bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Integrating Managerial and Tax Objectives in Transfer Pricing
Authors: Baldenius Tim , Melumad Nahum D. , Reichelstein Stefan
Published: March 2008

This paper examines transfer pricing in multinational firms when individual divisions face different income tax rates. Assuming that a firm decouples its internal transfer price from the arm's length price used for tax purposes, we analyze the effectiveness of alternative pricing rules under both cost- and market-based transfer pricing. In a tax-free world, Hirshleifer (1956) advocated that the internal transfer price be set equal to the marginal cost of the supplying division. Extending this solution, we argue that the optimal internal transfer price should be a weighted average of the pre-tax marginal cost and the most favorable arm's length price. When the supplying division also sells the intermediate product in question to outside parties, the external price becomes a natural candidate for the arm's length price. We argue that for internal performance evaluation purposes firms should generally not value internal transactions at the prevailing market price if the supplying division has monopoly power in the external market. By imposing intracompany discounts, firms can alleviate attendant double marginalization problems and, at the same time, realize tax savings due to differences in income tax rates. Our analysis characterizes optimal intracompany discounts as a function of the market parameters and the divisional tax rates.
The Effects of Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures on Analysts' and Nonprofessional Investors' Equity Valuation Judgments
Authors: Frederickson James R. , Miller Jeffrey S.
Published: March 2008

This paper presents an experiment that examines the effect of pro forma earnings disclosures on the judgments of analysts (i.e., more sophisticated investors) and nonprofessional (i.e., less sophisticated) investors. In the experiment, participants developed stock price assessments after reviewing background financial information and a current earnings announcement for a company. The earnings announcement was manipulated to report only GAAP earnings in one condition and both pro forma and GAAP earnings in the other condition. Consistent with empirical evidence, the pro forma earnings in our experiment exceeded GAAP earnings. The results indicate that nonprofessional investors who received an earnings announcement that contained both pro forma and GAAP disclosures assessed a higher stock price than did nonprofessionals who received an announcement containing only GAAP disclosures. Financial analysts' stock price judgments were not affected by the pro forma disclosures. Followup analyses suggest that analysts and nonprofessional investors used different valuation models and information processing. Analysts used well-defined valuation models, based on either earnings-multiples or cash flows, while the nonprofessional investors were more likely to use simpler, heuristic-based valuation models. The pro forma disclosure did not cause nonprofessional investors to assess a higher earnings number for determining a stock price, but rather caused nonprofessionals to perceive the earnings announcement as more favorable, which in turn caused them to convert earnings or some other performance metric into a higher stock price. This effect appears to be due to unintentional cognitive effects, rather than nonprofessionals relying on pro forma earnings information because they perceived it to be informative.
Earnings Informativeness and Strategic Disclosure: An Empirical Examination of “Pro Forma” Earnings
Authors: Lougee Barbara A. , Marquardt Carol A.
Published: March 2008

This paper provides evidence on the characteristics of firms that include “pro forma” earnings information in their press releases, whether the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors varies systematically with these characteristics, and whether the investor response to pro forma earnings is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. Using a sample of 249 press releases from 1997–99, we find that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms. We also find that strategic considerations, measured using the direction of GAAP earnings surprises, are an important determinant of pro forma reporting. In addition, our examination of the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings shows that investors find pro forma earnings to be more useful when GAAP earnings informativeness is low or when strategic considerations are absent. Tests of the predictive ability of pro forma earnings for future profitability and returns are mixed, and we therefore cannot conclusively determine whether the investor reaction to pro forma earnings at the time of the press release is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. The paper contributes to the growing literature on pro forma earnings and more generally to the literature on voluntary and strategic disclosure.
An Examination of Long-Lived Asset Impairments
Authors: Riedl Edward J.
Published: March 2008

Prior research reveals that write-offs of long-lived assets are both large in magnitude and frequent in occurrence. Responding to calls for enhanced reporting of these items, the FASB issued SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets. However, its effect on the characteristics of reported write-offs remains unclear, as implementation requires inherently subjective estimates. Further, critics (including dissenting FASB board members and the SEC) question the standard's guidance. Motivated in part by this debate, this paper contrasts the characteristics of write-offs reported prior versus subsequent to the issuance of SFAS No. 121. Empirical results reveal that economic factors have a weaker association with write-offs reported after SFAS No. 121. This is consistent across macro, industry, and firm-specific variables. Results also indicate a higher association between write-offs and “big bath” reporting behavior after the standard's implementation, and that this “big bath” behavior more likely reflects opportunistic reporting by managers rather than the provision of their private information. These inferences are robust to a number of alternative specifications and variable definitions. Overall, the results suggest the reporting of write-offs under SFAS No. 121 has decreased in quality, consistent with criticisms of the standard.
Predicting Firm Financial Distress: A Mixed Logit Model
Authors: Jones Stewart , Hensher David A.
Published: March 2008

Over the past three decades the literature on financial distress prediction has largely been confined to simple multiple discriminant analysis, binary logistic or probit analysis, or rudimentary multinomial logit models (MNL). There has been a conspicuous absence of modeling innovation in this literature as well as a failure to keep abreast of important methodological developments emerging in other fields of the social sciences. In particular, there has been no recognition of major advances in discrete choice modeling over the last 15 years, which has increasingly relaxed behaviorally questionable assumptions associated with the independently and identically distributed errors (IID) condition and allowed for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In contrast to standard logit, the mixed logit model fulfils this purpose and provides a superior framework for explanation and prediction. We explain the theoretical and econometric underpinnings of mixed logit and demonstrate its empirical usefulness in the context of a specific but topical area of accounting research: financial distress prediction. Comparisons of model-fits and out-of-sample forecasts indicate that mixed logit outperforms standard logit by significant margins. While mixed logit has valuable applications in financial distress research, its potential usefulness in other areas of accounting research should not be overlooked.
Former Audit Partners and Abnormal Accruals
Authors: Menon Krishnagopal , Williams David D.
Published: March 2008

Audit clients often employ a former partner of their present auditor as an officer or a director. This “revolving door” practice presents a potential threat to auditor independence. Using the Jones (1991) model to calculate abnormal accruals for firms in 1998 and 1999, we find that firms employing former partners as officers or directors report larger signed and unsigned abnormal accruals than other firms, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect abnormal accruals. To ensure that the results are not driven by performance characteristics of the former partner firms, we construct a performance-matched control sample and obtain consistent results. We also observe a disproportionately higher (lower) proportion of former partner firms than expected just meeting (missing) analysts' earnings forecasts.
The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific Information into Stock Prices
Authors: Piotroski Joseph D. , Roulstone Darren T.
Published: March 2008

We investigate the extent to which the trading and trade-generating activities of three informed market participants—financial analysts, institutional investors, and insiders—influence the relative amount of firm-specific, industry-level, and market-level information impounded into stock prices, as measured by stock return synchronicity. We find that stock return synchronicity is positively associated with analyst forecasting activities, consistent with analysts increasing the amount of industry-level information in prices through intra-industry information transfers. In contrast, stock return synchronicity is inversely related to insider trades, consistent with these transactions conveying firm-specific information. Supplemental tests show that insider and institutional trading accelerate the incorporation of the firm-specific component of future earnings news into prices alone, while analyst forecasting activity accelerates both the industry and firm-specific component of future earnings news. Our results suggest that all three parties influence the firm's information environment, but the type of price-relevant information conveyed by their activities depends on each party's relative information advantage.
The Effect of Accounting Report Structure and Team Structure on Performance in Cross-Functional Teams
Authors: Rowe Casey
Published: March 2008

Cross-functional teams operate in dynamic environments in which it is difficult to properly align incentives. As a result the free-rider problem can emerge. This paper presents two experiments in which dominant incentives to free ride were held constant. The first experiment examined the question of whether aligning accounting report structure and team structure in such a way as to create a “group frame” helps to mitigate the free-rider problem. Accounting report structure was found to complement team structure. When properly aligned, accounting and team structures helped to resolve the free-rider problem interactively by operating as a powerful group framing device. The second experiment provides theory-consistent evidence that people outside the teams (subjects who acted as management control system designers) fail to appreciate how powerfully the design of accounting and team structures influence performance within teams. Finally, the study provides additional insight into the role that accounting structure can play in promoting informal control within cross-functional teams.
Financial Reporting System Choice and Disclosure Management
Authors: Stocken Phillip C. , Verrecchia Robert E.
Published: March 2008

We examine the efficiency implications of a manager's financial reporting system choice and disclosure management. When a manager has some private information that is not captured by a firm's financial reporting system and may manipulate the financial report at some cost, we show that the manager may not choose the most precise financial reporting system. We examine how reporting system choice varies with the precision of the manager's private information captured by the reporting system, precision of information that is not captured by the reporting system, and the manager's cost of manipulating the report. We consider the effect of reporting discretion on the efficiency with which investors allocate resources.
Voluntary Disclosure in a Multi-Audience Setting: An Empirical Investigation
Authors: Bhojraj Sanjeev , Blacconiere Walter G. , D'Souza Julia D.
Published: March 2008

Theory suggests that voluntary disclosure decisions are a function of conflicting incentives vis-a`-vis multiple audiences. However, few opportunities exist to investigate this issue empirically. We identify a setting that offers us such an opportunity: the electric utility industry as it transitions toward deregulation. We consider two types of voluntary disclosures: strategies to protect the firm's existing customer base and plans to exploit emerging opportunities under deregulation. We examine these particular disclosures since they are voluntary, relevant to all sample firms, and convey positive information about the firm's prospects in a deregulated environment. We consider three target audiences: industry regulators, capital market participants, and product market competitors. We find that our disclosure index is negatively associated with the magnitude of utilities' stranded costs in jurisdictions where the stranded cost recovery issue is unresolved, consistent with our predicted regulatory incentives. Further, our evidence indicates that capital market-related incentives are positively associated with our disclosure index. Finally, we find that product market-related incentives play a deterrent role in disclosure, but only after regulatory concerns have been resolved.
Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia (Retracted)
Authors: Bhojraj Sanjeev , Libby Robert
Published: March 2008

We examine the effects of increased capital market pressure and disclosure frequency-induced earnings/cash flow conflict on myopic behavior. In our experiments, experienced financial managers choose between projects where a conflict exists between near-term earnings and total cash flow. Managers more often choose projects that they believe will maximize short-term earnings (and price) as opposed to total cash flows in response to increased capital market pressure resulting from a pending stock issuance, holding constant agency frictions and other stock market pressures. When faced with increased capital market pressure, changes in disclosure frequency cause managers to behave more or less myopically depending on the impact of the change on the pattern of earnings and the resulting earnings/cash flow conflict. Our study provides insights into managers' beliefs about stock market pressures, mandatory reporting, and the availability of alternative communications channels, and contributes to literature on managerial myopia and earnings management, as well as current debates over disclosure frequency.
The Combined Effect of Wages and Firm Profit on Employee Effort
Authors: Hannan R. Lynn
Published: March 2008

This study investigates whether paying higher wages motivates employees to provide higher effort and whether firm profit moderates this relation. Consistent with gift exchange (Akerlof 1982) and reciprocity (Rabin 1993) models, my experimental results show that workers provided more effort when they were paid higher wages even though there was no ex post financial reward for doing so. Moreover, firm profit influenced the relation between wages and effort. Workers provided higher effort when firm profit decreased compared to when it increased. This suggests that the degree of reciprocity is affected by firm profit. However, workers' responded asymmetrically to firm profit, in that they behaved as if they expected to share in firm profit increases but not decreases. Although firms were fairly adept at predicting the profit-maximizing wage strategy, they apparently did not anticipate workers' reluctance to share in firm profit decreases.
Investors' Evaluations of Strategic Prior-Period Benchmark Disclosures in Earnings Announcements
Authors: Krische Susan D.
Published: March 2008

Schrand and Walther's (2000) archival evidence suggests that managers strategically disclose prior-period benchmarks in current earnings announcements, which, in turn, influences investors' judgments. Using a controlled experimental setting, I present evidence confirming that a transparent description of a transitory prior-period gain or loss affects how investors apply prior-period earnings when evaluating currentperiod earnings. I also provide evidence that this effect is likely to be unintentional on the part of investors, resulting from limitations in their memory for the prior-period event. Overall, the experimental results suggest that a quantitative description of the transitory prior-period gain or loss in a current earnings announcement helps investors to evaluate company performance. The results also highlight the need for consistency in reporting non-GAAP financial performance measures.
What Determines Residual Income?
Authors: Cheng Qiang
Published: March 2008

This paper investigates the determinants of residual income scaled by book value of equity, i.e., abnormal return on equity (ROE), by analyzing the impact of value-creation (economic rents) and value-recording (conservative accounting) processes on abnormal ROE. I rely on economic theories to characterize economic rents and develop an empirical measure—the conservative accounting factor—to capture the effect of conservative accounting. As expected, industry abnormal ROE increases with industry concentration, industry-level barriers to entry, and industry conservative accounting factors. Also as expected, the difference between firm and industry abnormal ROE increases with market share, firm size, firm-level barriers to entry, and firm conservative accounting factors. Integrating these determinants into the residual income valuation model significantly increases its explanatory power for the variation in the market-to-book ratio.
An Evaluation of Accounting-Based Measures of Expected Returns
Authors: Easton Peter D. , Monahan Steven J.
Published: March 2008

We develop an empirical method that allows us to evaluate the reliability of an expected return proxy via its association with realized returns even if realized returns are biased and noisy measures of expected returns. We use our approach to examine seven accounting-based proxies that are imputed from prices and contemporaneous analysts' earnings forecasts. Our results suggest that, for the entire crosssection of firms, these proxies are unreliable. None of them has a positive association with realized returns, even after controlling for the bias and noise in realized returns attributable to contemporaneous information surprises. Moreover, the simplest proxy, which is based on the least reasonable assumptions, contains no more measurement error than the remaining proxies. These results remain even after we attempt to purge the proxies of their measurement error via the use of instrumental variables and grouping. We provide additional evidence, however, that demonstrates that some proxies are reliable when the consensus long-term growth forecasts are low and/or when analysts' forecast accuracy is high.
Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?
Authors: Farber David B.
Published: March 2008

In this study, I examine the association between the credibility of the financial reporting system and the quality of governance mechanisms. I use a sample of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their financial statements. Consistent with prior research, results indicate that fraud firms have poor governance relative to a control sample in the year prior to fraud detection. Specifically, fraud firms have fewer numbers and percentages of outside board members, fewer audit committee meetings, fewer financial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4 auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairmen of the board of directors. However, the results indicate that fraud firms take actions to improve their governance, and three years after fraud detection these firms have governance characteristics similar to the control firms in terms of the numbers and percentages of outside members on the board, but exceed the control firms in the number of audit committee meetings. I also investigate whether the improved governance influences informed capital market participants. The results indicate that analyst following and institutional holdings do not increase in fraud firms, suggesting that credibility was still a problem for these firms. However, the results also indicate that firms that take actions to improve governance have superior stock price performance, even after controlling for earnings performance. This suggests that investors appear to value governance improvements.
Auditor Tenure and Perceptions of Audit Quality
Authors: Ghosh Aloke , Moon Doocheol
Published: March 2008

We analyze how investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure. Using earnings response coefficients from returns-earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we document a positive association between investor perceptions of earnings quality and tenure. Further, we find that the influence of reported earnings on stock rankings becomes larger with extended tenure, although the association between debt ratings and reported earnings does not vary with tenure. Finally, we find that the influence of past earnings on one-year-ahead earnings forecasts becomes greater as tenure increases. In general, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors and information intermediaries perceive auditor tenure as improving audit quality. One implication of our study is that imposing mandatory limits on the duration of the auditor-client relationship might impose unintended costs on capital market participants.
Audit Committee Quality and Internal Control: An Empirical Analysis
Authors: Krishnan Jayanthi
Published: March 2008

I examine the association between audit committee quality and the quality of corporate internal control. While information on the quality of internal control is not generally available, companies changing auditors are required to disclose any internal control problems that were pointed out by their predecessor auditors. The empirical results are based on a comparison of companies disclosing such internal control problems with a control sample of companies changing auditors but not disclosing internal control problems. Audit committee quality is measured in three dimensions: its size, its independence, and its expertise. The internal control problems are observed at two levels of increasing seriousness: reportable conditions and material weaknesses. The sample time period precedes the effective dates of recent policy changes regarding audit committees. The results indicate that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems. This is true for both levels of internal control problems. The results are consistent with recent policy emphasis on audit committee independence and expertise.
Profit Sharing in an Auditing Oligopoly
Authors: Liu Xiaohong , Simunic Dan A.
Published: March 2008

This paper examines how partners in an audit firm can use profit-sharing rules to induce optimal partner behavior from the firm's point of view, taking into account the strategic competition of firms in an auditing oligopoly. We use a linear contracting framework to investigate the effects of profit-sharing rules on individual partners' various decisions, including their pricing strategies and effort choices.We assume that efficient audits of different types of clients require different effort profiles with respect to degree of partner cooperation. For example, the audit of a complex company requires different amounts of partner collaboration than does the audit of a simple company. Moreover, since it is too costly for an enforcement party, such as the head office of an audit firm or a court, to verify each client's type in order to resolve compensation disputes among the firm's partners, it is reasonable to assume that client type cannot be contracted upon for partner compensation purposes. Given this assumption, we derive conditions under which there exists an equilibrium in which audit firms strategically choose different profit-sharing rules to specialize in different types of clients, thereby earning positive economic profits. Our analysis provides insights into the strategic competition among the big audit firms, and helps to explain the observed differences in the compensation plans of these firms and in the nature of their client portfolios.
The Impact of SFAS No. 131 Business Segment Data on the Market's Ability to Anticipate Future Earnings
Authors: Ettredge Michael L. , Kwon Soo Young , Smith David B. , Zarowin Paul A.
Published: March 2008

This study investigates the effect of firms' adoption of SFAS No. 131 segment disclosure rules on the stock market's ability to predict the firms' earnings, as captured by the forward earnings response coefficient (FERC). The FERC is the association between current-year returns and next-year earnings. SFAS No. 131, effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997, arguably increased both the quantity and quality of segment disclosure. Consistent with the standard's intended qualitative effects, pre-131 multi-segment firms experienced a significant increase in FERC after adopting SFAS No. 131. Consistent with the standard's intended quantitative effects, many pre-131 single-segment firms began disclosing multiple segments, and those that did experienced an increase in FERC. However, pre-131 single-segment firms that remained single segment (i.e., were unaffected by SFAS No. 131) had no change in FERC, indicating that the increase in FERC for 131-affected firms is not due to some other event concurrent to the adoption of SFAS No. 131. These results are robust under numerous procedures that control for characteristics of the sample firms and their earnings, providing strong evidence that SFAS No. 131 resulted in an increase in stock price informativeness for affected firms. Thus, we provide the first empirical price-based evidence that SFAS No. 131 provided more information (about future earnings) to the market, as the standard's proponents have suggested.
Valuing Loss Firms
Authors: Joos Peter , Plesko George A.
Published: March 2008

We investigate whether investors price losses conditional on the likelihood of the firm's return to profitability, consistent with the abandonment option hypothesis (Hayn 1995). We first develop a loss-reversal model to define subsamples of persistent and transitory losses. We find that on average investors price transitory losses positively over the sample period, as if a transitory loss indicates a low likelihood of exercising the abandonment option. We also observe that early in the sample period investors do not price persistent losses, as predicted by the abandonment option hypothesis. By contrast, later in the sample period, larger persistent losses correspond to higher returns, inconsistent with the prediction of the abandonment option hypothesis. To understand why we observe a change in the valuation of persistent losses over the sample period, we study their components and establish the key role of R&D for their valuation. We find that investors do not price persistent losses without an R&D component, consistent with these losses indicating financial distress and a higher likelihood of exercising the abandonment option. However, when persistent losses contain R&D, investors separately value the R&D component as an asset and the non-R&D component as if it is a transitory loss. Thus, investors do not consider losses to be homogeneous, but consider the causes and nature of the loss to assess its long-term implications for firm value.
Accounting Recognition of Intangible Assets: Theory and Evidence on Economic Determinants
Authors: Wyatt Anne
Published: March 2008

This paper examines the extent to which management makes accounting choices to record intangible assets based on their insights into the underlying economics of their firm. It exploits a setting in which management has accounting discretion to record a wide range of intangible assets. The results suggest that management's choice to record intangible assets is associated with the strength of the technology affecting the firms operations, the length of the technology cycle time, and propertyrights-related factors that affect the firm's ability to appropriate the investment benefits. These effects are more important than other contracting and signaling factors consistent with the underlying economics operating as a first-order effect as envisaged by GAAP. The results also indicate that the intangible assets management has a voluntary (unregulated) choice to record—identifiable intangible assets—are more highly correlated with underlying economic factors than the regulated classes, purchased goodwill and R&D assets. This result suggests that limiting managements' choices to record intangible assets tends to reduce, rather than improve, the quality of the balance sheet and investors' information set.
Emphasis on Pro Forma versus GAAP Earnings in Quarterly Press Releases: Determinants, SEC Intervention, and Market Reactions
Authors: Bowen Robert M. , Davis Angela K. , Matsumoto Dawn A.
Published: March 2008

Earnings press releases provide managers a forum to present their firm's quarterly financial information and perhaps influence perceptions of the firm's stakeholders. We explore the use of managerial emphasis as a disclosure tool and contribute to the debate over pro forma earnings. We examine (1) the determinants of emphasis placed on pro forma and GAAP earnings within quarterly earnings press releases, (2) whether there has been a shift away from emphasizing pro forma earnings toward GAAP earnings, and (3) whether stock market reactions to earnings news were influenced by emphasis placed on metrics within the press release. We find that firms emphasize metrics that are more value-relevant and portray more favorable firm performance. We also find that the extent of a firm's media coverage affects managers' emphasis decisions. Further, our results indicate a highly significant shift toward GAAP emphasis and away from pro forma emphasis in 2002 relative to 2001. Finally, our stock market tests suggest that greater emphasis on an earnings metric results in a stronger market reaction to the surprise in that metric. Overall, these findings are consistent with managers using emphasis in the earnings press release as a disclosure tool and this emphasis influencing at least one important stakeholder group—investors.
Stock Price, Earnings, and Book Value in Managerial Performance Measures
Authors: Dutta Sunil , Reichelstein Stefan
Published: March 2008

This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are “soft” (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the accounting system as it seeks to separate investments from operating expenditures. This separation is of no concern to the stock market, which draws on its own information about future cash flows resulting from current investments. The firm's stock price, however, reflects all value-relevant information, parts of which are not incentive relevant. Optimal incentive provisions must combine “forward-looking” market information with “backward-looking” accounting information. Under certain conditions, optimal performance measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual income) and market value added.
Disclosure Incentives and Effects on Cost of Capital around the World
Authors: Francis Jere R. , Khurana Inder K. , Pereira Raynolde
Published: March 2008

Prior research predicts that firms reliant on external financing are more likely to undertake a higher level of disclosure, and a higher disclosure level should, in turn, lead to a lower cost of external financing. This paper tests these predictions outside the United States where alternative legal and financial systems could mitigate the effectiveness of such disclosures and, comprehensively, examines both disclosure incentives and disclosure consequences on cost of capital for a common set of firms. Using a sample from 34 countries, we find that firms in industries with greater external financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure levels, and that an expanded disclosure policy for these firms leads to a lower cost of both debt and equity capital. Crosscountry differences in legal and financial systems affect observed disclosure levels in predicted ways. However, a surprising result in the study is that voluntary disclosure incentives appear to operate independently of country-level factors, which suggests the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in gaining access to lower cost external financing around the world.
Effects of Accounting-Method Choices on Subjective Performance-Measure Weighting Decisions: Experimental Evidence on Precision and Error Covariance
Authors: Krishnan Ranjani , Luft Joan L. , Shields Michael D.
Published: March 2008

Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.
Credibility of Management Forecasts
Authors: Rogers Jonathan L. , Stocken Phillip C.
Published: March 2008

We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects how managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying predictable forecast bias. We find managers' willingness to misrepresent their forwardlooking information as a function of their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect misrepresentation. We examine incentives induced by the litigation environment, insider trading activities, firm financial distress, and industry concentration. With regard to the stock price response to forecasts, we find the market varies its response with the predictable bias in the forecast. The efficiency of the market's response, however, varies with the forecast news.
CEOs'/CFOs' Swearing by the Numbers: Does It Impact Share Price of the Firm?
Authors: Chang Hsihui , Chen Jengfang , Liao Woody M. , Mishra Birendra K.
Published: March 2008

We examine the impact on share prices of firms whose CEOs and CFOs certify their financial statements under oath, pursuant to the administrative order issued by the SEC on June 27, 2002. We hypothesize that (1) the certification provides assurance to investors by making disclosure more credible and by reducing information asymmetry between owners and management, and (2) the assurance value of certification is reflected in the stock price of the certifying company. Overall, the empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses. We observe, on average, positive abnormal returns for firms whose CEOs/CFOs certified their financial statements by August 14, 2002. Based on an analysis of bid-ask spreads, certifying firms experienced a significant decline in information asymmetry after certification. In cross-sectional analyses, we find abnormal returns are positively associated with firms that were under investigation, that used Andersen as their auditor, and that practiced aggressive revenue recognition.
Are Investors Influenced by Pro Forma Emphasis and Reconciliations in Earnings Announcements?
Authors: Elliott W. Brooke
Published: March 2008

This study presents the results of an experiment that examines how two underlying characteristics of pro forma earnings announcements, pro forma emphasis and the presence of a quantitative reconciliation, influence nonprofessional investors' and analysts' reliance on pro forma disclosures. The results indicate that the emphasis management places on pro forma earnings, not the mere presence of pro forma earnings, influences nonprofessional investors' judgments and decisions, but that this influence is mitigated by the presence of a quantitative reconciliation. Further analysis reveals that the influence of pro forma emphasis on nonprofessional investors' judgments and decisions seems to be the result of an unintentional cognitive effect as opposed to the perceived informativeness of the earnings figure emphasized by management. Analysts' judgments and decisions were also affected by the presence of reconciliation, but in the opposite direction to those of nonprofessional investors. Specifically, the presence of a quantitative reconciliation led analysts to view pro forma earnings as more reliable, increasing their reliance on the pro forma disclosure in judging the earnings performance of the firm.
Financial Reporting Transparency and Earnings Management (Retracted)
Authors: Hunton James E. , Libby Robert , Mazza Cheri L.
Published: March 2008

Prior research indicates that greater transparency in reporting formats facilitates the detection of earnings management. The current study hypothesizes and demonstrates that greater transparency in comprehensive income reporting also reduces the likelihood that managers will engage in earnings management in the area of increased transparency. In our experiment, 62 financial executives and chief executive officers decide which available-for-sale security to sell from a portfolio. We manipulate the transparency of comprehensive income reporting and the relationship of projected earnings to the consensus forecast in a 2×2 between-subjects design. When projected earnings are below (above) the consensus forecast, participants sell securities that increase (decrease) earnings. However, the rarely used, more transparent format for reporting comprehensive income significantly reduces both income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. Participants in the less transparent setting indicate that earnings management attempts will not be obvious to readers, will improve stock prices, and have no effect on management's reputation for reporting integrity. Conversely, respondents in the more transparent condition suggest that earnings management will be obvious to readers, harmful to stock prices, and damaging to reporting reputation. Results of this study suggest that more transparent reporting requirements will reduce earnings management in the area of increased transparency or change the focus of earnings management to less visible methods.
Fundamentals of Accounting Losses
Authors: Klein April , Marquardt Carol A.
Published: March 2008

This paper examines accounting and nonaccounting factors behind accounting losses over a 50-year period. Using multivariate time-series analysis, we report evidence that the annual percentage of losses for U.S. firms is significantly related to accounting conservatism, Compustat coverage of small firms, real firm performance as measured by cash flows from operations, and business cycle factors. We further find that nonaccounting factors tend to play the dominant role in explaining accounting losses over our sample period. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of macroeconomic productivity, as well as to varying model specifications. Our findings contribute to the literature on accounting losses and accounting conservatism and have implications for the use of accounting loss information in numerous settings.
Does the Form of Management's Earnings Guidance Affect Analysts' Earnings Forecasts? (Retracted)
Authors: Libby Robert , Tan Hun-Tong , Hunton James E.
Published: March 2008

This study examines how the form of management's earnings guidance (point, narrow range, wide range) affects analysts' earnings forecasts. Results from two experiments demonstrate that: (1) guidance form has no effect on analysts' forecasts made immediately after the guidance; and (2) after the actual earnings announcement, guidance form and the relationship of the earnings guidance to actual earnings (guidance error) interact in their effect on analysts' forecasts. After the actual earnings announcement, guidance error leads to higher (lower) analysts' forecasts for firms with downwardly (upwardly) biased guidance; this effect of guidance error is magnified by a narrow range and reduced by a wide range, compared to a point estimate. These results suggest that treating the mean of the range endpoints as equivalent to a point estimate and failing to consider effects after the release of actual earnings may paint an incomplete picture of how management guidance affects analysts and investors. It also offers useful information to managers who issue earnings guidance, and presents a challenge to the psychology literature regarding the effects of information precision on judgment and decision making.
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover
Authors: Desai Hemang , Hogan Chris E. , Wilkins Michael S.
Published: March 2008

In this paper we investigate the reputational penalties to managers of firms announcing earnings restatements. More specifically, we examine management turnover and the subsequent employment of displaced managers at firms announcing earnings restatements during 1997 or 1998. In contrast to prior research (Beneish 1999; Agrawal et al. 1999), which does not find increased turnover following GAAP violations or revelation of corporate fraud, we find that 60 percent of restating firms experience a turnover of at least one top manager within 24 months of the restatement compared to 35 percent among age-, size-, and industry-matched firms. Moreover, the subsequent employment prospects of the displaced managers of restatement firms are poorer than those of the displaced managers of control firms. Our results hold after controlling for firm performance, bankruptcy, and other determinants of management turnover, and suggest that both corporate boards and the external labor market impose significant penalties on managers for violating GAAP. Also, in light of resource constraints at the SEC, our findings are encouraging as they suggest that private penalties for GAAP violations are severe and may serve as partial substitutes for public enforcement of GAAP violations.
Pattern Identification and Industry-Specialist Auditors
Authors: Hammersley Jacqueline S.
Published: March 2008

Complex financial statement misstatements that are difficult to diagnose are likely to be described by multiple cues that individually appear innocuous, but that together form an ominous pattern. Because individual auditors are likely to obtain only some of the cues forming the pattern, it is important to understand how well auditors interpret incomplete cue patterns. In this paper, I examine experimentally whether industry-specialist auditors develop problem representations about a seeded misstatement to facilitate interpretation of incomplete patterns. Overall, I find that matched specialists (i.e., those working in their industry) are able to interpret and fill in partialcue patterns, whereas mismatched specialists do not recognize the implications of even full patterns. Matched specialists respond to a partial-cue pattern that potentially indicates misstatement by developing more complete problem representations about the seeded misstatement, assessing higher risk of misstatement, and suggesting procedures that will be efficient and effective at discriminating the presence of the seeded misstatement. Despite higher assessments of misstatement risk when receiving a partial-cue pattern, mismatched specialists' problem representations are impoverished and suggested procedures do not indicate a focus on the seeded misstatement.
Earnings Management Using Classification Shifting: An Examination of Core Earnings and Special Items
Authors: McVay Sarah Elizabeth
Published: March 2008

This paper examines the classification of items within the income statement as an earnings management tool. Evidence is consistent with managers opportunistically shifting expenses from core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses) to special items. This vertical movement of expenses does not change bottom-line earnings, but overstates “core” earnings. In addition, it appears that managers use this earnings management tool to meet the analyst forecast earnings benchmark, as special items tend to be excluded from both pro forma and analyst earnings definitions.
Does Recognition versus Disclosure Matter? Evidence from Value-Relevance of Banks' Recognized and Disclosed Derivative Financial Instruments
Authors: Ahmed Anwer S. , Kilic Emre , Lobo Gerald J.
Published: March 2008

We provide evidence on how investor valuation of derivative financial instruments differs depending upon whether the fair value of these instruments is recognized or disclosed. Expanded disclosures and accounting practices prior to SFAS No. 133 and mandatory recognition of derivative fair values after SFAS No. 133 provide a natural setting for comparing the valuation implications of recognized and disclosed derivative fair value information. This unique setting mitigates many of the research design problems with recognition versus disclosure studies. Using a sample of banks that simultaneously hold recognized and disclosed derivatives prior to SFAS No. 133, we find that the valuation coefficients on recognized derivatives are significant, whereas the valuation coefficients on disclosed derivatives are not significant. Further, using a sample of banks that have only disclosed derivatives prior to SFAS No. 133, which are recognized after SFAS No.133, we find that while the valuation coefficients on disclosed derivatives are not significant, the valuation coefficients on recognized derivatives are significant. These results are consistent with the view that recognition and disclosure are not substitutes. Our findings suggest that SFAS No. 133 has increased the transparency of derivative financial instruments.