bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Periodontitis is characterized by elevated PAI‐1 activity
Authors: Bizzarro S. , Van Der Velden U. , Ten Heggeler J. M. A. G. , Leivadaros E. , Hoek F. J. , Gerdes V. E. A. , Bakker S. J. L. , Gans R. O. B. , Ten Cate H. , Loos B. G.
Published: May 2007

Objectives: Periodontitis is a chronic infectious disease and has been associated with cardiovascular diseases (CVD). We investigated whether plasma levels of markers of a prothrombotic state were elevated in patients with periodontitis in comparison with healthy controls.

Materials and methods: Untreated patients with moderate (n=53) and severe periodontitis (n=38) and healthy controls (n=39) were recruited. Levels of von Willebrand factor (vWF), prothrombin fragment 1+2 (F1+2), plasminogen activator inhibitor‐1 (PAI‐1) activity and D‐dimer were measured as markers of a prothrombotic state.

Results: The erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR), plasma C‐reactive protein (CRP) and leucocyte counts (WBC) were significantly higher in patients with periodontitis. No statistically significant difference was found among the three groups for vWF (p=0.264), F1+2 (p=0.295) and D‐dimer (p=0.572). However, PAI‐1 was clearly elevated in the severe periodontitis group (p=0.001), even after adjusting for potential confounding factors (padj=0.004). Moreover, more patients than controls were having vWF and PAI‐1 levels above the respective population medians.

Conclusions: In periodontitis, elevated levels of PAI‐1 activity are observed compared with healthy controls. This may increase the potential for impaired fibrinolysis, a condition that results in a prothrombotic state. We suggest that this state, if left untreated, may contribute to an increased risk for CVD.
Effect of an essential oil‐containing antimicrobial mouthrinse on specific plaque bacteria in vivo
Authors: Fine Daniel H. , Markowitz Kenneth , Furgang David , Goldsmith Deborah , Charles Christine H. , Lisante Toni Anne , Lynch Michael C.
Published: May 2007

Aim: This study was conducted to investigate the effect of rinsing with an essential oil‐containing mouthrinse on levels of specific supra and subgingival bacteria in subjects with gingivitis.

Material and Methods: Fifteen subjects meeting entry criteria completed this randomized, controlled, double‐blind, crossover study. Subjects were required to have 1000 target organisms per millilitre in pooled samples from two subgingival sites. Following sampling of supra and subgingival plaque, subjects began twice‐daily rinsing for 14 days with either an essential oil‐containing mouthrinse (Cool Mint Listerine® Antiseptic) or a negative control. Supra and subgingival plaque was again sampled on day 15, and the procedure repeated after a 1‐week washout period with subjects using the alternate rinse.

Results: Compared with the negative control, the essential oil mouthrinse produced significant reductions in supragingival plaque levels of Veillonella sp., Capnocytophaga sp., Fusobacterium nucleatum, and total anaerobes ranging from 52.3 to 88.5% (p<0.001 except for Veillonella, p=0.002); respective reductions in subgingival plaque ranged from 54.1 to 69.1% (p<0.001).

Conclusions: Rinsing with the essential oil mouthrinse can have an impact on the subgingival plaque flora. This study provides additional evidence indicating that reduction in supragingival plaque can reduce levels of subgingival plaque.
Subjective intensity of pain during ultrasonic supragingival calculus removal
Authors: Braun Andreas , Jepsen Søren , Krause Felix
Published: May 2007

Objective: To assess subjective intensities of pain during supragingival calculus removal employing ultrasonic scaler tips of two different shapes.

Material and Methods: Twenty patients were treated using a piezoelectric ultrasonic device (Sirosonic L) and two different scaler tips representing a conventional (Instrument No. 3) and a slim‐line style (Perio Pro Line Instrument SI‐11) in a split‐mouth design. Pain was recorded during calculus removal at intervals of 0.5 s employing an inter‐modal intensity comparison. Additionally, a visual analogue scale was used for evaluation directly after the treatment procedure. Treatment time was recorded to assess the efficiency of calculus removal.

Results: Pain assessment during treatment showed that the slim‐line scaler tip (median pain score: 1.4 [U], maximum: 3.5 [U], minimum: 0 [U]) caused less pain than the conventional device (median pain score: 7.8 [U], maximum: 14.7 [U], minimum: 0 [U]) (p<0.05). These results could be confirmed by the visual analogue scale. Treatment with the slim‐line tip took significantly longer than treatment with the conventional tip (p<0.05).

Conclusions: Using slim‐line‐styled ultrasonic scaler tips for supragingival calculus removal, painful sensations can be reduced compared with conventional ultrasonic devices. Thus, it might be possible to increase the patient's compliance during dental treatment with oscillating instruments.
Preterm delivery but not intrauterine growth retardation is associated with young maternal age among primiparae in rural Nepal
Authors: Stewart Christine P. , Katz Joanne , Khatry Subarna K. , LeClerq Steven C. , Shrestha Sharada Ram , West Keith P. , Christian Parul
Published: May 2007

Pregnancy during adolescence is associated with adverse birth outcomes, including preterm delivery and low birthweight. The nutrient availability to the fetus may be limited if the mother is still growing. This research aims to study the effects of pregnancy during adolescence in a nutritionally poor environment in rural Nepal. This study utilized data from a randomized controlled trial of micronutrient supplementation during pregnancy in south‐eastern Nepal. Women of parity 0 or 1 and of age ≤ 25 years who gave birth to a singleton liveborn infant who was measured within 72 h of delivery were included (n = 1393). There was no difference in the risk of low birthweight (OR = 0.96; 95% CI = 0.90–1.02) or small for gestational age (OR = 1.01; 95% CI = 0.94–1.08) per year of increasing maternal age among primiparae. Young maternal age did not affect the anthropometry or gestational age of the offspring of parity 1 women. Each year of increasing maternal age among primiparae was associated with increases in birth length (0.07 cm; 95% CI = −0.01 to 0.16), head (0.05 cm; 95% CI = 0.01–0.09) and chest circumference (0.07 cm; 95% CI = 0.01–0.12), but not weight (9.0 g; 95% CI = −2.1 to 21.8) of their offspring. Young maternal age was associated with an increased risk of preterm delivery among primiparae (OR = 2.07; 95% CI = 1.26–3.38) that occurred at an age cut‐off of ≤18 years relative to those 19–25 years. Thus, we conclude that young maternal age (≤18 years) increased the risk of preterm delivery, but not intrauterine growth retardation, for the first but not second liveborn infant.
THIS ARTICLE HAS BEEN RETRACTED  Exergy as an ecological application used in the recovery process of benthic communities
Authors: ZHANG Feijun , TONG Chunfu , XIE Zhifa , LU Jianjian
Published: May 2007

Exergy, the thermodynamic function that represents the distance of an open system from equilibrium, is proposed as an ecological indicator for summarizing the complex dynamics occurring in a disturbed community during its recovery processes. These complex dynamics can be difficult to capture by using classical indices. In this study, we sampled macrobenthos using the BACI scheme (before versus after; control versus impact) in tidal wetlands of west Chongming Island, China, an area that has been disturbed by ecological engineering measures. Exergy storage is estimated for benthic communities. The control area is proposed as dynamic reference for estimating local exergy storage of the benthic community. Three different methods were used for estimating exergy on the basis of coefficients: (a) taken for taxa groups; (b) estimated from coding genes given for broad taxonomic groups; and (c) estimated from genome size taken as close as possible to the taxonomic level of the species, providing a basis for inferring similarities. We found a decrease of local exergy content in the disturbed area 9 days after the disturbance. Subsequently, the reference exergy of the benthic community increased (i.e. in the surrounding control area) in accordance with the proposed hypothesis regarding the dynamics of exergy storage during a system's development. Estimates of local exergy arrived at using the three methods provided comparable results. Based on this, we then discuss the feasibility of using the more readily available genome size data for estimating exergy. This result may have important implications for broader application of this indicator to biological systems. Moreover, the adjacent control samples seem to represent an appropriate dynamic reference for estimating the local exergy of disturbed communities. We found that exergy was a useful indicator that integrates the processes underlying the recovery of the benthic community after disturbance.
Conservation status of Chinese species: (1) Overview
Authors: XIE Yan , SUNG Wang
Published: May 2007

The first comprehensive evaluation of more than 10 000 species in China based on the IUCN Red List Criteria and Regional Guidelines is complete. More than 100 experts have been involved in this evaluation, which covers a wide range of species, including invertebrates, vertebrates, gymnosperms and angiosperms. The present paper summarizes the major conclusions of the project. The number of threatened species in China was found to be much high than previously expected. In the past, the estimated percentages of species in each phylum that were endangered was 2‐30%. In this comprehensive evaluation, the percentages of threatened species were found to be 7.4‐100%. Compared with the status of threatened species worldwide (IUCN Red List 2006), groups such as fish, mammals and gymnosperms face much higher levels of threat in China then they do globally, and other groups, such as crustaceans, reptiles and birds, face lower levels of threat. Given the dire conclusions of this study, we recommend that more research be done on the threats faced by those groups of organisms that are most threatened.
Understanding Alien Morals
Authors: SREENIVASAN GOPAL
Published: May 2007

Anthropologists often claim to have understood an ethical outlook that they nevertheless believe is largely false. Some moral philosophers—e.g., Susan Hurley—argue that this claim is incoherent because understanding an ethical outlook necessarily involves believing it to be largely true. to reach this conclusion, they apply an argument of Donald Davidson's to the ethical case. My central aim is to defend the coherence of the anthropologists' claim against this argument.

To begin with, I specify a candidate‐language that contains a significant number of alien thick descriptions. A thick description is a term that has both descriptive and evaluative content, e.g., “courageous.” I then argue that, because of its alien thick descriptions, this candidate‐language cannot be interpreted by someone who adheres to the strictures of Davidson's account of interpretation. to complete my criticism, I demonstrate that the meaningfulness of this candidate‐language cannot be impugned on Davidson's own terms. This involves showing that an interpreter's correctly assigning truthconditions, expressed in her own language, to sentences featuring alien thick descriptions is consistent with her believing those sentences to be false.

“In cycle maintenance things are not that involved, but when confusion starts it's a good idea to hold it down by making everything formal and exact. Sometimes just the act of writing down the problems straightens out your head as to what they really are.”Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest
Authors: ELDER CRAWFORD L.
Published: May 2007

Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby bring about changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition “from below”.
Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time
Authors: CRAIG WILLIAM LANE
Published: May 2007

One of the most serious obstacles to accepting a tenseless view of time is the challenge posed by our experience of tense. A particularly striking example of such experience, pointed out by Schlesinger but largely overlooked in the literature, is the wish felt by probably all of us at some time or other that it were now some other time. Such a wish seems evidently rational to hold, and yet on a tenseless theory of time such a wish must be regarded as irrational, since it is logically impossible for the now to be located at some other time, there being no such thing as an objective now or present. In order to accommodate rationally such a belief, most protagonists of tenseless time twist the evident meaning of the wish. Oaklander, for example, misconstrues the wish in terms of my wanting to have different perceptions. Others, like Coburn, admit frankly that such a wish is rational only on a tensed theory of time but mistakenly reject that theory on grounds that at best constitute a defeater of an argument for a tensed view of time, rather than a defeater of the tensed view itself. the argument for a tensed view of time from the experience of tense remains undefeated.
Perception and Belief
Authors: SMITH A. D.
Published: May 2007

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent

There are two main issues to address. the first is that ‘collateral’ beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) ‘non‐epistemic’perception can be understood only by employing the concept of ‘epistemic’perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with ‘doxastic’force.
Avowals and First‐Person Privilege
Authors: BAR‐ON DORIT , LONG DOUGLAS C.
Published: May 2007

When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first‐person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I'm thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio‐linguistic convention governing avowals. We reject both approaches. On our proposed account, a full explanation of the privilege must recognize avowals as expressive performances, which can be taken to reveal directly the subject's present mental condition. We are able to improve on special access accounts and deflationary accounts, as well as familiar expressive accounts, by explaining both the asymmetries and the continuities between avowals and other pronouncements, and by locating a genuine though non‐epistemic source for first‐person privilege.
Happiness and Pleasure1
Authors: HAYBRON DANIEL M.
Published: May 2007

This paper argues against hedonistic theories of happiness. First, hedonism is too inclusive: many pleasures cannot plausibly be construed as constitutive of happiness. Second, any credible theory must count either attitudes of life satisfaction, affective states such as mood, or both as constituents of happiness; yet neither sort of state reduces to pleasure. Hedonism errs in its attempt to reduce happiness, which is at least partly dispositional, to purely episodic experiential states. the dispositionality of happiness also undermines weakened nonreductive forms of hedonism, as some happiness‐constitutive states are not pleasures in any sense. Moreover, these states can apparently fail to exhibit the usual hedonic properties; sadness, for instance, can sometimes be pleasant. Finally, the nonhedonistic accounts are adequate if not superior on grounds of practical and theoretical utility, quite apart from their superior conformity to the folk notion of happiness.

“And does his philosophy make you happy?”

“I have never searched for happiness. Who wants happiness?

I have searched for pleasure.”

Oscar Wilde, the Picture of Dorian Gray (p. 209)
Mental Causation: Unnaturalized but not Unnatural
Authors: MARCUS ERIC
Published: May 2007

The central problem for a realist about mental causation is to show that mental causation is compatible with the causal completeness of physical systems. This problem has seemed intractable in large part because of a widely held view that any sort of systematic overdetermination of events by their causes is unacceptable. I account for the popularity of this view, but argue that we ought to reject it. In doing so. I show how we thereby undermine the idea that mental causes must be naturalizable in order to be legitimate. Thus I argue that a non‐naturalist conception of mental causation is compatible with a plausible kind of physicalism.
An Argument that Internalism Requires Infallibility
Authors: SIDELLE ALAN
Published: May 2007

Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism—a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one's beliefs whether or not one is subject to such deception. Even if one doesn't motivate one's internalism by appeal to internal twins, any internalist must agree that internal twins are equally well justified in their beliefs. I argue that the internal twins argument for. or commitment of internalism. commits one to the claim that the conditions in virtue of which one is justified must be ones about which a believer is infallible. The basic argument is that for anything about which one can be mistaken, one has an internal twin who is mistaken, but is equally well justified—and so, not in virtue of that about which one can be mistaken. If the argument can be resisted, this should tell us something useful about how to properly understand both internalism in general, and the idea of internal twins in particular.
Introspecting Phenomenal States
Authors: GERTLER BRIE
Published: May 2007

This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention done. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non‐causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions about phenomenal self‐knowledge, makes possible an appealing diagnosis of blindsight cases, and yields a highly plausible view as to the extent of our first‐person epistemic privilege. Because these virtues stem from construing phenomenal properties as non‐relational features of states, my defense of DA constitutes a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties, including functionalism and representationalism. And I provide reason to doubt that they can meet this challenge.
Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy
Authors: JESKE DIANE
Published: May 2007

Reasons of intimacy, i.e. reasons to care for friends and other intimates, resist categorization as either subjective Humean reasons or as objective consequentialist reasons. Reasons of intimacy are grounded in the friendship relation itself. not in the psychological attitudes of the agent or in the objective intrinsic value of the friend or the friendship. So reasons of intimacy are objective and agent‐relative and can be understood by analogy with reasons of fidelity and reasons of prudence. Such an analogy can help us to understand which objective agent‐relative reasons we have and which, such as deontological constraints, we do not have.
Marshall and Parsons on ‘Intrinsic’
Authors: LANGTON RAE , LEWIS DAVID
Published: May 2007

Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly, that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgements of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgements of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea of judging relative naturalness is a dubious business. We reply that, like them or not, such judgements cannot easily be avoided.
Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles*
Authors: WEATHERSON BRIAN
Published: May 2007

Three objections have recently been levelled at the analysis of intrinsicness offered by Rae Langton and David Lewis. While these objections do seem telling against the particular theory Langton and Lewis offer, they do not threaten the broader strategy Langton and Lewis adopt: defining intrinsicness in terms of combinatorial features of properties. I show how to amend their theory to overcome the objections without abandoning the strategy.
Stroud's Camap
Authors: ALSPECTOR‐KELLY MARC
Published: May 2007

In “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” Camap drew his famous distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his commitment to empiricism. He rejected that criticism as presupposing a super‐scientific standpoint from which constraints on the admissible domain of entities of science could be delivered. Carnap wanted to insulate science from the imposition of first‐philosophical metaphysical prejudice, not to defuse scepticism by appeal to verificationism.
On the Explanatory Role of Correspondence Truth
Authors: KITCHER PHILIP
Published: May 2007

An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth‐as‐correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.
Self‐Knowledge Failures and First Person Authority1
Authors: MCCULLAGH MARK
Published: May 2007

Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self‐knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts, no such person could fail to possess self‐knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true attributions of such failures.

While the core idea behind Davidson's and Burge's accounts appears ioadequate to this task, I argue that it can be deployed in such a way as to deliver the desired result. What makes this possible is that two attitude‐types can differ as follows: the self‐knowledge required for an utterance to be a Oing that p is different from the self‐knowledge required for it to be a Ψfing that p.
Blameworthy Action and Character
Authors: SHER GEORGE
Published: May 2007

A number of philosophers from Hume on have claimed that it does not make sense to blame people for acting badly unless their bad acts were rooted in their characters. In this paper, I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The claim is false, I argue, if it is taken to mean that agents can only be blamed for bad acts when those acts are manifestations of character paws. However, what is both true and important is the weaker claim that an act is not blameworthy unless it is rooted in some enduring aspect or aspects of the agent's character that may or may not be flaws, and that, if flaws, may or may not be bad in the same way that the act itself is.
Scala and the Spinning Spheres
Authors: ZIMMERMAN DEAN W.
Published: May 2007

I have argued that contemporary humeans face a trilemma: either (i) give up temporal parts. (ii) deny the humean supervenience of causal relations, or (iii) deny the possibility of there being a difference between rotating and nonrotating homogeneous spheres. Mark Scala (“Homogeneous Simples”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 64, 2002) describes an interesting class of seemingly possible objects, spinning and stationary simples; and argues their possibility undermines my argument. I argue that it does not. And 1 conclude with a more general assessment of the status of objections to humeanism from the possibility of homogeneous objects in motion.
Innocuous Infallibility
Authors: CONEE EARL
Published: May 2007

Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
Sellars vs. the Given*
Authors: BONEVAC DANIEL
Published: May 2007

John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars's arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars's arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument—the “inconsistent triad” argument—addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there are several ways of escaping its conclusion. Invocations of Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given are empty.
Is Conceptual Analysis Needed for the Reduction of Qualitative States?
Authors: LEVIN JANET
Published: May 2007

In this paper I discuss the claim (advanced in various ways by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson and David Chalmers) that the successful reduction of qualitative to physical states requires some sort of intelligible connection between our qualitative and physical concepts, which in turn requires a conceptual analysis of our qualitative concepts in causal‐functional terms. While I defend this claim against some of its recent critics, I ultimately dispute it, and propose a different way to get the requisite intelligible connection between qualitative and physical concepts.
Précis of Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View*
Authors: BAKER LYNNE RUDDER
Published: May 2007

Persons and Bodies develops and defends an account of persons and of the relation between human persons and their bodies. Human persons are constituted by bodies, without being identical to the bodies that constitute them—just as, I argue, statues are constituted by pieces of bronze, say, without being identical to the pieces of bronze that constitute them. The relation of constitution, therefore, is not peculiar to persons and their bodies, but is pervasive in the natural world.
Free Will and Scientiphicalism
Authors: Unger Peter
Published: May 2007

It's been agreed for decades that not only does Determinism pose a big problem for our choosing from available alternatives, but its denial seems to pose a bit of a problem, too. It's argued here that only Determinism, and not its denial, means no real choice for us.

But, what explains the appeal of the thought that, where things aren't fully determined, to that extent they're just a matter of chance? It's the dominance of metaphysical suppositions that, together, comprise Scientiphicalism: Wholly composed of such mindless physical parts as electrons, you are a being whose powers are all physical powers, physically deriving from the powers of your parts and their physical arrangements. Scientiphicalism conflicts with your having real choice.

Some fairly conservative alternatives to Scientiphicalism may allow for choice. Two are briefly discussed: On the further‐fetched, you are a Cartesian mental being, a nonphysical being in powerful interaction with physical things. On the more conservative approach, you are wholly composed of physical parts, but some of your powers are radically emergent, including your power to choose.

Finally, it's argued that, if you choose, you must be, to some extent, exempt from natural laws.
The Standard Meter by Any Name is Still a Meter Long
Authors: Gert Heather J.
Published: May 2007

In §50 of Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein wrote the sentence, “There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.” Although some interpreters have claimed that Wittgenstein's statement is mistaken, while others have proposed various explanations showing that this must be correct, none have questioned the fact that he intended to assert that it is impossible to describe the standard meter as being a meter long. Given that Wittgenstein introduces this sentence as analogous to the claim that “existence cannot be attributed to an element,” and that the preceding passages discuss a language‐game the simples of which can be described by their own names, there is good reason to think that Wittgenstein did not intend to assert this infamous sentence.
Sellars and the “Myth of the Given”
Authors: Alston William P.
Published: May 2007

Sellars is well known for his critique of the “myth of the given” in his “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. That text does not make it unambiguous just how he understands the “myth”. Here I take it that whatever else may be involved, his critique is incompatible with the view that there is a nonconceptual mode of “presentation” or “givenness” of particulars that is the heart of sense perception and what is most distinctive of perception as a type of cognition. A critical examination of Sellars’ arguments, particularly those directed at the Theory of Appearing, results in the conclusion that he has failed to eliminate the above view of perception. Moreover, though Sellars is clearly opposed to the view that perceptual experience cannot provide justification for beliefs about perceived objects, I argue that Sellars has failed to shake the intuitive plausibility of that view.
Typing Problems
Authors: Feldman Richard , Conee Earl
Published: May 2007

Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved.
The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment
Authors: Dreier James
Published: May 2007

“States of mind are natural states. They are extremely hard to define.”1
Take If from Me: The Epistemological Status of Testimony
Authors: ELGIN CATHERINEZ.
Published: May 2007

Testimony consists in imparting information without supplying evidence or argument to back one's claims. To what extent does testimony convey epistemic warrant? C. J. A. Coady argues, on Davidsonian grounds, that (1) most testimony is true, hence (2) most testimony supplies warrant sufficient for knowledge. I appeal to Grice's maxims to undermine Coady's argument and to show that the matter is more complicated and context‐sensitive than is standardly rocognized. Informative exchanges take place within networks of shared, tacit assumptions that affect the scope and strength of our claims, and the level of warrant required for their responsible assertion. The maxims explain why different levels of warrant are transferred in different contexts.
The Ontological Status of Persons*
Authors: BAKER LYNNE RUDDER
Published: May 2007

Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non‐Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by‐but not identical to‐human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions.

Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true
Realization, Micro‐Realization, and Coincidence
Authors: SHOEMAKER SYDNEY
Published: May 2007

Let thin properties be properties shared by coincident entities, e.g., a person and her body, and thick properties ones that are not shared. Thick properties entail sortal properties, e.g., being a person, and the associated persistence conditions. On the first account of realization defined here, the realized property and its realizers will belong to the same individual. This restricts the physical realizers of mental properties, which are thick, to thick physical properties. We also need a sense in which mental properties can be realized in thin physical properties shared by a person and her body. Defining this in turn requires defining a sense in which the instantiations of sortal properties and of thick properties are realized in micro‐structural states of affairs. A fourth notion of realization is needed to allow for the possibility of coincident entities that share a sortal property, e.g., coincident persons.
“This is Simply What I Do”
Authors: LEGG CATHERINE
Published: May 2007

Wittgenstein's discussion of rule‐following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called “the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date”. But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive scientific hierarchy. Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context. pertains to general predication.

Rule‐following scepticism, the paper suggests, results from running together two questions: “How is it that I can project rules?”, and, “What is it for a given usage of a rule to be right?”. In Peircean terms the former question, concerning the irreducibility of general predication (to singular reference), must be answered in phenomenology, while the latter, concerning the difference between true and false predication, is answered in logic. A failure to appreciate this distinction, it is argued, has led philosophers to focus exclusively on Wittgenstein's famous public account of rule‐following rightness, thus overlooking a private, phenomenological dimension to Wittgenstein's remarks on following a rule which gives the lie to Kripke's reading of him as a sceptic.
Self‐supporting Arguments*
Authors: CLING ANDREW D.
Published: May 2007

Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating.
Externalism, Slow Switching and Privileged Self‐Knowledge1
Authors: VAHID HAMID
Published: May 2007

Recent discussions of externalism about mental content have been dominated by the question whether it undermines the intuitively plausible idea that we have knowledge of the contents of our thoughts. In this article I focus on one main line of reasoning (the so‐called ‘slow switching argument’) for the thesis that externalism and self‐knowledge are incompatible. After criticizing a number of influential responses to the argument, I set out to explain why it fails. It will be claimed that the argument trades on an ambiguity, and that only by incorporating certain controversial assumptions does it stand a chance of establishing its conclusion. Finally, drawing on an analogy with Benacerraf's challenge to Platonism, I shall offer some reasons as to why the slow switching argument fails to reveal the real source of tension between externalism and privileged self‐knowledge.
Tropic of Value*
Authors: RABlNOWlCZ WLODEK , RØNNOW‐RASMUSSEN TONI
Published: May 2007

The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.

Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars (so‐called tropes) rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive ((fone entertains the existence of tropes), it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter.
Making it Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following
Authors: HATTIANGADI ANANDI
Published: May 2007

In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normativity—a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein's rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road—one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that this proposal fails to evade the dilemma, as Brandom himself understands it. Despite his use of normative vocabulary, Brandom's theory fares no better than the reductionist theories he criticises. I consider some responses that Brandom might make to my charges, and finally conclude that his proposal founders on his own criteria.
Two Kinds of Commitments (And Two Kinds of Social Groups)
Authors: BREWER TALBOT M.
Published: May 2007

In this paper, I draw a distinction between two fundamentally different kinds of commitments by highlighting some previously unnoticed subtleties in the pragmatics of “commissive” utterances. I argue that theories which seek to model all commitments on promises, or to ground them all on voluntary consent, can account only for one sort of obligation and not for the other. Since social groups are most perspicuously categorized in terms of the sorts of commitments that bind their members together, this puts me in a position to distinguish two importantly different kinds of social groups, which I call aggregations and associations. I try to show that this position can account for features of the normative structure of social groups that are overlooked by those theorists (e.g. Margaret Gilbert) who have attempted to offer a unitary, voluntarist account of the phenomena under investigation.
Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will
Authors: YAFFE GIDEON
Published: May 2007

Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator's ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator's ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. Manipulators see to it that their victims comply even in the face of forces that threaten to derail them from the manipulator's desired course. It is suggested that this has an impact on freedom because part of what we desire in wanting to be free is the availability of forms of life very different from those we actually enjoy.
Qualia that It Is Right to Quine*
Authors: GARCIA‐CARPINTERO MANUEL
Published: May 2007

Dennett (1988) provides a much discussed argument for the nonexistence of qualia, as conceived by philosophers like Block, Chalmers, Loar and Searle. My goal in this paper is to vindicate Dennett's argument, construed in a certain way. The argument supports the claim that qualia are constitutively representational. Against Block and Chalmers, the argument rejects the detachment of phenomenal from information‐processing consciousness; and against Loar and Searle, it defends the claim that qualia are constitu‐tively representational in an externalist understanding of this. The core of the argument is contained in section 3. In the first part, I contrast a minimal conception of qualia, relative to which their existence is not under dispute, with the sort of view to which I will object. In the second part I set the stage by presenting the facts about (minimal) qualia on which a Dennett‐like argument can be based.
The Transcendental Necessity of Morality
Authors: HEATH JOSEPH
Published: May 2007

David Gauthier tries to defend morality by showing that rational agents would choose to adopt a fundamental choice disposition that permits them to cooperate in prisoner's dilemmas. In this paper, I argue that Gauthier, rather than trying to work out a prudential justification for his favored choice disposition, should opt for a transcendental justification. I argue that the disposition in question is the product of socialization, not rational choice. However, only agents who are socialized in such a way that they acquire a disposition of this type could acquire the capacity to use language. Given the internal connection between language and thought, this means that no agent endowed with such a disposition could rationally choose to adopt another. Thus rational reflection by moral agents upon their own fundamental choice disposition will have no tendency to destabilize it.

“It is a necessary truth that people tend to do what they think they ought to do, for it is a necessary truth that people who occupy a linguistic position which means /ought to do A now, tend to do A. If they did not, the position they occupy could not mean Iought to do A now.”

Wilfrid Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games.”
Perceptual Entitlement*
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2007

The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called “entitlement”, that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti‐individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states–hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined.
Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience
Authors: SIMMONS ALISON
Published: May 2007

Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the Dioptrics and Treatise on Man tells a different story. I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualities but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception.
The Scope of Deflationism: Reply to Gregory
Authors: O'GRADY PAUL
Published: May 2007

Paul Gregory's careful and insightful response to “Carnap and Two Dogmas of Empiricism” highlights a number of points which were underdeveloped in that paper. I think that he has brought into relief a central issue between Camap and Quine by supplying a crucial distinction. However I still maintain that Quine's assault is less than successful and that Gregory's further analysis of the debate sheds light on why this is so.