Applicable Lessons Learned from AHIP/OH-58D and LHX/RAH-66 Development Programs for the Army's FARA Open Systems Aircraft
Authors:   Georgia Institute of Technology, Daniel Dr. ,   Tennessee Technical Test Team, William Dr. 
Published: July 2023

The Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program is much bigger than the two ambitious high speed helicopters that Bell and Sikorsky will now get more than $1 billion to build. At least five other major moving pieces must come together on time to turn the final aircraft, whoever makes it, into a working weapon:
- a new Improved Turbine Engine built by GE;
- helicopter-launched mini-drones called Air Launched Effects (ALE);
- a new Long-Range Precision Munition (LRPM), with the Israeli Spike-NLOS as the initial version;
- an Integrated Missile Launcher (IML) to launch both the missile and the drones;
- and the underlying electronic framework of standards and interfaces to plug it all together, the Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA).
*Recently, FARA has added a 20mm Gatling Gun being developed by The Advanced Rotorcraft Armament and Protection System (ARAPS) program team at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Center (CCDC) Armaments Center
The Army is "not just focused on the air vehicle, but focused on the weapon system," said Brig. Gen. Walter Rugen, Future Vertical Lift director at Army Futures Command, in a call this morning with reporters. [1]
While some have questioned the viability of fielding the FARA in ten years, e.g. by 2028, others have offered reasons on why the plan for a next-gen recon aircraft needs to be accelerated. Who knows how much money will be available to the Army for sustaining its aviation fleet as budget walls close in over the next several years? Trilliondollar deficits have a way of impinging on defense budgets. What is proposed, though, is that the Army compress its development schedule for a new armed recon rotorcraft so that our soldiers begin to be better equipped against the likes of Russia and China somewhere around 2025, rather than after 2030. A whole lot can happen in ten years. We don't need another Army development program to be overtaken by events. (2)
However, since the FARA will likely be in service for a half-century or more, it makes sense to conduct rigorous analysis up front to ensure that what is fielded has the capabilities to provide the most value for the warfighter and the taxpayer. Prior to spending billions of dollars and decades producing the FARA aircraft, it is prudent to spend the time to determine what the right solutions should be. Many projects fail when the initial requirements are not well thought out and the ramifications are not clearly understood. To solve the tension between these conflicting desires, designers need to iterate the design sensitivities with operational analysis to show the pros and cons of each attribute, alone and in concert, but ultimately the Army must prioritize its requirements and potentially make hard trade-off decisions.(3)
The major objective of this paper is provide a methodology for the necessary understanding of the push and pull of technology readiness and application through trade studies and operational analysis early to avoid disappointments and to minimize FARA slippages and cost increases. This will be accomplished by reviewing Lessons Learned from the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the LHX/RAH-66 Comanche development programs. While the authors were directly involved in these programs as Army Aviation engineers, managers and senior executives, the major emphasis for this paper will be to address how the government-industry teams brought these programs successfully through initial development. Fortunately, for the AHIP/OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Development Program there are excellent documentation of the government-industry team participation in References 4 and 5. While the authors strongly endorse the lessons learned in these documents, they will have a few of their own. For the LHX/RAH66 Comanche Development Program there is considerably less documentation; however, the authors will provide Army and their lessons learned. It is hoped that this paper and the referenced documents will be read, and the lessons learned by both government and industry involved in the FARA development program.