bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Determination of Equity Prices
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J.
Published: October 2003

Drawing on Chs. 4 and 5 (which discuss the supply and demand for securities separately), this chapter investigates whether economics has anything helpful to say about the prices of shares and related securities by reviewing the most important ideas suggested by economic theory in this area and assessing their usefulness in the real world. In the first two sections, two fairly ancient but still popular models of equity (share) prices are examined, one of which (the steady growth model) views shares as claims to future dividends and the other (the asset model) views them as claims to the underlying net assets (corporate net worth). For the most part, these models look at the shares of individual companies in isolation, not at the market as a whole, and that is their weakness, but the asset model in particular provides important insights into aggregate equity values; as an aside to this discussion it is shown that aggregate dividends have the intriguing feature of being an approximately constant percentage of national income, which means that corporate equities offer protection (though not perfect protection) against inflation as well as participation in the real growth of the economy. The third section looks at the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – a discovery of the 1960s that, by considering equities in relation to each other, provided important new insights into the relation between risk and return. A more recent alternative approach known as Arbitrage Pricing Theory is discussed next, and finally there is a section (an appendix) on stock indexes.
Options and Options Pricing
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J.
Published: October 2003

The first section of this chapter discusses the basic features of option contracts, with special reference to stock options, including the way in which the contractual elements of an option (such as the maturity or exercise price) have been standardized to facilitate trading. The second section examines various methods of valuing options contracts and how the value of a option will be influenced by its maturity, striking price, market interest rates and the price of the underlying security; it also explores the ways in which call and put options may be combined to form various types of ‘spreads’ and ‘straddles’. The last three sections are quite short: the third briefly analyzes the way in which options might be used to hedge a portfolio of stocks, and hence their role as a risk management tool; the fourth explains how the shares in a levered firm can themselves be viewed as a type of option, and the implications of this for the pricing of stocks; and the last discusses options on objects other than stocks. The examples given refer to the USA and Europe.
Harms as Setbacks to Interest
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

According to Feinberg, we must distinguish between a nonnormative notion of harm as a setback to interests and a normative notion of harm as a wrong. The harm captured in the harm principle combines both these interpretations: it refers to setbacks to others’ interests that are also wrongs. Interests take one of two forms: welfare interests, which are minimal, and nonultimate interests, or ulterior interests, which are interests related to one's personal projects and goals. Feinberg identifies three ways in which someone may impair one's network of interests: (1) she may modify circumstances to make it difficult for one to satisfy competing interests; (2) she may reduce the degree to which prudential interests are protectively diversified; or (3) she may directly impair one's welfare interests to make it difficult for one to pursue one's ulterior interests. Noting the link between wants, dislikes, and interests, Feinberg argues both that one's interests are not always compatible with one's wants and that one's dislikes (including most hurts and offenses) are not always antithetical to one's interests.
Failures to Prevent Harm
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Feinberg addresses two questions. First, are bad Samaritan laws morally legitimate? He believes they are since it is important to avoid serious harm to personal interests, and persons in danger have a right to be saved by those who can do so without unreasonable risk. Second, does the harm principle cover blamable failure to prevent harm? Feinberg holds that requiring people to help prevent harm is sometimes as reasonable a legal policy as preventing people, by threat of punishment, from actively causing harm. This conclusion does not represent a departure from the harm principle, he argues, since, in some circumstances, omissions may cause harm.
Assessing and Comparing Harms
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Formulates some “mediating maxims” to guide a legislature in applying the harm principle to difficult cases. Supplemental criteria that restrict the application of the harm principle include the magnitude of the harm committed, the probability of the harm occurring, the relative importance of the harm, and the aggregative nature of the harm. The greater the probability of harm, for example, the less grave the harm need be to justify coercion. In addition to such moral principles, practical reasons and rules of common sense are relevant to the application of the harm principle. Since a limitation on liberty is itself a harm, the state is justified by the harm principle in invading citizens’ interests in liberty only if this action outweighs the greater harm that would be caused by proscribed actions.
Fairly Imputing Harms
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Feinberg identifies additional restrictions on the application of the harm principle. Thwarting competing interests, for example, is not a harm unless it is also wrong, which means that it is inflicted unfairly, not voluntarily consented to, or illegitimate. Accumulative harms (harms caused by the general performance of a given action that on an individual basis does not cause harm) must be assessed by the legislature according to the likelihood of people undertaking this action. Feinberg examines environmental pollution as an example of a public accumulative harm. The effort to minimize threats to public interest such as air and water pollution must operate within the limits of efficacy, equity, and fair play. Feinberg notes that, as a consequence of these criteria, the harm principle not only loses its character as a merely vacuous ideal but also loses all semblance of factual simplicity and normative neutrality.
Propositions and Concepts
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

Underlying Leibniz's entire logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of language is the traditional view that the essential role of language is to represent our thoughts about the extralinguistic world. In accord with this, he speaks of three distinct regions or realms: (1) reality, (2) the realm of ideas, and (3) language. Reality consists exclusively of monads; the realm of ideas consists of concepts, a subclass of which are propositions; and language consists mainly of words, which are phenomena or collections of similar phenomena. This chapter is a close study of Leibniz's notions of concepts and propositions.
“Two Great Principles” and Two Lesser Ones
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

The “two great principles” are the principle of contradiction (“every proposition is either true or false, and not both”) and the principle of sufficient reason (“nothing occurs for which it would be impossible for someone who had enough knowledge of things to give a reason adequate to determine why the thing is as it is and not otherwise”). The two lesser ones are the principle of Continuity (“there are no gaps in nature”) and that of The Best (“everything in the actual world is the best it can be”). The explication and criticism of these principles and their seeming consequences constitute the content of the present chapter.
Islam in Nigeria
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick
Published: October 2003

Modern Nigeria was cobbled together in the nineteenth century from over 350 ethnic and linguistic groups, including sizable Muslim populations, especially in the country's north. Formative early figures like Uthman Dan Fodio and the scholar‐jurist Mohammad Bello were important in establishing Islam among the Hausa and Fulani populations, from which it spread elsewhere. Today, Nigeria's Muslim community is divided, and the extent to which Sharia law should be implemented has proved a contentious battleground both within the Islamic community and with other Nigerians. Islam in Nigeria seeks a competitive edge in the struggle with a nearly numerically equal Christian community.
Islam in Senegal
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick
Published: October 2003

Islam in Senegal is at the threshold of political change, as a shift in power takes place among the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa). Within the next decade, the growing Mouridiya brotherhood, founded by Amadou Bamba (1850–1927), is likely to overwhelm its rivals, such as the Tijaniya, an outgrowth of a Sufi mystical movement led by El Hajj Umar Tall, and later led by the Wolof cleric, Malik Sy (c.1855–1922). In the near term, the traditional symbiotic relationship between mosque and secular state is likely to continue as leaders on both sides act together and contain extremist Islamist tendencies and urban unrest. President Abdulaye Wade has adopted this balancing act policy in a country that is 94 % Muslim. Support of the Muslim community with its multiple interests is critical to Senegal's continued presence as a moderate, stable West African state. Issues facing the brotherhoods include unresolved succession questions affecting aging leaders, urbanization and growing population pressures, destructive agricultural practices, and social tensions, such as caste and class tensions.
Eastern Approaches
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick
Published: October 2003

From earliest times, Muslims were a visible presence along the Indian Ocean of East Africa, coming from different locations in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, and elsewhere. Islam moved inland in Kenya and surrounding countries during the nineteenth century, largely brought by traders. Kenyan Islam is divided along structural, ethnic, personality, geographical, and doctrinal lines, resulting in a divided community, accounting for perhaps 30% of the population. Despite the influence of Iran and Libya, Kenya has successfully contained radical Islam, especially following the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi, but Islamic discontent is unabated since the root causes of societal discontent remain unresolved. The short‐lived effort by Shaikh Khalid Balala proved more of an irritant than a threat to the government, which continues to dole out bits of patronage to coastal and Somali Muslims in the country's northeast.
Legal Moralism and Non‐Grievance Evils
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

The liberalism that Feinberg espouses denies that preventing evils other than harms and offenses is a good reason for establishing criminal prohibitions. Feinberg contrasts the straightforward denial of this view, which he calls “legal moralism in the broad sense,” with a narrow or strict conception of legal moralism, according to which the state may legitimately prohibit conduct on the ground that it is inherently immoral, although it causes neither harm nor offense to anyone. Taking the broader conception as his main target, Feinberg considers this principle in relation to the three liberty‐limiting principles discussed in the other volumes of his work – the harm principle, the offense principle, and legal paternalism – to demonstrate that these principles cannot encompass the evils that the legal moralist wishes to eliminate. After offering a taxonomy of evils (i.e., states of affairs to be regretted), Feinberg considers in detail two types of evils: free‐floating evils and welfare‐connected nongrievance evils. Feinberg maintains that, although there is a theoretical case to be made for legal moralism, nongrievance evils do not have enough weight to justify an invasion of personal autonomy.
Strict Moralism: Enforcing True Morality
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Feinberg's target here is the strict legal moralist, who defends (1) true morality (the set of rational norms that apply equally to all peoples) (2) a retributive theory of punishment, and (3) the view that criminal law may legitimately prevent free‐floating evils on the ground that they are immoral. According to Feinberg, the full doctrine of strict legal moralism is internally inconsistent since one cannot cling to both retributivism and moralism, as this would involve retributive punishment for victimless crimes. After contrasting pure strict moralism with impure strict moralism (which appeals to the indirect effects on public welfare of allowing harmless immoral conduct), Feinberg discusses Patrick Devlin's claim that liberals are inconsistent given their exclusion from the law of the consent defense for some crimes. To this, Feinberg replies that liberals, who permit this defense for all crimes except where it is not workable or would harm third parties, are not prey to this objection.
Legal Perfectionism and the Benefit Principles
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

A possible liberty‐limiting principle that Feinberg targets is legal perfectionism, according to which a state should promote the virtues and so may legitimately impose criminal prohibitions that will improve citizens’ characters. Feinberg defines character as the set of dispositions to act or feel in certain ways: commendable dispositions are excellences or virtues and blameworthy dispositions are flaws or defects. He opposes perfectionism as a form of moralistic paternalism that restricts liberty from the need to confer on the individual the benefit of a better character. Turning to the divergence in the views of B.F. Skinner and John Stuart Mill on character, Feinberg shows that, although they both reject legal perfectionism, Skinner holds that personal excellence doesn’t much matter and Mill claims that good character matters, but the law has a very limited role to play in realizing it. Mill's outlook resembles Feinberg's more complicated position, and values human liberty as an essential prerequisite for personal virtue. Other topics Feinberg considers here include: the educative function of law, ethical relativism, and the moral education of the theory of punishment.
Conclusion
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

In this final chapter of the four‐volume work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Feinberg returns to his main thesis that liberalism offers a tenable account of the moral limits of the legitimate power of the state to establish criminal prohibitions. In acknowledging certain weaknesses in the case for liberalism, Feinberg does not claim to have shown that either legal paternalism or legal moralism is false. The most persuasive version of liberalism, he claims, is not the “one very simple principle” option offered by John Stuart Mill, but a more complicated theory that (1) regards individual autonomy as absolute personal sovereignty, (2) recognizes the offense principle as a morally relevant reason to restrict autonomy, and (3) makes concessions to nonliberal views on both harm to self and harmless wrongdoing. Feinberg highlights two resistant counterexamples to his thesis that relate to welfare‐connected nongrievance evils and free‐floating evils. He concludes by defending the place of liberalism in nonpluralistic, nonsecular societies on the grounds that if personal sovereignty exists anywhere, it exists everywhere, in both traditional societies and pluralistic, secular ones.
Bible-Carrying Christians
Authors: Watt David Harrington
Published: October 2003

This book focuses on the relationship between conservative Protestants and social power in the U.S. The book, which is particularly concerned with which sorts of power relationships seem natural and which do not, is based on fieldwork (conducted in the early 1990s), in three Philadelphia churches: Oak Grove Church, Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, and the Philadelphia Church of Christ. The data drawn from that fieldwork suggests that in the early 1990s, Bible‐carrying Christian churches tended to naturalize (to various degrees) the authority of heterosexuals and men. The data also suggested that under certain (relatively rare) circumstances Bible‐carrying Christian churches denaturalized the authority of ministers, corporations, and nation‐states.
Fieldwork
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

This book examines the relationship between conservative Protestants and social power in the U.S. The book, which is particularly concerned with which sorts of power relationships were made to seem natural and which were not, is based on fieldwork in three Philadelphia churches: Oak Grove Church, Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, and the Philadelphia Church of Christ. The fieldwork was conducted in the early 1990s.
Philadelphia
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

During the early 1990s, when the fieldwork upon which this book is based was conducted, economic conditions in Philadelphia were not good. Jobs were relatively scarce and the city's cultural and educational institutions usually seemed short of cash. Life in the city was characterized by relatively high rates of violence and crime. At that time, there was a great deal of segregation – racial, ethnic, and economic ℃ in Philadelphia.
Social Power
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

This book uses data drawn from fieldwork to check the accuracy of one of the stories that scholars often tell about Bible‐carrying Christian churches. According to that story, such churches naturalize asymmetrical power relations. They teach people that it is natural for Christians to defer to the desires of corporations and nation‐states; for lay people to defer to ministers; for homosexuals to defer to heterosexuals; and for women to defer to men.
The Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

The Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, a congregation that deeply valued the traditions of the Anabaptists, was located in a section of West Philadelphia that was not at all prosperous. Many of the people associated with the fellowship were devoted to “traditional family values” and many of them believed that homosexuality was a sin. The congregation was not, by any means, made up exclusively of people who were thoroughgoing feminists. Nevertheless, the Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship was a place where patriarchal norms were sometimes interrogated. It was also a place where people were taught that Christians sometimes ought to resist the power of nation‐states and of corporations. At the Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, forms of hierarchy associated with ministerial authority were viewed with suspicion.
The Philadelphia Church of Christ
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

The Philadelphia Church of Christ, a congregation associated with a movement called the International Churches of Christ, put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of rapid church growth. The congregation was a place where people were taught that it is a mistake for Christians to pour too much energy into resisting the power of nation‐states or corporations. At the Philadelphia Church of Christ, people were taught that it is natural for women to defer to men and for homosexuals to defer to heterosexuals. People were taught, too, that it is imperative for Christians to unhesitatingly follow directions given to them by ministers and by other church authorities.
The Romanization of Catholicism
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

Focuses on the turning away from a Catholicism grounded in the American democratic tradition in the years 1820–1880. This was a key transition period in American Catholic history. What took place was a thorough Romanization of Catholicism in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. During these years, such aspects of American culture as the rise of the public school and anti‐Catholic nativism had an impact on Catholicism by reinforcing its sectarian quality.
Competing Visions
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

The five themes presented in Ch. 3 (American national identity, Americanization of Catholic doctrine, democracy, devotional Catholicism, and gender equality) are further examined here in the context of seeking to show how American culture shaped Catholicism in the era 1920–60 . It is shown that during these years, Catholics were beginning to think in a less parochial manner, and emerge from the neighbourhood/parish ghettos that had formed their life previously, and had been subject to attack by nativist revivals of Anglo‐Saxonism and anti‐Catholicism (in the shape of a revived Ku Klux Klan). Such a reorientation gave rise to the emergence of a public Catholicism that sought to influence the shape and values of American society.
An American Religion and a Roman Church, 1960–2001
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

The five themes presented in Ch. 3 (democracy, American national identity, gender equality, devotional Catholicism, and the Americanization of Catholic doctrine) are further examined here in the context of seeking to show how American culture shaped Catholicism in the period 1960–2001. The chapter starts by examining the role of President Kennedy in enabling Catholics to stand taller, and the changes initiated by Pope John XXIII's election in 1958, which led to the Second Vatican Council reforms (1962–65). It then examines the further emergence of a public Catholicism that sought to influence the shape and values of American society. The chapter also touches on some issues that have generated considerable controversy among Catholics in recent years – the ethical issues of abortion and birth control, the desire for more democracy in the management of parish life, the role of women in the church, the increased ethnic diversity of Catholicism, and the new rituals of prayer and worship that have emerged in the past 40 years.
Three Platonic Analogies
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Attempts to provide a coherent understanding of three analogies that appear at the center of Plato's Republic: The Sun and the Good, The Divided Line, and the Allegory of the Cave. The main innovation is to treat The Divided Line as an image‐object metaphor illustrating the nature of mathematical reasoning. On this reading, the middle two portions of the four‐part Divided Line both contain diagrams. In the lower middle portion, the diagram is treated as a physical object that can have reflected images. In the upper middle portion, the diagram is treated as a physical object, which is itself an image of a form.
Kant and Hume on Simultaneity of Causes and Effects
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

In the Treatise of Human Nature Hume argued – actually quite badly – that a cause must be prior to its effect. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant cites what seems to be a clear example of a cause being simultaneous with its effect: a ball impressing a hollow on a cushion. This raises a problem for Hume's account of causality, for, if we grant, agreeing with Kant, that causes are sometimes simultaneous with their effect, how, on Hume's “regularity” account of causality, can we distinguish causes from effects. The solution suggested here is that the direction of causality is not fixed by physical facts but, in part at least, by what we are doing or how we view things. Whether this is right or not, it seems to be a solution that conforms to a Humean account of causality.
Wittgenstein and Intuitionism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This essay explores one important strain that runs through Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: his commitment to themes characteristic of the intuitionist movement in logic and mathematics. Chief among them are his attacks on the unrestricted use of the Law of Excluded Middle, his distrust of nonconstructive proofs, and his impatience with the idea that mathematics stands in need of a foundation. The central idea of the essay is that these aspects of Wittgenstein's position can be explained by attributing to him the view that mathematical and logical propositions are tacitly governed by the modal operator “it is a rule that.”
Industrializing through Learning
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This is a book not only about South Korea and how it came to be a major factor in the world economy, but also about the industrialization process that South Korea followed. This process, which will be referred to as late industrialization, has profound implications for a range of other countries that are also struggling to compete in the world of international business. South Korea's success in this struggle can thus be seen both as a fascinating story in itself, and as an example from which others may learn. It is also an example of a new way of industrializing that challenges long‐held assumptions of generations of economic thinkers. This is discussed in the different sections of this chapter which cover: learning as a new mode of industrialization; the relative speeds of industrialization in different eras; South Korea as a special case of late industrialization; the role of the state (government) in late industrialization; the process of catching up; and overcoming technological ignorance.
Getting Relative Prices “Wrong”: A Summary
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

According to accepted economic theory, industrial expansion can be explained by one of two grand approaches, market oriented or institutional, and success is usually interpreted as a validation of market principles and of the institutions financially supporting them. In South Korea, in contrast, the government made most of the pivotal investment decisions, the firms involved operated with an extraordinary degree of market control, protected from foreign competition, and relative prices were not got right, they were deliberately got wrong. This chapter offers a new paradigm to explain the behavior of the growing economies of late industrializing countries, based on the historical record of deliberately getting prices wrong, and the disciplinary mechanism involved.
The Rise of Salaried Engineers: Automobile Manufacturing
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This chapter looks at the salaried automobile engineer in South Korea's late industrialization with respect to two extreme typologies – the small‐ and medium‐sized firm, and the huge diversified business group. These two groups are addressed in the first two main sections of the chapter, and includes some general discussion of across‐country situations in various manufacturing industries as well as specific discussion of the Korean automobile industry. Three further sections discuss the following: Learning at the Hyundai Motor Company, Japan's influence on Korea's small‐ and medium‐sized firms, and the subcontracting network of the Hyundai Motor Company.
The Switch in Industrial Leadership
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

Korea has diversified from less to more complex diversified industries in a nonlinear fashion. This chapter suggests that cotton spinning and weaving, South Korea's leading sector in terms of production volume, did not serve as the springboard for further (late) industrialization in any organizational sense. Insofar as the diversified business (industrial) group acted as the agent of expansion, it had its origins in the government's more management‐intensive, early import‐substitution projects, not in a labor‐intensive industry like cotton textiles. The first part of the chapter discusses the Korean textile industry in detail. The last part discusses the textile industry versus the cement‐making industry, with a section devoted specifically to the Hyundai Cement Company.
The Triumph of Steel
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines the hypothesis that climbing the ladder of comparative advantage is a matter of creating competitiveness, usually with government assistance, rather than stepping into it. The evidence comes from South Korea's integrated iron‐ and steel‐maker (the Pohang Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., POSCO), which is the centerpiece of basic industry and a public enterprise. The chapter discusses POSCO's founding in 1968; its profitability and subsidization; international competition; foreign technical assistance and the nature of steel‐making technology; POSCO's initial prioritization of increasing volume production, and the later shift to improving product quality and introducing new products; shop‐floor focus; and cross‐subsidization.
Warrant: The Current Debate
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).
Justification, Internalism, and Deontology
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I introduce the notion of warrant (that quantity, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and then turn to examine the connections between (epistemic) deontology, justification, and internalism. Central to deontology is the thought that being justified in holding a belief is a matter of having fulfilled one's epistemic duties in forming or continuing to hold that belief. The basic thrust of internalism is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access. After a brief survey of the great diversity in twentieth‐century views about justification, I argue that internalism flows from deontology, and that we can better understand twentieth century views about justification when we understand the relationships between deontology, justification, and internalism.
Coherentism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I consider coherentism taken generally (rather than this or that particular variety of coherentism), and argue that it does not afford the resources for a satisfactory account of warrant. We can better understand coherentism, I think, by contrasting it with foundationalism; I accordingly begin with an examination of ordinary foundationalism (and, in so doing, introduce the notion of proper basicality and the notion of a noetic structure). Turning next to coherentism, we find that the coherentist claims that coherence is both necessary and sufficient for warrant in that a proposition has warrant for me if and only if it is coherent with my noetic structure or appropriately follows from propositions that are coherent with my noetic structure. I argue that the coherentist is wrong on both counts – coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. I then close with a short discussion of classical foundationalism.
BonJourian Coherentism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I explain and critically examine Laurence BonJour's version of coherentism, as presented in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Speaking roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief has warrant only if it is an element in a system of beliefs that is coherent in the long run. Somewhat less roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief B has warrant for a person S if and only if S has a reason for thinking B to be true; and that reason, on BonJour's view, can only be the conjunction of (1) B being a member of S's system of beliefs, and that system is coherent (in the long run) and (2) if B is a member of S's system of beliefs and S's system of beliefs has been coherent for a sufficiently long run, then B is likely to be true. After explaining BonJour's coherentism, I comment on two interesting facets of BonJour's thought: (1) his relationship to classical foundationalism and his trust in reason, and (2) the success of his argument for a coherentist justification of empirical belief. Finally, and most importantly for the larger purpose of my book, I consider his conception of warrant, concluding that BonJourian coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.
Bayesian Coherentism and Warrant
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I outline the essentials of Bayesianism (also known as Bayesian Coherentism) and ask whether it contributes to a satisfying account of warrant. From the perspective of my overall project in Warrant: The Current Debate, Bayesianism can be seen as essentially suggesting conditions for a rational or reasonable set of partial beliefs, where a partial belief of an agent S is any belief that S accepts to some degree or another, no matter how small. Although Bayesians tend to speak not of warrant but of rationality, I consider in this chapter the relationship between Bayesianism and warrant. I conclude that the conditions for rationality proposed by Bayesians (e.g., coherence, strict coherence, changing belief by conditionalization or Jeffrey's “Probability Kinematics,” van Fraassen's Reflection) are neither severally necessary nor jointly sufficient conditions for warrant. Taken as a theory of warrant, Bayesianism is incomplete in that (1) it says nothing about the sort of relation between belief and experience required for warrant, and (2) it provides no account of evidence or evidential support.
Induction
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this chapter, I examine induction from the perspective of my account of warrant. I first take up what is now referred to as “the old riddle of induction,” rejecting David Hume's claim that inductive reasoning is not rationally justified and defending the view that beliefs formed on the basis of inductive reasoning can have warrant. I then turn to Nelson Goodman's ruminations on grue and the “new riddle of induction,” which is the question: what makes a property projectible? I reject Goodman's own solution to this problem, examine other inadequate solutions, and then suggest that an answer can be found by making reference to the proper function of the human intellect; projectible properties are just those properties that a properly functioning adult human being in our circumstances will in fact project.
Naturalism Versus Proper Function?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish only in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. To do so, I argue that there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation or account of the notion of proper function (or related notions like purpose, malfunction, design plan, etc.). I consider proposals for such an account that can be drawn from the work of John Pollock, Ruth Millikan, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, but find in each case that the proposed account is inadequate. I then consider the possibility that the notion of proper function (and related notions) should be thought of as useful fictions. After some critical comments about this possibility, I proceed to point out that if one (1) is convinced that there really is such a thing as warrant and that there really is (for natural organisms) such a thing as proper function, and also (2) thinks that there is no naturalistic analysis of these notions, then one has a powerful argument against naturalism.
The Ethics of Killing
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and defends distinctive accounts of the nature of personal identity, the evaluation of death, and the wrongness of killing. The central metaphysical claim of the book is that we are neither nonmaterial souls nor human organisms but are instead embodied minds. In ethical theory, one of the central claims is that the morality of killing is not unitary; rather, the principles that determine the morality of killing in marginal cases are different from those that govern the killing of persons who are self‐conscious and rational. Another important theme is that killing in marginal cases should be evaluated in terms of the impact it would have on the victim at the time rather than on the value of the victim's life as a whole. What primarily matters is how killing would affect that which would be rational for the victim to care about at the time of death. By appealing to various foundational claims about identity, death, and the morality of killing, this book yields novel conclusions about such issues as abortion, prenatal injury, infanticide, the killing of animals, the significance of brain death, the termination of life support in cases of persistent vegetative state, the use of anencephalic infants as sources of organs for transplantation, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and advance directives in cases of dementia. In particular, the book defends the moral permissibility of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain cases and argues that brain death is not the appropriate criterion of death either for a person or a human organism.
Identity
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: October 2003

Argues against three widely held views of our identity: the view that we are souls or incorporeal substances, the view that we are human organisms, and the view that the criterion of our identity over time is entirely psychological. It argues that we are instead embodied minds and that the criterion of our identity over time is the continued existence and functioning, in nonbranching form, of enough of those regions of the brain in which consciousness occurs in order for the brain to retain the capacity, with relevant support systems, to support consciousness or mental activity. It also follows Derek Parfit in claiming that identity is not the basis of egoistic concern about the future.
Ethics with Aristotle
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

This book turns a philosophical lens on to the main themes of Aristotle's Ethics, offering detailed discussions of happiness as an end, virtue, character development, voluntary agency, prohairesis (rational choice), practical wisdom, incontinence, pleasure, and the theoretic ideal. It shows how Aristotle's essentially practical orientation in ethics affects the content as well as the method of his inquiry. Closely examined topics include the difference between practical thinking (about particulars) and the thinking of the “statesman,” the category of “the noble,” the Aristotelian roots of justice in human development, the ambiguities of the craft analogy, how pleasure relates to value judgment, human happiness versus that of God, the uses of leisure, and the eccentricity of the theoretic ideal in the eyes of many of Aristotle's contemporaries. The discussion mainly follows the Nicomachean Ethics, but explores some distinctive doctrines of the Eudemian Ethics too.
Incontinence
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

Discusses Aristotle's limitation of incontinence proper to the field of temperance, temptation by noble ends, the nature of incontinent ignorance, and what it is to use one's practical knowledge.
Aristotle's Values
Authors: Broadie Sarah
Published: October 2003

The interpreter's problem is to reconcile Aristotle's reflections on theôria as the highest happiness with the practical emphasis of most of his ethics. Aristotle's problem is to explain why his godlike theoretical ideal ranks higher than his practical one, while showing that both are genuinely human ends. The argument turns on the importance of leisure and of serious activities.
Introductory Themes
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Sketches a view of the relationship between the interests of the individual and the demands of morality, a view according to which morality and self‐interest stand in a relation of potential congruence. In adopting this view, Scheffler rejects two extreme positions, one that sees morality and self‐interest as ultimately coinciding and another that sees them as diametrically opposed. The complete exposition of Scheffler's view is left for subsequent chapters, but in this introduction he proposes that a proper treatment of the relationship between morality and self‐interest, which must address morality's authority, content, scope, and deliberative role. Scheffler also situates his view in relation to the debate between defenders of contemporary moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian outlooks, and critics who claim that these positions neglect important ethical notions, such as virtue. Though he notes certain affinities between his view and the views of the critics, Scheffler denies that the defects in modern moral thought warrant its repudiation in favor of an ethics of virtue.
Morality's Demands and Their Limits: Competing Views
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

One response to an unusually demanding moral theory is to reject it on the ground that the content of morality is moderate rather than stringent, while a second response is to claim that a stringent theory may be acceptable, provided morality is thought of as limited in scope rather than as pervasive.In this chapter, Scheffler provides a general argument against the second response and in support of the view that morality is pervasive. In the process, he distinguishes the idea that morality is pervasive from the idea that it is overriding, which is a claim about morality's authority rather than its scope. He also replies to an argument of Bernard Williams against the pervasiveness of morality. On one interpretation of Williams's argument, Scheffler notes that the argument rests on the implausible assumption that to deem a certain action morally permissible is to imply that the agent should be motivated, at least in part, by the thought of the action's permissibility.
Overridingness, Human Correctness, and Motivational Naturalism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

The “claim of overridingness” (CO) is the claim that it is never rational to knowingly do what morality forbids. Although Scheffler doubts that CO is true, in this chapter he develops two criticisms of the usual arguments against CO. The first is that many of these arguments are inconclusive because they take for granted the controversial claim that morality is stringent. The second criticism is that many of the arguments against CO derive their inspiration from Hume's naturalistic account of moral motivation, and are therefore vulnerable to Kant's objections to motivational naturalism. Scheffler discusses what he calls standard naturalistic accounts of moral motivation – those that explain moral motivation in terms of desire or sympathy – and observes that these accounts run into difficulty not only in answering the Kantian challenge to motivational naturalism but also in explaining certain ordinary psychological phenomena that he calls the “resonance” and “fragility” of morality.
Reason, Psychology, and the Authority of Morality
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Scheffler begins this chapter by arguing that less turns on the question of morality's overridingness than some have supposed. Even if the claim of overridingness were shown to be true, that would not guarantee that all sane human beings would act morally. And even if the claim were false, most people would not abandon their moral beliefs and concerns. The question of what kind of authority morality would have if CO were false is further illuminated by Scheffler's extended discussion of moral motivation and psychoanalytic theory. Although Scheffler remains agnostic on the truth of this theory, Freud's classic account of moral motivation serves as an example of a naturalistic account that, unlike the standard accounts, is responsive to Kant's challenge to naturalism and can offer viable explanations of the resonance and fragility of morality.
Purity and Humanity
Authors: Scheffler Samuel
Published: October 2003

Turning to the question of morality's content, Scheffler undertakes a defense of the view that morality is moderate – that it makes demands and imposes constraints but still allows people, under favorable circumstances, to do as they please within broad limits. Those who oppose this view and see morality as stringent are, according to Scheffler, attributing a kind of purity to the moral point of view, and so he presents the contrast between the stringent and moderate views as a contrast between an Ideal of Purity and an Ideal of Humanity. Scheffler considers and rejects two argumentative strategies that are frequently used in defense of the Ideal of Purity, one that derives stringency from an allegedly uncontroversial property of morality, such as universality or impartiality and another that derives it from ordinary moral language and ordinary moral concepts. Scheffler suggests that, because the claims of stringency and moderation each have a place in our moral consciousness, neither claim can be adequately defended by appealing either to formal properties of morality or to facts about ordinary usage.
Plato, Socrates, and the Dialogues
Authors: Irwin Terence
Published: October 2003

Chapter 1 examines both what is Plato’s fundamental moral problem and how to read the Platonic dialogues as philosophical works. Concerning the former aspect, it is observed that Plato articulates the basic moral question, “What is the good life?” into two different problems: an epistemological one, “How ought we to live?” and a normative one, “How can we know how ought we to live?” Respecting the way Plato’s writings have to be interpreted, the so-called doctrinal approach is followed, i.e., the most important doctrines are formulated by the principal speaker of the dialogue (usually Socrates), while the other characters present several steps relevant for the argument. In conclusion, both Plato’s and Aristotle’s ways of interpreting Socrates’ theories are taken into account.