bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Unknown Probabilities, Bayesianism, and de Finetti's Representation Theorem
Authors: Hintikka Jaakko
Published: January 2016

In the development of the theory of subjective probability and in discussions about it an important role has been played by de Finetti's representation theorem and by a number of related results presented in de Finetti's classic monograph. This theorem, together with the notion of exchangeability (among its aliases there are the terms equivalence, permutability, and symmetry), was originally put forward by Bruno de Finetti as a solution to a problem to which his subjectivistic interpretation of probability had led him. Although this theorem is mentioned in many expositions of the theory of subjective probability, there are not many satisfactory discussions of its significance available to philosophers. (The best one, and almost the only one, is Braithwaite's paper ‘On Unknown Probabilities’.)
Method and Factual Agreement in Science
Authors: McLaughlin Andrew
Published: January 2016

One important view of the nature of facts in science sees the validity of factual claims as resting upon intersubjective agreement through observation, yet the conditions underlying such intersubjectivity are rarely explored. In this paper I should like to inquire into the role of shared method in arriving at intersubjective agreement concerning fact. One useful way of exploring this issue is to examine the methodological element in factual disputes in science, since such controversy may indicate important aspects of factual agreement.

There are times in science when an appeal to factual evidence is successful in the choice between hypotheses. In fact it is clear that, at least on some occasions, there is agreement among scientists as to “what the facts are.” Moreover, such factual agreement can be found between scientists who maintain quite different theories.
Objectivity, Scientific Change, and Self-Reference
Authors: Carl R. Kordig
Published: January 2016

Kuhn, Feyerabend, Polanyi, and Whorf would at times maintain that scientific objectivity is a myth. Kuhn writes:

We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigms carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth. ([10], p. 169)

He says that he

…would argue, rather, that in these matters neither proof nor error is at issue. ([10], p. 150)

On the basis of his interpretation of the history of science, Polanyi, also, feels that in a strong sense scientific knowledge is not objective ([11], p. 16). On the basis of his study of widely differing languages Whorf makes a similar claim:

The relativity of all conceptual systems, ours included, and their dependence upon language stand revealed. ([15], pp. 214-215)
On Popper's Philosophy of Social Science
Authors: Koertge N.
Published: January 2016

Partly through reading the works of Paul Feyerabend I have become intrigued with the following questions:

(1)

Is it possible to have a non-trivial theory of scientific method - that is, a fairly detailed and comprehensive theory of the best way(s) to try to increase and improve our knowledge? Is it possible to have a unified theory which would apply both to physical science and social science, and perhaps even to technological innovation as well?

(2)

If we could find such a theory of the scientific process, how would it have to be modified if we were to decide that our aim were not just ultimately to understand the world (i.e., to find well-tested explanatory theories of high empirical content) but also continually to change the world - to improve the human condition?
Thermodynamics, Statistical Mechanics and the Complexity of Reductions
Authors: Sklar Lawrence
Published: January 2016

That reductions of theories and unifications of science frequently occur by means of identifications is a widely accepted hypothesis of methodology. Usually we are concerned with the micro-reductions of things, in which an entity is identified with a structured aggregate of smaller constituents. And, it is frequently alleged, we must also take into account further identifications in which the attributes of the macro-object, expressed by predicates in the macro-theory, are identified with attributes of the aggregate of micro-entities differently expressed by predicates of the micro- or reducing theory.

I am fundamentally in strong agreement with this view, but intend here to explore one case of inter-theoretic reduction where some important qualifications of this account of reduction are in order. Philosophical scepticism is frequently encountered as to the possibility of ever making coherent sense of the notion of attribute identification. This scepticism often shows itself in the opposition to the identificatory account of the reduction of the theory of mental states to that of neurological states.
Evolutionary Rationality
Authors: Skolimowski Henryk
Published: January 2016

It may sound strange, if not heretical to suggest, as I wish to do, that there is no such thing as the rationality of science. At best we can talk about rationalities of science. Both historically and contemporarily we have used different criteria for explaining and justifying the alleged rationality of science. By giving different criteria for the justification of rationality, we ipso facto constitute different scopes for rationality.

This immediately poses the question. If so, which of these criteria are more “justifiable” than others ? Which rationality is preferable to other rationalities ? Now the point is that in justifying a set of criteria which would elucidate for us a given concept of rationality, in other words, in outlining the scope of a given rationality, we do so by resorting to some kind of rationality. And it would be strange if the hidden rationality we resort to, in order to justify the explicit one, would be much different from the explicit one.
The Conventionality of Slow-Transport Synchrony
Authors: Bowman Peter A.
Published: January 2016

The conventionality of distant simultaneity, as maintained by Hans Reichenbach and Adolf Grünbaum, is by now so widely known that it can be stated very briefly. Let us consider two points A and B which are separated from one another in an inertial frame K. For a light signal emitted from A and reflected at B back to A, we compare the time interval for the out-going trip to that for the round trip. This ratio is called ‘epsilon’ (∊). In formulating the special theory of relativity, Einstein effectively took ∊ to be ½; thus, we may use ∊=½ in defining what is now called ‘standard signal synchrony’. Reichenbach views 6 as being restricted only by the causal relations involved in the signaling process.
What is the Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?
Authors: Demopoulos William
Published: January 2016

Let me begin by briefly explaining the concept of ‘interpretation’ relevant to this discussion.

Certain physical theories postulate abstract structural constraints which events are held to satisfy. Such theories are termed ‘principle theories’. Interpretations of principle theories aim to explain their relation to the theories they replace. Interpretations are therefore concerned with the nature of the transitions between theories.

Theories of space-time structure provide the most accessible illustration of principle theories. For example, Newtonian mechanics in the absence of gravitation represents the 4-dimensional geometry of space-time by the inhomogeneous Galilean group, which acts transitively in the class of free motions, i.e. the inhomogeneous Galilean group is the symmetry group of the free motions: it is a subgroup of the symmetry group of every mechanical system, and the largest such subgroup. Einstein’s special principle of relativity is the hypothesis that the symmetry group of the free motions is the Poincaré group.
Rationality and the Social Sciences
Authors: Moor James H.
Published: January 2016

In this paper I will propose and defend a view of rationality which bears on three important issues in the philosophy of the social sciences. First, there is the issue of the nature of the principle of rationality in the social sciences. When the principle of rationality is formulated as an interesting empirical generalization, it seems false; but when the principle of rationality is formulated in a way which is clearly defensible and true, it seems trivially tautologous ([A],pp. 172-178). Secondly, there is the issue of the criteria for a rational action. When the criteria for a rational action are made relative to a culture, there is an implausibly large number of standards for judging rationality; but when the criteria for a rational action are not made relative to a culture, there is an implausibly small number of rational actions ([5], pp. 94-111).
Reconstructed Science as Philosophical Evidence
Authors: Maull Nancy L.
Published: January 2016

Since there is a philosophy of science, it is not surprising that philosophers make use of case studies from the history of science in their work. However, the uses to which such case studies can be put depend on important, but not always acknowledged, ideas about how to understand science. According to one view, philosophy provides a theoretically precise account of science,and case studies are the raw material which, when reinterpreted according to a theoretical account, illustrate that account. Thus, just as formal logic is sometimes said to reduce ordinary language to a fixed and, from one standpoint, more convenient form, so the philosophy of science is often thought to perform a similar function for science. But other philosophers, with different ideas about how to understand science, think that case studies from the history of science can provide evidence for philosophy's claims about (scientific) rationality.
Evolution, Human Behavior, and Determinism
Authors: Alexander Richard D.
Published: January 2016

Many of you know that there have been some dramatic theoretical changes in evolutionary biology during the past decade, and that sharp controversies have generated over whether or not, and how, they might be useful in our efforts to understand human behavior. It seems appropriate that these questions should be addressed at a meeting of philosophers of science.

Those of you who are aware of the controversies may agree that they have not always clarified the issues — at least not to a degree commensurate with the intensity of the feelings aroused. The word socioblology, for example, could have become simply a label for a new and broad interest in evolutionary approaches to social behavior. Instead, almost exactly like a predecessor, ethology, it has become associated with a concept of naive and intolerable determinism, and sometimes with only a few statements by one man about the genetic background of behavior.
Sociobiology — A Caricature of Darwinism
Authors: Lewontin R. C.
Published: January 2016

Darwin's theory of evolution by means of natural selection is an extremely powerful explanatory device. For its rigorous application to any phenomenon it requires only that some form of variation in the manifestation of the phenomenon exists, that the variations can persist in time, and that the properties of the variants cause them to have different average persistence times. So, for example, one could make a Darwinian explanation of the frequency of different sorts of rocks. There is variation in the hardness of rocks, they persist in time and indeed are being formed anew, and the harder rocks are more “adapted” to survive the weathering and erosion of wind and water. A similar story can be told about political parties, rumors, jokes, stars and discarded soft drink containers.
Truth and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge
Authors: Hesse Mary
Published: January 2016

This paper is a reaction to two themes in recent history and philosophy of science. The first is the revival in philosophy of language of interest in truth and meaning, which relates to problems long discussed in philosophy of science. My tentative conclusion here is that tools are now available for the solution of these traditional problems, but that the detailed discussion by philosophers of language tends to by-pass philosophy of science, chiefly because it does not take sufficiently seriously questions about truth and meaning in theories and above all the question of radical theory change. A second theme, which is more implicit than explicit in this paper, concerns the fashionable tendency in post-Kuhnian philosophy of science for discussing philosophical problems in terms of case histories. These discussions have been motivated by the desire to avoid the threat of relativism and to restore rationality to theoretical science.
Some Remarks about Complexity
Authors: Suppes Patrick
Published: January 2016

My remarks on Nelson and Simon are directed not so much at criticisms of what they have had to say as at questions generated by reading and studying what they have written. I also emphasize that my questions are genuine questions. They are not a rhetorical device for stating my own clear and definite views on the nature of complex systems. I have organized these remarks under seven headings.

Although the official title of our symposium is “Complex Fuzzy Systems,” neither Nelson nor Simon spends any time on what it means to say that a system is not merely a complex system but a complex fuzzy system. Presumably, the organizers of the symposium had in mind the concept of fuzzy introduced by Zadeh.
Discoveries and The Emergence of New Fields in Science
Authors: Darden Lindley
Published: January 2016

Understanding the growth of scientific knowledge is a central problem in philosophy of science today, a part of which takes the form of understanding how new knowledge arises and how it becomes unified with existing knowledge. As a way of tackling this problem, one may ask: how do new fields arise in science? And how is the knowledge in a new field related to that in other fields?

In recent work I characterized a scientific field as an area of science consisting of the following elements: a central problem, a domain of items taken to be facts related to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and concepts, laws and theories related to the problem which attempt to realize the explanatory goals (p. 44). Also in that work, my coauthor and I discussed interfield theories which serve to link two fields by postulating specific kinds of relations between them.
Four Contributions Values Can Make to the Objectivity of Social Science
Authors: Harding Sandra G.
Published: January 2016

In his intellectual autobiography, Rudolf Carnap describes a dispute between Otto Neurath and the rest of the members of the Vienna Circle.

All of us in the Circle were strongly interested in social and political progress. Most of us, myself included, were socialists. But we liked to keep our philosophical work separated from our political aims. In our view, logic, including applied logic, and the theory of knowledge, the analysis of language, and the methodology of science, are, like science itself, neutral with respect to practical aims, whether they are moral aims for the individual, or political aims for a society. Neurath criticized strongly this neutralist attitude, which in his opinion gave aid and comfort to the enemies of social progress. We in turn insisted that the intrusion of practical and especially of political points of view would violate the purity of philosophical methods, (p. 23).
Belief and the Incremental Confirmation of One Hypothesis Relative to Another
Authors: Mirabelli Andre
Published: January 2016

I will present a theory of confirmation (support or corroboration) which can be considered both an extension of the work of Ian Hacking on support and of Karl Popper on corroboration. However, it will be clear that my theory is not a “mere conjunction of these two theories” (p. 202) but a formally simple and intuitive synthesis that explains their strengths and corrects their weaknesses.

Popper's explication of corroboration relies on the expression P(e,h) - P(e)2 normalized in different ways (p. 410). He goes on to state the following additional criteria for the corroboration of h by e: (a) we can only “rationally justify a preference for one theory out of a set of competing theories…. so far proposed” (p. 82); (b) e must be the result of a severe test (pp. 414, 418); (c) more-falsifiable hypotheses must be preferred (p. 41); (d) if h is a probabilistic hypothesis then e can only be a statistically interpreted finding, and thus e is often not allowed to be the total available evidence (p. 413).
On The Correct Definition of Randomness
Authors: Benioff Paul
Published: January 2016

The concept of randomness as applied to number sequences is important to the study of the relationship between the foundations of mathematics and physics. A reason is that while randomness is often defined in mathematical-logical terms, the only way one has to generate random number sequences is by means of repetitive physical processes. This paper will examine the question: What definition of randomness is correct in the sense of being the weakest allowable? Why this question is so important will become clear during the course of the discussion.

The main body of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 1. discusses the use of probability theory to describe various statistical processes and some of the alternative definitions of randomness that have been proposed.

In Section 2. a criterion which a definition of randomness should satisfy is proposed.
Is “Physical Randomness” Just Indeterminism in Disguise?
Authors: Humphreys Paul W.
Published: January 2016

The topic of this session is “physical randomness”. It might be doubted whether such a subject exists, for definitions of randomness have hitherto almost all been mathematical in nature. The only exceptions of which I am aware are the preceding paper by Benioff and a paper by Wesley Salmon. These attempts to inject some empirical content into randomness are highly desirable. But anyone attempting to formulate a physically based definition of randomness should at some point make clear what the connection is (if any) with a more traditional notion of disorder - that of indeterminism. Repeated reference to quantum mechanical examples whenever physical randomness is discussed indicates that a primary motivation for considering physical randomness to be important is because of the current belief that data sequences associated with quantum mechanical experiments are irreducibly random. (As an indication of this, in any situation in which physical randomness is discussed, translate the remarks about quantum phenomena into remarks about coin tossing, and they will lose much of their interest.)
The Purposes of Biological Classification
Authors: Platnick Norman I. , Nelson Gareth
Published: January 2016

All biologists use classifications to one degree or another, and those of us who work on classifications use the results of all other biologists to one degree or another, so you might reasonably expect that biologists in general would share some common conception of how classifications should be constructed and how they can be used. Certainly one might expect that all taxonomists, at least, would share such a perspective. But this is not the case; in fact, the theory of taxonomy is at present a very controversial subject, with much of the controversy revolving around the question of how to go about constructing an ideal classification.

Surprisingly, there is relatively little controversy about what properties an ideal classification would have. Admittedly, different terms are used to describe these properties, various workers arguing that classifications should be maximally stable, or maximally useful, or maximally informative, or maximally testable, or maximally refutable, or maximally predictive, and so on.
Retrodiction in Geology
Authors: Kitts David B.
Published: January 2016

Our view of the first half of the 20th century has been influenced by what we suppose to have occurred in the middle of that century. It is by now part of the conventional wisdom of the geological community that during the 1950’s and 1960’s a revolution occurred. It is further supposed by many, that before the revolution there was among geologists an uneasiness resulting from the lack of an organizing principle in terms of which accumulating facts could be understood. It is difficult to see our own times in the kind of perspective that historians consider so important an ingredient of ‘good’ history. Geologists now only in their middle years began their careers before the ‘new tectonics’ came to pervade their discipline. They do not look back upon prerevolutionary days as a time waiting to be saved from crisis nor do they see themselves as having collected facts in anticipation of being able to weave them into some pattern on the basis of some as yet undiscovered truth.
The Recent Revolution in Geology and Kuhn’s Theory of Scientific Change
Authors: Laudan Rachel
Published: January 2016

The 1960s witnessed a striking change in geology. Since at least the seventeenth century, one of the central problems of the subject had been the origin of the major irregularities of the surface of the globe—continents and oceans, mountain chains and ocean islands—irregularities that were not anticipated by most physical theories. Traditionally these features had usually been explained either as residual traces of events occurring during the very early history of the globe, or as the result of vertical movements of the earth’s crust, caused, for example, by changes in the heat budget. The last two decades have seen an end to all this. The vast majority of geologists now believe that these irregularities largely result from the lateral movement of thin rigid plates covering the earth, a theory now known as “plate tectonics”, but a theory which also has obvious parallels with the hypothesis of continental drift, in which it was postulated that continents can move laterally.
Habermas and the Natural Sciences
Authors: Gutting Gary
Published: January 2016

Habermas’ fundamental philosophical project is to reinstate, in a contemporary context, the classical idea that human lives can be guided by practical knowledge; i.e., that it is possible to know what are the ultimate human values and direct our lives in accord with this knowledge:2 This project has a central importance because of the ironic turn taken by the development of contemporary society. Previously, societies generally thought they had a clear and rationally founded notion of the ultimate values that should guide human lives; but they lacked the technical resources needed to implement (or remove obstacles to) these values. Today, we have the technical resources to at least make a significant effort toward the realization of our values. But the very scientific advances that have provided these technical resources have called into question the rational bases of traditional values and even led to the suggestion—urged by the positivists—that our ultimate values have no cognitive status but are merely irrational givens.
Grounding Probabilities from Below
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: January 2016

What is at issue between the propensity and the long run frequency schools of thought about objective probability? Recent debate, although vigorous, has contributed little to our understanding of natural law or statistical inference. Yet there is at least one real question, none other than the much maligned topic of emergentism. Although this invokes a number of metaphysical views, such as the unity of science, emergentism primarily poses a question of matter of fact. Is it the case that every stable frequency, correctly represented by a mathematical probability, is ‘grounded from below’ by probabilities that apply to individuals? That is, does the frequency distribution in the population derive from probabalistic facts about the individuals that compose it? Or are there some stable frequencies that pertain to populations, but do not derive from probabalistic facts about members of the population?

At least two approaches to these questions have been developed.
Against Evolutionary Epistemology
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: January 2016

By “evolutionary epistemology” I mean Darwinian models of the growth of scientific knowledge. Such models rely on analogies between the development of biological species and the development of scientific theories. Recent proponents of evolutionary epistemology include the psychologist Donald Campbell (1974a), the sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (1976), and philosophers of science Karl Popper (1972), Stephen Toulmin (1972), and Robert Ackerman (1970). I shall argue that the similarities between biological and scientific development are superficial, and that clear examination of the history of science shows the need for a non-Darwinian approach to historical epistemology.

The neo-Darwinian model of species evolution consists of Darwin's theory of natural selection synthesized with twentieth century genetic theory. The central ingredients of the neo-Darwinian model are variation, selection and transmission. Genetic variations occur within a population as the result of mutations and mixed combinations of genetic material.
History and the Norms of Science
Authors: Brown James Robert
Published: January 2016

Most philosophers have a schizophrenic attitude toward the history of science. On the one hand, they want their philosophical accounts of how science ought to be done to do justice to typical scientific practice; but on the other hand, they want to avoid any confusion of historical facts with philosophical norms. A fine example of such a schizophrenic attitude is the one expressed by Wesley Salmon who says: “If a philosopher expounds a theory of the logical structure of science according to which almost all of modern physical science is methologically unsound, it would be far more reasonable to conclude that the philosophical reasoning had gone astray than to suppose that modern science is logically misconceived.” (Salmon 1970, p. 73).

But after conceding so much, he takes it all back when he adds: “In spite of this the philosopher of science is properly concerned with issues of logical correctness which cannot finally be answered by appeal to the history of science….
Idealization, Explanation, and Confirmation
Authors: Laymon Ronald
Published: January 2016

Scriven, with his well-known bridge example, showed that explanations need not carry with them accurate or useful predictions. A bridge has collapsed, but there is no history of overload or natural shock. Metal samples taken near the break show severely reduced elastic capabilities of a sort usually associated with natural aging. Therefore, given that the bridge did fall, it fell because of this sort of metal fatigue. However, on the basis of current theoretical and measurement capabilities, it could not have been predicted that it would fall. (Scriven 1962, pp. 181-185).

The existence of explanations which lack true or even usefully approximate predictions is not restricted to complex situations in engineering. Nor are such explanations the exclusive property of the non-physical sciences. The existence of such explanations, I want to claim, is common in the physical sciences as well.
The Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: January 2016

Empiricists are notoriously suspicious of causes. They have not been equally wary of laws. Hume set the tradition when he replaced causal facts with facts about generalizations. Modern empiricists do the same. But nowadays Hume's generalizations are the laws and equations of high level scientific theories. On current accounts, there may be some question about where the laws of our fundamental theories get their necessity, but it is no question that these laws are the core of modern science. Bertrand Russell is well known for this view: “The law of gravitation will illustrate what occurs in any exact science … . Certain differential equations can be found, which hold at every instant for every particle of the system … . But there is nothing that could be properly called “cause” and nothing that could be properly called “effect” in such a system.”
Holism, Individualism, and the Units of Selection
Authors: Sober Elliott
Published: January 2016

The units of selection problem, as it is discussed within evolutionary theory, recapitulates some important elements in the dispute between methodological holism and methodological individualism. Holism and individualism have for a long time occupied favored positions in the stable of old warhorses owned and operated by philosophers of social science. These particular old warhorses are thought by many to be in retirement, although there is less than universal agreement about whether holism or individualism won the battle. Part of the point I will make about group versus individual selection is that biologists, would do wellnotto emulate certain aspects of the holism/individualism controversy.
Quantum Logic and Meaning
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: January 2016

In concluding their major survey, “Quantum Logics,” Greechie and Gudder (1975) listed four outstanding directions for future research, the last of which was, “Explain the meaning of the word ‘logic’ in the title of this paper.” Broadly speaking, there are two radically different points of view on this. There is the view that, taken strictly, ‘logic’ is a misnomer: quantum logic studies certain algebraic structures naturally arising from the formal, apparatus of quantum theory, structures which may afford insights into quantum physics, on a number of levels, but which do not in any way involve giving up or replacing classical logical laws. (Cf., e.g., Jauch (1968, p. 77).) In contrast, there is the view that the non-Boolean structures arising from the Hilbert space formalism should be taken as giving rise to a genuine non-classical logic, in conflict with classical logic, but appropriate to the description of quantum mechanical reality.
“Internal” and “External” Evidence in Linguistics
Authors: Zwicky Arnold M.
Published: January 2016

It has become customary for linguists (especially generative linguists) to draw a distinction (initially rather unnatural for philosophers of science) between “internal” and “external” evidence. Usually classified as internal are data on the cooccurrence and alternation of linguistic elements in some language, as well as such systemic considerations as formal simplicity, economy, and the like. External evidence is everything else: the use of phonemes in rhyme schemes, patterns of acquisition, comparison to other languages, speech errors, dialect differences, historical change, and so on. The distinction is usually made invidiously--only internal evidence is probative--or defensively--external evidence, or at least some types of external evidence, are relevant and useful.

The distinction arises at two quite different points in the investigation of language. It arises first in the division of labor between linguistics and other fields.
Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry
Authors: Hausman Daniel M.
Published: January 2016

Explanations sometimes involve a certain asymmetry. For example, given Ohm's Law and the voltage of a battery, one can calculate the current in an electric circuit if one knows the resistance, or one can calculate the resistance if one knows the current. Both of these calculations are (roughly) deductive-nomological arguments, but only the calculation of the current from the resistance is an explanation. Why should only one of these calculations be an explanation?

One plausible diagnosis of such explanatory asymmetries is that they arise from the asymmetry of causal relations (see, for example, Salmon 1978 or Beauchamp and Rosenberg 1981, p. 313). The direction of explanation is the direction of causation. The resistance of the wire is a causal condition influencing the amount of the current, while the amount of current does not (as a first approximation) influence the resistance.
The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism
Authors: Leplin Jarrett
Published: January 2016

Scientific Realism, as I shall understand it, holds that (a) the purportedly referential terms of current theory are genuinely referential, and (b) the theoretical, lawlike statements of current theory are at least approximately or partly true. Realism recommends itself as an explanation of the success of current science at the level of explanations and predictions of experientially accessible phenomena. That is, the case for realism assumes:

(1) Current theory in fact achieves such success, and achieves it on balance, i.e., is free of serious disconfirmations.

(2) Realism explains such success; i.e., the truth of (a) and (b) would justify us in expecting current theory to be successful.

(3) There is no viable nonrealist explanation of the success of current theory.

(4) No features of current theory independent of predictive failure discredit (a) or (b).

I shall comment briefly on each of these assumptions.
Quantity and Quality: Some Aspects of Measurement
Authors: Koslow Arnold
Published: January 2016

We shall not belabor the importance of having a clear idea of the difference between classificatory, comparative, and quantitative terms. Even though some of the goals that were set for theories of measurement of empirical attributes no longer seem viable, and some do not seem generally applicable, there is every reason to believe that suitable general goals for such theories will rely upon a distinction between quantitative and qualitative terms. The distinction seems also to have an intrinsic interest, even though some of the claims originally made for it, no longer seem historically accurate, or philosophically defensible. The subject, then, is quantitative terms in theories of the measurement of empirical attributes like length, mass, charge, and utility. We shall consider two problems.
The Status and Meaning of the Laws of Inertia
Authors: Coleman Robert Alan , Korte Herbert
Published: January 2016

A great deal of literature on the status and meaning of the Laws of Inertia in spacetime theories has nurtured and given wide currency to the claim that the laws are conventional in character, that they are definitions, or circular and without empirical content.

Philosophers who argue for the conventional character of the laws, do so, either emphasizing epistemological or ontological considerations concerning the structure of spacetime.

Those who argue for their conventional character mainly on epistemic grounds, point out, that the laws do not supply independent criteria of what is to count as force-free or natural motion. The only way of knowing when no forces act on a body is that it moves as a free particle traveling along the geodesies of spacetime. But how, without already knowing the geodetic structure of spacetime is one to determine which particles are free and which are not?
The Insights and Oversights of Molecular Genetics: The Place of the Evolutionary Perspective
Authors: Beatty John
Published: January 2016

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. (Dobzhansky 1973)

Along with the notion that DNA is at the bottom of things biological, goes the notion that molecular genetics is on top. That is, along with the notion that DNA is the informational basis of life, goes the notion that the deepest explanations in biology are molecular-genetic. But even if the former notion is correct, the latter is not. More specifically; the molecular-genetic perspective alone is inappropriate for explaining those biological generalities that call out instead for an evolutionary account. Moreover, the molecular-genetic accounts that are brought to bear upon biological generalities are often themselves subject to evolutionary scrutiny in the final analysis. I cannot entirely rule out the possibility of an explanation of a biological generality that is, in the final analysis, molecular-genetic and nonevolutionary. I am, in this regard, in somewhat the position of the natural historian.
Recovering Philosophy from Rorty
Authors: Fuller Steve
Published: January 2016

There have been many responses to Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, but none of them have said why philosophers should be assigned a unique set of offices within the halls of academe rather than simply be distributed among the offices already provided for practicioners of the special disciplines (which, after the German Wissenschaften, will henceforth be referred to as the “sciences”)—with logicians situated among the mathematicians, epistemologlsts among the psychologists, and so forth. And ultimately the challenge of Rorty's book boils down to this bureaucratic question. We may not be convinced by his story of how philosophers, starting with Descartes and Locke, unwittingly came to raise the sciences of their day to the status of metaphysics. Nor may we find very illuminating his suggestion that philosophers now join the ranks of cultural critics.
Mechanizing the Search for Explanatory Hypotheses
Authors: Buchanan Bruce G.
Published: January 2016

Mechanized methods in science have attracted much attention among philosophers since Bacon. Of the many facets of scientific activity discovery has seemed most inscrutable. Until recently, Peirce and Hanson were the only ones to claim publicly that there can be rational methods for discovering hypotheses as well as for testing them. Their arguments, and more recent ones, are based on historical examples and analysis, and thus lack the convincingness of an existence proof. In this paper I take an empirical look at the question of whether there are rational methods of discovery and claim that computer programs provide a laboratory for experimentation on this question. Recent work in artificial intelligence, or AI, has produced programs capable of serious intellectual work in science. Results from AI will be used to show that there exist mechanized procedures for discovering hypotheses and that these methods often lead to plausible hypotheses (but do not guarantee always finding the correct hypothesis).
Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science Reasoning by Analogy in Theory Construction
Authors: Darden Lindley
Published: January 2016

As a historian and philosopher of science, I am interested in the process of the construction of new scientific theories. The hypothesis to be explored in this paper is that analogies may play an important role in the generation of new ideas that are built into new theories.

In order to make clear the locus of my discussion, I would like to present an over-simplified view of the levels of organization of scientific knowledge. The three levels are the following: data, empirical generalizations, and explanatory theories. At the lowest level of generality are the data, particular statements about, particular facts. For example, if we consider data from genetics, in a cross between a yellow pea plant and a green pea plant, all the peas of the first generation of hybrids are yellow; if the hybrids are self-fertilized, the second hybrid generation has a ratio of three yellow peas to one green pea.
Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: January 2016

In their contributions to this volume, Bruce Buchanan (1983) and Lindley Darden (1983) have provided compelling reasons why philosophers of science concerned with the nature of scientific discovery should be aware of current work in artificial intelligence. Buchanan presents abundant examples of the mechanization of generation of empirical hypotheses in current AI programs, while Darden, at a more speculative level, discusses the use of analogy in theoretical discovery. The implication of both these studies is that the philosophy of discovery can profitably borrow notions from work in artificial intelligence, since useful analogies can be found between problems in that field and the problems facing philosophers studying scientific discovery.

I have no quarrel with this claim, except that it is too weak. I shall argue that work in AI is not only useful but essential for investigations in philosophy of science concerning discovery. The connecting link between the two fields is empirical cognitive psychology.
van Fraassen's Semanticism
Authors: Minogue Brendan P.
Published: January 2016

Bas van Fraassen has formulated a semantical or model theoretic analysis of the structure of scientific theories. He contrasts his semantical approach with the syntactic approach of the logical positivists and argues that his theory is preferable on a number of grounds. My aims in this paper will be threefold. First, I will present a brief description of van Fraassen's approach. Secondly, I will compare his theory with that of the logical positivists and, in so doing, identify the virtues that van Fraassen believes recommend, his theory over the positivist theory. Finally, I will raise an objection that is positivist in spirit which suggests that, epistemically, his account is indistinguishable from classical historicism.

For van Fraassen, “To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, itsmodels; and secondly, to specify certain parts of these models (theempirical substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena.
The Logic of Science as a Model-Oriented Logic
Authors: Hintikka Jaakko
Published: January 2016

It has been suggested by Larry Laudan and others that scientific inquiry be conceptualized as a problem-solving and question-answering activity. This approach will be called here the interrogative conception of scientific inquiry. The logic of such a conception of scientific inquiry has not been studied systematically, however. In this paper, some of the main aspects of the logic on which the interrogative conception of science is based will. be briefly outlined on certain simplifying assumptions.

It is in fact natural to think of the typical task that confronts a scientist as a question-answer process in two different senses. Our scientist - I shall call her or him the Inquirer - is given a theory T as a starting-point and a question “C or C?” to be answered. Theory T is here assumed to be a truly general theory, i.e., it is assumed not to contain any individual constants.
Marjorle Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle's Biology
Authors: Lennox James G
Published: January 2016

During a period stretching from the publication of the Phoenix Books edition A Portrait of Aristotle In the early 1960's through the appearance of a number of papers in the mid-197O's, Marjorie Grene turned her attention to the relevance of Aristotle's biological interests to his overall philosophy, and to the relevance of that philosophy to contemporary philosophy of biology.

A Portrait of Aristotle was one among the influences which, turned me, as an undergraduate, toward Aristotle and his biology. As I re-read Professor Grene's work on Aristotle in the summer of 1981, a number of key themes emerged which are relevant to her own views about the nature of biological science.
New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics
Authors: Maddy Penelop
Published: January 2016

As the time for preparing these remarks drew nearer, I found myself warming to our assigned topic—“New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics”. What I like about it is the suggestion that the speaker will be pointing in some inspiring style towards a new vista, a new set of problems, a new direction in the field rather than proposing a substantial contribution to the solution to some already well-known difficulty. This image makes me feel less guilty about having no solutions of any sort to offer today. What I do have is a problem to pose, a problem that seems to me quite serious. If it isn't completely new, I can at least say truly that it hasn't received the attention that it deserves, that it is far from solved, and that it has become more pressing in recent years.
Cartwright, Causality, and Coincidence
Authors: Mayo Deborah G.
Published: January 2016

In How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983)2 Cartwright argues for being a realist about theoretical entities but non-realist about theoretical laws. Her reason for this distinction is that only the former involves causal explanation, and accepting causal explanations commits us to the existence of the causal entity invoked. “What is special about explanation by theoretical entity is that it is causal explanation, and existence is an internal characteristic of causal claims. There is nothing similar for theoretical laws.” (p. 93). For, according to Cartwright, the acceptability of a theoretical explanation is a matter of its ability to satisfy such criteria as prganizing and simplifying, and in her view, “success at organizing, predicting, and classifying is never an argument for truth.” (p. 91). In contrast, Cartwright claims, “When I infer from an effect to a cause, I am asking what made the effect occur, what brought it about.
Anthropic Explanations in Cosmology
Authors: Leslie John
Published: January 2016

Cosmologists often claim that our universe is “fine tuned” for life. A change by 1% in the strong nuclear force would have meant little carbon would exist, and carbon can seem biologically essential. Again, the riches of chemistry and biochemistry depend on the neutron’s being heavier than the proton by no more than 0.1%. The early cosmic expansion rate may have needed fine tuning to one part in l055 to prevent speedy recollapse and speedy disintegration. To prevent excess turbulence the “smoothness” perhaps needed fine tuning to one part in 10 raised to the power of 10123 (a number far greater than 101230). Etcetera (Leslie 1982, 1983a, 1985, 1986).

The list of such claims is very long. No doubt some of its items are mistakes. Others may be dictated by basic physics so that they are not fine-tunable.
A Case Study in the Applioation of Mathematics to Physics: Descartes’ Principles Of Philosophy, Part II
Authors: Grosholz Emily R.
Published: January 2016

The question of how and why the application of mathematics to physical reality is possible has occupied philosophers for many centuries. In contemporary discussions, Philip Kitcher’s attack on a priorist approaches to the question is particularly interesting, for it suggests that there is no global answer (Kitcher 1983, Chapters 1-4). In this essay, I would like to develop his insight by arguing, first, that the problem of how mathematics relates to physical reality should be addressed by an appeal to the history of mathematics and the sciences in the form of case studies which analyze the peculiar and changing ways in which these domains interact. Generalizations about such interaction should be made carefully, in a kind of local and piecemeal retrospective; I believe that the historical record will show that the grounds of justification and the form of applied mathematics changes dramatically from one historical era to the next.
Problems in the Development of Cognitive Neuroscience Effective Communication between Scientific Domains
Authors: Manier Edward
Published: January 2016

Could anything provide a philosophically convincing mark of the mental in simple organisms (Lloyd 1984)? Individual organisms’ capacities to modify behavior adaptively as a result of past encounters with the environment might mark the first step in the phylogeny of minds. The simplest examples of mental representation are likely to be found in the simplest forms of animal learning.

The most scientifically rigorous test case of “bottom- up” strategies in cognitive neuroscience is provided by current studies of the cellular and molecular biology of associative learning in higher invertebrates, but particularly gastropod molluscs, snails or slugs (Quinn 1984). For the relevant neurobiological research community (Farley and Alkon 1985; Hawkins, Clark, and Kandel 1986), “Bottom-up” does not just mean letting one’s study of the properties of the nervous system control one’s analyses of animal behavior or cognition.