bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Basic Sentences and Incorrigibility
Authors: Waters Bruce
Published: November 2002

The question of basic and incorrigible sentences has appeared in connection with certain recent attempts to refine and re-define the meaning of Empiricism. More directly still, the question appears in connection with the problem of verification. It is noteworthy that the question of protocols, more than any other issue, has served to draw out the philosophical differences between the original Wiener Kreis and the Cambridge Analysts. Yet despite their differences both schools are agreed that basic sentences in some sense of the word, are epistemologically necessary.

But if one takes the view, say of the Instrumentalists, that all perceptual knowledge is interpretation based upon accepted theories, and corrected in the light of such theories then basic sentences are quite unnecessary. But among those who employ the term “basic” there is little agreement as to its meaning. The common use of the term has not resulted in a common understanding. And instead of drawing Empiricists together it has succeeded only in driving them apart.
Vegetation as an Object of Study
Authors: Egler Frank E.
Published: November 2002

The historical development of a field of human knowledge progresses like the solution of a jig-saw puzzle, the full extent of which is completely unknown. What begins as an ocean may become only a lake; what starts as a grove of trees may develop into a forest. As study advances through the decades, the situation is repeatedly surveyed and the interpretation of the whole is modified to accord with the added information. For these reasons, conceptions and generalizations periodically undergo alteration, as effectively stated and discussed by Cooper (1926). Universal conformity in such conceptions is of course hardly to be expected in matters that deal largely with speculation rather than with simple experimental data.
The External World and Induction
Authors: Nelson Everett J.
Published: November 2002

The problem of induction is to validate inferences from some experiences or data to others. By experiences or data I mean such things as red patches, sounds, tastes, pains. Distinctions between private and public data, between internal and external impressions, between data and objects, are not epistemologically primitive or given but are modes of categorizing the given. The application of categories and the construction of objects are cases of, and so presuppose the validity of, induction.

To hypostatize a construction, or a system of constructions, is in fact to generate what may be called an external world. Examples are physical objects, and scientific objects. And when analysis proceeds, as it often does, by replacing the original subject by constructs, a hierarchy of external systems is generated. Thus, physical objects—e.g., our bodies—are external to data, and scientific objects are external to physical objects.
Habits, Instincts and Reflexes
Authors: Weiss Paul
Published: November 2002

The infant was first an embryo. Its body is neither new nor untried. Its heart, its liver, lungs and brain, all its nerves and tissues, were in existence some time before, constantly exercised in embryonic ways. The new born infant is an old campaigner on quite familiar terrain.

The embryo begins as a single cell feeding on the food its mother provides. Almost at once it becomes too large, too sluggish and inefficient for its own good, and must either immediately change its tactics and mode of life or be prepared to die. This is an alternative which all growing things face from time to time. The lowest organisms meet the issue by subdividing into a number of similar, smaller, independent cells, each with a life of its own. The embryo meets it by subdividing into a number of different kinds of cells all of which are capable of developing and living according to individual rhythms, but only a few of which are able to exist or develop all alone. Most of the new cells the embryo makes possible must cling to and remain under its sway if they are to continue and prosper at all.
The Scientific Outlook of Cézanne
Authors: Feibleman James
Published: November 2002

For some while now it has been the fashion to write about Cézanne. Numerous exhibitions of his paintings have been held and a flood of criticism in notices and books has poured forth; yet much remains to be seen and said. The reason for this is that his peculiar approach to art was of the kind which continues to excite interest in the medium itself. We get from him not only an esthetic enjoyment but an imagination stimulated to dwell upon the possibilities of painting. No derogation of other painters, whose more conventional mastery of their craft has been responsible for canvases of great truth and beauty, is implied by the impetus given to the study of esthetics by Cézanne. It simply happens that at the turn of the century a high suggestiveness was imparted to painting at Aix.
Remarks Concerning the Epistemology of Scientific Empiricism
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

The present paper purports partly to reexamine and partly to summarize several points which occupied and still occupy a central position in more recent discussions among empiricist philosophers. As such discussions are essentially attempts at the clarification of terms, it might also be said that this essay intends to contribute to the analysis of certain very general and highly ambiguous expressions. The words in question are, first and mainly, ‘hypothetical’ and, more incidentally or by the way of exposition, ‘atomic', ‘elementaristic', and ‘extensional.’ In general, it is an attempt to show the impact of some of the ideas developed in the work of Carnap; within a prevailingly logical frame of reference in The Logical Syntax of Language and, in a more epistemological setting, in Testability and Meaning. In particular, it wants to eliminate some ambiguities which could arise from an oversimplified reading of certain passages in TM, as for instance: “If by verification is meant definitive and final establishment of truth, then no (synthetic) sentence is ever verifiable” (p. 420). If this passage is understood to assert that every synthetic sentence is hypothetical, then it is either false or several meanings of ‘hypothetical’ are to be distinguished. This distinction, implicit in TM, will upon closer examination prove to be related to the fundamental distinction between statements within and statements about a linguistic structure.
Energy as the Basic Concept for A Unified Interpretation Of Physical Phenomena
Authors: Baldin Siluan F.
Published: November 2002

The increase of our knowledge of nature and the multiplicity of phenomena to be studied and investigated has led to specialization in pure and applied science and in practical work. In many instances the individual branches of science became isolated from each other to a considerable degree.

The establishment of the closest ties between the individual lines of knowledge, theoretical as well as practical, is one of the important aims of scientific thought. The analysis of the nature of the factors, used for the quantitative expression of physical processes, shows that many of them have a striking similarity as far as energy is concerned. Such similarity, and even identity, leads one to the conclusion that the concept of energy can serve as the basis for the unified interpretation of physical and, possibly, other phenomena of nature. This paper, which deals with physical processes, is an attempt toward such unification.
Living Systems and Non-Living Systems
Authors: Lillie Ralph S.
Published: November 2002

Biology is in a unique position among the natural sciences. It is not simply complex physics and chemistry, for living organisms have a psychological as well as a physical side. Even as physical systems their character is highly special, largely because their material substance is continually changing; perhaps it was from them that Heraclitus derived his idea that all is flow. The comparison with vortexes and candle flames is an old one. Wilhelm Ostwald included living organisms in his class of “stationary systems”: they represent not a static but a kinetic equilibrium, what we now often call a “steady state”; there is a balance of constitutive and dissipative processes. Materials and energy converge to the living center, undergo there characteristic transformations, among which complex chemical and structural syntheses are conspicuous, and are again distributed at random to the surroundings. The living organism is thus the seat of a special type of physical and chemical activity found nowhere else in nature, and it is significant that this is associated with psychical activity—demonstrably in the higher organisms, by implication in the lower.
Conventionalism in Geometry and the Interpretation of Necessary Statements
Authors: Black Max
Published: November 2002

The statements traditionally labelled “necessary,” among them the valid theorems of mathematics and logic, are identified as “those whose truth is independent of experience.” The “truth” of a necessary statement has to be independent of the truth or falsity of experiential statements; a necessary statement can be neither confirmed nor refuted by empirical tests.

The admission of genuinely necessary statements presents the empiricist with a troublesome problem. For an empiricist may be defined, in terms of the current idiom, as one who adheres to some version, however “weak,” of a principle of verifiability. One, that is, who claims that no statement can have cognitive meaning unless its truth depends, however indirectly, upon the truth of experiential statements; unless it can be provisionally confirrned or refuted by empirical tests. Allowing that some necessary statements have cognitive meaning, then, would be to provide a prima facie case against the validity of the principle of verifiability.
Operationalism: Idealism or Realism?
Authors: Hartung Frank E.
Published: November 2002

As presented by some, operationalism in sociology is Kantian in its view of the universe, of the assumptions and limitations of science, and of the scientist's ability to analyse and present the reality of the universe.

In his exposition, George A. Lundberg rests operationalism upon a twofold basis. First there is a materially-conceived nature. This is expressed in the terms “X,” “the cosmos,” or “that which arouses certain responses.” We do not know, cannot know, nor can science tell us, anything about the nature of this X, save that it precipitates responses. This position is qualified by making existence always relative to some responding organism. There is nothing final in the terms “existence” or “reality,” such as is usually implied in the terms “truth” and “fact.” An objective reality existing entirely independently of anyone's observations is believed by Lundberg to be incompatible with his philosophical basis. The only justification for this position is “… its demonstrable efficiency in helping us comprehend our world.”
Usages of the Term ‘Social'
Authors: Bowdery Barbara K.
Published: November 2002

The word ‘social’ is used in many different contexts, in each of which the word has a general root meaning, common to all contexts in which it is found. But in addition, there are other specific meanings, peculiar to each context, which are intended by the user of the term. Frequently, these other meanings of the term are not made explicit, and hence ambiguities arise.

The root meaning of the term involves some sort of relationship among two or more people. ‘Social’ is derived from the Latin socius, meaning ‘companion’. At least two people are involved here: 1) the person having the companion, and 2) the companion. Nothing is intended as to the nature of the relationship between the two or more people. In each context in which the term ‘social’ is used it has this root meaning. This paper is concerned, however, with those other aspects of the meanings of the term which are intended to specify more precisely the nature of this relationship among two or more people, and therefore are different in different contexts. The contexts will be isolated, and the more specific meanings of the term in these different contexts will be distinguished and made explicit.
Syllogistic Logic in Linear Notation
Authors: Thompson Samuel M.
Published: November 2002

The primary purpose of the system of linear notation is to make the logic of the syllogism more convenient to use by eliminating many of the operations required by its traditional forms. Except for its employment of the distinction between symmetric and nonsymmetric relations and the distinction between transitive and nontransitive relations, linear notation introduces no new principles into syllogistic logic. It is new only as a system of notation. As a system of notation it radically simplifies the application of the principles of syllogistic logic to the analysis of arguments.

The use of linear notation enables us to state subject-predicate propositions in such a way that their formal relations with each other are revealed directly without the necessity of performing any of the separate operations required by the traditional methods of syllogistic logic. Very complex arguments, involving any number of related premises, can be stated in such form that all possible conclusions that are obtainable by any combination of syllogistic operations may be read directly from the premises.
The Indexical and the Presentative Functions of Signs
Authors: Moore Willis
Published: November 2002

In his presidential address on “Symbols, Signs, and Signals,” given before the Association for Symbolic Logic, December 28, 1938, Professor C. J. Ducasse made and important distinction between what he there called the indicative and the quiddative symbol. He remarked in passing that he thought it possible to show that: 1) “The same entity may function both as indicative and as quiddative symbol: or one part of a complex symbol may be quiddative and another indicative”; and 2) “the difference between the two roles is irreducible: the indicative is not a species of the quiddative nor vice versa.” An indicative symbol is defined as “one of which the distinctive property is to orient our attention to some place in an order system …”; and a quiddative symbol as “one of which the distinctive property is to make us conceive a certain kind of thing—a certain ‘what'—no matter where in any order system it may or may not be existing.”
R-Systems Versus Psychological Spaces
Authors: Creegan Robert Francis
Published: November 2002

Certain traditional philosophic contradictions, pertaining to a postulated duality between mind and body, which at the same time is used to explain their functional unity, have been translated in contemporary thought into terms of certain contradictions, pertaining to a postulated duality between psychological worlds and the physical world, which at the same time is used to explain how one or the other somehow constitutes its contrary. Nevertheless, however unsuccessful hitherto, the more modern formulation of these connections at least provides a field within which progressive logical operations towards a non-contradictory synthesis are possible. Recently such an approach was developed in J. T. Culbertson's article, “A Physical Theory of Sensation”, which appeared in the technical scientific section of this Journal, vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 197-226. The present discussion concerns some of the problems suggested by that theory, which was so stated that it could very easily be converted into a statement concerning the structure of relations between any given psychological world and the physical world.
Cosmic Attributes
Authors: Boodin John Elof
Published: November 2002

We must start with the cosmos as a going concern and proceed at first analytically. Then we can reverse the process and examine the synthesis. Are there any characters which we must attribute to the cosmos taken as a whole—characters which we must take into account in all the various processes of nature? If so, we shall have a framework for metaphysics or cosmology. Owing to our new interest in nature, metaphysics merges into cosmology. In this respect we are going back to the Greeks, whose interest was cosmic.
The Essential Problem of Empiricism
Authors: Benjamin A. Cornelius
Published: November 2002

Every natural scientist, I should suppose, is an empiricist. But to say this is not to assert that he is consciously such. Very few scientists would presumably consider themselves qualified to state even what is involved in the term, and still fewer would be willing to admit that they are adherents of the position. One might say that natural scientists, in their general outlook, presuppose—in one of the many meanings of this term—the empirical point of view. This probably means that if one could make clear to them what is meant by the term, and if one could convince them that it is proper for scientists to take sides on philosophical issues, they should probably be willing to call themselves empiricists. Expressed otherwise, the general temper and spirit of natural science are those which philosophers tend to identify with the empirical outlook.
Behavior, Purpose and Teleology
Authors: Rosenblueth Arturo , Wiener Norbert , Bigelow Julian
Published: November 2002

This essay has two goals. The first is to define the behavioristic study of natural events and to classify behavior. The second is to stress the importance of the concept of purpose.

Given any object, relatively abstracted from its surroundings for study, the behavioristic approach consists in the examination of the output of the object and of the relations of this output to the input. By output is meant any change produced in the surroundings by the object. By input, conversely, is meant any event external to the object that modifies this object in any manner.
Creative Imagination and Indeterminism
Authors: Seifriz William
Published: November 2002

Scientists with creative imaginations are ever confronted by two opposing forces. One tempts them to soar into the realm of fancy, and the other cautions them to keep their feet on the ground. These conflicting influences play a significant part in the search for fundamental truth.

The complementary value of philosophical reasoning and matter-of-fact experimentation in the complete fulfillment of science is illustrated by many an epochal discovery. Von Laue had the brilliant thought that the symmetrical distribution of atoms in a crystal presents a lattice sufficiently fine to scatter the exceedingly small waves of X-rays. The idea appeared to be scientifically sound, at least to von Laue, but to certain of his colleagues, classicists all, it was untenable. The kinetic energy or heat-movement of the atoms would, they said, disturb the diffraction phenomena and obscure the picture. Von Laue had confidence in his hypothesis and the courage to see it through, but he also knew that the validity of a scientific theory lies in experimental verification. There were in his laboratory two assistants, both able experimenters, and they proved the truth of von Laue's dream.
The Intelligibility of Whitehead's Philosophy
Authors: Johnson A. H.
Published: November 2002

In the opinion of many, the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead is a novel emergent which, like the magician's rabbit, amazes the naive but does not seriously impress the enlightened.

One of the most fundamental criticisms of the philosophy of Whitehead has come from Professor Wilbur Urban. To The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 3) Urban has contributed a very thought provoking article entitled: “Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and Its Relation to His Metaphysics.” This, we are told, is a restatement of previous studies.
Method and Metaphysics in Sir Isaac Newton
Authors: Burtt E. A.
Published: November 2002

One of the annoying habits of philosophers is to substitute without warning a normative for a descriptive theory of the topic they are discussing—that is, in what purports to be a statement of how the subject actually presents itself they tell us instead how it ought to present itself. Current treatments of the elusive topic “meaning” seem to me to supply capital instances of this vice. Defenders of a positivist or an operational theory of meaning (I pick these two because of their wide contemporary influence) often give us no hint that their conclusions are conclusions about how the meaning of words ought to be interpreted, not about how, by and large, it is interpreted. Without such a hint their readers naturally suppose that it is the latter problem with which they are concerned, but this is rarely the case; were it so, emphasis could hardly fail to fall on determinants of meaning that are too often neglected by philosophical analysts.
Scientific Method and Knowledge
Authors: Lee Harold N.
Published: November 2002

Twenty five hundred years ago a Greek named Thales introduced something important into the world. We know little about the details, but there is a persistent tradition going back at least as far as Aristotle that Thales is to be given the credit for being the first person to think in the way that led, without break in continuity, to the development of the scientific method of thought. The conclusions to which Thales came, if we can trust the tradition, are of no value today. The important thing was the way of putting and answering questions. This was carried on by Thales' followers until by the time of Plato and Aristotle the essentials of the scientific method were coming to be recognized even though they were not explicitly and adequately stated in abstraction.
Mind—A Study in Perspective
Authors: Miller Cecil H.
Published: November 2002

In one of its numerous meanings “mind” has long represented, and popularly still to some extent does represent, a special non-spatial type of entity transcending and ideally complementing the world of matter. More particularly it has stood for an innate “rational faculty” characterizing men as men; an immaterial substance radically differentiating human beings from animals and by the same token serving to bind them to one another, as brothers are bound by the tie of common blood. Thus conceived, mind traditionally has justified, and so strengthened, the ingenuous a priori regard and appreciation which unlearned persons extend to their fellows for the sole reason that they are human. Upon this conception of mind numerous popular doctrines of “personal dignity,” “human equality”, “individual liberty”, “freedom of conscience”, “inalienable rights”, and so forth, have been rationally grounded. And without it as an inspiration—to name but one dependent consequence—“the American dream”, which Adams describes in The Epic of America, would doubtless never have been dreamt.
The Logic of the Sensum Theory
Authors: Gentry George
Published: November 2002

The most satisfactory way of isolating the specific issues with which this paper is concerned is by way of a brief summary of the theory and its internal development. The development of the theory embodies two major movements. These are: (a) an analysis of what the author considers the typical perceptual experience, “a perceptual situation”, and (b) the projection of a theory of the physical world on the basis of the results derived. We may consider these in order.
Animadversion on the Null Class
Authors: Carmichael Peter A.
Published: November 2002

A term and its contradictory exhaust the universe of discourse, but when examined for their relation to each other, I believe they are seen to exhaust that universe in a more particular respect than may have come into notice. They seem to exhaust or annul one of the leading notions of mathematical logic. This notion is the one concerning the whereabouts of the null class.
The Interpretation of Implication
Authors: Gauss Charles E.
Published: November 2002

When the student of logic is first initiated into the problem of the relation of implication as expressed by the hypothetical proposition, he enters into a portion of logic which seems to him an impenetrable jungle. Elementary statements of the meaning of implication, as he is acquainted with them, are so meagre that they have failed to give any indication of the problems and paradoxes involved. Adequate discussions, on the other hand, are so abstruse that the initiate is lost in their incomprehensibility, for these are issues discussed by the technical logicians largely among themselves. When one considers the important bearings implicit in the interpretation of implication, such a state of affairs is greatly to be deplored. Through a simple but adequate presentation of the meaning of a hypothetical proposition one may be led not only to an understanding of a fundamental paradox of logic but to the whole question of modal logic and of the philosophy of logic. It is my purpose in what follows to present as simply as possible the various interpretations of the meaning of implication and to show their relations to modal logic. Having done this I believe it will be possible to state the case in favor of material implication in a new light.
The Sociology of Knowledge: Emphasis on an Empirical Attitude
Authors: Wolff Kurt H.
Published: November 2002

Two distinct attitudes have been adopted by investigators in the field of the sociology of knowledge. One of them may be called speculative; the other, empirical. The central interest of an investigator having the speculative attitude lies in developing a theory of the sociology of knowledge. The central interest of investigators having the empirical attitude lies in finding out or explaining concrete phenomena; the theory is employed, implicitly or explicity, for this purpose. The existence of the two attitudes may be in part explained, as far as the German sociology of knowledge is concerned, by reference to the history of this school, which has grown out of and has been determined by a Marxist and materialistic philosophy, and especially by the use of this philosophy as a political instrument in the struggle of the emerging proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This statement, however, must be supplemented by a short location of the four most important contributors to the theory of the German sociology of knowledge. Max Scheler approaches the problem phenomenologically; he was the first and only one to ask the fundamental question, “What is knowledge?” Karl Mannheim, though markedly influenced by the Marxist viewpoint, particularly by Lukács, seems to me more adequately characterized by stressing his development from a more exclusively speculative to a more decidedly empirical attitude, which latter is especially evident in his most recent book, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1940). Alexander von Schelting's main contribution is his thorough logical analysis of Mannheim's theory in the light of Max Weber's methodology. Ernst Grünwald has given the most complete survey of the forerunners, the history, and the various contributions of the sociology of knowledge. These four thinkers are indirectly dependent on the historically determined emphasis of the movement on ideology in that they remain on the level of a theoretical discussion without arriving at factual research.
The Identity of Fact and Value
Authors: Lepley Ray
Published: November 2002

Social conflicts of ever widening scope have in recent years emphasized the importance of the problem of the relation of facts and values. This problem has received increasing attention from researchers and theorists in both the physical and social sciences. A number of interesting but by no means compatible solutions have been proposed.

Perhaps the simplest and most striking is the position of Carnap, Russell, and others, that value sentences, such as “A ought not to kill B” or “Killing is evil” are merely commands or expressions of wish and, as such, are emotional ejaculations or expletives but not statements which have any theoretical sense or enter (except as subject matter) into science. On this view the problem of the relation of fact and value statements is meaningless, or at least is not worth considering further.
The Theoretical Basis of Biotypology
Authors: Winthrop Henry
Published: November 2002

Constitutional schemata have been of continuing interest in medicine and psychology ever since the time of Hippocrates. With the work of Sheldon, Stevens and Tucker (5, 6), biotypology has been placed on a new basis. The reader who wishes to orient himself quickly and without too much detail, to the subject matter of typology, will find an interesting and substantial review by Anastasi (1). Wertheimer and Hesketh (7) have produced a comprehensive, but brief, historical and analytic treatment of the constitutional approach in their rather short monograph on the subject. Hempel and Oppenehim (2) have examined the concept of psychological type in a novel fashion from the standpoint of modern logic and positivist philosophy. Typology has been of more interest to continental writers than to American writers. Numerous medical school dissertations at European universities attest to this fact. Medical and psychological literature on the subject is also more frequently of European or Latin American origin, than of United States origin, as a cursory glance at the Index Medicus (4) or the Surgeon General's Catalogue (3) will quickly reveal. The work of Sheldon has raised fresh theoretical considerations which we propose to outline to some extent in this paper and the above sources, we feel certain, will furnish sufficient orientation to those readers who come to this subject with little or no previous acquaintance with it. Before going any further the reader is urged to read Chapter V of the “Varieties of Human Physique” (5).
Basic Decisions in Science
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

The following definitions and explanations are decisions formulated arbitrarily in a sense. However, the underlying assumptions serving as a guide to their formulation are found in both pragmatism and logical positivism. Yet there has been some confusion of the difference between definitions, axioms, postulates, etc., and as a result there is a confusion of certain phases of formal and factual knowledge. For example, one notices in C. I. Lewis' works that all formal statements are thought of as “definitive.” A more effective word, I believe, is “prescriptive.” Axioms are prescriptive, yet, as will be seen below, they are not definitions, and no one in practice conceives of them as such, as can be seen in mathematical works. Axioms prescribe the logical relationship between two or more concepts or words. If interpreted, the factual referents of the words, whose logical relations have been prescribed in axioms, are different. This is not the case with definitions.
On Being and Becoming
Authors: Mueller Gustav E.
Published: November 2002

Becoming is interpreted by various sciences. The exact sciences, physics, and chemistry, interpret this universal becoming or change of all things on the model of mathematical equations. In such an equation of quantities or magnitudes, one side always balances the other. We call such a process “circular”. Numbers may be subdivided or contracted, they may change their places or positions, but the sum total of the whole equation remains immutably the same. In this manner mechanics constructs change as a change of positions of unchanging particles in a continuous but divisible space and in a continuous but divisible time. Chemistry constructs qualitative change as a change of unchanging elements in such a fashion that the sum total of the elements involved in such transactions is always completely accounted for. But in the twentieth century becoming entered these closed systems. There are no unchanging atoms now, and no unchanging chemical elements. Both the physical atom and the chemical element, thought immutable before, are now seen to disintegrate, to radiate, to change their character according to their position in the “field” of energy in which they occur.
Notes on Identity
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

This is a brief sketch of the form which the analysis of the concept of identity would take under the impact of the most recent phase of Scientific Empiricism. The frame of reference is thus that of Carnap'sIntroduction to Semantics.Most characteristic of this approach is that it reaches its main clarifications by distinguishing between the various connotations of the traditional terms along the three lines of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The notion of truth, for instance, must be split into syntactical truth or analyticality, semantical truth, and pragmatical truth. Only the last has something to do with belief and verification. In a somewhat similar manner identity splits, upon closer examination, into three radically different meanings, but it will be seen that the third one has nothing to do with either pure or applied pragmatics. Some of the points I am trying to make have been dealt with, in an interesting manner, in a recent paper by Quine.
Cassirer Versus Russell
Authors: Smart Harold R.
Published: November 2002

The importance of Cassirer's extensive contributions to the philosophical comprehension of mathematics and mathematical physics is generally recognized to be second to none. Nevertheless few indeed in the English speaking world have apparently paid much attention to the penetrating criticisms of Russellian mathematical logic interspersed throughout his works, and formulated in such a way as to bring his own doctrines into that much clearer focus and to render his own position the more convincing.
The Role of Catalysis in Biological Causation
Authors: Witzemann Edgar J.
Published: November 2002

The last two words of the title for this essay are taken from a paper by R. S. Lillie, and the first phrase is also taken by implication from the same source. The study of chemical phenomena in life has progressed far enough so that underlying chemical causes, involved in Professor Lillie's picture of Biological Causation, may in part be discussed in general terms, and apart from the mass of detail known about the agents and processes involved. Moreover, this mass of detail is now great enough so that even though we are far from having a complete or even a comprehensive picture of these causes at least some of the fundamental principles involved in the chemical aspects of biological causation are clearly revealed.
Life, Mechanism and Purpose
Authors: Krikorian Y. H.
Published: November 2002

The determination of the place of life in nature has been a major philosophic issue. Some, in their attempt to show the continuity of nature, have resorted to the reductive method and have argued that the living differ in no significant sense from the non-living, unless it be in their complexity; others, in their desire to emphasize the qualitatively varied aspects of nature, have drifted to disjunctive method and have claimed that there is an unbridgeable gap between the living and the non-living. Yet life in its natural setting presents both continuity with the physical world and a distinctive difference from it. One need neither sunder the continuity in nature nor deny the empirically observable qualitative differences. It is this principle that will guide the present discussion of life.
The Masquerade of Esp
Authors: Nabours Robert K.
Published: November 2002

The supposed communication of one mind with another at a distance, without any means known to physical or psychological science, is a generally accepted definition of telepathy. Thus when persons sensorially isolated from each other experience congruence and coincidence of thoughts, emotions or actions they are considered as being in telepathic communication. Clairvoyance surmises the apprehension of particular objects and stimuli also without the employment of any of the agencies of the five senses. Although telepathy and clairvoyance have been thus recognized as distinct conjectures, either or both comprise features of Extra Sensory Perception (ESP). Both are conceived of as transcending the anatomical structures and physiological functionings that comprise the five senses. They therefore constitute a mysterious, additional sense which as yet cannot be ascribed to material bases or causes. However, the operations, if not the exact natures, of these recondite abilities have been, it is claimed, experimentally and precisely ascertained.
Why Psychologists Tend to Overlook Certain “Obvious” Facts
Authors: Ichheiser Gustav
Published: November 2002

Psychological research and theory has been in the past, and is at present, vitiated by three groups of presuppositions and tendencies. Firstly, by a rigid ideal of preciseness, which produces in the mind of psychologists a biased predilection for selecting and emphasizing those facts which lend themselves best to a precise investigation, and for neglecting those facts with which this is not the case. Secondly, by certain psychological presuppositions rooted in the ideological background of the society to which the psychologist himself belongs; these presuppositions induce him often to state, unwittingly, certain of his problems along the lines suggested by the predominant ideology. And thirdly, by the tendency to overlook, or to neglect, certain very important facts because these facts appear to be quite “obvious”.
Philosophy of Science and Social Philosophy
Authors: Schrickel H. G.
Published: November 2002

A problem of tremendous import confronts the social scientists of our day. Having accumulated a vast amount of detailed data on human relations the social scientists are now being asked about the significance of their data. Two major aspects of this questioning are these: How can we synthesize all available scientific data on human relations so that this knowledge can be successfully applied to the solution of current social problems; and secondly, since some of the data accumulated so far has been defined and organized in terms of concepts imitative of older (Newtonian) physical (and sometimes biological) concepts—the appropriateness of which to human relations as subject matter is questionable—should we not evaluate these basic concepts with a view to laying new conceptual foundations for our knowledge of human relations? Thus we shall open the way for new social research and at the same time develop a methodologically sounder basis for our knowledge of human relations. Briefly, our knowledge of human relations at present is at loose ends, and in this condition is not as applicable to the solution of pressing social problems as it would be if it were unified into a comprehensive and more flexible science of human behavior. Such a unification would demand not only a synthesis of the data of the social sciences but also the critical evaluation of many of the basic concepts of these sciences.
Analysis and Wholism
Authors: Boodin John Elof
Published: November 2002

The first aim of science has been analysis. From Leucippus in the fifth century B.C. to Sir Arthur Eddington today, science has tried to reduce nature to simple structural units. For Leucippus the atoms are structurally alike, though they differ in external characteristics, such as size and shape. The aim of physics today is expressed by Sir Arthur Eddington: “The aim of the analysis employed in physics is to resolve the universe into structural units which are precisely alike one another ... so that all variety originates in the structure and not in the elements out of which the structure is built.” To be sure, that is an ideal. In practice we speak of electrons, protons, neutrons. But that does not alter the problem. The question is: Are there such structural units?
Content Analysis and the Theory of Signs
Authors: Kaplan Abraham
Published: November 2002

During the past decade or two the influence of theories of language and meaning has made itself felt in almost every field of study, either because, as in the case of psychology and the social sciences, meaning phenomena were part of the subject matter, or because, as in the case of physics and philosophy, the language used in the study demanded analysis and clarification. In recent years there has been (and is being) developed, especially by H. D. Lasswell and his associates, a technique known as content analysis, which attempts to characterize the meanings in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion.
The Method of Elimination in Scientific Study
Authors: Smith Mapheus
Published: November 2002

Two essentially different approaches to “truth” should be recognized, although they are not in every respect and on all occasions mutually exclusive. If truth be taken to mean the “most adequate idea (statement, explanation, interpretation, expression) a mind (plural number of minds) is able to perceive at any given time,” the process may, first, be one of immediate intuition, insight or inspiration in which conclusions are arrived at without consciousness of the mediate, detailed steps between recognition of a problem and its solution and without considering all of the possible solutions to the problem; or, it may, second, be one of detailed examination and traversal of the various direct and simple steps to the “truth”, as well as the testing of all other methods of arriving at the same truth. The first method may bring about its result “in a flash”, instantaneously, unpredictably; but the second method is never so rapid, always more laborious, and always consumes more time and energy than the first. That is not to say that the first method always involves less elapsed time between inception and completion than the second; often the first method is marked by delays because the mind in question leaps to other trains of thought before obtaining a solution to the first problem. However, the amount of total time used exclusively to answer the question or solve the problem by the first method is much less than for the second.
Existential and Epistemic Probability
Authors: Hawkins David
Published: November 2002

Epistemology in modern times has been much influenced by the growth of the mathematical theory of probability. The reverse influence is less obvious, but perhaps equally important. This interrelation affords, moreover, an excellent example of the way philosophic ideas, while directing attention in one fruitful line of inquiry, at the same time may inhibit other discoveries until long overdue.
The Psychic Factor in Living Organisms
Authors: Lillie Ralph S.
Published: November 2002

In my recent paper on Living Systems and Non-living Systems I considered briefly the question of the special rôle assignable to the psychic, as natural factor associated with yet different from the physical, in the activities of living organisms. The general conclusion was reached that this rôle is primarily integrative, in correspondence with the integrative character which is the essential distinguishing feature of the psychic in our experience. As integrative, the psychic factor has a special relation to the synthetic activity so highly developed in living organism, since synthesis is by its nature integration or whole-formation. Originative or novelty-producing activity is the special prerogative of the psychic, rather than simple repetition or routine; the latter, as exemplifying the stable or conservative side of nature, belongs in the field of the physical. According to this conception, the psychic is the source of initiative when action takes on a novel or creative form, as in conscious voluntary activity or (in a broader sense) in natural creative action in general. For example, in animals vegetative or routine processes may be purely physiological and unconscious, while actions requiring special initiative or innovation demand conscious effort and attention.
The Neurodynamics of Behavior
Authors: Burrow Trigant
Published: November 2002

As individuals and as communities we have suddenly awakened to find ourselves enveloped in a welter of unprecedented changes—social, political, economic and scientific. If our minds are to keep pace with the restless current on which we are being carried along, if our senses are to become alert to the teeming dislocations that mark the present, it will be necessary to raise our sights to the farther reaches of a rapidly oncoming future. In this hurrying hour the outstanding domains of man's thought are found wanting. Accepted tenets in many fields of his activity are giving way to rapidly broadening concepts. In this moment of new assessments it is safe to predict that the field of psychopathology must also gird itself for very radical alterations. It is safe to predict that present-day preoccupations with interpersonal affects, domestic transferences, sexual irregularities, marital conflicts, psychotic episodes, and the vast array of neurotic symptoms that comprise our psychiatric systems will in the scientific reckoning of the future appear to us quite obsolete and inept. They will appear to us as humdrum and archaic, I feel sure, as old wives' tales when contrasted with the basic and encompassing constructs of an organismic phylobiology.
“Truth, Beauty and Goodness” in the Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead
Authors: Johnson A. H.
Published: November 2002

Some recent discussions of A. N. Whitehead's treatment of the problem of value have stressed the point that his work in this field is open to serious objection. For example, Professor John Goheen claims that Whitehead's attempt to indicate distinguishing characteristics of experience of “the Good”, is too general to be adequate. He also suggests that this generality of approach makes it impossible for Whitehead to differentiate between different species of value. Further, according to Goheen, Whitehead involves himself in confusion when he claims that satisfaction (value) is achieved when experience is characterized by order (unity); and yet he also suggests that in some cases, the presence of disorder makes possible a higher type of satisfaction. Professor P. A. Schilpp agrees with Goheen in feeling that Whitehead's explanation of the good life in terms of “pattern” is too vague. In Schilpp's opinion, Whitehead does not answer the basic question: “What kind of pattern?” There is a further objection to Whitehead's “theory of the close connection between morality and beauty,” because at times it looks like an actual identification. Schilpp also objects to what appears to be Whitehead's identification of “good” with “interest”. Finally, it is claimed by Schilpp that Whitehead subordinates goodness to beauty. This interpretation is apparently supported by Prof. George Morgan who states: “Truth and moral values are instrumental except in so far as they enhance beauty.” Professor B. Morris objects to Whitehead's attempt to apply the mathematical method to aesthetic experience. He suggests that the method of symbolic logic is too abstract to deal adequately with concrete aesthetic data. Professor J. W. Blyth, as the result of his examination of Whitehead's theory of truth, reaches the conclusion that “the various elements involved in Whitehead's theory of truth cannot be brought together in one coherent and consistent system.
Imperatives and Logic
Authors: Ross Alf
Published: November 2002

The existing literature treats of several investigations with a certain bearing on the question which is roughly indicated by the title “Imperatives and Logic.” Some of those investigations, however, are entirely outside the scope of the present work.

Mally sets himself the task of developing a “Logik des Willens” constituting a parallel to the usual logic, the “Logik des Denkens". In order to emphasize its independence, the author also calls this “Logik des Willens” “Deontik”, and he conceives it as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of will in the same way as the usual logic is conceived as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of thought. The author develops a formalistic deductive system on the basis of 5 axioms of demands (Grundsatze des Bollen), including the axiom that there is at least one fact which is unconditionally demanded, and through a lengthy series of theorems he arrives at the sentence that what is unconditionally demanded is identical with what is actually the case: “was sein soll, ist Tatsache”. Similarly, the author develops a system of axioms for “right” volition, including the axiom that right volition is non-contradictory.