bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Molecular Biology and the Unity of Science
Authors: Kincaid Harold
Published: November 2002

Advances in molecular biology have generally been taken to support the claim that biology is reducible to chemistry. I argue against that claim by looking in detail at a number of central results from molecular biology and showing that none of them supports reduction because (1) their basic predicates have multiple realizations, (2) their chemical realization is context-sensitive and (3) their explanations often presuppose biological facts rather than eliminate them. I then consider the heuristic and confirmational implications of irreducibility and argue that purely biochemical approaches are likely to be unsound and to be unable to confirm an important range of statements. I conclude by sketching criteria for scientific unity that do not entail reducibility and yet leave an important place for identifying underlying mechanisms. Molecular biology, properly understood, provides an excellent paradigm of non-reductive unity between different explanatory levels.
Prolegomenon to a Proper Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory
Authors: Teller Paul
Published: November 2002

This paper digests technical commonplaces of quantum field theory to present an informal interpretation of the theory by emphasizing its connections with the harmonic oscillator. The resulting “harmonic oscillator interpretation” enables newcomers to the subject to get some intuitive feel for the theory. The interpretation clarifies how the theory relates to observation and to quantum mechanical problems connected with observation. Finally the interpretation moves some way towards helping us see what the theory comes to physically.

The paper also argues that, in important respects, interpretive problems of quantum field theory are problems we know well from conventional quantum mechanics. An important exception concerns extending the puzzles surrounding the superposition of properties in conventional quantum mechanics to an exactly parallel notion of superposition of particles. Conventional quantum mechanics seems incompatible with a classical notion of property on which all quantities always have definite values. Quantum field theory presents an exactly analogous problem with saying that the number of “particles” is always definite.
Autonomy and Quantum Physics: Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Heisenberg
Authors: Seigfried Hans
Published: November 2002

The literary and poetic turn in philosophy exudes contempt for science and hostility against technology, both allegedly justified on grounds established by Nietzsche and Heidegger. I try to show that these grounds instead call for an extremely positive assessment of science and technology. It turns out that what Nietzsche and Heidegger describe as our highest achievement, namely, human autonomy, is really made possible by modern experimental physics. And I show how this assessment is borne out by what Heisenberg describes as the lesson of quantum physics.
Two Qualms about Functionalist Marxism
Authors: Dickman Joel
Published: November 2002

InKarl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence(1978), G. A. Cohen has developed a distinctively functionalist interpretation of historical materialism. In this paper I outline Cohen's novel reconstruction of Marx and subject it to two independent internal criticisms. I first argue that explanations cannot conform to Cohen's functionalist model. I then suggest that even if there could be explanations having the structure he has proposed, they would fail to be helpful in illuminating the causal kernel of Marx's theory. Finally I sketch a neglected but more promising approach to clarifying historical materialism, due to Geoffrey Hellman.
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping
Authors: Christensen David
Published: November 2002

The main appeal of the currently popular “bootstrap” account of confirmation developed by Clark Glymour is that it seems to provide an account of evidential relevance. This account has, however, had severe problems; and Glymour has revised his original account in an attempt to solve them. I argue that this attempt fails completely, and that any similar modifications must also fail. If the problems can be solved, it will only be by radical revisions which involve jettisoning bootstrapping's basic approach to theories. Finally, I argue that there is little reason to think that even such drastic modifications will lead to a satisfactory account of relevance.
Quantum Cosmology and the Beginning of the Universe
Authors: Smith Gerrit , Weingard Robert
Published: November 2002

In this note a recently developed quantum oscillating finite space cosmological model is described. The principle novelty of the model is that there is a quantum blurring of the classical singularity between cycles, instead of a singularity free bounce. Recently, Quentin Smith (1988) has argued that present theoretical and observational evidence justifies the belief that the past history of the universe is finite. The relevance of this cosmological model to Smith's arguments is discussed.
The “Tally Argument” and the Validation of Psychoanalysis
Authors: Richardson Robert C.
Published: November 2002

The classic charge against Freudian theory is that the therapeutic success of psychoanalysis can be explained without appeal to the mechanisms of repression and insight. Whatever therapeutic success psychoanalysis might enjoy would then provide no support for the diagnostic claim that psychological disorders are due to repressed desires or for the therapeutic claim that the gains in psychoanalysis are due to insight into repressed causes. Adolf Grünbaum has repeated the charge in The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984), arguing that Freud's response to it in what he calls the “Tally Argument” is woefully inadequate. Grünbaum claims that Freud's defense depends on the view that only psychoanalytic techniques can yield therapeutic effects, and therefore that the transience of some psychoanalytic “cures”, the existence of alternative treatment modalities, and the frequency of spontaneous remission undermine Freud's defense of psychoanalysis. I argue that, whatever the merits of psychoanalysis, Freud is not logically committed to any view as extreme as that attributed to him by Grünbaum; and, furthermore, Grünbaum's rendering of Freud is historically inaccurate.
Darwin's Long and Short Arguments
Authors: Sintonen Matti
Published: November 2002

Doren Recker has criticized the prevailing accounts of Darwin's argument for the theory of natural selection in the Origin of Species. In this note I argue that Recker fails to distinguish between a deductive short argument for the principle of natural selection, and a non-deductive, long argument which aims at establishing that the principle has explanatory power in the various domains of application. I shall try to show that the semantic view of theories, especially in its structuralist form, makes it easy to distinguish between the two arguments and to explain how Darwin's long argument counts as one argument. I also raise a question about Recker's views on Darwin's mid-Victorian background, arguing that Newton's First Rule of Reasoning was not just a constraint on hypotheses involving unobservables, but a general request to keep conjecture and certainty apart.
Discussion: Probabilistic Causality: A Rejoinder to Ellery Eells
Authors: Dupré John
Published: November 2002

In an earlier paper (Dupré 1984), I criticized a thesis sometimes defended by theorists of probabilistic causality, namely, that a probabilistic cause must raise the probability of its effect in every possible set of causally relevant background conditions (the “contextual unanimity thesis”). I also suggested that a more promising analysis of probabilistic causality might be sought in terms of statistical relevance in a fair sample. Ellery Eells (1987) has defended the contextual unanimity thesis against my objections, and also raised objections of his own to my positive claims. In this paper I defend and amplify both my objections to the contextual unanimity thesis and my constructive suggestion.
Horwich, Hempel, and Hypothetico-Deductivism
Authors: Gemes Ken
Published: November 2002

In his paper, “Explanations of Irrelevance” (1983), Paul Horwich proposes an amended version of hypothetico-deductivism, (H-D*). In this discussion note it is shown that (H-D*) has the consequence that “A is a non-black raven” confirms “All ravens are black” relative to any tautology! It is noted that Horwich's (H-D*) bears a strong resemblance to Hempel's prediction criterion of confirmation and that the prediction criterion faces the same obstacle. A related problem for hypothetico-deductivism in its simplest form—that is, E confirms H iff E is an (observational) consequence of H—is displayed. The discussion concludes with a suggestion about how (H-D*) and simple hypothetico-deductivism might be amended in order to avoid these results.
More on Russell's Hypothesis
Authors: Hinderliter Hilton
Published: November 2002

Previous articles on Russell's hypothesis and on criteria for scientific explanations are used as a springboard for analyzing some modern trends in science. Specifically, recent suggestions of the concept of “creation from nothing” in Big-Bang cosmology are compared to Russell's hypothesis, in light of James Woodward's criteria for an explanation purporting to be scientific. The discussion is then extended to the broader question of the direction of scientific theorizing, through examples showing that one generation's science may not build conformably upon the mindset of the previous generation.
Gereon Wolters' Mach I, Mach II, Einstein, und Die Relativitätstheorie. Eine Fälschung und Ihre Folgen
Authors: Disalle Robert
Published: November 2002

Historians of relativity theory have puzzled over the fact that, while Einstein regarded Ernst Mach as his chief philosophical mentor, Mach himself publicly rejected relativity in the preface to Die Prinzipien der physikalischen Optik. This work was first published by Mach's son Ludwig in 1921, five years after Mach's death, but the preface is dated “July 1913”, when Einstein was working on general relativity and believing not only that he had Mach's “friendly interest” and support, but also that his project was the working-out of some of Mach's suggestions. To Einstein, whose sympathy for Mach's overall philosophy of science had already begun to wane by 1921, the posthumous appearance of the preface seemed to underscore the inconsistency between Machian positivism and his own program to construct an abstract and geometrical physics; this interpretation appears in important modern analyses like Blackmore (1972), Holton (1988), and Zahar (1989), and it has frequently served the purposes of the philosophical reaction against logical positivism in general. Now Gereon Wolters' book (translation: Mach I, Mach II, Einstein, and the Theory of Relativity. A Forgery and its Consequences) challenges the usual interpretation with a startling claim: that Ernst Mach never wrote the preface, which in fact is a forgery by his son Ludwig. The words “A Forgery and its Consequences” suggest the sweeping consequences that the preface has had for our understanding of the relation between Mach and Einstein; the point of the book is not only to document the dramatic story of the forgery, but also to defend an equally sweeping reconsideration, indeed a rehabilitation, of Mach's philosophy and its role in the history of relativity.
On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: November 2002

It is not uncommon for philosophers to maintain that one is obliged to believe nothing beyond the observable consequences of a successful scientific theory. This doctrine is variously known as instrumentalism, fictionalism, constructive empiricism, theoretical skepticism and the philosophy of “as if”. The purpose of the present paper is to subject such forms of scientific antirealism to a two-pronged critique. In the first place it is argued that there is no genuine difference between believing a theory and being disposed to use it to make predictions, design experiments, and so on; so traditional instrumentalism is incoherent. In the second place, a retrenched position is considered in which theoretical belief would be tolerated but said to be justified on merely pragmatic, and not epistemic, grounds. In criticizing this point of view it is shown that the onus of proof rests on anyone who maintains it; furthermore, the only possible rationale for it (which is based on underdetermination of theory by data) is described, and various deficiencies in this argument are exposed.
Individualism and Semantic Development
Authors: Patterson Sarah
Published: November 2002

This paper takes issue with Tyler Burge's claim that intentional states are nonindividualistically individuated in cognitive psychology. A discussion of current models of children's acquisition of semantic knowledge is used to motivate a thought-experiment which shows that psychologists working in this area are not committed to describing the concepts children attach to words in terms of the concepts standardly attached to those words in the child's community. The content of the child's representational states are thus not individuated with reference to linguistic environment in the manner that Burge's nonindividualistic view requires. The paper concludes that the explanatory states of cognitive psychology are sometimes individualistically individuated.
What is the Logical Form of Probability Assignment in Quantum Mechanics?
Authors: Halpin John F.
Published: November 2002

The nature of quantum mechanical probability has often seemed mysterious. To shed some light on this topic, the present paper analyzes the logical form of probability assignment in quantum mechanics. To begin the paper, I set out and criticize several attempts to analyze the form. I go on to propose a new form which utilizes a novel, probabilistic conditional and argue that this proposal is, overall, the best rendering of the quantum mechanical probability assignments. Finally, quantum mechanics aside, the discussion here has consequences for counterfactual logic, conditional probability, and epistemic probability.
Husserl's Philosophy of Science and the Semantic Approach
Authors: Mormann Thomas
Published: November 2002

Husserl's mathematical philosophy of science can be considered an anticipation of the contemporary postpositivistic semantic approach, which regards mathematics and not logic as the appropriate tool for the exact philosophical reconstruction of scientific theories. According to Husserl, an essential part of a theory's reconstruction is the mathematical description of its domain, that is, the world (or the part of the world) the theory intends to talk about. Contrary to the traditional micrological approach favored by the members of the Vienna Circle, Husserl, inspired by modern geometry and set theory, aims at a macrological analysis of scientific theories that takes into account the global structures of theories as structured wholes. This is set in the complementary theories of manifolds and theory forms considered by Husserl himself as the culmination of his formal theory of science.
Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution
Authors: Ereshefsky Marc
Published: November 2002

A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed.
Embedding and Uniqueness in Relationist Theories
Authors: Mundy Brent
Published: November 2002

Relationist theories of space or space-time based on embedding of a physical relational system A into a corresponding geometrical system B raise problems associated with the degree of uniqueness of the embedding. Such uniqueness problems are familiar in the representational theory of measurement (RTM), and are dealt with by imposing a condition of uniqueness of embeddings up to composition with an “admissible transformation” of the space B. Friedman (1983) presents an alternative treatment of the uniqueness problem for embedding relationist theories, developed independently of RTM. Friedman's approach differs from that of RTM in securing uniqueness by adding new primitives to the physical system A in contrast to the RTM approach which adds new axioms. Friedman's proposal has recently been developed and defended by Catton and Solomon (1988).

This method of solving the uniqueness problem is here argued to be substantially inferior to the RTM method, both in practice and in principle. In practice we find that in none of the concrete examples offered to illustrate the method is the uniqueness problem actually solved in general. Moreover we find that in the most interesting case (addition to the system A of a finite number of relations of finite degree) the method is in principle incapable of success for mathematical reasons. In addition to these technical difficulties there are compelling methodological reasons for preferring the RTM method to the method of adding primitives.
A Reply to Mayo's Criticisms of Urbach's “Randomization and the Design of Experiments”
Authors: Urbach Peter
Published: November 2002

Mayo (1987) sought to discredit Urbach's (1985) arguments against randomization as a universal requirement in clinical and agricultural trials. The present reply rebuts Mayo's criticisms.
On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future
Authors: Stein Howard
Published: November 2002

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.
Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense
Authors: Neander Karen
Published: November 2002

In this paper I defend an etiological theory of biological functions (according to which the proper function of a trait is the effect for which it was selected by natural selection) against three objections which have been influential. I argue, contrary to Millikan, that it is wrong to base our defense of the theory on a rejection of conceptual analysis, for conceptual analysis does have an important role in philosophy of science. I also argue that biology requires a normative notion of a “proper function”, and that a normative notion is not ahistorical.
Realism About What?
Authors: Jones Roger
Published: November 2002

Preanalytically, we are all scientific realists. But both philosophers and scientists become uncomfortable when forced into analysis. In the case of scientists, this discomfort often arises from practical difficulties in setting out a carefully described set of objects which adequately account for the phenomena with which they are concerned. This paper offers a set of representative examples of these difficulties for contemporary physicists. These examples challenge the traditional realist vision of mature scientific activity as struggling toward an ontologically well-defined world picture. They challenge antirealist alternatives as well.
Reduction, Elimination, and the Mental
Authors: Schwartz Justin
Published: November 2002

The antireductionist arguments of many philosophers (e.g., Baker, Fodor and Davidson) are motivated by a worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental. This worry derives from a misunderstanding of the empiricist account of reduction, which, although it does not underwrite “cognitive suicide”, should be rejected for its positivist baggage. Philosophy of psychology needs more detailed attention to issues in natural science which serve as analogies for reduction of the mental. I consider a range of central cases, including water and H2O, genes and DNA, and common sense and scientific solidity. The last case is illuminated by Eddington's Two Tables paradox, a resolution which suggests the plasticity of the mental under reduction. If reduction of the mental is like any of these cases, it is neither empiricist nor eliminative.
Concept Attribution in Nonhuman Animals: Theoretical and Methodological Problems in Ascribing Complex Mental Processes
Authors: Allen Colin , Hauser Marc D.
Published: November 2002

The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe mental states to animals. However, a methodology that can avoid the charge of excessive anthropomorphism is needed. We describe a series of experiments that could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental processes. The techniques developed by comparative psychologists and behavioral ecologists are able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds.
Randomness and Probability in Dynamical Theories: On the Proposals of the Prigogine School
Authors: Batterman Robert W.
Published: November 2002

I discuss recent work in ergodic theory and statistical mechanics, regarding the compatibility and origin of random and chaotic behavior in deterministic dynamical systems. A detailed critique of some quite radical proposals of the Prigogine school is given. I argue that their conclusion regarding the conceptual bankruptcy of the classical conceptions of an exact microstate and unique phase space trajectory is not completely justified. The analogy they want to draw with quantum mechanics is not sufficiently close to support their most radical conclusion.
Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?
Authors: Reisch George A.
Published: November 2002

In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book.
On Saving the Phenomena and the Mice: A Reply to Bourgeois Concerning Van Fraassen's Image of Science
Authors: Foss Jeff
Published: November 2002

In the fusillade he lets fly against Foss (1984), Bourgeois (1987) sometimes hits a live target. I admit that I went beyond the letter of van Fraassen's The Scientific Image (1980), making inferences and drawing conclusions which are often absurd. I maintain, however, that the absurdities must be charged to van Fraassen's account. While I cannot redress every errant shot of Bourgeois, his essay reveals the need for further discussion of the concepts of the phenomena and the observables as used by van Fraassen.
Fine's “Shaky Game” (And Why Noa is no Ark for Science)
Authors: Schlagel Richard H.
Published: November 2002

The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.
Quantum Theory and Explanatory Discourse: Endgame for Understanding?
Authors: Cushing James T.
Published: November 2002

Empirical adequacy, formal explanation and understanding are distinct goals of science. While no a priori criterion for understanding should be laid down, there may be inherent limitations on the way we are able to understand explanations of physical phenomena. I examine several recent contributions to the exercise of fashioning an explanatory discourse to mold the formal explanation provided by quantum mechanics to our modes of understanding. The question is whether we are capable of truly understanding (or comprehending) quantum phenomena, as opposed to simply accepting the formalism and certain irreducible quantum correlations. The central issue is that of understanding versus merely redefining terms to paper over our ignorance.
Lüders's Rule as a Description of Individual State Transformations
Authors: Martinez Sergio
Published: November 2002

Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Lüders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual state which is not standard.
Einstein and EPR
Authors: Deltete Robert , Guy Reed
Published: November 2002

Recent studies have shown that Einstein did not write the EPR paper and that he was disappointed with the outcome. He thought, rightly, that his own argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory was badly presented in the paper. We reconstruct the argument of EPR, indicate the reasons Einstein was dissatisfied with it, and discuss Einstein's own argument. We show that many commentators have been misled by the obscurity of EPR into proposing interpretations of its argument that do not accurately represent Einstein's own views. Finally, we evaluate Einstein's own incompleteness argument, concluding that recent experimental findings have likely shown it to be unsound.
The Units of Selection and the Bases of Selection
Authors: Walton David
Published: November 2002

A correct analysis of hierarchical selection processes must specify 1) the objects that succeed differentially as units, and 2) the properties that provide the causal bases for differential success. Here I illustrate how failing to recognize the units/bases distinction creates a contradiction in Elliott Sober's recent account of selection. A revised criterion for units of selection is developed and applied to examples at several biological levels. Criteria for bases of selection are discussed in terms of the degree of context-dependence and directness of a property's effect on the success of units. The significance of previous work by Sober, Wimsatt and Brandon is thereby clarified.
On the Notion of Evolutionary Progress
Authors: Hahlweg Kai
Published: November 2002

In this paper, I develop a naturalistic conception of evolutionary progress. I argue that the Waddingtonian notion of adaptability can be embedded meaningfully into a framework which views living things as nonequilibrium structures. This thermodynamic interpretation places great emphasis on the dynamics of environmental change, whereas the classical conceptions are based on equilibrium conceptions of the evolutionary process. What improves in evolution is the ability of living things to stay alive in increasingly heterogeneous environments.
A Case for “Qualitative Confirmation” for the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Authors: Miller Steven I. , Fredericks Marcel
Published: November 2002

This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and significance of “qualitative confirmation”. The need to do so is related to the fact that, without such a conceptualization, a large portion of the human sciences are relegated to a less than scientific status. Accordingly, “qualitative confirmation” is viewed as a proper subset of traditional confirmation theory. To establish such a case, a general Hempelian framework is utilized, but it is supplemented with two additional levels of confirmation. It is concluded that the final test for adequacy of such confirmation must rest on a subjective probability notion.
Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions
Authors: Enfield Patrick
Published: November 2002

The logical empiricists knew that scientific theories sometimes arise out of the attempt to reconcile or unify two existing theories. They also thought that, at best, old theories would be retained as approximations to their successors. Kuhn lost both insights when he rejected the logical empiricists' formal approach in favor of an exclusively historical and psychological one. But when Putnam tried to restore such ideas he failed to provide them with the historical support they require. An account of revolutionary unifications is defended as reconciling Putnam's realist ideas about methodology with Kuhn's historical approach.
Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth
Authors: Kukla Andre
Published: November 2002

Rationality demands at least that we eliminate incoherencies among our beliefs when we are apprised of them. This minimal requirement gives us no grounds for condemning a refusal to look for incoherencies, or indeed to deliberate altogether. Several stronger conditions on rationality are explored and rejected. There are presently no good arguments against logical sloth.
Goldstick and O'Neill on “Truer Than”
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka
Published: November 2002

In a recent article, Goldstick and O'Neill propose a definition for the comparative “truer than” relation between rival propositions. This definition is studied here in a context where the concept of “convexity” is well defined for propositions. It turns out that the Goldstick-O'Neill definition gives a reasonable but very restricted sufficient condition for the “truer than” relation, but fails as a necessary condition.
The Neurobiology of Observation
Authors: Gilman Daniel
Published: November 2002

Paul Churchland has recently argued that empirical evidence strongly suggests that perception is penetrable to the beliefs or theories held by individual perceivers (1988). While there has been much discussion of the sorts of psychological cases he presents, little has been said about his arguments from neurology. I offer a critical examination of his claim that certain efferents in the brain are evidence against perceptual encapsulation. I argue that his neurological evidence is inadequate to his philosophical goals, both by itself and taken in concert with his psychological evidence.
Novel Evidence and Severe Tests
Authors: Mayo Deborah G.
Published: November 2002

While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are “novel facts”, there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that novelty matters is the deeper intuition that severe tests matter. I set out a criterion of severity akin to the notion of a test's power in Neyman-Pearson statistics. I argue that tests which are use-novel may fail to be severe, and tests that are severe may fail to be use-novel. I discuss the 1919 eclipse data as a severe test of Einstein's law of gravity.
Tempered Realism about the Force of Selection
Authors: Waters C. Kenneth
Published: November 2002

Darwinians are realists about the force of selection, but there has been surprisingly little discussion about what form this realism should take. Arguments about the units of selection in general and genic selectionism in particular reveal two realist assumptions: (1) for any selection process, there is a uniquely correct identification of the operative selective forces and the level at which each impinges; and (2) selective forces must satisfy the Pareto-style requirement of probabilistic causation. I argue that both assumptions are false; we must temper realism about the force of selection and revise the way we think about probabilistic causation.
Maher, Mendeleev and Bayesianism
Authors: Howson Colin , Franklin Allan
Published: November 2002

Maher (1988, 1990) has recently argued that the way a hypothesis is generated can affect its confirmation by the available evidence, and that Bayesian confirmation theory can explain this. In particular, he argues that evidence known at the time a theory was proposed does not confirm the theory as much as it would had that evidence been discovered after the theory was proposed. We examine Maher's arguments for this “predictivist” position and conclude that they do not, in fact, support his view. We also cast doubt on the assumptions of Maher's alleged Bayesian proofs.
On the Testability of Psychological Generalizations (Psychological Testability)
Authors: Henderson David K.
Published: November 2002

Rosenberg argues that intentional generalizations in the human sciences cannot be law-like because they are not amenable to significant empirical refinement. This irrefinability is said to result from the principle that supposedly controls in intentional explanation also serving as the standard for successful interpretation. The only credible evidence bearing on such a principle would then need conform to it. I argue that psychological generalizations are refinable and can be nomic. I show how empirical refinement of psychological generalizations is possible by considering concrete cases. A sufficiently detailed view of the role of psychological generalizations in interpretation allows us to find in psychological investigations instances of bootstrap testing.
Bell's Inequalities, Relativistic Quantum Field Theory and the Problem of Hidden Variables
Authors: Rédei Miklós
Published: November 2002

Based partly on proving that algebraic relativistic quantum field theory (ARQFT) is a stochastic Einstein local (SEL) theory in the sense of SEL which was introduced by Hellman (1982b) and which is adapted in this paper to ARQFT, the recently proved maximal and typical violation of Bell's inequalities in ARQFT (Summers and Werner 1987a–c) is interpreted in this paper as showing that Bell's inequalities are, in a sense, irrelevant for the problem of Einstein local stochastic hidden variables, especially if this problem is raised in connection with ARQFT. This leads to the question of how to formulate the problem of local hidden variables in ARQFT. By giving a precise definition of hidden-variable theory within the operator algebraic framework of quantum mechanics, it will be argued that the aim of hidden-variable investigations is to determine those classes of quantum theories whose elements represent a statistical content that cannot be reduced in a given way. In some particular way to be stated, a proposition will be stated which distinguishes quantum field theories whose statistical content cannot be reduced without violating some relativistic locality principle.
Some Critical Remarks Concerning Prigogine's Conception of Temporal Irreversibility
Authors: Verstraeten Guido
Published: November 2002

The concept underlying Prigogine's ideas is the asymmetric “lifetime” he introduces into thermodynamics in addition to the symmetric time parameter. By identifying processes by means of causal chains of genidentical events, we examine the intrinsic order of lifetime adopting Grünbaum's symmetric time order. Further, we define the physical meaning and the actuality of the processes under consideration. We conclude that Prigogine's microscopic temporal irreversibility is tacitly assumed at macroscopic level. Moreover, his “new” complementarity lacks any scientific foundation. Finally, we put forward the fact-like origin of temporal irreversibility referring to classical thermodynamics.
The Method to “Meaning”: A Reply to Leplin
Authors: Nersessian Nancy J.
Published: November 2002

In his article, “Is Essentialism Unscientific?” (1988), Jarrett Leplin claims that I do not have sufficient grounds for rejecting the customary “philosophical method of discovery” that allows for the direct transfer of theories developed in the philosophy of language to science. While admitting that all attempts at transfer thus far have failed, he still maintains that method is sound. I argue that the wholesale failure of these attempts is reason enough to suspect the method and to try to devise one more suitable to fathoming how “meaning”, “reference”, and “meaning change” are to be understood for scientific theories. The method I have proposed in Nersessian (1984b), and subsequent work, demands that we learn how to incorporate the actual practices of meaning construction in science into our analyses. Leplin distorts my analysis and, thus, fails to understand the insights that study provides.
Contrastive Explanation and Causal Triangulation
Authors: Lipton Peter
Published: November 2002

Alan Garfinkel (1981) and Bas van Fraassen (1980), among others, have proposed a contrastive theory of explanation, according to which the proper form of an explanatory why-question is not simply “Why P?” but “Why P rather than Q?”. Dennis Temple (1988) has argued in this journal that the contrastive explanandum “P rather than Q” is equivalent to the conjunction, “P and not-Q”. I show that the contrast is not equivalent to the conjunction, nor to other plausible noncontrastive candidates. I then consider David Lewis's (1986) proposal for the way contrasts determine an explanatory cause, which does not require recasting the contrastive explanandum. Lewis's proposal is found to be unacceptable, but it suggests an improvement that shows contrastive explanations to employ a mechanism of “causal triangulation”, similar to Mill's method of difference.
The Projection Postulate and the Time-Energy Uncertainty Relation
Authors: Kronz Frederick M.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to solve a serious problem for the projection postulate involving the time-energy uncertainty relation. The problem was recently raised by Teller, who believes that the problem is insoluble and, consequently, that the projection postulate should no longer be regarded as a serious focus for interpretive investigation.
David Lewis Meets John Bell
Authors: Butterfield Jeremy
Published: November 2002

The violation of the Bell inequality means that measurement-results in the two wings of the experiment cannot be screened off from one another, in the sense of Reichenbach. But does this mean that there is causation between the results? I argue that it does, according to Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation and his associated views. The reason lies in his doctrine that chances evolve by conditionalization on intervening history. This doctrine collapses the distinction between the conditional probabilities that are used to state screening off, and the counterfactuals with chance consequents that are used to state lack of causation. I briefly discuss ways to evade my argument.
Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism
Authors: Weston Thomas
Published: November 2002

This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories.

The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but details appear elsewhere. Objections are surveyed, including arguments by Miller, Laymon, and Laudan. Comparison is made with Niiniluoto's theory of verisimilitude, and the utility of his theory for realism assessed.
Does the Tally Argument Make Freud a Sophisticated Methodologist?
Authors: Derksen A. A.
Published: November 2002

In his The Foundations of Psychoanalysis (1984) Grünbaum compliments Freud on the development of the Tally Argument as an answer to a number of serious methodological criticisms, “The epistemological considerations that prompted Freud to enunciate (this argument) make him a sophisticated methodologist” (p. 128). In contrast to this position I argue that the Tally Argument and the considerations for it are hardly sophisticated: They would equally well go to demonstrate the methodological sophistication of modern-day evangelists. Furthermore, I argue that the Tally Argument does not play the crucial role that Grünbaum assigns to it. It is one of many arguments Freud used to counter criticism, but not one to which Freud gave pride of place.
What is Explained in Science?
Authors: Tuchańska Barbara
Published: November 2002

The fundamental problem of what is explained in science should be considered and clarified since it determines the way of solving the problem of how something is explained as well as the entire view of explanation. In the first section after the introduction, Hempel's models of explanation are criticized for their narrow concern with logical reconstruction. In the next section a broader epistemological approach to explanation is presented, and in the last section an historical example of Newtonian explanation as epistemic activity is discussed.
Screening-Off and the Units of Selection
Authors: Sober Elliott
Published: November 2002

Brandon ([1982] 1984, 1990) has argued that Salmon's (1971) concept of screening-off can be used to characterize (i) the idea that natural selection acts directly on an organism's phenotype, only indirectly on its genotype, and (ii) the biological problem of the levels of selection. Brandon also suggests (iii) that screening-off events in a causal chain are better explanations than the events they screen off. This paper critically evaluates Brandon's proposals.
Elisabeth A. Lloyd. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory
Authors: Burian Richard M.
Published: November 2002

The main goal of this book, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (Lloyd 1988), “is to introduce, develop, and demonstrate the usefulness of a precise analysis of the structure of evolutionary theory” (p. 23), an analysis that treats evolutionary theory as built up out of complexly interrelated mathematical models. The book has a second goal as well, namely, “to offer … evidence of the appropriateness and utility of the semantic view of scientific theories” (ibid.). The appropriate audience for the book is not obvious. It is well suited for graduate courses in philosophy of biology, though it demands substantial knowledge of both disciplines. Lloyd has attempted to make it accessible to wider biological and philosophical audiences by minimizing the technical treatment of mathematical models, but I doubt that she has succeeded in making the book accessible to those unfamiliar with the models of population genetics or to biologists previously unversed in the philosophy of science.
The Geometry of Opinion: Jeffrey Shifts and Linear Operators
Authors: van Fraassen Bas C.
Published: November 2002

Richard Jeffrey and Michael Goldstein have both introduced systematic approaches to the structure of opinion changes. For both approaches there are theorems which indicate great generality and width of scope. The main questions addressed here will be to what extent the basic forms of representation are intertranslatable, and how we can conceive of such programs in general.
Kurt Gödel and Phenomenology
Authors: Tieszen Richard
Published: November 2002

Gödel began to seriously study Husserl's phenomenology in 1959, and the Gödel Nachlass is known to contain many notes on Husserl. In this paper I describe what is presently known about Gödel's interest in phenomenology. Among other things, it appears that the 1963 supplement to “What is Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis?”, which contains Gödel's famous views on mathematical intuition, may have been influenced by Husserl. I then show how Gödel's views on mathematical intuition and objectivity can be readily interpreted in a phenomenological theory of intuition and mathematical knowledge.
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory
Authors: Dowe Phil
Published: November 2002

This paper examines Wesley Salmon's “process” theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about “hidden powers”. A new theory is suggested, based on “conserved quantities”, which fulfills Salmon's broad objectives, and which avoids the problems discussed.
Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism
Authors: Bickle John
Published: November 2002

Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that new reductionists should revise some significant details of the program, particularly the conception of theories, to circumvent this more potent Davidson-inspired worry.
Theory-Conjunction and Mercenary Reliance
Authors: Trout J. D.
Published: November 2002

Scientific realists contend that theory-conjunction presents a problem for empiricist conceptions of scientific knowledge and practice. Van Fraassen (1980) has offered a competing account of theory-conjunction which I argue fails to capture the mercenary character of epistemic dependence in science. Representative cases of theory-conjunction developed in the present paper show that mercenary reliance implies a “principle of epistemic symmetry” which only a realist can consistently accommodate. Finally, because the practice in question involves the conjunction of theories, a version of realism more robust than the “entity realism” of Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Hacking (1983) is required to explain the success of theory-conjunction.
What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade
Authors: Fetzer James H.
Published: November 2002

My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation.