bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Evidence for the involvement of the optic nerve as a migration route for larvae in ocular toxocariasis of Mongolian gerbils
Authors: Hayashi E. , Akao N. , Fujita K.
Published: February 2004

Although Toxocara canis, an important pathogen of ocular disease, tends to migrate to the eye, the precise migratory route has yet to be determined experimentally. Mongolian gerbils, Meriones unguiculatus, known as a useful animal model for human toxocariasis, were used to investigate the migration route toward the eyes. Infective larvae of T. canis were directly inoculated into the intracranial region. Haemorrhagic lesions or larvae were observed in 56.3% of cases. Histopathologically, a larva was observed in the optic nerve of gerbils 6 days after inoculation, and two larvae were found in the optic chiasma in the gerbils having a haemorrhage in the retina 9 days after inoculation. These results indicate that T. canis migrates from the brain to the eye through the optic nerve. Considering these data and previous studies showing that the ocular changes appear as early as 3 days of infection in the oral-administrated gerbils, there are two phases in the migration to the retina: a haematogenous early phase and an optic nerve route late phase.
Strongyloides ratti: the role of interleukin-5 in protection against tissue migrating larvae and intestinal adult worms
Authors: Watanabe K. , Sasaki O. , Hamano S. , Kishihara K. , Nomoto K. , Tada I. , Aoki Y.
Published: February 2004

To determine the role of interleukin-5 (IL-5) and eosinophils in protection against Strongyloides ratti, mice treated with anti-IL-5 monoclonal antibody (mAb) were infected with S. ratti larvae. Strongyloides ratti egg numbers in faeces (EPG) in mAb treated mice were higher than those in control mice on days 6 and 7 after inoculation. The numbers of migrating worms in mAb treated mice 36h after inoculation were higher than those observed in control mice. Intestinal worm numbers in mAb treated mice 5 days after inoculation were higher than those in control mice. These results show that eosinophils effectively protected the host against S. ratti infection by mainly the larval stage in primary infections. The involvement of eosinophils in protection against secondary infection was also examined. Before secondary infection, mice were treated with anti-IL-5 mAb and infected with S. ratti. Patent infections were not observed in either mAb treated or control Ab treated mice. The numbers of migrating worms in the head and lungs of mAb treated mice increased to 60% of that in primary infected mice. Intestinal worms were not found in mAb treated mice or in contcrol mice after oral implantation of adult worms. Eosinophils were therefore mainly involved in protection against tissue migrating worms in secondary infections.
Cadmium-induced cellular and immunological responses in Cyprinus carpio infected with the blood parasite, Sanguinicola inermis
Authors: Schuwerack P.-M.M. , Lewis J.W. , Hoole D.
Published: February 2004

Little is known about immune responses in teleosts as linked to the aetiology of pollutants and parasitic diseases and in particular their combined effects on the host. Cadmium(Cd)-mediated immunological responses in the thymus and pronephros of juvenile carp (Cyprinus carpio), experimentally infected with the blood parasite, Sanguinicola inermis (Trematoda: Sanguinicolidae) for 30 days followed by an exposure to 0.1mg Cd2+ l−1 for 48 or 168h were investigated. Differential organ-specific changes occurred in both organs examined. In carp exposed to Cd, intracelluar spaces, vacuolation in the eosinophils, dissociation of cell membranes together with the formation of concentric whorls occurred. The thymus of infected carp exposed to Cd had a granular cytosol which contained vesicles with electron-dense inclusions, swollen mitochondria with distended cristae and condensed nuclei in the erythrocytes. Cell counts on the two organs revealed a differential response to cadmium exposure in S. inermis infected carp compared to control infected fish. A significant increase in the neutrophil, eosinophil and thrombocyte components occurred in the thymus in contrast to a significant decrease in pronephric neutrophils. In addition, there was a differential blastogenesis response in infected and Cd-exposed infected carp fry exposed to cercarial antigens and the mitogens, concanavalin A and pokeweed mitogen.
Effects of the trematode Microphallus turgidus on locomotion and prey capture in the grass shrimp Palaemonetes pugio
Authors: Khan R.N. , Spiers J.A. , Pung O.J.
Published: February 2004

The grass shrimp, Palaemonetes pugio, is common in estuaries and marshes along the east coast of the USA and is frequently infected with metacercariae of the trematode, Microphallus turgidus. To test whether or not M. turgidus has an effect on intermediate host behaviour, the length of time spent swimming and walking over 1min and 3min intervals and prey (Artemia) capture rates of uninfected grass shrimp and those infected with 1–10, 11–20 or 21–30 metacercarial cysts were compared. Uninfected shrimps spent significantly more time swimming than infected shrimps during the first minute of observation. There were no differences between the control and infected groups in terms of swimming at 3min, walking at 1 and 3min, or in numbers of prey captured. These results indicate that M. turgidus may induce little or no change in grass shrimp locomotion nor in prey capture behaviour. This is in contrast to other parasites that modify intermediate host behaviour to enhance their transmission to definitive hosts. Furthermore, these data support earlier studies indicating that M. turgidus does not affect the growth and survival of P. pugio.
Larval anisakid infections of some tropical fish species from north-west Australia
Authors: Doupé R.G. , Lymbery A.J. , Wong S. , Hobbs R.P.
Published: February 2004

Despite the commercial and zoonotic importance of larval anisakid infestations of teleosts, their distribution among Australia's diverse marine fish fauna is poorly understood. A preliminary survey of Australia's tropical north-west revealed a generally high prevalence of larval anisakids representing four genera (Anisakis, Terranova, Thynnascaris and Raphidascaris) among only seven fish species. The potential impact of high larval anisakid infections on both the health of recreational fishermen and aquaculture environments is discussed.
Cross-reactivity induced by Anisakis simplex and Toxocara canis in mice
Authors: Perteguer M.J. , Águila C. , Fenoy S. , Guillén J.L.
Published: February 2004

The aim of this study was to verify whether cross-reactivity appeared between Toxocara canis and Anisakis simplex in an experimental rodent model. No cross-reactions were detected using sera from mice infected with T. canis eggs. When responses obtained against T. canis ES antigen using sera from BALB/c and C57BL/10 mice infected with T. canis eggs were compared with those obtained by testing sera from mice infected with one A. simplex L3, an increase in cross-reactions was observed using the C57BL/10 strain.
The predatory capability of three nematophagous fungi in the control of Haemonchus contortus infective larvae in ovine faeces
Authors: Flores-Crespo J. , Herrera-Rodríguez D. , Mendoza de Gives P. , Liébano-Hernández E. , Vázquez-Prats V.M. , López-Arellano M.E.
Published: February 2004

The effect of oral administration of three different nematode-trapping fungi, in aqueous suspension containing either Dactylaria sp. or Arthrobotrys oligospora conidia or Duddingtonia flagrans chlamydospores, on the number of Haemonchus contortus infective larvae in sheep faeces, was evaluated. The three selected species of fungi produce three-dimensional adhesive nets in the presence of nematodes. Sixteen Creole sheep were divided into four groups of four animals each. Groups 1 and 2 were orally drenched with a suspension containing 2×107 conidia of either A. oligospora or Dactylaria sp. Group 3, received a similar treatment, with D. flagrans chlamydospores, instead of conidia, being administered, at the same dose. Group 4 acted as control, without any fungi. Faecal samples were collected directly from the rectum of each sheep and faecal cultures were prepared and incubated at 15 and 21 days. Larvae were recovered from faecal cultures and counted. The highest reduction of the nematode population occurred in the D. flagrans group, reaching reductions of 96.3% and 91.4% in individual samplings in plates incubated for 15 and 21 days, respectively. Arthrobotrys oligospora showed moderate reductions in the faecal larval population, ranging between 25–64% at 15 days incubation. In general, Dactylaria sp., was less efficient in its trapping ability. Despite the inconsistent results with Dactylaria sp., reduction percentages of 73.4% and 80.7% were recorded in individual samplings during the first and second days, in plates incubated for 15 days. Duddingtonia flagrans, was shown to be a potential biological control agent of H. contortus infective larvae.
Parasite antigenaemia and IgG4 antibodies to a filarial protease in an endemic human population in India
Authors: Bal M.S. , Beuria M.K. , Mandal N.N. , Das M.K.
Published: February 2004

Levels of circulating filarial antigen (Og4C3) and IgG4 antibodies to a filarial protease were determined in subjects of Wuchereria bancrofti exposed sera from Orissa, India. In addition to all individuals with antigenaemia (microfilaraemia), IgG4 antibodies were also detected in some individuals without antigenaemia. A 2-year longitudinal follow-up indicated that IgG4 seropositivity in asymptomatic amicrofilaraemics could be a risk factor for acquiring infection (antigenaemia).
Tributyltin and copper effects on encystment and in vitro excystment of Parorchis acanthus larvae
Authors: Bennett S.C. , Irwin S.W.B. , Fitzpatrick S.M.
Published: February 2004

Effects of tributyltin (TBT) and copper (Cu) on cercariae and metacercariae of the trematode Parorchis acanthus (Digenea: Philophthalmidae) were investigated. Cercariae released by the dogwhelk, Nucella lapillus were maintained in natural seawater (SW) or solutions of TBT or Cu ranging from 0.001–100μgl−1 and 1–6mgl−1 respectively before they encysted. Over 79% of the cercariae encysted in control and test solutions. Low concentrations of TBT reduced encystment success more than low concentrations of Cu. The percentage of cercariae that formed cysts in the highest concentrations of both pollutants was higher than in the controls, perhaps representing an ‘emergency response’ to the pollutants. Before being induced to excyst in vitro, metacercariae were left in the heavy metal solutions for 3 weeks. Metacercariae exposed as cercariae to TBT and Cu achieved lower percentage excystment success than those that had encysted in SW. Cyst walls provided greater protection against Cu than TBT. It was concluded that TBT and Cu had a detrimental effect on the larval stages of P. acanthus at the higher concentrations used but the cyst wall afforded an element of protection if formed in unpolluted seawater before the larval stages were subjected to the pollutants.
Cyclical Preferences and World Bayesianism
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: February 2004

An example shows that ‘pairwise preferences’ (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifiable either because of troublesome credences or because of troublesome preferences. An appendix comments on a third way in which efforts to maximize can be frustrated.
Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (or: In Defense of “Narrow” Functions)
Authors: Buller David J.
Published: February 2004

Millikan (1993) and Wilson (1994) argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology.
Essential Membership
Authors: LaPorte Joseph
Published: February 2004

In this paper I take issue with the doctrine that organisms belong of their very essence to the natural kinds (or biological taxa, if these are not kinds) to which they belong. This view holds that any human essentially belongs to the species Homo sapiens, any feline essentially belongs to the cat family, and so on. I survey the various competing views in biological systematics. These offer different explanations for what it is that makes a member of one species, family, etc. a member of that taxon. Unfortunately, none of them offers an explanation that is compatible with the essentialism in question.
Inductive Skepticism and the Probability Calculus I: Popper and Jeffreys on Induction and the Probability of Law-Like Universal Generalizations
Authors: Gemes Ken
Published: February 2004

1. Introduction. Attempts to utilize the probability calculus to prove or disprove various inductive or inductive skeptical theses are, I believe, highly problematic. Inductivism and inductive skepticism are substantive (logically consistent) philosophical positions that do not allow of merely formal proofs or disproofs. Often the problems with particular alleged formal proofs of inductive or inductive sceptical theses turn on subtle technical considerations. In the following I highlight such considerations in pointing out the flaws of two proofs, one an alleged proof of an inductive sceptical conclusion due to Karl Popper, the other an alleged proof of an inductivist thesis originally due to Harold Jeffreys and later advocated by John Earman. Surprisingly, in examining Popper's argument it is shown that certain apparently weak premises, often embraced by both inductivists and deductivists, lend themselves to inductive conclusions. However it is argued that those premises are still philosophically substantive and not amenable to a purely formal demonstration. The lesson to be learnt here is twofold. First, we need to be very careful in determining which formal theses entail, and which are entailed by, inductive skepticism and inductivism. Second, we need to take great care in laying out and examining the assumptions presumed in formal arguments directed for and against such formal theses. In a follow up article I will consider various attempts by David Stove and Karl Popper and David Miller to identify the exact content of inductive skepticism and propose a new identification based on the theory of content developed in Gemes 1994. Finally I will compare this new version with that proposed recently in Alberto Mura 1990.
A Clearer Vision
Authors: Shapiro Lawrence A.
Published: February 2004

Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content in which content does the sort of explanatory work that Egan denies is possible.
Mental Simulation and Motor Imagery
Authors: Currie Gregory , Ravenscroft Ian
Published: February 2004

Motor imagery typically involves an experience as of moving a body part. Recent studies reveal close parallels between the constraints on motor imagery and those on actual motor performance. How are these parallels to be explained? We advance a simulative theory of motor imagery, modeled on the idea that we predict and explain the decisions of others by simulating their decision-making processes. By proposing that motor imagery is essentially off-line motor action, we explain the tendency of motor imagery to mimic motor performance. We close by arguing that a simulative theory of motor imagery gives (modest) support to and illumination of the simulative theory of decision-prediction.
Bayes and Beyond
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: February 2004

Several leading topics outstanding after John Earman's Bayes or Bust? are investigated further, with emphasis on the relevance of Bayesian explication in epistemology of science, despite certain limitations. (1) Dutch Book arguments are reformulated so that their independence from utility and preference in epistemic contexts is evident. (2) The Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem problem is pursued; the phenomenon of a “protective belt” of auxiliary statements around reasonably successful theories is explicated. (3) The Bayesian approach to understanding the superiority of variety of evidence is pursued; a recent challenge (by Wayne) is converted into a positive result on behalf of the Bayesian analysis, potentially with far-reaching consequences. (4) The condition for applying the merger-of-opinion results and the thesis of underdetermination of theories are compared, revealing significant limitations in applicability of the former. (5) Implications concerning “diachronic Dutch Book” arguments and “non-Bayesian shifts” are drawn, highlighting the incompleteness, but not incorrectness, of Bayesian analysis.
A Logic of Induction
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: February 2004

1. Probabilism. Statistics is probably the last discipline the ordinary person would associate with ideological wars, but one has been raging there for the last thirty years and more. Until recently the Classical, also known as Frequentist, theory of statistical inference dominated. But gradually a quite different approach has attracted adherents. This, named the Bayesian theory after the eighteenth-century English clergyman, Thomas Bayes, is a phoenix, reborn from the theory of inductive inference dominant from the mid-eighteenth to the late nineteenth century, which said that the measure of confidence proper to employ in an uncertain proposition is its probability (the idea goes back well beyond Bayes; in his greatArs Conjectandi, published posthumously in 1715, James Bernoulli stated that probability is degree of certainty (Part IV, Chapter II)).
Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments
Authors: Maher Patrick
Published: February 2004

Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem.
How About Bust? Factoring Explanatory Power Back into Theory Evaluation
Authors: Laudan Larry
Published: February 2004

1. Introduction. The papers by Hellman and Mayo offer up a rich menu of problems and proposed solutions, so there is much here for a friendly critic to fasten on. In order to bring a modicum of focus to my commentary, I shall limit my remarks to the Duhem problem and its radiations in epistemology and methodology. Both Mayo and Hellman claim to have solutions to that hoary old problem and they tout these solutions as key indicators of the explanatory power of their respective technical epistemologies, whether Bayesian or Neyman/Pearsonian. Like Mayo, I shall be arguing that the Bayesian treatment of Duhem's problem is no solution at all; that, indeed, it fails to grapple with the core challenges posed by the purported ambiguities of falsification. My response to Mayo's more detailed, and I think more right-headed, treatment of the Duhem problem will be more complex. While I believe that she is moving in the right direction in many respects, I think that she fails to see one key dimension of the Duhemian conundrum. Indeed, she risks solving not Duhem's problem but quite a different one. I shall gently try to encourage her to steer her way back towards the central task.
H2O: Hempel-Helmer-Oppenheim, An Episode in the History of Scientific Philosophy in the 20th Century
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: February 2004

Preface. Almost fifty years ago, in 1948, when I was an undergraduate at Queens College in New York and a student of Carl G. Hempel's, I received from his hands an offprint of his now-classic but then just-published paper “Studies in the Logic of Explanation”, written in collaboration with Paul Oppenheim and then just published inPhilosophy of Science(15[1948], pp. 135–75).1This paper greatly impressed me—and I was not alone. We have here one of those unusual publications that sets the agenda for a whole generation of investigators. It set in train an enormous body of discussions and publications which shaped the course of deliberations about scientific explanation over the next decades—an effort to which my own work also made some contributions. (This literature and its inherent dialectic has been examined and analyzed in close and interesting detail in Wesley Salmon's fine survey ofFour Decades of Scientific Explanation.2) However my present aim is not to consider what came out of the Hempel-Oppenheim paper but what went into it. I want, in sum, to consider the prehistory of that era of scientific explanation studies—and to look more closely at the background ramifications of this paper that launched a thousand others.
Thomas S. Kuhn, 1922–1996
Authors: Buchwald Jed Z. , Smith George E.
Published: February 2004

Thomas S. Kuhn's singular voice was stilled by cancer on June 17, 1996, some 49 years after his initial encounters with past science had drawn him into a career in the history and philosophy of science. One of the most widely-read and influential academics of the 20th century, Kuhn was educated at Harvard University, where he received an S.B. (summa cum laude) in Physics in 1943 and a Ph.D. in the subject in 1949. He remained there until 1956, first as a Junior Fellow in the Society of Fellows from 1948 to 1951, when he in effect retrained himself as a historian of science, and then as an Assistant Professor of General Education and History of Science. He joined the faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, in 1956, becoming Professor of History of Science in 1961. From 1964 to 1979 he was on the faculty of the History of Science Program of Princeton University, and from 1972 to 1979 also a member of the Institute for Advanced Study. He moved to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1979, where he became Professor Emeritus in 1991. He was President of the History of Science Society in 1968—70 and of the Philosophy of Science Association in 1988–90. He received the George Sarton Medal of the History of Science Society in 1982 and the John Desmond Bernal Award of the Society for the Social Studies of Science in 1983.
Divisive Conditioning: Further Results on Dilation
Authors: Herron Timothy , Seidenfeld Teddy , Wasserman Larry
Published: February 2004

Conditioning can make imprecise probabilities uniformly more imprecise. We call this effect “dilation”. In a previous paper (1993), Seidenfeld and Wasserman established some basic results about dilation. In this paper we further investigate dilation on several models. In particular, we consider conditions under which dilation persists under marginalization and we quantify the degree of dilation. We also show that dilation manifests itself asymptotically in certain robust Bayesian models and we characterize the rate at which dilation occurs.
Two Faces of Intentionality
Authors: Cunningham Suzanne
Published: February 2004

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.
Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: February 2004

This paper discusses several distinct process theories of causality offered in recent years by Phil Dowe and me. It addresses problems concerning the explication of causal process, causal interaction, and causal transmission, whether given in terms of transmission of marks, transmission of invariant or conserved quantities, or mere possession of conserved quantities. Renouncing the mark-transmission and invariant quantity criteria, I accept a conserved quantity theory similar to Dowe's—differing basically with respect to causal transmission. This paper also responds to several fundamental constructive criticisms contained in Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of both the mark-transmission and the conserved quantity theories.
Contextualism and Nonlocality in the Algebra of EPR Observables
Authors: Laudisa Federico
Published: February 2004

The Bell 1964 theorem states that nonlocality is a necessary feature of hidden variable theories that reproduce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In view of the no-go theorems for non-contextual hidden variable theories already existing up to 1964, and due to Gleason and Bell, one is forced to acknowledge the contextual character of the hidden variable theory which the Bell 1964 theorem refers to. Both the mathematical and the physical justifications of this contextualism are reconsidered. Consequently, the role of contextualism in recent no-hidden-variables proofs and the import of these proofs are investigated. With reference to the physical intuition underlying contextualism, the possibility is considered whether a context-dependence of individual measurement results is compatible with context-independence of the statistics of measurement results.
Science, Publicity, and Consciousness
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: February 2004

A traditional view is that scientific evidence can be produced only by intersubjective methods that can be used by different investigators and will produce agreement. This intersubjectivity, or publicity, constraint ostensibly excludes introspection. But contemporary cognitive scientists regularly rely on their subjects' introspective reports in many areas, especially in the study of consciousness. So there is a tension between actual scientific practice and the publicity requirement. Which should give way? This paper argues against the publicity requirement and against a fallback version of it, viz. that evidence-conferring methods must at least have their reliability publicly validated.
Reference Invariance and Truthlikeness
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka
Published: February 2004

A holistic account of the meaning of theoretical terms leads scientific realism into serious troubles. Alternative methods of reference fixing are needed by a realist who wishes to show how reference invariance is possible in spite of meaning variance. This paper argues that the similarity theory of truthlikeness and approximate truth, developed by logicians since the mid 1970s, helps to make precise the idea of charitable theoretical reference. Comparisons to the recent proposals by Kitcher and Psillos are given. This argument helps to undermine the scepticist meta-induction about theories, and thereby to reevaluate Laudan's alleged confutation of scientific realism.
Reconciling Cognitive and Perceptual Theories of Emotion: A Representational Proposal
Authors: Charland Louis C.
Published: February 2004

The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptualtheoriesof emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitivefactorsin emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical framework for reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories is proposed. This is the Representational Theory of Emotion (RTE). A detailed case study of Antonio Damasio's important new contribution to emotion theory is presented in defense of the RTE. The paper is intended for readers interested in the foundations of emotion theory and cognitive science.
Discoverers' Induction
Authors: Snyder Laura J.
Published: February 2004

In this paper I demonstrate that, contrary to the standard interpretations, William Whewell's view of scientific method is neither that of the hypothetico-deductivist nor that of the retroductivist. Rather, he offers a unique inductive methodology, which he calls “discoverers' induction.” After explicating this methodology, I show that Kepler's discovery of his first law of planetary motion conforms to it, as Whewell claims it does. In explaining Whewell's famous phrase about “happy guesses” in science, I suggest that Whewell intended a distinction between “inductions,” which can be empirically verified, and “mere hypotheses”—or guesses—which cannot. Finally, I argue that Whewell's discoverers' induction is a view worthy of our attention today, because it avoids a number of problems faced by prominent alternative methodologies.
Capacities, Universality, and Singularity
Authors: Glennan Stuart S.
Published: February 2004

In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.
Modal Interpretation of Repeated Measurement: A Rejoinder to Leeds and Healey
Authors: van Fraassen Bas C.
Published: February 2004

A recent article (Leeds and Healey 1996) argues that the modal interpretation (Copenhagen variant) of quantum mechanics does not do justice to immediately repeated non-disturbing measurements. This objection has been raised before, but the article presents it in a new, detailed, precise form. I show that the objection is mistaken.
An Intervening Cause Counterexample to Railton's DNP Model of Explanation
Authors: Gluck Stuart , Gimbel Steven
Published: February 2004

Peter Railton (1978) has introduced the influential deductive-nomological-probabilistic (DNP) model of explanation which is the culmination of a tradition of formal, non-pragmatic accounts of scientific explanation. The other models in this tradition have been shown to be susceptible to a class of counterexamples involving intervening causes which speak against their sufficiency. This treatment has never been extended to the DNP model; we contend that the usual form of these counterexamples is ineffective in this case. However, we develop below a new version which overcomes these difficulties. Thus we claim that all of the models in this tradition, DNP included, have an equal status with respect to sufficiency.
Some Historical and Philosophical Reflections on Science and Enlightenment
Authors: Shimony Abner
Published: February 2004

I am grateful for the opportunity to share with you some of my convictions, anxieties, and hopes. My central conviction is the immense value of a mental outlook which can be called by the suggestive and historically recognized name Enlightenment, whose exact characterization, however, requires careful discussion. It is an outlook widely shared, though with innumerable personal variations, by the members of the Philosophy of Science Association, by the broader community of scientists, science teachers, and philosophers, and by an ill-defined part of the general public. My anxieties are that the cultivation and the influence of this mental outlook in our nation and in the world are threatened in various ways, among them ideological attacks, slackening of educational standards, and demoralization of its adherents. My central hope is that Enlightenment will prevail despite these threats.
Causation, Agency, and Independence
Authors: Hausman Daniel M.
Published: February 2004

This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative “independence” theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties.
The Interplay of Instrumentation, Experiment, and Theory: Patterns Emerging from Case Studies on Solar Redshift, 1890–1960
Authors: Hentschel Klaus
Published: February 2004

This paper discusses a series of case studies on observations, experiments, and the theoretical interpretation between 1890 and 1960 of a shift of dark Fraunhofer lines in the solar spectrum. I argue for the use of flow charts to analyze interconnections and to identify sequences of research strategies. Also I advocate using a newly-developed tool called “block diagram” representation of experimental systems as an appropriate method to identify recurrent patterns in the interplay of instrumentation, experiment, and theory in research episodes.
Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation
Authors: Steinle Friedrich
Published: February 2004

Starting with some illustrative examples, I develop a systematic account of a specific type of experimentation—an experimentation which is not, as in the “standard view”, driven by specific theories. It is typically practiced in periods in which no theory or—even more fundamentally—no conceptual framework is readily available. I call it exploratory experimentation and I explicate its systematic guidelines. From the historical examples I argue furthermore that exploratory experimentation may have an immense, but hitherto widely neglected, epistemic significance.
Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain
Authors: Van Orden Guy C. , Paap Kenneth R.
Published: February 2004

The method of positron emission tomography (PET imaging) illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images (or other observables) after the fact. Also, both require a “true” componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, componential accounts.
What's Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations?
Authors: Hull David L.
Published: February 2004

An invisible hand seems to play an important role in science. In this paper I set out the general structure of invisible-hand explanations, counter some objections that have been raised to them, and detail the role that they play in science. The most important issue is the character of the mechanisms that are supposed to bring about invisible-hand effects.
An Economist's Glance at Goldman's Economics
Authors: Sent Esther-Mirjam
Published: February 2004

Goldman joins the ranks of epistemologists, philosophers, and science studies scholars trying to use economic models of science. For Goldman, these models are part of social rather than individual epistemics. His hope is that these models will illustrate that non-epistemic goals of individual scientists such as professional success do not necessarily undermine epistemic aims of science such as the acquisition of truth. This paper shows that there are inconsistencies between Goldman's individual and social epistemics, that these models do not live up to Goldman's standards of evaluation, and that the economic models that Goldman uses are not social.
Science and the Politics of Hunger
Authors: Tiles Mary
Published: February 2004

The problem of hunger is a problem of the inequitable distribution of food entitlements. I argue that ‘modern’ science is implicated in the current form of this problem and that it can only contribute to its resolution, rather than exacerbation, if the forms of its implication are acknowledged. But this requires acceptance of the claim that science is not value-neutral. In part this paper is also an examination, in a particular problem context, of some dimensions of disputes over the value neutrality of science.
Comments on Science and Social Responsibility: A Role for Philosophy of Science?
Authors: Longino Helen E.
Published: February 2004

Each of the three papers offers a different model for the role philosophers of science might play in consideration of the relations of science to society. These comments address common themes in the three papers, articulate further questions for each, and suggest some historical shifts that require different forms of philosophical engagement now than in the early part of the century.
Mirrors and the Direction of Time
Authors: Arntzenius Frank
Published: February 2004

The frequencies with which photons pass through half-silvered mirrors in the forward direction of time is always approximately 1/2, whereas the frequencies with which photons pass through mirrors in the backward direction in time can be highly time-dependent. I argue that whether one should infer from this time-asymmetric phenomenon that time has an objective direction will depend on one's interpretation of quantum mechanics.
What is ‘The Problem of the Direction of Time’?
Authors: Callender Craig
Published: February 2004

This paper searches for an explicit expression of the so-called problem of the direction of time. I argue that the traditional version of the problem is an artifact of a mistaken view in the foundations of statistical mechanics, and that to the degree it is a problem, it is really one general to all the special sciences. I then search the residue of the traditional problem for any remaining difficulty particular to time's arrow and find that there is a special puzzle for some types of scientific realist.
Time Symmetry in Microphysics
Authors: Price Huw
Published: February 2004

Physics takes for granted that interacting systems without common history are independent, before interaction. This principle is time asymmetric, for no such restriction applies to systems without common future, after interaction. The time asymmetry is normally attributed to boundary conditions. I argue that there are two such independence principles at work in contemporary physics, one of which cannot be attributed to boundary conditions, and therefore conflicts with the assumed T-symmetry of microphysics. I note that this may have interesting ramifications in quantum mechanics.
Natural and Artificial Complexity
Authors: Richardson Robert C.
Published: February 2004

Genetic regulatory networks are complex, involving tens or hundreds of genes and scores of proteins with varying dependencies and organizations. This invites the application of artificial techniques in coming to understand natural complexity. I describe two attempts to deploy artificial models in understanding natural complexity. The first abstracts from empirically established patterns, favoring random architectures and very general constraints, in an attempt to model developmental phenomena. The second incorporates detailed information concerning the genetic structure, organization, and dependencies in actual systems in an attempt to explain developmental differences. The results offered by these models, pitched at these different levels of abstraction, are different. The more detailed models are more continuous with classical developmental approaches.
Comments on Complexity and Experimentation in Biology
Authors: Burian Richard M.
Published: February 2004

Biology deals, notoriously, with complex systems. In discussing biological methodology, all three papers in this symposium honor the complexity of biological subject matter by preferring models and theories built to reflect the details of complex systems to models based on broad general principles or laws. Rheinberger's paper, the most programmatic of the three, provides a framework for the epistemology of discovery in complex systems. A fundamental problem is raised for Rheinberger's epistemology, namely, how to understand the referential continuity of the theoretical terms and concepts employed in typical case studies involving complex systems.
Models: The Blueprints for Laws
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: February 2004

In this paper the claim that laws of nature are to be understood as claims about what necessarily or reliably happens is disputed. Laws can characterize what happens in a reliable way, but they do not do this easily. We do not have laws for everything occurring in the world, but only for those situations where what happens in nature is represented by a model: models are blueprints for nomological machines, which in turn give rise to laws. An example from economics shows, in particular, how we use—and how we need to use—models to get probabilistic laws.
The Technology of Analogical Models: Irving Fisher's Monetary Worlds
Authors: Morgan Mary S.
Published: February 2004

Mary Hesse's well-known work on models and analogies gives models a creative role to play in science, which rests on developing certain analogical properties considered neutral between the two fields. Case study material from Irving Fisher's work (The Purchasing Power of Money, 1911), in which he used analogies to construct models of monetary relations and the monetary system, highlights certain omissions in Hesse's account. The analysis points to the importance of taking account of the negative properties in the analogies and to certain differences between “ready-made” analogies (models of systems based on existing analogical structures) and “designed” analogies (models built up from separate analogical features).
Feyerabend, Mill, and Pluralism
Authors: Lloyd Elisabeth A.
Published: February 2004

I suggest following Paul Feyerabend's own advice, and interpreting Feyerabend's work in light of the principles laid out by John Stuart Mill. A review of Mill's essay, On Liberty, emphasizes the importance Mill placed on open and critical discussion for the vitality and progress of various aspects of human life, including the pursuit of scientific knowledge. Many of Feyerabend's more unusual stances, I suggest, are best interpreted as attempts to play certain roles—especially the role of “defender of unpopular minority opinion”—that are necessary to fulfilling Mill's conditions for rational exchange and optimal human development.
To Transform the Phenomena: Feyerabend, Proliferation, and Recurrent Neural Networks
Authors: Churchland Paul M.
Published: February 2004

Paul Feyerabend recommended the methodological policy of proliferating competing theories as a means to uncovering new empirical data, and thus as a means to increase the empirical constraints that all theories must confront. Feyerabend's policy is here defended as a clear consequence of connectionist models of explanatory understanding and learning. An earlier connectionist “vindication” is criticized, and a more realistic and penetrating account is offered in terms of the computationally plastic cognitive profile displayed by neural networks with a recurrent architecture.
Feyerabend's Retreat from Realism
Authors: Preston John
Published: February 2004

In attempting to assess the legacy of Paul Feyerabend's philosophical work, matters are complicated by the fact that there was a change in his basic orientation towards the philosophy of science around the end of the 1960s. Here I shall indicate one aspect of Feyerabend's divided legacy. My main aims are to sketch the principal themes in his (fairly extensive but little-known) 1990s output, to situate that later output insofar as it bears on the realism/antirealism debate, and (rather precipitously, perhaps) to identify what I take to be the single common premise of his entire philosophical work.
Why Do Biologists Argue Like They Do?
Authors: Beatty John
Published: February 2004

“Theoretical pluralism” obtains when there are good evidential reasons for accommodating multiple theories of the same domain. Issues of “relative significance” often arise in connection with the investigation of such domains. In this paper, I describe and give examples of theoretical pluralism and relative significance issues. Then I explain why theoretical pluralism so often obtains in biology—and why issues of relative significance arise—in terms of evolutionary contingencies and the paucity or lack of laws of biology. Finally, I turn from explanation to justification, and raise questions about the purpose and value of concerns and disagreements about relative significance.
Does Biology Have Laws? The Experimental Evidence
Authors: Brandon Robert N.
Published: February 2004

In this paper I argue that we can best make sense of the practice of experimental evolutionary biology if we see it as investigatingcontingent, rather than lawlike, regularities. This understanding is contrasted with the experimental practice of certain areas of physics. However, this presents a problem for those who accept the Logical Positivist conception of law and its essential role in scientific explanation. I address this problem by arguing that the contingent regularities of evolutionary biology have a limited range of nomic necessity and a limited range of explanatory power even though they lack the unlimited projectibility that has been seen by some as a hallmark of scientific laws.
Two Outbreaks of Lawlessness in Recent Philosophy of Biology
Authors: Sober Elliott
Published: February 2004

John Beatty (1995) and Alexander Rosenberg (1994) have argued against the claim that there are laws in biology. Beatty's main reason is that evolution is a process full of contingency, but he also takes the existence of relative significance controversies in biology and the popularity of pluralistic approaches to a variety of evolutionary questions to be evidence for biology's lawlessness. Rosenberg's main argument appeals to the idea that biological properties supervene on large numbers of physical properties, but he also develops case studies of biological controversies to defend his thesis that biology is best understood as an instrumental discipline. The present paper assesses their arguments.
Pragmatic Laws
Authors: Mitchell Sandra D.
Published: February 2004

Beatty, Brandon, and Sober agree that biological generalizations, when contingent, do not qualify as laws. Their conclusion follows from a normative definition of law inherited from the Logical Empiricists. I suggest two additional approaches: paradigmatic and pragmatic. Only the pragmatic represents varying kinds and degrees of contingency and exposes the multiple relationships found among scientific generalizations. It emphasizes the function of laws in grounding expectation and promotes the evaluation of generalizations along continua of ontological and representational parameters. Stability of conditions and strength of determination in nature govern projectibility. Accuracy, ontological level, simplicity, and manageability provide additional measures of usefulness.