bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
True Interpretations
Authors: Davies Stephen
Published: May 2010

Monroe C. Beardsley holds that literary interpretations can be assessed for truth and that conflicting interpretations cannot both be true. By contrast, Joseph Margolis argues for the compatibility of conflicting interpretations by denying they can be assessed for truth. Both assume that if any interpretation of a work can be true, then only one interpretation of it can be true. That assumption is rejected here. This chapter is interested in discovering the meanings that can be put upon a work and argues that it can be true that many meanings are sustained by it.
Relativism in Interpretation
Authors: Davies Stephen
Published: May 2010

Joseph Margolis argues that literary interpretations allow of contrary and conflicting interpretations that can be equally plausible. In doing so, he opts for a relativistic multivalent logic allowing for truth-like contradictions. Against this view, it is argued that an interpretation is true just in case the work can be read meaningfully as it proposes; that is, can be read in a manner making the work as coherent as possible while respecting its identity, and so on. ‘ The work is p’ is true if ‘the work can be read as p’ is true. Judged this way, it can be true that a given work can be interpreted as p and also true that a given work can be interpreted as not-p.
Replies to Arguments Suggesting that Critics' Strong Evaluations could not be Soundly Deduced
Authors: Davies Stephen
Published: May 2010

This chapter reviews and rejects arguments offered in support of the opinion that the reasons offered in favour of strong aesthetic evaluations (‘this work is good’) cannot be sufficiently strong logically to entail their truth. In summary the arguments are: there is an unbridgeable gap between facts and values; evaluations are disguised ‘ought’ statements that could not follow from ‘is’ statements; criticism is concerned with conveying perceptually based experiences of the work rather than beliefs about it; there can be no general rules of artistic value because we value works of art for what makes each unique; the creativity of artists transcends the possibility of rules concerning art in general; and generalizations about the dependence of aesthetic value on the occurrence of any given set of aesthetic properties are always defeasible. None of these positions succeed in showing that reasoning in aesthetics has a distinctive, non-deductive character.
Truth‐Values and Metaphors
Authors: Davies Stephen
Published: May 2010

This chapter argues that metaphors rely solely on the literal meanings of the terms they use. They do not possess or generate meanings that transcend their literal meanings and they do not express special, metaphoric truths that are at odds with their literal truth-values. The death of a metaphor occurs when it takes on a predictable, public use. Metaphors operate by expressing a knowingly entertained thought, not via assertion. The metaphor expresses rather than describes an experience. Because the metaphor is not used assertorically, its truth-value ceases to be important.
Globalization, Development, and ‘Other Players’: Widening the Lens
Authors: Gerber David J.
Published: May 2010

Competition law was of limited importance in most parts of the world outside the US and Europe until the 1990s. Since then, however, it has developed rapidly virtually everywhere, as many countries have introduced competition laws for the first time and others have intensified enforcement and implementation efforts. This chapter focuses on countries in which competition law is either relatively new or little-developed. These countries will be central to global competition law development, because the success of any global competition law strategy will depend on their support. The chapter reviews with varying levels of intensity the competition law experiences of Japan, Korea, China, Canada, and Australia in their own right, and it identifies patterns in Latin America and Africa. In each case, it views national experience in its global context. A main theme is the evolving relationships between national and international domains of competition law.
Reconceiving Competition Law for Global Markets: Agreements, Commitments, and Pathways
Authors: Gerber David J.
Published: May 2010

This chapter examines multilateral agreement as a strategy for developing competition law on the global level. It identifies the potential for multilateral agreement, outlines the forms such agreement might take, and dissects the issues that will influence support of a multilateral strategy. The analysis emphasizes the need to adapt any multilateral agreement to the specific needs of competition law development rather than to follow pre-existing forms or subject it to pre-existing institutional procedures. Time and flexibility are likely to be critically important in fashioning an effective strategy, because they allow the obligations of states and the relationships among states to be adapted to the process of economic development. An effective strategy will call for active support from all types of participants in the global economy. The chapter then sketches a conception of multilateral agreement called a ‘commitment pathway’, which is specifically designed to take these factors into account.
Global Competition and Law: Trajectories and Promises
Authors: Gerber David J.
Published: May 2010

This chapter ties together the preceding sections of the book. It takes a longer and broader view of the trajectories of national competition law experience and analyzes how they have been intertwined with transnational competition law developments. These interrelationships shape the dynamics of global competition law development and, in order to be effective, any competition law regime for global markets must be based on them. The chapter evaluates the promise of global competition law development and the obstacles to creating a more effective legal framework for global economic relations. It concludes that the early 21st century represents a major point of transition in economic and political relations, and thus a ‘constitutional moment’ in which competition law can contribute to meeting human needs and enriching economic and political opportunities around the world.
Introduction: Motivations for Relativism
Authors: Kölbel Max
Published: May 2010

This introductory chapter provides a systematic overview of the issue of contemporary truth-relativism. It first outlines the standard approach to semantics, modifications of which have been demanded. Then it looks at one of the cases, matters of taste, and examines what the motivations for modifying standard semantics are. The chapter then outlines the parallel reasoning in some of the other cases, among them: epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, moral values, and future contingents. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume.
Moderate Relativism
Authors: Recanati François
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses two classical objections to the view that the content of a tensed utterance is a ‘temporal proposition’, true relative to certain times and false relative to others. The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. In response, it is argued that the (complete) content of a representation is distributed over its explicit content and the circumstance with respect to which that content is to be evaluated. As a result, the explicit content (lekton) need not be fully propositional; it may determine only relative truth-conditions. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who claimed that temporal propositions cannot be the object of propositional attitudes such as belief. It is argued that that argument can be resisted if one distinguishes two aspects in a belief and, correlatively, two interpretations for a belief report. The last section of the chapter briefly discusses ‘faultless disagreement’.
Three Forms of Truth Relativism
Authors: Einheuser Iris
Published: May 2010

Several authors have argued that a range of linguistic data calls for a relativization of propositional truth to contexts of assessment or, more generally, perspectives. This chapter defends the more orthodox view that the truth of a proposition depends only on what the world is like. It develops an account — factual relativism — on which what the world is like depends, in some respects, on a perspective. The resulting model, which allows for a natural account of faultless disagreement and of the evaluation of perspectival representations from different points of view, is applied both to discourse about taste and discourse involving epistemic modals. Finally, it is argued that a plausible propositional relativism is bound to reduce to either indexical or factual relativism.
Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism
Authors: Moruzzi Sebastiano
Published: May 2010

This chapter argues that MacFarlane's truth-relativism faces two problems. First, it cannot explain the existence of disputes over assessment-sensitive propositions because it does not have a viable notion of disagreement. Second, it entails the idea that knowledge of the truth-relativist thesis in the context of a dispute is dialectically inhibiting: the truth relativist is committed to an ignorance theory, for the speakers who take part, to a dispute on matters of taste.
Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness
Authors: Cappelen Herman
Published: May 2010

For some relativists some of the time the evidence for their view presents a puzzling data pattern. On the one hand, there's evidence that the terms in question exhibit some kind of content stability across contexts. On the other hand, there's evidence that their contents vary from one context of use to another. The challenge is to reconcile these two sets of data. Truth-relativists claim that their theory can do so better than contextualism and invariantism. Truth-relativists, in effect, use an argument to the best explanation: they present data that they claim to be able to handle better than any competing theory. This chapter focuses on how semanticists should react to this allegedly puzzling data pattern. It argues that what generates the appearance of a puzzle is a mistaken assumption about the relationship between semantic content and speech act content (i.e., the relationship between semantic content and what speakers assert, say, and claim). When this mistaken assumption is corrected for, any semantics can deal with this data pattern. It doesn't cut either way with respect to the debate between the contextualist, the invariantist, and the truth-relativist.
Economics and efficiency
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel
Published: May 2010

This chapter introduces the ‘dismal science’ of economics to non-economists, and draws trained economists' attention to those parts of their discipline that are most relevant in the context of this book. It argues that the equilibrium point at which demand equals supply offers an attractive theoretical solution to ‘the grand economic problem’ of how much to produce in order to maximize welfare. The interaction between producers and consumers, each of them acting out of their own self-interest, brings about an optimal outcome where social welfare is maximized. The idea that an ‘invisible hand’ can bring about allocative efficiency has been immensely attractive to economists since the founding father of modern economics, Adam Smith (1723-1790), introduced this parable. However, the ‘invisible hand’ is troublesome in the real world, where a range of restrictive assumptions will have to be satisfied for the market to be the ideal system for achieving efficiency. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
Equality and fairness
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel
Published: May 2010

This chapter begins with an inquiry into altruism and redistribution. It then explores the issues of equality and fairness as applied to the distribution of health and health care. Altruism is seen through the eyes of ‘the individual as a consumer’, while equity is seen through the eyes of ‘the individual as a citizen’. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
The health environment
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses some key policy options for reducing the negative impacts of an unhealthy environment, as well as some challenges involved when attempting to reduce social causes of ill health. Physical and social environments represent the circumstances under which people live and to which they more or less have to adapt. Physical and social environments represent more structural constraints, while health-related lifestyle to a larger extent reflects choices based on individual preferences. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
Uncertainty and health insurance
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel
Published: May 2010

This chapter shows that there is a welfare gain from health insurance because people are risk averse with respect to the financial implications of the prospect of ill health. There are effectively two main types of asymmetric information related to health insurance: adverse selection, where the asymmetry occurs before the insurance contract is made; and moral hazard, where the asymmetry occurs after the contract is made. Two different bases are presented for pricing health insurance: individual rating and community rating. The arguments in favour of individual rating are: i) it offers consumers a choice of contracts; ii) people have financial incentives for healthy behaviour; and iii) there is no forced cross-subsidy, i.e. it is actuarially ‘fair’. The arguments against individual rating are: i) it involves adverse selection (market failure); ii) transaction costs are high due to false signalling of risks; and iii) access depends on income (‘unfair’). The simplest policy solution to adverse selection, high transaction costs, and unequal access is compulsory public insurance, to which we now turn. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
On Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

What is a human right? How can we tell whether a proposed human right really is one? How do we establish the content of particular human rights, and how do we resolve conflicts between them? These are pressing questions for philosophers, political theorists, jurisprudents, international lawyers, and activists. This book offers answers in its investigation of human rights. The term ‘natural right’, in its modern sense of an entitlement that a person has, first appeared in the late Middle Ages. When during the 17th and 18th centuries the theological content of the idea was abandoned in stages, nothing was put in its place. The secularized notion that we were left with at the end of the Enlightenment is still our notion today: a right that we have simply in virtue of being human. During the 20th century, international law has contributed to settling the question of which rights are human rights, but its contribution has its limits. The notion of a human right that we have inherited suffers from no small indeterminateness of sense. The term has been left with so few criteria for determining when it is used correctly that we often have a plainly inadequate grasp on what is at issue. This book takes on the task of showing the way towards a determinate concept of human rights, based on their relation to the human status that we all share. The book works from certain paradigm cases, such as freedom of expression and freedom of worship, to more disputed cases such as welfare right — for instance the idea of a human right to health. The goal is a substantive account of human rights; an account with enough content to tell us whether proposed rights really are rights. The book emphasizes the practical as well as theoretical urgency of this goal: as the United Nations recognized in 1948 with its Universal Declaration, the idea of human rights has considerable power to improve the lot of humanity around the world.
Introduction
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This introductory chapter begins by presenting the rationale behind this book, namely the not uncommon belief that we do not yet have a clear enough idea of what human rights are. It contends that this belief needs more focus. It considers the developing notion of human rights running through this history or ‘historical notion’. It argues that human rights should be seen as protections of our normative agency. That is not a derivation of human rights from normative agency; it is a proposal based on a hunch that this way of remedying the indeterminateness of the term will best suit its role in ethics.
Human Rights: The Incomplete Idea
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

Use of the term ‘human rights’ began at the end of the 18th century, but gained wide currency only in the middle of the 20th century. Before the end of the 18th century, the talk was instead of ‘natural rights’. The two terms come from the same continuous tradition; they have largely the same extension, though different intensions. ‘Natural rights’ were generally seen as derived from ‘natural laws’. This chapter shows how it is altogether harder to say from what ‘human rights’ are supposed to be derived. It considers the state of the discourse of human rights today. It highlights the need for an account of ‘human rights’ with at least enough content to tell us, for any such proposed right, difficult borderline cases aside, whether it really is one and to what it is a right.
The Metaphysics of Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter begins with a discussion of the two models of value judgement. It discusses human interest as part of the natural world. It then goes on to consider how much of the epistemic and metaphysical standing of human interests carries over to the human rights derived from them.
The Relativity and Ethnocentricity of Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter begins with a discussion of ethical relativity. It then discusses the relativity of human rights and the problem of ethnocentricity. It considers John Rawls's views on tolerance between peoples, arguing that we should not follow Rawls's lead in commandeering the language of human rights to explain intervention. The language that he can provide is too indeterminate in sense to do so, and, once its sense is made more satisfactorily determinate, it will contain what is needed to justify the ampler list of human rights that, for so long, the tradition has championed.
Autonomy
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

According to the personhood account, human rights are protections of our normative agency. Normative agency has stages. The first stage is autonomy, which consists in our assessing options and thereby forming a conception of a worthwhile life. To form and then to pursue that conception, we need various kinds of support: life itself of course, a certain level of health, certain physical and mental capacities, a certain amount of education, and so on. These are referred to as ‘minimum provision’. These are not enough for agency if others then stop us; we must also be free to pursue that conception. This is called ‘liberty’. All human rights will then come under one or other of these three overarching headings: autonomy, welfare, and liberty. And those three can be seen as constituting a trio of highest-level human rights. This chapter discusses the distinction between autonomy and liberty, the value of autonomy, the content of the right to autonomy, and autonomy and free will.
Welfare
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses welfare rights. Topics covered include the historical growth of rights, welfare as a civil or human right, the case for a human right to welfare; and human rights, legal rights, and rights in the United Nations.
A Right to Life, a Right to Death
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses issues associated with the right to life. Topics covered include Locke's views on the scope of the right to life, personhood as the ground of the right, and a right to death.
Privacy
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses the right to privacy. Topics covered include personhood and content of a human right to privacy, legal approaches to the right to privacy, privacy of information, privacy of space and life, privacy of liberty, and privacy versus freedom of expression and right to information.
Group Rights
Authors: Griffin James
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses group rights. It considers the good-based argument and justice-based argument for group rights. The first argument is unsuccessful while the second succeeds as an argument, but that it is not an argument for group rights. Many supposed group rights are also best not seen as rights at all, and some others can be reduced to individual rights. Two possibilities are discussed: exclusion and reduction.
Analysis, Description, and the A Priori?
Authors: Blackburn Simon
Published: May 2010

This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics that the author wrote for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. It attempts to sketch the essence of Jackson's approach to metaphysics and ethics, and to indicate some of the places where it is surprising and, inevitably, controversial. It focuses on the ‘analytic descriptivism’, or the ‘a priori passage principle’ that Jackson stands by, generating ‘the view that for each true statement concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that statement’ (Jackson 2003).
Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis
Authors: Lycan William G.
Published: May 2010

According to Stich and Weinberg, Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics is, by a long shot, the most sophisticated defence of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy that has ever been offered. The author agrees but the book is also very difficult. This chapter explores the book's three main chapters, trying to clarify its basic notions and its argument, and taking issue where the author sees fit.
Jackson's Classical Model of Meaning
Authors: Schroeter Laura , Bigelow John
Published: May 2010

Jackson often writes as if his account of public language meanings in terms of descriptivist conventions were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? This chapter shows just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind Jackson's semantic theory really are. First, it explains how Jackson's theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, it sketches an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the improvisation model of meaning, which seems psychologically more realistic. The chapter concludes that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson's semantic theory stands in need of a more substantial defence than he has so far offered.
Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument
Authors: Van Gulick Robert
Published: May 2010

Few arguments in the recent philosophy of mind have generated as much discussion or controversy as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA), and none has had a more surprising history. Having offered the KA in 1983 and ably defended it for fifteen years against a wide variety of objections, Jackson did an about-face in 1998 and disavowed it. His rejection of the argument is essentially coupled with the acceptance of another controversial if widely held view, namely the Representational Theory of Consciousness or at least of Conscious Sensory Experience (RTS), which he regards as the sole means to defeat the KA and avoid the cognitive illusion that generates its intuitive appeal. This chapter begins by briefly reviewing objections to the KA. It considers where, if anywhere, Jackson's own present critical view fits in the logical geography of options. It then turns to the question of whether the RTS is in fact either necessary or sufficient for refuting the KA.
The ‘Actual’ in Actualism
Authors: Driver Julia
Published: May 2010

The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and expectabilism (or a variety of subjective consequentialism). Suppose that we define the right action as that action which maximizes the good. Some writers, such as Michael Slote, have argued that this straightforward criterion is underdetermined. Are we to maximize ‘actual’ good or ‘expected’ good? That is the debate between the objective consequentialist and the subjective consequentialist. There is also the issue of whether or not the agent who is deliberating considers what would be best given what will happen as opposed to what could or can happen. That is the debate between the actualist and the possibilist in determining relevant options for the moral agent to consider in deliberation. This chapter explores differing answers to both of these questions, and then explores one strategy for answering both — a strategy which has been very much influenced by the work of Frank Jackson. Though the author agrees with Jackson on actualism, it disagrees with him on expectabilism. It is argued that the definition of ‘right action’ is clear and not at all underdetermined — the right action just is the action that maximizes the good, the actual good. But what is often confusing is that the semantics of right is confused with an issue in the epistemology of right — that is the issue of determining how we are to go about doing the best that we can properly.
Kant's System of Nature and Freedom
Authors: Guyer Paul
Published: May 2010

The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity
Authors: Guyer Paul
Published: May 2010

This chapter argues that Kant's reassignment of the regulative principles of scientific inquiry from the faculty of reason (in the Critique of Pure Reason) to the faculty of reflective judgment (in the Critique of the Power of Judgment) reflects his recognition that systematicity is a necessary condition for scientific knowledge, not a desideratum additional to scientific knowledge, even though it remains, as in the first Critique, a regulative ideal.
Kant's Conception of Empirical Law
Authors: Guyer Paul
Published: May 2010

This chapter focuses on Kant's conception of particular laws of nature, and argues that empirical laws of nature are always an amalgam of empirical input and non-empirical foundations.
Kant on the Systematicity of Nature:Two Puzzles
Authors: Guyer Paul
Published: May 2010

This chapter argues that, particularly in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant treats the postulation of the systematicity of nature as a ‘transcendental’ and not merely ‘logical’ principle because he has come to regard systematicity not just as a heuristic assumption for the easier discovery of empirical laws of nature, but as the basis for the assumption of the necessary truth of such laws. It also explores the tension between Kant's posit of necessity for laws of nature and the requirement of apparent contingency for the experience of beauty, even though both are supposed to be products of reflective judgment.
Purpose in Nature: What is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Teleology?
Authors: Guyer Paul
Published: May 2010

This chapter argues that the necessity of Kant's regulative but still teleological approach to the investigation of organic nature has been put in question by subsequent developments in biological science, but that his vision of nature as the arena for the realization of human morality suggests valuable moral constraints on the human treatment of our natural environment.
The EC Common Fisheries Policy
Authors: Churchill Robin , Owen Daniel
Published: May 2010

The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is one of the longest established and more controversial of the common policies of the EC. It deals principally with the management of fishery resources, relations between the EC and third States in fisheries matters, the marketing of and trade in fishery products, financial assistance to the fisheries sector, and aquaculture. However, the CFP is not just a matter for those with an economic interest in fisheries. It also raises many issues of more general concern, such as the capacity of the EC and its member states to manage important natural resources sustainably, the impact of fishing on the wider marine environment, and relations between developed and developing states. This book addresses the CFP from a legal perspective. It provides a detailed account of the very large body of EC law comprising the CFP, and draws on the European Commission's associated documents to aid interpretation and add context. As a result, the book will be of value to anyone wanting knowledge of the law of the CFP. Although not addressing the Commission's 2009 Green Paper on reform of the CFP, the book should provide a reference point against which to view the reform of parts of the CFP that is anticipated to take place over the next few years.
The scope of the Common Fisheries Policy
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel
Published: May 2010

This chapter addresses the scope of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) from three angles. After a brief introduction, it looks at the species and products covered by the CFP, known as the ‘material scope’. Then it considers the CFP's geographical scope, i.e., the land and maritime areas to which the CFP applies. Thirdly, it addresses the ‘personal scope’ of the CFP, meaning the various entities to which the CFP applies. Although the chapter focuses on the EC Treaty, it also considers the potential effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on the CFP's material and geographical scope.
Public expenditure in the fisheries sector
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel
Published: May 2010

This chapter addresses public expenditure in the fisheries sector. It deals first with two EC financial instruments: the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and Regulation 861/2006. The latter is complementary in purpose to the EFF and is sometimes referred to as ‘the second fisheries instrument’, i.e., second to the EFF. The EFF and Regulation 861/2006 are not the only sources of EC funding for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). A further important source is the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF). The EAGF funds the market intervention system (i.e., permanent withdrawal, ‘carry-over’, ‘private storage’, and the ‘compensatory allowance’ for tuna producers) as well as providing some other funding to producer organizations. Some other Community financial instruments provide support in connection with fisheries, albeit not under the CFP. After dealing with the EFF and Regulation 861/2006, the chapter moves on to consider State aid, i.e., aid granted by Member States to the fishing industry other than in conjunction with funds from any EC financial instrument.
Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity
Authors: Audi Robert
Published: May 2010

This chapter concerns the nature of testimony, its relation to belief, justification, and knowledge, and its status as a source of all three. It argues that testimony-based beliefs are non-inferential and, in that special sense, psychologically basic. Some of those non-inferential beliefs also constitute basic knowledge. Testimony is not, however, a basic source of knowledge. It has a kind of dependence on perception that precludes this. Testimony is also a source of justification, though it is non-basic for justification as well as for knowledge; but the chapter indicates some ways in which its role in giving us justification differs from its role in giving us knowledge. These and other ideas are then developed in comparison with Thomas Reid's theory of testimony. The chapter finally shows how testimony differs from such basic sources of knowledge and justification as perception and reason, but is nonetheless essential for human knowledge as we know it.
Reid on the Credit of Human Testimony
Authors: Van Cleve James
Published: May 2010

This chapter explores the analogy proposed by Thomas Reid between testimony and sense perception. It begins by trying to arrive at a correct understanding of the two principles he identifies as fundamental to our acquiring information from others: the principles of veracity and credulity. Next, it investigates the similarities Reid finds between perception and testimony considered as mechanisms of belief formation. Finally, it investigates whether the analogy between perception and testimony can be extended from psychology into epistemology. In particular, it discusses whether beliefs based on testimony, like beliefs based on sense perception, may be regarded as epistemologically basic or foundational. It concludes that although Reid's answer is yes (testimonial fundamentalism), the correct answer is no (testimonial reductionism).
Truth, Thought, Reason
Authors: Burge Tyler
Published: May 2010

This book is made up of an introductory chapter, ten historical/philosophical chapters on Frege, and four postscripts to the chapters. The topics are divided into the three areas of the book's title: (1) Frege's work on truth, which includes his revolutionary insights into linguistic and cognitive structure, into the nature of truth conditions, and into philosophical method in using logic to frame and clarify philosophical problems; (2) his work on cognition, which uses linguistic structure not as a focus but as a starting point; and (3) his defense and development of knowledge based on reason, principally knowledge in logic and mathematics.
Frege (1991)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of how Gottlob Frege's name and work remain unknown to the wider intellectual public. It then describes Frege's contributions to philosophy, including concentration on language in the expression of knowledge and a recognition of the power of logic to illuminate the structure of language and its contribution to the expression of knowledge. It shows how Frege's positivist successors used his innovations against a background of philosophical attitudes that Frege did not share. They differed with him, in absolutely fundamental ways, about both meaning and knowledge. The chapter make some more specific philosophical remarks about Frege's contributions, as discussed in these three parts: truth, structure, and method; sense and cognitive value; and rationalism.
The Concept of Truth in Frege's Program (1984)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

This chapter provides a brief overview of the role of Frege's concept of truth in his logicist program. It discusses the argument in Frege that gave rise to the Church–Gödel ‘slingshot’ argument: his own argument for the view that the denotation of a sentence is its truth-value. The chapter also discusses Frege's reason for taking the truth-value truth to be the logical object that he took it to be. It concludes with a rebuttal of Dummett's criticism of Frege's taking sentences to denote truth, and maintains that Frege motivated his view by reference to the role of truth in being an aim of judgment and assertion.
Frege on Truth (1986)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

This chapter shows that Frege's argument that sentences have truth values as their Bedeutungen (denotations) depends on his composition principle for denotation and on his view of the theoretically most important feature of sentences that functionally depends on their denotations. Frege's argument is contrasted with the Church–Gödel argument and with Russell's view of the semantical values of sentences. Frege's view that predicates are literally functional expressions, his account of the incompleteness (unsaturatedness) of predicate expressions, his attempt to clarify the notion of an extension of a concept, and his redundancy view of truth are discussed as grounds for his claim that truth values are literally logical objects. Frege's pragmatic view of theory-building is emphasized throughout. The chapter rebuts Dummett's claim that Frege's claim that truth values are denotations of sentences is an ‘almost unmitigated disaster’. In particular, Dummett's claim that Frege lost track of the distinction between sentences (which are the vehicles of assertion) and singular terms (which are not) in his logical theory is shown to be false, even of Frege's formal language. Although Frege's claims that predicates denote functions and that truth values are objects are rejected, these claims are much more pragmatically motivated and much less momentous than most commentary assumes. Frege's account of which logical objects the truth values are to be identified with is shown to be thoroughly motivated, and not merely a stipulation. Truth is the basic logical object in Frege's system.
Sinning Against Frege (1979)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

Frege's claims about indexicals, and to a lesser extent proper names, makes it clear that his notion of sense is different from what is now ordinarily understood as linguistic meaning; both communal and idiolectic linguistic meaning. This difference derives from his interest in language as an expression of thought, not in the rules governing linguistic usage and linguistic understanding. A large number of authors and translators are criticized for assimilating Frege's notion of sense to linguistic meaning. Frege's views on names are shown to be capable of resisting some, but not all, of the criticisms leveled against them by Kripke and others. This chapter maintains that the right way to criticize Frege on proper names and indexicals is to criticize his theory of thought, not his understanding of natural language. The weakness in his theory of thought is that he takes all thought components to be eternal and independent of any occurrences in space and time for being the thought components that they are. Elements in thought that are occurrence-based are needed to account for certain de re propositional attitudes.
Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning (1990)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

While Frege's notion of sense fathered contemporary notions of linguistic meaning, key elements in Frege's conceptions have disappeared from view. Some of these elements are those brought out in ‘Sinning Against Frege’ (1979). Others derive from Frege's rationalism. This chapter discusses an interpretative puzzle. The puzzle centers on Frege's saying both that the most expert mathematicians may lack a sharp grasp of mathematical expressions and that such expressions nevertheless have a denotation (Bedeutung), hence a definite sense that determines a denotation. It is argued that for Frege, the cognitive value of a sense expressed by language is not exhausted by any type of linguistic meaning that is associated with actual linguistic usage or linguistic understanding, by an individual or a community. Frege believes that the sense of an expression can transcend what any actual user understands by the expression. Senses are partly individuated by rational structures, grounded in logical reality, that may not be completely understood by a thinker at any given time, but that help to individuate what it is to have a mind. The chapter discusses what Frege means by grasping or understanding a sense. Although Frege believed in a priori rational insight, he grounded it — much more clearly than his rationalist predecessors did — on the development of a true mathematical theory; and he conceived theory development with the pragmatism of a practicing mathematician. Frege's rationalism thus contrasts with traditional rationalism, and his conception of thought is distinguished from use-based conceptions. Both points are illuminated by the distinction between Fregean sense and linguistic meaning.
Frege on Knowing the Foundation (1998)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

In reasoning about justification of the basic principles of logic and mathematics, Frege combined a traditional Euclidean conception with a more modern pragmatic one. In thinking of the self-evidence of axioms — understood as true, natural, starting points for justification — he strictly distinguished self-evidence from obviousness. This chapter discusses Frege's notions of axiom, self-evidence, basic truth, certainty, unprovability, and proof structure. Frege's tendency to argue for his axioms is explained not as a justification for them, but as a way of articulating a proper understanding of them; an elaboration of their self-evidence. Frege's semantical exposition of axioms and rules of inference in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic is explained in the same way. Thus, the arguments and semantical expositions are not themselves justifications, for their conclusions are self-evident: they carry their evidence or justification in themselves. Frege's more modern, pragmatic strands centre in his contextualist views about sense, his view that applications and experience with theory provide a type of justification that is significant but secondary to proof, and his strong emphasis that obviousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for self-evidence or rational certainty. The inferences involved in theory building were for Frege integral to obtaining the understanding necessary to appreciate the self-evidence and rational certainty of the basic principles of logic and mathematics.
Frege on Apriority (2000)
Authors: BURGE TYLER
Published: May 2010

This chapter compares Frege's conception of apriority with those of Kant and Leibniz. The oddity (indeed, mistake) in Frege's explaining apriority in terms of derivation from general laws is explained and set in context. Frege's account is shown not to be equivalent with Kant's account of apriority in terms of independence of a justification from sense experience. Frege's attempt to show that his account is compatible with Kant's is criticized. Quite apart from its not explicitly mentioning sense experience, Frege's conception of apriority is not compatible with Kant's view that a singular capacity, pure intuition, underlies many a priori truths or cognitions; in fact, all synthetic a priori truths or cognitions. Frege takes the generality of a justification's (proof's) starting point as the essential kernel of apriority. Although Frege's conception is close to Leibniz's, it dispenses with Leibniz's heavy reliance on modality. Three areas of difficulty for Frege's conception of apriority are discussed: cogito judgments, judgments in geometry, and judgments in arithmetic. In each case, the idea that there is a priori truth or cognition whose justification has an ineliminably singular element is discussed. The problems raised by cogito judgments and judgments in arithmetic are taken to be serious threats to Frege's view that apriority is to be explained in terms of derivation from general propositions. The chapter article concludes by recommending the Kantian idea of fundamentally singular a priori cognition, without resting the idea on the Kantian notion of pure sensible intuition.
The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid
Authors: Rubini Luca
Published: May 2010

This book presents a conceptual framework for analysing the definitions of State aid and subsidy in EC and WTO law. This is done through a comparative analysis, examining the coherence of the conceptual understanding of the crucial, but still elusive, issue of the definition of subsidy. The first, important finding is that the topic is not only technical but raises more fundamental questions about the objectives of subsidy control in a given legal system and, more radically, about the goals of that system itself. The analysis does not only concentrate on the state of the law but critically looks forward, offering suggestions for new interpretations and law reform. The book focuses on the substantive provisions of the EC and WTO relating to what are identified by the author as the core properties of a notion of subsidy, i.e., a form of public action, the grant of an economic advantage and the ensuing impact on the competitive process. The current regulation in EC and WTO law is analysed, compared, and assessed in depth, and tested against a baseline represented by a notion of subsidy inserted in a subsidy regulation pursuing certain objectives. Drawing on the results of the comparative exercise, the book argues that both systems can learn valuable lessons from each other to achieve a greater coherence and a more efficient regulatory system.
Introduction
Authors: Rubini Luca
Published: May 2010

This introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section I introduces reader to the subject of this book then Section II turns to the desirability and feasibility of the adoption of a comparative (WTO-EC law) approach in its analysis. The importance of a ‘contextual’ examination is underlined and discussed using a case-study on the attitudes to legal interpretation prevailing in the two systems at issue. Section III singles out the main elements of the analysis by clarifying what the author considers as ‘definition’ of subsidy in this book. Section IV introduces a crucial relationship — that between ‘scope and justification’ – and its impact on the boundaries of the ‘definition’ of subsidy. This interaction, which is a recurring theme of the book, is set into the broader theoretical discourse by linking the issue of subsidies with the concepts of distributive justice and equality. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Foundations: The Purpose of Subsidy Control
Authors: Rubini Luca
Published: May 2010

This chapter addresses two foundational questions which have an important impact on the more confined topic of the definition of subsidy. Why do we, and should we, control subsidies? If so, how do we devise an international system of control? Emphasis is placed on the first question, identifying two justifications for subsidy control, one trade-related (linked to market access), the other competition-related (linked to distortions of competition). The chapter also underlines the important role that subsidy plays in remedying market failures and pursuing other laudable public policy objectives. On the basis on these findings, it sketches the main features of the systems of subsidy control in the WTO and EC as they are, and as we suggest they should be.
The Forms of Governmental Action Covered by WTO Subsidy Rules
Authors: Rubini Luca
Published: May 2010

This chapter discusses what forms of action actually constitute a subsidy or a State aid in the WTO and EC, and what forms of action should be considered as such. It begins with the examination of the state of the law in the WTO. The analysis focuses on the legal treatment of subsidies in both the GATT and the WTO. In so doing it concentrates on three techniques: the formulation of the definition, rules of imputability, and the origin of the resources.