bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
CRISIS EN LA COMUNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA INSTITUCIONAL.
Authors: Burguete Cal y Mayor Araceli , Gutiérrez Margarita
Published: March 2017

En el año 2010 Chamula asiste en dos ocasiones al Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF ). Siendo un municipio cuyos habitantes han defendido con fuerza sus propias instituciones de gobierno y lo que ellos llaman sus «usos y costumbres» para decidir desde dentro los asuntos relativos a su vida política, sorprende su presencia en los tribunales electorales ¿Cómo llega Chamula a los tribunales y por qué? ¿Qué coyuntura surgió en el año 2010 que fracturó esa estructura sólida de voluntad autonomista? ¿Qué factores intervinieron para hacer posible que se configurara una conflictividad de dimensiones tales que debilitara su capacidad para resolver desde dentro sus conflictos electorales, y tuviera que recurrirse a los tribunales estatal y federal? Adicionalmente, el caso muestra las serias dificultades que enfrenta el TEPJF para interpretar adecuadamente el ejercicio de derechos políticos y electorales cuando están en juego los sistemas normativos internos de los pueblos indígenas

 

THE INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNITY CHAMULA CRISIS.

Chamula in the Electoral Tribunal (2010)

the year 2010, Chamula attended the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judicial Branch (TEPJF by its acronym in Spanish) on two different occasions. Chamula is a municipality the inhabitants of which have strongly defended their own government institutions as well as their own indigenous customary law, known as «usos y costumbres» (i.e., «customs and traditions »), in order to make decisions within the community regarding issues related to their political life. It is thus surprising to find the Chamula community present in the electoral tribunals. How did Chamula get to the tribunals and why? What juncture was created in Chamula in the year 2010 that fractured its firm autonomy-based structure? What factors intervened to give shape to a conflict of such dimensions that it weakened their capacity to solve electoral issues from within, pushing them to resort to state and federal tribunals? In addition, the case illustrates the serious difficulties that the TEPJF faces to appropriately interpret the exercise of political and electoral rights when indigenous internal regulatory systems are at stake
«SOMOS UN PUEBLO, PRECISAMOS UN TERRITORIO PORQUE ALLÍ ES DONDE SE DA LA VIDA INDÍGENA; SIN TERRITORIO NO HAY IDENTIDAD COMO PUEBLO». BUEN VIVIR EN ARGENTINA
Authors: Carrasco Morita , Ramírez Silvina
Published: March 2017

El artículo aborda una perspectiva respecto del surgimiento de la noción del buen vivir, asociado a dos modelos de desarrollo en los países de Latinoamérica. Analiza las posibles consecuencias legales emanadas de la incorporación del respeto a la naturaleza en las constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador. Desde una mirada interdisciplinaria que articula finalmente posiciones del derecho y la antropología, el artículo propone un análisis de algunos pronunciamientos y documentos de pueblos indígenas en la Argentina para comprender el sentido que estos dan al buen vivir, sin nombrarlo de este modo.

«WE ARE A PEOPLE. WE NEED A TERRITORY BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE INDIGENOUS LIFE TAKES PLACE. WITHOUT A TERRITORY, THERE IS NO IDENTITY AS A PEOPLE». BUEN VIVIR IN ARGENTINA

This article views the emergence of the notion of good living (buen vivir), associated to development models in Latin American countries. It analyzes the possible legal consequences derived from the inclusion of the notion of respect for nature within the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador. From an interdisciplinary perspective that ultimately articulates positions drawn from law and anthropology, the article proposes an analysis of some statements and documents the indigenous peoples from Argentina have made in order to understand the meaning they place on the notion of good living, without naming it as such.
PAISAJES AGROFORESTALES EN EL ESPACIO PERIURBANO DE UNA CIUDAD MEDIA, ¿OPORTUNIDAD PARA LA CONSERVACIÓN O EL DETERIORO DEL BOSQUE?
Authors: Calderón Cisneros Araceli , Soto Pinto Lorena , Huerta Silva Margarita H.
Published: March 2017

San Cristóbal de Las Casas, ciudad media en Chiapas, ha tenido un rápido y desordenado crecimiento en las últimas décadas. Con el propósito de analizar la estructura del paisaje en un espacio periurbano de esta ciudad (el cerro Huitepec) y su relación con los procesos de apropiación social rural y urbana del territorio, se integró un análisis geográfico de los usos del suelo con un análisis social cualitativo por medio de entrevistas y cuestionarios. Se observa en este espacio periurbano un paisaje heterogéneo y diversificado donde los remanentes forestales son importantes, pero con variaciones al interior en función de las formas de uso y de los actores sociales presentes. Este paisaje cumple funciones relevantes para la conservación de los recursos naturales y la provisión de servicios ambientales en beneficio de la población local y urbana, pero su condición es muy incierta a futuro.

AGRO-FOREST LANDSCAPES IN THE PERI-URBAN AREA OF A MEDIUM-SIZED CITY: AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESERVE OR DETERIORATE FORESTS?

In recent decades, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, a medium-sized city in Chiapas State, has shown rapid and chaotic growth. For studying the landscape structure in a peri-urban area of this city (Huitepec Hill) and its relationship with rural and urban social appropriation processes of the territory, a geographic analysis of land use was integrated into a qualitative social analysis through interviews and questionnaires. A heterogeneous and diversified landscape can be observed in this peri-urban area where the remaining forests are important, but show internal variations that depend on forms of use and the social stakeholders who are present. This landscape plays relevant roles in the conservation of natural resources and the provision of environmental services for the benefit of the local and urban population. However, its future condition is highly uncertain.
TERRITORIALIDADES Y ARQUITECTURAS DE LO SAGRADO EN EL MÉXICO CONTEMPORÁNEO, 2014, COORDINADO POR MARTÍN MANUEL CHECA-ARTASU, J. JESÚS LÓPEZ GARCÍA Y MARÍA CRISTINA VALERDI NOCHEBUENA
Authors: Lisbona Guillén Miguel
Published: March 2017

Reseña a Territorialidades y arquitecturas de lo sagrado en el México contemporáneo, 2014, coordinado por Martín Manuel Checa-Artasu, J. Jesús López García y María Cristina Valerdi Nochebuena, Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes, ISBN 978-607-8359-53-0.
Reportage as Compound Suggestion
Authors: May John D.
Published: March 2017

Journalistic narrative prose is rich in suggestion. By voicing a single narrative ("X happened")
statement in a supposedly non-fiction context, sender invites receiver to impute intelligibility, ascertainability, feasibility, topicality and speaker
sincerity, as well as veracity, to the terms of an account. Conversely, when a narrative statement passes through a 'news-giving' medium, receivers
are deterred from appraising those invited inferences. Similar inducements come from pseudonarrative statements. Meanwhile, some narratives convey other suggestions. Without being explicit they invite extra-logical inferences about event locations, agent numbers, chronologies, relative importance, and determinants, as well as current practicabilities. Awareness of such suggestions is the first step toward distinguishing between prudent and foolhardy inferences.
By Parity of Reasoning
Authors: Woods John , Hudak Brent
Published: March 2017

By Parity of Reasoning
Dependent and Independent Reasons
Authors: Yanal Robert J.
Published: March 2017

How are dependent (or linked) premises to be distinguished from independent (or convergent) premises? Deductive validity, sometimes proposed as a necessary condition for depende'nce, cannot be, for the premises of both inductive and deductive but invalid arguments can be dependent. The question is really this: When do multiple premises for a certain conclusion fonn one argument for that conclusion and when do they form multiple arguments? Answer: Premises are dependent when the evidence they offer for their conclusion is more than the ordinary sum of their probabilities. Ordinary sums are defined in the paper.
Arguing, Arguments, and Deep Disagreements
Authors: Davson-Galle Peter
Published: March 2017

In response to earlier papers in Informal Logic by Robert Fogelin and Andrew Lugg, this paper explores the issue of whether disagreement could ever be so deep that it defied rational resolution. Contra Lugg, I agree with Fogelin that such unresolvable disagreement is possible and, contra Fogelin, I suggest that the focus of such disagreement can be quite Iimited-a single proposition
rather than a whole system of beliefs. I also suggest that emphasising arguing as a human practice rather than arguments as a structure of propositions
is unhelpful to consideration of these issues.
A Response to McMurtry's System of Fallacy in the Media
Authors: Ulrich Walter
Published: March 2017

In the Fall 1988 issue of Informal Logic, John McMurtry suggests that the current mass communication system "obstructs and deforms our thinking and our reasoning by a general system of deception" (p. 133). This essay suggests that McMurtry's view of the mass media is inaccurate. The mass media needs to make choices about what material it includes; McMurtry's description of the media could be explained by a rational theory of media agenda setting. Finally. it is argued that critical thinkers need to go beyond the mass media to make decisions; the mass media should not be expected to provide all arguments and viewpoints.
"Trivial" Matters: Some Historico-Pedagogical Reflections
Authors: Conley Thomas
Published: March 2017

The enduring persistence of the examples and exercises used in handbooks of the traditional arts of the Trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) suggests that they were recognized as
perennially effective as ways to inculcate intellectual virtue in many generations of students. Yet an examination of those examples and exercises suggests that only the ones in the rhetoric curriculum were able to resist acquiring the bad habits of the sister arts of grammar and logic. Sensitivity to facts and meanings and the ability to manipulate theses do not by themselves guarantee the formation of active and competent citizens. Only when those virtues are combined in the interests of eloquence-the art of disciplined expressioncan they be fully realized.
Ideology, Rhetoric and Argument
Authors: Weiler Michael
Published: March 2017

Rhetorical criticism examines ideology as a form of strategic argumentation that functions to legitimize political authority. Ideology presents itself as political philosophy in a way that calls attention to its argumentation. Ideological arguments support claims (1) that those who wield political power represent the interests of all, and (2) that the existing social order is natural and inevitable in light of human nature. Functionally, ideology is indispensible, but perverse. Formally, ideology is argumentation that obscures its partiality under claims to universality.
Is the Theoretical Unity of the Fallacies Possible?
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

Historically, the fallacies have been neglected as objects of systematic study. Yet, since Hamblin's famous criticism of the state of fallacy theory, a substantial literature has been produced. A large portion of this literature is the work of Douglas Walton and John Woods. This paper will deal directly with the criticism of that work which has been advanced by van Eemeren and Grootendorst, particularly the complaints found in their writings of 1992, concerning the disunification of the fallacies and the exemplaristic approach of Woods and Walton's theories. It proposes a unification of the theories of Woods and Walton with that of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, and suggests that such a unification could be advantageous to both theories, and highly interesting for fallacy theory in general.
TArgument is War...and War is Hell: Philosophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation
Authors: Cohen Daniel H.
Published: March 2017

The claim that argumentation has no proper role in either philosophy or education, and especially not in philosophical education, flies in the face of both conventional wisdom and traditional pedagogy. There is, however, something to be said for it because it is really only provocative against a certain philosophical backdrop. Our understanding of the concept "argument" is both reflected by and molded by the specific metaphor that argument-is-war, something with winners and losers, offensive and defensive moments, and an essentially adversarial structure. Such arguments may be suitable for teaching a philosophy, but not for teaching philosophy. Surely, education and philosophy do not need to be conceived as having an adversarial essence-if indeed they are thought to have any essence at all. Accordingly, philosophy and education need more pragmatic goals than even Pierce's idealized notion of truth as the end of inquiry, e.g., the simple furtherance of inquiry. For this, new metaphors for framing and understanding the concept of argumentation are needed, and some suggestions in that direction will be considered.
Emotions and Argumentation
Authors: Ben-Zeev Aaron
Published: March 2017

The relationship between emotions and argumentation is not always clear. I attempt to clarify this issue by referring to three basic questions: (1) Do emotions constitute a certain kind of argumentation?; (2) Do emotions constitute rational argumentation?; (3) Do emotions constitute efficient argumentation? I will claim that there are many circumstances in which the answer to these questions is positive. After describing such circumstances, the educational implications of the connection between emotions and argumentation will be indicated.
Using Computer-Assisted Instruction and Developmental Theory to Improve Argumentative Writing
Authors: Irwin Ronald R.
Published: March 2017

A study is described in which the effectiveness of a computer program (Hermes) on improving argumentative writing is tested. One group of students was randomly assigned to a control group and the other was assigned to the experimental group where they are asked to use the Hermes program. All students were asked to write essays on controversial topics to an opposed audience. Their essays were content-analysed for dialectical traits. Based on this analysis, it was concluded that the experimental group wrote more dialectically effective essays than the control group, and the amount of difference between the control and experimental groups was related to the students' intellectual developmental level, as assessed by the Measure of Epistemological Reflection (MER). It is concluded that argumentative writing, operationalized here as dialectical writing, can be improved by computer-assisted instruction,
but that attempts to teach such forms of thinking and writing need to take into account students' capacity to benefit from such instruction. Such capacity is defined here as intellectual development.
Premise Acceptability, Deontology, Internalism, Justification
Authors: Freeman James B.
Published: March 2017

Acceptability is a thoroughly normative epistemic notion. If a statement is acceptable, i.e. it is proper to take it as a premise, then one is justified in accepting it. We also hold that a statement is acceptable just in case there is a presumption of warrant in its favor. We thus see acceptability connected to epistemic normativity on the one hand and to warrant on the other. But there is a distinct tension in this dual connection. The dominant tradition in modern epistemology sees epistemic justification as an internalist notion. We are justified in holding a belief just in case certain conditions are fulfilled of which we have privileged access. Warrant is an externalist notion. We have no privileged access to the conditions of warrant. Is our understanding of acceptability as both normative and definable in terms of presumption of warrant philosophically coherent? We shall argue that it is a philosophically coherent notion. Presumption of warrant, unlike warrant, is an internalist notion. Our position can be characterized as an externalist internal ism. It avoids the charge brought against externalism of allowing one to be justified in accepting some claim even if one has no evidence for it. We meet the classical internalist challenge that acceptance is normatively proper only if one has done one's epistemic duty and thus one is aware of the normative propriety of the acceptance by providing a non-deontological definition of epistemic justification, and arguing that this is still a sufficiently normative notion for acceptability.
Critical Thinking Dispositions: Their Nature and Assessability
Authors: Ennis Robert H.
Published: March 2017

Assuming that critical thinking dispositions are at least as important as critical thinking abilities, Ennis examines the concept of critical thinking disposition and suggests some criteria for judging sets of them. He considers a leading approach to their analysis and offers as an alternative a simpler
set, including the disposition to seek alternatives and be open to them. After examining some gender-bias and subject-specificity challenges to promoting critical thinking dispositions, he notes some difficulties involved in assessing critical thinking dispositions, and suggests an exploratory attempt to assess them.
What is an Infinite Regress Argument?
Authors: Gratton Claude
Published: March 2017

I describe the general structure of most infinite regress arguments; introduce some basic vocabulary; present a working hypothesis of the nature and derivation of an infinite regress; apply this working hypothesis to various infinite regress arguments to explain why they fail to entail an infinite regress; describe a common mistake in attempting to derive certain infinite regresses; and examine how infinite regresses function as a premise.
The Asymmetry Thesis and the Diversity of "Invalid" Argument-Forms
Authors: Bowles George
Published: March 2017

According to the Asymmetry Thesis, whereas there are many kinds of
argument-forms that make at least some of their instances valid, there is none that makes any of its instances invalid. To refute this thesis, a counterexample has been produced in the form of an argument-form whose premise-form's instances are all logically true and whose conclusion form's instances are all logically false. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are many more kinds of argument-forms that make some of their instances invalid and that, hence, are counterexamples refuting the Asymmetry Thesis.
Why Formal Logic is Essential for Critical Thinking
Authors: Hatcher Donald L.
Published: March 2017

After critiquing the arguments against using formal logic to teach critical thinking, this paper argues that for theoretical, practical, and empirical reasons, instruction in the fundamentals of formal logic is essential for critical thinking, and so should be included in every class that purports to teach critical thinking.
The Enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric: From Argumentation Theory to Logic
Authors: Braet Antoine C.
Published: March 2017

Which properties are characteristic of the enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric? There is no consensus on this point. The present discussion centres on three properties. 1. Is there always an implicit premise? (Answer: Above all, a pragmatic level and a logical level must be distinguished.) 2. Do the premises consist by definition of probabilities and signs? (Answer: No.). 3. Are all enthymemes reducible to a syllogistic form? (Answer: The literature pertaining to this question is dominated by a false dilemma: an enthymeme does not have either a topical or a syllogistic structure). In general, Aristotle's approach to the enthymeme in the Rhetoric appears to shift from argumentation theory to logic.
Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalities
Authors: Maudet Nicolas , Rescher Nicholas
Published: March 2017

As Russell's paradox of "the set of all sets that do not contain themselves" indicated long ago, matters go seriously amiss if one operates an ontology of unrestricted totalization. Some sort of restriction must be placed on such items as "the set of all sets that have the feature F' or "the conjunction of all truths that have the feature G." But generally, logicians here introduce such formalized and complex devices as the theory of types or the doctrine of impredictivity. The present paper argues for the informal and elementary idea that the items invoked in a proper identification have themselves already been identified. Even as an explanation is not satisfactory that proceeds in terms of items that themselves require prior explanation, so the same holds with identification. And heed of this elementary idea suffices to sideline those otherwise paradoxical perplexities.
The Disposition Toward Critical Thinking: Its Character, Measurement, and Relationship to Critical Thinking Skill
Authors: Facione Peter A.
Published: March 2017

Theorists have hypothesized that skill in critical thinking is positively correlated with the consistent internal motivation to think and that specific critical thinking skills are matched with specific critical thinking dispositions. If true, these assumptions suggest that a skill-focused curriculum
would lead persons to be both willing and able to think. This essay presents a researchbased expert consensus definition of critical thinking, argues that human dispositions are neither hidden nor unknowable, describes a scientific process of developing conventional testing tools to measure cognitive skills and human dispositions, and summarizes recent empirical research findings that explore the possible relationship of critical thinking skill and the consistent internal motivation, or disposition, to use that skill. Empirical studies indicate that for all practical purposes the hypothesized correlations are not evident. It would appear that effective teaching must include strategies for building intellectual character rather than relying exclusively on strengthening cognitive skills
Con Amore: Henry Johnstone, Jr.'s Philosophy of Argumentation
Authors: Crosswhite James
Published: March 2017

Henry Johnstone's philosophical development was guided by a persistent need to reform the concept of validity -either by reinterpreting it or by finding a substitute for it. This project lead Johnstone into interesting confrontations with the concept of rhetoric and especiaUy with the work of Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. The project culminated in a failed attempt to develop a formal ethics of rhetoric and argumentation, but this attempt was itself not consistent with some of Johnstone's other characterizations ofan ethics of argument ation. A virtue ethics would be truer to the Johnstonian philosophical project than a formal ethics of argument.
Resume
Classification of Fallacies of Relevance
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

Fallacies of relevance, a major category of informal fallacies, include two that could be called pure fallacies of relevance-the wrong conclusion (ignoratio elenchi, wrong conclusion, missing the point) fallacy and the red herring digression, diversion) fallacy. The problem is how to classify examples of these fallacies so that they clearly fall into the one category or the other, on some rational system of classification. In this paper, the argument diagramming software system, Araucaria. is used to analyze the argumentation in some selected textbook examples of pure fallacies of relevance. A system of classification of these fallacies is proposed, and criteria for determining whether an example should be classified as wrong conclusion or red herring are formulated. A key difference cited is that in a case where the red herring fallacy has been committed, even if the argument may go to a wrong conclusion, there is evidence of the use ofa deceptive tactic of diversion. Textual evidence must indicate that the arguer deliberately interjects a distracting controversy to lead the respondent away from the real issue to be disputed.
Emotion, Argumentation and Informal Logic
Authors: Gilbert Michael A.
Published: March 2017

Over the past 60 years there have been tremendous advances made in Argumentation Theory. One crucial advance has been the move from the investigation of static arguments to a concern with dialogic interactions in concrete contexts. This focus has entailed a slow shift toward involving both non-logical and non-discursive elements in the analysis of an argument. I argue that the traditional attitude Informal Logic has displayed toward emotion can be and ought be moderated. In particular, I examine the role of emotion in everyday argumentation, and how Informal Logic can encompass it alongside the more traditional logical mode of communication
Treacherous Ascents: On Seeking Common Ground for Conflict Resolution
Authors: Campolo Christian
Published: March 2017

The judgment competent reasoners exhibit in deciding when reasoning should not be used to resolve disagreements is eroded by adopting the popular strategy of
ascending to higher levels of generality. That strategy encourages disputants to believeoften incorrectly-that they stand on some common ground that can be exploited to reach agreement. But if we regularly assume that we share values and interests with our opponents in seemingly intractable disputes, we risk losing the ability to judge whether or not we share enough. And when we lose track of the difference between promising and unpromising conditions for reasoning, we end up trying to reason at the wrong times. Such reasoning can in turn seriously damage our reasoning skills themselves.
Emotional Backing and the Feeling of Deep Disagreement
Authors: Friemann Richard
Published: March 2017

I discuss Toulmin's (1964) concept of backing with respect to the emotional mode of arguing by examining an example from Fogelin (1985), where emotional backing justifies a warrant concerning when we should judge that a person is being pig-headed. While Fogelin 's treatment is consistent with contemporary emotion science, I show that it needs to be supplemented by therapeutic techniques by comparing an analysis of an emotional argument from Gilbert (1997). The introduction of psychotherapy into argumentation theory raises the question of the extent to which ordinary arguers can use such techniques. Psychotherapeutic techniques can be used in an intractable quarrel; is it fruitful to use them in the context of a deep disagreement?
Introduction: The Epistemological Approach to Argumentation--A Map
Authors: Lumer Christoph
Published: March 2017

An overview of the epistemological approach to argumentation, explaining what it is, justifying it as better than a rhetorical or a consensual ist approach.
systematizing the main directions and theories according to their criteria for good argumentation and presenting their contributions to major topics of argumentation
theory. Also. an introduction to the articles of the two special issues of Informal Logic about the epistemological approach to argumentation.
In Defense of the Objective Epistemic Approach to Argumentation
Authors: Biro John , Siegel Harvey
Published: March 2017

In this paper we defend a particular version of the epistemic approach to argumentation. We advance some general considerations in favor of the approach and then examine the ways in which different versions of it play out with respect to the theory of fallacies, which we see as central to an understanding of argumentation. Epistemic theories divide into objective and subjective versions. We argue in favor of the objective version, showing that it provides a better account than its subjectivist rival of the central fallacy of begging the question. We suggest that the strengths of the objective epistemic theory of fallacies provide support for the epistemic approach to argumentation more generally.
Norms of Legitimate Dissensus
Authors: Kock Christian
Published: March 2017

The paper calls for argumentation theory to learn from moral and political philosophy. Several thinkers in these fields help understand the occurrence of what we may call legitimate dissensus: enduring disagreement even between reasonable people arguing reasonably. It inevitably occurs over practical issues, e.g., issues of action rather than truth, because there will normally be legitimate arguments on both sides, and these will be incommensurable, i.e., they cannot be objectively weighed against each other. Accordingly, ‘inference,’ ‘validity,’ and ‘sufficiency’ are inapplicable notions. Further distinctive features of pro and con arguments in practical argumentation are explored, and some corollaries are drawn regarding evaluative norms of legitimate dissensus. Examples from immigrationrelated public debates in Denmark are given.
Refuting a Standpoint by Appealing to Its Outcomes: Reductio ad Absurdum vs. Argument from Consequences
Authors: Jansen Henrike
Published: March 2017

Used informally, the Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA) consists in reasoning appealing to the logically implied, absurd consequences of a hypothetical proposition, in order to refute it. This kind of reasoning resembles the Argument from Consequences, which appeals to causally induced consequences. These types of argument are sometimes confused, since it is not worked out how these different kinds of consequences should be distinguished. In this article it is argued that the logical consequences in RAA-argumentation can take different appearances and that it therefore must be concluded that RAA cannot be characterised by a specific content, but must instead be characterised as an argument form. Furthermore, clues are provided to distinguish RAA reasoning from the Argument from Consequences.
Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy
Authors: Aikin Scott F.
Published: March 2017

Though textbook tu quoque arguments are fallacies of relevance, many versions of arguments from hypocrisy are indirectly relevant to the issue. Some arguments from hypocrisy are challenges to the authority of a speaker on the basis of either her sincerity or competency regarding the issue. Other arguments from hypocrisy purport to be evidence of the impracticability of the opponent’s proposals. Further, some versions of hypocrisy charges from impracticability are open to a counter that I will term tu quoque judo.
Johnson, MacIntyre, and the Practice of Argumentation
Authors: Kvernbekk Tone
Published: March 2017

This article is a discussion of Ralph Johnson’s concept of practice of argumentation. Such practice is characterized by three properties: (1) It is teleological, (2) it is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I argue that Johnson’s preferred definition of practice—which is Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of practice as a human activity with internal goods accessible through partcipation in that same activity—does not fit these properties or features. I also suggest that this failure should not require Johnson to adjust the properties to make them fit the practice concept. While MacIntyre’s concept of practice clearly has some attractive features, it does not provide what Johnson wants from a concept of practice.
Vagueness: A Variant Approach
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: March 2017

Paradoxes of vagueness have been on the agenda since classical antiquity. Some theorists have addressed them by curtailing logical principles (bivalence, excluded middle). Others pro-pose to extrude vagueness as an illusion of sorts rooted overlooking an existing but unidentified boundary or limit. The pre-sent paper projects a third prospect, grounded in the idea of a predicative va-grancy, that resolves the issue by epis-temological resources via the prospect of ignorance regarding not just the place-ment but the very existence of a boun-dary.
Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration
Authors: Hahn Ulrike , Harris Adam J.L. , Corner Adam
Published: March 2017

Argumentation is pervasive in everyday life. Understanding what makes a strong argument is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. One factor that seems intuitively important to the strength of an argument is the reliability of the source providing it. Whilst traditional approaches to argument evaluation are silent on this issue, the Bayesian approach to argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) is able to capture important aspects of source reliability. In particular, the Bayesian approach predicts that argument content and source reliability should interact to determine argument strength. In this paper, we outline the approach and then demonstrate the importance of source reliability in two empirical studies. These experiments show the multiplicative relationship between the content and the source of the argument predicted by the Bayesian framework.
"Inductive, Deductive"
Authors: Weddle Perry
Published: March 2017

"Inductive, Deductive"
The Metaphoric Fallacy to a Deductive Inference
Authors: Berman Michael P , Lightbody Brian A
Published: March 2017

Our article identifies and describes the metaphoric fallacy to a deductive inference (MFDI) that is an example of incorrect reasoning along the lines of the false analogy fallacy. The MFDI proceeds from informal semantical (metaphorical) claims to a supposedly formally deductive and necessary inference. We charge that such an inference is invalid. We provide three examples of the MFDI to demonstrate the structure of this invalid form of reasoning. Our goal is to contribute to the set of known informal fallacies.
Truth and Argument Evaluation
Authors: Bondy Patrick
Published: March 2017

We are all familiar with the traditional conception of what makes for a good argument: that its premises are true and that it is valid.[1] That traditional view of the goodness of arguments has sustained serious criticism over the past few decades, so that most theorists have dropped either the validity requirement or the truth requirement or both. Almost all theorists that I am aware of take it that an argument is good if it fulfills its purpose, and it is widely agreed that arguments can fulfill their purpose even when not all of their premises are true, or they are not deductively valid. Still, some theorists retain a focus on the truth-directed nature of arguments, and those theorists rightly hold that, given such a focus, truth plays an important role in the evaluation of arguments. Johnson (2000) goes so far as to reintroduce truth as a constraint on premise adequacy, alongside the criterion of acceptability, and he holds that in a case where a premise is false but acceptable, truth (/falsity) outweighs acceptability.             What I propose to do in this essay is to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments, when the purpose of arguments is understood as truth-directed in some important way. I begin with a discussion of truth and the purpose of arguments. In the second section of the paper, I give an argument to the effect that the theory of argument evaluation ought not to involve truth as a constraint on premise adequacy. The third section contains my argument for the positive claim that the proper place for the concept of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation is worked out.[2] I conclude the essay with a response to Hamblin’s (1970) argument that no arguments are truth-directed. [1] Hitchcock (1999) traces the concept of soundness in the textbook tradition to Black (1946), and before that (but with different terminology), to Cohen and Nagel (1934). [2] By "theory of evaluation" I mean the set of criteria that a theory provides us with for evaluating arguments. By "the metatheory" in terms of which the theory of evaluation is worked out, I mean the broader theory of argument, including reference to what it is that the criteria for argument evaluation are supposed to accomplish, in which the theory of evaluation is articulated.
Critical Thinking and Small Group Activities
Authors: Gratton Claude
Published: March 2017

I mention the benefits, challenges, and costs of using small group activities to enhance our students’ learning of critical thinking skills in our courses, and then describe ten examples of these groups. Two of these examples are not commonly reported in the literature on small groups, so I describe them in greater detail to facilitate their use in our courses.
Functionalism, Normativity and the Concept of Argumentation
Authors: Patterson Steven W
Published: March 2017

In her 2007 paper, “Argument Has No Function” Jean Goodwin takes exception with what she calls the “explicit function claims”, arguing that not only are function-based accounts of argumentation insufficiently motivated, but they fail to ground claims to normativity. In this paper I stake out the beginnings of a functionalist answer to Goodwin.
Inference Claims
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

A conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if an acceptable counterfactual-supporting covering generalization of the argument rules out, either definitively or with some modal qualification, simultaneous acceptability of the premisses and non-accepta-bility of the conclusion, even though it does not rule out acceptability of the premisses and does not require acceptability of the conclusion independently of the premisses. Hence the reiterative associated conditional of an argument is true if and only it has such a covering generalization, and a supposed unexpressed premiss supplied to make an argument formally valid should be a covering generalization.
Pragma-Dialetics Epistemologized: Reply to Lumer
Authors: Botting David
Published: March 2017

I would like to thank Christoph Lumer for his illuminating comments on my paper “The question of truth” published in this journal (Botting 2010) and would like to exercise my right of reply on a few of the issues that he raises.
What a Real Argument Is
Authors: Hamby Ben
Published: March 2017

: In “What is a ‘Real’ Argument?” Geoff Goddu (2009) suggests and rejects four candidates for what a real argument is, concluding that argumentation theorists should abandon the idea that there is a theoretically significant sub-class of arguments that should be called real. In this paper, I argue against Goddu’s conclusion, finding that real arguments are arguments that are used or that have prospective use in the practice of thinking about matters that call for reasonable and reflective judgment concerning what to believe or do. What makes these arguments theoretically distinct from arguments in general is that they are used or that they may be used in the pragmatic endeavor of attempting to establish good reasons for beliefs and actions. Real arguments are therefore the arguments that should be treated in a course that aims to improve the skills of argumentation that students might use outside of the classroom in real-life.
The Paradox of Charity
Authors: Lewiński Marcin
Published: March 2017

The principle of charity is used in philosophy of language and argumentation theory as an important principle of interpretation which credits speakers with “the best” plausible interpretation of their discourse. I contend that the argumentation account, while broadly advocated, misses the basic point of a dialectical conception which approaches argumentation as discussion between (at least) two parties who disagree over the issue discussed. Therefore, paradoxically, an analyst who is charitable to one discussion party easily becomes uncharitable to the other. To overcome this paradox, I suggest to significantly limit the application of the principle of charity depending on contextual factors.
Trudy Govier and Premise Adequacy
Authors: Allen Derek
Published: March 2017

My main concern in this paper is with Trudy Govier’s acceptability criterion for the adequacy of the premises of an argument considered independently of whether they are “properly connected” to the conclusion. I consider arguments she makes against the view that a good argument must have true premises, and I con-tend that a theory of argument could hold both that for an argument to be a good argument its premises must be true and that for it to be a good argument relative to its audience, the audience must be epistemically justified in accepting its premises as true.
A List of Trudy Govier's Publications
Authors: Blair J. Anthony , Johnson Ralph H.
Published: March 2017

The Editors thank Ken Peacock for his assistance.
Throwing the Baby Out with the Water: From Reasonably Scrutinizing Authorities to Rampant Scepticism About Expertise
Authors: Seidel Markus
Published: March 2017

In this paper, I argue that many arguments from expert opinion are strong arguments. Therefore, in many cases it is rational to rely on experts since in many cases the fact that an expert says that p makes it highly likely that p is true. I will defend this claim by providing 5 arguments that illuminate and elaborate on 5 crucial claims about expertise. In this way, I aim to undermine recent attempts to establish a rampant scepticism about arguments from expert opinion.
Freeman's Syntactic Criterion for Linkage
Authors: Hitchcock David
Published: March 2017

Freeman’s syntactic criterion for linked argument structure (Freeman 2011) is often readily applicable, captures intuitively linked structures, and implies that refuting a single premiss of a linked argument suffices to refute the argument. But one cannot sharply separate analysis from inference evaluation in applying it, whether an argument satisfies it can be uncertain, it under-generates cases where refuting one premiss suffices to refute an argument, some arguments satisfying it can be easily rescued if a single premiss is refuted, and Freeman’s underlying account of probative relevance is dubious.
On Novels as Arguments
Authors: Plumer Gilbert
Published: March 2017

If novels can be arguments, that fact should shape logic or argumentation studies as well as literary studies. Two senses the term ‘narrative argument’ might have are (a) a story that offers an argument, or (b) a distinctive argument form. I consider whether there is a principled way of extracting a novel’s argument in sense (a). Regarding the possibility of (b), Hunt’s view is evaluated that many fables and much fabulist literature inherently, and as wholes, have an analogical argument structure. I argue that a better account is that some novels inherently exhibit a transcendental argument structure.
The Real Struggle: An Objective Notion of Expertise?
Authors: Seidel Markus
Published: March 2017

In a paper published in this journal Martin Hinton aims to show that the struggle between Moti Mizrahi and me about whether arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments rests on misunderstandings (Hinton 2015). Let me emphasize that I generally appreciate Hinton’s intention to settle the dispute between Mizrahi and myself in this way. 1 Furthermore, I also agree with Hinton’s conclusion that if Mizrahi is interpreted in the way Hinton does, then Mizrahi’s “claim becomes far less controversial, but also rather uninteresting” (Hinton 2015, 551)—to refer to the title of my former paper: just spilling out the water wouldn’t be worth a paper in Informal Logic. 2 Let me therefore focus in this reply on the points where Hinton directly attacks my treatment of Mizrahi and also what Hinton takes to be my account of expertise. I will discuss the following criticism of Hinton: (1) that, at points, my attack on Mizrahi is unfair due to my misunderstanding of his intentions, (2) that the notion of expertise I use is self-contradictory/inconsistent, (3) that the argument for my view is circular, (4) that one of my examples—the example from soccer—is mistaken. In rebutting this criticism, I aim to clarify the background of my former paper in this journal.
Redundancy of Redundancy in Justifications of Verdicts of Polish The Constitutional Tribuna
Authors: Winczorek Jan
Published: March 2017

The results of an empirical study of 150 justifications of verdicts of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT) are discussed. CT justifies its decisions mostly on authoritative references to previous decisions and other doxa- type arguments. It thus does not convince the audience of a decision's validity, but rather documents it. Further, the methodology changes depending on features of the case. The results are analysed using a conceptual    framework    of sociological systems theory. It is shown that CT's justification methodology ignores the redundancy (excess of references and dependencies) of the legal system, finding redundancy redundant. This is a risky strategy of decision- making, enabling political influence.
Profiles of Dialogue for Relevance
Authors: Walton Douglas , Macagno Fabrizio
Published: March 2017

This paper uses argument diagrams, argumentation schemes, and some tools from formal argumentation systems developed in artificial intelligence to build a graph-theoretic model of relevance shown to be applicable (with some extensions) as a practical method for helping a third party judge issues of relevance or irrelevance of an argument in real examples. Examples used to illustrate how the method works are drawn from disputes about relevance in natural language discourse, including a criminal trial and a parliamentary debate.
Conductive Argument as a Mode of Strategic Maneuvering
Authors: Xie Yun
Published: March 2017

This paper is to argue that conductive arguments could be understood from a rhetorical perspective. It contends that conductive arguments can be regarded as a particular mode of strategic maneuvering, rather than a new type of argument. Moreover, it demonstrates that the use of conductive arguments can be adequately analyzed and evaluated by adopting the theoretical tools developed in the extended Pragma-Dialectics.
Musclebuilding for Strength in Critical Thinking
Authors: Weinstein Mark
Published: March 2017

Musclebuilding for Strength in Critical Thinking
The Current State of Informal Logic
Authors: Blair J. Anthony , Johnson Ralph H.
Published: March 2017

The Current State of Informal Logic
Una aproximación multimodal de la representación mediática de las protestas del Sector Educación
Authors: Fernández Fernández Daniel , Studt Solano Lua
Published: March 2017

En el presente artículo se analiza la representación de las protestas sociales concernientes a las reivindicaciones del sector educación en una muestra de noticias difundidas en el telediario Noticias REPRETEL de Costa Rica durante el mes de mayo del año 2014. La investigación se desarrolla a partir de un abordaje metodológico del discurso multimodal; con el acometido de discernir los diferentes mecanismos persuasivos con los cuales las protestas del sector educación son enmarcadas.
Editorial
Authors: Maldonado Chaparro Adriana
Published: March 2017

La Revista de Investigación Agraria y Ambiental es una publicación realizada por la Escuela de Ciencias Agrícolas, Pecuarias y del Medio Ambiente de la Universidad Nacional Abierta y a Distancia. Fue concebida en el año 2008 como resultado de la iniciativa de los académicos de la Universidad, para dar visibilidad a los trabajos de investigación desarrollados por los docentes de la Escuela. En su momento, la revista estuvo a cargo del Dr. Edwin Páez, quien como Editor logró consolidar la primera política editorial y recibió los primeros manuscritos sometidos, algunos de los cuales han nutrido este primer número de la revista. En el año 2009, la revista es sometida a una reestructuración interna, que tiene como consecuencia el replanteamiento de la política editorial, para incorporar algunos de los estándares internacionales propios de las publicaciones seriadas y se consolidaron los diferentes comités responsables de la orientación académica, científica y administrativa, así como el sistema de pares evaluadores a través del cual cumpliremos con los estándares exigidos por los sistemas internacionales de indexación, como Publindex y Latindex.

De esta forma buscamos la calidad científica de las contribuciones para mejorar el estándar y prestigio de nuestra publicación.