bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion during the Cultural Revolution
Authors: Robinson Thomas W.
Published: March 2009

The Wuhan Incident of late July 1967 represents the apex of revolutionary violence in 1967 and a turning-point in the Cultural Revolution. Before mid-July, the Maoist group seemed relatively permissive in allowing, and even instigating, clashes throughout the country between various revolutionary factions, each claiming to be more loyal than the other to Mao and the Party Centre. From mid-July to early August, regional military authorities in Wuhan not only sided with the “conservative” revolutionary rebel faction (in violation of a Central Committee directive instructing them to promote unity among revolutionary forces) but also threw down a direct challenge to Peking. This had some of the markings of warlord politics and Peking had no choice but to deal severely with the regional authorities.
Chinese Film Images of Invasion and Resistance
Authors: Weakland John H.
Published: March 2009

It is clear that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic is very concerned about national defence and possible foreign attack – especially from the United States, but increasingly from the Soviet Union also. Obviously, such concerns are largely relatable to both historical and current political and military realities – such as 100-odd years of western and Japanese encroachments on China, the Vietnam war, American military bases around China, Chinese-Soviet border clashes, and both ideological and practical political conflicts between China and the United States, and China and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, these practical realities alone cannot provide a full basis for understanding the nature and strength of Chinese concerns about potential invasion. In the first place, such attitudes are both too deep and too wide. Traditionally, from long before the West became powerful in Asia, China has been concerned to keep foreigners out or at least carefully restricted, and long before the bitter attacks by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on “cultural imperialism” this concern extended to economic and cultural as well as direct military or political influence. Second – more generally, but more fundamentally – political behaviour and attitudes are never so neatly and completely rational and compartmentalized as to depend only on the “real” political circumstances. As with anyone else, both what the Chinese perceive as “real” and as “political,” and the significance attributed to these perceptions, depends also on the lenses they use to view the world. And the nature of the lenses used to view international affairs may be shaped by matters that at first seem remote from international relations, and by unconscious and emotional as well as conscious and rational calculations.
Report from China: The Canton Fair: An Academic Perspective
Authors: Tretiak Daniel
Published: March 2009

About 50 per cent of China's foreign trade is negotiated at the Chinese Export Commodities Fair (the Canton or Kwangchow Fair), making it a major instrument in Chinese foreign trade activities. However, it also provides a rich experience for China specialists who wish to observe and participate in the workings of an important Chinese institution over a considerable period of time. The experience is particularly valuable for anyone with an academic interest in Chinese foreign policy, for the Fair can provide an opportunity to gain not only insights into the day-to-day workings of the Chinese foreign trade process, but also into various trends in Chinese foreign policy generally.
Industrial Output by Province in China, 1949–73
Authors: Field Robert Michael , Lardy Nicholas R. , Emerson John Philip
Published: March 2009

This article presents data on the gross value of industrial output (GVIO) by province for the years 1949–73 and shows their relationship to GVIO figures published for the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a whole. From the founding of the People's Republic on 1 October 1949 until the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Chinese statistical authorities made conscious and sustained efforts to copy Soviet statistical organization and practices. Consequently, the Chinese statistical system, as it developed in the 1950s, mirrored the Soviet system. Descriptions of the Soviet statistical system give valuable insights into the functioning of the Chinese system, and an understanding of problems noted in western studies of Soviet statistics has often been important to an understanding of statistical data from China.
Chinese Demand for South–East Asian Rubber, 1949–72
Authors: Wong John
Published: March 2009

Before 1949, China used to consume a limited quantity of rubber amounting to only about 20,000 tons a year. Today the People's Republic has emerged as a significant factor in the world rubber market. In 1972, with the import of 190,000 tons, all from South-east Asia – a region which produces over 90 per cent of the world's supply, China absorbed 7 per cent of the world's traded rubber. China's purchases rank her above such traditionally large rubber consumers as Britain. The importance of China in the rubber trade is reflected not only in her rapidly growing share in the world market, but also in her potential as either a stabilizing or de-stabilizing force on rubber prices. For years China has followed an erratic buying pattern, and on many occasions her sudden entry and withdrawal created a “stir” in the market, especially in Malaysia and Singapore.
Some Notes on Tax Reform in China
Authors: Chuanlun Wang
Published: March 2009

To encourage economic construction and development, China is considering the reform of her system of taxation, principally the taxing of industrial and commercial enterprises. The aim of such reform is two-fold: to secure more stable revenues for the financing of key projects of national importance and, even more crucial, to try to make the tax system into a means of economic management. The latter has been called the leverage function of taxation.
A Weather Index for Analysing Grain Yield Instability in China, 1952–81
Authors: Kueh Y. Y.
Published: March 2009

This article applies standard regression techniques to examine the impact of adverse weather conditions on average grain yield per sown hectare in contemporary China. By isolating the weather impact I hope (a) to quantify the possible influence of frequent policy and organizational changes which have been so characteristic of Chinese agriculture since 1949; and (b) to show to what extent grain production in China has become more “weather-proof” after three decades of massive investment in water control and other modern inputs. I shall deal mainly with the long-term trends from 1952 to 1981, with special reference to the extraordinary 1959–61 period, during which total grain output and yield declined by an average of 21 and 12 per cent respectively (or 25 and 18 per cent for the two trough years of 1960 and 1961), measured against the benchmark year of 1957.
Chinese Opera after the Cultural Revolution (1970–72)
Authors: Mackerras Colin
Published: March 2009

The theatrical life of the Chinese in recent years has closely reflected the evolution of Chinese society as a whole since the Cultural Revolution. Although the ninth Party Congress in April 1969 confirmed the success of the Maoist line established in the Cultural Revolution, deciding exactly how to apply that ideological system has not always been easy. Debate has continued in all sections of the community, and is reflected very clearly in the newspapers and media. Amid these debates enough concrete decisions have been reached to begin new cultural activity, largely suspended while the issues were being thrashed out during the Cultural Revolution, and with the passing of time the pace of the revival in the arts has quickened. The resurgence is based on Maoist theory, and it may conseqeuntly be useful to begin with a discussion of how the Chinese are formulating their ideas on what the theatre is all about.
Impressions of China's New Diplomacy: The Australian Experience
Authors: FitzGerald Stephen
Published: March 2009

The visit of the Australian Labour Party (ALP) delegation to China in July this year provided an interesting and representative example of Chinese diplomacy in action.* Although the ALP is in opposition, the delegation was dealt with by China as the representatives of a possible future Australian government, and its leader, Gough Whitlam, as the alternative Australian Prime Minister. The discussions were pitched accordingly. The visit also had some general relevance because of the importance China now attaches to relations with “small” powers, including countries like Australia (which see themselves rather as middle powers); indeed, China's new diplomatic contacts with such powers illustrate the whole thrust of China's global diplomacy in 1971. The Australian case is interesting also because in Australia, as in the United States and a number of other countries, the “China problem” has been such a central issue in foreign policy that it has spilled over into a complex involvement in domestic politics.
Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP
Authors: Bing Dov
Published: March 2009

The formative years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long remained one of the most obscure periods in the recent past of China. There remain many puzzles about why and how the alliances, between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, came about in the early 1920s.

For the last four years I have been studying the establishment and first years of the CCP, at the same time paying attention to the foundation and first years of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV), which was later to become the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI). In this connexion I have been specially interested in outlining the origins of that strategy whereby Communist Party members entered a nationalist mass movement and tried to capture it from within.
The Student Movement and the Chinese Civil War, 1945–49
Authors: Pepper Suzanne
Published: March 2009

In the areas controlled by the Central Government, the Chinese student movement between 1945 and 1949 was essentially an anti-war movement. As the Civil War progressed during those years, the student protests became one of the Government's major political problems, referred to by Mao himself as the “second front” in the struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek Government. As such, the student anti-war movement assumed its place within the twentieth-century tradition of Chinese student activism.
The Poetry of Mao Tse-tung
Authors: Ng Yong-Sang
Published: March 2009

Early in 1957, an event perhaps unparalleled in the world of letters was reported from China. A new monthly magazine, Shih-k'an (Poetry), made its appearance in February of that year, its inaugural issue including a collection of eighteen poems by Mao Tse-tung. The appearance of Mao's poetry was not in itself an exceptional event. From ancient times down to recent decades, Chinese statesmen and military leaders have often displayed talent in the writing of poetry; and it appeared that Mao Tse-tung was carrying on the established tradition of a long line of strong rulers in China who desired to impress the world that they were not only victorious conquerors and vigorous administrators, but also accomplished artists.
Heroes and Hero-Worship in Chinese Communist Fiction
Authors: Hsia T. A.
Published: March 2009

A reader in the United States of America or Great Britain may have great misgivings when he opens a book of fiction from Communist China. He is painfully aware of the conditions under which the book is written. He knows that thought control in Communist China means not only a set of taboos but also a strict order to write about certain subjects in a certain manner. With little effort he can guess the plot which rushes on to actual victory or victory imagined. And there is the other side to the “struggle,” which is always wrong and bad and doomed. He knows what characters he is going to encounter: the familiar ugly face of a landlord, the aspiring workers, peasants, and intellectuals who unite to follow the leadership of the Communist Party, and the waverers who somehow have to make a choice between the good and the evil—shadows of the types which, he remembers, dominated proletarian literature in the 1930s. Oversimplification is always an insult to intellect; and the insult becomes all the more unbearable if things are simplified not merely because of the writer's ignorance but, as the reader suspects, from an intention to deceive. Of course, the reader does not have to suffer all this if he can help it. But the book in his hand may be useful as source material for some kind of research, a social document or a storehouse of Communist jargon. So in the name of research, he doggedly reads on, with little expectation of pleasure or stimulus for thought. He is prepared to be insulted and to be bored to death.
Co-operatives and Communes in Chinese Communist Fiction
Authors: Shih C. W.
Published: March 2009

In less than a decade, collectivisation has come to more than five hundred million Chinese peasants and a large portion of the urban population; it has transformed the socio-economic structure of the nation, causing general repercussions around the world and unascertainable effects in the country. The development of this massive and significant collectivisation movement is reflected, in large measure, in Chinese Communist literature. This article first presents, following a general chronological order, fictional materials reflecting the co-operative and commune movements, and then discusses summarily the artistic and social values of this literature.
The People's Procuratorate in Communist China: The Period of Maturation, 1951–54
Authors: Ginsburgs George , Stahnke Arthur
Published: March 2009

In considering the organisational evolution and functional development of the office of the people's procuratorate in Communist China from 1951 to 19S4, a clear-cut distinction must be drawn between the two subsidiary stages into which this phase of the institution's history readily breaks down. The first spans the years 1951–52; the second extends through 1953 and 1954. For purposes of analysis, it would be best to keep them separate, for reasons that will soon become apparent.
Li Ta-Chao and the Chinese Communist Treatment of the Materialist Conception of History
Authors: Meisner Maurice
Published: March 2009

The traditional alliance between politics and scholarship that Professor Fitzgerald has referred to as “characteristically Chinese” has become a most explicit alliance in contemporary China. Not only is scholarship to serve immediate political interests, but it must do so within the frame-work of an all-pervasive ideology. In no field of scholarship is this union more explicit than in the study of history. The application of Marxist-Leninist theory and the “thought of Mao Tse-tung” to the study and understanding of the Chinese past is the appointed task of Chinese Communist historians, and they would no doubt be the first to acknowledge that historiography cannot, and indeed should not, be separated from ideology. The most relevant portion of this body of ideology for historians is, of course, the materialist conception of history. It is from the assumptions of this theory that the Chinese Communist interpretation of history ostensibly begins.
Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives in Marxism-Leninism in China
Authors: Meisner Maurice
Published: March 2009

Isaac Deutscher once observed that the Chinese Communist revolution presents the paradox of “the most archaic of nations avidly absorbing the most modern of revolutionary doctrines, the last word in revolution, and translating it into action. Lacking any native ancestry, Chinese Communism descends straight from Bolshevism. Mao stands on Lenin's shoulders.” This echoes the generally accepted view of the historical relationship between Maoism and Leninism. Among most western students of Chinese communism it is something of a truism that Marxism came to China in its Leninist form; for different reasons, Maoists have long been saying that Mao (and now only Mao) is the true heir of Lenin. Indeed, the “thought of Mao Tse-tung” is no longer simply considered the practical application of “the universal truths” of Marxism-Leninism to the specifically Chinese historical situation, but is explicitly celebrated as a new and higher stage of universally valid revolutionary theory; it is “invincible Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought” that now propels world history forward. In contemporary Maoist eyes, Mao stands on the shoulders of Lenin as firmly as Lenin presumably stands on the shoulders of Marx.
Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan
Authors: Jacobs J. Bruce
Published: March 2009

The winds of political change in Taiwan have begun to breathe. In some areas, turnover within the leadership is substantial and the new incumbents are generally both younger and better educated than their predecessors. While Mainlanders, especially those from the Lower Yangtze Valley, dominate the political system, explicit and not insignificant steps are being taken to increase Taiwanese participation. Changes in the status of Chiang Ching-kuo, eldest son of President Chiang Kai-shek, give further indications of his preparation for eventual supreme leadership. A group of intelligent, well-educated and relatively young technical experts have moved into top leadership positions and are having a substantial impact on policy-making. Against this background, constraints on political dissent continue. This article is an attempt to investigate these trends and analyse their importance for the political system on Taiwan. In order to provide the framework for this discussion, the article begins with a brief introduction to the political setting, the central party and governmental organs.
The Tutelary State and National Revolution in Kuomintang Ideology, 1928–31
Authors: Bedeski Robert E.
Published: March 2009

As the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) enters its third decade the question of viability as a stable nation-state has become increasingly urgent. Events since the Great Leap Forward seem to indicate an internal crisis of confidence which has slowly led to the present emergence of military power within the Government. If unity and stability can be maintained only by using the People's Liberation Army (PLA), then a situation is arising which closely resembles the Nationalist regime in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s. At that time, the army under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek dominated much of the political life of the state. A sense of impending war (against Japan in the 1930s and against the Soviet Union in 1969 and 1970) also reinforces the tendency of the civilian leadership to rely on military instruments. Of course, Lin Piao is not Chiang, Mao Tse-tung is not a Sun Yat-sen, nor is Liu Shao-ch'i a modern counterpart of Wang Ching-wei. Analogies can be constructed, but the problem is that students and scholars of modern China have not devoted sufficient attention to the Nanking state as a comparative referent for Communist China, with the result that they have largely been unprepared to ask questions which a knowledge of the Kuomintang (KMT) experiment might have raised.
Villains, Victims and Morals in Contemporary Chinese Literature
Authors: Huang Joe C.
Published: March 2009

Novels reflect social realities at given times and under given conditions. When the direct survey method cannot be applied to the study of Chinese society, novels constitute one of the available sources from which useful information concerning the structure, order and conditions of society and interpersonal relations may be inferred. However, the difficulty of reconstructing the social conduct of Chinese people from such elusive source materials is enhanced since Communist novels reflect less the realities as they are than the realities as they should be. The theory of the combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism demands that the plots and characters must be “romanticized” to give a picture of the society corresponding to the needs of ideology. Even if this is so, the stories still have to be based on social realities for the readers to appreciate them. A somewhat modified interpretation holds that romanticization is based on the foundation of realism. It is from the discernment of this element of realism in Chinese Communist fiction that we may attempt to reconstruct the nature of Chinese society.
Prison Management in the Kiangsi and Yenan Periods
Authors: Griffin Patricia
Published: March 2009

Recent studies on the origins of various Chinese Communist administrative techniques have revealed a striking continuity between present methods and the Communists' pre-1949 experiments in the Kiangsi Soviet (1927–34) and in the Border Regions of the north-west (1935–45).1 The Kiangsi and Yenan experiences are particularly vital to an under-standing of the Party's penal theories, since it was during the 1927–49 period that the Communists formulated their policies concerning release, leniency, production, democratic management, education and thought reform. Of particular interest is the gradual elaboration, during a war-time situation, of their controversial procedures of thought control or “ brainwashing.” While a description of the development of these policies from 1927–49 is interesting in itself, this article aims in addition to analyse how changes in technique were a response to environmental and political factors. It can be shown that prison policies varied in a direct relationship to the changing economic, political and military environment; consequently, the present penal policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cannot be understood without reference to their origin in the physical and psychological environment of Kiangsi and Yenan.
Leaders and Leadership in an Expanding New Territories Town
Authors: Johnson Graham E.
Published: March 2009

The social structure of Hong Kong is dominated by three elements – economic change, population growth (specifically in-migration) and colonialism. The three are closely interrelated. The extent of economic change and the effects of enormous population growth have been dramatic. The impact of colonial policy is less obvious but nonetheless crucial for it has provided the framework within which economic and demographic changes have made their effect. Colonial policy in Hong Kong can have a dual impact, for administratively Hong Kong has two distinct parts – the leased New Territories and the ceded parts of Hong Kong island and part of Kowloon.
Chairman Hua Edits Mao's Literary Heritage: “On the 10 Great Relationships”.
Authors: Schram Stuart R.
Published: March 2009

The publication, on Mao Tse-tung's birthday, of an official text of his crucially important speech of 25 April 1956 “On the 10 great relationships” (reproduced below in the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, pp. 221–38) adds significantly to our knowledge both of Chairman Mao and of his successor. On the one hand, it constitutes a substantial document which will be closely scrutinized by all those interested in the thought of Mao Tse-tung. On the other, the way in which the text has been edited, and the fact of its publication, provide some hints about the thinking, and perhaps even about the policy intentions of Hua Kuo-feng.
The “Second Wang Mine Line” (1935–38)
Authors: Kwong Shum Kui
Published: March 2009

Gregor Benton's article “The ‘Second Wang Ming Line’ (1935–38)” is the first major attempt to explore the internal ideological debates in the CCP during the Second United Front Period, the complexities of which have long been overlooked by other historians. In line with the prevailing tendency among historians to look upon Wang Ming as a young, inexperienced and dogmatic theoretician, Benton elaborates and confirms the official Chinese Communist interpretation of Wang's “rightist opportunism” or “capitulationism” in relation to the Kuomintang (KMT). He further asserts that Wang was simply a spokes-man for the Comintern, who framed his policies with “one eye on Moscow's foreign policy needs.” Proceeding on the assumption that Mao's internal statements do not provide conclusive evidence against Wang since the latter's secret reports are not available, he draws comparison between the public statements of Mao and Wang to support his view that fundamental and far-reaching conflicts existed between the two over various policy issues of the united front from 1935 onwards.
The ‘Gang of Four‘—and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975—76
Authors: Domes Jürgen
Published: March 2009

Early in March this year visitors to China reported seeing in Canton a wall-poster with the headline “ [I]t's not a ‘gang of four’ but a gang of five!” (pu shih ‘ssu-jen-pang,’ erh shih wu-jen-pang!). The poster alleged that the new chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, Hua Kuofeng, had been a loyal follower of the Cultural Revolutionary Left led by Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It went on to claim that although he had turned against the personnel of the Left, he nevertheless remained a supporter of Leftist policies even today. We do not know whether the wall-posters “vilifying Chairman Hua,” for which seven men and two women were reportedly executed in Hangchow on 11 March 1977, and 26 people in Shanghai in early April, had carried the same accusation. But there is some evidence that certain, as yet unidentified, forces in China take a different view of the policies and attitudes of Hua Kuo-feng during the intra-elite conflict of the last few years, from that of most foreign observers of Chinese politics. Such observers have generally argued, since the spring of 1976, that Hua is a “middle-of-the-roader,” a politician having more in common with the ideas and values of the now dominant complex of veteran cadres and generals than with those of their “radical” Cultural Revolutionary adversaries.
Mao Tse-tung Thought, the Last Struggle for Succession, and the Post-Mao Era
Authors: Tsou Tang
Published: March 2009

In a letter to Joseph Bloch, dated 21–22 September 1890, Friedrich Engels wrote: “[W]e make our history ourselves, but in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions. Among these the economic ones areultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed, even the traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one.” The phrase, “the political ones, etc.,” refers to the superstructure and the forms of social consciousness of a society as distinguished from its economic base or the mode of production.
Settling Accounts with the Cultural Revolution at Beijing University 1977–78
Authors: Munro Robin
Published: March 2009

The purpose of this report is to focus upon two events of some significance that took place at Beijing University (Beida) between late November 1977 and 1978. The first of these was a spontaneous, grassroots polemic concerning an innovation of the Cultural Revolution period. At issue was the radically new approach to the problem of rearing new generations of proletarian intellectuals, namely, the “worker-peasant-soldiers7” student enrolment policy, whereby university students were selected through recommendation by the masses instead of on the basis of examination results. This polemic constituted an uninvited interlude in the carrying out at Beida of the nationwide “third campaign” in the criticism of the “gang of four,” and focused upon the problem of how, in the light of recent changes in educational policy, the status of worker-peasant-soldier students was to be evaluated.
Chinese Statistics Up-dated
Authors: Klatt W.
Published: March 2009

Ten months after the PRC's State Statistical Bureau (SSB) published -for the first time in two decades - a reasonably comprehensive set of national economic data (XINHUA, 27 June 1979), these were amended, up-dated and supplemented in an even fuller statement, issued by the SSB at the end of April (and early in May) 1980 and covering the results of the national plan for 1979. As on the previous occasion, most of the items published were given in such a way as to facilitate comparisons with the information available for the year prior to the first plan (1952) and the year in which it was completed (1957). Whilst the data for the early years fall short in part, particularly in the agricultural sector, of being perfect, the years 1952 and 1957 nevertheless serve as useful landmarks on China's long, and often winding, path from the past to the present. Thus the China-watcher now has a dossier of economic and social data from official sources against which he can check his own estimates and those made - in the absence of official statistical documentation - by various national and international agencies concerning themselves with the successes and shortcomings of the PRC since its inception in 1949. Where he is not satisfied with the newly published information, he must, of course, reserve the right to ask questions even where no answer may be given for some time to come.
Changing Medical Models in China: Organizational Options or Obstacles?
Authors: Lucas AnElissa
Published: March 2009

No nation begins anew – with or without a political revolution – without building upon and carrying forward selective aspects of an inherited past. Nor for that matter, is any national policy implemented without reference to past experience and accumulated resources. Despite claims of revolutionary transformation and self-sufficiency, no nation has developed a modern medical system either overnight or in isolation.
China and the Great Power Triangle
Authors: Segal Gerald
Published: March 2009

The notion of a great power triangle composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and PRC, and the “card games” played within this geometric configuration, are now particularly prevalent in the field of international politics. It is the purpose of this analysis to study the relevance of the great power triangle concept for Chinese foreign policy. A primary assumption will be that an understanding of Beijing's previous policies in a tripolar system will be a useful guide to the policies and problems of the present. Therefore we will begin with a review of the development of tripolarity and China's past attitudes. We will then concentrate on some crucial aspects of the triangle, the difficulties facing the Chinese leaders, and some possible policy options derived from our focus on the great power triad.
Military Control and Leadership, 1954–1964
Authors: Gittings John
Published: March 2009

Any discussion of the PLA leadership over the past fifteen years is inevitably hampered by lack of information. No “Army List” is published in China, and while major appointments are usually announced, dismissals are almost always left to be inferred. The names of military office-holders have to be correlated from isolated attributions in the Chinese press, with the proviso that the protracted non-appearance of an individual's came does not necessarily indicate his absence from active duty or his demotion.
The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy
Authors: Sonnenfeldt Helmut
Published: March 2009

The chief purpose of this discussion is to suggest areas of inquiry which might illuminate the way in which China may have influenced Soviet disarmament policy in recent years. One must be careful not to exaggerate Chinese influence on Soviet disarmament policy. There are obviously many other factors: domestic political considerations, relations with the East European countries, relations with less developed countries, relations with the West, including the Soviet assessment of the strategic “correlation of forces,” and sometimes perhaps even disarmament considerations per se. In recent years there may have been a tendency to look too much to the Chinese in seeking explanations for Soviet behaviour in the disarmament field, partly because the drama of the evolving Sino-Soviet split was so fascinating that all else seemed to pale in significance and partly because “China” sometimes seemed a convenient explanation for otherwise baffling Soviet moves. I propose, rather arbitrarily, to analyse Soviet disarmament policy in four categories: (1) tactics on formal disarmament conferences; (2) the formal proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R.; (3) the general thrust of Soviet disarmament propaganda; and (4) decisions, or what appear to be decisions, by the U.S.S.R. to negotiate seriously for the purpose of actually achieving an agreement.
Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
Authors: Young Oran R.
Published: March 2009

There is one substantial difference between Chinese and Soviet attitudes toward the spread of nuclear weapons. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, China is basically an Nth country and a potentially very powerful one at that. As a consequence, the Soviet position on the spread of nuclear weapons has been strongly influenced by the development of the Chinese nuclear programme and by the increasing cleavages in Sino-Soviet relations in recent years. For the Chinese, however, the question of nuclear diffusion refers only to the possible spread of nuclear weapons beyond the group of five powers which presently possess at least some nuclear capability. And although there are several additional powers in the international arena with nuclear potential that might eventually pose problems for China, none constitutes the immediate challenge which China herself does to the Soviet Union.
Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power
Authors: Bridgham Philip
Published: March 2009

In January 1967, Communist China's “great proletarian cultural revolution” entered a new stage—a stage of violent overthrow of all those in positions of authority in the Party and government who refused to accept Mao Tse-tung's new “revolutionary” order. Erupting in Shanghai under the name of the “January Revolution,” this frenzied drive to “seize power” initiated a period of nation-wide violence and disorder.
Guangzhou's Democracy Movement in Cultural Revolution Perspective
Authors: Rosen Stanley
Published: March 2009

China's “democracy movement” seems, for the moment, to have passed into history. It began with wall-posters in Beijing in November 1978 and reached its high-tide the following February and March. By late March–April 1979, however, the first of a series of restrictions had been placed on participants, and the movement's most outspoken representatives, such as Wei Jingsheng, had been arrested. A year later there was a second crackdown, and even moderate members of the movement were ordered to desist. The final crackdown occurred in April 1981 and resulted in the arrest of more than 20 activists. Although the movement focused upon Beijing, where a wide variety of “unofficial” or “people's publications” (minjian kanwu) vied for domestic and international attention, many of China's provinces and cities produced their own “democracy activists” and publications.
The Political Implications of Document No. 1, 1984
Authors: Lieberthal Kenneth
Published: March 2009

The Chinese countryside is currently experiencing a return to the family farming system, with enormous implications for the lives and fortunes of some 80 per cent of the country's population. Little of this could have been foreseen in 1979, when the rural reform really got under way nationwide. Although each subsequent year has witnessed new initiatives, the major turning-point came with the issue of Central Document No. 1 of 1983, which fully blessed and promoted the “responsibility” system. Central Document No. 1 of 1984, by comparison, is less path-breaking. Indeed, in most respects the latter simply reaffirms the initiatives of the former, or reiterates support for policies announced in the press during the intervening year. The few significant additions made by the 1984 Document, however, highlight the most dramatic and consequential factors of the agricultural reform.
The Basis for Chinese Agricultural Growth in the 1980s and 1990s: A Comment on Document No. 1, 1984
Authors: Stone Bruce
Published: March 2009

Rather than considering the possible ramifications of each clause of Document No. 1, 1984 separately, this comment will focus on aspects of the document which are consistent with Chinese development strategy in the 1980s and those which acknowledge the principal vulnerabilities of the strategy as they pertain to agriculture. Much of the document is concerned with: (1) consolidating the gains achieved since the late 1970s in transforming rural organization via the production responsibility system and the attendant liberalization of rural markets; (2) extending the current areas of profitability in terms of increased production and the sale of farm goods that have become available through this transformation and especially in terms of reaping the rewards from specialization, hitherto untapped; and (3) more effectively setting the stage for future growth by attempting to generate confidence as to the durability of these organizational, and other critical policy changes.
Household and Family in Kaixiangong: A Re-examination
Authors: Gonzalez Nancie L.
Published: March 2009

Opportunities to revisit a remote field site studied many years before are relatively rare in anthropology generally, but when the location happens to be China, we simply do not expect them to occur. It is, therefore, all the more remarkable that the village of Kaixiangong, first presented to the scholarly world in Fei Xiaotong's Peasant Life in China, should have been further described by William R. Geddes in 1955 and by Fei himself after a 1957 visit. When invited by the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) to visit China in the summer of 1981 to undertake a scientific study of my choice, I was intrigued when Professor Fei suggested I request permission to go to Kaixiangong, and delighted when it was granted. I stayed in the community four days and nights during September, and the following is based on information gathered then.
The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China
Authors: Dittmer Lowell
Published: March 2009

On 1 September 1982, 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates convened the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The meeting was announced in advance (at the seventh plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in Beijing 4–10 August) and proceeded with well-rehearsed smoothness to its scheduled adjournment 15 days later. The meeting agenda conformed closely to established protocol, consisting of speeches and work reports, discussion and adoption of a new Party constitution, culminating in the election of new members to the Central Committee and other “standing” (i.e. permanently tenured) positions and convention of the first plenary meetings of these organs. The meeting began on 1 September with a relatively brief opening speech by Deng Xiaoping, the presiding chairman (though in a typical gesture to collective leadership there were no less than nine other presiding chairmen), and was followed by Hu Yaobang's comprehensive report and by speeches or reports by Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others. These documents were all published as part of a general effort at greater publicity that included prior announcement of the dates of convention and adjournment, invitation of more than 70 responsible persons from democratic parties, non-Party patriots and other well-known personages from various circles to attend as observers (as had been done previously during the Eighth Congress), fairly detailed reporting of the election of deputies, their assembly and daily activities, arrangements and so forth, and even a sort of press conference that Zhu Muzhi, spokesman of the conference, held for Chinese and foreign reporters – although no foreign Communist Party members or foreign journalists were permitted to attend the Congress itself.
The Sino-Soviet Split: Borkenau's Predictive Analysis of 1952
Authors: Tashjean John E.
Published: March 2009

At a meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in March 1961, Professor Bernard Morris read a paper on Sino-Soviet relations which began as follows:

Almost a decade ago, the late Franz Borkenau wrote that a profound conflict between the communist regimes of Russia and China is in the long run as certain as anything in politics. He based his prediction on the strength of two arguments. First, it is in the very nature of totalitarian regimes to establish their absolute control as far as they can; they therefore cannot have genuine allies but must seek to dominate. Secondly, the unity of the communist world movement is axiomatic for every Leninist. Hence it follows that the Kremlin must exert control over all communist parties. This thrust of Soviet totalitarianism, Borkenau argued, is therefore incompatible with Mao Tse-tung's clear desire to be a leader in his own right and to preserve Chinese national independence.
Chinese Educational Policies in the 1980s and Economic Development
Authors: Bastid Marianne
Published: March 2009

Like other Chinese state institutions, the educational system has undergone many changes since the death of Mao Zedong and the overthrow of the “gang of four” in 1976. Several accounts and studies have appeared treating different stages and aspects of this continuing transformation. Further adjustments to the system of education are likely to take place in the near future. Now that the Sixth Five-Year Plan has been published in draft form laying down the blueprint of China's development in the coming few years, some kind of assessment needs to be made of the; educational system, its performance and its prospects, since much of they immediate and future operation of rapid economic growth depends on U ithe human capital provided by schools.
Consequences of China's New Population Policy
Authors: Siu-lun Wong
Published: March 2009

After several ebbs and flows a new high-tide in population control has been gathering force since 1978. This new birth control campaign has three major features which separate it from earlier ones: consensus as to its desirability among the top leadership, the high priority being awarded to it, and a sense of urgency in achieving results.
The Economic Transformation of the Republic of China on Taiwan
Authors: Myers Ramon H.
Published: March 2009

Just as the Greek hero Odysseus faced many misfortunes and great challenges and yet overcame them before returning to his beloved Ithaca, so, too, the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1949–50 faced insurmountable odds and difficulties and year-to-year crises thereafter, and yet also overcame them to achieve economic modernization and prosperity.
Sino-Japanese Economic Co-operation
Authors: Ishikawa Shigeru
Published: March 2009

1. Introduction – China's Four Modernizations and Japan's Policy Standpoint

The Deng Xiaoping government has, since 1978, been tackling the task of achieving Four Modernizations by the end of this century.
Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests
Authors: Walder Andrew G.
Published: March 2009

China's industrial wage reforms, initiated with much fanfare in 1977, have currently reached an impasse. Despite large increases in wages over the past decade, the expansion of incentive pay, and several new schemes to link incentive funds to factory performance, low labour productivity and lax work discipline remain major problems in state industry. Moreover, the reforms have created consequences that were unintended: they have heightened contention over wage matters in the work place; they led in the initial years of the reform to uncontrolled increases in bonus expenditures that outstripped increases in productivity and profitability; and they have inadvertently provided an incentive for sharp business practices and financial deception, both of which hinder broader industrial reform.
The Place of Chinese Disunity in Japanese Army Strategy during 1931
Authors: Jordan Donald A.
Published: March 2009

The aggressive action of Japan's Kwantung Army in 1931 is widely known. Its armed takeover of most of Manchuria from a conglomeration of Chinese forces which greatly outnumbered the Japanese, points to a weakness in China's defences other than that of numbers. None of the various Chinese armies was as modern in firepower or as well supplied logistically as Japan's crack army in Manchuria. The disarray within the Chinese Government of Nanjing (Nanking) that was obvious in mid 1931 also tempted the adventurous field officers of the Kwantung Army (KA). These veteran officers with years of duty in China, decided, from their reading of the situation in China as well as in Japan and the West, to act on 18 September 1931 rather than make further preparations as recommended in Tokyo.
China's Senior Middle Schools in a Social Perspective: A Survey of Yantai District, Shandong Province
Authors: Thøgersen Stig
Published: March 2009

No part of China's educational system has undergone more radical changes since 1977 than senior secondary education.1 Three trends have dominated reforms at this level: reduced intake, streaming based on aptitude and the re-introduction of a vocational secondary school system that has already enrolled a considerable proportion of senior middle school students.
The 13th Party Congress of the Kuomintang: Towards Political Competition?
Authors: Domes Jürgen
Published: March 2009

The Kuomintang (KMT) held its 13th Party Congress from 7 to 13 July 1988 on Taiwan. The Congress departed from its predecessors in several significant ways: a majority of its delegates had been directly elected by party members; a local-born Taiwanese was officially confirmed as Party leader; the Central Committee was elected at the Congress by secret ballot; after which it appointed its own Standing Committee, the majority of whom were local-born Taiwanese and for the first time included a woman.
Chinese Civil Service Reform: The 13th Party Congress Proposals
Authors: Burns John P.
Published: March 2009

Since 1980, in their pursuit of economic development, reformist Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders have decentralized personnel administration and transferred formal authority over some personnel matters to state institutions. To manage its more complex economy, Party authorities have been forced to select professionals and specialists based in part on their technical qualifications and job performance. To a limited extent, the Party has begun to place personnel management in the hands of experts who are competent to assess the qualifications and work of their peers, and directly in the hands of employing institutions. The CCP has beat a limited, if unsteady retreat.
Household Durable Goods Ownership in Tianjin, China
Authors: Hu Teh-wei , Li Ming , Wei Shangjin
Published: March 2009

The consumption structure in China has undergone a dramatic change since the economic reform started in late 1979. Durable goods ownership, an important aspect of overall consumption, has experi enced an even greater change both in variety and quantity. Analyses of general consumption in China are found in Lardy, Van der Gaag, Hu et al. and Zhang et al.1 Quantitative analysis devoted solely to durable goods consumption in Chinese cities has rarely been undertaken.
Factions in Chinese Military Politics
Authors: Parish William L.
Published: March 2009

In Chinese Studies, three themes have acquired new emphasis since the Cultural Revolution: first, the view that China is not a simple monolithic state but one with diversified interest groups and potential internal conflict. Second, the influence of the military throughout society and the extent to which its particular interests and internal conflicts shape the nature of government and society. Third, the fact that bureaucratism, though attacked in the Cultural Revolution, is likely to continue shaping Chinese society and to be a perennial threat to revolutionary ideals. This article touches on each of these themes – first, by an analysis of personal loyalty groups during the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair and, second, by an account of the changing nature of Chinese bureaucracies and of how these changes impinge on factional politics.