bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Growth of Cu(In,Ga)Se2 thin films using ionization Ga source and application for solar cells
Authors: Li Zhang , Nishijima Mitsutaka , Yamada Akira , Konagai Makoto
Published: February 2009

Cu(In,Ga)Se2(CIGS) thin films with lower (Ga/III = 0.30) and higher (Ga/III = 0.70) Ga‐content were grown onto the soda‐lime glass substrates by the co‐evaporation process using ionization Ga source. The enlargement of grain size for the as‐grown CIGS films was observed using the higher grid ionization voltage (Vc) and filament current (Ifila). XRD results revealed that the crystal quality can be improved using higher Vc and Ifila which is consistent with SEM results. Hall effect measurements showed that an obvious increasing in carrier concentration and decreasing in resistivity using higher Vc. Finally, the lower and higher Ga‐content CIGS solar cell with a promising efficiency of 15.4% and 8.27% has been achieved, respectively. Our results suggested that the high energy inherent to the ionized Ga atoms could be transferred to the substrate and played an important role for improvement of film quality like a local substrate heating sources. (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)
Surface Functionalization of Single Superparamagnetic Iron Oxide Nanoparticles for Targeted Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Authors: Amstad Esther , Zurcher Stefan , Mashaghi Alireza , Wong Joyce Y. , Textor Marcus , Reimhult Erik
Published: February 2009

Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), a non‐invasive, non‐radiative technique, is thought to lead to cellular or even molecular resolution if optimized targeted MR contrast agents are introduced. This would allow diagnosing progressive diseases in early stages. Here, it is shown that the high binding affinity of poly(ethylene glycol)‐gallol (PEG‐gallol) allows freeze drying and re‐dispersion of 9 ± 2‐nm iron oxide cores individually stabilized with ≈9‐nm‐thick stealth coatings, yielding particle stability for at least 20 months. Particle size, stability, and magnetic properties of PEGylated particles are compared to Feridex, a commercially available untargeted negative MR contrast agent. Biotin‐PEG(3400)‐gallol/methoxy‐PEG(550)‐gallol stabilized nanoparticles are further functionalized with biotinylated human anti‐VCAM‐1 antibodies using the biotin–neutravidin linkage. Binding kinetics and excellent specificity of these nanoparticles are demonstrated using quartz crystal microbalance with dissipation monitoring (QCM‐D). These MR contrast agents can be functionalized with any biotinylated ligand at controlled ligand surface density, rendering them a versatile research tool.
Off‐line model predictive control of DCDC converter and its experimental verification
Authors: Zanma Tadanao , Asano Nobuhiro , Ishida Muneaki
Published: February 2009

This paper presents an optimal control method for DCDC converters. The system is modeled as a mixed logical dynamical system so that the switching property can be considered explicitly. Specifically, the input of the system is confined to a discrete value whereas the output to be controlled is a continuous value. The optimal control law for the system is obtained by means of off‐line model predictive control. The effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated through numerical simulations and experiments. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Positioning control experiment switching from adaptive nonstationary servo control to force sensorless nonstationary impedance control
Authors: Hara Susumu , Yamada Yoji , Lee Suwoong
Published: February 2009

The authors have studied on the positioning control of a cart by means of a smooth switching from the servo access control (SAC) for automatic conveyance function to the impedance control (IC) for power‐assisting function. The nonstationary optimal control (NOC) method and the force sensorless nonstationary impedance control (FSLIC) method were applied in a previous study. However, NOC requires the offline calculations for generating time‐varying feedback gains. This letter shows the experimental result of smooth switching from the adaptive nonstationary servo control (ANSSC) to FSLIC. ANSSC generates the feedback gains online and realizes some adaptive control for parameter variations of a controlled object. Copyright © 2009 Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Design of Experiments to Evaluate the Detergency of Surfactants on Fatty Soils in a Continuous‐Flow Device
Authors: Jurado Alameda Encarnación , Bravo Rodríguez Vicente , Núñez Olea Josefa , Bailón Moreno Rafael , Gálvez Borrego Antonio , Altmajer Vaz Deisi
Published: February 2009

Detersive processes are complex systems involving a great number of variables. To determine the effect of these variables on the washing of hard surfaces and fatty soils is the object of this work. The statistical design of experiments has been used to evaluate the influence of factors such as temperature, soil concentration and surfactant concentration on detergency. The experimental trials have been made in a continuous‐flow device where the soiling agent is confined in a column filled with borosilicate glass spheres. Solutions of the commercial surfactant Berol©LFG61 (a mixture of alkylpolyglucosides and fatty‐alcohol ethoxylates) have been employed as the wash bath. Both the design of experiments and the continuous experimental system used proved to be an effective tool for detecting the key variables in the cleaning process. Expressions were developed to simulate detergency levels as a function of the variables assayed, always inside the experimental domain. In the trials with oleic acid as the soiling agent, it was found that the temperature and soil concentration were the most important variables to take into account, while the surfactant concentration was not a significant variable. When a semi‐solid mixture of different fatty acids was employed, all the variables assayed proved significant, with high detergency values being reached by combining temperature and surfactant concentrations. Results clearly show that the effectiveness of the surfactant used is influenced by the type and concentration of the soil and thus the intended application of the product being developed should be taken into account when designing detergent formulas.
Dietary n‐3 and n‐6 PUFA Enhance DHA Incorporation in Retinal Phospholipids Without Affecting PGE1 and PGE2 Levels
Authors: Schnebelen Coralie , Grégoire Stéphane , Pasquis Bruno , Joffre Corinne , Creuzot‐Garcher Catherine P. , Bron Alain M. , Bretillon Lionel , Acar Niyazi
Published: February 2009

The purpose of this study was to determine whether dietary n‐3 and n‐6 PUFA may affect retinal PUFA composition and PGE1 and PGE2 production. Male Wistar rats were fed for 3 months with diets containing: (1) 10% eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and 7% docosahexaenoic acid (DHA), or (2) 10% γ‐linolenic acid (GLA), or (3) 10% EPA, 7% DHA and 10% GLA, or (4) a balanced diet deprived of EPA, DHA, and GLA. The fatty acid composition of retinal phospholipids was determined by gas chromatography. Prostaglandin production was measured by enzyme immunoassay. When compared to rats fed the control diet, the retinal levels of DHA were increased in rats fed both diets enriched with n‐3 PUFA (EPA + DHA and EPA + DHA + GLA diets) and decreased in those supplemented with n‐6 PUFA only (GLA diet). The diet enriched with both n‐6 and n‐3 PUFA resulted in the greatest increase in retinal DHA. The levels of PGE1 and PGE2 were significantly increased in retinal homogenates of rats fed with the GLA‐rich diet when compared with those of animals fed the control diet. These higher PGE1 and PGE2 levels were not observed in animals fed with EPA + DHA + GLA. In summary, GLA added to EPA + DHA resulted in the highest retinal DHA content but without increasing retinal PGE2 as seen in animals supplemented with GLA only.
Stability of multipeakons
Authors: El Dika Khaled , Molinet Luc
Published: February 2009

The Camassa–Holm equation possesses well-known peaked solitary waves that are called peakons. Their orbital stability has been established by Constantin and Strauss in [A. Constantin, W. Strauss, Stability of peakons, Comm. Pure Appl. Math. 53 (2000) 603–610]. We prove here the stability of ordered trains of peakons. We also establish a result on the stability of multipeakons.
Phosphorylation of the eukaryotic initiation factor 3f by cyclin‐dependent kinase 11 during apoptosis
Authors: Shi Jiaqi , Hershey John W.B. , Nelson Mark A.
Published: February 2009

MINT‐6948836, MINT‐6948849, MINT‐6948862: CDK11p46 (uniprotkb:P21127) phosphorylates (MI:0217) EIF3f (uniprotkb:O00303) by protein kinase assay (MI:0424)
Projection
Authors: Child Arthur
Published: February 2009

Some words enter the language with an uncommon aptitude both for uniting things already observed but formerly severed by separate terms and for fostering the recognition of things unnoticed before. Indeed, they often unite things that ought still to be left discrete; and even among those properly united, clarity may require the acknowledgment of many distinctions. I shall here consider such a term and the various kinds of things to which it can and cannot (in the same sense) refer: projection.
Philosophy as Social Philosophy
Authors: Haines Nicolas
Published: February 2009

Just before the second world war, in a paper read to the British Association, Morris Ginsberg talked about the failure of social philosophy and the social sciences to work together in the universities ‘toward the rational ordering of society’. Some time after the war Alexander Macbeath complained to British sociologists of his own vain search for a social philosopher who could teach in a course on public administration. Then a few years later A. E. Teale told an inter-professional conference at Keele that people who teach and train teachers, those who train social workers of all kinds, were disappointed when philosophers professed themselves unable to help those who had to ‘equip students with the skill to change prevailing moral attitudes and standards’.
Justice and Legal Punishment
Authors: Doyle James F.
Published: February 2009

TheQuestion of punishment and its justification has been a major preoccupation in recent philosophy of law. The reasons for this growing concern are not difficult to discover. Both philosophers and jurists have become increasingly sceptical of traditional theories of legal punishment. Each of these inherited theories was designed to establish criteria for the recognition and appraisal of punishment as a legal institution. However, alternative theories emphasised different and often conflicting criteria. Some theories emphasised moral desert and retribution, while others appealed to the social utilities of punishment. Failure to reconcile these diverse philosophical viewpoints, through sustained debate over two centuries, has been a major source of intellectual dissatisfaction.
The Unity of Space and Time
Authors: Ward K.
Published: February 2009

Mr A. Quinton has attempted to show that the Kantian doctrine of the necessary unity of space rests ultimately on very general contingencies (Philosophy, 1962). More recently, Mr Swinburne has tried to argue the same point for time; and thus he asserts that ‘Kant's unity of time is no more an unalterable necessity of thought than his unity of space’ (Analysis, June, 1965). I wish to defend Kant against both charges, by showing that the charming stories which Quinton and Swinburne tell, in order to show that there are conceivable circumstances in which space and time would not be unitary, do not succeed in showing this at all.
Do I ever directly raise my arm?,
Authors: Imlay Robert A.
Published: February 2009

Do I ever directly raise my arm? Before dealing with this question we must make clear that the corresponding affirmation is to be taken as a way of rejecting one interpretation of the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ On the interpretation of the question I have in mind the appropriate reply, if the question were not rejected, would be, ‘I raise my arm in or by doing something internal’. The way we are employing the phrase ‘doing something internal’ will, I think, become clear when we consider candidates for the description ‘doing something internal’. But it is important to remember that to affirm that I directly raise my arm is to reject the question, ‘In doing or by doing what do I raise my arm?’ on our interpretation of the question.
Wittgensteinian Fideism
Authors: Nielsen Kai
Published: February 2009

Wittgenstein did not write on the philosophy of religion. But certain strands of his later thought readily lend themselves to what I call Wittgensteinian Fideism. There is no text that I can turn to for an extended statement of this position, but certain remarks made by Winch, Hughes, Malcolm, Geach, Cavell, Cameron and Coburn can either serve as partial statements of this position, or can be easily used in service of such a statement. Some of their contentions will serve as targets for my argumentation, for as much as I admire Wittgenstein, it seems to me that the fideistic conclusions drawn by these philosophers from his thought are often absurd. This leads me back to an inspection of their arguments and the premisses in these arguments.
A Scientific Morality?
Authors: Haksar Vinit
Published: February 2009

It is neither possible, nor desirable, to have a system of dealing with criminals that does away with norms. But Lady Wootton sometimes talks as if it is possible and desirable to do away with norms. And she claims that in her pragmatic system norms have been done away with. She believes her pragmatic system of dealing with criminals is, unlike our present system, scientific. There are at least two respects (though Lady Wootton does not seem to distinguish these two respects) in which she seems to be claiming that her system is scientific, unlike the present system. Firstly, she seems to think that her system is scientific in the sense of being a workable system; she believes that in her system, leaving aside the moral and other limitations that she mentions, the last word ‘is always with the statistician’. Under the present system, on the other hand, she argues, we are asked to answer questions—such as ‘could he have helped what he did?’—which are inherently insoluble. (We shall see in Section 2 how far Lady Wootton is justified in saying this.)
Forgiveness
Authors: O'Shaughnessy R. J.
Published: February 2009

I have no comment to make on the aesthetic merits of these verses. I have put them at the head of my discussion because they happen to introduce a cluster of concepts connected with forgiveness: pride, love, hate, God, friendship, goodwill, eternity, offence, condemnation, resentment, blame. We may think that some, but not all, of these have essential connections with the concept in which we are interested. And we may, of course, think that the list is incomplete. Other obvious candidates spring to mind: pity, for example, repentance, compassion, punishment and pardoning.
Unconscious Intentions
Authors: Hamlyn D. W.
Published: February 2009

Is it possible to do something intentionally and yet be unconscious of so doing? Many philosophers would answer ‘No’ to this question on the grounds that it is of the essence of intention that if we do something intentionally we do it knowing what we are doing.
Good and Evil Morality
Authors: Kaye Michael
Published: February 2009

Though we should probably find it easier to detect immorality in its instances than to determine morality in its essence, we generally take it for granted that to be moral is to be good. On the assumption, I suppose, that morality and goodness are actually equivalent, some have even said that it is goodness alone that is good. And yet in the name of morality men have suppressed their vitality, stifled their generosity, surrendered their reason, and gone like sheep to the slaughter. In the name of morality men have distorted the truth and tormented the innocent. They have cut off heads in the past and they cut off heads in the present. It seems to me that alike with morality and without it, alike without it and with it, human behaviour may display brutality and insanity. Our human society may disintegrate and wither because of moral vacillation and paralysis. But it may be blighted the world over because struck by the lightning of moral frenzy.
Other People's Pleasures and One's Own: an Ethical Discussion
Authors: Laird John
Published: February 2009

The opinion that I want to discuss in this essay is fairly commonly although not universally held among moralists. It is the opinion that there is never a moral duty to try to promote one's own pleasure for the sake of that pleasure although, contrariwise, there is often a moral duty to try to promote the pleasure of others for the sake of that pleasure. I cannot myself assent to the view, and I want to explain why I cannot; but I allow that the opposition I have to face is formidable. Indeed there are authors like Meinong who would make degree of self-sacrifice the standard of morality.
Back to Descartes
Authors: Taylor A. E.
Published: February 2009

I must explain at once that these few pages do not attempt or pretend to be anything like a formal review of the recently published posthumous volume of Professor Bowman with the same title. I am precluded from writing such a review partly by the wide range of problems attacked by the author, partly by my own insufficient familiarity with many of the positions of the most recent physical and natural science which are brought under review. I will therefore confine myself, so far as the strict business of the reviewer is concerned, to the single remark that the editor, Professor J. W. Scott, has discharged his difficult task of preparing the book for publication—no easy matter, as will be seen from his Preface—with equal skill and devotion, and has laid himself open to no worse criticism than that there are less than a dozen obvious slight misprints which have escaped detection, but will readily be detected by a careful reader. What I propose to do in the remarks which follow is simply to indicate the very real importance of the book by saying something as to its main purpose and thesis, and the points where I still feel that there is some difficulty or ambiguity about the writer's position which would, no doubt, have been largely cleared up if he had lived to reconstruct the whole six of his Vanuxem Lectures for publication as he has done the first three.
Ceteris Paribus—The Danger of the Increment
Authors: Stamp Lord
Published: February 2009

The final persistence of democracy depends upon whether its right decisions outweigh the wrong ones in number and value, though conceivably one really bad decision might ruin the structure built on all the right ones. It is passing from the stage where a few reasoning leaders govern the masses through their emotions, to the next perilous stage in which every man's thoughts matter. Right decisions depend upon access to relevant facts and doing the right thinking about them. It is of the essence of Nazi philosophy that general liberty of thought is self-destructive, the common man not being rational; it is of the essence of Nazi practice to flatter the many by the pretence that their thinking does matter, but to control and modify the whole supply of factual material upon which they must reason. One declared to me once that he favoured freedom of thought and was not afraid of it, for if he was allowed to supply the “facts” any ordinary rational mind could come to only one conclusion, viz. the one he intended. And in the process the ordinary man might remain proud of his reasoning power, so long as he could be sheltered from seeing the falsity of his conclusions. Control of facts must be perpetual, and cats must never be allowed to get out of bags. But in a democracy, where facts are all born free (and much too equal), it is the thinking about them that really matters.
Kant's Concept of Appearance—I
Authors: Cousin D. R.
Published: February 2009

The following discussion arises out of reflection upon a number of related topics. One of these is the problem of perception, and in particular of perceptual illusion. Another is the use which has been made, e.g. by Bradley, of the distinction between appearance and reality as a guiding principle of metaphysical inquiry. But the immediate occasion of the present inquiry is the attempt to discover what Kant in particular has to say upon these and similar problems. It is for this reason that I have given the paper its title, and not because I wish to pose as an expert in Kantian scholarship. What contribution I can make to Kantian studies is only that of the outsider whose questions may perhaps suggest to the experts lines of inquiry which their very familiarity with Kant's ways of expressing himself may have led them to overlook. But the aim of the paper is not so much to discover what Kant meant as to formulate a particular view which may have been Kant's in such a way that we can judge whether it is true or not. The decision on that point, however, falls outside the scope of the present discussion.
Whitehead'S Philosophy: Actual Entities
Authors: Hooper Sydney E.
Published: February 2009

I have tried to expound Whitehead's doctrine of Creativity and of actual entities. Nothing remains but to give a brief summary of what has been said in the foregoing notes.

Creativity is the ultimate activity and principle of novelty in the Universe.

The world is said to consist of “actual entities,” not substances. An actual entity is also called an “actual occasion.” It is essentially a genetic process, having two sides, (I) the process of “becoming,” and (2) the outcome of the process named the “satisfaction.” The satisfaction is the fully determined achievement abstracted from the process. On attaining satisfaction the actual entity viewed as a self-creating subject loses its “final” causation, and as a subject perishes, but the “satisfaction” remains as a potential constituent for the emergence of a new actual entity. This is its “efficient” causation. The potentiality of the satisfaction for a new creation is called its “objective immortality”: in this capacity it functions as an “object” for the self-creation of another actual entity.
Duty and Interest—(I)
Authors: Lamont W. D.
Published: February 2009

1.Aim and Scope of this Paper.—In this paper I shall try to show that “duty” derives its significance from its relation to “interest,” and that the former concept cannot be understood when taken apart from its relation to the latter. Such a doctrine is, I am aware, rejected by some contemporary philosophers; and I shall, I trust, make it sufficiently clear in the sequel why I am unable to accept their view.

I am not, however, concerned primarily with criticism of other theories. This paper represents an attempt to interpret a particular province of “the common moral consciousness” and to elicit the principles there implied. I begin by accepting the view that, like natural science, ethics has its data, and that it is the business of ethics to interpret these data which are the contents of the “moral consciousness.” InSection AI discuss various methods which may be used for the discovery of the relevant data, and suggest that initial enquiries can most fruitfully be pursued in the field of law and custom. InSection BI undertake an analysis of the principles of the law relating to promise-keeping. As a result of what is there found, it becomes necessary, inSection C, to discuss the nature of rights and their relation to interests, and, inSection D, the nature of duties and their relation to rights.
The Good as Means and as End
Authors: Lofthouse W. F.
Published: February 2009

The various discussions on morals which have recently appeared in the pages of this journal, like most modern discussions of the subject, have had to concern themselves with two antitheses, between the good and the right, and between duty and interest. As to the first, is the good what it is because it is right, or is right what it is because it is good? Or may the two be distinct, so that what is right is not necessarily good? And if it is not good, is it bad? Or do the right and the good overlap? For the second, the antithesis between duty and interest—“of course,” says one, “the two have nothing to do with one another; the more carefully we keep them apart, the better.” In rare instances, indeed, it will be allowed that my duty may coincide with my interest; but when it does so, it is felt to be shorn of half its worth. If it pays me to tell the truth, what thank have I for all my veracity?
Descartes on Material Things
Authors: Laing B. M.
Published: February 2009

According to tranditional philosophical terminology and to most interpretations of Cartesianism, Descartes is a dualist. This dualism is expressed in his fundamental distinction between two substances—mind and matter—and, though admitted to be full of difficulties and by many to be untenable, it has very generally been regarded as at least a clearly intelligible doctrine, consistently held by Descartes. That this is not so has been shown by Professor Boyce Gibson in his able and careful analysis of Cartesianism. The aim of the present essay is to draw attention to another difficulty that has not been sufficiently noticed; whether it is an actual one or only an apparent one due to a misunderstanding of Descartes is a question that may be left to those who read him differently and who may be able to remove one more charge of inconsistency. The general contention is that Descartes—and this point is conceded in expositions of Descartes—seeks to prove that there are material bodies, that material bodies are necessary for his own account of the physical universe, and that yet his own theory of matter as extension, even combined with motion, makes the existence of bodies (in the plural) impossible and hence any proof of such existence impossible. In fact, the employment of the idea of motion only serves to emphasize the difficulty and inconsistency of the theory.
The Spiritual Basis of Democracy
Authors: Reid Louis Arnaud
Published: February 2009

In this article I shall employ the word “spiritual” for want of a better. It is not a particularly good word, for it is “emotive,” stirring up sentimental feelings in some people and causing the sympathies of others to shut up like clams. “Personal” is in some ways less objectionable, but a title like “The Personal Basis of Democracy” might suggest a thesis other than I have in mind. Nor is the word “moral” nearly wide enough. As to the meaning of “spiritual” all I can say now is that my readers will have at least some idea of what I am referring to by the time they reach the end of the article.
Ideals and Practice (II)
Authors: Russell Leonard J.
Published: February 2009

Two types of conception of a Way of Life are important for a consideration of the question of the forming and testing of ideals of conduct, and consequently for a consideration of our questions regarding the relation of ideals to practice. The one type is more, the other type less general. The one has reference to man as man, the other to particular classes of man, with relation to their specific function in society. The former issues in the idea of a universal ethic, the latter in the idea of a professional code. Thus the former has a wider generality, the latter has a greater concreteness. Ethical progress seems to me to require that both types should be kept in view, and used to guide man's efforts.
Friedrich Nietzsche
Authors: Copleston F. C.
Published: February 2009

Many people who have never read the works of Nietzsche possess some vague notion of what he taught. For them the philosophy of Nietzsche is represented by a few floating ideas—“Superman,” “Will to Power,” and even perhaps “blond beast.” Others again have learnt a little more about Nietzsche and perhaps read something of what he actually said; yet the net result is an impression of a passionate and destructive thinker, who launched his attacks on this side and on that, without any regard for consistency. For them there can be no philosophy of Nietzsche: they know that he often wrote in the form of aphorism and they picture his thought in general as a series of detached utterances, many of which are mutually exclusive. It may then be of use to some, if we attempt to set forth the guiding inspiration and leading ideas of Nietzsche, for when these have been grasped, it will be seen that it is by no means absurd to speak of a philosophy of Nietzsche. It may well be impossible to reconcile all his utterances, at least so far as the words are concerned—though Nietzsche is of course not the only philosopher who betrays inconsistency in his thought—but it should be remembered that Nietzsche was not given to standing still: his thought developed. Moreover, he often spoke in an exaggerated form, so that some of the apparent inconsistencies may be ascribed to over-emphasis. In any case, even granting the presence of irreconcilable inconsistencies in his thought, Nietzsche's various theories not only may, but must, be seen as a whole, if they are seen in the light of his guiding ideas and inspiration.
The Development of the Civilized Mind in the Ancient Civilizations
Authors: Murphy John
Published: February 2009

The positions which are offered for consideration in this paper may be summarized in the following four points:

First, there is a civilized type of mind which may be clearly distinguished from a primitive type.

Second, the civilized mind developed from the primitive under certain economic and ethnological conditions which are to be described.

Third, this emergence of the civilized mind from the primitive took place at a fairly definite period and reached its height in the remarkable efflorescence of genius between the ninth and fourth century b.c., over an area from Egypt to China. This was the appearance in that period of a mind essentially one in character, with natural variations, in the Greek thinkers, the Hebrew prophets, the early Hindu mystical philosophers and the Buddha in India, and the ethical teachers of China of the Confucian school.

Fourth, this type of mind with its characteristic powers was achieved once for all and was never lost. In spite of the decay of most of the ancient civilizations, the civilized mind has been transmitted, chiefly through the survival of Greek and Graeco-Hebraic thought, into science, philosophy, and theology to become the modern mind for the world of culture of to-day.
Immortality of the Soul in the Platonic Dialogues and Aristotle
Authors: Duncan Patrick
Published: February 2009

Plato's thought on the question of the immortality of the soul, in the sense of the existence after death of an individual personality, is stated by Constantin Ritter in his book on The Essence of Plato's Philosophy as follows: “I must admit that for Plato personal immortality was a serious problem and that his whole exposition and especially the trend of his argument in the Phaedo, urges us to accept it” (page 119); and again—“The notion of immortality in the sense that we understand it, viz. the survival of personality beyond the limits of earthly existence, was for Plato a serious problem; but it never became a dogma with him, even though he gives us a strong hint in the Phaedo to affirm this notion” (page 301).
The Philosophy of the Wolf State
Authors: Inge W. R.
Published: February 2009

Among all the sorrows and anxieties of the present crisis in human affairs, none has caused so much consternation to thoughtful people as the open and scornful repudiation, by two of the most civilized nations of Europe, of all the moral principles, all the decent conventions, which for two thousand years have enabled human societies to live together in some degree of contentment and security. Almost all things which once seemed sacred and immutable have now become unsettled—truth and humanity, justice and reason. An apprehension of impending doom, of the break up of a great civilization, has become general.
Gestalt Psychology
Authors: Garnett Maxwell
Published: February 2009

The aim of psychology is first of all to describe how we think, or the flow of our consciousness, and then to sum up the facts in terms of principles, generalizations, or “laws” which “govern” our thinking. These laws must enable us to foretell what a man will think and how he will act when we know his environment and the state of his thought at any given moment, provided that no unforeseeable exercise of free will intervenes. Psychology has also to inquire whether interventions of “free will” ever do occur and, if they do, what is their nature and scope.
Ethics and Christian Ethics
Authors: Waterhouse E. S.
Published: February 2009

An Indian student, returning, after completing his course at a British university, to his own land, told his tutor that in India at least he would find once more that truth was one and indivisible. On being asked what he meant, his reply was that in England everyone separated scientific from religious truth, but that to Indian thought they were one. So familiar is this dualism of truth to us that we pass over its strangeness without question. In the Middle Ages Europe was of the same opinion as India is now. What then is the reason for the rent we have torn in the seamless vesture of truth? The answer is found by retracing our steps to the days when the old wineskins of theology were bursting under the pressure of the Revival of Learning, and, more important still, the layman was becoming the scholar. The Reformation issued no general licence to every man to think as he liked, but it at least allowed freedom of thought within certain bounds. Had Thomas Hobbes, for example, been born in 1488 instead of 1588, he would hardly have lived to die abed at the age of 91. Hobbes was not a great thinker, but he was a great iconoclast, and he created a critical temper of thought which showed itself in many who were in no sense Hobbists.
Apropos de Kierkegaard
Authors: Webb Clement C. J.
Published: February 2009

In an interesting article on Kierkegaard and the “Existential” Philosophy, contributed to the number of Philosophy for July 1941, Miss Dorothy Emmet counselled her readers to make themselves acquainted with the Journals of the famous Danish thinker, now rendered accessible to Englishmen ignorant of his language by the translation of Mr. Dru. I have taken her advice and am grateful to her for it. I am not indeed convinced that this self-revelation of a remarkable personality can be ranked among the great autobiographies of the world. It seems to me to fall, if only on account of its lack of unity as a work of literary art, below the standard which such an estimate of it would imply. But it is undoubtedly both impressive in itself and important in view of the influence which its author, little known in his lifetime beyond a circle of the parochial narrowness of which he was painfully conscious, has come, long after his death, to exert upon the spiritual and intellectual life of Europe to-day. The present article, however, will not be concerned with the exposition or criticism of this or other writings of Kierkegaard, but with thoughts, more or less suggested by my reading of him, respecting the notion of God and its significance for philosophy.
Shakespeare on the Wars of England
Authors: Laird John
Published: February 2009

In these grim and heavy years, despite all their inroads upon leisure, it seems likely that Shakespeare is read more widely and loved more deeply in this country than for many generations past, and since foreign communiqués as well as British ministers of the crown have been known to quote from him, it may be conjectured that the world as well as these islands is sensible of a part of the debt that humanity owes him. Be that as it may, there is perennial refreshment in the blended wit and wisdom and fancy of his immortal pages, and a timely privilege for his countrymen in the fact that his Histories dealt with anguished, bitter years. To be sure, we read him more for his timelessness than for his timeliness, and allow, with the speaker in King John that ‘He is but a bastard to the times, That doth not smack of observation.’ Such observation is just philosophy; but even philosophy reacts to the stimulus of its immediate environment.
The Object of Observation and Knowledge
Authors: Lafleur Laurence J.
Published: February 2009

A passing remark may at times be a clearer indication of basic conceptions or misconceptions than a well-pondered dissertation, and the present article had its inception in a passing remark of Professor Dewey's, to the effect that no man has as yet seen an atom, although it is quite possible that atoms might be observed in the future.
Whitehead's Philosophy: Space, Time and Things
Authors: Hooper Sydney E.
Published: February 2009

In earlier articles an account has been given of some of the chief notions in the Organic Philosophy, namely Creativity, Actual Entities, Eternal Objects, God. In the present article the writer will endeavour to present Whitehead's doctrine concerning the space-time continuum and the nature of enduring objects implicated therein.
Act and Attitude
Authors: Robinson N. H. G.
Published: February 2009

In recent years ethical discussion has centred round the problem of the relation between the idea of right and the idea of good. Previously it had been more or less generally assumed that moral philosophy was principally concerned with the idea of good, and followed its course by asking such questions as: What is the meaning of good? or, What are the characteristics which anything must have in order to be good? or even, What things are good? The idea of right was generally regarded as subordinate, and it was perhaps more often implied than stated that an action was right if by it something good was realized.
Memory: A Cloud of Witness
Authors: Rowell E. M.
Published: February 2009

The experience of each one of us is individual, private and particular, and in its immediacy is incommunicable. Images of all sorts, sense factors, figments of the imagination, mental comments and judgments, all these impressions, some persistent, some fleeting, follow one another in endless passage through the consciousness.
The Epistemological Foundations of Natural Philosophy
Authors: Whitrow G. J.
Published: February 2009

The history of Natural Philosophy is dominated by a paradox; broadly speaking, a vast increase in its range of application to the external world has been accompanied by a sweeping simplification in its basic assumptions. From the standpoint of Empiricism this dual development appears utterly mysterious. On the other hand, Rationalism, which seeks to demonstrate the metaphysical necessity of natural law, and hence might throw light on this development, has been generally discredited, particularly by men of science. It is not surprising, therefore, that philosophical discussion of scientific method has become a Babel of confusing tongues.
Some of the Main Problems of Ethics
Authors: Broad C. D.
Published: February 2009

Ethics, in the sense in which that word is used by philosophers, may be described as the theoretical treatment of moral phenomena. I use the phrase “moral phenomena” to cover all those facts and only those in describing which we have to use such words as “ought,” “right and wrong,” “good and evil,” or any others which are merely verbal translations of these.
Equality and Equity
Authors: Raphael D. Daiches
Published: February 2009

In some sense every man has a moral right, or more properly a moral claim, to equality with other men. In what sense will, I hope, become apparent in the course of this paper. That there is such a claim in some sense is clear enough. “Equality before the law,” for example, is something which we all recognize to be right.
The Neurological Approach to the Problem of Perception
Authors: Brain W. Russell
Published: February 2009

I much appreciate the honour of being invited to deliver the first Manson lecture, which, its founder has laid down, is to be devoted to the consideration of some subject of common interest to philosophy and medicine. I cannot think of anything which better fulfils that condition than the neurological approach to the problem of perception. The neurologist holds the bridge between body and mind. Every day he meets with examples of disordered perception and he learns from observing the effects of lesions produced by disease, or by the physiologist's experiments, something of how the neural basis of perception is organized. It is possible to study perception as though this was largely irrelevant. How far that view is right will be for you to judge when I have finished.
On Poetic Truth
Authors: Lewis H. D.
Published: February 2009

Poetry has to do with reality in its most individual aspect. It is thus at the opposite pole to science, and out of its reach. Studies like The Road to Xanadu, highly valuable though they may be in one way, do not help us in any measure to understand what poetry in itself is; nor do they heighten substantially our appreciation of poetry. This may seem rather obvious, but it is not in fact idle to say it. For our thought is apt to be unduly coloured to-day by the progress of science, and some of the votaries of science are prone to regard it, in the Biblical phrase, as ‘profitable unto all things.’ These are less naïve to-day than their prototypes a century ago, and they have a subtler psychology at their disposal when they turn to art. But their view is no less pernicious for that reason. Science has very certain limits, and we only bring it into contempt by forcing upon it a forlorn and unnatural enterprise beyond its own terrain. Some scientists, and they include eminent persons like Julian Huxley, have made that mistake in regard to our ideas of right and wrong, and have endeavoured to develop a science of ethics. It is not to the purpose here to expose the confusions involved in this particular act of aggression on the part of science. Science has nothing to do, in the final analysis, with our ideas of right and wrong. And it is also true, quite apart from ultimate questions about the meaning of value, that we cannot give a scientific analysis of art. Science may indeed help us to understand matters incidental to the pursuit of artistic activities.
Descartes and Leibniz in 1946 On their 350th and 300th Birthdays
Authors: Schrecker Paul
Published: February 2009

The three hundred and fiftieth birthday of René Descartes and the three hundredth of G. W. Leibniz, both being commemorated this year, recall to mind an epoch which, in many respects, resembled our own more than any other period of modern history. The Thirty Years' War during which Descartes served four years in the armies of the Dukes of Nassau and Bavaria and the aftermath of which determined many circumstances of Leibniz's life and work, was largely an ideological war leaving Europe in a state of tension, which the Peace of Westphalia did little to allay. As a matter of fact, the strife continued in many changing forms up to the time of the American Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution, if it can be said at all to have been terminated by these events.
The Scientific World-Outlook
Authors: Taylor F. Sherwood
Published: February 2009

The scientific world-outlook is something quite different from natural science. The word “science” in its legitimate modern usage represents both a kind of knowledge and the method of obtaining that knowledge. By “science” we may mean an objective body of facts and relationships concerning the physical world and arrived at by the scientific method of observation and reasoning—preferably quantitative observation and mathematical reasoning: thus we may say that the law of constant proportions is a part of the science of chemistry. But we may also use the word science to denote that scientific method which I have just mentioned: thus I may say that science is the key to the investigation of nature—or that some inaccurate or biased piece of work is unscientific. Science, in either of these senses, does not contain any world-outlook, for it is quite impersonal. Thus science in the first sense consists of certain statements and relationships e.g.—that sulphur is yellow, that Jupiter has eight satellites, that all solutions of acids in water conduct electricity; while the scientific method indicates the manner in which from the data of our sense-impressions we can infer statements and conclusions, such as the above, which will be found to represent the phenomena correctly. But a scientific world-outlook means something different, because it is a world-outlook, the attitude of a man or woman towards the whole of that of which he or she is conscious.
The Marxist Outlook
Authors: Acton H. B.
Published: February 2009

By a “world-outlook” I mean a systematic account of the nature of the world which claims, by showing the place of man in the scheme of things, to indicate the point and purpose of his life. The theory of the world is often called a metaphysical theory and the theory of conduct an ethical or moral theory. In my opinion the clarification and criticism of world-outlooks is a fundamental part of philosophy. Indeed, I hardly think that philosophy would have existed as something distinct from science or poetry but for the tendency to attempt some explanation of the world as the scene of human endeavour. When Kant referred to “the inevitable problems of pure reason” about “God, freedom, and immortality,” he was referring in a summary way to the fundamental philosophical task of analysing and criticizing world-outlooks, a task that may be undertaken even by those philosophers who do not believe that any world-outlook is or could be adequate. It is clear, of course, that the civilized religions, since they seek to show how human conduct fits in with some Divine Plan or Cosmic Conflict, have world-outlooks. It is, however, misleading to look upon religions and world-outlooks as the same thing, as some people do. For in ordinary usage religion involves belief in supernatural beings and conduct regulated in the light of this belief, but according to some world-outlooks (e.g. that of Spinoza) there are no supernatural beings, while according to others (e.g. Epicureanism) beings may exist deserving that description but human conduct need take no account of them.
Philosophy and Mathematics
Authors: Kneebone G. T.
Published: February 2009

This essay is an attempt to take stock of what has been done by those who have worked on the foundations of mathematics and to suggest, very inadequately in so short a space, what may be a satisfactory approach to this subject for one who is not an expert in it. The subject is one that neither mathematicians nor philosophers can any longer afford to ignore, but in the technicalities of which they may not be very interested.
The Development of Bishop Butler's Ethics
Authors: McPherson Thomas H.
Published: February 2009

The aim of this article is to show that there are two distinct ethical theories in the writings of Bishop Butler. This is something that his critics do not seem to have realized. One or two of them have seen that the Dissertation on Virtue contains ideas which do not harmonize very well with those of the Rolls Sermons, but no one has made a detailed study of the differences. It has been usual to dismiss them with the remark that Butler is an inconsistent writer and we should not worry too much over details.