bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Reason, Reference, and the Quest for Knowledge
Authors: Shapere Dudley
Published: November 2002

This paper examines the “causal theory of reference”, according to which science aims at the discovery of “essences” which are the objects of reference of natural kind terms (among others). This theory has been advanced as an alternative to traditional views of “meaning”, on which a number of philosophical accounts of science have relied, and which have been criticized earlier by the present author. However, this newer theory of reference is shown to be equally subject to fatal internal difficulties, and to be incompatible with actual science as well. Indeed, it rests on assumptions which it shares with the purportedly opposing theory of meaning. Behind those common assumptions is the supposition that the nature of science can be illuminated by an examination of alleged necessities of language which are independent of the results and methods of scientific inquiry. An alternative view of science is proposed, according to which the goals and language of science develop as integral parts of the process of demarcating science from non-science, a process in which the notion of a “reason” gradually assumes a decisive role. On this view, the comparability, competition, and development of scientific ideas are understood without reliance on either common “meanings” or common “references” as fundamental tools of analysis.
From the Descriptive to the Normative in Psychology and Logic
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: November 2002

The aim of this paper is to describe a methodology for revising logical principles in the light of empirical psychological findings. Historical philosophy of science and wide reflective equilibrium in ethics are considered as providing possible models for arguing from the descriptive to the normative. Neither is adequate for the psychology/logic case, and a new model is constructed, employing criteria for evaluating inferential systems. Once we have such criteria, the notion of reflective equilibrium becomes redundant.
Counterfactual Definiteness and Local Causation
Authors: Skyrms Brian
Published: November 2002

Bell's Theorem is proved for locality and conservation formulated in terms of subjunctive conditionals with chance consequents, rather than the usual conditional probability formulation. This brings into sharp focus the minimal counterfactual assumptions needed for Bell's theorem.
Probability and Determinism
Authors: Von Plato Jan
Published: November 2002

This paper discusses different interpretations of probability in relation to determinism. It is argued that both objective and subjective views on probability can be compatible with deterministic as well as indeterministic situations. The possibility of a conceptual independence between probability and determinism is argued to hold on a general level. The subsequent philosophical analysis of recent advances in classical statistical mechanics (ergodic theory) is of independent interest, but also adds weight to the claim that it is possible to justify an objective interpretation of probabilities in a theory having as a basis the paradigmatically deterministic theory of classical mechanics.
Natural Kinds and Freaks of Nature
Authors: Fales Evan
Published: November 2002

Essentialism—understood as the doctrine that there are natural kinds—can be sustained with respect to the most fundamental physical entities of the world, as I elsewhere argue. In this paper I take up the question of the existence of natural kinds among complex structures built out of these elementary ones. I consider a number of objections to essentialism, in particular Locke's puzzle about the existence of borderline cases. A number of recent attempts to justify biological taxonomy are critically examined. I conclude that theory partially justifies such taxonomies but supports only a weaker form of essentialism.
Split Brains and Atomic Persons
Authors: Moor James
Published: November 2002

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation.
The Reduction of Phenomenological to Kinetic Thermostatics
Authors: Kuipers Theo A. F.
Published: November 2002

Standard accounts of the micro-reduction of phenomenological to kinetic thermostatics, based on the postulate relating empirical absolute temperature to mean kinetic energy (ū = (3/2)kT), face two problems. The standard postulate also allows ‘reduction’ in the other direction and it can be criticized from the point of view that reduction postulates need to be ontological identities.

This paper presents a detailed account of the reduction, based on the postulate that thermal equilibrium is ontologically identical to having equal mean kinetic energy. In particular, it is shown that this postulate enables reduction only in the appropriate direction, but leaves room for ‘evidence transport’ in the other. Moreover, it makes possible the derivation (explanation) of the standard postulate, using the existential kinetic hypothesis and phenomenological laws with which it turns out to be laden.
Discussion: The Failure to be Rational
Authors: Schagrin Morton L.
Published: November 2002

In a book and a series of articles (1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1978) Harold I. Brown has presented “the new theory of science”, which he characterizes as a “modest historicism”. I propose to examine Brown's contribution to the current debate on scientific method, and to show the inadequacy of his proposals. In particular, I want to concentrate on a fundamental concern of Brown's, namely, rationality.
Discussion: How Not to Reduce a Functional Psychology
Authors: Richardson Robert C.
Published: November 2002

There is often substantial disparity between philosophical ideals and scientific practice. Philosophical reductionism is motivated by a drive for ontological austerity. The vehicle is conceptual parsimony: the fewer our conceptual primitives, the less are our ontological commitments. A general moral to be drawn from my “Functionalism and Reductionism” (1979) is that scientific reduction does not, and should not be expected to, facilitate conceptual economy; yet reduction it still is, and in the classical mold. Those who press for the irreducibility of a functional psychology have been seduced by an inadequate account of scientific reduction. Patricia Kitcher (1980) is unhappy with my argument because it fails to live up to her philosophical ideals. “The claim that psychology is irreducible to neurophysiology,” she suggests, “rests to a large extent on the fact that, even in principle, neurophysiology is not capable of carrying out the explanatory work of a functional psychology” (1980, p. 140).
Artifact, Cause and Genic Selection
Authors: Sober Elliott , Lewontin Richard C.
Published: November 2002

Several evolutionary biologists have used a parsimony argument to argue that the single gene is the unit of selection. Since all evolution by natural selection can be represented in terms of selection coefficients attaching to single genes, it is, they say, “more parsimonious” to think that all selection is selection for or against single genes. We examine the limitations of this genic point of view, and then relate our criticisms to a broader view of the role of causal concepts and the dangers of reification in science.
What Shall we do With Verisimilitude?
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka
Published: November 2002

Popper distinguishes the problems of theoretical and pragmatic preference between rival theories, but he claims that there is a common non-inductive solution to both of them, viz. the “best-tested theory”, or the theory with the highest degree of corroboration. He further suggests that the degrees of corroboration serve as indicators of verisimilitude. One may therefore raise the question whether the recent theory of verisimilitude gives a general non-inductive solution to the problem of theoretical preference. This paper argues that this is not the case: the theory of verisimilitude is applicable to this problem if and only if there is an independent solution to the problem of induction. Moreover, the solutions to the theoretical and pragmatic problems of preference coincide only in some special cases.
Invention and Induction Laudan, Simon and The Logic of Discovery
Authors: McLaughlin Robert
Published: November 2002

Although on opposite sides of the logic of discovery debate, Laudan and Simon share a thesis of divorce between discovery (invention) and justification (appraisal); but unlike some other authors, they do not base their respective versions of the divorce-thesis on the empirical/logical distinction. Laudan argues that, in contemporary science, invention is irrelevant to appraisal, and that this irrelevance renders epistemically pointless the inventionist program. Simon uses his divorce-thesis to defend his account of invention, which he claims to be non-inductive—so evading the problem of induction. Underlying both authors' positions are inadequate conceptions of inductive inference. Laudan here ignores the role in contemporary science of plausibility arguments, which provide a crucial link between invention and appraisal, and thence an epistemic rationale for inventionism. Simon's account of invention does covertly call upon inductive principles from the context of appraisal, and this is what gives his program epistemic import; otherwise he would be vulnerable to Laudan's “no rationale” critique. The tensions in both authors reveal the falsity of the divorce-thesis, and the essential function of induction in both appraisal and invention of hypotheses.
Sellarsian Materialism
Authors: Robinson William S.
Published: November 2002

Wilfrid Sellars has proposed a materialist account of sensation which relies in part on the postulation of special kinds of individuals. This postulational strategy appears to be analogous to the one that introduces such entities as electrons. After setting out Sellars' account, I focus on his application of the postulational strategy. I argue that this application requires the discovery of new effects for familiar properties; that this kind of discovery is disanalogous to what postulation usually does; and that this kind of discovery cannot really be arrived at by postulation. I conclude that Sellars has not provided a successful, materialist account of sensation.
Science, Ethnoscience, and Ethnocentrism
Authors: Amundson Ron
Published: November 2002

The conventionalist epistemology of cultural anthropology can be seen to be embedded in the methods of ‘cognitive anthropology’, the study of folk conceptual systems. These methods result in indiscriminately depicting all folk systems as conventional, whether or not the systems are intended by the native to represent objective features of the world. Hypothetical and actual ethnographic situations are discussed. It is concluded that the anthropologist's projection of his/her own epistemology onto a native system is ethnocentric. This epistemological prejudice may be peculiar to the cognitive sciences.
A Good Explanation of an Event is not Necessarily Corroborated by the Event
Authors: Good I. J.
Published: November 2002

It is shown by means of a simple example that a good explanation of an event is not necessarily corroborated by the occurrence of that event. It is also shown that this contention follows symbolically if an explanation having higher “explicativity” than another is regarded as better.
Discussion: Ambiguities in The Subjective Timing of Experiences Debate
Authors: Hoy Ronald C.
Published: November 2002

Some recent physiological data indicate that the “subjective timing” of experiences can be “automatically referred backwards in time” to represent a sequence of events even though the earlier portions of associated neurophysiological activity are themselves insufficient to elicit the experience of any sensation. The challenge, then, is to explain how subjects can experience what they do in the reported ways when, if one looked just at certain neurophysiological activity, it would seem that perhaps subjects should report their sensations differently. The phenomenon has seemed sufficiently remarkable to the neurobiologist John Eccles to count as evidence for mind-body dualism (Eccles 1977). This dualistic interpretation has resulted in a spirited attack by P. S. Churchland on both the physiological research and the dualistic interpretation (Churchland 1981a). Her attack resulted in an equally spirited defense of the research by the primary investigator, B. Libet, where he reaffirmed his more guarded interpretation that “the temporal discrepancy creates relative difficulties for identity theory, but that these are not insurmountable” (Libet 1981, p. 196). In turn, Churchland has defended her criticism of Libet's research so that, for her, Libet's hypothesis remains “infirm and unconfirmed” (Churchland 1981b, p. 496).
Discussion: A Note on Realism
Authors: Currie Gregory
Published: November 2002

In a recent article (1980) G. H. Merrill has defended realism against an argument devised by Hilary Putnam. My first aim is to show that Merrill's defence is inadequate. I shall also argue that the proper conclusion of Putnam's argument is somewhat different from the conclusion Putnam himself offers.
Discussion: On The Propensity Definition of Fitness
Authors: Rosenberg Alexander
Published: November 2002

In the insightful and searching paper of Mills and Beatty (1979) the following definition of ‘fitness’, as the term figures in the theory of natural selection, is offered:

The [individual] fitness of an organism x in environment E equals n =dfn is the expected number of descendants which x will leave in E.
Discussion: Independent Testability and Experimental Type: Response to Erlichson
Authors: Laymon Ronald
Published: November 2002

One of the things I attempted to do in my paper on independent testability (1980) was to illustrate convincingly the very real difficulties of distinguishing between the accidental and essential features of a scientific experiment. The importance of this distinction is that independent testability presumably requires differences that are essential and telling and not merely accidental reflections of existing experimental technique or of the procedural preferences of the experimenter. In the case of the Michelson-Morley (MM) and Kennedy-Thorndike (KT) experiments, I showed, following a suggestion of M. G. Evans, that Grünbaum's attempt to distinguish these two experiments does not work. I also showed that certain obvious and natural variations of Grünbaum's approach do not adequately distinguish these experiments. So, for example, it will not do simply to claim that MM is characterized by equal arms and KT by unequal arms, since equal arms are required for MM only in the absence of adequate photographic registration methods. But if these methods are not available then KT is not possible. Conversely, if these methods are available, then while both MM and KT are experimentally possible, MM need not be restricted to equal arms.
Discussion: A Reply to Frankel's Criticism of Harré's Theory of Causality
Authors: Smith Joseph Wayne
Published: November 2002

Frankel (1976) has argued that the theory of causality developed by Rom Harré (Harré 1970) and his colleague Edward Madden (Harré and Madden 1975) is incoherent, since the proposal that causal claims are naturally necessary leads to a vicious infinite regression

“which ends by requiring that for any causal claim to be accorded the status of natural necessity an infinite number of causal claims must be accorded the status of natural necessities.” (Frankel 1976, p. 560)
Logic, Quantum Logic and Empiricism
Authors: Bell John , Hallett Michael
Published: November 2002

This paper treats some of the issues raised by Putnam's discussion of, and claims for, quantum logic, specifically: that its proposal is a response to experimental difficulties; that it is a reasonable replacement for classical logic because its connectives retain their classical meanings, and because it can be derived as a logic of tests. We argue that the first claim is wrong(1), and that while conjunction and disjunction can be considered to retain their classical meanings, negation cruciallydoes not.The argument is conductedviaa thorough analysis of how the meet, join and complementation operations are defined in the relevant logical structures, respectively Boolean- and ortholattices(3). Since Putnam wishes to reinstate a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, we ask how quantum logic can be a logic of realism. We show that it certainly cannot be a logic ofbivalencerealism (i.e., of truth and falsity), although itisconsistent with some form ofontologicalrealism(4). Finally, we show that while a reasonable explication of the idealized notion of test yields interesting mathematical structure, it by no means yields the rich ortholattice structure which Putnam (following Finkelstein) seeks.
Substitution and Truth in Quantum Logic
Authors: Pitowsky Itamar
Published: November 2002

If p(x1, …, xn) and q(x1 …, xn) are two logically equivalent propositions then p(π(x1), …, π(xn)) and q(π(x1), …,π(xn)) are also logically equivalent where π is an arbitrary permutation of the elementary constituents x1, …, xn. In Quantum Logic the invariance of logical equivalences breaks down. It is proved that the distribution rules of classical logic are in fact equivalent to the meta-linguistic rule of universal substitution and that the more restrictive structure of the substitution group of Quantum Logic prevents us from defining truth in a classical fashion. These observations lead to a more profound understanding of the Logic of Quantum Mechanics and of the role that symmetry principles play in that theory.

… Its decisive difference in comparison to the Classical-Model is the fact that gratings in vector-space defy superposition.

—Hermann Weyl (1949)
Quantum Logic, Conditional Probability, and Interference
Authors: Bub Jeffrey
Published: November 2002

Friedman and Putnam have argued (Friedman and Putnam 1978) that the quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us an explanation of interference that the Copenhagen interpretation cannot supply without invoking an additional ad hoc principle, the projection postulate. I show that it is possible to define a notion of equivalence of experimental arrangements relative to a pure state φ, or (correspondingly) equivalence of Boolean subalgebras in the partial Boolean algebra of projection operators of a system, which plays a role in the Copenhagen explanation of interference analogous to the role played by the material equivalence, given φ, of certain propositions in the Friedman-Putnam quantum logical analysis. I also show that the quantum logical interpretation and the Copenhagen interpretation are equally capable of avoiding the paradoxical conclusion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935). Thus, neither interference phenomena nor the correlations between separated systems provide a test case for distinguishing between the relative acceptability of the Copenhagen interpretation and the quantum logical interpretation as explanations of quantum effects.
Discussion: Quantum Logic and The Lüders Rule
Authors: Stairs Allen
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Lüders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Lüders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Lüders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all.
The Truth of Scientific Claims
Authors: MacKinnon Edward
Published: November 2002

The idea that science aspires to and routinely achieves truths about the world has been challenged in recent writings. Rather than beginning with a theory of scientific development, or of scientific explanation, we begin with a consideration of truth claims in ordinary discourse, particularly with Davidson's truth-functional semantics. Next we consider the way in which some framework features of ordinary language discourse are extended to and modified in scientific discourse. Two areas are treated in more detail: quantum theory, and the peculiar problem of semantic entailment it involves; and quantum field theory. These supply a basis for criticizing some historicist and logicist treatments of the truth of scientific claims.
A Note on Peter Gibbins’ “A Note on Quantum Logic and The Uncertainty Principle”
Authors: Jammer Max
Published: November 2002

The arguments presented by Gibbins (1981) in his Note are based on a sharp distinction between the product Δx·Δp, which refers to the ranges of position and momentum of an individual system, and the uncertainty principle ΔX·ΔP ≥ ħ/2, which expresses a statistical relation for an ensemble of systems. A critical role in Gibbins’ reasoning is played by the theorem T which states that the restriction of the dynamical variable of position x of an individual system to a finite range Δx excludes the possibility of restricting the canonically conjugate dynamical variable of momentum p to a finite range Δp.
Towards an Empirically Adequate Theory of Science
Authors: Kourany Janet A.
Published: November 2002

While there has been general agreement among modern philosophers of science that a purely a priori method is inappropriate to the task of establishing a theory of science, there has, unfortunately, been little comparable agreement regarding the method that is appropriate. I try to lay the foundations for such agreement. I first set out reasons for a purely empirical method for establishing a theory of science, and defend such a method against charges raised by Giere. I then develop some very basic criteria for the evaluation of alternative empirical methods for establishing a theory of science, and use these criteria to evaluate the two such methods that have dominated philosophic discussion in recent years—those of Lakatos and Laudan. I end by defending a revised version of Lakatos’ proposal.
On The Space-Time Ontology of Physical Theories
Authors: Manders Kenneth L.
Published: November 2002

In the correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz proposes to construe physical theory in terms of physical (spatio-temporal) relations between physical objects, thus avoiding incorporation of infinite totalities of abstract entities (such as Newtonian space) in physical ontology. It has generally been felt that this proposal cannot be carried out.

I demonstrate an equivalence between formulations postulating space-time as an infinite totality and formulations allowing only possible spatio-temporal relations of physical (point -) objects. The resulting rigorous formulations of physical theory may be seen to follow Leibniz’ suggestion quite closely. On the other hand, physical assumptions implicit in the postulation of space-time totalities are made explicit in the reconstruction of the space-time versions from the physical-relation versions.
In Defense of Convergent Realism
Authors: Hardin Clyde L. , Rosenberg Alexander
Published: November 2002

Many realists have maintained that the success of scientific theories can be explained only if they may be regarded as approximately true. Laurens Laudan has in turn contended that a necessary condition for a theory's being approximately true is that its central terms refer, and since many successful theories of the past have employed central terms which we now understand to be non-referential, realism cannot explain their success. The present paper argues that a realist can adopt a view of reference according to which a theory might plausibly be said to be approximately true even though its central terms do not refer, or alternatively, he may construe reference in such a way as to assign reference to a range of successful older theories which includes Laudan's purported counterexamples.
Empirical Adequacy
Authors: Hanna Joseph F.
Published: November 2002

In his book, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen argues for an anti-realist view of science according to which the sole epistemological aim of science is to “save the phenomena”. As originally conceived, his constructive empiricism is strongly extensional, but in his account of the empirical adequacy of probabilistic theories, van Fraassen reluctantly abandons this extensional position, arguing that modal (intensional) notions are unavoidable in interpreting probability. I argue in this paper that van Fraassen has not presented the strongest possible case for a fully extensional account of empirical adequacy. On the present account, a probabilistic theory is empirically adequate just in case there is no theory that has a higher likelihood relative to all the phenomena in the actual world. I prove that a theory is empirically adequate if and only if the probability attributed to each observable event that occurs in the actual world is its limiting relative frequency. Thus, in so far as one is concerned with the empirical adequacy (rather than with the literal truth) of probabilistic theories, strict relative frequencies provide an adequate basis for “interpreting probability”.

Probabilistic theories are treated in a genuine measurement context. In this connection I distinguish between worlds that are “strongly infinite” and worlds that are only “weakly infinite”. It is characteristic of the former worlds that there is no limit to the precision of actual measurements. I show by example that in some “strongly infinite” worlds, theories will be empirically adequate only if observables are represented by continuous (rather than discrete) random variables. The range of such examples is clarified by a theorem which states necessary and sufficient conditions under which the “phenomena can be saved” without recourse to continuous random variables and real numbers.
Are There Causal Relations Among Dependent Variables?
Authors: Hausman Daniel
Published: November 2002

This paper makes explicit and takes issue with the bizarre view, which is unfortunately prevalent among social scientists, that causal relations are features of models only. There are some good reasons to represent causal factors with independent variables. But the association between causes and independent variables is only a desideratum in model construction. It is not a criterion for judging which things are causes and which are effects.
Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
Authors: Weirich Paul
Published: November 2002

The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.
Analysis and Subsumption in the Behaviorism of Hull
Authors: Cummins Robert
Published: November 2002

The background hypothesis of this essay is that psychological phenomena are typically explained, not by subsuming them under psychological laws, but by functional analysis. Causal subsumption is an appropriate strategy for explaining changes of state, but not for explaining capacities, and it is capacities that are the central explananda of psychology. The contrast between functional analysis and causal subsumption is illustrated, and the background hypothesis supported, by a critical reassessment of the motivational psychology of Clark Hull. I argue that Hull's work makes little sense construed along the subsumptivist lines he advocated himself, but emerges as both interersting and methodologically sound when construed as an exercise in the sort of functional analysis featured in contemporary cognitive science.
The Age of the Universe
Authors: Acock Malcolm
Published: November 2002

This paper discusses “Russell's hypothesis” that the world sprang into existence five minutes ago. The three most widely accepted “solutions” to the Russell's hypothesis problem are shown to be unsatisfactory.

Two main points of interest are involved in the paper's discussion. First, I show all the widely accepted “solutions” to be unacceptable by using the same device—alternatives to Russell's hypothesis. The device, which has never previously been applied to this problem, is a familiar one in discussions of the problem of induction. (Parallels between these two problems are sketched at the paper's end.) Second, the discussion introduces the new concept of crucial consequences for hypotheses that are otherwise different in only trivial linguistic ways.
Discussion: Wright on Teleological Descriptions of Goal-Directed Behavior
Authors: Nissen Lowell
Published: November 2002

Larry Wright's analysis of teleological description of goal-directed behavior, though ingenious and insightful, errs in the following ways: it incorrectly claims that intentional human action exhibits consequence-etiology, making it impossible, contrary to his claim, for reference to consequence-etiology to be metaphorically transmitted to teleological descriptions of nonhuman behavior; it does not remove the threat of reverse causation for nonhuman behavior; it assumes in the face of contrary evidence that reference to purpose drops out in metaphorical extension; and it cannot account for unrequired behavior directed toward impossible goals.
Realist Principles
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: November 2002

We list, with discussions, various principles of scientific realism, in order to exhibit their diversity and to emphasize certain serious problems of formulation. Ontological and epistemological principles are distinguished. Within the former category, some framed in semantic terms (truth, reference) serve their purpose vis-à-vis instrumentalism (Part 1). They fail, however, to distinguish the realist from a wide variety of (constructional) empiricists. Part 2 seeks purely ontological formulations, so devised that the empiricist cannot reconstruct them from within. The main task here is to characterize “independence of mind”. A pair of notions, “physical invariance” and “anti-determination”, seem to work. They enable us to assess anew “the problem of constructing the physical out of the phenomenal” (yielding certain clarifications demanded by Goodman). Modern cosmology, especially, is seen to present insuperable obstacles to such empiricist approaches to science. The final section on epistemological principles reveals a morass better avoided in favor of an elementary claim about perception, together with a rejection of any absolute observation/theory dichotomy. Finally, a positive, realist notion of “observable-in-principle” is sketched, and it is suggested that, from the perspective of relativistic cosmology, even this defines no boundary to potential knowledge.
Rationality and Charity
Authors: Thagard Paul , Nisbett Richard E.
Published: November 2002

Quine and others have recommended principles of charity which discourage judgments of irrationality. Such principles have been proposed to govern translation, psychology, and economics. After comparing principles of charity of different degrees of severity, we argue that the stronger principles are likely to block understanding of human behavior and impede progress toward improving it. We support a moderate principle of charity which leaves room for empirically justified judgments of irrationality.
E. C. Tolman and the Intervening Variable: A Study in the Epistemological History of Psychology
Authors: Amundson Ron
Published: November 2002

E. C. Tolman's ‘purposive behaviorism’ is commonly interpreted as an attempt to operationalize a cognitivist theory of learning by the use of the ‘Intervening Variable’ (IV). Tolman would thus be a counterinstance to an otherwise reliable correlation of cognitivism with realism, andS-Rbehaviorism with operationalism. A study of Tolman's epistemological background, with a careful reading of his methodological writings, shows the common interpretation to be false. Tolman was a cognitivist and a realist. His ‘IV’ has been systematically misinterpreted by both behaviorists and antibehaviorists. For this reason, Tolman's alliance with modern cognitivism and his influence on its development have been underestimated.
The Philosophy of Exploratory Data Analysis
Authors: Good I. J.
Published: November 2002

This paper attempts to define Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) more precisely than usual, and to produce the beginnings of a philosophy of this topical and somewhat novel branch of statistics.

Adata setis, roughly speaking, a collection ofk-tuples for somek.In both descriptive statistics and in EDA, thesek-tuples, or functions of them, are represented in a manner matched to human and computer abilities with a view to finding patterns that are not “kinkera”. Akinkusis a pattern that has a negligible probability of being even partly potentially explicable. A potentially explicable pattern is one for which there probably exists a hypothesis of adequate “explicativity”, which is another technical probabilistic concept. A pattern can be judged to be probably potentially explicable even if we cannot find an explanation. The theory of probability understood here is one of partially ordered (interval-valued), subjective (personal) probabilities. Among other topics relevant to a philosophy of EDA are the “reduction” of data; Francis Bacon's philosophy of science; the automatic formulation of hypotheses; successive deepening of hypotheses; neurophysiology; and rationality of type II.
Tendencies
Authors: Gibson Quentin
Published: November 2002

The question is raised, what is going on when there is a tendency for something to happen, but it does not happen. A conspicuous case is that in which there is an equilibrium between opposing forces. One answer, given, for example, by Anscombe and Geach, Harré, and Bhaskar, is that such tendencies are in a sense real, though not manifest. The other answer, given, for example, by Braithwaite and Mackie, is that statements of tendencies are conditional statements about what is manifest but ones in which some antecedents are not specified. The first of these answers is criticized and the second defended.
Discussion: Stich and Nisbett on Justifying Inference Rules
Authors: Conee Earl , Feldman Richard
Published: November 2002

Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts.
Pair Distributions and Conditional Independence: Some Hints about the Structure of Strange Quantum Correlations
Authors: Mermin N. D.
Published: November 2002

Some statistical questions that arise in studies of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations are given precise and complete answers for a very simple but artificial set of pair distributions. Some recent results and conjectures about hidden variable representations of the more complex distributions that describe the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment are examined in the light of the behavior of the simple model.
The Reference Class
Authors: Kyburg Henry E.
Published: November 2002

The system presented by the author in The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference (Kyburg 1974) suffered from certain technical difficulties, and from a major practical difficulty; it was hard to be sure, in discussing examples and applications, when you had got hold of the right reference class. The present paper, concerned mainly with the characterization of randomness, resolves the technical difficulties and provides a well structured framework for the choice of a reference class. The definition of randomness that leads to this framework is simplified and clarified in a number of respects. It resolves certain puzzles raised by S. Spielman and W. Harper in their contributions to Profiles: Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Isaac Levi (R. Bogdan (ed.) 1982).
A Conflict between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book
Authors: Seidenfeld Teddy , Schervish Mark J.
Published: November 2002

For Savage (1954) as for de Finetti (1974), the existence of subjective (personal) probability is a consequence of the normative theory of preference. (De Finetti achieves the reduction of belief to desire with his generalized Dutch-Book argument for previsions.) Both Savage and de Finetti rebel against legislating countable additivity for subjective probability. They require merely that probability be finitely additive. Simultaneously, they insist that their theories of preference are weak, accommodating all but self-defeating desires. In this paper we dispute these claims by showing that the following three cannot simultaneously hold:

(i) Coherent belief is reducible to rational preference, i.e. the generalized Dutch-Book argument fixes standards of coherence.

(ii) Finitely additive probability is coherent.

(iii) Admissible preference structures may be free of consequences, i.e. they may lack prizes whose values are robust against all contingencies.
Tempo and Mode in Evolution: Punctuated Equilibria and the Modern Synthetic Theory
Authors: Thompson Paul
Published: November 2002

Several paleontologists have recently challenged the explanatory adequacy of the modern synthetic theory of evolution. Their position is that, contrary to the prevailing view that evolutionary change is gradual, the fossil record manifests long periods of species stasis (equilibrium) punctuated by periods of rapid species formation. And, they argue, this punctuated equilibria pattern challenges the gradualist, adaptationist and extrapolationist assumptions of the modern synthetic theory of evolution and supports a hierarchical, non-extrapolationist (non-reductionist) view of evolution. In this paper I argue that the challenge rests on an inadequate characterization of the modern synthetic theory and that, even accepting punctuated equilibria and an irreducible evolutionary hierarchy, the modern synthetic theory is adequate to explain evolutionary change at all levels of the hierarchy.
Inconsistent Theories as Scientific Objectives
Authors: Madan Dilip B.
Published: November 2002

Theories are conceptualized as predictors of phenomena using computable functions acting on prior world information. Formally, the concept of bounded prior world recursive function is defined and used as a candidate for a potential theory. An artificial world of fact is then constructed for which there exist two inconsistent best theories, in that they cannot be improved upon, and these theories are maximally inconsistent in that every best theory is a compromise. It is argued that in such a world the scientific objective would be to find these maximally inconsistent theories. The construction is motivated as an attempt to illustrate the status of theory in the social sciences and in economics, in particular.
Glymour on Evidential Relevance
Authors: Christensen David
Published: November 2002

Glymour's “bootstrap” account of confirmation is designed to provide an analysis of evidential relevance, which has been a serious problem for hypothetico-deductivism. As set out in Theory and Evidence, however, the “bootstrap” condition allows confirmation in clear cases of evidential irrelevance. The difficulties with Glymour's account seem to be due to a basic feature which it shares with hypothetico-deductive accounts, and which may explain why neither can give a satisfactory analysis of evidential relevance.
Siegel on Naturalized Epistemology and Natural Science
Authors: Roth Paul A.
Published: November 2002

What is the relation of epistemology, understood as the study of the evaluation of knowledge claims, and empirical psychology, understood as the study of the causal generation of a person's beliefs? Quine maintains that the relation is one of “mutual containment”.

Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is contained in natural science, as a chapter of psychology. … We are studying how the human subject of our study posits bodies and projects his physics from his data, and we appreciate that our position in the world is just like his. Our very epistemological enterprise, therefore, and the psychology wherein it is a component chapter, and the whole of natural science wherein psychology is a component book—all this is our own construction or projection from stimulations like those we were meting out to our epistemological subject. There is thus reciprocal containment, though containment in different senses: epistemology in natural science and natural science in epistemology (Quine 1969, p. 83).
Kordig's Paradox Objection to Radical Meaning Variance Theories
Authors: Galle Peter
Published: November 2002

In his book, The Justification of Scientific Change, Carl Kordig claims that the radical meaning variance view of Feyerabend and others becomes ensnared in a self-referential paradox. The accusation fails because it rests upon a confusion of that view with its “counterparts” in other linguistic/theoretical contexts.
Decision Theory as Philosophy
Authors: Kaplan Mark
Published: November 2002

It is not easy to assess the extent to which decision theory constitutes a contribution to philosophy. On the one hand, the enthusiasts seem tirelessly to churn out highly technical Bayesian reconstructions of scientific practice. On the other hand, their opponents dismiss the result as a body of theory that is overidealized and falsely precise, bearing no important relation to the actual conduct of inquiry. And most philosophers seem happy to ignore the debate altogether and pursue a theory of inquiry as best they can. I take the opponents’ criticism seriously, but I am still an enthusiast. The aim of this paper is to explain why. The paper consists of an accessible argument for a Bayesian decision theory designed to enable any interested philosopher to see how the insights of decision theory provide, without idealization or false precision, a fundamental (and somewhat revolutionary) contribution to our understanding of the enterprise of rational inquiry.
Quantum Logic, Realism, and Value Definiteness
Authors: Stairs Allen
Published: November 2002

One of the most interesting programs in the foundations of quantum mechanics is therealist quantum logicapproach associated with Putnam, Bub, Demopoulos and Friedman (and which is the focus of my own research.) I believe that realist quantum logic is our best hope for making sense of quantum mechanics, but I have come to suspect that the usual version may not be the correct one. In this paper, I would like to say why and to propose an alternative.
Established Theories
Authors: Rohrlich Fritz , Hardin Larry
Published: November 2002

Criteria are given to characterize mature theories in contradistinction to developing theories. We lean heavily on the physical sciences. An established theory is defined as a mature one with known validity limits. The approximate truth of such theories is thereby given a quantitative character. Superseding theories do not falsify established theories because the latter are protected by their validity limits. This view of scientific realism leads to ontological levels and cumulativity of knowledge. It is applied to a defense of realism against recent attacks by Laudan.
Frequency-Dependent Causation: A Defense of Giere
Authors: Collier John
Published: November 2002

Ronald Giere's analysis of causal effectiveness in populations involves the comparison of two hypothetical populations, one in which every individual has the suspected causal factor, and the other in which none do. Elliott Sober has argued that in cases where causal effectiveness depends on relative population sizes, Giere's analysis breaks down. I take issue with this claim, and argue to the contrary that Giere's analysis can help provide insight into these cases.
Revisions of Bootstrap Testing
Authors: Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

Scientific arguments often attribute the credit or blame for particular experimental or observational results to fragments of theories rather than to the whole of them. The thesis of Theory and Evidence (Glymour 1980) is that there are structural criteria that account for at least part of the distribution of credit and blame; the book also attempts a tentative formal characterization of one structural criterion. David Christensen (1983) has produced a series of counterexamples which show that the formal characterization is untenable. The question remains whether the failure is due to an oversight in the formal theory or to the falsity of the very idea that there are structural criteria for evidential relevance. Since the counterexamples are uniformly eliminated by a single formal principle, I incline to the first answer.
Levi, Petersen, and Direct Inference
Authors: Kyburg Henry E.
Published: November 2002

In (1981), Levi has laid out the issues involving chances, frequencies, and direct inference with admirable precision. Nevertheless, puzzles remain. The chief puzzle to which I wish to draw attention is this: Under certain circumstances, we can combine knowledge of chances and knowledge of frequencies to yield new knowledge of chances. If Petersen is “drawn at random” from among Swedes, and we also know that the proportion of Protestants among Swedes is 0.9, then we can say that the chance that Petersen is a Protestant is 0.9. But if we apply this principle generally, we are led to generally trivial results: direct inference yields probabilities constrained only to lie in a broad interval like [0, 1]. On the other hand, if we can't always combine knowledge of chances and knowledge of frequencies to get new knowledge of chances, or if this knowledge can be overridden by other considerations, how do we know when we can usefully apply direct inference?
Kyburg on Random Designators
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: November 2002

To ground judgments of credal probability on knowledge of chance via direct inference, one should appeal to the information about chances available relative to the most specific description known to be true of the trial event.

Thus, to obtain a judgment of credal probability concerning the hypothesis that coin a landed heads at t given that it is known that at t it is known that a was tossed by Levi in 728 Philosophy Hall, the pertinent knowledge of chances concerns the chances of coin a landing heads on a toss of coin a which is (i) a toss at t, (ii) a toss in 728 Philosophy Hall and (iii) a toss by Levi. In many contexts, appeal is made to knowledge of the chance of coin a landing heads on a toss. This appeal, when legitimate, takes for granted that the additional information about the specific tossing listed in (i), (ii) and (iii) is stochastically irrelevant to landing heads and, hence, may be ignored. Such an assumption is a substantive presupposition about chances and not an a priori, self evident or pragmatic principle of methodology.