bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Marx, Karl
Authors: Reiman Jeffrey
Published: January 2013

Karl Marx did not present a systematic analysis of the moral good (Kamenka 1969: 2). He did, however, have a moral vision – a notion of the good human life – that has proven extremely influential. We can see that vision by considering what Marx took to be evils of capitalist society and projecting from them to what he thought a good human society would be like. Marx had two main objections to capitalism. First, he thought that capitalism was
alienating
: it estranged human beings from their labor, their bodies, their fellows, and from nature. Second, he thought that capitalism was (effectively)
unjust
: it exploited workers by forcing them to give more labor to capitalists than they were compensated for. Though there is controversy over whether Marx's basic views on these matters changed or remained the same over his life, it is fair to say that the alienation charge is most fully developed in Marx's early writings, in particular
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
; and the injustice charge is most fully developed in Marx's later writings, in particular
Capital
. To these charges must also be added that Marx had a critical view of prevailing moral notions, in particular justice, rights, and liberty. They were products of the society in which they arose and, as such, tended to be understood in ways that disguised the moral failings of that society. That moral notions could function in this
ideological
way is a distinct and important Marxian contribution to ethics. Accordingly, the discussion here will be divided into three parts: (1) alienation, (2) injustice, and (3) ideology.
Relativism, Moral
Authors: Wong David B.
Published: January 2013

Two kinds of moral relativism – metaethical and normative – are here distinguished. Metaethical relativism holds that conflicting moral judgments can both be correct. Normative relativism holds that we have moral reason not to impose our moral views on others if their opposing views are as correct as ours. The most radical versions of these views attract the most attention and criticism: as morally dangerous because they allegedly encourage a light regard for morality and the need for patient, critical examination of difficult moral issues; as confused because they conflate the moral value of tolerance with moral neutrality; and as ill‐founded, because they take diversity in moral belief as direct evidence for the absence of universally valid moral requirements. On the other side, moral relativists have taken such criticisms to reflect a moral imperialism that does not trouble itself with an attempt to understand before judging the different to be inferior or mistaking dogmatism for well‐founded conviction. In their more moderate forms these relativist views deserve dispassionate consideration on the basis of their power to explain and respond to fundamental moral disagreement.
Late Modern Continental Ethics
Authors: Pinkard Terry
Published: January 2013

Immanuel Kant saw philosophy as responding to three basic questions: What can I know? What ought I do? For what can I hope? (He later added a fourth: What is man?) The answers, he thought, each had to do with how one answered the other (seeKant, Immanuel).
Reasons, Internal and External
Authors: Arkonovich Steven
Published: January 2013

It is common sense to say that, at least sometimes, what someone has reason to do depends on what he or she wants. It is a philosophical doctrine – a doctrine called “internalism” – to hold that this is always the case, and so to say that all of one's reasons for action depend on one's desires. According to internalism, any consideration (whether it concerns prudence, morality, aesthetics, finance, etc.) can give rise to reasons only for those agents who care about such considerations. I will sometimes refer to the internalism that concerns us here as “reasons internalism” to indicate that it is a completely general view about the conditions under which agents have reason to act.
Dewey, John
Authors: Eldridge Michael
Published: January 2013

It is questionable whether John Dewey (1859–1952) (seePragmatic Ethics) had a moral philosophy; certainly, the foremost American philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century did not have a well‐worked out systematic moral philosophy presented in one place or in a series of books or articles (for the latter claim, see Pappas 2008: 4). This is not all that surprising, for Dewey rejected or was ambivalent about many of the usual philosophical categories – metaphysics (Seigfried 2004; Eldridge 2005: 631–2), epistemology (Eldridge 2005: 632), philosophy of religion (Eldridge 1998: 126–69), and political theory (Eldridge 1998: 67). To be sure, he reflected on morality and one can, using his work, engage contemporary moral philosophy, as Pappas (2008), Elizabeth Anderson (2010), and Jennifer Welchman (2010) have done. Pappas has even attempted to develop Dewey's “moral vision” into a cohesive whole (Pappas 2008: 4). Dewey did philosophically consider morality in such works asHuman Nature and Conduct(1922) and the popular textbookEthics(Dewey and Tufts 1985 [1908]). But he also thought conventional morality was inadequate for the times in which he lived (Anderson 2010) and his naturalistic (seeNaturalism, Ethical) but cognitivist theory (Welchman 2010) was at odds with the prevailing metaethics of G. E. Moore (seeMoore, G. E.), other intuitionists (seeIntuitionism, Moral), and the ensuing emotivists (seeEmotivism) and other non‐cognitivists (seeNon‐cognitivism) whose work dominated the first two‐thirds of the twentieth century. Not only was Dewey's normative theory not one of the standard ones (utilitarian, deontological, or virtue ethics) (seeUtilitarianism;Deontology;Virtue ethics), but his work shows little concern with universality or realism; rather, he proposed that we engage in intelligent action. A recommendation to be experimental in one's conduct would seem to drain that which is compelling from morality as ordinarily understood.
Moore, G. E.
Authors: Baldwin Thomas
Published: January 2013

G. E. Moore (1873–1958) was one of the most influential British philosophers of the twentieth century. His career was based in Cambridge (England), where he was Professor of Philosophy and a close associate of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. During the course of his life Moore addressed a broad range of philosophical issues, but in his early writings it is ethical questions which are given most attention, most notably in his only substantial monograph,
Principia Ethica
(1993). Moore wrote
Principia Ethica
while he held a prize fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, which he had been awarded on the basis of a dissertation on “The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics” (see Moore 2011). After completing
Principia Ethica
in 1903, however, Moore devoted relatively little attention to ethical theory apart from a short introductory book,
Ethics
, which he completed in 1912 (Moore 1966). But in 1941, finding himself confronted by several critical essays on his ethical theory in
The Philosophy of G. E. Moore
, he wrote a substantial reply to them (Moore 1942).
Infectious Diseases
Authors: Selgelid Michael J.
Published: January 2013

Infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses.
Early Christian Ethics
Authors: Cahill Lisa Sowle
Published: January 2013

The term “early Christian ethics” may refer to the historical study of the morality and ethical ideals of Jesus himself and his first followers; to those of later communities who produced the Christian New Testament, as well as other “noncanonical” texts, from the middle to the end of the first century; or to the ethics of Christian communities from the second through fourth centuries (seeAugustine, Saint), particularly the second.
Proportionality (in War)
Authors: Haque Adil Ahmad
Published: January 2013

Proportionality imposes moral and legal constraints on at least two aspects of the use of force by parties to an armed conflict (
see
War). First, proportionality is part of
jus ad bellum
, the moral and legal norms which constrain the initial resort to armed force, as well as the continuation of armed conflict. Second, proportionality is part of
jus in bello
, the moral and legal norms which regulate the conduct of hostilities. In both contexts, proportionality judgments depend on an evaluation of the relevant harms and relevant benefits brought about by military force; a standard specifying whether and to what extent the benefits must outweigh the harms or vice versa; as well as external variables, such as intention, national identity, and responsibility, which may alter the moral significance of the harms and benefits or the applicable standard of comparison (Hurka 2005).
Sexual Harassment
Authors: Cudd Ann E.
Published: January 2013

Sexual harassment is discriminatory and harassing conduct that involves sexual, heterosexist, or sexist behavior and violates the rights (
see
Civil Rights) of individuals not to be harassed in employment (
see
Employers And Employees) or education. Sexual harassment was invented as a concept in US law by Catharine MacKinnon in her 1979 work
Sexual Harassment of Working Women
, in which she argued that it is a form of prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. She identified two types of such harassment: quid pro quo, “in which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity,” and what has become known as “hostile environment sexual harassment,” where sexual harassment is a pervasive condition of the work environment (MacKinnon 1979: 32). The two types introduce different philosophical complications about what is wrong about the behavior. Quid pro quo raises the issue of how an offer can be coercive (
see
Coercive Wage Offers); hostile environment problematizes the harms (
see
Harm) of and criteria for judging sexual harassment. Both types are also recognized in educational environments as rights violations. Claims of sexual harassment have broadened beyond MacKinnon's original conception to include harassment of homosexuals, transgender persons, and other gender norm violators, and sexual harassment of men by other men. The analysis of the wrongness of sexual harassment has been reconceived to fit these various forms. While objections to sexual harassment as a unified conception of harm have been made, recognition of the many types of harms that go under the name sexual harassment represents significant moral progress.
Global Business Ethics
Authors: Frederick Robert
Published: January 2013

Global business ethics has both empirical and normative aspects. From an empirical point of view it is an investigation of the actual ethical practices of profit oriented businesses engaged in buying and selling goods and services in the world economy. The normative point of view has two subdivisions. First, it is a discussion of the normative role businesses ought to play with respect to local and global moral problems; and second, given that role, of the ethical norms and procedures they ought to follow as they deal with specific issues such as poverty, wages and working conditions, corruption, healthcare, education, ethnic and religious conflict, environmental degradation, and human rights violations (seeGlobal Poverty; Rights) The primary focus of this essay will be on the first part of the normative aspect for two main reasons. First, it is important to be clear about the normative role of business before making judgments about what an individual business ought or ought not to do with respect to specific moral problems. Second, particular problems, e.g., environmental pollution, are both highly context dependent and rapidly changing, making it difficult to say anything constructive about what a business morally ought to do about them without a detailed analysis of local conditions. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay. However, there are certain conditions in which global business operates that are essential for understanding the normative role of business. Some of these are briefly described in the next section.
Pro‐Attitudes
Authors: Sehon Scott
Published: January 2013

The term “pro‐attitude” is a quasi‐technical term that philosophers have used to designate a loosely defined subset of mental states. Which subset is thereby specified to be in the extension of the term varies somewhat from philosopher to philosopher, and the usage has shifted over time. The term is sometimes used in the process of characterizing various philosophical doctrines, including expressivism, non‐cognitivism, and the Humean theory of motivation (seeCognitivism; Non‐Cognitivism; Motivation, Humean Theory of).
Hume, David
Authors: Cohon Rachel
Published: January 2013

In ethics, David Hume (1711–76) is best known for asserting four theses:
Imperfect Duties
Authors: Baron Marcia
Published: January 2013

Although the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties predates Immanuel Kant (1724–1804;
see
Kant, Immanuel), it received its most sustained and (currently) most influential development from Kant. Kant mentions the distinction in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
, explaining it briefly in a footnote and indicating that he will develop it more fully in a future work. In that footnote (
Groundwork
421, n.) he says he understands a perfect duty (
see
Duty and Obligation) as “one that admits no exception in favor of inclination,” leaving the reader to surmise that imperfect duties do allow exceptions in favor of inclinations. In
The Metaphysics of Morals
, where he develops the distinction, the distinction is more complex and less tidy than it sounded in the
Groundwork
. Indeed it is untidy enough that it is more accurate to view imperfect duties as falling along a slide which at one end has juridical duties (those duties that entail a corresponding right to exercise compulsion) (
see
Rights) and at the other, those duties with greatest latitude (what Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [1992] has called the “wide imperfect duties”).
Desire Theories of the Good
Authors: Lukas Mark
Published: January 2013

Desire theories of the good hold that we are better off, in some fundamental way, if the things we want to happen do, and we are worse off if they do not. If we think of the objects of desire as propositions, we can say that a person's desire that P is
satisfied
if P is true and
frustrated
if P is false. We can then characterize a desire satisfaction as a state of affairs consisting of a person desiring that P and P being true and a desire frustration as one consisting of a person desiring that P and P being false. Desire theories of the good, then, tell us that the basic constituents of well‐being are desire satisfaction and desire frustration (
see
Well‐Being).
Moral Absolutes
Authors: Robinson Luke
Published: January 2013

The term “moral absolute” refers to many different ideas. In contemporary moral philosophy, it most commonly refers to the idea of a moral prohibition or rule that holds without exception. Less commonly, it refers to the idea of a moral rule or standard that applies to all moral agents, rather than only to members of a particular society or culture or only to particular individuals (e.g., those who accept it). The present topic is moral absolutes in the first of these two senses (hereinafter, “moral absolutes”). Notable philosophers who have maintained that there are such absolutes include Immanuel Kant and Elizabeth Anscombe (
see
Kant, Immanuel; Anscombe, G. E. M.). And the debate over the existence of moral absolutes has implications not only for general moral theory, but also for many topics in applied ethics and just war theory. For example, the question of whether the prohibition on deliberately killing the innocent is absolute has important implications for abortion, euthanasia, and noncombatant immunity (
see
Abortion; Euthanasia; Civilian Immunity).
Kelsen, Hans
Authors: Paulson Stanley L.
Published: January 2013

Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was born in Prague. Three years later, the family moved to Vienna, where Kelsen attended a Protestant primary school and then Vienna's highly respectedAkademisches Gymnasium. In 1906 he took a doctorate in law at the University of Vienna, and, five years later, he completed theHabilitation, a procedure in the German‐speaking countries that includes a major dissertation and leads to thevenia legendior state license to hold university lectures. Kelsen published the dissertation under the titleHauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre(1911; Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law). Notwithstanding its title, the treatise is decidedly juridico‐philosophical in character, and its profound challenge to psychologism and naturalism (seeNature and the Natural) in legal science distinguished Kelsen, from the beginning, as a figure to reckon with.
Xunzi
Authors: Stalnaker Aaron
Published: January 2013

Xunzi (“Master Xun,” ca. 310–ca. 220
bce
) was the third great Confucian thinker of China's classical age, after Confucius and Mencius (
see
Confucius; Mencius). Xunzi lived during the end of the Warring States period of Chinese history, as brutal interstate warfare accelerated in both frequency and ferocity. Xunzi participated in government at times but more frequently devoted himself to teaching and writing. He wrote unified essays expounding a complex and systematic philosophy, but also wrote poetry and instructed his many students in the Zhou dynasty classics revered by all Confucians (
see
Confucian Ethics).
Reasons for Action, Morality and
Authors: Littlejohn Clayton
Published: January 2013

Your friend asks if there is any good reason not to order the cod. You both know that the cod is healthier and tastier than anything else on the menu, so this is not a question about health or taste. You take this to be some kind of moral question. She might be asking a substantive question (e.g., she might want to know if morality tells us not to order the cod given their low numbers). She might instead be asking a question about the rational authority of morality (seeRationalism in Ethics). If morality says not to order the cod, do moral reasons help determine what there is overall reason to do? We shall focus on this question.
Moral Education
Authors: Nucci Larry
Published: January 2013

As in every area of teaching, systematic approaches to moral education are a function of the goals and underlying assumptions about the processes that account for educational outcomes. Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have dominated this field since the early 1930s. One approach has its roots in traditional educational practices buttressed by the writings of the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1925;
see
durkheim, emile
), and the psychological schools of behaviorism and social learning theory. On this account morality is defined by the norms and values of society. Moral education entails processes of transmission resulting in the inculcation of the young into the normative value framework of the adult community (Wynne and Ryan 1993). Borrowing loosely from Aristotle, the goal of this enculturation vision of moral education is to instill personal characteristics or “virtues” within students that will form the moral aspect of the student's character and serve to motivate and guide behavior (Carr 2008;
see
Aristotle; Virtue; Virtue Ethics; Character).
Civic Friendship
Authors: Scorza Jason A.
Published: January 2013

Civic or political friendship (politikē philia) is a bond of reciprocal good will between fellow citizens (seeCitizenship) expressed through norms of civic behavior, such as mutual recognition of moral equality, mutual concern, and mutual defense and support. Theories of civic friendship are, at their heart, normative arguments about the proper nature of political unity – that is to say, arguments about how fellow citizens in general should regard and relate to one another in the public sphere.
Good and Bad Samaritanism
Authors: Malm Heidi
Published: January 2013

Questions regarding good and bad samaritanism range from metaethical questions about the causal status of the omissions of the bad samaritan, to normative questions about whether individuals have a moral right to be rescued, to applied questions about whether or to what extent the law should be used to encourage acts of good samaritanism and discourage acts of bad samaritanism. In the course of covering this broad range of issues, debates about samaritanism connect with a wide variety of other moral and legal debates, including those related to the ethics of aid, duty vs. supererogation, doing vs. allowing, and criminal vs. tort law, to name just a few.
Intention
Authors: Paul Sarah K.
Published: January 2013

G. E. M. Anscombe (1958) famously argued that it is not profitable to do moral philosophy until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology (seeAnscombe, G. E. M.). The investigation of what we are morally permitted to do is integrally bound up with the puzzle of what it is to act. Intentional actions are paradigm objects of moral evaluation; therefore, grasping what it is to act is part of understanding and justifying such evaluation. In turn, the study of intentional action is integrally bound up with the notion of intention. What is done intentionally stands in some relation to the intention with which one acts: the very same physical event of an arm rising might on one hand be an unintentional spasm, and on the other any of the intentional actions of hailing a taxi, voting, stretching, or signaling for the revolution to begin. And in addition to contributing to the determination of what is done, the intention with which an action was performed may influence our moral assessment of that action. An account of the nature of intention and its relation to intentional action is thus highly relevant for moral philosophy.
Compromise
Authors: May Simon Căbulea
Published: January 2013

Compromise is an inescapable part of human coexistence, from the mundane choices of domestic life to the grand stage of world politics. Edmund Burke (1993: 257) famously remarks that “all government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.” To create and enjoy the many benefits of social cooperation, individuals must make concessions to each other in one way or another. Notwithstanding its ubiquity, compromise raises a number of philosophical puzzles. One kind of problem is conceptual: what is compromise, and how might it differ from similar social phenomena, such as consensus and bargaining? These questions are discussed in the first section. A second kind of problem concerns the murky ethics of compromise, particularly on matters of moral significance. Compromise may have a salutary role in facilitating cooperation, but it can also involve the sacrifice or betrayal of important values. Can there be moral reasons for genuine moral compromise and, if so, what form might they take? Similarly, are there any limits to moral compromise, or are all moral commitments ultimately subject to negotiation? These questions are discussed in the second section.
King Jr., Martin Luther
Authors: McGary Howard
Published: January 2013

Although Martin Luther King Jr. (January 15, 1929–April 4, 1968) wrestled with philosophical texts and ideas, he was not a professional philosopher. He was a world‐renowned social activist, an accomplished Baptist minister, a superb public speaker, and a tireless advocate for peace and social justice. He received many honors in a life that was cut short by an assassin's bullet, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964.
Just Cause (in War)
Authors: Luban David
Published: January 2013

Classical just war theory distinguishes the justice of going to war (jus ad bellum) from the justice of how war is waged (jus in bello) (seeWar). As the theory ofjus ad bellumevolved over the past millennium, a war had to satisfy multiple criteria to be just. The war must be waged (1) by alegitimate authoritywho is (2) acting withright intention; (3) the war must havereasonableprospects of successat attaining its goals, the importance of which is (4)proportionalto the harm that the war can be expected to inflict (seeProportionality (in War)); (5) the war must be thelast resort; and (6) there must be ajust causefor the war. None of these criteria is clear or unambiguous, but just cause is perhaps the most contested.
Military Occupation
Authors: Ryan Cheyney
Published: January 2013

The topic of military occupation has gained increasing attention from philosophers in recent years, due partly to political events. The actions of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised serious questions about what foreign powers may legitimately due in countries they have occupied. Interest in these matters has led many to look back on the experiences of Germany and Japan in the post‐World War II years, when the victorious Allied powers reconstructed the defeated enemies along democratic lines. In addition, discussion has concerned the means by which an occupying power pursues its ends, through military actions or other uses of force. War, proper, has its rules by which fighting must proceed; what are the rules by which an occupation must proceed, and do they differ for just and unjust occupations? Finally, cases of unjust occupation have focused attention on the response of occupied peoples to their predicament; for example, are terrorist‐type actions ever legitimate as a response?
Durkheim, Emile
Authors: Lukes Steven
Published: January 2013

Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) was one of the founders of sociology and the author of several of that discipline's classic texts. One is
The Division of Labor in Society
(1984 [1893]), which contrasts two forms of social solidarity: the “mechanical solidarity” of pre‐industrial societies, with a strongly unifying, religiously based common consciousness, and the “organic solidarity” of advanced, organized socially differentiated societies integrated by functional interdependencies. A second is
Suicide
(1951 [1897]), which focuses on the distinctively modern social pathologies indicated by current high suicide rates whose social causes are the breakdown of restraining social norms (“anomie”), in both the economic and sexual spheres, and social isolation (“egoism”) (
see
Suicide). A third is
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life
(1995 [1912]), which, through a study of totemism, proposes sociological explanations of the causes and consequences of religious beliefs and ritual practices and an interpretation of these in social terms (“I see in divinity,” he wrote, “only society transfigured and conceived symbolically” [1953: 52]). These works, together with his lectures on moral education (Durkheim 1961;
see
Moral Education) and on professional ethics and civic morals (
see
Professional Ethics), were pioneering contributions to the sociology of morality, as was much of the work of the “Durkheimian” scholars grouped around the
Année sociologique
, the remarkable journal of monographs and reviews whose 12 volumes he edited from 1898 to 1913.
Rules, Standards, and Principles
Authors: Goldman Alan H.
Published: January 2013

Various types of rules are adopted to regulate the behavior of members of different groups. These types will be specified in this section. The next section will consider why and when rules should be adopted and followed. The last section will distinguish rules from standards and principles, especially as the latter are defined within the law.
Coercive Wage Offers
Authors: Anderson Scott A.
Published: January 2013

Karl Marx argued that workers in a capitalist economy are both exploited by the owners of capital and coerced or forced to work for them (Marx 1975: 274; 1971: 819;seeCoercion; Exploitation; Marx, Karl). Both claims have attracted considerable discussion without consensus, but it would seem that the latter claim, that workers are coerced into accepting offers of employment from their employers, is demonstrably false, if one accepts recent theories of coercion. Twentieth‐century scholarship has tended to associate coercion exclusively with the use of threats, and has correspondingly held that offers cannot coerce those who receive them. This has prompted some to rethink the nature of coercion, and to defend the possibility of coercive offers. This dispute is of interest both for the light it sheds on political economy and the nature of employment relations (seeEmployers and Employees; Work, Nature and Value of) as well as on our understanding of the nature of coercion.
Publicity
Authors: Kelly Erin I.
Published: January 2013

Publicity is a broad topic, potentially spanning many others. I will consider publicity primarily as a feature of what I will refer to as the political justification requirement. Publicity is an aspect of the moral demand that political arrangements be justified to their subjects. This means that political justification should be public in these ways: it should be transparent; it should represent common knowledge; and it should be grounded in shared values. So understood, publicity is a condition of the legitimacy of political authority and of the justice of political institutions. Justice and legitimacy are aspects of the morality of institutions (seeAuthority; Citizenship; Justice).
Wilderness, Value of
Authors: Nelson Michael P. , Vucetich John A.
Published: January 2013

Why should we preserve areas known as wilderness? What good is wilderness preservation? What is wilderness preservation for? An answer to each of these questions will presuppose that those places we call wilderness have a certain value or set of values. For over a century people have been putting forth various arguments for why we should value and preserve wilderness. Over time, the assumed values of wilderness have changed. In the early part of the twentieth century these arguments appealed to the broad range of recreational values wilderness provides. More recently, wilderness arguments have been premised upon scientific values associated with wilderness preservation. Upon examination, however, these arguments are not all equally persuasive. Here we review these arguments and offer a general examination or critique of the values upon which these arguments are premised.
Montesquieu, Charles‐Louis de Secondat, Baron de
Authors: Radasanu Andrea
Published: January 2013

Montesquieu (1689–1755) was arguably the most influential philosopher of the eighteenth century, particularly with respect to his views on morality. His elliptical and aphoristic manner of writing, however, has made it difficult to interpret his thought on this subject and others. In his masterwork,The Spirit of Laws(1748), Montesquieu seems to take part in both the tradition of natural law and the new Enlightenment science of morality, providing accounts of morality in various historical and political circumstances from an intellectual distance. He has been labeled a latter‐day Thomist, a follower of Hugo Grotius's secularized school of natural law, a Stoic, a proto‐sociologist, a critic of Hobbes's reduction of justice to convention, and even a follower of Hobbesian positivism (see Courtney 2001; MacDonald 2001; Manent 1994; Pangle 1973; Waddicor 1970 for important points of view on this matter) (seeNatural Law; Aquinas, Saint Thomas; Grotius, Hugo; Stoicism; Durkheim, Emile; Hobbes, Thomas). Whatever the role of these various strands of thought in his work, an analysis of Montesquieu's ethical stance should begin with the observation that he championed and helped invent a cosmopolitan ethic of gentle mores (doux moeurs). Some of the main hallmarks of this view are moderate government, protection of individual liberties (including property rights and religious toleration), lenient penal law, and peaceful international relations. These are some of the defining characteristics of liberalism, broadly understood (seeLiberalism).
Balguy, John
Authors: Hill Benjamin
Published: January 2013

John Balguy (1686–1748) was a Cambridge‐educated clergyman who is best remembered for a dogged defense of moral rationalism (
see
Rationalism in Ethics), clever critiques of Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory (
see
Hutcheson, Francis), and staunch opposition to Hobbesian egoism (
see
Hobbes, Thomas).His influence can be seen in David Hume's (
see
Hume, David) reformulations of the doctrine of moral sense and the rationalisms of Richard Price and Thomas Reid. Balguy's thought belongs squarely within the tradition of British rationalism (Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Price, and Reid). It stands opposed to both the skeptical/egoistical tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Bernard Mandeville and the sentimentalist tradition of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith (
see
Sentimentalism; Sentiments, Moral).
Ethical Issues in Teaching
Authors: Cholbi Michael
Published: January 2013

Learning is any process that, by engaging with a person's rational powers, results in an improvement in that person's knowledge, skills, behaviors, or values. Learning can of course occur unaided. Teaching, however, is the deliberate effort to induce learning in another person. The ethics of teaching, then, addresses the ethical standards, values, or traits that govern deliberate efforts to induce learning in others.
Butler, Joseph
Authors: Phillips David
Published: January 2013

Joseph Butler (1692–1752) was a bishop, theologian, and philosopher. His corpus is quite limited: essentially just theFifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel(1726; second edition 1730) andThe Analogy of Religion(1736). And for moral philosophers the really interesting texts are still more circumscribed: roughly two thirds of the sermons (The Preface and Sermons 1–3, 5–6, and 8–12), and theDissertation of the Nature of Virtue(an appendix to theAnalogy). Nonetheless his work had a significant influence on the development of British moral philosophy: in the introduction to hisTreatise, David Hume listed him (with Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson) as one of the “late philosophers inEngland, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing” (Hume 1978: xvii;seeHume David); and in the short intellectual autobiography included in the Preface to the sixth edition of theMethods(Sidgwick 1981: xvii–xxiii, esp. xx–xxi), Henry Sidgwick makes Butler (with Mill and Kant) one of his three modern “masters” (seeSidgwick, Henry).
Biopiracy
Authors: Magnus and David C. , Allyse Megan
Published: January 2013

“Biopiracy” is a term, originally attributed to the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) (Mooney 1993), that refers “either to the unauthorized extraction of biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge from developing countries, or to the patenting of spurious “inventions” based on such knowledge or resources without compensation” (Robinson 2010: 20). While inflammatory, the term encapsulates a complex and fraught debate about the relationship between developed and developing countries, the notion of shared heritage and who “owns” natural resources.
Nationalism and Patriotism
Authors: Archard David
Published: January 2013

The statement, frequently made some years ago, that nationalism and patriotism are neglected topics in moral and political philosophy is now dated. Since the 1990s, a wealth of relevant material has been published. Although by no means universally sympathetic to its subject the work has nevertheless not, on the whole, shared the disparaging tone that had previously explained the neglect. Thus, no one now simply dismisses nationalism and patriotism out of hand as unprincipled and shameful. Equally, not everyone agrees that the principles underpinning both patriotism and nationalism are beyond reproach.
Clarke, Samuel
Authors: Garrett Aaron
Published: January 2013

Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) was one of the most original and influential British moral philosophers between Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Butler. He was a close confidante of Isaac Newton and a central figure in the Newtonian revolution in the natural sciences. Notably, he served as Newton's defender, translator of the
Optics
into Latin (a translation which pleased Newton so much that he gave Clarke one hundred pounds for each of his five children [Whiston 1730: 9]), and then amanuensis in the Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence, the work for which he is best known today. His learning and interests were formidable and ranged from theology – he was a chaplain and rector, and his theological views informed much of the rest of his interests – to physics, to mathematics, to classics, to metaphysics, to moral philosophy. As a moral philosopher Clarke was a great influence on Catharine Cockburn Trotter, Butler (Butler corresponded with him when he was in his teens), Thomas Reid, Henry Sidgwick (who held him in the highest regard as a moral philosopher), and many others (
see
Butler, Joseph; Reid, Thomas; Sidgwick, Henry). He is today perhaps even better known through his critics, in particular David Hume (
see
Hume, David) and Francis Hutcheson (
see
Hutcheson, Francis), both of whom used attacks on Clarke's metaphysical moral realism as launching pads for their sentimentalist programs (
see
Sentimentalism).
Stakeholder Theory
Authors: Norman Wayne
Published: January 2013

“Stakeholder theory” is a rubric that emerged in the field of business ethics (seeBusiness Ethics; Applied Ethics) in the 1980s and has been used to identify a wide range of normative, conceptual, and empirical claims about the relations between a business firm and its stakeholders. While it may not really qualify as atheoryin the way moral and political philosophers generally use that term, stakeholder theory is centrally concerned with the obligations of firms and their managers to key stakeholder groups like investors, employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers, and local communities, among others. Stakeholder theorists see themselves as providing an alternative to what they take to be the “prevailing view” within economics and management studies, which holds: that the firm is owned by its investors; that its purpose is to serve the owners’ interests; and that the managers of the firm are obligated, primarily or solely, to advance the interests of the owners in whatever ways are permitted by law. In contrast, stakeholder theorists think of the firm as a vehicle to advance the interests of all stakeholder groups, with investors or shareholders beingbut oneof many such groups, and having no inherent priority over the others. Through the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty‐first century, it was almost certainly the most widely discussed approach to business ethics within the scholarly literature.
Public Health Ethics
Authors: Verweij and Marcel , Dawson Angus
Published: January 2013

In the first decades of its development, bioethics has mainly focused on ethical issues in clinical medicine and medical technology (seeBioethics). Since the end of the twentieth century, however, more and more attention has been given to moral and legal issues in public health. The field of public health encompasses a broad range of health problems and societal responses that inevitably raise ethical questions. Infectious disease control, mass screening, and health promotion have the potential to reduce the burden of disease within populations, but they can also be in tension with other values such as liberty or individual well‐being, or raise questions about justice in relation to priority setting. However, public health ethics is not just about a new set of topics, but can also be thought of as a distinctive approach to biomedical ethics for at least three reasons. First, public health interventions are generally aimed at populations rather than individuals, and therefore cannot easily be tailored to individual choice. Hence, whereas “autonomy” and “informed consent” are seen as core elements of clinical bioethics, their role in public health ethics is less clear (seeAutonomy; Informed Consent).
Rationalism in Ethics
Authors: Birondo Noell
Published: January 2013

The word ‘rationalism,' as it appears in philosophical discussions of ethics and morality, signifies at least one of a cluster of theses, each of which connects some aspect of ethical experience toreasonorrationality. The most provocative rationalist thesis arises in contemporary discussions in metaethics (seeMetaethics); and it is this thesis that remains the most likely referent, in contemporary discussions, of the phrase ‘moral rationalism.' The thesis is more accurately referred to, however, as metaethical rationalism, since it concerns the provenance and nature of moral obligations, rather than their substance. A strong version of metaethical rationalism maintains that if someone is morally obligated to perform a certain action, then performing that action is what she has the strongest reasons, all things considered, to do. A weaker version of metaethical rationalism claims that if someone is morally obligated to perform a certain action, then performing that action is something that she hasareason to do, even though the reason might not be decisive: another reason, for instance of prudence, might trump the reason she has to act morally (seePrima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts). It is rationalism in this metaethical guise that will be the ultimate focus of this essay.
Wolff, Christian
Authors: Rosenkoetter Timothy
Published: January 2013

Christian Wolff (1679–1754) was a philosopher, mathematician, and natural scientist of remarkable scope and astounding productivity (circa 50,000 published Pages), who ranks as the central figure of the pre‐Kantian German Enlightenment (
see
Kant, Immanuel). Though Wolff is often considered primarily a theoretical philosopher whose contributions fall within ontology and metaphysics, this does not accord with Wolff's self‐understanding. His first published work, which gained him the attention of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), was in ethics, and practical philosophy was the focus of his energies during the final 16 years of his life. Moreover, even when he was writing in theoretical fields, Wolff understood his work to be ultimately aimed at helping people to lead more rational lives. Many of his philosophical works during his initial appointment at the University of Halle as a professor of mathematics (1706–23) were written in German, which was unusual at the time, and was motivated by his Enlightenment project of making accessible to the general population their own capacities for adopting rational epistemic and practical policies. Wolff's terminological choices in these works proved pivotal for the subsequent development of German as a philosophically mature language, and thereby for German philosophy as a whole. Through his influence on students and others who read his works, Wolff was the first German philosopher to establish what could be considered a school. Wolff maintains a lasting influence on the history of ethics, especially through Kant, who reacted to Wolff in part through the Wolffians Gottfried Achenwall (1719–72), Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–62), and Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–77), whose works Kant used as textbooks on a regular basis.
Mercy
Authors: Rainbolt George W.
Published: January 2013

Mercy has been the subject of philosophical analysis at least since the time of the ancient Greeks. It was a subject of consideration in both Roman and medieval philosophy as well as in a rich tapestry of literature, drama, poetry, and song. In these materials, one finds that mercy is said to have at least three features. (1) Mercy is a morally good: mercy “is twice blessed”; (2) mercy frequently modifies the demands of justice: “mercy seasons justice”; (3) one does not demand mercy – one hopes or begs for it: “The quality of mercy is not strain'd.” Following Shakespeare, let us refer to this third feature of mercy as its “gentle” quality (Shakespeare,The Merchant of Venice, Act 4, Scene 1, Portia speaks). Various theories of mercy give differing accounts of these three features as they attempt to resolve three puzzles of mercy.
Modesty
Authors: McMullin Irene
Published: January 2013

“Modesty” comes from the Latin
modestia
, which means “moderation” and derives in its turn from
modus
, “measure.” Roughly speaking, a modest person is someone who “keeps measure” in the appropriate way.
Plotinus
Authors: Remes Pauliina
Published: January 2013

One of the most influential philosophers of late antiquity, Plotinus (ca.CE204/5–270) is the founder of the neo‐Platonic school of thought. He considered himself a faithful follower of Plato (seePlato). Besides, however, being able to complement Plato's views in the light of the criticisms and developments of Aristotle (seeAristotle), later peripatetics, Hellenistic philosophers, and the so‐called middle‐Platonists, Plotinus formulates a body of doctrines that goes well beyond Plato (seeStoicism; Hellenistic Ethics). Plotinus lectured to a circle of friends, intellectuals, and politicians in Rome, to where he had moved from Alexandria. His life history is accessible through the biography (Vita Plotini) written by his student and colleague, Porphyry.
Euthanasia
Authors: Lindsay Ronald A.
Published: January 2013

Euthanasia is commonly understood as bringing about another's death to end that person's suffering. There is substantial controversy whether euthanasia is morally permissible, and, if so, under what circumstances. One can understand why euthanasia is controversial. At least in some instances, euthanasia is considered by many a form of killing, and to say there is a strong presumption that killing another human is immoral is an understatement (seeKilling). The prohibition on killing is at the core of morality. If one of the aims of morality is to foster peaceful cooperation among humans living together, killing must be prohibited, except in exceptional circumstances, such as when it is when necessary to preserve one's own life or the lives of others (seeSelf‐defense). Given the strong presumption that killing is wrong, it would take a very persuasive argument to rebut that presumption.
Feminist Political Theory
Authors: Watson Lori
Published: January 2013

Feminism, broadly understood, has two principal aims: first, to understand, diagnose, and analyze the forms and sources of gender inequality; and, second, to offer principles, policies, and directives to undo gender inequality as well as provide a vision for gender equality. Given the diversity of analyses on both fronts, “feminism(s),” rather than “Feminism,” is a more accurate term for the collection of views that identify with these principal aims. Given that one underlying theme in feminist approaches is demonstrating the ways in which politics, understood as power relations, is present in our everyday lives, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to describe feminist theory as a whole as a kind of political philosophy. However, the goal in this piece is to describe a more narrow set of feminist theorizing, that has to do more directly with political theory traditionally understood. The focus of such feminist political theory often includes an examination of the state and its role in either the reproduction of gender inequality or its potential for redressing such inequality. Some feminist political theory involves substantive critiques of conventional political theory that does not theorize gender relations explicitly; its aim is to reframe many of the central questions of political theory in ways that place issues of gender inequality front and center.