bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Concepts without Primitives
Authors: Churchman C. West
Published: November 2002

1. Outline of the Project. This paper is intended to be a progress report on a project in philosophy of science. The immediate stimulus of this report is the eightieth birthday of E. A. Singer, Jr., who was the inspiration of the project, and, needless to say, though responsible for the whole is not responsible for the misconceptions in the specific parts.
Two Styles of Research in Current Social Studies
Authors: Mills C. Wright
Published: November 2002

When in the course of our work we are uncertain, we sometimes become more concerned with our methods than with the content of our problems. We then try to clarify our conceptions and tighten our procedures. And as we re-examine studies that we feel have turned out well, we create conscious models of inquiry with which we try to guide our own work-in-progress.
What is Matter?
Authors: van Heerden P. J.
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. It is an amazing thing that, unlike pebbles, clouds and stars, the smallest building stones of Nature—the electrons, the protons and the neutrons—are all completely uniform. There seems to be a necessity in Nature for systems of a very special form, and one can wonder now what kind of necessity this is. I believe that this can only be a mathematical necessity, that consequently the principle of Nature is a mathematical one. How else could Nature obey the mathematical laws of physics if it were not because of her own principle? It can be argued that these mathematical laws, like Newtonian mechanics, the classical theory of electromagnetism and the quantum theory of the electron are all some form of beginner's luck, and that continued investigation will reveal Nature as more and more mysterious and irrational. If that were true, one might as well give up the pursuit of physics completely! But on one hand modern physics has discovered what we believe to be the elementary particles of the material world, and on the other hand it comes out that at least a part of these elementary forms obey mathematic laws to a very high degree of accuracy.
The James-Lange Theory: A Logical Post-Mortem
Authors: Golightly Cornelius L.
Published: November 2002

The following statement from James’ 1884 essay in Mind (12) is repeated in his later work (10, pp. 100–101) and appears often in secondary sources as a summary of his celebrated theory of the emotions:

Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the Perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry, and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestation must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we would not actually feel afraid or angry.
The Application of Neurological Studies in an Approach to Some Philosophical Problems
Authors: Chessick Richard D.
Published: November 2002

The so-called “mind-brain” problem affords the greatest opportunity for the cooperation of philosophy and science in the advancement of knowledge. In this paper we will outline pertinent facts already learned about the human mind from neurological disciplines, and, using some hypotheses from outstanding workers in neurobiology, we will relate this material to some important philosophical problems. Our proposal is to examine these problems in the light of knowledge gathered from the scientific disciplines, and we hope to demonstrate how this method may eventually clarify some of the confusion and suggest certain solutions.
The Empirical Philosophy of Roger and Francis Bacon
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

To this date Roger Bacon remains one of the controversial and colorful figures in the history of empirical science. This paper is an attempt to ascertain his views regarding the nature and function of empirical science and to compare his writings on this topic with those of the more famous Francis Bacon. The ground for comparison is the fact that both men have often been cast in the same role in the history of science; i.e., they have both been acclaimed as the first in the western world to emphasize and bring out the importance of experimental method in the accumulation of knowledge. In this connection Francis, of the sixteenth century, has long been acknowledged as the father of the experimental method in preference to Roger, of the thirteenth century. In effect, therefore, this paper probes the relative merits of the claims for each thinker.
Comments on the Ethical Theory of Edgar A. Singer
Authors: Flower Elizabeth
Published: November 2002

“We get wise by asking questions, and even if these are not answered, we get wise; for a well packed question carries its answer on its back as a snail carries its shell.” These lines from James Stephens’ Irish Fairy Tales are an appropriate introduction, for Singer takes the question, ‘How shall I live if I would have of life the best it has to offer?’ as the departure for his ethics, or perhaps it would be fairer to say, for his reflections on ethical matters. This brief essay is expository and interpretive rather than critical and brings together material from various essays, particularly “Progress,” “On The Contented Life,” and “Old Ways and New Beginnings of Science and of Morals.”
Corrigibility and Law
Authors: Kaminsky Jack
Published: November 2002

Corrigibility has generally been designated as the major qualification of a scientific law. Although various other characteristics of a scientific law have been questioned, corrigibility has usually been accepted as one of its essential features. On this basis scientists, positivists, and pragmatists have frequently distinguished between genuine empirical laws and all other assertions that only seem to be laws. The mark of a genuine law in the scientific sense is its corrigibility; the mark of a pseudo law is its non-corrigibility. In this paper I should like to reopen philosophic inquiry into the nature of corrigibility as it is supposedly exemplified in law and to call attention to some of the peculiar difficulties and conclusions attendant on any such inquiry.
Two Concepts of Optimism
Authors: Axinn Sidney
Published: November 2002

1. Objective of the Paper. This is an exercise in formalism; an attempt to see what a certain hypothesis would look like if it were spelled out in more detail than it has so far received. The object is to frame a self-consistent hypothesis that includes certain contributions of both optimism and pessimism. We would like to save the moral advantages of each position; at first glance they seem logically exclusive.
Explanation by Laws in Social Science
Authors: Brown Robert
Published: November 2002

There are two parts to the paper. The first is concerned with the question: “are there law statements in any of the social sciences?” In order to answer this question two explanations drawn from the literature of anthropology and sociology are considered in detail. It is shown that these are “explanation sketches” rather than logically complete explanations. Both of these “sketches” presuppose but do not state tendency laws. These law statements are then made explicit by the writer, and thus it is shown that the use of law statements is assumed in at least some of the social sciences.
Sullivan's Concept of Scientific Method as Applied to Psychiatry
Authors: Harris Catherine
Published: November 2002

H. S. Sullivan's approach to the study of psychiatry reflects the fact that his conception of scientific method was derived from work in physics rather than in the biological sciences. His definition of psychiatry as the study of “interpersonal process” appears to have been influenced partly by his previous training in physics, and also by his conclusion that the most significant aspects of personality could be revealed only through an understanding of the person's actual behavior in relation to others.
Axiomatic Systems, Conceptual Schemes, and the Consistency of Mathematical Theories
Authors: McNaughton Robert
Published: November 2002

Lately, an increased interest in formal devices has led to an attempt on the part of some mathematicians to do without those aspects of mathematics which require intuition. One consequence of this movement has been a new conception of pure mathematics as a science of axiomatic systems. According to this conception, there is no reality beyond an axiomatic system which the statements of mathematics are about; the fact that a statement is a theorem in the system is all that is of interest. This is a sort of nominalist position, since the contrary position seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of a domain of mathematical entities, which are just as suspect as the universale commonly discussed in metaphysical treatises. More often it is called formalism.
Concerning Value Science
Authors: Haworth L. , Minas J. S.
Published: November 2002

There has been much discussion in recent years of the possibilities for and nature of “value science.” The present paper is intended to be a contribution to this discussion. One encouraging feature of the bulk of current discussion of value science is that its protagonists have a definite end in view, namely, “human betterment,” taking that phrase in the common sense as covering, at least, a process of creating and maintaining such conditions of life as enable human beings successfully to engage in satisfying activities.
Comments on Professor Plochmann's “Is Quantity Prior to Quality?”
Authors: Storer Thomas
Published: November 2002

In his reexamination of the relationship between quality and quantity, Professor Plochmann has avoided the method of linguistic analysis in favor of a more traditional method of philosophizing. Since I agree with him that in general quality and quantity are irreducible one to the other, but may both be reducible to some category more fundamental than either, my comments are to be considered supplementary to his. In particular, I should like to see what clarifications, if any, arise if one considers qualities and quantities from the purely linguistic point of view.
Can Time Flow Backwards?
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

The nature of time is one of the crucial problems in the philosophy of science and it cannot be solved by an appraisal of past formulations of the time concept, nor by introspective examination of our awareness of time. Among the philosopher's tasks is the seemingly thankless one of scrutinizing the advance of modern science for significant facts and ideas, and to integrate these into the larger notions he has formed of time. Recent physics bears suggestions of peculiar interest in this regard; chief among them is the theory of quantum electrodynamics developed by Feynman which involves reversals in the course of time and thereby cherishes, in the minds of many, an age-old phantasy of more than scientific appeal. To appraise that theory in philosophic terms is the purpose of this note.
Social Aspects of Scientific Method in Industrial Production
Authors: Littauer Sebastian B.
Published: November 2002

In moments of daring, some physical scientists consider problems of social inquiry, hoping naively that the methods of physical inquiry will provide them with special insight. In my own work on problems of industrial production where I am searching for “practical” means for optimizing production in some socially satisfactory sense, I find that the physical scientist cannot escape the responsibility for social inquiry. So far as I can understand the nature of this work, it requires for its fruitful pursuit a methodology which leans heavily on the concepts of statistical control of Shewhart (1, 2, 3), of cybernetics of Wiener (4, 5) and of experimentalism of Singer (6, 7, 8, 9), Churchman (10, 11) and Ackoff (11).
Truth in Science and in Philosophy
Authors: Ushenko A. P.
Published: November 2002

This essay proposes to differentiate between science and philosophy on the evidence that the truth of scientific, or, more generally, empirical, statements is perspectival whereas the truth of a philosophical statement is not. A perspectival truth depends upon a perspective in the sense that it may no longer be acceptable after the point of view which determines a perspective has been changed to another. Accordingly, the admission of perspectival truth requires the existence of alternative perspectives. The existence of alternative perspectives does not mean that every statement which is true in one of them is false in another. Some statements, to be called perspectivally invariant, remain true regardless of the perspective. But the admission of perspectival truth requires at least one statement to be true in one perspective but false in an alternative perspective. Two perspectives, no matter how different in other respects, will not be called alternative unless they involve perspectival truth. The point is important. For no one denies that perspectives differ with regard to their heuristic value, i.e. no one would deny that a certain point of view may lead us to findings which from a different point of view might remain indiscernible and therefore undiscovered. But the opponents of perspectival truth and of alternative perspectives argue, with W. R. Dennes, that once a truth has been established the same finding can be acknowledged by a true statement in any other perspective although the acknowledgment may call for a restatement in a different idiom or language (1). The issue is between the admission of perspectival truth, on the one hand, and the contention of interperspectival translatability of truth, on the other.
Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments
Authors: Hartung Frank E.
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. Cultural relativity is one of the most important conceptions to which anthropology and sociology have devoted much attention in recent years. It is a theory of human conduct based upon observational studies of different cultures and different societies. Many of the leaders in the various social sciences are currently among the advocates of this viewpoint. The burden of these pages, however, is that cultural relativity is flying under false colors: it claims to be empirical but is illogical; it claims to be objective but is surreptitiously moral; it claims to be reasonable but elevates irrationalism; it claims to be scientific but prevents the development of an experimental science of sociocultural conduct. These are serious charges to lodge against leading social scientists; to detail them all would require much more space than is here available. Therefore this paper will be devoted to an incomplete exposition of only two points, namely, that cultural relativity is surreptitiously moral, and, that it deprives man of rational grounds for decision in certain crucial areas. To put the matter bluntly, the advocates of cultural relativity, while they allege themselves to be scientifically amoral, sneak in through the back door a peculiarly crude form of ethnocentric morality which is clearly contrary to the observable facts of human behavior; and, while presenting a presumably scientific analysis of human conduct, leave us only with personal taste as the basis for making certain important decisions.

2. Cultural Relativity Defined. Cultural relativity, briefly stated, asserts that any set of customs and institutions, or way of life, is as valid as any other. It may be well to let some representative cultural relativists speak for themselves at this point, in order to show that the summary statement of their position, just given, is correct. The author of an excellent and widely adopted textbook in cultural anthropology stresses the dignity inherent in every body of custom, and abjures us to be tolerant of the ways of other people:

… cultural relativism is a philosophy which … lays stress on the dignity inherent in every body of custom, and on the need for tolerance of conventions though they may differ from one's own … the relativistic point of view brings into relief the validity of every set of norms for those people whose lives are guided by them, and the values these represent. … The very core of cultural relativism is the social discipline that comes of respect for differences—of mutual respect. Emphasis on the worth of many ways of life, not one, is an affirmation of the values of each culture. Such emphasis seeks to understand and to harmonize goals, not to judge and destroy those that do not dovetail with our own, (4, pp. 76–77).
Methods of Furthering New Ideas
Authors: Kogan Zuce
Published: November 2002

In an effort to ease the task of developing new ideas, whether in research, development or some other endeavor, it is generally accepted to resort to a method of problem solving. Although the use of such a method may, in many cases, be done without the realization of the individual, it does not detract from the fact that such methods play a part in our mental processes and research techniques. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the methods and to arbitrarily classify them so that they can be consciously applied. Inasmuch as all methods must to some extent ultimately define the problem, the division presented here is obviously arbitrary, based on the degree of specificity with which the problem must be defined.
Logic and Professor Ryle
Authors: Colburn N. H.
Published: November 2002

The period between 1945 and 1952 marked the development of Professor Ryle's conception of the principles of inference as performance rules. This development has paralleled that of his now well-known distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. Indeed, the former is a corollary to the latter. Beginning with the inaugural address to the Aristotelian Society in 1945 (2) and reaching full fruition in The Concept of Mind in 1949 (4), it finds its most detailed and illuminating expression in “‘If’, ‘So’, and ‘Because’,” which appeared in 1950 (5). The present essay will attempt to explore this conception of rules in some detail, in the hope of clarifying the nature of Professor Ryle's views on classical logic and on certain problems within the philosophy of logic. Professor Ryle belongs, if his views may be so labeled, to the school of informal language analysts. On the other hand, we incline more toward formalism. We tend to agree with those philosophers who consider certain schemata indispensable tools for the solution of philosophical problems. Logic and the philosophy of logic are, as everyone knows, the areas in which the formalists’ technique originated. In these areas it is accepted by virtually everybody. The only recent exception is a group of English writers, many of whom take their inspiration from Ryle. One may hope, then, that the present criticism of Ryle's view from the other standpoint will throw some light on both positions. What follows falls naturally into two parts. The first deals mainly with Ryle's objections to current logical theory, the second with his own philosophy of logic.
On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Authors: Brodbeck May
Published: November 2002

When, in recent years, philosophers of science attend to the physical sciences, their activity centers on the analysis and clarification of the methods and theories of these sciences. Thus philosophers have made remarkable contributions to our understanding of mechanics, the relativity theory, the quantum theory, probability, and geometry, as well as to the foundations of mathematics. More general discussions about theory construction, explanation, and concept formation always are illustrated and illuminated by reference to specific theories within science. In our generation, most philosophers of science have taken for granted that physical science is descriptive, empirical, functional, and—leaving aside controversial interpretations of quanta—deterministic.
Subjectivism and Objectivism in the Social Sciences
Authors: Gewirth Alan
Published: November 2002

Philosophizing about the social sciences involves an initial problem of denotation. Although the natural sciences are the scene of intramural disputes like those between proponents of quantum mechanics and relativity theory, no one doubts either what the natural sciences are or that they are sciences; and all of them may be said to use, broadly speaking, the same scientific method. But the case of the social sciences is different. It resembles somewhat the situation in mathematics where the intuitionists deny that non-constructible concepts or problems belong to mathematics; and even more the situation in philosophy where groups like the analysts and the existentialists not only do not speak the same language but do not even recognize one another's right to be called “philosophy.” Similarly, the disciplines which comprise the social sciences today differ from one another in basic ways, involving long-standing disputes over which ones have a right to the names of the several social sciences and what their proper methods are. Familiar examples of these disputes are the controversies between the classicists and institutionalists in economics, and between the analytical and sociological schools in jurispurdence. Consequently, it is impossible for philosophers, or social scientists philosophizing about their general field, to proceed to discuss “the” subject-matter or “the” method of “the” social sciences as if the phrases containing these definite articles were definite descriptions on whose objects there was general agreement.
Philosophy and Social Science
Authors: Rudner Richard S.
Published: November 2002

I wish, for the sake of the vivacity of any discussion which might ensue, that I could find myself more in disagreement with Dr. Brodbeck than I do. As a matter of fact, however, I find myself in substantial agreement with her on practically all of the points upon which she takes issue with Hayek. There are, to be sure a few questions of relatively minor import that I should like to ask Dr. Brodbeck, but in the main I have confined my own discussion to an elaboration and supplementation of some of the points considered in her paper, and some related considerations raised in Hayek's book but which Dr. Brodbeck did not have the time, perhaps, to treat.
Dialectic of the Schools (I)
Authors: Singer E. A.
Published: November 2002

1. Foreword. Man's every act is an act of faith; generally, an unconscious faith; seldom, an examined faith; never, a faith that by taking thought could have been replaced by assured certainties. All this appears whenever we stop to “rationalize” our conduct. Whatever that conduct may have been, it can be made to appear reasonable only if some propositions are taken to be true, others false. Or, perhaps the more experienced and less exacting mind would feel the reasonableness of its actions to have been as well established as might be, if it could show the premises with which its acts were consistent to be more likely true than false; those with whose truth they were inconsistent, more likely false than true. Either way of putting it points to the one moral; namely, that, apart from incalculable chance, there is nothing but one's judgment in the matter of premises to determine all that one's life can come to know of fruition or frustration. Nothing, then, can be more important to any man than to do all he can to assure the soundness of his reasons for the faith that is in him; i.e. to test the weight of evidence supporting the working hypotheses on which he is willing to act. But to have considered the evidence for the hypotheses on which he has acted or is prepared to act, could be practically useful only to one who had in one way or another come by a sound idea of the evidence on which one should act, if one's actions are not to end in disappointment. The result at which a man's thought on this matter of evidence may have arrived, will constitute his theory of evidence; and the task of constructing the soundest possible theory of evidence is the undertaking of philosophy.
What is disease?
Authors: King Lester S.
Published: November 2002

Biological science does not try to distinguish between health and disease. Biology is concerned with the interaction between living organisms and their environment. What we call health or disease is quite irrelevant.

These reactions between the individual and his environment are complex. The individual and his surroundings form an integrated system which we can arbitrarily divide into two parts. There is an “external” component, by which we mean such factors as light, heat, percentage of oxygen in the air, quantity of minerals or vitamins in food, micro-organisms in food or air, and so on. These can induce changes in what we arbitrarily call the “internal” component. Here we include such crude factors as anatomical structures, or finer details like composition of intercellular fluid, or secretions of glands, or changes of electrical potential in nerve or muscle.
Some Reflections on Language Games
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid
Published: November 2002

1. It seems plausible to say that a language is a system of expressions the use of which is subject to certain rules. It would seem, thus, that learning to use a language is learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. However, taken as it stands, this thesis is subject to an obvious and devastating refutation. After formulating this refutation, I shall turn to the constructive task of attempting to restate the thesis in a way which avoids it. In doing so, I shall draw certain distinctions the theoretical elaboration of which will, I believe, yield new insight into the psychology of language and of what might be called “norm conforming behavior” generally. The present paper contains an initial attempt along these lines.
Can Men Change Laws of Social Science?
Authors: Gewirth Alan
Published: November 2002

1. Some Preliminary Distinctions. The relation between the natural and the social sciences, as it bears on their respective subject-matters, methods, and propositions, has long been a source of problems for the philosophy of science. The title of this paper is intended to indicate one of the most basic of these problems. Before developing my point, however, I wish to guard against a possible misinterpretation. I am not questioning the accepted fact that as knowledge in any field advances men may come to recognize the incorrectness of what they had previously regarded as “laws” in that field, and may consequently “change” these laws to take account of such increased knowledge. Let me call this kind of change of laws doctrinal change. The kind of change about which I am asking is rather a change in the subject-matter itself insofar as it is subject to laws—i.e., a change in the causal relations among the facts, objects, properties, events, or whatever they may be called, with which the science deals. Let me call this kind of change of laws factual change. Now, without inquiring more fully at the moment into the nature of scientific laws as such, we may say that the history of science shows that men can and do effect doctrinal changes in the laws of any science, natural as well as social, and formal as well as empirical. And it is recognized also, with minor exceptions to be noted later, that men cannot effect factual changes in the laws of the natural sciences, since these are independent of human volition or decision. The question I am asking, then, is whether men can effect factual changes in the laws of the social sciences.
Some Remarks on Problems and Methods in the Philosophy of Science
Authors: Suppes Patrick
Published: November 2002

What sort of subject is the philosophy of science? It would be difficult to find any sort of agreement on the answer to this question. There are a large number of physicists who have promoted the idea that the subject is a kind of cosmic journalism: any new major discoveries in physics warrant an up-to-the-minute, catch-as-catch-can analysis of the boundaries of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, the Oxonian sirens of ordinary language tell us that any careful scrutiny of technical scientific matters is not proper philosophical activity. I want to argue that the philosopher of science need be neither a journalist of science nor merely an acute man of common sense eternally restricted to contemplating the general meaning of such notions as those of mind, free will, cause and determinism.
The Clock Paradox in the Special Theory of Relativity
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. The germ of the clock paradox was contained in Einstein's fundamental paper on the special theory of relativity, where he declares that the retardation of a moving clock “still holds good if the clock moves from A to B in any polygonal line, and also when the points A and B coincide.” This remark soon gave rise to a criticism which was to play a prominent role in the discussions of the consistency of the theory of relativity. It was charged that this theory allows the paradoxical conclusion that at the instant of the return of a moving clock U1 to its point of departure A, the time shown by Ul is both earlier and later than the corresponding reading of a clock U2 which has remained stationary at A during U1's journey. Critics based this contention on the following assumptions, for which they claimed the sanction of relativity: (i) The relative motion of U1 and U2 is such that the kinematic process seen by an observer on one of these clocks is of the same character as that seen by an observer on the other, and this symmetry allows each of these two clocks to be used as a reference frame from which to describe the motion of the other, and (ii) there is reciprocity between these two reference frames such that in each of them, the moving clock must be slow upon returning to the stationary one.
Information, Entropy and Inductive Logic
Authors: Pakswer S.
Published: November 2002

It has been shown by several authors that in operations involving information a quantity appears which is the negative of the quantity usually defined as entropy in similar situations. This quantity ℜ = − KI has been termed “negentropy” and it has been shown that the negentropy of information and the physical entropy S are mirrorlike representations of the same train of events. In physical terminology the energy is degraded by an increase in entropy due to an increased randomness in the positions or velocities of components, wave functions, complexions in phase space; in informational terminology some information about the same components has been lost or the negentropy has been decreased. In equilibrium the system has for a given energy content maximum randomness (or minimum information is required). One consequence of this dual aspect was the idea to apply the methods of statistical mechanics to problems of communication and Brillouin showed that Fermi-Dirac statistics or generalized Fermi statistics are applicable for example to a transmission of signals such as telegrams.
The Control Factor in Social Experimentation
Authors: Lindley T. Foster
Published: November 2002

When the terms ‘control’ and ‘experiment’ are used in reference to the methodological procedures of the social sciences, frequently the question is raised as to whether or not the investigator uses the terms in the same sense as the natural scientist. The purpose of this paper is to show that the social scientist has good reason to use them in the same sense and that in fact this usage is consistent with a long tradition of social research. This will be shown by an investigation of some common assumptions in the social sciences, such as, (a) the claim that the social sciences are younger than the natural sciences and that the former have depended upon the latter for methodological cues, (b) that human behavior is ultimately inexplicable and unpredictable, and (c) that the social scientist is unable to observe human behavior under controlled, experimental conditions except in trivial instances. Of course, not all social scientists make these assumptions but they occur in the literature and their significance is considerable when the scientific status of the social sciences is being discussed.
Society, Technology, and Philosophical Reasoning
Authors: Topitsch Ernst
Published: November 2002

The old quarrel between the logical empiricists or pragmatists and the defenders of metaphysics is still far from being settled. This situation is at least partly due to the fact that neither of the two antagonists has a clear insight in the historical background, the systematical validity, and the practical purposes of the concepts and methods used in traditional philosophy. Therefore further clarification is needed.

The following paper does not claim to give final definitions and decisions. It will rather try to draw the attention to certain ways of reasoning still very widespread in metaphysics and moral theory. Their careful analysis may throw light on some of the so-called eternal philosophical problems.
Dialectic of the Schools (II)
Authors: Singer E. A.
Published: November 2002

4. The Mind's Lawmaking: Critical Idealism. Pleased with something dramatic in the phrase, we often characterize experiment as “a question put to Nature.” But if there be anything flattering to our state in Nature's submission to our questioning, there can be nothing grateful to our heart in her manner of answering. “Are we all to die?” Nature answers, “Yes.” “Will the sun that warmed our fathers last out our children?” Nature answers, “No.” Thus Nature giveth and Nature taketh away; her complaisance ends with letting us know her way with us.
Ontology and the Theory of Meaning
Authors: Cartwright Richard L.
Published: November 2002

In a number of essays published over the last decade or so, W. V. Quine has made some interesting suggestions concerning the ontology of theories. (3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 10) If I understand him correctly, one of his principal objects has been to formulate a criterion by means of which one can correctly decide what are the ontological commitments of any given theory. My aim in this paper is to reveal what I think are inadequacies in Quine's criterion and to indicate the direction in which a proper formulation lies.
A Model for the Science of Decision
Authors: Bates James
Published: November 2002

This paper attempts to present a formal model for the science of decision where “science of decision” is restricted to the work that has been done in formal models and not those aspects connected with the gathering of empirical data and development of measures for the data. One of the difficulties in treating such a phenomenon as decision-making has been to give a precise statement of the problem. The literature of numerous fields is filled with models and talk about models where various restrictions are imposed. Among all of these it seems that the formalistic or logical, game-theoretic, and statistical decision function conceptual schemas have solved some decision problems largely due to the fact that they could give a mathematical formulation of the problem and its solution. The result is that in these three fields the decision problem can be fed into a computer which grinds out an answer for each particular set of parameters.
The Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics
Authors: Simon Herbert A.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this note is to examine a recent axiomatization of classical particle mechanics, and its relation to an alternative axiomatization I had earlier proposed. A comparison of the two proposals casts some interesting light on the problems of operationalism in classical celestial mechanics.

1. Comparison of the Two Axiomatizations. The basic differences between the two proposals arise from the nature of the undefined terms. Both systems take the set of particles, time, and position as primitive notions. Both systems assume that there exists a set of particles having continuous, twice-differentiable paths over some time interval. In addition, CPM takes mass and force as primitive notions, and assumes that with each particle there is associated a mass and a set of forces such that Newton's Second Law is satisfied (Axiom P6). A system with these properties is called in CPM “a system of particle mechanics.” If, in addition, the set of forces in the system satisfies Newton's Third Law, the system is called in CPM “Newtonian.”
Critical Note on “Culture” and “Learning-theory”
Authors: Hamburg Carl H.
Published: November 2002

Current preoccupation with learning-theory has led psychologists, and other social scientists, to expect more from it than can presently be delivered. The subsequent reflections are submitted in order to suggest that at least some formulations of the relation between learning-theory and the “culture-concept” are somewhat defective. More specifically, I shall examine two recent contributions by O. K. Moore (one of which appeared in this journal (1)), whose attempts at definition are distiguished by the employment of the formidable weapons of symbolic logic. Without denying the advantages to be gained, by the sciences in general and the social sciences in particular, from the introduction of this new logic, I would justify my critical concern with Moore's definition of “culture” in terms of “learning-theory,” because it may become representative of other contributions whose partial inadequacies are easily obscured by the technicality of a symbolic language into which the actual empirical complexity of an issue could be falsely thought to have been properly translated.
An Alternative Set of Rules for the Syllogism
Authors: Johnstone Henry W.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this note is to present a set of rules for the syllogism which not only is equivalent with the set ordinarily used, but also is the dual of the latter. It must be emphasized, however, that the discussion of both of these sets presupposes the hypothetical interpretation of universal propositions, and would not hold true of the existential interpretation of such propositions. A universal proposition is interpreted hypothetically, rather than existentially, when it is not assumed that the class denoted by its subject must have members. Thus the hypothetical interpretation of “All unicorns are mammals” would be just “If anything is a unicorn, then it is a mammal—but it is not necessarily true that unicorns exist.” One important consequence of the distinction between these two modes of interpretation is that rule 3, below, is true for the hypothetical interpretation, but not for the existential.
Action Research—A Scientific Approach?
Authors: Blum Fred H.
Published: November 2002

The concept of action-research has been developed during the last decade, mainly at the Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and at the Commission for Community Interrelations of the American Jewish Congress—centers founded by the late Kurt Lewin whose original and creative mind has made many contributions to social-psychological and sociological research. I owe my acquaintance with this new approach to the Research Center, particularly to Ronald Lippitt and Alvin Zander. Yet most of the following observations are based on my research experience during the last four years. The responsibility for what I am saying is, therefore, completely my own.
Indeterminacy and Freedom: A Reappraisal
Authors: Barbour Ian
Published: November 2002

The developments in 20th century physics which have brought into question the status of causality in subatomic phenomena are common knowledge today in the philosophical world. For the purposes of our discussion attention focusses on the quantum-mechanical solutions which describe atomic states by probability distributions instead of by exact values of observable variables.
Amplifying Systems and Available Energy
Authors: O'Rourke Neil W.
Published: November 2002

This paper considers combinations of frictionless mechanical amplifiers arranged in a cycle so that the amplified signal passes around through an endless chain of such systems the output of the last system being fed into the first. It appears that while each amplifier may be reversible in the absence of friction, the effect of the combination is such that the signal would be unable to pass around the cycle indefinitely, using the same energy over and over again. It is felt that the assumptions upon which this cycle is based are related to some of the conditions met with in consideration of open thermodynamic systems such as heat engines and living organisms when in finite environments.
Do Statistical Laws have Explanatory Efficacy?
Authors: Gluck Samuel E.
Published: November 2002

In “Studies In The Logic Of Explanation” (Philosophy of Science, XV, 1948) Hempel and Oppenheim analyze the basic pattern of scientific explanation. One of the difficult problems which they acknowledge is “whether and how the analysis of explanation can be extended from the case where all general explanatory principles invoked are of a strictly universal or ‘deterministic’ form to the case where explanatory reference is made to statistical hypotheses.” It is hoped that the remarks which follow may contribute a little toward clarifying the issue.
On Synonymy and Indirect Discourse
Authors: Scheffler Israel
Published: November 2002

The notion of synonymy has recently been severely criticized, and its replacement by graded, continuous notions of one or another sort urged on general grounds. At the same time, it has usually been assumed both by critics and defenders of the notion, that synonymy and indirect discourse are in the same boat, that analyzing the latter, for instance, requires no more than an acceptable decision on the former while it requires at least that. Defenders of synonymy have thus thought it sufficient to apply their interpretations of this idea to indirect discourse, while opponents have not thought to attack such application save by way of an attack on synonymy.
The Clock Paradox in the Special Theory of Relativity
Authors: Leaf Boris
Published: November 2002

Publication in this journal recently of a paper by A. Grünbaum has induced me to submit a treatment of the same subject. Like Grünbaum, I shall use the framework of special relativity, but my analysis will be different. Some of his arguments, I believe, are inadmissable. I shall pose the problem in a form different from his, but the solution to be described will be applicable to his case as well.
Clinical Judges and Clinical Insight in Psychology
Authors: Buck Roger C. , Seeman W.
Published: November 2002

Our purpose in this paper is to characterize the methodological role of judges in clinical psychology. What, methodologically speaking, do the judges do for the experimenter in this area? Why, and in what ways, are the experimenter's procedures more respectable, his results more valid, when he employs judges? In order to present a concrete example of the use of judges we begin by describing in some detail a procedure actually employed in the testing of an hypothesis. Next we contrast this procedure with a prima facie analogous one from chemistry, noting that an appeal to judges here would be clearly superfluous. Our problem then presents itself in the form: “Why these sorts of differences between chemistry and clinical psychology?”. As the argument develops it becomes clear that the methodological significance of what is called “clinical insight” (or “intuition”) must be carefully considered in any attempt to understand the peculiar importance of the judges’ role in psychology. It is argued that the absence of precise criteria for typical concepts of clinical psychology is closely connected with the frequent appeals to clinical insight. And it is urged that the full significance of the employment of judges emerges only when seen in the light of this conceptual uncertainty, and of the clinician's attempt to operate scientifically in spite of that uncertainty.
An Examination of Information Theory
Authors: Bar-Hillel Yehoshua
Published: November 2002

One of the tasks with which communication engineers are presented is that of devising a mechanism by which a significant sequence of words, amessage, produced by somebody, thesenderof the message, is reproduced at some other place, with the shortest practical time lag. The reproduction must be such that thereceiverof the message will be able to understand what the sender meant by his message, at least, if he knows the sender's language (or, perhaps, his specific use of the language). The following illustration is typical:Awrites on a sheet of paper “I love you” and wishes thatB, 3000 miles away, should become aware of the full content of this message, with little delay and at a low cost. There will be institutions, in a capitalistic society, which will compete with each other in providingA, for a price, with the required service. Those companies which perform these services most satisfactorily, i.e., with an overall better combination of faithfulness, time lag, and cost, will get the job. The executives of these companies will hire engineers and put them to work on improving this overall combination.
The Comparative Method in the Social Sciences
Authors: Sjoberg Gideon
Published: November 2002

American social scientists, with the possible exception of the anthropologists, have typically been ethnocentric in their writings and research. Most of their studies are simply unique to a particular institutional complex, possessing little generality beyond a single socio-cultural system. Nevertheless, social scientists nowadays are evincing increased interest in comparative studies. They are coming to realize that many of their generalizations may be found wanting when tested in the laboratory of world cultures. For the solution of many significant problems cross-cultural comparison seems essential—the relationships among the variables involved must be examined under diverse cultural conditions.
Comments on “The Comparative Method in the Social Sciences”
Authors: Rapoport Anatol
Published: November 2002

In relating the problem of comparison to that of conceptualization, Dr. Sjoberg brings into focus a central methodological problem of social science. For to compare is to discover unity in diversity and differences among similarities, that is, to uncover structure. The first act in this process is to name the parts and the relations among them, and naming, of course, both stems from and induces conceptualizations.
Darwin and Social Theory
Authors: Bock Kenneth E.
Published: November 2002

It has been argued repeatedly that the modern study of social and cultural evolution took its inspiration and form from Charles Darwin's Origin of Species and Descent of Man. In 1920, Robert H. Lowie (27; pp. 55–56) observed that it was after evolutionary principles had been accepted in biology that they were applied to social phenomena, and that Lewis Henry Morgan was among the first to make the application. Sir James George Frazer (16; p. 581), at about the same time, dated the birth of anthropology from the promulgation of the evolution theory of Darwin and Wallace in 1859 and maintained that “this conception of evolution … supplies a basis for the modern science of anthropology.” Harry Elmer Barnes (1; pp. 25–26) similarly traced the development of anthropology from the theory of organic evolution and advised the student that he “need not concern himself with the history of method in sociology before the entry of Darwinian concepts.”