bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Diabetic ketoacidosis and cerebral oedema in Sweden—a 2‐year paediatric population study
Authors: Hanas R. , Lindgren F. , Lindblad B.
Published: August 2007

Aim  The aim of this study was to investigate diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) and cerebral oedema in the Swedish paediatric diabetes population, and to measure laboratory parameters during treatment.

Methods  The Swedish National Paediatric Diabetes Registry (SWEDIABKIDS) indicates that 16% of patients < 18 years during 2000 to 2004 had DKA at onset of diabetes. Data from 1999 and 2000 was collected retrospectively from all of Sweden by questionnaire.

Results  We identified 292 cases of DKA (pH < 7.30) in 265 children (149 at diabetes onset), aged 0.8–19.9 years. The incidence of DKA in patients with previously diagnosed diabetes was 1.4/100 patient years in 1999 and 1.7/100 in 2000. Two patients, both 11 years old with newly diagnosed diabetes, had overt symptoms of cerebral oedema and one developed neurological sequelae. This corresponds to an incidence of 0.68% (2/292) with no mortality. Symptoms of subclinical cerebral oedema after admission (headache, vomiting, lethargy) were recorded in a further 16 cases. In two of these mannitol was given, and both recovered within 1–2 h. Laboratory data was available from 253/292 episodes. During treatment for DKA, hypokalaemia (< 3.5 mmol/l) was significantly more common at onset of diabetes than in patients with established diabetes (65 vs. 28%, P < 0.001; initial prescription of potassium was 20 mmol/l).

Conclusions  We conclude that 16% of children with new‐onset diabetes presented with DKA at diagnosis and that the incidence of DKA in children with established diabetes was 1.6/100 patient years. Cerebral oedema occurred in 0.68% of the DKA episodes.
QT interval prolongation in association with impaired circadian variation of blood pressure and heart rate in adolescents with Type 1 diabetes
Authors: Karavanaki K. , Kazianis G. , Kakleas K. , Konstantopoulos I. , Karayianni C.
Published: August 2007

Aims  The aim of our study was to assess diurnal blood pressure (BP) and heart rate variability and their possible relationship to the duration of the QT interval in adolescents with Type 1 diabetes.

Methods  In 48 normotensive, normoalbuminuric diabetic adolescents, with a mean (± sd) age of 17.3 (± 4.1) years and a mean (± sd) diabetes duration of 8.5 (± 3.3) years, 24‐h ambulatory BP was recorded. In addition, 24‐h heart rate (HR) monitoring was performed and QT and corrected QT (QTc) intervals were estimated as indices of autonomic function. The patients were divided into two groups according to the absence of a decrease (non‐dippers) or the presence of a decrease (dippers) in nocturnal diastolic BP (DBP).

Results  In comparison with the dippers, the non‐dippers showed reduced mean 24‐h HR (79.6 vs. 84.0 beats/min, P = 0.05) and reduced mean daytime HR (81.3 vs. 86.0 beats/min, P = 0.05). The QT interval was prolonged in the non‐dippers (366.3 vs. 347.5 ms, P = 0.015), and end systolic (28.7 vs. 25.9 mm, P = 0.004) and end diastolic left ventricular diameters (47.8 vs. 45.5 mm, P = 0.037) were greater. In stepwise multiple regression, HR variables were the most important factors affecting DBP ratio or the duration of the QT interval.

Conclusions  In conclusion, normotensive diabetic adolescents with impaired nocturnal BP reduction also have impaired autonomic function tests, in association with prolonged QT interval and increased left ventricular diameters. These findings suggest that diabetic adolescents who have the ‘non‐dipper’ phenomenon may need close follow‐up for the possible development of vascular complications, such as cardiac arrhythmias and left‐ventricular hypertrophy.
The Role of Rules
Authors: WEINBERGER OTA
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author conceives rules as action‐determining ideas. They are general and of hypothetical form, and they are of three semantic types: descriptive, technological, and normative rules. The most important categorisation of normative rules is the distinction between rules of behaviour and power‐conferring rules. Both kinds of rules are necessary to establish institutions. Principles are a special kind of normative rules. The social existence of normative rules is connected with their institutionalisation as frames for action. The dynamics of rules is in principle based on two elements: on socially approved habit, and/or on authorised norm creation.
The Fundamental Features of Legal Rationality
Authors: GARDIES JEAN‐LOUIS
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to clarify the logical structure of a code connecting together some distinctions already introduced by different authors: a distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, the latter being implied by the provisions describing institutions in the indicative; a distinction between norms the content of which concerns a state and those the content of which concerns a behaviour which is itself function of several states; a distinction, among the primary norms, of the norms of competence by which a normative power can be delegated to an individual; lastly a distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules.
On The Interpretation Of Laws
Authors: FRIEDMAN LAWRENCE M.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The essay is an attempt to examine aspects of legal interpretation from an external, sociological point of view. “Interpretation”, in its normal juristic sense, is primarily a process in which decision‐makers with secondary legitimacy link their decisions to authority of primary legitimacy. The type of legitimacy which is dominant within the legal system greatly influences the style of interpretation ‐ in “closed” systems, where the stock of premises is fixed, “legalism” will abound. Legal interpretation is not concerned with what a text really means, in any literal sense; and standards for judging legal interpretation are different from the standards of judging other forms of communication, for example, literature. Indeed, a judge can be considered great precisely because of his creative acts of misinterpretation.
Morality and Law
Authors: LETWIN SHIRLEY ROBIN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The controversy over law and morality between positivists and normativists is largely a result of failure on both sides to understand the idea of authority. The author argues that Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Hobbes held a common notion of legal authority that was distinctively moral. They all saw the virtue of law (and the source of legal obligation) in the equal protection it provides for all against the disorder to which passion makes men vulnerable, and not in the justice of its provisions. Michael Oakeshott, among contemporary theorists, best illustrates this approach to a resolution of the differences between positivists and normativists.
The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory*
Authors: WALDRON JEREMY
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Existing accounts of the Rule of Law are inadequate and require fleshing out. The main value of the ideal of rule of law for liberal political theory lies in the notion of predictability, which is essential to individual autonomy. The author examines this connection and argues that conservative theories of rule of law claim too much. Liberal theory equates the rule of law with legality, which is only one of the elements necessary for a just social order.
Introduction
Authors: von WRIGHT GEORG HENRIK
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author recalls a distinction between philosophy conceived as “analytics of truth” and philosophy as “ontology of the actual.” The latter might be seen as a diagnostics of our times. For this second type of philosophy questions of legitimation are prominent. According to the author, one can distinguish three main sources of legitimacy of beliefs and practices: religion, reason, and nature. Reason has been considered the most important legitimating ground as far as modernity is concerned. Nevertheless, it has never been very clear what reason as a source of legitimation amounts to. The author, finally, points to the fact that, in times of increasing menace to the biosphere, “nature”– metaphorically speaking – may set a standard for human laws.
On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality*
Authors: ALEXY ROBERT
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality.
Punishment and Justice in Adam Smith*
Authors: NORRIE ALAN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The modern interpretation of Smith as a retributive theorist of punishment is challenged in favour of a view of his work as containing a curious amalgam of retributive and utilitarian elements. This unsynthesised theoretical compound accounts for many of the contradictory positions assumed by him, examples of which are given in the article. At the level of “punishment” (i.e., punishment considered without a political dimension), the retributivehtilitarian dichotomy is observed in his discussions of merit and demerit (which are utilitarian in their logic) and propriety and impropriety (which are retributive). At the level of state punishment, the same dichotomy is seen in his juxtaposition of considerations of individual justice and the political ends of punishment. A final section locates Smith's “double cleft stick” theoretically in his position on the one hand in the Hobbesian materialist tradition and on the other in his historical stance half‐way between the individualism of the contractarians and the full blown utilitarianism of Bentham.
Problems Related to the One Right Answer Thesis*
Authors: WRÓBLEWSKI JERZY
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author discusses the conditions necessary to accept the one right answer theory. The argument is based on an analysis of the deep structure of the justified fractional decisions pertaining to the substantive decisional model of the judicial application of law within the statutory law system. The role of evaluative choices is needed to justify the decisions in question at least in hard cases. This makes the theory of one right answer unacceptable in a noncognitivist axiological framework.
Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation*
Authors: JONES ANDREW J. I.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The current literature in the Artificial Intelligence and Law field reveals uncertainty concerning the potential role of deontic logic in legal knowledge representation. For instance, the Logic Programming Group at Imperial College has shown that a good deal can be achieved in this area in the absence of explicit representation of the deontic notions. This paper argues that some rather ordinary parts of the law contain structures which, if they are to be represented in logic, will call for use of a reasonably sophisticated deontic logic.
The Logic of Time in Law and Legal Expert Systems*
Authors: MACKAAY EJAN , POULIN DANIEL , FRÉMONT JACQUES , BRATLEY PAUL , DÉNIGER CONSTANT
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Research on an expert system regarding unemployment insurance law has pointed to the difficulties of explicitly representing temporal relations. The question has been addressed in the artificial intelligence literature with respect to planning systems and linguistic analysis. The approaches adopted do not appear to be directly transposable to legal discourse. The problem seems so far to have escaped notice amongst researchers attempting to develop legal expert systems. The paper explores in a preliminary way how lawyers use temporal concepts. It is submitted that “legal time” only partly overlaps with real time. A sketch of a formalization of temporal relations in law, following J. F. Allen's approach, is presented.
Synthesizing Related Rules from Statutes and Cases for Legal Expert Systems
Authors: ALLEN LAYMAN E. , PAYTON SALLYANNE , SAXON CHARLES S.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Different legal expert systems may be incompatible with each other: A user in characterizing the same situation by answering the questions presented in a consultation can be led to contradictory inferences. Such systems can be “synthesized” to help users avoid such contradictions by alerting them that other relevant systems are available to be consulted as they are responding to questions. An example of potentially incompatible, related legal expert systems is presented here ‐ ones for the New Jersey murder statute and the celebrated Quinlan case, along with one way of synthesizing them to avoid such incompatibility.
On Law and Morality. A Dialogue
Authors: WRIGHT GEORG HENRIK VON , AARNIO AULIS
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a “minimum content” of natural law is not said to be “law,” but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are “right answers” to moral questions.
The Politics of the Rule of Law*
Authors: RAZ JOSEPH
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The rule of law should be understood as part of the culture of democracy which requires a distribution of power between a periodically elected legislature and executive and an independent, but publicly accountable, judiciary in charge of a more slowly changing legal doctrine. The rule of law is also essential for the protection of individuals in fast changing pluralistic societies. In both its aspects the doctrine is a product of a particular historical culture, and requires a culture of legality, and not merely the introduction of a few legal rules, for its proper functioning.
Dworkin and His Critics: The Relevance of Ethical Theory in Philosophy of Law
Authors: BALL STEPHEN W.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Two deficiencies characterize the vast critical literature that has accumulated around Dworkin's theory of law. On the one hand, the main lines of the debate tend to get lost in the crossfire of objections by critics and rejoinders by Dworkin — with little dialogue between the critics, or any systematic interrelation or resolution of these largely isolated disputes. On the other hand, such arguments on various points of Dworkin's Jurisprudence tend to neglect or obscure underlying issues in philosophical ethics. The present essay is a critical analysis addressing each of these deficiencies in an attempt both to clarify and to advance the debate. The analysis hinges on three basic propositions: (1) that this debate in Jurisprudence has overlooked relevant issues about the nature of moral values; (2) that theories of law, in general, are best assessed in terms of separate descriptive and normative issues, corresponding to a fact/value distinction in ethics; and (3) that the debate on Dworkinian rights has assumed a confused and historically superficial contrast with the utilitarian tradition, in ethical theory as well as in philosophy of law.
Jurisprudential Oaks from Mythical Acorns: The Hart‐Dworkin Debate Revisited
Authors: PHANG ANDREW BOON LEONG
Published: August 2007

Abstract. This article attempts to demonstrate, via the famous Hart‐Dworkin debate on the nature and functions of judicial discretion, that substantial jurisprudential disputes as well as theories can, and do, arise from misconceived critiques, whether intended or otherwise. It also seeks to show that, whilst Dworkin's initial critique of Hart was misconceived, his theory of adjudication that arose as a result of responses to his initial views is a positive contribution to learning, although 1 argue that Dworkin's views are not, in the final analysis, sufficiently persuasive to constitute a radical departure from Hart's own views.
Principles, Values, and Rules in Legal Decision‐Making and the Dimensions of Legal Rationality
Authors: WRÓBLEWSKI JERZY
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author singles out various conceptions of rationality used in practical legal discourse: formal and substantive rationality, instrumental goal‐ and means‐rationality, communicative rationality. Practical rationality is expressed in decisions justified by epistemic and axiological premises according to the rules of justificatory reasoning. Five levels of analysis of this justification are identified. Rules, principles and evaluations are used as justifying arguments and their characteristics determine the dimensions of rationality of decision depending on the features of rules, various conceptions of principles, and kinds of relativisation of evaluations. The dimensions of legal rationality depend mainly on three singled out conceptions of rationality, i.e., formal rationality dealing with the deep structure of justification, instrumentally oriented rationality as content of justifiability, and communicative rationality linked with the pragmatics of human interaction. Legitimacy, according to the presented analysis, appears as a subclass of external justification dealing with axiological premisses in terms of instrumental rationality and/or communicative rationality.
Justice in the Distribution of Benefits
Authors: HELLNER JAN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The welfare state raises questions concerning the just distribution of benefits. The proceeds from tort liability and insurance supplementing or replacing such liability are benefits that must be included in this context. The author argues that neither distribution based solely on the needs of various persons injured nor considerations of economic efficiency are sufficient. Commutative justice must be considered relevant as well. The ultimate valuations cannot be justified by rational arguments alone but such arguments must be taken into account in order to reach legitimate results.
On Justifying Legal Paternalism
Authors: VALDÉS ERNESTO GARZÓN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Paternalism, understood as coercive intervention with the behavior of a person in order to prevent her from causing harm to herself, is a highly controversial issue, because it implies a departure from the widely recognized principle of harm to others. Some conceptual differences between legal paternalism and other forms of state coercion that also depart from the principle of harm to others will be indicated. This is followed by an analysis of the arguments that are usually brought forth against legal paternalism. And finally, the possibility of determining ethically justifiable types of legal paternalism is explored.
Some Problems of Legal Language
Authors: KNAPP VIKTOR
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author moves from the consideration of law as a set of rules serving as a means of socially regulating human conduct. He focuses on the fact that in order to fulfil its function, the law must be seen as a type of information. In this perspective law is a particular language and therefore gives rise to linguistic problems, linked to the technical character of juristic discourse. The author deals with some of the linguistic and sociological aspects of legal language and attempts to pinpoint some trends of interlingual development.
Overlooking the Merits of the Individual Case: An Unpromising Approach to the Right to Die
Authors: FEINBERG JOEL
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

One of the strongest arguments against the legalization of voluntary euthanasia is that even though a given suffering or comatose patient may have a moral right to die, legal recognition of the right would lead inevitably to mistakes and abuses in other cases. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that it is always and necessarily a greater evil to let someone die by mistake than to keep a person alive by mistake. In fact, we cannot plausibly say that one of these two kinds of mistake is in itself, isolated from other factors, always more serious than the other. This point is illustrated by an examination both of a terminal patient whose prospect is a full year of intolerable pain (Matthew Donnelly) and of a patient in a “persistent vegetative state” (Nancy Cruzan). Moreover, it is untrue that legalization would necessarily lead to greater numbers of mistakenly approved discontinuances of treatment than of mistakenly approved refusals of termination, and numbers, it is argued, do matter.
Liberalism and Legal Moralism: The Hart‐Devlin Debate and Beyond*
Authors: HÄYRY HETA
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

The legitimate impact of common morality on legal restrictions has been continuously discussed within the Western philosophy of law since Lord Patrick Devlin in the late 1950s presented his moralistic arguments against some liberal conclusions drawn by the English Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in their public report. Devlin's arguments were subsequently identified and refuted by Richard Wollheim, H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, but in a way that later provoked further argument. In particular the attack against anti‐moralistic principles set forth by Simon Lee (1986) owes much to the rather naive liberalism represented by the opponents of Devlin. The battle over liberalism and moralism from the Hart‐Devlin debate to the present day is reviewed. In addition to the discussion of the philosophers mentioned above, a potential flaw in the argumentation of Joel Feinberg (1986) is considered.
Is There a Logic of Norms?*
Authors: WRIGHT GEORG HENRIK VON
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

If norms are neither true nor false, can logical relations such as contradiction and entailment obtain between them? Earlier logical positivists and also Hans Kelsen in his later years have answered the question with No. While appreciating the seriousness of the problem, the author of the present paper makes a fresh attempt to answer the question with Yes. His answer presupposes that norms can be judged from the point of view of their rationality. The deontic loic or logic of norms built on this foundation is much more restricted, however, than tae “classical” systems. This again is a consequence of the author's opinion that the sentential connectives (negation, conjunction, disjunction, etc.) apply to norms only on condition that they can be “shifted” from joining norm‐formulations to the descriptive contents of the norms themselves.
Norm Propositions Defended
Authors: NIINILUOTO ILKKA
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

The author replies to some semantic and epistemic criticisms of the concept of norm proposition. The author's contention is that though some, many, or most norm formulations are uncertain or indefinite with respect to their validity or interpretations, insofar as at least some norms with definite content definitely belong to the legal order, the concept of norm proposition can be maintained to be sound. Three such cases are singled out. Finally the author argues for a consensus theory of legal order focusing on the concept of valid norm conceived either as a norm accepted or as a norm to be accepted by the legal community.*
Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems
Authors: MAZZARESE TECLA
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “legal norm” is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of “systemic legal validity” is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.
A. D. Woozley and the Concept of Right Answers in Law*
Authors: BIX BRIAN
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

In the debates about legal determinacy, an important but often neglected issue is what is meant in the legal context by saying that a question has a right answer. By way of a critique of A. D. Woozley's discussion of “right answers,” I try to show how this issue is connected with issues of legal truth, legal mistake, and precedent.
Possession: Common Sense and Law
Authors: BHALLA R. S.
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

This article is written with a view to clarifying the following points: First, to understand the nature of possession, its origin must be kept in mind. Possession is not a legal invention, it is a pre‐legal fact. Second, possession whether in law or in common sense is a de facto control. There is no difference between possession in law and possession in fact. Third, different types of rules and policies of law to deal with possession, do not change the contents of possession. They merely represent the situations in which possession is found under different circumstances.
Rights and Individual Well‐Being
Authors: RAZ JOSEPH
Published: August 2007

Abstract

This article challenges the view permeating much philosophical thought that the primacy of individual rights represents the individual's standpoint against the public good or against the requirements of others generally. The author explicates the underlying features of our common culture contending that the conflict between individual and general good as being central to rights misconstrues the surface features of rights. The range and nature of common goods determine the options available to individuals and define their well‐being. The relative absence of conflict of interests and the background of a common tradition make the courts a suitable forum for the conduct of this branch of politics.
Rights, Legal Reasoning and Rational Discourse
Authors: ALEXY ROBERT
Published: August 2007

Abstract

The first part of this article contains an analysis of the concept of a right, which implies a rational structure of reasoning about rights, elaborated in the second part. In the third part both the concept of a right and reasoning about rights are connected with the theory of rational discourse. The author's thesis is that there exists an internal relation between the theory of rights and the theory of legal reasoning.
A Conception of Moral Rights and Its Application to Property and Welfare Rights*
Authors: KOLLER PETER
Published: August 2007

Abstract

This article deals with the conceptual features and the rational justification of moral rights. For this purpose, the author starts with a common classification of rights, i.e., the distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam. He argues that rights of the first kind can be justified by a two‐fold application of the principle of universalizability, while the latter are based on moral rules concerning special social relations, rules which themselves are founded on the principle of universalizability. This distinction, however, does not suffice to cover a further category of rights that play a very important role in social life, namely the rights of community membership, i.e., the particular rights that exist between the members of a social community. These rights cannot be derived from universalizability alone, but, instead, are based on the idea of social justice. This paper provides a short account of the main principles of social justice, and tries to apply them to property and welfare rights.
Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo‐Arguments in Practical Philosophy*
Authors: WEINBERGER OTA
Published: August 2007

Abstract

The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence.
Practical Reason and Legislation
Authors: ATIENZA MANUEL
Published: August 2007

Abstract

The author's starting point is Bobbio's theoretical approach to the problems of the relations between law and reason. He then appraises the meanings of reason and the concept of theoretical and practical rationality in the application of law. He examines the complex problem of the rationality of legislation and distinguishes five levels of rationality.
Epistemological Perspectives in Legal Theory
Authors: HOECKE MARK VAN , OST FRANÇOIS
Published: August 2007

Abstract

The authors deal with several important epistemological problems in legal theory. The Nineteenth century background is analyzed from the emergence of legal science freed from the constraints of natural law and built on the model of the empirical sciences. The authors show how this science of law has been influenced by the social sciences and trends in ideological criticism throughout the Twentieth century. The epistemological question central to legal science is tackled, i.e., what kind of “epistemological break” should there be with regard to the object studied? To answer this question, the authors plead for the adoption of a “moderate external point of view” which bears in mind lawyers' “internal point of view.”
Unequal Property and Subjective Personality in Liberal Theories
Authors: ZUCKER ROSS
Published: August 2007

Abstract

A conception of the person as a subjective being plays a crucial, though frequently overlooked, role in the justification of unequal property in liberal theories. Unger's ascription of individualism to general liberal legal theory can be concretely defended with respect to liberal theories of property. Identifying a common fundamental structure calls in question the conventional view that the liberal legal theories rest on an ensemble of different moral foundations. So important is subjective personality to the moral basis for highly unequal property that such property looks to be morally untenable if this concept of the person is invalid. The analysis points to social theory of personality as a major direction for research into an alternative theory of egalitarian property right.
Institutionalism Old and New*
Authors: TORRE MASSIMO LA
Published: August 2007

Abstract

The author deals with the legal theoretical approach that has been labelled “legal institutionalism.” An old and a new version of this approach are singled out: The old one is identified with the theory defended by the Italian public lawyer Santi Romano in the first half of this century; the second one is seen in the recent work by Ota Weinberger and Neil MacCormick. After a short presentation of Romano's work, his ideas and the development proposed by MacCormick and Weinberger are compared. Similarities and differences between the two versions of institutional theory are worked out. A coda hints at an ambiguity in the definition of institution proposed by the “new” institutionalism.
Social Justice and Legal Form
Authors: SYPNOWICH CHRISTINE
Published: August 2007

Abstract

This essay argues for a conception of law as a normative practice, a conception which departs from traditional, particularly positivist, conceptions. It is argued that Dyzenhaus's book (Dyzenhaus 1991), with its fascinating case study of unjust judicial decisions in South Africa, makes a compelling argument for such a conception. However, the essay takes issue with Dyzenhaus for romanticising the liberal tradition, and inflating the power of law and legal theory. Nonetheless, the essay agrees that positivist accounts tend to downplay the emancipatory promise of law, and ends with some remarks about promise.
Is There a Modern Legal Culture?
Authors: FRIEDMAN LAWRENCE M.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. This essay argues that there are certain traits which, taken together, characterize modern legal systems, and are reflexes of modern legal culture. Modern law is rapidly changing; it is dense and ubiquitous; the basis of its legitimacy is instrumental; it stresses fundamental human rights and is strongly individualistic; lastly, the globalization of law leads to a process of convergence among legal systems. These traits also produce structural changes in legal systems, for example, an increase in the power and activism of courts.
Global Legal Interaction and Legal Cultures
Authors: GESSNER VOLKMAR
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The legal discourse of a steadily growing European legal community and universal legal harmonization is misleading since it abstracts completely from the cultural dimension of law which consist of patterns of interpretation and behavioral routines with respect to law. The article makes use of abundant literature in administrative sciences, international management research and socio‐psychological studies in Intercultural Communication in order to propose indicators for a comparison of legal cultures in the areas of European legal integration, international commercial transactions and international lawyering.
The Plurality of Sources of Law*
Authors: RICCEUR PAUL
Published: August 2007

Abstract. In this paper, the Author contends with the problem of an infra‐state differentiation of sources of law. He examines two accounts of a juridical pluralism, that of Walzer (1983) and that of Boltanski and ThCvenot (1991). Both these works reveal a similar inability to account for the political dimension. The Author identifies this inability as the result of the paradox of the political. He goes on to discuss this paradox in terms of a need to reconcile indivisible popular sovereignty with the proliferation of a multitude of sources of legality.
Political Liberalism. Neutrality and the Political
Authors: MOUFFE CHANT AL
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The paper examines the current discussion in liberalism around the issue of the “neutrality” of the state. It scrutinizes the “political liberalism” defended by John Rawls and Charles Larmore and shows that the consequence of their approach is to evacuate the dimension of “the political” from the idea of a well‐ordered society. By presenting the exclusions existing in their model of liberal society as the product of free agreement resulting from rational procedures, “political liberals” offer us a picture in which antagonism, violence and power have only disappeared because they have been made invisible. The consequence is to leave liberalism unable to conceptualize power and antagonism. The paper concludes that there cannot be such a thing as a “neutral justification of the neutrality of the state” (Larmore 1987) and that a pluralist perfectionist perspective like the one proposed by Joseph Raz offers a more adequate way to envisage the specificity of modern pluralist democracy.
The Concept of Liberty in “A Theory of Justice” and Its Republican Version
Authors: SPITZ JEAN‐FABIEN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The Author offers three interpretations of the Rawlsian conception of liberty. At the same time he compares this formal version of civil and political liberty with the substantive version produced by the republican theory of liberty. The first question is this: Can liberties be unequal? Here the liberal concept of liberty is discussed linking human will of liberty and equality. The second question is: Can liberties be equal when their respective values are not? The Author stresses the Rawlsian distinction between liberty and the value of liberty showing the risk of reducing the less powerful to dependency. The third question is: Can political liberty be limited for the sake of personal liberties? From a republican perspective the answer to the Rawlsian instrumental conception of political liberty is that all personal liberties are necessarily founded on political liberty.*
A Metastructural Reinterpretation of the Rawlsian Theory: From Rawls to Machiavelli*
Authors: BIDET JACQUES
Published: August 2007

Abstract. In the framework of a reinterpretation of Marxism and Rawlsianism which aims at a non‐eclectic integration of both these theories, the author presents a transformation of the Rawlsian principles of justice into principles of political struggle with a view to establishing a just society. He deduces this normative development from a general theory of the modern world, proposed in his recent book (Bidet 1990).
Legal Security from the Point of View of the Philosophy of Law
Authors: MARTÍNEZ GREGORIO PECES‐BARBA
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author analyses the concept of legal security from its historical evolution to its main structural aspects. In the first part he argues that legal security is a historical and cultural concept of the modern world. He considers a series of factors which lead from the general concept of security generated by an ideological monism and the social rigidity characterizing the Middle Ages to the concept of legal security protected by the legal monism of the modern state, where legal security, understood as formal or procedural justice, has become a principle inspiring the entire legal system. Then he considers legal security in the social state as the expression of the relationship between man and his social needs. In the second part the author makes a structural analysis of the concept of legal security in a modern legal order, identifying the different spheres in which it can be found: state,—focusing on procedural guarantees as limits to power—, law—considering the internal functioning of the legal system—, society—stressing the effects of the action of the social state on the idea of legal security.
Constitutional Rights and Democracy in the U.S.A.: The Issue ‐of Judicial Review
Authors: MARTIN REX , GRIFFIN STEPHEN M.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The first section takes up some main details of American constitutional history. At the end of that section and in section two, we concentrate on one constitutional doctrine in particular, judicial review. We argue that this doctrine rests, traditionally, on the foundational idea of a permanent tension between democratic institutions and basic rights. In section three, we deal with the problem just raised, by suggesting an alternative view of the relationship that exists between these fundamental constitutional elements. Here we attempt to show that there is an essential principled harmony between basic constitutional rights and democratic majority rule. And we try to locate judicial review within this alternative conception. Then in section four and in the conclusion we discuss the institutional arrangements for the practice of judicial review in the light of this alternative conception.
Preface to Social Theory of Property Rights
Authors: ZUCKER ROSS
Published: August 2007

Abstract. In the history of liberal theories of property, the predominant model deduces a right to highly unequal amounts of property from a premise that the person is primarily independent and self‐determined. But modem social theory, communitarianism and critical legal theory have generated strong support for an alternative premise of social self‐determination of the person. These theories have not, however, adequately explored the logical implications of social personality for the justifiable degree of equality of income under property right. This study reasons a right to some significant equalization of income from a premise that the individual is socially self‐determined. The supporting argument develops a different concept of social personality than found in prevailing social and communitarian theories. With regard to property, it is particularly important to conceptualize the formation of the individual by and within the system of economic relations. The personological premises are also developed differently from Marx's analysis, which overemphasizes the production side of the economy. The present analysis examines the individual in the consumption side as well. But in contrast to the subjective‐individualist conception of the consumer in neoclassical economic theory, we will utilize a conception of socially self‐determined consumer wants and self‐seeking. This social‐personological premise proves to have strong egalitarian implications for the distribution of income under property rights.
War and International Order in Kant's Legal Thought“*
Authors: MERTENS THOMAS
Published: August 2007

Abstract.

Kant's writings on international law and especially his Toward Perpetual Peace have been interpreted both in a “statist” and a “cosmopolitan” manner. In this article it is argued that these interpretations stem from an ambiguity in those writings. In the course of proposing a resolution of this ambiguity, the first question to be examined is the extent to which war forms a part of human history and of human nature. Secondly, Kant's arguments against the realistic position and the conditions for a lasting peace are presented. An interpretation is then offered both of the proposed league of nations and of the situation that exists when such a league is still absent. According to the interpretation offered here, Kant's writings fit partly within the tradition of the “just war.”1
Rights, World‐Society and the Crisis of Legal Universalism*
Authors: BELVISI FRANCESCO
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The universalism of rights is a corollary to the individualistic semantics of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Paradoxically, the grounds of universalism were those legal and political concepts that theoretically describe the 19th century nation‐state (such as sovereignty of the people, citizenship, rights, and the like). All these concepts of the liberal tradition construct the nation‐state on the presupposition of a highly homogeneous political community of rational subjects, whose homogeneity consists in the very social, economic, political and sexual conditions of their rationality. This kind of legal and political semantics is no longer adequate to characterize contemporary society which is a multicultural, highly in‐homogeneous world‐society. It no longer incorporates an ethic which is able to enforce universal leading values for human action.
The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship
Authors: HABERMAS JÜRGEN
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The “global success” of nation states is currently brought into play by the new requirements of multicultural differentiation and globalization. After commenting on the common concepts of “state” and “nation” and discussing the formation of nation states, the author explains the particular achievement of the national state and the tension between republicanism and nationalism built into it. The challenges that arise from the multicultural differentiation of civil society and from trends towards globalization throw light on the limitations of this historical type.
Discourse Theory and Human Rights*
Authors: ALEXY ROBERT
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The author's thesis is that human rights can be substantiated on the basis of discourse theory. The argument has two steps. The first step is the justification of the rules of discourse. The second step consists in the foundation of human rights.
Information and Human Liberty
Authors: WEINBERGER OTA
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Political and juristic enquiry must be conceived of as an action theoretical approach. On the basis of his formal and finalistic action theory as well as his neo‐institutionalist view, the author sketches the role of information in modern democracy. He holds the view that democratic institutions are always in danger of being misused. The complex role of mass media, party propaganda and the detrimental effects of state propaganda are analyzed. The author deals with some general features of information processes in the realm of political practice: Information has to be considered in relation to action; the message by itself does not show whether the information is true; there are two forms of reception of information, active and passive reception. Information processes have a deep influence on personal as well as on political liberty. The intrusion of marketing‐methods of propaganda in political practice is a great danger for democratic life, particularly if realized by the state or central institutions. It can destroy intellectual freedom, which is a prerequisite of discursive democracy. Democracy and human liberty can flourish only in an open society.
On Values. Universal or Relative?
Authors: AARNIO AULIS , PECZENIK ALEKSANDER
Published: August 2007

Abstract. Any value statement belongs to a certain value code shared, to a certain degree, by a number of people. Is the value code itself relative or not? To solve this problem, one must assume that universal value statements and principles always have a prima‐facie character. Prima‐facie value propositions not only claim universality but can also be understood as universally valid in the following sense. First, their validity does not depend on an individual's free preferences. Second, although they are culture‐bound, there is something all cultures must have in common. But such prima‐facie propositions do not logically imply a moral judgement in any particular case. They are merely a starting point of an evaluation procedure, i.e., of weighing and balancing, nothing more. On the other hand, the final (contextual, all things considered) evaluations are necessarily relative to a certain culture and, indeed, to individual preferences. When claiming universality of values, people see the first side of the problem. When endorsing relativism, they see only the second side.
On Law and Logic
Authors: ALCHOURRON CARLOS E.
Published: August 2007

Abstract. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role played by logic in the legal domain. In the traditional conception which underlies the movement of codification, judges are able to find in the legal system (the Master System) a unique answer for every legal problem. This entails its completeness, consistency and the possibility of deriving from it the contents of all judicial decisions. Although the ideal model of this conception is supported by important theoretical and political ideals, it has significant shortcomings. The elements of normative systems (Master Systems) are “norms” and not mere “norm‐formulations.” A “norm” is the meaning attributed to normative linguistic expressions. The set of all normative expressions, such as statutes, codes, etc. forms what is called the Master Book. One of the main problems for the ideal model is the identification of a normative system behind the Master Book. Interpretative arguments are the tools designed to solve these problems. Although the requirements of the model are not totally fulfilled in actual practice, it remains as an effective ideal rational goal behind legal activities linked to adjudication and most theoretical approaches to law.