated democracy as a socially transformative historical tendency, one of several that he thought were propelling such societies toward a form of “democratic” socialism. Schumpeter regarded the politics of labor and the reorientation of state policy in the New Deal era as evidence of these tendencies—especially of a tendency toward the democratic reconstruction of workplace hierarchy, which he deplored. In his later work, Schumpeter sketched the outlines of a “democratic” socialist society in which the most harmful of these tendencies, in his estimation, would be curbed.
Evaluating Theories
Authors: Waltz Kenneth N.
Published: May 2006

John Vasquez claims to follow Imre Lakatos but distorts his criteria for judging theories and evaluating research programs. Vasquez claims that facts observed can falsify a theory by showing that its predictions are wrong. He fails to consider the puzzles posed by the interdependence of theory and fact. He places all realists in a single paradigm despite the divergent assumptions of traditional and structural realists. In contrast to Vasquez, I argue that explanation, not prediction, is the ultimate criterion of good theory, that a theory can be validated only by working back and forth between its implications and an uncertain state of affairs that we take to be the reality against which theory is tested, and that the results of tests are always problematic.
A simple treatment of truth functions
Authors: Ross Anderson Alan , Belnap Nuel D.
Published: May 2006

In this note we present an axiomatization of the classical two-valued propositional calculus, for which proofs of decidability, consistency, completeness, and independence, are almost trivial (given an understanding of truth tables).
An investigation on the logical structure of mathematics (V). Contradictions of Russell's type
Authors: Kuroda Sigekatu
Published: May 2006

If a contradiction is deduced by using only the defining formula of a set, it is called a contradiction of Russell's type, and the set is called inconsistent. A set is called consistent, if no contradiction can be deduced from the defining formula of the set.

The object of this note is to determine some conditions for some sets to be consistent or inconsistent.

In §1 notations and terms are defined. In §2 main results are stated. In §3, the proof in UL of a contradiction is simplified for a special kind of sets, so that a simplified definition of the proof of a contradiction is given for the kind of sets, and some properties of a proof in UL are stated concerning the simplified definition. This definition and the properties of a proof are the basis of the proof of the results given in §§5–10. Thus, this Part (V), except §3, is written independently of other Parts as far as possible. However, it depends essentially on Parts (I) and (II). In §4 some examples are given.
Entailment and relevance1
Authors: Belnap Nuel D.
Published: May 2006

Those who object to the identification of strict implication and entail-ment speak in such a way that for A to entail B, A must be relevant to B. This view of entailment agrees not only with that of the naive student of logic (who tends to think the phrase paradoxes of “implication” more accurate than “paradoxes” of implication), but also with that expressed in the initial chapters of many textbooks in logic under the heading “Fallacies of Relevance.”2

In regard to formal theories proposed as explications of the notion of entailment, it becomes important to have at our disposal some formal account of the demand for relevance as between antecedent and consequent of an entailment.
Note on Carnap's relational asymptotic relative frequencies
Authors: Harary Frank
Published: May 2006

A (binary) relation is a collection of ordered couples. Two relations are isomorphic if there is a 1–1 correspondence between their fields which preserves the ordered couples. Isomorphism between relations is itself an equivalence relation, and a structure is an isomorphism class of binary relations.

Carnap ([1], p. 124) asks certain questions concerning (both the exact and) the asymptotic value of the relative frequency that a relation on p objects satisfies certain properties. Among the most interesting special cases are the asymptotic value of the relative frequency that a binary relation on p objects be (a) symmetric, (b) reflexive, (c) transitive irreflexive anti-symmetric, and (d) symmetric irreflexive. These results already appear either in, or almost in, the literature, in various disguises. The object of this expository note is to bring them to light, especially since some of the references may not be generally known to logicians.

Carnap ([1], p. 124) points out explicitly the correspondence between binary relations and linear graphs. Davis [2] and Harary [4] obtains precise results for the number of structures with certain properties using the language of relations and graphs respectively; but these do not supply the asymptotic values directly. The asymptotic results which are most useful here are either contained in, or are straight-forward extensions of, the formulas presented in Ford and Uhlenbeck [3], which in turn are based on unpublished work of G. Pólya. In addition, we utilize a result of L. Moser on transitive relations, which appears in Wine and Freund [5].
Concerning formulas of the types A→B ν C,A →(Ex)B(x) in intuitionistic formal systems
Authors: Harrop Ronald
Published: May 2006

In a previous paper [1] it was proved, among other results, that a closed disjunction of intuitionistic elementary number theory N can be proved if and only if at least one of its disjunctands is provable and that a closed formula of the type (Ex)B(x) is provable in N if and only if B(n) is provable for some numeral n. The method of proof was to show that, as far as closed formulas are concerned, N is equivalent to a calculus N1 for which the result is immediate. The main step in the proof consisted in showing that the set of provable formulas of N1 is closed under modus ponens. This was done by obtaining a subset of the set which is closed under modus ponens and contains all members of the original set, with which it is therefore identical.
Corrections to a theory of restricted quantification
Authors: Hailperin Theodore
Published: May 2006

R. Sherman Lehman has called my attention to an error which vitiates the proofs of two theorems in the paper mentioned in the title (this Journal, vol. 22, pp. 19–35, 113–129). New proofs are here presented.

Proof of Lemma, p. 27. Induction Step: Assume as hypothesis of induction that the lemma holds for formulas P with n—1 or fewer free restricted variables and consider a P having n (n>0) such variables.
Peirce's axioms for propositional calculus
Authors: Prior A. N.
Published: May 2006

In 1885 Peirce axiomatised the propositional calculus on the basis of five ‘icons’ or axioms, which with Cpq for ‘If p then q’ and o for a false proposition, and with the source in Peirce's [2] beside each, may be represented as follows: 1. Cpp (3.376); 2. CCpCqrCqCpr (3.377); 3. CCpqCCqrCpr (3.379); 4. Cop (3.381); 5. CCCpqpp (3.384). From these Peirce proves, among other things, 6. CpCCpqq (3.377), 7. CpCqp (3.378), and with Np (Not p) for Cpo, 8. CNNpp (3.384).

By a well-known result of Wajsberg's II. 93, the entire two-valued propositional calculus is derivable by substitution and detachment from 3, 4, 5, and 7 (with Df. N). In Berry [1] this is taken to show the completeness of Peirce's basis; but this proof will not do as it stands. For Peirce's proof of 7 consists in first passing from 1 to CqCpp by the argument that ‘to say that (x ⥽ x) is generally true is to say that it is so in every state of things, say in that in which y is true’; and then from CqCpp to 7 by 2. This procedure clearly involves, formally, the use not only of substitution and detachment but of a rule to infer ⊦ Cqα. from ⊦α. Peirce's basis is sufficient with substitution and detachment nevertheless; for by a less well-known result of Wajsberg's II. 93, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are sufficient in this sense, and Peirce does prove 6 by substitution and detachment from 1 and 2.
Reductions of Hilbert's tenth problem
Authors: Davis Martin , Putnam Hilary
Published: May 2006

Hilbert's tenth problem is to find an algorithm for determining whether or not a diophantine equation possesses solutions. A diophantine predicate (of positive integers) is defined to be one of the form

where P is a polynomial with integral coefficients (positive, negative, or zero). Previous work has considered the variables as ranging over nonnegative integers; but we shall find it more useful here to restrict the range to positive integers, no essential change being thereby introduced. It is clear that the recursive unsolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem would follow if one could show that some non-recursive predicate were diophantine. In particular, it would suffice to show that every recursively enumerable predicate is diophantine. Actually, it would suffice to prove far less.
On the definition of an infinitely-many-valued predicate calculus
Authors: Rutledge Joseph D.
Published: May 2006

This paper presents a class of plausible definitions for validity of formulas in the infinitely-many-valued extension of the Łukasiewicz predicate calculus, and shows that all of them are equivalent. This extended system is discussed in some form in [3] and [4]; the questions discussed here are raised rather briefly in the latter.

We first describe the formal framework for the validity definition. The symbols to be used are the following: the connectives + and ‐, which are the strong disjunction B of [2] and negation respectively; the predicate variables Pi for i ∈ I, where I may be taken as the integers; the existential quantifiers E(J), where J⊆I, and I may be thought of as the index set on the individual variables, which however do not appear explicitly in this formulation.
Subbarrel patterns of thalamocortical innervation in rat somatosensory cortical barrels: Organization and postnatal development
Authors: Louderback Katherine M. , Glass Christina S. , Shamalla‐Hannah Lorraine , Erickson Susan L. , Land Peter W.
Published: May 2006

Barrel hollows in the posteromedial barrel subfield of adult rat somatosensory cortex typically encompass two or three metabolically and structurally distinct regions, termed subbarrels. We used immunohistochemical staining for vesicular glutamate transporter 2 and the neuronal serotonin transporter, in conjunction with cytochrome oxidase (CO) histochemistry, to investigate the distribution of thalamocortical (TC) axon terminals in relation to subbarrel domains. We found, first, that CO‐dark subbarrels are more intensely immunoreactive for thalamocortical terminals than the CO‐light clefts that separate them. Second, during the first postnatal week, immunoreactivity for markers of TC terminals is relatively homogeneous throughout the barrel hollow; subbarrel patterns of distribution only become recognizable between P‐8 and P‐10. These observations extend previous findings that subbarrels denote barrel regions enriched in synaptic contacts. The data also indicate that allocation of TC terminals into subbarrel domains does not occur immediately upon thalamic axon ingrowth. Instead, refinement of TC arbors into subbarrels is a gradual process, the outcome of which is not manifest until the second week of postnatal life. J. Comp. Neurol. 497:32–41, 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
Local and global dynamics of shallow gas-fluidized beds
Authors: Sierra C. , Tadrist L. , Occelli R.
Published: May 2006

Shallow fluidized beds (SFB) are studied in this paper as a paradigm for deep fluidized beds. We take advantage of their much simpler behavior to analyze their dynamics with a one-dimensional Eulerian-Lagrangian model. After a validation with available experiments, we examine how particle-scale collisional and hydrodynamic phenomena combine to produce the overall dynamics of SFB. Characteristic times governing the particle's motion are evidenced and the coupling with the fluid is also examined. As a perspective to this work we finally discuss the implications of the SFB dynamics for deep beds. We show that despite the severe simplifications, the model is able to reproduce the temporal dynamics of deep beds and that the internal structuring of SFB is similar in nature to bubbling beds.
Constitution of the Far Eastern Republic
Authors: Quigley Harold S.
Published: May 2006

The constitution of the Far Eastern Republic, promulgated April 17, 1921, contains ten articles, divided into 184 clauses. There is no preamble. Article I, among other general provisions, sets forth that “The Far Eastern Republic is established as a democratic republic.” Article II names the component parts and the boundary lines of the state and undertakes to maintain the rights and obligations formerly Russian within that territory. The subject of Article III is “Citizens and their Rights.” Included in the latter are equality before the law; freedom of conscience and speech; habeas corpus; inviolability of person, house, and correspondence; and non-liability to arrest without warrant unless taken in the act.
The Supreme Court and the Constitution
Authors: Monroe Alan H.
Published: May 2006

Ever since the famous case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the United States Supreme Court has exercised the power of declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional and of refusing to enforce them as law. From the beginning, the exercise of this power has been the subject of great controversies as to both theory and practice. It has been assailed as subverting the true nature of our government. It has been stigmatized as the foundation of a judicial obligarchy. It has been attacked as a means for the nullification of the popular will as expressed in Congress. It will be the purpose of this paper, therefore, to inquire into the use of this power in relation to acts of Congress with especial regard to (1) the criticisms that have been made at various times throughout American history, and (2) the proposals that have been made to modify the exercise of this power.
Constitutional Law in 1919–1920. I: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1919
Authors: Corwin Edward S.
Published: May 2006

The work of the Supreme Court during the term concluded last June was quite unusual both in the nature of the problems involved and the importance of certain of the results achieved. The center of interest in constitutional interpretation has swung, for the time being at least, decidedly from questions of state power to those of national power. This is partly the aftermath of the war, partly the corollary of recent amendments to the Constitution. By the same sign, the court has been confronted in recent months with not a few problems of considerable novelty—some indeed being questions of first impression—with the result that it has been called upon to enunciate principles which must guide its interpretation of important provisions of the Constitution for years to come. In preparing this review, the unique quality of the court's work during the period under consideration ought to determine the procedure. Accordingly the greater part of the space is devoted to a few outstanding cases, all of which involve questions of national power, while less striking results have received much briefer consideration, often only cursory mention.
England's New Ministry of Health
Authors: Carpenter William S.
Published: May 2006

Of great importance in the reconstruction program of the United Kingdom is the new ministry of health authorized by act of Parliament on June 3. At first sight it would seem that the local government board has merely changed its name. But this is not the whole truth. The new ministry is to become the one authority in all matters of health, taking over such duties from the home office with reference to factories and workshops, and from the education department, in regard to children at school. It will also assume, in England, the responsibilities of the national insurance commissioners under the legislation of 1911.
Annulment of Legislation by the Supreme Court
Authors: Davis Horace A.
Published: May 2006

The growing strength of the various political movements for limiting judicial authority over constitutional questions has aroused a new interest in the origin of the courts' power. Wherever the source be found, or however the practice may have developed, the authority now exercised by the United States supreme court does not determine the proper function of state courts in local cases, which is now the chief issue; but its study throws some light on the attitude that each of the three departments of government—legislative, executive and judicial—ought to assume toward the subject of constitutional law, and is of particular interest to the many citizens whose opinion of the new proposals will be more or less favorable as they appear to bring us back nearer to original ideals or to carry us farther away. The historical study is interesting also in showing that our forefathers in their discussions by no means adopted the viewpoint of most of the modern writers—of assuming that whenever a law is declared unconstitutional, the court is always right, and is performing a public service in so deciding.
Physics and Politics—an Old Analogy Revised
Authors: Munro William Bennett
Published: May 2006

It is just fifty-five years since Walter Bagehot wrote his Physics and Politics, a very suggestive book in its day. He began the first chapter of this book with a reference to “the sudden acquisition of much physical knowledge” which had marked the second half of the nineteenth century, and declared it his purpose to show the bearing of these new ideks upon the political conceptions of mankind. That purpose he, fulfilled with much ingenuity, pointing out the various lines along which the advance in natural science seemed to suggest modifications in the old theories of the state and of government.

This was only a half-century ago; yet the new physics of Bagehot's day has already growh old. Its basic concepts have been turned inside out and upside down. Its laws relating to the indestructibility of mass and the conservation of energy have been radically amended. Even a generation ago the atom was held to be the ultimate and indivisible unit in the composition of the universe. It was the basis upon which the scientists of the nineteenth century built up an inclusive set of laws and principles relating to the structure of all creation. No one had ever seen an atom, but its existence could be postulated and its properties were held to be knowable.
Latin America and the League of Nations
Authors: Martin Percy Alvin
Published: May 2006

To students of international relations it has become almost a commonplace that among the most significant and permanent results of the World War has been the changed international status of the republics of Latin America. As a result of the war and post-war developments in these states, the traditional New World isolation in South America, as well as in North America, is a thing of the past. To our leading sister republics is no longer applicable the half-contemptuous phrase, current in the far-off days before 1914, that Latin America stands on the margin of international life. The new place in the comity of nations won by a number of these states is evidenced—to take one of the most obvious examples—by the raising of the legations of certain non-American powers to the rank of embassies, either during or immediately after the war. In the case of Brazil, for instance, where prior to 1914 only the United States maintained an ambassador, at the present time Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, and Japan maintain diplomatic representatives of this rank.

Yet all things considered one of the most fruitful developments in the domain of international relations has been the share taken by our southern neighbors in the work of the League of Nations. All of the Latin American republics which severed relations with Germany or declared war against that country were entitled to participate in the Peace Conference. As a consequence, eleven of these states affixed their signatures to the Treaty of Versailles, an action subsequently ratified in all cases except Ecuador.
Constitutional Law in 1924–1925: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1924
Authors: Cushman Robert E.
Published: May 2006

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.

In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.
The Delimitation and Mensurability of Political Phenomena
Authors: Catlin George E. G.
Published: May 2006

Political science is not a sociological science of everything, a psychological study of all human behavior in all aspects, an anthropological inquiry into miscellaneous human customs, or a philosophy of history. Still less is it a study only of the state, which is a form of social organization resulting from one species of political action, or a study only of governments and the stage properties of law and administration.

Politics is concerned with a field of human behavior characterized by the recurrence of specific behavior patterns. These peculiarly political patterns, however, must not be treated simply as a series of incidents in mere temporal juxtaposition. Human history must be studied as natural history and physical phenomena have been studied, that is to say, with a view to the detection of a recurrence in these patterns, and, hence, of a process in accordance with which, in given total situations, given detailed behavior patterns recur. These patterns are “lines of conduct” of an individual or group character, pursued in relation to other individuals or groups, as a matter of human method in dealing with such situations, which situations arise partly from the nature of the non-human environment, partly from the historical combination of human factors. The resultant specific action or behavior recurs with the recurrence of the stimuli of the approximately recurrent situation; for example, a certain general situation known as “the outbreak of hostilities” has certain specific consequences in changes of individual conduct toward members of a given nation, and the need of putting through a domestic policy against opposition brings into play the ever similar methods of party organization.
Social Order and Political Authority
Authors: Dickinson John
Published: May 2006

No present political tendency is more marked than the extension of law to cover ever wider fields of conduct. Political scientists and constitutional lawyers have come to recognize that this tendency can be properly assessed only by examining how law operates in contrast and connection with other agencies of order such as custom, ethics, religion, and economic forces. When one wishes to understand the failure of such laws as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or the Volstead Act to accomplish the results expected of them, or when one wishes to form a judgment of the effects to be anticipated from the operation of a minimumwage law or from the codification of international law, it is important to understand the relation to the other forces which are giving direction to human conduct. There are regularities and patterns of adjustment in human behavior due to other causes than law administered by government; and these regularities not only work at times toward the same, or some of the same, ends which it is sought to attain by law, but at times they form a highly resistant part of the material against which law must work. An effort will be made in this paper to present the problem of law and government as part and parcel of the whole wider problem of social order, beginning with an attempt to understand the nature and operation of what may be called the “non-political” agencies of order. The task is facilitated by the contributions which anthropology has made to our knowledge of primitive peoples, and by the light which psychology has shed on the springs of conduct. We no longer have to rely like Hobbes and Rousseau on a naive theory of human nature or upon a fancy-picture of savage life. The outstanding result of the newer contributions has been to emphasize the central significance of the principle of relativity in the social no less than the physical sciences.
State Constitutional Law in 1928–1929
Authors: Field Oliver P.
Published: May 2006

No new constitution was adopted in any state in 1928–29, and relatively few legal problems concerning the amending process were decided during the year. The South Carolina court upheld an amendment proposed by the legislature and ratified by the voters notwithstanding attacks based on the inclusion of several subjects in the resolution proposing the amendment, the failure of the officers charged with the preparation of the ballots to print the amendment in full, and the absence of the title of the amendment from the journals of the legislature, the title being entered on the journals only as part of the resolution proposing the amendment. Such a provision as that contained in Article in, Section 17, of the constitution of South Carolina providing that “every act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,” might well be held not to apply to resolutions proposing amendments to the constitution, but to be restricted in application to ordinary acts of legislation, thus distinguishing acts of legislation from constituent acts. The court did not consider this distinction, but settled the case on its merits, deciding that the resolution did not contain separate subjects, that the ballots need not contain the entire text of the amendment, and that it was sufficient if the resolution proposing the amendment containing the title was printed in the journals of the two houses.
The Mentors of Mussolini
Authors: Stewart William Kilborne
Published: May 2006

Attentive observers of conditions in Italy are well aware that Fascism is an exceedingly complicated phenomenon; that what seems to be simply a dictatorship of the upper classes in reality presents many surprising and apparently contradictory features. Fascism, indeed, has been likened to a great river into which numerous tributaries have poured their waters. Among these tributaries are such movements as Nationalism, Futurism, and Syndicalism. Besides, Fascism is more than a practical experiment in government. It has developed a theory and a philosophy, and, one may even add, an art, a mysticism, and a religion. “Fascism,” declares Mussolini, “has a doctrine, or, if you will, a philosophy with regard to all the questions which beset the human mind today.” And again he remarks, “We play upon every chord of the lyre, from violence to religion, from art to politics.”

The stages in the outward history of Fascism need only be mentioned. The movement had humble and, its enemies say, even sordid beginnings. The first Fascio di Combattimento was formed in March, 1919, by Mussolini and other derelicts of the war. This organization, swollen by all sorts of unexpected accretions, was transformed into the National Fascist party in November, 1921. In October, 1922, occurred the sensational march on Rome, which placed the party exultantly, but none too securely, in the seat of power. The murder of Matteotti in May, 1924, precipitated a dangerous crisis in which Fascism appeared to be momentarily on the defensive, but from which it triumphantly emerged as complete master of the situation. Since then it has effectually quelled all opposition and has proceeded to the realization of its constructive program, of which the great Labor Charter of April, 1927, is thus far the most impressive item.