bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Distinct Axonemal Processes Underlie Spontaneous and Stimulated Airway Ciliary Activity
Authors: Ma Weiyuan , Silberberg Shai D. , Priel Zvi
Published: November 2002

Cilia are small organelles protruding from the cell surface that beat synchronously, producing biological transport. Despite intense research for over a century, the mechanisms underlying ciliary beating are still not well understood. Even the nature of the cytosolic molecules required for spontaneous and stimulated beating is debatable. In an effort to resolve fundamental questions related to cilia beating, we developed a method that integrates the whole-cell mode of the patch-clamp technique with ciliary beat frequency measurements on a single cell. This method enables to control the composition of the intracellular solution while the cilia remain intact, thus providing a unique tool to simultaneously investigate the biochemical and physiological mechanism of ciliary beating. Thus far, we investigated whether the spontaneous and stimulated states of cilia beating are controlled by the same intracellular molecular mechanisms. It was found that: (a) MgATP was sufficient to support spontaneous beating. (b) Ca2+ alone or Ca2+-calmodulin at concentrations as high as 1 μM could not alter ciliary beating. (c) In the absence of Ca2+, cyclic nucleotides produced a moderate rise in ciliary beating while in the presence of Ca2+ robust enhancement was observed. These results suggest that the axonemal machinery can function in at least two different modes.
The Cation Selectivity Filter of the Bacterial Sodium Channel, NaChBac
Authors: Yue Lixia , Navarro Betsy , Ren Dejian , Ramos Arnolt , Clapham David E.
Published: November 2002

The Bacillus halodurans voltage-gated sodium-selective channel (NaChBac) (Ren, D., B. Navarro, H. Xu, L. Yue, Q. Shi, and D.E. Clapham. 2001b. Science. 294:2372–2375), is an ideal candidate for high resolution structural studies because it can be expressed in mammalian cells and its functional properties studied in detail. It has the added advantage of being a single six transmembrane (6TM) orthologue of a single repeat of mammalian voltage-gated Ca2+ (CaV) and Na+ (NaV) channels. Here we report that six amino acids in the pore domain (LESWAS) participate in the selectivity filter. Replacing the amino acid residues adjacent to glutamatic acid (E) by a negatively charged aspartate (D; LEDWAS) converted the Na+-selective NaChBac to a Ca2+- and Na+-permeant channel. When additional aspartates were incorporated (LDDWAD), the mutant channel resulted in a highly expressing voltage-gated Ca2+-selective conductance.
Rod Sensitivity DuringXenopusDevelopment
Authors: Xiong Wei-Hong , Yau King-Wai
Published: November 2002

We have measured the sensitivity of rod photoreceptors from overnight-dark–adapted Xenopus laevis through developmental stages 46–66 into adulthood by using suction-pipette recording. The dark current increased gradually from ∼5 pA at stage 46 to ∼20 pA at stage 57, compared with an adult (metamorphosed) current of ∼35 pA. This increase in dark current largely paralleled the progressive increase in length and diameter of the rod outer segment (ROS). Throughout stages 46–66, the dark current increased approximately linearly with ROS surface area. At stage 53, there was a steep (∼10-fold) increase in the rod flash sensitivity, accompanied by a steep increase in the time-to-peak of the half-saturated flash response. This covariance of sensitivity and time-to-peak suggested a change in the state of adaptation of rods at stage 53 and thereafter. When the isolated retina was preincubated with 11-cis-retinal, the flash sensitivity and the response time-to-peak of rods before stage 53 became similar to those at or after stage 53, suggesting that the presence of free opsin (i.e., visual pigment without chromophore) in rods before stage 53 was responsible for the adapted state (low sensitivity and short time-to-peak). By comparing the response sensitivity before stage 53 to the sensitivity at/after stage 53 measured from rods that had been subjected to various known bleaches, we estimated that 22–28% of rod opsin in stage 50–52 tadpoles (i.e., before stage 53) was devoid of chromophore despite overnight dark-adaptation. When continuously dark adapted for 7 d or longer, however, even tadpoles before stage 53 yielded rods with similar flash sensitivity and response time-to-peak as those of later-stage animals. In conclusion, it appears that chromophore regeneration is very slow in tadpoles before stage 53, but this regeneration becomes much more efficient at stage 53. A similar delay in the maturity of chromophore regeneration may partially underlie the low sensitivity of rods observed in newborn mammals, including human infants.
The Human Heart and Rat Brain IIA Na+ Channels Interact with Different Molecular Regions of the β1 Subunit
Authors: Zimmer Thomas , Benndorf Klaus
Published: November 2002

The α subunit of voltage-gated Na+ channels of brain, skeletal muscle, and cardiomyocytes is functionally modulated by the accessory β1, but not the β2 subunit. In the present study, we used β1/β2 chimeras to identify molecular regions within the β1 subunit that are responsible for both the increase of the current density and the acceleration of recovery from inactivation of the human heart Na+ channel (hH1). The channels were expressed in Xenopus oocytes. As a control, we coexpressed the β1/β2 chimeras with rat brain IIA channels. In agreement with previous studies, the β1 extracellular domain sufficed to modulate IIA channel function. In contrast to this, the extracellular domain of the β1 subunit alone was ineffective to modulate hH1. Instead, the putative membrane anchor plus either the intracellular or the extracellular domain of the β1 subunit was required. An exchange of the β1 membrane anchor by the corresponding β2 subunit region almost completely abolished the effects of the β1 subunit on hH1, suggesting that the β1 membrane anchor plays a crucial role for the modulation of the cardiac Na+ channel isoform. It is concluded that the β1 subunit modulates the cardiac and the neuronal channel isoforms by different molecular interactions: hH1 channels via the membrane anchor plus additional intracellular or extracellular regions, and IIA channels via the extracellular region only.
What is Philosophy of Science?
Authors: W. M. M.
Published: November 2002

Philosophy of science is the organized expression of a growing intent among philosophers and scientists to clarify, perhaps unify, the programs, methods and results of the disciplines of philosophy and of science. The examination of fundamental concepts and presuppositions in the light of the positive results of science, systematic doubt of the positive results, and a thorough-going analysis and critique of logic and of language, are typical projects for this joint effort. It is not necessary to be committed to a belief that science and philosophy are or should be one, or else that “never the twain shall meet.” If anything, there is to be expected a wholesome regard for the value of established science in furnishing a foil for philosophy and a check on its old extravagances. This does not mean that even the best-established science may not be subject to most devastating criticism by analysis of its foundations. In fact, despairing of the philosophy of the schools, science has done it largely for itself. The theories of gravitation, atomicity, electro-magnetism, evolution, relativity and quanta have all arisen through drastic revisions of complacent fundamental “truths.”
On the Character of Philosophic Problems
Authors: Carnap Rudolf
Published: November 2002

Philosophers have ever declared that their problems lie at a different level from the problems of the empirical sciences. Perhaps one may agree with this assertion; the question is, however, where should one seek this level. The metaphysicians wish to seek their object behind the objects of empirical science; they wish to enquire after the essence, the ultimate cause of things. But the logical analysis of the pretended propositions of metaphysics has shown that they are not propositions at all, but empty word arrays, which on account of notional and emotional connections arouse the false appearance of being propositions. This conception that the “propositions” of metaphysics, including those of ethics, have no theoretical content, is to be sure still disputed. We shall not, however, enter here on its demonstration, but, under its guidance, will limit ourselves to non-metaphysical and non-ethical (non-evaluating) philosophical problems.
The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction
Authors: Feigl Herbert
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to make clear (1) that the widely recognized formulations of the principle of induction do not express the most fundamental rule of induction; (2) that the current view concerning the probability of induction must be revised in terms of a frequency theory of probability; (3) that on this basis the problem of induction in its traditional form is a pseudo-problem; and (4) that the principle of induction must be interpreted as a pragmatic or operational maxim.
Finite or Infinite?
Authors: Bell E. T.
Published: November 2002

When I undertook to write an article for mathematical laymen on the mathematical infinite. I did not realize the depths of my own layness, I do now. Having refreshed my memory of the classics of infinity by re-reading among other things the famous papers of Cantor and Zermelo, and having struggled like a boa constrictor to swallow the latest papal bull on the human significance of the infinite, I am completely reduced to what Professor E. W. Hobson aptly and somewhat indignantly calls Mathematical Nihilism.
On the Foundations of the Theory of Probabilities
Authors: Struik D. J.
Published: November 2002

The foundation of the mathematical theory of probabilities is still a controversial subject. There are schools of insufficient reasoning and of cogent reasoning, of a priori determination and of frequency determination, of subjective and of objective probability. Two main difficulties exist. The first is the definition of equally like events. The second difficulty is the relation between the laws of causal natural science (mechanics, electrodynamics, etc.) and the laws of statistical regularity. Is it really necessary to add to the laws of mechanics one or more independent “laws of large numbers” to explain the regularities in dice throwing? In all these cases different answers exist, and the existence of a mathematical theory of probabilities remains a kind of miracle, as esoteric to the further domain of natural science as the resurrection of the dead.
An Examination of the Quantum Theories. I
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

Reference to quantum theory has become quite the fashion, and to base an expectation on an already receding episode with relativity theory, a great philosophical assault of interpretation of quanta is brewing in many quarters. The author of this series of studies would be content if by a plain statement of “what is the case” at this stage he could stem the more quixotic efforts, or rather reveal their unreal character to the spectators who may be enmeshed in the spell cast over such adventures. It is constantly necessary to restate the physicists' claims plainly in their positive content—as Einstein himself did once for relativity theory—so that one may know what is no-man's land and what is everyman's land in the new territory. This in itself is largely but a hope since there is no unanimity as to all the facts, and, worse, unanimity is no guarantee of stability. Nevertheless, the painstaking revision that is constantly going on on the experimental front enables us to arrange at least the data on a well-ordered scale of reliability. It then becomes much easier to detect false props to otherwise attractive theories, to discriminate live matter from the débris of progress, and to speculate on future growth. For such reasons the present examination of the various quantum theories will proceed from a presentation of facts and theories to their appraisal and then to a proposal concerning the organization of the facts, concepts and theories. The subject is very complex: There are several quantum theories, some of which are already referred to as “classical” although these themselves were anti-classical (anti-Newtonian); all have claimed success in their time; all have serious hiatuses, including the present. The author has chosen to hark back to some of the older issues before appraising the latest claims.
Quantum Mechanics as a Basis for Philosophy
Authors: Haldane J. B. S.
Published: November 2002

Biologists have as yet taken but little cognizance of the revolution in human thought which has been inaugurated by physicists in the last five years, and philosophers have stressed its negative rather than its positive side.
Indeterminism and Natural Selection
Authors: Fisher R. A.
Published: November 2002

The historical origin and the experimental basis of the concept of physical determinism indicate that this basis was removed with the acceptance of the kinetic theory of matter, while its difficulties are increased by the admission that human nature, in its entirety, is a product of natural causation. An indeterministic view of causation has the advantages (a) of unifying the concept of natural law in different spheres of human experience and (b) of a greater generality, which precludes the acceptance of the special case of completely deterministic causation, so long as this is an unproved assumption. It is not inconsistent with the orderliness of the world, or with the fruitful pursuit of natural knowledge. It enriches rather than weakens the concept of of causation. It possesses definite advantages with respect to the one-sidedness of human memory, and to the phenomena of aiming and striving observable in man and other animals. Among biological theories it appears to be most completely in harmony with the theory of natural selection, which in its statistical nature resembles the second law of thermo-dynamics.

In an indeterministic world natural causation has a creative element, and science is interested in locating the original causes of effects of special interest, and not merely in pushing a chain of causation backwards ad infinitum. These contrasting tendencies are illustrated by a critique of the mutation theory, and by an attempt more closely to define the sense in which indeterministic causation should be thought of as creative.
A New Budget of Paradoxes
Authors: W.M.M.
Published: November 2002

“A New Budget of Paradoxes” will be a section of our Journal devoted to the pathological. It is not mere amusement. The old “Budget of Paradoxes,” edited by Augustus De Morgan is our model both for choice of material and for humaneness toward the Don Quixotes of Thought.
Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

The disagreement with regard to the validity of the principle of causality, existing to-day among scientists, has its roots in the diversity of definitions of the principle itself rather than in a problematic scientific situation. As far as the formulation of quantum theory is complete its bearing upon philosophical questions can be fixed with precision provided the questions are phrased intelligibly. But a question is intelligible from a scientific point of view only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the meaning of its terms must be fixed; (2) it must be in accord with the conventions of the science to which the question is put.
Concerning the Validity of Aristotelian Logic
Authors: Kattsoff L.
Published: November 2002

The controversy which has raged between those who accept Aristotelian Logic and those who reject it, seems to continue. It is, I believe, advisable to consider the arguments on both sides. Modern Logicians for the most part insist that Aristotelian Logic breaks down, i.e. it is not true for all meanings of the terms. On the other hand there are those who insist on the validity of Aristotelian Logic claiming that those values for which it fails are not permissible values. But there is one who stands almost entirely alone in his position—namely Professor H. B. Smith—who maintains that Aristotelian Logic breaks down because and only because its interpretation into Boolean terms has been accomplished by means of a definition that is not forced upon us and which, since it gives up desirable principles, is to be rejected.
On the Method of Theoretical Physics
Authors: Einstein Albert
Published: November 2002

If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don't listen to his words, examine his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the constructions of his imagination appear so necessary and so natural that he is apt to treat them not as the creations of his thoughts but as given realities.
An Examination of the Quantum Theories. II
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

The striking synthetic effort made by Bohr to unite radiation facts with atomic structure facts led to the formulation of his “quantum theory of atomic structure,” which with a large group of subsequent developments, is now usually referred to as the “classical quantum theory.” As a conceptual aid it takes over the idea of an “astronomical atom” consisting of a positive nucleus around which electrons revolve in definite orbits, more or less in the fashion of the solar system. More or less. The similarities and differences as a bit of description are interesting and impressive, but when the theory is reduced to its postulates—and it is this which interests us here—it sounds very much like a re-statement (for a purpose) of the Planckian decisions.
Time, Space and Gestalt
Authors: Reiser Oliver L.
Published: November 2002

Time, space and matter are the most pervasive and inescapable aspects of the physical universe. And yet, notwithstanding the fact that they represent the most fundamental and ubiquitous characteristics of reality, they have always presented elements of mystery to the human mind. Thus on the level of common thought we ponder how the withering hand of time reaches from out the past into the future to bring decay and destruction to all things; and on the more sophisticated level, after the fashion of Immanuel Kant, we are puzzled by certain antinomies of thought concerning the necessity for an origin, and an end, of the universe in time and space, in the face of the equally necessary reasons for regarding the universe as being unlimited in its space and time dimensions. In either case, however, we are paying tribute to the tantalizing nature of these problems concerning the cosmic framework of space-time-matter in which we live, and move, and have our being. Indeed, it is not too much to say that genuine philosophy took its origin in Zeno's paradoxes of motion, and will have its final consummation when it solves Kant's antinomies.
The Mystery of Scientific Discovery
Authors: Benjamin A. Cornelius
Published: November 2002

The extent to which the scientific method has yielded to analysis in recent years serves only to emphasize by contrast the presence within that method of an irrational element. For it is becoming increasingly evident that whatever one may say of the logical and psychological character of the pre-inductive operations, of the formal processes involved in deducing the consequences of a given theory, of the technique of experimental corroboration, and of certain other aspects of the scientific method, there is one phase of the movement which remains a surd. This is the act of the creative imagination through which hypotheses and theories are called into being. Its mysterious character is exhibited in the terminology which is employed in describing it, in the variety and inconstancy of the conditions which give rise to it, in the apparent impossibility of controlling it, and in the impossibility of recognizing completely the adequacy of its results when it does occur. It is variously described as an act of intuition, mystic revelation, divine insight, a flash of understanding; it arises out of the greatest variety of conditions: acute and prolonged attention to the data in the confinement of the laboratory, or the complete relaxation of a walk in the country, or the intense mental effort upon a problem in a wholly unrelated field; it forbids direction, in fact it seems to arise most readily when the element of effort and control is conspicuously absent; it cannot even be certainly identified, for many supposed acts of discovery prove later to have produced only groundless fancies and absurd creations of the unguided imagination.
The Method of Physical Coincidences and the Scale Coordinate
Authors: Bender WM.
Published: November 2002

The history of Physical Science appears to exhibit, periodically, a race between the acmulation of data and the ability of its codification (usually, a mathematical theory) to find a natural place (in the codifying scheme) for much of the empirical findings. If the codifying scheme is a mathematical theory, capable of interpolation and extrapolation, according to the rules of the particular branch of mathematics employed, the ablest handlers of the theory are frequently confronted with a situation in which mathematical computation alone does not suffice. In such a situation the introduction of symbols, whose interpretation is not direct and simple (from the point of view of the methodology whereby the data were procured) is resorted to. This symbol is usually involved in a mathematical relation by a species of reasoning, which may be somewhat unfamiliar and remote from customary habits of thought. It is generally accepted as physically valid, if the mathematical formulation which involves it can produce results which account for the mass of data uncovered by experimenters. As an example of such a procedure we may mention the case of the Schrödinger Ψ-symbol, a symbol which was involved in Schrödinger's famous matter wave equation. The successes which such a theory enjoyed, particularly, in its initial stages, in formally relating the relative positions and intensities of spectral lines, with the atomistic concepts of gross matter which were inferred from the data of macroscopic measurement, such as the atomic mass, the electronic charge, Planck quantum of action, etc.,—these successes, gave a certain physical dignity to the Ψ-function itself. This dignity was further enhanced by the disclosure, by Schrödinger, of four functions of the Ψ-symbol (and its complex conjugate) which held the same place in the “continuity equation” as the classical charge density and the three components of current density. The successes accompanying this discovery for spectroscopic problems, in particular, are well known to Physicists.
The Views of Haeckel in the Light of Genetics
Authors: Muller H. J.
Published: November 2002

The extent to which Ernst Haeckel was hated and attacked by reactionary scientists, philosophers, litterateurs and preachers, is, as Lenin has pointed out in his “Materialism and Empirocriticism,” a measure of the success with which he originally expounded the results of natural science and drove them home to their logical conclusions in the interpretation of nature on a materialistic basis. Haeckel, in the days of his greatest mental vigor, made himself the spearhead of the scientific attack upon the then dominant forces of theology and obscurantism, showing fearlessly how revolutionary were the results of modern science, and particularly those concerned with evolution, in altering fundamentally man's outlook upon the world in which he lived and his own nature. It has become the mode among many intellectual circles in Western countries to refer slurringly both to the more technical scientific work and to the more general reasoning of Haeckel, as being crude and out of date; but this derogation has its origin in the despair of the teleologists and is not founded in the facts of modern scientific development. Certainly, so far as genetics is concerned, the most modern results are not merely in harmony with, but brilliantly confirmatory of, those main tenets of Haeckel's general interpretation of nature which involved him in the bitterest controversy. In addition they help to show the general soundness of his more technical zoological contributions. By contrast, Haeckel's deficiencies in the realm of social affairs stand out the more strongly, although his own materialism of natural science is a necessary basis for an adequate social materialism. We will not concern ourselves here, however, with Haeckel's own social theories, but only with those in the field of natural science; it was only in the latter field that he attained his real prominence.
Freud and the Scientific Method
Authors: Brown J. F.
Published: November 2002

All of Freud's more recent writings extol the virtues of the scientific method. “The Future of an Illusion” ends with the definite suggestion that religious instruction be taken from the list of topics taught every child and that in its place children be taught to interpret reality in terms of natural science. A similar theme runs through “Civilization and its Discontents”; if there be any hope for humanity, it lies in the scientific method. Finally, Freud's “New Introductory Lectures” ends with the following lines—lines which must be very reassuring to many admirers of Freud (and the present writer counts himself one of these) who have been somewhat discomfited by some of the recent highly speculative passages from his pen:
Scientific Method and Social Science
Authors: Mayer Joseph
Published: November 2002

If there is an essential difference as suggested in a preceding article, between the natural sciences on the one hand and the social studies on the other, in the sense that man has the power to change, and has repeatedly changed, existing social organizations, whereas he has no such power over natural phenomena, the meaning of social science must in this respect at least differ substantially from that of natural science. Elsewhere the present writer has designated society an “artificial creation,” much as the automobile or a steel mill is, i.e. made by the artifice of man. The artificial automobile or steel mill is of course fabricated in the light of the natural laws of physical science. Its construction would be impossible without a knowledge of these laws. There are also certain natural laws and tendencies in human nature and animal behavior which must serve as a foundation for any scientifically fabricated society, i.e. constructed on the basis of observation and verification of these tendencies on the one hand and a rigorous use of theory and analysis on the other. In short, despite any essential difference, as suggested, between natural and social science, the scientific method is apparently just as applicable in the one field as in the other. There is still much confusion on this score. But before pursuing further the significance of the distinction, artificial versus natural, it will be well to have before us more of what opposing schools of methodological thought in the social studies have to offer.
Abstract Logic or the Science of Modality
Authors: Smith Henry Bradford
Published: November 2002

The logician recognizes the following propositional forms as necessary and sufficient for the expression of any truth:
An Examination of the Quantum Theories III
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

The Bohr formulation—the original one—is now largely a matter of history. The usual career of a theory was its fate. It explained much, but it failed at the first signs of complication, even for the simplest molecules as hydrogen and helium. Some results were either only approximate in a loose or incomplete fashion, e.g. in the application of the correspondence principle to intensities, the only reliable predictions being only for an absence of certain lines, or they quite disagreed with experiment, e.g. in the case of the hydrogen molecule and the hydrogen molecule ion, the normal and excited states of helium, the anomalous Zeeman effect, the Ramsauer effect (the phenomenon of the deflection of electrons at low speeds being less than at higher speeds in atomic collisions), and in the treatment of problems where more than one electron was involved. In the last mentioned cases the perturbation method, so successful in solving “many-body” problems in celestial mechanics, failed completely because systems of several electrons, possessing frequencies of the order of light waves, cannot interact classically. A bit of much forced pragmatism was practiced in treating the many electron atom as a variation of the hydrogen atom. Besides, there were technical oddities, like ½ quantum numbers, and impenetrated anologies between visible and X-ray spectra.
Physico-Mathematical Aspects of the Gestalt-Problem
Authors: Rashevsky N.
Published: November 2002

Following the general program, outlined in a previous paper on the Foundations of Mathematical Biophysics, we shall outline some physico-mathematical aspects of the Gestalt-problem. Faithful to the principles laid down before, we shall not attempt to give a theory of such and such psycho-physiological phenomena connected with our problem, but we shall investigate in a preliminary way the abstract conceptual basis, which must underlie the construction of any concrete theory. To make our aim quite clear and to avoid at the same time unnecessary repetition, we refer the reader to our previous paper. Furthermore we shall give here only an outline of the physico-mathematical aspects; and of necessity we must leave a number of details untouched and unanswered.
Logical Analysis of the Psychophysical Problem
Authors: Feigl Herbert
Published: November 2002

The mind-body problem is—despite appearances—still the inevitable basic issue of unending discussions in recent philosophy. Various types of epistemologies and metaphysics, European and American, have offered their widely divergent “solutions” of the dreaded Cartesian tangle. Is there any hope of reaching a universally acceptable view?
The Parallel Development of Method in Physics and Psychology
Authors: Hartshorne Charles
Published: November 2002

There is a significant and a too little noted analogy between the histories of the physical and the “mental” sciences—especially psychology—an analogy capable of throwing much light upon the present-day problems of the latter. Some aspects of this analogy have become commonplaces, but others have been almost completely overlooked.
A Preamble to an Organismic Theory of Knowledge
Authors: Norris O. O.
Published: November 2002

One of the interesting and encouraging signs of our times is the fact that the several sciences are learning to develop and carry their own philosophy. Here psychology seems to me to be a bit backward. In this paper I am presuming to suggest that the time has come when the psychologist should take over the subject of theory of knowledge, emancipate it from the leading-strings of Mother Philosophy, and make it a phase of his own science and of its organizing and interpretative philosophy. In fact, I am suggesting that thinking and knowing of whatever sort, even psychologizing and philosophizing, being matters of “mental” activity, are properly object matters for the psychologist, when he really knows his stuff; and I am presuming to say that he is now well enough advanced towards this goal so that he should accept this implied challenge and proceed to take possession of this most significant portion of his proper field. This should greatly enlarge the field of psychological experimentation; it should open up new areas, that are even more significant for our science than are animal psychology and the psychology of learning, as we have hitherto envisioned these; and it should result in a development of principles for the better organization of our findings in these fields.
The Nature of Philosophic Analysis
Authors: Blumberg Albert E.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly what is meant by the term “philosophy” as it occurs in such expressions as “philosophy of physics,” “philosophy of mathematics,” “philosophy of science” and the like. The discussion will be divided into three parts: the first will consider several distinct meanings of the term “philosophy;” the second will discuss one of these in some detail, namely, philosophy as analysis; the third will seek to answer an important question concerning the results of philosophic analysis.
Dialectics versus Mechanics
Authors: Emery A.
Published: November 2002

“A millennium has gone by since the idea of the relationship of all things, the chain of causes was born. A comparison of the meaning of what we call causes throughout the history of human thinking could give us, no doubt, a conclusive epistemology.” (Lenin, V. I., Unpublished Notes to Lasalle's Heraclite.)
What Is Topology?
Authors: Franklin Philip
Published: November 2002

Introduction. Topology (sometimes called analysis situs) is the most general and most fundamental branch of geometry. Logically its study should precede that of other kinds of geometry. But mathematical knowledge, whether regarded as part of our cultural heritage or as the possession of an individual, does not come into being like a building, from a completed foundation to a limited superstructure, but rather grows like a tree with ever-deepening roots as well as ever-spreading branches. So, historically, systematic studies in topology lagged behind Euclid's elements some 2000 years and were unknown a century ago. There has, however, been considerable activity in this field by the present generation, and a number of modern treatments are available for the specialist. In spite of its fundamental nature, the subject is difficult, and many of its problems remain unsolved even today. This difficulty makes it pedagogically advisable to avoid questions of topology germane to other branches of mathematics and there is a distinct scarcity of material available even to the mathematician, whose main interest lies outside this field.
Methodology of Modern Physics
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

Methodology might be understood to mean a description of various individual procedures which have led to the successful solution of specific problems. In studying the subject of physics from this point of view, i.e. with special emphasis on method, one would naturally turn his attention to the traditional divisions of experimental and theoretical physics, the former with its measuring devices and the latter with its mathematical technique. In no other sense than this does the term methodology make any direct appeal to the working physicist, and if you would ask him to define his methods he would probably answer with a description of experimental technique or the methods of setting up and solving differential equations. His answer would tell you how he solves his problems, but hardly how he finds them and why he solves them.
The Biophysics of Space and Time
Authors: Rashevsky N.
Published: November 2002

In studying various possible physico-chemical interpretations of biological phenomena we arrived by a systematical development of what we have called “Mathematical Biophysics” at the interpretation of even such complex phenomena, as those involved in learning, Gestalt-discrimination and Gestalt-transposition. Yet, in spite of the apparent progress made along this newly trodden road, a sophisticated mind may feel that we are advancing into a peculiar “cul-de-sac.” Indeed we are discussing possible physico-chemical mechanisms underlying the discrimination, recognition and constancy-properties of various spatial forms. Yet we have not touched at all the much more fundamental question, which logically precedes all the above, namely, what can be the physicochemical interpretation of the general and primordial fact that we perceive those forms as spatial? Can we conceive any physicochemical model at all, which would illustrate how and why we experience everything as being in space?
The System of the Sciences and the Organization of Knowledge
Authors: Bliss Henry Evelyn
Published: November 2002

In the survey and criticism of science and philosophy we are considering systems of knowledge and thought rationally developed from coherent human experience. These rational systems are in a definite sense intellectually organized. Where intellectual and social problems are real and urgent the relevant knowledge and thought should be organized socially and purposively to achieve tentative, if not adequate or definitive solutions.
Is Scientific Verification Possible in Philosophy?
Authors: Ducasse C. J.
Published: November 2002

I. The present state of philosophy contrasted with that of the sciences. Both philosophy and science seek not mere opinion but knowledge. The sciences, however, have by now won a vast body of knowledge, and daily make positive additions to it notwithstanding their theoretical controversies. In philosophy, on the contrary, the same great problems are discussed by generation after generation with rather meager results other than a multiplication of theories and schools of opinion. One is therefore moved to wonder whether philosophy is forever doomed to inconclusiveness, or whether on the contrary knowledge and definite progress are possible in its field in the same sense as in the sciences.
The Nature of the ‘Given’
Authors: Schilpp Paul Arthur
Published: November 2002

It is by no means impossible that the discussion of epistemological problems, at the present stage of our understanding of the issues involved, may be futile. But so long as anyone desires to “know” anything at all, just so long it will be impossible for thoughtful men to leave the questions of epistemology alone. So, futile or not, this paper is concerned with an analysis of one of the most fundamental of epistemological problems, namely that of the ‘given.’ It is true, the ‘given’ has recently received an unusual amount of attention from philosophers. What with two of the American Philosophical Association's presidential addresses last year having much to say on the subject, and what with the logical positivists making the ‘given’ the cap-stone of their radical empiricism? All of which, it will be claimed, proves the contention that any attack upon the problems of epistemology, from the standpoint of our present knowledge and understanding of the total situation involved, is condemned to hopeless futility. Why, then, add one more hopelessly futile attempt to those of all the rest? If, despite such initial misgivings, I shall proceed to my own analysis of the ‘given,’ I shall do so, first of all, in recognition of the indisputable fact that everyone of us, even though we should be blind, deaf and dumb, do, as a matter fact, find ourselves confronted with something ‘given’; and, secondly, because it appears to me that, as philosophers, it is still our task seriously to concern ourselves with unsolved problems, even though they may not yet be capable of being so stated that a unanimously acceptable solution for them may be—at present—possible. Even the logical positivists, who, of course, are most critical of what philosophy is or ought to be, insist that “the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.” Since the ‘given’ is a concept (thought) most widely used not only by so-called ‘pseudo-philosophers’ but even by the logical positivists themselves, it certainly cannot be denied that the clarification of the concept of the ‘given’ is decidedly a philosophical task. More than that: it is a necessary philosophical task just so long as there is such wide difference of opinion concerning the ‘given’ among philosophers.
Postulational Methods. I
Authors: Kattsoff Louis Osgood
Published: November 2002

The keynote of our investigation is suggested by a remark made by Enriques, “the young student of mathematics would indeed look in vain to the classical logic into which he was initiated for an adequate conception of the structure of a deductive science like Geometry let alone for an explanation of the value and meaning of the principles of such a discipline. What are axioms, postulates, definitions? What place do they occupy in the edifice of the theory? What criteria determine their choice and how can we establish whether they are acceptable or not?” These are in general the questions we shall seek to answer in part and then we shall make a special analysis of two of the criteria determining the choice of the axioms.
Methodology of Modern Physics
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

Do masses, electrons, atoms, magnetic field strengths, etc., exist? Nothing is more surprising indeed than the fact that in these days of minute quantitative analysis, of relativistic thought, most of us still expect an answer to this question in terms of yes or no. The physicist frowns upon questions of the sort: is this object green?; or what time is it on a distant star? For he knows that there are many different shades of green, and that the time depends on the state of motion of the star. Almost every term that has come under scientific scrutiny has lost its initially absolute significance and acquired a range of meaning of which even the boundaries are often variable. Apparently the word to be has escaped this process.
Samuel Alexander's Concept of Space-Time
Authors: Ruja Harry
Published: November 2002

Since the seventeenth century, when Descartes divided the universe into two realms, the distinctive character of one of which being its spatiality or extendedness, philosophers have been increasingly concerned with the analysis of the category of Space. Scientists, too, have been interested in the concepts of Space and Time, especially since the promulgation of the theory of relativity.
Structure, Function and Growth
Authors: Frank Lawrence K.
Published: November 2002

Today we are in the midst of a far-reaching shift in scientific thought involving the recasting of many of our long-cherished ideas and preconceptions. To some this appears but the orderly evolution of scientific thought, while to others it portends a revolution in both the ideas and the methods of scientific inquiry.
The Relation of the Attributes of Sensation to the Dimensions of the Stimulus
Authors: Boring Edwin G.
Published: November 2002

It is the traditional view of psychology that the attributes of sensation show a one-to-one correspondence to the dimensions of the stimulus. Some such view is also implicit in the naïve epistemology of the physicist. He often thinks of pitch as if it were the perception of the frequency of a tone, but that view soon runs into difficulties. Within psychology it was Wundt who originally equipped sensation with two attributes, quality and intensity, thus making sensations mirror the more obvious aspects of stimuli which differ as to kind and in degree. Later it became clear to Külpe that extension must be an attribute of visual and tactual sensations because the retina and the skin are areal organs and because extent enters into perception quite as ‘immediately’ as does intensity. A loud sound is not a congeries of faint sounds, nor is a perceived line a row of sensations. In a similar reaction against Wundtian atomism Külpe also added duration (protension) to the list, for a tone that lasts 0.8 sec. yields a different perception from one that lasts 0.6 sec. and yet there is no sense to saying that the first represents a greater number of seried sensations than the second. Thus the four classical attributes of sensation are quality, intensity, extensity and protensity. The conventional view has been that they are respectively correlated with four aspects of the stimulus, and this paper is written with the intention of refuting this view.
The Forgotten Problem: Aims in Science
Authors: Somerville John
Published: November 2002

At the present time there is a tremendous discussion of the scientific method. But there is almost no discussion of the scientific aim. This is a paradoxical state of affairs. Is it possible to discuss method intelligently unless the question of aim is first given thorough and serious consideration? Is not a method, by virtue of the very fact that it is a method, something which is subordinate to an aim and determined by that aim ? Is not a method something which is to be understood, evaluated, attacked and defended only in relation to the particular aim which it serves? Surely to deal with method in any other way is to mishandle the situation. Yet at the present day we witness this tremendous volume of discussion of method, with almost no discussion of aim.
Philosophy of Science and Science of Philosophy
Authors: Morris Charles W.
Published: November 2002

It is proposed to examine the consequences which ensue if philosophy is deliberately oriented around the methods and results of science. That such reorientation has been more or less unconsciously taking place for centuries is evident; the problem demands particular discussion at this time only because the reorientation has gone so far and with such success as to challenge seriously certain past conceptions of philosophy and to demand of philosophers what, if anything, is left for them to do. For present purposes the revolution indicated will be regarded as a fait accompli, and the sole concern will be with what alternatives remain open. The conclusions differ from those of certain others who accept the same fait accompli only in believing that more alternatives do in fact remain open than they envisage.
Metaphysics for Positivists
Authors: Hartshorne Charles
Published: November 2002

What is metaphysics? There is real danger of taking the meaning of this term too much for granted, and of leaning too heavily upon an undefined word in the very act of dismissing metaphysics as word jugglery. Metaphysics is not, as I conceive it, the study of the wholly transcendent or supersensible. It may sometimes have been so conceived, and this is, indeed, one reason why some of its alleged results are so unsatisfactory—or, as positivists would say, meaningless. Such a meaningless “metaphysical” idea is the mediaeval doctrine of God as a power acting upon the world but not reacted upon by it, as purposive but non-temporal, loving but “impassive,” etc. Such is the windowless monad of Leibniz, connected with other monads only by pre-established harmony. Such is the Aristotelian idea of substance as that in which other things inhere but which itself is in nothing (apparently not even in the world or nature). The history of metaphysics is, indeed, strewn with failures to achieve meaning. But does this mean that metaphysics has scored no successes? Surely we must remember that human success is invariably of the fumble-and-correction type. Ideas such as those mentioned may be meaningless as they stand, and yet have potential meaning in that some modification of them might render them significant conceptions. We must also remember that mankind now possesses new instruments of logical analysis, and that these instruments may prove useful in metaphysics—not, as logical positivism holds, with the result of banishing all metaphysical ideas, but of correcting their erroneous aspects.
Stability in Causal Systems
Authors: Birkhoff G. D. , Lewis D. C.
Published: November 2002

The general concept of a causal system has been basic in scientific thought. It may be formulated as follows. The system in question possesses certain measurable attributes such as those of dimensions, temperature, and so forth. In the case of a causal system, it is affirmed that the subsequent development of the system from a known initial condition—that is, a condition in which the measurable variables have known values—is uniquely determined by these values. More definitely, the value of these same variables after any interval of time depends only on the initial values of the variables and the time interval which has elapsed.