The Argument from Transnational Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy
Authors: Somek Alexander 
Published: July 2010

This article continues with a discussion of what the author calls the argument from transnational effects. It says that supranational or transnational forms of integration, in particular market integration, are desirable on account of democracy itself. National democracies find themselves thereby forced to confront and to internalise the externalities that they cause for each other. A fortiori, democracy becomes supposedly emancipated from the confines of the nation state.

This article examines the argument critically at a general level. The situation under consideration concerns all cases in which, regardless of whether there is movement or not, the acts of one democracy adversely impact on the interests of others.

The article tries to identify instances where the harm is tied to a failure of representation in a transnational context and not caught by the harm principle, broadly understood.

In order to calibrate the argument's scope the article resorts to the principle of universalisation. The guiding intuition is that so long as the act of one democracy is morally justified on the basis of this principle, the argument from transnational effects does not apply. Hence the argument is of no avail where the impact of one democracy on another is perfectly legitimate. This would be the case, for example, when the effects are too insignificant to require any debate.

Determining the range of legitimate impact is a core question of transnational constitutional law. Any such determination presupposes mutually shared interest definitions. More often than not, however, the relevant interest definitions underlying universalisation are debatable. Therefore, it appears to be inevitable, at first glance, to have relations of transnational interdependency matched by transnational democratic processes.

The article then goes on to identify three different types of universalitation with reference to what can be regarded as their respective anchor. Simple universalisation is based upon shared interest definitions. Reflexive universalisation involves common views of oneself (and others). Self‐transcending universalisation is grounded in the desire to live in a free society.

Reflexive universalisation requires to extend mutual sympathy. From this perspective, transnational democratic processes are tantamount to nation‐building. However, one would commit a sentimentalist fallacy if one were to conclude that mutual sympathy in and of itself engenders an expansion of mutual responsibility.

The article argues that with regard to the third type of universalisation the institutionalisation of transnational democratic procedures cannot be justified. It would threaten to undermine various conceptions of a free society. It is argued that for the sake of the realisation of equal citizenship the argument from transnational effects actually needs to endorse the existence of bounded democratic communities. Unbounded transnational democracy would exercise an adverse effect on citizenship.

It also turns out that the argument from transnational effects, in its uncorrected form, remains haunted by the dilemma that the type of democracy that is envisaged by it becomes easily absorbed by administrative processes.

The article concludes that the argument from transnational effects, correctly understood, has a more modest import than its proponents would have us believe. Rather than supporting the release of democracy from its national bounds, it helps to explain why the co‐existence of bounded democratic polities remains essential to equal citizenship. More forceful versions of transnational integration graft onto political societies elements that are not genuinely democratic and strangely reminiscent of different forms of rule. These are forms of rule that Aristotle would not have called ‘political’, for they do not involve the exercise of power by equals over equals.