bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
A “Fundamental” Axiomatization of Multiplicative Power Relations Among Three Variables
Authors: Luce R. Duncan
Published: November 2002

Suppose that entities composed of two independent components are qualitatively ordered by a relation that satisfies the axioms of conjoint measurement. Suppose, in addition, that each component has a concatenation operation that, together either with the ordering induced on the component by the conjoint ordering or with its converse, satisfies the axioms of extensive measurement. Without further assumptions, nothing can be said about the relation between the numerical scales constructed from the two measurement theories except that they are strictly monotonic. An axiom is stated that relates the two types of measurement theories, seems to cover all cases of interest in physics, and is sufficient to establish that (the multiplicative form of) the conjoint measurement scales are power functions of the extensive measurement scales.
The Problem of Counterfactuals
Authors: Tredwell R. F.
Published: November 2002

The “problem of counterfactuals,” as proposed by Goodman and Chisholm, cannot be solved. However, a similar program, pioneered by Hiż and Mrs. Milmed, but largely neglected, can be completed and promises a satisfactory analysis of subjunctive conditionals.
Theoretical Terms and Partial Definitions
Authors: Winnie John A.
Published: November 2002

The problem of the interpretation of theoretical terms is outlined, and some difficulties connected with the distinction between partial definitions and empirical postulates are discussed. A reconstruction is sketched which is intended to explicate the ‘definitional’ character of partial definitions. Finally, some implications for the methodology of theory construction are indicated.
Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities
Authors: Resnik Michael David
Published: November 2002

This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities in the paradoxical position of maintaining that it is no theory at all. Moreover, his metaphysics rules out well-known suggestions for avoiding this difficulty.
Four Simple Systems of Modal Propositional Logic
Authors: Massey Gerald J.
Published: November 2002

Four progressively ambitious systems of modal propositional logic are set forth, together with decision procedures. The simultaneous employment of parenthesis notation and parenthesis-free notation, the dual use of symbols as primitive and defined, and the introduction of a new modal operator (the truth operator) are the principal devices used to effect the development of these logics. The first two logics turn out to be “the same” as two of von Wright's systems.
Limitations of Formalization
Authors: Politis Constantine
Published: November 2002

After several decades during which formalization has flourished it now becomes possible to detect its shortcomings. A definition of formalization is given at the outset. It is next shown that the main justification of formalization as making explicit the form of a proof has serious difficulties. An important shortcoming is found in the fact that many validation procedures in logic and mathematics are not adequately represented deductively. Several such procedures relating to the validation of logical and mathematical sentences are examined. It is concluded that formalization is materially inadequate.
Quine, Synonymy and Logical Truth
Authors: Barrett Robert
Published: November 2002

W. V. O. Quine's well-known attack upon the analytic-synthetic distinction is held to affect only one of the two species of analytic statements he distinguishes. In particular it is not directed at and does not affect the so-called logical truths. In this paper the scope of Quine's attack is extended so as to embrace the logical truths as well. It is shown that the unclarifiability of the notion of ‘synonymy’ deprives us not only of “analytic statements that are obtainable from logical truths by the replacement of synonyms with synonyms” but of “logical truths” themselves.
The Non-Reducibility of Koopman's Theorems of Probability in Carnap's System for Mc
Authors: Jones Robert M.
Published: November 2002

Carnap gives a definition for a comparative concept of confirmation. For it he uses the notation “MC(h, e, h′, e′).” His defined notation is intended to be an explicatum for the explicandum: “the hypothesis h is confirmed by the evidence e equally strongly or more strongly than h′ by e′” ([1], p. 428).
Katz on the Vindication of Induction
Authors: Clendinnen F. John
Published: November 2002

J. J. Katz in “The Problem of Induction and its Solution” argues that not only a validation but also a vindication of induction is impossible. In the course of his argument a number of interesting issues arise about what is actually required for a satisfactory vindication. The aim of those who have sought to provide a vindication for induction has been to show that it is the most satisfactory means for forming expectations about the future; they have accepted the impossibility of showing that induction must, or will probably, lead to true predictions. Feigl gives a general characterisation of vindication as an “argument concerning means with respect to ends” and contrasts it to validation which is a justification of a knowledge claim by establishing it as true or probably true. We cannot validate the rules of induction but we can give a vindication of the adoption of these rules ([1], pp. 136-7). Katz accepts Feigl's distinction in general terms but proposes some modifications to meet certain defects which he believes to be present in the latter's account. Katz distinguishes two senses of vindication, an “expediency vindication” which “establishes a justificandum as a suitable means,” while a “preferability vindication” “establishes the justificandum as the preferable means for achieving the end.” An expediency vindication shows that the proposed means is a sufficient condition for achieving the end in view, but it need not establish this means as necessary to achieve this end. A preferability vindication will establish the means as necessary to achieve this end in the best way ([2], pp. 26-8). He then proceeds as follows: “an argument which demonstrates that a justificandum is a necessary condition—but only a necessary condition—for achieving the relevant end is not a real vindication.” He holds that the vindication of a certain means must show at least that it will achieve the end sought, and preferably that it is the best way of achieving this end ([2], p. 28).
Nelson Goodman's Entrenchment Theory
Authors: Kahane Howard
Published: November 2002

One of the fundamental problems in the fields of inductive logic and the philosophy of science is the one concerning inferences or projections containing so-called “grue-like” or “pathological” predicates. This problem was first put into sharp focus by Nelson Goodman, who called it the “new riddle of induction.”

Goodman has shown that the few attempts by others to solve this problem (which appear in the literature) are not adequate. However, very little has been written concerning Goodman's own attempt to solve the problem, namely his theory of entrenchment. The purpose of this article is to show that Goodman's entrenchment theory also is inadequate as a solution to the new riddle of induction. I shall try to do this by presenting two kinds of counterexamples to the entrenchment theory: one kind illustrating a general objection to the theory as a whole ; the other kind, specific objections to particular (vital) parts of the theory.
On Theoretical Constructs and Ramsey Constants
Authors: Martin R. M.
Published: November 2002

The method of Ramsey sentences has been proposed for handling theoretical constructs within a scientific system. Essentially it consists of constructing a certain “monolithic” sentence for an entire theory. In this present paper several improvements are suggested which help to overcome some of the awkward features of the method. In particular we have here many Ramsey sentences rather than just one, each erstwhile primitive theoretical term giving rise to a Ramsey sentence. Such a sentence in effect defines what we call a Ramsey constant. Using Ramsey constants, we attempt to improve the method in important logical and semantical respects. It is suggested also that such constants are of interest for the philosophy of mathematics.
Von Neumann's Argument for the Projection Postulate
Authors: Sneed Joseph D.
Published: November 2002

Much of the recent discussion of problematic aspects of quantum-mechanical measurement centers around that feature of quantum theory which is called “the projection postulate.” This is roughly the claim that a change of a certain sort occurs in the state of a physical system when a measurement is made on the system. In this paper an argument for the projection postulate due to von Neumann is considered. Attention is focused on trying to provide an understanding of the notion of “the state of a physical system” which is compatible with the argument von Neumann offers. An attempt is made to formulate the argument in terms of an objectivistic interpretation of probability concepts. It is seen that such an interpretation does not provide a suitable way of understanding the argument. An attempt is made to illustrate the source of this failure in terms of a non-quantum-mechanical example.
Freedom and the Marxist Philosophy of History
Authors: Addis Laird
Published: November 2002

Many believe that the Marxist philosophy of history entails that man is not free in a sense in which it seems obvious that he is. In particular it is held to be (1) materialistic, (2) holistic, (3) economistic, and (4) fatalistic. It is claimed, in short, that since the Marxist philosophy of history has these features, man is not capable of shaping his own (social) destiny if it is true. I show for each of these features either that it does not entail what it is believed to entail or that it is not correctly attributed to the Marxist philosophy of history.
Objectivism and Interactionism
Authors: Margolis Joseph
Published: November 2002

The views of linguistic analysts and objectivists are explored with regard to the question of interactionism. It is argued that the admission of a logical difference between explanation by cause and explanation by motive cannot disqualify causal explanations of human action, cannot be construed as challenging the competence of science, and cannot count against interactionism. It is also argued that objectivist programs for eliminating mentalistic concepts either implicitly admit interactionism or cannot distinguish relevantly between interactionism and parallelism.
Objectivism vs. Subjectivism in the Social Sciences
Authors: Diesing Paul
Published: November 2002

Recent developments in social science methods have made most of the objectivism-subjectivism arguments in the philosophy of social science obsolete. Developments in experimental methods have made possible a behavioristic treatment of everything cherished as important in human action by the subjectivists; developments in computer and mathematical models have made possible a type of theory which carries out the program of the subjectivists but is not vulnerable to the arguments of the objectivists. What remains of the philosophical argument are two types of theory (for example, game theory and learning theory) which are both useful, both scientific, and frequently equivalent. Choice between them by scientists can be made on empirical grounds rather than on the grounds developed in the philosophical controversy.
Extensionality and Randomness in Probability Sequences
Authors: Cannavo S.
Published: November 2002

The charge that the limit-frequency theory of probability is inconsistent due to incompatibility between the required features of randomness and limit convergence is inapplicable when probability sequences are taken to be empirically (i.e., extensionally) generated, as they must be on a strictly empirical conception of probability.

All past attempts to meet this charge by formulating constructive definitions of randomness that would still allow for a demonstrable limit-convergence have, in their exclusive concern with logically (i.e., intensionally) prescribed sequences, left the logic of extensional classes essentially untouched. In the light of a strict differentiation between intensional and extensional classes a generalized approach is possible under which several closely connected senses of randomness, i.e., the formal, material, restricted and unrestricted senses may be easily distinguished and related to the notion of relevance.
On Semantic Pitfalls of Biological Adaptation
Authors: Ghiselin Michael T.
Published: November 2002

“Adaptation” has several meanings which have often been confused, including relations, processes, states, and intrinsic properties. It is used in comparative and historical contexts. “Adaptation” and “environment” may designate probabilistic concepts. Recognition of these points refutes arguments for the notions that: 1) all organisms are perfectly adapted; 2) organisms cannot be ill-adapted and survive or well-adapted and die; 3) adaptation is necessarily relative to the environment; 4) change in environment is necessary for evolution; 5) preadaptation implies teleology. Such notions are associated with metaphysical ideas, and may affect the thinking of biologists.
Complementarity and Relativity
Authors: Kouznetsov B.
Published: November 2002

Such difficulties in the theory of elementary particles as the infinite magnitudes of energy and charge when one takes into account a particle's interactions with vacuum, call for a radical synthesis and generalization of quantum and relativistic ideas if a real solution is to be obtained. It is purposed here to demonstrate that, if a synthesis of this kind is aimed at, the analysis of the concept of being may be of some heuristic value.
Cosmological Horizons
Authors: Swinburne R. G.
Published: November 2002

Horizons are frontiers between things observable and things unobservable. Even if such horizons exist we may extrapolate from observable to non-observable regions of the universe by

(a)

using the laws of physics which tell us how a presently observable galaxy will evolve even when we can no longer observe it, and

(b)

using the cosmological principle, which tells us that the physical situation beyond the horizon is by and large the same as the physical situation within the horizon.

It would be paradoxical to define the universe in terms of objects or events within a horizon because it is only in virtue of information about objects and events outside the horizon that we have reason to believe that the horizon exists.
Induction and Objectivity
Authors: Clendinnen F. John
Published: November 2002

This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of predicting. While objectivity is not a necessary condition for successful predicting, it is a sufficient condition for the possession of a property that is, in turn, a necessary condition for correct predicting; and further there could be no reason to expect any non-objective method to possess this necessary condition for success.

Induction is the only objective method of predicting for it alone uses facts which must be identified by any predicting method based on rules; and it alone uses these facts according to a relationship that must hold between facts and any meaningful empirical statement. Any alternative to induction must assume that the factual regularities that have been detected will alter in the future and the way they are expected to alter must be arbitrary. It is further claimed that this vindication is proof against the criticisms that have been advanced against practicalist justifications of induction.
Nomological Necessity and the Paradoxes of Confirmation
Authors: Skyrms Brian
Published: November 2002

“What might have been is an abstraction Remaining a perpetual possibility Only in the world of speculation.”

T. S. Eliot

Burnt Norton

Some of the concerns which motivate attempts to provide a philosophical reduction of nomological necessity are briefly introduced in I. In II, Hempel's treatment of the paradoxes is contrasted with a position which holds that nomological necessity is a pragmatic dimension of laws of nature, and that this pragmatic dimension is of such a type that it prevents laws of nature from contraposing. Such a position is, however, untenable unless (i) the sense of ‘pragmatics’ at issue is specified, and the possibility of pragmatic differences resulting in differences in confirmation is defended, and (ii) a relevant pragmatic difference between contrapositives is indicated. III attempts to satisfy condition (i) by developing a new sense of pure pragmatics and argues that some remarks by Goodman and Scheffler together with work on the logic of explanation by Dr. Rescher and myself suggest that nomological contrapositives are not pragmatically equivalent (i.e. substitutable salva veritate in the pure pragmatics of an ideal scientific language). If such is the case, condition (ii) is also satisfied.
Probability and Decision
Authors: Kyburg H. E.
Published: November 2002

One hears increasingly from philosophers that statistical inference is a technical study that is well in control by statisticians and should be left to them; and one hears, increasingly, from mathematical statisticians that all this talk about interpretations of probability is so much philosophical frosting that is utterly irrelevant to the serious business of producing mathematical statistics. “The more interpretations of probability there are, the wider the scope of applications of our purely mathematical theories.” The point of this paper is to present, in detail, a situation in which an individual withgivendegrees of belief,givenevidence, andgivenvalues, will have three differentand contrarycourses of action recommended to him, each according to one of the three most popular interpretations of probability.
Some Decision Factors in Scientific Investigation
Authors: Emmerich David S. , Greeno James G.
Published: November 2002

An empirical law or evidence which supports a theory tends to have the greatest scientific value when it seemed improbable before it was investigated. Evidence which falsifies a theory tends to have the greatest value when it seemed probable that the investigation would confirm the theory. A scientist who wishes to optimize his contribution to knowledge probably will investigate most frequently hypotheses which seem neither very probable nor very improbable of being confirmed. This strategy leads neither to a maximum number of confirmations of a theory, nor to a set of tests which are maximally severe.
The Laws of Logic
Authors: Klemke E. D.
Published: November 2002

In Reason and Analysis, Prof. Brand Blanshard criticises the logical empiricist view regarding necessary statements, including the laws of logic. He distinguishes four component theses of this view: (I) Necessary statements—here, the laws of logic—are resolutions or reports of linguistic usage. (II) They are conventions. (III) They are analytic (tautologies). (IV) They say nothing about the world. In this paper I first show that Prof. Blanshard is essentially right in his criticisms of (I), (II), and (IV); but that he has done nothing to show that (III) is incorrect with regard to the laws of logic. Then, second, I attempt to show that even though (I), (II), and (more importantly) (IV) are false, (III) is true. That is, the laws of logic are tautologies, and yet, in a sense to be distinguished, they say something about the world.
Explanation in Psychoanalysis and History
Authors: Madden Edward H.
Published: November 2002

A number of authors recently have pointed out what they think are enlightening similarities between psychoanalysis and history. In stressing such similarities they are usually trying to justify their own particular characterization of psychoanalysis. I show wherein I think these characterizations go wrong and at the same time try my own hand at clarifying the nature of psychoanalytic propositions.
Mathematical Proof and Experimental Proof
Authors: Copeland Arthur H.
Published: November 2002

In studies of scientific methodology, surprisingly little attention has been given to tests of hypotheses. Such testing constitutes a methodology common to various scientific disciplines and is an essential factor in the development of science since it determines which theories are retained. The classical theory of tests is a major accomplishment but requires modification in order to produce a theory that accounts for the success of science. The revised theory is an analysis of the nondeductive aspect of scientific reasoning. It results in a new definition of probability and a nonclassical point of view with regard to the foundations of probability.
Can Quantum Mechanics be Formulated as a Classical Probability Theory?
Authors: Cohen Leon
Published: November 2002

It is shown that quantum mechanics cannot be formulated as a stochastic theory involving a probability distribution function of position and momentum. This is done by showing that the most general distribution function which yields the proper quantum mechanical marginal distributions cannot consistently be used to predict the expectations of observables if phase space integration is used. Implications relating to the possibility of establishing a “hidden” variable theory of quantum mechanics are discussed.
Cause and Counterfactual
Authors: Simon Herbert A. , Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

It is shown how a causal ordering can be defined in a complete structure, and how it is equivalent to identifying the mechanisms of a system. Several techniques are shown that may be useful in actually accomplishing such identification. Finally, it is shown how this explication of causal ordering can be used to analyse causal counterfactual conditionals. First the counterfactual proposition at issue is articulated through the device of a belief-contravening supposition. Then the causal ordering is used to provide modal categories for the factual propositions, and the logical contradiction in the system is resolved by ordering the factual propositions according to these causal categories.
Inexactness and Explanation
Authors: Mellor D. H.
Published: November 2002

The paper∗∗ discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity.
Physicalism, the Identity Theory, and the Doctrine of Emergence
Authors: Kekes John
Published: November 2002

I Physicalism, and the weak identity theory deny, while physicalism2 and the radical identity theory assert, that raw feels can be accomodated in a purely physicalistic framework.

II A way of interpreting the claim of physicalism1 is that raw feels are emergents.

III The doctrine of emergence asserts that: (i) there are different levels of existence, (ii) these levels of existence are distinguishable on the basis of the behaviour of entities of that level, and (iii) an adequate scientific explanation of a lower level is inadequate for a higher level.

IV The criteria of emergence are novelty and a priori unpredictability.

V Either qualities or laws or both may be regarded as emergents.

VI If the alleged impossibility of explaining higher level phenomena on the basis of explanation adequate for lower level phenomena is logical, then the impossibility is either trivial or it implies indeterminism.

Consideration of theories of emergence:

VII Semantic emergence. On this view emergence is theory-bound, analogous to indefinability or indemonstrability.

VIII Methodological emergence. On this view what we regard as emergents depends on the theory we construct.

IX Nomological emergence. On this view emergence is an empirical problem.

Conclusion: if there are emergents, physicalism2 and the radical identity theory probably have to be abandoned. However, unless actual examples of emergents are produced both theories hold. The logical possibility of falsification is not an objection against physicalism2 and the radical identity theory; it is one of their merits.
Discussion: Coombs' Theory of Data
Authors: Thompson John W.
Published: November 2002

A working theory can involve a compromise between pragmatic application and pure theory. This is illustrated by the development of Coombs's theory of data. The original version of the theory purported to guide investigators in the use of scaling techniques, but subsequent revisions including a logico-mathematical statement of the theory do not show whether the practical recommendations made earlier still apply. These practical recommendations, some of which Coombs has discarded to obtain a comprehensive theory, are important in spite of shortcomings as they reveal differences between attitude and mental test data. The different forms of Coombs's theory point to the existence of a general problem, how to find a compromise between practice and pure theory.
Discussion: Feyerabend and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation
Authors: Butts Robert E.
Published: November 2002

Central to Paul K. Feyerabend's philosophy of science are two theses: (1) there is no standard observation language available to science; instead, observability is to be viewed as a pragmatic matter; and (2) when considering questions of empirical significance and experimental test, the methodological unit of science is a set of inconsistent theories. I argue that the pragmatic theory of observation by itself decides neither for nor against any particular specification of meaning for an observation language; and that Feyerabend's position provides no decision procedure when two contending theories share no terms having the same meaning, and thus cannot be said to be logically incompatible. Also, Feyerabend's insistence upon falsification will force him to admit that there are relatively permanent facts available to all theories, or to abandon the idea of test as falsification and to conclude that scientific theories can only be accepted or rejected on the basis of non-evidential considerations.
Imprecision and Explanation
Authors: Mellor D. H.
Published: November 2002

The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations.
Dispositional Properties
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

An analysis of problematic dispositional predicates like ‘soluble’ is presented. The analysis attempts to combine cogent features of opposed previous analyses of Carnap and Bergmann, while avoiding problematic features of both. The suggestion that there is an ambiguity in negations of assertions of dispositional properties, and a consequent distinction between “not soluble” and “insoluble,” lies at the core of the solution.
Theory in History
Authors: Goldstein Leon J.
Published: November 2002

Present-day interest in history among philosophers seems largely limited to a debate over the nature of historical explanation among those who for Humean reasons insist that all explanations must rest upon general laws and history cannot be an exception to this, and those who say the historians do explain and since they do not use general laws the Humean claim is obviously mistaken. Like the latter, the present paper takes the explanations of historians seriously, but unlike the latter it is not willing to limit the role of philosophy of history merely to the elucidation of the language in which historians give final expression of their work. Rather it recognizes that those explanations themselves set the stage for further inquiry in that they are required to be justified. It is here that the theories or general laws demanded by Humean analysis come in. After examining examples of general laws offered by way of example of what the “Humean” philosophers are supposed to have in mind, each of which is an immediate generalization of the explanation it is called upon to explain and is, hence, an instance of what has been called “the dogma of universality,” some examples of more promising prospects of theory in history are examined.
Deductive Explanation and Prediction Revisited
Authors: Suchting W. A.
Published: November 2002

The paper has two main aims. The first is to reformulate Hempel's version of the thesis of the symmetry of explanation and prediction, as regards the deductive covering-law model, so as to generalise it and make it no longer subject to some of the criticisms which have been directed at it (Section II). The second aim is to consider, with special critical reference to Hempel's recent treatment in Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York and London, 1965), some central criticisms of both the constituent parts of the above symmetry thesis, viz. that adequate explanations are potentially predictive (Section III), and that adequate predictive arguments are potentially explanatory (Section IV).
Discussion Kuhn on Scientific Revolutions
Authors: Purtill Richard L.
Published: November 2002

T. S. Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, [1], is a long and complex work, containing a large number of examples and arguments bearing on questions in the philosophy, history, and sociology of science. My treatment of it here will necessarily be limited, but I will try to state its main theses and discuss them insofar as this can be done without detailed examination of the examples cited from the history of science.
Discussion on the D-Thesis
Authors: Swanson J. W.
Published: November 2002

Reanimated for the contemporary literature in the writings of Quine ([15]), [16]) and Kuhn [7], the conventionalism of Duhem [2] and Poincaré [12] has emerged in the last few years as one of the genuinely interesting topics in the philosophy of science. The theory in question—let us follow Grünbaum [3] in calling it the D-thesis, after its founder, Pierre Duhem—claims three things: (1) a single scientific hypothesis H is never disconfirmable in isolation from its fellow; (2) every single hypothesis H of science presupposes, explicitly or implicitly, the support of a conjunction A = A, • A2 • … • Am of auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses; (3) the failure of an observational consequence of H in face of contradictory evidence disconfirms only the conjunction of H and A, not H alone—i.e. establishes only ∼ (H • A). The logical picture is as follows:
Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox
Authors: Meehl Paul E.
Published: November 2002

Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching ½ of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by “success” is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. “Statistical significance” plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental “cuteness” and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation.
Conventionality in Distant Simultaneity
Authors: Ellis Brian , Bowman Peter
Published: November 2002

In his original paper of 1905, “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, Einstein described a procedure for synchronizing distant clocks at rest in any inertial system K. Clocks thus synchronized may be said to be in standard signal synchrony in K. It has often been claimed that there are no logical or physical reasons for preferring standard signal synchronizations to any of a range of possible non-standard ones. In this paper, the range of consistent non-standard signal synchronizations, first for any one inertial system, and second for any set of such systems, is investigated, and it is shown that the requirement of consistency leaves much less room for choice than is commonly supposed. Nevertheless consistent non-standard signal synchronizations appear to be possible. However, it is also shown that good physical reasons for preferring standard signal synchronizations exist, if the Special Theory of Relativity yields correct predictions.

The thesis of the conventionality of distant simultaneity espoused particularly by Reichenbach and Grünbaum is thus either trivialized or refuted.
Approaches to Reduction
Authors: Schaffner Kenneth F.
Published: November 2002

Four current accounts of theory reduction are presented, first informally and then formally: (1) an account of direct theory reduction that is based on the contributions of Nagel, Woodger, and Quine, (2) an indirect reduction paradigm due to Kemeny and Oppenheim, (3) an “isomorphic model” schema traceable to Suppes, and (4) a theory of reduction that is based on the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn. Reference is made, in an attempt to choose between these schemas, to the explanation of physical optics by Maxwell's electromagnetic theory, and to the revisions of genetics necessitated by partial biochemical reductions of genetics. A more general reduction schema is proposed which: (1) yields as special cases the four reduction paradigms considered above, (2) seems to be in better accord with both the canons of logic and actual scientific practice, and (3) clarifies the problems of meaning variance and ontological reduction.
What is a Game?
Authors: Suits Bernard
Published: November 2002

By means of a critical examination of a number of theses as to the nature of game-playing, the following definition is advanced: To play a game is to engage in activity directed toward bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by specific rules, where the means permitted by the rules are more limited in scope than they would be in the absence of the rules, and where the sole reason for accepting such limitation is to make possible such activity.
Are Biological Species Real?
Authors: Lehman Hugh
Published: November 2002

Difficulties with the typological concept of species led biologists to reject the “typological” presupposition of an archetype which is manifest in each member of a species. The resulting concept of species, which is here called the phenotypic species concept, is considered as implying that biological species are not real. Modern population thinking has given rise to the concept of a species as a gene-pool. This modern concept is contrasted here with the phenotypic concept in light of some general criteria for evaluating species concepts and is shown to be more satisfactory. Finally, it is held that to ask if a species is real is to ask whether the species grouping arrived at by applying the principles involved in the species concept corresponds with groups of organisms amongst which important biological relationships exist. It is argued that in this sense species, as defined by the gene-pool concept, are certainly real.
Discussion: Professor Marcucci on Whewell's Idealism
Authors: Butts Robert E.
Published: November 2002

Professor Marcucci's book on Whewell [6] is a comprehensive expository treatment of Whewell's philosophy of science. The work contains chapters on Whewell's theory of ideas, the fundamental principles of his philosophy of science, his views on mathematics and mechanics, and on his philosophy of induction and philosophy of discovery. In addition there is a chapter on the English reception of Whewell's thought. Professor Marcucci's notes are rich, both in references to Whewell's many critics and to nearly all of the extant literature on Whewell. Indeed, no full study of Whewell has as yet appeared that makes better or more extensive use of all the relevant literature on Whewell.
Discussion: Reply to Ackermann
Authors: Kahane Howard
Published: November 2002

Permit me to reply to the recent note [1] in this journal by Robert J. Ackermann, concerning my critical comments (in [4]) on Nelson Goodman's entrenchment theory.
Discussion: Conflict and Decision
Authors: Ackermann Robert J.
Published: November 2002

In Howard Kahane's current reply to my previous discussion of Goodman's elimination rules, he suggests both that the notion of conflict required by the first elimination rule cannot be made clear, and that both proposed revisions of the second elimination rule are too strong [4]. These seem to me to be the points which require settlement, and I would like to discuss them in this paper.
On Going Backward in Time
Authors: Earman John
Published: November 2002

This paper presents a critical examination of claims advanced by several philosophers to the effect that ‘time travel’ represents a physical possibility and that the interpretation of certain actually observed phenomena in terms of ‘time travel’ is both legitimate and advantageous. It is argued that (a) no convincing motivation for the introduction of the time travel hypothesis has been presented; (b) no coherent and interesting sense of ‘going backward in time’ has been supplied which makes ‘time travel’ compatible with Special Relativity; (c) even the conceptual possibility of ‘time travel’ is an unsettled and somewhat nebulous question.
On Theories of Fieldwork and the Scientific Character of Social Anthropology
Authors: Jarvie I. C.
Published: November 2002

The following intellectual as opposed to practical reasons for all anthropologists doing fieldwork are examined: fieldwork: (1) records dying societies, (2) corrects ethnocentric bias, (3) helps put customs in their true context, (4) helps get the “feel” of a place, (5) helps to get to understand a society from the inside, (6) enables appreciation of what translating one culture into terms of another involves, (7) makes one a changed man, (8) provides the observational, factual basis for generalizations. None of these is found sufficient to make fieldwork imperative for all anthropologists, although they are quite sufficient to allow that it is imperative for anthropology as a whole that fieldwork in some form by some people continue. In place of the view of fieldwork as an essential preparation for doing anthropology, an alternative role for it is explored: namely as a testing procedure. The implications of this—that the study of problems and the articulation of theories can usefully proceed prior to or even independently of fieldwork—are drawn out, and a new institution of selective fieldwork is proposed.
On the Significance of Choice Sets with Incompatibilities
Authors: Walsh Vivian Charles
Published: November 2002

The axiom of comparability has been a fundamental part of mathematical choice theory from its beginnings. This axiom was a natural first assumption for a theory of choice originally constructed to explain decision making where other assumptions such as continuous divisibility of choice spaces could legitimately also be made. Once the generality of application of formal choice theory becomes apparent, it also becomes apparent that both continuity assumptions and the axiom of comparability may be unduly restrictive and lead to the neglect of decision situations which are important and which can be handled on a modified axiom set. These considerations bear on the philosophical analysis of the concept of rational decision.
Particulars and Acquaintance
Authors: Addis Laird
Published: November 2002

Philosophers who hold that the correct ontological analysis of things includes both properties and particulars have often been pressed to “show” the particular. If we are not acquainted with them, it is argued, then we should not suppose that they exist. I argue that, while we do have good and sufficient reasons for supposing there to be particulars, we are not acquainted with them. To suppose that we are acquainted with them is to treat particulars as if they were properties and to fail to realize how radically different particulars are from properties. The relevance of these matters to some considerations of “simplicity” and the principles of empiricism is explored.
Things, Relations and Identity
Authors: Allaire Edwin B.
Published: November 2002

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and non-identity.
Newman and Explanation-Sketches
Authors: Goh S. T.
Published: November 2002

In his article “Explanation Sketches” [3], Fred Newman argues that Scriven is mistaken in his interpretation of Hempel's notion of explanation sketch. According to Scriven, to complete an explanation is to fill in further initial conditions so that the explanandum of the sketch would be entailed by the new enlarged set of initial conditions. The point may be alternatively put by saying that according to Scriven to have a complete explanation is to have a covering-law which connects initial conditions with the explanandum of the original sketch. Now Scriven's point against the deductive theory as applied to History is just that very often when we try to complete a given explanation sketch, we only succeed in unearthing a law which is either false or else trivial. Newman, however, contends that this is an excusable but, nevertheless, unsympathetic way of interpreting Hempel. He suggests an alternative account to the effect that to complete an explanation we need not necessarily produce a covering-law connecting initial conditions with the explanandum; all we need to do is to mention other initial conditions and certain laws which need not necessarily contain mention of the explanandum of the sketch. As he himself puts the point: “However, generously interpreted, when Hempel speaks of a sketch vaguely indicating laws we may take him as merely suggesting that some laws are vaguely indicated which would make up theexplanansof an explanation of the event in question—not necessarily in the terms whichdescribe the event in the sketch's explanandum.” ([3], p. 170).
Explanation and Prediction: A Plea for Reason
Authors: Angel R. B.
Published: November 2002

Anyone, today, with even a slight interest in the methodology of science will be aware of the heated debate which has raged in regard to the thesis of the logical symmetry between explanation and prediction, which is entailed by the hypotheticodeductive account of scientific theory. The symmetry thesis, which received its classical exposition in a well-known article by Hempel and Oppenheim [2], has been subject to a steadily growing criticism by several eminent thinkers. My intention, in this article, is to argue that the current reaction to the Hempel-Oppenheim position, as exemplified by Professors Hanson, Scriven, et al., represents a retrograde movement in the philosophy of science, which, as the number of its converts grows, could undermine the progress, which has been accomplished in the broad tradition that extends from Mach and Poincaré through the Vienna Circle to the present day. Specifically, it is my contention that the aforementioned reaction is symptomatic of a contemporary trend in the direction of irrationalism which, of all branches of philosophy, the philosophy of science should seek to dispel rather than to foster. For the sake of brevity, I propose to focus my remarks wholly on the original widely read article of Hanson on this subject [1]. That I single out this particular source should not be taken to belie the admiration I hold for the masterful scholarship of its author.
Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability
Authors: Savage Leonard J.
Published: November 2002

We statisticians, with our specific concern for uncertainty, are even more liable than other practical men to encounter philosophy, whether we like it or not. For my part, I like it comparatively well. That is why the honor of opening this session of discussion has come to me, though my background makes my knowledge and idiom somewhat different from your own.
Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: November 2002

A person required to risk money on a remote digit of π would, in order to comply fully with the theory [of personal probability] have to compute that digit, though this would really be wasteful if the cost of computation were more than the prize involved. For the postulates of the theory imply that you should behave in accordance with the logical implications of all that you know. Is it possible to improve the theory in this respect, making allowance within it for the cost of thinking, or would that entail paradox?
Amplifying Personal Probability Theory: Comments on L. J. Savage's “Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability”
Authors: Shimony Abner
Published: November 2002

Professor Savage has been candid and generous in stating his interest in philosophy, and the philosophers who have heard him are surely grateful for this. His attitude is very far from that of some competent scientists and mathematicans who purport to clear up the questions which philosophers raise concerning their disciplines by means of a battery of technical results of varying relevance—a procedure which can often be appropriately described as “an abominable snow-job.” However, Professor Savage's generosity places a responsibility on philosophers, since the questions he raises are difficult.
A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability
Authors: Bolker Ethan D.
Published: November 2002

This paper contributes to the mathematical foundations of the model for utility theory developed by Richard Jeffrey inThe Logic of Decision[5]. In it I discuss the relationship of Jeffrey's to classical models, state and interpret an existence theorem for numerical utilities and subjective probabilities and restate a theorem on their uniqueness.