bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Spatially Resolved Spectroscopy of Starburst and Post-Starburst Galaxies in the Rich z ∼0.55 Cluster CL 0016+16
Authors: Pracy Michael B. , Couch Warrick J. , Kuntschner Harald
Published: September 2010

We have used the Low Resolution Imaging Spectrograph on the W. M. Keck I telescope to obtain spatially resolved spectroscopy of a small sample of six ‘post-starburst’ and three ‘dusty-starburst’ galaxies in the rich cluster CL 0016+16 at z=0.55. We use this to measure radial profiles of the Hδ and [OII]λ3727 lines which are diagnostic probes of the mechanisms that give rise to the abrupt changes in star formation rates in these galaxies. In the post-starburst sample we are unable to detect any radial gradients in the Hδ line equivalent width — although one galaxy exhibits a gradient from one side of the galaxy to the other. The absence of Hδ gradients in these galaxies is consistent with their production via interaction with the intracluster medium; however, our limited spatial sampling prevents us from drawing robust conclusions. All members of the sample have early-type morphologies, typical of post-starburst galaxies in general, but lack the high incidence of tidal tails and disturbances seen in local field samples. This argues against a merger origin and adds weight to a scenario where truncation by the intra-cluster medium is at work. The post-starburst spectral signature is consistent over the radial extent probed with no evidence of [OII]λ3727 emission and strong Hδ absorption at all radii, i.e. the post-starburst classification is not an aperture effect. In contrast the ‘dusty-starburst’ sample shows a tendency for a central concentration of [OII]λ3727 emission. This is most straightforwardly interpreted as the consequence of a central starburst. However, other possibilities exist such as a non-uniform dust distribution (which is expected in such galaxies) and/or a non-uniform starburst age distribution. The members of the sample exhibit late-type and irregular morphologies.
Modification of silver anode and cathode for a top-illuminated organic photovoltaic device
Authors: Lin Chi-Feng , Liu Shun-Wei , Hsu Wei-Feng , Zhang Mi , Chiu Tien-Lung , Wu Yunfeng , Lee Jiun-Haw
Published: September 2010

We have demonstrated a top-illuminated organic photovoltaic device with a thick Ag anode and a thin Ag cathode capped with an α-naphthylphenylbiphenyl diamine (NPB) thin film. The surface of the Ag anode was oxidized by UV–ozone which improved the carrier collection and reduced the exciton quenching. Compared with the control device with an indium tin oxide anode, a 15.59 times reduction in the serial resistance and a 1.72 times increase in the shunt resistance were observed with a fill factor of 0.61 in such a device. The NPB capping layer not only improved the light transmission from the semitransparent cathode, but also hindered the formation of Ag island growth and thereby improved the device stability.
The Taste of Music
Authors: Benamou Marc
Published: September 2010

This chapter is a lexicographic exploration of the word rasa, which may (too) generally be translated as “affect” or “intuition.” In fact, rasa is much more than that. Its meanings are multiple and layered, as demonstrated by the many oral citations from musicians interviewed for the study. Some attention is given as well to how the word is used in a nonmusical context, which necessarily brings in Javanese psychological and philosophical theories of selfhood and perception (kebatinan), which in turn have a strong foundation in Buddhism and Sufism.
The Classification of Rasa Gendhing
Authors: Benamou Marc
Published: September 2010

Chapter 3 focuses on only one of the meanings of rasa identified in chapter 2, namely, “musical affect, ” or rasa gendhing. It thus leaves aside other dimensions of the concept and investigates the range of rasas that may be expressed musically, as well as how they may be combined into a piece. To understand this panoply more fully, we must in turn ask how the various musical affects are related to each other—in other words, how the rasa lexicon is structured into intersecting categories. An important point that emerges as rasas are mapped into shifting constellations of relatedness, is just how paramount connotative meaning is. Like chapter 2, then, this chapter is mainly semantic in nature.
Having Rasa, Part 1
Authors: Benamou Marc
Published: September 2010

Chapter 4 attempts to weave together musical affect and musical context, aesthetics and sociology. For in assessing who or what has rasa, we are led back to the Javanese categories of geography, gender, and social status first described in chapter 1. That is, this chapter looks for patterns in just which performances—and, more particularly, which performers—are said to have more or less rasa than others. Three large themes are identified: veneration, the inside/outside metaphor, and moderation and suitability. Some attention to changing preferences is also given.
The Berlin Organ Scene, ca. 1770–ca. 1820
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter describes the emergence of Berlin as the center of the German organ world in the late 18th century. It presents a brief overview of some of the principal churches and organs of Berlin in the period c.1770 to c.1820, to help provide an understanding of why so many gifted organists were drawn there. The churches mentioned are or were almost all located in the center of Berlin; or more specifically, in what was until reunification, East Berlin. These include parish churches, churches not under municipal patronage, and Lutheran churches.
Mendelssohn: The Formative Years, 1820–1838
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter details the life of Mendelssohn from 1820-38. It argues that consideration of Mendelssohn and the organ must proceed from the premise that, first and last, Mendelssohn was a secular musician. Unlike the great body of organists and organ composers of the past, Mendelssohn never held a regular church post anywhere. Haydn, Mozart, and even Beethoven had all at one time or another known the weekly routines and responsibilities of the church organist. Mendelssohn, on the other hand, remained exempt from such duties: In the first place he was financially independent and did not need the meager salary that most organists were paid. From early on, Mendelssohn's primary professional locus was the concert hall; by his early twenties he had already built an international reputation as a composer, conductor, and brilliant keyboard performer. Given the demands of his widespread musical activities, it would have been impossible for him to carry out the normal responsibilities of a church organist or cantor. Beyond the purely fiscal and social reasons that allowed him to avoid taking on a position as a church organist, there was also the question of temperament. Perhaps most important, he was simply not by nature religiously inclined in any traditional sense. He had grown up in a household that was resolutely secular in character, and it is consequently little wonder that he was left largely untouched by either Jewish or Protestant Christian theology.
Mendelssohn As Organ Improviser
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on Mendelssohn's skills in improvising organ music. While improvisation of “serious” music was largely relegated to the “artistic limbo [of ] the organ loft” in the 20th century, it was still considered a requisite for any aspiring pianist or organist throughout most of the 18th and 19th centuries. Certainly this aim was also true for Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn developed his extraordinary skills in improvisation at a very early age. Mendelssohn's improvisatory style made also itself felt in his written organ works.
Mendelssohn As Editor Of Bach's Organ Music
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter shows that Mendelssohn's achievements as an editor of Bach's organ music were both innovative and important. In collaboration with Marx he was the first to edit and publish some of Bach's most important free organ works, including what is unquestionably Bach's most famous work for the instrument, the Toccata and Fugue in D Minor (BWV 565). Moreover, he was the first to publish the Orgelbüchlein — although he never referred to it as such — and to bring the bulk of Bach's “Great Eighteen” chorale preludes, as well as two partitas, before the public. In terms of his editorial thinking, Mendelssohn also deserves credit not only as a pioneer in presenting unembellished scores but also for the way in which he resolutely defended and justified his editorial stance.
Mendelssohn and The German Organ Community, ca. 1820–1847
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on how Mendelssohn's relationship with the Berlin organ community mirrors to a considerable extent his relationship with the larger Berlin musical community. His immense talent, impressive achievements, and international reputation were all universally recognized, but in Berlin's small organ society, as in its larger musical world, he was generally treated correctly but coolly. Widely respected but not warmly embraced, many of Mendelssohn's greatest annoyances and disappointments befell him in Berlin, and it is hardly surprising that his feelings about the city were ambivalent at best.
Six Sonatas For The Organ (op. 65), 1844–1845
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents reviews of Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas. On 15 September 1845, Mendelssohn's Six Sonatas for the Organ appeared in print. The critical response to the Sonatas was virtually unanimous, and as early as April 1846 Dr. Edmund Chipp (1823-86) of Ely “was one of the first — probably the first — to play the organ sonatas in public, at an Organ Recital at Walker's organ factory... On one occasion [he] played the whole six in succession, entirely from memory.” The Organ Sonatas were reviewed in Germany's two leading musical journals. In an exhaustive review in the Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, published in three installments, Eduard Krüger both applauded and faulted them, in both general and specific terms. A reviewer for AMZ August Gottfried Ritter was quite content with the designation sonata and agreed that the term was well chosen and appropriate. In France, Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas were not published until early 1846, but only shortly afterwards they were reviewed by one of the country's leading activists for the reform and improvement of church music, Jean-Louis-Félix Danjou.
Crystal structure refinement
Authors: Müller Peter
Published: September 2010

The determination of a crystal structure consists of several steps of which refinement comes towards the end. After crystal growth, data collection, data reduction, absorption correction, and solution of the phase problem, the crystallographer has obtained atomic coordinates for some or all non-hydrogen atoms. Frequently, the atom types assigned to some of these coordinates are incorrect or no atom types have been assigned at all. In addition, the coordinates in the first solution are usually not very accurate and many details of the structure are yet to be determined. The way to get from the first solution to the final accurate and publishable model is called refinement. This chapter explains how structure refinement is performed by SHELXL. This includes the concept of constraints, restraints, and free variables as well as calculating structural parameters such as bond lengths and angles.
Twinning
Authors: Herbst-Irmer Regine
Published: September 2010

According to Carmelo Giacovazzo crystallographic ‘twins are regular aggregates consisting of individual crystals of the same species joined together in some definite mutual orientation’. Georges Friedel distinguished between merohedral twinning (a special case which is racemic twinning) pseudo-merohedral twinning, reticular merohedral twinning, and non-merohedral twinning. This chapter defines all four types of crystallographic twinning. It describes how twin laws can be derived, how twinning can be taken into consideration during data reduction, absorption correction, scaling, and merging of the data; and how HKLF5 format files can be generated. Several programs are described in addition to SHELXL, and the typical warning signs for twinning are listed and twinning tests are explained. Six detailed examples are used to demonstrate how twin refinement is performed in SHELXL.
Structure validation
Authors: Spek Anthony L.
Published: September 2010

This chapter points out some of the more common and avoidable pitfalls of structure determination. It discusses readily available computer software that generates appropriate alerts when something unusual or inconsistent is detected. A crystal structure determination is not finished with the refinement to convergence of the structural model parameters, but the model has to be analyzed in detail in a process called structure validation. In particular, the model should make chemical sense. An incorrect model may easily lead to disastrous conclusions about the underlying chemistry. The following topics are addressed in detail: missed symmetry, voids, displacement ellipsoids, bond lengths and angles, atom type assignment, intermolecular contacts, hydrogen bonds, connectivity, disorder, reflection data, and refinement parameters.
Protein structure (cross) validation
Authors: Sawaya Michael R.
Published: September 2010

Cross validation is a key concept in attaining accuracy in crystallographic refinement. Refinement of protein structures is especially subject to model bias; an unchecked imagination during the model building process or an inattentiveness to detail can reinforce features in the electron density map that are incorrect. The problem of model bias stems from the fact that protein structure refinement is almost always an underdetermined problem, as a medium-resolution dataset does not contain a sufficient number of structure factors to justify the number of parameters refined. Besides explaining the concept of Rfree, this chapter describes the algorithms of the programs PROCHECK, WHATCHECK, Verify3D, ERRAT, and PROVE. Program outputs are illustrated and interpreted for a particular example.
4 Negotiating Gifts: The 1607 Entertainment at Merchant Taylors' Hall
Authors: Heaton Gabriel
Published: September 2010

This chapter is focused on a civic entertainment, one written by Ben Jonson and performed before King James I at Merchant Taylors' Hall in May 1607. The Merchant Taylors' Company, a leading livery company dominated by members of London's mercantile elite, had a very different relationship to the crown from the aristocrats who were the hosts in entertainments discussed in other chapters, and this difference is reflected in the enterainment itself. This chapter explains the sequence of events leading up to the king's visit, including his visit to the Clothworkers' Company a few weeks earlier, and also provides a detailed reading of Ben Jonson's songs written for the occasion, which have only recently been identified.
Conclusion: Selling Entertainments
Authors: Heaton Gabriel
Published: September 2010

This chapter‐length conclusion traces the later history of entertainment texts: these books and manuscripts have continued to circulate over the centuries since their production in ways that reveals much about how they have been understood. There are about sixty surviving copies of the various Elizabethan entertainment pamphlets, and their provenance history shows them shifting from being objects of antiquarian interest to highly prized bibliographical rarities. Manuscripts have, for a number of reasons, tended to circulate much less, but a similar pattern of steadily increasing value can be discerned in the way that they have been sold over the centuries. The book ends with details of recent book auction sales.
The Holy Grail of Moral Philosophy
Authors: Hills Alison
Published: September 2010

Many of us believe everyone has reasons to be moral. But not everyone agrees, in particular, the ‘sensible knave’ – the Egoist – claims that everyone has reasons to do what is in their self-interest, whether or not doing so is morally right. The holy grail of moral philosophy is an argument persuading the Egoist that she really does have reasons to be moral. Many philosophers – including Plato, Kant, and Hume – have been intrigued by Egoism, but arguments against Egoism have not met with much success. This book makes an unusual epistemological argument against Egoism.
Standard Egoism
Authors: Hills Alison
Published: September 2010

There are many challenges to the authority of morality, the claim that everyone has reasons to be moral. This chapter distinguishes the challenge from Egoism from a recent, widely discussed claim by Williams, that there are no ‘external’ reasons. It introduces standard Egoism, the theory that everyone has reason to maximize their happiness (and no other reasons for action). It is the most common form of Egoism. It has obvious parallels with rational utilitarianism, the theory that everyone has reason to maximize the general happiness. Sidgwick noticed these parallels and tried to show that standard Egoism was mistaken. But he found that he could not: he was left with a ‘dualism of practical reason’, and his project to defend morality failed.
Kantian Egoism
Authors: Hills Alison
Published: September 2010

Kant believes that moral reasons for action are catEgorical imperatives which override all other reasons for action, including reasons based on happiness. In the first half of the chapter, some interesting variations on standard Egoism are set out, and it is explained why Kant thought that Egoism could not be a genuine rival to the moral law. The second half of the chapter takes a different approach, however, developing an entirely new, distinctively Kantian version of Egoism that is not based on happiness. Kantian Egoism parallels the moral law: it is a theory of self-regarding catEgorical imperatives. In discussing this theory, some fundamental issues in Kant's practical philosophy are addressed; in particular, a new ‘realist’ account is given of the importance of rational nature and the way in which it is the source of other kinds of value, which is an improvement on the more familiar constructivist interpretations of Kant.
Modest Vindication
Authors: Hills Alison
Published: September 2010

A modest vindication of morality is a valid argument based on premises that an Egoist would not accept (but that a defender of common sense morality would): that Egoism is false. Initially it seems straightforward to give modest arguments defending morality, but on reflection these arguments face strong objections. This chapter sets out three such problems. Modest vindications of morality are compared to similar arguments from G. E. Moore defending common sense against idealists and sceptics about the external world. One objection pressed by Wright – that these arguments lack cogency – is discussed in detail, and it is shown that these arguments can at least in principle be cogent.
The Birth of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

Public law emerges as an autonomous field of knowledge in the period between the mid-16th and late 17th centuries. This was a critical period of intense religious conflict in which the character of collective human association was placed in question. The period, marked by the historicization, rationalization, and secularization of political thought, led to the severing of political order from its religious origins and a shift in focus from the sovereign towards the state. The corporate idea of the state became the ground on which an autonomous concept of public law could be built. This chapter explains this transition by reference first to a methodological shift that leads to the promotion of public law as a type of historico-political discourse; secondly to the growth of absolutist thought and the idea of sovereignty; and then to a revolution in natural law thinking leading to the emergence of modern natural right. Sovereignty and right combine to provide the rudiments of the concept of public law.
The Science of Political Right: I
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who has done more than any other thinker to bring out both the principles and practices of political right. Rousseau's thought offers a way of highlighting the tensions and ambiguities between right and power — between potestas and potentia — and it sets a frame for an inquiry into the fundamentals of the subject. The key to this investigation lies in the observation that Rousseau offers not one but two accounts of political right, and these are based on contrasting accounts of the nature of the political pact. The chapter first examines the subject of The Social Contract and then considers its influence on Kant's legal theory. It argues that Kant provides a formal science of political right which is unable to explain the complexity of modern public law.
Political Jurisprudence
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

The relationship between theory and practice, the elements of which were examined in the previous chapters, complicates the exercise of devising a general account of political right. This chapter argues that the resulting tensions, which are clearly expressed in the character of the modern state itself, cannot be overcome but can only be negotiated. This means that rather than being treated as an explication of the science of political right, public law should be recognized as an exercise in political jurisprudence. The consequences are explained and the grammar of the practice is outlined.
The Concept of the State
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents an account of the juristic concept of the state. It first explains how, through a series of protracted struggles over its meaning, the idea of the state emerged and it shows how, within this historical account, the state is inextricably linked to the concept of sovereignty. The specifically juristic concept is then elaborated through an account of the 19th-century German discipline of Staatslehre and, especially through its elaboration of the three fundamental elements of territory, ruling authority, and people, its general influence in 20th-century legal thought. The chapter argues that the juristic concept of the state is best understood to form an scheme of intelligibility and it offers a key to understanding the nature of public law.
The Constitution of the State
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

Since the state is itself the source of law, there can be no concept of fundamental law that binds the state. But since the state in its juristic meaning is not simply an institutional arrangement but is a scheme of intelligibility, the question can be asked: what is the nature of this scheme? Alternatively, does the state have a constitution? This chapter examines this constitutive aspect of the state. It concerns the conditions of the public sphere and the type of political power that it generates and sustains, and this constitution of the state is distinct from the issue of the constitution of the office of government.
The Constitutional Contract
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

In the modern world, constitutions are conceived as contracts drawn up by ‘the people’ to establish and limit the powers of governing institutions. This modern concept of the constitution, which marks a distinct break with the ancient understanding, performs an important function: it provides the foundation of legal order and lays down the basic law of law-making, establishing itself as the pivot on which the legitimacy of legality turns. But the foundational claims made of modern constitutions are riddled with ambiguities. This chapter considers many of the foundational questions relating to the status of modern constitutions in jurisprudential thinking, and examines the nature and function of the constitutional contract.
Rechtsstaat, Rule of Law,l'Etat de droit
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines the origins of the various articulations of the general expression of the ‘rule of law’ in English, German, and French legal thought. It shows that the role performed by this expression significantly varies across different governing regimes. Further, although a coherent formulation of the general concept can be devised, this formulation is entirely unworkable in practice and that, for this reason, the ‘rule of law’ cannot be conceived as a foundational concept in public law. Since its general and ambiguous character renders it peculiarly susceptible to being used for ideological purposes, it is suggested that the expression much be used carefully and that the extent to which its aspirational qualities can be realized in practice must remain a political achievement.
Potentia
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

Although the origins of potentia can be traced to the exercise of the king's prerogatives, its significance in the modern era has been altered out of all recognition. This came about because of a third revolution to have shaped public law: the disciplinary revolution which flowed from the Protestant Reformation. This establishes as the main objective of public law that of establishing a well-ordered commonwealth. The disciplinary revolution supplements the bourgeois revolutionary concern for the structure of government with a concern over its infrastructure and a consequential shift in orientation takes place: from input legitimacy (focusing on right ordering) towards output legitimacy (measured by effectiveness in service provision) — that is, a shift from potestas towards potentia. This chapter examines the origins and nature of the disciplinary revolution and considers its impact on the workings of modern government.
Introduction
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

This volume collects most of the author's publications on free will, agency, and responsibility. They chronicle an attempt to answer two complementary questions: ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives? ’ The author's answers to both questions appeal to our capacity for normative competence. We are agents because we have this capacity and to the extent that we exercise it; we are responsible to each other for our lives together as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The volume groups these 12 essays according to three prominent themes: (1) one's own motivational states as possible impediments to one's freedom; (2) causal determination and reductive mechanism as alleged threats to freedom; and (3) the nature of responsibility.
Skepticism about Weakness of Will
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

This chapter considers two sorts of scepticism about the possibility of knowingly acting against one's practical judgment, or weakness of will. The Socratic view that weak behaviour is impossible overlooks the truth that human beings are subject to different sources of motivation: evaluative judgments and mere desires. A second kind of scepticism targets the common view that the difference between weakness and compulsion is that weak agents give into desires which they could resist. The chapter proposes a different understanding of the phenomena, according to which weakness exhibits a culpable failure of self-control. Culpability here does not presume that the agent was at the time able to resist, but only that she is open to criticism for her lack of self-control. This account allows for a distinction between weak and compulsive behaviour that is consistent both with scepticism about resistibility, and with important judgments of responsibility.
The Work of the Will
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

This chapter investigates the relation between the will — understood as the capacity for decision, or the active formation of intention — and the kind of practical commitment involved in deliberative judgment. The first part investigates two conceptions of this relation: internalism and externalism. The former takes the will to be necessarily guided by the good, and hence in the service of deliberative judgment. The latter argues that full-blooded agency requires the capacity to decide whether or not to be guided by judgment. While internalist views have notorious difficulties about akrasia, externalist views leave us in the dark about how the will can be reasons-responsive at all. The second part of the chapter argues that we are active in the formation of our judgments as well as our intentions. It follows that the province of agency is not bounded by the will.
Free Action and Free Will
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

Rival conceptions of free agency can be understood as competing interpretations of the notions of self-determination and alternative possibilities, and the characteristic shape of the dialectic between compatibilists and incompatibilists can be understood in these terms. Compatibilism holds that self-determining action is action proceeding from an unencumbered will, and likewise freedom to do otherwise is dependency on the agent's will. Incompatibilists object that freedom requires not just dependency on the will but self-determination of the will. It is not clear, however, that any sense can be made of this requirement. This chapter spells out this dialectic by means of a distinction between explanatory and modal incompatibilism, concluding that if there is a coherent account of free agency, then it is compatible with a deterministic or mechanistic metaphysics. The options are compatibilism or scepticism.
Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

Both libertarians and compatibilists have tended to explain away the harder edges of their respective views. Libertarianism, we are assured by some of its advocates, requires no radical adjustment of our conception of agency and its place in nature. On the contrary, it looks as though libertarian agency requires nothing less than the capacity to be prime movers. In the same way, compatibilists have tended to downplay the difficulties of reconciling that doctrine to our self-conceptions. In particular, if compatibilism is true, then the exercise of our free agency across a lifetime might be completely the product of super agent authors of the life in which we are supposed to be authors. This chapter argues that this is a disturbing conclusion we should nonetheless accept. The main point, however, is that philosophical alternatives for those who would accommodate freedom are hard.
1 Moral Pyrrhonism and Noncognitivism
Authors: Kalderon Mark Eli
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that moral acceptance is noncognitive. Specifically, moral acceptance centrally involves a certain kind of affect, what Scanlon (1998) describes as a desire in the directed attention sense. In accepting a moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker reconfigures his affective sensibility so as to render salient, in a phenomenologically vivid manner, the moral reasons apparentlyavailable in the circumstance, as he understands it. In accepting a moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker quite literally decides how he feels about things. It is the structure of a person's moral consciousness, and not some further fact, that constitutes the relevant kind of affect. The relevant affect is nothing over and above the tendency for certain features of the circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and imagination, and for these to present a certain complex normative appearance.
4 Attitude, Affect, and Authority
Authors: Kalderon Mark Eli
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that renewed moral inquiry might have a number of outcomes. At one end of the spectrum, a revision of moral practice is both theoretically and practically required. At the other end of the spectrum, no such revision is required. But there are interim possibilities. Perhaps moral practice would remain fictionalist even after a renewed moral inquiry but the character of the fiction would change. Perhaps, while benign moral fictionalism is a legitimate possibility, the moral fiction that competent speakers actually accept is not itself benign. Or perhaps the actual moral fiction is in many ways benign but renewed moral inquiry suggests ways in which that fiction could be improved. There is no telling, in advance, what such an inquiry would reveal.
Suffering, Theodicy, and Defense
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter introduces the project of the book, which is an examination of the problem of evil and an attempt to give a defence with respect to the argument from evil. It examines the nature of suffering and considers what would be an appropriate response to the argument from evil based on suffering. It distinguishes theodicy from defence and presents the nature of the defence at issue in this book. It also begins the examination of the methodology to be used in the construction of a defence. In the process, the chapter discusses the views of Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen on the nature of a defence. It also considers the claims of sceptical theism that no defence is needed with regard to the problem of evil, and it supports the possibility of defence even if sceptical theism is correct, on the grounds that the religions under attack by the argument from evil accept the notion of divine revelation.
Union, Presence, and Omnipresence
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter develops an account of union between persons. It begins by considering the relationship obtaining between personal presence and closeness between persons. It argues that many conditions are necessary for closeness between persons, and that closeness between persons is required for the most significant personal presence. The chapter shows that on Aquinas's moral psychology internal integration around the good is also necessary for closeness and thus for the most significant personal presence. Recent research in developmental psychology is also used in order to illuminate the nature of joint attention, and joint attention is shown to be necessary for significant personal presence as well.
The Story of Abraham: The Desires of the Heart
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

Abraham is an exemplar of a person who suffers because of what he has set his heart on. This chapter examines the problem of suffering in connection with the loss or deprivation of the desires of the heart. It concentrates on the biblical story of Abraham and gives a detailed philosophical examination of many parts of the story, but especially the part of the story involving the binding of Isaac. It argues against Kierkegaard's well-known interpretation of the story in Fear and Trembling, and suggests an alternative that emerges when the episode of the binding of Isaac is set in the whole context of Abraham's relations with the children he fathers and their mothers. So understood, the story illuminates the nature of faith as a response to the problem of suffering, and it sets a very high standard for acceptable solutions to the problem.
Theodicy in Another World
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter uses the narratives in the preceding chapters as well as the worldview of Aquinas outlined in earlier chapters to present Aquinas's theodicy. Taken in the context of the biblical narratives and encompassed in Aquinas's whole worldview but especially his account of love, Aquinas's theodicy is the heart of the defence promised at the outset of the book. On Aquinas's theodicy, God is justified in allowing the suffering of a mentally fully functional adult human person by one or the other or both of two possible benefits, where Aquinas's scale of value is the measure of the benefits. For a person whose suffering is entirely involuntary, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to warding off a greater harm for her. For a person whose suffering is involuntary only in a certain respect, suffering is defeated in virtue of its contributing to providing a greater good for her. The chapter concludes with an argument that Aquinas's theodicy is incomplete as it stands and in need of further development.
Referee Reports on Fitch's “A Definition of Value”
Authors: Church Alonzo
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents the earliest version of the knowability proof by Alonzo Church which appears in a 1945 referee report for the Journal of Symbolic Logic. Church anonymously conveyed the proof to Fitch. The proof had the effect of undermining a certain definition of ‘value’ that Fitch was articulating — a definition that is trivialized if there are unknowable truths. So the proof originates in a context that is very different from the one in which we discuss the proof today. We think of the knowability paradox today either as an all-too-quick refutation of anti-realism or as a logical collapse of apparently distinct philosophical commitments. Church offers a number of potentially promising ways to block the proof. He is most sympathetic to a rejection of closure principles for knowledge and belief, and a fortiori the principle that knowledge is closed under conjunction-elimination.
The Paradox of Knowability and the Mapping Objection
Authors: Rasmussen Stig Alstrup
Published: September 2010

This chapter further investigates and defends Dummett's newly favoured knowability principle, p→¬¬Kp. It discusses the ‘mapping objection’, which points out that Gödel's 1933 mapping of intuitionistic logic into S4 fails to preserve the original formulation of the knowability principle, and that this fact counts against the original formulation as an expression of intuitionistic anti-realism.
Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox
Authors: Bermúdez José Luis
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that the Dummett (2001) position is well-motivated. The position restricts the knowability principle to atomic statements, and defines intuitionistic truth inductively from there. An instructive account of Dummett's development in (1990) and (1996) is offered. There Dummett attempts to clarify the notion of indefinite extensibility of such concepts as set, natural number, and real number, and argues that only intuitionistic logic can illuminate a proper understanding of the notion. If this is correct, then the Dummett (2001) theory of truth is well-motivated, and so, we have a principled solution to the knowability paradox.
Logical Types in Some Arguments about Knowability and Belief
Authors: Linsky Bernard
Published: September 2010

Over the years a number of arguments have been formulated in elementary modal logic purporting to show that there are limits to what can be known or believed. These include the ‘Fitch’ style arguments that will be the main interest of this chapter, versions of the paradoxes of the ‘Surprise examination’ and the ‘Preface’, and several arguments against analyses of truth in terms of verifiability under ideal conditions. A use of iteration of operators and even apparent self-reference seems to reappear in various of these arguments and so one might wonder what exactly is common to these arguments and if that common element reveals something about their validity. In recent years, it has also been claimed that verificationism is subject to logical difficulties revealed by these arguments. It would be a challenge to verificationism to have a proof that some true sentences simply cannot be known, or believed, even by an idealized agent. The understanding of these arguments is thus a pressing issue for the verificationist program. Proposals for analyses of truth in terms of verification in ideal conditions also confront difficulties when one worries about the truth conditions for statements asserting that such ideal conditions do or do not obtain. There appears to be at least self-application of the theory of truth to its own preconditions. This chapter identifies the elements of ‘self-reference’ in these various arguments, distinguish self-reference proper from the use of iteration of operators expressing epistemic conditions, and then provide a uniform account of them making use of the idea of logical types of propositions.
Restriction Strategies for Knowability: Some Lessons in False Hope
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L.
Published: September 2010

The knowability paradox derives from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963. The proof purportedly shows that if all truths are knowable, it follows that all truths are known. Antirealists, wed as they are to the idea that truth is epistemic, feel threatened by the proof. For what better way to express the epistemic character of truth than to insist that all truths are knowable? Yet, if that insistence logically compels similar assent to some omniscience-like claim, antirealism is in jeopardy. Response to the paradox has drifted toward a common theme — a theme that this chapter argues is a non-starter in resolving the paradox. Seeing this point will also make clear the philosophical inadequacy of simply viewing the paradox as a refutation of a wide range of antirealisms.
Revamping the Restriction Strategy
Authors: Tennant Neil
Published: September 2010

This chapter continues the anti-realist's quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch's paradox. It proposes that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist's knowability principle ‘φ, therefore ◇Kφ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise φ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of φ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the so-called Rule of Factiveness ‘◇Kφ therefore φ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitch-style derivation that uses the KK-thesis in order to get around the Cartesian restriction on applications of the knowability principle.
On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox
Authors: Brogaard Berit
Published: September 2010

This chapter develops a Fitch-like paradox for strong modal fictionalism. It argues that the most promising strategy to avoid paradox is to reject the claim that modal claims are to be analyzed in terms of the contents of the fiction of possible worlds. It is hoped that by looking at the parallel case of modal fictionalism light can be shed on the threat posed by Fitch's paradox to semantic anti-realism.
Performance and Paradox
Authors: Hand Michael
Published: September 2010

The knowability paradox, or Fitch's paradox, is thought to threaten semantical (Dummettian) antirealism. This chapter suggests that the lesson of the paradox concerns the theoretical location at which to impose the antirealist's ‘epistemic’ constraints on truth, i.e., on the ‘central notion’ of the antirealist's meaning theory. In particular, the knowability principle — that every truth is knowable — is not a successful way of capturing the antirealistic insight that truth is epistemically conditioned.
Invincible Ignorance
Authors: Hart W. D.
Published: September 2010

This chapter takes Fitch's proof to be evidence for realism. It argues that the prospects are not good for a solution coming from the theory of types.
Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch‐Style Reasoning
Authors: Kelp Christoph , Pritchard Duncan
Published: September 2010

This chapter looks at one — perhaps the only — theoretical view to which, on the face of it, the knowability principle is of central importance. It then considers two deflationary responses to Fitch's argument on behalf of defenders of this view. A ‘deflationary’ response to the argument refers to a proposal which proceeds by weakening, on a principled basis, one of the principles essentially employed by that argument. The motivation for this strategy is this: ceteris paribus, if one can accommodate the considerations which prompt adoption of a certain principle by advancing a version of that principle which is (perhaps only slightly) logically weaker, then one ought to do so. If one can further show that the Fitch argument is blocked once the weaker ‘deflated’ version of the principle is adopted, then one will have succeeded in offering a deflationary response to the argument. The first deflationary response that we will consider proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledge. It is argued that this strategy does not stand up to closer inspection. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for holding that the second deflationary response considered — which rejects the principle of knowability in favour of a weaker principle — is effective at resolving the problem posed by Fitch's argument.
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
Authors: Restall Greg
Published: September 2010

According to the ‘knowability thesis’, every truth is knowable. Fitch's paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. This chapter proposes a weakening of the knowability thesis (called the ‘conjunctive knowability thesis’) to the effect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. It shows that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very differently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak.
The Importance and Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms
Authors: Charlier Christopher , Valceschini Egizio
Published: September 2010

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an attempt to estimate a monetary value for environmental or public health degradation. In a regulatory context, it should be seen as a complementary tool to risk assessment for the purposes of public decision-making. CBA should, therefore, be particularly relevant in the governance of modern biotechnology. GMOs, however, provide a ‘textbook case’ of the complexity which results from any attempt to conduct CBA in relation to innovation, this being a function of their novelty, the ethical concerns which they raise, their economic importance, the danger of potentially irreversible effects on biodiversity, the absence of scientific unanimity in risk assessment, and consumer fear. This chapter underlines the importance of CBA in the regulation of GMOs and highlights the specific difficulties with which such analysis is confronted. It argues that these difficulties should not be considered as a reason to dispense with economic evaluation.
Implementing the Community Environmental Liability Directive: Genetically Modified Organisms and the Problem of Unknown Risk
Authors: Rodgers Christopher
Published: September 2010

This chapter assesses the role for environmental liability in the context of the GMOs, with emphasis on the provisions of the Community Environmental Liability Directive. It commences with discussion of the role of liability regimes more generally (adopting Coasean analysis) and compares and contrasts the Environmental Liability Directive with the Lugano Convention. The application of the Environmental Liability Directive is then considered in detail, with particular attention devoted to: the definition of environmental damage, the basis of liability (whether strict or grounded upon fault), the use of the administrative liability model, and risk allocation and insurance. The chapter concludes that the Community regime has serious limitations. Not least, its territorial application is largely restricted to the Natura 2000 network of protected wildlife sites, where GM crop cultivation is in practice unlikely to occur.