bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
O papel negocial do departamento de GRH na “responsabilidade social”: um estudo qualitativo
Authors: Moreira Ricardo Bessa , Cunha Pedro
Published: October 2017

A investigação atual sobre negociação começou nos Estados Unidos, na segunda metade do século XX. A negociação revela-se vital para as organizações. A sua utilidade reside no fundamento dos seres humanos se virem impelidos a negociar por não poderem controlar tudo o que os rodeia. Estudar a negociação, na perspetiva da interação entre departamentos, implica uma perspetiva integrada destas unidades no processo negocial. Procura-se analisar o papel do Departamento de GRH na eficácia negocial, partindo- se do princípio de que quem gere os recursos humanos pode atuar como ‘intermediário’ negocial em áreas tão determinantes como a da Responsabilidade Social (Aggarwal e Bhargava, 2009; Beersma e Dreu, 2005; Sayli e Gormus, 2009). Este estudo tem por base a análise de 20 entrevistas realizadas a diretores de departamento(s) e unidade(s) que não o de RH sobre qual o papel negocial que o departamento que gere as pessoas tem no ‘contrato psicológico’. Destacam-se os resultados que indiciam que o comprometimento do Departamento de GRH nesta área será tanto mais efetivo quanto mais elevada for a sua posição na hierarquia. O poder negocial da gestão das pessoas, no que concerne à Responsabilidade social, é disseminado pelas diferentes hierarquias nas organizações e, muitas vezes, ultrapassa o Departamento de GRH.
Especificidades dos imigrantes brasileiros em Portugal e implicações na gestão internacional de recursos humanos
Authors: Santos José Manuel Gameiro Rebelo , Pedro Maria de Lurdes Cardina
Published: October 2017

Os brasileiros constituem hoje em dia a maior comunidade de imigrantes em Portugal. A sua forma de estar e de ser tem reflexos na sua integração na sociedade e nas organizações em que desenvolvem uma atividade profissional, repercutindo-se inclusive na própria gestão de recursos humanos dessas organizações. Este estudo tem como objetivos perceber como os imigrantes brasileiros percecionam os portugueses, numa perspetiva ligada aos standards culturais, segundo os referenciais de Hofstede e de Trompenaars & Hampden e que implicações têm essas perceções para a gestão de recursos humanos. Visa ainda caracterizar a comunidade brasileira, quantificando os seus elementos e identificando a sua distribuição por regiões. Para o efeito recorre-se em primeiro lugar aos dados divulgados pelo Instituto Nacional de Estatística e pelo Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras para caracterizar esta comunidade. Analisam-se ainda inquéritos por entrevista efetuados a brasileiros residentes em Portugal, com idades entre os 20 e os 65 anos e com uma permanência em Portugal de, pelo menos, dois anos e a responsáveis pela gestão de recursos humanos em organizações que empregaram imigrantes brasileiros. Os dados preliminares indiciam mais informalidade nas relações de trabalho, muita dedicação e competências em áreas específicas.
Reducing Reasons
Authors: Silverstein Matthew
Published: October 2017

Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning therefore provides the basis for a reductive account of reasons. Like all proposed reductions, this one must confront some version of G. E. Moore’s open question argument. I argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea that reasons figure in sound reasoning is well-equipped to meet the open question challenge head on.
The Normative Significance of Self
Authors: Dorsey Dale
Published: October 2017

A number of recent (and not so recent) works in the metaethics of practical rationality have suggested that features of a person’s character, commitments, projects, practical identities and social roles have important normative consequences. For instance, I might commit to caring for a loved one, or I might become an artist, or take on the role of father to a child. In each case, it seems right to say that the normative landscape I face has been altered by this new fact – to put them under one general heading, the new fact about my self. In this paper, I explore the normative significance of self and how best it is to be understood. Typically, views that posit the normative significance of self hold that the content of one’s self can create practical reasons to behave in particular ways. For instance, if I become a father, this means that there are additional reasons to care for my child than there were prior to this fact of self. I argue, however, that this suggestion cannot be plausibly sustained – facts of self do not give rise to practical reasons. I show that, while there are two ways that facts of self might give rise to or create new practical reasons, both succumb to very serious problems.

However, or so I also argue, we can salvage the normative significance of self via an alternative mechanism. Facts of self, such as the fact that one is an artist or a father, do not create new reasons. Rather, they strengthen certain pre-existing reasons, viz., those reasons to which I am especially susceptible given this fact of self.
Ability and Volitional Incapacity
Authors: Southwood Nicholas , Gilabert Pablo
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Non-Cognitivism and the Problem of Moral-Based Epistemic Reasons
Authors: Long Joseph
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False
Authors: Case Spencer
Published: October 2017

Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted pluralism maintains that only some are. Unrestricted pluralism, depending on how it is cashed out, is either nihilism about practical reason or else it is subjectivism. Neither view is consistent with normative pluralism; hence, pluralism must be restricted. Restricted pluralism, however, faces two problems. The first stems from the question: “Why is it that some standards are normative domains while others are not?” The question seems to demand an answer, but it is hard to give any answer without appealing to considerations that imply facts about what we ought simpliciter to do. Second, restricted pluralism has difficulty accounting for our intuitions about cases in which one option is optimal in all domains, but not better than each alternative in any one domain. The unique option that is optimal in every domain seems better than its competitors, though it isn’t better within any domain. This is different than the widely discussed argument from notable-nominal comparisons. So I conclude that we have good reason to reject restricted pluralism, the only form of normative pluralism really worthy of that name.
The Debunking Challenge to Moral Realism
Authors: Levy Arnon , Levy Yair
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Virtuous and Vicious Anger
Authors: Bommarito Nicolas
Published: October 2017

I defend an account of when and why anger is morally virtuous or vicious. Anger often manifests what we care about; a sports fan gets angry when her favorite team loses because she cares about the team doing well. Anger, I argue, is made morally virtuous or vicious by the underlying care or concern. Anger is virtuous when it manifests moral concern and vicious when it manifests moral indifference or ill will. In defending this view, I reject two common views about anger and moral character. First, I respond to several arguments that attempt to show that all anger is vicious. Then I respond to the view that some anger is required to be a virtuous person. Anger, on my view, can be morally virtuous but is not a necessary condition for being a virtuous person. This best accommodates not only morally irrelevant failures to get angry but also allows for emotional variation among virtuous people.
Instrumental Rationality: A Reprise
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2017

No abstract
The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy
Authors: Levy Neil
Published: October 2017

Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an act, omission, or attitude to an agent is sufficient for responsibility for it, and those which hold that responsibility depends crucially on choice. I argue that accounts of the first, attributionist, kind fail to make room for the relatively stringent epistemic conditions upon moral responsibility, and that therefore an account of the second, volitionist, kind ought to be preferred. I examine the various arguments advanced on behalf of attributionist accounts, and argue that for each of them volitionism has a reply that is in every case at least as, and often more, persuasive. Most significantly, only volitionism can accommodate the intuitively important distinction between the bad and the blameworthy.
Cudworth and Normative Explanations
Authors: Schroeder Mark
Published: October 2017

Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work – that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focus primarily on only one. It plays a crucial role in an argument originally due to Cudworth that has been widely held to conclusively establish that voluntaristic ethical theories are incoherent. But if Cudworth’s argument works, then so would similar arguments against many other moral theories. All of these theories therefore need a different model for how normative explanations can work. So I also motivate and sketch one such alternative model. The result enables us to make progress in evaluating the prospects for a successful reductive view about the normative.
'Simply In Virtue of Being Human'
Authors: Gardner John
Published: October 2017

In this paper I raise some questions about the familiar claim, recently reiterated by James Griffin, that human rights are rights that humans have 'simply in virtue of being human'. I ask, in particular, how we are to read the words 'simply in virtue of'. Are we speaking of who has the rights (A has them if and only if he or she is human) or why they have the rights (A has them because and only because he or she is human)? Griffin brings the two readings together, as two sides of the same coin. He offers a (more or less) universalistic case for (more or less) universalistic rights. I try to show how the two readings can be driven apart, how the universality of human rights need not be undermined merely by there being no adequate universalistic case for them. On the strength of this discussion I suggest an inversion of the relationship that is often thought to hold between human rights and human dignity. In a way our rights give us our dignity, not vice versa. And in a way this helps to make the case for the universality of human rights.
Beyond a Strictly Political Liberalism?
Authors: Inoue Akira
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Hume's Internalism Reconsidered
Authors: Dorsey Dale
Published: October 2017

A standard reading of Hume on the nature of practical reasons holds that he is a normative internalist; that, for Hume, legitimate practical reasons must be linked to an agent’s set of desires or motivating passions. Though the internalist reading of Hume is popular, it gives rise to serious puzzles of interpretation. To pick one nearly at random, it appears that, on an internalist reading, Hume has serious difficulties in establishing that the so-called “artificial" virtues of justice and promise-keeping are reason-giving, especially when it comes to characters like the sensible knave. Some, skeptical of the internalist reading, have argued that Hume is in fact a nihilist about practical reasons, and admits no reasons for action at all. Against the internalist and skeptical readings, I argue that there is substantial reason to believe that Hume’s corpus is compatible with a far more robust account of normativity than even internalism allows. If so, I argue, Hume has a genuine response to the sensible knave that establishes the knave’s obligation to justice. As it turns out, Hume’s considered view is unique, underexplored, and merits further philosophical investigation.
Consequentialism, Constraints, and Good-Relative-to
Authors: Suikkanen Jussi
Published: October 2017

No abstract
Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism
Authors: McPherson Tristram
Published: October 2017

G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall with Moore’s own arguments in metaphysics and epistemology, in virtue of their shared structure. I argue that this is not so. I suggest that the epistemic force of the canonical Moorean arguments can best be understood to rest on asymmetries in indirect evidence. I then argue that this explanation suggests that Moorean arguments are less promising in ethics than they are against Moore’s own targets. I conclude by examining the competing attempt to vindicate Moorean arguments by appealing to Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium.
Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement
Authors: Killoren David
Published: October 2017

There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions in that debate is whether, and to what extent, the prevalence and persistence of disagreement between our moral intuitions causes problems for those who seek to rely on intuitions in order to make moral decisions, issue moral judgments, and craft moral theories. Meanwhile, in general epistemology, there is a relatively young, and very lively, debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. A central question in that debate concerns peer disagreement: When I am confronted with an epistemic peer with whom I disagree, how should my confidence in my beliefs change (if at all)? The disagreement debate in moral epistemology has not been brought into much contact with the disagreement debate in general epistemology (though McGrath [2007] is an important exception). A purpose of this paper is to increase the area of contact between these two debates. In Section 1, I try to clarify the question I want to ask in this paper – this is the question whether we have any reasons to believe what I shall call “anti-intuitivism.” In Section 2, I argue that anti-intuitivism cannot be supported solely by investigating the mechanisms that produce our intuitions. In Section 3, I discuss an anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement which relies on the so-called “Equal Weight View.” In Section 4, I pause to clarify the notion of epistemic parity and to explain how it ought to be understood in the epistemology of moral intuition. In Section 5, I return to the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement and explain how an apparently-vulnerable premise of that argument may be quite resilient. In Section 6, I introduce a novel objection against the Equal Weight View in order to show how I think we can successfully resist the anti-intuitivist argument from disagreement.
Cosmic Coincidence and Intuitive Non-Naturalism
Authors: Hanna Nathan
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Concept Formation in Ethical Theories
Authors: Lutz Sebastian
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Agent-Relative Restrictions and Agent-Relative Value
Authors: Emet Stephen
Published: October 2017

In this article I pose a challenge for attempts to ground all reasons in considerations of value. Some believe that all reasons for action are grounded in considerations of value. Some also believe that there are agent-relative restrictions, which provide us with agent-relative reasons against bringing about the best state of affairs, on an impartial ranking of states of affairs. Some would like to hold both of these beliefs. That is, they would like to hold that such agent-relative restrictions are compatible with a teleological theory, one that grounds all reasons for action in considerations of value. This is what I will argue is problematic. I will argue that agent-centered restrictions will not fit into a teleological theory. If the correct moral theory is a teleological one, then there are no agent-relative restrictions. If there are agent-relative restrictions, then teleology is false. My argument challenges a particular project, of showing that all ethical theories are broadly consequentialist. The attraction of this project is that it promises to preserve what is thought to be compelling about consequentialism—its teleology and maximizing—while also preserving elements of commonsense morality—such as agent-relative restrictions—that have typically been thought of as distinctly non-consequentialist in nature. If my argument is correct, then this promise cannot be fulfilled.
People Do Not Have a Duty to Avoid Voting Badly
Authors: Arvan Marcus
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
What About Ought?
Authors: Van Zyl Liezl
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
The Limits of Democratic Authority
Authors: Ten C.L.
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Self-Evidence and Disagreement in Ethics
Authors: Fanselow Ryan
Published: October 2017

Moral epistemology, like general epistemology, faces a regress problem. Suppose someone demands to know why I am justified in holding a moral belief. In a typical case, I will respond by citing a further moral belief that justifies it. A regress arises because, in order for this further belief to justify anything, it too must be justified. According to a traditional position in moral epistemology, moral foundationalism, the regress comes to an end with some moral beliefs. Moral foundationalism is an attractive position because it promises to answer the regress problem. However, it inherits the burden of explaining why some moral beliefs have a particular privileged epistemic position – that is, why these beliefs are justified without requiring inferential support from other beliefs. The standard answer to this question is to insist that some moral beliefs have as their content propositions that are self-evident.

A common way of resisting moral foundationalism is to argue from the fact of moral disagreement to the claim that no moral proposition is self-evident. I argue that while a simple version of this argument fails, this argument can be developed in such a way that it poses serious difficulties for moral foundationalism. I develop this argument by drawing on recent work in epistemology on the nature of our epistemic burdens in the face of peer disagreement. I then suggest that even if this argument does show that moral foundationalism fails, it need not have skeptical implications so long as coherentism remains a viable option in moral epistemology. Finally, I claim that this argument has implications for normative ethics. Namely, it rules out a position advocated by Peter Singer in his early work and indirectly supports the method of reflective equilibrium.
Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness
Authors: Mason Elinor
Published: October 2017

In this paper I present a new argument for prospectivism: the view that, for a consequentialist, rightness depends on what is prospectively best rather than what would actually be best. Prospective bestness depends on the agent’s epistemic position, though exactly how that works is not straightforward. I clarify various possible versions of prospectivism, which differ in how far they go in relativizing to the agent’s limitations. My argument for prospectivism is an argument for moderately objective prospectivism, according to which the right thing to do is what would make sense given reasonable beliefs, reasonable probability estimates and a reasonable understanding of value.

My argument is an argument for this form of prospectivism over objectivism. Arguments about prospectivism and objectivism usually use an example with the following form: an agent has a choice between options – one she knows would be acceptable, while the other could either be catastrophic or very good. Objectivists argue that the right thing to do is what would in fact be best (though the agent cannot know which option that is) while prospectivists argue that the agent’s ignorance is relevant, and the right thing to do is to compromise. The question is how we should understand the underlying argument. It is not about action guidance. Moderately objective prospectivism is not action guiding, because an actual agent may not have access to reasonable beliefs, probability estimates and so on. Another common argument is that the objective notion is the primary one. I show that there are no good grounds for this claim.

My argument uses the distinction between rightness and goodness to show that a consequentialist theory, that bases rightness on goodness, should take into account how much goodness is at stake. Crucially, potential losses as well as gains are relevant. So long as goodness, rather than rightness, is in the driving seat, we should not be “bestness fetishists.” As the name suggest, this would be an irrational privileging of the best option. This argument does not apply to pure deontology: a pure deontology does not use the notion of goodness at all, and so there is nothing to compromise with. If the agent does not know what is right, there is nothing further to say.

I end by arguing against a recent strategy that aims to show that although objectivism is true (the right option is the best one), we should sometimes do what is wrong (i.e. what is prospectively best). I argue that insofar as this is correct, it is simply prospectivism with awkward terminology.
How Not to Defend Moral Blame
Authors: Menges Andreas Leonhard
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
On the Nature, Existence and Significance of Organic Unities
Authors: Zimmerman Michael J.
Published: October 2017

Many philosophers have endorsed G. E. Moore’s principle of organic unities – according to which the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts – claiming this principle to be of fundamental importance to ethics. In this paper, I cast doubt on the principle. In Section 1, I provide a provisional reformulation of the principle of organic unities and contrast such unities with mere sums of value. In Section 2, I do some groundwork in order to arrive at an account of the part–whole relation with which the principle of organic unities is concerned. In so doing, I provide some further reformulations of that principle. In Section 3, I discuss the isolation method that Moore proposes for determining the value of something, and then, in Section 4, I begin an extended discussion of a particular example of an alleged organic unity, namely, Schadenfreude. I explain why some philosophers claim that such pleasure constitutes an organic unity, but I also present reasons for denying this claim. In Section 5, I pursue one of these reasons in particular, a reason that appeals to the concept of what I call evaluative inadequacy, and, in Section 6, I seek to motivate this appeal by drawing on the relation between value and fitting attitudes. In so doing, I provide still further reformulations of the principle of organic unities. In Section 7, I entertain objections to my account of Schadenfreude, one of which requires one final reformulation of the principle of organic unities, and then, in Section 8, I discuss the more general objection that, even if my reasons for denying that Schadenfreude constitutes an organic unity are cogent, these reasons do not extend to other alleged organic unities, such as the related phenomenon of Mitleid. In the final section, I address the significance of the debate about whether the principle of organic unities is true.
Expressivism Worth the Name
Authors: Woods Jack
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought
Authors: Laskowski Nicholas
Published: October 2017

No abstract.
Manipulation Arguments and the Standing to Blame
Authors: King Matt
Published: October 2017

The majority of recent work on the moral standing to blame (the idea that A may be unable to legitimately blame B despite B being blameworthy) has focused on blamers who themselves are blameworthy. This is unfortunate, for there is much to learn about the standing to blame once we consider a broader range of cases. Doing so reveals that challenged standing is more expansive than previously acknowledged, and accounts that have privileged the fact that the blamers are themselves morally culpable likely require revision. One such account figures in Patrick Todd’s (2012) argument for incompatibilism, which ostensibly depends on considerations involving the standing to blame. I believe this argument fails. But its failure is instructive, for it allows us to appreciate the numerous ways in which one’s blame can be morally problematic, and hence ways in which one’s standing to blame can be challenged. Thus, while one objective of this paper is to show why Todd’s argument fails, the larger aim is to use that argument to frame discussion of some important (and novel) ways in which the standing to blame can be compromised.
I Might be Fundamentally Mistaken
Authors: Ridge Michael
Published: October 2017

Quasi-realism aspires to preserve the intelligibility of the realist-sounding moral judgments of ordinary people. These judgments include ones of the form, “I believe that p, but I might be mistaken,” where “p” is some moral content. The orthodox quasi-realist strategy (famously developed by Simon Blackburn) is to understand these in terms of the agent’s worrying that some improving change would lead one to aban-don the relevant moral belief. However, it is unclear whether this strate-gy generalizes to cases in which the agent takes their error to be funda-mental in a sense articulated by Andy Egan. In an influential paper, Egan argues that it does not. Egan suggests that Blackburn’s approach is the only game in town for the quasi-realist when it comes to making sense of judgment of fallibility, and therefore concludes that Blackburn’s ina-bility to handle worries about fundamental moral error refutes quasi-realism tout court. Egan’s challenge has generated considerable discus-sion. However, in my view, we have not yet gotten to the heart of the matter. I argue that what is still needed is a fully general, quasi-realist-friendly theory of the nature of first-person judgments of fallibility, such that these judgments are demonstrably consistent with judging that the belief is stable in Egan’s sense. In this article, I develop and defend a fully general quasi-realist theory of such judgments, which meets this demand. With this theory in hand, I argue that Egan’s challenge can be met. Moreover, my discussion of how the challenge is best met provides an elegant diagnosis of where Egan’s argument against goes wrong. On my account, Egan’s argument equivocates at a key point between a “could” and a “would.”
Is it Bad to Be Disabled?
Authors: Andric Vuko , Wundisch Joachim
Published: October 2017

This paper examines the impact of disability on wellbeing and presents arguments against the mere-difference view of disability. According to the mere-difference view, disability does not by itself make disabled people worse off on balance. Rather, if disability has a negative impact on wellbeing overall, this is only so because society is not treating disabled people the way it ought to treat them. In objection to the mere-difference view, it has been argued, roughly, that the view licenses the permissibility of causing disability and the impermissibility of causing nondisability. In her recent article, “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” (2014), Elizabeth Barnes attempts to show that this causation-based objection does not succeed. We disagree and argue why. We begin by explaining that in order to defeat the causation-based objection it does not suffice to show that it is not always true that the mere-difference view licenses causing disability. Rather, license in some cases, in a way that undermines the plausibility of the mere-difference view, would be sufficient for the causation-based objection to succeed. Then our discussion turns to an important challenge for proponents of the causation-based objection: Some defenders of the mere-difference view are prepared to simply accept the counterintuitive implications of their position. A dialogue with such proponents of the mere-difference view requires arguments with independent traction. We present several such arguments to the effect that the mere-difference view needs to be significantly reduced in scope – and may turn out to be false altogether.
Full Conference Proceedings
Authors: Cohen Eli
Published: October 2017

Papers accepted for the Informing Science & IT Education Conference (InSITE) 2014 were published as the proceedings papers listed below or in one of the ISI journals. A complete listing of papers published as the full Proceedings of the Informing Science & IT Education Conference (InSITE) 2014 can be found at http://proceedings.informingscience.org/
Exploring Graduate Students’ Attitudes towards Team Research and Their Scholarly Productivity: A Survey Guided by the Theory of Planned Behavior
Authors: Wei Tianlan , N Sadikova Alime , Barnard-Brak Lucy , W. Wang Eugene , Sodikov Dilshod
Published: October 2017

This study explores the attitudinal and motivational factors underlying graduate students’ attitudes towards team research. Guided by the Theory of Planned Behavior, we hypothesize that attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control are three major determinants of graduate students’ intentions to conduct team research. An instrument was developed to measure the influences of these factors on students’ intentions and relevant scholarly productivity. A total of 281 graduate students from a large, comprehensive university in the southwest United States participated in the survey. Descriptive statistics reveal that around two-thirds of graduate students have no co-authored manuscripts submitted for publication since they started graduate school. Factor analyses validated the factor structure of the instrument, and the results of Structural Equation Modeling show that (a) graduate students’ attitudes towards team research have a positive correlation with their attitudes towards individual research; (b) attitude towards team research, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control, along with students’ discipline/major areas and classification, account for 58% of the variance in the intention to conduct team research; and (c) subjective norm appears to be the most influential factor in the model, followed by attitude; while perceived behavioral control is not of much importance. These findings provide implications for academic departments and programs to promote graduate students’ team research. Specifically, creating a climate for collaborative research in academic programs/disciplines/universities may work jointly with enhancing students’ appraisals of such collaborations.
Effectiveness of Peer Assessment in a Professionalism Course Using an Online Workshop
Authors: David Strang Kenneth
Published: October 2017

An online Moodle Workshop was evaluated for peer assessment effectiveness. A quasi-experiment was designed using a Seminar in Professionalism course taught in face-to-face mode to undergraduate students across two campuses. The first goal was to determine if Moodle Workshop awarded a fair peer grader grade. The second objective was to estimate if students were consistent and reliable in performing their peer assessments. Statistical techniques were used to answer the research hypotheses. Although Workshop Moodle did not have a built-in measure for peer assessment validity, t-tests and reliability estimates were calculated to demonstrate that the grades were consistent with what faculty expected. Implications were asserted to improve teaching and recommendations were provided to enhance Moodle.
The Effects of Technology Innovativeness and System Exposure on Student Acceptance of E-textbooks
Authors: N. Ngafeeson Madison , Sun Jun
Published: October 2017

The efforts of educators in the last three decades have, among other things, focused on the use of information technology (IT) in education. It has become commonplace to view information systems both as an effective carrier of course content as well as a cost-effective tool to improve student learning outcomes. One of such technologies is the e-book. Decision-makers in the education field need make sense of this technological transformation. However, despite the growing popularity of e-books in higher education, its adoption by students is yet to be crystalized. This study exploits the technology acceptance model (TAM) framework to examine student acceptance of e-textbooks as “internally” impacted by technology innovativeness and “externally” influenced by system exposure. The results showed that students’ technology innovativeness is associated with student acceptance of e-textbooks and that system exposure was a strong moderator of the TAM relationships. The findings suggest that students’ openness to new technology, in general, is likely to positively affect the adoption of a specific new instructional technology. Additionally, system exposure was found to be a significant moderator of the TAM relationships. It is concluded that students’ technology innovativeness and system exposure must therefore be factored into instructional technology usage decision-making models.
A Longitudinal Examination of the Effects of Computer Self-efficacy Growth on Performance during Technology Training
Authors: P. Downey James , Kher Hemant
Published: October 2017

Technology training in the classroom is critical in preparing students for upper level classes as well as professional careers, especially in fields such as technology. One of the key enablers to this process is computer self-efficacy (CSE), which has an extensive stream of empirical research. Despite this, one of the missing pieces is how CSE actually changes during training, and how such change is related to antecedents and performance outcomes. Measuring change requires repeated data gathering and the use of latent growth modeling, a relatively new statistical technique. This study examines CSE (specifically general CSE or GCSE) growth over time during training, and how this growth is influenced by anxiety and gender and influences performance, using a semester-long lab course covering three applications. The use of GCSE growth more accurately models how students actually learn in a technology classroom. It provides novel clarity in the interaction of gender, anxiety, GCSE, specific CSEs, and performance during training. The study finds that the relationship between anxiety and self-efficacy decreases over time during training, becoming non-significant; it clarifies the significant role gender plays in influencing GCSE at the start of and during training. It finds GCSE influences application performance only through specific CSEs.
Design and Implementation of an HCI course for MIS students – Some lessons
Authors: Or-Bach Rachel
Published: October 2017

Courses on Human Computer Interaction (HCI) largely differ in the conception of the role of the course in the program, in the topics to be included, in emphases, in the instructional strategies that are employed and more. This paper describes the design and implementation of an HCI course for students of the Management Information Systems department in our college. Students’ intermediate and final homework assignments were analyzed to provide feedback for the course design. Findings from this analysis along with additional impressions from the course implementation are summarized and discussed.

This paper was published in the journal Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology
Volume 12, 2015
Design and Redesign of a Multimodal Classroom Task – Implications for Teaching and Learning
Authors: Öman Anne , Sofkova Hashemi Sylvana
Published: October 2017

Digital technologies are increasingly implemented in Swedish schools, which impact on education in the contemporary classroom. Screen-based practice opens up for new forms and multiplicity of representations, taking into account that language in a globalized society is more than reading and writing skills.
This paper presents a case study of technology-mediated instruction at the primary-school level including an analysis of the designed task and how the teacher orchestrated the digital resources during three introductory classes. The aim was also to explore the pupils’ redesigning of advertising films based on teacher’s instructions and available digital resources. Sequences of a learning trajectory were video recorded and analysed from a multimodal perspective with a focus on the designed task and the processes of how pupils orchestrate meaning through their selection and configuration of available designs.
The findings show a distinction between the selection of design elements in the teacher’s orchestration of the laptop resources during instruction and the pupils’ redesigning of the task. Pupils’ work developed from the linguistic design provided by the teacher towards visual design and the use of images as the central mode of expression in the process of creating advertising films. The findings also indicate a lack of orientation towards subject content due to the teacher’s primary focus on introducing the software.
The Use of Computer Simulation to Compare Student performance in Traditional versus Distance Learning Environments
Authors: Guy Retta , Lownes-Jackson Millicent
Published: October 2017

[The final form of this paper was published in the journal Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology.] Simulations have been shown to be an effective tool in traditional learning environments; however, as distance learning grows in popularity, the need to examine simulation effectiveness in this environment has become paramount. A casual-comparative design was chosen for this study to determine whether students using a computer-based instructional simulation in hybrid and fully online environments learned better than traditional classroom learners. The study spans a period of 6 years beginning fall 2008 through spring 2014.  The population studied was 281 undergraduate business students self-enrolled in the 200-level microcomputer application course. The overall results support previous studies in that computer simulations are most effective when used as a supplement to face-to-face lectures and in hybrid environments.
Requirements Elicitation Problems: A Literature Analysis
Authors: Davey Bill , R. Parker Kevin
Published: October 2017

[The final form of this paper was published in the journal Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology.] Requirements elicitation is the process through which analysts determine the software requirements of stakeholders.  Requirements elicitation is seldom well done, and an inaccurate or incomplete understanding of user requirements has led to the downfall of many software projects. This paper proposes a classification of problem types that occur in requirements elicitation. The classification has been derived from a literature analysis. Papers reporting on techniques for improving requirements elicitation practice were examined for the problem the technique was designed to address. In each classification the most recent or prominent techniques for ameliorating the problems are presented. The classification allows the requirements engineer to be sensitive to problems as they arise and the educator to structure delivery of requirements elicitation training.
Informing and Performing: A Study Comparing Adaptive Learning to Traditional Learning
Authors: Coffin Murray Meg , Pérez Jorge
Published: October 2017

Technology has transformed education, perhaps most evidently in course delivery options. However, compelling questions remain about how technology impacts learning. Adaptive learning tools are technology-based artifacts that interact with learners and vary presentation based upon that interaction. This paper compares adaptive learning with a conventional teaching approach implemented in a digital literacy course. Current research explores the hypothesis that adapting instruction to an individual’s learning style results in better learning outcomes. Computer technology has long been seen as an answer to the scalability and cost of individualized instruction. Adaptive learning is touted as a potential game-changer in higher education, a panacea with which institutions may solve the riddle of the iron triangle: quality, cost and access. Though the research is scant, this study and a few others like it indicate that today’s adaptive learning systems have negligible impact on learning outcomes, one aspect of quality. Clearly, more research like this study, some of it from the perspective of adaptive learning systems as informing systems, is needed before the far-reaching promise of advanced learning systems can be realized.

A revised version of the paper was published in Informing Science: the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline, Volume 18, 2015
Comparing Social Isolation Effects on Students Attrition in Online Versus Face-to-Face Courses in Computer Literacy
Authors: Ali Azad , T Smith David
Published: October 2017

[The final form of this paper was published in the journal Issues in Informing Science and Information Technology.] This paper compares the effect of social isolation on students enrolled in online courses versus students enrolled on campus courses (called in this paper Face-to-Face or F2F). The paper uses grade data collected from a computer literacy course that was recently taught by the author. The author was the same instructor for one online section and two F2F sections thereby simplifying data collection and providing a controlled comparison between the two forms of teaching (F2F and online). The paper first introduces the plan and the limitation of this study. It reviews literature about social isolation and the trend of online courses. The paper then presents the data from the courses that were summarized for the purpose of this study; it analyzes them and makes a recommendation based on the analysis of the data.
Strategic Issues on Implementing a Software Process Improvement Program
Authors: Rossi Rogério , Hirama Kechi
Published: October 2017

Software technology has high impact on the global economy as in many sectors of contemporary society. As a product enabling the most varied daily activities, the software product has to be produced reflecting high quality. Software quality is dependent on its development that is based in a large set of software development processes. However, the implementation and continuous improvement of software process aimed at software product should be carefully institutionalized by software development organizations such as software factories, testing factories, V&V organizations, among others. The institutionalization of programs such as a Software Process Improvement Program, or SPI Program, require a strategic planning, which is addressed in this article from the perspective of specific models and frameworks, as well as reflections based on software process engineering models and standards. In addition, a set of strategic drivers is proposed to assist the implementation of a Strategic Plan for a SPI Program which can be considered by the organizations before starting this kind of Program.
KenVACS: Improving Vaccination of Children through Cellular Network Technology in Developing Countries
Authors: Gatuha George , Jiang Tao
Published: October 2017

Health Data collection is one of the major components of public health systems. Decision makers, policy makers, and medical service providers need accurate and timely data in order to improve the quality of health services. The rapid growth and use of mobile technologies has exerted pressure on the demand for mobile-based data collection solutions to bridge the information gaps in the health sector. We propose a prototype using open source data collection frameworks to test its feasibility in improving the vaccination data collection in Kenya. KenVACS, the proposed prototype, offers ways of collecting vaccination data through mobile phones and visualizes the collected data in a web application; the system also sends reminder short messages service (SMS) to remind parents on the date of the next vaccination. Early evaluation demonstrates the benefits of such a system in supporting and improving vaccination of children. Finally, we conducted a qualitative study to assess challenges in remote health data collection and evaluated usability and functionality of KenVACS.
Big Data Analysis: Why Not an Asthma APP?
Authors: Do Quan , Robinson Kris , Tran Son
Published: October 2017

Asthma and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) is among the highest health diagnosis and therefore an economic drain, which puts substantial pressure on a huge number of patients, communities, and health systems. These chronic conditions are presently incurable but their symptoms can be controlled through quality health care, appropriate medications, and good self-management skills. Many asthma APPs have been developed to support asthma patients’ self-management of the disease. Asthma APPs are still in the infancy stage of development. Literature review indicates satisfaction to be equivocal. Moreover, available APPs have many unresolved issues, such as the following: (1) No APP provides comprehensive asthma information while at the same time possessing the characteristics of an efficient tool for self-management of the disease; (2) No APP has the ability to integrate data from disparate formats; (3) Not many APPs provide for two way communication between patients and Health Care Providers (HCPs) and support the providers decision making process; (4) No APP targets older adults.
Different sources of data often imply data stored in inherently different formats. The integration of such data, culled from different databases requires use of Big Data (BD) techniques.
The proposed asthma mobile APP aims to promote elderly asthma patients’ positive adjustment to this chronic disease by being an effective tool for patients to control their asthma triggers and support asthma self-management. Adjustment is a dynamic process and varies by individual. For that reason, a personalized asthma APP is necessary to control this chronic disease. The proposed asthma APP will allow patients to input their own asthma self-management data so the APP can identify patient personal triggers and will predict an asthma attack accordingly. Considering a patient’s individual determinants and uniqueness is required to push the patient’s positive adjustment to asthma since these elements affect the ability of individual to adapt to the illness.
The paper reports our effort to establish the desirable characteristics for the next generation asthma APP and for a population segment not presently well served.