The Determination of Wages and Working Conditions in the Agricultural Sector: Three Alternatives
Authors: Bruce C. J. , Kerr W. A. 
Published: July 2010

During the last few years, minimum wage regulation and trade union organization have begun to extend into the Canadian agricultural sector, but there has been little discussion of the merits or problems to be expected from such an extension, nor of alternative forms of labor organization which may he possible. This paper reviews current provincial acts and regulations pertaining to agricultural workers and identifies considerable differences between provinces. A method of labor relations based on British agricultural wage hoards is introduced as an alternative to both minimum wages and trade unions, the three institutions are compared and evaluated in the context of recent research into labor relations, and finally the applicability of each to Canadian agriculture, with its unique production and organizational problems, is studied.

Au cours de ces derníeres annèes, le règlement sur les salaires minimums ainsi que ľorganisation de syndicats. ont commencéà se développer dans le secteur agricole canadien. Cependant, il y a eu peu de discussions quant aux bienfaits et aux problèmes devant ètre escomptés ďune telle extension, de mème qu'au sujet ďautres formes possibles ďorganisations ouvrieres. Cet article examine les lots et les arrètés provinciaux en vigueur. relatifs aux travailleurs agricoles, et identifie des diffërences considérables enlre les provinces.

Une méthode de relations ouvriers‐patronnat basée sur les commissions salariales pour ľagriculture en Grande‐Bretagne est présentée en tant qu'alternative en ce qui concerne à la fois les salaires minimums et les syndicats. Les trois institutions sont compareées el évaluées dans le contexte des recherches récentes sur les relations ouvriers‐patronnat, de méme qu ‘est étudiée ľapplicabilité de chacune ďentre elles àľagriculture canadienne, en tenant compte des problèmes de production et ďorganisation spècifiques à cette dernîere.

The first purpose of this paper is to argue that collective bargaining offers certain benefits which make its extension to the agricultural sector socially desirable. In particular, it has been suggested that collective bargaining can act to redress an imbalance in worker‐employer bargaining power, redistribute income, reduce worker alienation, and improve worker safety and security. However, it has also been noted that the prevailing system, in which trade unions employ the strike threat to enforce their demands, has two serious drawbacks when applied to the agricultural sector: the strike threat provides some groups of agricultural workers with inordinate amounts of bargaining power while, on the other hand, the difficulties of organizing disparate groups of workers produces the result that many groups are provided with very little bargaining power.

In this light, the second major goal of the paper is to seek a system which might be able to provide the benefits of collective bargaining without the above‐mentioned drawbacks. One such system which was considered was that of setting statutory minimum wages. However, this system was rejected on the grounds that it provided no input from the affected workers; that it produced significant disemployment effects because it made no allowances for variations in working conditions and demographic characteristics; and that it restricted itself only to wages. For these reasons, British agricultural wages boards were examined. It was found that these boards offered many of the advantages, with few of the disadvantages, of collective bargaining and statutory minimum wages. However, as some minor drawbacks to the wages board system remain, consideration of the following system, modelled on the British wages boards, is suggested for Canada.

Each province should establish a number of agricultural wages boards (e.g., one each for livestock, grain, and field‐crop workers) to determine any of those conditions of employment which would normally be considered to come within the purview of a trade union. In those sectors in which agricultural unions and farmers' organizations are active, worker and employer representation would be provided equally by those organizations. Where such organizations did not operate, however, representatives would be selected through a government‐supervised and organized vote within the appropriate constituency. Furthermore, in the latter case, the government would provide funds to support one or more full‐time representatives for each of the two groups, to deal with grievances and to collect information for the following round of negotiations.

Initially, the government would have to select the independent members of the wages boards and outline the general procedures they were to follow. However, there is no reason why each individual board could not, in time, establish its own procedures and select its own independent members/arbitrators to meet the particular conditions of that sector.

Relative to the use of strike‐backed collective bargaining, the primary advantages of the wage board system are that: the disruptive effects of strikes would not be felt; bargaining power between employers and employees would be equalized; and employer‐employee bargaining would not have to wait for the development of formal trade union structures. Relative to the use of statutory minimum wages, wages boards allow for the direct involvement of the parties who are to be affected by the wages orders, and provide an opportunity for the parties to regulate working conditions, grievance procedures, and fringe benefits as well as minimum wages.

Whether one accepts the contention that agricultural wages boards represent the best of the alternative agricultural labor relations systems, it seems undeniable that a considered review of those systems is long overdue. If the industry itself does not put forward alternatives, either strike‐based collective bargaining, with its associated atmosphere of confrontation, or bureaucratically imposed minimum wages appear likely for the agricultural sector. A greater risk to fanners, it would seem, would be the spectre of facing unequal resources in the labor confrontation. Once organized, farm workers' unions can benefit from obvious economies of scale in organization and expertise. Individual farms have fewer resources and expertise with which to conduct all facets of labor negotiations. Of course such ability can be acquired by purchase and/or learning‐by‐doing, but it is likely to be expensive. In addition, attempts to establish countervailing power through producer organizations may be possible but organization and enforcement may also demand considerable resources. Therefore, it may be in the interest of producers to join in the search for improved institutions for labor relations. Organized labor, at the moment, seems reasonably open‐minded about what structure should be instituted in the agricultural sector:

What most concerns the Canadian Labour Congress is the undeniable fact that most provincial labour legislation today enshrines the concept of the seasonal farmworker as an inferior human being. This should not be taken as an accusation that they are everywhere treated as inferior by their employers. only that they are legally designated as such by lawmakers who had neither the courage or imagination to tackle the problems associated with the peculiar nature of agricultural employment. [Reno]

Unless some alternatives are presented to the political decision‐makers, however, one is likely to see only the extension of existing institutions into the agricultural sector.