bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Paradigm(s) Shifting? Responding to China’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis
Authors: Breslin Shaun
Published: September 2012

This chapter considers how China responded to the impact of the global crisis, and the subsequent debates over what this response means for the balance of power in the global order. A massive injection of funds through both official stimulus packages and an expansion of bank loans helped overcome a sharp drop in exports in the short term, but reignited debates over the structure of economic power in China, and the need to develop a new mode of growth promotion in the long term. Despite some problems related to asset bubbles and increasing bank debt, China’s ability to bounce back quickly from the impact of the crisis has cemented China as a leading actor in attempts to reform global economic governance, and has led many to rethink the efficacy of strong state-led developmental strategies vis-à-vis (neo)liberal alternatives.
Constituent Structure Sets II
Authors: Bury Dirk , Uchida Hiroyuki
Published: September 2012

This chapter replaces traditional phrase structure trees with a new type of set-based representations. Typical labelled trees permit copying of one category onto distinct syntactic nodes and excessive copying possibilities need to be filtered out by independent measures. Such additional means not only increase the complexity of the grammar but also blur the distinction between syntactic and semantic constraints. Thus, is presented an alternative structure representation system that can express syntactic copying only in one specific configuration, whose importance is exemplified by German V2 data. The system is incompatible with certain current approaches to phrasal movement, namely with multidominance systems and with (certain versions of) the copy theory of movement. Its implications are discussed with regard to wh-extraction and reconstruction. Finally, the chapter compares the authors' representation system with dependency graphs as well as other set-based structure representations proposed in Chomskyan syntax.
A Parallel Merge Solution to the Merchant/Johnson Paradox
Authors: Citko Barbara
Published: September 2012

This chapter provides a new argument in favor of a multidominant approach to gapping. The crucial empirical observation it builds on concerns the fact that gapping parallels pseudogapping with respect to the ungrammaticality of voice mismatches. Merchant (2008) derives the ungrammaticality of voice mismatches in pseudogapping from vP (rather than VP) ellipsis, which suggests that gapping should be analyzed as vP ellipsis as well. Such an account of gapping, however, is incompatible with Johnson’s (2000), (2004), (2009) arguments against treating gapping as ellipsis. The chapter shows that the Parallel Merge structures of the kind proposed in Citko (2005) can provide a solution to this paradox as they allow a voice head in a gapping construction to be shared without all the elements above it being shared.
Evidence for Multidominance in Spanish Agentive Nominalizations
Authors: Fábregas Antonio
Published: September 2012

Since the work of Gärtner (1997), the view that each node in a tree structure is the representation of a set has been pursued by some authors (Starke 2001, 2004; Citko 2005, inter alia). The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence for this view of structures. The relevant data involve Spanish agent nominalizations, where the affix responsible for the change of category is sensitive and cancels an argument position that is otherwise required by the affix. In a multidominance account, the affixes that cancel an argument are introduced in the position which that argument requires inside the verbal structure in such a way that argument cancellation amounts to structural incompatibility. At a later step, the affix remerges on top of the verbal structure, thus projecting as a whole phrase with the verb as its complement, in such a way that the category of the set becomes nominal.
Sideward Movement: Triggers, Timing, and Outputs
Authors: Nunes Jairo
Published: September 2012

This chapter discusses some extensions and refinements of the specific implementation of sideward movement proposed in Nunes 1995, 2001, 2004. Assuming that Move is not a primitive operation, but simply a mnemonic label for one particular instantiation of applications of Copy and Merge, the chapter shows that the same conditions that restrict upward movement also constrain sideward movement. In particular, it is argued that within a core set of minimalist assumptions, sideward movement may not only be seen as cost free, but also paves the way for sound analyses of intricate empirical phenomena involving noncanonical realization of copies, adjunct control, and preposition contraction.
Unconventional Mergers
Authors: Vries Mark de
Published: September 2012

This chapter discusses the nature of the operation Merge, and the possibility of unconventional mergers, with some attention to the issue of representation. Regular Merge has three possible effects, depending on the input. Next to “first-time” Merge, there are both “internal” and “external” Remerge. The last creates a temporary doubly rooted structure, which potentially results in a configuration with superficially non-local properties. Furthermore, the chapter argues that a fundamentally different kind of operation is needed in order to account for the general behavior of parentheses: Parenthetical Merge, which has the effect of blocking scopal relationships, among other things. Finally, a family of construction types is studied in which both phenomena seem to come together: sentence amalgamation.
“Lasnik‐Effects” and String‐Vacuous ATB Movement
Authors: Abe Jun , Hornstein Norbert
Published: September 2012

The question raised in this chapter is why string-vacuous movement is insensitive to locality effects. It argues that, although such movement creates a normal chain, it is the bottom copy that is pronounced due to the fact that overt movement must have a PF effect. Since such locality effects, as caused by the Right Roof Constraint (RRC) and island conditions, apply only to “overt” movement, it follows that string-vacuous movement does not show locality effects. Thus, the chapter supports Sabbagh”s (2007) Across-the-Board (ATB) movement analysis of Right Node Raising (RNR): the latter always involves ATB movement. This idea is implemented in Lasnikian (2001) fashion: copy deletion as it applies within ATB chains results in the elimination of “offending” copies, thereby “saving” otherwise illicit derivations. The authors show that a refinement of Sabbagh”s analysis accommodates Japanese Left Node Raising (LNR) constructions, the mirror image of English RNR structures.
On Transparent Adjuncts in Japanese
Authors: Miyamoto Yoichi
Published: September 2012

This chapter shows that adjuncts are sometimes transparent in Japanese. The case examined is comparative deletion in Japanese where the Japanese equivalent of the English than-clause, the yori-clause, is adjoined to the floating quantifier (FQ) oozei/takusan “many.” The chapter shows that, the yori-clause can be scrambled out of the complex FQ formed by the yori-clause and oozei/takusan despite the adjunct status of this complex FQ. Adopting MacDonald’s (2006, 2008a, b, 2009) proposal on inner aspect, the chapter argues that only when this complex FQ establishes an Agree relation with Asp can the yori-clause move out of this complex FQ. The chapter concludes that to examine the presence/absence of adjunct condition effects, and to address the question of whether adjuncts are inherent barriers for movement, we need to examine the structural level where adjuncts are merged, and any establishment of Agree relationship with the elements in the matrix clause.
JUSTIFYING TARGETED KILLING WITH A NEUTRAL PRINCIPLE?
Authors: Waldron Jeremy
Published: September 2012

This chapter examines a proposed legal norm that would license targeted killing: N1: Named civilians may be targeted with deadly force if they are presently involved in planning terrorist atrocities or are likely to be involved in carrying them out in the future. It explores not only the issue of likely abuses of norms like N1 but also the way in which those abuses disclose inherent difficulties with the norm. The last part of the chapter (Sections VIII to X) makes the case that the liability to abuse of norms like N1 is not just an instance of the general liability of any legal norm to abuse. It is connected also with its content, for N1 represents a relaxation of one of the most important norms we have — the norm against murder — and the justifications adduced for N1 or for similar principles represent a significant modification of our usual way of arguing about murder — a modification in the direction of moral opportunism and unreliable analogy.
TARGETED KILLING: MURDER, COMBAT OR LAW ENFORCEMENT?
Authors: McMahan Jeff
Published: September 2012

This chapter begins by arguing that the targeted killing of terrorists can be morally justified only in terms of self-defence or the defence of others, and not on retributive grounds. The most plausible version of the defensive justification holds that a terrorist is liable to the use of force when he is responsible for a threat to innocent lives and the force reasonably aims to avert that threat. On this justification, the permissibility of using lethal defensive force is not based on the terrorist's involvement with past episodes of terrorism, as would be the case in retributive justification, but, rather, on his current involvement by way of intending, planning, or assisting some envisioned act of terrorism. This justification might seem to fit well with the law-enforcement model, because domestic criminal law authorizes the use of deadly force for purposes of self-defence and the defence of others. However, the justification in question must depart from the law-enforcement model in a crucial respect: the latter model authorizes defensive force only when the threat is imminent, while targeted killing is preventive, aimed at persons whose threat is not imminent.
IMMINENCE IN JUSTIFIED TARGETED KILLING
Authors: Christopher Russell
Published: September 2012

The targeted killing of terrorists fails to satisfy the imminence requirement of self-defence. But this chapter argues that the imminence requirement itself is problematic and should be abandoned. If this argument is successful, the principal obstacle to justifying targeted killings under the self-defence approach might be circumvented. Demonstrating the invalidity of the imminence requirement lays the foundation for consideration of alternative standards. Perhaps the principal alternative standard is whether defensive force is necessary to prevent the aggression; that is, rather than focusing on the imminence of the aggression, the standard focuses on the necessity of the defensive response to the (imminent or non-imminent) aggression. While a number of commentators have criticized the imminence requirement, these criticisms have not been sufficient to alter the traditional and consensus view of the importance of the imminence requirement. The chapter attempts to advance some new arguments against, and rebut some existing arguments in favour of, the imminence requirement. The principal focus is to show why the imminence requirement is problematic, rather than to advance a preferable standard.
Essays on Kant
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This volume contains a collection of seventeen essays which have been previously published on Kant and an addendum to one of these essays that is here published for the first time. Although these essays cover virtually the full spectrum of the author's work on Kant, ranging from his epistemology, metaphysics, and moral theory to his views on teleology, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and the philosophy of religion, most of them revolve around three basic themes: the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the purposiveness of nature. The first two of these have been the foci of the author's work on Kant since its inception and the essays dealing with them in this volume are intended as clarifications, elaborations, and further developments of what the author has said on these topics elsewhere. Among their major new elements is the introduction of a significant comparative dimension, which is intended both to place Kant's views in their historical context and to explore their contemporary relevance. To this end, Kant's views are contrasted with those of his major predecessors and immediate successors, as well as present‐day philosophers. The concept of the purposiveness of nature is the major contribution of the third Critique (Critique of the Power of Judgment) to Kant's “critical” philosophy and one the main concerns of the essays dealing with it is to demonstrate its central place in Kant's thought.
Where Have all the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay contains a “friendly” critique of Béatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of the transcendental deduction in her Kant and the Capacity to Judge. The critique is friendly because it acknowledges the many virtues of this important book, particularly her emphasis on the significance of the capacity to judge [Urteilskraft] for the argument of the first Critique. Nevertheless, it maintains that she neither provides an adequate account of the role of the categories in the two parts of the deduction nor explains how these two parts are supposed to provide a single proof of the categories as Kant claims.
Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay argues that the key to understanding Kant's transcendental idealism is to understand the transcendental realism with which he contrasts it. It maintains that the latter is not to be identified with a particular metaphysical thesis, but with the assumption that the proper objects of human cognitions are “objects in general” or “as such,” that is, objects considered simply qua objects of some understanding. Since this appears to conflict with Kant's own characterization of transcendental realism as the view that (mistakenly) regards appearances as if they were things in themselves, the essay explicates the connection between the concepts of an object (or thing) considered as such and a thing considered as it is in itself. In light of this, it maintains that Kant's transcendental idealism is compatible with a robust empirical realism and that many of its critics are tacitly committed to a misguided transcendental realism.
We Can Act Only Under the Idea of Freedom
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay has a two‐fold aim. One is to respond to Daniel Dennett's naturalistic treatment of the free will problem. According to Dennett, the idea of free will is reducible to a deliberator's unavoidable ignorance regarding the outcome of a proposed course of action, which is perfectly compatible with that action being causally determined. Against this, it is argued that Kant's account of rational agency makes a persuasive case for attributing to an agent a genuine spontaneity which eludes the naturalistic framework that is assumed by Dennett to be all‐encompassing. The other is to counter the views of John McDowell, who rejects a “bald naturalism” (such as Dennett's) and insists on the ineliminability of a conception of spontaneity like Kant's, while criticizing Kant for linking this spontaneity with transcendental idealism. In response, it is argued that McDowell misconstrues Kant's idealism and that he is himself committed to a form of idealism.
Reflective Judgment and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kant's Deduction of the Principle of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay examines Kant's account of the purposiveness of nature as a transcendental principle of the power of judgment in its reflective capacity in the two versions of the Introduction to the third Critique. It argues that, in virtue of its role in the formation of empirical concepts and laws, this principle lies at the center rather than the periphery of Kant's epistemology. It further argues that the transcendental deduction that Kant provides for it in the published version of the Introduction constitutes his definitive answer to Hume regarding the rational grounding of induction. And, finally, it argues that what differentiates the principle of purposiveness from the transcendental principles of the first Critique is its purely subjective nature. Whereas the latter involve the understanding legislating to nature, purposiveness involves the power of judgment legislating to itself regarding how it must investigate nature.
Russell's Logical Atomism
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his seminal article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), but is mainly concerned with the development of his simple and his ramified theory of types, which culminated in Principia Mathematica of 1910. The merits and drawbacks of these theories are noted. The parts on epistemology and metaphysics begin with his ‘principle of acquaintance’, which is supposed to explain our understanding of propositions, but is open to many objections. They continue with his account of what knowledge is, and with his ‘constructions’ of material objects and of minds, which aim to conform to what (according to him) can be known. They then discuss his changing views on propositions, and his largely tacit views on universals, before ending with an account of his ‘logically perfect’ language, and his claim that its structure mirrors the structure of the world
The Contradiction (ii): A Simple Solution
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Seeking for a solution to his ‘contradiction’, Russell came to think that he could set aside classes in favour of propositional functions. In fact his first attempt in this direction, i.e. the ‘substitutional’ theory, also set aside propositional functions, in favour of quantification over propositions. But he then discovered that unrestricted quantification over propositions itself leads to contradictions, and so went back to treating propositional functions as independent entities, but now subjected to distinctions of type. This chapter treats only of simple types, which is all that the earlier substitutional theory requires. It gives a formal presentation of this theory, and notes that Russell’s own principles prevent us from providing it with a useful definition of validity.
The Contradiction (iii): A Ramified Solution
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Poincaré had recommended a ‘Vicious Circle Principle’, and Russell accepted this in his final ‘ramified’ theory of types. He claims both that this principle resolves a range of paradoxes (including those concerning propositions that were earlier unresolved), and that it has a certain ‘consonance with common sense’. The first claim, which deals with ‘self-reference’ and ‘self-quantification’, is acceptable, but the solution offered is somewhat extravagant. The second apparently requires a conceptualist approach to abstract objects. (Principia Mathematica seems to sidestep this requirement, but the alternative justification which it offers is clearly faulty.) The Vicious Circle Principle introduces many problems for Russell’s derivation of mathematics, which he overcomes only by introducing an axiom of reducibility. This, he thinks, gives him all the right results: it still blocks the so-called ‘semantic’ paradoxes, but also allows the deduction of mathematics.
Problems
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell’s attempt to obey the Vicious Circle Principle must lead to the conclusion that there are only countably many propositional functions, but this conflicts with his axiom of reducibility. So we do better to reject the ramified type theory, and thereby dispense with both. The simple type theory still has problems in deducing mathematics, e.g. over the axiom of infinity, and problems too over what this chapter calls ‘type-neutral’ predicates. A remedy for both of these points may be available, but it would take us into uncharted waters. One may observe that the axiom of choice (which Russell calls the ‘multiplicative’ axiom) is needed for the classical theory of infinite sets.
The Demise of Neutral Monism
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

In 1927 Russell gave a new theory of perception, emphasising its causal nature. This led him to abandon his old claim that causation was nothing more than regular concomitance, and it also led him to say that the events from which material objects are constructed are not sensings, but are the physical happenings that would cause those sensings if sense-organs, nerves, and brain were present. They are, for example, the passings of light-waves. Such events are not ‘neutral stuff’, composing both minds and matter, so neutral monism is here abandoned. (But it is not clear that Russell himself realised this.)
Epilogue
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell’s main achievements are in logic. He popularised this topic, so that it has now become a familiar tool both in philosophy and in mathematics. He also contributed his controversial theory of logical types. Both his thoughts and everyone else’s thoughts in this area have been profoundly influenced by the paradox that he discovered to be latent in our ordinary ways of thinking. But under the heading ‘logic’ he also includes what he calls ‘logical analysis’ and ‘logical constructions’. His attempts at the latter were not notably successful, but ‘analysis’ became the byword for almost all (English‐speaking) philosophy for the next century. This is in no small part due to his influence.
Introduction
Authors: Miller D. Gary
Published: September 2012

Since this volume is about the external influences on English, there is no discussion of the Indo‐European heritage per se. Nevertheless, as a matter of contextualization, the place of English in the Germanic branch of Indo‐European is discussed, along with other Germanic languages and non‐Germanic influences. Because of early Celtic influence on English, there is also a discussion of the members of the Celtic family and their properties to identify the specific source(s) of influence.
Celtic, Roman, and Germanic background
Authors: Miller D. Gary
Published: September 2012

This chapter elaborates on the history of contact between the Germanic languages that made up Old English and the main languages in their environment from which words and other elements were transferred. The history establishes a timeframe for contact with pre‐Celts, Celts, and Romans, and discusses the nature of the evidence for the different types of contact. Toponyms figure prominently, as do specific structural convergences with Brythonic Celtic.
The French input
Authors: Miller D. Gary
Published: September 2012

French influence on English was largely lexical, but because of the high volume of loanwords the effect on English morphology was extensive. This chapter outlines the historical context in which thousands of words were transferred, the two main dialects from which they came, the death of French in England as seen in records of the London Grocers’ Company, and the suffixes that became productive in Middle and Early Modern English.
Introduction
Authors: Emon Anver M.
Published: September 2012

This chapter introduces the thesis in terms of the major themes addressed throughout the book.
Sharīʿa as Rule of Law
Authors: Emon Anver M.
Published: September 2012

This chapter introduces and explains the analytic purchase of considering Sharīʿa as Rule of Law. The chapter addresses in inductive fashion various features of premodern Islamic law (e.g. curriculum, minstitutions of adjudication, and interpretive theories). It contrasts those features with the contemporary elements that contribute to the legal culture of modern states, and thereby contributes a historical dimension to the Rule of Law analytic framework developed in the Introduction and this chapter.
Religious Minorities and the Empire of Law
Authors: Emon Anver M.
Published: September 2012

This chapter offers a comparative set of examples to the dhimmī rules by analyzing recent court decisions in France, the UK, and the US that regulate the covered Muslim woman. By offering a close reading of the cases and examining the jurisprudence used to justify the legal outcomes, the chapter suggests that the dynamics underlying premodern dhimmī rules and contemporary legal decisions on the covered Muslim woman share more than might seem apparent.
Introduction
Authors: José L. Zalabardo
Published: September 2012

This introduction introduces three central themes of the chapters in the collection: the relationship between Wittgenstein's account of representation and Russell's theories of judgment, the role of objects in the tractarian system and Wittgenstein's philosophical method. It argues that some central aspects of the tractarian theory of representation should be understood as a modification of Russell's ideas on judgment. It then discusses the role of Frege's context principle in Wittgenstein's ideas.
Early Wittgenstein on Judgement
Authors: Hanks Peter W.
Published: September 2012

In ‘Notes on Logic’ and the Tractatus Wittgenstein put forward different accounts of judgment sentences, both of which are attempts at finding a way through a dilemma. On one hand, ‘A judges p’ is not a truth-function of p and cannot express a relation between a subject and something named by p, since the sentence p is not a name for anything. On the other, p must occur as a complete sentence in the analysis of ‘A judges that p’. It cannot be broken up into its components in the manner of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment. This chapter shows how Wittgenstein's attempts at reconciling these competing demands are closely tied to the evolution of his views about elementary sentences from ‘Notes on Logic’ to the Tractatus. A larger aim is to shed light on the picture theory of meaning by showing how it developed out of the very different account of sense in ‘Notes on Logic’.
The Tractatus and the Unity of the Proposition
Authors: Candlish Stewart , Damnjanovic Nic
Published: September 2012

One of the central problems Wittgenstein faced in the work which led to the Tractatus was the ancient one of explaining the unity of the proposition. Roughly, the problem is this: if a proposition has constituents, then what is it about a proposition that distinguishes it both from a mere list of its constituents, and from another proposition with the same constituents, so that it represents the world as being a certain way? While this problem has often been ignored, it has recently re-emerged in contemporary philosophy of language. This chapter considers Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with the approaches to the problem offered by Frege and by Russell, and provides an account of his own solution. In order to evaluate the solution the chapter distinguishes several aspects of the problem of the unity of the proposition and suggests the relevance of Wittgenstein's position to some contemporary views.
Simple Objects: Complex Questions
Authors: Sluga Hans
Published: September 2012

The chapter examines Wittgenstein's doctrine that there must be simple objects that form the substance of the world. Focusing on the 1914–1916 notebooks it seeks to determine the emergence of this doctrine and the reasons for its ultimate destruction.
What Can You Do with the General Propositional Form?
Authors: Diamond Cora
Published: September 2012

Peter Sullivan has argued, about Wittgenstein's Tractatus, that there is no way in which the variable which is supposed to give the general form of proposition can be constructed, and that, even if it could be constructed, there is no obvious way in which it can be put to use. The chapter focuses on the second claim, and argues that there is a straightforward sort of use for the variable, but that such a use cannot be seen unless we abandon a familiar way of interpreting Wittgenstein's remarks about how propositions can occur in other propositions. Among the good reasons for abandoning that interpretation is that we shall also be able to give a satisfying interpretation of Wittgenstein's deeply puzzling remarks about belief. The chapter explains how a different interpretation of the remarks about propositional occurrence fits in with central ideas of the Tractatus. It also demonstrates how Wittgenstein understood the activity of philosophical clarification of our thoughts, by providing some examples of how such clarification works.
Russell’s Merit
Authors: Kremer Michael
Published: September 2012

At Tractatus 4.0031, Wittgenstein writes that ‘Russell's merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real form.’ What precisely did Wittgenstein take himself to have learned from Russell? The easy answer is that in ‘On Denoting,’ Russell showed that the logical form of sentences containing denoting phrases differs from that suggested by their surface grammar, but can be displayed perspicuously in a formal language. Thus, Russell's merit is to have shown that ‘colloquial language disguises the thought’ (Tractatus 4.002), while a formal language can reveal the form of the thought which colloquial language occludes. This interpretation faces several difficulties. Given Frege's analysis of universal propositions as containing covert applications of the conditional, why should this be Russell's merit, rather than Frege's? Why is Russell's merit mentioned in a comment (4.0031) on 4.003, which explains that the problems of philosophy are nonsensical, rather than on 4.002? How is Russell's merit related to the ‘critique of language’ identified with ‘all philosophy’ in 4.0031? The chapter develops an alternative interpretation capable of answering these questions, based on a careful account of the development and content of Wittgenstein's account of philosophical nonsense, and of Russell's use of the theory of descriptions to solve philosophical puzzles. Russell's merit is shown to involve the idea that a formal language can be used to reveal categorial equivocations in the nonsensical sentences of philosophers, thus showing those sentences to have no determinate logical form at all.
Naturalism and ‘Turning our Examination Round’
Authors: McGinn Marie
Published: September 2012

In his later work, Wittgenstein attacks the tendency to sublime the logic of our language that he finds in Russell and his own earlier philosophy. This chapter argues that this tendency should be taken to include, not only our craving for generality, but also the temptation to picture meaning as a remarkable act of mind. The chapter then discusses the strategies employed by the later Wittgenstein to undermine both aspects of this tendency.
Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway over International Dealings?
Authors: Cassese Antonio , Condorelli Luigi
Published: September 2012

According to many commentators, the state is in crisis because it is undergoing a downright expropriation of the main prerogatives and functions associated with it, to the benefit of international agencies and organizations, on the one hand, and the business world, on the other. Regarding the latter, it is pointed out in particular that it increasingly escapes the grasp of ‘state-centric’ law — whether national or international — and ultimately operates under the exclusive dominion of the rules it gives itself: private law made by private persons, in the logic of ‘leges mercatoriae’ (or the like). This chapter first considers the evolution of international law, and then the autonomy of private economic power, as contributory causes of the alleged crisis of the state.
Customary International Law: The Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow of General International Law
Authors: Condorelli Luigi
Published: September 2012

Three developments may be observed in current international relations. First of all, in fact courts, and in particular the International Court of Justice, tend to attach overriding importance to opinion juris over usus. Secondly, at present a broad correspondence can be found between general customary rules and those provisions written down in large international conventions of (basically) universal character. Thirdly, among customary rules of international law some have emerged that have a special legal force: they may not be derogated from by treaty law. There are three possible ways of improving upon the current role of customary law. First, the widely lamented fragmentation of international law in separate and self-contained legal regimes, in fact depends, in large measure, on the as it were ‘fragmented eye’ of the observer, rather than on the fragmentation of the observed object. Hence, the best way to counter this fragmentation would reside in training practitioners in general international law, rather than in (or in addition to) specialist areas. Secondly, it is necessary to promote compliance with jus cogens, by ensuring that all members of the international community have effective tools at their disposal for the removal of treaties affecting the fundamental rights of each and all. Thirdly, mechanisms should be put in place for monitoring compliance of Security Council decisions with the principles of the UN Charter including jus cogens.
The Deficiencies of the Law of State Responsibility Relating to Breaches of ‘Obligations Owed to the International Community as a Whole’: Suggestions for Avoiding the Obsolescence of Aggravated Responsibility
Authors: Dupuy Pierre-Marie
Published: September 2012

The 2001 International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility are a valuable but incomplete project which, to some extent, relied on the dream of an ‘international community’. One of the main weaknesses of the ILC Articles is that, after eliminating the concept of ‘crime of state’, substituted by the notion of ‘breach of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole’, they do not provide a comprehensive and substantial legal regime for the responsibility of one state vis-à-vis other states, whether they belong to a specific group or simply to the international community as a whole. This chapter considers different scenarios in order to answer the following question: is the multilateral dimension of the modern law of state responsibility just a dream based on an optimistic vision born during the second half of the last century? Or is there still a chance to make this dream a reality in the future?
Immunity of States and State Officials: A Major Stumbling Block to Judicial Scrutiny?
Authors: Gaeta Paola
Published: September 2012

The international legal order lacks a universal and compulsory system for enforcing international responsibility, and therefore the role that domestic courts play in this regard is crucial. The various facets of the doctrine of international immunities, however, can make the domestic judicial system unavailable in cases of claims against foreign states and (former or sitting) foreign state officials. The application of this doctrine to domestic claims concerning egregious violations of human rights has given rise to controversy. As for foreign state immunity, it has been argued that the jus cogens nature of international rules protecting human rights should prevail over those granting immunities. As for personal immunities, international customary law does not seem to provide for an exception to their applicability in cases of serious violations of human rights amounting to international crimes. It is, however, argued that, de lege lata, there can be cases where domestic courts can refuse to apply the rules on personal immunities in order to avoid a denial of justice. Finally, with regard to functional immunities, the general contention is made that they do not apply for domestic claims concerning international crimes. Nonetheless it would be wrong to consider that this constitutes a derogation from, or an exception to, the customary rules of international law on functional immunities.
The International Criminal Court: Struggling to Find its Way
Authors: Schabas William
Published: September 2012

In spite of the initial success in the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the Court is facing difficulties in becoming operational and effective. Many procedural defects stand out. In addition, the idea that the choices of ‘situations’ falling under the Court's jurisdiction is left to one unaccountable individual, who employs vague concepts of ‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice’ to explain these, is the Court's greatest flaw. The Court remains confronted by the need to address shortcomings that have manifested themselves in its first years of operation. Nevertheless, there are many encouraging signs that it continues to enjoy the confidence of a large number of states.
How to Cope with the Proliferation of International Courts and Coordinate Their Action
Authors: Bennouna Mohamed
Published: September 2012

The problem of coordination between international courts and tribunals arises as a result of the existence of numerous tribunals interpreting and applying international law. This problem is due to the horizontal, autonomous, and non-hierarchical relationships between these courts. The need for coordination arises in two respects: the jurisdiction of certain courts may overlap; and the substantive law that each court ‘produces’ can cause disparities in the interpretation and application of international law. For the purposes of coordination, one should consider the creation by the UN General Assembly of a new expert body, modelled on the International Law Commission, which would ensure ‘the progressive development of international law and its codification’. The task of this expert body would be to identify and analyse the potential divergences in the interpretation and application of general international law, as well as the consequences thereof.
Overseeing Human Rights Compliance
Authors: Clapham Andrew
Published: September 2012

In imagining a realistic utopia for human rights compliance it is not enough to stress independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs), judicial training, treaty monitoring, periodic reviews, and national protection systems to hold governments accountable. Violence which emanates from beyond the state and which often has transnational dimensions also needs to be addressed. This is violence brought about by: private security companies; companies entrusted with public functions such as water supply or guarding detainees and prisoners; clothing manufacturers relying on sweatshop conditions and union free zones; rebel groups and armed gangs operating; and some activities of international organizations. To carry out effective monitoring, a combination of transnational and national NGOs are crucial. Furthermore, there is a need for a World Court for Human Rights. The Court would: encompass all human rights, including subsistence rights, collective rights, and the welfare rights that are central to addressing inequality; transnational actors would be both plaintiffs and defendants; and as the key to future protection lies in access to justice at the national level, the proposal for the World Court recognizes that, in thinking about human rights compliance, we need to take into account a multiplicity of priorities, actors, and national systems.
Operationalizing the UN Charter Rules on the Use of Force
Authors: Sands Philippe
Published: September 2012

More than six decades after the UN Charter was adopted it is difficult to see how the formulation of the Charter provisions on the use of force might usefully be altered. They are — on their merits — no more inadequate than those governing the prohibition of violence at the national level. There is little to be served in fine-tuning the language of Articles 2(4) and 51, and it is unlikely that states would easily reach agreement on a generalized meaning of ‘imminent attack’ legitimizing self-defence, a concept that will necessarily fall to be interpreted and applied by reference to the particular facts of a given situation. Utopian efforts must recognize that where vital interests are seen to be at stake no drafting exercise will be able to finesse away major differences, or impose real solutions. Instead, utopian efforts would do better to focus on the operationalization of the Charter rules, chiefly through: domestic legal debate; international judicial consideration; and international legislative efforts, such as the definition of the crime of aggression agreed upon in 2010 by the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute.
Bolstering the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
Authors: Melzer Nils
Published: September 2012

In virtually all contemporary armed conflicts a staggering 90% of all victims are civilians. A comprehensive and constructive clarification of international law relating to the protection of civilians in armed conflict requires that both academics and practitioners take a step back from an overly technical, political, or positivist analysis of the law and look at the questions presenting themselves through the prism of general, well-established principles of law, most notably the principles of: necessity; proportionality; precaution; and humanity, which underlie the entire normative framework governing the use of force. Indeed, wherever states resort to force, whether in self-defence against armed attacks, in the conduct of hostilities against belligerent adversaries, or in exercise of their law-enforcement authority, it is always these four principles which circumscribe the permissible scope and intensity of their action. In short, these four principles reflect general principles of law which govern the use of force by states in all circumstances. A major problem arises with regard to the lack of any incentive for rebels to comply with international humanitarian law. A viable alternative to the introduction of a full combatant privilege for non-state belligerents would require a two-pronged approach. In accordance with the respective logic of the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, the conduct of hostilities and the exercise of power and authority over persons in compliance with international humanitarian law should be encouraged and legitimized (first objective), whereas the initiation of, or participation in, an armed conflict in contravention of domestic law should be discouraged (second objective).
The Future of International Criminal Justice: A Blueprint for Action
Authors: Hemptinne Jérome de
Published: September 2012

New ways must be found to increase significantly the cohesion, efficiency, and transparency of the international criminal justice system without disrupting the decentralized structure of the international order in which it operates. Two avenues of action should be pursued. On the one hand, a large number of international criminal cases should be decentralized on the basis of precise rules of jurisdictional allocation, that is, brought before local, ad hoc internationalized or possibly regional courts that are located as close as possible to the populations concerned. On the other hand, a number of investigative and judicial activities of the International Criminal Court should be devolved, that is, conducted by the Court, not in The Hague, but in the countries concerned. These two processes of decentralization and devolution should be implemented in parallel according to well-defined criteria.
Domestic Courts Should Embrace Sound Interpretative Strategies in the Development of Human Rights-Oriented International Law
Authors: Iovane Massimo
Published: September 2012

There are two significant trends in how domestic courts are applying international law. In the first place, they are exploiting all the unifying and creative potential of customary international law by pioneering the determination of new customary rules, or favouring the evolution of old ones. However, in so doing, they have often affirmed the existence of international customs without sufficient reference to international precedents, or have declared international treaty rules as corresponding ipso facto to general international law. In the second place, they constantly apply the interpretative methods of modern constitutionalism to solve the conflicts between international norms, or to propose an evolutive interpretation of customary and treaty norms on the protection of human rights. In doing so, however, they tend to go too far, violating some well-established norms of customary international law and giving rise to a plethora of interpretations from state to state. This chapter examines these two trends in two dedicated sections, before considering their main shortcomings, with some recommendations for future methodological improvement that may overcome the above-mentioned failings in an otherwise positive and innovative trend.
Telicity expression in the visual modality
Authors: Malaia Evie , Wilbur Ronnie B.
Published: September 2012

This chapter reports experimental results of motion capture studies in two unrelated sign languages: American Sign Language (ASL), and Hrvatski Znakovi Jezik (HZJ) — aimed at investigating kinematic correlates of event structure representation. The studies addressed the following questions: Do signers mark event structure kinematically in predicate signs? What are the kinematic features associated with telicity in predicate signs? If kinematic markers of telicity do exist, how do they interact with known prosodic features in sign languages? The results for both sign languages demonstrate that signers reliably mark predicate event structure using higher peak velocity for telic predicates, as well as rapid deceleration following peak velocity. Furthermore, phrase-final lengthening affected sign kinematics in both languages such that phrase-final predicates were signed slower that those in phrase-medial position. This experimental work has important theoretical consequences for the accounts of sign language phonology, prosody, and semantics, as well as theories of event structure representation across modalities in human languages.
From psych verbs to nouns
Authors: Fábregas Antonio , Marín Rafael , McNally Louise
Published: September 2012

The Aspect Preservation Hypothesis (APH) predicts that, all things being equal, the aspectual information of a deverbal nominalization reflects the Aktionsart of the verbal base. This hypothesis faces prima facie counterexamples in the domain of psychological nouns, as they quite systematically denote states, while not all psychological verbs are stative. This chapter addresses these counterexamples and argues that they do not pose a problem for the APH. We argue that the base of the nominalization is a partially specified verbal stem; then we show that only verbs whose stem is stative have a derived psychological noun. Verbs whose stem is not stative lack a corresponding nominalization, although they can be associated with an underived psychological noun.
Passive states
Authors: Gehrke Berit
Published: September 2012

This chapter addresses the semantics of the German adjectival passive and investigates restrictions on event-related modification with this construction. The account proposed, according to which German adjectival passives instantiate a consequent state kind of an event kind, is motivated by the following facts. First, this construction is fully acceptable only with verbs whose event structure contains a consequent state, represented by an event-semantically interpreted become component. Furthermore, only those event-related modifiers are possible with German adjectival passives that modify either the event kind argument or the state itself. However, modifiers that need to access an event token, such as temporal or spatial modifiers, are not grammatical.