bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
State and Society in Nineteenth-Century China
Authors: Michael Franz
Published: July 2006

Communist China has broken with the Chinese cultural tradition, which it attacks and condemns. This break was prepared in part by the transformation of China during the declining years of imperial rule and in Republican times. But whereas this period was marked by the disintegration and disappearance of old institutions and some uncertainty about things to come, a new, rigid doctrine and social structure are now being introduced to integrate a new society within a totalitarian state. The old values have been discarded, but some of the organizational patterns of the past have been carried over, or have reappeared in the new system. The Communists are attempting to impose their system on Chinese society through the agency of an ideologically oriented elite which not only holds official position in government but also controls society itself. The degree of success which this system achieves may depend in part on the extent to which Chinese society has been prepared by its tradition to accept a centralized bureaucratic state working through a trained elite. In addition to helping us to assess the degree of preconditioning in China for Communist rule, an analytical study of imperial China may provide us with a greater understanding of the social and political techniques which a bureaucratic state employs, and which become of such special importance for a totalitarian government. What, then, were the key features of the imperial state and society which the Communists have retained or replaced in their own way, and what was the role played by the educated elite of the past?

The imperial state aimed at a strong control over Chinese society. The struggle to keep an all-powerful central rule was the dominant concern of every Chinese dynasty. The center of all authority was the emperor and the court, the embodiment of the interests of the state. Serving the emperor was a group of officials, small in number compared with the size of the country and the population, and with the importance of the functions to be carried out. These officials represented the interests of the state as a whole—its concern with the well-being or acquiescence of all groups of the population. The last Chinese dynasty had in addition special support from a group which served the state without being a part of Chinese society. The Manchus had come as conquerors from the frontier of the Chinese empire, with their forces militarily organized into units known as “banners.” When the Manchu dynasty was set up, the Manchu banners were kept apart from the Chinese people and the bannermen remained an inner core of dynastic supporters used both as a military force and in key official positions. But these bannermen were only a small group, largely unqualified for the complex tasks of Chinese administration, and thus the Manchu dynasty, like its predecessors, had to recruit its state administration from Chinese society.
Conditions and Prospects for Economic Growth in Communist China
Authors: Eckstein Alexander
Published: July 2006

Regardless of whether a detailed Five-Year Plan is in operation or not, there is in Communist China every indication of a determined, relentless, and massive effort to pursue a program of industrial expansion. The rapid rate of recovery, the restructuring of the institutional framework, the possession of an industrial base in Manchuria, the termination of hostilities in Korea, and, above all, the application of political and social power to the mobilization of resources in the hands of the state are all factors that have enabled the regime to raise the rate and level of investment considerably above that of the past. At the same time, the regime is mobilizing not only capital, but technique and entre-preneurship as well. In essence, the Chinese economy—after being more or less stationary for centuries, with only erratic and partial spurts of growth in recent decades—seems to be entering, for better or for worse, a self-sustaining growth process.

Barring another world war or a major agricultural crisis in China, the long-run question before us is not whether the Chinese Communist economy will grow at all, but whether the rate of growth will be sufficiently rapid so that the forces of the industrial revolution will be in a position to defeat the Malthusian counterrevolution. Given the previously discussed conditions and limitations, how rapidly may industrialization be expected to proceed? Obviously, these questions can only be answered conditionally and hypothetically. However, before approaching this problem, it may be well to take a schematic look at the “size” and “structur” of the Chinese mainland economy in 1952, which may be considered as the point of departure for the upward climb.
Wilson's Neutrality Re-Examined
Authors: Buehrig Edward H.
Published: July 2006

Before our entry into the First World War American policy was labeled as one of neutrality, which implied that the proper measure of relations with the belligerents was to be found in international law and, more particularly, in the rules of maritimewarfare. The content of that policy failed to correspond with its label, for actually it was sharply inclined to the side of Great Britain. However, the Administration refrained from acknowledging the fact that British naval actions were not being scrupulouslysubjected to the test of the rules of maritime warfare. Freedom of the seas and support of Great Britainwere quite different points from which to proceed.Each might have been used as the basis of separate phases of a changing policy. In fact, however, they were employed simultaneously. Since they not only failed to complement each other but were actually contradictory, the result was to subject American policy toa terrific internal tension.
Our Columnists on the A-Bomb
Authors: Besse Janet , Lasswell Harold D.
Published: July 2006

Opinion differs about the role of syndicated columnists in the forming of national opinion and in the decision-making process in the United States. Our columnists have been the subject of pioneering studies, but we have a long way to go before the picture can be called historically complete, scientifically precise, or fully satisfactory for policy-making purposes. What the columnists say is an important chapter in the history of the American public, and history is most useful for critical purposes when written close to the event. The general theory of communication and politics can be refined as the details of the opinion process are more fully known.
The Bomb and Blackett
Authors: Ridenour Louis N.
Published: July 2006

P. M. S. Blackett, Nobel Laureate in Physics for 1948, is a scientist of distinction and outstanding ability. He is therefore capable, as all good scientists should be, of careful and objective reasoning concerning matters that do not impinge too closely upon his faiths and implicit beliefs. Unfortunately, the subject matter of his book, Fear, War, and the Bomb, suggests that Blackett has allowed his pronounced political sympathies to warp his observations and his reasoning. They have apparently led him to suppress large numbers of pertinent facts, to ignore many crucial technical and political possibilities, and to depreciate the honesty and good faith of his government and of ours to an absurd degree.
India's Foreign Economic Policies
Authors: Cohen Jerome B.
Published: July 2006

While the West is occupied with the cold war, an economic test is slowly shaping in Asia. Upon its outcome may depend the political beliefs and allegiance of half the world's people. The issue may be stated simply, although the forces at work are complex and intricate: Can India, with a population of 360 million, under the democratic process, with free elections and a mixed economy similar to mat of many Western nations, meet the national aspirations for economic betterment and a more abundant life more fully and more rapidly than Communist China, with its totalitarian rule of 500 million people and its forced labor, forced investment, and forced production? In spite of all the propaganda about progress in Communist China, it is probable that the Indian record of actual achievement is more impressive, though less well publicized.
Grants and Loans in U.S. Foreign Assistance
Authors: Malenbaum Wilfred
Published: July 2006

Of Some 45.5 billion dollars in aid which the United States has provided to foreign countries in the postwar period from July 1, 1945, through June 30, 1953, roughly 75 per cent is recorded as grant assistance, the remainder as assistance in the form of credits. Examination of the statistics in these two categories suggests that there really is a third category, in which some of the aid listed in each of the two might properly be put. Thus, transactions listed as “grants” have realized some repayments; others have been renegotiated into cash or credits. On the other hand, there are “loans” which are obviously part grants; other loans remain loans only because of our grants to the same country.
Intelligence and Policy-making in Foreign Affairs
Authors: Hilsman Roger
Published: July 2006

When he set out to form a secret intelligence agency for President Roosevelt in 1941, “Wild Bill” Donovan made little effort to curb his own characteristic receptivity to the new, the different, and even the unorthodox. Completely in character, he took up with quick enthusiasm the novel idea that scholars—those dreamy inhabitants of ivory towers—would be ideal for the job. He believed that by searching through the Library of Congress and through the files of the many government agencies these men could uncover much of the information for which secret agents risked their lives. In a sense, he dedicated the Research and Analysis Branch of the wartime Office of Strategic Services to the task of making the romantic secret agent obsolete. Since then, more and more people have come to believe that research—and the social sciences—have at last found a home within the formal structure of government.
In Search of the National Interest
Authors: Kirk Grayson L.
Published: July 2006

There are fads in scholarship as well as in fashion. Just JL now, the current fad, with respect to American diplomatic history, is to belabor what is called “Wilsonianism” with all the sarcasm and dignified invective at the writer's disposal. It is almost de rigueur to expatiate upon the prescient wisdom of the Founding Fathers, to pass over most of the period between John Quincy Adams and William McKinley as relatively unimportant, and to concentrate the heaviest guns of criticism upon the “Utopianism” of the first half of the twentieth century. Only now, and belatedly, we are told, is the United States beginning to come down from the clouds of illusion and to survey realistically the true nature of the world with which its diplomatists and policymakers must cope. Only now are we beginning once again to measure possible policy decisions by the yardsticks of power and “the national interest.”
The Postwar Italian Economy: Achievements, Problems, and Prospects
Authors: Hildebrand George H.
Published: July 2006

WITHIN the past year, the Italian government has revealed a ten-year program, known as the Vanoni Plan, for the development of the Italian economy. By the investment of $56 billion, the government hopes to conquer the problem of chronic unemployment and to revitalize the laggard southern regionof the country. The plan is a bold and imaginative one, replete with government controls, and probably too optimistic. Nonetheless, it has forcefully drawn international attention to Italy's basic economic problems. Hence it is opportune to examine those problems against the perspective of what has been attained by the Italian economy in the past ten years.

Compared with northwest Europe, Italy has always been economically poor. Capital is much scarcer and the endowment of natural resources is much less favorable. Deposits of coal and metallic minerals are negligible or lacking, though natural gas production is growing and petroleum has recently been discovered. Arable land is poor in average quality. Only 1.78 hectares areavailable per person engaged in agriculture, one-third less than in France, while total arableland is one-quarter below France although the population of Italy is 10 per cent larger (47.1 million in 1951).
Prospects for Economic Development in Indonesia
Authors: Hawkins Everett D.
Published: July 2006

MOST American forecasters in the first half of 1955 were optimistic about the United States economy, but many were gloomy about the prospects for Asia. The head-shaking over Indonesia was particularly grave.1 Such a pessimistic outlook was perhaps a natural reaction to the sanguine attitude that followed the Indonesian achievement of freedom from the Dutch on December 27, 1949. In Indonesia itself, a battle raged in 1955—culminating in the overthrow of the Ali cabinet—between those out of power who blamed the cabinet for inflation, insecurity, and corruption, and those in power who tried to place the onus on previous cabinets, the Dutch, and remnants of colonialism. Indonesian newspapers played up these disputes with perhaps even more vigor than the American press handles party differences within the United States.

Indonesia is a classic example of a recently freed, former colony. Winning sovereignty from the Netherlands ended the first and basically the simpler phase of the revolution. The second phase, more difficult and much more gradual, must evolve new institutions to make the country a truly independent power and ensure economic development with a rising standard of living for her people. She is struggling with the usual boom-and-bust cycle that characterizes araw-material producing country. In the 1930's, she suffered through the sugar depression. Since she gained her freedom, rubber, tin, and copra, comprising over 70 per cent of her exports, have give hera hectic ride on the roller coaster of world prices.
Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience
Authors: Fox William T. R.
Published: July 2006

What is today in the United States conventionally known as international relations is a subject different in content and emphasis from its counterpart of even two decades ago. Much of what seemed important in 1929 seems irrelevant, and some of it even trivial, in 1949. Another twenty years may perhaps bring a similar judgment on work now being done. But we ought at least to be aware of the direction in which we have been moving if we are to control the future development of the field.

In 1930 the following statement passed unchallenged in a discussion among some of Ameria's leading social scientists: “The emotional drive is so highly developed in the kind of person who goes into the international relations field that it often leads to unclear thinking.” The implication that no one without this drive could conceivably be persuaded to enter the field is a commentary on the disesteem with which international relations research was then regarded.
The Present Course of International Relations Research
Authors: Dunn Frederick S.
Published: July 2006

This is a good time to ask what are the important emerging trends in research in international relations. In the first place, the problems of world politics today are as arresting in their implications for the security and well-being of peoples everywhere as they have ever been; at the same time, they seem less subject to human control. Secondly, a generation of experimenting and high-level groping with international problems has produced, or ought to have produced, some valuable conclusions about how to proceed in carrying out fruitful research in the field. Finally, the impressive advances made in various branches of the social sciences in the last few years have provided some interesting new tools and skills that ought to be of great help to the political analyst working on the international level.
Why Eisenhower's Forces Stopped at the Elbe
Authors: Pogue Forrest C.
Published: July 2006

On April 12, 1945, the day of President Roosevelt's death and eighteen days before the Russians took Berlin, American forces crossed the Elbe near Magdeburg, some fifty miles from the German capital. A second bridgehead was established across the Elbe on the 13th. On the following day, a German counterattack forced U.S. units to withdraw from their northern bridgehead, while retaining the one in the south. These elements were ordered to hold in place, and other units arriving at the Elbe were turned toward objectives south and north along the west bank of the river. On May 5, a week before the Russians entered Prague, the Third U.S. Army had advance spearheads inside the Czechoslovak frontiers and, on the day the war ended, General Patton was in a position to send aid to the Czechoslovak capital. Despite the pleas of Czechoslovak leaders in Prague and London, these units were not sent forward.
The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution: Some Suggestive Analogies
Authors: Deutscher Isaac
Published: July 2006

An eminent French historian once wrote: “Consider the revolutions of the Renaissance: in them you will find all the passions, all the spirit, and all the language of the French Revolution.” With some reservations, one might also say that if one considers the Great French Revolution, one can find in it the passions, the spirit, and the language of the Russian Revolution. This is true to such an extent that it is absolutely necessary for the student of recent Russian history to view it every now and then through the French prism. (The student of the French Revolution, too, may gain new insights if occasionally he analyzes his subject in the light of the Russian experience.) Historical analogy by itself is, of course, only one of the many angles from which he ought to approach his subject; and it may be downright misleading if he merely contents himself with assembling the points of formal resemblance between historical situations. “History is concrete”; and this means, among other things, that every event or situation is unique, regardless of its possible similarity to other events and situations. In drawing any analogy, it is therefore important to know where the analogy ends. I hope that I shall not offend badly against this rule; and I would like to acknowledge my great debt to the eminent French historians whose works on the French Revolution have helped me to gain new insights into the Russian Revolution.
The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics
Authors: Furniss Edgar S.
Published: July 2006

Ten years ago Harcourt, Brace and Company published America's Strategy in World Politics. It was written by Nicholas John Spykman, Professor of International Relations at Yale University from 1928 until his death in 1943, and first director of the Institute of International Studies at Yale. Critics recognized that the book was important, but agreed on little else. One reviewer hailed it as “brilliant, incisive, provocative, well-reasoned, well-written, and altogether admirable as an analysis of American foreign policy from a point of view all too long neglected in the United States.” On the other hand, a second reviewer bitterly asked, “What were those eminent scholars at Yale thinking about when they let such an idea loose [that the United States might need German and Japanese power after the war]? … Such guessing and surmising is not objective political science, it is not anything but the expression of mental discomfort that the learned gentleman feels in a world that, despite his own cold-blooded cult of political realism, does not appear to be moving in the direction suggested by his own wishful thinking.” And there was more, much more, both pro and con. Despite a laudatory, front-page review, complete with picture, in the New York Times Book Review, Professor Spykman probably, if the score were totaled, did no better than break even.
Science and Politics: A Commentary
Authors: Tauber Kurt P.
Published: July 2006

The formation of attitudes and expectations in international politics—if they are to be adequate bases for action—must rest upon, among other things, a correct appraisal of the motives of the leaders of other countries and of the means by which they achieve their objectives. In a recent article in World Politics entitled “Science and Politics in the U.S.S.R.: The Genetics Debate,” Miss Pamela N. Wrinch discusses the possible ideological motives (as well as, speculatively, some of the psychological ones) which give impetus to the eradication of disapproved scientific theories and procedures, and the argumentative means employed in this stamping-out process. Though the article is fully convincing in presenting a clear picture of Soviet debating techniques, Miss Wrinch is less successful on the score of assessing the motives for the official opposition to certain theories in Soviet Russia.
Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons
Authors: Brodie Bernard
Published: July 2006

Military demonstrations could conveniently be classified according to objective under two major headings: (a) those intended primarily to convey purpose or intention, and (b) those intended primarily to convey capability. The latter type is generally free of the political risks which often attend the former. Both types, but especially the former, may be effected without necessarily disclosing new advances in the use, design, or performance of weapons. In the latter type, however, there may be a strong temptation—or a strong justification even in the absence of temptation—to parade a new or improved weapon or weapons system which reflects both technological achievement and enhanced capability.
Protect or Compensate?
Authors: Hulley John
Published: July 2006

The postwar drive to liberalize trade, increase competition, and thereby improve productivity within Western Europe has met with determined opposition, as have similar attempts at reducing trade barriers in the United States. This resistance has come from a variety of groups which fear that their interests will be jeopardized as a result of keener competition, and its magnitude can hardly be overestimated. Indeed, it probably constitutes the major single barrier to European economic unification. Certainly, it can no longer be passed off with lectures on the virtues of competition, mobility of the factors of production, and international division of labor.
Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
Authors: Viner Jacob
Published: July 2006

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries economic thought and practice were predominantly carried on within the framework of that body of ideas which was later to be called “mercantilism.” Although there has been almost no systematic investigation of the relationship in mercantilist thought between economic and political objectives or ends in the field of foreign policy, certain stereotypes have become so prevalent that few scholars have seriously questioned or examined their validity. One of these stereotypes is that mercantilism was a “system of power,” that is, that “power” was for mercantilists the sole or overwhelmingly preponderant end of foreign policy, and that wealth, or “plenty,” was valued solely or mainly as a necessary means to attaining or retaining or exercising power. It is the purpose of this paper to examine in the light of the available evidence the validity of this interpretation of mercantilist thought and practice. Tracing the history of ideas, however, always runs to many words, and limitations of space force me to confine myself, even with respect to bibliographical references, to samples of the various types of relevant evidence. That the samples are fair ones I can only attest by my readiness in most cases to expand them indefinitely.
The Political Science of E. H. Carr
Authors: Morgenthau Hans
Published: July 2006

If peace and security are the earmarks of a successful foreign policy, the foreign policies pursued since the end of the first World War by the great Western powers were certainly less successful than any pursued by these powers since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. To say this, of course, is only to state the obvious. That the succession of failures is rooted in a marked decline in the political intelligence of the Western world is less obvious. Yet the recognition of that relationship is decisive for the understanding of the disease which holds the modern state system in its grip.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Authors: Wood Bryce
Published: July 2006

These four publications appeared in the latter half of 1947 but all of them were written near the middle of the year. Three of them deal directly with the policy which the United States should adopt toward the Soviet Union. The concern of Mr. Armstrong at first seems to be limited to “the two main objectives of American foreign policy”: “to help Europe live and to strengthen the United Nations.” Subsequently, however, although Mr. Armstrong is nowhere explicit on this point, it appears that these are techniques, rather than objectives, for the first would avert the “planned social and economic disintegration” furthered by the Soviet Union, while the second would diminish the effectiveness of Moscow's policy of “indirect aggression.” It is, therefore, not unreasonable to include Mr. Armstrong among those offering answers to the question: Where do we go from here in seeking equilibrium and even an accord with the Kremlin?
The Scope of International Relations
Authors: Dunn Frederick S.
Published: July 2006

Four able and penetrating writers have recently given us their considered views on the nature and scope of international relations as a branch of higher learning.* While each of them starts from a somewhat different intellectual viewpoint, they display a striking similarity of conception of the general place of international relations (hereafter referred to as IR) in the spectrum of human knowledge. I propose here, not to subject these writings to critical scrutiny, but to use them as a starting point for a brief inspection of the scope of international relations as it now seems to be taking form in the work of the leading scholars in the field.

It is necessary to note in the beginning that “scope” is a dangerously ambiguous word. It suggests that the subject matter under inquiry has clearly discernible limits, and that all one has to do in defining its scope is to trace out these boundaries in much the manner of a surveyor marking out the bounds of a piece of real property. Actually, it is nothing of the sort. A field of knowledge does not possess a fixed extension in space but is a constantly changing focus of data and methods that happen at the moment to be useful in answering an identifiable set of questions. It presents at any given time different aspects to different observers, depending on their point of view and purpose. The boundaries that supposedly divide one field of knowledge from another are not fixed walls between separate cells of truth but are convenient devices for arranging known facts and methods in manageable segments for instruction and practice. But the foci of interest are constantly shifting and these divisions tend to change with them, although more slowly because mental habits alter slowly and the vested interests of the intellectual world are as resistant to change as those of the social world.
The Metamorphosis of the Stalin Myth
Authors: Tucker Robert C.
Published: July 2006

THE death of Joseph Stalin marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Soviet regime in Russia. It set in motion a train of events in the internal political life of the country which, for better or for worse, will alter the political personality of the Soviet regime as the world came to know it under the influence of Stalin's dominating figure. No one can yet predict with any confidence how this sequence of events will unfold in the years to come. The most that can be done at this early stage is to visualize the forces at work behind the scenes and strive to reach an informed preliminary guess about the direction or directions in which these forces are moving.

That is the task of the present article. It seeks to investigate certain aspects of the post-Stalin train of events which are now themselves a part of history. Its purpose is to cast light upon some of the principal trends and issues in the internal political life of Soviet Russia since Stalin died. These trends and issues are for the most part hidden beneath the surface of Soviet public life; only occasionally, as in the Beria episode, have they erupted into full view of a perplexed and fascinated world. It is necessary, therefore, to study the submerged political realities through their indirect reflection in the public pronouncements of the controlled and official Soviet press. The central importance of the new regime‘s attitude toward Stalin and the Stalin heritage directs attention upon the changing manner in which the official propaganda has presented the image of Stalin to the Soviet people. We shall first tell the factual story of this process, tracing the steps by which Stalin‘s heirs successively dethroned him, partially restored him, and finally refashioned an entirely new Stalin image to fit their present needs. The latter part of the article attempts to interpret the political meaning of the new Stalin myth and of another new phenomenon closely associated with it, the “cult of the Party”
German Officialdom Revisited: Political Views and Attitudes of the West German Civil Service
Authors: Herz John H.
Published: July 2006

DEEP crises in the life of a nation sometimes lay bare with lightning clarity those basic social ties, loyalties, and commitments which render possible some maintenance of order and control when everything seems about to break down or disappear. In 1945, year of the deepest crisis that the German people have undergone in modern times, groups and organizations like the Junkers or the Nazi Party simply vanished; others, like the military, disappeared at least temporarily or, like the industrialists, were gravely weakened. It was the bureaucracy which became the bedrock, the irreducible minimum of social cohesion upon which, first locally, then in larger units, society was rebuilt. Subsequently, confirmed in its traditional position of control by the occupation powers (certain measures of attempted political purge and technical reorganization notwithstanding), its actual power was enhanced by the innumerable tasks of postwar reconstruction, from the building-up of entire new administrations (in the new Länder as well as on the bi-zonal and then federal levels of government) to the handling of what has been aptly called the “universe of claims” arising out of Nazi, war, and postwar conditions.
The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?
Authors: Haas Ernst B.
Published: July 2006

“The Soviet Union is now engaged in an audacious attempt JL to upset the established balance of power prevailing in Europe.” This statement was used by C. L. Sulzberger, writing in theNew York Timesfor March 23, 1952, to open a discussion of the Soviet offer to establish a unified and neutral Germany. It symbolizes the startling renaissance of the balance of power concept in recent years not only in the pages of learned journals, but in the daily press and in radio as well. This rebirth is probably attributable to the effort to reconsider the notions concerning international relations generally held during the League of Nations period, notions which emphasized open diplomacy, collective security, and the use of arbitration instead of unilateral force. The apparent futility of these methods seemed to call for the reintroduction of more meaningful concepts into the analysis of international affairs, and the balance of power thus reappeared as part of the general trend to re-establish the primacy of power as the key to the understanding of interstate relations. There would be no difficulty in this development if the term “balance of power” were free from philological, semantic, and theoretical confusion. Unfortunately, it is not. The term is defined differently by different writers; it is used in varying senses, even if not defined exactly at all; and, finally, it is the focal concept in several quite distinct theories of international relations. The purpose of this article is the clarification, not only of theverbaldifferences in meaning, but also of theapplied meaningsof the “balance of power” phrase as they vary in accordance with the intentions of the users. The necessity for such an attempt may be demonstrated by an introductory discussion of the variety of thought on this topic, in terms of substantive meanings no less than in terms of systems of classification.
Aesthetic Functions in Modern Politics
Authors: Rieff Philip
Published: July 2006

The relations between art and politics have rarely been discussed either in contemporary aesthetics or in political science. Since Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Arts, the analysis of art styles as the sensuous objectifications of cultural attitudes has been worked out in detail. But the same method has not been applied to the sensuous objectifications of political action. The removal of art from social life to the museum has also removed it from among the integral concerns of political science. Accepting the popular dichotomy between art and politics, modern political science has long lost its senseof art as techne, as a practical instrument of communication and coercion. An older political science did indeed consider “art” an instrument of coercion, curbing what Freud liked to call “the rebelliousness and destructive passions” of the masses and binding them to their rulers. Indeed, perhaps Freud alone among modern masters of social science comprehended art as one of the weapons of coercion in the arsenal of culture. “Works of art,” Freud writes, “promote the feelings of identification” and identification is, in the Freudian theory, the modality of authority.
Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade
Authors: Pauker Guy J.
Published: July 2006

Four areas in the world are at present or potentially major power centers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Communist China. In all four, productivity is on the increase and the political system performs relatively well its integrating and decisionmaking functions. Despite major differences among them which need not be examined here and various weak spots which might reverse trends, these four areas are likely to be in a position to play major roles in political, economic, and cultural international affairs in the coming decade. In contrast, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Tropical Africa, and Latin America are apt to remain power vacuums during this period, owing to their lack of unity, political instability, economic stagnation, and cultural heterogeneity.
International Relations: The Long Road to Theory
Authors: Hoffmann Stanley H.
Published: July 2006

It has become customary to begin a discussion of the nature and present state of the discipline of international relations with a number of complaints. This article will not abandon the custom; indeed, its purpose is, in the first place, to state the conviction that many of the problems we face in our field can be solved only by far more systematic theoretical work than has been done in the past—a conviction shared by most writers. Secondly, however, I will try to show that recent approaches to a general theory of international relations are unsatisfactory, because each one is, in its own fashion, a short cut to knowledge—sometimes even a short cut to a destination that is anything but knowledge.
Sino-Soviet Aid to South and Southeast Asia
Authors: Aubrey Henry G.
Published: July 2006

It is customary to show that total assistance by the United States to the underdeveloped world by far exceeds that of the Soviet bloc; and since the comparison is invariably much in favor of the United States, one cannot help being puzzled by the alarm displayed about Communist aid “penetration.” Moreover, I feel that such global comparisons fail to impress individual countries, which either care little about aid given to others or resent it if it is given to unfriendly neighbors or to partners in military alliances disliked for political or ideological reasons. Even aid that is gladly received is not necessarily well remembered later.
The Concept of Economic Potential for War
Authors: Knorr Klaus
Published: July 2006

TOWARD the end of the Second World War, Field Marshal Rommel confided to his diary that, once the German U-boats were beaten in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the swelling stream of American soldiers and supplies could reach Europe, Germany “was doomed to inevitable defeat at any place which was accessible to the Anglo-American transport fleets.” Not everyone will agree with this assertion of the prominent role played by sheer masses of military manpower and matériel in deciding the outcome of World War II. It is suggestive, however, that the fortunes of that war turned in close association with the changing ratio of munitions production by the Axis powers and the United Nations.
On United Nations Economics
Authors: Furth J. Herbert
Published: July 2006

The United Nations has made a vital contribution to economic intelligence and analysis through the publications of its Bureau of Economic Affairs as well as those of its regional commissions. The prestige of its professional staff is so high that their pronouncements find a respectful audience all over the world. This well-merited recognition, however, burdens the staff with heavy responsibilities. An academic economist may well indulge in political advice or economic forecasting, even though proficiency in economic theory guarantees neither sound political judgment nor the possession of prophetic gifts. It is different with staff members of a public agency, and especially with those of one of the foremost international institutions. Any advice they give should be based on generally accepted theories and values rather than on controversial hypotheses or partisan opinions. And, since they are as unable to foresee the future as other human beings, they should withstand the temptation to make predictions.
Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin
Authors: Franklin William M.
Published: July 2006

EVER since the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949, the author has been asked on a number of occasions to explain how the zonal boundaries in Germany came to be drawn and why Berlin was left as an island in the Communist sea. A brief and simple answer was found to be impossible for several reasons: First, the Department of State does not have all the pertinent records, since the Department was not included in all of the negotiations on this subject. Second, some parts of the story do not seem to be documented adequately in any official records, with the result that certain aspects of the subject are open to controversial interpretations. Third, not only is the story of these negotiations complicated in itself, being woven from several separate strands, but it can only be explained in the larger framework of the overall planning for the occupation of Germany. Despite these many limitations and difficulties, the author has felt that he should attempt to set down as complete and objective an answer as he could to the persistent queries which this subject has evoked. The result is the present article.
European Unification: A Strategy of Change
Authors: Etzioni Amitai
Published: July 2006

The success of the European Economic Community often has been hailed as the most important development of international relations in the West in the last century. Even if the EEC does not progress beyond the point it has already reached, it is probably the most integrated union ever to have been formed among nation-states. Moreover, observers have been impressed by the momentum the EEC has had until recently, leading most of them to expect that its level of integration will continue to rise and its scope of unification to grow. Much of the credit for the success of the EEC is often attributed to “background” factors, to the fact that the member countries share the same European tradition, have a sizable Catholic population, are in a similar stage of economic development, have a similar civilization, and so forth.
Cincinnatus and the Apparatchik
Authors: Brzezinski Zbigniew , Huntington Samuel P.
Published: July 2006

KTO KOVO?” asked Lenin. “Who governs?” echoes a contemporary American political scientist. The question is of perennial interest. The “who's” have the capacity to influence the behavior of others. They include political leaders, who customarily exercise power through public or governmental bodies, and non-political leaders, who may exercise power through the command of other values, such as wealth, income, expertise. Political leaders and non-political leaders together constitute the elite; they lead the masses, who, needless to say, greatly outnumber the elite.
Continuity and Change in International Systems
Authors: Liska George
Published: July 2006

The comparative analysis of past and present systems as an approach to the study of international politics has been subjected to its first major test. It can be said at once that the effort is a most creditable one. The approach promises to become increasingly attractive with time. Much of the theoretical writing that uses the data of international politics is becoming the preserve of specialists in abstract theory. And the student committed primarily to international politics and to theory only insofar as it helps order and apprehend significant problems of international politics here and now is quite naturally attracted to the historical perspective. History can be used to illuminate the evolving structural features of contemporary relations and it provides some relief from the politics of the Cold War, which are becoming progressively routinized.
Berlin and the German Problem
Authors: Shell Kurt L.
Published: July 2006

The acute phase of the Berlin crisis appears to be past. It began with the Soviet “ultimatum” of November 17,1958, and petered out in the aftermath of the showdown over Cuba. But though there are many indications that for some time a renewal of the threatening pressure on Berlin—West Berlin, to be precise—need not be expected, there can be no assurance that the situation will not blow up in our faces at any moment any day, as the death of Peter Fechter at the Wall in August 1962 illustrated. Also, we are as far as ever from a real solution for the admittedly abnormal situation of this city. And it still remains an open question whether, with the passage of time, acceptance and adjustment to the brutal abnormality of the Wall and the division of Germany will win out over growing frustration and the explosive and dangerous consequences of disappointed hopes for unification and liberation. Thus Berlin is likely to remain indefinitely both a thermometer indicating the temperature of the Cold War and a time-bomb that resists defusing.
Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force
Authors: Lerner Daniel , Robinson Richard D.
Published: July 2006

Military predominance in public life has a long and strong tradition in Turkey. Lybyer has told us: “The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else. … in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men.” And Gibb quotes el-Gazali, at the end of the eleventh century: “Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the caliph.”
The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda
Authors: Apter David E.
Published: July 2006

Social analysts have long been preoccupied with those features of traditional culture and belief which affect the direction of change and the receptivity of a society to innovation. In spite of the very considerable literature concerned with acculturation, there have been few efforts to examine different types of traditional systems with respect to the problems they pose for political modernization. We attempt this form of analysis here. The plan is to examine two countries, Ghana and Uganda, which are engaged in the effort to build a national society. Each is experimenting with constitutional forms and each has had to deal with the problem of traditionalism.
Political Development and Political Decay
Authors: Huntington Samuel P.
Published: July 2006

Among the laws that rule human societies,” de Tocqueville said, “there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.”1 In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the “art of associating together.” The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocqueville's precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the “art of associating together” and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.
People and Population
Authors: Afriat S.N.
Published: July 2006

The human population is the base of human existence. This, when considered, seems an inescapable proposition. But in the minds of most men it must have an absurd remoteness. The process of population has seemed like primordial creation itself, hardly a thing to be touched by mere scruple. Beyond the scope of any deliberation, the peopling of the earth has, for mankind as a whole, remained unquestioned as the earth, an axiom behind which there was no going and from which all proceeded. But according to a relentless gathering of awareness, as witnessed in an abundance of recent writings, it appears that history has marched to a new point. The condition of the world is being modified by a constellation of emergencies, and any observation and reflection on them, any rough glance at the outlines of trends in the life of the world, points to the swelling flood of population as the central reality in every perspective on the future.
The USSR, the United Nations, and the General Welfare
Authors: Gordenker Leon
Published: July 2006

International, the flooding stream of words from national governmental representatives in international organizations has been accompanied by only a trickle of scholarly studies. These include the Carnegie Endowment's valuable series of studies of national policies in the UN, most of which are now outdated. The series does not have a volume on the USSR. The most extended and valuable recent attempt to fathom Soviet policy in the United Nations is Alexander Dallin's The Soviet Union at the United Nations (New York 1962). It deals with broader subject matter than the two books discussed here and gives much consideration to Soviet policy in relation to the maintenance of peace and security.