bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Covering Law Explanation
Authors: Nickles Thomas
Published: November 2002

A serious problem for covering law explanation is raised and its consequences for the Hempelian theory of explanation are discussed. The problem concerns an intensional feature of explanations, involving the manner in which theoretical law statements are related to the events explained. The basic problem arises because explanations are not of events but of events under descriptions ; moreover, in a sense, our linguistic descriptions outrun laws. One form of the problem, termed the problem of weak intensionality, is apparently solved by a simple logical move, but in fact the problem arises in a new, strong form. It is found that Hempel's model for deductive explanation (to which this discussion is confined) requires modification to handle the weak intensionality problem but then is faced with the problem of strong intensionality. In consequence, it is suggested that Hempel's important concept of explanation sketch is not as widely applicable as usually claimed, especially for explanations in the behavioral and social sciences and history. Reason is found to reject the covering law thesis that every scientific explanation must contain at least one law statement. An important feature of the discussion is that some of the main reasons given for altering the deductive model and for considering other forms of explanation are internal to the covering law theory.
An Interpretation of Scientific Models Involving Analogies
Authors: Carloye Jack C.
Published: November 2002

In order to account for the actual function of analogue models in extending theories to new domains, we argue that it is necessary to analyze the inference involved into a complex two dimensional form. This form must go horizontally from descriptions of entities used as a model to redescriptions of entities in the new domain, and it must go vertically from an observation language to a theoretical language having a different and exclusive logical syntax. This complex inference can only be intelligible if we interpret theoretical terms in a platonic manner, a la Körner.
The Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction Hypothesis and the Combined Rod Contraction-Clock Retardation Hypothesis
Authors: Erlichson Herman
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper in this journal which was part of a panel discussion of Grünbaum's philosophy of science, M. G. Evans discusses the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis and related matters [2]. The purpose of this note is to clarify and correct some of the points in Evans' paper.
“What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?”
Authors: Suppe Frederick
Published: November 2002

Achinstein, Putnam, and others have urged the rejection of the received view on theories (which construes theories as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms are given partial observational interpretations by correspondence rules) because (i) the notion of partial interpretation cannot be given precise formulation, and (ii) the observational-theoretical distinction cannot be drawn satisfactorily. I try to show that these are the wrong reasons for rejecting the received view since (i) is false and it is virtually impossible to demonstrate the truth of (ii). Nonetheless, the received view should be rejected because it obscures a number of epistemologically important features of scientific theorizing. I show this by sketching an alternative analysis which reveals some of these features and gives a more faithful picture of scientific theorizing.
Towards an Aristotelean Theory of Scientific Explanation
Authors: Brody B. A.
Published: November 2002

In this paper, I consider a variety of objections against the covering-law model of scientific explanation, show that Aristotle was already aware of them and had solutions for them, and argue that these solutions are correct. These solutions involve the notions of nonHumean causality and of essential properties. There are a great many familiar objections, both methodological and epistemological, to introducing these concepts into the methodology of science, but I show that these objections are based upon misunderstandings of these concepts.
An Analysis of Festinger's Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Authors: Krause Merton S.
Published: November 2002

An axiomatization of the theory is presented based on an explication of the 1957 text. Twenty-five theorems are deduced from the seven postulates. An abstract test space for the theory is formulated and the operations for its practical testing discussed. Traditional experimentation with the theory seems generally concerned with few of its propositions and incapable of testing it.
Einstein's Discovery of Special Relativity
Authors: Gutting Gary
Published: November 2002

This paper discusses the controversy between philosophers of science (e.g. Grünbaum) and historians of science (e.g. Holton) regarding Einstein's discovery of STR. Although Holton is surely correct on the historical point that experimental results (especially the Michelson–Morley experiment) had little influence on Einstein's development of STR, this fact is not sufficient to establish his (and Polanyi's) claim that major scientific discoveries are primarily matters of private, nonspecifiable insights into physical reality. It is possible that Einstein's work was based primarily on non-empirical but nonetheless publicly discussable, objective considerations. And a more comprehensive survey of the discovery of STR shows that this was indeed the case and thus excludes STR as a supporting instance of Holton's and Polanyi's assertions of the primacy of “private science.”
A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method
Authors: Maxwell Nicholas
Published: November 2002

This paper considers objections to Popper's views on scientific method. It is argued that criticism of Popper's views, developed by Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos, are not too damaging, although they do require that Popper's views be modified somewhat. It is argued that a much more serious criticism is that Popper has failed to provide us with any reason for holding that the methodological rules he advocates give us a better hope of realizing the aims of science than any other set of rules. Consequently, Popper cannot adequately explain why we should value scientific theories more than other sorts of theories; which in turn means that Popper fails to solve adequately his fundamental problem, namely the problem of demarcation. It is suggested that in order to get around this difficulty we need to take the search for explanations as a fundamental aim of science.
Three Types of Referential Opacity
Authors: Sharvy Richard
Published: November 2002

Three distinct things have been called “referential opacity,” causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.
The Determinism of Quantum-Mechanical Probability Statements
Authors: Scoledes Aristotle G. M.
Published: November 2002

A presentation showing how the statements which relate to microphysical objects as they are different from the statements of classical mechanics is made. The determinism of classical and of quantum-mechanical theories is qualified. A (crucial) distinction between causality and determinism is given. Detailed analyses of diffraction as a result of single and double-slit demonstrations point to paradoxes arising from the use of particle or wave models, respectively, for photons and electrons. The compromising wave-packet model is underscored. The meanings for the Psi-function and for |ψ|2 are presented, with an explanation of the limitations that arise from giving an interpretation of |ψ|2 as a probability. The meaning of ψ-waves is analyzed. A case is made for the ψ-function's describing a well-ordered list of betting odds, based on previous statistical experiences, for the different results of specific experiments of a microscopic object of study with macroscopic apparatus. The Schrödinger wave equation is evaluated for meaning and judged as a deterministic expression.
Explanation and Teleology
Authors: Wright Larry
Published: November 2002

This paper develops and draws the consequences of an etiological analysis of goal-directedness modeled on one that functions centrally in Charles Taylor's work on action. The author first presents, criticizes, and modifies Taylor's formulation, and then shows his modified formulation accounts easily for much of the fine-structure of teleological concepts and conceptualizations. Throughout, the author is at pains to show that teleological explanations are orthodox from an empiricist's point of view: they require nothing novel methodologically.
Thomas Reid's Discovery of a Non-Euclidean Geometry
Authors: Daniels Norman
Published: November 2002

Independently of any eighteenth century work on the geometry of parallels, Thomas Reid discovered the non-euclidean “geometry of visibles” in 1764. Reid's construction uses an idealized eye, incapable of making distance discriminations, to specify operationally a two dimensional visible space and a set of objects, the visibles. Reid offers sample theorems for his doubly elliptical geometry and proposes a natural model, the surface of the sphere. His construction draws on eighteenth century theory of vision for some of its technical features and is motivated by Reid's desire to defend realism against Berkeley's idealist treatment of visual space.
Fictionalism and the Elimination of Theoretical Terms
Authors: Sinks John D.
Published: November 2002

The claim that theoretical entities are not real, that they are merely convenient fictions, has been defended and attacked in diverse ways. This paper is concerned with only one defense of the fictionalist thesis and with a certain realist attack on it. The defense in question is that theories which prima facie make reference to theoretical entities can be revised in such a way that no such apparent reference is made by eliminating all occurrences of theoretical expressions. It will be argued here that there is a procedure for revising theories which meets certain minimal criteria of adequacy, contrary to arguments in the literature. Further, it will be argued that the existence of this procedure provides neither sufficient nor necessary support for the fictionalist thesis, that this procedure is not of significance in the dispute between the fictionalist and the realist. Whether or not the theoretical-nontheoretical distinction is viable is another story which will not be told here. It will be assumed for the sake of argument that such a distinction can be drawn.
Biological Foundations of the Psychoneural Identity Hypothesis
Authors: Globus Gordon G.
Published: November 2002

Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. “Consciousness per se” and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the (unobserved) brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory receptor-transducer systems. Thus, on the psychoneural identity hypothesis, consciousness per se comprises directly physical events-in-themselves rather than being a Euclidean representation of physical events as is the case for phenomenal content. After comparing consciousness per se to “onta,” a paradox is suggested: rather than being irreducible to physical reality, consciousness per se is the only experience congruent with the ultimate nature of physical reality as conceived by contemporary physics.
The Logic of Projectibility
Authors: Pollock John L.
Published: November 2002

Projectible conditions are (roughly) those whose universal generalizations are con firmed by their positive instances. This paper proposes certain modifications to the above definition in order to capture the pre-analytic notion it is supposed to explicate. Then we investigate what logical operations, when performed on projectible conditionals, yield new projectible conditionals. A number of surprising theorems are proven, and these theorems indicate that few conditionals having complex antecedents and consequents are projectible. It is also shown that projectibility is not closed under contraposition, and this is proposed as a solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. Finally, a general conjecture is made concerning just what conditionals are projectible, and it follows from this conjecture that although most conditionals are not projectible, they can still be dealt with inductively, but in ways more complex than recognized by classical confirmation theory.
Degrees of Interpretation
Authors: Phillips John N.
Published: November 2002

What has been learned about logic by means of “uninterpreted” logistic systems can be supplemented by comparing the latter with systems which are more uninterpreted, as well as with others which are less uninterpreted than the well-known logistic systems. By somewhat extending the meaning of ‘uninterpreted’, I hope to establish certain claims about the nature of logistic systems and also to cast some light on the nature of “logic itself.”

My procedure involves looking at three major “degrees” of interpretation: first, systems uninterpreted both semantically and syntactically, second, systems uninterpreted semantically but not syntactically, and third, systems uninterpreted neither semantically nor syntactically. We shall be forced to limit ourselves to the truth-functional part of logic in this brief study. What are usually called uninterpreted systems can be seen on a continuum of “degrees” of interpretation, from ordinary reasoning at one extreme to a “thoroughly uninterpreted system” at the other.

“Logic itself” apparently lies nearer to the interpreted, deformalized end of the spectrum than to the uninterpreted, formalized end. Logic is not identical with any particular logistic system, but is that which the particular logistic systems aim to formalize or model or capture. I propose that it is that minimum set of logical, rather than syntactical, primitive terms, definitions, and rules which is needed to generate logically, rather than syntactically, the principles of ordinary reasoning as it is used by logicians in their metalinguistic discussions and informal proofs of metatheorems. This minimum set is somewhat larger than the primitive bases of most logistic systems; its truth-functional part is presented in the “Deformalized Logic” at degree twelve.
Physics by Convention
Authors: Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

“It ain't nuthin' until I call it.”

Bill Guthrie, Umpire

Numerous criticisms of Adolf Grünbaum's account of conventions in physics have been published ([1], [2], [3], [4], [13]), and he has replied to most of them ([6], [8]). Nonetheless, there seem to me to be good reasons for offering further criticism. In the first place Grünbaum's philosophy seems to me at least partly an extrapolation of one aspect of the views on conventions developed by Reichenbach and others. Since I think many of the issues which Reichenbach attempted to settle in his various discussions of conventions in physics are genuine and important, and I also think that those aspects of his views on which Grünbaum has focused are among the least satisfactory, it seems important to suggest questions and answers about conventions in physics which may develop more satisfactory Reichenbachian themes. Secondly, Grünbaum's philosophy centers on a distinction, that between extrinsic and intrinsic properties and relations, which has never been made satisfactorily clear either by Grünbaum or by his critics. Until it is clarified we will remain unsure of just what he is claiming and why we should think it true or think it false. Finally, Grünbaum's replies to his critics, especially his most recent reply, [9], involve unusually important claims which fail to be buttressed by the arguments he gives. I have in mind such claims as that we can learn something important about the ontological status of properties and relations by examining descriptions of them, that on (what I take to be) the most straightforward and literal interpretation, the general theory of relativity is inconsistent, and that the foremost advocates of geometrodynamics, Clifford and Wheeler, were and are enmeshed in contradiction. My own view is that all of these claims are dubious or false, but I shall be less concerned with establishing their falsity than with discrediting the arguments offered for them.
Mental Health and Mental Illness: Some Problems of Definition and Concept Formation
Authors: Macklin Ruth
Published: November 2002

In recent years there has been considerable discussion and controversy concerning the concepts of mental health and mental illness. The controversy has centered around the problem of providing criteria for an adequate conception of mental health and illness, as well as difficulties in specifying a clear and workable system for the classification, understanding, and treatment of psychological and emotional disorders. In this paper I shall examine a cluster of these complex and important issues, focusing on attempts to define ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’; diverse factors influencing the ascription of the predicates ‘is mentally ill’ and ‘is mentally healthy’; and some specific problems concerning these concepts as they appear in various theories of psychopathology. The approach here will be in the nature of a survey, directed at the specification of a number of problems—conceptual, methodological, and pragmatic—as they arise in various attempts to define and to provide criteria for applying the concepts of mental health and mental illness.
Vision and Revolution: A Postscript on Kuhn
Authors: Scheffler Israel
Published: November 2002

In Chapter 4 of Science and Subjectivity, I offered several arguments critical of Professor Thomas Kuhn's views as expressed in his influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. His recent replies to these criticisms seem to me so inadequate as to suggest that he, and therefore others as well, may have failed to grasp their full import. Accordingly, I shall, in the first part of this paper, briefly recapitulate my earlier arguments and offer a short rejoinder to Professor Kuhn's replies. The second part of the paper will expand upon my earlier discussion to consider the basic metaphors of vision and revolution, offered by Kuhn to replace the traditional notion of deliberation. My argument here will be that these new metaphors are incongruous in critical respects, and my discussion will conclude by considering their relations to the contrast between understanding and accepting a theory.
Lewis on Immodest Inductive Models
Authors: Spielman Stephen
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper [2] David Lewis offered an extremely interesting and, if correct, important solution to the main unsolved problem of Carnap's program for inductive logic—the choice of an appropriate C-function (=an inductive method). The gist of Lewis' solution is to first obtain a pilot sample from the target population (a time-honored procedure in statistical methodology) and then select, on the basis of this sample, from among the immodestλ-methods. An immodest inductive method is one which estimates that the mean squared error of its estimates of population relative frequencies is less than or equal that of any other inductive method. By great ingenuity Lewis apparently shows that on any evidence e there is one and only one immodest λ-method. I will attempt to show that Lewis made a conceptual error in formulating the equations to be solved and that when it is corrected it can be easily demonstrated that all admissible λ-methods are immodest and hence that Lewis' criterion is of no value.
Mechanism and Biological Explanation
Authors: Varela Francisco , Maturana Humberto
Published: November 2002

Machines and Biology have been, since antiquity, closely related. From the zoological figures present in astronomical simulacra, through renaissance mechanical imitations of animals, through Decartes' wind pipe nerves, to present day discussions on the computer and the brain, runs a continuous thread. In fact, the very name of mechanism for an attitude of inquiry throughout the history of Biology reveals this at a philosophical level ([4] and [6]). More often than not, mechanism is mentioned in opposition to vitalism, as an assertion of the validity of the objectivity principle in biology: there are no purposes in animal nature; its apparent purposefulness is similar to the purposefulness of machines. Yet, the fact that one picks machines as a set of objects comparable to living systems, deserves a closer look. What in machines makes it possible to establish such a connection?
Biological Progress and Dominance: A Reply to Janet L. Travis
Authors: Glickman Maurice J. A.
Published: November 2002

In a recent article in Philosophy of Science Janet Travis [13] seeks to refute the argument for evolutionary progressivism which is based on a series of dominant life forms on the grounds that there is no rigorous definition of that concept. In particular she claims that the definitions formulated by Sir Julian Huxley and George Gaylord Simpson fail adequately to exclude any group of organisms. The concept of dominance is therefore alleged to be meaningless and the argument for progress invalid.
Causation and Direct Realism
Authors: Gram M. S.
Published: November 2002

Direct Realism as a theory of perception has traditionally been thought to collapse on the existence of hallucinations. The cause of that collapse is what is familiar to philosophers as the Argument from Illusion. And what sustains that argument is the equally familiar No-Intrinsic-Difference Claim. The argument and the claim conspire to undermine Direct Realism as follows. We are first given cases in which we are acquainted with perceptual states of affairs that can be neither material bodies nor parts of such bodies. We are told that what we see in such cases is phenomenally indistinguishable from what we see in cases of veridical perception: There is, so the argument goes, no characteristic of either kind of state of affairs available to inspection which enables us to distinguish one from the other. And since there is no phenomenal difference between them, there is also no intrinsic difference; hence, we are never directly aware of material bodies or their parts in perception—from which it is generally inferred that Direct Realism is false.
Stegmüller on the Relationship between Theory and Experience
Authors: Kockelmans Joseph J.
Published: November 2002

Stegmüller's most recent publication, Theorie und Erfahrung, is the second of four volumes of a work which appears under the general title Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytische Philosophie, ([36], all references in the discussion below are taken from the second volume of this work). In this voluminous and daring work the author intends to deliver a systematic, critical account of the most important literature which has appeared on various basic topics of philosophy of science and its underlying assumptions over the past twenty-five years. The work promises to become a classic in the German language because of its comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and clarity.
Determinism, Laws, and Predictability in Principle
Authors: Boyd Richard
Published: November 2002

This paper examines commonly offered arguments to show that human behavior is not deterministic because it is not predictable. These arguments turn out to rest on the assumption that deterministic systems must be governed by deterministic laws, and that these give rise to predictability “in principle” of determined events. A positive account of determinism is advanced and it is shown that neither of these assumptions is true. The relation between determinism, laws, and prediction in practice is discussed as a question in scientific epistemology.
Quantum Mechanics and Interpretations of Probability Theory
Authors: Grossman Neal
Published: November 2002

Several philosophers of science have claimed that the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics can be resolved by appealing to a particular interpretation of probability theory. For example, Popper bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the propensity interpretation of probability, and Margenau bases his treatment of quantum mechanics on the frequency interpretation of probability. The purpose of this paper is (i) to consider and reject such claims, and (ii) to discuss the question of whether the ψ-function refers to an individual system or to an ensemble of systems.
On Arguments Against the Empirical Adequacy of Finite State Grammar
Authors: Daly Richard
Published: November 2002

In the first part of this paper, two arguments, one by Chomsky, and one by Bar-Hillel and Shamir, are examined in detail and rejected. Both arguments purport to show that the structure of English precludes its having a finite state grammar which correctly enumerates just the well formed sentences of English.

In the latter part of the paper I consider the problem of supporting claims about the structure and properties of a natural language when no grammar for the language has yet been accepted.
Contextual Falsification and Scientific Methodology
Authors: Leplin Jarrett
Published: November 2002

Recent discussion of the problem of the conclusive falsification of scientific hypotheses has generally regarded the Duhemian Thesis (D-Thesis) as both true and interesting [10] but has dismissed the claim that disconfirmed hypotheses can be retained in explanations of the disconfirming evidence as either trivial [3] or unargued [12]. This paper rejects these positions. First, the status, in the argument for the D-Thesis, of the claim that auxiliary assumptions are necessary for the derivation of evidential propositions from hypotheses is examined. It is concluded that depending on this status, the D-Thesis is either trivially true or unargued. Then the retention of contextually disconfirmed hypotheses is discussed. It is found that the use of such hypotheses in explanations of the disconfirming evidence is mediated by principles of scientific methodology. A new thesis is presented connecting the problem of conclusive falsification with changes in methodology. The argument for this thesis introduces a new analysis of methodological principles as inductive generalizations from scientific practice. Finally, the contribution of this analysis to the understanding of scientific change is described.
Reduction in Genetics—Biology or Philosophy?
Authors: Hull David L.
Published: November 2002

A belief common among philosophers and biologists alike is that Mendelian genetics has been or is in the process of being reduced to molecular genetics, in the sense of formal theory reduction current in the literature. The purpose of this paper is to show that there are numerous empirical and conceptual difficulties which stand in the way of establishing a systematic inferential relation between Mendelian and molecular genetics. These difficulties, however, have little to do with the traditional objections which have been raised to reduction.
Statistical Explanation
Authors: Lehman Hugh
Published: November 2002

Wesley Salmon has advanced a new model of explanations of particular facts which requires that the explanans contain laws. The laws used in explanations (according to this model) are of the form P(A · C1, B) = p1 ... P(A · Cn, B) = pn. A condition imposed by Salmon on these laws is that the reference classes, i.e. A · C1 ... A · Cn, be homogenous with reference to the property B. A reference class A is homogenous with reference to a property B if every property which determines a place selection with reference to B within A is statistically irrelevant to B in A. It is argued here that the concept of homogeneity cannot in general be satisfied in scientific explanations and that even a weaker requirement, “epistemic homogeneity,” may be too strong.
On When There Must Be a Time-Difference between Cause and Effect
Authors: Hedman Carl G.
Published: November 2002

Building on two nonproblematic claims, I argue for a qualified endorsement of Hume's intuition that there must be a time-difference between cause and effect. Those claims are: (i) that the statement ‘A caused B’ is meaningful only if we have a criterion for saying ‘A’ and ‘B’ refer to distinct events; and (ii) that an adequate view of what it is to be an event must illuminate the enterprise of seeking to establish a singular causal statement. Specifically, I argue there must be a time-difference when cause and effect are modifications of the same physical object.
A Comment on Ruse's Analysis of Function Statements
Authors: Wright Larry
Published: November 2002

Michael Ruse has offered an interesting and insightful analysis of function statements in biology. The analysis he gives of statements of the form ‘The function of x in z is to do y‘ is :

(i)

z does y by using x.

(ii)

y is an adaptation ([4], p. 91).

The first thing to notice about this formulation is the peculiarity of step (ii). There are many cases in which we would naturally say that x was the adaptation, instead of y; or perhaps we might say that everything asserted in step (i) constituted the adaptation. For example, the function of the duck's webbed feet is to enable it to swim. But we would commonly and naturally say that the adaptation was the webbing, not the swimming. It seems to me that Ruse's insistence on the formulation in (ii) points to the major difficulty of his analysis : and understanding what drives him to this unnatural formulation suggests the way out of those difficulties.
On Stevenson's If-Iculties
Authors: Martin R. M.
Published: November 2002

Professor Stevenson's valuable paper [5] calls attention to a number of discrepancies between ‘if’ in English and its usual translation into the horseshoe of material implication. “This is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe,” he notes, “which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse” ([5], p. 27). Accordingly, Stevenson proposes to develop a “richer logic” than the ordinary one, by adding as primitives certain sentential connectives. He speaks throughout in the old terminology of “propositions” rather than in that of the sentences or statements used to express them. Thus he speaks of atomic and molecular propositions, somehow no doubt as real entities in the world, where talk of atomic and molecular sentences would save him from implicit involvement in the notorious difficulties connected with atomic facts. Finally, the inner structure of atomic sentences, and therewith of molecular ones, is never considered. Many molecular sentences contain quantifiers in interesting ways, the clarification of which would seem essential in getting at their structure. Stevenson, however, has no concern with quantifiers, and does not exhibit the quantificational structure of the English sentences considered.
Disconfirmation by Positive Instances
Authors: Berent Paul
Published: November 2002

(1) The probability of some generalizations can be lowered by positive instances.

(2) The change in probability (both degree and direction) can depend on factors other than the new evidence, the statement, and the probability of the statement given the old evidence.
Countering a Counter-Intuitive Probability
Authors: Rose Lynn E.
Published: November 2002

Professor Copi provides us with the following example:

Remove all cards except aces and kings from a deck, so that only eight cards remain, of which four are aces and four are kings. From this abbreviated deck, deal two cards to a friend. If he looks at his cards and announces (truthfully) that his hand contains an ace, what is the probability that both his cards are aces? If he announces instead that one of his cards is the ace of spades, what is the probability then that both his cards are aces? (These two probabilities are not the same!) ([1], p. 433)
Biological Adaptation: A Reply
Authors: Munson Ronald
Published: November 2002

Michael Ruse [3] has criticized the distinction between biological function and evolutionary adaptation that I argued for in my article “Biological Adaptation” [2]. I shall show below that Ruse's criticisms are not, for the most part, well taken and that the distinction remains as I made it.
Laws of Science, Theories, Measurement: (Comments on Ernest Nagel's the Structure of Science)
Authors: Nowak Leszek
Published: November 2002

The problem of idealization in empirical sciences is very rarely taken up in works concerned with the methodology of those sciences. It seems to be common knowledge that in advanced natural sciences references are made to concepts such as “perfectly rigid body,” “material point,” “perfect gas,” etc., but it remains a fact that the most important methodological concepts, concepts which have determined the present-day form of the philosophy of science, have been advanced without regard to the peculiarities of the procedure mentioned above. And yet a moment's consideration suffices to raise doubts as to Carnap's physicalism and/or Popper's falsificationism if we just realize the trivial and commonly known truth that empirical sciences resort to idealizationism. For how are we to imagine a reduction of idealizational concepts to observation terms? And how are we to imagine that theorems which include idealizational concepts imply observation statements which refute, or at least are at variance with, those theorems? But it is a fact that such doubts have neither been raised by the authors of the conceptions mentioned above, nor have they been raised (as far as the present writer is informed) against them.
On Being Unreasonable
Authors: Schagrin Morton L.
Published: November 2002

The problem of the critical assessment of theories across paradigms raised by Kuhn is not resolved, it is argued, either by Scheffler's appeal to initial credibility or by Lakatos' conception of a research program. It is argued further that, in these contexts, the notion of reasonable choice by individuals makes no sense. The conclusion supports Feyerabend's position of “epistemological anarchism.”
Realist Foundations of Measurement
Authors: Byerly Henry C. , Lazara Vincent A.
Published: November 2002

This paper defends a realist interpretation of theories and a modest realism concerning the existence of quantities as providing the best account both of the logic of quantity concepts and of scientific measurement practices. Various operationist analyses of measurement are shown to be inadequate accounts of measurement practices used by scientists. We argue, furthermore, that appeals to implicit definitions to provide meaning for theoretical terms over and above operational definitions fail because implicit definitions cannot generate the requisite descriptive content. The special case of establishing a temperature scale is examined to show thatnonrealistaccounts fail to provide insight into the theoretical connections that scientific laws postulate to hold among quantities.
Conditions and Limitations of Prediction-Making in Biology
Authors: Kochanski Zdzislaw
Published: November 2002

Some scientists believe that although evolutionary theory is explanatory, it does not have, in contrast to the theories of physics, any predictive power. This raises the question of its testability. The analysis given shows that there are good reasons to claim the unpredictability of evolutionary events; nevertheless, the evolutionary theory has potential predictive power. It is argued that the difference between biology and physics lies not in the predictive power of the theories involved, but in the different weight which is lent to the forecasting of particular events in these sciences. A second source of confusion derives from the ambiguity of the term ‘prediction’. In order to define ‘prediction’ for cases in which the term is used to refer to a part of testing procedure, the reference to the time-point “now” is quite irrelevant. Prediction of unknown observational data is sufficient for testing a hypothesis, but such prediction may or may not be identical with forecasting of future events. Different factors that may cause particular difficulties met by biologists in forecasting future events are analyzed subsequently in the second part of the paper. The conclusion is drawn that although particular cognitive situations limiting the ability of forecasting are very frequent in biological sciences, the claim about the peculiar logical status of biological theories is not thereby justified.
Reciprocity in the Uncertainty Relations
Authors: Kirschenmann Peter
Published: November 2002

A philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics presupposes a clear understanding of what is asserted by this theory. The aim of this paper is to help clarify one specific theorem of quantum mechanics, namely the so-called uncertainty relations. The surprisingly wide spread belief that these relations generally imply a reciprocal or inversely proportional relationship between the respective uncertainties is shown to be mistaken. Several reasons why this mistaken belief has been embraced are suggested. The conditions under which one could say that the uncertainty relations imply an inversely proportional relationship between uncertainties are specified.
Dispositions Revisited
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

Subjunctive conditionals have their uses, but constituting the meaning of dispositional predicates is not one of them. More germane is the analysis of dispositions in terms of “bases”—except that past efforts to maintain an ontic gap between dispositions and their bases, while not wholly misguided, have failed to appreciate the semantic birthright of dispositional concepts as a species of theoretical construct in primitive science.
The Ideal Scientific Theory: A Thought Experiment
Authors: Laszlo Ervin
Published: November 2002

To overcome sociopsychologism and historical relativism, the growth of science is deduced from the combined effect of postulated invariant controls, in the form of enduring ideals of science, in their interaction with nature. The thus constituted “cybernetics-of-science” concept permits extrapolation from present to future states of science. The ideal scientific theory is the goal or target toward which the scientific process is oriented, by virtue of its invariant controls. The form of the ideal theory can thus be extrapolated, and some speculative hypotheses advanced as to its contents, taking those of the recently emerged constructs of science as basis which best accord with the predicted form of the theory.
A Simplified Proof of an Impossibility Theorem
Authors: Mackay Alfred F.
Published: November 2002

In this paper I prove a theorem which is similar to Arrow's famous impossibility theorem. I show that no social welfare function can be both minimally majoritarian and also independent of irrelevant alternatives. My condition of minimal majoritarianism is substantially weaker than simple majority rule.
Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory
Authors: Sklar Lawrence
Published: November 2002

Some philosphers of science of an empiricist and pragmatist bent have proposed models of statistical explanation, but have then become sceptical of the adequacy of these models. It is argued that general considerations concerning the purpose of function of explanation in science which are usually appealed to by such philosophers show that their scepticism is not well taken; for such considerations provide much the same rationale for the search for statistical explanations, as these philosophers have characterized them, as they do for lawlike explanations.

But, it is further argued, a significant piece of what is frequently offered as an explanation of well known phenomena in statistical mechanics, fails to meet this general “pragmatic rationale” for statistical, or indeed any kind of, explanation. The question then arises whether the physicists have misconstrued the value of this piece of physical theorizing, ergodic theory, taking it to be explanatory when it is actually not; or whether, instead, the philosopher's account of just what is genuinely explanatory is too narrow.
On Theories
Authors: Alder Michael D.
Published: November 2002

An axiom set is given which purports to formalize the notion of a “theory involving measurement.” The abstract objects satisfying these axioms are examined, and some candidates for measures of complexity are considered.

This framework allows us to discuss some forms of a degree of confirmation. Both “complexity” and “degree of confirmation” appear to be intimately bound up with geometrical aspects of these “theories” which derive from measurement considerations, suggesting that the concepts may be inapplicable to more “general theories.”

The view is taken throughout that the well known paradoxes indicate inadequacies of the linguistic apparatus and that the axiomatization here presented is an attempt to construct an adequate language for the relevant portion of the world. This position is not defended in the paper.
Probability Magic Unmasked
Authors: Rosenkrantz R. D.
Published: November 2002

It has been alleged that Bayesian usage of prior probabilities allows one to obtain empirical statements on the basis of no evidence whatever. We examine this charge with reference to several examples from the literature, arguing, first, that the difference between probabilities based on weighty evidence and those based on little evidence can be drawn in terms of the variance of a distribution. Moreover, qua summaries of vague prior knowledge, prior distributions only transmit the empirical information therein contained and, therefore, their consequences for long-run frequency behavior are “a priori” in at best a Pickwickian sense.
The Picturability of Micro-Entities
Authors: Noren Stephen J.
Published: November 2002

In Patterns of Discovery, [1], and Concept of the Positron, [2], the late N. R. Hanson put forward an intersting and, I believe, essentially sound argument to the effect that, necessarily, micro-entities are “unpicturable.” Hanson's claim is centrally a claim about microreduction, but his use of the term ‘unpicturable’ may be misleading, generating critiques which overplay its implications and its importance. A. M. Paul, in a recent article, [4], has taken Hanson to task in this regard, claiming that the notion of picturability is so cloudy as to render Hanson's whole enterprise unconvincing. In what follows I shall critically discuss Hanson's argument and Paul's analysis and attempt to state a version of it capable of meeting Paul's objections. I will claim that Hanson's use of the term ‘unpicturable’ may be, at worst, infelicitous, and that his thesis concerning micro- or property-reduction remains unaffected by questions concerning what we can or cannot picture.
Systems, Inquiry, and the Meanings of Falsification
Authors: Mitroff Ian I.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration ; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can never be more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted.
The Meaning and Status of Newton's Law of Inertia and the Nature of Gravitational Forces
Authors: Earman J. , Friedman M.
Published: November 2002

A four dimensional approach to Newtonian physics is used to distinguish between a number of different structures for Newtonian space-time and a number of different formulations of Newtonian gravitational theory. This in turn makes possible an in-depth study of the meaning and status of Newton's Law of Inertia and a detailed comparison of the Newtonian and Einsteinian versions of the Law of Inertia and the Newtonian and Einsteinian treatments of gravitational forces. Various claims about the status of Newton's Law of Inertia are critically examined including these: the Law of Inertia is not an empirical law but a definition; it is not a law simpliciter but a family of schemata; it is a convention and gravitational forces exist only by convention; it is (or is not) redundant; the concepts it embodies can be dispensed with in favor of operationally defined entities; it is unique for a given theory. More generally, the paper demonstrates the importance of space-time structure for the philosophy of space and time and provides support for a realist interpretation of space-time theories.
Demonstrative Induction: Its Significant Role in the History of Physics
Authors: Dorling Jon
Published: November 2002

It is argued in this paper that the valid argument forms coming under the general heading of Demonstrative Induction have played a highly significant role in the history of theoretical physics. This situation was thoroughly appreciated by several earlier philosophers of science and deserves to be more widely known and understood.
Higher Order Probabilities and Coherence
Authors: Uchii Soshichi
Published: November 2002

It is well known that a degree-of-belief function P is coherent if and only if it satisfies the probability calculus. In this paper, we show that the notion of coherence can be extended to higher order probabilities such as P(P(h) = p) = q, and that a higher order degree-of-belief function P is coherent if and only if it satisfies the probability calculus plus the following axiom: P(h) = p iff P(P(h) = p) = 1. Also, a number of lemmata which extend an incomplete probability function to a complete one are established.
Special Relativity in Accelerated Systems
Authors: Giannoni Carlo B.
Published: November 2002

Within Special Relativity accelerated systems can be described as those systems in which standard clock synchronism does not hold. Therefore, the ε-generalized Lorentz equations derived by Winnie are the equations governing accelerated systems. The ε-generalized equation for time is used in analyzing two cases of the clock paradox: (1) the case in which a clock travels in a straight line, stops, and returns, and (2) the case in which a clock travels with uniform velocity in a circular path. The treatment of case (1) of the paradox within this generalization of the Special Theory is compared with Møller's treatment of it within the General Theory.
Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?
Authors: Simon Herbert A.
Published: November 2002

It is often claimed that there can be no such thing as a logic of scientific discovery, but only a logic of verification. By ‘logic of discovery’ is usually meant a normative theory of discovery processes. The claim that such a normative theory is impossible is shown to be incorrect; and two examples are provided of domains where formal processes of varying efficacy for discovering lawfulness can be constructed and compared. The analysis shows how one can treat operationally and formally phenomena that have usually been dismissed with fuzzy labels like ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’.