bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Some Indications of Unity Among the Sciences
Authors: Frazer William R.
Published: November 2002

From the beginnings of thought, through the period of ancient Greece and including the medieval and early modern period, knowledge was sought after and looked upon as an integrated totality. In recent years certain scientific fields have progressed at greatly accelerated rates, leading to extreme complexity. The specialization necessary for comprehension of any of these fields has tended to destroy the integration of knowledge. Yet there are some hopeful signs amid the confusion of modern philosophy. The present note attempts to sketch a perspective toward integration of a large portion of scientific knowledge, the perspective which has been opened by modern researches and was not known at the time when the old dichotomies of mechanism versus vitalism, determination versus freedom, cause versus purpose, etc., arose. The discussion was stimulated by a series of lectures at Carleton College given by Henry Margenau, lectures which seek encouragingly to reverse the trend toward rigid compartmentalization. Its substance is drawn largely from two recent books, What Is Life? by Erwin Schrödinger (1) and Cell and Psyche by Edmund W. Sinnott (2).
Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I
Authors: Davidson Donald , McKinsey J. C. C. , Suppes Patrick
Published: November 2002

Contemporary philosophers interested in value theory appear to be largely concerned with questions of the following sort:

What is value?

What is the meaning of the word ‘good’?

Does the attribution of value to an object have a cognitive, or merely an emotive, significance?

The first question is metaphysical; to ask it is analogous to asking in physics:

What is matter?

What is electricity?

The others are generally treated as semantical questions; to ask them is analogous to asking in statistics:

What is the meaning of the word ‘probable’?

Does an attribution of probability express an objective fact, or merely a subjective attitude?
Dispositional Statements
Authors: Burks Arthur W.
Published: November 2002

Because statements like ‘This object is soluble in aqua regia’ involve the causal modalities, we call them causal dispositional statements. Now while this involvement has long been recognized, no thorough examination of its exact nature has ever been made. One purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination. In Sec. 2 we will suggest an analysis of causal dispositional statements, and in Sec. 3 we will discuss some philosophic issues to which this analysis is relevant.
Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science
Authors: Khatchadourian Haig
Published: November 2002

In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science (if any), we have to first define the terms ‘presupposition’ and ‘metaphysics’ or ‘metaphysical’. We shall begin with the former.

Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions? discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be (a) a necessary condition: p presupposes q, dt = p implies q, i.e. not-g implies not-p. (b) a premise or a rule (or a set of rules) of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense, p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be grounded.
On the Nature and Use of Dialectic
Authors: Ballard Edward G.
Published: November 2002

Dialectic, like love, has a good and a bad reputation. This ambivalence may be illustrated in different ways in almost every period of philosophical history. One may even suspect that this richness borders upon confusion. And yet, the attempt to orientate oneself in this jungle of meanings can be expected to be profitable, for the term “dialectic” has always referred, although often obscurely, to notions and processes of the first importance. The definition, illustration, and evaluation of the uses of this term should, accordingly, be a task promising some value.
The Short Run
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

1. The Problem. In spite of the vast discussion which has been devoted to the theory of probability, the problem of the short run has received surprisingly little attention. Yet, the whole significance of the theory depends upon a solution of this problem, for without an answer to it we cannot say why it is useful to have knowledge of probabilities or why we should take account of this knowledge in making practical decisions. As far as I know, Charles Peirce was the first to appreciate the importance and difficulty of the question, and his characteristically vivid formulation serves as an excellent starting point for its consideration. He says:

According to what has been said, the idea of probability essentially belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated indefinitely. An individual inference must be either true or false and can show no effect of probability; and therefore, in reference to a single case considered in itself, probability can have no meaning. Yet if a man had to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty-five red cards and a black one, or from a pack containing twenty-five black cards and a red one, and that of a red one were destined to transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to consign him to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although from the nature of the risk, it cannot be repeated. [Collected Papers, 2.652]
Prediction and Hindsight as Confirmatory Evidence
Authors: Simon Herbert A.
Published: November 2002

The central concept of Carnap's probabilistic theory of induction is a triadic relation, c(h, e), the probability or degree of confirmation of the hypothesis, h, on evidence, e. The relation is a purely logical one. The value of c can be computed from a knowledge of h, of e, of the structure of the language, and of the inductive rule to be employed.
An Essay on the Relativity of Categories
Authors: von Bertalanffy L.
Published: November 2002

Among recent developments in the anthropological sciences, hardly any have found so much attention and led to so much controversy as have the views advanced by the late Benjamin Whorf.

The hypothesis offered by Whorf is,

“that the commonly held belief that the cognitive processes of all human beings possess a common logical structure which operates prior to and independently of communication through language, is erroneous. It is Whorf's view that the linguistic patterns themselves determine what the individual perceives in this world and how he thinks about it. Since these patterns vary widely, the modes of thinking and perceiving in groups utilizing different linguistic systems will result in basically different world views” (Fearing, 1954).

“We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar. … We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see” (Whorf, 1952, p. 21)
George H. Mead and the Philosophy of Science
Authors: McKinney John C.
Published: November 2002

Several aspects of the work of George H. Mead have attracted a rather considerable amount of attention in recent years. The attention devoted by several disciplines to the relevant aspects of his work, however, has not involved an explicit focusing upon his philosophy of science. This is deemed regrettable, at least by this writer, in view of the fact that Mead's philosophy of science appears to be a rather substantial conceptualization of the actual research process.
What is a Population?
Authors: Goudge T. A.
Published: November 2002

Biologists have recently found it useful to give a prominent place in their theories to the concept of a plant or animal population. Genetics, ecology, paleontology, and especially the theory of evolution have been able to make notable advances as a result of employing the concept in their interpretations and inferences. The concept has not, however, first been rigorously defined and then put to work. That is rarely the way fruitful scientific notions develop. On the contrary, in most discussions the term “population” has a large degree of vagueness about it. This is due in part to the fact that the term has been taken over from ordinary language and employed in a number of novel contexts. But some of the vagueness also seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the immensely intricate phenomena to which the term refers. In any case, the role played by the concept of a population in evolutionary theory makes even a brief inquiry into its meaning worthwhile. The present paper is concerned with such an inquiry. What I wish to do is, first, to review the major ways in which the concept has been used by biologists in connection with recent formulations of the theory of evolution; and secondly, to comment on a few misleading issues which may arise if care is not taken to observe certain logical and linguistic distinctions.
Control and Unfreedom
Authors: Oppenheim Felix E.
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. Now that operationalism has evolved from a battle cry of a militant minority to a widely accepted maxim of scientific method, and has in the process lost much of its initial intransigeance, it seems time to devote more attention to the application of operational analysis to the social sciences. This paper attempts to explicate some basic concepts in the behavioral sciences, both individual and social, namely, ‘control’ and ‘unfreedom,’ as well as the concepts by which they will be defined, such as ‘persuasion,’ ‘constraint,’ ‘deprivation,’ and ‘punishment’. This analysis will enable us to ascertain with greater precision some of the rather intricate connections which exist between these relations.
Report on the “International Congress for the Philosophy of Science” in Zurich, Switzerland, August 23–28, 1954
Authors: Rieser Max
Published: November 2002

The “International Congress for the Philosophy of Science” was held in the week of August 23–28, 1954 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The Institute enjoys a very high reputation as one of the foremost schools of its kind in the world. It was at this Institute that Albert Einstein taught at the beginning of his academic career. The Congress was arranged as the Second Congress of the “Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences” (U.I.P.S.) which has its permanent seat in Paris, France. The first Congress of the U.I.P.S. was held in Paris in 1949. It was then that the “International Forum of Zurich” was asked to organize five years later the Congress of Zurich.
War Games and Operations Research
Authors: Cushen Walter E.
Published: November 2002

The problems of operations research, optimized at the tactical and strategic level, have a domain of interest much broader than many of its earlier suboptimization problems. Its appeal to scientific method requires the construction of a model from which predictions can be made. This model must have the comprehensive character of those proposed by philosophy and the sciences. Such a model is available in the form of war gaming, a traditional military training vehicle transformed in such a way as to make it a research tool of great power and flexibility and which can assume a multitude of forms. The war game as a new research tool, when applied to the important problems at a high level of optimization, carries with it the excitement of a pioneering venture and the promise of contributions of greatly increased importance to the development of military science.
Vectorial Composition of Velocities in Relativity
Authors: Leaf Boris
Published: November 2002

The Einstein law of velocity addition is well-known. Consider three inertial reference frames S, K, and M, with X axes parallel in the same sense. Let K have velocity v1 along the X axis of S, and M have velocity v2 along the X axis of K. Then, according to the Einstein formula, the velocity v3 of M along the X axis of S is

If v2 is the velocity of an object at rest in M as measured by an observer in K, then v3 is the velocity of the same object as measured by an observer in S. The formula is valid for a change in reference frame of the observer.
Some Contributions of Economics to the General Theory of Value
Authors: Boulding K. E.
Published: November 2002

There is a famous character in one of Oscar Wilde's plays who knew the price of everything and the value of nothing. An economist wonders uneasily if the reference is not to him. The word “value” occurs in economic writings with high frequency, the frequency of meanings being almost as great as the frequency of occurrence. It has been the occasions of long and bitter disputes, some on the semantic level, some more substantive. What I want to accomplish in this paper is a relatively humble task—to examine some of the concepts and related systems in economics which seem to be relevant to the general problem of value, and to see how far and in what directions they might be safely generalized. I do not claim that economics, even when generalized to the full, gives us a complete theory of value. Many of the most important and most difficult questions in value theory cannot be answered within the framework which I shall set up. But economics can, I hope, provide something of a foundation on which to build, or at least a launching platform from which to send off our philosophical rockets.
On Explanations in History
Authors: Danto Arthur C.
Published: November 2002

Whether or not history is, or could be, or ought to be a science, depends in part upon how the words “science” and “history” are to be used. But if one of the criteria of a science is an ability to provide explanations of large numbers of events by means of a small number of general laws, it then becomes in part a question of whether or not history does, or can, provide explanations of this sort for the phenomena which concern it. It is common knowledge that history, at the present time, displays no obvious instance of such an explanation; and I shall try to argue that, though the phenomena with which history deals could conceivably be explained in a “scientific” manner, it is not the office of history to provide such explanations, nor does its lack of explanations in any way diminish either the effectiveness or importance of history. So if my conclusions here suggest that history is not a science, and could not be one, they also suggest that it ought not to be one, but that it is a special and irreducible activity of the human spirit, with a function and justification of its own.
Information, Logic, and Physics
Authors: Rothstein Jerome
Published: November 2002

Theoretical physics is a deductive discipline which presupposes the validity and applicability of certain other disciplines. Among these are logic, algebra, analysis, and geometry. Before relativity, Euclidean geometry was the only one thought to be important for physical space. These disciplines correlate well with experience, and, in the course of time, a priori validity came to be ascribed to them. To Kant, for example, the universe could not possibly be based on any geometry other than Euclid's. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometries by Bolyai and Lobatchevsky, its systematic extension by Riemann, and the critical scrutiny of foundations by Mach and Poincaré shook the “self-evident truth” of Euclidean geometry as applied to the world of physics. The death knell of the a priori truth of any geometry was supplied by Einstein. He showed that a wider body of experience was coordinated by a Riemannian geometry than by Euclidean. He traced the success of Euclidian geometry back to the existence of so-called rigid bodies, in terms of which operations can be associated with numbers which correlate well with numbers associated in a purely mathematical way with mathematical constructs put in correspondence with these bodies. For the physicist, then, the geometry of the real world is now a physical theory whose “truth” like that of all physical theory, is measured by its degree of success in coordinating experience.
Maxwell on the Logic of Dynamical Explanation
Authors: Turner Joseph
Published: November 2002

In the course of his researches in electromagnetism and the kinetic theory of gases, James Clerk Maxwell gave some thought to the nature of science itself. His observations in this field are of interest today not only because they are his, but because they are still instructive. Maxwell's views are to be found in the many asides with which he enlivened his scientific papers and treatises and in the various articles and reviews which he prepared for more popular consumption. The topics discussed bear on his own contributions to physics; they include the logic of dynamical explanation, the method of physical analogy, and the perennial question of action at a distance versus contiguity. In the present essay, I wish to discuss Maxwell's views on dynamical explanation.
Basic Research and the Social System of Pure Science
Authors: Shepard Herbert A.
Published: November 2002

In Executive Order No. 10521, March 17, 1954, President Eisenhower stated: “…only a small fraction of the Federal Funds is being used to stimulate and support the vital basic research which makes possible our practical scientific progress. I believe strongly that this Nation must extend its support of research in basic science.”
A Definition of Degree of Confirmation for Very Rich Languages
Authors: Putnam Hilary
Published: November 2002

Carnap's system of inductive logic (1) has very often been criticized on the ground that “degree of confirmation” is defined only for languages which are extremely over-simplified. Allegedly, it would be very difficult—and perhaps impossible—to define it adequately for languages formalized within the higher predicate calculi, or languages equivalent to these in richness, and it is such languages that would be needed were we ever to formalize the language of empirical science as a whole. Thus, this criticism bears not only on Carnap's work, but on all attempts to construct an exact analysis of induction from this particular standpoint; that is, from the standpoint of “logical measure functions.”
The Perspective for Fundamental Research in Anthropology
Authors: Weltfish Gene
Published: November 2002

I propose to treat this broad topic in terms of three main questions:

1.

The shift in emphasis in anthropological research from culture-history-culture philosophy to “social engineering”,

2.

The question of whether these two types of emphasis are related or not, and if so in what manner, and

3.

The implications of anthropology for other fields of knowledge.
Physical Realism and Relativity: Unfinished Business
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood
Published: November 2002

It is to be understood that the philosopher is not the one to query the procedures and the working hypotheses of the physicist. These arise from grappling with technical problems which have arisen historically in his science; and the philosopher seldom has the technical competence to get the concrete feel of the situation and to realize, to the full, the meaning of what is being proposed.
Psychology and the Ethics of Survival
Authors: Hamburg Carl H.
Published: November 2002

The following reflections are submitted in awareness of an unfortunate situation which currently finds both psychologists and philosophers concerned with the search after criteria for assessing human conduct, yet with either profession suspicious of the contributions to be expected from the other. The objections frequently entertained against psychologizing philosophers are only matched by those entertained against philosophizing psychologists. Yet, if the worst is said, it still remains true that much psychological work, devoted to problems of mental health, maturity or neurosis, makes contact with moral issues. It also is true that such contact has so far not been fruitful to the point of encouraging psychologists or philosophers to expect new illumination from each other. Unless it be groundless, in principle, to look towards psychological findings as potentially relevant for moral theory or vice versa, it would seem that the only cure for poor relations between the two disciplines are better ones rather than none at all. At any rate, it is on the assumption that more successful relations are possible that I shall now comment upon what appears to be both a most influential and unsuccessful attempt by one psychologist to solve an ethical problem. I shall take my departure from B. F. Skinner's recent Science and Human Behavior,∗ especially from his chapters on value and the survival concept.
Science and Changing Publication Patterns
Authors: Sjoberg Gideon
Published: November 2002

During the past half-century the patterns of publication in science have undergone radical change. A vast increment has occurred in the amount of scientific writing. And scientific findings are increasingly being disseminated through “non-traditional” publishing media such as mimeographing and microfilming. These two interrelated trends have had some notable effects upon science. 1. With the rapid increase in the number of publications the problem of maintaining continuity in science has become acute; the traditional scientific social structure seems quite incapable of accomplishing this vital task. 2. An extensive organization is developing which seeks to provide the desired continuity, but its very existence poses dilemmas for the traditional scientific order. 3. Moreover, the changing publication patterns seem to be intensifying the “schisms” between the theoretician and the specialized researcher. 4. They are also challenging the older standards for evaluating scientists. We thus hypothesize that the volume and form of communication is a significant variable inducing modifications in the scientific social system. This theoretical orientation has in part been suggested by Harold Innis (7) who, however, was concerned with broader systems—i.e., civilizations. The following analysis should point up some little-considered problems inherent in the research process.
Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation
Authors: Freistadt Hans
Published: November 2002

Following an initial section, in which the relation of materialism to positivism (including operationalism) and agnosticism is discussed, and the latter views criticized, a formal definition of dialectical materialism is given. Materialism is contrasted to idealism and dualism. Dialectics is contrasted to metaphysics. Some additional assumptions, usually included in dialectics, such as the interpenetrating character of the levels of science, and rationalism, are listed. In a section devoted to the relation between matter and spirit, the foundations of materialist ethics are laid by stating the humanist axiom of purpose. In the last section, historical materialism is defined, and some reasons for the occasional entanglement of scientific, philosophical, and political controversies are discussed.
Philosophic Principles and Scientific Theory
Authors: Palter Robert
Published: November 2002

Current discussions of science—both popular and philosophical—often represent the development of science in our civilization as a gradual process of purification from superstitious, religious, and metaphysical elements. This purification is usually presumed to be complete by now—although there may be occasional lapses on the part of individual scientists. That science has changed in character over the centuries is a truism; that it has increasingly loosened ancient ties with magic, religion, and speculative philosophy is an easily substantiated historical thesis. This much admitted, however, an interesting question remains over for discussion: is science by its very nature independent of philosophy? This question has only as much meaning as its two key words (“science” and “philosophy”). According to one common view, “science” would signify some cumulative heritage of methods, principles, and results, while “philosophy” would signify a certain tradition of writings in which the later constantly refer to the earlier, but which otherwise exhibit no discernible uniformity of methods, principles, or results. On this view, then, science is essentially monistic while philosophy is essentially pluralistic.
Boyle's Metaphysic of Science
Authors: Kultgen J. H.
Published: November 2002

Robert Boyle's corpuscular philosophy was an important instance in the history of thought of a use of metaphysical principles in formulating new methods for physical science. Since Boyle nowhere completely and explicitly discussed his metaphysic, I shall undertake to reconstruct it and trace its influence on his scientific work.
On Elementary Particle Theory
Authors: Hanson Norwood Russell
Published: November 2002

In thirty years the science of elementary particles has made few achievements compared with its unsuccessful essays. The recent works of Schwinger, Tomonaga, Feynman and Dyson, however, have had some success. We have here a hint that progress is being made on the formal side of the discipline—though even this work is profoundly disturbing in some of its purely mathematical aspects. There could be no better time to review the situation from a physical and philosophical standpoint, even if this proves to be an over-ambitions undertaking.
Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

Russell's book on Leibniz appeared in 1900. That it is important, because of its subject and because of its author, hardly needs to be argued. An examination of it, or of parts of it, after more than half a century is therefore in order. Yet the title I chose indicates only part of my intent. The other part is to examine certain ideas, irrespective of what either Leibniz or Russell thought and of what the latter thought about the thoughts of the former. The title best suited to this part is Individuals, Natures, Relations, and Change. The mixed form of presentation, analytic and quasihistorical, has very great advantages. For the nature of the philosophical enterprise is such that an analyst is lost without some grasp or, at least, some image of “structural history.” The danger is that only very few, if any, are masters of two trades; in this case, logical analysis and historical scholarship. I, for one, make no pretense whatsoever of being a scholar. Naturally, I have read in Leibniz; and I did not skip or take lightly anything in the letters to Arnauld and Clarke; but I have by far not read everything that is available. Reading about Leibniz, aside from Russell, of which I did but little, I found Latta and, particularly, Joseph sometimes helpful. More often, though, I felt that the former's Hegelianism and the latter's Aristotelianism had got between them and their subject.
Mathematics and its Applications in the Sciences
Authors: Feibleman James K.
Published: November 2002

We have undertaken to discuss the nature of mathematical systems, the way in which they are discovered, and the uses to which they are put in the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences employ mathematical systems in framing final formulations, but adopt mathematical techniques long before reaching that stage. It is a prerequisite that the mathematics they employ has been developed separately and within its own domain. We shall return to the relation between mathematics and the empirical sciences before we are done, but in the meanwhile we shall be constrained to begin by discussing the situation in mathematics in isolation from any empirical considerations.
On the Establishment of a Universal Time
Authors: Moon Parry , Spencer Domina Eberle
Published: November 2002

The concept of simultaneity, and the associated problems of synchronization of moving clocks and establishment of a universal time scale, were given little or no attention prior to the twentieth century. In 1905, however, Einstein analyzed the concept of simultaneity on the basis of two principal postulates:

(1)

Absolute velocity is meaningless (relativity postulate),

(2)

The velocity of light in a vacuum is the same for all unaccelerated observers.
Letter to Editor
Authors: Dunayevskaya Raya
Published: November 2002

I wish to take issue with a statement in the report by Dr. Max Rieser on the International Congress for the Philosophy of Science, which appeared in the October 1955 issue of your journal. It reads: “As for an explanation of the unexpected absence of the scholars of the satellite countries, it should be borne in mind that they were all educated and grown up before the communist revolutionary upheaval and therefore naturally more susceptible of defection from the Marxist orthodoxy than the Russians. …”
Gestalt and Relativity: An Analogy
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood
Published: November 2002

This is in no sense an attack on the theory of relativity but, instead, an attempt to clarify some points about its epistemology and ontology. It is quite probable that the queries I have had in mind are products of the past. But I observe enough uncertainty in writings here and there to justify a brief discussion.

Discarding both ether and Newtonian Space either as entities or as frames for light, we have left the problem of relating the behavior of light to physical bodies, such as the proverbial rods.
Operations and the Occult
Authors: Palter Robert
Published: November 2002

What strikes one first about two recent books in philosophy of science is that they seem to be polar opposites in all important respects. Bridgman, of course, typifies the hard-headed and skeptical physical scientist, whose interest in the broad “philosophic” questions of scientific methodology stems largely from current problems in theoretical physics, but he is, nevertheless, very much concerned to extend the salutary effects of operational analysis to other intellectual disciplines. Jung, on the other hand, not only is a psychiatrist—and therefore professionally committed to a certain gullibility about mental phenomena—but he also is deeply convinced of the importance for science of such subjects as astrology and alchemy; and Pauli, although a distinguished physicist in his own right, has clearly been influenced by Jung's conception of archetypal ideas in the collective unconscious.
An Inquiring Mind
Authors: Walcott Gregory Dexter
Published: November 2002

I yield to no one in my admiration for and appreciation of what the scientists have accomplished in the last few centuries as well as back in the days of the Greeks. Nonetheless there are certain questions that perennially recur. One might readily say that scientists have not yet reached the proper answers, but judging from what they have already accomplished satisfactory answers will be forthcoming in the revolving years. That is too facile a reply. On some things we want real answers now. To put off fairly adequate explanations until some future limbo is wholly unsatisfactory.
A Model of Communication
Authors: Harrah David
Published: November 2002

In this paper I discuss a generalization of communication theory. I sketch a model of the communication situation sufficiently general to subsume all models of particular aspects of communication. Several definitions and lines of inquiry are proposed. It will be evident that much of what I say has been influenced by Bar-Hillel (1), and also that this paper goes beyond Bar-Hillel's both in generality of scope and in details of analysis. The more general aim of the paper is to suggest a reconstruction of our intuitions regarding communication. In particular, I argue that we should drop the idea that anything is “conveyed” in communication.
Validity Rules for Proportionally Quantified Syllogisms
Authors: Finch Henry Albert
Published: November 2002

Since the time, about a century ago, when DeMorgan (8), Boole (1) and Jevons (12), inaugurated the study of the logic of numerically definite reasoning, no one has been concerned to establish the validity rules for a very general type of numerically definite inference which is a strong analogue of the classical syllogism. The reader will readily agree that the traditional rules of syllogistic inferencecannot even begin to decidewhether the following proportionally quantified syllogism is a valid argument: at most 4/7pare at most 2/3 not-mand at least 3/5sare precisely 7/8m, hence, at most 1/3sarep.Likely reasons, of broad methodological interest, why this readily definable type of formal inference has been neglected will presently be proposed. Among the masters of twentieth century logic, Hilbert and Bernays (11) have, to be sure, meticulously shown how such numerically definite propositions as “at least 7 individuals have the propertyp”can be expressed in the predicate calculus with the use of the identity relation. They do not, since their concern with such propositions is indirect, proceed to establish a systematic calculus of classes whose “size” or extent is numerically definite. As we shall always notice, traditional logic and even ordinary Boolean algebra prefer to generalize about the laws governing the interrelationship of classes in inference systems without making any hypotheses concerning class “size” or extentexceptby the classical quantifier “some”, which quantifier admits the measure or extent of a class only in terms of the proposition that a given class contains or does not containat least onemember. Such a restricted admission of the relevance for inference of class size is among the fundamental reasons for the neglect of proportional quantifiers, i.e., quantifiers where numerical value is any rational numberrsuch that 0/100 ≤r≤ 100/100. It can, of course, also be pointed out that the traditional syllogism and ordinary Boolean algebra do not i.e. measure, numerically define, the degree of inclusion of one class in another. Inclusion is taken either as total or partial, with no discrimination of the degree of partial inclusion.
The Importance of Presents in Contemporary Science
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

Until the theory of evolution was developed in recent times, two theories of change were more or less in competition with each other. The first held that ends, purposes, goals, (teleos), are both the cause of change and constitute that toward which change is directed, as when the form of man directs the growth of a child and is the aim of growth. Hence, from this point of view, change is both accounted for and understood through what were called “final causes.”
Dialetical Materialism: A Further Discussion
Authors: Freistadt Hans
Published: November 2002

The present article is a continuation of an earlier paper, entitled “Dialectical Materialism: A Friendly Interpretation” (hereafter quoted as “Friendly Interpretation”), which appeared in this journal. In the “Friendly Interpretation”, the emphasis was on formal and systematic exposition. Here, familiarity with the basic tenets of dialectical materialism is presumed, and some peripheral topics, which were deleted from the “Friendly Interpretation” lest they interrupt its continuity, are treated in five essay-type sections. First, an interpretation of dialectical materialism proposed by Rosenfeld, according to which the usual acausal interpretation of quantum mechanics is consistent with, and even an instructive illustration of dialectical materialism, is criticized. In the second section, the connection between positivism and Orwell's “doublethink” is pointed out. This is done in order to exhibit certain difficulties to which consistent positivism leads, but which are avoided by both materialism and objective idealism; in particular, the language of positivism, lacking the concept of “existence”, is inadequate to distinguish by any absolute criterion between reality and a dream world. In the last three sections, two acausal philosophies are compared and contrasted to dialectical materialism. First, in the third section, Landé‘s argument, showing the incompatibility of the principles of complete causality and of continuity of cause and effect, is summarized. It is shown that Landé‘s choice, in favor of continuity of cause and effect, is not the only consistent one, and that if one accepts the outlook of dialectical materialism, the opposite choice can and should be made. In the fourth section, Margenau's interpretation of quantum mechanics is criticized, both in terms of the criteria proposed by Margenau, and from the point of view of the doctrine of rationalism, which, in the “Friendly Interpretation”, was included as part of dialectical materialism. The interpretation of Bohm, de Broglie, and Takabayasi is preferred to that of Margenau, which is akin to the usual Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation of quantum mechanics. Margenau's sharp distinction between concepts applicable to the microcosm, and those useful in macroscopic considerations, is criticized. In the fifth (and last) section, Margenau's use of the term “historical reality” in connection with the microcosm is criticized. It is argued that the reality of historical concepts is not intrinsically different from the reality of physical concepts. This leads to a further discussion of “free will”.
Trends in Philosophical Anthropology and Cultural Anthropology in Postwar Germany
Authors: Wein Hermann
Published: November 2002

The semantic confusion in Europe about the term “anthropology” has of late been considerable. On the one hand there is meant by it, and quite justifiably, human biology and medical anthropology. On the other hand, the work of some contemporary thinkers, under the name of “philosophical anthropology,” has recently gone beyond the narrower compass. This has been noticeable at both the German and the international European philosophical conventions since the last war. In addition to this, there appeared the term “Kulturanthropologie,”—for the first time probably as the title of E. Rothacker's contribution to Systematische Philosophie, a collection of essays edited by Nicolai Hartmann and published in 1942. But “Kulturanthropologie,” in Rothacker's sense, is not a translation of “cultural anthropology,” which has in recent years grown to such eminence among scholarly fields in England and America. In the United States, (1) “anthropology” designates a group of scholarly fields ranging on the one hand from biological anthropology to archaeology and the study of the beginnings of history on the other, often including history, linguistics, and other realms of research; (2) it is neither one of the natural sciences nor of the humanities but one of the social sciences; and (3) the actually new results of this young discipline, especially at Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago, are arrived at by means of team work by anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists, which in Germany has not been the case so far.
Epistemological Reflexions over the Special Theory of Relativity and Milne's Conception of Two Times
Authors: Törnebohm Håkan
Published: November 2002

In this paper we shall discuss the relativistic space-time metric. Even if all inertial frames of reference are treated as equivalent in the formalism of the theory of relativity, there is an important difference between them if we take possible observers into account. The class of possible frames of reference for human or man-made observers is a proper part of the class of conceivable frames of reference. This subclass is privileged with respect to human knowledge: Descriptions of physical phenomena with respect to members of it have a different epistemological status from descriptions with respect to other frames of reference. This fact is often neglected in presentations of the theory of relativity. We shall attempt to show that an emphasis on the observer's position sheds light on some features of the theory of relativity.
Remarks Concerning Moon and Spencer's “On the Establishment of a Universal Time”
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Moon and Spencer maintain (p. 228) that there is a divergence between Einstein's analysis of simultaneity, as set forth in his fundamental paper on relativity of 1905, and my treatment of that concept in a recent publication. They write: “Einstein decided that simultaneity is meaningless in all cases of relative motion. … Grünbaum decided that even Einstein's restriction is not sufficiently stringent and that simultaneity is a questionable concept even with stationary observers. … Grünbaum rejects Postulate VI [which states (p. 218) that ‘If A and B are not in relative motion, the time taken for a pulse of radiation to travel in a vacuum from A to B is the same as from B to A’] and is thereby unable to synchronize clocks even when they are stationary.”
The Empirical Basis and Theoretical Structure of Psychology
Authors: Spence Kenneth W.
Published: November 2002

In accepting the invitation of your society to discuss some aspects of the philosophy of science, particularly as they might bear on the problems of an experimental psychologist, I should like from the start to make it very clear that I do not consider myself a philosopher, not even an amateur one. Like most empirical scientists, particularly of the laboratory variety, I usually take it for granted that my world is real and that the things I perceive as existing in it can be investigated by my empirical methods. I seem to get along quite well with this unpremeditated, common-sense realism, and, for the most part, I go along minding my own experimental business. As the psychologists among you may know, however, every once in a while I seem to have to abandon this happy, naive state and let myself get involved in questions about my science, the kinds of questions that are more properly the business of the philosopher of science.
Belief and Propositions
Authors: Pap Arthur
Published: November 2002

The repudiation of propositions as “obscure entities” which is prevalent among logicians and philosophers of “nominalistic” persuasion, is frequently justified by pointing out that no agreement seems ever to have been reached about the identity-condition of propositions. And if we cannot specify, so they argue, under what conditions two sentences express the same proposition, then we use the word “proposition” without any clear meaning. Quine, for example, feels far less uneasy about quantification over class-variables than about quantification over attribute-variables and propositional variables, because there is a clear criterion for deciding whether we are dealing with two classes or with only one class referred to by different predicates: two classes are identical if they have the same membership. And such a criterion of identity is alleged to be lacking for intensions.
Explanation and Interpretation in History
Authors: Frankel Charles
Published: November 2002

Historians, philosophers, and men of affairs frequently raise questions about the “meaning” of history, or of selected segments of history, and frequently disagree about the relative merits of competing interpretations of specific historical periods or of the historical process as a whole. Such discussions are anything but idle. They affect what historians and others say about the past, and, in doing so, they influence the construction of social policies in the present. Indeed, they affect the very quality of a culture. For the view that a group of people hold towards their past is one of the controlling factors in their morals, religion, art, and intellectual pursuits, to say nothing of the sights, sounds, and actual feel of their daily experience.
The Logic of Explanation in Malinowskian Anthropology
Authors: Goldstein Leon J.
Published: November 2002

In a contribution to a symposium on “Causality in the Social Sciences,” Lewis Feuer remarks in passing that “Functionalism, in the form which Malinowski gave it, affirms that culture is an ‘organic unity’; it is the principle that in every culture, each custom, belief, and behavioral form ‘represents an indespensible part within a working whole.’” That culture is an integrated and organic unity is a view found quite often in the writings of Malinowski, though he does not maintain it with full consistency. Sometimes he seems to say that a culture is made up of a number of grand institutions, each of which is an integrated unity, though the totality need not be. But whether affirmed or denied this thesis is not the doctrine, characteristic of almost every attempt made by Malinowski to explain cultural phenomena during the last quarter century of his life, which may be properly called “Malinowskian functionalism.” And that the doctrine cited by Feurer is sometimes formulated in such a way that the term “functional” or some variant is used, as in “culture is a functionally integrated organic unity,” makes no difference to my claim. I am not at all certain that the addition of the word “functionally” does anything for the view in question; it surely makes no difference to its scientific sterility. But that apart, the point I wish to make here is that a good many scholars who make references to Malinowski's functionalism have never bothered to discover just what in the world this is. They have been all too ready to cite the vague programmatic pronouncements in which Malinowski's writings abound, while seemingly oblivious to the fact that with rare exception every major attempt by Malinowski to account systematically for some kind of sociocultural phenomena reveals one and the same pattern of explanation. And it is this pattern alone which may be spoken of as Malinowski's method of functional analysis.
Aristotle's Treatment of Probability and Signs
Authors: Madden Edward H.
Published: November 2002

Probability and Frequency. Aristotle frequently used the concept of probability, but apparently he did not make any persistent effort to clarify or analyze it. His description of a fortiori argument in The Topics (115a, 6–14), e.g., depends upon “the more or less likely or probable,” but he does not explore this notion. In The Rhetoric, where he applies himself to a puzzle about probability which the Sophists had advanced (1402a, 5–30), he comes closer to an analysis of probability. Aristotle quotes Agathon,

One might perchance say this was probable—

That things improbable oft will hap to men,

and elaborates thusly: “For what is improbable does happen [often], and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable.’ “(1402a, 10–15.) Aristotle believes that one can avoid this imposture by distinguishing between “general” and “specific” probability, and apparently intends by the former the statistical sense of frequent occurrence; but he does not establish what he might mean by the probability of an individual event and so leaves the notion of “specific probability” unclear.
Can “Essence” be a Scientific Term?
Authors: Kaminsky Jack
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper Copi has argued for the admission of the term “essence” into scientific terminology. His primary reason is that the increasing adequacy of scientific theories is evidence of a gradual approximation to the real essences of things. Copi is aware that the laws of modern science are not to be taken as formulations of essences. But, he claims, “that is an ideal towards which science strives… Centuries hence wiser men will have radically different and more adequate theories, and their notions will be closer approximations than ours to the real essences of things.”