bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
D
ugway
P
roving
G
round
Authors: Glass Michael , Egan Jill
Published: July 2011

Dugway Proving Ground is the Department of Defense's (DoD) primary chemical and biological defense testing center. In addition to performing chemical and biological defensive testing, Dugway scientists conduct environmental characterization and remediation technology testing, battlefield smokes and obscurants and munitions testing, and reliability and survivability testing of all types of military equipment in a chemical or biological environment. Recently, the facility has taken on a larger role in homeland defense. Past, present, and future activities at Dugway Proving Ground are discussed.
E
dgewood
C
hemical
B
iological
C
enter,
A
berdeen
P
roving
G
round
Authors: Gutierrez David
Published: July 2011

This entry provides an overview of the history, current efforts, and future plans of the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground. It covers ECBC's history from wartime defense and chemical weapons research to its current biodefense‐related activities. The article describes how ECBC supports military and federal defense efforts and highlights both new biological detection products, and biodefense products in development.
Education for Biodefense
Authors: Wehling Fred
Published: July 2011

Educators have made strong progress since 2001 in preparing health and public safety professionals to meet the threat of bioterrorism. Professional training programs in these fields have clearly recognized the need for competency in bioterrorism preparedness. However, it is less clear how well educational programs have prepared the general public to cope with biological incidents.
Epidemiology in Bioterrorism
Authors: Zerwekh Tyler , Waring Stephen
Published: July 2011

The public health response to bioterrorism entails many distinct functions including surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory diagnosis, medical response, and interagency communications between stakeholders. This entry focuses on surveillance and epidemiology, which together aim to decrease morbidity and mortality through the early detection and rapid diagnosis of disease in a community. This response plays a pivotal role in episodes both related and unrelated to bioterrorism.
Alphaviruses, Including Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
Authors: Morse Stephen S. , Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

Alphaviruses exist throughout the world and commonly cause natural encephalitis outbreaks among horses and humans. Generally, this disease is fatal in horses but only incapacitating in humans. Nevertheless, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV) was weaponized by the pre‐1992 Soviet and pre‐1969 United States biological warfare programs. Largely for this reason, alphaviruses are classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as Category B threat agents, or of second highest priority with respect to public health and national security. However, their potential as biothreat agents remains unclear as it would be technically difficult to weaponize and disperse them.
Ethnic Weapons
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A. , Carus W. Seth
Published: July 2011

An ethic weapon is one that will cause high morbidity and/or mortality rates among a targeted human population that can be individuated on the basis of ethnic or racial characteristics while causing little or no damage to other populations. Although some analysts have postulated that it is possible for weapons scientists to develop such weapons, it is our opinion that at this time, such weapons are unfeasible because they would be insufficiently specific to preferentially strike any ethnic or racial population. However, as science learns more about the human genome, the probability that biological agents can be designed to target genetic or biological markers specific to population sets increases.
Fatality Management
Authors: McGowan Dennis
Published: July 2011

Mass fatality management is a component of bioterrorism defense that has traditionally been relegated to low priority status if considered at all. However, proper post‐mortem infection control, human remains decontamination, and safe disposal measures are necessary to ensure that outbreaks are effectively controlled. A hypothetical mass fatality scenario is reviewed, with appropriate management steps delineated along the timeline.
Food and Drug Administration
Authors: Vandegrift Serina N.
Published: July 2011

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration plays a vital and multi‐faceted role in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat agent adverse health consequence mitigation and management by: 1) facilitating the development and availability of medical countermeasures; 2) protecting the safety and security of regulated medical products; 3) enhancing overall emergency preparedness and response capabilities; 4) implementing comprehensive food security strategies; and 5) ensuring the safety and security of Agency assets.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Sheer Jennifer L.O.
Published: July 2011

When human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) first appeared in large numbers in the 1980s, the Soviet Union alleged that the virus had been created at Fort Detrick, Maryland as part of the United States' biological weapons program. While this allegation was determined to be untrue, there have been cases of intentional infection and threatened use of HIV as a biological weapon; however, there are several characteristics and variables that suggest HIV would be a poor choice for a bioterrorist attack.
Influenza
Authors: Pouliot Yannick , Sheer Jennifer L.O.
Published: July 2011

Influenza (“flu”) is caused by a highly infective respiratory virus that is a major cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, due to both annual epidemics and more rare pandemics. At this time, influenza virus seems an unlikely choice for a bioweapons attack; however, modern genetic techniques have increased the likelihood of the creation of novel strains of the virus with the result that nefarious engineering of influenza can occur.
Intelligence Collection and Analysis
Authors: Egan Jill
Published: July 2011

To address the biological capabilities of terrorist groups, the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on terrorist abilities to acquire and produce biological agents, as well as information on what delivery mechanisms could be used to distribute these agents. The Intelligence Community is comprised of several different agencies and departments, all of which contribute to the collection and analysis of bioterrorism and biological warfare activities throughout the world. Three main components that currently provide focused attention on the bioterrorist threat are CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the National Counterproliferation Center.
I
srael
Authors: Goldberg David H.
Published: July 2011

Over the years, the State of Israel has been compelled to develop well organized and coordinated military and public health systems for dealing with the immediate aftermath of conventional megaterrorist attacks. For most of its existence it has also lived under the threat of a concrete threat of chemical and biological attack from several of its neighbors. This entry examines developments in the four critical areas of Israel's bioterrorism strategy: response/consequence management, defense, prevention, and biosecurity. It concludes that Israel's bioterrorism defense strategy must, by necessity, remain in a seemingly constant state of transition, needing always to remain one‐step ahead of terror groups and terror‐sponsoring states that remain unconditionally committed to the Jewish state's destruction, with biological weapons if such can be acquired and deployed.
M
innesota
P
atriots
C
ouncil
Authors: Pate Jason , Miller Jacqueline E.
Published: July 2011

In 1995, four Minnesota men were the first to be tried and convicted under the United States Anti‐terrorism Act of 1989. Douglas Baker, Leroy Wheeler, Dennis Henderson, and Richard Olrich acquired ricin as part of an alleged plot to kill local deputy sheriffs.

The four men were members of a radical tax‐protesting militia named the Minnesota Patriots Council.
Minutemen: A Case Study
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Sheer Jennifer L. O.
Published: July 2011

The Minutemen, a 1960's right‐wing California militia group, to defend the United Sates against what it believed to be an inevitable communist takeover. Its founder, Robert DePugh, made numerous threats to use chemical and biological weapons to further his goals, there is no evidence any such weapons were ever acquired.
N
ato and Bioterrorism Defense
Authors: Cellino Andrea
Published: July 2011

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a relative newcomer to the field of Bioterrorism Defense. Only after September 11, 2001 did the Alliance launch specific initiatives to address terrorism. Before this event, NATO did address the threat of biological attacks as part of the Cold War, focusing on aggression from the former Soviet Union.

This entry discusses the goals of NATO in the past and in the present. The Alliance established a Weapons of Mass Destruction center at NATO Headquarters in 2000. NATO'S Defence Ministers decided in 2002 to enhance Alliance forces' ability to defend against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC). A multinational Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Battalion—designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the release of any CBRN agent—was declared “fully operational” at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. It has since been succeeded by a Combined Joined CBRN Defense Task Force.

Initiatives adopted in Prague include: a disease surveillance system; a CBRN event response team, a prototype deployable NBC analytical laboratory; a NATO biological and chemical Defence stockpile, and a virtual training center.
P
alestine
L
iberation
O
rganization
Authors: Silverbrook Julie
Published: July 2011

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a Palestinian‐based group dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The U.S. State Department no longer considers the PLO as a foreign terrorist organization, but the PLO continued to fund and support terrorist activities up until the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004.
Pharmaceutical Industry
Authors: Poupard James A.
Published: July 2011

The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries play an important role in providing anti‐infective drugs, vaccines, and biologicals (products such as immunomodulators, interferons, and monoclonal antibodies). The biologicals are often produced in facilities similar to vaccine production lines since they are usually derived from tissue cultures or modified organisms. Research, development, and production programs initiated by the pharmaceutical industry will play a key role in providing new therapeutic agents for use against bioterrorist attacks. The industry will be an important element in determining future policies in regard to bioterrorism.
P
ine
B
luff
A
rsenal
Authors: Egan Jill
Published: July 2011

The Pine Bluff Arsenal historically served as a site for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agent production, associated munitions filling, and storage. Today the facility still remains a storage site for a portion of the US legacy CW stockpile until all agents and munitions are destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The biological warfare (BW) production facility at Pine Bluff was converted in 1972, renamed the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), and currently houses research for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In 2001, Congress supported the Arsenal Support Program Initiative to help maintain the viability of army arsenals. This allows arsenals to enter in cooperative partnerships with private companies. Programs at Pine Bluff teach emergency responders how to choose, operate, and maintain, their radiological, chemical, and biological response equipment.
Plague (Yersinia Pestis)
Authors: Popov Serguei
Published: July 2011

Yersinia pestis
is classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a Category A agent, of highest priority in terms of public health and national security. Its high degree of infectivity and potential for person‐to‐person transmission have led to its development as a weapon agent by numerous state‐level biological warfare programs in the past. The disease exists in three principle forms, bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic plague. Pneumonic plague, the most likely manifestation of deliberate exposure, is the most rapidly progressive and frequently causes fatal pneumonia if not immediately treated. Coughing by victims of pneumonic plague releases airborne droplets that can spread the pathogen to other individuals, compounding the potential impact of this form of the disease.
P
olisario
Authors: Nelson Gail H.
Published: July 2011

The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saquia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) composed of Western Sahara (Saharawis) tribesmen claim independence from Morocco under agreements made between France, Spain, and Morocco in 1900, 1904, and 1912; and ongoing United Nations arbitration including a 2001 agreement for autonomy and a subsequent referendum to be held governing independence. Meanwhile, the Polisario will pursue independence for Western Sahara and resume the insurgency against Morocco if protracted international arbitration fails. The Polisario is not seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction including bioterrorism to achieve its political ends. There are no indications that the Polisario will adopt other than conventional means to wage their liberation campaign.
Prion Diseases
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

Prion stands for “proteinaceous infectious particle.” Prion diseases are infectious diseases of the brain that can occur in both animals and humans. It causes slow degeneration of the central nervous system, inevitably leading to death. Prion diseases are transmissible between animal species. While prion disease is given a different name according to the species it affects, the general term “Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy” encompasses all prion diseases. This article discusses prion pathogens and diagnostic methods for their detection.

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions are one of the 80 select agents requiring special attention under the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. However, it is questionable whether anyone would use prions as biological weapons agents due to the fact that they have very long incubation times and their efficient dispersal cannot be guaranteed.
Psychological and Social Sequelae of Bioterrorism
Authors: Ackerman Gary
Published: July 2011

By definition, one of the core objectives of terrorism is to impact a broader population than the immediate victims of attack by causing fear, anxiety, and social disruption. Bioterrorism in particular encompasses several features that can serve to amplify these effects; indeed, this is one of the very reasons why terrorists might find this form of attack attractive. The psychological casualties of any terrorism incident involving unconventional weapons are also likely to outnumber the physical casualties, which could complicate response efforts. Even a small‐scale bioterrorist event with limited direct casualties will likely impact millions, as seen during the 2001 “anthrax mail attacks.” Therefore, one cannot overlook the psychological and social consequences of a bioterrorist event in any discussion about preparation or defense against bioterrorism.
P
ublic
H
ealth
P
reparedness in the
U
nited
S
tates
Authors: Katz Rebecca
Published: July 2011

Public health preparedness is a crucial aspect in the defense against bioterrorism. This article discusses the basic responsibilities of the public health system with respect to bioterrorism preparedness and reviews current capabilities.
R
epublic of
T
exas: A Case Study
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

In July 1998, Johnnie Wise, Jack Abbott Grebe, Jr., and Oliver Dean Emigh, all members of the separatist militia The Republic of Texas, were arrested in Wise's home in Olmito, Texas and charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. The Republic of Texas believes that Texas was not properly annexed in 1845 and is therefore not a part of the United States. The trio belongs to a splinter faction and the Republic of Texas issued a statement denouncing any connection to the trio.
RISE: A Case Study
Authors: Carus W. Seth
Published: July 2011

In January 1972, the Chicago, Illinois police arrested two college students on the basis that the two were about to contaminate the Chicago water system with
Salmonella typhi
, the organism that causes typhoid fever. The two students, Steven Pera and Allen C. Schwander were students at Mayfair College. They had vague ecological concerns and this led them to organize a terror group which they called RISE.
Syndromic Surveillance
Authors: Zelicoff Alan P. , May Larissa S.
Published: July 2011

This entry examines a vital area of the nation's counterterrorism response: the use of timely electronic surveillance to detect groups of signs or symptoms that may be an early indicator of an infectious disease outbreak. Syndromic Surveillance is public health surveillance that emphasizes the use of near real time pre‐diagnostic data and statistical tools to detect and characterize unusual activity for further public health investigation. This approach can augment existing public health reporting infrastructure for classical “reportable disease” and laboratory‐based surveillance. In addition this approach can potentially strengthen routine public health systems.
Terrorist Group Identification
Authors: Reich Bernard , Ryan John J.
Published: July 2011

Terrorist groups are identified differently by various governments. In the European Union terrorist groups are identified by EUROPOL. In the United States national terrorist groups are identified by various law enforcement agencies while foreign terrorist groups are designated solely by the United States Department of State.
Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet Union
Authors: Harrington Anne
Published: July 2011

Containing the proliferation of former Soviet biological weapons expertise and materials from Russia and Eurasia was a high priority nonproliferation objective shared by the United States, Russia, and other countries, particularly during the decade starting in the late 1990s. Various aspects of the U.S. efforts in this area have been reviewed independently by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the National Academy of Sciences and are generally viewed as successful. A number of objectives of the original programs have been accomplished and the reasons for continuing these efforts have evolved. Fewer of the Soviet scientists who worked on weapons projects still have productive work time ahead of them and more opportunities are now available in Russia to support their long‐term research and industrial activity. In recent years, Canada, the U.K., the U.S., and the EU have partnered on project planning as well as funding. This entry gives an overview of efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons expertise, discusses countering bioterrorism as an element of engagement, attempts to secure and contain highly dangerous pathogens, and ways in which bio engagement efforts have evolved.
Toxins: Overview and General Principles
Authors: Poli Mark A.
Published: July 2011

The threat of bioterrorism or biological warfare by terrorist groups and rogue states is very real. While the threat needs to be continuously evaluated, the description of biological agents as “the ultimate terrorist weapon” is likely overstated, at least for toxins. The realistic number of potential weapons that utilize toxins is relatively low due to limitations stemming from potency, stability, and availability. Effective weaponization and dissemination are not trivial. Although gaps exist in our knowledge base, research programs are in place to address these needs.
Tularemia (Francisella Tularensis)
Authors: Dembek Zygmunt F.
Published: July 2011

Tularemia is a zoonosis, a disease of animals transmissible to humans, and is caused by the facultative intracellular bacteriumFrancisella tularensis. F. tularensisis considered a potential agent of biological warfare and bioterrorism and as such has been rated among the top 6 category A agents (see also “Category Agents A‐C”). Formerly,F. tularensiswas included among agents developed and used by state‐sponsored bioweapons programs.F. tularensisis one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to cause human infection. At present there are four recognized subspecies ofF. tularensis: tularensis, holarctica, mediasiatica, and novicida, although only tularensis and holoarctica consistently cause disease in humans. Complete identification of all the natural reservoirs ofF. tularensishas probably not yet occurred. Ongoing research continues to delineate the virulence mechanisms ofF. tularensis. In a bioterrorism scenario, respiratory tularemia (acquired through inhalation) is judged to be the greatest threat. Natural outbreaks of human respiratory type A or type B tularemia have repeatedly been recorded in farmers and landscape workers illustrating the potential of effectiveF. tularensistransmission by dry aerosols. The clinical expression of tularemia largely depends on the route of entrance of the infectious agent and the prognosis in tularemia is highly dependent on the causative subspecies ofF. tularensis. There is currently no licensed and widely available tularemia vaccine. Tularemia warrants antibiotic treatment and is not transmitted from person to person. Currently, there is renewed interest in tularemia and development of new diagnostics, prophylactics and therapies.
U
nited
S
tates Department of Agriculture
Authors: Heintzelman Leila
Published: July 2011

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) plays a critical role in protecting the United States' food supply and agricultural products from acts of bioterrorism. The ability to effectively respond to an attack is dependent upon the effectiveness of the existing food safety infrastructure. The current food safety infrastructure, rooted in policies established over a century ago, has evolved in an effort to meet modern day food safety challenges. Coordination between federal agencies, state and local governments, and the public health community, is a key component in safeguarding against and responding to a bioterrorism attack.
U
nited
S
tates Legislation and Presidential Directives
Authors: Jacobs Leslie Gielow , Parker Elizabeth Rindskopf
Published: July 2011

Bioterrorism defense policy is a broad and complex body of law stemming from United States legislation, federal agency regulations and presidential directives. This immense area of law may be discussed in three general categories: defining and punishing biological weapons offenses; expanding laws, enforcement tools and methods; and preventing access to biological weapons materials, equipment and expertise.
Water Supply, Vulnerability, and Attack Specifics
Authors: Burrows W. Dickinson , Birkmire Sara E.
Published: July 2011

Though hardly credible as weapons of mass casualties when applied to community water supplies, biological warfare agents can sicken and even kill many people when the agent is applied to potable water distribution systems close to targeted populations. An effective defense will require improved detection and monitoring capability, better knowledge of infectivity or toxicity of individual agents, as well as their environmental stability, upgraded water treatment technologies, and vigilance.
Weather Underground: A Case Study
Authors: Muldoon Anna
Published: July 2011

The Weather Underground was a radical anti‐war group, formed in the late1960s, which was responsible for a number of bombings in the US. In November 1970, several newspaper articles reported that the Weather Underground had attempted to acquire biological weapons to contaminate a city's water supply. There is no evidence, however, that the group ever sought weapons of mass destruction, nor that they attempted to acquire biological agents in 1970.
Risk Assessment in Bioterrorism
Authors: Hope Bruce K. , Elrod Sarah
Published: July 2011

General concerns about terrorist use of biological agents have increased at U.S. state and federal levels and in the popular press. However, establishment of effective security and counterterrorism programs will require condensing generalizations about such threats into specific attack scenarios, as well as use of an analysis method that helps focus decision makers on those scenarios that are both most probable and potentially most damaging. This chapter proceeds on the premise that risk assessment methodologies developed for human health and the environment can be adapted to move decision makers beyond potentially intractable generalizations about who or what is threatened by bioterrorism toward specific scenarios that can be evaluated, anticipated, and managed. A two‐step process is outlined with which to achieve this goal: first, a vulnerability analysis to define and rank scenarios, followed, for the more highly ranked scenarios, by a quantitative risk assessment to more clearly identify (and eventually manage) specific factors contributing to risk.
“
A
merithrax”: The Investigation of Bioterrorism Using

B
acillus
A
nthracis

Spores in Mailed Letters
Authors: Murch Randall S.
Published: July 2011

In September and October 2001, letters containing spores of the bacterial pathogen and recognized biological weapon agent,
Bacillus anthracis
, were sent through the mail to several prominent media outlets and to two United States Senators. As a result, 22 persons contracted inhalational or cutaneous anthrax, and five of those individuals died. A massive 7‐year investigation led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was undertaken that eventually identified a suspect who committed suicide in 2008 before formal legal action could be taken against him.
Ansar al‐Islam
Authors: Ryan John J.
Published: July 2011

Ansar al‐Islam was one of the most potent threats that U.S. and coalition forces faced in Iraq. The group formed in the semi‐autonomous Kurdish region of Northern Iraq and shares close ties to both al‐Qa'ida's central leadership and al‐Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). Ansar al‐Islam provided safe haven to members of al‐Qa'ida who fled Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S. invasion, and who prepared to fight U.S. forces prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As this entry is being written, Ansar al‐Islam continues to mount attacks against U.S. and coalition forces, and anyone else that does not share its ideology.
Attribution of Biological Weapons Use
Authors: Bahr Elizabeth
Published: July 2011

The goal of biological weapons attribution is to identify and assign the origin of a disease outbreak within human, plant, and/or animal populations. Attribution can be defined as the ability to link an outbreak to a particular biological source at a particular place and time, as well as linking the outbreak to a specified perpetrator. The process of biological weapons attribution, therefore, involves not only the identification of a biological agent responsible for an event, but also the characterization of the event, as well as the ultimate attribution of biological weapons use to a specific perpetrator. However, due to the unique nature of biological weapons, as well as the complex political restraints of both a domestic or international biological weapons outbreak, the successful attribution of biological weapons use remains challenging.
AustraliaGroup
Authors: Woodward Angela
Published: July 2011

The Australia Group is a voluntary, informal arrangement between 40 participant States and one intergovernmental organization (the European Commission) to harmonize national export licensing in order to prevent the diversion of specified chemicals, biological agents, and dual‐use chemical and biological manufacturing facilities, and equipment that could assist States or non‐State actors acquire a chemical or biological weapons capability.
B
iological
W
eapons
C
onvention
Authors: Lennane Richard
Published: July 2011

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is a major multilateral treaty prohibiting the development, acquisition, retention, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Its relatively simple provisions have been supplemented by additional understandings, procedures and processes introduced by successive review conferences.
Bioterrorism Preparedness: The
U
nited
K
ingdom Approach
Authors: Pearson Graham S.
Published: July 2011

There has long been a necessity in the United Kingdom to be able to respond to outbreaks of disease which may affect humans, animals or plants. The response to bioterrorism is primarily based upon the capability to respond to terrorist incidents and upon the capability to respond to outbreaks of disease. The integrated approach in the United Kingdom to a major emergency provides the background to the examination of the effectiveness of that approach in preparedness to counter deliberate releases of biological materials.
Bioterrorism Targeted at Agriculture
Authors: Casagrande Rocco , Wills Nickolas
Published: July 2011

Bioterrorism targeted at agriculture has received relatively little attention despite the significant economic disruption that could result from such an attack. In this entry, we examine several aspects of the US agriculture system that make it potentially vulnerable to attack, several qualities of pathogens that make them likely to be considered for use as a weapon. Additionally, we discuss what the possible consequences of an agriculture targeted attack could be in the context of recent, natural outbreaks are considered. We also examine why agriculture may be an attractive target to adversaries with a variety of motivations.
Biowatch Program
Authors: Siegrist David W.
Published: July 2011

BioWatch is a collection of aerosol samplers and a system for detecting an aerosol attack featuring a number of pathogens and toxins. It is led by the Department of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Centers for Disease Control and the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as other Federal partners, in conjunction with local jurisdictions. The system has been implemented since 2003.
C
uba, Terrorism, and Biotechnology
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

The Cuban government has in the past been known to directly support terrorist groups and, as well, nations that are or were supporters of terrorists. In addition, it has taken steps over its existence to acquire a powerful biotechnology infrastructure. Is it possible that Cuban biotechnology has been misused for the purpose of acquiring biological weapons? There certainly have been allegations made by high U.S. government officials to this effect. This entry addresses the relationships between Cuba, terrorism, and biotechnology. It has two sections. The first section considers Cuba's history of terrorist support and associations with nations that have been named by the United States as supporting terrorists, such as Iran, Libya, and Syria. Second, Cuba's powerful biotechnological capability is reviewed, as well as its potential for biological weapons acquisition.
D
emocratic
P
eople's
R
epublic of
K
orea
Authors: Pinkston Daniel A.
Published: July 2011

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea fell behind South Korea economically in the 1970s and militarily in the 1980s. North Korea increasingly relies upon asymmetric military capabilities as it falls further behind in the conventional realm. The DPRK has conducted two nuclear tests and possesses a large missile arsenal. North Korea signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1987, but has been suspected of having a biological weapons program. South Korean intelligence reported in the early 1990s that North Korea had produced 13 types of pathogens, including those that cause anthrax, cholera and typhoid. There is speculation that the DPRK could have obtained smallpox virus from the former USSR in the 1980s. North Korea probably has the infrastructure to produce BW agents, but recent intelligence estimates have been revised downward. The Republic of Korea government now believes the DPRK has not weaponized any pathogens it might possess. The DPRK has not engaged in terrorism since 1987 and was removed from the U.S. Department of State's terrorism list in October 2008.
DianeThompson: A Case Study
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

In 1996, Diane Thompson, a laboratory technician in Dallas, Texas provided a number of fellow hospital workers with pastries contaminated withShigella dysenteriae. This attack led to 12 illnesses and 4 hospitalizations. Thompson was arrested for food tampering and is serving a 20‐year prison sentence.
D
irector of
N
ational
I
ntelligence
Authors: Elrod Sarah
Published: July 2011

The Director of National Intelligence oversees the Intelligence Community, working to integrate its 17 intelligence agencies into a single, coherent enterprise. In addition to his management duties, he serves to direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and advises the President, National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council on intelligence issues that relate to U.S. national security. It is through the coordinated efforts of the Intelligence Community that the U.S. can position itself to withstand the threat of bioterrorism and other terrorist activities.
E
nvironmental
P
rotection
A
gency:
B
ioterrorism
D
efense
E
fforts
Authors: Funke Odelia
Published: July 2011

The US Environmental Protection Agency makes several key contributions to the federal government's bioterrorism defense program. This entry outlines the principal areas of EPA's responsiblity, including protection of drinking water infrastructure,emergency response, and environmental monitoring. EPA's role in bioterrorism defense builds on Agency expertise in dealing with biological materials as environmental problems to be monitored, tested, controlled and cleaned up. In addition, the Agency is extending its research agenda in biomonitoring, and its programmatic concerns related specifically to addressing bioterrorism threats to protect drinking water as a national infrastructure asset.
Exercises
Authors: Allen Heather
Published: July 2011

Large‐scale exercises are organized to test national and international preparedness and response capabilities against bioterrorism events. Through these exercises, weaknesses can be identified and targeted for improvement. This entry discusses TOPOFF 1‐4, Black ICE I‐II, and Dark Winter. The latter is a real event in whichBacillus anthraciswas dispersed in the United Kingdom in 1981. Special attention is given to the hypothetical biological event in each exercise.
Geneva Protocol
Authors: Woodward Angela
Published: July 2011

The 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) of 1925 bans the use of biological and chemical weapons during war.
International Health Regulations
Authors: Katz Rebecca
Published: July 2011

The Revised International Health Regulations is binding upon all Member States of the World Health Organization, and requires nations to have core capabilities to detect, notify and respond to public health emergencies of international concern.
I
nterpol
Authors: Kellman Barry
Published: July 2011

INTERPOL, an international organization for facilitating international police cooperation, launched the INTERPOL Bioterrorism Prevention Program in 2004 to assist law enforcement in bio‐related investigations and promote international cooperation on these issues. Through this program, INTERPOL has hosted numerous training sessions and exercises, developed a database of biocriminalization information, and produced training materials to assist law enforcement in countering biocrimes.
I
slam and
B
ioterrorism
Authors: Lailari Guermantes
Published: July 2011

Most Muslims are not terrorists, but many terrorist groups today use Islam as justification for violence. After providing a basic primer on Islam, this entry explores the violent past of Islam and how modern Islamic scholars have justified the use of violence according to Islamic jurisprudence. Since the late 1970s, more and more Islamic terrorist organizations have appeared throughout the world. In fact, most terrorist groups listed by Western countries are Islamic. Types of Jihad are discussed, focusing on violent forms as well as types of Islamic terrorist groups. As Jihadists use a black and white world view, they are able to use these stark perspectives to clearly define who is on their side and who is their enemy. The threat to each area of the world by Islamic terrorist groups is briefly described. State sponsors of these Islamic terrorist groups are also mentioned as well as Islamic states and violent nonstate actors desires to increase their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capacity. Several Islamic scholars are cited to explain under what circumstances WMD can be used against Islam's perceived enemies, including bioterrorism. Terrorist historical uses of WMD and uses of WMD by Islamic terrorists are provided. The entry concludes by explaining which Islamic state and Islamic terrorist organization present the most dangerous threats to the world.
J
emaah
I
slamiyah
Authors: Pervez Fouad
Published: July 2011

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a militant Islamic organization in Southeast Asia with a wide range of goals, including the establishment of Islamic governments, a Southeast Asian Islamic caliphate, or jihad against the West, with debate between members as to which goal should be pursued. It has been significantly weakened by counterterrorism activity, especially after the 2002 Bali club bombing. In turn, it has pursued alliances with other Islamic groups. While there may be some intent in JI to use bioterrorism as a tactic, it is unclear if the group has the capability to acquire biological weapons.
L
arry
W
ayne
H
arris
Authors: Harrison Lauren , Miller Jacqueline E.
Published: July 2011

Larry Wayne Harris, a trained microbiological technician from Lancaster, Ohio has been implicated in two cases of possession of biological materials that are of particular concern in weapons. In 1995, he was charged with misrepresenting himself while ordering three vials of the causative agent of plague. He was also arrested on suspected possession of the causative agent of anthrax. This substance was later found to be a harmless veterinary strain. He is thought to be a lone actor and not maintaining ties with any terrorist groups or states. He did have, at one time, ties with Aryan Nations and other neo‐Nazi groups. He renounced his racist views in mid‐1990s.
Managing Laboratory Biorisk
Authors: Petrillo Jessica
Published: July 2011

Managing the risks associated with laboratory use of biological agents is necessary to ensure the health and safety of laboratory personnel, the public, and the environment. Inadvertent or deliberate release of infectious materials risks the health of people, animals, or plants and can potentially undermine national and international security and stability. Effective management of the risks associated with laboratory use of biological agents is a process in which the components of the research environment associated with biological agents are examined to determine if they can cause harm, whether the appropriate precautions are in place to mitigate the harm, and, if not, to determine what additional steps are required. Application of risk mitigation measures must be based on a thorough assessment of risk, consistent with the specific risks at the facility and cost‐effective. Mitigation measures must not unduly impede life sciences research. This process of managing laboratory risk is the shared responsibility of all those engaged in the life sciences, including the researcher, institution, local community, national government, and international community.
Marine Toxins
Authors: Poli Mark A.
Published: July 2011

Marine biotoxins should not be overlooked as potential agents of food bioterrorism. Because they occur naturally in fresh and otherwise wholesome seafood products, possess no visual or olfactory clues to their presence, and are impervious to typical cooking temperatures, they can be a difficult problem to identify. Toxic foodstuffs are easily acquired and, in theory, need only be inserted into the food supply at the desired location downstream of any regulatory testing. Six major seafood intoxication syndromes, along with their bioterrorism implications, are discussed.
Melamine Contamination
Authors: Heintzelman Leila
Published: July 2011

Melamine and its analogues (cyanuric acid, ammeline and ammelide) have been identified as the cause of attributed to two serious food adulteration incidents: contaminated pet‐food in the United States in 2007 resulting in the death of perhaps a thousand cats and dogs, and adulterated infant formula in China in 2008 affecting almost 300,000 infants and children and causing at least 6 deaths (WHO, 2008). In both cases, melamine was deliberately added to products artificially inflate their protein content. Melamine toxicity is dependent on concentration. Data suggests that exposure to both melamine and cyanuric acid is more toxic than exposure to either compound individually. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) continues to screen products, collaborate with foreign governments and their regulatory agencies, and monitor reports of contamination from international sources to help ensure that the U.S. food supply is safe.
M
oro
I
slamic
L
iberation
F
ront
Authors: Pervez Fouad
Published: July 2011

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front is a militant Islamic organization in the Philippines that uses violence to pursue its goal of independence for the Muslim regions of the southern part of the country. It has alternated between violence and peace with the government, although prospects for a long‐term peace settlement seem low right now. The group has not been linked to bioterrorism, although it allegedly is connected to Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayaf, groups that have been accused of having links, albeit weakly, to bioterrorism.
Nanobiotechnology
Authors: Kosal Margaret E.
Published: July 2011

The intersection of the pursuit of the minutely small—nanotechnology—with biotechnology and the life sciences is thriving in academia, in the private sector, and in global state science and technology programs. Bionanotechnology has great potential to provide new and possibly revolutionary countermeasures from improved methods for detection of biological agents to medical therapeutics. Concurrently bionanotechnology creates many of the same concerns, and some unique, regarding dual‐use applications as traditional biotechnology. The biosecurity implications, both for traditional nonproliferation regimes and for misuse by non‐state actors, of developments in biotechnology have not received commensurate attention to other areas of nanotechnology or biotechnology.
N
ational
B
iodefense
A
nalysis and
C
ountermeasures
C
enter
Authors: Fitch J. Patrick
Published: July 2011

The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center's (NBACC) mission is to provide the nation with the scientific basis for characterization of biological threats and bioforensic analysis to support attribution of their use against the American public. NBACC is a Department of Homeland Security Federally Funded Research and Development Center that is managed and operated by the Battelle National Biodefense Institute, LLC.
N
ational
C
enter for
M
edical
I
ntelligence
Authors: Michaud Joshua
Published: July 2011

The National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI), part of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is responsible for preparing, coordinating, and disseminating integrated all‐source intelligence for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and other U.S. government customers on health threats and issues. NCMI is the U.S. government's primary producer of “medical intelligence,” defined as the assessment of health risks and issues that affect force health or other critical U.S. interests worldwide, and which includes such topics as infectious diseases, foreign medical capabilities, environmental threats, and medical science and technology. Medical intelligence has played an important role in DoD missions in times of both peace and war, and has a history extending back at least 60 years. NCMI's roles and responsibilities grew in 2008 when it expanded from its previously highly DoD‐focused mission to a broader mission that also includes homeland health protection. NCMI's medical intelligence now supports U.S. operational and policy decisions worldwide, plays a role in protecting the health of deployed forces, and also helps protects the homeland from a diverse set of health threats by forging and maintaining communication and awareness on these threats between agencies that span domestic and foreign intelligence.
N
ations of
C
oncern:
I
ran
Authors: Nordmann Brian
Published: July 2011

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush announced that he considered Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea as countries that threatened the global interests of the United States. He declared these three countries as the “Axis of Evil.” Iran was considered deserving of this designation because of its weapons of mass destruction programs and its support of terrorist groups. Some continue to fear that Iran will combine its interests with other groups to uses their resources against their enemies. Iran has maintained an advanced biotechnology program. Iran's official stance on biological weapons is one of complete abhorrence. Iran has hosted mock inspections for future inspections and is a party to every relevant international arms control agreement. However there are still fears that Iran could arm terrorist groups such as Hezbollah with biological weapons.
Nations ofConcern:Libya
Authors: Nordmann Brian
Published: July 2011

After the 1969 coup that overthrew the ruling monarchy, Libya maintained a foreign policy of enmity to the West and occasionally erratic behavior towards the rest of the world. In 2003, leader Mu'ammar al‐Qadhafi made “the historic decision” to renounce the country's weapons of mass destruction and eliminate all vestiges of its weapons programs,
N
ations of
C
oncern:
T
he
R
epublic of
S
udan
Authors: Nelson Gail H.
Published: July 2011

Sudan remains a region dominated by protracted ethno‐territorial and boundary disputes. It strides the geostrategic divide between the Middle East and Africa, a safe haven for extremist and transnational terrorism. However, evidence the government in Khartoum was in pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction during the 1990s was never confirmed. Sudan is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 (signed 1999) and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (signed 2003). Nevertheless, Sudan remains a region vulnerable to extremist and terrorist infiltration, and requires constant monitoring to ensure it does not become a refuge or staging area for non‐state actors in pursuit of WMD materials or components.
N
orth
A
merican
M
ilitia
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Zilinskas Raymond A.
Published: July 2011

In 1998, Randy Graham, of Springfield, Bradford Metcalf of Olivet, and Kenneth Carter of Battle Creek, Michigan, all members of the North American Militia, were implicated in a series of plots against government officials. Searches of their homes and belongings by law enforcement uncovered, in addition to conventional weapons, a tape for instructions on the preparation of ricin. The men were convicted on charges unrelated to toxin weapons.