bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Another View
Authors: Levy Frank , Truman Edwin M.
Published: May 2006

This paper observes that analyses of the process of decentralization often fail to recognize that constraints are imposed by the nature of the organization being examined. In particular, the analysis of an organization producing economic goods can be misleading if applied, without qualification, to organizations producing government goods. Taking as its point of departure the analysis of an economic organization, the article focuses on three salient differences in the operation of the two types of organizations. First, in the economic organization both its personnel and its clients agree on the items produced. In the government organization there may be substantial disagreement about what should be produced. Second, in the economic organization the information flows will generally be of a compact numerical form. In the government organization the information flow will often not take a numerical form. Information transmission will be less dense and, therefore, more expensive. Third, in the economic organization prices act as “sufficient statistics,” which completely measure the organization's performance of its objective (profit maximization). For many government organizations no such sufficient statistics exist.
Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election
Authors: Converse Philip E. , Miller Warren E. , Rusk Jerrold G. , Wolfe Arthur C.
Published: May 2006

Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace constituted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater proportion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral college stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since taken root.

At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual, within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Republicans followed the most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Republican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnson's shocking announcement that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nominating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.
Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives
Authors: Shapiro Michael J.
Published: May 2006

In recent years the welter of data accumulated on American voting behavior has been continually reanalyzed by social scientists interested in building theories of electoral choice. Most of the original data-gathering enterprises were guided by general theoretical frameworks which, for the most part, were not developed to a point where the ensuing analyses addressed themselves unambiguously to the overall conceptions by which they were guided. As a result much of our knowledge about voting behavior is in the form of generalizations about what social and psychological variables account for voting choices while we lack conceptual frameworks which systematically interrelate these generalizations and provide comprehensive and parsimonious explanation. If any one unifying conception has emerged from the original large scale studies it is that the average voter is irrational. This inference has been derived from a variety of empirical relationships coupled with varying conceptions of rationality.

The more recent reanalyses of these data sets have been characterized by a theoretical sophistication that was lacking heretofore. One of these, a theory of the calculus of voting, has applied some formal rigor to the question of the rationality of the decision to vote, selected empirical equivalents of theoretical entities from survey data on national elections, and conducted a successful test of the theory. Unlike traditional approaches to the rationality question which infer the degree of rationality from quantities of information possessed or from correlates of decisions (background, party affiliation, group memberships, etc.), this investigation conceived of rationality in terms of the kind of calculus employed by the individual in deciding among alternatives (in this case whether or not to vote).
Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change
Authors: Scott James C.
Published: May 2006

The study of political influence in the West has for the most part focused on the process by which interest groups affect the content of legislation; hence, the input process has occupied the center of attention.

Students of politics in the new states of Africa and Asia who have adopted this perspective, however, have been struck by the relative weakness both of interest structures to organize demands and of institutionalized channels through which such demands, once organized, might be communicated to decisionmakers. The open clash of organized interests is often conspicuously absent during the formulation of legislation in these nations. To conclude from this, however, that the public has little or no effect on the eventual “output” of government would be completely unwarranted. Between the passage of legislation and its actual implementation lies an entirely different political arena that, in spite of its informality and particularism, has a great effect on the execution of policy.

Much of the expression of political interests in the new states has been disregarded because Western scholars, accustomed to their own politics, have been looking in the wrong place. A large portion of individual demands, and even group demands, in developing nations reach the political system, not before laws are passed, but rather at the enforcement stage.
A Reactive Linkage Model of the U.S. Defense Expenditure Policymaking Process
Authors: Ostrom Charles W.
Published: May 2006

Several alternative explanations of U.S. defense expenditure policy-making behavior have been heralded as theoretically sound and empirically supported representations of U.S. defense expenditure policy making. This has created an atmosphere in which almost as much effort is directed towards criticizing and/or defending existing explanations as is given to improving them through continued theoretical and empirical investigations. To overcome this impasse, I have developed in this article a working synthesis of three current approaches–Arms Race, Organizational Politics, Bureaucratic Politics–based on the insights and observations of Samuel Huntington (1961), Warner Schilling (1962), Colin Gray (1971), and James Rosenau (1971). The resulting formulation, which is labeled theReactive Linkage Model,characterizes the pattern of U.S. defense spending in terms of an initial response by the armed services to the anticipated USSR expenditure level which is subsequently filtered through the president, Congress, and the Departmen t of Defense to determine the magnitude, scale, and timing of the reaction.

On the basis of the theoretical and empirical analyses here presented, I have reached the following conclusions. First, the Reactive Linkage Model successfully synthesizes the three existing explanations of U.S. defense expenditure policy making into a coherent and plausible whole. Second, the estimated version of the model provides an accurate representation of the pattern of U.S. defense expenditure policy making from 1954 to 1973. Specifically, the individual equations account for a large portion of the variance with parameter estimates that are both sharp and plausible and the model as a whole generates extremely accurate historical forecasts. Finally, I investigate the impact of war, presidential party, and negative public opinion on individual decisions, basing my inquiry on the assumption that the model accurately represents U.S. defense expenditure policy making. The results show that different events have an impact on only some of the steps in the policy-making process and the steps which are so affected vary from event to event. As a consequence of these results, I argue that the Reactive Linkage Model, and hence the idea of combining the key elements from competing explanations, represents a positive step forward in the study of U.S. defense expenditure policy making.
The Political Economy of Charles E. Lindblom
Authors: Anderson Charles W.
Published: May 2006

The consistent theme in Charles E. Lindblom's work is a vision of political economy as constitutional engineering. Lindblom sees the question of institutional design in terms of a mechanical metaphor in which political economic systems are contrived out of relatively simple components. Politics and Markets compares a broad range of capitalist and socialist systems as a means of evaluating market mechanisms and authority structures as instruments of social coordination and control. Lindblom's argument that the privileged power of the corporation poses a problem for liberal market-oriented societies is logically distinct from his case that the corporation fits “oddly” with democratic theory, and the latter may be the more significant theme for further inquiry in political economic theory.
An Alternative Answer to: Who Pays for Defense?
Authors: Hollenhorst Jerry , Ault Gary
Published: May 2006

In a recent article (this Review, 63 [June, 1969]), Bruce Russett attempts to answer the title question by using two-variable regression analysis to estimate the “trade-off” relationships between the defense spending proportion of Gross National Product (GNP) and the other nondefense expenditure proportions of GNP for the 1939–68 period. This paper contends that Russett's method of analysis is misleading because it does not permit the detection of possible subperiod shifts in the trade-off relationships. The results of a multiple regression, dummy variable analysis indicate that significant shifts in both the sign and the numerical values of the trade-off relationships occurred between the three war periods and the peacetime period. Two attempts to identify the reasons for the shifts produced mixed results, but our tentative conclusion is that the shifts are related to subperiod differences in the unemployment rate and the methods of financing defense expenditures.
Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson
Authors: Mueller John E.
Published: May 2006

I think [my grandchildren] will be proud of two things. What I did for the Negro and seeing it through in Vietnam for all of Asia. The Negro cost me 15 points in the polls and Vietnam cost me 20.

Lyndon B. Johnson

With tenacious regularity over the last two and a half decades the Gallup Poll has posed to its cross-section samples of the American public the following query, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way (the incumbent) is handling his job as President?” The responses to this curious question form an index known as “Presidential popularity.” According to Richard Neustadt, the index is “widely taken to approximate reality” in Washington and reports about its behavior are “very widely read” there, including, the quotation above would suggest, the highest circles.

Plotted over time, the index forms probably the longest continuous trend line in polling history. This study seeks to analyze the behavior of this line for the period from the beginning of the Truman administration in 1945 to the end of the Johnson administration in January 1969 during which time the popularity question was asked some 300 times.

Four variables are used as predictors of a President's popularity. These include a measure of the length of time the incumbent has been in office as well as variables which attempt to estimate the influence on his rating of major international events, economic slump and war. To assess the independent impact of each of these variables as they interact in association with Presidential popularity, multiple regression analysis is used as the basic analytic technique.
Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution: An Essay Review
Authors: Rothman Stanley
Published: May 2006

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be the master—that's all.”

Through the Looking Glass

It is not hard to find reasons why Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship has had such widespread influence. Its approach, that of comparative, historical sociology, seeks clues to the present in the past, and Moore demonstrates mastery of a wide range of historical materials. Yet I feel that the book is ultimately unsatisfactory, for it is marred by a lack of respect for its own sources of information and by contradictions and non-sequiturs at critical points in the argument.

In this critique I shall first examine the general thesis of the book and then turn to the case studies which Moore uses to support his arguments. I shall also attempt to account for the sharp contrasts in the quality of scholarship which characterize the study, and will attribute them to Moore's preconceived ideological assumptions about the nature of the good society.
A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964
Authors: Clausen Aage R. , Cheney Richard B.
Published: May 2006

The manifest purpose of the roll call analysis described in this paper is that of demonstrating the existence of two policy dimensions in Congressional voting: economic and welfare. Support is sought for two propositions:

I. Each of the two dimensions appears in both the House and the Senate in each of six Congresses, the 83rd through the 88th, 1953–1964;

II. Roll call voting on the economic policy dimension is more heavily influenced by partisan differences while welfare policy voting is more subject to constituency constraints.

The second proposition is significant as an attempt to distinguish between a policy dimension on which partisan differences appear to be responsible for the greater part of the voting variation, and a policy dimension on which constituency factors have a substantial impact. This bears upon the more general concern with distinguishing those party differences in voting behavior which are a function of an independent partisan factor from those which may be attributed to any number of factors correlated with partisan affiliation. This problem will be viewed from different analytic perspectives, including an analysis of the effects of intra-party and inter-party personnel turnover on the policy positions taken by representatives of the same constituency.
The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980
Authors: Ragsdale Lyn
Published: May 2006

The study provides an empirical analysis of the determinants and consequences of presidential speechmaking, defined as the occurrence of a major, nationally broadcast and televised address. Major speeches delivered by Presidents Truman through Carter are examined during the period 1949-1980. Using a probit analysis, a prediction is made of the likelihood of a major speech occurring within a month, based on the effects of public attitudes, national conditions, and events. The results indicate that changes in public approval ratings and the presence of visible national events increase the likelihood that a president will deliver a speech. Conversely, worsening economic conditions (inflation and unemployment) as well as expanding military situations decrease speechmaking efforts. The findings also demonstrate that a president's popularity increases significantly with the delivery of a major address.
Partisan Orientations over the Long Haul: Results from the Three-Wave Political Socialization Panel Study
Authors: Jennings M. Kent , Markus Gregory B.
Published: May 2006

The present study examines the dynamics of partisanship and voting behavior by utilizing national survey panel data gathered in 1965, 1973, and 1982 from two strategically situated generations—members of the high school senior class of 1965 and their parents. At the aggregate level, generational effects appeared in the persistently weaker partisan attachments of the younger generation. At the individual level, strong effects based on experience and habituation appeared in the remarkable gains occurring in the stability of partisan and other orientations among the young as they aged from their mid-20s to their mid-30s. Dynamic modeling of the relationship between partisanship and voting choice demonstrated that the younger voters had stabilized at an overall weaker level of partisanship, leading to more volatile voting behavior which, in turn, failed to provide the consistent reinforcement needed to intensify preexisting partisan leanings.
A Pragmatic Method for Evaluating Election Schemes through Simulation
Authors: Bordley Robert F.
Published: May 2006

This article combines ideas from ethics, social choice, and political theory to develop a simulation method for assessing the desirability of different voting schemes in different situations. I use the method to evaluate six well-known election systems. My results are intuitive. I find that approval voting seems to be a good voting scheme for mass elections.
Economic Voting and the “Symbolic Politics” Argument: A Reinterpretation and Synthesis
Authors: Stephen Weatherford M.
Published: May 2006

Economic voting is generally regarded as a straightforward political demand for the amelioration of economic grievances. This assumption about motives underlies the implicit theories of politicians and the imputations of interests to voters in aggregate time series models. Several recent articles have argued that voting is not self-interested but a manifestation of “symbolic” preferences at the level of the collectivity. This article places the dispute between personal and collective decision referents into the broader perspective of a multi-stage model of information processing and decision making. Personal and collective decision referents are shown to define the poles of a continuum, and several hypotheses are derived to predict the relative weights assigned to each in the voter's calculus. The model is used in analyses of both the public's evaluations of incumbent economic management and economic voting in different electoral arenas by varying issue publics. Designed to maximize comparability with aggregate studies, this research includes both objective and subjective measures of economic conditions and indexes changes in personal conditions over time from panel data.
Provision of Public Goods and the MCS Experimental Paradigm
Authors: Rapoport Amnon
Published: May 2006

Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (1983) reported the results of a series of experiments in which n subjects each receive a monetary endowment and then may choose privately whether to contribute it to a monetary public good; the good is supplied if a prespecified numberm < nof contributions or more is made. Decision policies maximizing expected value are derived for this experimental paradigm under three different assumptions about the expectations each individual has about the decisions of the othern– I members: A homogeneity assumption postulating that each other member contributes with fixed probability p, a heterogeneity assumption postulating that then– I p's are independently selected from a subjective probability distribution, and a partial homogeneity assumption postulating that then– I members are partitioned into distinct subsets with the same p for all members of each subset. The theoretical and social implications of these assumptions are briefly discussed.
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting
Authors: Bendor Jonathan , Taylor Serge , Gaalen Roland Van
Published: May 2006

The empirical literature on the control of bureaus notes that politicians have difficulty observing bureaucratic output, but this insight is rarely represented informal models. To analyze how bureaus use this uncertainty strategically, we develop a model of expertise-based agenda control, building on the Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983) tradition. We show that under some plausible conditions, bureaus will underestimate the benefits, and overestimate the costs, of their programs. In the model, politicians are neither passive nor omniscient: they anticipate the bureau's strategic behavior and establish a monitoring system to counteract it. This possibility of detection changes the bureau's behavior: even imperfect monitoring reduces the bureau's deception of the legislature, whether or not the legislature's demand for the bureau's services is concealed. Moreover, uncertainty by itself matters: if the legislature makes it harder for a risk-averse bureau chief to predict demand or penalty, the bureau will restrain its deception.
Time and Power in Africa
Authors: Bienen Henry , van de Walle Nicolas
Published: May 2006

Both rapid leadership turnover and remarkably durable leaders can be found side by side in African systems of personal rule. In order to explain differences in time in power among African leaders we employ life tables analysis and hazard models, a multivariate technique. We find that the risk of losing power is a decreasing function of time that is little affected by country or leader particularities. The best predictor of whether a leader will lose power in any given period is the length of rule up to that point.
Modeling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt
Authors: Stewart Philip D. , Hermann Margaret G. , Hermann Charles F.
Published: May 2006

We present a contingency model of Soviet foreign policy making that focuses on decision making in the Politburo. The model is designed around three questions and shows how the answers to these questions determine the likely nature of the decision the Politburo will reach at any point in time. The questions are (1) Whose positions on the Politburo are critical to making a decision? (2) What are the positions or preferences of those who count on the issue under consideration? (3) How are disagreements among these individuals handled? The model is illustrated by examining the Soviet decision to increase significantly the numbers and types of weapons delivered to Egypt in early 1973. Of interest in this case is accounting for the shift in Soviet policy from refusing Egypt offensive weapons to providing them.
A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution
Authors: Plotnick Robert D. , Winters Richard F.
Published: May 2006

This study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists, who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public-good nature of redistribution, and political scientists, who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands. We propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the American states.

The empirical analysis addresses determinants of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children guarantee, adjusted for Medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled. We posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables, such as per-capita income, and latent constructs, such as liberal party control. We specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the LISREL method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients. The findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee.
Marxism and Secular Faith
Authors: Arneson Richard J.
Published: May 2006

It has been argued by Mancur Olson and others that Karl Marx's theory of revolution is logically defective in that front its premises one cannot draw Marx's conclusion that workers will unite to revolt against capitalism. Workers who might wish for large social changes are confronted with a collective action problem that Marx fails to appreciate—so runs the criticism. The critics are assuming that Marx is reasoning from a Hobbesian premise to the effect that insofar as they are rational, individuals act always to fulfill narrowly self-interested goals. This article denies the assumption. In particular it is urged that to make sense of Marx's optimistic hopes about the likely outcome of successful majoritarian working-class revolution, one must attribute to him a secular faith that most people are disposed to play fair with others. This disposition is relatively weak and only sporadically effective in determining behavior, but in the right revolutionary circumstances, Marx hopes, it might play a considerably greater role in this respect. (A circumstance on which Marx places great weight is material abundance.) Being optimistic about the future, Marx cannot be as cynical about human motivation in the present as commentators often take him to be.
The Decline of Class Revisited: Class and Party in England, 1964–1979
Authors: Kelley Jonathan , McAllister Ian , Mughan Anthony
Published: May 2006

Class has long been the preeminent source of political conflict in industrial society, but its electoral influence has declined in recent years. The sources of the decline are not yet firmly established, and moreover the implications for political parties remain unclear. The decline-of-class hypothesis states that parties on the left will decline as the working class becomes more affluent and adopts middle-class styles of conduct. By contrast, the party-appeals hypothesis suggests that as the electorate becomes more middle class, parties of the left will alter their appeals to encompass the growing middle class and so offset the shrinkage of their traditional working-class constituency. This article applies multivariate anaysis to survey data collected in England between 1964 and 1979 to test four specific hypotheses derived from the two scenarios. The results support the decline-of-class theory's prediction that economic development erodes the working-class bases of left-wing parties, but not its claim that the left-wing party's vote declines proportionately. Rather, the results suggest that parties are apparently able to change their appeals to reduce their losses, as argued by the party-appeals theory, but not to eliminate them. It seems that there are restraints on parties' ability to change their appeals, limitations not envisioned by the party appeals theory.
Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party
Authors: Kernell Samuel
Published: May 2006

Midterm congressional elections have been generally viewed as relatively sterile affairs marked by reduced turnout, party voting, and the play of politically idiosyncratic forces such as friends-and-neighbors voting. The usual reduction in the number of seats controlled by the President's party, according to the “surge and decline” thesis, simply reflects the departure of short-term forces which presumably benefited the president's party two years earlier. In this study an alternative thesis is proposed which considers midterm election outcomes within the context of the current political environment. Evaluations of the President's performance are found to be directly associated with congressional preferences over a series of midterm elections from 1946 through 1966. Moreover, controlling for party identification, persons who disapprove of the President's performance were generally more likely to vote and to cast their ballot against the President's party than were his admirers to support it. This “negative voting” bias helps to explain why the Democratic and Republican parties have performed more poorly in those midterm elections during which they occupy the White House.
Hegel as a Social Scientist
Authors: Steinberger Peter J.
Published: May 2006

The purposes of this essay are (1) to identify Hegel's role in the propagation of certain philosophic principles essential to the development of an interpretive social science, (2) to demonstrate in what ways Hegel himself can be understood as an early sociologist, and (3) to indicate those aspects of Hegel's thought that might be of greatest use to contemporary philosophers of social and political inquiry.

The first part of the exposition relies on the Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind in order to outline Hegel's epistemological and methodological recommendations. The second part demonstrates the practical meaning of these recommendations by looking at the analysis of ancient Greece found in the Philosophy of History. It is concluded that this analysis is indeed a social scientific analysis and, moreover, is suggestive of subsequent work by such interpretivists as Weber, Schutz, and G. H. Mead.
On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections
Authors: Ferejohn John A.
Published: May 2006

Several authors have observed a decline in the number of competitive congressional districts during the past two decades. Various explanations have been proposed for this change. Among these are theories attributing major causal significance to changing methods of drawing district boundaries, and increasing control of campaign resources by incumbents. These theories are examined critically and arguments are advanced for their rejection. The principal cause of the decline of competition for congressional seats appears to rest on a change in individual voting behavior.
An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races
Authors: Gillespie John V. , Zinnes Dina A. , Tahim G.S. , Schrodt Philip A. , Rubison R. Michael
Published: May 2006

Lewis Frye Richardson's simple differential equations model of armaments races has been long criticized for its lack of incorporation of the goals of nations. Using the mathematics of optimal control theory, the authors formulate a model which incorporates national goals into an “arms balance” objective function. The goals used are based on the traditional concerns in the balance-of-power literature. From an objective function together with the Richardson model an optimal armaments policy is derived. The United States-Soviet, NATO-WTO, and Arab-Israeli arms races are used as empirical examples, and the parameters in the model are estimated by means of functional minimization techniques. The optimal control model is further examined for its equilibrium and stability properties. The equilibrium and stability conditions are assessed with respect to the empirical examples. The findings are that while the United States and the Soviet Union in direct confrontation pursue strategies that lead to a lack of equilibrium and stability, when taken as part of NATO and WTO, the major powers and their alliance partners do pursue stable and equilibrium strategies. The Israeli policy is found to lead to equilibrium and stability while the Arab policy does not.
Wellsprings of Political Leadership
Authors: Burns James MacGregor
Published: May 2006

To develop a general theory of leadership we must locate the function of political leadership in a theory of historical causation. One may begin by identifying sources of leadership in the wants and needs, aspirations and expectations, of humankind. In helping to gratify these “motive-bases,” leaders move followers “up” the hierarchy of needs and other motivations and thus create new social configurations in which leaders act. As persons–especially children-move “up” through stages of morality, they also create structures of values that both empower and constrain would-be leaders. Leadership over human beings is exercised when would-be leaders, possessing certain motives of their own, mobilize their own psychological, institutional, pohtical, and other resources relevant to potential followers' motive bases in such a way as to satisfy the motives of both leaders and followers. The test of leadership is the achievement of goals of both leaders and followers in a context of open conflict over ends and means, with leaders and followers mutually and freely defining their values and purposes.
The Carryover Effect in Presidential Elections
Authors: Stone Walter J.
Published: May 2006

The carryover hypothesis asserts that participants' candidate support behavior in the general election is affected by their preferences for their party's nomination. This paper examines data from activist and national sample surveys for evidence of a carryover effect in the 1980 election. There is a detectable carryover effect on voting behavior both for activists and for citizens generally. Among activists, where evidence about candidate support behaviors beyond voting is available, the effect on such activity is substantial, and increases with the effort associated with the general election activity in question.
From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection
Authors: Mendelson Wallace
Published: May 2006

Substantive due process is the classic, if temporary, achievement of judicial activism. The Roosevelt Court destroyed it out of respect for the democratic processes. Mr. Justice Black's “incorporation” ploy was calculated to forestall backsliding by equating the Fourteenth Amendment with the Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights, after all, is quite old fashioned. It does not cover many matters deemed crucial in our day, e.g., poverty. To fill this “gap” the Warren Court used “equal protection” as “actively” as the pre-Roosevelt Court had used “due process.” Obviously inspired by the Black incorporation principle, the early Burger Court is doing to substantive equal protection what the Roosevelt Court did to substantive due process. A generation ago we called it a “return to the Constitution,” now it is called strict construction. If in time the full Nixon Court succumbs to the magic of power and imposes its ideals upon the nation, some of us may find embarrassment in our quondam efforts to convince ourselves that judicial activism (it used to be called judicial supremacy) is a proper handmaiden of democracy.
Legislative Partisanship, Constituency and Malapportionment: The Case of California
Authors: Robeck Bruce W.
Published: May 2006

Two principal problems were analyzed in the study: (1) the impact of malapportionment on party voting, and (2) the influence of constituency on legislative partisanship. The California Senate was used as a test case because it was generally considered to deviate from the pattern of party voting found in other two-party states, and because it was the most poorly apportioned upper chamber in the nation. It was found that the proportion of party votes in the Senate increased significantly after reapportionment, and gross malapportionment may have inhibited a trend toward more party voting. It was also found that there was a much stronger association between political and socioeconomic constituency variables and an index of partisan voting following elections in reapportioned districts.
The Techno-Bureaucratic Elite and the Entrepreneurial State in Dependent Industrialization
Authors: Duvall Raymond D. , Freeman John R.
Published: May 2006

A common characteristic of dependent industrializing countries is a substantial direct entrepreneurial role for the state. One explanation for this is that in dependent industrializing countries the system of allocation and production has been captured by a key group, the techno-bureaucratic elite. The argument is that this elite lends its political support to the state, in return for the state substituting as entrepreneur in the industrialization process.

In this article we analyze the theoretical implications of this explanation of the entrepreneurial state. A formal model is constructed of the relationship between state entrepreneurship, material consequences for the techno-bureaucratic elite, and important domestic and international constraints. We then use deductive methods to analyze the logic of state entrepreneurship. Among other things, we show how cyclical fluctuations in the global economy are reflected in constantly changing levels of state entrepreneurship, and we investigate the consequences of alternative kinds of dependency syndromes for histories of entrepreneurial substitution and for streams of benefits to the techno-bureaucratic elite. It is demonstrated that there is an inverse relationship between the tendencies to reach stable levels of state entrepreneurship and the long-term potential for economic growth.
Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry
Authors: Miller Eugene F.
Published: May 2006

The present controversy between “behavioral” and “postbehavioral” views of political inquiry reflects a larger dispute between two opposing theories of knowledge. Whereas the behavioral movement has its epistemological roots in positivism and, ultimately, in classical British empiricism, the most recent protest against behavioralism draws upon the theory of knowledge that has been the principal foe of empiricism over the past century. This theory of knowledge, which received the name “historicism” shortly after its emergence, had become the dominant epistemological position by the mid-twentieth century. This essay considers the general nature of historicism and its influence on the recent revolt against positivism in the philosophy of science. Finally, it examines the use that political scientists have made of historicist principles in opposing positivistic models of political inquiry. It argues that an epistemological relativism becomes unavoidable once certain premises of historicism are embraced.
From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968
Authors: Pomper Gerald M.
Published: May 2006

Analysis of national election surveys from 1956 to 1968 reveals significant changes in the voters' perceptions of issues and the major parties. There has been a considerable increase in the correlation of party identification and opinion on six major issues, relating to social welfare, racial integration, and foreign aid. Voters are more prone to see a difference between the parties on these issues and are increasingly likely to identify the Democratic party as favorable to federal governmental action. These findings contrast with those of The American Voter and similar studies. The reasons for the changes cannot be found in demographic factors, as tested by controls for age cohorts, education, region, and race. More probably the explanation lies in strictly political factors. A particularly important event was the presidential campaign of 1964, in which ideological differences between the parties were deliberately emphasized. The electorate responded to this campaign by becoming more ideologically aware, and its learning appears to have persisted through the 1968 election. This finding suggests that past conclusions about the low ideological awareness of the electorate were specific to the Eisenhower era, and that the issue content of the vote will vary with the stimuli provided by the general political environment.
Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference
Authors: Willetts Peter
Published: May 2006

Cluster-bloc analysis is a useful method of examining the voting records of a legislature, in order to find what subgroups of members regularly vote together. Agreement scores are calculated for every legislator with every other legislator. Then when a group is found to have all its members in high agreement with each other they are referred to as a cluster bloc. These groups, which are discovered empirically, are not necessarily the same as the formal caucus groups. So far each researcher has had to use his own judgment as to what constitutes “high agreement,” but it can be shown that the cutoff points can be established statistically, against the null hypothesis of random voting. Since each score can be tested for significance, it is possible to use statistically based indices of cohesion for the legislature or any specified subgroup and indices of adhesion between the various subgroups. Examples are given for the African group in the UN General Assembly.
Institutions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections
Authors: Chubb John E.
Published: May 2006

As the U.S. states develop their political institutions and take greater responsibility for their economic well-being, two concerns that have long driven research on national elections—electoral insulation and economic accountability—should become central in research on state elections. I investigate institutionalization's effects on the vulnerability of state elections to major periodic forces—coattails, turnout, and economic conditions—and how political responsibility for economic growth is apportioned between presidents and governors in state elections. The investigation relies upon dynamic models of state legislative and gubernatorial outcomes estimated with a pooled data set comprised of most states and elections in the years 1940–82. The results, which have important implications for state government more broadly, indicate that institutionalization has substantially insulated legislative elections against major threats and that state legislators and governors have less to fear from their state economies than is often thought, but also that state elections are becoming more susceptible to swings in the national economy.
Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections
Authors: Wright Gerald C. , Berkman Michael B.
Published: May 2006

This analysis demonstrates that policy issues play an important role in the selection of members of Congress. We differ with the conclusion of much of the existing research on congressional elections, which indicates that policy considerations are of minor importance. We have conducted an analysis of the 1982 U.S. Senate elections, drawing on data from the CBS News/New York Times1982 congressional poll and from 23 statewide exit polls. We demonstrate that (1) candidates behave as though they believe issues are important to voters; (2) candidates' policy positions systematically influence voters' decisions; and (3) candidates' issue positions and voters' evaluations of the president and the economy interact to provide clear patterns of policy effects on Senate election outcomes. Policy effects are substantial and systematic in Senate elections, and cannot be omitted if we are to appreciate the importance of congressional elections in the national policy-making process.
Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States
Authors: Nordlinger Eric A.
Published: May 2006

When military officers are either sitting in the governmental saddle or have one foot securely in the stirrup, is it likely that such military controlled governments will pursue policies of socio-economic change and reform? What are the officer-politicians' motivations in reacting to the possibilities of such modernizing changes? Under what conditions are their motivations likely to vary? This essay attempts to answer these questions with regard to the contemporary non-western states. And in making the attempt, I believe that the analysis falls squarely within the purview of certain recent changes that are taking place in the study of comparative politics. These changes may be most broadly depicted as a movement away from that aspect of behavioralism that has focused exclusively upon “inputs,” and away from that dimension of “scientism” that has focused upon abstract concepts at the expense of empirical analysis. The change can also be described (in an overly facile manner) as a movement toward the politics in political science and the government in comparative politics.

As is evidenced in LaPalombara's call for “parsimony” in the selection of problems, we should choose problems for analysis that are blatantly political and of obvious contemporary relevance. In approximately half of the contemporary non-western states military officers either occupy the topmost seats of government themselves or they have a marked influence upon the civilian incumbents. And when this fact is placed alongside the potential of most contemporary governments to influence the pace and direction of social and economic change, this essay's central concern fulfills LaPalombara's criterion.
Models, Measurement and Sources of Error: Civil Conflict in Black Africa
Authors: Welfling Mary B.
Published: May 2006

Cross-national research is plagued by several methodological problems that threaten to distort results and hence raise questions concerning the adequacy of substantive findings. The extent and impact of three of these methodological problems—measurement, sampling, and specification errors—are assessed for a recent model of civil conflict developed by Gurr and Duvall. Concepts in their model are measured with two distinct data sets to estimate measurement error; to assess sampling error, measures are applied to a sample of black African nations which were excluded from their analysis; and new concepts are introduced to assess error in theoretical specification. Although all forms of error are found to exist in their work and to have some distorting effects on their model, it is concluded that some of the general model is accurate. However, discovery of (1) the concepts and data sets that contain the greatest error, and (2) the sources of sampling and specification error, is used to improve substantive findings about the causes of manifest political conflict.
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Authors: Browne Eric C. , Franklin Mark N.
Published: May 2006

One important proposition about the distribution of coalition payoffs is found in W. A. Gamson's theory of coalition formation: “Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition.” This proposition is tested in a universe of cabinet coalitions existing in thirteen European democracies during the postwar period. Here, payoffs to partners are indicated by the percentage share of cabinet ministries received by parties for their percentage contribution of parliamentary seats/votes to the coalition.

The proportionality proposition is shown to hold strongly. Disproportionality, however, is observed to occur in distributions at the extremities of party size—large parties tend to be proportionately underpaid and small parties overpaid, the larger or smaller they become. This effect, however, is most pronounced when the size of the coalition is small, and tends to reverse itself as the size of the coalition increases.