A Ratiocinative Appraisal of Harvey Siegel’s Critique of Epistemological Relativism
Authors: EKONG JOSEPH T. 
Published: January 2023

Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, there are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the oldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. Epistemic relativism is the position that knowledge is valid only relatively to a specific context, society, culture or individual. The discussion about epistemic relativism is one of the most fundamental discussions in epistemology concerning our understanding of notions such as 'justification' and 'good reason'. All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system,” that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others.

Purpose: In one sense, this work, in defense of Harvey Siegel, takes issue with anti-realist views that eschew objectivity. But, in another sense, it interrogates the epistemic absolutism of Harvey Siegel, showing some of its untoward implications for the furtherance of knowledge, as typified in most ambitious versions of foundationalist or dogmatic epistemology. Minimally, objectivity maintains that an objective gap between what is the case and what we take to be the case, exists. Plato was very clear in his claim that epistemological relativism was self-defeating in two ways. As reformulated by Siegel: First, arguments for relativism are either relativistically or non-relativistically sound. Second, relativism is either relativistically or non-relativistically true. Either choice commits the relativist to major concessions to his or her opponent. In each case, they are dialectically ineffective for the relativist.

Results: One cannot live reasonably as a relativist, because relativism leads to epistemic paralysis. Relativism is rationally indefensible, because it is incoherent. It is incoherent because it can be true only if it is false. Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness.

Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy: In the midst of different proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. He argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry, and maintains that inclusion, as an epistemic virtue, is neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that in order not to become victims of relativism, certain criteria are needed to distinguish what is indeed rational. Insofar as relativism might be construed, by some scholars, as a gadfly (a gadfly is a person who interferes with the status quo of a society or community by posing novel, potentially upsetting questions, usually directed at authorities) against any form of dogmatism, in philosophy, the basic presuppositions of relativism are self-referentially inconsistent.