bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Electoral competition and the oversight game: a transaction cost approach and the Norwegian experience
Authors: MAOR MOSHE
Published: September 2003

Abstract. The central question addressed by this article is whether the absence of active competition changes the forces that shape the institutional landscape at the parliamentary level, and thereby the landscape itself. Based on a transaction cost approach, the study investigates whether the bolstering of parliamentary oversight procedures occurs in situations in which there is no credible alternative to the incumbent government, and whether opposition impotence contributes to the development of oversight institutions. The article argues that the strengthening of parliamentary oversight procedures is most likely to occur when there is a minority government but the opposition MPs are not in a position to form or envisage a credible alternative. An analysis of changes in oversight arrangements in Norway during 1993—1996 strongly supports this argument.
Between first and second order: a comparison of voting behaviour in european and local elections in britain
Authors: HEATH ANTHONY , McLEAN IAIN , TAYLOR BRIDGET , CURTICE JOHN
Published: September 2003

Abstract. In Britain, both local elections and European elections can be regarded as second–order. However, voters believe that even less is at stake in European elections than in local elections, and their behaviour is congruent with this: voters are more likely to turn out in local elections, they are more likely to ‘split their ticket’ they are more likely to report that they vote on issues specific to the second–order arena. Logistic regression of party choices in the local, European and national contexts confirms this. National considerations played less part in the local election and there was some evidence that voters were influenced by the record of the locally–incumbent party. It appears that voting in the European elections has more of an expressive character, and is less instrumental than that in either local or national elections.
Egalitarian justice and interpersonal comparison
Authors: CLAYTON MATTHEW , WILLIAMS ANDREW
Published: September 2003

Abstract.This paper surveys the strengths and weaknesses of three widely–discussed egalitarian standards of interpersonal comparison:welfare, resource, andcapability. We argue that welfare egalitarianism is beset by numerous serious problems, and should be rejected. Capability and resourcist standards conform with egalitarian convictions more closely, but each faces distinctive problems. We itemise a set of desiderata which a fully adequate account of interpersonal comparison would satisfy. We conclude that the choice between capability and resourcist standards turns on the relative importance of such an account being able to accommodatereasonable pluralismand identify inequality in apublicly verifiablemanner.
The increasingly difficult art of comparative European politics
Authors: ELGIE ROBERT
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Those writing textbooks on comparative European politics, or the cross–national study of European democracies, have a number of key choices to make. They must decide whether to cover Western Europe as well as Central and Eastern Europe; whether to focus on a limited number or a broad range of countries; whether to include the EU in the analysis or exclude it; whether to adopt a thematic or a country–by–country approach; whether to survey events or test a broader argument; and whether to focus on the politics of institutions and representation or to include more social and economic–oriented concerns as well. The evidence from the most recently published texts in this area is that different writers make different choices. Moreover, the context within which European politics now operates also suggests that their choices are becoming increasingly difficult ones to make.
Feminist comparative policy: A new field of study
Authors: MAZUR AMY
Published: September 2003

Abstract.This article presents feminist comparative policy (FCP) as a new field of study. It argues that FCP scholars have successfully developed a distinct approach to doing political research and a significant scientific community which follows this approach. In doing so, FCP scholars, particularly since the early 1990s, have moved this area of study into a new stage of institutionalization and influence. These achievements are documented in a discussion of first, the development and major features of the FCP approach and second, the individuals and research infrastructure that comprise the FCP community. The conclusion considers the successes of FCP in the context of speculations about its contributions to non feminist political science.
Romanian political science since 1989
Authors: STAN LAVINIA
Published: September 2003

Abstract. In a relatively short period of time, Romanian political science has made considerable progress, moving from virtual obscurity to unchallenged local prominence. This article examines the efforts to date to institutionalize political science as a separate teaching and research discipline by presenting recently established political science university–level programs, the major groups of authors carrying out research on political phenomena and the recurrent themes emerging from relevant literature. Though the present article is concerned mainly with current developments, occasional references to the political science's position during the communist period are also made.
The Politics and economics of revenue growth: A cross–national analysis
Authors: Royed Terry J. , Borrelli Stephen
Published: September 2003

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, ‘fiscal illusion’, elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for ‘fiscal illusion’ and ideological theories of revenue growth.
The European parliament and environmental legislation: The case of chemicals
Authors: Tsebelis George , Kalandrakis Anastassios
Published: September 2003

Abstract The paper studies the impact of the EP on legislation on chemical pollutants introduced under the Cooperation procedure. A series of formal and informal analyses have predicted from significant impact of the EP, to limited impact (only in the second round) to no impact at all. Through the analysis of Parliamentary debates as well as Commission and Parliamentary committee documents, we are able to assess the significance of different amendments, as well as the degree to which they were introduced in the final decision of the Council. Our analysis indicates first that less than 30% of EP amendments are insignificant, while 15% are important or very important; second, that the probability of acceptance of an amendment is the same regardless of its significance. Further analysis indicates two sources of bias of aggregate EP statistics: several amendments are complementary (deal with the same issue in different places of the legal document), and a series of amendments that are rejected as inadmissible (because they violate the legal basis of the document or the germainess requirement) are included in subsequent pieces of legislation. We calculate the effect of these biases in our sample, and find that official statistics under estimate Parliamentary influence by more than 6 percentage points (49% instead of 56% in our sample). Finally, we compare a series of observed strategic behaviors of different actors (rapporteurs, committees, floor, Commission) to different expectations generated by the literature.
Remembering the bad old days: Human rights, economic conditions, and democratic performance in transitional regimes
Authors: Hofferbert Richard I. , Klingemann Hans–Dieter
Published: September 2003

Abstract Using the natural laboratory of 18 post–communist Central and Eastern European countries, this article presents a basic model for democratic transition, specifically testing two alternative explanations for the degree of citizen satisfaction with the performance of their fledgling democracies: (1) virtues of omission, which include bad actions from which the state refrains, namely violations of individual human rights, and (2) virtues of commission, which include positive state actions, in particular actions enhancing economic well–being. The findings clearly indicate that, during the transition period citizens’ sense of the condition of human rights is consistently more important than are perceived economic prospects as predictors of democratic performance.
The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature
Authors: Bräuninger Thomas , König Thomas
Published: September 2003

Abstract In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators’ party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.
The organization of influence on the EC's common agriculturalpolicy: A network approach
Authors: Pappi Franz U. , Henning Christian H.C.A.
Published: September 2003

Abstract The common agricultural policy of the EC with its market regulations is decided at EC level by a multilevel system of government, in which the Commission and the parliamentary parties of the European Parliament play the supranational role and the national ministries of agriculture act as parts of the intergovernmental system of the Council of Ministers. National interest groups have thereby three major access routes to the EC system, first through their national governments, or second indirectly, transmitted by their European peak organizations, or third directly to the supranational EC actors. The network approach is applied to study empirically the densities of access through these various routes. The links between actors in the agricultural policy domain are conceptualized as links for the exchange of resources, the most important resource of a policy domain being the final control of policy decisions. The political actors of the governance system originally hold full control of this valuable resource which they exchange for influence resources possessed by the interest groups, as public support or expert knowledge. Empirically, answers to the network questions depend on the type of resource and the viewpoint of the interviewed actors. An index is developed which indicates the resource flows between actors and the distribution of equilibrium control of policy decisions. It is shown that the national ministers of agriculture depend very much on the support and expertise of their national farmers’ lobby, whereas the Commission relies more on contacts within the political sector itself. Multilevel systems need a lot of political coordination, so that the political actors within such systems, especially at the supranational level, seem to deal first of all with each other and not so much with the demand side of politics, compared to the national ministers of agriculture.
Measuring party orientations towards European integration: results from an expert survey
Authors: Ray Leonard
Published: September 2003

Abstract Some observers have held that political parties have been minor players in the process of European integration due to the low salience of the issue and the prevalence of intra party disagreement over European questions. Although recent scholarship and the rising salience of European issues have brought increased attention to the role of political parties, the study of the relationship between party positions and both public opinion and policy outcomes has been hampered by an absence of comparable data on party positions. This research note presents the findings of an expert survey on party positions on the issue of European integration. In addition to estimates of the parties’ positions on the issue itself, this survey provides information on the importance of the issue of European integration to each party, and the extent of internal dissent within parties. The data also indicate that parties have, on average, become increasingly pro–European over the period 1984–1996. Both the salience of the issue of integration and the extent of intra–party disagreement have increased during this period. However, deep intra–party divisions appear less prevalent than commonly believed.
Political allegiance and European integration
Authors: VAN KERSBERGEN KEES
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Under what conditions and to what extent do national publics come to accept the increasing efforts of state elites to build new political institutions that transcend the constitutional frontiers of the nation–state and affect their interests beyond their direct control? This paper explores the role of national publics and social policy in the process of national and European integration. A theory of allegiance is proposed as particularly useful for analyzing this topic. Allegiance is defined as the willingness of a national public to approve of and to support the decisions made by a government, in return for a more or less immediate and straightforward reward or benefit. National publics accept the efforts of their national state elites to build new trans– or supranational political institutions on the condition that this guarantees or reinforces economic (e.g. employment) and social (e.g. income maintenance) security in the national context. European integration depends on a double allegiance, consisting of a primary allegiance to the nation–state and its political elite and a secondary or derived allegiance to the EC or EU. Secondary allegiance, however, exists only to the extent that European integration facilitates nation–states to provide the resources upon which primary allegiance hinges. The theory of double allegiance specifies theoretically the mechanism explaining the link between national economic and social conditions, and public support for the European Union.
Constitutional analysis: The power index approach
Authors: LANE JAN‐ERIK , MÆLAND REINERT
Published: September 2003

Abstract. A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.
Economic globalization and regional penetration: The failure of networks in Baden‐Württemberg
Authors: KOCH ANDREW M. , FUCHS GERHARD
Published: September 2003

Abstract.This paper explores the emergence of direct linkages between the international economy and the state government of Baden–Württemberg, Germany. In the early 1990s Baden–Württemberg embarked on a plan in which the laender government took the lead in organizing a large–scale, high technology project for the development of interactive television. Creating a ‘network’ between itself and major economic actors the laender government sought to enhance the economic development of the region. However, as the economic actors involved in the project questioned the economic viability of interactive television, they began to withdraw from the project. The project's failure demonstrates the incompatibility of political objectives with the economic goals of actors in a globalized economy. We conclude that as attractive as the network approach may be for regional and national governments, it is likely to be successful only where both sets of actors see the outcome as enhancing their respective priorities (political legitimacy and economic gains).
Anti‐immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?
Authors: VAN DER BRUG WOUTER , FENNEMA MEINDERT , TILLIE JEAN
Published: September 2003

Abstract. In this article we address the question whether or not the votes for anti–immigrant parties can be considered as protest votes. We define protest votes by the motives underlying electoral choices, building on earlier research done by Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk & Franklin (1996). That research showed that ideological proximity and party size are the best predictors of party preference. On this basis we designed a typology of motives for party choice and how these motives would manifest themselves empirically. Analyzing the 1994 elections for the European Parliament for seven political systems we show that anti–immigrant parties attract no more protest votes than other parties do, with only one exception: the Dutch Centrumdemocraten. Voting for anti–immigrant parties is largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties. In addition, (negative) attitudes towards immigrants have a stronger effect on preferences for anti–immigrant parties than on preference for other parties. Social cleavages and attitudes towards European unification are of minor importance as determinants of preferences for anti–immigrant parties. The overall conclusion is that a rational choice model of electoral behavior has strong explanatory power for party preferences in general, but also for the support for anti–immigrant parties in particular.
Interesting but irrelevant: Social capital and the saliency of politics in Western Europe
Authors: VAN DETH JAN W.
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Many explanations of political involvement are based on the idea that higher levels of resources will be matched by higher levels of political involvement. Yet these kind of interpretations seem to overlook the fact that resources potentially increase individual autonomy and widen the scope of alternative actions, and so facilitate a decrease of political involvement. The analyses presented here are based on the rather paradoxical expectation that we will find a higher level of subjective political interest and, simultaneously, a lower level of political saliency among people commanding relatively high levels of social capital or other resources. The empirical evidence available for Western European countries in 1990 and 1998 essentially confirms the notion of diverging consequences of social capital (and other resources) for political involvement. People combining high political interest with a low saliency of politics are labelled spectators here. For them politics has lost its obligatory character – it is interesting and probably important to follow what goes on in this area, but compared with other matters its relevance is relatively low. Besides, a strong gender bias still can be found for each and every aspect of political involvement.
The disentanglement of interest politics: Business associability, the parties and policy in Italy and Greece
Authors: LANZA ORAZIO , LAVDAS KOSTAS
Published: September 2003

Abstract. The article explores changes in the politics of business associability in Italy and Greece, focusing in particular on a set of comparable domestic and European developments that have played the roles of stimuli for the slow but unmistakable transformation of interest politics. Against a background of intense politicization, changes that are taking place since the 1980s suggest that organized interests become disentangled from the linkages which sustained party colonization and state dominance. Changes in interest politics were facilitated by the transition to a majoritarian system (in Italy) and party alternation (in Greece). The disentanglement we refer to would be difficult under conditions of sharing–out government; conversely, alternating governments facilitate changes in the relationships between interests, parties and policy–making. Apart from the domestic sources of change, the article argues that shifts in interest politics are the combined outcome of wider challenges and of the impact of Europeanization. On the basis of this analysis, we speculate that the disentanglement of interest politics may be conducive to national policy adjustment in two possible scenarios. Either by enabling intersectoral agreements over policy issues or by freeing national policymaking from the burden of oligopolistic coalitions — a social democratic and a neoliberal scenario respectively.
Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
Authors: STRØM KAARE
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced by politicians and especially by the scholarly community but remains less widely understood. In this essay, I identify the institutional features that define parliamentary democracy and suggest how they can be understood as delegation relationships. I propose two definitions: one minimal and one maximal (or ideal–typical). In the latter sense, parliamentary democracy is a particular regime of delegation and accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory, which allows us to identify the conditions under which democratic agency problems may occur. Parliamentarism is simple, indirect, and relies on lessons gradually acquired in the past. Compared to presidentialism, parliamentarism has certain advantages, such as decisional efficiency and the inducements it creates toward effort. On the other hand, parliamentarism also implies disadvantages such as ineffective accountability and a lack of transparency, which may cause informational inefficiencies. And whereas parliamentarism may be particularly suitable for problems of adverse selection, it is a less certain cure for moral hazard. In contemporary advanced societies, parliamentarism is facing the challenges of decaying screening devices and diverted accountabilities.
Representation or abdication? How citizens use institutions to help delegation succeed
Authors: LUPIA ARTHUR , MCCUBBINS MATHEW D.
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Modern democracy requires delegation. One problem with delegation is that principals and agents often have conflicting interests. A second problem is that principals lack information about their agents. Many scholars conclude that these problems cause delegation to become abdication. We reject this conclusion and introduce a theory of delegation that supports a different conclusion. The theory clarifies when interest conflicts and information problems do (and do not) turn delegation into abdication. We conclude by arguing that remedies for common delegation problems can be embedded in the design of electoral, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. The culmination of our efforts is a simple, but general, statement about when citizens and legislators can (and cannot) control their agents.
Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work
Authors: MÜLLER WOLFGANG C.
Published: September 2003

Abstract. In modern democracies political parties exist because (1) they reduce transaction costs in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas and (2) help overcome the dilemma of collective action. In Western Europe political parties are the central mechanism to make the constitutional chain of political delegation and accountability work in practice. Party representatives in public office are ultimately the agents of the extra–parliamentary party organization. In order to contain agency loss parties rely on party–internal mechanisms and the institutionalisation of party rights in public rules and, in contrast to US parties, they apply the full range of ex ante and ex post mechanisms. Generally, the role of party is weaker the further down the chain of delegation.
Voters and their representatives: Electoral institutions and delegation in parliamentary democracies
Authors: MITCHELL PAUL
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Of all the links in the democratic delegation chain, the first link (from voters to legislators) may be fraught with the greatest potential for agency losses. Voters — the ultimate principals – may lack the information and resources to select the best legislators and subsequently ensure that they do the public's bidding. This paper uses some of the insights of the principal–agent approach to examine the Voter–MP relationship by focusing primarily on two sets of organisational and institutional rules: methods of candidate selection and electoral laws. Since the emphasis is on direct links between voters and legislators (rather than on the intermediary role of parties), we examine electoral laws in terms of the incentives they provide for candidates to seek a personal vote. Since agency losses are most likely when the MPs’ careers do not directly depend on voters, electoral systems are arranged on a continuum from party–centred systems (little or no incentive to seek personal votes), to intermediate systems (limited effectiveness of personal voting) to candidate–centred systems (where personal voting is most effective). One of the arguments is that a trade–off often exists between the directness of the link between voter and agent and the choice of agents that is crucial to voters’ abilities to sanction agents. If it is thought desirable that voters have the ability to directly sanction representatives, then an institutional design involving effective preferential voting in districts of moderate magnitude should be optimal.
Members of parliament and governments in western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversight
Authors: SAALFELD THOMAS
Published: September 2003

Abstract. The vast majority of West European polities feature an agency relationship between members of parliaments and members of cabinets as the latter depend on the confidence of the majority of the former to remain in office. In this article, the terminology used by principalagent theory to characterise oversight activities – contract design, screening, monitoring and the use of institutional checks – and elements of transaction cost economics are applied to the agency relationship between members of parliaments and cabinet members in Western Europe. Traditional studies of parliamentary oversight have narrowly concentrated on monitoring, although parliaments (with considerable cross–national variations) use a broad range of oversight mechanisms including equivalents of contract design, screening and institutional checks. In addition, traditional studies have focused almost exclusively on one particular type of monitoring often referred to as ‘police–patrol oversight’, whilst neglecting or underestimating the effectiveness and low transaction costs associated with ‘fire–alarm oversight’. Despite the valuable insights the principal–agent framework has already added to the study of executive–legislative relations in parliamentary democracies, future research will have to account more realistically for the role and organisation of political parties which structure the delegation process, help to solve a number of co–ordination problems in parliaments (for example, the co–ordination of committees and floor activities) and generate important internal agency relationships that are fundamental to an understanding of executive–legislative relations in Western Europe.
Beyond compare? Women's movements in comparative perspective
Authors: BECKWITH KAREN
Published: September 2003

Abstract. This article reviews a selected range of comparative political research on women's movements, a subfield of political science whose recent proliferation now positions it at the leading edge of women and politics scholarship. Recognizing that “women” as a category of research is of necessity heterogeneous and informed by differences of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, generation, and religion, the article argues that this complex intersectionality need not mean that women's movements are beyond the scope of comparative political research. Rather, as the research focus of women and politics scholars has become increasingly carefully specified, general patterns are evident in the research that should serve to advance the comparative study of women's movements and comparative political research more generally. The article focuses on definitional challenges and the limitations of conflating “women's movements”, “feminist movements”, and “women in social movements”, and discusses four major research arenas within which cross–national commonalities among women's movements are evidenced. These include the relationship between women's movements and political parties; “double militancy” as a potentially distinctive collective identity problem for women's movement activists; the extent to which political opportunities for women's movements are (or can be) gendered; and the relationship between women's movements and the state. The article concludes with suggestions for future research in the subfields of comparative women's movements and comparative politics.
Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirical developments
Authors: DOWDING KEITH , JOHN PETER , MERGOUPIS THANOS , VAN VUGT MARK
Published: September 2003

Abstract. This paper seeks to reconstruct and revitalize the famous Hirschman framework by providing a comprehensive review of the current use of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’. We begin by critically examining Hirchman's original account, and then look at the way his argument has been extended in different fields both conceptually and empirically. We suggest that while advances have been made, the results so far are somewhat disappointing given the perceptiveness of the original insight. We believe this is because his apparently simple schema is more complex than it first appears, and different aspects of exit, of voice, and of empirical foundations of loyalty need to be analytically distinguished in order to produce testable empirical hypotheses about their relationships.
‘Civil society’ in Japanese politics: Implications forcontemporary political research
Authors: CARVER TERRELL , CHIBA SHIN , MATSUMOTO REIJI , MARTIN JAMES , JESSOP BOB , IIDA FUMIO , SUGITA ATSUSHI
Published: September 2003

Abstract. This article presents a definitional and historical summary of ‘civil society’ as a western concept, and then traces how it was used in Japanese political theory and practice. ‘Civil society’ discourse became a familiar term amongst post–war Japanese historians and social scientists in the period 1945–1970, and thus preceded the recent international proliferation of ‘civil society’ literature in the ‘west’ from the 1970s onwards. ‘Civil society’ discourse was politicised in practice in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, principally in opposition movements wanting to encourage political participation by ordinary citizens. While some ‘civil society’ discourse in Japan was based on an idealisation of ‘western’ ideas and practice, it is also the case that the individualism and democratisation implied in ‘civil society’ discourse has been very differently understood in ‘western’ countries and very unevenly instituted in their political practice. A simple East–West frame makes significant similarities between Japanese ideas and practice and ‘western’ concepts and politics disappear, and additionally causes significant differences within the ‘west’ regarding individualism and democratisation to become invisible.
Same Menu, Seperate Tables: The Institutionalist Turn in Political Science and the Study of European Integration
Authors: Aspinwall Mark D. , Schneider Gerald
Published: September 2003

Abstract Recent research on European integration has largely profited from the institutionalist turn in political science. Theoretical progress has, however, been hampered by the diverse understandings of this new research tradition. This paper tries to tackle the conceptual diversity in a positive way. We first analyze the neo–institutionalist turn in political science and European studies and then move on to a detailed analysis and comparison of the three competing approaches — sociological, historical, and rational choice institutionalism. Next, we will show that the main differences are as much epistemological as theoretical. A convergence towards a unifying institutionalist approach can thus only be possible if some sort of a methodological convergence takes place. We sketch how a synthesis between the competing schools might appear.
Policy horizons in West European parliamentary systems
Authors: Warwick Paul V.
Published: September 2003

Abstract This paper investigates the hypothesis that coalition behaviour in West European parliamentary systems is conditioned by the existence of ‘policy horizons’ that delimit the extent to which parties can compromise on policy positions in order to participate in government. The first part of the paper demonstrates that policy horizons are implied by certain conceptions of party utility and that their existence would entail important constraints on the coalition game; in particular, they would produce equilibrium outcomes in some situations where voting cycles would normally be expected and they would tend to confine possible outcomes to central locations in the policy space in the absence of equilibria. The paper then develops a method of estimating policy horizons empirically in order to show that they account to a substantial extent for both the size and party composition of governing coalitions in these systems.
Channeling frustrations: institutions, economic fluctuations, and political behavior
Authors: Taylor Michaell A.
Published: September 2003

Abstract While the literature suggests that clear lines of responsibility lead to greater incumbent dependence on economic conditions for support, little has been said about how electorates channel frustrations in systems characterized by ‘fuzzy’ lines of responsibility, i.e., the shape and status of parliamentary government in relation to possible choice of electors open to them. The argument presented here is that fuzzy lines of responsibility result in lower incentives to participate in political processes and greater system dissatisfaction given economic circumstances. This decline is greater in systems in which incumbent responsibility is less easily identified by the individual citizen. To test this, data are collected from eight European nations over the period 1975–1992. Split sample and slope intervention models with robust estimation are employed at the individual level. System level aggregates are analyzed using pooled time–series analysis to confirm individual level findings. Finally, election turnout data are also analyzed to obtain election level verification of survey findings. Evidence suggests that participation is more heavily influenced by economic conditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existing literature, this suggests that while clear settings encourage punishment of the incumbent unclear settings tend to cause individuals to become more withdrawn and alienated. However, economic conditions are also important to overall system effects. The findings herein suggest that unclear or fuzzy settings increase the role of economic conditions in determination of system affect.
The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in European countries
Authors: De Vries Michiel S.
Published: September 2003

Abstract This paper addresses the arguments in favour of both the decentralization and centralization of public policy making. It points out that the same arguments are sometimes used to advance either claim and that in different countries opposite arguments are used to support the same claim. Clearly, the inherent features of centralization and decentralization are far from obvious. A closer look at the attention given to the issue by political parties at the national level in four European countries reveals that decentralization becomes an issue in these countries at different periods and as a cause of different arguments, which rather reflect the dominant values in the political culture than refer to inherent properties of decentralization itself. An analysis of opinions of local elites points at the relation between their opinion on decentralizing responsibilities in a specific field and the support for existing institutional arrangements, their own influence in the policy field and the predisposition towards decentralization tendencies. This results in the conclusion that the support for decentralization tendencies is more closely related to existing specific institutional arrangements, and to the degree to which it is expected to influence one's own position, than to its inherent merits.
West European welfare states: The old politics of retrenchment
Authors: Scarbrough Elinor
Published: September 2003

Abstract Analysing endeavours to restructure welfare provision, Paul Pierson proposes that the ‘politics of retrenchment’ is very different from the politics of welfare expansion. In particular, the difficulties of welfare retrenchment are not to be explained by existing theories of welfare expansion; and the ‘old’ politics of welfare expansion has little to offer in explaining the ‘new’ politics of welfare retrenchment. This article questions these claims. First, contemporary societal developments are considered in the light of three major theories advanced to explain the emergence of welfare states in Western Europe: the logic–of–industrialism, the crisis of capitalism, and nation–building. Secondly, focusing on trade unions, mainstream left parties, and traditions of governance, the current status of the political forces regarded as vital in building welfare states is assessed. The conclusion drawn is that the resilience of the welfare state in Western Europe lies less in the ‘new’ politics of ‘policy lock in’ and ‘client interest groups’ than in the persistence of the ‘old’ forces that led to the founding and expansion of welfare states.
The diminishing role of governments in cable policy
Authors: Katz Yaron
Published: September 2003

Abstract The article examines the role of governments in the transition in cable policy in the three largest media countries of Europe (Britain, France and Germany). In theoretical terms it is argued that the involvement of governments in determining the course of development of cable systems has comprised three main stages. In the first stage, governments tried to ignore cable and prevent the establishment of cable infrastructure. In the second stage, governments regulated the technology in order to promote a national cable policy and encourage the overall development of the broadcasting media. In the third stage, although at different speeds and perceptions, governments deregulated cable by giving permission to market forces to dominate cable's development and abandoning the social goals of cable policy.
A judges' revolution? Political corruption and the judiciary in Italy
Authors: PORTA DONATELLA DELLA
Published: September 2003

Abstract. During the investigations into political corruption in Italy, judges emerged in the eyes of the public as the ‘heroes’ of a peaceful revolution against the ‘villainous’ politicians. The established explanation for the active role of the judiciary against corruption stresses the unusual degree of independence of Italian judges. Without denying the importance of this institutional variable, analysis of the interactions between politicians and judges in the history of the Italian Republic allows one to discuss the role of other two important variables: the informal networking between politicians and judges, and the professional culture of the magistracy. The three sets of variables are in fact used to explain two different strategies adopted by Italian judges in their interaction with the political system: a strategy of ‘role substitution’, acccording to which some judges act as a surrogate power for the protection of the citizens against corrupt politicians, and a ‘collusive strategy’, consisting of various levels of hidden exchanges between judges and politicians. This article is based on an examination of judicial documents relating to 40 episodes of political corruption, in–depth interviews with experts, reports of relevant Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions, requests for indictment of Members of Parliament, official statistics and the daily and weekly press.
Rights, review, and spending: Policy outcomes with judicially enforceable rights
Authors: MÄKINEN AMY K.
Published: September 2003

Abstract. This paper posits that countries with a constitutional right to social security that can be enforced by courts via judicial review will show patterns of spending on social security that are distinct from countries with other constitutional and judicial arrangements. Governments in countries with enforceable rights will be constrained to spend more on transfer programs to avoid censure from the courts. The hypotheses are tested using data from 22 OECD countries using time–series cross–section analysis. The results show that enforceable rights are associated with higher growth rates in social security spending and lower fluctuation in expenditures on social programs, although the amount of GDP spent on social transfers is unaffected by rights. These results are consistent with the idea that governments’ spending habits are constrained by positive rights, but rebut the argument that rights lead to economic distortions.
The creation of neo–liberal corporate bias in transnational medicines control: The Industrial shaping and interest dynamics of the European regulatory state
Authors: LEWIS GRAHAM , ABRAHAM JOHN
Published: September 2003

Abstract. Drawing on the political theories of corporatism, neo–liberalism and pluralism, and on comparative empirical research in Brussels, Germany, Sweden and the UK, this article conceptualises the nature of Europeanised medicines regulation. It argues that a marketisation of regulation has been established in the European Union as a result of competition between national regulatory agencies for ‘regulatory business’ from the pharmaceutical industry. In the pharmaceuticals sector the Europeanised regulatory state is a product of three key factors: (a) the European Commission's commitment to an ‘efficiency’ regime which would meet the political objectives of a single European market and the commercial agendas of transnational pharmaceutical companies, (b) the endemic corporate bias associated with medicines regulation in the most influential member states, and (c) the considerable success of neo–liberal politics across a number of major member states, including Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Organized Interests and the state: A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark
Authors: BLOM‐HANSEN JENS
Published: September 2003

Abstract. It has proven difficult to determine the direction in which corporatism is moving. This discussion is marred by two shortcomings: A bias towards the macro–level and the lack of a clear distinction between the stages of the policy process. Trying to remedy these shortcomings, this paper follows the development of corporatism over the twenty years since 1980 and uses this material to illuminate the causes of the development of corporatism. The analysis consists of a comparative study of seven Danish policy areas. By focusing on the meso–level within one country we gain the methodological advantage of being able to hold constant a number of variables at the macro–level which are difficult to control for in cross–national analyses. We are thus in a position to illuminate the explanatory value of a number of commonly advanced explanations of corporatism: partisan influences; state traditions; and policy specific factors. These explanations are all found wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting an alternative explanation more consistent with the Danish data, namely that corporatism be studied from a perspective placing politicians and agency at center stage.
Why people want something for nothing: The role of asymmetrical illusions
Authors: WINTER SØREN , MOURITZEN POUL ERIK
Published: September 2003

Abstract. This article examines if and why mechanisms exist at the individual citizen level that may contribute to public sector growth — and whether such mechanisms can be altered through provision of information about the costs of public services.We test and find empirical support for the theory of fiscal illusion according to which citizens underestimate the costs of public services and therefore demand more public spending than if they had been fully informed. We also develop and find empirical support for a theory of asymmetrical illusions. This theory claims that producers and users of public services are more spending–minded than ordinary taxpayers — and that limited rationality contributes to this difference. However, the provision of information about the unit costs of public services can weaken these mechanisms of fiscal illusion and asymmetrical illusions. The test is based on tabular, logit, and experimental analysis of survey data from Odense, a Danish city with 175,000 inhabitants.
Decommodification and the Workfare State
Authors: Holden Chris
Published: September 2003

Two related concepts have been used to understand the welfare state – ‘decommodification’ and the ‘workfare’ or the ‘competition’ state, as it relates to processes of ‘recommodification’. I show how these related literatures may be integrated in order to enhance our understanding of current labour market policies. Applying these concepts to an analysis of the ideas and policies of New Labour leads to the conclusion that state welfare services are being reconfigured to serve more effectively the needs of the market, through a process of ‘administrative recommodification’.