bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Pascal’s wager
Authors: Jordan Jeff
Published: September 2018

Pascal’s wager is a type of theistic argument developed by Blaisé Pascal, a French mathematician of the seventeenth century. There are at least four versions of the wager within Pascal’s posthumously published work, Pensées, each of which is a pragmatic argument. Pragmatic arguments for theism are designed to motivate and support belief even in the absence of strong evidence. They seek to show that theistic belief is permissible, even if one does not think that it is likely that God exists, and then to employ prudential reasons to conclude that one should accept theism. Other theistic arguments – the Ontological Proof or the Cosmological Argument for example - provide epistemic reasons in support of theism: that is, reasons to think that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, morally perfect being. According to Pascal, there is good reason to seek to inculcate theistic belief, even if one does not appreciate the evidence in support of theism (see Pascal 1960). The role of the wager, as Pascal conceived it, was to move self-interested individuals towards a perspective in which they could appreciate the evidence for theism. Understood in this way, the wager is not a pragmatic trumping of the epistemic, but a means of bridging the chasm between the pragmatic and the epistemic.

The wager has the structure of a gamble, a decision made under uncertainty. Pascal assumed that a person, just by virtue of being in the world, is in a betting situation such that one cannot avoid betting one's life on whether God exists or not. The wager concerning God is forced, one might say, since trying to avoid wagering is tantamount to wagering for one of the alternatives. To wager that God exists is to take steps to inculcate theistic belief. To wager against is to do nothing. Bringing about belief is not an action that one can directly will, but one can take steps to try to bring about belief indirectly.

If one wagers on God and believes, then there are two possible outcomes. Either God exists and one may have put oneself in a position to gain an eternity of bliss; or, God does not exist and one loses little, if anything. On the other hand, if one bets against God and wins, one gains little. But, if one loses that wager, the consequences may be dismal. Because the first alternative has an outcome that overwhelms any possible gain attached to nonbelief, the choice is clear, says Pascal, one should wager that God exists.
Sceptical theism
Authors: McBrayer Justin
Published: September 2018

Sceptical theists are theists who are sceptical of our abilities to discern whether the evils in our world constitute good evidence against the existence of God. According to sceptical theists, the human mind is limited in such a way that it would not at all be surprising that God would have reasons that are beyond our understanding for allowing the evils of our world. For that reason, we are not licensed to conclude that what look like pointless evils to us are really pointless evils. For all we know, the evils in our world are necessary to secure some greater good or prevent an evil equally bad or worse. The sceptical element of sceptical theism can be used to undermine various arguments for atheism including both the argument from evil and the argument from divine hiddenness.

Many trace the seeds of this view to the book of Job in the Hebrew scriptures, and it was developed by various modern thinkers, starting with Descartes and Hume. Contemporary philosophers have further refined sceptical theism into a family of related views, each with a different defence. These defences include appeals to analogies (for example the parent/child relationship), appeals to the limitations of our grasp of the moral realm and appeals to epistemic requirements (for example sensitivity requirements or contextual requirements). Sceptical theism has been criticized in a variety of ways including charges that sceptical theism falsely implies a consequentialist view of ethics, that consistent sceptical theism results in moral paralysis, that sceptical theism implies a more pervasive (or even global) form of scepticism and that sceptical theism reduces to absurdity.
Aesthetics and ethics
Authors: Tanner Michael
Published: September 2018

The contrast between ethical and aesthetic judgments, which has provided a good deal of the subject-matter of aesthetics, stems largely from Immanuel Kant’s idiosyncratic view of morality as a series of imperatives issued in accordance with the dictates of practical reason, while for him judgments of taste are based on no principles. This has led even non-Kantians to argue that aesthetic judgments are primarily concerned, as is art itself, with uniqueness, while morality has mainly to do with repeatable actions. This tends to separate art from other human activities, a separation which was encouraged by the collection of useless items by ‘connoisseurs’, who took over as their vocabulary of appreciation the traditional language of religious contemplation. This viewpoint has been attacked passionately by idealist aestheticians, who claim that art is a heightening of the common human activity of expressing emotions, to the point where they are experienced and rendered lucidly, as they rarely are in everyday life. Marxist aestheticians, whose roots lie in the same tradition as idealists, argue that art is inherently political, and that the realm of ’pure aesthetic experience’ is chimerical. Meanwhile the analytic tradition in aesthetics has spent much effort amplifying Kant-style positions, without taking into account their historical conditioning. There is a tendency to contrast the activities of the moralist, prescribing courses of action, with that of the critic, whose only job can be to point to the unrepeatable features which constitute a work of art.
Applied ethics
Authors: Almond Brenda
Published: September 2018

Applied ethics is marked out from ethics in general by its special focus on issues of practical concern. It is concerned with ethical issues in various fields of human life, including medical ethics, business ethics and environmental ethics. Within these broad areas, it engages with policy issues resulting from scientific and technological change and with the evaluation of social and legal decision-making in public areas such as health care, policing, media and information, and the world of business and finance. It is also concerned with professional codes and responsibilities in such areas.

The boundaries between areas are not solid. For instance, ethical issues arising from the new reproductive technologies inevitably interact with family and human relationships and this can open up broader questions about gender and ethnicity, population and demographic change. Similarly, discussion of the surveillance society has links with crime and punishment, terrorism and war, while the issue of animal experimentation in the laboratory has immediate links with questions about animal rights and ethically based vegetarianism.

Although practical ethical issues like these are often regarded as free-standing, applied ethics sees them in relation to some of the more fundamental questions that have been perennial preoccupations of philosophers, such as: How should we see the world and our place in it? What is the good life for the individual? What is the good society? In this way, applied ethics must take into account basic ethical theory, including utilitarianism, liberal rights theory and virtue ethics. Some see it as necessary to reason from within one of these ethical positions in order to deal adequately with an issue; others adopt a more relativistic strategy, and simply list what they see as the alternative conclusions to be reached from those differing theoretical bases. Others again favour a contextual solution that has affinities to the ancient practice of casuistry. These differences in underlying theory inevitably affect conclusions on practical issues, so that applied ethics is in the end, like other philosophical explorations, a controversial area.

‘Applied ethics’ and ‘applied philosophy’ are sometimes used as synonyms, but applied philosophy can be used more broadly to cover also such fields as law, education, art or artificial intelligence. The difference is that these areas include philosophical problems - metaphysical and epistemological - that are not strictly ethical, while applied ethics focuses more narrowly on ethical questions. Nevertheless, many of the issues it treats do in fact involve other aspects of philosophy. Medical ethics, for example, may raise metaphysical questions about the nature of ‘personhood’ or the definition of death, and conceptual questions about truth and trust.
Business ethics
Authors: Sorell Tom
Published: September 2018

Business ethics is the application of theories of right and wrong to activity within and between commercial enterprises, and between commercial enterprises and their broader environment. It is a wide range of activity, and no brief list can be made of the issues it raises. The safety of working practices; the fairness of recruitment; the transparency of financial accounting; the promptness of payments to suppliers; the degree of permissible aggression between competitors: all come within the range of the subject. So do relations between businesses and consumers, local communities, national governments and ecosystems. Many, but not all, of these issues can be understood to bear on distinct, recognized groups with their own stakes in a business: employees, shareholders, consumers, and so on. The literature of business ethics tends to concentrate on ‘stakeholders’ – anyone who occupies a role within the business or who belongs to a recognized group outside the business that is affected by its activity – but not in every sort of business. Corporations are often discussed to the exclusion of medium-sized and small enterprises.

Theories of right and wrong in business ethics come from a number of sources. Academic moral philosophy has contributed utilitarianism, Kantianism and Aristotelianism, as well as egoism and social contract theory. There are also theories that originate in organized religion, in the manifestos of political activists, in the thoughts of certain tycoons with an interest in social engineering, and in the writings of management ‘gurus’. Recently, business ethics has been affected by the ending of the Cold War, and the breakdown of what were once command economies. These developments have encouraged enthusiasts for the market economy to advocate moral and political ideas consistent with capitalism, and the handing over to private companies of activity in certain countries that has long been reserved for the state.
Development ethics
Authors: Crocker David A.
Published: September 2018

Development ethics is ethical reflection on the ends and means of socioeconomic change in poor countries and regions. It has several sources: criticism of colonialism and post-Second World War development strategies; Denis Goulet’s writings; Anglo-American philosophical debates about the ethics of famine relief; and Paul Streeten’s and Amartya Sen’s approaches to development.

Development ethicists agree that the moral dimension of development theory and practice is just as important as the scientific and policy components. What is often called ‘development’ – economic growth, for instance – may be bad for people, communities and the environment. Hence, the process of development should be reconceived as beneficial change, usually specified as alleviating human misery and environmental degradation in poor countries.

Development ethicists do not yet agree on whether their ethical reflection should extend to destitution in rich countries or aspects of North–South relations apart from development aid. Other unresolved controversies concern the status and content of substantive development norms. Finally, agreement does not yet exist as to how the benefits of and responsibilities for development should be distributed within and between countries.
Evil
Authors: Kekes John
Published: September 2018

Evil actions cause grievous, deliberate, gratuitous, morally inexcusable and unjustifiable harm, and their prevalence is the most serious obstacle to our well-being. According to realistic explanations, evil actions reflect the basic ambivalence of our motivation and the resulting struggle for dominance between our moral and immoral propensities. Optimistic explanations deny that our immoral tendencies are basic. The Socratic view is that actions are evil only because of ignorance of the good. The Stoic–Spinozistic view holds that evil is illusory, because what we take to be evil is merely the frustration of irrational desires. And the Leibnizian view is that some evil is necessary, because without it the much greater good could not exist. There are strong reasons for rejecting each of these optimistic explanations of evil. Any realistic attempt to cope with evil must begin with acknowledging that both moral and immoral propensities are inherent and ineliminable parts of our psychological condition.
Examples in ethics
Authors: Louden Robert B.
Published: September 2018

Philosophers often employ examples to illustrate how their favoured principles are to be applied to concrete cases, and sometimes even to show that principles are of no help in decision-making. Examples are also used to convince readers of the existence of moral dilemmas – unresolvable conflicts between moral obligations. But a variety of different philosophical questions concerning the role, status, and nature of examples used in ethics have also been raised. One such question concerns the role that examples should play in our moral experience: should this be a rhetorical, pedagogic role of persuading us to do what is right, as determined by pre-existing principle; or a stronger, logical role of helping to determine what is morally right? Another query relates to moral teaching: is exposure to and reflection on stories, tales, narratives and exemplars sufficient for moral education, or is there a further need for exposure to principles and theories of ethics? Third, in terms of the kinds of examples employed in moral philosophy and reflection, should such examples be culled from great literature or sacred texts? Alternatively, should they be actual case studies drawn from real life, or hypothetical but realistic examples constructed by theorists? Or should they be imaginary, highly improbable cases designed to test our intuitions? A fourth question asks how examples are best identified and described, and to what extent the examples used in ethics are themselves theory-laden or even theory-constituted.
Family, ethics and the
Authors: Ruddick William
Published: September 2018

Do obligations to children take priority over filial and other family obligations? Do blood kin have stronger moral claims than relatives acquired through marriage? Whatever their origin, do family obligations take precedence over obligations to friends, neighbours, fellow citizens? Do family moral ties presuppose specific family feeling, love, or loyalty? Is the traditional family of a married, heterosexual couple with biological offspring morally preferable to families formed by adoptive, single, remarried or same-sex parents, or with the help of gamete donors or gestational (‘maternal’) surrogates? On what grounds may friends, neighbours or government agencies intrude upon ‘family privacy’?

To simplify the complexity and diversity of family life, reasoned answers to such questions may stress a single dimension. A metaphysical approach draws on the commands of a deity or the needs of a nation. A biological approach appeals to physical resemblance, blood or genes. An economic approach focuses on family property, income, division of work and resources, and inheritance. A related political approach attends to power, subordination, and rights within a family, as well as to their regulation by the state. A psychological approach takes affection, identification, intimacy, and emotional needs as morally decisive. A narrative approach makes recalling and revision of family stories the basis of moral education and the definition of family ties.

Although mutually compatible, these approaches do each tend to favour particular moral theories.
Future generations, obligations to
Authors: De-Shalit Avner
Published: September 2018

There are at least three different views concerning obligations to future generations. One is that morality does not apply here, future generations not being in any reciprocal relationship with us. Another is that, though we are not obliged to do anything for future generations, it would be praiseworthy to do so. A third view is that justice demands that we respect the interests of future generations.

Philosophers and others have discussed obligations in three main areas: the environment, and the damage inflicted upon it in pursuit of profit; savings and the accumulations of capital; and population policy.

Different theoretical approaches have been taken. According to utilitarianism, the interests of people count equally with those of present people, and all interests are to be satisfied maximally. This may have very demanding implications. Contractarianism rests morality on the agreement of all affected parties. But whose views will be considered in the case of future generations? Perhaps the most plausible approach is communitarianism, according to which obligations can rest on a sense of community which stretches into the future.
Good, theories of the
Authors: Korsgaard Christine M.
Published: September 2018

‘Good’ is the most general term of positive evaluation, used to recommend or express approval in a wide range of contexts. It indicates that a thing is desirable or worthy of choice, so that normally, if you have reason to want a certain kind of thing, you also have reason to prefer a good thing of that kind.

A theory of the good may consist in a general account of the good, which is meant to apply to all good things; or in a definition of ‘good’, that is, an account of how the term functions in the language. Theories of the good have metaphysical implications about the relations between fact and value. Many ancient and medieval philosophers believed in the ultimate identity of the real and the good. Modern philosophers generally reject this identification, and have held a range of positions: realists, for example, hold that the good is part of reality, while certain moral-sense theorists hold that when we call something ‘good’ we are projecting human interests onto reality; and emotivists hold that we use the term ‘good’ only to signify subjective approval.

Theorists of the good also categorize different kinds of goodness and explain how they are related. Good things are standardly classified as ends, which are valued for their own sakes, or as means, valued for the sake of the ends they promote. Some philosophers also divide them into intrinsic goods, which have their value in themselves, and extrinsic goods, which get their value from their relation to something else. Various theories have been held about the relation between these two distinctions – about whether an end must be something with intrinsic value. Philosophers also distinguish subjective or agent-relative goods – things which are good for someone in particular – from objective or agent-neutral goods, which are good from everyone’s point of view. Views about how these kinds of goodness are related have important implications for moral philosophy.

Usually, a theory of the good is constructed in the hope of shedding light on more substantive questions, such as what makes a person, an action, or a human life good. These questions raise issues about the relation between ethical and other values. For example, we may ask whether moral virtue is a special sort of goodness, or just the ordinary sort applied to persons. Or, since actions are valued as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, we may ask how these values are related to the action’s goodness or badness. We may also pose the question of whether a life that is good in the sense of being happy must also be a morally good or virtuous life. This last question has occupied the attention of philosophers ever since Plato.
Help and beneficence
Authors: Murphy Liam B.
Published: September 2018

Which people are we morally required to help, and to what extent? In a world where the basic needs of many millions remain unmet, this is a philosophical question of great practical urgency. A minimal position is that while it is always praiseworthy to help someone, we are morally required to help only those to whom we stand in some special relation. In addition to the objection that it is too minimal, this view faces difficulties in accounting for emergency cases, in which one could, for example, save a stranger’s life at little cost to oneself. More stringent views that place no restrictions on the range of people to be helped do not have these difficulties; they do, however, raise the intractable problem of how much we must sacrifice for the sake of others.
Ideals
Authors: Rosati Connie S.
Published: September 2018

Ideals are models of excellence. They can be moral or nonmoral, and either ‘substantive’ or ‘deliberative’. Substantive ideals present models of excellence against which things in a relevant class can be assessed, such as models of the just society or the good person. Deliberative ideals present models of excellent deliberation, leading to correct or warranted ethical conclusions. Ideals figure in ethics in two opposed ways. Most centrally, ideals serve to justify ethical judgments and to guide people in how to live. Sometimes, however, ideals may conflict with moral demands, thereby testing the limits of morality.

Reliance upon ideals in the development of ethical theories seems unavoidable but raises difficult questions. How can the choice of a particular ideal be justified? How might conflicts between ideals and other values, especially moral demands, be resolved?
Innocence
Authors: Hoose Bernard
Published: September 2018

In its most general sense, innocence refers to the state of being without sin. A more restricted meaning is attributed to the word in the legal sphere, where people who are found not to be guilty of a particular crime are described as innocent. In official teaching of the Roman Catholic church, all direct killing of the innocent is forbidden. Here the word refers to people who are not harmful. Nowadays, this can be taken to mean ‘non-aggressors’. According to Rousseau, humans possess original goodness. Corrupting influences come from outside them.
Intuitionism in ethics
Authors: Frazier Robert L.
Published: September 2018

To intuit something is to apprehend it directly, without recourse to reasoning processes such as deduction or induction. Intuitionism in ethics proposes that we have a capacity for intuition and that some of the facts or properties that we intuit are irreducibly ethical. Traditionally, intuitionism also advances the important thesis that beliefs arising from intuition have direct justification, and therefore do not need to be justified by appeal to other beliefs or facts. So, while intuitionism in ethics is about the apprehension of ethical facts or properties, traditional intuitionism is principally a view about how beliefs, including ethical beliefs are justified. Varieties of intuitionism differ over what is intuited (for example, rightness or goodness?); whether what is intuited is general and abstract or concrete and particular; the degree of justification offered by intuition; and the nature of the intuitive capacity. The rejection of intuitionism is usually a result of rejecting one of the views that lie behind it.

Note that ‘intuition’ can refer to the thing intuited as well as the process of intuiting. Also, somewhat confusingly, intuitionism is sometimes identified with pluralism, the view that there is a plurality of fundamental ethical properties or principles. This identification probably occurs because pluralists often accept the epistemological version of intuitionism.
Kantian ethics
Authors: O’Neill Onora
Published: September 2018

Kantian ethics originates in the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), which remain the most influential attempt to vindicate universal ethical principles that respect the dignity and equality of human beings without presupposing theological claims or a metaphysical conception of the good. Kant’s systematic, critical philosophy centres on an account of reasoning about action, which he uses to justify principles of duty and virtue, a liberal and republican conception of justice with cosmopolitan scope, and an account of the relationship between morality and hope.

Numerous contemporary writers also advance views of ethics which they, and their critics, think of as Kantian. However, some contemporary work is remote from Kant’s philosophy on fundamental matters such as human freedom and reasoning about action. It converges with Kant’s ethics in claiming that we lack a substantive account of the good (so that teleological or consequentialist ethics are impossible), in taking a strong view of the equality of moral agents and the importance of universal principles of duty which spell out what it is to respect them, and in stressing an account of justice and rights with cosmopolitan scope.

Both Kant’s ethics and contemporary Kantian ethics have been widely criticized for preoccupation with rules and duties, and for lack of concern with virtues, happiness or personal relationships. However, these criticisms may apply more to recent Kantian ethics than to Kant’s own ethics.
Life, meaning of
Authors: Wolf Susan
Published: September 2018

This is an obscure yet central topic in philosophy. Often associated with the question whether human beings are part of a larger or divine purpose, the question,‘What is the meaning of life?’ seems to invite a religious answer. Much philosophical discussion, however, questions the necessity of this association. Attention to the inevitability of death has often seemed to make life’s meaning problematic, but it is not obvious how immortality could make the difference between meaning and its absence. The theme of absurdity runs through much discussion of those who believe the universe to be indifferent. Though our lives have no significance, they argue, we must live as if they do. In the face of this absurdity, some advocate suicide, others defiance, others irony. One may also turn away from the issue of cosmic significance, and look for meaning elsewhere.
Medical ethics
Authors: Wikler Daniel
Published: September 2018

Medical ethics was once concerned with the professional obligations of physicians, spelled out in codes of conduct such as the ancient Hippocratic oath and elaborated by contemporary professional societies. Today this subject is a broad, loosely defined collection of issues of morality and justice in health, health care and related fields. The term ‘bioethics’ is often used interchangeably, though it is also used with its original broad meaning, which included issues in ecology.

The range of concerns grouped under ‘medical ethics’ begins with the relationship of doctor to patient, including such issues as consent to treatment, truth-telling, paternalism, confidentiality and the duty to treat. Particular moral uncertainty is engendered by contexts which demand divided allegiances of physicians, such as medical experimentation on human subjects, public health emergencies and for-profit medicine. Issues in medical ethics arise in every stage of life, from the fate of defective newborns to the withholding of life-sustaining therapies from the very old. Medical practices with patients who may not be competent to make their own medical decisions, including paediatrics and psychiatry, raise a distinctive set of ethical issues, as does medical genetics, which involves choices affecting family members, future individuals and offspring in utero. In recent years, medical ethics has broadened its focus beyond the individual physician or nurse to include the organization, operation and financing of the health care system as a whole, including difficult theoretical and practical uncertainties regarding the fair allocation of health care resources.

Medical ethics is at once a field of scholarship and a reform movement. The latter has campaigned in many countries on behalf of patients’ rights, better care of the dying and freedom for women in reproductive decisions. As a field of scholarship, medical ethics addresses these and many other issues, but is not defined by positions taken on any of them. Though ethicists often favour an emphasis on informed consent, oppose paternalism, urge permission to end life-sustaining therapy (or choose suicide) and seek protection of human subjects of experimentation, a diversity of viewpoints finds expression in the medical ethics literature.
Moral agents
Authors: Haksar Vinit
Published: September 2018

Moral agents are those agents expected to meet the demands of morality. Not all agents are moral agents. Young children and animals, being capable of performing actions, may be agents in the way that stones, plants and cars are not. But though they are agents they are not automatically considered moral agents. For a moral agent must also be capable of conforming to at least some of the demands of morality.

This requirement can be interpreted in different ways. On the weakest interpretation it will suffice if the agent has the capacity to conform to some of the external requirements of morality. So if certain agents can obey moral laws such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong’, then they are moral agents, even if they respond only to prudential reasons such as fear of punishment and even if they are incapable of acting for the sake of moral considerations. According to the strong version, the Kantian version, it is also essential that the agents should have the capacity to rise above their feelings and passions and act for the sake of the moral law. There is also a position in between which claims that it will suffice if the agent can perform the relevant act out of altruistic impulses. Other suggested conditions of moral agency are that agents should have: an enduring self with free will and an inner life; understanding of the relevant facts as well as moral understanding; and moral sentiments, such as capacity for remorse and concern for others.

Philosophers often disagree about which of these and other conditions are vital; the term moral agency is used with different degrees of stringency depending upon what one regards as its qualifying conditions. The Kantian sense is the most stringent. Since there are different senses of moral agency, answers to questions like ‘Are collectives moral agents?’ depend upon which sense is being used. From the Kantian standpoint, agents such as psychopaths, rational egoists, collectives and robots are at best only quasi-moral, for they do not fulfil some of the essential conditions of moral agency.
Moral judgement
Authors: Cullity Garrett
Published: September 2018

The term ‘moral judgement’ can refer to an activity, a state, a state-content, a capacity or a virtue. The activity of moral judgement is that of thinking about whether something has a moral attribute. The thing assessed might be an action, person, institution or state of affairs, and the attribute might either be general (such as rightness or badness) or specific (such as loyalty or injustice). If I engage in this activity and make up my mind, then the result will be the formation of a psychological state: the state of judging that the thing has the attribute. The state should then be distinguished from its content: what is judged by me, rather than my judging it. My psychological state of judging that human trafficking is wrong is a feature of me with a duration and location that depend on me. But the content of that state – the wrongness of human trafficking itself – is not a feature of me. Philosophers also frequently use ‘moral judgement’ to refer to a capacity: our alleged capacity ‘to go beyond the application of rules’ when we deliberate morally. And, going further, it can be used as a term of commendation, referring to a moral virtue (or set of virtues) that we might also call ‘moral discernment’ or ‘moral wisdom’, displayed when we exercise that capacity well. Someone with the virtue of moral judgement, it is often claimed, has an appropriate sensitivity to the way in which the individuality of a person or the particularity of a context can determine how it is right to act, think and feel – a sensitivity that cannot be captured in any general rule. Moral judgement in these various senses raises four main groups of philosophical questions. First, what kind of psychological state is the state of moral judgement? Is it, either wholly or in part, a belief, or is it some kind of noncognitive state? Secondly, what is required in order for a moral judgement-state, or the content of that state, to be justified? What kind of support do moral judgements require? Thirdly, how ought the activity of moral judgement to be conducted? In particular, what role within this activity is properly played by the application of rules? Do we need a capacity that goes beyond rule-application? And, fourthly, what is it to possess the virtue of moral judgement?
Moral knowledge
Authors: Sayre-McCord Geoffrey
Published: September 2018

One possesses moral knowledge when, but only when, one’s moral opinions are true and held justifiably. Whether anyone actually has moral knowledge is open to serious doubt, both because moral opinions are so hard to justify and because there is reason to think moral opinions are expressions not of belief (which might be evaluated as true or false) but of taste or preference. A successful defence of the view that people do have moral knowledge requires assuaging these doubts. Attempts in this direction standardly emphasize the respects in which our moral opinions, and the evidence we have for them, are analogous to the opinions and evidence we have concerning nonmoral matters, such as logic, mathematics, science, psychology and history. In the process they attempt to show that we do have good reason to think some of our moral opinions are true.
Moral realism
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: September 2018

Moral realism is the view that there are facts of the matter about which actions are right and which wrong, and about which things are good and which bad. But behind this bald statement lies a wealth of complexity. If one is a full-blown moral realist, one probably accepts the following three claims.

First, moral facts are somehow special and different from other sorts of fact. Realists differ, however, about whether the sort of specialness required is compatible with taking some natural facts to be moral facts. Take, for instance, the natural fact that if we do this action, we will have given someone the help they need. Could this be a moral fact – the same fact as the fact that we ought to do the action? Or must we think of such a natural fact as the natural ‘ground’ for the (quite different) moral fact that we should do it, that is, as the fact in the world that makes it true that we should act this way?

Second, realists hold that moral facts are independent of any beliefs or thoughts we might have about them. What is right is not determined by what I or anybody else thinks is right. It is not even determined by what we all think is right, even if we could be got to agree. We cannot make actions right by agreeing that they are, any more than we can make bombs safe by agreeing that they are.

Third, it is possible for us to make mistakes about what is right and what is wrong. No matter how carefully and honestly we think about what to do, there is still no guarantee that we will come up with the right answer. So what people conscientiously decide they should do may not be the same as what they should do.
Moral scepticism
Authors: Nelson Mark T.
Published: September 2018

Scepticism in general is the view that we can have little or no knowledge; thus moral scepticism is the view that we can have little or no moral knowledge. Some moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because we cannot get the evidence necessary to justify any moral judgments. More radical moral sceptics argue that we cannot have moral knowledge because in morality there are no truths to be known. These radical sceptics argue either that moral judgments are all false because they erroneously presuppose the real existence of ‘objective values’, or that moral judgments aim to express feelings or influence behaviour instead of stating truths. Critics of moral scepticism, in turn, argue that in at least some cases moral judgments aim to state truths, some of these judgments are in fact true, and we have enough evidence to say that we know these moral truths.
Praise and blame
Authors: Klein Martha
Published: September 2018

Praise and blame are philosophically interesting partly because, despite appearances, they are not simple opposites, but mainly because there are significant disagreements about whether, and when, they can be justified. The issue of justification connects praise and blame with some of philosophy’s most central concerns: justice, desert and free will.

Disagreements about the justification of praise and blame tend to take two forms. In one the disagreement is about whether praise and blame can be justified without being deserved. Utilitarians, who argue that the rightness of praise and blame does not depend on desert, but on their contributing to the level of happiness, are opposed by those who believe that justice is of overriding value.

In its second form, the disagreement is about the essential requirements for deserving praise and blame. Among the conditions which have been proposed as essential are voluntariness (outlined originally by Aristotle), acting from the motive of duty (for praiseworthiness), and (usually in connection with blameworthiness) being free in a sense which is incompatible with determinism (the thesis that every event has a necessitating cause). Kant, who argued for both of the last two requirements, is a key figure in this debate.
Professional ethics
Authors: Chadwick Ruth
Published: September 2018

Professional ethics is concerned with the values appropriate to certain kinds of occupational activity, such as medicine and law, which have been defined traditionally in terms of a body of knowledge and an ideal of service to the community; and in which individual professionals have a high degree of autonomy in their practice. The class of occupations aiming to achieve recognition as professions has increased to include, for example, nursing, while at the same time social and political developments have led to criticism of and challenge to the concepts of professions and professionalism. Problems in professional ethics include both regulation of the professional-client relationship and the role and status of professions in society. A central question for ethics is whether there are values or virtues specific to particular professions or whether the standards of ordinary morality are applicable.
Reciprocity
Authors: Becker Lawrence C.
Published: September 2018

To reciprocate is to return good in proportion to the good one has received, or to retaliate proportionately for harms. The central, contested philosophical issues surrounding reciprocity are whether reciprocity is a fundamental moral principle or a subsidiary one; how we are to measure fittingness and proportionality; and whether the norm of reciprocity requires that we reciprocate for all the goods we receive, or only for the ones we invite. While most philosophers believe that reciprocity is a subsidiary principle which is unproblematic only in the context of fully voluntary transactions, there are significant minority views on this matter.
Rectification and remainders
Authors: Card Claudia Falconer
Published: September 2018

Forgiveness, mercy and gratitude are rectifications, attempts to correct imbalances or set things right between us. Guilt is a moral remainder, a residue acknowledging an unexpiated wrong. Remainders offer us a limited redemption in revealing our appreciation that not everything has been made right.

Forgiveness manifests compassion for wrongdoers, who may or may not deserve it. Questions arise about when, what and whom we can forgive, what forgiving achieves, and when we ought or ought not to forgive. Forgiveness has special value in personal relationships, enabling their renewal. Connections among punishment, repentance, forgiveness and regret (another remainder) are complex, sometimes paradoxical.

Mercy often manifests forgiveness, as in pardons and amnesties. Yet we can also show mercy in administering rules where there has been no wrong. Is mercy unjust? Answers vary according to whether the case resembles a criminal offence or a civil suit. Grounded in others’ sufferings rather than their deeds, mercy has us see ourselves in them, but the value of doing so can be qualified by considerations of justice and of self-respect.

Mercy and forgiveness sometimes evoke gratitude, appreciative acknowledgement of another’s goodwill. Gratitude can be deserved or misplaced. Debts of gratitude are paradoxical, giving rise to ethical questions. When do we owe more than emotional response? What does reciprocity require between unequals? Some paradoxes may be solved by understanding obligations of gratitude as like those of a trustee rather than those of a debtor.

Guilt is emotional self-punishment (often relievable by forgiveness) which continues even after compensation, restitution or punishment by others. Questions arise about when it is rational and how it is related to shame, remorse, regret and repentance, which are also remainders.
Respect for persons
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: September 2018

The idea that one should treat persons with due respect is an important part of common sense morality, but opinions differ about when respect is called for, what it requires, and why. Respect for persons is also a central concept in many ethical theories. Some theories even hold respect for persons to be the foundation of all other moral duties and obligations.

Respect is distinguished commonly, on one side, from fear and submission, and on another, from admiration, liking and affection. Respect for all persons as such is distinguished normally from esteem or special regard for persons of unusual merit. Some philosophers identify respect with agapē, a special kind of love, but respect is perhaps most often regarded as a distinct attitude that should constrain and complement the promptings of love. Kant, for example, held that the requirements of respect and love are different, though compatible, and that both are dependent upon the more general and fundamental idea that humanity in every person is an end in itself.

Other key issues in discussions of respect for persons include: what moral requirement, if any, there is to respect all persons; what the grounds, scope, and theoretical status are of that requirement; whether one can forfeit all claim to respect as a person; what ‘respect for persons’ demands with regard to specific problems, such as conflicts rooted in race and gender differences; and whether there is the same ground and obligation to respect oneself as to respect others.
Right and good
Authors: Larmore Charles
Published: September 2018

‘Right’ and ‘good’ are the two basic terms of moral evaluation. In general, something is ‘right’ if it is morally obligatory, whereas it is morally ‘good’ if it is worth having or doing and enhances the life of those who possess it.

Acts are often held to be morally right or wrong in respect of the action performed, but morally good or bad in virtue of their motive: it is right to help a person in distress, but good to do so from a sense of duty or sympathy, since no one can supposedly be obliged to do something (such as acting with a certain motive) which cannot be done at will.

Henry Sidgwick distinguished between two basic conceptions of morality. The ‘attractive’ conception, favoured by the ancient Greeks, views the good as fundamental, and grounds the claims of morality in the self-perfection to which we naturally aspire. The ‘imperative’ conception, preferred in the modern era, views the right as fundamental, and holds that we are subject to certain obligations whatever our wants or desires.
Risk
Authors: Shrader-Frechette Kristin
Published: September 2018

Every day persons face threats from natural disasters such as hurricanes and from technological hazards such as exposure to more than 60,000 different chemicals. The increase of pervasive, human-caused hazards raises a number of philosophical issues, most notably in the areas of ethics and epistemology. There are three main classes of ethical issue associated with risk. (1) Who should define risk, and how should it be defined? (2) Who should evaluate risk, and according to which rules? (3) What are the conditions under which it is ethically acceptable to impose societal risk? Societal risks (such as those from liquefied natural gas facilities) tend to be involuntarily imposed, whereas individual risks (such as those from dietary consumption of saturated fats) are more voluntarily chosen. This discussion addresses societal, rather than individual, risks because they involve less individual choice and hence more ethical controversy.
Self-deception, ethics of
Authors: Martin Mike W.
Published: September 2018

Self-deception is complicated and perplexing because it concerns all major aspects of human nature, including consciousness, rationality, motivation, freedom, happiness, and value commitments. In a wide sense, ‘self-deception’ refers to intentional activities and motivated processes of avoiding unpleasant truths or topics and the resulting mental states of ignorance, false belief, unwarranted attitudes, and inappropriate emotions. Deceiving oneself, like deceiving other people, raises a host of questions about immorality. These include whether self-deception is always immoral or only when it conceals and supports wrongdoing; whether self-deception about wrongdoing and character faults compounds or mitigates guilt for causing harm; how important the value of authenticity is, and whether it can be sacrificed in an attempt to cope with reality; what the relation is between self-deception and responsibility; and whether groups can be self-deceived. Ultimately, the moral status of any instance of self-deception depends on the particular facts of the case.
Shaftesbury, Third Earl of (Anthony Ashley Cooper) (1671–1713)
Authors: McNaughton David
Published: September 2018

Shaftesbury, whose influence on eighteenth-century thought was enormous, was the last great representative of the Platonic tradition in England. He argued that by natural reason we can see that the world is an intelligible, harmonious system. In reflecting on our character traits we will inevitably approve of those which contribute to the good of humanity and of the whole system. These same personal qualities are also needed for a happy life, so virtue and happiness go hand in hand.

Shaftesbury is often seen as the founder of the moral sense or ‘sentimentalist’ school in ethics, whose members held that morality was based on human feeling rather than on reason. Although leading sentimentalists, such as Hutcheson and Hume, made use of many of his ideas, Shaftesbury himself has more in common with the rationalists, who held that there are eternal moral truths which we can know by the use of reason.