bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Nomic Concepts, Frames, and Conceptual Change
Authors: Andersen Hanne , Nersessian Nancy J.
Published: February 2004

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published at the beginning of what has come to be known as “the cognitive revolution.” With hindsight one can construct significant parallels between the problems of knowledge, perception, and learning with which Kuhn and cognitive scientists were grappling and between the accounts developed by each. However, by and large Kuhn never utilized the research in cognitive science—especially in cognitive psychology—that we believe would have furthered his own paradigm. This is puzzling since he did not have the traditional philosophical aversion to “psychologizing” and in fact drew on insights from psychology to support the most radical claims in Structure, such as the “Gestalt switch” nature of conceptual change. Indeed, the research program outlined there seems intrinsically historical, philosophical, and psychological and Kuhn's work has had considerable influence on research in cognitive science.
Kuhnian Puzzle Solving and Schema Theory
Authors: Nickles Thomas
Published: February 2004

Looking at Thomas Kuhn's work from a cognitive science perspective helps to articulate and to legitimize, to some degree, his rejection of traditional views of concepts, categorization, theory structure, and rule-based problem solving. Whereas my colleagues focus on the later Kuhn of the MIT years, I study the early Kuhn as an anticipation of case-based reasoning and schema theory. These recent developments in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence may point toward a more computational version of Kuhn's ideas, but they also expose ambiguities in his work, notably in his understanding of exemplars.
Fashioning Descriptive Models in Biology: Of Worms and Wiring Diagrams
Authors: Ankeny Rachel A.
Published: February 2004

The biological sciences have become increasingly reliant on so-called ‘model organisms’. I argue that in this domain, the concept of a descriptive model is essential for understanding scientific practice. Using a case study, I show how such a model was formulated in a preexplanatory context for subsequent use as a prototype from which explanations ultimately may be generated both within the immediate domain of the original model and in additional, related domains. To develop this concept of a descriptive model, I focus on use of the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans and the wiring diagrams that were developed as models of its neural structure. In addition, implications of the concept of a descriptive model, particularly its relevance for the data-phenomena distinction as well as its relation to long-standing debates on realism, are briefly examined.
Organism and Character Decomposition: Steps Towards an Integrative Theory of Biology
Authors: Laubichler Manfred D. , Wagner Günter P.
Published: February 2004

In this paper we argue that an operational organism concept can help to overcome the structural deficiency of mathematical models in biology. In our opinion, the structural deficiency of mathematical models lies mainly in our inability to identify functionally relevant biological characters in biological systems, and not so much in a lack of adequate mathematical representations of biological processes. We argue that the problem of character identification in biological systems is linked to the question of a properly formulated organism concept. Lastly, we demonstrate how a decomposition of an organism into independent characters in the context of a specific biological process—such as adaptation by means of natural selection—depends on the dynamical properties and invariance conditions of the equations that describe this process.
Ontological Butchery: Organism Concepts and Biological Generalizations
Authors: Wilson Jack A.
Published: February 2004

Biology lacks a central organism concept that unambiguously marks the distinction between organism and non-organism because the most important questions about organisms do not depend on this concept. I argue that the two main ways to discover useful biological generalizations about multicellular organization—the study of homology within multicellular lineages and of convergent evolution across lineages in which multicellularity has been independently established—do not require what would have to be a stipulative sharpening of an organism concept.
The Organism in Development
Authors: Richardson Robert C.
Published: February 2004

Developmental biology has resurfaced in recent years, often without a clearly central role for the organism. The organism is pulled in divergent directions: on the one hand, there is an important body of work that emphasizes the role of the gene in development, as executing and controlling embryological change; on the other hand, there are more theoretical approaches under which the organism disappears as little more than an instance for testing biological generalizations. I press here for the ineliminability of the organism in developmental biology on explanatory grounds. I examine classical work concerned with growth and development, particularly inDrosophilaandC. elegans.Some of this work is suggestive of modular development, and accordingly suggests a level below that of the organism as being explanatory. These are not the only type of case. There are other equally well-established results, which indicate greater integration in the developing organism. Though with a modular organization the organism can be thought of as made up of its constituent traits, and though the explanations of these traits may lie in terms of cells or genes, even with modular development the explanations of “genetic” differences require an appeal to the organism. With non-modular organization the organism has an even more central role. This does not mean that these genetic or cellular contributions are unreal in any way, or that development requires some sort of vitalistic contribution; but the genetic contributions make sense only as constituents of the organism, embedded in a larger organic context.
Development, Culture, and the Units of Inheritance
Authors: Griesemer James
Published: February 2004

Developmental systems theory (DST) expands the unit of replication from genes to whole systems of developmental resources, which DST interprets in terms of cycling developmental processes. Expansion seems required by DST's argument against privileging genes in evolutionary and developmental explanations of organic traits. DST and the expanded replicator brook no distinction between biological and cultural evolution. However, by endorsing a single expanded unit of inheritance and leaving the classical molecular notion of gene intact, DST achieves only a nominal reunification of heredity and development. I argue that an alternative conceptualization of inheritance denies the classical opposition of genetics and development while avoiding the singularity inherent in the replicator concept. It also yields a new unit—the reproducer—which genuinely integrates genetic and developmental perspectives. The reproducer concept articulates the non-separability of “genetic” and “developmental” roles in units of heredity, development, and evolution. DST reformulated in terms of reproducers rather than replicators preserves an empirically interesting distinction between cultural and biological evolution.
Development, Evolution, and Adaptation
Authors: Sterelny Kim
Published: February 2004

In this paper I develop three conceptions of the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology. I further argue that: (a) the choice between them largely turns on as yet unresolved empirical considerations; (b) none of these conceptions demand a fundamental conceptual reevaluation of evolutionary biology; and (c) while developmental systems theorists have constructed an important and innovative alternative to the standard view of the genotype/phenotype relations, in considering the general issue of the relationship between evolutionary and developmental biology, we can remain neutral on this debate.
The Brain's “New” Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology, and Constraint
Authors: Hatfield Gary
Published: February 2004

There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments about the fundamentality or objectivity of physics or physiology in relation to psychology.
Chaos in a Model of an Open Quantum System
Authors: Kronz Frederick M.
Published: February 2004

In a previous essay I argued that quantum chaos cannot be exhibited in models of quantum systems within von Neumann's mathematical framework for quantum mechanics, and that it can be exhibited in models within Dirac's formal framework. In this essay, the negative thesis concerning von Neumann's framework is elaborated further by extending it to the case of Hamiltonian operators having a continuous spectrum. The positive thesis concerning Dirac's formal framework is also elaborated further by constructing a chaotic model of an open quantum system in which an entropy measure is shown to approach its maximum value as time goes to infinity. Having such an entropy measure is a characteristic that is closely connected to chaotic behavior in phase space models of classical systems.
Chaos and Fundamentalism
Authors: Belot Gordon
Published: February 2004

It is natural to wonder what our multitude of successful physical theories tell us about the world—singly, and as a body. What are we to think when one theory tells us about a flat Newtonian spacetime, the next about a curved Lorentzian geometry, and we have hints of others, portraying discrete or higher-dimensional structures which look something like more familiar spacetimes in appropriate limits?
The Gauge Argument
Authors: Teller Paul
Published: February 2004

This paper examines the so-called “gauge argument” sometimes used by physicists to motivate the introduction of gauge fields, here facilitated by an informal exposition of the fiber bundle formalism. The discussion suggests some preliminary ways of understanding the connection between gauge fields and interactions.
Mathematics and Reality: Two Notions of Spacetime in the Analytic and Constructionist Views of Gauge Field Theories
Authors: Auyang Sunny Y.
Published: February 2004

This paper presents two interpretations of the fiber bundle fonnalism that is applicable to all gauge field theories. The constructionist interpretation yields a substantival spacetime. The analytic interpretation yields a structural spacetime, a third option besides the familiar substantivalism and relationalism. That the same mathematical fonnalism can be derived in two different ways leading to two different ontological interpretations reveals the inadequacy of pure fonnal arguments.
Reeh-Schlieder Meets Newton-Wigner
Authors: Fleming Gordon N.
Published: February 2004

The Reeh-Schlieder theorem asserts the vacuum and certain other states to be spacelike superentangled relative to local quantum fields. This motivates an inquiry into the physical status of various concepts of localization. It is argued that a covariant generalization of Newton-Wigner localization is a physically illuminating concept. When analyzed in terms of nonlocally covariant quantum fields, creating and annihilating quanta in Newton-Wigner localized states, the vacuum is seen to not possess the spacelike superentanglement that the Reeh-Schlieder theorem displays relative to local fields, and to be locally empty as well as globally empty. Newton-Wigner localization is then shown to be physically interpretable in terms of a covariant generalization of the center of energy, the two localizations being identical if the system has no internal angular momentum. Finally, some of the counterintuitive features of Newton-Wigner localization are shown to have close analogues in classical special relativity.
Discussion: Conceptual Foundations of Field Theories in Physics
Authors: Wayne Andrew
Published: February 2004

This discussion provides a brief commentary on each of the papers presented in the symposium on the conceptual foundations of field theories in physics. In Section 2 I suggest an alternative to Paul Teller's (1999) reading of the gauge argument that may help to solve, or dissolve, its puzzling aspects. In Section 3 I contend that Sunny Auyang's (1999) arguments against substantivalism and for “objectivism” in the context of gauge field theories face serious worries. Finally, in Section 4 I claim that Gordon Fleming's (1999) proposal for hyperplane-dependent Newton-Wigner fields differs importantly from his previous arguments about hyperplane-dependent properties in quantum mechanics.
Becoming and the Arrow of Causation
Authors: Dorato Mauro
Published: February 2004

The conceptual relation between objective becoming and the direction of time is explored by discussing an ontologically asymmetric notion of causation. It is claimed that such a notion, in terms of which Stein defined objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime, has either a purely metaphysical status or is reducible to physical concepts. In the former case, it is adequate for Stein's purpose but irrelevant to physical theories. In the latter, the causal asymmetry can be related to irreversible physical processes only in an extrinsic way. This dilemma creates additional difficulties both to a unified theory of the direction of time and to the project of making room for becoming in the physical world.
QM and STR: The Combining of Quantum Mechanics and Relativity Theory
Authors: McCall Storrs
Published: February 2004

Combining quantum mechanics with special relativity requires (i) that a spacetime representation of quantum states be found; (ii) that such states, represented as extended along equal-time hyperplanes, be invariant when transformed from one frame to another; and (iii) that collapses of states be instantaneous in every frame. These requirements are met using branching spacetime, in which probabilities of outcomes are represented by the numerical proportions of branches on which the outcomes occur. Quantum states of systems are then identified with the probability values, built into spacetime along spacelike hypersurfaces, of all possible outcomes of all possible tests to which the systems can be subjected.
Relativity and Persistence
Authors: Balashov Yuri
Published: February 2004

The nature of persistence of physical objects over time has been intensely debated in contemporary metaphysics. The two opposite views are widely known as “endurantism” (or “three-dimensionalism”) and “perdurantism” (“four-dimensionalism”). According to the former, objects are extended in three spatial dimensions and persist through time by being wholly present at any moment at which they exist. On the rival account, objects are extended both in space and time and persist by having “temporal parts,” no part being present at more than one time. Relativistic considerations seem highly relevant to this debate. But they have played little role in it so far. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I argue that considerations based on the special theory of relativity and the notion of coexistence favor perdurantism over endurantism.
A Defense of Presentism in a Relativistic Setting
Authors: Hinchliff Mark
Published: February 2004

Presentism is the view, roughly speaking, that only presently existing things exist. Though presentism offers many attractive solutions to problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, it faces threats from two main sources: McTaggart and the special theory of relativity. This paper explores the prospects for fitting presentism together with the special theory. Two models are proposed, one which fits presentism into a relativistic setting (the cone model) and one which fits the special theory into a presentistic setting (the surface model). It is concluded that there is no good reason arising from the special theory of relativity for rejecting presentism. Presentism is tenable here and preferable elsewhere.
Shedding Light on Time
Authors: Callender Craig
Published: February 2004

Throughout this century many philosophers and physicists have gone for the ‘big kill’ regarding tenses. They have tried to show via McTaggart's paradox and special relativity that tenses are logically and physically impossible, respectively. Neither attempt succeeds, though as I argue, both leave their mark. In the first two sections of the paper I introduce some conceptual difficulties for the tensed theory of time. The next section then discusses the standing of tenses in light of special relativity, especially recent work by Stein on the topic. I argue that, Stein's possibility theorem notwithstanding, special relativity is inconsistent with anyphilosophically interestingconception of tense. Finally, I search for help for tenses in the broader context of quantum theory, Lorentzian interpretations of time dilation/length contraction, and general relativistic spacetimes. I suggest that these avenues do not provide tenses the home for which some have hoped.
Tense and Indeterminateness
Authors: Saunders Simon
Published: February 2004

Is tense real and objective? Can the fact that something is past, say, be wholly objective, consistent with modern physics? I believe that it can. But some hold that for tense to be real, then a certain ontological doctrine must also hold. There must be a fact of the matter as to what really, truly, exists at each time. For example, it is held that only what is now really exists. This is the doctrine of presentism. Alternatively, that only what is now or past really exists; following Savitt, I shall call this possibilism. But on either view there is a problem with special relativity.
Putting Quantum Mechanics to Work in Chemistry: The Power of Diagrammatic Representation
Authors: Woody Andrea I.
Published: February 2004

Most contemporary chemists consider quantum mechanics to be the foundational theory of their discipline, although few of the calculations that a strict reduction would seem to require have ever been produced. In this essay I discuss contemporary algebraic and diagrammatic representations of molecular systems derived from quantum mechanical models, specifically configuration interaction wavefunctions for ab initio calculations and molecular orbital energy diagrams. My aim is to suggest that recent dissatisfaction with reductive accounts of chemical theory may stem from both the inability of standard accounts of reduction to incorporate the diverse forms of representation found in chemical practice and our philosophical predilection to analyze all connections between theories in terms of logical reduction.
How We Divide the World
Authors: Root Michael
Published: February 2004

Real kinds or categories, according to conventional wisdom, enter into lawlike generalizations, while nominal kinds do not. Thus, gold but not jewelry is a real kind. However, by such a criterion, few if any kinds or systems of classification employed in the social science are real, for the social sciences offer, at best, only restricted generalizations. Thus, according to conventional wisdom, race and class are on a par with telephone area codes and postal zones; all are nominal rather than real. I propose an account of real kinds that recognizes the current reality of race but not zip codes and shows how a kind can be both constructed and real. One virtue of such an understanding of realism is the light shed on our current practice of racial classification. Race is not a real biological kind but neither is race a myth or illusion. However, the question of whether a social kind is real is separate from whether the category is legitimate. W. E. B. Du Bois maintained that while there are no biological races, race is real and should be conserved. My aim, in this paper, is not to argue for the legitimacy or conservation of race but to defend Du Bois's idea that kinds of people can be both made up and real and provide an understanding of realism that does justice to the social sciences.
Half-Naturalized Social Kinds
Authors: Miller Richard W.
Published: February 2004

We often legitimately ascribe reality both to social and to natural kinds. But the bases for these ascriptions are not entirely the same. In both cases, reality is typically determined by what characterizations of causal factors are indispensable to adequate explanation. Nonetheless, a psychological role as part of an identity that instances embrace is sometimes, distinctively, a condition for ascribing reality to a social kind. Although such assessments of reality can be construed as employing a standard of causal activity shared with natural science, they reveal a distinctive moral dimension in the bases for ascribing reality to social kinds.
Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?
Authors: Andreasen Robin O.
Published: February 2004

Race was once thought to be a real biological kind. Today the dominant view is that objective biological races don't exist. I challenge the trend to reject the biological reality of race by arguing that cladism (a school of classification that individuates taxa by appeal to common ancestry) provides a new way to define race biologically. I also reconcile the proposed biological conception with constructivist theories about race. Most constructivists assume that biological realism and social constructivism are incompatible views about race; I argue that the two conceptions can be compatible.
Global Arguments and Local Realism About the Social Sciences
Authors: Kincaid Harold
Published: February 2004

This paper argues that realism issue in the social sciences is not one that can be decided by general philosophical arguments that evaluate entire domains at once. The realism issue is instead many different empirical issues. To defend these claims, I sort issues that are often run together, explicate and criticize several standard realist and antirealist arguments about the social sciences, and use the example of the productive/nonproductive distinction to illustrate the approach to realism questions that I favor.
Philosophy of Science that Ignores Science: Race, IQ and Heritability
Authors: Sesardic Neven
Published: February 2004

Philosophers of science widely believe that the hereditarian theory about racial differences in IQ is based on methodological mistakes and confusions involving the concept of heritability. I argue that this “received view” is wrong: methodological criticisms popular among philosophers are seriously misconceived, and the discussion in philosophy of science about these matters is largely disconnected from the real, empirically complex issues debated in science.
Anti-Representationalism and the Dynamical Stance
Authors: Chemero Anthony
Published: February 2004

Arguments in favor of anti-representationalism in cognitive science often suffer from a lack of attention to detail. The purpose of this paper is to fill in the gaps in these arguments, and in so doing show that at least one form of anti-representationalism is potentially viable. After giving a teleological definition of representation and applying it to a few models that have inspired anti-representationalist claims, I argue that anti-representationalism must be divided into two distinct theses, one ontological, one epistemological. Given the assumptions that define the debate, I give reason to think that the ontological thesis is false. I then argue that the epistemological thesis might, in the end, turn out to be true, despite a potentially serious difficulty. Along the way, there will be a brief detour to discuss a controversy from early twentieth century physics.
Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Grantham Todd
Published: February 2004

Arguments about the evolutionary function of phenomenal consciousness are beset by the problem of epiphenomenalism. For if it is not clear whether phenomenal consciousness has a causal role, then it is difficult to begin an argument for the evolutionary role of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that complexity arguments offer a way around this problem. According to evolutionary biology, the structural complexity of a given organ can provide evidence that the organ is an adaptation, even if nothing is known about the causal role of the organ. Evidence from cognitive neuropsychology suggests that phenomenal consciousness is structurally complex in the relevant way, and this provides prima facie evidence that phenomenal consciousness is an adaptation. Furthermore, we argue that the complexity of phenomenal consciousness might also provide clues about the causal role of phenomenal consciousness.
Theoreticity, Underdetermination, and the Disregard for Bizarre Scientific Hypotheses
Authors: Kukla André
Published: February 2004

Theproblem of scientific disregardis the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property oftheoreticity.This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis.
Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy
Authors: Craver Carl F.
Published: February 2004

Many areas of science develop by discovering mechanisms and role functions. Cummins' (1975) analysis of role functions—according to which an item's role function is a capacity of that item that appears in an analytic explanation of the capacity of some containing system—captures one important sense of “function” in the biological sciences and elsewhere. Here I synthesize Cummins' account with recent work on mechanisms and causal/mechanical explanation. The synthesis produces an analysis of specifically mechanistic role functions, one that uses the characteristic active, spatial, temporal, and hierarchical organization of mechanisms to add precision and content to Cummins' original suggestion. This synthesis also shows why the discovery of role functions is a scientific achievement. Discovering a role function (i) contributes to the interlevel integration of multilevel mechanisms, and (ii) provides a unique, contextual variety of causal/mechanical explanation.
Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective
Authors: Mahner Martin , Bunge Mario
Published: February 2004

In this paper we examine the following problems: How many concepts of function are there in biology, social science, and technology? Are they logically related and if so, how? Which of these function concepts effect a functional explanation as opposed to a mere functional account? What are the consequences of a pluralist view of functions for functionalism? We submit that there are five concepts of function in biology, which are logically related in a particular way, and six function concepts in social science and technology. Only two of them may help effect a genuine functional explanation. Finally, our synthetic approach allows us to distinguish four different varieties of functionalism in biology, psychology, social science, and technology: formalist, black boxist, adaptationist, and teleological. And only one of them is explanatory in the strong sense defended here.
Logic, Probability, and Coherence
Authors: Vickers John M.
Published: February 2004

How does deductive logic constrain probability? This question is difficult for subjectivistic approaches, according to which probability is just strength of (prudent) partial belief, for this presumes logical omniscience. This paper proposes that the way in which probability lies always between possibility and necessity can be made precise by exploiting a minor theorem of de Finetti: In any finite set of propositions the expected number of truths is the sum of the probabilities over the set. This is generalized to apply to denumerable languages. It entails that the sum of probabilities can neither exceed nor be exceeded by the cardinalities of all consistent and closed (within the set) subsets. In general any numerical function on sentences is said to be logically coherent if it satisfies this condition. Logical coherence allows the relativization of necessity: A function p on a language is coherent with respect to the concept T of necessity iff there is no set of sentences on which the sum of p exceeds or is exceeded by the cardinality of every T-consistent and T-closed (within the set) subset of the set. Coherence is easily applied as well to sets on which the sum of p does not converge.

Probability should also be relativized by necessity: A T-probability assigns one to every T-necessary sentence and is additive over disjunctions of pairwise T-incompatible sentences. Logical T-coherence is then equivalent to T-probability: All and only T-coherent functions are T-probabilities.
Reeh-Schlieder Defeats Newton-Wigner: On Alternative Localization Schemes in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory
Authors: Halvorson Hans
Published: February 2004

Many of the “counterintuitive” features of relativistic quantum field theory have their formal root in the Reeh-Schlieder theorem, which in particular entails that local operations applied to the vacuum state can produce any state of the entire field. It is of great interest then that I. E. Segal and, more recently, G. Fleming (in a paper entitled “Reeh-Schlieder meets Newton-Wigner”) have proposed an alternative “Newton-Wigner” localization scheme that avoids the Reeh-Schlieder theorem. In this paper, I reconstruct the Newton-Wigner localization scheme and clarify the limited extent to which it avoids the counterintuitive consequences of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem. I also argue that there is no coherent interpretation of the Newton-Wigner localization scheme that renders it free from act-outcome correlations at spacelike separation.
Quantum Indeterminism and Evolutionary Biology
Authors: Stamos David N.
Published: February 2004

In “The Indeterministic Character of Evolutionary Theory: No ‘Hidden Variables Proof’ But No Room for Determinism Either,” Brandon and Carson (1996) argue that evolutionary theory is statistical because the processes it describes are fundamentally statistical. In “Is Indeterminism the Source of the Statistical Character of Evolutionary Theory?” Graves, Horan, and Rosenberg (1999) argue in reply that the processes of evolutionary biology are fundamentally deterministic and that the statistical character of evolutionary theory is explained by epistemological rather than ontological considerations. In this paper I focus on the topic of mutation. By focusing on some of the theory and research on this topic from early to late, I show how quantum indeterminism hooks up to point mutations (via tautomeric shifts, proton tunneling, and aqueous thermal motion). I conclude with a few thoughts on some of the wider implications of this topic.
The Curve-Fitting Problem: An Objectivist View
Authors: Mulaik Stanley A.
Published: February 2004

Model simplicity in curve fitting is the fewness of parameters estimated. I use a vector model of least squares estimation to show that degrees of freedom, the difference between the number of observed parameters fit by the model and the number of explanatory parameters estimated, are the number of potential dimensions in which data are free to differ from a model and indicate the disconfirmability of the model. Though often thought to control for parameter estimation, the AIC and similar indices do not do so for all model applications, while goodness of fit indices like chi-square, which explicitly take into account degrees of freedom, do. Hypothesis testing with prespecified values for parameters is based on a metaphoric regulative subject/object schema taken from object perception and has as its goal the accumulation of objective knowledge.
Money Pumps
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: February 2004

After maintaining in (Sobel 1997) that certain cyclical preferences can be reasonable, the following questions were tabled: “in what circumstances and under what assumptions … these … preferences of George's would turn him into a ”money pump,” and in what circumstances and under what assumptions they would not do that.” (47) Two pumps afford answers. George, who is sufficiently reasonable and well-informed to use backward induction, has, for this reason, nothing to fear from the first pump, but the second, of a nonstandard design by Wlodek Rabinowicz, ruins him just because he is subject to the constraints of backward induction. Could he be helped by extending his options from actions in a single round, to courses of actions starting in that round? Possibly not. He would be safe if he were capable of resolute choices of couses of action. Even so, he is in trouble through no fault of his, if, as I think, not having that capacity, though a misfortune, is not a fault.
Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism
Authors: Christensen David
Published: February 2004

Both Representation Theorem Arguments and Dutch Book Arguments support taking probabilistic coherence as an epistemic norm. Both depend on connecting beliefs to preferences, which are not clearly within the epistemic domain. Moreover, these connections are standardly grounded in questionable definitional/metaphysical claims. The paper argues that these definitional/metaphysical claims are insupportable. It offers a way of reconceiving Representation Theorem arguments which avoids the untenable premises. It then develops a parallel approach to Dutch Book Arguments, and compares the results. In each case preference-defects serve as a diagnostic tool, indicating purely epistemic defects.
Genetic Information: A Metaphor In Search of a Theory
Authors: Griffiths Paul E.
Published: February 2004

John Maynard Smith has defended against philosophical criticism the view that developmental biology is the study of the expression of information encoded in the genes by natural selection. However, like other naturalistic concepts of information, this “teleosemantic” concept is equally applicable to many non-genetic factors in development. Maynard Smith also fails to show that developmental biology is concerned with teleosemantic information. Some other ways to support Maynard Smith's conclusion are considered. It is argued that on any definition of information the view that development is the expression of genetic information is misleading. Some reasons for the popularity of that view are suggested.
Refusing the Devil's Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?
Authors: Stanford P. Kyle
Published: February 2004

Advocates have sought toprovethat underdetermination obtains because all theories haveempirical equivalents.But algorithms for generating empirical equivalents simply exchange underdetermination for familiar philosophical chestnuts, while the few convincing examples of empirical equivalents will not support the desired sweeping conclusions. Nonetheless, underdetermination does not depend on empirical equivalents: our warrant for current theories is equally undermined by presently unconceived alternatives as well-confirmed merely by theexistingevidence, so long as this transient predicament recurs for each theory and body of evidence we consider. The historical record supports the claim that this recurrent, transient underdetermination predicament is our own.
Is Structural Realism Possible?
Authors: Psillos Stathis
Published: February 2004

This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker realist position. (It has been recently advocated by Worrall, French, and Ladyman.) This paper unravels and criticizes the metaphysical presuppositions of both paths to SR. It questions its very possibility as a substantive—and viable—realist thesis.
Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?
Authors: Hendry Robin Findlay
Published: February 2004

Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist or instrumentalist. I argue that there are no good arguments for the indifference claim under the second interpretation, and good reasons to think that it is false.
Deflationary Metaphysics and the Natures of Maps
Authors: Sismondo Sergio , Chrisman Nicholas
Published: February 2004

“Scientific theories are maps of the natural world.” This metaphor is often used as part of a deflationary argument for a weak but relatively global version of scientific realism, a version that recognizes the place of conventions, goals, and contingencies in scientific representations, while maintaining that they are typically true in a clear and literal sense. By examining, in a naturalistic way, some relationships between maps and what they map, we question the scope and value of realist construals of maps—and by extension of scientific representations. Deflationary philosophy of science requires more variegated stances.
Reference and Resemblance
Authors: Andersen Hanne
Published: February 2004

Many discussions between realists and non-realists have centered on the issue of reference, especially whether there is referential stability during theory change. In this paper, I shall summarize the debate, sketching the problems that remain within the two opposing positions, and show that both have ended on their own slippery slope, sliding away from their original position toward that of their opponents. In the search for a viable intermediate position, I shall then suggest an account of reference which, to a degree, follows the causal theory in explaining reference as carving the world at its joints. Contrary to the causal theory, however, I submit that this world is a phenomenal world whose variable joints exist only in a historical process in which they are transmitted gradually from one generation to the next. According to this account, the joints of the phenomenal world are constituted by family resemblance, where bundles of features that span bounded areas in perceptual space underlie the joints. Furthermore, the integrity of the cognitive process by which these joints are recognized depends on a transmission process by which new generations are presented with given joints and bundles by the preceding generation. Contrary to a traditional realist account, this heritage from the preceding generation may be transformed into new joints and bundles before transmission to new generations. This permits a continuous process of referential change in which the joints and bundles at different stages in the development of a theory can be connected by chains-of-reasoning.
The Reemergence of ‘Emergence’
Authors: Cunningham Bryon
Published: February 2004

A variety of recent philosophical discussions, particularly on topics relating to complexity, have begun to reemploy the concept of ‘emergence’. Although multiple concepts of ‘emergence’ are available, little effort has been made to systematically distinguish them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of higher-order properties that (inter alia) distinguishes three classes of emergent properties: (1) ontologically basic properties of complex entities, such as the mythical vital properties, (2) fully configurational properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived of by functionalists and computationalists, and (3) highly configurational/holistic properties, such as the higher-level patterns characteristic of complex dynamical systems. Or more simply: emergence as ontological liberality, emergence as multiple realizability, and emergence as interactive complexity.
Undermining Undermined: Why Humean Supervenience Never Needed to Be Debugged (Even If It's a Necessary Truth)
Authors: Roberts John T.
Published: February 2004

The existence of “undermining futures” appears to show that a contradiction can be deduced from the conjunction of Humean supervenience (HS) about chance and the Principal Principle. A number of strategies for rescuing HS from this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper, a novel way of defending HS from the threat is presented, and it is argued that this defense has advantages not shared by others. In particular, it requires no revisionism about chance, and it is equally available to defenders of HS who hold HS to be necessary and those who hold it to be contingent.
Probability and Symmetry
Authors: Bartha Paul , Johns Richard
Published: February 2004

The Principle of Indifference, which dictates that we ought to assign two outcomes equal probability in the absence of known reasons to do otherwise, is vulnerable to well-known objections. Nevertheless, the appeal of the principle, and of symmetry-based assignments of equal probability, persists. We show that, relative to a given class of symmetries satisfying certain properties, we are justified in calling certain outcomes equally probable, and more generally, in defining what we call relative probabilities. Relative probabilities are useful in providing a generalized approach to conditionalization. The technique is illustrated by application to simple examples.
A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications
Authors: Fitelson Branden
Published: February 2004

A Bayesian account of independent evidential support is outlined. This account is partly inspired by the work of C. S. Peirce. I show that a large class of quantitative Bayesian measures of confirmation satisfy some basic desiderata suggested by Peirce for adequate accounts of independent evidence. I argue that, by considering further natural constraints on a probabilistic account of independent evidence, all but a very small class of Bayesian measures of confirmation can be ruled out. In closing, another application of my account to the problem of evidential diversity is also discussed.
Statistical Model Selection Criteria and Bayesianism
Authors: Kieseppä I. A.
Published: February 2004

Two Bayesian approaches to choosing between statistical models are contrasted. One of these is an approach which Bayesian statisticians regularly use for motivating the use of AIC, BIC, and other similar model selection criteria, and the other one is a new approach which has recently been proposed by Bandyopadhayay, Boik, and Basu. The latter approach is criticized, and the basic ideas of the former approach are presented in a way that makes them accessible to a philosophical audience. It is also pointed out that the former approach establishes a new, philosophically interesting connection between the notions of simplicity and informativeness.
Bayesian Statistics in Radiocarbon Calibration
Authors: Steel Daniel
Published: February 2004

Critics of Bayesianism often assert that scientists are not Bayesians. The widespread use of Bayesian statistics in the field of radiocarbon calibration is discussed in relation to this charge. This case study illustrates the willingness of scientists to use Bayesian statistics when the approach offers some advantage, while continuing to use orthodox methods in other contexts. The case of radiocarbon calibration, therefore, suggests a picture of statistical practice in science as eclectic and pragmatic rather than rigidly adhering to any one theoretical position.
Old Evidence and New Explanation III
Authors: Wagner Carl G.
Published: February 2004

Garber (1983) and Jeffrey (1991, 1995) have both proposed solutions to the old evidence problem. Jeffrey's solution, based on a new probability revision method called reparation, has been generalized to the case of uncertain old evidence and probabilistic new explanation in Wagner 1997, 1999. The present paper reformulates some of the latter work, highlighting the central role of Bayes factors and their associated uniformity principle, and extending the analysis to the case in which an hypothesis bears on a countable family of evidentiary propositions. This extension shows that no Garber-type approach is capable of reproducing the results of generalized reparation.
Reentrant Neural Pathways and the Theory-Ladenness of Perception
Authors: Raftopoulos Athanassios
Published: February 2004

In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call perception, is bottom-up and theory neutral. As such, perception could play the role of common ground on which a naturalized epistemology can be built and relativism avoided.
Model Organisms as Models: Understanding the ‘Lingua Franca’ of the Human Genome Project
Authors: Ankeny Rachel A.
Published: February 2004

Through an examination of the actual research strategies and assumptions underlying the Human Genome Project (HGP), it is argued that the epistemic basis of the initial model organism programs is not best understood as reasoning via causal analog models (CAMs). In order to answer a series of questions about what is being modeled and what claims about the models are warranted, a descriptive epistemological method is employed that uses historical techniques to develop detailed accounts which, in turn, help to reveal forms of reasoning that are explicit, or more often implicit, in the practice of a particular field of scientific study. It is suggested that a more valid characterization of the reasoning structure at work here is a form of case-based reasoning. This conceptualization of the role of model organisms can guide our understanding and assessment of these research programs, their knowledge claims and progress, and their limitations, as well as how we educate the public about this type of biomedical research.
Group-Level Cognition
Authors: Wilson Robert A.
Published: February 2004

David Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of agroup mindas an application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology and what I call thesocial manifestation thesis—a thesis about the psychology of individuals. Contemporary work on this topic has confused these two theses. My discussion also points to research questions and issues that Wilson's work raises, as well as their connection to externalist conceptions of the mind familiar since the work of Putnam and Burge.