Perspective-Taking and Coalition Context Predictability
Authors: Cantiani Anabela , van Beest Ilja , Erle Thorsten Michael 
Published: September 2024

Coalition theories have assumed that players anticipate the allocation norms used by others. This anticipation subsequently shapes the final coalition outcomes, determining both which coalition form and how payoffs are allocated. As these assumptions have only been deduced from observed final coalition outcomes, the present research sought to empirically test them. Partially aligning with these assumptions, we hypothesized that both allocation norms and the ability to infer other’s allocation norms (known as perspective-taking) are relevant to predict final coalition outcomes. Nevertheless, we posited that these processes are not as stable as presumed by coalition theories. Specifically, we hypothesized that perspective-taking abilities would vary based on the predictability of allocation norms. We expected that perspective-taking abilities would be essential in less predictable contexts, where the inference of others' allocation norms becomes both more necessary and challenging. Conversely, that perspective-taking would be less relevant in contexts where allocation norms are more predictable. In a real-time and incentivized three-person coalition experiment that simulates political governance, participants (N = 851) were assigned either to a Coalition theories assume that people make alliance decisions by anticipating how others want to distribute resources. For example, if a player anticipates that member A will demand more resources than member B, they might coalesce with B to secure better gains for themselves. Following this logic, coalition outcomes are shaped by players' ability to anticipate others' demands and ally with those offering favorable terms. To explain how players can anticipate others' demands, these theories assume that all players follow the same allocation norms (rules about fair distribution) and that perspective-taking (the ability to understand others' viewpoints) enables players to infer these demands. However, these assumptions have only been deduced from final coalition outcomes, without direct empirical testing. We propose that while allocation norms and perspective-taking both predict coalition formation, their relationship is more dynamic than previously thought. Specifically, the importance of perspective-taking depends on the predictability of the allocation norms. We hypothesized that perspective-taking would be crucial when allocation norms are unclear and harder to predict, but less important when the norms are obvious. In a real-time three-person coalition experiment, participants (N = 851) were assigned either to a condition where allocation norms were more salient (High-Predictable condition) or less salient (Low-Predictable condition). As expected, we found that perspective-taking predicted greater inclusion in winning coalitions and higher final payoffs only in the Low-Predictable condition, but not in the High-Predictable condition. We delved into potential mechanisms and discusses the implications of these findings for advancing process-oriented theories of coalition formation.