bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Managerial Control
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins the historical analysis of welfare state development by tracing the origins of American segmentalism, a pattern of labor market control marked by decentralized industrial relations, relatively high and downwardly rigid wages paid by many large employers (efficiency wages), and extensive use of company benefits (welfare capitalism). Leading employers in America embarked on their segmentalist strategy early in the 20th century by breaking with existing and emerging centralized regulation of labor markets (multiemployer collective bargaining), desiring in part to assert absolute management rights against the militant claims of labor unions. For reasons analyzed in Ch. 2, success of the employers gave rise to heightened interests in regulatory social reform in response to the deflationary macroeconomic shock of the Great Depression.
Employers Unite
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter turns to the dramatically different turn of events in early 20th century. Sweden, where highly centralized collective bargaining took hold, largely at the behest of employers, accomplished with their effective use of sweeping multifirm and multiindustry lockouts. Securing absolute management rights despite union input in collective bargaining, employers achieved a solidaristic system of labor market regulation in which wages were held below market equilibrium for most firms and wages were standardized or compressed within many industries. The employer confederation was not successful, however, in achieving a desired compression of wages across industries, a goal that was to require labor union help and political intervention, discussed in the following chapter.
Cross‐Class Alliance
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter picks up where the last left off, in the 1930s, when the Swedish Social Democratic Party took power, and instead of undermining solidarism, actually helped employers achieve their long sought‐after solidaristic goal of compressing wage levels across industries. During the Great Depression, Social Democratic intervention against militant unions in the building and construction trades brought their wages down to levels long sought by employers, and inaugurated a decade‐long period of labor‐management harmony and consensual politics despite Social Democratic domination. This harmony was based on a cross‐class alliance of interest between major export‐oriented sectors of Swedish industry and the social democratic labor movement, reflected in the details of achievements of other political and industrial relations of the decade: the Social Democratic government's crisis program against unemployment and the famous 1938 Basic (Saltsjöbaden) Agreement between the labor and employer confederations.
World War and Class Politics
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

Wraps up the analysis of labor market developments in the U.S. through the 1940s showing how and why employers abdicated their segmentalist autonomy and submitted temporarily to state‐imposed solidarism, including intersectoral wage compression similar to what Sweden's normal peace time system brought about. During the prewar and interwar periods, the same employers actively sought another kind of intersectoral control, especially over wages in the building and construction trades, because high wages in this sector disrupted major manufacturers’ otherwise workable system of labor market governance just as they did in Sweden. Unlike in Sweden, however, major American manufacturers were unable to find allies for a cross‐class alliance against the building trade unions, and thus political relations between capital and labor remained far more hostile than in Sweden despite the Swedish labor movement's explicitly anticapitalist ideology.
The New Deal for Market Security
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

Constructs an explanation of welfare state development in the U.S. from analysis of segmentalism and cartelism, analyzed in earlier chapters, which characterized key components of its labor market system. Segmentalists (implicitly) and cartelists (explicitly) contracted with workers to hold wages and benefits higher than what market mechanisms alone would have set them; thus, these employers were vulnerable to the deflationary macroeconomic shock and unemployment of the Great Depression, which allowed competitors to threaten their profits by more freely lowering wages and therefore charging lower prices. New Dealers, having learned from the Progressive era as well as more recent reform about the potential for capitalist support ignored vocal opposition from business organizations and proceeded with regulatory social security, unemployment insurance, minimum wage, and labor law reform that would level the competitive playing field upward, stabilizing ruinous competition for cartelists and segmentalists, and thereby securing a cross‐class alliance for the New Deal.
Whose Business Were the New Dealers Minding?
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

Submits additional evidence for the cross‐class alliance theory of welfare state development in order to challenge competing theories, especially those that deny the positive role that capitalist power plays in determining the timing and shaping of reform. It shows, contrary to influential institutionalist theory, that the New Dealers did not act in bold defiance of monolithic opposition from capitalists, for in fact business organizations were internally divided; that corporate progressives were not disappointed with the New Deal; and that the New Dealers were not interested in building or defending state institutions that would endow bureaucrats and policy experts with the autonomous power to execute progressive policy without regard to capitalist interests. The discussion also challenges other theories that focus on the following: the loss of capitalist power due to the Depression and therefore politicians’ supposed new freedom to ignore business confidence; horse trading between internationalist business interests with little to lose from progressive legislation, and labor groups with little to lose from free trade; and direct pressure from capitalists for regulatory social reform.
From Solidarism to Social Democracy
Authors: Swenson Peter A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter turns to an explanation of welfare state development in Sweden, where ironically, the major strides had to wait until the 1940s and 1950s, although Sweden's progressive political forces seemed stronger than America's in the 1930s. First it looks at why. Because of their solidaristic system of labor market governance, capitalists in Sweden would benefit from progressive reforms in times of acute labor scarcity (associated with postwar macroeconomic conditions) rather than the reverse as in the U.S. Then it analyzes how the Social Democratic government's very modest unemployment insurance and pension reforms of the 1930s served solidarism's need for low levels of militancy and heightened labor mobility, and thus helped forge the kind of cross‐class alliance that was to secure a long reign of peaceful relations between labor and capital under a leftist government.
The Theological Context of Mark
Authors: Sabin Marie Noonan
Published: October 2003

Searches for the origins of Mark in Early Judaism, taking up the questions of its authorship, provenance, and genre. In the process, Sabin discusses the Papias fragment that links Mark with Peter, the Aramaic and semitisms of Mark's language, and the relevance of midrashic methods of composition to the shape of Mark's Gospel. She connects her conclusions to the Christian tradition, evident in the church fathers, of seeking to preserve the gospel's Jewish roots. She presents her own hermeneutical method as one of retrieval and dialog: retrieval of what the text might have meant to its original author and audience, and dialog with that meaning in relation to the present Christian community. In the rest of the book she proposes to reconstruct the reading‐frame of first‐century Judaism and place the consequent interpretation of Mark in conversation with other reading‐frames that have been used by Christians over the centuries.
Scripture Intersecting History: Mark's Eschatology
Authors: Sabin Marie Noonan
Published: October 2003

Sabin challenges the idea that the eschatology of Mark 13 warrants calling it “The Little Apocalypse,” showing how its outer frame begins with Jesus’ prediction of the destruction of the Temple, but ends with two parables that indicate its restoration. She sees Jesus’ Parable of the Returning Householder as a scriptural reference to God's return to his dwelling, and the Parable of the Fig Tree in bloom as a scriptural sign of God's kingdom. She also shows how the inner frame of Mark 13 begins with the disciples asking a question about the End Time typical of apocalyptic writing, but concludes with Jesus’ nonapocalyptic response of not knowing. She argues that while Jesus’ central discourse is filled with apocalyptic conventions warning about the End, they are immediately defused by Jesus’ reassurances. She notes that at the center of his discourse, Jesus describes the core evil not as Satan, but as “the desolating sacrilege,” a reference to the destructive acts of Antiochus IV as type or symbol of Rome's corruption of Temple worship.
From the Temple to the Cross: An Exegetical Journey
Authors: Sabin Marie Noonan
Published: October 2003

Sabin reads the Temple‐cleansing scene in the framework of Maccabees, The Parable of the Fig Tree in the context of Genesis, and the Parable of the Vineyard in the context of the Prophets, seeing these linked episodes as a midrashic lexicon stressing the hope that the Temple would be restored. Reading Jesus's debates in the Temple in the framework of the four sons’ questions in an ancient Passover liturgy, she sees them serving to discriminate between the righteous and the unrighteous within Judaism, with Jesus himself in perfect agreement with the righteous Temple scribe. Sabin perceives the accusations that Jesus planned to destroy the Temple to be false, in keeping with a pattern evident in the Psalms, Lamentations, and the Wisdom of Solomon, all of which describe false witnesses who condemn God's righteous one through untruthful accusations. In conclusion, she discusses the rending of the sanctuary veil in Mark 15:38, suggesting that the verb Mark uses here – schizo – recalls Isaiah's prayer to God to take back his sanctuary (Isa 63), as well as the opening up of the heavens in Mark 1:10. Sabin argues that by means of these interweaving scriptural frameworks, Mark takes the reader on an exegetical journey that moves from cleansing the Temple of its profanation to the revelation of where God dwells – not in a majestic building but in human life and death, even death on a cross.
The Discipleship of Wisdom: A Process of Transformation
Authors: Sabin Marie Noonan
Published: October 2003

Sabin argues that Mark's characterization of the Jesus community must be understood in the context of the Wisdom traditions, where it is common to pose an antithesis between the wise and the foolish; within the Markan narrative, she argues, the obtuse and faithless behavior of the male disciples constitutes a metaphor for folly. Mark dramatizes their folly by showing how they repeatedly fail to comply with the instruction of their teacher, Wisdom/Jesus; they are symbolic fools in respect to their self‐aggrandizement, their greed, and their failure to “watch” for God's kingdom. At the same time, Mark sets up a foil to their foolishness in the actions of the women who, in their faithful following of Wisdom/Jesus, become symbols of the wise. First the women, who start out as social pariahs (the mother‐in‐law, the menstruating woman, the dead child) are all “raised up” to a new status through Jesus’ miraculous intervention; then they act out the roles the male disciples have failed to perform (they anoint,follow, and watch). If the authentic ending of Mark (Mk 16:1–8) is translated properly, they are shown to be so transformed by Jesus’ resurrection that they become its first witnesses, and bearers and symbols of God's renewed Creation.
Doing Things for Reasons
Authors: Bittner Rüdiger
Published: October 2003

What are the reasons for which people do things? A common answer is “the pairing of a desire and a belief within the agent”. Arguing that the desire‐belief‐theory is supported only by an old philosophical tradition, and not by good reasons, this book defends the idea that a reason is a state of affairs in the world, and that what is done for a reason is a response to that state of affairs. It then follows that explanation of action by the reasons for which it was done is historical explanation. It also follows that – in contrast to what most philosophers have held –there is nothing normative about reasons. Finally, Bittner concludes that doing things for reasons is not a human privilege and that higher animals are capable of it as well.
Doing Things for Reasons—The Idea
Authors: Bittner Rüdiger
Published: October 2003

The central idea of the book is this: a reason for which people do things is a state of affairs or event in the world, and the action is a response to that state of affairs or event. The present chapter introduces this idea by means of examples. It explains the term “response” and argues that it is historical knowledge that allows us to tell what some action is a response to. It argues, moreover, that this idea makes the best sense of how we ordinarily think and speak of reasons for which people do things.
Reasons One Has for Doing Something
Authors: Bittner Rüdiger
Published: October 2003

This chapter takes up reasons one merely has, in contrast to reasons for which one does something. Rejecting the usual terminology of motivating and justifying reasons, the chapter argues that merely having a reason for doing something amounts to one's being in a situation where there is a state of affairs or event that could be a reason for which one did something. A reason one has is just the initial part of a history of one's doing it for that reason – an initial part, though, that may not get completed. On this account, a plurality of reasons one has for doing something, or for doing different things, is readily intelligible, as is one's doing something for one of the reasons one has rather than for another. The phenomena of advice and of deliberation can also be accounted for on this understanding of the reasons one has.
Are Reasons Internal? and Are They Normative?
Authors: Bittner Rüdiger
Published: October 2003

The chapter defends the present account of reasons one has against challenges by internalism and normativism. Internalists like Bernard Williams hold that one does not have a reason for doing something unless one has also a motivation to do it or could acquire such motivation by sound deliberation on the basis of the motivation one has. However, the argument for this claim is based on the premise that only what motivates agents can explain actions, and nothing speaks in favor of accepting this premise. On the other hand, it is a consequence of the present account that reasons are not normative, contrary to the view of most of the literature, and the arguments offered by Korsgaard and Broome for the received view do turn out to be defective.
The Animal Question
Authors: Cavalieri Paola
Published: October 2003

What we call moral progress can for the most part be seen as the history of the replacement of hierarchical visions in favor of equality. Yet, we currently use nonhuman animals as means to our ends – in fact, we treat them in ways that we would deem profoundly immoral were they human beings. Is such a position warranted? This book's aim is to show that it is not. I argue that, just like the past justifications of intra‐human discrimination, the justifications of discrimination against nonhumans are indefensible. I first discuss the problem of moral status in the context of rational, nonreligious ethics; then, after criticizing the philosophical sources of the present double standards, I challenge both the appeal to species membership and the appeal to mental complexity as defenses of humanism – the limiting of equal basic moral protection to human beings. I then turn to the task of redefining the moral community without inconsistency or prejudice. The argument I put forward is not a freestanding one, but rather is derived from the most universally accepted of contemporary ethical doctrines – human rights theory. What I claim is that, if we take the egalitarianism of such theory seriously, we cannot but extend the institutionalized protection of the basic interests in life, freedom, and welfare, to (most) nonhuman animals. I conclude that, at the social level, such a reform would require the constitutional abolition of the mere property status of nonhuman animals, and the prohibition of all the practices that are today made possible by such status.
The Problem of Moral Status
Authors: Cavalieri Paola
Published: October 2003

After defending the idea that ethics is a theoretical enquiry endowed with autonomous standards of justification and criticism, within which criteria coming from other domains have no direct relevance, I dwell on the structure of the moral community. The notions of moral agent and moral patient are clarified, and a distinction is drawn between possible levels in moral status. Within this framework, I consider a set of often quoted criteria for inclusion into the moral community. My conclusion, which is widely shared within contemporary moral philosophy, is that, thanks to its connection with the role‐shift test, the criterion of consciousness remains the only plausible candidate criterion for the status of moral patient.
A Minimal Normative Proposal
Authors: Cavalieri Paola
Published: October 2003

Finally, I argue that we already have at our disposal a theory that settles some of the moral questions of a decent coexistence, namely, human rights doctrine. I suggest that basic human rights have three main features: they are political and institutional in character; they refer to narrow morality and are thus negative rights; they are not justified by reference to rationality, self‐consciousness, or any other ”higher” characteristics, but instead by reference to the mere intentionality of the individual. In the light of the moral irrelevance of species membership, I conclude that consistency demands that we expand human rights doctrine to include all those intentional animals whom we currently treat as little more than mere things, and that we alter our institutions accordingly.
The Book of Evidence
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: October 2003

What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).
The Dean's Challenge
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: October 2003

The claim is made that standard philosophical accounts of evidence are and ought to be ignored by scientists for two reasons. First, they are too weak, allowing facts to count as evidence for hypotheses even if they provide no reason whatever for believing those hypotheses. Second, they mistakenly make the question of whether a fact is evidence for a hypothesis settleable entirely a priori, by calculation, whereas, in general, this is an empirical issue.
What's Wrong With These Probabilistic Theories of Evidence?
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: October 2003

Counterexamples are presented against the two standard probabilistic theories of evidence of Ch. 3. Various responses of defenders of these probabilistic theories are considered. It is argued that evidence, by contrast to probability, is a threshold concept that requires a certain amount of probability before any evidence is present. Patrick Maher's defense of the positive relevance view of evidence is presented and rejected.
Explanation Versus Prediction: Which Carries More Evidential
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: October 2003

According to one standard view, a prediction of a new fact always counts as stronger evidence for a hypothesis than an explanation of a known one. According to another view, it is the reverse. Both views are shown to be mistaken. What is important for evidence is not whether it was predicted or explained, but (in the sort of cases used by each side) what selection procedures were used to obtain the evidence. Stephen Brush's defense of ”explanationism” and Patrick Maher's defense of ”predictivism” are critically examined, as is Clark Glymour's problem of ”old evidence.”
Who Really Discovered the Electron?
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: October 2003

Although J.J. Thomson is credited with the discovery of the electron on the basis of his experiments with cathode rays in 1897, various physicists, including William Crookes, Arthur Schuster, Philipp Lenard, and others, who had also conducted cathode ray experiments claimed that they deserved the credit. This chapter provides a general definition of discovery that can be used to help resolve the question, which, as it turns out, is a complex philosophical and historical one. The relationship between discovery and evidence, as well as what's so important about who discovered the electron, are issues also discussed in the present chapter.
Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Morality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This second volume on rights, duties, and status explores life and death as general issues in non‐consequentalist ethical theory. It comprises three parts. Part I has five chapters discussing the question of the moral (in)equivalence of killing and letting die, harming, and not aiding. Part I has two chapters and offers a discussion of the so‐called ‘Trolley Problem’ and some other closely related dilemmatic situations, for the purpose of developing a principled account of when harming some to save others is permissible and when it is impermissible. Part III has five chapters and is concerned with the further examination of the relation between restrictions on conduct and prerogatives not to make sacrifices, and how these topics relate to human rights, duties, and the existence of valuable entities and states of affairs. In addition, it is concerned with the power of agreements and of supererogatory conduct to override restrictions.
Killing and Letting Die: Arguments for Inequivalence and the Problem of Contextual Interaction
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Considers a new use for non‐standardly equalized cases of killing and letting die, comparing cross‐definitionally equalized killing and non‐cross‐definitionally equalized killing cases to collect evidence for the truth or falsity of Thesis E (Thesis of the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die). In addition, a comparison is made of cross‐definitionally equalized killing and letting‐die cases to test for the moral significance of what is called here ‘non‐exportable’ definitional properties of killing or letting die. With this as a foundation, two arguments are presented against Thesis E: one argument focuses on the significance of certain definitional properties of killing and letting die, and one on the transitivity argument. The first argument may tell us why killing and letting die differ morally per se, not only that they do. Two methodological issues in making these arguments are also addressed: the Principle of Contextual Interaction, and the possible failure of transitivity.
Harming, not Aiding, and Positive Rights
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Considers what would follow if the General Equivalence Thesis (GE) of the moral equivalence of harming and not aiding (in cases in which less than life is at stake) were true. The possible existence of positive rights (or duties minus correlative rights) is considered, and an argument against positive rights by Judith Thomson is examined. Arguments are considered that attempt to derive positive rights or duties from the existence of negative rights and a warning given against the failure to consider the role of independent rights or self‐standing claims to things, and the significance of already having had something. An examination is made of how far it is possible to come, consistent with Thesis GE, toward deriving the radical conclusion that we may have a right to something to which we have no independent right or self‐standing claim if it is not permissible to take it from us.
The Trolley Problem
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Part I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not permissible to kill some to save others. Ch. 6 first examines in some detail the arguments John Harris has made for a survival lottery (where we may select from among healthy people the one who will die to save another or who will share a fair risk of death with another), and considers a very limited context in which a curtailed survival lottery might be installed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of the many attempts to solve the problem of why we may not ordinarily kill one to save more (as in the Transplant Case, where a non‐consequentialist would believe that we may not chop up one innocent non‐threatening person, who would not otherwise die, to transplant his organs into a greater number of people in order to save their lives) but may kill via redirection of threats (as in the Trolley Case, where there is a choice between killing one or killing a greater number by turning/redirecting, or failing to turn/redirect, a runaway trolley). These attempts include the views of Philippa Foot, proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (e.g. Michael Costa), Warren Quinn, James Montmarquet, Judith Thomson, and Bruce Russell. A detailed examination is also made of whether the notion of ‘being already involved’ is a moral notion or can be given a non‐moral description.
Harming Some to Save Others
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Continues the consideration of when it is and is not permissible to kill some to save others, by presenting a new proposal (related to an earlier one made by the author) for a Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH) for dealing with the Trolley Case and related cases. One upshot of this proposal is to show that many redirection‐of‐threat cases are not sui generis but one of a class of cases in which greater good (or its structurally equivalent component or a means that has greater good as its non‐causal flip side) may permissibly cause lesser harm. This PPH is compared with the Doctrine of Double Effect, and a morally crucial distinction concealed within the concept of ‘intending’ is pointed out. The problem then is to explain what important moral notions the PPH expresses; an investigation is made of this (focusing on the maintenance of appropriate relations between victim and beneficiaries) and of why the PPH does not govern omissions (even when there are positive rights). Concludes by examining the bearing of the PPH on the killing/letting‐die distinction, and the problem of euthanasia, also noting how its application is limited by, among other considerations, the Principle of Secondary Permissibility and the distinction between intra‐ and inter‐personal benefits.
Prerogatives and Restrictions
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

The first three chapters of Part III of the book (Chs 8–10) examine the question of whether it is morally permissible to treat people in ways ruled out by the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH; this was introduced in Ch. 7 and provides an account of certain restrictions/constraints on killing) only for the sake of minimizing violations of the PPH itself, or whether there is a constraint on doing this. Ch. 8 first examines the arguments Samuel Scheffler presents against both restrictions and constraints, and his defence of prerogatives not to maximize good or minimize harm (his Hybrid Theory); since Scheffler's views on prerogatives are in some ways related to those of Bernard Williams, the latter's views on integrity are also considered. The criticism made of Scheffler in Sect. I of this chapter is concerned with his view of the supposed gulf between prerogatives and restrictions, and consideration is given to whether too great an emphasis on an active/passive distinction does not underlie his strong opposition to restrictions and whether (by a transitivity argument) he is committed to no restrictions even in pursuing personal non‐optimal projects. Possible similarities between prerogatives and restrictions (or constraints) are considered, but the focus is on crucial differences with respect to minimizing the violation of prerogatives and restrictions, these differences giving rise to what are called the Value and Selection Problems; solutions to the Selection Problem based on asymmetries in victims and differentiation between agents are considered. Sect. II of the chapter re‐examines the foundations of a prerogative (not to maximize good or to minimize harm) that Scheffler located in the personal point of view (PPV); rejecting the sufficiency of Scheffler's account, the chapter focuses on freedom of choice over entitlements in creatures who are ends‐in‐themselves, discussing briefly the idea of reasons generated from the PPV in such creatures; finally, an examination is made of the arguments Shelly Kagan has constructed for and against prerogatives, including the Negative and Positive Arguments, and the Argument from Vividness.
Constraining Rights and the Value of Status
Authors: Kamm F. M.
Published: October 2003

Examine the question of whether it is morally permissible to treat people in ways ruled out by the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH; this was introduced in Ch. 7 and provides an account of certain restrictions/constraints on killing) only for the sake of minimizing violations of the PPH itself, or whether there is a constraint on doing this. Having considered alternative grounds for a constraint in Ch. 9, Ch. 10 fleshes out a victim‐focussed, agent‐neutral, rights‐based view founded in a strengthened PPH right (constraint), which protects against minimizing violations of the right by violating the right; consideration is given to whether and in what sense minimizing violations of PPH rights by violating them would be both strictly irrational and also exhibit lack of concern for the right. Rejecting this as a route to founding the constraint (on grounds that strict irrationality would arise only if there were already a constraint (or an absolute right not to be killed)), a constraint is generated by focusing on a concern that is at the heart of the PPH and applying it to the pursuit of any goal (utility or minimization of rights violations), the chapter considers how the permissibility of minimization would alter every person's status, and examines the distinction between eliminating a right, violating it, and infringing it, focussing on the significance of negative residues of, and compensation for, rights violations. An exploration is made of whether the structure of deontological and consequentialist theories can be brought closer together via the agent‐neutral value of an inviolable status (of a certain sort), though a distinction is made between the irrationality argument against minimizing the violation of constraints, and support for a concept of the person as strongly inviolable. It is also considered whether creatures who are inviolable are therefore more important entities whose existence makes the world a better place and whether belief in a constraint affects both how good the world is and the effect of acts done in accord with or in opposition to the constraint; further examination is made of the futility of permitting minimization of rights violations by violating rights (‘futilitarianism’) by contrasting the role of utility vs rights per se in motivating minimizing.
The Evolution of Cooperation and Consciousness
Authors: Miles Rebekah L.
Published: October 2003

An examination is made of Rosemary Radford Ruether's naturalist moral realism, whose naturalist, ecofeminist ethic locates both God (divine presence) and human norms in natural processes, particularly in evolution. Transcendence of immediate context and experience is possible through conscious participation in natural evolutionary development into the future. Ruether's moral realism is evident in her confidence that humans can know the good by looking to nature, including human nature, and this same confidence makes her an idealist about the potential to eliminate domination by creating new selves, theologies, and social structures. Moreover, Ruether's description of normative human nature focuses on boundedness to nature and the self's unique faculty of consciousness as an expression of nature; it does not include the human capacity for radical transcendence of or freedom over nature and consciousness. Thus, it is argued, Ruether offers grounding for moral norms in her naturalist moral realism, but she lacks a mechanism to judge those norms and to account for the resilience of human sin and the potential of human creativity to transmute nature.
Battling for Truth in the Beloved Community
Authors: Miles Rebekah L.
Published: October 2003

An examination is made of Sharon Welch's political realist position. Welch, in contrast to Ruether, locates moral norms and the divine in particular human communities, and all moral claims are radically relative to those particular contexts. Appeals to an experience or reality that transcends our interactions in communities are illusory justifications of our own relative positions, since only within community interaction can we transcend ourselves as we see the limitations of our understandings through the criticism of others. Welch is a political realist in the sense that she is suspicious of the power interests hidden behind truth claims, and she is cynical in her skepticism of any substantive grounding for moral claims. It is shown that each of these proposals undercuts a crucial aspect of feminist moral judgment and, thus, does not lessen, but rather unintentionally supports, further domination.
The Islamic Leviathan
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza
Published: October 2003

Islamism is often associated with oppositional social movements. However, increasingly, Muslim states too have served as agents of Islamism. They have adopted Islamization strategies, and realigned state ideology and policy‐making to reflect Islamist ideals and to fulfill demands of Islamic ideology. They have done so not only as a reaction to Islamist challenges from below but also to harness the energies of Islamism to expand state power and capacity. By co‐opting Islamism, they have strengthened the postcolonial state. Pakistan during the Zia ul‐Haq period, and Malaysia under Mahathir Mohammad have been at the forefront of this trend, devising Islamization from above strategies that allowed these weak states to effectively alleviate limitations before exercise of state power and to pursue goals such as economic growth. The Islamization of the postcolonial state underscores the importance of religion and culture to state power and capacity.
The Colonial Legacy
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza
Published: October 2003

In Malaya and India, the British devised a system of indirect rule whereby they relied on local norms, social organizations, and indigenous institutions of authority such as landlords and sultans who managed the daily lives of their subjects but were controlled by the British through treaties. Both the colonial states used patronage to rule, creating dependencies between local authorities and the colonial state, and also creating economic, legal, and social structures that, along with the patronage, divided the society vertically.
From Independence to 1969
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza
Published: October 2003

Malaysia and Pakistan were created from the rump of British colonialism in India and Southeast Asia. Both states lacked national identity or a unified polity that preceded independence. Both confronted social divisions that were the legacy of the colonial era. In fact, in both countries the struggle for independence was not directed against the British, but was a competition of racial, religious, and ethnic rivals. As weak states, they were unable to proceed with effective state formation. Economic Disparities in Malaysia led to racial and ethnic tensions. Weak state institutions and constitutional crises led to ethnic tensions in Pakistan.
Malaysia, 1981–1997
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza
Published: October 2003

In the 1980s, Malaysia adopted the policy of state‐led Islamization. The ruling UMNO party co‐opted ABIM, fashioned itself as an Islamically oriented party, and adopted many Islamist ideas. The state created Islamic institutions, and supported Islamic cultural, political, and economic activities. It used Islamization to expand its power and to penetrate the Malay society. The state also embarked on rapid economic growth to address racial tensions. It used its control of Islam to manage Islamic politics and define Islamic values with a view of economic growth and accommodating globalization.
Introduction
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Presents an argument for Lessing's significance for German intellectual history as well as his significance for modern Protestant theology. The assertion made here is that Lessing, as a pioneer among the nontheologians who fostered the development of modern theology, belongs to the arena of the history of theology, even though he was not a theologian by profession. The task of articulating Lessing's theology or philosophy of religion is a difficult task that demands meticulous treatment. In order to escape the famous dilemma posed by Friedrich Loofs when he claimed that Lessing's “esoteric view” is concealed behind impenetrable “exoteric” walls, we consider the question of methodology for Lessing studies and reexamine old interpretive methods. The new method introduced here involves a heuristic and contextual interpretation of each of Lessing's cardinal texts, or an “intellectual assay” into the hidden and presumably rich vein of his thought with an eye to systematic reconstruction in future.
Lessing and Christianity
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Surveys Lessing's relationship with Christianity and theology in preparation for a detailed analysis of particulars in the ensuing chapters. The survey depicts in general terms Lessing's long and deep‐rooted engagement with Christianity. A glance at Lessing's formative period as well as his later involvement in the “fragments controversy” (Fragmentenstreit) provides instructive hints as to the salient features of his theological thought. In an attempt to identify Lessing's real intention and his theological position in this fierce theological dispute, the question is raised as to why Lessing ventured, anonymously, to publish Reimarus's posthumous manuscripts. Investigation suggests that Lessing's act of publishing the Fragments from an Unnamed Author can be construed as an act intended to serve the pursuit of truth.
The Religious Thought of the Young Lessing
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Analyzes the young Lessing's religious thought with special attention to his early writings, particularly Religion, Some Thoughts about the Moravians, The Jews, and The Christianity of Reason. These poetic, theological, dramatic, and philosophical writings illustrate his religious skepticism, his theological critique, his ideal of universal humanity, and certain speculative reflections. The analysis shows that in his early years Lessing still vacillated among four ways of thinking: Lutheran orthodoxy, pietism, deism, and Leibniz‐Wolffian metaphysics. But these early writings also contain many of the germs of the religious‐philosophical thought of his mature years. The inquiry demonstrates that the young Lessing displayed brilliantly in these early writings something of his later genius both as a theological critic and as a philosopher of religion.
The Controversy Between Lessing and Goeze
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Analyzes the confrontation between Lessing and Goeze during “the second stage of the fragments controversy,” i.e., the stage when the target of criticism was no longer the author of the fragments but the editor who had ventured to make them public. The Lessing‐Goeze controversy began when Goeze, the Hauptpastor in Hamburg who was notorious as “the Inquisitor” and who looked on himself as the defender of Lutheran orthodoxy, launched a fierce attack on Lessing, the ducal librarian at Wolfenbüttel and the editor of Fragments from an Unnamed Author. Lessing's defense took the form of a series of polemical writings: A Parable; Axioms; the eleven‐installment Anti‐Goeze; and The Necessary Answer to a very Unnecessary Question. It is observed that what was of highest importance for Lessing was the “truth question,” whereas Goeze's sole concern was the preservation of established Lutheran orthodoxy. Lessing's intention to discuss the question of the truth of Christian revelation in open forum was marred by his opponent's recourse to the civil authorities.
Lessing's “Ugly Broad Ditch”
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Explicates the meaning of Lessing's famous metaphor or image of the “ugly broad ditch” (der garstige breite Graben). This image is a metaphorical expression of his proposition that “accidental truths of history can never become the proof for necessary truths of reason.” Lessing asserts that since the “proof of the spirit and of power” has lost its erstwhile validity, the Christian religion, the quintessence of which Lessing regards as genuine Christian love, must authenticate itself solely by its “inner truth.” But Karl Barth, calling the authenticity of Lessing's “ugly ditch” into question, weighs Lessing's problem (“historical distance”) unfavorably against Peter's problem (“the real distance” between God and human beings). Faced with Barth's sharp criticism, we argue that Lessing's “ugly ditch” involves not just a problem of “historical distance” but a theological problem of existential appropriation, a problem of great importance for the modern person.
Lessing's Basic Thought in The Education of the Human Race
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Explicates Lessing's basic thought as set forth in his theological and religious‐philosophical manifesto, The Education of the Human Race. A meticulous and thoroughgoing analysis of the text unravels Lessing's dialectical conception of the relationship between revelation and reason. For Lessing, the human race finds fulfillment in a developmental process induced and propelled by divine revelation. Hence he introduces the novel concept of the development of human reason as a gradual appropriation of divine revelation. The chapter concludes that the ideal of Lessingian enlightenment is the attainment of an “autotheonomy” in which “autonomy is at the same time theonomy.”
Lessing's “Spinozism”
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Argues the question of Lessing's alleged “Spinozism.” The discussion shows that Lessing's hen kai pan [One and All] signifies not a Spinozistic pantheism but a panentheism of spiritualistic stamp. It is also pointed out that for Lessing's hen kai pan there are three different Greek formulas: hen kai pan, as Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi reports in his letter to Moses Mendelssohn; hen ego kai panta, as Lessing's own 1780 handwritten epigram suggests; and hen ego kai pan, as introduced in recent years by Alexander Altmann and Erwin Quapp. Religious‐philosophical as well as linguistic observation recommends taking the phrase hen ego kai panta [I am One and All] as Lessing's most authentic formula, thus suggesting that the world (panta and God (theos) are mediated through the first person “I” (ego). In view of this “panta” formula, our concluding proposal is to characterize Lessing's view of God and the world as “pantaentheism.”
Conclusion
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa
Published: October 2003

Offers a general summary of our findings on Lessing's view of Christianity and reason and discusses certain implications of his work for contemporary thinking. It has been demonstrated that Christianity stood at the forefront of Lessing's concerns throughout his life, though his contribution to the history of Protestantism is actually Janus‐faced. For Lessing, as his famous dictum testifies, the goal of enlightenment is a mature autonomy capable of confessing that absolute truth is for God alone. We propose to designate this ideal of Lessingian enlightenment as the attainment of an “autotheonomy” in which “autonomy is at the same time theonomy.” Our inquiry confirms that Lessing's thought contains the potential needed for the constitutive elements of a viable theology in the postmodern age.
Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy
Authors: McCarthy Timothy
Published: October 2003

Attempts to offer a response to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of reference and translation by developing an original theory of radical interpretation, i.e. the project of characterising from scratch the language and attitudes of an unknown agent or population. Ch. 1 situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject and offers arguments against its main competitors, namely, Kripkean theories of reference and Dummettian verificationist accounts. Ch. 2 introduces the constitutive principles of McCarthy's own theory of radical interpretation, exploiting the constraints on interpretation suggested by Davidson and Lewis as the starting point of discussion. Chs 3 and 4 apply McCarthy's framework to theories of reference and the interpretation problem for the philosophy of logic, offering original accounts of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined, and how the logical devices of a language can be characterized on the basis of data provided by an interpretation of its speakers.
Introduction
Authors: McCarthy Timothy
Published: October 2003

Serves three main purposes: first, it lays out and attempts to justify the methodological point of view of the investigation. Secondly, it situates the theory put forward in the context of the recent history of the subject, which is dominated by three families of responses to Quine's indeterminacy arguments, namely, Kripkean theories of reference, Dummettian verificationist accounts, and theories of interpretation along the lines of those favoured by Davidson and Lewis. Thirdly, it sketches some of the substantive conclusions reached in the subsequent chapters of the book.