bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Aristotle onNousof Simples
Authors: Butler Travis , Rubenstein Eric
Published: June 2016

In so many of his epistemological writings, Aristotle defends a sensible flavor of gradualism about our cognitive capacities: we Start with the partial grasps afforded by what is better known to us, and if things go well, we end up with understandings of those objects better known by nature. The picture is of a step-wise process, rather than a transforming moment of illumination.

In a difficult passage inMetaphysicsIX, however, Aristotle introduces a kind of cognition which admits of no more or less, no better or worse. With respect to simples(ta asuntheta),Aristotle Claims, knowing is like touching — there is contact, or there isn't. Put differently, for simple objects, what is necessary for thinking of them at all is sufficient for grasping them completely. For this reason, Aristotle sees error about simples as impossible: any successful thinking about them will be such as to preclude error. The only possible mistakes are failures even to have them in mind.
The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy
Authors: Sutherland Daniel
Published: June 2016

In theCritique of Pure Reason,Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all.
Can't We All Just Respect One Another a Little Less?
Authors: Neumann Michael
Published: June 2016

Contemporary moral philosophy and much contemporary moralizing almost radiate respect for persons. Thomas Nagel is one of many who take its primacy for granted. In a review of Scanion he says:

Scanlon's theory addresses a number of its central questions: first, the question of the objectivity or truth of moral Claims, their relation to reason, and whether or not they should be regarded as in some sense relative or subjective; second, the question of the kind of concern or respect for persons that is at the foundation of morality…

Many others take the centrality and foundational role of such respect as a given. This is a big change from the days when moralists held that all human beings deserved a certain basic and equal disrespect.
Innocence and Responsibility in War
Authors: McPherson Lionel K.
Published: June 2016

Innocence is a notion that can prove controversial. Claims of innocence typically support not imposing burdens on the innocent when their conduct is relevantly unobjectionable. This paper examines innocence in the context of violent conflict between states or groups. Many thinkers about the morality of such violence want to establish a principle that would protect innocent civilians. Yet the common view in just war theory does not affirm the moral innocence of civilians. Similarly, the common view that soldiers have an equal right to kill does not affirm their equal moral culpability.

Talk of innocence usually Starts from the idea that a kind of moral appraisal makes sense. We assume that persons can be innocent or not by virtue largely of the choices they have made. I will accept this assumption and set aside metaphysical doubts about our capacity for freedom. There is, of course, no issue of moral innocence if in fact we cannot be morally responsible for our actions.
What is a Change?
Authors: Hurtado Guillermo
Published: June 2016

In this paper I offer an ontological elucidation of change. In the first part, I examine two conceptions of change that can be found in Aristotle'sPhysicsand I hold that one of them is more basic than the other. In the second part, I offer an ontological model of change according to which a change is a kind of conjunction of states and times.

According to Aristotle a change,metabolé,isfromsomethingtosomething else. He distinguishes three kinds of changes. One of them is what he calls motion-kinesis-i.e., the transition from a positive termAto a negative termB.Motion in respect to quality is called alteration, in respect to quantity it is known either as increase or as decrease, and in respect to place it is designated by the name of locomotion.
The Rashness of Traditional Rationalism and Empiricism
Authors: Rey Georges
Published: June 2016

I was brought up to believe that, in the “great debate” with the Rationalists, the Empiricists had largely won, particularly in view of Quine's holistic conception of justification, whereby even the claims of logic, though remote from experience, are indirectly tested by it. But some years ago I awoke to the possibility that there was something fishy in all this, and that the fallibilistic banalities that have played such a large role in driving the Quinean conception couldn't plausibly have such dramatic consequences. “Everything can be revised in the light of experience” is good advice for someone who hasn't noticed just how rich, complex and indirect our reasonings about any issue, including logic and mathematics, can be; but does it really tell against what Kant and the others had in mind when they believed that there were some claimswhose justification needn't appeal to experience(which, it's crucial to remember, is how he and others thought of it, until the Positivists and Quine revised it to “unrevisability“)?
Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and A Posteriori Identities
Authors: Goldstein Irwin
Published: June 2016

Materialists say sensations and other kinds of mental states are physical events. Today, most materialists are neural materialists. They think mental states are neural events or material properties of neural events.

Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the physical. A defining property of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something's being correctly termed ‘physical’ (a conjunction of all defining properties provides a sufficient condition.) Defining properties of the physical include spatial and temporal properties and causal propensities and sensitivities. A particle is an electron, for instance, by having a particular set of spatiotemporal properties and causal sensitivities and powers.
Emotion and Rationality
Authors: Lance Mark , Tanesini Alessandra
Published: June 2016

This paper is concerned with the roles played by emotions in rationality, a topic which has been generally, but unjustifiably, ignored by epistemologists. Silence on this matter is, we believe, indicative of the overly narrow view that epistemologists have had of their field. Whatever else we might accomplish by considering the rational role of emotions, we hope to motivate a number of questions and philosophical contexts not commonly considered by epistemologists.

Everyone knows that rationality depends on the doxastic state of the individual. Thus, whether an action, decision, inference, or belief is rational depends on what other things the individual believes, or is justified in believing in the given situation. This holds not just for rationality, but for epistemic norms in general. Many such normative statuses apply directly to beliefs, and all depend at least indirectly on the background doxastic status of the agent. In this paper, it is our purpose to argue that rationality, and epistemic norms more generally, depend as well on the emotional states of the agent.
How to Distinguish Autonomy from Integrity
Authors: McLeod Carolyn
Published: June 2016

1)

‘“Be true to yourself!” and “Don't cave in!” express the value people place on [_]….’

2)

‘… an important sense of [_] is being true to oneself.’

3)

‘[_] encourages and protects people's general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to and for them. ’

4)

‘… to value [_] is to place value on an agent's acting from herreasons, whether they are good ones or not.’

Quiz: fill in the blanks. Here is a hint: two are autonomy and two are integrity. Can you sort out which ones are which? I suspect not, especially since the first two are nearly identical but have different answers. The third seems clearly to be integrity, at least given what philosophers such as Bernard Williams write about integrity: that it involves preserving one's own distinct character. However, the answer to 3) is autonomy. The fourth quotation brings to mind discussions about how autonomous agents can make bad choices, but we respect their autonomy by allowing them to do so. However, the answer to 4) is integrity.
Socratic Rhetoric in the Gorgias
Authors: Carone Gabriela Roxana
Published: June 2016

Given that it seems uncontroversial that Socrates displays considerable contempt towards rhetoric in theGorgias,the title of this paper might strike one as an oxymoron. Indeed, a reading of the text has more than once encouraged scholars to posit an Opposition between the elenctic procedures championed by Socrates and the rhetorical procedures of his interlocutors. At least three features have been highlighted that seem to indicate this contrast:

1.

the Socratic interest in short questions and answers versus his interlocutors’ use of long speeches(makrologia);

2.

the Socratic interest in truth regardless of the opinion of the many, the latter seeming an important concern of the rhetorician;

3.

the supposed Socratic appeal to the intellectual powers of the interlocutor, which is usually contrasted with the appeal to the emotions which is distinctive of rhetoric.
Nature, Nurture and Why the Pendulum Still Swings
Authors: Garvey Brian
Published: June 2016

In both popular and technical discussion we often find the pairs of opposed terms ‘innate/acquired,’ ‘due to genes/due to environment,’ ‘nature/nurture,’ and so forth. They appear to be used as if they all captured a genuine distinction, and the same distinction at that. A related family of opposed pairs is held to describe the difference between those who attribute a certain trait to ‘nature’ and those who attribute it to ‘nurture’: ‘nativists’ versus ‘constructivists’ is one such pair. Chomsky and his followers are often described as ‘nativists’ regarding certain features of language. On a cursory examination, many of the claims of Evolutionary Psychology bear the appearance of ‘nativism.’ That is, it looks as though Evolutionary Psychologists are making claims to the effect that many features of the mind which are often thought to be due to ‘nurture’ are in fact due to ‘nature.’ However, two of the genre's leading practitioners, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, vigorously deny that this is their position.
Coherence Between Theories
Authors: Elsamahi Mohamed
Published: June 2016

This paper explores the conceptual dimension in theory acceptance, throws light on the notion of coherence between theories, and emphasizes the role of coherence between theories in theory acceptance. It is important, however, to recognize that the empirical-conceptual distinction, like most other distinctions in philosophy, is only pragmatic because purely empirical or conceptual notions in science are rare. That is, the term ‘conceptual’ is actually used in the sense of ‘mostly conceptual’, and the term ‘empirical’ signifies what is predominantly empirical. Yet it is useful in many contexts to speak of conceptual and empirical merits of theories separately. Among the commonly discussed conceptual merits of a theory are internal consistency, simplicity, comprehensiveness, and coherence with existing theories. Empirical merits include accommodating known evidence and passing experimental tests. The focus of this paper is coherence between theories.
Advising as Inviting to Trust
Authors: Hinchman Edward S.
Published: June 2016

One feels it is not enough just to State one's opinion; one tries at the same time to frame it in a way that does not disconcert the other person, but helps him; one is holding the truth up for him, yes, but in such a way that he can slip into it.

— Max Frisch,Sketchbook,1946

Advising is sometimes just inviting someone to act on a reason he already has: giving him strategically useful information, encouraging his flagging spirits, making vivid what he wishes to forget. In that case no reasons aregiven.Sometimes, too, you find that your interlocutor has, as you'll put it, ‘no reason to do’ what you think he should do. You find you need to ‘give him’ a reason to do it. Here you have a choice between two strategies. You can attempt to influence him in a way that's at odds with the form of address distinctive ofreasoningwith him.
The Ontological Argument as an Exercise in Cartesian Therapy
Authors: Nolan Lawrence
Published: June 2016

It is sometimes suggested that Descartes’ version of the so-called ontological ‘argument’ should be read not as a formal proof but as a seif-evident axiom, grasped by intuition. If correct, this Suggestion would enable us to answer finally one of the vexed questions of Cartesian scholarship, namely what relation holds between the ontological argument, as presented in the Fifth Meditation, and the causal argument of the Third Meditation. The ontological argument has the appearance of being an afterthought but, given the elegant and tightly ordered structure of theMeditations,this cannot be. Still, commentators have wondered why Descartes separates his theistic proofs in this way, and why the ontological argument emerges later in the ‘order of reasons.’ If the ontological ‘argument’ were intended as the report of an intuition, then these long-standing difficulties would be easily resolved. One could argue that rather than being an afterthought, it is the culmination of the meditator's efforts to achieve perfect knowledge(scientia)of God's existence.
Descartes's Ontology of Sensation
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: June 2016

If we were to look caref ully at recent commentary on Descartes's theories of ideas and Sensation, we would find that a large number of commentators hold that he believes the following:.

(1)

Ideas are representational,

(2)

Sensations are ideas,

(3)

Sensations are not representational.

This is an inconsistent triad: any two of the above claims can be true together, but they cannot all be true together. The inconsistent triad can be avoided if we reject one of the claims. Some have argued that Descartes did not hold (l).1 Some have argued that he did not hold (3). I believe that Descartes held (1) and (3), and will argue that he did not hold (2).

Generally, any account of Cartesian Sensation at the very least must account for sensations in terms of the ontology. The account must say whether they are modes or not, and if modes, modes of what — mind, body, both, the union, and so on. Moreover, how sensations are cast in terms of the ontology must agree with how they are cast in terms of the epistemology.
Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and Distributive Justice
Authors: Caney Simon
Published: June 2016

In recent years a powerful case has been made in defence of a system of global governance in which supra-state institutions are accountable directly to the citizens of the world. This political vision- calling for what is commonly termed a ‘cosmopolitan democracy‘- has been defended with considerable imagination by thinkers such as Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David Held, and Tony McGrew. At the same time, a number of powerful arguments have been developed in favour of cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. Philosophers such as Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Onora O'Neill, Thomas Pogge, Henry Shue, and Peter Singer have developed formidable arguments against wholly local theories of distributive justice and have argued for cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice.
Global Distributive Justice, Entitlement, and Desert
Authors: Brock Gillian
Published: June 2016

The facts of global poverty are staggering. Consider, for instance, how 1.5 billion people subsist below the international poverty line, which means about a quarter of the world's current population lives in poverty. There is much talk about how freer markets will help the situation of these people, in particular how it will help the worst off. So far the evidence for this claim is fairly unclear. ‘

At any rate, on several accounts, alleviating the worst aspects of poverty would impose fairly small costs on us in more affluent countries, yet we continue to do very little about alleviating this situation. For instance, a 1 per cent tax on world product would make enormous inroads in lifting people out of poverty. Alternatively, simply a shift in priorities could do this without any added taxes: a 1 per cent decrease in military spending in the developed world and a 10 per cent decrease in military spending in the developing world could have the same effect.
Global Distributive Justice: An Egalitarian Perspective
Authors: Fabre Cécile
Published: June 2016

A good deal of political theory over the last fifteen years or so has been shaped by the realization that one cannot, and ought not, consider the distribution of resources within a country in isolation from the distribution of resources between countries. Thus, thinkers such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge advocate extensive global distributive policies; others, such as Charles Jones and David Miller, explicitly reject the view that egalitarian principles of justice should apply globally and claim that national communities have only duties to help other countries be viable economically and meet the basic needs of their members. In the global justice debate, pretty much all parties acknowledge that we have obligations of distributive justice to for-eigners. The question is how strong those obligations are, and in particular whether national boundaries can make any difference to the distribution of resources between members of different countries.
Constituting Humanity: Democracy, Human Rights, and Political Community
Authors: Bohman James
Published: June 2016

Democracy and human rights have long been strongly connected in international covenants. In documents such as 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, democracy is justified both intrinsically in terms of popular sovereignty and instrumentally as the best way to “foster the full realization of all human rights.” Yet, even though they are human and thus universal rights, political rights are often surprisingly specific. In the Covenant, for example, “the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs” is equated with “the right to vote and to be elected.” More often then not, their realization is left to states and their constitutions, as for example in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Political rights have a “peculiar” status among enumerated human rights, and this difficulty has to do with deep assumptions about the nature and scope of democracy and political community that remain unexamined by the drafters of these important declarations.
Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism
Authors: Baumgartner Michael
Published: June 2016

One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call themaster argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.
Subjectivity and the Elusiveness of the Self
Authors: Howell Robert J.
Published: June 2016

‘Where am I?’ This is something we might expect to hear from hapless explorers or academics with no sense of direction. If we can, we'll explain to our inquirer that he is east of East St. Louis and hope he can find his way from there. If he persists, insisting that he is not really lost, but only cannot find himself no matter how hard he looks, we might reasonably suspect that we are dealing with that peculiarly incorrigible academic explorer, the philosopher. When we hesitantly point to his body, we hear him explain, exasperated, ‘No, don't you get it? That's my body, but I’m looking for my self! And I cannot find it!’ At this point it is tempting to slip away, convinced that our philosophical friend is throttling himself with the noose of his own cleverness and is at risk of intellectual suicide by denying that he in fact has a self. Nevertheless, we shouldn't turn away so quickly: some pretty ingenious people from radically diverse schools of thought have endorsed the claim that the self ineluctably evades detection.
An Argument Against Cloning
Authors: Ahlberg Jaime , Brighouse Harry
Published: June 2016

It is technically possible to clone a human being. The result of the procedure would be a human being in its own right. Given the current level of cloning technology concerning other animals there is every reason to believe that early human clones will have shorter-than-average life-spans, and will be unusually prone to disease. In addition, they would be unusually at risk of genetic defects, though they would still, probably, have lives worth living. But with experimentation and experience, seriously unequal prospects between cloned and noncloned people should erode. We shall ignore arguments about cloning that focus on the potential for harm to the fetus or resultant human being, where harm is understood solely in terms of physical and mental health. Unless the resultant people would generally have lives worth living there is no positive case for cloning, or any other form of reproduction, for that matter. If the resultant beings will generally have lives worth living there is a prima facie case for allowing cloning. We imagine the case in which the resultant beings will have lives well worth living.
How Understanding Makes Knowledge Valuable
Authors: Boylu Ayca
Published: June 2016

Many have suggested that understanding is a worthier goal for theoretical reflection than is propositional knowledge. Some have even claimed that, unlike knowledge, understanding is always intrinsically valuable. In this essay, I aim only to show that there is a basic value in understanding and that when knowledge conduces to understanding, it gets this basic value extrinsically from understanding. After distinguishing two kinds of understanding, namely, teleological and non-teleological understanding, I will conclude that teleological understanding has more of this basic value than does non-teleological understanding.
Hume's Determinism
Authors: Millican Peter
Published: June 2016

David Hume has traditionally been assumed to be asoft deterministorcompatibilist, at least in the ‘reconciling project’ that he presents in Section 8 of the firstEnquiry, entitled ‘Of liberty and necessity.’ Indeed, in encyclopedias and textbooks of Philosophy he is standardly taken to be one of the paradigm compatibilists, rivalled in significance only by Hobbes within the tradition passed down through Locke, Mill, Schlick and Ayer to recent writers such as Dennett and Frankfurt. Many Hume scholars also concur in viewing him as a determinist, for example (in date order) Norman Kemp Smith, Barry Stroud, A. J. Ayer, Paul Russell Don Garrett, Terence Penelhum, George Botterill, John Bricke, and John Wright. My main purpose in this paper will be to provide the evidence to substantiate this traditional interpretation, which has hitherto been widely assumed rather than defended. In the absence of such a defence, the consensus has been left open to challenge, most notably in a recent paper and a subsequent book by James Harris, who boldly claims that Hume ‘does not subscribe to determinism of any kind, whether Hobbesian or merely nomological.’
The Fundamental Disagreement between Luck Egalitarians and Relational Egalitarians
Authors: Anderson Elizabeth
Published: June 2016

Much contemporary egalitarian theorizing is broadly divided between luck egalitarians, such as G. A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, and John Roemer, and relational egalitarians, such as John Rawls, Samuel Scheffler, Josh Cohen, and me. The two camps disagree about how to conceive of equality: as an equal distribution of non-relational goods among individuals, or as a kind of social relation between persons - an equality of authority, status, or standing (Anderson 1999).

This disagreement generates a second, about when unequal distributions of non-relational goods are unjust. Luck egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it is accidental: when it is caused by morally arbitrary factors such as circumstances of birth. Relational egalitarians claim that inequality is unjust when it disadvantages people: when it reflects, embodies, or causes inequality of authority, status, or standing.
Equality without Documents: Political Justice and the Right to Amnesty
Authors: Blake Michael
Published: June 2016

All modern democratic societies claim to be egalitarian. They do not agree, of course, about what egalitarianism demands; the ideal of equality is hardly transparent and can be plausibly understood to encompass any number of social arrangements and values. Thatsomeform of equality is to be prized, though, is uncontroversial. Indeed, it may be true that all political theories that have stood the test of time can be understood as specifying and interpreting the ideal of equality (Dworkin 1973, 500; 513). Whether or not this is true, I think it is hard to deny that democratic political philosophy can generally be understood as egalitarian in character; to know how to treat people as moral equals, on this account, is to know what justice demands of us. We are all, if this is correct, egalitarians now, however much we argue about what such a label truly demands.
Justice, Educational Equality, and Sufficiency
Authors: Macleod Colin
Published: June 2016

Among the novel objects that attracted my attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general equality of condition among the people. (de Tocqueville 1990, 7)

There are significant inequalities in the lives of America's children, including inequalities in the education that these children receive. These educational inequalities include not only disparities in funding per pupil but also in class size, teacher qualification, and resources such as books, labs, libraries, computers, and curriculum, as well as the physical condition of the school and the safety of students within it. While not all schools attended by poor children are bad schools, and not all schools attended by well-off children are good schools, there are clear patterns. Poor children are more likely to attend crowded and poorly equipped schools with less qualified teachers than the children of more affluent families. They are less likely to have computers, books, and advanced placement academic courses. (Satz 2007, 623)
Doing something intentionally and knowing that you are doing it
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: June 2016

A defence of the idea that an agent's knowledge that he is intentionally doing such-and-such is not ‘based on’ or ‘derived from’ any ‘experience’ of the agent or any item or state he is aware of in acting as he does. The explanation of agents' knowing, in general, what they are intentionally doing lies in the capacity for self-ascription and self-knowledge that is a required for being a subject of any intentional attitudes, and so for competent intentional agency.
Incompatibilism proved
Authors: Pruss Alexander R.
Published: June 2016

The consequence argument attempts to show that incompatibilism is true by showing that if there is determinism, then we never had, have or will have any choice about anything. Much of the debate on the consequence argument has focused on the “beta” transfer principle, and its improvements. We shall show that on an appropriate definition of “never have had, have or will have any choice”, a version of the beta principle is a theorem given one plausible axiom for counterfactuals (weakening). Instead of being about transfer principles, the debate should be over whether the distant past and laws are up to us.
The cost of truthmaker maximalism
Authors: Jago Mark
Published: June 2016

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so foralltruths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.
Skeptical hypotheses and moral skepticism
Authors: May Joshua
Published: June 2016

Moral skeptics maintain that we do not have moral knowledge. Traditionally they haven't argued via skeptical hypotheses like those provided by perceptual skeptics about the external world, such as Descartes' deceiving demon. But some believe this can be done by appealing to hypotheses like moral nihilism. Moreover, some claim that skeptical hypotheses have special force in the moral case. But I argue that skeptics have failed to specify an adequate skeptical scenario, which reveals a general lesson: such arguments are not a promising avenue for moral skeptics to take. They're ultimately weaker when applied to morality compared to perception.
An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions
Authors: Brogaard Berit
Published: June 2016

Scott Soames has recently argued that traditional accounts of propositions as n-tuples or sets of objects and properties or functions from worlds to extensions cannot adequately explain how these abstract entities come to represent the world. Soames’ new cognitive theory solves this problem by taking propositions to be derived from agents representing the world to be a certain way. Agents represent the world to be a certain way, for example, when they engage in the cognitive act of predicating, or cognizing, an act that takes place during cognitive events, such as perceiving, believing, judging and asserting. On the cognitive theory, propositions just are act types involving the act of predicating and certain other mental operations. This theory, Soames argues, solves not only the problem of how propositions come to represent but also a number of other difficulties for traditional theories, including the problem of de se propositions and the problems of accounting for how agents are capable of grasping propositions and how they come to stand in the relation of expression to sentences. I argue here that Soames’ particular version of the cognitive theory makes two problematic assumptions about cognitive operations and the contents of proper names. I then briefly examine what can count as evidence for the nature of the constituents of the cognitive operation types that produce propositions and argue that the common nature of cognitive operations and what they operate on ought to be determined empirically in cross-disciplinary work. I conclude by offering a semantics for cognitive act types that accommodates one type of empirical evidence.
Two aspects of propositional unity
Authors: Ostertag Gary
Published: June 2016

The paper builds upon familiar arguments against identifying the proposition that Brutus stabbed Caesar with a given sequence containing Brutus, Caesar, and the stabs relation. It identifies a further problem, one that affects not only traditional Russellian accounts of propositions, but also the recent act-theoretic approach championed by Scott Soames and Peter Hanks. The problem is that there is no clear content to the idea that the pair  < Brutus, Caesar> instantiates the stabs relation. It is argued that this further problem presents a decisive objection to the act-theoretic approach to propositions.
Why it isn't syntax that unifies the proposition
Authors: Fletcher Logan
Published: June 2016

King develops a syntax-based account of propositions based on the idea that propositional unity is grounded in the syntactic structure of the sentence. This account faces two objections: a Benacerraf objection and a grain-size objection. I argue that the syntax-based account survives both objections, as they have been put forward in the existing literature. I go on to show, however, that King equivocates between two distinct notions of ‘propositional structure’ when explaining his account. Once the confusion is resolved, it is clear that the syntax-based account suffers from both Benacerraf and grain-size problems after all. I conclude by showing that King's account can be revised to avoid these problems, but only if it abandons its motivating idea that it is syntax that unifies the proposition.
The metaphysics of propositional constituency
Authors: Keller Lorraine
Published: June 2016

In this paper, I criticize Structured Propositionalism, the most widely held theory of the nature of propositions according to which they are structured entities with constituents. I argue that the proponents of Structured Propositionalism have paid insufficient attention to the metaphysical presuppositions of the view – most egregiously, to the notion of propositional constituency. This is somewhat ironic, since the friends of structured propositions tend to argue as if the appeal to constituency gives their view a dialectical advantage. I criticize four different approaches to providing a metaphysics of propositional constituency: set-theoretic, mereological, hylomorphic, and structure-making. Finally, I consider the option of taking constituency in a deflationary, metaphysically ‘lightweight’ sense. I argue that, though invoking constituency in a lightweight sense may be useful for avoiding the ontological problems that plague the ‘heavyweight’ conception, it no longer proffers a dialectical advantage to Structured Propositionalism.
Why we should not identify sentence structure with propositional structure
Authors: Hodgson Thomas
Published: June 2016

It is a common view among philosophers of language that both propositions and sentences are structured objects. One obvious question to ask about such a view is whether there is any interesting connection between these two sorts of structure. The author identifies two theses about this relationship. Identity (ID) – the structure of a sentence and the proposition it expresses are identical. Determinism (DET) – the structure of a sentence determines the structure of the proposition it expresses. After noting that ID entails DET, the author argues against DET (and therefore also against ID). This argument is based on considerations to do with unarticulated constituents, but it is not ultimately empirical. As well as answering a question suggested by contemporary theories of propositions, the conclusion is significant because some, but not all, of the theories of propositions currently popular entail ID and/or DET. Unless there is a response to the argument here, those theories are refuted.
Propositions and higher-order attitude attributions
Authors: Ludwig Kirk
Published: June 2016

An important objection to sententialist theories of attitude reports is that they cannot accommodate the principle that one cannot know that someone believes that p without knowing what it is that he believes. This paper argues that a parallel problem arises for propositionalist accounts that has gone largely unnoticed, and that, furthermore, the usual resources for the propositionalist do not afford an adequate solution. While non-standard solutions are available for the propositionalist, it turns out that there are parallel solutions that are available for the sententialist. Since the difficulties raised seem to show that the mechanism by which sentential complements serve to inform us about attitudes and about sentence meaning does not depend on their referring to propositions, this casts doubt on whether talk of propositions should retain a significant theoretical role in the enterprise of understanding thought, language and communication.
Contingently existing propositions
Authors: Nelson Michael
Published: June 2016

I argue that propositions are contingent existents. Some propositions that in fact exist might not have existed and there might have been propositions that are distinct from every actually existing proposition. This is because some propositions are singular propositions, which are propositions containing ordinary objects as constituents, and so are ontologically dependent on the existence of those objects; had those objects not existed, then the singular propositions would not have existed. I provide both a philosophical and technical understanding of the contingent status of propositions.
Individuating Fregean sense
Authors: Speaks Jeff
Published: June 2016

While it is highly controversial whether Frege's criterion of sameness and difference for sense is true, it is relatively uncontroversial that that principle is inconsistent with Millian–Russellian views of content. I argue that this should not be uncontroversial. The reason is that it is surprisingly difficult to come up with an interpretation of Frege's criterion which implies anything substantial about the sameness or difference of content of anything.
Cake Baking with Alternative Carbohydrates for Potential Sucrose Replacement. I. Functionality of Small Sugars and Their Effects on High‐Ratio Cake‐Baking Performance
Authors: Kweon Meera , Slade Louise , Levine Harry
Published: June 2016

For exploring the effects of sugar type on predictive differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), rapid viscoanalysis (RVA), and cake baking, including time‐lapse photography analyses, xylose, glucose, fructose, and sucrose were selected as a diagnostic series of small sugars. The effects of chlorination on solvent retention capacity, wheat flour starch gelatinization, and pasting, and of sucrose particle size on cake baking, were also examined. DSC and RVA results showed that 50 w% sugar solutions retarded starch gelatinization and enhanced starch pasting, respectively, for nonchlorinated and chlorinated flours. Chlorination did not affect starch gelatinization but enhanced earlier pasting and resulted in higher viscosity. Cake baking with chlorinated flour showed a similar pattern for height of cake center and height of cake edge but a different pattern for cake shape factor. More rapid sugar dissolution of sucrose with smaller particle size resulted in exaggerated collapse. The use of time‐lapse photography and interpretation of the expansion profiles during baking of cakes made with the diagnostic series of sugars led to a deeper understanding about cake‐baking performance, which makes it possible to relate RVA behavior in diagnostic sugar solutions to cake‐baking potential and to guide wheat‐breeding efforts to provide functional flours for baking of high‐ratio‐type cakes.
Impact of Soaking and Drying Conditions on Rice Chalkiness as Revealed by Scanning Electron Microscopy
Authors: Leethanapanich Kanokporn , Mauromoustakos Andy , Wang Ya‐Jane
Published: June 2016

Chalkiness is one of the most influential factors on head rice yield. Parboiling is known to be an effective way to remove chalkiness and improve head rice yield. However, the steps involved in the removal of chalkiness are still not completely resolved. This study investigated the effects of soaking temperature, soaking duration, and drying conditions on the removal of rice chalkiness. Chalky brown rice kernels were selected and soaked at 25, 65, 70, or 75°C for 3 h. After 1, 2, or 3 h, the rice samples were frozen before drying or immediately dried. Soaking at 25°C did not remove chalkiness and caused no morphological change in starch granules. When the soaking temperature increased from 25 to 65, 70, and 75°C, the chalkiness decreased from 100% to 34.1, 29.7, and 15.9%, respectively. Soaking rice at temperatures above the starch glass transition temperature but below the gelatinization temperature reduced chalkiness owing to rearrangement of starch granules and protein denaturation to fill the void spaces in the chalky area. During soaking, the morphology of starch granules also changed from round to angular in shape. Drying at temperatures above the starch glass transition temperature also facilitated rearrangement of starch granules to further reduce rice chalkiness.
Climate Suitability for Magnaporthe oryzae Triticum Pathotype in the United States
Authors: Cruz Christian D. , Magarey Roger D. , Christie David N. , Fowler Glenn A. , Fernandes Jose M. , Bockus William W. , Valent Barbara , Stack James P.
Published: June 2016

Wheat blast, caused by the Triticum pathotype of Magnaporthe oryzae, is an emerging disease considered to be a limiting factor to wheat production in various countries. Given the importance of wheat blast as a high-consequence plant disease, weather-based infection models were used to estimate the probabilities of M. oryzae Triticum establishment and wheat blast outbreaks in the United States. The models identified significant disease risk in some areas. With the threshold levels used, the models predicted that the climate was adequate for maintaining M. oryzae Triticum populations in 40% of winter wheat production areas of the United States. Disease outbreak threshold levels were only reached in 25% of the country. In Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, the probability of years suitable for outbreaks was greater than 70%. The models generated in this study should provide the foundation for more advanced models in the future, and the results reported could be used to prioritize research efforts regarding the biology of M. oryzae Triticum and the epidemiology of the wheat blast disease.
Sir Alfred Charles Bernard Lovell OBE. 31 August 1913 — 6 August 2012
Authors: Davies Rodney D. , Graham-Smith Sir Francis , Lyne Andrew G.
Published: June 2016

Bernard Lovell is remembered for the iconic radio telescope at Jodrell Bank that bears his name, and for the research group at the University of Manchester that has become the Jodrell Bank Centre for Astrophysics. His enthusiasm and warm personality inspired several generations of radio astronomers, many of whom now lead their own research groups. Lovell also played a key role in the development of airborne radar during World War II.
George William Gray CBE MRIA FRSE. 4 September 1926 — 12 May 2013
Authors: Goodby John W. , Raynes Peter
Published: June 2016

George Gray was a renowned British materials chemist, internationally distinguished for his research into liquid crystals and their applications in flat-panel displays. His seminal invention of the liquid-crystalline cyanobiphenyls underpinned the creation of the modern electronic displays industry, which began with digital watches and has continued through to smart and three-dimensional televisions. There are now more liquid crystal displays in the world than people, and these devices have engendered societal changes through social networking on the Internet. His ability to design, synthesize and utilize self-organizing materials across the various disciplines of science showed that he was a supreme molecular engineer. For his contributions to soft-matter and related advanced technologies he was made a Commander of the British Empire, Kyoto Prize laureate, Fellow of the Royal Society, Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and Honorary Member of the Royal Irish Academy.
Paul Fatt. 13 January 1924 — 28 September 2014
Authors: Ashmore Jonathan F.
Published: June 2016

Paul Fatt made discoveries that are fundamental to our understanding of synaptic transmission in the nervous system. He grew up in the USA and saw service in World War II, but came to London in 1948 as a research student supported by the GI Bill. His seminal work with Bernard Katz at University College London (UCL), John Eccles in Canberra, and Bernard Ginsborg at UCL was carried out during an intense period between 1950 and 1960. His work with Katz demonstrated for the first time that neurotransmitter is released in small packets, or ‘quanta’. His work with Eccles (and Katz) provided an understanding of the mechanism underlying synaptic inhibition, and his work with Ginsborg identified voltage-gated calcium currents for the first time. Furthermore, in the early 1960s his electrical measurements of the muscle transverse tubule system contributed to the early models of excitation–contraction coupling in muscle. The final period of his research career was spent working on phototransduction in the visual system.
Conflict between background matching and social signalling in a colour-changing freshwater fish
Authors: Kelley Jennifer L. , Rodgers Gwendolen M. , Morrell Lesley J.
Published: June 2016

The ability to change coloration allows animals to modify their patterning to suit a specific function. Many freshwater fishes, for example, can appear cryptic by altering the dispersion of melanin pigment in the skin to match the visual background. However, melanin-based pigments are also used to signal dominance among competing males; thus colour change for background matching may conflict with colour change for social status signalling. We used a colour-changing freshwater fish to investigate whether colour change for background matching influenced aggressive interactions between rival males. Subordinate males that had recently darkened their skin for background matching received heightened aggression from dominant males, relative to males whose coloration had not changed. We then determined whether the social status of a rival male, the focal male's previous social status, and his previous skin coloration, affected a male's ability to change colour for background matching. Social status influenced skin darkening in the first social encounter, with dominant males darkening more than subordinate males, but there was no effect of social status on colour change in the second social encounter. We also found that the extent of skin colour change (by both dominant and subordinate males) was dependent on previous skin coloration, with dark males displaying a smaller change in coloration than pale males. Our findings suggest that skin darkening for background matching imposes a significant social cost on subordinate males in terms of increased aggression. We also suggest that the use of melanin-based signals during social encounters can impede subsequent changes in skin coloration for other functions, such as skin darkening for background matching.