bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Core of the Constitution
Authors: Hammond Thomas H. , Miller Gary J.
Published: May 2006

It is often argued that the United States Constitution was designed so as to create a stable political order. Yet in the literature on the formal theory of democracy, there has been very little examination of constitutional provisions for their stability-inducing properties. In this paper we demonstrate that bicameralism and the executive veto tend to create stability, that the legislative override of the executive veto tends to undermine this stability, and that the interaction of bicameralism and the executive veto is likely to produce stable outcomes despite the destabilizing impact of the veto override.
Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition
Authors: Salisbury Robert H. , Heinz John P. , Laumann Edward O. , Nelson Robert L.
Published: May 2006

Interest-group interactions may be examined in ways comparable to the analysis of conflict and coalition in other areas of political science. We seek to measure and compare the structure of interest-group participation and conflict in four domains of U.S. domestic policy: agriculture, energy, health, and labor. Data are drawn from a survey of 806 representatives of organizations with interests in federal policy, supplemented by interviews with 301 government officials in the same four domains. Several types of data are adduced regarding the intensity and partisanship of group conflict in each domain and the range and variety of group participation. Coalitional patterns are described and the mutual positioning of different kinds of organization—peak-association groups versus more specialized trade, professional, or commodity groups, for example—are examined.
Value Change in Industrial Societies
Authors: Inglehart Ronald , Flanagan Scott C.
Published: May 2006

Ronald Inglehart has argued that, while most of the major political parties in Western countries tend to be aligned along a social class–based axis, support for new political movements and new political parties largely reflects the tension between materialist and postmaterialist goals and values. This has presented something of a dilemma to the traditional parties, and helps account for the decline of social-class voting. Scott Flanagan takes issue with Inglehart's interpretation in several particulars. Although their views converge in many respects, Flanagan urges conceptual reorientations and adumbrates a different interpretation of post–World War II political development in Europe and Japan.
Guns and Butter and Government Popularity in Britain
Authors: Norpoth Helmut
Published: May 2006

Britain under the government of Prime Minister Thatcher provides a unique opportunity to probe the effects of both war and macroeconomic performance on government popularity. Monthly ratings for Thatcher and Conservative-party support (June 1979 to July 1985) are examined by way of Box-Tiao intervention models. The model that best captures the impact of the Falklands War of 1982 is of the gradual-temporary variety: popularity gains accrued through the three-month war shrink in a geometric fashion. Nevertheless, they prove to be worth over five percentage points for the Conservative party a year later, in the 1983 election. Macroeconomic performance, meanwhile, is found to have an asymmetric effect on government popularity, with unemployment strongly significant but inflation not significant at all. Apparently, the British public is punishing failure (on employment) while letting success (on inflation) go unrewarded. Qualifications of the positive effect of war and the negative effect of macroeconomic performance are suggested.
The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science
Authors: Riker William H.
Published: May 2006

Science involves the accumulation of knowledge, which means not only the formulation of new sentences about discoveries but also the reformulation of empirically falsified or theoretically discredited old sentences. Science has therefore a history that is mainly a chronicle and interpretation of a series of reformulations. It is often asserted that political science has no history. Although this assertion is perhaps motivated by a desire to identify politics with belles lettres, it may also have a reasonable foundation, in that political institutions may change faster than knowledge can be accumulated. To investigate whether propositions about evanescent institutions can be scientifically falsified and reformulated, I examine in this essay the history of the recent and not wholly accepted revisions of the propositions collectively called Duverger's law: that the plurality rule for selecting the winner of elections favors the two-party system. The body of the essay presents the discovery, revision, testing, and reformulation of sentences in this series in order to demonstrate that in at least one instance in political science, knowledge has been accumulated and a history exists.
Defense Expenditures and National Well-being
Authors: Russett Bruce
Published: May 2006

The existence of a trade-off between military expenditures and social spending is widely hypothesized but often difficult to establish empirically. This article constructs a model to test the effects of changes in military spending on federal expenditures for health and education from 1941 through 1979. Important economic, demographic, and political changes are controlled. No systematic tradeoff between military spending and federal health and education expenditures is found, nor in this period was there any significant depressing effect on health and education expenditures by Republican presidential administrations. Thus, the current administration, under which there are major increases in military spending and major cuts in health and education spending, emerges as exceptional.
Contours of the Modern Congressional Career
Authors: Hibbing John R.
Published: May 2006

In the last 40 years careerism has hit Congress full force, yet we do not know much about the pros and cons of lengthy congressional careers. I describe the changes typically occurring over the course of extended stays in Congress and then show that these contours have shifted over the decades such that for most aspects of congressional service (electoral support, formal positions held, and constituency attention) there is less differentiation between a member's early and late career stages than there used to be. However, a major exception exists to the diminution of life cycle effects in Congress: pure legislative involvement (raw levels of activity combined with the extent to which a member's legislative agenda is focused and efficient), despite widely held beliefs about the death of apprenticeship, is now more than ever dependent on tenure. In relative terms, junior members arelesslegislatively involved than they were a few decades ago. While many portions of congressional service are now routinized from the beginning, legislative involvement comes not just with a subcommittee chair but only with experience. This finding has clear implications both for proposals to limit congressional terms and for perceptions of congressional careerism in general.
The Political Reliability of Italian Governments: An Exponential Survival Model
Authors: Cioffi-Revilla Claudio
Published: May 2006

Italian cabinets (governi) fall from power in a seemingly haphazard pattern, thus defying most deterministic analyses of their durability. This analysis views Italian government longevity as essentially indeterminate, or stochastic, and it applies the theory of “political reliability” to explain the probability that an Italian government will be in power at time t after it was formed. An exponential survival model R = e−kt, with constant government breakdown rate k = .021 per week, is developed, estimated, tested, and discussed. It is shown that Italian governments have a half-life (τ) of approximately 32.8 weeks, after which their political reliability drops below .50, and their mean duration is 47.7 weeks, so the probability that an Italian government will survive as long as the average is only 36.8%. Theoretical aspects of the model are also discussed, together with characteristic features of exponential political reliability, such as lifetime density, political mortality, and government downfall rate, as well as the systems reliability and crisis process characteristic of Italian governments.
Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment
Authors: Bobo Lawrence , Gilliam Franklin D.
Published: May 2006

Using 1987 national sample survey data that included a large black oversample, we reexamine black-white differences in sociopolitical participation. We hypothesized that increases in black empowerment would affect the level of black sociopolitical participation and change the nature of black-white differences in political behavior. The results show that blacks in high-black-empowerment areas—as indicated by control of the mayor's office—are more active than either blacks living in low-empowerment areas or their white counterparts of comparable socioeconomic status. Furthermore, the results show that empowerment influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious orientation to politics and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs. We discuss the results' implications for theoretical interpretations of when and why black sociopolitical behavior differs from that of whites.
The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85
Authors: Lijphart Arend
Published: May 2006

A systematic analysis of the relationships between the main electoral system variables (electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure) and electoral outcomes (the degrees of disproportionality and multipartism) in the 20 Western democracies from 1945 to 1985—representing 32 distinct electoral systems (an electoral system being defined as a set of elections held under basically the same rules)—shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionality are very strong, much stronger than Douglas W. Rae and subsequent researchers have suggested; that on the other hand, their effects on the number of parties participating in elections is surprisingly weak; and that ballot structure affects the degree of multipartism only in single-member district systems. These findings suggest that strategic behavior by politicians and voters plays a less important role in reducing multipartism than is usually assumed.
Altering the Foundations of Support for the President Through Priming
Authors: Krosnick Jon A. , Kinder Donald R.
Published: May 2006

The disclosure that high officials within the Reagan administration had covertly diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras funds obtained from the secret sale of weapons to Iran provides us with a splendid opportunity to examine how the foundations of popular support shift when dramatic events occur. According to our theory ofpriming, the more attention media pay to a particular domain—the more the public is primed with it—the more citizens will incorporate what they know about that domain into their overall judgment of the president. Data from the 1986 National Election Study confirm that intervention in Central America loomed larger in the public's assessment of President Reagan's performance after the Iran-Contra disclosure than before. Priming was most pronounced for aspects of public opinion most directly implicated by the news coverage, more apparent in political notices' judgments than political experts', and stronger in the evaluations of Reagan's overall performance than in assessments of his character.
Political Ideology and Subjective Culture: Conceptualization and Empirical Assessment
Authors: Szalay Lorand B. , Kelly Rita Mae
Published: May 2006

Ideology and subjective culture are examined as two systems of behavioral organization well known for their hidden but frequently powerful influences on political choices and behavior. After a brief sketch of a representational theory of behavioral organization, a research strategy based on inferences drawn from the distribution of thousands of free word associations is described and illustrated with results from several international studies. Findings on Slovenian images and frame of reference demonstrate the effects of Marxist doctrines. Korean and American data illustrate differences that are predominantly psychocultural. The analytic method outlined suggests new capabilities for studying ideology and its influence on people's perceptions, their system of representation of the world, and their organization of behavior. It may be used to assess predispositions to adopt democratic principles and procedures. It might also be used to assess the influence of ideological doctrines and their degree of integration with the cultural views and frame of reference. The most natural use will probably be in research in the field of international understanding and communication.
Defending Liberalism
Authors: Galston William
Published: May 2006

The much-discussed contemporary revival of political theory in the Anglo-American intellectual community has for the most part been a revival of liberal theory. This should not have come as a great surprise. Most Anglo-Americans are, in one way or another, liberals; all are deeply influenced by the experience of life in liberal societies. Liberal polities have come under attack from within as well as from without, giving those who think them worthy of defense both the motive and the occasion to clarify the grounds of their partisanship.

It is less often remarked that in one decisive respect, the revival of liberal theory remains rooted in the climate of moral skepticism that it has supplanted. Most contemporary liberal theorists are deeply mistrustful of what John Rawls has called “perfectionism”—the philosophic attempt to identify superior ways of life or traits of character and, once having identified them, to use them as the goals of political life. Contemporary liberal theory consists in the attempt to combine this skepticism about theories of the good life with the belief in philosophically defensible principles that regulate relations among individuals.

It is my thesis that this defense of liberalism is fundamentally misguided. No form of political life can be justified without some view of what is good for individuals. In practice, liberal theorists covertly employ theories of the good. But their insistence that they do not reduces the rigor of their theories and leaves the liberal polity unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism.
European Party Loyalties Revisited
Authors: Richardson Bradley M.
Published: May 2006

The likelihood that party loyalties reflect the characteristics of parties and political competition within specific political environments was generally ignored in critiques of party identification abroad. In this article, I identify substantial frequencies of stable partisan ties among British, Dutch, and German voters in the 1960s through the 1980s. Stable party loyalists in turn usually vote for their preferred party in subsequent elections. Long-term partisan ties are most common among supporters of traditional cleavage parties. These long-term party loyalties reflect the effects of both long-standing hostilities toward opposing parties and well-developed party principles. Since partisan responses are internally consistent and subsume ideational as well as affective components, these feelings resemble social psychology's affect-laden schemata.
Managing Blame: An Experimental Test of the Effects of Political Accounts
Authors: McGraw Kathleen M.
Published: May 2006

Public officials are not passive bystanders in the electoral process. Rather, they actively try to shape or manage citizens' perceptions of events (particularly those involving negative outcomes) through explanations or accounts. I argue that consideration of citizens' understandings of political accountability and how these are shaped by public officials represent critical missing components of models of electoral behavior. The distinction between excuses and justifications provides a valuable conceptual framework for understanding the impact of political accounts on a variety of judgments and psychological processes. I examine satisfaction with various excuses and justifications and their impact on subsequent evaluations of the official.
Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index
Authors: Molinar Juan
Published: May 2006

I propose an alternative index to operationalize the variablenumber and size of partiesin a party system. To support it, I present a critical overview of the two most common indices, Laakso and Taagepera'seffective number of parties andKesselman and Wildgen'shyperfractionalization, showing the causes of their weakness. Then I explain the computational logic of my alternative, “number of parties,” and compare it with the other two, using hypothetical cases. After that, I contrast the Laakso-Taagepera index with mine, using data from actual elections between 1945 and 1981. I conclude that my index outperforms the other two as an operationalization of the variable number and size of parties.
The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Interest Group Liaison
Authors: Peterson Mark A.
Published: May 2006

Studies of the relationship between the presidency and organized interests generally focus on presidential assistants and their communications with the interest group community. I take a different perspective. Based on presidential strategic interests and choices illuminated for several administrations through interviews with White House officials, four kinds of interest group liaison are identified: governing party, consensus building, outreach, and legitimization. These approaches are then empirically evaluated for the Reagan White House using interviews with Reagan's staff and the responses of several hundred interest group leaders to 1980 and 1985 surveys of national voluntary associations. Like the Carter administration after its first year, the Reagan White House initially emphasized “liaison as governing party” built on exclusive and programmatic ties to groups. A less activist legislative agenda and new circumstances later shifted the emphasis of the Reagan and Bush administrations to other forms of interest group liaison.
Corporate Electoral Activity, Constitutional Discourse, and Conceptions of the Individual
Authors: Stark Andrew
Published: May 2006

Recently, constitutional scholars have begun exploring how far constitutional discourse is governed by competing liberal and republican conceptions of the just or the good society. At the same time, political theorists have placed in doubt how far this debate rests on the metaphysical dichotomy between a radically autonomous and a radically encumbered individual. Scholars, however, have yet to investigate to what extent metaphysical conceptions of the autonomous or the encumbered individual underlie and determine strands of constitutional discourse. I analyze the deep structure of constitutional discourse in one important area—the legitimacy of prohibitions on corporate electoral activity. I show that the constitutional argumentation recurrently mounted against corporate electoral activity rests on a particular version of the radically encumbered individual and that the major constitutional defenses of corporate electoral activity assume a particular version of the radically autonomous individual.
Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States
Authors: Huber John D.
Published: May 2006

I develop a framework for applying existing formal models of restrictive amendment procedures in Congress to the study of the French government's use of two restrictive legislative procedures, the package vote and the “guillotine”. I test six hypotheses derived from existing formal models and from existing research on the French National Assembly. The analysis shows that the French government invokes the two procedures on the same types of distributive and jurisdictionally complex bills that frequently receive closed rules in Congress. The analysis also shows that the decision to use the restrictive procedures is strongly linked to the majority status of the government, suggesting they are used to preserve agreements between parties in the same way that restrictive amendment procedures are used to preserve agreements between individual members of Congress. Thus, existing formal models of legislative institutions can help us study how procedural structures shape strategic bargaining between political parties in parliamentary systems, especially during coalition and minority government.
Postmodernism and the Public Sphere
Authors: Villa Dana R.
Published: May 2006

The idea of the public sphere, of an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction, is central to democratic theory and practice. The modern age has, however, witnessed the erosion of a public realm distinct from the state and the market. In response to this erosion, public realm theory, notably the work of Arendt and Habermas, attempts to theorize the minimal conditions necessary for a discursive realm free of structural coercion or manipulation. The resulting normative conception of the public sphere has come under sharp attack by postmodern theorists, including Foucault, Lyotard, and Baudrillard, who question the basic presuppositions of public realm theory. I examine their objections and show how the public realm theory of Arendt can be viewed as motivated by concerns similar to the postmoderns'. Against Habermas, I argue that Arendt's public realm theory is less concerned with the question of legitimation than with the theorization of an agonistic political subjectivity.
On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making
Authors: George Tracey E. , Epstein Lee
Published: May 2006

How does the U.S. Supreme Court reach decisions? Since the 1940s, scholars have focused on two distinct explanations.The legal modelsuggests that the rule of law (stare decisis) is the key determinant. Theextralegalmodel posits that an array of sociological, psychological, and political factors produce judicial outcomes. To determine which model better accounted for judicial decisions, we used Supreme Court cases involving the imposition of the death penalty since 1972 and estimated and evaluated the models' success in accounting for decisional outcomes. Although both models performed quite satisfactorily, they possessed disturbing weaknesses. The legal perspective overpredicted liberal outcomes, the extralegal model conservative ones. Given these results, we tested another proposition, namely that extralegal and legal frameworks present codependent, not mutually exclusive, explanations of decision making. Based on these results, we offer an integrated model of Supreme Court decision making that contemplates a range of political and environmental forces and doctrinal constraints.
The Political Structure of the Federal Reserve System
Authors: Reagan Michael D.
Published: May 2006

Public policy is not self-generating; it emerges from institutions. Foremost among the institutions charged with monetary and credit policy formation—an area, like fiscal policy, that has not received from political scientists the attention accorded to micro-economic regulation of particular firms or industries—is the Federal Reserve System. The purpose of this paper is to examine the “fit” of the System's formal structure to (1) the policy functions and the informal policy-forming mechanisms of the “Fed,” and (2) the pattern of interests and values affected by monetary policy. Its thesis is that a substantial gap has developed between these elements.

A brief sketch of the formal structure of authority and the historical development of System functions is needed to begin with; this is followed by analysis of the formal and the effective roles of each component of the System along with the internalized interest representation at each level. Then the linkage between the Federal Reserve System and general economic policy is explored. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings and suggests briefly how formal structure and policy functions might be brought into closer, more effective alignment.
Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process
Authors: Langton Kenneth P.
Published: May 2006

The role of education as a significant political socialization process is widely accepted among social scientists and educators. Numerous studies point to positive correlations between education level and political cognition and participation. But beyond this point agreement ends. While many studies have demonstrated with varying degrees of certitude the formal role of curriculum and the teacher in the socialization process, the inconclusive and contradictory nature of the findings has led many students of socialization to a closer examination of the less formal environment of the school. Yet only a few studies have examined the influence of the informal school environment upon political socialization.

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of the class climate in peer groups and schools upon the reinforcement or resocialization of political attitudes and behavior patterns.
Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions
Authors: Diermeier Daniel
Published: May 2006

Informational theories of legislative institutions have demonstrated the potential collective gains from committee specialization due to the use of restrictive amendment procedures. For these benefits to be realized, however, the floor majority must overcome a commitment problem. I demonstrate that in a multistage game, majority rule, combined with the fact that generations of legislators overlap, allows the legislature to solve the commitment problem and to sustain legislative norms and institutions even if legislators are “finitely lived.” The model suggests that rather than restrictive amendment procedures, it is the committee's expectation of floor deference that sustains committee specialization. As a consequence, legislative norms may collapse due to an unexpected influx of new members even if the distribution of preferences in the legislature does not change. Finally, I discuss consequences for a comparative study of legislative institutions.
The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory
Authors: Arnhart Larry
Published: May 2006

There has been a resurgence of Darwinian naturalism in political theory, as manifested in the recent work of political scientists such as Roger Masters, Robert McShea, and James Q. Wilson. They belong to an intellectual tradition that includes not only Charles Darwin but also Aristotle and David Hume. Although most political scientists believe Darwinian social theory has been refuted, their objections rest on three false dichotomies: facts versus values, nature versus freedom, and nature versus nurture. Rejecting these dichotomies would allow the social sciences to be linked to the natural sciences through Darwinian biology.
Social Construction (Continued)
Authors: Lieberman Robert C. , Ingram Helen , Schneider Anne L.
Published: May 2006

In thisReviewin June 1993 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram argued that the social construction of target populations is an important political and policy phenomenon. Robert Lieberman criticizes Schneider and Ingram's “circular” conceptualization of public policy and social construction. He proposes a “historical-institutional” framework for understanding the role of group identities in political change. Lieberman analyzes the dual experience of African-Americans in the American welfare state as an example of political institutions and policy changes' affecting changing group constructions. Ingram and Schneider respond that their purpose is to understand how social constructions shape policy designs, which in turn affect citizen perceptions and participation, and argue that Lieberman's ideas of institutions and history yield no analytic improvement. They provide their own analysis of the case of welfare to illustrate the advantages for future research of their conception of policy targets.
A Model of Muddling Through
Authors: Bendor Jonathan
Published: May 2006

As arguments about the effectiveness of “muddling through” have proven frustratingly inconclusive, incrementalism—once a major approach to the study of boundedly rational policy processes—has gone dormant. In an attempt to revitalize the debate, I present a formal model of muddling through. The model, by clarifying the logical structure of the informal theory, presents a clearer target for criticism. More importantly, it establishes numerous deductive results. First, some of Lindblom's less controversial conjectures—about the benefits of seriality (repeated attacks on the same policy problem) and redundancy (multiple decision makers working on the same problem)—turn out to be correct if conflict across policy domains is absent or takes certain specified forms. But given other empirically reasonable types of conflict, even these claims are wrong. Second, the advantages of incremental (local) policy search (Lindblom's best-known and most controversial claim) turn out to be still less well founded: in many empirically plausible contexts the claim is invalid.
War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability
Authors: de Mesquita Bruce Bueno , Siverson Randolph M.
Published: May 2006

We seek to answer the question, What effect does international war participation have on the ability of political leaders to survive in office? We develop a model of political reliability and derive seven related hypotheses from it that anticipate variation in the time a national political leader will survive in office after the onset of a war. Drawing upon a broadly based data set on state involvement in international war between 1816 and 1975, our expectations are tested through censored Weibull regression. Four of the hypotheses are tested, and all are supported by the analysis. We find that those leaders who engage their nation in war subject themselves to a domestic political hazard that threatens the very essence of the office-holdinghomo politicus, the retention of political power. The hazard is mitigated by longstanding experience for authoritarian elites, an effect that is muted for democratic leaders, while the hazard is militated by defeat and high costs from war for all types of leaders. Additionally, we find that authoritarian leaders are inclined to war longer after they come to power than democratic leaders. Further, democratic leaders select wars with a lower risk of defeat than do their authoritarian counterparts.
Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency
Authors: Dixit Avinash , Londregan John
Published: May 2006

The political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way, namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses. We find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome. To achieve economically efficient outcomes, it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers. But the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics, which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market. We identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices.
Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court
Authors: Maltzman Forrest , Wahlbeck Paul J.
Published: May 2006

Justices are strategic actors. This is particularly evident when they change their votes between the original conference on the merits and the Court's announcement of the final decision. We predict that such voting fluidity may be influenced by strategic policy considerations, justices' uncertainty over issues involved in a case, the chief justice's interest in protecting his prerogatives, and other institutional pressures. To test our hypotheses, we explore the occurrence of fluidity on the Burger Court (1969–85). Using logistic regression, we show that justices' decisions to change their votes stem primarily from strategic policy considerations. In limited instances, the decision to switch can be attributed to either uncertainty or institutional pressures. Our findings suggest that the decision of a justice to join an opinion results from more than his or her initial policy preferences; final votes are influenced as well by the politics of opinion writing.
“Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare
Authors: Gilens Martin
Published: May 2006

Crime and welfare are now widely viewed as “coded” issues that activate white Americans' negative views of blacks without explicitly raising the “race card.” But does the desire of whites to combat crime or curtail welfare really stem from their dislike of blacks? Are these not pressing problems about which Americans rightly should be concerned—apart from any associations these issues may have with race? In this paper I assess the extent to which white Americans' opposition to welfare is rooted in their attitudes toward blacks. Using conventional survey modeling techniques and a randomized survey-based experiment from a national telephone survey, I find that racial attitudes are the single most important influence on whites' welfare views. I also show that whites hold similar views of comparably described black and white welfare mothers, but that negative views of black welfare mothers are more politically potent, generating greater opposition to welfare than comparable views of white welfare mothers.
Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States
Authors: Alt James E. , Lowry Robert C.
Published: May 2006

Does partisan control of American state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels? Does divided control affect the government's ability to make hard decisions? Do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter? Using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the American states from 1968 to 1987, we conclude that (1) aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under Democrats and Republicans, the net result being that Democrats target spending (and taxes) to higher shares of state-level personal income; (2) divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits, particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature; and (3) unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year (outside the South) have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions.
Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis
Authors: Poe Steven C. , Tate C. Neal
Published: May 2006

This crossnational study seeks to explain variations in governmental repression of human rights to personal integrity (state terrorism) in a 153-country sample during the eighties. We outline theoretical perspectives on this topic and subject them to empirical tests using a technique appropriate for our pooled cross-sectional time-series design, namely, ordinary least squares with robust standard errors and a lagged dependent variable. We find democracy and participation in civil or international war to have substantively important and statistically significant effects on repression. The effects of economic development and population size are more modest. The hypothesis linking leftist regime types to abuse of personal integrity rights receives some support. We find no reliable evidence that population growth, British cultural influence, military control, or economic growth affect levels of repression. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for scholars and practitioners concerned with the prevention of personal integrity abuse.
A Grammar of Institutions
Authors: Crawford Sue E. S. , Ostrom Elinor
Published: May 2006

The institutional grammar introduced here is based on a view that institutions are enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations. The syntax of the grammar identifies components of institutions and sorts them into three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. We introduce the grammar, outline methods for operationalizing the syntax, apply the syntax to an analysis of cooperation in collective dilemma situations, and discuss the pragmatics of the grammar for analyses of behavior within complex institutional settings.
Mary Astell (1666–1731), Critic of Locke
Authors: Springborg Patricia
Published: May 2006

In the now considerable literature reevaluating the reception of Locke'sTwo Treatises, no mention has been made of perhaps his first systematic critic, the commissioned Tory political pamphleteer, Mary Astell. Contemporaneous with Charles Leslie, who is usually credited with the honor, Astell had diagnosed Locke's political argument by 1705 and perhaps as early as 1700. Why has her contribution remained unacknowledged for so long? It is argued here that for too long commentators have been looking for the wrong person in the wrong place. Astell correctly saw that Locke's political philosophy was inextricable from his psychological and theological systems, addressing all three in works that were political, theological and homiletic. But why Locke, and why in 1700–1705? Did Astell already know the authorship of theTwo Treatises, only officially established in 1704 with the publication of the codicil to Locke's will?
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Authors: Lupia Arthur , Strøm Kaare
Published: May 2006

Cabinet coalitions in multiparty parliamentary democracies lead a precarious existence. Legislative majorities can typically dismiss the cabinet at will and can sometimes force early elections through parliamentary dissolution. Since coalition termination can have substantial political consequences, it is important to understand when and why such decisions are made. To this end, we develop a model of coalition bargaining in a legislature with dismissal and dissolution powers. We use the model to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for both coalition termination and parliamentary dissolution. In contrast to several widely held maxims, we find that coalition terminations need not be the automatic consequence of exogenous shocks. Nor do opportunistic parties with favorable electoral prospects always dissolve parliament to enhance their power. Instead, decisions to terminate coalitions or call new elections result from party leaders' rational responses to the constraints of legislative and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate.
Shaping Mexico's Electoral Arena: The Construction of Partisan Cleavages in the 1988 and 1991 National Elections
Authors: Domínguez Jorge I. , McCann James A.
Published: May 2006

In the 1988 and 1991 national elections, Mexican voters asked themselves above all whether they continued to support the long-ruling official party. Voter behavior was not well explained by attachments to social cleavages, attitudes on policy issues, or general assessments about the present circumstances and the prospects for the nation's economy or personal finances. In both elections, moreover, the parties of the Left failed to mobilize voters that had chosen to abstain in past elections. Once voters were ready to oppose the ruling party, however, differences by issue, prospective economic assessments, and social cleavages shaped their choice between the opposition parties.
Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
Authors: Bawn Kathleen
Published: May 2006

Congressional choices about administrative procedures affect an agency's political responsiveness and the technical accuracy of its decisions. Legislators would like to design procedures so that agencies make technically sound decisions and balance the needs of competing interests in the way intended. In practice, agency procedures designed to promote technical competence often allow for political drift, and those that promote political control provide little new technical information about the consequences of policy decisions. The trade-off between technical competence and political control is captured in a model of a legislative coalition's decision about agency procedures. The choice variables are the agency's expected preferences and independence. Depending on exogenous levels of technical and political uncertainty, optimal agency procedures can maximize technical competence, maximize political control, or achieve a combination of the two.
A purely topological form of non-Aristotelian logic
Authors: Hempel Carl G.
Published: May 2006

1. The problem. The aim of the following considerations is to introduce a new type of non-Aristotelian logic by generalizing the truth-table methods so far employed for establishing non-Aristotelian sentential calculi. We shall expound the intended generalization by applying it to the particular set of pluri-valued systems introduced by J. Łukasiewicz. One will remark that the points of view illustrated by this example may serve to generalize quite analogously any other plurivalued systems, such as those originated by E. L. Post, by H. Reichenbach, and by others.

2. J. Łukasiewicz's plurivalued systems of sentential logic. First of all, we consider briefly the structure of the Łukasiewicz systems themselves.

As to the symbolic notation in which to represent those systems, we make the following agreements: For representing the expressions of the (two- or plurivalued) calculus of sentences, we make use of the Principia mathematica symbolism; however, we employ brackets instead of dots. We call the small italic letters “p”, “q”, “r”, … sentential variables or elementary sentences, and employ the term “sentence” as a general designation of both elementary sentences and the composites made up of elementary sentences and connective symbols (“~”, “ν” “.”, “⊃” “≡”).

Now, the different possible sentences (or, properly speaking, the different possible shapes of sentences, such as “p”, “p∨q”, “~p.(q∨ r)”, etc.) are the objects to which truth-values are ascribed; and just as in every other case one wants a designation for an object in order to be able to speak of it, we want now a system of designations for the sentences with which we are going to deal in our truth-table considerations.
Inner models for set theory—Part I
Authors: Shepherdson J. C.
Published: May 2006

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann (4), Mostowski (5), and more recently Gödel (1), who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model.
On complete atomic proper relation algebras
Authors: Harary Frank
Published: May 2006

The object of this note is to classify the isomorphism types of all complete atomic proper relation algebras. In particular we find that the number of abstractly distinct complete atomic proper finite relation algebras of 2m elements is equal to the number of distinct partitions of the positive integer m into summands which are perfect squares.

A relation algebra is called complete atomic if its Boolean algebra is complete atomic. A proper relation algebra is a relation algebra whose elements are relations. Lyndon has recently proved, by constructing an appropriate finite relation algebra, that not every complete atomic relation algebra is isomorphic to a proper relation algebra.

Henceforth, let us consider a complete atomic proper relation algebra. The atoms {〈a, b〉}, {〈c, d〉} will be called connected if and only if {a, b} ⋂ {c, d} is not empty. Let the relation of connectedness over the set B of all atoms be denoted by ~. For brevity let B = {b1,b2, …}. The relation ~ is obviously reflexive and symmetric. But ~ is not transitive, since a, b, c, d distinct implies {〈a, 0〉} ~ {〈b, c〉}, {〈b, c〉} ~ {〈c, d〉}, and {〈a, b〉} ≁ {〈c, d〉}.
Sur les types des propositions composées
Authors: Pólya G.
Published: May 2006

Il s'agit d'un problème combinatoire de logique formelle, formulé par Jevons; il sera expliqué en détails dans ce qui suit (voir no. 1). Jevona luimême n'a traité le problème que dans les cas les plus simples (n= 1, 2, 3); un cas plus difficile (n= 4) a été traité par Clifford; le cas général (nquelconque) a été à peine abordé.

Le but de ce travail est de faire remarquer que ce problème de Jevons et de Clifford est contenu comme cas particutier dans un problème combinatoire général que j'ai traité ailleurs. La méthode générale ramène le problème présent à l'étude d'un certain groupe de permutations d'ordren!2n, étroitement lié au groupe symétrique d'ordren!. J'ai fait les calculs nécessaires pourn= 1, 2, 3, 4. Mes résultats numèriques sont complètement en accord avec les résultats de Jevons, mais ils ne s'accordent qu'en partie avec les résultats de Clifford.

Une proposition peut être vraie ou fausse. On peut exprimer la même chose en disant que nous pouvons attribuer à une proposition l'une ou l'autre des deux “valeurs logiques” qui s'excluent mutuellement: la “vérité” et la “fausseté.”