bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In Ch. 8, I distinguished epistemic probability from objective probability and then pointed out some debilitating problems with the three main accounts of epistemic probability. In this chapter, I propose my own account of epistemic probability. I first distinguish between two sides to epistemic probability, which I call the objective component and the normative component. In typical cases where we assert that some proposition is epistemically probable, two things get asserted: that the proposition is objectively probable with respect to the evidence (the objective component), and that it is rational (or reasonable) to place a high degree of confidence in the proposition, given the circumstances of having as evidence what in fact we do have as evidence (the normative component). Attempting to unpack these two components (especially the second), I sketch the view that (roughly) the normative component of the epistemic conditional probability of A on B is the interval containing the degrees of belief a rational person could have in A, provided she believed B and was aware that she believed B, considered the evidential bearing of B on A, had no other source of warrant for B or its denial, and had no defeater for the warrant, if any, accruing to A or its denial by virtue of being thus believed on the basis of B.
Is Naturalism Irrational?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I continue to argue that naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics. I do so by presenting two epistemological arguments against metaphysical naturalism; the first argument is for the falsehood of naturalism, the second, and more developed, is for the conclusion that it is irrational to accept naturalism. Crucial to both arguments is the estimation of the value of a certain conditional probability, P(R/(N&E&C)), where (roughly) R is the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable, N is metaphysical naturalism, E is the proposition that our cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms of evolution (i.e., the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention), and C is a complex proposition stating what cognitive faculties we have and what sorts of beliefs they produce. In the second argument I contend that (1) it is quite plausible to think either that the rational attitude to take towards the conditional probability mentioned above is the judgment that it is low or that the rational attitude is agnosticism with respect to it, and, (2) in either case, the devotee of N & E has a defeater for any belief he holds, including N. Further, since this defeater is an ultimately undefeated defeater (as I argue), it is irrational to accept N, since it is irrational to accept any proposition such that one knows one has an ultimately undefeated defeater for it.
Death
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

Analyzes the badness of death for those who die. Argues that our intuitions about the comparative badness of different deaths are best justified if we abandon the idea that death should be evaluated in terms of its effect on the value of life as a whole. Instead, death should be evaluated in terms of the effect that it has on what the victim has reason to care about from an egoistic point of view at the time of death. Only in this way can we adequately explain why the death of a fetus or newborn infant is less bad than the death of an older child or adult.
Killing
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

Seeks to understand why killing is normally wrong. It argues that there is no single, unitary explanation of the wrongness of killing. It begins by considering the morality of killing animals and contends that there is no morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings on the one hand and all other animals on the other. The reason why killing an animal is morally objectionable appeals solely to considerations of interests. But killing a rational, self‐conscious being is wrong because it involves a failure of respect for that individual as a rational being. The morality of killing a fetus is governed by the same principles that govern the killing of an animal.
Beginnings
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

Discusses abortion, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury. It argues that early abortion is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion can be justified in many cases because of the comparative weakness of the fetus's interest in continuing to live. The permissibility of abortion is not threatened either by considerations of potential or by claims about the sanctity of human life. Because there is no significant intrinsic difference between a late‐term fetus and a newborn infant, infanticide can also be permissible in a limited range of cases for the same reasons that abortion can be justified. Abortion cannot be justified, however, by appealing to a pregnant woman's right of self‐defense.
Endings
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

Argues that we must have two concepts of death – the death or ceasing to exist of the person and the death of the human organism. Brain death is not the proper criterion for either of these. Persistent vegetative state involves the death or ceasing to exist of the person, even though the human organism continues to live. This chapter also defends the permissibility of assisted suicide and euthanasia in a broad range of cases and concludes by discussing the authority of advance directives in cases involving dementia.
Happiness, the Supreme End
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

What is the best human life? is a question for the Aristotelian statesman and for those whom upbringing has endowed with good starting points. The analysis of Aristotle's answer takes us to the idea of happiness, to the problem of its relation to other goods, and to its definition in terms of the human function.
Virtues and Parts of the Soul
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

Discusses the virtue of character: the definition of it in terms of prohairesis and the orthos logos; in what sense it is a mean; how it involves conformity of desire to reason; how it develops in the soul; and how the conditions of upbringing explain why justice is a human virtue.
The Voluntary
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

In the context of perspectives drawn from philosophy of action and from Aristotle's natural philosophy, the chapter examines the ambiguity of the Aristotelian voluntary, its connections with censure and responsibility, its defensibility by excuse of force or ignorance, its bipolarity, its connection with character formation, and its implications, if any, for determinism.
Practical Wisdom
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

The main topics are Aristotle on the structure and psychology of rational choice (prohairesis); on practice and production; on practical versus theoretical truth; on particulars as the sphere of practice; on ends and means in deliberation; and on the relation of character and intelligence in practical wisdom. The chapter argues against “Grand End” interpretations of this Aristotelian virtue.
Pleasure
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

No one understands better than Aristotle how deeply the desire for pleasure is rooted in human and animal nature. He must show that while pleasure can threaten morality, it also lies at the heart of human rational perfection. His complex reactions to neutralism (“The good is beyond pleasure and pain”), and to the hedonism of Eudoxus, shape his views about pleasure, activity, and completeness.
Human Morality
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

This book defends a conception of morality as moderate in content and pervasive in scope, and as possessing an authority that derives in part from its deep roots in human psychology. According to Scheffler, the point of view of morality and that of enlightened self‐interest stand in a relation of potential congruence, a relation that he explains by reference to three central ideas. The first is that even though moral considerations and considerations of self‐interest do sometimes conflict; moral norms must be capable of integration into a coherent, attractive human life. The second is that individuals can develop psychological structures that make moral motivation possible and that shape individual interests so as to reduce the conflict between the moral and the personal points of view. And the third idea is that it is a practical, social task to achieve a measure of fit between the demands of morality and the interests of the individual. The view of morality developed in the book embodies what Scheffler calls an Ideal of Humanity, and Scheffler maintains that this ideal coheres with the totality of our firmly held values and considered convictions.
Plato's Ethics
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.
The Protagoras
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

Chapter 6 offers a detailed analysis of the Protagoras conceived as the first dialogue in which Plato starts to reflect on the failure of the early dialogues and to provide definitive solutions to moral problems. Although the dialogue is labelled as aporetic, one part of it--the discussion of hedonism--is considered dialectal. How the hedonism of the Protagoras tries to be an advancement of the one of the early dialogues is examined. Then the two theories of virtues are presented: the “unity thesis” and the “reciprocity thesis.” The former holds that all the virtues are the same, while the latter holds that all the virtues imply each other. Finally, it is emphasised that despite their differences, Plato does not dismiss any of the views.
Republic II: Objections to Justice
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Plato’s view of justice is presented, which possibly differs from Socrates’. Plato’s “sufficient thesis” (virtue is sufficient for happiness), is compared with the “comparative thesis” (virtue is always better then non-virtue), held by Glaucon and Adeimantus. A detailed discussion of all the relevant problems of book II, the relation between happiness and justice, is outlined. In conclusion, some aspects of Plato’s view are critically evaluated.
Republic IV: Justice and Happiness
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory account of Plato’s theory of justice. Firstly, a study of the role and the functions of the rational part of the soul are offered. Secondly, some crucial aspects of happiness are illustrated. These considerations are important to introduce the account on justice. Two kinds of justice are distinguished: psychic justice (P-justice) and common justice (C-justice). The former expresses the relation between the different parts of the soul, whereas the latter refers to the interaction among people. In conclusion, it is analysed why P-justice is self-regarding, while C-justice is other-regarding.
Republic V–VII
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

This chapter endeavours to demonstrate the relevance of the epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of books V, VI, and VII for Plato’s ethics. Firstly, the role played by the analysis of the sight-lovers theory and how it relates with the other aspects of this books is investigated. Secondly, the relevance of the doctrine of the Good as the supreme form and its analogy with the sun is evaluated. Thirdly, how the line and the cave fit with Plato’s discussion and the role they play is examined.
Reason and Virtue
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

The last chapter analyses how Plato’s ethical views are developed in the later dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws). In the last dialogue Plato tries to harmonise the different virtues. The relations between pleasure, happiness, and desire are analysed. Finally, the role played by the cardinal virtues in the later dialogues is examined, in particular, a certain attention toward the condition of wisdom and how it is related to the other virtues.
Externalism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal (or reliabilist) account of knowledge.
Foundationalism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Foundationalist theories of justification attempt to solve the Agrippa problem by finding some way of bringing the infinite regress of reasons to a nonarbitrary halt. This chapter concentrates on Chisholm's attempt to do this. Such a theory faces a double task: the first is to find suitable starting points that do not themselves stand in need of justification – Chisholm appeals to what he calls self‐presenting properties to do this.

The second is to show that from these starting points, a suitably large domain of those knowledge claims that we take to be justified is justified. Criticisms are offered of both parts of this program. It is also argued that, in various places, Chisholm begs the question against skepticism.
Internal Coherentism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Coherentists attempt to solve the problem of infinite regress by rejecting what they sometimes call “the linear conception of knowledge.” Coherentists adopt, instead, a holistic conception of justification. This chapter examines BonJour's efforts to develop a coherentist account of empirical knowledge. BonJour faces two tasks: the first is to specify the conditions for a system of beliefs to be coherent, the second is to provide an argument showing that a system possessing these features provides justification for the beliefs it contains. To be coherent, according to BonJour, a system must be both logically and probabilistically consistent, be rich in inferential connections, not be divided into isolated subsystems, and be free of anomalies. Finally, to be justified in believing something, a person must be able recognize that his belief has this status in his system of beliefs. This position is criticized on a number of grounds. It seems to have the consequence that no human being has ever been justified in any of his empirical beliefs. Nothing seems to rule out the multiple‐choice problem of there being two equally coherent but incompatible systems of belief.
From Morality to Virtue
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over other large‐scale approaches. The present work is the first to attempt such a systematic and freestanding or independent virtue ethics.
Rudiments of Virtue Ethics
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

Virtue ethics treats aretaic, as opposed to deontic, concepts as fundamental and focuses in the first instance on character traits or motives rather than actions. Virtue ethics also contrasts with utilitarianism (or consequentialism) because although both these approaches are self‐other symmetric, they embrace different forms of symmetry. Utilitarianism holds that one's concern for oneself should be no different, fundamentally, from the concern one has for each and every other individual. But such ”in sensu diviso” symmetry differs from an ”in sensu composito” symmetry that would have us be equally concerned with ourselves and with others considered as a class. Commonsense virtue ethics subscribes to the latter kind of symmetry because of the way in which it gives equal or nearly equal weight to both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues.
Virtue, Self, and Other
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

In commonsense terms, many traits count as virtues independently of the benefit they bring their possessors or others. For example, the courage to face the fact that one has cancer may actually make things less pleasant for both the cancer victim and his/her friends and relations. In addition, many virtuous traits have both self‐regarding and other‐regarding versions: e.g. honesty, loyalty, and trustworthiness. A commonsense virtue ethics makes use of that fact to underscore the significance and plausibility of its self‐other symmetric approach to ethical theory.
Reduction vs. Elevation
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

There are five basic classes of ethical notions: the notions surrounding the idea of welfare; moral notions; virtue notions; rationality notions; and notions involving the evaluation of states of affairs. Epicureanism and utilitarianism try to reduce all the other notions (notion‐clusters) to that of well‐being or welfare, but Stoicism moves in the opposite direction, seeing well‐being as a function of virtue. Since virtue seems higher or more ideal as a value than sheer or mere well‐being, we can say that Epicureanism and utilitarianism monistically reduce virtue to well‐being, whereas Stoicism monistically elevates well‐being to the status or level of virtue. But commonsense virtue ethics treats well‐being and virtue in dualistic fashion as mutually ineliminable.
The Main Issue Between Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics
Authors: Slote Michael
Published: October 2003

The main issue between utilitarianism and commonsense virtue ethics is whether what is admirable is a function of the overall benefit a trait brings to sentient beings generally or whether there can be sources of admirability and virtue status somewhat independent of such overall consequences. It is argued by example that many kinds of admirability seem possible and that some of these do not grow out of overall likely benefits to sentient beings. This favors commonsense virtue ethics over utilitarianism.
Kantian Consequentialism
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.
Introduction
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not consequentialist, and indeed Kant argues at length against empiricist, utilitarian approaches to ethics. The question, however, is whether he actually provides a nonconsequentialist justification of deontological intuitions or individual rights. I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, Kant simply does not consider, and thus does not reject, a consequentialist interpretation of the moral law or categorical imperative. Furthermore, once we distinguish the justification of normative principle from the principle itself, Kant's rationalist, internalist approach to justification seems to be compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, we see that the key to the rejection of consequentialism is the justification of basic agent‐centered constraints. The introductory chapter also provides a comment on rational reconstruction as a form of textual interpretation and an overview and summary of the book's argument.
Rational Nature as an End‐In‐Itself
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kant maintains that “rational nature exists as end‐in‐itself” and thus you must “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” As Korsgaard has emphasized, Kant presents a transcendental argument for the unconditional value of rational nature. According to Kant, happiness is indeed also valued as an end, but its value is nonetheless conditioned by the value‐conferring power of rational nature. In this chapter, Kant's conceptions of intrinsic value, the goodness of ends and means, and the idea of an end‐in‐itself are explained. Problems for the argument for the priority of rationality are also explored.
Conclusion
Authors: Cummiskey David
Published: October 2003

Kantian consequentialism combines a Kantian conception of the justification of moral principles with a consequentialist principle of right action. Although the focus of this book is on defending the Kantian foundations of this new type of consequentialism, it is noteworthy that the resulting Kantian theory of value also leads to a more intuitively plausible form of consequentialism. The Kantian foundation of this new form of consequentialism does indeed entail significant constraints on the kinds of sacrifices that are morally permissible. Most centrally, the maximization of happiness cannot override the basic interests related to our rational nature. For similar reasons, on issues of social justice, this type of consequentialism is more distribution‐sensitive than classical utilitarianism. Kantian consequentialism thus supports many of the deontological intuitions and basic rights concerns that have led Kantians like Rawls to reject utilitarianism.
Making Sense of My Life as a Whole
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

The entry‐point for ethical reflection in ancient ethics is the question of how I ought to live. This develops into thoughts about my final end and the formal conditions that have to hold of it. The assumption that this is happiness raises issues about similarities and differences between modern notions of happiness and the ancient concept of happiness or eudaimonia.
Nature and Naturalism
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient theories appeal to nature, in several ways, as support. This is distinguished from modern versions of naturalism. The ancient appeal to nature is not tied to a particular theory such as teleology, and involves nature as an ideal.
The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the Universe
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

The Stoics appeal to human nature in their theory of virtue and ‘preferred indifferents’, showing in a developmental account how grasping virtue is the culmination of a natural progression. They also appeal to the nature of the cosmos to support ethics as a whole, but this does not, as issometimes claimed, provide premises from which specific ethical conclusions are inferred.
The Epicureans: Rethinking What Is Natural
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Epicurus’ appeal to nature to show that our final end is pleasure is less crude than often thought. Instead of formulating a hedonic calculus, he distinguishes between desires in terms of what is natural and what is necessary. He produces a revisionary, ideal account of nature, illustrated by Philodemus’ work on anger.
Uses of Nature
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient appeals to nature are not like modern appeals – from fact to value. They begin from nature as the given aspects of ourselves that theory cannot ignore but also think of the full development of nature as giving us ethical ideals. Natural development thus guides ethical theory without being independent of normativity.
The Good of Others
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Because of their eudaimonistic structure, ancient theories have been criticized as egoistic, but this is a mistake, overlooking the place in them of philia or ‘friendship’, covering particular relationships, and of justice; both require other‐concern, the question for ancient ethics being how far this should extend.
Self‐Concern and the Sources and Limits of Other‐Concern
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

There is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern (Aristotle), thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development (the Stoics)? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.
Happiness, Success and What Matters
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient ethical theories all assume that we are seeking our happiness when we try to live a moral life. This produces considerable revision of the intuitive content of happiness, different theories making more or less revisionary transformations of its content.
Epicurus: Virtue, Pleasure and Time
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Epicurus, in claiming that happiness is really pleasure, produces an account of pleasure as tranquility tailored to allow it to be our final end. This greatly revises our attitudes to death, particularly premature death, to particular pleasures and pains, and to variation in our activities, which are to produce tranquility.
The Sceptics: Untroubledness Without Belief
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Sextus Empiricus represents the only school of ancient scepticism to have developed views on happiness as our final end. He gives arguments to dislodge our commitment to all positive theories of happiness, aiming to produce suspension of judgement, which is alleged to result in tranquility. But what replaces it is not substantial enough to be plausibly articulated as a theory of happiness, and is too dependent on actual agreement to ground scepticism's alleged therapeutic value.
Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus sharpened the claim that happiness requires external goods as well as virtue, a claim prominently denied by the Stoics. Their position that virtue is sufficient for happiness requires revision of the content of happiness and adjustment of our attitudes to premature death and many other matters. The strain put on our concept of happiness is, however, greatly alleviated by the Stoic theory of preferred indifferents, which allows things other than virtue to have value of a different kind, as the material on which virtuous activity is exercised.
Morality, Ancient and Modern
Authors: Annas Julia
Published: October 2003

Ancient and modern ethical theories are compared, with renewed warning against reading modern assumptions into ancient texts. The book's discussions of ancient theories supports the position that ancient concerns about virtue can reasonably be compared with modern concerns with morality, and that the chief difference is the eudaimonistic structure of ancient theories. Some contrasts with modern theories are briefly drawn.
Darwin's Achievement
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

Offers an extensive case study—Darwin's formulation and defence of evolutionary theory—in an attempt to show how detailed study of a historical episode can make room for the possibility of scientific progress and rational acceptance of novel views.
The Microstructure of Scientific Change
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

Using the details of the case study as an illustration, offers a picture of the scientist as a cognitive subject, and introduces the key notion of a scientific practice. Instead of thinking of a corpus of beliefs, it is suggested that the state of science at a time can best be represented by a multidimensional entity, among whose components are the language used, the questions hailed as significant, the answers accepted, the methodological and experimental lore, and so forth. Both individual practices and the consensus practice (the practice that represents the view of the community) are considered.
The Experimental Philosophy
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: October 2003

Discusses the major questions that arise about the knowledge of the individual scientist. First, the problems of the theory‐ladenness of observation are distinguished and discussed. Second, the traditional issues in the theory of confirmation are addressed by articulating an eliminativist view of scientific inference. This view faces obvious difficulties stemming from the alleged underdetermination of theory by evidence. It is suggested that some forms of this problem are less intractable than is usually supposed, but that related questions are at the heart of worries about the rational resolution of scientific revolutions. To tackle these worries, some historical episodes—one focused on the chemical revolution of the eighteenth century, the other on Darwin's arguments from biogeography—are discussed in some detail.
Modalities
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This book is a collection of papers by Ruth Barcan Marcus, covering much ground in the development of her thought, and spanning from 1961 to 1990. Many of the papers deal with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in intensional logic, and in particular, modalities. Some important themes that run through these papers are extensionality, the necessity of identity, the directly referential conception of proper names as “tags,” essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defense of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine. Modalities also includes two papers on belief, which have consequences for epistemic logic and more widely for theories of rationality; two papers on ethical issues, which have consequences for deontic logic and practical reasoning; and finally, two papers on historical figures, Spinoza and Russell, dealing with the ontological proof of God's existence, and the nature of particularity, identity, and individuation, respectively.
Essentialism in Modal Logic
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

In this paper, an example of the kind of essentialist argument that is supposed to generate difficulties for quantified modal logic is shown to be invalid on one interpretation, and valid but unable to generate categorical necessities without the ad hoc addition of essentialist premises, on another. The paper specifies how attributes figure in quantified modal logic, and also gives a formal characterization of essential properties.
Quantification and Ontology
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

Interpretations of standard first‐order logic fail as vehicles for paraphrase of important segments of discourse involving tenses, modalities, and the like. This paper considers substitutional quantification, which severs the connection between quantifiers and ontological commitment, as a way of increasing the range of translatability into and out of an interpretation of standard first‐order logic.
Nominalism and the Substitutional Quantifier
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper explores the claim that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims. Without committing herself to nominalism, Marcus establishes some important points of contact between the two, such as the belief that proper names are not redundant or eliminable, and that substitutional semantics allows quantifiers with predicates as substituends without thereby forcing an ontology of universals.
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

In this paper, it is argued that moral dilemmas need not indicate that the set of moral principles under which we define our obligations is inconsistent. It is also argued that the consistency of moral principles does not entail that moral dilemmas can be settled without residue. This points not only to an intractable fact about the human condition and the inevitability of guilt but also to a second‐order regulative principle: as rational agents we ought to conduct our lives and arrange our institutions so as to minimize predicaments of moral conflict.
On Some Post‐1920s Views of Russell on Particularity, Identity, and Individuation
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

Expanding on scholarly work by M. Boudot, this paper indicates (1) what remains constant in the evolution of Russell's ontological views against which his later theories seem to be natural outcomes, (2) some criticisms of Russell's earlier views, which may have acted as catalyst for the change, and (3) some consequences the revised theory has for Russell's logic. It then comments on Russell's later views, which seem to prefigure contemporary theories of demonstratives and ordinary proper names.
Possibilia and Possible Worlds
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper examines claims that quantified modal logic trades on deep failures and confusions. In particular, it discusses the putative problem of failure of substitutivity of co‐referential terms in modal contexts, and the apparent commitment of modal semantics to possibilia. It concludes with a discussion of alternatives for a more adequate modal logic and its semantics, developing themes and proposals from earlier work.
A Backward Look at Quine's Animadversions on Modalities
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper reflects, in a loosely historical and personally reminiscent fashion, on Quine's animadversions on modalities, the debates they provoked, and some of its outcomes.
Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief and Believing
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan
Published: October 2003

This paper proposes an “object‐centered” account of belief and believing that departs from the dominant, language‐oriented accounts, according to which the objects of believing are linguistic or quasi‐linguistic entities. The paper provides a critical examination of such language‐oriented views, and also includes discussions of the disquotation principle, a puzzle about belief in non‐existence, and whether one can believe an impossibility.
Introduction
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

The central problem of political theory is to reconcile the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. The problem is not approached as a question about the relation between the individual and society; in essence and origin it is a question about each individual's relation to himself. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements, which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.
Two Standpoints
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of our own, and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be. From this abstracted impersonal standpoint, the content and character of different individual standpoints remain unchanged. The impersonal standpoint plays an essential role in the evaluation of political institutions. Any political theory that aspires to moral decency must try to devise and justify a form of institutional life, which answers to the real strength of impersonal values while recognizing that they are not all we have to reckon with.
The Problem of Utopianism
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

The duality of standpoints makes its appearance in political theory with particular prominence as the root of an old and persistent problem – the problem of utopianism. A political ideal, however attractive it may be to contemplate, is utopian if reasonable individuals cannot be motivated to live by it. But a political system that is completely tied down to individual motives may fail to embody any ideal at all. The danger of utopianism comes from the political tendency, in pursuit of the ideal of moral equality, to put too much pressure on individual motives or even to attempt to transcend them entirely through an impersonal transformation of social individuals. A nonutopian solution requires a proper balance between these two elements, and that requires knowing what they are and how they interact.
Legitimacy and Unanimity
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

The task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under it. If the justification is successful, no one will have grounds for moral complaint about the way it takes into account and weighs his interests and point of view. Nagel uses Kant's unanimity criterion in relation to political institutions and to the individual lives of their members; he maintains that unanimity could be achieved by us in many respects as we are, provided that we are also reasonable and committed within reason to modifying our claims, requirements, and motives in a direction that makes a common framework of justification possible.
Kant's Test
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

What is reasonable for individuals cannot be determined at the level of individual practical reason alone, but depends also on some judgment about the collective result of everyone's following those principles. Nagel argues that a principle of universal acceptability is a genuine and nonvacuous alternative to the pure dominance of the impersonal standpoint. This alternative allows the personal standpoint an independent role in the justification of universal principles, and explains why some solutions are morally plausible and others are not.
Egalitarianism
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

Modern political theories agree that a society must treat its members equally in some respects, but they disagree over the respects, and the priorities among them. Nagel advances a strong equalitarian social ideal and presents a case for extending the reach of equality in a legitimate political system beyond what is customary in modern welfare states, and then reflects on the great difficulties, practical and moral, of doing so. He also calls into question the motivational viability of an egalitarian position based on the conception of Kantian unanimity advanced by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.
Problems of Convergence
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

What sort of accommodation between egalitarian impartiality and personal motivation can pass the test of acceptability from all points of view at once? To consider this question, we must descend from the level of egalitarian impartiality and regard things instead from the mixed point of view of real members of a society. Nagel argues that an acceptable societal framework for apportioning negative interpersonal responsibilities is a condition of the moral acceptability of strict limitations on negative responsibility in the rules of individual conduct that govern personal relations within it.
Equality and Motivation
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

While institutions must play an important role in creating social and economic equality, they cannot sustain it unless they come to express what enough people feel. Nagel explores what transformations of motive might make possible the realization of a more egalitarian social ideal. There is no natural way to divide the creation of advantages by talent into the legitimate and the illegitimate, along lines that could correspond to a psychologically plausible division between personal and impersonal motivation. All that can be done is to reduce the magnitude of the inequalities in life chances within which the effort will determine the result.
Options
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

There is a personal dimension of life in which egalitarian impartiality has no place, but which interacts with the public domain to generate inequalities that raise serious issues of social justice. To avoid this, Nagel proposes that impartiality and egalitarianism would apply to the social structure, but not to private life, and individuals would be expected to devote their energies and their personal resources to the pursuit of happiness and for the benefits of their families.
Inequality
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

It is not always easy to prevent egalitarianism in political morality from infecting other values. If one is really uneasy about socio‐economic stratification, one can become uneasy about cultural, educational, and aesthetic stratification as well. Moral equality does not mean that people are equal in all respects. There are values, which are not just the values that things have for persons, and such values provide legitimate goals for a society. Nagel argues that some form of egalitarian impartiality should be the dominant value.
Toleration
Authors: Nagel Thomas
Published: October 2003

The most intellectually difficult problem regarding an acceptable partition of motives arises not from conflicts of interest but conflicts over what is truly valuable. Members of a society all motivated by an impartial regard for one another will be led into conflict by that very motive if they disagree about what the good life consists in, hence about what they should want impartially for everyone. Nagel argues that in the cases of toleration we require a different device to ensure legitimacy – the exclusion of certain values from the admissible grounds for the application of coercive state power. We must agree to refrain from limiting people's liberty by state action in the name of such values.
Truth
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

This chapter turns to the most basic puzzle about Nietzsche's philosophy – the question about how his well‐known “perspectivism” can be consistent with his assertion of any ontological or valuative claims. Doesn’t that doctrine require that all his theories and values are “just his perspective,” and doesn’t this deprive them of the status he thinks they have? These doubts are reinforced by his attacks on the value and possibility of truth. I proceed by examining Nietzsche's genealogy of the “will to truth” and showing the complex set of senses for “truth” this genealogy reveals. I then argue that Nietzsche projects a new stage in the development of this will to truth, reached by his “new philosophers,” by which this will pursues a “perspectival truth.” With such a truth, his own perspectives can have the privileged status he claims for them.
The Wartime Transition
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

World War I transformed the international economic and political environment. This chapter analyzes the major changes in domestic and international finance and their implications for the economic balance of power. It also describes the changes in domestic political institutions that channeled the pressures felt by policy makers. The six sections of the chapter look at the disintegration of the prewar international monetary system based on the gold standard, domestic finance, foreign finance, trade and competitiveness, domestic political changes, and the implications for postwar international monetary relations.
The Interwar Gold Standard in Operation
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This is the first of three chapters that consider the operation of the reconstructed gold standard system following World War I; it documents the decline in its credibility and in international cooperation over it, in comparison with the prewar era. Britain joined the USA on the gold standard in April 1925, and by the end of that year, nearly three dozen countries had effectively restored convertibility; the French franc was stabilized de facto in 1926, the Italian lira in 1927, and by the beginning of 1928, the reconstruction of the gold standard system was essentially complete. However, from the outset, it was apparent that the new gold standard was not having the beneficial effects so widely envisaged; the most glaring problem was its failure to maintain price stability, and the adjustment mechanism did not succeed in swiftly eliminating balance‐of‐payments surpluses and deficits. The obvious solution was international cooperation, but the requisite level was not forthcoming. The different sections of the chapter look at the form of the reconstructed system, problems of its operation – liquidity and adjustment, the role of international cooperation, monetary policy in 1927, 1928–1929, and impediments to cooperation.
Cracks in the Facade
Authors: Eichengreen Barry
Published: October 2003

This is the second of three chapters that consider the operation of the reconstructed gold standard system following World War I. It analyzes the role of the gold standard in the onset of the Great Depression and shows how, in turn, the slump undercut the foundations of the gold standard system. The first section of the chapter looks at the setting, and the second at the three options available to heavily indebted countries: the orthodox response – to boost exports and limit imports, cut public spending, raise taxes (especially import duties), and apply export bounties; action to suspend export debt service to devote foreign exchange to essential imports; and action to suspend the gold standard. The next three sections look at Australia as a prototypical primary producer – the first country to suspend the gold standard, the suspension of the gold standard by Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, and the situation in Germany. The last two sections discuss the acceleration into Depression, the US policy response, and European repercussions.