bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Bloch, Ernst
Authors: Geoghegan Vincent
Published: January 2013

The German philosopher and social critic Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) held chairs in philosophy at the universities of Leipzig (1949–61) and Tübingen (1961–77). Before this, after studying in Munich, Würzberg, Berlin, and Heidelberg, he had begun a wandering life as a freelance intellectual and journalist, publishing a number of books in which he began to lay the basis for his later philosophical system. With Hitler's accession to power in 1933, Bloch, as a Marxist and a Jew, went into exile, first in Central Europe and France, and then in the United States (1938–49). He first came to prominence with his 1918 book
The Spirit of Utopia
. Its title proclaimed the central theme of his life's work: the development of a positive and greatly expanded concept of the “utopian,” grounded in the category of hope. In what many consider his greatest work,
The Principle of Hope
(written between 1938 and 1947), he provided, in three volumes, an encyclopedic account of the many manifestations of hope in history and contemporary life, from simple daydreams to complex visions of perfection. Unsurprisingly, in this exploration of the better and the best, his works return time and again to the subject matter of ethics, and in 1961 he produced his most sustained discussion of ethical traditions in
Natural Law and Human Dignity
. As a Marxist, however, he had to do all of this in a tradition of thought that tended to use the word “utopian” as a term of abuse, and which was famously inhospitable to the use of moral critique and exhortation. The result was a distinctly unorthodox Marxism, one possessed of a richness and vigor that has continued to speak to readers far beyond that tradition.
Minimalism about Truth, Ethics and
Authors: Miller Alexander
Published: January 2013

Issues concerning minimalism about truth are relevant to important matters in metaethics (seeMetaethics): specifically, to questions about the plausibility of expressivist (or non‐cognitivist) accounts of moral judgment (seeNon‐Cognitivism). Historically, expressivists and non‐cognitivists rely on minimalist views of truth to respond to certain criticisms of their view. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that minimalism about truth actuallyunderminesexpressivism and non‐cognitivism. In this essay, after brief introductions to ethical expressivism and minimalism about truth, we distinguish between minimalism about truth and minimalism abouttruth‐aptitude, and explain why it is the latter that is crucial to expressivism's plausibility. We then explain why some philosophers have claimed that minimalism about truth‐aptitude undermines expressivism, while others have claimed that ethical expressivism can wholeheartedly embrace minimalism about truth‐aptitude (seeTruth in Ethics).
Blame
Authors: Smith Angela M.
Published: January 2013

Blame – for better or worse – is a pervasive feature of our moral experience. In both moral and nonmoral contexts, we are often concerned to determine who or what is the appropriate target of blame, and most of us will go to great lengths to avoid being seen as such a target. Yet it is surprisingly difficult to say what, exactly, blame is (Sher 2006: vi; Scanlon 2008: 122). While some regard blame as simply a negative (moral) evaluation, others insist that blame involves additional emotional and/or behavioral responses that go beyond such cognitive assessments. My aim in this essay is to survey some of the most prominent philosophical accounts of the nature of blame, and to explain how blame is connected to several other important philosophical concepts, including moral agency (seeMoral Agency), responsibility (seeResponsibility), and free will (seeFree Will).
Universalizability
Authors: Adler and Jonathan E. , Gowans Christopher W.
Published: January 2013

A judgment isuniversalizableonly if the reasons for it do not depend on the individuals referred to in that judgment ineliminably. If someone judges that Joe is musically gifted because he was accepted at the Julliard School, that judgment is universalizable only if it commits the agent to the claim that, under normal conditions, any music student who is accepted at Julliard is gifted. Universalizability implies that it is the generic qualities of the individual that justifies the judgment, rather than singular qualities (ones that refer to that individual essentially).
Concepts vs. Properties, Moral
Authors: Wedgwood Ralph
Published: January 2013

The distinction between concepts and properties plays an important role in several areas of philosophy outside ethics, such as metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language. This distinction may turn out to be important within ethics as well.
Ewing, A. C.
Authors: Olson Jonas , Timmons Mark
Published: January 2013

A. C. Ewing (1899–1973) came last in the tradition of British moral philosophers that began with Henry Sidgwick and continued with H. A. Prichard, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad. Philosophers in this tradition shared a nonnaturalist realist view of moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, but they differed on the relations between normative concepts and on normative ethics. Ewing made substantial contributions to these controversies and anticipated several moves in the contemporary debates as he sought to reconcile putatively incompatible views. Attempts to find conciliatory “middle ways” are a recurring theme in Ewing's work. This essay focuses on three main topics: moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, the relation between
intrinsic goodness
and
ought
, and utilitarianism and Rossian deontology. Finally, it describes briefly Ewing's work in other areas of moral philosophy.
Nuclear Weapons
Authors: Lee Steven P.
Published: January 2013

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive military technology ever developed. The original atomic bomb of 1945 was about a thousand times as powerful as the largest existing conventional weapon, and the hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb, developed eight years later, was about a thousand times more powerful than the 1945 bomb (
see
Weapons Research and Development). Within the short space of less than ten years, the amount of destructive power in human hands increased a million‐fold, an augmentation by six orders of magnitude.
Price, Richard
Authors: Louden Robert B.
Published: January 2013

Richard Price (1723–91) was a Welsh dissenting (i.e., non‐Anglican) minister who made major contributions not only to ethics but also to theology, political thought, national finance, probability theory, and actuarial science. His main work in moral philosophy (the focus of this essay and also his first publication) is
A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals
(1758; 2nd ed. 1769). In the third edition (1787), normally referred to in contemporary discussion of Price, the title was shortened to
A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals
. Also important for Price's ethics is a set of letters that he co‐published with his friend Joseph Priestley in 1778 entitled
A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity
. Here Price extends the analyses of liberty of will and self‐determination defended earlier in the
Review
(
see
free will
).
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Authors: Reginster Bernard
Published: January 2013

The importance of the philosophy of Nietzsche (1844–1900) in the history of ethics is no longer in dispute, but the nature of this importance very much is. It is commonly believed to lie in his sharp critique of the authority of morality. Moral values are assumed to have two kinds of authority – they areuniversalandoverriding– and Nietzsche challenges both. Moreover, this critique of morality also assigns a controversial role topsychology, particularly inOn the Genealogy of Morality(1887), which is widely considered his most important work on the subject. Although this common view certainly captures an important strain of Nietzsche's ethical thought, it also overlooks another which is arguably of equal importance, namely his development of a distinctive new conception of happiness as an alternative to the traditional, and in his view unrealistic, conception of it in terms offulfillment. I shall accordingly divide this essay in two main sections: I shall devote the first section to Nietzsche's critique of morality and attempt to elucidate the role of psychology in it, and I shall focus on his new conception of happiness in the second section.
Needs
Authors: Brock Gillian , Hassoun Nicole
Published: January 2013

Moral and political discourse frequently appeals to matters of need. Indeed, we often think claims made in virtue of need deserve a certain weight, more so than many claims grounded in wants, desires, or preferences. What are needs? Do needs have some special moral force? How are they related to other key concepts or aspects of well‐being? What role do needs play in social and political philosophy, or policy more generally? This essay addresses these questions. The next section considers the concept of needs, why needs often have a certain normative force, and some of the most influential accounts in the literature. The section following focuses on the role of needs in normative theory and public policy. The final section concludes.
Fictionalism, Moral
Authors: Mabrito Robert
Published: January 2013

Moral fictionalism is the view that, when we discuss and think about morality, what we are doing (or, on some versions, what we should be doing, even if we are not currently doing it) is roughly what we are doing when we tell stories or we pretend. As a view concerning the status of moral talk and thought, moral fictionalism belongs to metaethics. There has been a growth of interest in fictionalism, and fictionalist accounts of numerous areas have been proposed. (Kalderon 2005a collects articles discussing several of them.) Recent discussions of moral fictionalism – by Joyce (2001), Kalderon (2005b), and Nolan et al. (2005) – are part of this trend. A key distinction is between those versions of moral fictionalism that offer fictionalism as a description of our moral talk and thought as it is now and those versions that deny that fictionalism accurately describes our current practices but argue that there is good reason to revise our practices along fictionalist lines. The descriptive version of the theory is usually called hermeneutic moral fictionalism, and the revisionary version revolutionary moral fictionalism. This essay divides into three sections: a brief description of moral fictionalism and its relationship to other metaethical positions; a discussion of arguments for hermeneutic moral fictionalism; and a discussion of arguments for revolutionary moral fictionalism.
Deontic Logic
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove
Published: January 2013

In discussions on moral norms we tend to assume that a reasonable system of norms should have certain structural properties. Obligations should be consistent, so that a person cannot be morally required both to visit her father in his home and to stay out of the town where he lives. Certain norms imply other norms; someone who has a duty to mow her neighbor's lawn also has permission to enter her garden in order to do so. Deontic logic is the discipline that attempts to systematize such structural properties of systems of norms. Along with decision theory, the logic of preference, and game theory and rational choice, deontic logic is one of the disciplines that apply formal rigor to moral reasoning and to the subject matter of moral philosophy in general (
see
Preference; Game Theory and rational choice; Moral Reasoning).
Rights
Authors: Martin Rex
Published: January 2013

This essay begins with a brief history of rights, focused mainly on important natural rights theorists and documents of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the criticism of natural rights (occurring at the time of the French Revolution and after), and the revival of interest in human rights at the end of World War II. The essay then focuses on the contemporary idea of rights, and pays special attention to human rights and constitutional rights. A three‐part analysis of rights is undertaken by looking at (1) views of the constituent elements of rights, (2) the function(s) of rights, and (3) the grounding of rights. The essay concludes with a short synoptic account of the character and value of rights.
Paternalism
Authors: Scoccia Danny
Published: January 2013

Much about paternalism is contested, including its definition. This essay will define it as an action or practice that “interferes” with choices thought to cause or risk causing harm to self, for the chooser's own good. The most common forms of interference are physical compulsion with small children and coercion with adults, but others include reducing the attractiveness of bad options (e.g., “sin taxes”), increasing the attractiveness of good ones (e.g., offering incentives), deception, and manipulation (
see
Manipulation). Few dispute that paternalism is sometimes permissible with small children and incompetents, but some deny that it is ever permissible when it uses coercion and targets the voluntary choices of competent adults. In particular, many liberal political theorists doubt the legitimacy of paternalism when the state practices it via the criminal law.
Comparative Religious Ethics
Authors: Stalnaker Aaron
Published: January 2013

While comparative assessment of the ethics of different religious groups is an ancient and widespread pursuit, the modern field of comparative religious ethics arguably dates from the founding of the Journal of Religious Ethics in 1973. While there have been a variety of motivations for the attempt to study “religious ethics” rather than or in addition to “Christian ethics,” one animating idea has been the growing recognition that people from numerous religious groups propound sophisticated and powerful moral visions, which possess intriguing similarities and differences, and which are not easily reducible to a common denominator. Moreover, the variety and particular characteristics of such visions are historically and politically significant in the modern era of increasingly pervasive globalization. Indeed, comparative religious ethics may be desperately needed in our contemporary context of global interdependence, misunderstanding, and mutual mistrust. There are thus ample grounds, both social and purely intellectual, to suggest that this ethical variety needs to be engaged directly via rigorous comparison (seeReligion and Global Ethics).
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Authors: Wicks Robert
Published: January 2013

In accord with the spirit of nineteenth‐century philosophizing, it is only in view of Schopenhauer's metaphysics that his moral theory comes into an intelligible light. According to Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), the inner nature of the world is a unitary, unconscious, unbounded, nonrational, and essentially pointless impulse‐toward‐satisfaction that he callsWill. Schopenhauer apprehends Will directly in his bodily presence, after setting aside all humanly specific qualities such as rationality and advanced emotional states in an effort to disclose his basic constitution. Upon that primal foundation, he argues that his body's inner reality reveals the inner nature of all other things, assuming that his body is no different as such, from any other physical body, and, hence, that its inner nature is no different. Schopenhauer also observes Will manifesting itself when magnets attract iron, vines grow toward distant supports upon which they can ascend, birds anticipate their offsprings' needs by building nests, and humans tend toward increasing self‐knowledge, among many examples.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Authors: Pinkard Terry
Published: January 2013

Although Hegel (1770–1831) never wrote a book with the word “ethics” in its title, many of his works had subsections with labels such as “morality” and “ethical life.” What many consider his masterwork, the 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit
, contained a lengthy critique of what he called in that book the “moral worldview.” In it he accused Kant and his immediate successors of promoting a kind of overly formalistic conception of the moral life, which could make itself plausible only by patching into itself disparate and conflicting elements that ultimately made the whole Kantian enterprise – and the possibility of a moral life lived in its light – untenable (
see
Kant, Immanuel). This problem was to be resolved, he claimed, through something like a practice of forgiveness and reconciliation, which also had something of a religious component (
see
Forgiveness). Likewise, during the part of his career when he was a middle‐school teacher in Nuremberg (from 1808 to 1818), Hegel taught courses on moral duties; the content of those courses fairly well recapitulated some of the themes he had already raised in his
Phenomenology
and was to continue to explore throughout his life.
Trolley Problem
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: January 2013

The Trolley Problem concerns a set of cases that raise the problem of whether, when, and by whom some innocent bystanders may be killed in order that a greater number of different people can survive. I shall describe the problem in more detail, consider some proposed solutions, and illustrate the method of hypothetical cases used in discussing the problem. The cases are often unrealistic because, as in scientific experiments, they are constructed to isolate and test the significance of some factors while holding others constant.
Foucault, Michel
Authors: Cremonesi Laura
Published: January 2013

The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–84) undertook a reflection on ethics especially in the last part of his life, between the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
Oppression
Authors: Cudd Ann E.
Published: January 2013

“Oppression” names a harm (
see
Harm) through which groups of persons are systematically and unfairly or unjustly constrained, burdened, or reduced by any of several social forces. Theories of oppression consider the kinds of harms that constitute oppression, what it means for these harms to be inflicted unfairly or unjustly, who suffers and who inflicts oppressive harms, and how they are inflicted. The historical roots of current theories of oppression lie primarily in modern political philosophy, in discussions of liberty, slavery, the subjection of women, and the deprivation and coercion of workers (
see
Liberty; Slavery). Oppression is now seen as a normative concept that names a social injustice (
see
Justice) that affects people because of and through their social group status. These group identities or attributions include gender, sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, and class based groups. The main controversies about oppression include which groups are oppressed, but also the main causes and harms of oppression, and even whether oppression is a univocal phenomenon. There are also controversies concerning the possibility of and moral responsibility for ending oppression.
Population
Authors: Roberts Melinda A.
Published: January 2013

The choices we make today have consequences for what life will be like for future people, how many future people there will be, and who those future people are. Suchquality, quantity, andidentityissues – and more besides – fall within the domain ofpopulation ethics. A widely accepted goal within moral philosophy is the design of a moral theory that plausibly instructs whether an agent's choice to distribute well‐being across a given population in a given way is morally permissible in light of alternative distributions of well‐being across that same population available to that agent at the critical time. Closely related is the design of a theory that plausibly ranks one such distribution against another in terms of the respective moral value, or degree of goodness, of each. The recognition that drives population ethics is that any adequate moral theory must also take into account that the very choices under evaluation for their permissibility may themselves produce distinct populations – some larger, some smaller, some that overlap in terms of identities of their membership, and some that do not. An adequate moral theory must give a plausible account, in other words, of both “Same People” (and hence “Same Number”) cases and “Different People” (whether “Same Number” or not) cases (Parfit 1987: 356, 351–454; Blackorby et al. 1997, 2005).
Daoist Ethics
Authors: Lee Jung H.
Published: January 2013

Daoism represents one of the major indigenous traditions of China, dating back to the Warring States Period (479–221bce) and having a cultural reach rivaling Confucianism and Buddhism (seeBuddhist Ethics; Confucian Ethics; Confucius). Although Daoism has sometimes been dismissed as a mystical tradition, seemingly indifferent to the moral life, we can discern in its foundational texts (e.g.,Zhuangzi,Laozi,Huainanzi,Neiye) a distinct moral language and vision that address the question of “how one should live” (seeLaozi; Morality, Definition of; Zhuangzi). At the most general level, Daoism, or at least the textual tradition of the Warring States Period and the early Imperial Age, can be classified as a form of virtue ethics that commends its practitioners to cultivate certain virtues of the Dao (“the Way”), its source of normativity (seeNormativity; Virtue; Virtue Ethics). Particular attributes of the Dao such as “tranquility” (jing), “emptiness” (xu), “responsiveness” (ying), and “selflessness” (wu‐si), when acquired in inner‐cultivation practices and exercised in intelligent awareness, can all be characterized as stable psychophysiological states or dispositions which seem to enable the Daoist to achieve those goods and excellences definitive of the well‐lived life and integral to the general project of human flourishing. It is through such cultivation, according to early Daoist texts, that one fully realizes the Good.
Impartiality
Authors: Cullity Garrett
Published: January 2013

Impartiality is primarily a feature of normative or evaluative deliberation – deliberation about what ought to be done or about something's goodness or badness. An initial description is this: such deliberation is impartial when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Derivatively, impartiality can be attributed to actions that are guided by (or perhaps merely conform to) deliberation with this feature, or persons who characteristically deliberate or act in this way.
Whewell, William
Authors: Schultz Bart
Published: January 2013

William Whewell (1794–1866) developed and vigorously defended an impressive, deeply historically informed intuitionism (seeIntuitionism, Moral) at odds with the secular and theological forms of utilitarianism (seeUtilitarianism) gaining currency in his day. Although various influential critics complained that his view was no more than a simplistic intuitionism used to defend unreflective commonsense morality – by claiming that everyone just sees, clearly and distinctly, that promise‐keeping, truth‐telling, etc., are right – Whewell knowledgeably countered that charge. He held that the theory of morality, once philosophically developed and refined, yielded a system ofa priorimoral truths, and that these were apprehended intuitively but discovered and tested historically and empirically. This approach, for Whewell and his defenders, marked a productive middle path between pure rationalism, emphasizing the role of reason (rational insight or intuition) in grounding knowledge independently of sense experience, and pure empiricism, emphasizing the role of sense experience in grounding knowledge.
Montaigne, Michel de
Authors: Hartle Ann
Published: January 2013

Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) is best known for his invention of the essay in its modern form. What is less well recognized is the philosophical significance of the
Essays
, especially the radical transformation of moral philosophy of which the essay form is the literary expression. Montaigne's project might be described as the emergence of the private, common man out of the hiddenness and shame of privacy, into the light of publicity. This philosophical act announces the coming into being of modern society and a fundamental change in the relationship of the individual to the political realm.
Ethics of Aging
Authors: Tong Rosemarie
Published: January 2013

A number of philosophers have written about the moral status of children. Some talk about children's special rights (
see
Children's Rights); others discuss special duties children might have: to obey their parents, heed their teachers, respect the elderly, and so forth. Still others talk about special duties that others, especially parents, have to children. Although philosophers’ explanations for these special rights and duties vary, all trace them back to particular facts about children and their relationships. Children are especially vulnerable; they lack important knowledge and experience; and they depend on their parents and other adults for most everything, including food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attention, and, even more importantly, love.
Last Person Arguments
Authors: O'Neill John
Published: January 2013

Last person arguments form a class of arguments for the extension of the domain of beings and states which have intrinsic value beyond those of human and sentient beings. The arguments appeal to thought experiments about destructive actions by the last existing person or persons on parts of nonhuman nature. They appeal to a moral intuition that the persons act wrongly. Since no person can be wronged by the last persons, the thought experiment intuition is taken to show that the domain of intrinsic value includes nonhuman and beyond this nonsentient beings.
Firth, Roderick
Authors: Carson Thomas
Published: January 2013

Roderick Firth (1917–87) received his BA from Haverford in 1938 and his PhD from Harvard in 1943. He taught at William and Mary from 1943 to 1945 and at Swarthmore between 1945 and 1953. From 1953 until 1987 he taught at Harvard, where he became Alford Professor in 1962. Most of Firth's writings are in epistemology; he defended a version of radical (Berkeleyan/phenomenalist) empiricism (see Troyer 1998: 4–9). His reputation in ethics rests almost entirely on his paper “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” which gives the classic statement of the ideal observer theory (IOT;
see
Ideal Observer Theories).
Sexual Consent
Authors: McGregor Joan
Published: January 2013

Consent is generally thought to play a critical role in our moral relationships, purportedly by transforming impermissible acts into permissible ones (seeConsent). In sexual relationships, consent changes the nature of the activity, from a sexual violation to a voluntary sexual encounter, and performs a central role in the legal analysis of rape or sexual assault (seeRape). Given the morally transformative function of consent, what is consent's nature, its moral force, and what conditions undermine it are widely debated. Beyond the concerns about what consent really is and what its moral force is, there are questions about whether attention to consent is misguided. Questions such as whether consent is a sufficient condition to make any sexual behavior morally permissible (seeSexual Morality) and whether genuine consent to sex is even possible in a society with extensive gender hierarchy and oppression are argued as more critical to the discussion about the legitimacy of sexual interactions than the discussion about consent.
Feinberg, Joel
Authors: Rainbolt George W.
Published: January 2013

Joel Feinberg (1926–2004) was a social, political, and legal philosopher who did seminal work on issues such as punishment, rights, and the moral limits of the law. In addition, his philosophical method and writing style have been widely influential.
Moral Character
Authors: Badhwar Neera Kapur
Published: January 2013

A moral character is the set of traits, good or bad, that make someone the kind of person she is. In the original Greek, kharaktēr is an engraving or stamping tool; the Latin “character” comes to mean a distinctive engraving or mark. This idea of distinctiveness is often imported into talk of moral character by contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Yet although our characters do nearly always distinguish us from each other, distinctiveness is not essential to the idea of moral character. Two identical twins with the same virtues or vices, the same strengths or weaknesses, have a character, even though their characters don't distinguish them from each other.
Cognitivism
Authors: Strandberg Caj
Published: January 2013

Cognitivism is the position in metaethics (seeMetaethics) according to which moral sentences function to convey facts, which means that they can be true or false in the same manner as ordinary fact‐stating sentences (seeSemantics, Moral). Whether cognitivism is correct or not has implications for a number of central issues in moral philosophy, such as the possibility of moral truths, the existence of moral properties, the objectivity of morality, the nature of moral disagreement, and the connection between moral language and attitudes. Cognitivism has consequently become a focal point of much of the discussion in contemporary moral philosophy within the analytic tradition, although related questions have also been discussed by a number of classical philosophers (seeHume, David) and philosophers within other traditions.
Privacy
Authors: Moore Adam D.
Published: January 2013

There is little agreement about how to define the term “privacy.” For example, Warren and Brandeis, following Judge Thomas Cooley, called it “the right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 194). Alan Westin (1967) described privacy in terms of information control. William Parent argued that “privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others” (1983: 269), while Julie Inness defined privacy as “the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which include decisions about intimate access, intimate information, and intimate actions” (1992: 140). Privacy is also viewed by many as morally valuable and worthy of protection, while others have viewed it with suspicion. This essay will review each of these areas, including (1) a brief history of privacy, (2) philosophical definitions of privacy along with specific critiques, (3) views about the value of privacy, and (4) general critiques of privacy.
Consent
Authors: Kleinig John
Published: January 2013

Although consent has always played some role in determining the legitimacy of human transactions, that role has greatly expanded. The marriage of individual rights to diverse conceptions of human flourishing has increased the importance of consent for interpersonal and group transactions. Consent has become (for many) a
sine qua non
of political legitimacy (
see
Political Obligation; Social Contract); informed consent is accorded a pivotal role in many professional–client relations (
see
Informed Consent); and – for the most part – consent transforms what would be the rights‐invasions of assault, theft, and rape into (say) a sporting tackle, a loan, and a romantic encounter. Why does consent have the role it does, how does it accomplish this role, and to what extent does it legitimate such transactions?
Thomasius, Christian
Authors: Schröder Peter
Published: January 2013

Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) was one of the leading German intellectuals of the seventeenth century. From 1669 he studied philosophy in his birth‐town at the University of Leipzig. He moved on to the Calvinist university of Frankfurt an der Oder, where he studied law and came into contact with the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (seePufendorf, Samuel Von). In 1679 he was awarded a doctorate in law. He returned to Leipzig where he practiced as a lawyer and continued his academic work. The orthodox Lutheran theologians in Leipzig severely criticized him for his more moderate views on religion and succeeded in having him banned from teaching and publishing. He left his birthplace and moved to Halle in 1690 where he was appointed by the Ritterakademie. In Halle he was one of the founding fathers of the newly established university under the elector, Frederic III of Brandenburg, which replaced the Ritterakademie in 1693.
Maimonides, Moses
Authors: Diamond James A.
Published: January 2013

Moses Maimonides (1138–1204), or Rambam the Great Eagle, the acronym and sobriquet he has been revered by in the traditional Jewish academy since his lifetime, is arguably the most seminal thinker to have emerged throughout the course of Jewish intellectual history. Virtually every current of Jewish thought intersects in his written legacy, be it philosophy, theology, biblical exegesis, rabbinics, or jurisprudence. He was born in Cordoba, Spain, and, after frenetic peregrinations caused by Almohadic Islamic extremism, ended in old Cairo (Fustat) Egypt, a somewhat more tolerant environment, where he led an active and exhausting career as community head, physician, rabbinic decisor, and writer of much of his literary corpus that remains with us today. That corpus embraces a wide spectrum of Jewish thought and, although there is no tract dedicated exclusively to ethics and ethical theory, it was a subject that preoccupied him, as evidenced by its treatment in practically every genre of thought he engaged. Living within the Islamic orbit all his life, and exposed to its rich rapport with Greek science and philosophy by such Islamic thinkers as Al‐Farabi (seeAl‐Farabi), of course influenced his formulations in all areas, ethics being no exception (seeIslamic Ethics). However, of paramount importance to understanding, or reconstructing, his ethical theory is his own religious faith and tradition. While a prominent exponent of medieval Jewish rationalism, struggling with the reconciliation of reason and divinely revealed scripture, he was also a devout rabbinic Jew, thoroughly committed to Judaism's combined foundational canon of the Old Testament and classical rabbinic literature, primarily represented by the Talmuds of both Palestine and Babylonia. Any account of his ethical theory then must take into consideration his dedication to Jewish law as refracted through the rabbinic lens, and cannot be divorced from his conceptions of God and revelation as the sources of the normative Jewish apparatus to which he remained dedicated (seeRabbinic Ethics).
Glass Ceiling
Authors: Oxley Julinna C.
Published: January 2013

The phrase “glass ceiling” refers to the invisible barrier that prevents a qualified person from advancing into an organizational leadership position or from attaining political office. The phrase was first used in 1984, and the US Department of Labor defines it as “artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management‐level positions” (Barreto et al. 2009: 5). It is generally used to describe women's experiences, although it may also apply to race or ethnicity.
Practical Reasoning
Authors: Richardson Henry S.
Published: January 2013

Practical reasoning is something that each of us sometimes engages in when we are figuring out what to do. When we think explicitly about what to do in light of the reasons we take ourselves to have, we are engaging in practical reasoning. Of course, we often exercise complex practical skills without engaging in explicit thinking about what to do. Examples might include a soldier picking his way through an enemy village or a florist putting together a bouquet. To call these skillful actions exercises of “practical reasoning” would be to stretch that term so far as to lose contact with the main body of philosophical thinking about practical reasoning, which takes it to be an explicit mode of thinking.
Guo Xiang
Authors: Ziporyn Brook
Published: January 2013

Guo Xiang (252–312) is often classified in English‐language writings as a “Neo‐Daoist,” but in reality his work is a combination and harmonization of ethical insights from Confucian and early Daoist thought by means of an innovative and radical metaethical theory of his own devising (seeDaiost Ethics; Confucian Ethics).
Companions in Guilt Strategy
Authors: Lillehammer Hallvard
Published: January 2013

Philosophers often seek to defend the credentials of one set of disputed claims by comparing them to other claims with which they are said to have important features in common. Some arguments of this kind have a “companions in guilt” form (Mackie 1977: 39). Companions in guilt arguments are designed to defend the credentials of one set of claims, A, by showing that some of the features of A‐claims that are thought to be problematic are shared by another set of claims, B, the credentials of which are less controversial. With respect to these features, A‐claims and B‐claims are said to be companions in guilt. In other words, if the credentials of A‐claims are undermined by possessing these features, then so are the credentials of B‐claims, all other things being equal. On the assumption that the credentials of B‐claims are not undermined by the fact that they possess these features, then neither are the credentials of A‐claims.
Marriage
Authors: Brake Elizabeth
Published: January 2013

Marriage can be broadly defined as a legal, social, or religious institution which regulates, recognizes, and supports intimate personal relationships, typically sexual, between at least two parties. The historical and cultural variability of marital forms and purposes makes a narrower definition difficult. Unsurprisingly, in light of this variousness, much philosophical debate over marriage concerns its proper definition. Debates in moral philosophy have focused on defining the proper purpose of marriage, and accordingly, its essential form, obligations, and relation to the human good. Debates in political philosophy have concerned what legal definition of marriage justice requires; recent focal points of these debates have included same‐sex marriage, polygamy, and the effects of marriage law on gender equality.
Vaccination Policies
Authors: Verweij Marcel
Published: January 2013

Vaccination involves priming the immune system with an antigenic agent that mimics a virus or bacterium, which results in immunity against the “real” microorganism. Collective vaccination policies have played an important role in the control of infectious disease worldwide. They can serve the utilitarian aim to protect public health – hence welfare – and also promote fairness: making essential vaccines accessible to all members of the public. Yet as more and more vaccines are developed, societies face the question of how far to go in expanding public programs. Decisions about adopting new vaccines in the program will require combining scientific evidence about the disease and the vaccine, with value judgments about, for example, the extent to which a disease poses a threat to public health (Verweij and Dawson 2004; Houweling et al. 2010). It makes sense to promote transparency of such (expert) deliberations because one cannot expect that citizens simply accept every government vaccination policy.
Moral Language, Uses of
Authors: Finlay Stephen
Published: January 2013

Moral language comprises a diverse class of words which are put to many different uses. Central and undisputed instances includethinmoral words like ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ and ‘ought’.
Capital Punishment
Authors: Reiman Jeffrey
Published: January 2013

Though “killing as punishment,” to use Hugo Bedau's (2004) striking phrase, is sometimes proposed for serious crimes other than murder, such as treason, or limited to especially heinous murders, here, for simplicity's sake, it will be considered primarily as punishment for premeditated murder (seeCriminal Justice Ethics). Most typically, arguments for or against capital punishment, paralleling arguments for punishment in general, concern either the death penalty's effectiveness as a deterrent to future murders (seeDeterrence), or the death penalty's capacity to provide murderers with what they deserve (seeDesert). Additionally, some arguments point to features special to the punishment of death, such as its irrevocability, the especially harsh conditions of life on death row awaiting execution, or whether killing criminals is compatible with respecting their special dignity as rational or moral agents (seeRespect); alongside of these are other arguments that apply throughout the criminal justice system but apply to this penalty with particular force because of these special features; here is included the notorious racial bias in capital sentencing (seeRacism). Accordingly, the discussion here will be divided into three sections: “Deterrence,” “Desert,” and “Special Features of the Death Penalty.”
Stem Cell Research
Authors: Baylis FranÇoise
Published: January 2013

Three reasons are given for the pursuit of human stem cell research: to increase understanding of normal cell development; to screen new drugs in vitro; and to provide tissue for cell‐based regenerative medicine. Not surprisingly, public enthusiasm for human stem cell research centers on the promise of regenerative medicine where there is the prospect of developing transplantation therapies for patients with debilitating or life‐threatening conditions such as Parkinson's disease, diabetes, traumatic spinal cord injury, neurological degeneration, and congenital heart disease.
Highest Good
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: January 2013

For most ancient Greek ethical systems, “What is the highest good (summum bonum)?” was the fundamental question. In the context of a search for practical guidance, the question is about the highest good realizable by human beings. Thus it might be claimed that God alone deserves the absolute title of “the highest good,” but since, anyway in traditional theism, God is assumed to be existent eternally and independently of our actions, “God” is not a relevant answer when the question is asked from the standpoint of human ethics. This of course allows the ethical philosopher to identify the highest practicable good with a theologically defined state of affairs, e.g., the condition of our being at one with God.
Executive Compensation
Authors: Donaldson Thomas
Published: January 2013

A central ethical issue with executive compensation involves the variance between executive and nonexecutive compensation relative to norms of fairness (
see
Justice). Philosophical and empirical analyses have criticized executive compensation on the grounds of fairness and distributive justice (Harris 2009). Dramatic variance in the salary and bonus packages of executives versus nonexecutives in modern, for‐profit corporations is evident in demographic data. This variance is often highlighted in studies that compare salary and bonus packages of the average chief executive officer (CEO) to those of the average production worker. For example, in 1970 the comparison ratio in the United States was 25 to 1, with CEOs earning on average $700,000. By 2000 it had risen to at least 90 to 1, with CEOs earning on average $2.2 million (Murphy and Zabojnik 2004). Some often‐cited estimates in the popular media placed the ratio even higher, e.g., 364 to 1, or 531 to 1. Variance also exists in executive pay across different countries, with countries such as Japan and Spain displaying relatively lower ratios of executive‐to‐worker pay to countries such as the US and the UK.
Skepticism, Moral
Authors: Zimmerman Aaron
Published: January 2013

There are a number of varieties of moral skepticism.Reasons skepticsdoubt that we have any reason to act morally when we know that we can best realize our aims by acting immorally instead.Motives skepticsdoubt that we are ever moved to forgo an otherwise desirable course of action from our belief in its immorality.Nihilistsclaim that nothing is immoral; everything is permitted.Epistemic moral skepticsdoubt whether we have any moral knowledge or are justified in persisting in any of our moral beliefs.Metaethical moral skepticsaccept the existence of moral knowledge but deny its objectivity. Responses to moral skepticism are legion, but each form continues to attract adherents.
Explanations, Moral
Authors: Sinclair Neil
Published: January 2013

A moral explanation is an explanation of a particular or type of event (or fact or state of affairs) that features moral terms in the explaining phrase. Here are some examples. First, one way of reading the quote that begins this essay is as the claim that, in the broad sweep of history, societies tend toward more just institutions, and that they do so precisely because these institutions are just. This is a moral explanation of social development. Second, historians might claim that “The injustice of slavery contributed to its demise”: this is a moral explanation of a historical event. Third, I might say that “I believe that Hitler was morally depraved because he was morally depraved”: this is a moral explanation of a moral belief. Finally, philosophers sometimes say things like “In the original Trolley case, it is morally right to flick the switch, because this will lead to the morally best outcome”: this is a moral explanation of a particular moral fact (seeTROLLEY PROBLEM).
Ethics of Competitive Sport
Authors: Walsh Adrian
Published: January 2013

Competitive sport raises many significant ethical issues. Perhaps the most important of these – and to which the most attention has been paid – concerns how individuals should conduct themselves when engaging in competitive sport. Topics considered here include cheating and the use of performance‐enhancing drugs. There are also important ethical questions that arise out of the central role sport plays in our cultural and political lives, such as what role it plays in damaging or enhancing society and whether sport itself should be subject to political evaluation. The serious examination of these questions is relatively recent, beginning with Weiss's text
Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry
(1969). At the present time there are only two English‐language philosophical journals devoted to sport:
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
and
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
.
Employment at Will
Authors: Werhane Patricia H. , Radin Tara J.
Published: January 2013

“Employment at Will” (EAW) is an American common‐law doctrine that governs a majority of employment relationships in the private sector of the economy in the United States (www.workplacefairness.org). Indeed, the United States is the only industrialized country that has such a doctrine. In the absence of an express contract, EAW specifies the terms of the employment relationship, i.e., essentially, that there are no terms – that either the employer or the employee can change the employment relationship at any time, for any reason, for no reason, just not for a reason contrary to law. Unlike employment relationships in the private sector, employees in the public sector are guaranteed due‐process procedures and protection for whistleblowing.
Military Necessity
Authors: Ryan Cheyney
Published: January 2013

Military necessity is a legal concept used in the law of war, or what is now termed international humanitarian law. As such, it plays a central role in ethical discussions of war and peace (
see
Just War Theory, History of).