bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Additive Conjoint Measurement with Respect to a Pair of Orderings
Authors: Marley A. A. J.
Published: November 2002

Suppose that entities composed of two distinct components can be qualitatively ordered in two ways, such that each ordering relation satisfies the axioms of conjoint measurement. Without further assumptions nothing can be said about the relation between the pair of numerical scales constructed for each component. Axioms are stated that relate the two measurement theories, and that are sufficient to establish that the two conjoint scales on each component are linearly related.
Special Relativity Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part II
Authors: Winnie John A.
Published: November 2002

The Reichenbach-Grünbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light of the conventionality thesis. The slow-transport method of synchrony is then examined in the light of these results and is shown not to provide an adequate method of uniquely determining the one-way speed of light. Finally, the general ∊-Lorentz transformations for events along the x-axis are derived from three principles : the round-trip light principle, the principle of equal passage times, and the linearity principle. These principles are shown to be independent of one-way velocity assumptions, and thus may form the basis of a Special Theory of Relativity without simultaneity assumptions.
Conventionalism and Economic Theory
Authors: Boland Lawrence A.
Published: November 2002

Roughly speaking all economists can be divided into two groups—those who agree with Milton Friedman and those who do not. Both groups, however, espouse the view that science is a series of approximations to a demonstrated accord with reality. Methodological controversy in economics is now merely a Conventionalist argument over which comes first—simplicity or generality. Furthermore, this controversy in its current form is not compatible with one important new and up and coming economic (welfare) theory called “the theory of the Second Best.” In this paper I offer a Second Best meta-theory that says that (1) any compromise between simplicity and generality must yield a theory which is “third best” by these Conventionalist criteria; and (2) there exists a better way than a compromise.
Positive Evidence in Science and Technology
Authors: Agassi Joseph
Published: November 2002

If the problem of induction were soluble, it should be solved inductively: by observing how scientists observe, etc. The fact is that scientific research is successful, and the real question is, will it be so in future? If there is a formula of induction by which success is achieved, then by this formula we can say, as long as it will be used science will succeed. If there is no formula it looks as if future success in scientific research is most doubtful. Hence, a transcendental argument for induction goes, there is an inductive formula. Since, however, such a view of induction is rejected even by inductivists as naive, the argument collapses. Hence the question is, on what basis do we project the future success of science? My answer is that this future success is built into our social institutions and is partially institutionally safeguarded.
Rationality and Total Evidence
Authors: McLaughlin Andrew
Published: November 2002

The meaning and justification of the requirement of total evidence are examined. It is argued that there are several significantly different interpretations of the requirement, but each interpretation makes the requirement highly suspect. For any of the usual interpretations of the requirement, it would be quite unreasonable to conduct inquiry in such a way as to fulfill it. It is then suggested that the rational inquirer should seek the optimal amount of evidence, rather than all the evidence. This raises the problems surrounding the idea of scientific or epistemic utility.
Evaluation of Statistical Hypotheses Using Information Transmitted
Authors: Greeno James G.
Published: November 2002

The main argument of this paper is that an evaluation of the overall explanatory power of a theory is less problematic and more relevant as an assessment of the state of knowledge than evaluation of statistical explanations of single occurrences in terms of likelihoods that are assigned to explananda.
On the Extension of Beth's Semantics of Physical Theories
Authors: Van fraassen Bas C.
Published: November 2002

A basic aim of E. Beth's work in philosophy of science was to explore the use of formal semantic methods in the analysis of physical theories. We hope to show that a general framework for Beth's semantic analysis is provided by the theory of semi-interpreted languages, introduced in a previous paper. After developing Beth's analysis of nonrelativistic physical theories in a more general form, we turn to the notion of the ‘logic’ of a physical theory. Here we prove a result concerning the conditions under which semantic entailment in such a theory is finitary. We argue, finally, that Beth's approach provides a characterization of physical theory which is more faithful to current practice in foundational research in the sciences than the familiar picture of a partly interpreted axiomatic theory.
On Some Patterns of Reduction
Authors: Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

The notion of reduction in the natural sciences has been assimilated to the notion of inter-theoretical explanation. Many philosophers of science (following Nagel) have held that the apparently ontological issues involved in reduction should be replaced by analyses of the syntactic and semantic connections involved in explaining one theory on the basis of another. The replacement does not seem to have been especially successful, for we still lack a plausible account of inter-theoretical explanation. I attempt to provide one.
An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation
Authors: Giere Ronald N.
Published: November 2002

Several authors, e.g. Patrick Suppes and I. J. Good, have recently argued that the paradox of confirmation can be resolved within the developing subjective Bayesian account of inductive reasoning. The aim of this paper is to show that the paradox can also be resolved by the rival orthodox account of hypothesis testing currently employed by most statisticians and scientists. The key to the orthodox statistical resolution is the rejection of a generalized version of Hempel's instantiation condition, namely, the condition that aPQis inductively relevant to the hypothesis (x)(Px⊃Qx) even in the absence of all further information. Though their reasons differ, it turns out that Bayesian and orthodox statisticians agree that this condition lies at the heart of the paradox.
Strawson, Russell, and the King of France
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

It is argued that Strawson's celebrated attacks on Russell's views about proper names and descriptions are misleading and unfounded. An attempt is made to show that Strawson's alternative views are philosophically more problematic than Russell's. It is also argued that, properly stated, Russell's analyses do not do violence to ordinary usage and that attempts to justify Strawson's analysis on the ground that it fits better with ordinary usage are mistaken.
Are There Necessary Connections in Nature?
Authors: Fisk Milton
Published: November 2002

The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections? What is physical necessity? If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed ? It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic than that of logical necessity, once it is recognized that the necessity of physical and logical necessity is the same. A variant of Keynes' principle of limited independent variety answers the question of the amount of physical necessity presupposed.
Counting and the Natural Numbers
Authors: Sicha Jeffrey F.
Published: November 2002

Early sections of the paper develop a view of the natural numbers and a view of counting which are suggested by the remarks of several modern philosophers. Further investigation of these views leads to one of the main theses of the paper : a special kind of quantifier, the “numerical quantifier” is essential to counting. The remainder of the paper suggests the rudiments of a new view of the natural numbers, a view which maintains that numerical quantifiers are one kind of natural number.
On the D-N Model of Scientific Explanation
Authors: Omer I. A.
Published: November 2002

This paper discusses the D-N model of scientific explanation. It is suggested that explanation is a part of assertive discourse where certain principles must be observed. Then use is made of the relation between the informative content and logical content of a sentence (as shown, for instance, by Popper) to draw some of the conditions necessary for a sound model. It is claimed that the conditions of the model proposed in the present paper exhaust the insights of the papers in the literature, solve the difficulties encountered by other authors, but have some damaging consequences on the D-N model of scientific explanation.
Kim on Deductive Explanation
Authors: Morgan Charles G.
Published: November 2002

In [2] Hempel and Oppenheim give a definition of “explanation” for a certain formal language. In [1] Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague prove five theorems demonstrating that the Hempel and Oppenheim definition is not restrictive enough. In [3] Kim proposes two further conditions to supplement the Hempel and Oppenheim definition in order to avoid the objections posed in [1]. In this paper it is shown that the definition of Hempel and Oppenheim supplemented by Kim's conditions is open to a trivialization very analogous to that given in [1].
A Reply to “Induction and Objectivity”
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: November 2002

In “Induction and Objectivity” [1], F. John Clendinnen puts forwards a vindication of induction. I wish to argue that the vindication fails. As Clendinnen's argument is complex and presents certain difficulties it is necessary and only fair to quote his summary of it ([1], p. 218).

“I shall attempt to vindicate induction by showing that it is the only possible way of predicting that is objective, and further that, while objectivity is not a necessary condition for success in predicting, objective methods are the only methods which we could have any possible reason to believe possessed a property which is a necessary condition for success. This property I will call ”concordance“. An objective method is one that ensures that all whose use it will agree in their conclusions.... To say that a method is concordant is simply to say that there are no contradictory conclusions drawn from it. A method could possess this property as a consequence of its being objective; but on the other hand it is possible for a method of predicting to be concordant merely by chance.

If a predicting method is to be successful it must be concordant; for if there were a number of conflicting predictions made about the outcome of the one situation it would only be possible for one of them to be correct, and we should not describe as successful a method which had at least as many false applications as correct. Thus concordance is a necessary condition of success even in a single occasion of predicting. What, then is the relation between an objective and a concordant method?

It would be possible to have a concordant method by chance; for example, if a method should never be used to make more than one prediction about the outcome of any one situation it would ipso facto be concordant. Alternatively, the different predictions of a non-objective method may by chance agree. Thus objectivity is not a necessary condition of concordance nor, consequently, of being a successful method. However, in selecting a satisfactory method of predicting we must ensure that it is concordant. If we choose an objective method we do ensure this. Further, there is no other way of doing this; for by definition any method which of its nature is concordant is objective. The possibility of a non-objective method being concordant depends on contingencies beyond the control of the method or of any particular person who adopts it; for it is always possible for others to adopt the same method and make predictions about the same situations.

Thus, knowing that concordance is a necessary condition of a successful method and knowing that the only possible reason for expecting any method to be concordant is that it is objective, we may conclude that it is reasonable to adopt a method if it can be shown that it is the only objective method.“
A Response to Jackson
Authors: John Clendinnen F.
Published: November 2002

Frank Jackson's criticisms have helped me recognize some of the weaknesses in my proposed vindication of induction. The core of the argument I offered was that induction is the only method of predicting which is based in a nonarbitrary way on the facts. I still believe that this is so and that because of this property induction is the only reasonable way of predicting. However I now recognize defects in the argument by which I attempted to establish that the uniqueness of this property to induction constitutes its justification.
Reply to A Response
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: November 2002

While disagreeing with some of the detail of my argument in [2] F. John Clendinnen accepts its conclusion, namely, that the vindication he proposed in [1] fails. I will thus confine myself to saying, very briefly, why I think the new vindication of induction that he sketches in [3] also fails.
On a Simple-Minded Solution
Authors: Hullett James N.
Published: November 2002

Mr. Bartley's remark that Goodman's puzzle ([2], Chap 3) is “an interesting variant of the possibility .. . that the next instance may be different” ([1], p. 85) rather badly misrepresents matters. One might say that the “new riddle” arises just because no matter what the nature of the next instance, it will be as much like all previously examined cases as any other instance. Suppose “Hester” is the name of the first emerald examined after time t. If Hester is green, then Hester is like previously examined emeralds with respect to their green-ness. But should Hester be blue, then Hester has its grue-ness in common with previously examined emeralds. The difficulty here is that likenesses abound; the evidence presents us with more likenesses than we could consistently expect of or project to subsequent cases. And the question that Goodman's puzzle poses is, by what criteria do we select one from among all of these likenesses to project to subsequent cases ?
On the Paradoxical Time-Structures of Gödel
Authors: Stein Howard
Published: November 2002

Gödel's conclusion that time-travel is possible in his models of Einstein's gravitational theory has been questioned by Chandrasekhar and Wright, and treated as doubtful in the recent philosophical literature. The present note is intended to remove this doubt: a review of Gödel's construction shows that his arguments are entirely correct; and the objection is seen to rest upon a misunderstanding. Computational points treated succinctly by Gödel are here presented in fuller detail. The philosophical significance of Gödel's results is briefly considered, and a set of technical questions is posed whose answers would clarify this significance.
Choosing Between Confirmation Theories
Authors: Swinburne R. G.
Published: November 2002

The paper considers on what grounds we ought to choose between competing confirmation theories. It begins by distinguishing between confirmation theories and other theories which might be confused with them, such as theories of acceptability. It then argues that the task of a confirmation theory is to analyze rather than explicate our ordinary standards of confirmation, to “draw out” from our intuitive judgments the standards implicit in them. A theory of confirmation will do this in so far as it is coherent and does not yield counter-intuitive judgments.
A Remark on Hempel's Replies to His Critics
Authors: Dietz Stephens M.
Published: November 2002

One of the most difficult problems facing anyone who would discuss Professor Carl Hempel's thesis about explanation is the following: which of the many objections that have been made are actually relevant to the thesis ? Professor Hempel has claimed that several of these objections are not relevant at all ([1], pp. 412-414). In order to evaluate such replies, let me first state what I take to be the three claims which constitute Professor Hempel's thesis.

His first claim is that all adequate scientific explanations possess a certain property:

... all scientific explanations and their everyday counterparts claim or presuppose at least implicitly the deductive or inductive subsumability of whatever is to be explained under general laws or theoretical principles ([1], p. 425).
A. C. Michalos' “Postulates of Rational Preference”
Authors: Mullen John D.
Published: November 2002

In an article in this journal [2], A. C. Michalos, while arguing for the normative and empirical inadequacy of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M) postulates of rational preference, completely misconstrued the concept of simple additivity contained in the (independence) postulates. As a result, the following argument is a non-sequitur.
Physical and Psychic Energy
Authors: Shope Robert K.
Published: November 2002

In order to assess the tenacity of psychoanalysts in continuing to use a concept of psychic energy, it is advisable to consider whether, as they sometimes claim, the concepts of energy, force, and work in psychoanalysis are akin to those in the natural sciences. Strong disanalogies suggest that the psychoanalytic concepts are quite different and used equivocally even within psychoanalysis. However, they may not be subject to the objections which certain critical psychoanalysts have raised.
The Place of the Explanation of Particular Facts in Science
Authors: Alston William P.
Published: November 2002

On the critical side it is argued that, contrary to a widespread view, the explanation of particular facts does not play a central role in pure science and hence that philosophers of science are misguided in supposing that the understanding of such explanations is one of the central tasks of the philosophy of science. It is suggested that the view being attacked may stem in part from an impression that the establishing of a general law is tantamount to the explanation of particular facts that “fall under” the law. This suggestion effects a bridge to the more positive part of the paper, which consists of an exploration of the complexities exhibited by the relation between the two activities. More specifically, I point out a number of disabilities, any one of which could prevent us from being able to explain particular facts that fall under a given law even after having established the law. Some of these have to do with the form of the law, and some have to do with our powers of detection vis-à-vis the particular facts in question. The former sort have to do with the ways in which laws may deviate from the strict-necessary-and-sufficient-condition ideal. The latter include the following points. (1) The individual explanatory factors may lie beyond our present powers of detection. (2) The complexity of such factors may be too great for us to be able to interrelate them. (3) We may be unable to apply concepts used in the law to facts in this area (although they are in fact applicable).
Towards a Reassessment of Comte's ‘Méthode Positive‘
Authors: Laudan Larry
Published: November 2002

In this study of Auguste Comte's philosophy of science, an attempt is made to explicate his views on such methodological issues as explanation, prediction, induction and hypothesis. Comte's efforts to resolve the dual problems of demarcation and meaning led to the enunciation of principles of verifiability and predictability. Comte's hypothetico-deductive method is seen to permit conjectures dealing with unobservable entities.
Immodest Inductive Methods
Authors: Lewis David
Published: November 2002

Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ = 0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We should therefore reconsider the assumptions that led to this conclusion: for instance, the measure of accuracy.
Hume and the Fiery Furnace
Authors: Madden Edward H.
Published: November 2002

There are a standard number of replies to the riddle of induction, none of which has gained ascendency. It seems that a new approach is needed that concedes less to the Humean dialectic. Humeans, both traditional and contemporary, unwittingly play on the ambiguity of the phrase “change in the course of nature,” and that is why 'C · ~E' appears to be self-consistent, though in fact it is not. I provide an analysis of 'cause' and ‘natural necessity’ which gives inductive inference that internal warrant we assume it to have in ordinary and scientific thinking and rebut in advance contemporary Humean objections based on the erroneous assumption that ‘x is necessary’ and ‘x is a priori‘ are materially equivalent.
Similar Systems and Dimensionally Invariant Laws
Authors: Luce R. Duncan
Published: November 2002

Using H. Whitney's algebra of physical quantities and his definition of a similarity transformation, a family of similar systems (R. L. Causey [3] and [4]) is any maximal collection of subsets of a Cartesian product of dimensions for which every pair of subsets is related by a similarity transformation. We show that such families are characterized by dimensionally invariant laws (in Whitney's sense, [10], not Causey's). Dimensional constants play a crucial role in the formulation of such laws. They are represented as a function g, known as a system measure, from the family into a certain Cartesian product of dimensions and having the property gφ = φg for every similarity φ. The dimensions involved in g are related to the family by means of certain stability groups of similarities. A one-to-one system measure is a proportional representing function, which plays an analogous role in Causey's theory, but not conversely. The present results simplify and clarify those of Causey.
On the Theoretical Dependence of Correspondence Postulates
Authors: Child James
Published: November 2002

The nature of the connection between theory and observation has been a major source of difficulty for philosophers of science. It is most vexing for those who would reduce the terms of a theory to those of an observation language, e.g. Carnap, Braithwaite, and Nagel. Carnap's work, particularly his treatment of physical theories as partially interpreted formalisms, forms the point of focus of this paper. Carnap attempted to make the connection between theory and observation through correspondence postulates. It is pointed out that such postulates depend in critical ways upon theoretical truths. This particular type of theoretical dependence produces serious trouble for Carnap's approach. For reasons given it may make it untenable. Furthermore, this problem when generalized creates difficulty for any similar reductionist program. Not only is this kind of theoretical dependence pointed out, but more important, the logical conditions which produce it are revealed. In this way light is shed upon the formal characteristics of the notion of theory dependence, especially upon the way in which observation terms depend upon theories for their meaning.
Systems Theory and Evolutionary Models of the Development of Science
Authors: Blachowicz James A.
Published: November 2002

Philosophers of science have used various formulations of the “random mutation—natural selection” scheme to explain the development of scientific knowledge. But the uncritical acceptance of this evolutionary model has led to substantive problems concerning the relation between fact and theory. The primary difficulty lies in the fact that those who adopt this model (Popper and Kuhn, for example) are led to claim that theories arise chiefly through the processes of relatively random change. Systems theory constitutes a general criticism of this model insofar as it demonstrates the necessity of supplementing this mechanism with the non-random influences exercised by the internal organization of a system on its own development.
Biological Adaptation
Authors: Munson Ronald
Published: November 2002

In this paper I attempt to show that adaptational sentences (i.e. sentences containing the terms “adaptive”, “adapted”, etc.) in evolutionary biology are best interpreted as equivalent to sentences about Darwinian or genetical selection. Thus, the use of adaptational languages does not introduce final purposes or other nonempirical notions into biology. I also try to demonstrate that adaptational sentences and functional sentences are not equivalent in an evolutionary context so that an analysis of function does not dispense with the need for an analysis of adaptation. Finally, it is argued that, although some adaptational sentences might be construed as teleological explanations, given an empirical content, they do not serve as explanations. Rather, they express the outcome of selection, regarded in one way, and regarded in another, they express data for which a theory of evolution must account.
Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability
Authors: Dretske Fred I.
Published: November 2002

Though one believes that P is true, one can have reasons for thinking it false. Yet, it seems that one cannot know that P is true and (still) have reasons for thinking it false. Why is this so ? What feature of knowledge (or of reasons) precludes having reasons or evidence to believe (true) what you know to be false? If the connection between reasons (evidence) and what one believes is expressible as a probability relation, it would seem that the only satisfactory explanation of this fact is that when one knows that P is true, the reasons or evidence one has in support of P are such as to confer upon P the probability of 1. It is shown by an application of Bayes' Theorem that any value smaller than 1 would permit having reasons to believe what one knows to be false. Hence, it would seem that knowledge requires conclusive reasons to believe (if reasons or evidence is required at all).
The Decline and Fall of Quantum Dualism
Authors: Landé Alfred
Published: November 2002

The Bohr-Heisenberg doctrine of wave-particle duality has been attacked in the past for its methodical defects, over-complication, internal contradictions, its positivistic phenomenalism, etc. The present investigation shows that duality, the doctrine of equivalence of the particle picture and the wave picture of matter, is untenable since its wave part leads to empirically wrong results in the relativistic domain, and violates the postulate of independence of the arbitrary choice of reference system in the non-relativistic realm. Therefore, when methodical objections were never quite conclusive, the physical failure of the duality idea seals its fate irrefutably, together with all its pseudo-philosophical implications.
Sharp and the Refutation of the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen Paradox
Authors: Hooker C. A.
Published: November 2002

D. H. Sharp has recently argued that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen failed to make good their claim that elementary quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality. Sharp expounds in detail three criticisms (a fourth is mentioned) which focus largely on formal features of the quantum theory. I argue, on grounds centered largely in our search for an adequatephysical understandingof the micro domain, that each of these criticisms must be rejected. The original criticism of quantum theory reemerges as a still-important baseline in our search for an adequate understanding of quantum theory.
Art as Cognitive: Beyond Scientific Realism
Authors: Foss Laurence
Published: November 2002

Thesis : Art like science radically affects our perceiving and thinking, and the two are substantially alike in that together—along with an inherited “natural” language system with which they overlap—they enable us to articulate the world.

Science has been advanced as the measure of all things: scientific realism. By implication, art pertains to beauty, science truth. Science effects conceptual breakthroughs, changes our models of natural order. On the contrary (I argue), as a nonverbal symbol system art similarly affects paradigm-induced expectations. Substantively there is no difference in the way each enables us to articulate or measure the world : symbolic realism.

The myth of resemblance as a criterion of representation—imitation as a one-one relation—has, at least since the time of Plato, obscured this truth. Once the distinction between representational and nonrepresentational art falls, the true nature of artist (like scientist) as maker is illumined. The artist, the scientist (disciplinarian), the cosmologist (those responsible for the formulation of so-called natural languages—in time all of us) make the world or, what practically amounts to the same thing, the known, perceived world. This is the claim of the symbolic realist. Is symbolic realism itself only a watershed ? What implication does this critique have for assessing the role of the philosopher today?
Neutral Functional Statement Schemata
Authors: Nissen Lowell
Published: November 2002

The claim that there are nonpurposive functional statements is critically examined by looking at nine translation schemata, several of which are drawn from recent literature. All but one or two fail, suggesting that all functional statements (a) are causal (and not about probabilities or necessary conditions), and (b) have implicit reference to goals. If so, then the possibility of nonpurposive functional statements rests squarely on the possibility of nonpurposive goals.
A Syntactic and Semantic Analysis of Idealizations in Science
Authors: Barr William F.
Published: November 2002

Various laws and theories in the natural and social sciences are presented with a view to discerning the syntactic and semantic characteristics of many idealizations in science. Three different kinds of idealizations are discussed: ideal conditions, ideal cases, and idealized theories. An ideal condition is a formula in which state variables occur, whose existential closure is false, and for which there is another formula that can be constructed out of the original formula such that the existential closure of the new formula is true. An ideal case is a statement which is logically equivalent to a universal conditional which has an ideal condition as its antecedent. And an idealized theory is a set of false universal conditional statements. Alternative syntactic and semantic analyses are viewed and criticized.
The Probability of Particular Events
Authors: Swinburne R. G.
Published: November 2002

The paper investigates what are the proper procedures for calculating the probability on certain evidence of a particular object e having a property, Q, e.g. of Eclipse winning the Derby. Let ‘α‘ denote the conjunction of properties known to be possessed by e, and P(Q/α) the probability of an object which is α being Q. One view is that the probability of e being Q is given by the best confirmed value of P(Q/α). This view is shown not to be generally true, but to provide a useful approximation in many cases. Then given that we have information about the observed frequencies of Q among objects having one or more of the properties whose conjunction forms α, the paper shows how to establish which value of P(Q/α) is the best confirmed one.
Theoretical Languages in Psychology
Authors: Martin J. E.
Published: November 2002

An attempt is made to provide a statement of the sufficient conditions for the functional equivalence of observable events in Psychology. Without a statement of those conditions, no explanation of functional equivalence in empirical situations can be achieved. A characterization of functional equivalence strictly in terms of the traditional S–R language is examined. This characterization is found to be inappropriate in that it entails vacuous mediators. A revision of S–R language is attempted in order to characterize functional equivalence. While this account does not entail vacuous mediators, it is unsatisfactory since it cannot be stated naturally in terms of the S–R language. It is argued that the degree to which the conditions for functional equivalence can be appropriately and naturally stated in theoretical languages provides a criterion for choosing among them as theoretical languages for psychology. A statement of the conditions for functional equivalence in terms of a TOTE analysis (see [5]) is then given. This is found to be more satisfactory than both the traditional and modified S–R analyses in that it does not entail vacuous mediators and in that a natural characterization of functional equivalence can be achieved.
William James on Time Perception
Authors: Myers Gerald E.
Published: November 2002

James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of “the present moment.” But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes that the description of time as sensed is also a description of time as an objective property of independent events. This is nowhere established, and making it plausible is a recurrent problem for philosophies like neutral monism and radical empiricism.
Confirmation and Adequacy Conditions
Authors: Hanen Marsha
Published: November 2002

Several standard conditions of adequacy for confirmation are considered and a conclusion of B. Skyrms regarding the converse-consequence condition is shown to be mistaken. Widely accepted conditions such as the entailment condition and the special consequence condition are shown to be open to counterexample, and confusion about these conditions is traced to confusion about the difference between two kinds of confirmation concepts—concepts of firmness and concepts of increase in firmness. The importance of concepts of the latter sort is stressed. Finally, some suggestions are offered relating to the notion of selective confirmation.
A Criticism of the Use of the Concept of “Dominant Group” in Arguments for Evolutionary Progressivem
Authors: Travis Janet L.
Published: November 2002

I criticize the particular argument for evolutionary progressivism which is based on the concept of a series of “dominant life forms.”

My procedure is to show that there is no rigorous definition for the concept of “dominant life form.”

I examine several attempts to define this concept by Julian Huxley and a new formulation of the concept by G. G. Simpson and show that none of the criteria either of these men develop for determining which groups of organisms can be classified as dominant are adequate to exclude any groups of organisms from the classification. The concept proves so broad as to be meaningless. Since it is a key concept in the particular argument for progressivism that I discuss, the criticism of the concept demonstrates the argument to be invalid.
Solipsism: An Essay in Psychological Philosophy
Authors: Mitroff Ian I.
Published: November 2002

The thesis of this paper is that in dealing with problems of “mind,” the philosopher of mind needs to be as well grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology) as the philosopher of the physical sciences needs to be grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. physics). The thesis of this paper is also that the psychological analysis of solipsism and the philosophical analysis are not independent (or at least not independent in all of their aspects), and that therefore the psychological analysis sheds light on the philosophical, and vice versa. It is argued that solipsism is untenable on at least two grounds: because (1) there are no such physical phenomena as acts of “immediate perception,” and because (2), that there can be no such thing as an “individual mind” withoutsome formof a “group mind.”
Humanistic Significance of Science: Some Methodological Considerations
Authors: Cantore Enrico
Published: November 2002

This essay discusses the problem of the two cultures. According to the author the problem arises because science is the source of a new way of conceiving reality and man, different from the mental conception entertained by nonscientific persons. The article suggests methodological guidelines for the philosopher interested in understanding the humanistic mentality of the scientists. The approach proposed is inductive-genetic. The aim is to help the philosopher explore science in its developmental becoming so that he may become aware of the reasons for the characteristic mentality of scientists as regards humanistic issues. The essay concludes with a discussion of the new perspectives disclosed to scientific-humanistic dialogue.
A Recent Drawing of the Theory/Observation Distinction
Authors: Machamer Peter K.
Published: November 2002

James Cornman has recently offered a definition for ‘observation term’ which he takes to meet most, if not all, of the standard objections to such definitions. He also employs this definition against certain materialists, but in what follows I wish only to address myself to the proposed definition. I shall argue that he has failed to show any logical difference between “observation terms,” as he defines them, and terms which are not so classified. I shall show that his definition is too restrictive.
Observing and What it Entails
Authors: Cornman James W.
Published: November 2002

In the preceding article, [3], Peter Machamer states three objections to my recent attempt to define ‘observation term’. While I believe that all Machamer's objections are mistaken, as I will try to show, his discussion does touch on two problems which have forced revisions. Both his first and second objections are that my definition is too restrictive because its second necessary condition for a term ‘O‘ being an observation term rules out too many terms which are obviously observation terms. The condition is :

For any term, 'P' if 'There is an O (O-thing)' entails the (contingent) statement, 'There is a P-thing', then ‘Under certain conditions, some P-thing would appear as P to any standard observer’ is true.
Against Krips' Resolution of Two Paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Hooker C. A.
Published: November 2002

Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite recently quantum theoretical accounts of the measurement process have been appearing which sidestep direct reference to such things as “contraction” of the wave packet (see, for example, Krips and Jauch). With this development it has become increasingly popular to take a “cool” approach to these paradoxes, arguing that the new approach to measurement provides a consistent, nonbizarre account of the physical situations and that the paradoxicality was due largely to intuitive blunders—even plausible intuitive blunders—accentuated (but also disguised) by the unfortunate features of the von Neumann approach to measurement. Both Krips and Jauch, for example, adopt this approach.
The Use of the Axiomatic Method in Quantum Physics
Authors: Gauthier Yvon
Published: November 2002

Although the introduction of the modern axiomatic method in physics is attributed to Hilbert, it is only recently that physicists and mathematicians have applied it significantly, i.e. on a basis extensive enough to promise fruitful results. Carnap, for one, stresses the importance of the axiomatic method, yet he considers its application in physics as a task for the future.
Sommers' Theory and the Paradox of Confirmation
Authors: Englebretsen George
Published: November 2002

In order to confirm any statement of the form (a) A are B we consider a sufficiently large number of A in order to check them for having or failing to have property B. But logic leads us to believe that A are B is equivalent to (b) non-B are non-A. If this is so then it seems reasonable to suppose that we confirm (a) and (b) in the same way. Whatever set of things we consider for confirming one must be the same set that we consider for the other. Yet in confirming (a) the set considered seems to be the set of A, while in confirming (b) the set considered seems to be the set of non-B. How can two logically equivalent statements be confirmable in different ways?
On Achinstein's Concepts of Science
Authors: Wilson Fred
Published: November 2002

This book is in the tradition that defines the philosophical center of contemporary philosophy of science, the tradition of Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel as supplemented by generous additions from Austin and an Oxfordized Wittgenstein in the style introduced by N. R. Hanson. This tradition has been criticized both from the philosophical left, by Sellars, and from the philosophical right, by Bergmann. Achinstein's work is so squarely in the center that neither Sellars nor Bergmann ever appear in the index. That makes the book the third or fourth generation of a series in that central tradition all of which have been concerned largely with discussing their predecessors in that same tradition. This series is now producing books—Achinstein's is one of them—that have the virtues and the defects of an ingrown aristocracy: finely shaped features; an aloofness with respect to which no doubt is felt that it is justified ; and in their quarrels among themselves the cunning of foxes; but with none of the robust life and vitality of lions that first secured them the right to rule.
The Comparability of Scientific Theories
Authors: Kordig Carl R.
Published: November 2002

In this article I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I consider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. Each of these writers would hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that “incommensurable” replacement is what does, and should, occur during scientific “revolutions.” Such writers, however, have trouble in comparing different scientific theories. My account permits different theories to be compared in various ways. These comparisons, I argue, are possible through appeal to “first-level” and “second-level” invariance. In this connection I argue that observation, meaning, and regulative standards should be, and in fact usually are, nontrivially invariant with respect to scientific change.
Replacing One Theory by Another Under Preservation of a Given Feature
Authors: Eberle Rolf A.
Published: November 2002

The conditions are examined under which one theory is said to be replaceable by another, while preserving those features of the original theory which made it serviceable for a given purpose. Among such replacements, special attention is given to ones which qualify as so-called reductions of a theory, and some theorems are proved concerning the notion of a reduction.
Alternatives and Incommensurables: The Case of Darwin and Kelvin
Authors: Hattiangadi J. N.
Published: November 2002

If, as it is usually understood, incommensurable theories must be compatible then one need never choose between two such theories. But if theories were incompatible and incommensurable one would have to choose between them. What if they are incompatible only outside the domain of observation? The fact that Darwin's biology can clash with Kelvin's physics (each with their respective auxiliary assumptions) regarding the age of the earth shows how commensurable theories may yet be incompatible. But it also shows that they need not be alternatives—i.e. that one may not be able to simply and satisfactorily replace the other in our world view. But standard examples of scientific revolutions consist of the replacement of one theory by another in one's world view. These alternative theories must therefore be more than merely incompatible—what do they share if not content ? (I.e. they must be commensurable.)
Is Quantum Logic Really Logic?
Authors: Gardner Michael R.
Published: November 2002

Putnam and Finkelstein have proposed the abandonment of distributivity in the logic of quantum theory. This change results from defining the connectives, not truth-functionally, but in terms of a certain empirical ordering of propositions. Putnam has argued that the use of this ordering (“implication”) to govern proofs resolves certain paradoxes. But his resolutions are faulty; and in any case, the paradoxes may be resolved with no changes in logic. There is therefore no reason to regard the partially ordered set of propositions as a logic—i.e. as embodying a criterion for soundness of proofs. Its role in quantum theory ought to be understood in an entirely different way.
Intentions and Programs
Authors: Todd William
Published: November 2002

It is suggested that there is a strong connection between intentions and plans, and these plans are then taken to be programs of the sort suggested by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram in Plans and the Structure of Behavior. There is then a hierarchy of programs connected with intentions stretching from the macroscopic level of ordinary discourse to the neurological level. It is argued that as we proceed downwards we arrive at a threshold below which we can still describe the phenomena but below which we can no longer speak of intentions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the criteria for the identity of intentions at various levels.