Eugene Island Block 215 Platform Fire
Authors: Wagenecht Eugene G. , Johnson Thomas J. 
Published: December 2007

American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

This paper was prepared for the 47th Annual Fall Meeting of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, to be held in San Antonio, Tex., Oct. 8–11, 1972. Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words. Illustrations may not be copied. The abstract should contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper is presented. Publication elsewhere after publication in the JOURNAL paper is presented. Publication elsewhere after publication in the JOURNAL OF PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY or the SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS JOURNAL is usually granted upon request to the Editor of the appropriate journal provided agreement to give proper credit is made. provided agreement to give proper credit is made. Discussion of this paper is invited. Three copies of any discussion should be sent to the Society of Petroleum Engineers office. Such discussion may be presented at the above meeting and, with the paper, may be considered for publication in one of the two SPE magazines.

The Amoco Production Company-operated production platform in Eugene Island Block 215 caught fire on October 16, 1971. All five dually completed wells on this platform had USGS-approved safety valves installed, and all safety equipment on the platform had been inspected and approved by the USGS. An Oil Spill Contingency Plan previously adopted by Amoco was implemented with an Emergency Task previously adopted by Amoco was implemented with an Emergency Task Group being appointed. All personnel assigned to this group were relieved of all other duties in order to devote full attention to the fire and were assigned specific areas of responsibility. A close working relationship was established with appropriate regulatory agencies to keep them informed of plans and procedures developed. In formulating these plans, emphasis was placed on environmental aspects and frequent press releases were issued to keep the public informed of our progress towards control of the situation. Oil boom and skimming equipment was assembled as fast as possible to contain and recover any oil spillage which might have developed. A method to launch and recover this equipment in open seas was developed as an industry first. Joint surveillance flights by Amoco, USGS, and Coast Guard personnel were made daily in order to determine the extent of any slick, rainbow or sheen which might be present. A joint report was released by the parties in these flights and revealed only minimal amounts of spillage occurred. The small amount of oil recovered during skimming operations also supported these observations.

Relief well drilling was selected as a primary means of controlling the burning wells. While drilling operations were progressing, the burning platform's integrity was preserved as much progressing, the burning platform's integrity was preserved as much as possible by spraying the jacket section with sea water. A work platform was considered vital in order to have an all-weather, platform was considered vital in order to have an all-weather, stable work area from which to operate adjacent to the burning platform. The work deck of the platform installed was the same one platform. The work deck of the platform installed was the same one originally designed by Chevron and later used by Shell. This platform has proven very useful not only during control operations platform has proven very useful not only during control operations but also during subsequent salvage and well restoration work.

Although drilling operations were initiated on relief wells for four of the five wells on the platform, only two wells were ultimately required. The last well was under control in 47 days from the beginning of the fire. Complete restoration of the platform and wells is anticipated by August, 1972. platform and wells is anticipated by August, 1972.