Canadian Security In the High Arctic: a Strategic Analysis In Three Parts- Part 3 - Military Considerations
Authors: Critchley Harriet 
Published: March 2010

Dr. Critchley's paper is available in three parts; Part 1, the "Fourth Boundary Problem," Part 2, "The Energy Shortage," and Part 3, "Military Considerations."

III. Military Considerations

Canadian security policy is strongly related to our participation in the NATOand NORAD alliances. NATO is seen as the defence against the Warsaw Pact threatto Western Europe. NORAD, The Canada-U.S. agreement originally formed toprovide for continental defence against the Soviet Union'sstrategic bomber threat to the United States, is now regarded as a subsidiarypart of the NATO arrangement. Several recent developments in militarytechnology, and reactions to these developments on the part of the Soviet Unionand NATO members, may cause parts of the arctic region to become a new focus ofmilitary activity and of NATO and NORAD concern. NATO-related developments willbe analyzed first.

Currently, the use of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas by military vessels isconfined to nuclear-powered submarines. Evidence in the public domain indicatesthat such usage appears to be in the form of occasional experimental-trainingexercises(1)·

The attention of strategic analysts and naval planners is concentrated not onthe Arctic, but on the North Atlantic. The reason for concentration on the North Atlantic is the build-up of the Soviet Northern Fleet, which is based in Murmansk and other ports on the Kola Peniusula. As of mid -1981, that fleetincluded approximately 82 major surface combat ships, 135 attackand cruise-missile submarines and 45 ballistic-missile-carryingsubmarines(2).

Three types of nuclear-powered submarines are assigned to this and other fleetsof the Soviet navy: attack submarines and cruise-missile submarines(designated as SSNs and SSGNs respectively) have the mission ofattacking an adversary's surface shipping and submarines at sea;ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), armed with long-range missiles withnuclear warheads, have major military installations, industrial complexes andurban centres as probable targets in the event of a nuclear war. The veryexistence of SSBNs, along with other strategic nuclear weapons, is thought toprevent such a war from occurring.

Of particular concern to NATO is the Soviet Union's assignment of a large Proportion of SSNs, SSGNs and most of their Yankee-class and Delta-class SSBNsto the Northern Fleet. More specifically, the Northern Fleet has 65% of the Soviet navy's SSBNs and 52% of all other types of Sovietsubmarines(3). The build-up of the Northern Fleet in relation to the Baltic, Black and Pacific fleets appears to relate to the existence ofchoke-points (narrow water channels or straits) which govern the exits of thelatter three fleets from their home ports and the absence of such a choke-pointfor the Northern Fleet. Submarines and surface vessels can make way from their Barents Sea ports to the Atlantic without having to pass through any narrowstraits. Although only a small portion of that fleet deploys into the North Atlantic at any given time(4), this and other evidence has led mostanalysts to conclude that the fleet's primary tasks are strategic and tactical(anti-shipping) offensive missions in the North and Central Atlantic.

The NATO response to these developments and analysis has been acontinuing effort to construct a "choke-point" at the GIUK gap.