bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Human Welfare and Moral Worth
Authors: Hill, Jr. Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

The essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and constructivist strategies of argument. The second part concerns issues regarding human welfare: the moral significance of altruistic sentiments, the source of other‐regarding and self‐regarding reasons, different conceptions of happiness and personal values, and interpretation of the duty of beneficence. The third part concerns the moral assessment of persons as guilty or innocent, deserving or undeserving, motivated in a worthy way or not. More specifically, these last essays compare Kant's conception of conscience with other conceptions, contrast his theory of punishment with utilitarian and deeply retributivist theories, and distinguish morally worthy from unworthy motivation by conscience and punishment. The final essay proposes a Kantian perspective on moral dilemmas, gaps in moral theory, and residual feelings of guilt and regret in cases of irresolvable moral conflicts. Although the essays are often critical of Kant's particular views, they show how many familiar objections miss the mark. They emphasize features of Kant's ethics that remain worthy of attention today. They attempt to develop these independently of Kant's more dubious beliefs, for example, his rigorism regarding particular substantive principles and his transcendental idealism. The essays often propose readings of specific controversial texts and challenge common interpretations, but they also explore ways that Kantian ethics can be valuable in addressing moral, social, and political problems.
Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Distinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as categorical imperatives, and that moral agents have autonomy of the will. Arguably, an a priori method is needed for analysis and assessment of rationality claims, and we can act on moral reasons implicit in the humanity formula without a sense of constraint or an objectionably impartial attitude. The idea of a noumenal world is not a premise of Kantian ethics, but a conclusion to which Kant thought his ethics inevitably led.
Is a Good Will Overrated?
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Offers a “practical” interpretation of Kant's famous thesis that only a good will is unconditionally good. Rather than providing a criterion for praise and blame, this thesis affirms the moral priority of a will to do what is right, no matter what it costs in terms of conditional goods. So understood, the thesis is not subject to many objections that critics have raised, for example, that it prescribes self‐righteous preoccupation with one's moral purity.
Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This essay regarding Kantian moral epistemology focuses specifically on one normative (rather than metaethical) version of Kantian constructivism. The aim is to examine the justificatory role of actual, hypothetical, and possible consent in Kantian ethics. The importance of actual consent is more limited and derivative than commonly thought, and the difference between possible and hypothetical consent standards has been exaggerated. Review of formulas of the Categorical Imperative and the idea of an original contract confirms these claims, and familiar objections to appeals to hypothetical consent are not decisive against the Kantian position. For example, arguably, hypothetical agreement does not serve merely as a dubious proxy for actual consent, reduce value to empirical fact, alienate us from common moral standards, or depend on circular reasoning.
Beneficence and Self‐Love
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Kantian responses to three related questions are considered: (1) Given the limits of our altruistic sentiments, is it possible for us to act beneficently as duty seems to require? (2) What are we morally required to do for others besides respecting their rights? (3) Why is this a reasonable requirement? Although the importance of empirical facts in deliberation is undeniable, the distinction between a practical deliberative point of view and the perspective of empirical inquiry proves to be crucial. Kant's grounds for an imperfect duty of beneficence are examined. From a deliberative perspective, we must assume that we can act beneficently, even when lacking altruistic sentiments, provided we understand the good reasons for doing so.
Happiness and Human Flourishing
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Reviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness.
Meeting Needs and Doing Favors
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This essay, responding to recent work of David Cummiskey and Barcia Baron, defends the thesis that imperfect duty of beneficence in Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals is a rather minimal, indeterminate requirement but must be supplemented by judgement guided by the values expressed in Kant's formulas of the Categorical Imperative. So understood, Kant's ethics is neither as permissive nor as inflexibly demanding as various commentators have thought. Although Kant does not acknowledge supererogation as a moral category, arguably his position implies that some acts are meritorious and more than required.
Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

The focus here is on what individuals value and pursue when considered apart from moral considerations. Personal values are contrasted with various kinds of moral values, but the central question is whether having the former commits one to the latter. Textual evidence casts doubt on the recently popular thesis that, in Kant's view, in setting ends (and adopting maxims) agents thereby express (or take on) a rational commitment to the objective goodness of their ends and acts. Unfortunately, influential Kantian arguments (notably, by Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood) seem to use that dubious thesis to argue that even minimally rational agents are rationally committed to moral standards. A further troublesome issue considered here is whether, independently of debates about free will, Kant's idea that we “set ends” as an “act of freedom” implies an untenable voluntarism about how we come to have our basic goals.
Four Conceptions of Conscience
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This contrasts Kant's view of conscience, and its merits, with alternative views. These alternatives are a popular religious view, a social relativist conception, and Joseph Butler's philosophical account. Kant's view avoids the epistemological problems of the first view, but accepts its idea that conscience is often experienced as an unsolicited voice. Kant denies the metaethical scepticism of social relativists, but agrees with them that conscience expresses a dissonance between our acts and our moral beliefs rather than an independent perception of what is truly right or wrong. Kant agrees with Butler that reason, in due reflection, is the source of justified moral beliefs, but he distinguishes moral reasoning and judgement about what acts are permissible from conscience, which is an inner forum in which a verdict of innocence or guilt is pronounced on the basis of the moral beliefs that we already have.
Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Contrasts utilitarian, Kantian, and deep retributive views about the relations between wrongdoing and suffering because of one's wrongdoing. Kant maintains that, although wrongdoers are intrinsically liable to suffer self‐reproach and moral disapproval of others, wrongdoing does not entail “deserving to suffer” in a sense providing intrinsic practical reasons to inflict suffering. Arguably, even Kant's most infamous remarks on punishment fail to prove otherwise. Contrary to common impressions, Kant is best understood as holding a mixed theory in which the retributive policies that Kant endorses lack deep retributive justification. Some implications for the justice of current practices of punishment are explored.
Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Reviews briefly Kant's conceptions of punishment and conscience and then considers the role of punishment and conscience as motives in a moral life. From a Kantian perspective, both motives seem to lack moral worth. We note, however, that some motives, such as anticipation of grief and a desire to do worthy deeds, can be interpreted in two ways, one commendable and the other less so. By analogy, the essay argues that anticipation of punishment and pangs of conscience can motivate us in two different ways, one morally worthy and the other not.
Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Offers an explanation of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas and criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves into a moral dilemma by our own wrongdoing. Although genuine moral dilemmas, in which one would be wrong no matter what one did, are impossible, “gaps” in moral theory may leave us with no resolution in tragic cases of moral conflict. Kantian moral theory has such gaps, but attempts to develop theories without such gaps are not necessarily desirable. Finally, the essay addresses “residues” of moral feeling and attitude after one has acted in a case of tragic conflict in which one could find no morally better option. Perhaps surprisingly, Kantians should affirm that, even though feeling guilty for the choice is inappropriate, there is an important sense in which one should feel especially bad about those one has harmed, and regret one's own role, in such cases.
Practical Reality
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Practical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act—our motivating reasons, as they are commonly called—as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or even purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the normative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason, for instance, that the train is about to leave. This, rather than my belief that the train is about to leave, must be my reason for running. Motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent, but states of affairs.
Reasons for Action
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also distinguishes between Humeanism and anti‐Humeanism in the theory of motivation, psychologism, and anti‐psychologism in the theory of motivation, internalism, and externalism (Williams‐style) and desire‐based and value‐based theories of normative reasons.
Reasons and Desires
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Argues that normative reasons are value‐based rather than desire‐based, following and hopefully improving on the work of Raz, Quinn, and Scanlon.
Reasons and Beliefs
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Argues that normative reasons, whether moral or prudential, are states of affairs rather than the agent's beliefs—a form of normative realism. It considers arguments to the contrary by H. A. Prichard, among others.
The Theory of Motivating States
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
Acting for a Good Reason
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Argues that motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent but (real or supposed) states of affairs. The main argument for this appeals to the normative realism established earlier. Since a reason to act (a good reason) is a state of affairs, the reasons in the light of which we act must also be capable of being states of affairs, for otherwise it would be impossible to act for a good reason. Our reasons are what we believe rather than that we so believe, or our so believing. I also consider and reject the view that our motivating reasons are the contents of our beliefs; in this context, I argue that a good reason cannot be a proposition.
As I Believe
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Considers and rejects the view that motivating reasons are best specified in psychological form (S's reason was that he believed that . . .) rather than in non‐psychological form (S's reason was that . . .). Asks how we should then explain the fact that, if S acts for the reason that p, S must believe that p. It also asks whether the fact that the agent can be mistaken forces us to prefer the psychological form of explanation. It is argued that it does not, because explanation in terms of reasons is not factive; we explain S's action by appeal to what he believed even when he is wrong.
Consequential Matters
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Argues against disjunctive accounts of action‐explanation. Also considers the metaphysics of reasons and returns to the distinction between internalism and externalism in the theory of normative reasons. Ends by asking how objective our account of reasons should be.
How Many Explanations?
Authors: Dancy Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Considers the idea that, in addition to the ‘normative’ explanation of action as characterized in this book, there might not also be causal explanations that appeal to psychological states of the agent as causes. Argues that such causal explanations cannot be accounts of the reasons for which the agent acted; we cannot have two such accounts in play at once. But, if they are merely causal, they are no longer attractive. Ends by considering the possibility of other causal explanations of action and their relation to normative explanations.
Order in Multiplicity
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Aristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.
The Varieties of Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

The aims of this chapter are, firstly, to understand homonymy, or multivocity; secondly, to reveal the theoretical foundations of homonymy; and thirdly, to reflect on the cogency of the general framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. Shields discusses Aristotle's introduction of homonymy in the Categories and how it contrasts with synonymy; this distinction is exhaustive, in that every definable term is either homonymous or synonymous. Shields argues that Aristotle implicitly relies upon different conceptions of homonymy in different contexts. Aristotle recognizes discrete homonyms and associated homonyms, and, of the latter, he reserves a special philosophical role for core‐dependent homonymy among the latter. Shields argues that Aristotle appeals to functional determination to establish homonymy or non‐univocity; however, functional determination cannot show that distinct homonyms are associated.
The Promises and Problems of Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Shields reviews Aristotle's methods for establishing homonymy, association, and core dependence, without yet evaluating their success or failure. Shields begins by considering Aristotle's critical and constructive uses of homonymy, before turning to the sorts of tests upon which Aristotle relies for establishing non‐univocity; after that, he considers the sorts of tests needed to establish association and core dependence. Shields distinguishes focal meaning from focal connection, on linguistic or semantic grounds, before raising some of the problems or objections that homonymy faces. At the end of the chapter, Shields considers the promise of homonymy to be methodological; core‐dependent homonymy is something that allows Aristotle to offer a way of philosophizing that is sensitive to metaphysical multiplicity, and yet alive to the prospects of multiplicity's order. Aristotle's reliance on homonymy can be compelling, however, only if he offers a plausible method of establishing non‐univocity and clarifies the notion of association.
Homonymy and Signification
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Considers Aristotle's suggestion that difference in signification is sufficient for establishing homonymy. Shields examines Aristotle's notion of signification, and argues that difference in signification is not just sufficient, but necessary, for homonymy. He first explains Aristotle's account of signification in the context of Aristotle's general semantic theory; then considers questions about signification and word meaning, arguing that signification is a meaning relation. While Shields thus believes that Aristotle is justified in assuming that difference in signification is sufficient for homonymy, difference in signification alone cannot establish association or core dependence. Shields also defends Aristotle from the possible objection that he conflates concepts and properties, by arguing that an identification of properties and concepts is possible as the properties are essences specified by signification.
Core‐Dependent Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

The last chapter of Part I is an examination of the general framework of core‐dependent homonymy, Aristotle's most striking use of homonymy for philosophical purposes. If Aristotle can establish both non‐univocity and core dependence for some central philosophical concepts, then he can justifiably claim to have introduced a powerful methodology for rejecting Platonism, while retaining a constructive approach to philosophical analysis. But this is possible only if Aristotle can show that some homonyms associate. In this chapter, Shields articulates and defends Aristotle's method of core dependence for finding unity and multiplicity. Shields develops a general framework for core‐dependent homonymy such that these homonyms are determinate, yet open ended, being related by one of the four causes to each other.
The Body
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Shields begins the investigation of the practical application of homonymy by considering the principle use of discrete, seductive homonymy; the body, for Aristotle, is a discreet homonym. Aristotle's appeals to homonymy in serious philosophical contexts are appeals to discrete homonymy, because these are patently non‐univocal. Shields argues that homonymy in this context is a defensible application of homonymy, and furthermore it arms Aristotle against serious objections of the hylomorphic analysis of soul–body relations. The homonymy principle is also compatible with a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind.
Oneness, Sameness, and Referential Opacity
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Shields examines oneness and sameness within the framework of homonymy developed in Part I. One of Shields's main aims here is to reject the reading according to which Aristotle introduces multiple entities when discussing accidental sameness. Shields argues that Aristotle does not countenance such entities, because the homonymy of oneness permits him to say that, e.g. Socrates and Socrates seated, are and are not one and the same. Oneness and sameness are core–dependent homonyms that gives Aristotle a means of recognizing how things can be one without being identical.
Goodness
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

Shields argues that Aristotle is correct to argue for application of the homonymy to goodness, although it is only a partial success, as certain of Aristotle's arguments to this end are not good. Shields places Aristotle's discussion of the homonymy of goodness into its proper context, which is as an anti‐Platonic manoeuvre.

Shields examines Aristotle's argument for the homonymy of goodness in Nicomachean Ethics 6, and also some interpretations of it, and he denies that it can be successfully defended, since it fails to establish non‐univocity. Other arguments are more successful while only establishing non‐univocity; in fact, Aristotle fails to offer a compelling argument for the thesis that goodness is a core‐dependent homonym. However, Shields draws on Aquinas's argument for the homonymy of goodness, and since Aristotle holds premises analogous to those of Aquinas's argument, we may attribute to Aristotle the homonymy of goodness, but in a more limited sense than is usually thought to be the case.
The Homonymy of Being
Authors: Shields Christopher
Published: October 2003

One argument for the homonymy of goodness fails, because Aristotle attempts to show that it is derived from the homonymy of being; but being, as Shields argues in the final chapter, is not homonymous. Aristotle's most celebrated treatment of homonymy is his conception of the homonymy of being. The bulk of this chapter is a critique of five approaches to the homonymy of being. Shields considers and criticizes interpretations of Aristotle's attempts to establish the homonymy of being, including that of G.E.L. Owen, and of Michael Frede. The problem with the doctrine that being is homonymous, Shields argues, is that being as such is univocal; hence, it cannot be a core‐dependent homonym because it is not a homonym at all.
Saving Strangers
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Argues that there has been a change of norm in relation to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. It shows how humanitarian justifications for the use of force lacked legitimacy in Cold War international society, focusing on the cases of India, Vietnam, and Tanzania's interventions in the 1970s. This reflected the dominance of pluralist international society thinking in shaping the legal rules and institutions of international society. By focusing on cases of intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the second part of the book shows how a new solidarist conception of international society shaped Western interventions in the 1990s. In arguing that a new norm has developed that has facilitated new state actions; the book identifies two key limits to this norm: first, military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds requires UN Security Council authorization; second, whilst new norms enable new actions, they do not determine that intervention will take place when it is urgently needed as in Rwanda.
Humanitarian Intervention and International Society
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Explores traditional realist and pluralist objections to the practice of humanitarian intervention in international society. It then develops a solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention that rebuts these criticisms. A key part of the chapter lies in drawing on English School theory, constructivism, and Quentin Skinner's work to develop the claim that legitimacy is constitutive of state actions.
Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia: The Triumph of Realism Over Common Humanity?
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Investigates why Vietnam was so heavily sanctioned for its use of force against the murderous regime of Pol Pot. The reactions of other states reflected the domination of a pluralist conception of international society. However, I argue that Vietnam's use of force should have been legitimated on solidarist grounds as humanitarian.
Good or Bad Precedent? Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Examines why Tanzania's overthrow of the Ugandan Government of Idi Amin was greeted with almost tacit approval compared to Vietnam's reception in overthrowing Pol Pot. International society did not endorse the principle of humanitarian intervention in this case, but it did show by its reaction that it understood the moral context in which Tanzania had acted.
From Famine Relief to ‘Humanitarian War’: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Analyses how the USA and UN came to intervene militarily in Somalia in 1992–94. It shows how the Security Council in Resolution 794 crossed the threshold on authorizing the use of force to end a humanitarian crisis, albeit in a case where the government of the state had collapsed. It also explores why the Somali mission failed, and what lessons can be learnt from it for future humanitarian interventions.
The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention from the Air: The Cases of Bosnia and Kosovo
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J.
Published: October 2003

Shows how the international community learnt particular lessons from the Bosnian conflict that it applied to the crisis in Kosovo. It explores the legality and legitimacy of NATO action in bombing Yugoslavia, focusing on the reaction in the Security Council to NATO's use of force without explicit Security Council authorization.
Setting the Scene
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian
Published: October 2003

The purpose of this book is to make a scientific contribution to the development of social indicators as part of the social agenda in the EU. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of different indicators relevant to social inclusion in Europe, and their usefulness in promoting good practice by member state governments and allowing comparable assessment of social outcomes. The aim is that the book will play a role in widening public debate about the social dimension of Europe, will be of value to the social partners, to non‐governmental and grass‐roots organizations, and to the socially disadvantaged. It seeks to provide both a constructive background document at a crucial stage in the evolution of the social dimension of the EU and a reference work of continuing value. This first chapter sets the scene, providing background information about social indicators and about the development of the social agenda in the EU; in particular, it seeks to make clear both what the book tries to achieve and what it is not intended to provide. The four sections of the chapter (1) introduce social indicators, (2) look at social policy in Europe, (3) discuss the development of the European social agenda since the agreement reached by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 that the EU should adopt for the next decade the strategic goal of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge‐based economy . . . with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, and (4) provide an outline of the structure of the book.
Social Indicators from a Member State Perspective
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian
Published: October 2003

In designing indicators for use in the EU monitoring process, a great deal can be learnt from the experience of member states in their national policies to combat social exclusion. Ch. 3 reviews, country by country, social indicators from a member state perspective, with the aim of illustrating the range of current practice in the use of social indicators in the field of social inclusion, rather than providing a comprehensive assessment. Member states differ in the degree to which they have embarked on strategies aimed at promoting social inclusion that already include explicit targets and indicators against which to measure the effectiveness of policy, and for this reason, the amount of space allocated to each country varies. In each case, however, the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (NAPincl) submitted to the European Commission in June 2001 is discussed from the viewpoint of the method by which the plans were produced, their relation with previous policy formation, the use made of the seven indicators proposed by the Commission, and other indicators employed by member states that seem of wider interest, particularly where they relate to fields not covered by the Commission's indicators. The countries included in the review are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the UK.
Portfolio of Indicators as a Whole
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian
Published: October 2003

Commences the analysis of social indicators for use in the EU monitoring process, starting with the portfolio as a whole, where a three‐tier structure of indicators is envisaged. There would be a small set of lead ‘headline’ indicators (Level l), supported by a wider range of indicators at Level 2, where both levels would be common across member states; to these, member states would be encouraged to add their choice of Level 3 indicators, to highlight specificities in particular areas, and to help interpret the Level l and 2 indicators. The Level l and 2 indicators would be presented in the form of a level of performance, rather than a ranking, so that improvements in country performance can be clearly seen. The difficulties of aggregate performance measures are discussed, and two different types of aggregation outlined—the aggregation of aggregate indicators, and the aggregation of different elements of deprivation at the individual level (which are then summed over individuals to form an aggregate index for the country). The Level l and 2 indicators would also be disaggregated in a number of ways, and the importance is highlighted of giving separate indicators for women and men, and of examining the regional dimension wherever possible.
Depth of Poverty and Income Inequality
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian
Published: October 2003

Considers the persistence of financial poverty, measures of the poverty gap, and the extent to which those with low financial resources are suffering enforced deprivation. This latter section of the chapter discusses deprivation indicators, looking at their application in the context of the EU. The final section of the chapter turns to the broader issue of the overall distribution of income—measures of income inequality.
Coordination at the European Union Level
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian
Published: October 2003

The end result of the investigations carried out over the last 8 chapters is a list of 33 recommendations, which are printed in bold type, scattered throughout the book, and summarized at the end of the book, preceding a list of the proposed social indicators. The recommendations and proposed indicators are intended as a contribution to the debate about EU policy‐making, and in this chapter, the future policy process is considered. Topics discussed include the use of indicators in National Action Plans on Social Inclusion and by the European Commission, policy and national targets, and the development of indicators and mobilizing actors.
Introduction
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Sets out five criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then discusses the aspiration to find coherence between theory and our moral intuitions. Also argues that, other things being roughly equal, we rightly prefer a moral theory that offers a unified foundation for morality to one that does not. What is more, the chapter argues that, other things being roughly equal, we rightly prefer a moral theory that offers an impartial foundation for morality to one that does not.
What Are the Rules to Promote?
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Argues that rules should not be evaluated in terms of the numbers of acts of this or that kind that they allow. Then asks whether rules should be assessed in terms of whether they promote equality, fairness, and justice, or whether they give priority to the worst off. Finally, two sections discuss how rule‐consequentialism and contractualism differ as to whether morality contains prohibitions on how humans treat animals and the natural environment.
Is Rule‐Consequentialism Guilty of Collapse or Incoherence?
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

According to this chapter's arguments, rule‐consequentialism need not be guilty of either collapse into extensional equivalence with act‐consequentialism or incoherence. The chapter also explains how rule‐consequentialism and contractualism differ over what is the best account of impartially justified rules. The final two sections consider rule‐consequentialism's relation to intuitionism and Ross‐style pluralism and whether rule‐consequentialism fails to be a form of consequentialism.
Predictability and Convention
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Considers whether rule‐consequentialism is undermined by the unpredictability of the consequences of whole codes of rules. Argues that, where we can calculate that some alternative is better than the status quo, we press forward with reform, and that where we cannot calculate that some alternative code is better than the status quo, we should stick with the status quo. Concludes by considering how ideal codes have to compromise with extant conventions, and how rule‐consequentialism can support public goods.
Prohibitions and Special Obligations
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

We typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to underwrite these prohibitions, and, in particular, to underwrite our views about when such prohibitions should be amended or overridden. Argues against absolute prohibitions and explores the role of judgement in rule‐consequentialism. The final section explains how rule‐consequentialism can endorse rules giving agents special obligations towards family and friends.
Act‐Consequentialism
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Act‐consequentialism is best construed as a criterion of rightness, not a decision procedure. Act‐consequentialism recommends that our procedure for making moral decisions employs rules very like the ones endorsed by rule‐consequentialism. However, the chapter highlights the remaining significant differences between act‐consequentialism and rule‐consequentialism over prohibitions, and discusses the extreme demandingness of act‐consequentialist duties to aid.
Rule‐Consequentialism and Doing Good for the World
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Surveys different principles about duties to aid, including Kantian principles. Then proposes a rule‐consequentialist duty to aid, and defends that approach against objections to it.
Help With Practical Problems
Authors: Hooker Brad
Published: October 2003

Tries to illustrate how rule‐consequentialism can be applied to other practical problems. Explains which traditional prohibitions on sexual activity rule‐consequentialism would endorse. Then explains how rule‐consequentialists would think about the permissibility of euthanasia.
Introduction
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

An introduction to the most important themes in Peirce's account of rational self‐control, which outlines his pragmatism and his theory of truth before explaining his account of the scientific method. There is also a discussion of his commitment to realism. After exploring the main ideas of his theory of signs (semiotic) and his theory of categories, this chapter addresses issues about how to make sense of the development of Peirce's thought.
Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes.
Truth and the Convergence of Opinion
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.
Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

A discussion of a dispute between Royce and Peirce about truth and the possibility of false belief. Royce argued that only an absolute idealist can make sense of how we can refer to objects about which we have false beliefs. Peirce responded that this argument rested upon a flawed theory of reference: once we recognize that our primary kind of reference uses indexical signs, we can reconcile realism with the possibility of false belief. The chapter explores Peirce's account of indexical reference and its relation to his realism.
Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

This discussion of Peirce's account of vagueness begins with a comparison of the attitudes towards vagueness of Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein. It explores Peirce's account of vagueness through an exploration of his account of assertion and his semiotic account of quantification in natural languages. The place of bivalence in his philosophy is discussed, as are his claims about the importance of vagueness for science and other kinds of cognition.
Design and Chance: The Evolution of Peirce's Evolutionary Cosmology
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

During the 1880s, Peirce began to develop a system of ‘scientific metaphysics’, an evolutionary cosmology that explains the evolution to a law‐governed external world from a state of pure possibility. This appeals to his ‘tychism’, the view that there is absolute chance, and provides a defence of his realism. The chapter explores the emergence of this theme in his work, asking why it is required by his beliefs about logic and how it is related to other themes in his writing.
Common Sense, Pragmatism, and Rationality
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Peirce defended ‘critical common‐sensism’, a modification of the common‐sense philosophy of Reid that reflected Peirce's Kantian affiliations. This chapter explores what is distinctive in Peirce's form of common‐sensism, discusses a range of examples of common‐sense beliefs, and discusses the role of the appeal to common‐sense in Pierce's account of rational self‐control. This appeal to common‐sense is an important plank in Peirce's rejection of Descartes's strategies in epistemology and in his defence of pragmatism.
Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Central to Peirce's rejection of the Cartesian obsession with scepticism is the claim that sceptical arguments do not produce real doubt. This chapter provides a detailed examination of the role of doubt in the regulation in inquiry, claiming that states of real doubt involve immediate cognitive evaluations that are manifested in emotional reactions such as epistemic anxiety. Many of our most important epistemic evaluations reflect habitual standards of evaluation that are not explicitly articulated and that are expressed in emotional evaluations.
On Reading God's Great Poem
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

An exploration of Peirce's defence of religious belief and of how this is compatible with his pragmatist principle and with his claim that all responsible inquiry should use the method of science. There is a discussion of his ‘common‐sensist’ insistence that we should not trust theoretical reflection in connection with ‘vital question’ and his assumption that instinctive beliefs are innocent until proved guilty. Much of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of his ‘neglected argument’ for the reality of God, which consists in recognizing that religious belief is instinctive and its instinctive character contributes to its authority. There is also a discussion of Peirce's account of sentiments and emotions and his claim that the reality of God is comprehended in ‘feeling’.
Avoiding Circularity and Proving Pragmatism
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Peirce's pragmatist principle is defended as a methodological rule for clarifying concepts and hypotheses. He claimed that, unlike other versions of pragmatism, his could be proved, and much of his work after 1900 is devoted to the search for a proof. The chapter discusses what sort of proof he required: it must be sufficiently strong to convince the champions of a priori metaphysics and nominalists who reject the form of realism that Peirce took to be essential to pragmatism. Later sections of the chapter discuss the resources that Peirce took to be available for constructing the proof: phenomenology, results in normative sciences like ethics and logic and semiotic.
The Resurrection of God Incarnate
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the dead involved a violation of natural laws, and so could have happened only if natural laws depend for their operation on God, who set them aside on this occasion. The main reason he would have for setting them aside would be any reason he had himself to become incarnate; the Resurrection would then be the divine signature on his work, showing that he had become incarnate. So any evidence from natural theology that there is a God with a certain nature, and any reason to suppose that having that nature would lead a God to become incarnate, is evidence (background evidence) that some sort of super‐miracle like the Resurrection would occur. Any evidence against the existence of God or against him being such as to become incarnate would be evidence against the Resurrection. I argue that God does have reason to become incarnate—to provide atonement, to identify with human suffering, and to reveal truth. Our evidence about the life of Jesus (the prior historical evidence) is such that it is not too improbable that we would find it if God was incarnate in Jesus for these reasons. Our evidence about what happened after the death of Jesus (the posterior historical evidence) is such that it is not too improbable that we would find it if Jesus had risen from the dead. For no other prophet in human history, is there anything like this combination of prior and posterior historical evidence. Given a moderate amount of positive background evidence, it then becomes very probable that Jesus was God Incarnate who rose from the dead.
Principles for Weighing Evidence
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Evidence about what happened on a particular occasion is provided by memory, testimony, physical traces, and background evidence (whether the world as a whole shows that sort of thing very likely to occur). Apparent testimony claims should be taken as genuine claims and should be believed in the absence of counter‐evidence. If Jesus rose from the dead, this was a miracle—a violation of natural laws brought about by God. If there is no God, there cannot be such a violation. If there is a God, violations can occur but in general do not. But, in so far as the evidence of natural theology suggests that there is a God, and that he has reason to bring about this sort of miracle on this occasion, then positive evidence for the Resurrection from the testimony of witnesses may make it overall very probable that Jesus rose from the dead.
God's Reasons for Incarnation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

There are three reasons why an omnipotent and perfectly good God might choose to become incarnate (to become human, as well as divine). The first is to provide atonement for our sins. All humans have wronged God, and the resulting guilt requires repentance, apology, and reparation. We can repent and apologize, but we have not the time or the will to ‘make it up’ to God. He must himself provide the reparation in the form of a perfect life of the kind that we should have lived. The second reason is to identify with our suffering, and the third is to reveal to us moral and theological truths that we need for living.
The Historical Sources
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Most of St Paul's epistles are totally reliable historical sources. The synoptic gospels are basically historical works, though they do sometimes seek to make theological points (especially in the Infancy narratives) by adding details to the historical account. St John's Gospel is also basically reliable, at any rate on the later events of the story of Jesus, but it contains more ‘theologizing’ than the others.