bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Sexual Risk Taking Among Transgender Male-to-Female Youths With Different Partner Types
Authors: Wilson Erin C. , Garofalo Robert , Harris D. Robert , Belzer Marvin
Published: November 2009

Objectives. We examined associations between partner types (categorized as main, casual, or commercial) and sexual risk behaviors of sexually active male-to-female (transgender female) youths.

Methods. We interviewed 120 transgender female youths aged 15 to 24 years recruited from clinics, community-based agencies, club and bar venues, referrals, and the streets of Los Angeles, California, and Chicago, Illinois.

Results. Sexual risk behaviors varied by partner type. Transgender female youths were less likely to use condoms during receptive anal intercourse with their main partner and were less likely to use condoms with a main partner while under the influence of substances. Youth participants were also more likely to talk to a main partner about their HIV status. Our data identified no demographic or social factors that predicted condom use during receptive anal intercourse by partner type.

Conclusions. Research and interventions that focus on understanding and mitigating risk behaviors by partner type, especially those that tackle the unique risks incurred with main partners, may make important contributions to risk reduction among transgender female youths.
Support for Smoke-Free Policies: A Nationwide Analysis of Immigrants, US-Born, and Other Demographic Groups, 1995–2002
Authors: Osypuk Theresa L. , Acevedo-Garcia Dolores
Published: November 2009

Objectives. We examined whether support for tobacco control policies varies by demographic group, including nativity status (i.e., immigrant versus US born).

Methods. We analyzed 1995 to 2002 data from the Current Population Survey Tobacco Use Supplement (n = 543 951). The outcome was a summary attitudinal measure assessing support of smoking bans in 4 of 6 venues.

Results. US-born respondents, smokers, male respondents, Native Americans, Whites, and those who were unmarried, of lower socioeconomic status, and whose workplaces and homes were not smoke free were less likely to support smoking bans. Immigrants exhibited stronger support for banning smoking in every venue, with a generation-specific gradient in which support eroded with increasing assimilation to the United States. Levels of support were more than twice as high among immigrants as among US-born respondents (odds ratio [OR] = 2.16; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.08, 2.23). Naturalized citizens displayed higher support than US-born citizens, which may be relevant for mobilization of the electorate. Differences in population composition and contexts (e.g., smoke-free workplaces) only partially accounted for immigrants' stronger level of support.

Conclusions. Immigrants and their children may be valuable tobacco control allies given their supportive attitudes toward smoke-free policies.
HIV/AIDS and Tourism in the Caribbean: An Ecological Systems Perspective
Authors: Padilla Mark B. , Guilamo-Ramos Vincent , Bouris Alida , Reyes Armando Matiz
Published: November 2009

The Caribbean has the highest HIV rates outside of sub-Saharan Africa. In recent decades, tourism has become the most important Caribbean industry. Studies suggest that tourism areas are epicenters of demographic and social changes linked to HIV risk, such as transactional sex, elevated alcohol and substance use, and internal migration. Despite this, no formative HIV-prevention studies have examined tourism areas as ecologies that heighten HIV vulnerability. HIV/AIDS research needs to place emphasis on the ecological context of sexual vulnerability in tourism areas and develop multilevel interventions that are sensitive to this context. From our review and integration of a broad literature across the social and health sciences, we argue for an ecological approach to sexual health in Caribbean tourism areas, point to gaps in knowledge, and provide direction for future research.
Schools of Public Health and the Health of the Public: Enhancing the Capabilities of Faculty to Be Influential in Policymaking
Authors: Longest Beaufort B. , Huber George A.
Published: November 2009

Faculty members of schools of public health contribute to better health largely through their teaching, research, and community service roles. We suggest attention to another role: exerting their influence to ensure effective public health policy.

Using recent actions taken at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public Health as a template, we describe some of the key steps that public health schools can take to help their faculties be more influential in public health policy. These steps include (1) building infrastructures to support and facilitate this role, (2) teaching faculty members how to be more influential in the policy arena, and (3) aligning incentives and rewards for faculty who contribute to improved public health by influencing the formation and implementation of public health policy.
Recent Empirical Evidence on Discrimination by Regulated Firms
Authors: Reiffen David , Ward Michael R
Published: November 2009

Well-established economic principles show that regulated monopolies may have an incentive to act discriminatorily against rivals of their unregulated affiliates. This paper discusses some recent empirical evidence regarding discrimination in telecommunications. Specifically, it surveys anecdotal and systematic evidence that LECs discriminate against unaffiliated providers of mobile telephony. Evidence regarding discrimination by LECs against rival local phone companies is also discussed. At the same time, the evidence suggests that allowing LECs to enter cellular telephony may result in higher-quality or lower-cost cellular phone provision. These findings provide evidence that discrimination is a real phenomenon, and that there is a policy trade-off between preventing discrimination (by mandating separation) and realizing economies of scope.
Bill and Keep as the Efficient Interconnection Regime?: A Reply
Authors: Degraba Patrick
Published: November 2009

In a critique of my paper outlining the Central Office Bill and Keep (COBAK) proposal, Wright (2001) offers two sets of conditions under which a COBAK interconnection regime would not lead to optimal utilization. While there could be conditions under which some interconnection regime other than COBAK would lead to higher social surplus measures in very simple models of telecommunications, the critique provides no evidence that these conditions would be empirically significant. This, along with the other considerations explained in the proposal and not considered in the analysis, continue to suggest that COBAK is an appropriate policy recommendation.
The Economics of Open Source Software: A Survey of the Early Literature
Authors: Schiff Aaron
Published: November 2009

This paper reviews the recent literature on the economics of open source software. Two different sets of issues are addressed. The first looks at the incentives of programmers to participate in open source projects. The second considers the business models used by profit-making firms in the open source industry, and the effects on existing closed source firms. Some possible future research directions are also given.
Did The High Court Reach An Economic Low In Verizon v. FCC?
Authors: Weisman Dennis L.
Published: November 2009

The Supreme Court's decision in Verizon v. FCC rests on two errant interpretations of the 1996 Telecommunications Act: First, the Act represents a new form of regulation rather than a deregulatory statute; Second, Congress intended that the playing field be tilted in favor of new entrants. Under the Chevron Doctrine, deference is given to the controlling federal agency if there is a "rational connection" between the regulations and statutory intent. The Court ruled that the FCC's implementation of the Act survives that scrutiny. This discussion contests that finding and argues that the FCC's regulations undermine the goals of the Act.
The Court's Divide
Authors: Lehman Dale E.
Published: November 2009

The Supreme Court decision in Verizon et al v. FCC et al has finally settled the legality of the FCC's methodology for setting prices for wholesale services that are "based on cost", as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Court's decision reveals unanimous agreement that forward-looking costs may be used as the measure of cost. It also reveals agreement that the FCC's leeway in establishing a methodology for measuring these costs is limited by the need for the methodology to bear a "rational connection" to the goals of the Act. The majority and Justice Breyer differ in whether this limitation was binding in this case. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical evidence that could have shed light on the Court's disagreement  evidence that was not part of the case presented to the Court. While the evidence casts considerable doubt on the wisdom of the public policy approach adopted by the FCC, it does not lead to the conclusion that the Court should have ruled differently.
An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems
Authors: Rochet Jean-Charles , Tirole Jean
Published: November 2009

The paper investigates, in a non-technical fashion, the economic determinants of interchange fees in payment card systems and the potential need for their regulation. Among other things, it demonstrates that the proposal for a cost-based regulation of interchange fees relies on an erroneous, vertically organized, model of the payment card industry.
The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions
Authors: Rochet Jean-Charles
Published: November 2009

We synthesize the results of the recent theoretical literature on the determination of interchange fees by payment card associations. We analyze in particular the conditions under which these interchange fees are excessively high, as compared with social optimum. These conditions involve several parameters: the intensity of competition between banks and between merchants; the elasticities of demand on both sides of the market, as well as the degrees of heterogeneity among merchants and among cardholders. A crucial element is the competitive edge that merchants can gain by accepting cards.
Automated Teller Machine Network Pricing - A Review of the Literature
Authors: Mcandrews James J.
Published: November 2009

Automated teller machines (ATMs) have altered the relationship between banks and their depositors, as well as the competitive relationships among banks. In this paper, I survey the literature to describe the ways that ATMs have influenced these aspects of banking markets, and conclude with suggestions for further research.
What Does it Cost to Make a Payment?
Authors: Humphrey David , Willesson Magnus , Lindblom Ted , Bergendahl Göran
Published: November 2009

We survey the limited data that exists concerning the cost of making/receiving a payment by banks, retailers, and other parties to a transaction. Since an electronic payment costs between one-third and onehalf that of a paper-based instrument, a country may save 1% of its GDP annually as it shifts from a fully paper-based to a fully electronic-based payment system. Some gains have already been realized. Additional analysis indicates that bank costs of making a payment may have fallen by 45% in Europe as the share of electronic transactions in 12 countries rose from .43 to .79 over 1987-1999.
Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries
Authors: Evans David S.
Published: November 2009

Multi-sided platform markets have two or more different groups of customers that businesses have to get and keep on board to succeed. These industries range from dating clubs (men and women), to video game consoles (game developers and users), to payment cards (cardholders and merchants), to operating system software (application developers and users). They include some of the most important industries in the economy. A survey of businesses in these industries shows that multi-sided platform businesses devise entry strategies to get multiple sides of the market on board and devise pricing, product, and other competitive strategies to keep multiple customer groups on a common platform that internalizes externalities across members of these groups.
Aligning Price Regulation with Telecommunications Competition
Authors: Tardiff Timothy J. , Taylor William E.
Published: November 2009

Since the 1990s, local exchange telecommunications carriers (LECs) have been subject to incentive regulation plans. This paper discusses theoretical and practical aspects of the evolution of price regulation as retail competition increases and as regulators mandate extensive availability of wholesale services. Particular issues include (1) adjusting price change/productivity expectations as the proportion of services subject to price regulation decreases, (2) whether earnings sharing is compatible with more limited price regulation, and (3) compatibility among wholesale and retail price and quality regulation. The paper concludes by describing recent developments in specific jurisdictions and recommends directions for future incentive regulation.
The Effects of Incentive Regulation on Retail Telephone Service Quality in the United States
Authors: Sappington David E. M.
Published: November 2009

This article provides a review and critique of the empirical literature that examines the effects of incentive regulation on retail telephone service quality in the United States. The literature provides mixed findings. Some dimensions of service quality appear to improve under incentive regulation (relative to rate of return regulation) while others deteriorate. Suggestions for much-needed future research are offered.
Dynamic Pricing and Investment from Static Proxy Models
Authors: Mandy David M. , Sharkey William W.
Published: November 2009

This paper evaluates the use of static cost proxy models in setting forward-looking prices such as the prices set according to the FCC's TELRIC methodology. First, it compares the time paths of prices and depreciation under traditional regulatory accounting with the prices and depreciation implied by various versions of TELRIC. When TELRIC prices are recomputed at intervals shorter than asset lives, the firm will generally not earn the target rate of return. In these cases, a correction factor must be applied to the TELRIC price path in order for revenues to exactly recover investment cost, including the target rate of return. Next, the paper considers a firm's cost minimizing investment decisions under two different assumptions about asset obsolescence. In both scenarios, cost minimizing investment paths and implied utilization rates for the firm's assets are derived under a variety of assumptions about the relevant input parameters. Some implications for TELRIC pricing are then derived.
The Arbitrage Mirage: Regulated Access Prices with Free Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets
Authors: Hazlett Thomas W. , Havenner Arthur M.
Published: November 2009

Incumbent telecommunications carriers have been mandated to share their networks with new retail service providers at regulated wholesale rates. This regulatory structure creates options which incumbent systems must write and which all potential entrants are awarded at a price of zero. Intense debate revolves around the effect of the policy in promoting investment in network infrastructure or retarding it. Rival viewpoints in the policy discussion, however, appear to share the fundamental position that the options issued entrants by incumbent network owners are a transfer of wealth. This paper notes that, to the extent that the regulations actually achieve their purpose in eliminating entry barriers, the assumption is incorrect. Eliminating the sunk costs associated with providing network services can result in regulatory arbitrage that reduces the value of the option to enter to zero. The U.S. market for local telecommunications has witnessed characteristic elements of this rent seeking competition, and financial markets suggest that investors have begun to incorporate the view that the regulated wholesale access regime results in zero long-term profits for entrants.
Incentive Regulation in Practice: A Massachusetts Case Study
Authors: Vasington Paul B.
Published: November 2009

The Massachusetts public utility commission has pursued policies to promote competition and efficient pricing in telecommunications since the divestiture of AT&T in 1984. As part of this effort, the Massachusetts Commission approved incentive regulation for AT&T and Verizon  the only two companies for which prices were regulated in the state. This article is a case study of what preceded the incentive plans, how the plans themselves were decided, and what came after.
The Economics of Standards Wars
Authors: Stango Victor
Published: November 2009

Policymakers face an increasing number of questions regarding whether markets efficiently choose technological standards. In this essay I survey the economic literature regarding standards, focusing on arguments that markets move between standards either too slowly or too swiftly.
Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey
Authors: Kosfeld Michael
Published: November 2009

This paper provides a survey of recent experimental work in economics focusing on social and economic networks. The experiments consider networks of coordination and cooperation, buyer-seller networks, and network formation.
An Application of DEA Windows Analysis to Container Port Production Efficiency
Authors: Cullinane Kevin , Song Dong-Wook , Ji Ping , Wang Teng-Fei
Published: November 2009

There have been various analyses of the efficiency of container port (or terminal) production using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) based on cross-sectional data. When time is not considered, the efficiency results derived using this approach can be biased. In order to overcome this problem, this paper applies DEA windows analysis, utilising panel data, to a sample of the worlds major container ports in order to deduce their relative efficiency. The results suggest that estimates of container port efficiency fluctuate over time. The paper concludes that existing programming methods for estimating efficiency are inadequate in capturing the long-term increased efficiency and competitiveness that accrue from significant investments.
Multi-period Congestion Pricing Models and Efficient Tolls in Urban Road Systems
Authors: Liu Louie Nan
Published: November 2009

This paper reviews recent advances in multi-period congestion pricing models in urban road system. Mathematical formulations of various congestion pricing problems for two time periods (peak and off-peak) and for a simple road network are presented. A procedure is provided for conducting a simulation study of the peak and off-peak congestion pricing models to examine congestion tolls and their effects on traffic allocations and social welfares. Major findings from the analysis results are summarized. Some extensions of the existing models and future research topics are also discussed.
Regulating Vertical Integration in Broadband: Open Access versus Common Carriage
Authors: Hogendorn Christiaan
Published: November 2009

Broadband Internet involves two vertical relationships: the Internet Service Provider (ISP) requires both a physical conduit (e.g. telephone or cable television lines) and content. The ISPconduit relationship has been subject to controversial unbundling regulation, but no such rules apply to the ISPcontent relationship. We argue that regardless of whether ISPs are vertically integrated with conduits, they have incentives to create vertical restrictions on content. Foreclosure of ISPs by conduits may not increase and indeed could reduce these restrictions. Thus, telephone common carriage and Internet application neutrality may both be at odds with unbundling and "open access" policies.
Price Regulation in a Vertically Integrated Natural Gas Industry: The Case of Mexico
Authors: Brito Dagobert L. , Rosellón Juan
Published: November 2009

The Comisión Reguladora de Energía of Mexico has implemented a netback rule for linking the Mexican natural gas price to the Texas natural gas benchmark price in an industry structure characterized by a vertically integrated state-owned monopoly. This paper shows that in an open economy where agents can choose between gas and alternative fuels, and where the density function describing the distribution of agents along the pipeline can have mass points, the netback rule is Pareto optimal.
A Fallacy of Dominant Price Vectors in Network Industries
Authors: Bolle Friedel , Heimel Jana
Published: November 2009

In German mobile phone contracts, calls in the provider's home net are usually less expensive than external calls (to the network of a competitor). Thus customers have to compare vectors of prices, and such a comparison can be the source of a fallacy in the presence of network externalities. Even if a provider with a lower market share requires lower prices for calls in the home as well as to other networks, his average price may be higher than that of a larger provider. Not being aware of this fact is called "a fallacy of dominant price vectors". Based on a questionnaire study this fallacy turns out to be a real phenomenon.
The Regulation of Payment Cards: The Mexican Experience
Authors: Negrín José L.
Published: November 2009

We present a review of the regulation of general acceptance payment cards in Mexico. We find that there are distortions that may justify public intervention. The market for payment cards is underdeveloped and the usage of debit cards at POS is restricted. Also, the structure of the interchange fee (IF) may hinder POS deployment and limit debit card usage. Banco de Mexico (BM) has regulatory jurisdiction over the payment systems. BM has introduced transparency in banks' charges and removed restrictions to participation. Regarding IF, the Association of Mexican Banks has reduced it without direct regulation.
The Credit Card Industry in Israel
Authors: Gilo David , Spiegel Yossi
Published: November 2009

This paper reviews the Israeli credit card industry and discusses in detail the ongoing attempts by the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) to promote competition in the industry. Currently, these attempts had only limited success: there is still little competition both on the issuing and the acquiring sides of the market.
Country Studies of Interchange Fees: Commentary
Authors: Prager Robin
Published: November 2009

The following is a transcription of my discussion of the three papers (published in this issue) that were presented in the "Panel of Country Studies" session of the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference.
Payment Systems Are Different: Shouldn't Their Regulation Be Too?
Authors: Simon John
Published: November 2009

This paper makes the case that the structure of payment systems is such that, in contrast to competition in normal markets, private incentives can encourage activities and pricing that do not necessarily improve social welfare. Furthermore, while there is usually a reasonable presumption that where arrangements do not breach antitrust laws they are efficient, this presumption does not necessarily carry over to payment systems. Thus, there is a case for the regulation of payment systems. In particular, the paper suggests that, because of the distinctive nature of payment systems, payment system specific regulation has a number of advantages over generic antitrust regulation.
Panel on Competition Policy in Card-Based Payment Systems: Commentary
Authors: Ergas Henry
Published: November 2009

The following is a transcription of my discussion of the papers (published in this issue) that were presented in the Panel on Competition Policy in Card-Based Payment Systems session of the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference.
Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems: A Comment
Authors: Cabral Luis M. B.
Published: November 2009

In this short comment, I provide my views on "Market Power and Efficiency in Card Payment Systems" (published in this issue) that was presented at the Antitrust Activity in Card-Based Payment Systems: Causes and Consequences conference, and more generally on the ideas introduced by Rochet and Tirole's work on payment systems.
Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks
Authors: Emch Eric , Thompson T. Scott
Published: November 2009

We discuss competition among payment card networks, and in particular how antitrust practitioners might approach questions of market definition and market power in these markets. Application of the hypothetical monopolist test to define markets, and the use of traditional metrics to measure market power, may be less straightforward for card networks than for many markets. The "two-sidedness" of the market does not, however, overturn the basic logic of the hypothetical monopolist test or traditional measurements of market power. We demonstrate some practical ways to apply these antitrust principles to competition among payment card networks.
Market Definition and Market Power in Payment Card Networks: Some Comments and Considerations
Authors: White Lawrence J.
Published: November 2009

Antitrust and regulatory concerns swirl around the payment cards industry, for understandable reasons: It is not atomistic; it has network characteristics; it involves two-sided markets; and its two prominent members  Visa and MasterCard  are network joint ventures of the banks that issue cards to consumers and enroll and service the merchants who accept those cards. These characteristics raise the possibility that the industry may not be fully competitive and thus raise potential policy concerns. But these same characteristics also cloud the standard against which the performance of the industry should be judged and complicate the analysis necessary for forming judgments.
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks
Authors: Chakravorti Sujit , Roson Roberto
Published: November 2009

In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric networks, and alternative assumptions about consumer preferences. We find that competition unambiguously increases consumer and merchant welfare. We extend this analysis to competition among payment networks providing different payment instruments and find similar results.
A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card Payments?
Authors: Hayashi Fumiko
Published: November 2009

This paper presents models that explain why merchants accept payment cards even when the fees they face exceed the transactional benefits they receive from a card transaction. The prevalent assumption  merchants accept cards only when they earn positive net transactional benefits  holds only for a monopoly merchant who faces an inelastic consumer demand. The paper also explores possible explanations for the recent gradual increases in merchant fees in the United States. Three possible explanations are 1) inflexible product price setting by merchants, 2) decreases (increases) in cardholder fees (rebates), and 3) increases in cardholding-customer proportion in a given industry.
The Move Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics
Authors: Garcia-Swartz Daniel D. , Hahn Robert W. , Layne-Farrar Anne
Published: November 2009

Ever since the first general-purpose charge card debuted in the early 1950s, pundits have been predicting the "cashless society". Over fifty years later, we may finally be getting close to that vision. This study is the first to examine empirically the move toward a cashless society using a cost-benefit framework. We find that when all key parties to a transaction are considered and benefits are added, cash and checks are more costly than many earlier studies suggest. In general, the shift toward a cashless society appears to be a beneficial one.
The Move Toward a Cashless Society: Calculating the Costs and Benefits
Authors: Garcia-Swartz Daniel D. , Hahn Robert W. , Layne-Farrar Anne
Published: November 2009

While the "cashless society" has not yet fully become a reality, payment choices by consumers and merchants have been moving the U.S. economy in that direction slowly and steadily over the past five decades. In this study, a companion paper to Garcia-Swartz (2006a) in this volume, we lay out the detailed cost and benefit calculations behind our analysis of the steady changes in transaction payment methods.
Handicapping Countries in the Race to Digital Switching
Authors: Shampine Allan
Published: November 2009

This paper examines the diffusion of digital switching in 19 countries by specifying a model of technology choice and testing the significance of the implied determinants of adoption. The results are compared and contrasted with previous analyses of the adoption of digital switching within the U.S. In particular, the results suggest that previous analyses of the effects of telecommunications infrastructure on GDP, such as Roller and Waverman (2001), may achieve greater statistical power by accounting for the type of infrastructure as well as the level of infrastructure.
The Economics of IPR Protection Policies
Authors: Gil Ricard
Published: November 2009

In this paper, I model competition between legal and pirate products. In this framework, the government affects competition through police spending and taxes on the legal products. Therefore, the government can choose the optimal combination of spending and taxes that fit better its goals. I show that governments focusing on eradicating piracy will use lower level of taxes and police spending than governments focused on maximizing consumption, consumer surplus, and welfare or government size. This result highlights the importance of demand side policies in the fight against piracy and challenges the traditional solo approach of supply side policies.
Determination of Revenue Streams Subject to Sharing in the Mobile Internet Market
Authors: Koh Byungwan , Oh Jungsuk
Published: November 2009

Wireless operators often outsource the task of creating content to independent content providers in the mobile Internet market. Revenue streams of the mobile Internet market typically consist of two main sources, data traffic and content sales. It is often the case that only the revenue from content sales is subject to sharing between wireless operators and content providers. This paper applies the "dummy variable axiom" to the market data of a representative Korean wireless operator to show that, in some cases, data traffic revenues should also be shared between the wireless operator and content providers.
Interconnection Economics of All-IP Networks
Authors: Yoon Kiho
Published: November 2009

This paper is an exploratory study on the interconnection economics of All-IP networks. To understand the economics of the yet-to-be-realized All-IP networks, this paper begins with discussing three important features of current IP networks: packet switching, receiver benefit, and two-sidedness. It then develops simple models of interconnection for basic fixed fee settlements and for session-based charges. The analysis shows that interconnection settlements depend on network size, market competitiveness, direct and cross network externalities, and costs. Some policy issues are also briefly discussed.
Airline Business Models and Networks: Regulation, Competition and Evolution in Aviation Markets
Authors: Gillen David
Published: November 2009

This paper examines the evolution of airline business models and network structure decisions in the passenger aviation industry. The paper reviews the growth of hub-and-spoke networks as the dominant business model following deregulation in the latter part of the 20th century, followed by the emergence of low cost carriers as a global phenomenon at the end of the century. The paper highlights the link between airline business strategies and network structures, and examines the resulting competition between divergent network structure business models. In this context, we discuss issues of market structure stability and the role played by competition policy.
Optimal Monopoly Price Paths with Expanding Networks
Authors: Gabszewicz Jean , Garcia Filomena
Published: November 2009

In this paper, we survey the literature on optimal pricing of a monopolist operating on a network industry. We also describe explicitly the optimal path of prices for a monopolist facing an expanding demand due to the presence of network effects. The optimal path of prices appears as a function of the network effect intensity and horizon length. Prices are increasing over time and for very low network effect intensity, or very high horizon length, the monopolist will offer the good at zero price in the initial period.
Telecommunications Services and Multi-Unit Firms: Inside the Black-Box
Authors: Creti Anna
Published: November 2009

This paper analyzes telecommunications demand by firms, focusing on communication flows among production units. We consider first the case of two business unit that can play simultaneously or in a leader/follower situation regarding their communication decisions. In this context, we define the network effect as the advantage a production unit obtains by using an input whose costs are shared by another user. The model is then generalized, taking into account indirect links among production units. The theoretical framework we suggest explains business telecommunications usage by multi-unit firms, and sheds light on the relationship between firms' internal organisation and communication flows.
Bargaining and Fixed Price Offers: How Online Intermediaries are Changing New Car Transactions
Authors: Arnold Michael A. , Pénard Thierry
Published: November 2009

This paper develops a model of oligopolistic price competition to analyze the impact of online intermediaries such as Autobytel.com on the price setting process in the automobile market. The roles of dealer search costs, the fraction of buyers using the intermediary, the value of the item being sold, and heterogeneity in buyer bargaining abilities are explored. The model provides theoretical insights relevant to the empirical literature addressing the role that intermediaries like Autobytel play in online markets. For example, we present conditions under which the price offered through the intermediary is either higher or lower than offline (bargained) prices.
Digital Business Models for Peer-to-Peer Networks: Analysis and Economic Issue
Authors: Krishnan Ramayya , Smith Michael D. , Tang Zhulei , Telang Rahul
Published: November 2009

Peer-to-peer (P2P) services allow users to share networked resources, notably bandwidth and content, from the edges of the network. These services have been popularized because of file sharing  particularly the sharing of unlicensed copyrighted files. However, content owners are increasingly exploring the ability of peer-to-peer networks to accommodate legitimate content distribution and promotion. In this article, we review the economic characteristics of P2P networks and outline the implications of these characteristics on efforts to counteract illegal piracy and on potential uses of P2P networks in a commercial media distribution strategy.
"Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is" - A Betting Platform for Better Prediction
Authors: Fang Fang , Stinchcombe Maxwell , Whinston Andrew
Published: November 2009

We designed a platform with a betting mechanism for eliciting costly, dispersed information of different quality. Our objective is to elicit both dispersed information and the precision of the information so as to efficiently weight dispersed information to produce reliable forecasts. After deciding to incur the costs to acquire information, participants will report their forecasts and decide the size of their bets to indicate precision. Our mechanism selects those with relatively precise information at lower costs. We also discuss the implementation issues of our mechanism and the implication to fulfil the task of crowd sourcing.
Do Open Source Developers Respond to Competition? The LATEX Case Study
Authors: Gaudeul Alex
Published: November 2009

This paper traces the history of TEX, the open source typesetting program. TEX was an early and very successful open source project that imposed its standards in a particularly competitive environment and inspired many advances in the typesetting industry. Developed over three decades, TEX came into competition with a variety of open source and proprietary alternatives. I argue from this case study that open source developers derive direct and indirect network externalities from the use of their software by others and must therefore consider non-developers' needs to make their software more attractive to a broader audience and more competitive with proprietary alternatives.
Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks
Authors: Pindyck Robert S.
Published: November 2009

This paper addresses the investment impact of network sharing mandated by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Such investments involve sunk costs and so are irreversible. Regulators allow entrants to utilize such facilities at prices reflecting the cost of building a new, efficient, large-scale network. Such sharing opportunities are extensive, covering virtually all network services, and extremely flexible, as entrants can rent facilities in small increments for short duration. Because entrants do not bear the sunk costs, there is an asymmetric allocation of risk and return not properly accounted for in the pricing of network services. This creates a significant investment disincentive.
Efficiency Trade-Offs in the Design of Competition Policy for the Telecommunications Industry
Authors: Gayle Philip G. , Weisman Dennis L.
Published: November 2009

Trade-offs between imitation and innovation create natural tensions in the design of competition policy for the telecommunications industry. We explore the relationship between the prices of unbundled network elements (UNEs) and static/dynamic efficiency. We find that even when UNEs are priced to induce efficient make-or-buy decisions from a static perspective, mandatory unbundling reduces the incumbent's incentive to invest from a dynamic perspective. Moreover, while the literature focuses on disincentives for investment in innovation associated with low UNE prices, we find that raising prices for UNEs, when such prices preserve the efficient make-or-buy decision, can discourage investment in process innovation.
Broadband Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Authors: Blum Ulrich , Growitsch Christian , Krap Niels
Published: November 2009

Recently, investments in new generation networks in Germany have been curtailed, since potential investors required this new network be unregulated. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments to occur but prevents monopolistic prices, we model an investor's decision problem under a threat of regulation. We show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention may prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both the investment decision and the investor's price via her signals on regulation probability and price.
A Dynamic Model of Airline Competition
Authors: Fang Ying , Sickles Robin C.
Published: November 2009

We develop a dynamic model of collusion in airport-pair routes for selected US airlines and specify the first order conditions using a state-space representation that is estimated by Kalman-filtering techniques using the Databank 1A (DB1A) Department of Transportation (DOT) data during the period 1979I-1988IV. We consider two airlines, American (AA) and United (UA) and four city-pairs. Our measure of market power is based on the shadow value of long-run profits in a two-person strategic dynamic game and we find evidence of relative market power of AA in three of the four city pairs we analyze.
Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators
Authors: Singer Hal J. , Sidak J. Gregory
Published: November 2009

This paper argues that a cable operator with sufficient market power in the downstream multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) market can deny access to unaffiliated programmers, resulting in an upstream programming rival's exit or impaired dynamic efficiency. Further, market dominance by cable operators may harm consumers of video programming through higher prices and less choice in the downstream MVPD market. The reason is that as unaffiliated video programming becomes affiliated programming, the latter is then withheld from rival MVPDs. This analysis is then applied to the recent acquisition of Adelphia by Comcast and Time Warner.
International Perspectives on Electricity Market Monitoring and Market Power Mitigation
Authors: García José A. , Reitzes James D.
Published: November 2009

We review the different market monitoring and market-power mitigation policies that arise in world electricity markets. Regulators for electricity markets apparently respond to differences in underlying market structure and design features when choosing between ex-ante (that is, rule-based) behavioral restrictions as opposed to ex-post enforcement (that is, investigations and sanctions) as the principal means for deterring abuses of market power. Particular design features that influence market-monitoring policies are whether the market is one-part (energy only) versus two-part (energy and capacity), and whether there is centralized or bilateral trading. Information-disclosure requirements also are a key element of market monitoring.
Another Look at Payment Instrument Economics
Authors: Shampine Allan
Published: November 2009

This article revisits the research in "The Move Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics" in order to clarify assumptions underlying the theoretical model and how they impact the included cost and benefit categories; evaluate the estimates' plausibility by comparing the model's results to observed behaviour; and extend the sensitivity analysis.
Further Thoughts on the Cashless Society: A Reply to Dr. Shampine
Authors: Garcia-Swartz Daniel , Hahn Robert W. , Layne-Farrar Anne
Published: November 2009

We address Allan Shampine's critiques of our study on the costs and benefits of payment instruments, and review the current state of the literature. We argue that a consensus seems to be emerging in which: (a) different payment instruments appear to be socially efficient at different transaction sizes; (b) cash appears to be efficient for small payments; and (c) debit cards appear to overtake cash as the socially optimal instrument as the transaction size increases. Except for the fact that in our study credit appears to overtake debit at large transaction sizes, our 2006 findings are consistent with the consensus.
The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Comment
Authors: Martínez-Sánchez Francisco
Published: November 2009

We provide a theoretical result on the effect of piracy on the sales of legal product using the same framework as Gil (2006). We obtain that when the illegal sector is perfectly competitive and the marginal cost of the legal firm and the quantity tax are small enough, piracy does not lead to lower sales of the legal product.
The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Reply
Authors: Gil Ricard
Published: November 2009

In a comment to my paper "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies," Martínez-Sánchez (2007) shows that in my model under certain conditions the presence of piracy increases the quantity produced by the legal monopolist firm. In this note, I show how the algebra used in Martínez-Sánchez (2007) may be misleading and clarify under what assumptions such a finding would emerge. Finally, I discuss the validity of the assumptions in my model that would yield such counterintuitive finding.
The Arlanda Airport Rail Link: Lessons Learned from a Swedish Construction Project
Authors: Nilsson Jan-Eric , Hultkrantz Lars , Karlström Urban
Published: November 2009

The Stockholm  Arlanda airport rail link is a public-private partnership opened for traffic in 1999. This paper addresses costs and benefits of giving a private company control over one section of the otherwise public railway network. The project has reduced the pressure on the public sectors budget and reduced the need to raise efficiency distorting tax revenue. The number of passengers has been below expectations. Track capacity may, however, be sufficient to negotiate an increase the supply of rail services by way of extending existing commuter trains, in that way attracting more passengers.
Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures
Authors: De Donder Phillippe , Cremer Helmuth , Dudley Paul , Rodriguez Frank
Published: November 2009

Postal regulators set price controls in order to simultaneously ensure the provision of the universal service, promote competition and equity. We study the associated price control procedures in a model where the universal service provider offers both a single piece product and a business mail product and where entrants offer a bulk mail product. Our results from the numerical calibration of our model indicate that in the case where entry is confined only to access, a range of procedures appear capable of meeting these objectives. However, if bypass is available these trade offs become more costly.
Sharing costs between a Service of General Economic Interest and Competitive Activities: The Example of the Postal Retail Network
Authors: Lecou Sebastien , Roy Bernard
Published: November 2009

The European Commission has produced precise rules governing the computation of the cost of services of general economic interest (SGEI). The Commission has adopted a fully distributed cost approach where the SGEI can bear a "reasonable" share of the common cost. We highlight a possible inconsistency issue between this state aid case law and the antitrust case law based on an incremental cost approach. We also show the difficulty introduced by the identification of the common costs, relying on the example of the network of a postal operator providing commercial services and fulfilling an accessibility obligation.
The "Waterbed" Effect and Price Regulation
Authors: Schiff Aaron
Published: November 2009

This paper investigates conditions that generate the so-called "waterbed" effect under price regulation. This is the effect whereby regulation of one price of a multiproduct firm causes one or more of its unregulated prices to change as a result of the firm's profit-maximizing behavior. A waterbed effect is shown to arise when demands and/or marginal costs are interdependent, firms use nonlinear pricing, or there is a zero-profit constraint or global price cap. Some implications for market definition, welfare analysis of regulation, non-price competition, collusion and two-sided markets are also discussed, as well as specific applications to fixed-to-mobile termination and bank overcharges.
Natural Experiments in U.S. Broadband Regulation
Authors: Hazlett Thomas W. , Caliskan Anil
Published: November 2009

Regulations governing broadband networks are being considered. Natural experiments conducted with respect to "open access" rules yield probative marketplace evidence. Using the metric of subscribership, policy regimes are compared. Prior to 1Q2003, cable modem service was unregulated (and has remained so), while digital subscriber lines (DSL) were subject to network unbundling mandates. Those rules were effectively lifted in 1Q2003 and 3Q2005. Across regimes, subscriber growth appears significantly and negatively correlated with regulation. By year-end 2006, DSL subscribership was about 65% above the trend established in the regulated pre-1Q2003 era, a difference of eight to ten million households.