bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Scientific Philosophy
Authors: Feibleman James K.
Published: November 2002

Science is a comparatively recent affair, but the alternatives at our command in philosophy are old ones. The range of Greek philosophy seems to have an astonishing stability. The philosophy of religion was used for centuries to bolster religion. It is some indication of the rapid growth of the prestige of science that now the philosophy of science is used to bolster philosophy.
Kinds and Criteria of Scientific Laws
Authors: Bunge Mario
Published: November 2002

Factual statements that might qualify for the status of law statements are classed from various philosophically relevant standpoints (referents, precision, structure of predicates, extension, systemicity, inferential power, inception, ostensiveness, testability, levels, and determination categories). More than seven dozen of not mutually exclusive kinds of lawlike statements emerge. Strictly universal and counterfactually powerful statements are seen to constitute just one kind of lawlike statements; classificatory and some statistical laws, e.g., are shown not to comply with the requirements of universality and counterfactual force.

Conditions for lawlike statements to be called laws are then examined, and a liberal criterion of lawfulness is finally proposed, which reads thus: A proposition is a law statement if and only if it isa posteriori(not logically true), general in some respect (does not refer to unique objects), has been satisfactorily corroborated for the time being in some domain, and belongs to a theory (whether adult or embryonic). It is claimed that criteria of laws change alongside with the emergence of new usages of the term ‘law’, and that by adopting a liberal criterion of lawfulness we would conform to contemporary usage and would cease inhibiting the search for regularities in the sciences of man.
The Natural System in Biology
Authors: Lorch J.
Published: November 2002

Prior to the advent of evolutionary theory the Natural System was generally conceived as based on “distinctions of kind, not consisting in a given number of definite properties” (J.S. Mill). It was considered final and unique, to be arrived at by more than one approach. Evolutionary theory has shifted emphasis to different characters, yet explicitly or implicitly the belief in a final natural system in biology persists in many textbooks and taints research. Allegedly natural systems are shown to be fundamentally arbitrary and artificial, dependent on numerous value judgments and intrinsically conflicting to varying degrees. Because of this and because it has turned into a bar to clear thinking, the adjective “natural” should be abolished.
Physical and Social Kinship
Authors: Barnes J. A.
Published: November 2002

Although this note is prompted by the recent exchange between Gellner [2], [3] and Needham [4], I shall ignore the issues raised by Gellner's specification for an ideal language. I am concerned here only with Needham's statement that ‘biology is one matter and descent is quite another, of a different order’ which, it will be remembered, Gellner treats as Needham's first error. I write under a sense of obligation, for I discussed this matter with Gellner in 1955 while he was preparing his first article and my arguments then were phrased similarly to those advanced by Needham. It appears that I did not make myself clear to Gellner and I shall try again. I do not wish to attack or defend either protagonist; each is quite able to look after himself. Therefore I propose neither to examine where they have misunderstood each other, nor to discuss the difference between kinship (Gellner's starting-point) and descent (Needham's), but simply to state the connexion, as I see it, between physical and social kinship.
Explanations and their Justifications
Authors: Weingartner Rudolph H.
Published: November 2002

Criticism of the deductive model of explanation continues. In a recent article, “Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanations,” Professor Michael Scriven hangs a great many critical points from the distinction between explanations and their justifications. I should like to examine his proposal with a view to showing that in so far as this distinction can be made, it cannot be used as a basis of criticisms of the deductive or covering law model, as it was originally outlined by Professor Carl G. Hempel.
Ontological Induction and the Logical Typology of Scientific Variables
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

It is widely agreed among philosophers of science today that no formal pattern can possibly be found in the origins of scientific theory. There is no such thing as a “logic of discovery,” insists this view—a scientific hypothesis is susceptible to methodological critique only in its relation to empirical consequences derived after the hypothesis itself has emerged through a spontaneous creative inspiration. Yet confronted with the tautly directed thrust of theory-building as actually practiced at the cutting edge of scientific research, this romantic denial of method in the genesis of ideas takes on the appearance of myth.

It is the contention of this article that as empirical data ramify in logical complexity, they deposit a hard sediment of theory according to a standard inductive pattern so primitively compelling that it must be recognized as one of the primary forms of inferential thought. This process, here called “ontological induction,” is a distillation out of unwieldly observed regularities of more conceptually tractable states hypothesized to underlie them, and is the wellspring of our beliefs in theoretical entities. Previous failure to recognize this pattern of induction has undoubtedly been in substantial measure a result of inadequate attention to the structural details of scientific propositions; for in order to exhibit the nature of ontological induction clearly, it is first necessary to make extended forays through sparsely explored methodological terrain—notably, the nature of scientific “variables,” the logical form of “laws,” and the type-hierarchy of scientific concepts.
Probability Concepts in Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Suppes Patrick
Published: November 2002

The fundamental problem considered is that of the existence of a joint probability distribution for momentum and position at a given instant. The philosophical interest of this problem is that for the potential energy functions (or Hamiltonians) corresponding to many simple experimental situations, the joint “distribution” derived by the methods of Wigner and Moyal is not a genuine probability distribution at all. The implications of these results for the interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle are analyzed. The final section consists of some observations concerning the axiomatic foundations of quantum mechanics.
The Concept of Information and the Unity of Science
Authors: Wilkinson John
Published: November 2002

An attempt is made in this paper to analyze the purely formal nature of information-theoretic concepts. The suggestion follows that such concepts, used to supplement the logical and mathematical structure of the language of science, represent an addition to this language of such a sort as to allow the use of a unitary language for the description of phenomena. (The alternative to this approach must be certain multi-linguistic and mutually untranslatable descriptions of related phenomena, as with the various versions of Complementarity).

This conception is tested for the specific case of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, in order to show that, with the assumption of a suitable and intuitively satisfactory definition of the quantity of information contained in a measurement, the Heisenberg Principle becomes an informational restriction arising from the formal properties of the symbols of a given language rather than as a “law” of nature.
Probabilities as Truth-Value Estimates
Authors: Leblanc Hugues
Published: November 2002

The author recently claimed that Pr(P, Q), where Pr is a probability function and P and Q are two sentences of a formalized language L, qualifies as an estimate—made in the light of Q—of the truth-value of P in L. To substantiate his claim, the author establishes here that the two strategies lying at the opposite extremes of the spectrum of truth-value estimating strategies meet the first five of the six requirements (R1-R6) currently placed upon probability functions and fail to meet the sixth one. He concludes from those two results that the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R5 must rate “minimally satisfactory” and the value for P and Q of any function satisfying R1-R6 must rate “satisfactory” as an estimate—made in the light of Q—of the truth-value of P in L.
Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation
Authors: Eberle Rolf , Kaplan David , Montague Richard
Published: November 2002

Hempel and Oppenheim, in their paper ‘The Logic of Explanation’, have offered an analysis of the notion of scientific explanation. The present paper advances considerations in the light of which their analysis seems inadequate. In particular, several theorems are proved with roughly the following content: between almost any theory and almost any singular sentence, certain relations of explainability hold.
Explanation Revisited
Authors: Kaplan David
Published: November 2002

In ‘Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation’, (see preceding article) Eberle, Kaplan, and Montague criticize the analysis of explanation offered by Hempel and Oppenheim in their ‘Studies in the Logic of Explanation’. These criticisms are shown to be related to the fact that Hempel and Oppenheim's analysis fails to satisfy simultaneously three newly proposed criteria of adequacy for any analysis of explanation. A new analysis is proposed which satisfies these criteria and thus is immune to the criticisms brought against the earlier analysis.
The Case Against Quantum Duality
Authors: Landé Alfred
Published: November 2002

(1) The idea that diffraction of matter particles can only be understood in terms of a temporary wave transformation or ‘double manifestation’ is an uneconomical ad hoc hypothesis, shattered already in 1923 by the unitary quantum theory of diffraction of Duane which in 1926 became part of the quantum mechanics, with a statistical interpretation of wave-like appearances.

(2) Bohr's re-interpretation of Heisenberg's uncertainty of prediction as an indeterminacy of existence rests on an illegitimate literal translation of a wave result into particle language which is at variance with experience as well as with the statistical interpretation.

(3) The fact that one can transform the simple and unitary particle mechanics into a complicated wavelike form is only a weak substitute for genuine dualism — as if one would see dualism in the transformability from the geo- to the heliocentric reference system.

(4) The strongest argument against a symmetry of the particle and the wave theory of matter is the explainability of the former in terms of simple postulates of invariance, leaving the wave formalism as a purely ad hoc construction.
Naming and Saying
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid
Published: November 2002

The essay adopts the Tractarian view that configurations of objects are expressed by configurations of names. Two alternatives are considered: The objects in atomic facts are (1) without exception particulars; (2) one or more particulars plus a universal (Gustav Bergmann). On (1) a mode of configuration is always an empirical relation: on (2) it is the logical nexus of ‘exemplification.’ It is argued that (1) is both Wittgenstein's view in the Tractatus and correct. It is also argued that exemplification is a ‘quasi-semantical’ relation, and that it (and universals) are “in the world” only in that broad sense in which the ‘world’ includes linguistic norms and roles viewed (thus in translating) from the standpoint of a fellow participant.
The Dematerialization of Matter
Authors: Hanson Norwood Russell
Published: November 2002

1. The philosophical version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a) the ‘real’ properties of matter, (b) the epistemology of sensation, and (c) a contrast challenged by Berkely as illusory.

The scientific version of the primary-secondary distinction concerns (a′) the physical properties of matter, (b′) a contrast essential within the history of atomism, and (c′) a contrast challenged by 20th century microphysics as de facto untenable.

2. The primary-secondary distinction within physics can be interpreted in two ways:

a. it can refer to content; e.g. ‘Matter has the properties of mass, shape, density… etc. — it only appears to have the properties of warmth, fragrance, etc.’ Or,

b. it can refer to form; e.g. ‘Whatever properties our best theories accord to primary matter, e.g., electrons, these are by definition primary. All other properties of, e.g., macromatter, are derivative.’

Concerning 2.a., this interpretation is simply false when 17th, 18th, or 19th century values for the property-variables are introduced. Concerning 2.b., this either uninformative or misleading. It is uninformative when it constitutes no more than a decision to use the word ‘primary’ as an umbrella-word for all the properties contemporary micro-physics accords to fundamental material particles, whatever these may be. It is misleading when it turns on an implicit contrast between certain properties particles may be said to have when ‘harnessed’ to a detector, and certain other properties these particles have when free and unharnessed to any detector. This contrast does not exist. Quantum-theoretic information is always about particles-and-their-detectors-in-combination. Dissolve this combination and you destroy any possible knowledge of the particle. Hence the notion of ‘completely objectifiable properties of particles’ is in principle unsound. (Cf. Hanson, American Journal of Physics, 27 January, 1959).
On the Seriousness of Mistakes
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: November 2002

Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense—i.e., in a sense which reduces “accepting P” to “acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O”. In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of “accepting a hypothesis”; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced.
Postulates and Meaning
Authors: Madden Edward H. , Kiteley Murray J.
Published: November 2002

Most philosophers of science nowadays hold a network or postulational view of the meaning of theoretical words. However, there are many nuances to this view, and after explicitly separating them, we show what we take to be wrong with each one. While we reject the postulational view we do not defend its traditional alternatives either; rather we show the pointlessness of insisting on a single source for the meaning of theoretical words. We also point out the shortcomings of Carnap's newest meaning criterion which depends upon a network view. But, again, we suggest not only that this new rendition of the criterion is faulty but also that there is something misguided about any search at all for such a criterion.
The Role of Teleonomy in Evolution
Authors: De Laguna Grace A.
Published: November 2002

The papers presented at the Chicago Darwin Centennial suggest a fresh approach to the philosophical problem of ends in nature. In order to avoid the implications of “teleology,” assumed to refer only to the process of evolution as directed towards goals, the discussants use “teleonomy” in reference to the biological organism as end-directed (for reproduction). They accept “teleonomy” only as descriptive, and neglect its significance for theory.

The present thesis is that each of the three recognized phases of universal evolution: inorganic, organic, and post-organic initiated by the advent of man and his culture, is characterized and made possible by the emergence of a distinctive type of teleonomic organization. While the process of evolutionary change is not itself end-directed to any goal, the end-directed structures which arise are not only “in nature” but are themselves crucial factors in evolution, since it is on them that natural selection operates. By using the concept of teleonomy, it is argued, one can avoid the issue of “mechanism” versus “teleology.”
Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and Prediction, and Mechanism Versus Teleology
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Three major ways in which temporal asymmetries enter into scientific induction are discussed as follows:

1. An account is given of the physical basis for the temporal asymmetry of recordability, which obtains in the following sense: except for humanly recorded predictions and one other class of advance indicators to be discussed, interacting systems can contain reliable indicators of only their past and not of their future interactions. To deal with the exceptional cases of non-spontaneous “pre-records,” a clarification is offered of the essential differences in the conditions requisite to the production of an indicator having retrodictive significance (“post-record”), on the one hand, and of one having predictive significance (“prerecord” or recorded prediction), on the other. Purported counter-examples to the asymmetry of spontaneous recordability are refuted.

2. It is shown how in cases of asymmetric recordability, the associated retrodiction-prediction asymmetry makes for an asymmetry of assertibility as between an explanandum (or an explanans) referring to a future event and one referring to a past one. But it is argued that this epistemological asymmetry in the assertibility per se must be clearly distinguished from a logical asymmetry between the past and the future in regard to the inferability (deductive or inductive) of the explanandum from the explanans. And it is then contended that the failure to distinguish between an epistemological and a logical asymmetry vitiates the critiques that recent writers have offered of the Popper-Hempel thesis, which affirms symmetry of inferability as between predictive and post-explanatory arguments. In reply to Scriven, it is maintained that predictions based on mere indicators (rather than causes) do not establish an asymmetry in scientific understanding as between predictive arguments and post-explanatory ones.

3. As a further philosophical ramification of the retrodiction-prediction asymmetry, a set of sufficient conditions are stated for the correctness of philosophical mechanism as opposed to teleology.
Evidence and Events in History
Authors: Goldstein Leon J.
Published: November 2002

The first part of the paper distinguishes between a real past which has nothing to do with historical events and an historical past made up of hypothetical events introduced for the purpose of explaining historical evidence. Attention is next paid to those so-called ancillary historical disciplines which study historical evidence, and it is noted that the historical event is brought in to explain the particular constellation of different kinds of historical evidence which are judged to belong together. The problem of explaining events is then taken up, and an attempt is made to defend the view that such explanation must presuppose general laws. And this is followed by a discussion, partly speculative, of social-historical laws. The final section of the paper tries to argue that the subjective intentions of individuals are irrelevant to historical explanation.
Science and the Problem of PSI
Authors: Shewmaker Kenneth L. , Berenda Carlton W.
Published: November 2002

Some issues raised by parapsychological phenomena (psi) are examined in the light of their implications for a philosophy of science. It is shown that the kinds of problems psi poses for science vary with the way one conceives of science as well as one's conception of psi. It is suggested that psi may be a product of the fact that all of our scientific concepts are abstractions and therefore oversimplifications. This raises the possibility that our best conceptual technique for dealing with psi is a non-discursive symbolism, since this would not demand “classes” (oversimplification). Implications of this approach are considered.
An Objective Approach to Measurement of Behavior
Authors: Delgado R. Rodriguez , Delgado J. M. R.
Published: November 2002

Theoretical problems concerning concepts of systems and measurement of behavior were encountered during experimental studies of the effects of electrical stimulation of the brain on the social behavior of a monkey colony. General problems involved in the description and measurement of behavior of natural systems, and especially of organisms are discussed.

In animals with differentiated brain the general process of stimulation may be divided into four subprocesses: input, throughput, transput and output.

Categories of behavior, temporal and spatial units, and logical rules of homogeneity for sorting data and comparing measurements and categories, are discussed. Simple behavioral units are divided into: 1. Individuala.static or posturalb.dynamic or gestural 2. Sociala.staticb.dynamic. Complex behavior is divided into: 1. Simultaneous 2. Sequential 3. Syntactic 4. Roles.

The process of interpretation of data by the observer is assumed to be dependent upon actual behavior of the system, techniques of observation and experimentation, theoretical and technical processes of analysis, and synthesis and integration of data. Expression of behavior in mathematical terms insures greater accuracy than descriptive methods and enables data to be processed with computers.
The Lorentz-Formulae and the Metrical Principle
Authors: Törnebohm Håkan
Published: November 2002

The Lorentz-formulae are deduced from three factual statements the physical meaning of which is explained in terms of operations with clocks, light-signals and measuring rods. These statements are:

(1) The time-length of a process is invariant.

(2) The velocity of light is the same in all inertial systems.

(3) The velocity of light is independent of the source.

It is also shown that these statements can be deduced from the Lorentz-formulae. They are the physical content of the latter.

The principle of relativity and the light-principle together, however, contain more physical meaning than the Lorentz-formulae.

Operational definitions are given for all relevant concepts.
Whewell and Mill on Induction
Authors: Walsh Harold T.
Published: November 2002

Much of the Mill-Whewell dispute was purely verbal, but much was not. Mill did not understand Whewell; the true character of the non-verbal aspect of the controversy emerges only upon adequate analysis of Whewell's actual position. Such analysis shows that Mill's objections to Whewell were misdirected, although suggestive of other which might, if prosecuted, carry. Ultimately, the dispute has to do with the given; neither man gives an adequate account of it. For this reason, the controversy cannot be resolved definitively in favor of either of them.
Perceptual Events, States, and Processes
Authors: Myers Charles M.
Published: November 2002

The notion that there is a category mistake or some other conceptual confusion in regarding seeing, hearing, and other forms of perception as events, states, or processes is incorrect. Ryle's analysis of “seeing” as an achievement word does not rule out our regarding seeing as an event, but in fact suggests that we do so when we carry the analysis beyond the point where Ryle leaves it. Furthermore there are uses of “see” not noticed by Ryle which justify our saying that within certain contexts seeing is a state and within other contexts a process. The question of what these events, states, and processes are cannot be met without recognizing a fundamental duality of aspect that characterizes perception. This duality can be formulated in terms of the way perception is known. One who observes a perceiver knows the perceiver's perception in a categorically different way than the perceiver knows it. From this it can be seen that perceptual events, states, and processes have both a physical aspect and an epistemological aspect. Any attempt to reduce one of these aspects to the other would involve a category mistake.
The Dual Character of Marxian Social Science
Authors: Hodges Donald Clark
Published: November 2002

For the purpose of understanding recent developments in Soviet historiography, it is necessary to consider its philosophical basis in the classic works of Marx and Engels. Especially pertinent are the normative orientations and epistemic foundations of Marxian social science, and the relevance of scientific socialism and historical materialism to the leading principles of not only Marxian historiography, but also political economy. Of basic importance is the dual commitment of socialist humanism to both the common good and the partisan interests of a particular class, and the dual character of materialist dialectics in its effort to be scientifically impartial and intellectually partisan at the same time. Also revealing is the high degree of correlation between “vulgar Marxist” partisanship in the social sciences and ultra-leftist heterodoxy and between “formalism” or “academicism” in social science and revisionist political persuasions.
Marxism and the New Physics
Authors: Mattick Paul
Published: November 2002

Although the ideological struggle between the East and the West has been carried into the natural sciences, the author contends that there is no connection between Marxism and physical theory, whether deterministic or indeterministic. Marxism, which concerns itself with social theory, deals with physical theory only in so far as it is used for specific class purposes instead of social needs. Marxism does not derive its social theory, as has been asserted, either from, or by analogy with, physical processes, nor does it read “social laws” of development into nature. The attempt to do so by way of “dialectical materialism” must be regarded as a Marxist aberration. The author deals with the history of this aberration and with the reasons for its persistency in Marxism-Leninism.
On Teaching Marxist Epistemology
Authors: Dunham Barrows
Published: November 2002

Materialism is the view that existence does not necessarily involve perceiving or being perceived, knowing or being known. Dialectics is the view that the universe is a system of entities in process of change, the dynamic arising from the impact of the parts on one another. The epistemology of Dialectical Materialism (Marxism) is therefore the view that truth (i.e. the correspondence of a sentence with fact) can be determined by the following rule: “Examine any alleged state of affairs as related to and distinguished from a total environment, and you will know whether or not the sentence alleging that state of affairs is true.”

No special pedagogy is required for Marxist epistemology: the only rule is the usual rule of honesty and candor which bids us teach every subject as that subject actually is.
Some Observations on the Neglect of the Sociology of Science
Authors: Ehrlich Howard J.
Published: November 2002

This paper represents an attempt to analyze the basis for the lack of interest and study in the sociology of science within American sociology and within American society. An attempt is first made to indicate the divergence between the meta-sociology of the sociologist of knowledge and contemporary American sociology; and in a derivative manner to indicate the way in which divergent meta-sociologies may lead to different claims about the relationship of science and society. Secondly, an attempt is made to show how the prestige position of the sociologist and the clarity of his status with regard to natural science may also be construed as grounds for the neglect of this field of inquiry.
The Historical-Philosophical Basis for Uniting Social Science with Social Problem-Solving
Authors: Goodwin Leonard
Published: November 2002

Social scientific development has been greatly influenced by Galilean-Newtonian thought which emphasized formulation of abstract hypotheses valid throughout all time and space and independent of human characteristics. This influence has resulted in an artificial hiatus between social science and social problem-solving. Dissolution of certain Galilean-Newtonian assumptions has opened the way for integrating aspects of another stream of thought, the Hegelian-Marxian one, into the social scientific endeavor. Hegelian-Marxian thought emphasizes the individual becoming self-conscious of, and involved in, the social-historical process. The uniting of certain aspects of Galilean-Newtonian and Hegelian-Marxian thought provides a genuinely experimental social science in which abstract hypothesis-testing is united with social action that is based on persons’ awareness of relevant hypotheses viewed in historical perspective.
On Establishing Necessary Human Abilities and Disabilities
Authors: McGill V. J.
Published: November 2002

This is a discussion of the claim by certain recent philosophers to have established universal human abilities and disabilities on “logical” grounds, or as a priori necessary. These traits would be independent of empirical conditions, and not of the sort which could be disproved by psychology which, accordingly, would share its field with the a priori philosopher. The author agues, using a series of examples, that these supposed traits do, or could, vary with empirical conditions, and that it is unlikely that in this psychological area there is any good alternative to inductive methods.
Measurements and Quantum States: Part I
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

Although there is a complete consensus among working physicists with respect to the practical and operational meanings of quantum states, and also a rather loosely formulated general philosophic view called the Copenhagen interpretation, a great deal of confusion and divergence of opinions exist as to the details of the measurement process and its effects upon quantum states. This paper reviews the current expositions of the measurement problem, limiting itself for lack of space primarily to the writings of physicists; it calls attention to inconsistencies and proposes resolutions. Except for a summary of the properties of statistical matrices which are needed in Part II, the first part is non-mathematical and deals largely with two kinds of probability, reducible and irreducible probabilities, which need to be distinguished for a proper understanding of the measurement act.
Confirmation Theory, Order, and Periodicity
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: November 2002

This paper examines problems of order and periodicity which arise when the attempt is made to define a confirmation function for a language containing elementary number theory as applied to a universe in which the individuals are considered to be arranged in some fixed order. Certain plausible conditions of adequacy are stated for such a confirmation function. By the construction of certain types of predicates, it is proved, however, that these conditions of adequacy are violated by any confirmation function defined for the type of language in question.

Various possible solutions to these difficulties are explored and found tobe inadequate. In particular, a proposal which stems from the suggestion to restrict a fundamental principle of confirmation to hypotheses containing only non-positional predicates is cited. This proposal, however, is shown to prevent confirmation functions from taking periodicities into account, and so is deemed unsatisfactory. A general theorem is proved to the effect that if non-positional predicates are taken to satisfy the conditions of adequacy which have been formulated, then no periodicity predicates whatsoever (i.e., predicates used in formulating hypotheses which foretell periodicities) can be subject to these conditions, on pain of contradiction. Yet it seems that periodicity predicates must be subject to these conditions of adequacy if a confirmation function is to recognize periodic occurrences. Thus, an impasse seems to be reached.

In the final sections we consider the beginnings of one possible solution to these difficulties. Our proposal involves treating sets of individuals, rather than individuals themselves, as instances, of an hypothesis which predicts a periodicity. On this basis we formulate new conditions of adequacy which are free from the previous difficulties and which will permit a confirmation function that satisfies them to take periodicities into account.
Truth-Valued Fluents and Qualitative Laws
Authors: Seall Robert E.
Published: November 2002

In this paper, some qualitative scientific laws are treated in a way that is analogous to the method by which Karl Menger has clarified the nature of quantitative laws such as Boyle's law about ideal gases. The qualitative analogue of the number-valued fluents, such as temperature, are fluents whose domains consist of physical objects while their values are T and F (true and false).
The Scientists’ Criterion of True Observation
Authors: Ellson D. G.
Published: November 2002

A theory of true observation is developed as a generalization of the method of inter-observer agreement that scientists use to determine the objectivity and reliability of observations. A true observation is defined as a statement included in a set of statements in which there is statistical dependence and perfect agreement between the statements made by a universe of experimentally independent persons. Meaningfulness—the existence of an objective referent—for each form of statement included in the set is inferred from statistical dependence, correct meaning within the universe of observers from the absence of disagreement. In this theory truth is inferred from a spatio-temporal pattern of statements as behavior rather than from the traditional correspondence between observation and object or logical relationships among statements.
Truth Preference and Neuter Propositions
Authors: King-Farlow John
Published: November 2002

Tarski's equivalence, as he allows, applies only roughly to assertions in ordinary language. Some of the relevant exceptions are of merely grammatical importance but others leave scope for interesting metaphysical pronouncements on science, mathematics and other fields of assertion. To understand these latter exceptions is to gain insight into Baylis’ and Lukasiewicz’ views on the question “Are some Propositions neither True nor False?” (this journal, 1936). From different standpoints each is right and each is wrong. This comment also applies to some later contributions to their controversy.
The Law of Inertia: A Philosopher's Touchstone
Authors: Hanson Norwood Russell
Published: November 2002

The conceptual excitement of science often seems geared only to work in contemporary physics. Thus, philosophers regularly discuss current cosmology, relativity, or the foundations of microphysics. In these areas one's philosophy is stretched and strained far beyond what our ancestors might have anticipated. Historians of science have also focused attention on past events by remarking their analogies and similarities with perplexities in physics today.

But there are statements, hypotheses and theories of the past which are rewarding in themselves, without having to be referred to the agonies which now confound quantum theory and cosmology. Specifically, the First Law of Motion—the “Law of Inertia”—this has everything a logician of science could look for. Understanding the complexities and perplexities of this fundamental mechanical statement is in itself to gain insight into what theoretical physics in general really is. With this in view a study of the law is undertaken.
Performance, Purpose, and Permission
Authors: Martin R. M.
Published: November 2002

In this paper we attempt to formulate logical foundations for a theory of actions or performance. Human beings act in various ways, and their actions are intimately interrelated with their use of language. But precisely how actions and the use of language are interrelated is not very clear. One of the reasons is perhaps that we have no precise vocabulary in terms of which such interrelations may be handled. There is need for developing a systematic theory in which different kinds of actions may be discussed, contrasted, and compared. Then the various interrelations between actions and linguistic usage may perhaps be discussed rather more carefully and thoroughly than heretofore.

Although much important preliminary work has been done in the analysis of actions, no one it seems has attempted to develop a strict logical theory for such analysis. A few tentative and programmatic steps were taken in the author's Toward a Systematic Pragmatics.1 Let us attempt here to improve those and take a few more. Any first attempts of this kind are of course fraught with difficulties. There inevitably will be some oversimplification or some overelaboration here or there. Ultimately of course we are interested in interrelating performance with various notions from syntax, semantics, and quantitative pragmatics.2 But this is not easy and only a few tentative suggestions toward such a development can be given here.

In § 1 the distinction between action-kinds and action-events is drawn, and the character of the primitive or primitives needed for the theory of performance is discussed. In § 2 some further notions are then defined. Certain Rules of Performance are suggested in § 3. In § 4 there is discussion of the somewhat tenuous notion of acceptance as a basis for action. In § 5 the fundamental notions required for Parsons and Shils’ theory of social action is discussed briefly. In § 6 we attempt to define the two basic notions required in Leonard's recent papers concerning authorship and purpose. Finally, in § 7, the theory of performance is interrelated with von Wright's deontic logic, in which such notions as permission and obligation are considered.
Measurements and Quantum States: Part II
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

This is the second, mathematically more detailed part of a paper consisting of two articles, the first having appeared in the immediately preceding issue of this Journal∗. It shows that a measurement converts a pure case into a mixture with reducible probabilities. The measurement as such permits no inference whatever as to the state of the physical system subjected to measurement after the measurement has been performed. But because the probabilities after the act are classical and therefore reducible, it is often possible to adjust them so that Von Neumann's projection postulate is true.

Among the more specific features dealt with in Part II is the occurrence of negative joint probabilities for the measurement of non-commuting operators in certain (not all!) quantum states. The general conclusions reached are stated at the end of the article.
Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: November 2002

Confirmation theorists seek to define a function that will take into account the various factors relevant in determining the degree to which an hypothesis is confirmed by its evidence. Among confirmation theorists, only Rudolf Carnap has constructed a system which purports to consider factors in addition to the number of instances, viz. the variety manifested by the instances and the amount of analogy between the instances. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the problem which these additional factors raise for confirmation theory, and to prove that, despite Carnap's claim, no confirmation function satisfying the requirements he has specified can take account of variety and analogy. This result is first proved for a special case, and then, in a subsequent section, is generalized through the introduction of a theorem (the proof of which is given in Appendix I). In the final section of the paper it is shown that, contrary to a claim which Carnap has made, not even the concept of the “logical width” of a predicate will enable confirmation functions satisfying his requirements to take adequate account of analogies between instances.
Variety, Analogy, and Periodicity in Inductive Logic
Authors: Carnap Rudolf
Published: November 2002

Peter Achinstein gives in his papers [1] and [2] interesting analyses of some problems of inductive logic and of some approaches I have proposed. I shall discuss here some of these problems in order to clarify my present position. My comments will mainly concern the variety of instances, and only briefly the analogy influence, and the inductive methods for a coordinate language.
A Neglected Proposal Concerning Simplicity
Authors: Ackermann Robert
Published: November 2002

This paper is intended to explore Jeffrey's proposal for the measurement of the simplicity of scientific laws. The first part is a sketch of Jeffreys’ development of a view on simplicity, which will be followed by a discussion of what seem to be some rather crucial defects in the proposal as it stands. It will be suggested here that no plausible way of countering these defects seems available.
Nature and Society in Social Anthropology
Authors: Gellner Ernest
Published: November 2002

This article is concerned to argue that the social sciences and notably social anthropology, must necessarily be concerned with the physical environment of the societies investigated (which includes the biological nature of its members), and not only with the social reality which is at the centre of their concern. This is argued with special reference to fields such as kinship and politics, and to social relationships such as paternity or feuding. The article is concerned to refute arguments put forward in support of the logical autonomy of social studies, particularly in the sphere of kinship, in earlier articles by Barnes and Needham.
On Vindicating Induction
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

This paper deals with the problem of vindicating a particular type of inductive rule, a rule to govern inferences from observed frequencies to limits of relative frequencies. Reichenbach's rule of induction is defended. By application of two conditions, normalizing conditions and a criterion of linguistic invariance, it is argued that alternative rules lead to contradiction. It is then argued that the rule of induction does not lead to contradiction when suitable restrictions are placed upon the predicates admitted. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is considered, and an attempt to resolve it is offered. Finally, Reichenbach's pragmatic argument, hinging on convergence properties, is applied.
The Mathematical Philosophy of Giuseppe Peano
Authors: Kennedy Hubert C.
Published: November 2002

Because Bertrand Russell adopted much of the logical symbolism of Peano, because Russell always had a high regard for the great Italian mathematician, and because Russell held the logicist thesis so strongly, many English-speaking mathematicians have been led to classify Peano as a logicist, or at least as a forerunner of the logicist school. An attempt is made here to deny this by showing that Peano's primary interest was in axiomatics, that he never used the mathematical logic developed by him for the reduction of mathematical concepts to logical concepts, and that, instead, he denied the validity of such a reduction.
A Model for Applying Information and Utility Functions
Authors: Harrah David
Published: November 2002

If the currently available theories of semantic information and utility-expectation are to be applied in a satisfactory way, they must be combined with a message-processing procedure. This paper presents a model of communication within which such a procedure can be defined. In this model the sender's messages arrive over a period of time, the receiver can reject some messages and retain others, the receiver can change his mind in various ways, and the receiver can apply various evaluation functions to a “usable message total”. As one example of message-evaluation, a system for evaluating news-value is presented.
A Commentary on “Radical Behaviorism”
Authors: Johnson Rochelle J.
Published: November 2002

B. F. Skinner is perhaps even more widely known for his views on science than for his experimental work. His comments on the role of theory in science have been labeled “anti-theoretical,” “ultra-empirical”, “non-theoretical,” “radical,” and worse. His position appears to be both extreme and untenable. Scriven [1] has given us a critique of Skinner that goes beyond mere labeling; it is an examination of the assumptions and implications of such a position.
On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanation
Authors: Kim Jaegwon
Published: November 2002

Hempel and Oppenheim have stated in Part III of their paper “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” [2] a set of conditions for deductive explanation. However, their analysis has come under damaging systematic criticisms in a recent paper by Eberle, Kaplan and Montague [1], The principal aim of the present paper is to review the Hempel-Oppenheim analysis and propose a strengthened version of it that avoids the recent criticisms.
Remarks on the Language of Physics
Authors: Myhill John
Published: November 2002

A notation for the language of physics is given, and a system of axioms constructed. It is argued that from the standpoint of a ‘realistic’ ontology our method is preferable to Carnap's ‘coordinate languages.’ The primitive ideas are the part-whole relation μ and the set ℜ of coordinate systems. Only such statements are intended in the axioms as are non-controversial; i.e. no open cosmological questions are prejudged.
Meaning and Action
Authors: Brodbeck May
Published: November 2002

This paper examines the current variant of the view that meaningful human actions are not amenable to causal, scientific explanation. Rather, the view examined holds that, understanding the language, we understand the meaning of other people's overt acts by analyzing the concepts appropriately applied to the situation, tracing their logical connections with other mentalistic concepts. A matter of conceptual analysis, our understanding of man is held to be a priori and necessary rather than, as with the natural sciences, a posteriori and contingent.

Various uses of ‘concept’, ‘meaning’, and ‘understanding’ are here distinguished. It is then shown, first, how the objectivist can in principle account for intentionality and for “rule-governed” behavior, that is, for the presence and efficacy of mind in the world. Secondly, current criticisms of the objectivist program are examined. An uncritical use of ‘concept’ and of ‘rule’, as well as a fusion of various uses of ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’, gives those criticisms a specious plausibility that does not withstand close analysis. It is concluded that the objectivist program has not been shown to be untenable.
Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains, and Problems in the Theory of Scientific Explanation and Prediction
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

Recent discussions in the philosophy of science have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of conceptual issues relating to the methodology of explanation and prediction in the sciences. Part of this literature has been devoted to clarifying the very ideas of explanation and prediction. But the discussion has also ranged over various related topics, including the status of laws to be used for explanatory and predictive purposes, the logical interrelationships between explanatory and predictive reasonings, the differences in the strategy of explanatory argumentation in different branches of science, the nature and possibility of teleological explanation, etc. The aim of the present article is to examine the issues involved in such questions from the specialized perspective afforded by one particular kind of physical systems—namely, systems, here to be characterized as discrete state systems, whose behavior has been studied extensively in the scientific literature under the general heading of Markov chains. These systems have been chosen as our focus because their behavior over time can be analyzed at once with great ease and with extraordinary precision.