bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Education
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

This chapter tackles issues that lie at the intersection of epistemology and the philosophy of education. In keeping with the veritistic theme, it holds that a primary aim of education is the learning of truths, though this does not mean that teachers should always instruct students rather than allow them to learn independently. The ostensible conflict between multiculturalism and a truth‐oriented aim of education is more appearance than reality. That diverse cultural traditions have diverse values, experiences, and perspectives is itself a truth that needs to be learnt. The role of critical thinking versus trust in education is discussed in detail, given its overlap with the topic of testimony in epistemology.
The Integration Challenge
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them. Reconciliation in a given domain may be achieved by re‐conceiving the metaphysics of that domain, or its epistemology, or both. More radically, reconciliation may involve offering slimmed‐down truth conditions, or abandoning the notion of truth conditions altogether for the domain. Options that reject the possibility of integration are scepticism and the denial that an apparent domain involves any genuine subject matter at all. Illustrations of these strategies are given in the cases of necessity, the past, self‐knowledge, and freedom of the will.
The Unity Argument
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: October 2003

The Unity Argument states that the ability to think of one's perceptions as perceptions of objects in the weighty sense is necessary for unity of consciousness. A distinction is drawn between two versions of the Unity Argument. The first turns on the idea that unity of consciousness involves what P. F. Strawson calls ’transcendental’ self‐consciousness. The second turns on the idea that unity of consciousness involves ’personal’ self‐consciousness.
Originality and Value
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Raises the question of whether there is, as is often proposed, an intricate relation between the originality of a work of art and its aesthetic merit or value. Sibley follows Beardsley in asserting that originality, in a non-evaluative sense that concerns merely difference, has no bearing on value. He is explicit, however, about the need to distinguish between different uses of ‘original’ in order to reveal the ambiguities underlying the apparent disagreements of commentators with regard to the importance of originality.
Aesthetic Judgements: Pebbles, Faces, and Fields of Litter
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Summarises the argument of ch. 12 and applies its conclusion about adjectives in general to aesthetic adjectives like ‘beautiful’, ‘graceful’, ‘pretty’ or ‘elegant’. Sibley’s suggestion is that some aesthetic judgements are legitimately predicative, that is to say, some things can legitimately be judged, e.g. beautiful without ‘beautiful’ being used predicatively: one need not know what the things are because the nouns or concepts in question set no restrictive standards vis-à-vis beauty or beauty-giving properties. With nouns that do set standards incorporating notions of appropriateness, aesthetic judgements are attributive.
Against Ordinary Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

This chapter lays out the basic elements of ordinary morality, according to which there is only a limited requirement to promote the overall good. In particular, ‘constraints’ impose restrictions on permissible means of promoting the good, and ‘options’ free us of the obligation to promote the good – even within the limits set by those constraints. We are free to make large sacrifices for others, but typically are not required to do so. This is an intuitively attractive position, but there is more involved in defending a moral view than showing its intuitive appeal. The most natural defence of options appeals to the cost to the agent of promoting the good, but this appeal leads to unacceptable results unless we can first defend constraints as well, and many straightforward attempts to defend constraints are inadequate.
The Structure of Ordinary Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

This chapter explores certain technical details concerning the characterization of ordinary morality. First, it argues that defenders of ordinary morality believe in the existence of a pro tanto reason to promote the good, a reason that always has weight, even if it can be overridden. Second, it offers an account of what conditions must be met for there to be a moral requirement to perform a given act. Third, it sketches in general terms what the defender of ordinary morality must show if both options and constraints are to be defended. Finally, it argues that this overall approach does not beg any questions against the defender of ordinary morality.
Intending Harm
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

The second way to characterize a constraint against harm is as a constraint against intending harm. This presupposes a distinction between harm that is intended as a means or an end, and harm that is merely foreseen as an unintended side effect. We can again provide some intuitive support for this distinction – in terms of either the idea of using someone or the idea of aiming at evil – but here too the distinction ends up sorting cases in ways that are intuitively unattractive. And once again, attempts to defend the relevance of the distinction are ultimately unsuccessful, as are attempts to show that the distinction would support a constraint.
Without Constraints
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

Given the difficulties surrounding the attempt to defend constraints, we need to reconsider the possibility of defending options without assuming the existence of constraints. A view that incorporated options but not constraints would be a departure from ordinary morality, but might be attractive nonetheless. This chapter first explores the structure of such a theory, and then argues that it cannot avoid unacceptable implications unless it presupposes the moral relevance of one of the distinctions discussed in the two previous chapters, such as the distinction between doing and allowing harm. But that distinction remains problematic and inadequately supported, even given the more limited use being made of it here.
The Appeal to Cost
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins to examine the defence of options in terms of an appeal to the potential cost to the agent of promoting the good. It suggests, first, that cost here should be understood in terms of the loss involved to the agent's ability to promote his various interests, and it examines how well such an account fits with ordinary views about the range of options. It then asks how, exactly, the appeal to cost is supposed to justify options. The most promising answer takes off from a general account of the nature of the personal point of view, combined with the thought that morality must adequately reflect the nature of people.
The Fabric of Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

The Fabric of Character explores Aristotle's account of virtuous character and its development. I argue that traditional conceptions of Aristotelian habituation have ignored the critical role of practical reason in both the development of virtue and the emotions constitutive of virtue. Virtue is, thus, neither the product of mindless drill nor of well‐behaved, but ultimately stupid emotions. If the virtuous person is, as Aristotle insists, also practically wise, then the path to a knowing kind of virtue must itself be critical and reflective. Character development is also a social project, on Aristotle's view, and the book explores the role of friendship (philia) in both the early and more mature stages of character growth. Key to a shared life is the possibility of coordinated ends and choices as well as empathetic attunement. I suggest an Aristotelian account of this kind of coordination and its role in the construction of happiness or eudaimonia. Finally, I explore the role of moral perception within virtue, and the epistemic role of emotions in discerning moral salience.
The Choices of a Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy
Published: October 2003

I frame the chapter by taking up two related objections—that Aristotle lacks an adequate account of moral reasoning about the ends of good living and that he lacks an account of future intention. I try to meet both objections, arguing that Aristotle has a systematic account of deliberation about how best to live over the course of a life and that this is a form of deliberating about future plans and intentions. Central to the account is the notion of prohairesis or reasoned choice and its relationship to stable character.
The Background to Kant's Mature Theory of the Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul
Published: October 2003

Introduces major theories of the sublime preceding Kant's. These feature Longinus, Dennis, Addison, and Burke. Kant's pre‐critical theory of the sublime is outlined.
Axioms
Authors: Maddy Penelope
Published: October 2003

Pursues the theoretical level of the two‐tiered epistemology of set theoretic realism, the level at which more abstract axioms can be justified by their consequences at more intuitive levels. I outline the pre‐axiomatic development of set theory out of Cantor's researches, describe how axiomatization arose in the course of Zermelo's efforts to prove Cantor's Well‐ordering Theorem, and review the controversy over the Axiom of Choice. Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and various questions of descriptive set theory were eventually shown to be independent of the standard axioms, and new axiom candidates—Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility, on the one hand, determinacy and large cardinal axioms, on the other—offer dramatically different solutions. This situation presents a new epistemic challenge to the set theoretic realist: on what grounds can we adjudicate between new axiom candidates?
Reason and Reasons
Authors: Grice Paul
Published: October 2003

Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that combine the two by being reasons acted upon and regarded as justifying by the agent. Finally, he introduces a structural representation for practical and alethic justificatory reasons that shows that ‘common modals’ (ought, must, necessary, etc.) are used univocally on both sides of the practical/alethic divide. This representation consists of a single modal operator ‘Acc’ (‘it is acceptable that’), two mood‐operators ‘!’ (practical ) and ‘⊥’ (alethic), and a phrastic ‘r’ that these operators apply to.
The Scientific Image
Authors: Fraassen Bas. C. van
Published: October 2003

This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.
Gentle Polemics1
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

This chapter parodies Aquinas’ Five Ways to prove the existence of God by displaying similar arguments reminiscent of those often given in support of scientific realism. This is followed by a parody of scientific realists’ attempts to defend themselves against objections to such arguments.
The Structure of the Private Language Argument
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Having clarified the private language argument, Pears relates it to the earlier discussion of phenomenalism, which by itself constitutes a basis of objection against Wittgenstein's argument. Pears then works out the relation between the private language argument and the thesis that sensation language grafted on to a complex pre‐linguistic structure. These two discussions constitute the basis on which the deep structure of the private language argument is to be revealed.
Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: October 2003

The facticity view of fundamental laws of physics takes them to state facts about reality. To preserve the facticity of laws in the face of complex phenomena with multiple intervening factors, composition of causes, often by vector addition, is invoked. However, this addition should be read only as a metaphor, for only the resultant force is real. The truth and the explanatory power of laws can both be preserved by viewing laws as describing causal powers (or capacities) that objects possess, but this view would require a new account of explanation.
The Simulacrum Account of Explanation
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: October 2003

The very paucity of bridge principles in physics is important for increasing the explanatory power of fundamental theories, given that physics usually employs a few well‐understood principles to model many different aspects of physical processes. However, this also implies that the fundamental laws of physics do not govern objects in the real world, but rather only objects in models. Consequently, the proper account of explanation in science is the ‘simulacrum’ view. On this account, to explain is to construct a model that fits the phenomenon into the basic framework of the theory, and then to derive analogues for its phenomenological laws.
Rational Belief
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Distinguishes five different kinds of rationality that a belief may possess. It may be rational in being probable, given the believer's evidence and his inductive standards; or probable, given the believer's evidence and correct inductive standards. Or it may be rational in being the result of what the believer regards as adequate investigation, or the result of adequate investigation by the believer's own standards, or the result of adequate investigation by correct standards. Correct standards require a subject to investigate the truth of a proposition; insofar as its initial probability is not very close to l or 0, there is an initial probability that investigation will change the probability, and having a true belief on the issue is important relative to other demands on the subject's time.
Utilitarian Accounts: The Desire Account Developed
Authors: Griffin James
Published: October 2003

This chapter, the second of two on utilitarian accounts of well‐being, seeks to identify the best development of the desire account. It argues that the ancient question, valuable because desired, or desired because valuable, should be answered, and there is no priority. The best form of the desire account is an informed‐desire account, in which the person is well informed about the desire. An informed desire is one formed in proper appreciation of the nature of the object of the desire. This high standard raises the question whether the desire account, fully developed, is still in accord with the utilitarian tradition.
Fairness
Authors: Griffin James
Published: October 2003

Looks at problems of fairness arising from cooperation problems (the prisoner's dilemma, free‐riding, etc.). It proposes a ‘minimal solution’ to free‐rider problems, by considering the least that has to be done to ensure fairness in these situations: viz. the introduction of a principle of equal chances (and the establishment of its relation to other moral principles). It ends by considering the objection that the proposed solution to the free‐rider problem is too weak. It then assesses tougher Kantian and various other de‐ontological solutions, which it finds too strict.
Desert
Authors: Griffin James
Published: October 2003

Many moral views give no deep place to desert: utilitarianism, Kant, Rawls’ contractualism. Is desert a moral reason for action? Is merit? The chapter argues that, although merit can be a reason to praise or thank or honour a person, and to fail to one or other of these things may be wrong, it is not a moral reason or a moral wrong. Demerit is different: though both reward and punishment are responses with standards of appropriateness, punishment is a response to something moral and gets its own moral status from that. It concurs with an account of the forms of punishment that are morally justified.
Redemption
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Each human owes atonement to God for his own sins, and owes it to his fellow humans to help them to make atonement to God for their sins. Only an individual sinner can repent and make apology, but others can provide him with the means to make reparation (and penance) (the two other parts of atonement). Jesus Christ, who, being God, owed nothing to God, provided his life and death as something that we can offer to God as our reparation (and penance) for our own sins and those of our fellows. This model of atonement, tantamount to the ‘satisfaction’ model of Anselm (as qualified by Aquinas) and the to the biblical model of ‘sacrifice’, is the most satisfactory of the traditional theological models of the Atonement.
Practical Dilemmas
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Explains why C cannot be directly self‐defeating. Theories are agent‐relative if they give different agents different aims. Two such theories are S and Common Sense Morality, or M. It is often true that, if each of several people does what would be best for themselves, that would be worse for all these people. In such cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating. In moral analogues of such cases, M is similarly self‐defeating. The chapter describes how these problems can have political, psychological, or moral solutions.
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Examines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Examines the Present‐aim Theory of rationality, or P; The Instrumental and Deliberative Theories, how desires can be intrinsically irrational, or rationally required; the Critical Present‐aim Theory, or CP; the relations between P, S, CP and morality; and Psychological egoism; offers the best objection to S; and how temporal neutrality is not what distinguishes S from P, or CP.
Different Attitudes to Time
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Discusses whether it is irrational to give no weight to past desires – desires that depend on value judgements or ideals; three attitudes to time: caring more about, or being biased towards, what is near, what is in the future and what is present – whether these attitudes are rational; the direction of causation; how it would be better for us if we were temporally neutral; Time's passage; and the asymmetry in our attitudes to our own lives and the lives of others.
The Non‐Identity Problem
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Examines how our identity depends on when we were conceived. It discusses cases that involve all and only the same people, same numbers but different people, and different numbers of people; what weight we should give to the interests of future people. It examines the case of a young girl's child; how lowering the quality of life might be worse for no one; and whether this fact makes any moral difference.
The Repugnant Conclusion
Authors: Parfit Derek
Published: October 2003

Is it better if more people live? This chapter examines the effects of population growth on existing people, overpopulation, whether a decline in the quality of life could always be made up for by a sufficient increase in the number of people living. It discusses a repugnant conclusion and the level at which lives cease to be worth living.
The Archimedean Point
Authors: Gauthier David
Published: October 2003

The Archimedean point is one from which a rational individual may exert the force needed to govern the moral realm, and hence one in which she must choose and act aware that she is a person with preferences but unaware of the content of those preferences, and so impartially. We contrast this person, the ideal actor, with other idealizing conceptions in moral theory, the noumenal self, the ideal observer, the ideal sympathizer, and the ideal proprietor. We then characterize choice from the Archimedean point, rejecting the views of John Harsanyi and John Rawls, and arguing instead that the ideal actor would choose the proviso, the market in conditions of perfect competition, and the principle of minimax relative concession. Thus, analysis from the Archimedean point confirms the conclusions about rational choice reached in previous chapters.
Existence and Goodness
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Argues that objective value is capable of explaining, not just our believing this or that, but also the very existence of order. The natural order exists because it is good that it should do so. This idea, I claim, is a natural extension of ordinary thinking. I also argue that the explanation of the existence of the world directly in terms of goodness is to be preferred to an account that introduces a mediating God, who creates the world because he perceives that it would be good that such a world should exist; and further, that it is reasonable to prefer it to an account according to which the existence of the world has no explanation.
Goodness and God
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Discusses the relationship between God and morality. I argue that the most satisfying view identifies the will of God with the basic facts about goodness. This, I claim, yields an abstract conception of God, according to which to say that the world exists because it is good is to say that it was created by God. I argue further that God, so conceived, can be thought of, not only as the creator of the world, but as reacting to the world, as possessing knowledge, and as loving. I reject, however, the identification of duty with the content on divine commands.
The Problem of Evil
Authors: Rice Hugh
Published: October 2003

Discusses the problem of evil, and, in particular, the question whether the world could have been created by God, when he is conceived in the way I have proposed. I consider the way in which the existence of free will might make the existence of evil in a good world inevitable, and whether the existence of free will is essential to any solution. I also consider the problem posed by unintended evil and the existence of terrible lives.
The Role of Conceptual Analysis
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives an account of what conceptual analysis is in terms of how it makes folk theory explicit by drawing on intuitions about possible cases and how, so understood, it solves the location problem outlined in Ch. 1. It is argued that the approach is less anti‐Quinean than it might seem.
Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: October 2003

Work by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke has made us sensitive to the distinction between metaphysical necessity and conceptual necessity, and between being necessary and being a priori. This chapter relates these matters to the discussion of conceptual analysis given in Ch. 2 and uses the apparatus of two‐dimensional modal logic and the associated distinction between A‐intensions and C‐intensions (or primary and secondary intensions, respectively, in David Chalmers’ terms) to argue that physicalism is committed to the thesis that the mental is in principle a priori derivable from the physical.
Points of View
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I begin by raising the question whether there can be ‘absolute representations’. This is equivalent to the question whether the world can be represented from no point of view, absoluteness being an extreme form of objectivity. I probe the question, explain its significance and argue for an affirmative answer. I then consider arguments for a negative answer, and suggest that the most compelling of these depend on a kind of transcendental idealism that can be extracted from the work of Kant and Wittgenstein. The problem with such arguments is that the transcendental idealism in question is incoherent. But whence then its appeal? My diagnosis is that such transcendental idealism is the nonsense that results from attempting to express ineffable knowledge that we have. I then apply this idea to a range of further philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject matter of mathematics, anti‐realism, value, and God.
Chapter Two
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

I next consider the significance of my question. I give various reasons for thinking that a negative answer would be disquieting. Such an answer would signal limits to how objective we can be; it would discredit the ambitions of science, or at any rate of physics; it would exacerbate certain problems associated with disagreement and relativism; it would pose a threat to our idea of reality; and it would curb a basic aspiration that we have to transcend our own finitude.
Chapter Five
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: October 2003

Having argued for an affirmative answer to my question, I consider arguments for a negative answer to it. With the important exception of those arguments in which the Basic Assumption is rejected, I think I can resist each of these. (This typically involves denying that what I call ‘outlooks’—ways of seeing the world—correspond to points of view.) But in the case of arguments in which the Basic Assumption is rejected, I seem to reach an impasse. There is, however, some prospect of reconciliation. This comes in a species of transcendental idealism whereby all our representations are from a ‘transcendent’ point of view and whereby the Basic Argument, though it has to be rejected at that ‘transcendent’ level, can be retained at a ‘non‐transcendent’ level.
Religion, Tradition, and Natural Theology
Authors: Barr James
Published: October 2003

Widens the context so as to bring in the conceptions of general theism and world religion, and to consider how far these conceptions may fit with those of the Bible.
The Life and Work of Christ
Authors: Davies Brian
Published: October 2003

According to I Timothy I: 15, ‘Christ Jesus came into the world in order to save sinners’, and Thomas Aquinas, of course, accepts this. ‘The work of the Incarnation’, he says, ‘was directed chiefly to the restoration of the human race through the removal of sin.’ According to him, God became incarnate so that sinners might he brought back to God. But how can the Incarnation lead to this effect, and how can the fact that Christ was God do anything to bring us anything we might think of as salvation? This chapter chiefly looks at the ways in which Aquinas answers these questions. The different sections of the chapter look at: the general picture; sin and the Incarnation; satisfaction – the restoration of people subject to sin to a right relationship with God through Christ's suffering and death; the idea that something more (grace) is required for Christ's satisfaction to be effective in delivering from us sin; the receipt of justification by virtue of Christ's grace; and the resurrection and ascension of Christ.
Foundations of Liberalism
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

Foundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.
Introduction
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

This chapter defines the main terms and the project of the book, and specifically situates the problem of the relation of self‐interest and morality in the larger philosophical context.
Gewirth and the Project of Entailment
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines the Kantian argument put forward by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality, that morality, which is identified with liberal principles of justice, is entailed in the standpoint of self‐interest, and can be discerned through the exercise of theoretical reason. This chapter argues that it fails to overcome the dualisms that bedevilled Kant's version of this argument.
Contextual Arguments for Liberalism
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

Contextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the derivation of liberal principles from a neutral starting point and claim that their liberal principles are justified because they are the most appropriate response to the circumstances that obtain in modern society, and particularly the circumstance of moral pluralism.
Perfectionist Arguments for Liberalism
Authors: Moore Margaret
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines Will Kymlicka's argument in Liberalism, Community and Culture and Joseph Raz's argument in The Morality of Freedom, both of which justify liberal political principles in terms of a (thin) conception of the good life as embodying autonomy.
The Revolt Against the West and International Society
Authors: Armstrong David
Published: October 2003

The Second World War was followed by a new kind of challenge to international society from radical and revolutionary Third World states. Sukarno's Indonesia, Castro's Cuba, Mao's China, Gaddafi's Libya, and Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran all displayed different aspects of this challenge. All shared an underlying perception of world politics in terms of an ongoing conflict between rich and poor, oppressed and oppressors, and old and new, which made them advocates of international revolution in some form. All encountered strong opposition from the US.
Norms, Rules, and Laws
Authors: Armstrong David
Published: October 2003

Revolutionary states have challenged international law in several ways. They tend to reject the underlying notion of international law that there is a society of states as well as the emphasis on maintaining order. They also see themselves as serving a higher and more permanent law—whether they define it in terms of god, nature, or history—than any transient, man‐made substitute. The French, American, Soviet, Chinese, and Iranian responses to international law are considered in detail. International law seems to grow in significance whenever it is placed under greatest pressure, and it may give intellectual coherence as well as authority to the established powers’ response to revolutionary states.
Conclusion
Authors: Armstrong David
Published: October 2003

The study has tried to maintain a focus on the interaction between revolutionary states and the sovereignty‐based notion of international society that has been termed here ‘the Westphalian conception of international society’. International order is a fundamental principle of international society and also one that has been frequently challenged by revolutionary states. It is possible to discern elements of a pattern in the interaction between international society and revolutionary states. There is always a close relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of revolutionary states. Revolutionary states encounter strong pressures to become socialized into the international society of which they find themselves part, but they have also over time influenced processes of change within international society.
Introduction
Authors: Miller David
Published: October 2003

Market socialism is an alternative both to the free‐market thinking of the libertarian Right and to the statist thinking of many socialists. It aims to combine the freedom and efficiency advantages of markets with a more democratic organization of work and more equal distribution of resources. Co‐operatives can be an efficient way of organizing production, provided suitable investment agencies can be created to supply them with capital.
Altruism and Welfare
Authors: Miller David
Published: October 2003

Libertarians argue that altruistic concern for the poor should be channelled through private charity rather than through a (compulsory) welfare state. Altruism, however, is a complex idea. Should it be directed at satisfying preferences or at meeting needs? We also need to distinguish between calculating altruists, who are concerned only about collective outcomes and would prefer not to contribute themselves; reciprocal altruists, who are willing to contribute so long as others do too; and conscientious altruists, who are willing to contribute their share regardless of how other people behave. Both calculating and reciprocal altruists have good reason to prefer the welfare state to private charity as a way of meeting their concern for the badly off.
Distributive Justice
Authors: Miller David
Published: October 2003

Could a market economy produce outcomes that meet our criteria of distributive justice? Some egalitarians, such as Carens, have proposed that markets should govern production but not distribution, relying on moral incentives to motivate the producers, but this seems unrealistic. Instead, we can ask whether a suitably framed market might give people the income that they deserved, as measured by their productive contribution. A conception of economic desert is elaborated by considering various challenges to this proposal. The conclusion is that a market socialist economy can at least come close to achieving distributive justice.
The Socialist State
Authors: Miller David
Published: October 2003

In a market socialist society, the state would have five basic functions: personal protection, resource distribution, economic management, public goods provision, and self‐reproduction. Because of the failings of simple majority rule, the socialist state should be constitutional, with its powers divided up between different bodies. It should embody the rule of law and recognize and protect individual rights, which should probably be constitutionally entrenched. Capital investment should be handled by a plurality of independent banks rather than a centralized bureaucracy. Welfare provision should be publicly funded, but the form in which services are delivered should be sensitive to personal choice.
Marxism and Democracy
Authors: Femia Joseph V.
Published: October 2003

The collapse of the Soviet Union apparently sounded the death knell for Marxism as a blueprint for social change. Why has this doctrine—the repository of so many hopes and dreams—failed in its grand ambition to liberate the human race from poverty and oppression? Through a critical and systematic analysis of what Marx and his disciples had to say about democracy, the book tries to shed light on the reasons for this failure. It explores the bewildering variety of Marxist attitudes to democracy and relates this diversity to Marxism's inconsistent goals: active political participation and all‐embracing central planning, human emancipation and collective submission to the dialectical ‘truths’ of history. The book explains why Marxism's internal contradictions have always, in practice, been ‘solved’ through the imposition of despotic modes of government. Marxism's tragic flaw, it is concluded, is its unwillingness to recognize the distinctiveness and independence of the individual.
The Marxist Critique of Liberal Democracy
Authors: Femia Joseph V
Published: October 2003

The various Marxist criticisms of liberal democracy are analysed and assessed. These can be divided into two broad categories: philosophical and sociological. The former type of criticism, whose locus classicus in the early work of Marx, concentrates on the idea of political alienation. The latter type of criticism, relying as it does on economic determinism, dismisses the state as a tool of bourgeois interests. In whatever form, Marxist criticisms of liberal democracy depend on a priori assumptions about human nature and social causation.
Identities in Conflict
Authors: Benner Erica
Published: October 2003

It is often assumed that Marx and Engels’ ‘materialist’ theory of history cannot explain why national ideologies and identities have had exceptional mobilizing power. In fact, the theory left plenty of room for nuanced analyses of nationalist doctrines, and for an understanding of their ambivalent impact on movements for social and international reform. The authors’ approach to national doctrines was profoundly shaped by their early attempts to counter the influence of idealistic nationalism in Germany, in both its statist and ethnocentric variants.
Ethics and Realpolitik in the National Policy, 1847–1849
Authors: Benner Erica
Published: October 2003

The relationship between ethical principles and cold, strategic Realpolitik in Marx and Engels’ national policy has been much disputed. This chapter reconstructs the ethical thinking behind their policies during the 1848 revolutions and counter‐revolutions. It argues that a distinctive, consistent set of ethical concerns can be tracked in most of their writings in this period, although Engels’ infamous stance on the ‘historyless’ Slav peoples deviates from their usual anti‐determinist approach.
Rights as Political
Authors: Ingram Attracta
Published: October 2003

This chapter discusses the connection between liberal democratic thought and a political understanding of rights, and their impact on belief in universal rights, human rights, rights-scepticism and talent pooling. It argues that rights are political in the sense of being moral powers which are specified by the political principles of a voluntary politics. The assertion of human rights should not be discouraged by the parochialism of liberal theory. Bodily integrity need not be violated under the principle of strong social provision.
Industrial Relations and European State Traditions
Authors: Crouch Colin
Published: October 2003

For more than a century of development, the industrial relations systems of Western European countries grew in very diverse and changing ways. The forms they adopted can be mapped against a set of basic types, and this study moves between historical detail and theoretical typology in order to capture the complexity of that mapping. The book traces the development of trade unions, organized employers, the state's role, and patterns of industrial conflict in 15 countries. It concludes by linking contemporary industrial relations systems to a longue durŽe of relations between states and societies reaching back to the Reformation.
Organized Interests in the Economy: Diversity in Western European Experience
Authors: Crouch Colin
Published: October 2003

The renewal of public interest in industrial relations and conflict during the inflationary crises of the 1970s, and the differences in different national experiences, stimulated intellectual interest in modelling different forms taken by those relations.
Disorganized Capitalism?
Authors: Crouch Colin
Published: October 2003

Changes in relations between states, organized employers and trade unions in western European countries are tracked through a series of 'snapshots’, concentrating on the situation reached around 1975 and 1990. At each moment there is a review, partly quantitative, of the position of trade union and employer organization, the role of the state, industrial conflict and the development of relations among the partners. These data are used to map national cases against the theoretical scheme developed in Part I.
An Overview
Authors: Crouch Colin
Published: October 2003

The overall trajectory of developments outlined in the previous chapters, covering the whole period from 1870 to 1990, is described for all 15 countries.
Economic Organizations and Political Space: Historical Legacies
Authors: Crouch Colin
Published: October 2003

The ways in which the religious base and other nation‐building criteria affected the reception given by states to the organization of economic interests from the early nineteenth century onwards is described and analysed. Differences in the extent to which states 'shared’ public space are stressed.
Vico and Marx on ‘Making’ History
Authors: Ball Terence
Published: October 2003

Although both Giambattista Vico and Karl Marx claimed that men `make’ their own history, each had a different view of what `making’ means and what it entails. Both agreed that humans have a special sort of knowledge—`maker's knowledge—of what they have made. But Vico's view that Verum et factum convertuntur—that knowing and making are one—relies on a distinctly non‐material or linguistic–communicative conception of making (as in making a promise or making sense), while Marx's conception of making is decidedly materialist and is concerned with the human transformation of nature through productive labour.
Money and Complex Equality
Authors: Waldron Jeremy
Published: October 2003

Jeremy Waldron argues that Michael Walzer's theory of justice mischaracterizes money's influence on social meanings. Waldron argues that the correct conception of money reveals that Walzer is mistaken in categorizing various social goods primarily in terms of their exchangeability or non‐exchangeability for money. Waldron offers an alternative explanation of why some monetary transactions are wrong. He argues that meanings of goods should be questioned and re‐examined.
Response
Authors: Walzer Michael
Published: October 2003

Responding to the critical assessments of his Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer rethinks the central aspects of the notion of complex equality. He addresses the following issues: the meaning and possibility of complex equality; the centrality of democratic citizenship; the danger of complex inequality; the injustice of current international distributions; the role of ordinary morality in distributive justice; the importance of efficiency; and the need for a historical account of social differentiation and distributive complexity.
Against the Masses
Authors: Femia Joseph V.
Published: October 2003

Given the almost universal assumption that democracy is a ‘good thing’, the goal of mankind, it is easy to forget that ‘rule by the people’ has been vehemently opposed by some of the most distinguished thinkers in the Western tradition. The book attempts to combat collective amnesia by systematically exploring the evaluating anti‐democratic thought since the French Revolution. Using categories first introduced by A. O. Hirschman in The Rhetoric of Reaction, it examines the various arguments under the headings of ‘perversity’, ‘futility’, and ‘jeopardy’. This classification scheme makes it possible to highlight the fatalism and pessimism of anti‐democratic thinkers, their conviction that democratic reform would be either pointless or destructive. They failed to understand the adaptability of democracy, its ability to coexist with traditional and elitist values. Nevertheless, it must be granted that some of their predictions and observations have been confirmed by history.
Seven Schools of Macroeconomic Thought
Authors: Phelps Edmund S.
Published: October 2003

This volume represents the publication of seven lectures––the first annual Arne Ryde Memorial lectures administered by the University of Lund––on what the author deems to be the seven leading schools of thought in contemporary macroeconomics. The result is a wide‐ranging appreciation of the richness of macro theory and a commentary on some of its more doubtful tenets by a scholar who has himself made contributions to all seven schools. The recurring motif is that actual economies are complicated and each school has its own important insights into them. The first four schools have in common that they regard monetary mechanisms as a key part of the engine determining the level of economic activity while the last three schools all adopt essentially non‐monetary perspectives. The first chapter considers at length the basis for Keynes's break from classical economics. The next chapter addresses the sister school called ‘monetarism’. Chapters on the New Classical school and the New Keynesian school follow. The supply side is the first stop in the non‐monetary realm and the related school, called ‘Real Business Cycle theory’, is the next. The last chapter looks at the early work of the structuralist school, which was at an early stage of development when these lectures were given.
Introduction
Authors: Kreps David M.
Published: October 2003

There are three stages of thought in the development of the normative theory of trade policy. This book expounds the third stage, where the link between the case for free trade and for laissez faire is broken.
Entitlements and Deprivation
Authors: Sen Amartya
Published: October 2003

In this final chapter, the entitlement approach advocated by the author to the causation of starvation and famine is further consolidated by taking up general issues of deprivation related to entitlement systems. Reasons for rejecting the view that famines are caused by food availability decline are summarized.
Introduction
Authors: Jorgenson Dale W. , Yun Kun‐Young
Published: October 2003

This introductory chapter shows how the concept of cost of capital arises in the management of capital as a factor of production. The concept is introduced of an effective tax rate within a highly simplified system for taxation of income from capital. A tax wedge is defined as the difference between the remuneration of capital before taxes, which corresponds to the marginal product of capital, and the compensation after taxes available to holders of financial claims on the firm. The effective tax rate is the ratio of this tax wedge to the marginal product. The chapter is organized as follows: it first outlines the contents of the following chapters, and then goes on to present simple economic analyses of cost of capital, capital as a factor of production, rates of return and capital income taxation.
A Market Theory of Money
Authors: Hicks John
Published: October 2003

John Hicks's writing on monetary economics spans over fifty years. This book draws together the common threads of his work in a single succinct statement of the basics of monetary theory. It also outlines a theory of competitive markets that can be linked to the monetary sector; neither standard classical or neo-classical value theory can, on its own, fill the gap between monetary and non-monetary economics. In reviewing his own work, Hicks explains the way in which economic theory has been adjusted to reflect developments in the real economy. He sees these changes, sometimes quite major, as the discovery of truths which have become more appropriate, rather than the discovery of completely new truths.