bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice
Authors: Arneson Richard J.
Published: June 2016

Some theories of justice hold that individuals placed in fortunate circumstances through no merit or choice of their own are morally obligated to aid individuals placed in unfortunate circumstances through no fault or choice of their own. In these theories what are usually regarded as obligations of benevolence are reinterpreted as strict obligations of justice. A closely related view is that the institutions of a society should be arranged in a way that gives priority to helping people placed in unfortunate circumstances through no fault or choice of their own. Any theory of this type needs a way of assessing individuals’ circumstances to determine who is fortunate and who is unfortunate.

I shall argue that the standard for assessing people's circumstances to determine what they owe and are owed according to distributive justice should be the welfare or well-being level that they can attain, given their circumstances. This claim, that the ‘currency of justice’ should be welfare, has attracted criticisms that some have thought decisive. My counterclaim is that if we adopt an objective account of welfare and properly accommodate concerns about individual responsibility, the criticisms can be drained of their force.
The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation
Authors: Korcz Keith Allen
Published: June 2016

The epistemic basing relation is the relation which must hold between a person's belief and the adequate reasons for holding that belief if the belief is to be epistemically justified by those reasons. Although the basing relation is a fundamental component of any adequate theory of epistemic justification, it has received scant attention in the literature. In this paper, I propose a novel causal analysis of the basing relation, one which helps to characterize an intemalist element which, I shall argue, is required of any successful account of epistemic justification, and which confirms current trends away from coherentist and reliabilist theories of justification.
Statements of Fact: Whose? Where? When?
Authors: Code Lorraine
Published: June 2016

The phrase “statements of fact” has a clear, unequivocal ring. It speaks of a stable place untouchable by contests in epistemology and in more secular places, around questions of constructivism, subjectivism, and the politics of knowledge. It offers fixity, a locus of constancy in a shifting landscape where traditional certainties have ceased to hold, maintains a vantage point outside the fray, where knowledge-seekers can continue to believe in some degree of “correspondence” between items of knowledge and events in the world. Within the social institutions and practices where knowledge is an issue, it designates a secure starting place for deliberation, a way of ensuring that processes of decision-making remain cognizant of the “realities” they have to address.

In the institutions of knowledge production and knowledgeable practice that generate the examples I appeal to in this essay – medicine and law – “statements of fact” appear to comprise an incontestable core around which interpretive strategies may indeed have to be enlisted, but which itself functions as a kind of interpretation-exempt zone. There are good reasons for its retaining that status, for resisting the instabilities and sheer whimsicalities that would follow from dislodging it.
Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition
Authors: Churchland Paul M.
Published: June 2016

Professor Clark's splendid essay represents a step forward from which there should be no retreat. Ourde factomoral cognition involves a complex and evolving interplay between, on the one hand, thenondiscursive cognitive mechanisms of the biological brain, and, on the other, the often highly discursive extra-personal “scaffolding” that structures the social world in which our brains are normally situated, a world that has been, to a large extent, created by our own moral and political activity. That interplay extends the reach and elevates the quality of the original nondiscursive cognition, and thus any adequate account of moral cognition must address both of these contributing dimensions. An account that focuses only on brain mechanisms will be missing something vital.
A Tale of Two Froggies
Authors: Allen Colin
Published: June 2016

There once was an ugly duckling. Except he wasn't a duckling at all, and once he realized his error he lived happily ever after. And there you have an early primer from the animal literature on the issue of misrepresentation – perhaps one of the few on this topic to have a happy ending.

Philosophers interested in misrepresentation have turned their attention to a different fairy tale animal: the frog. No one gets kissed in this story and the controversial issue of self-recognition is avoided. There are simply some scientifically established facts about ways to get a frog to stick out its tongue. (Who would want to kiss a frog under those conditions, anyway?) Some frogs, it seems, are fairly indiscriminate about sticking out their tongues. Not just flies, but a whole slew of other things will go down the hatch if propelled at just the right velocity and range through a frog's visual field, provoking a tongue-flicking response. Fortunately for us all, frogs seem to be a bit more discriminating about whom they will kiss.
Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?
Authors: Aydede Murat , Robbins Philip
Published: June 2016

I Introduction

Let's assume there are psychological generalizations that the folk rely upon in explaining and predicting the behavior of their fellows. Let's further assume these generalizations are intentional, in that they do their explanatory and predictive work by attributing to the subjects in their domain intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, and the like. Then we can define a broad intentional psychology as one that adverts only to broad, viz. purely denotational/ truth-conditional, mental contents in its generalizations; so the sentences expressing its generalizations should be read transparently. A narrow psychology is one that is not so restricted. Accordingly, sentences expressing narrow generalizations will contain opaque contexts, indicated by ‘that’ -clauses ('believes that…,’ ‘desires that … ,’ and the like). Here is an example of the sort of generalization we have in mind:

(G) If S desires that P and believes that S can bring it about that P, then, ceteris paribus, S will try to bring it about that P.
What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?
Authors: Thau Mike , Caplan Ben
Published: June 2016

By any reasonable reckoning, Gottlob Frege's ‘On Sense and Reference’ is one of the more important philosophical papers of all time. Although Frege briefly discusses the sense-reference distinction in an earlier work (‘Function and Concept,’ in 1891), it is through ‘Sense and Reference’ that most philosophers have become familiar with it. And the distinction so thoroughly permeates contemporary philosophy of language and mind that it is almost impossible to imagine these subjects without it.

The distinction between the sense and the referent of a name is introduced in the second paragraph of ‘Sense and Reference.’
Natural Selection Explanation and Origin Essentialism
Authors: Pust Joel
Published: June 2016

Does natural selection explain why individual organisms have the traits that they do? This question has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent philosophy of biology. Sober and Walsh have defended the thesis that natural selection does not explain why any individual organism has the traits that it does. This thesis, I shall call ‘the Negative View.’ Neander and Matthen have defended the contrary thesis, which I shall call ‘the Positive View,’ according to which natural selection at least sometimes does explain why an individual organism has the traits that it does. In this paper, I will argue that recent arguments for the Positive View fail for a reason hitherto unnoticed and I will demonstrate that other recent defenses of the Negative View depend upon my own for their plausibility.

I begin, in Section II, by showing that the issue is whether or not natural selection explains, of an individual, why it has the traits it does.
Anselm's Account of Freedom
Authors: Williams Thomas , Visser Sandra
Published: June 2016

According to Anselm's official definition, freedom of choice is ‘the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of that rectitude itself.’ From the point of view of contemporary metaphysics, this is one of the most unhelpful definitions imaginable. Does such freedom require alternative possibilities, for example? Is it compatible with causal determination? Is the exercise of such freedom a necessary and sufficient condition for moral responsibility? The definition sheds no light on these questions.

And so we need to move on from Anselm's definition to Anselm's account of freedom. Here, though, we encounter the opposite problem. Where Anselm's definition seems not to answer these questions at all, Anselm's account seems to answer all these questions, sometimes with a yes and sometimes with a no. Consider the question about alternative possibilities. In De libertate arbitrii, Anselm seems clearly to deny that freedom involves alternative possibilities. God, the good angels, and the blessed dead cannot do otherwise than preserve rectitude, but they are still free- freer, in fact, than those who are capable of abandoning rectitude.
Why Physics Alone Cannot Define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, Metaphysics, and the Formulation of Physicalism
Authors: Crook Seth , Gillett Carl
Published: June 2016

Materialist metaphysicians want to side with physics, but not to take sides within physics.

Ifwetook literally the claim of a materialist that his position is simply belief in the claim that all is matter, as currently conceived, we would be faced with an insoluble mystery. For how would such a materialist know how to retrench when his favorite scientific hypotheses fail? How did the 18thcentury materialist know that gravity, or forces in general, were material? How did they know in the 19thcentury that the electromagnetic field was material, and persisted in this conviction after the aether had been sent packing?

The doctrine of physicalism casts a long shadow in contemporary philosophy, configuring all kinds of philosophical issues and projects. Unsurprisingly, its proponents argue that physicalism has all the obvious features necessary for a scientific hypothesis to be in what we will call ‘good standing,’ i.e. being worthy of serious scientific investigation. In fact, many claim much more, arguing that physicalism is a well-confirmed hypothesis and possibly amongst the best of our theories. But, as our second opening passage makes clear, a persistent worry has been that physicalism, or ‘materialism’ as van Fraassen terms it, is an edifice built on sand. For many philosophers question whether the ‘physical’ can be specified at all, or at least in a manner that will produce a physicalism that would be in good standing.
Semantic Pragmatism and A Priori Knawledge (or ‘Yes we could all be brains in a vat’)
Authors: Jackman Henry
Published: June 2016

Hilary Putnam has famously argued that we can know that we are not brains in a vat because the hypothesis that we are is self-refuting. While Putnam's argument has generated interest primarily as a novel response to skepticism, he originally introduced his brain in a vat scenario to help illustrate a point about the ‘mind/world relationship.’ In particular, he intended it to be part of an argument against the coherence of metaphysical realism, and thus to be part of a defense of his conception of truth as idealized rational acceptability. Putnam's discussion has already inspired a substantial body of criticism, but it will be argued here that these criticisms fail to capture the central problem with his argument. Indeed, it will be shown that, rather than simply following from his semantic externalism, Putnam's conclusions about the self-refuting character of the brain in a vat hypothesis are actually out of line with central and plausible aspects of his own account of the relationship between our minds and the world.
The Fallacy Of Philanthropy
Authors: Gomberg Paul
Published: June 2016

Should we stop spending money on things we do not really need and send the money instead to groups that aid victims of absolute poverty? Garrett Cullity and Peter Unger have given renewed vigor to the well known argument by Peter Singer that we should do this. Like Singer, Cullity and Unger compare our duties to the poor to our duties when we encounter a victim of calamity, such as a child in danger of drowning. (Unger argues that our duties to the poor are even more pressing.) Singer and Unger tell us what to do and why we must do it; most starkly, Unger gives us the names, addresses, and toll-free phone numbers of four organizations to which we can donate, and the book cover tells us that the author's royalties are going equally to Oxfam America and the U.S. Committee for UNICEF. Unger dissolves the divide between theory and practice.
Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming
Authors: Hetherington Stephen
Published: June 2016

Descartes challenged himself to know that he was not dreaming, with the supposed price to be paid if he lacked that knowledge being his failure to have any knowledge at all of the contingent existence and features of an external world. And subsequent epistemologist after subsequent epistemologist has kept that Cartesian skeptical challenge alive. Recent non-skeptical responses to it — most notably, Robert Nozick's — have focussed on whether one's not knowing that one is not dreaming really does entail one's lacking all external world knowledge. Seemingly, Nozick is unworried by the prospect of one's never knowing that one is not dreaming. He does argue that no one ever has that knowledge, but he reassures us that this does not entail that people do not have a steady and satisfying supply of the more ‘Standard’ sorts of external world knowledge. As I will argue in this paper, though, I see no good reason to concede in the first place that one cannot know that one is not dreaming.
Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness
Authors: Gennaro Rocco J.
Published: June 2016

Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (the HOT theory) which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of (self-) consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness.
Descartes on the Innateness of All Ideas
Authors: Gorham Geoffrey
Published: June 2016

Though Descartes is traditionally associated with the moderately nativist doctrine that our ideas of God, of eternal truths, and of true and immutable natures are innate, on two occasions he explicitly argued that all of our ideas, even sensory ideas, are innate in the mind (AT 8B 358, AT 3 418; CSM 1 304, CSMK 187). One reason it is surprising to find Descartes endorsing universal innateness is that such a view seems to leave no role for bodies in the production of our ideas of them.
Divine Commands at the Foundations of Morality
Authors: Shaw Joseph
Published: June 2016

In this paper I wish to consider one aspect of the role that divine commands seem to play in religious ethics, their role when considered in relation to the foundations of morality. If, as seems to be taken for granted in traditional religious ethics, divine commands have moral force in and of themselves, then at least some obligations are derived from commands. This being so, might not all be? If they were, then divine commands would be what the rest of morality derived from and was founded upon.
On the Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation
Authors: Mittag Daniel M.
Published: June 2016

If one is to believe that p justifiably, then one must believe p for, or because of, one's evidence or reasons in support of p. The basing relation is exactly this relation that obtains between one's belief and one's reasons for believing. Keith Allen Korcz, in a recent article published in this Journal, has argued that two conditions are each sufficient and are jointly necessary to establish basing relations between beliefs and reasons. One condition is formulated to account for basing relations that can obtain in virtue of causal relations between one's belief and reasons, and the other condition is supposed to account for basing relations which can be established independently of the instantiation of any such causal relation.
On (Not) Living the Good Life: Reflections on Oppression, Virtue, and Flourishing
Authors: Tessman Lisa
Published: June 2016

In this article I attempt to untangle the purported connection between moral virtue and flourishing in the context of examining what looks like an unexpected effect of oppression: If moral virtue is necessary for flourishing—as Aristotle assumes that it is when he describes eudaimonia as an “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” — then members of structurally privileged groups can only flourish if they are morally good. However, it is hard to conceive of the privileged as morally good, since their privileges result from unjust social positionings. Thus it appears that they are prevented from leading good lives. This is an odd claim to add to a theory of oppression, which one would expect to explain how the victims of oppression — rather than its beneficiaries — are denied a shot at the good life.

While the privileged may enjoy especially ample opportunities to develop certain virtues, I will be thinking here about vices associated with practices of domination, including active or passive acceptance of the benefits that come from occupying positionings that depend upon systems of male dominance, white supremacy, class divisions under capitalism, norms of heterosexuality, and so on.
Mere and Partial Means: The Full Range of the Objectification of Women
Authors: McLeod Carolyn
Published: June 2016

Kant discussed the moral wrong of treating people as mere means or as a means only. To treat people as means is to treat them as objects for our use. It is to objectify them. To treat people as a mere means is to treat them wholly as objects, rather than partially so. It is to have an objectifying manner that is absolute or unmitigated. Whether Kant meant to suggest that we commit a moral wrong only when we treat people as means absolutely, rather than partially, is debatable. My concern is with how feminist theorists writing on the objectification of women have followed Kant in emphasizing the extreme case of the mere means. These feminists have implied that the moral wrong of objectification occurs only with absolute objectification, as though between it and respecting someone's autonomy there were no degrees of objectification that are morally suspect.

The relevant feminist work centres on such topics as women's reproductive freedom, their sexual freedom, and gender equity in employment.
Concepts of Life Span and Life-Stages: Implications for Ethics
Authors: Overall Christine
Published: June 2016

This is an exploratory paper, the kind of thing to which philosophers often give a title beginning with the word “towards,” as in, “Towards a Theory of the Ethical Significance of Concepts of Life Span and Life Stage.” We give titles like this when we think we may be on to something interesting but can so far only gesture at what it means. This paper is part of a larger ongoing project, and it is programmatic at best. Throughout much of this work. I have felt, I believe with justification, that there is relatively little philosophical background for what I am trying to do.

In her classic paper, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson suggests that if human pregnancy lasted only one hour, or conversely, if it lasted nine years, then our views about the morality of abortion would justifiably change from what they are now.
Frege on Identity and Identity-Statements: A Reply to Thau and Caplan
Authors: Heck Richard G.
Published: June 2016

In ‘What's Puzzling Gottlob Frege?’ Michael Thau and Ben Caplan argue that, contrary to the common wisdom, Frege never abandoned his early view that, as he puts it in Begriffsschrift, a Statement of identity ‘expresses the circumstance that two names have the same content’ and thus asserts the existence of a relation between names rather than a relation between (ordinary) objects. The arguments at the beginning of ‘On Sense and Reference’ do, they agree, raise a problem for that view, but, they insist, Frege does not, as the ‘standard’ Interpretation has it, take these arguments to refute it. Rather, they claim, Frege is out to defend (a version of) his earlier view against these objections: indeed, the defense he there offers is pretty much the same defense offered in Begriffsschrift against what are pretty much the same objections.
A Puzzle About Persistence
Authors: Carroll John W. , Wentz Lee
Published: June 2016

Our topic is the ontology and persistence conditions of material objects. One widely held doctrine is that identity-over-time has causal commitments. Another is that identity-over-time is just identity (simpliciter) as it relates one object that exists at two times. We believe that a tension exists between these two apparently sensible positions: very roughly, if identity is the primary conceptual component of identity-over-time and—as is plausible—identity is noncausal, then the conceptual origins of the causal commitments of identity-over-time become a mystery. We will begin by formulating the two widely held doctrines and our puzzle more fully and more carefully. Then, the remainder of the paper will be devoted to analyzing views one might adopt that could minimize the tension.
The Negative Principle of Just Appropriation
Authors: Attas Daniel
Published: June 2016

Possession and control of an object enhance the freedom of its holder. Property protects this freedom; but it restricts the freedom of ail others. Drawing the boundaries of freedom with respect to external objects is a central and difficult challenge for libertarians. What justifies my ownership of, say, the cup I am drinking from? Several possible answers come to mind: answers based on need, on welfare, on desert or on equality. None of these is endorsed by the libertarian; none of these, arguably, can justify private property in the cup. From a proprietarian point of view the legitimacy of any holding derives from the moral power of its previous owner. An owner has the power of transfer, the power to make another person the owner. What justifies my ownership of the cup is the exercise of the power of the person who gave it to me; his ownership was justified by the exercise of the power of the person who sold it to him; the latter's ownership was justified by the exercise of the power of the person who bequeathed it to him; and so on and so forth. But series of transfers of this kind, long as they may be, must come to an end. There must have been a point where something not privately owned became the private property of an individual or group.

Libertarians must assert a principle of just appropriation. Such a principle specifies the ways in which a person can come to own a natural resource which was previously not (privately) owned.
Descriptive Phenomenology and the Problem of Consciousness
Authors: Fisette Denis
Published: June 2016

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of (intentional) consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades (Fisette and Poirier 2000). Many philosophers of mind, for instance, Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1995), Owen Flanagan (1977), Colin McGinn (1991) and David Chalmers (1996), have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenologicaltradition.They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences.
Intention and Volition
Authors: Zhu Jing
Published: June 2016

The volitional theory of human action has formed a basis for a prominent account of voluntary behavior since at least Aquinas. But in the twentieth century the notions of will and volition lost much of their popularity in both philosophy and psychology. Gilbert Ryle's devastating attack on the concept of will, and especially the doctrine of volition, has had lingering effects evident in the widespread hostility and skepticism towards the will and volition. Since the 1970s, however, the volitional theory has received some renewed interest in the philosophy of action.
Malebranche on Ideas
Authors: Pessin Andrew
Published: June 2016

In this paper I offer an interpretation of Malebranche's conception of ideas. This is no easy matter. Malebranche says so many different things about ideas that it is daunting to try to weave them all together. To make matters worse, some of the things he says are not very clear. Worse still, some of the things he says are not obviously consistent with each other or with other Malebranchean doctrines. It is not surprising, therefore, that his account of ideas came under attack from the beginning, and continues to be attacked to this day. It is with trepidation, then, that I offer any interpretation at all. It is with even greater trepidation that I suggest that this interpretation affords Malebranche a clear and coherent theory of ideas, one that is consistent with the rest of his philosophy, has its primitives in the right places, and may even satisfactorily address the common charges laid against him.
Hume and the Perception of Spatial Magnitude
Authors: Slowik Edward
Published: June 2016

Among the current topics in Hume scholarship witnessing an upsurge in attention, few can match the inherent complexities associated with his doctrine of space, that of ten neglected and occasionally maligned theory put forth in Book I, Part II, of theTreatise.Yet despite this increase in academie interest, Hume's concept of spatial magnitude — i.e., the spatial size or magnitude of visible and tangible figures — as opposed to his more generai notion of space, has not attracted the same degree of attention. Even if commentators agree that Hume took the idea of space to be an idea derived from ‘the impressions of color'd points, dispos'd in a certain manner’ (T 1.2.3.3), this fact does not teil us what measures the distance between these impressions (perceptions), or what psychological processes and empirical properties are involved in the act of determining size or magnitude. If one bears in mind that the concept of spatial magnitude is also intimately connected with the status of geometry, and the debate on whether Hume endorsed a synthetic or analytic a priori account of geometrical knowledge, the failure to study exhaustively Hume's concept of distance becomes all the more astonishing.
Putnam, Context, and Ontotogy
Authors: Gross Steven
Published: June 2016

When a debate seems intractable, with little agreement as to how one might proceed towards a resolution, it is understandable that philosophers should consider whether something might be amiss with the debate itself. Famously in the last Century, philosophers of various stripes explored in various ways the possibility that at least certain philosophical debates are in some mannerdeficient in sense.Such moves are no longer so much in vogue. For one thing, the particular ways they have been made have themselves undergone much critical scrutiny, so that many philosophers now feel that there is, for example, a Quinean response to Carnap, a Gricean reply to Austin, and a diluting proliferation of Wittgenstein interpretations.
Binding into Character
Authors: Dever Joshua
Published: June 2016

Since Kaplan's “Demonstratives,” it has become common to distinguish between the character and content of an expression, where the content of an expression is what it contributes to “what is said” by sentences containing that expression, and the character gives a rule for determining, in a context, the content of an expression. A tacit assumption of theories of character has been that character is autonomous from content - that semantic evaluation starts with character, adds context, and then derives content. One consequence of this autonomy thesis is that the rules for character can contain no variables bound by content-level operators elsewhere in the sentence. Tacit appeal to this consequence features essentially both in Jason Stanley's recent argument, in “Context and Logical Form,” that all contextual ambiguity must be linked to “elements in the actual syntactic structure of the sentence uttered”, and in my arguments against character-based theories of complex demonstratives in my “Complex Demonstratives.“
Context Dependent Quantifiers and Donkey Anaphora
Authors: King Jeffrey C.
Published: June 2016

It is generally agreed that some anaphoric pronouns with (what appear to be) quantifier antecedents occur outside the syntactic scope (i.e., the c-command domain) of their antecedents. First, there is “donkey anaphora,” of both the conditional and relative clause varieties:

(1)

If Sarah owns a donkey, she beats it.

(2)

Every woman who owns a donkey beats it.

Without going through the details, let me just assert that there is good reason to think that the pronouns in (1) and (2) do not occur in the syntactic scope of the quantifier’ a donkey’ . A second sort of case in which a pronoun with a quantified antecedent occurs outside the syntactic scope of its quantifier antecedent is one in which the pronoun and its antecedent occur in different sentences.

A second sort of case in which a pronoun with a quantified antecedent occurs outside the syntactic scope of its quantifier antecedent is one in which the pronoun and its antecedent occur in different sentences. Examples of such “discourse anaphora,” from the very simple to the slightly complex, include:

(3)

A man is following Sarah. He is from the Internal Revenue Service.

(4)

A man is following Sarah. Melanie believes he is from the Internal Revenue Service.

(5)

It is possible that several students flunked at most five exams. Melanie believes they didn’t study for them.

(6)

Suzi ought to apologize to most of Ann’s dinner guests. It is certain that she insulted them. But it is unclear whether they noticed.
Proper Names: Ideas and Chains
Authors: Macià Josep
Published: June 2016

Chains, well I can't break away from these chains[… ]

And they ain't the kind that you can see.

(“Chains,” Gerry Goffin and Carole King)

The main aim of this paper is to present a certain notion — that of Coordination — and an associated requirement — the Coordination Requirement (CR) —,and to show how they help us to better understand the communicative role of proper names. A second aim of the paper is to use these notions to defend the kind of view I favour regarding the meaning of proper names — a certain kind of descriptivist theory — by showing that this view is not subject to two seemingly powerful considerations against it that have been provided from two different camps: one from the anti-descriptivist camp (by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity), another from the neo-Fregean camp (by Richard Heck in The Sense of Communication). In dealing with these matters, I will have to discuss the role that complex individual concepts (or ideas) play in allowing us to understand and use proper names.
The Dialectical Context of Boghossian's Memory Argument
Authors: Goldberg Sanford
Published: June 2016

Externalism is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker's (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian's 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational
Authors: Jollimore Troy
Published: June 2016

It is relatively common for philosophers to doubt whether we have any reason to act as morality requires. But it is very difficult to find philosophers who are willing to doubt, in a similar way, the idea that we have reason to act as instrumental rationality requires; reason, that is, to take effective steps toward attaining the ends we have accepted as our own. The inference from the fact that a certain action is an effective means of satisfying an agent's ends to the conclusion that that agent has reason to perform that action is held by almost everyone to be, as it is sometimes said, automatic:once it is determined that the action in question bears the specified relation to one's goals, nothing more needs to be shown. But fewer philosophers are willing to grant that morality possesses this sort of automatic reason-giving force. Rather, it is quite commonly held that some additional consideration needs to be cited in order to show that an agent has reason to act as she is morally required. The fact that an action is morally required, claim those who adhere to this type of position, is not enough in itself.
Intuitive Maximin
Authors: Mendola Joseph
Published: June 2016

One standard objection to familiar utilitarian consequentialism queries its troubling commitment to the maximization of overall value irrespective of distribution, for instance among the well and badly off. Call this ‘the objection from distribution.'

The simplest and most obvious alternative form of consequentialism deploys some sort of maximin principle. Maximin principles maximize the well-being of the worst off.Lexicalmaximin rules in particular, which are perhaps the simplest and most obvious subtype, maximize first the well-being of the worst-off, and then in case of ties among the worst-off, maximize the well-being of the second worst-off, and so forth. Maximin principles provide an obvious route to the unification of plausible concerns with maximization and with distributional equity.
Molyneux's Question
Authors: Hopkins Robert
Published: June 2016

In 1693 William Molyneux put a question to John Locke:

Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to teil, when he feit one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see;quare,Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and teil which is the globe, and which the cube? (Locke,EssayII, ix, 8)

The question became celebrated, attracting some of the foremost minds of the eighteenth Century and beyond. However, it is far from obvious what Molyneux's question is really about. What issue, or issues, of a more general and theoretical nature, does it raise? Since this is unclear, it is also unclear whether Molyneux's question still matters today. I defend a particular conception of what the question is about. If I am right, the question does indeed still matter.
Contemporary Skepticism and the Cariesian God
Authors: Nagel Jennifer
Published: June 2016

Although Descartes presents himself as an adversary of skepticism, in contemporary epistemology he is celebrated much more for his presentation of the skeptical problem than for his efforts to solve it. The ‘Cartesian skepticism’ of the evil genius argument remains a Standard starting point for current discussions, a starting point that is seen (by contextualists, for example) to provide such a powerful challenge to knowledge that while one as much as contemplates such arguments one loses the right to ascribe knowledge to anyone. Even Descartes's less radical skeptical arguments are still widely credited as having tremendous force: Barry Stroud, for example, argues at length that no satisfactory response has yet been given to the dream argument of the First Meditation. The Cartesian response to skepticism, on the other hand, is not nearly so warmly received. In the current literature on skepticism one does not find much resistance to Stroud's assessment of the Cartesian response to skepticism as utterly unpromising, nor to his diagnosis of its central fault: the Cartesian response depends on a series of theological claims that Descartes does not (or perhaps cannot) show to be plausible, let alone true.
Cosmopolitan Luck egalitarianism and the greenhouse effect
Authors: Gosseries Axel
Published: June 2016

Evidence provided by the scientific community strongly suggests that limits should be placed on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This means that states, firms, and individuals will have to face potentially serious burdens if they are to implement these limits. Which principles of justice should guide a global regime aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originating from human activities, and most notably from CO2emissions? This is both a crucial and difficult question. Admittedly, perhaps this question is too ambitious, given the uncertainties and complexities characterizing the issue of climate change. Yet, rather than listing them all at this stage, let us address the question in a straightforward manner, introducing some of these complexities as the need arises.
The Convention on Biological Diversity: From Realism to Cosmopolitanism
Authors: Maris Virginie
Published: June 2016

The decline of biodiversity is without a doubt one of the most important symptoms of what could be called a “global environmental crisis.” Our ability to stop this decline depends on the capacity to implement an effective, collective system of preservation on a global scale. In this paper, I will analyze the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the international agreement that aims at creating this type of global cooperation.

While I consider that cosmopolitan governance is desirable, given the legitimacy of the preservation of global biological diversity, I will not attempt to directly argue for it here. Still, it is worth mentioning some of the reasons that might lead us to adopt this position. First, certain past conservation measures have been harshly criticized as imperialistic. For example, Project Tiger in India, which Western environmentalists often cited as a success, have had a deleterious effect on local populations.
Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation
Authors: Haji Ishtiyaque
Published: June 2016

Take determinism to be the thesis that for any instant, there is exactly one physically possible future (van Inwagen 1983, 3), and understand incompatibilism regarding responsibility to be the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. Of the many different arguments that have been advanced for this view, the crux of a relatively traditional one is this: If determinism is true, then we lack alternatives. If we lack alternatives, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we can't be morally responsible for any of our behavior. The second premise is a version of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP): persons are morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise. This principle, in conjunction with the assumptions that responsibility requires control, and that this control consists in the freedom to do otherwise, provides the vital bridge from the initial premise to the skeptical conclusion. Some incompatibilists, joining ranks with various compatibilists, have sought to reject this principle by invoking so-called ‘Frankfurt examples.’
Person, Substance, Mode and ‘themoral Man’ in Locke's Philosophy
Authors: Lolordo Antonia
Published: June 2016

In 1769, the English bishop and theologian Edmund Law published aDefence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity. In this work, Law attempted to ‘explain and vindicate Mr. Locke's hypothesis’ (301) by offering a new account of Lockean persons. Law's account centers around three key claims. First, persons are modes — very roughly, properties — rather than substances. Second, the relevant properties are those that make moral evaluation appropriate, thus taking seriously Locke's insistence that ‘person’ is a forensic term. And third, the fact that persons are modes is what makes a demonstrative science of morality possible.

I am not convinced that Law's interpretation actuallyvindicatesLocke, though it does make his theory come out rather better than is typically imagined. I am, however, convinced that Law's interpretation provides the best available account of Lockean persons.
Spinoza on essence and ideal individuation
Authors: Murray Adam
Published: June 2016

My project in this paper is to fill a gap in Spinoza's theory of metaphysical individuation. In a few brief passages of the Ethics, Spinoza manages to explain his views on the nature of composition and the part-whole relation, the metaphysical facts which ground the individuation of simple bodies and the extended individuals they compose, and the persistence of one and the same individual through time and mereological change. Yet Spinoza nowhere presents a corresponding account of the individuation of simple ideas, or the minds such ideas compose. While it is initially tempting to locate the details of such an account in Spinoza's views on the relation between the mental and physical domains, I argue here that such approaches fail, in conflicting with Spinoza's insistence that the mental and the physical are conceptually and explanatorily independent. By contrast, I show that for Spinoza, each idea essentially possesses the property of affirming the existence of its object, and that such properties are well-suited to serve as the principle of ideal individuation Spinoza never explicitly provided.
The modal view of essence
Authors: Cowling Sam
Published: June 2016

According to the modal view, essence admits of reductive analysis in exclusively modal terms. Fine (1994) argues that modal view delivers an inadequate analysis of essence. This paper defends the modal view from Fine's challenge. This defense proceeds by examining the disagreement between Finean primitivists and Quinean eliminativists about essence. In order to model this disagreement, a distinction between essence and a separable concept, nature, is required. This distinction is then used to show that Fine's challenge is misdirected and therefore unsuccessful.
What are Propositions?
Authors: Richard Mark
Published: June 2016

This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses and the range of quantifiers like that in ‘Sanna believes all that Matti said’ – are states of affairs. States of affairs – and thus propositions – are not, in the primary sense, representational; what is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions. There is, it is argued, a derivative sense in which propositions are bearers of truth, but truth in that sense is a derivative, non-explanatory notion. This view is contrasted with views like the one Scott Soames develops in What is Meaning?. It’s argued that this view is superior to Soames’ in various ways.
Potential Sugar Reduction in Cookies Formulated with Sucrose Alternatives
Authors: Kweon Meera , Slade Louise , Levine Harry
Published: June 2016

Sugar reduction in low‐moisture cookies is a challenge for the baking industry, because detrimental gluten development and starch gelatinization/pasting increase as sugar concentration decreases. In this study, sucrose and two healthful carbohydrate oligomers (i.e., isomaltulose and Mylose 351 syrup/Glucodry 314 powder) were used to explore the effects of the sucrose alternatives on results from solvent retention capacity (SRC), differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), rapid viscoanalysis (RVA), and AACC International wire‐cut cookie baking. Wheat flour SRC results indicated lower swelling of solvent‐accessible arabinoxylans in isomaltulose solution, but higher swelling in Glucodry 314 and Mylose 351 solutions, compared with that in sucrose solution. DSC and RVA results showed retardation of wheat flour starch gelatinization and pasting onset, respectively, both in the order water < Glucodry 314 ≤ Mylose 351 < sucrose ≤ isomaltulose. Isomaltulose, when predissolved, exhibited cookie‐baking responses similar to those for sucrose, suggesting that this sugar could be used successfully as a sucrose alternative to produce wire‐cut cookies with lower glycemic impact. Cookie baking with blends of sucrose and Glucodry 314 alleviated a cookie‐geometry issue observed for 100% sucrose replacement by Glucodry 314, suggesting that Glucodry 314 or Mylose 351 could partially replace sucrose for sugar‐reduction purposes.
Isolation and Characterization of High‐Molecular‐Weight (HMW) Gliadins from Wheat Flour
Authors: Schmid Markus , Wieser Herbert , Koehler Peter
Published: June 2016

The aim of this study was to isolate high‐molecular‐weight (HMW) gliadins from wheat flour and to characterize the protein components that contribute to HMW gliadins. Wheat flour Akteur was extracted with a modified Osborne procedure, and the fraction soluble in 60% ethanol (total gliadins) was separated by gel‐permeation HPLC, yielding three fractions, GP1–GP3. GP1 (21.5%) consisted of oligomeric HMW gliadins, GP2 (15.2%) of ω5‐gliadins, and GP3 (63.3%) of ω1,2‐, α‐, and γ‐gliadins. Two‐dimensional SDS‐PAGE of HMW gliadins showed that interchain disulfide bonds were present in HMW gliadins. The molecular mass distribution of HMW gliadins determined by gel‐permeation HPLC was in a range from 66,000 to 680,000 with an average degree of polymerization of 13. Reduced HMW gliadins were further separated by preparative reversed‐phase HPLC into four subfractions (RP1, RP2, RP3, and RP4), which were characterized by SDS‐PAGE and semiquantitative N‐terminal sequencing. HMW gliadins of the wheat flour Akteur contained all types of gluten proteins: 48% low‐molecular‐weight glutenin subunits, 18% γ‐gliadins, 13% α‐gliadins, 9% ω1,2‐gliadins, 8% HMW glutenin subunits, and 4% ω5‐gliadins. We postulate that the existence of HMW gliadins can be explained by the presence of terminators, which interrupt the polymerization of glutenin subunits during biosynthesis and lead to polymers of limited size (oligomers) that are still soluble in aqueous ethanol.