bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Southern 2MASS Active Galactic Nuclei Survey: Spectroscopic Follow-up with Six Degree Field
Authors: Masci Frank J. , Cutri Roc M. , Francis Paul J. , Nelson Brant O. , Huchra John P. , Jones D. Heath , Colless Matthew , Saunders Will
Published: September 2010

The Two Micron All-Sky Survey (2MASS) has provided a uniform photometric catalog to search for previously unknown red active galactic nuclei (AGN) and Quasi-Stellar Objects (QSOs).We have extended the search to the southern equatorial sky by obtaining spectra for 1182 AGN candidates using the six degree field (6dF) multifibre spectrograph on the UK Schmidt Telescope. These were scheduled as auxiliary targets for the 6dF Galaxy Redshift Survey. The candidates were selected using a single color cut of J – Ks > 2 to Ks ≲ 15.5 and a galactic latitude of lbl > 30°. 432 spectra were of sufficient quality to enable a reliable classification. 116 sources (∼27%) were securely classified as type I AGN, 20 as probable type I AGN, and 57 as probable type II AGN. Most of them span the redshift range 0.05 < z < 0.5 and only 8 (∼6%) were previously identified as AGN or QSOs. Our selection leads to a significantly higher AGN identification rate amongst local galaxies (>20%) than in any previous (mostly blue-selected) galaxy survey. A small fraction of the type I AGN could have their optical colors reddened by optically thin dust with AV < 2 mag relative to optically selected QSOs. A handful show evidence of excess far-infrared (IR) emission. The equivalent width (EW) and color distributions of the type I and II AGN are consistent with AGN unified models. In particular, the EW of the [Oiii] emission line weakly correlates with optical–near-IR color in each class of AGN, suggesting anisotropic obscuration of the AGN continuum. Overall, the optical properties of the 2MASS red AGN are not dramatically different from those of optically-selected QSOs. Our near-IR selection appears to detect the most near-IR luminous QSOs in the local universe to z≃0.6 and provides incentive to extend the search to deeper near-IR surveys.
Mendelssohn and the Organ
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

Although Mendelssohn was most famous during his lifetime as a composer, virtuoso pianist, and conductor, he also enjoyed an enviable reputation as a highly skilled organist. The instrument had fascinated — one might almost say mesmerized — him from earliest youth, but aside from a year or so of formal training at the age of about 12 or 13, he was entirely self-taught. He never held a position as church organist, and never had any organ pupils. Nevertheless, the instrument played a uniquely important role in his personal life. In the course of his many travels, whether in major cities or tiny villages, he invariably gravitated to the organ loft, where he might spend hours playing the works of Bach or simply improvising. Although the piano clearly served Mendelssohn as an eminently practical instrument, the organ seems to have been his instrument of choice. He searched out an organ loft, not because he had to, but because he wanted to, because on the organ he could find catharsis. Indeed, as he once exclaimed to his parents after reading a portion of Schiller's Wilhelm Tell, “I must rush off to the monastery and work off my excitement on the organ!” Mendelssohn's public performance on the organ in Germany was rare, and he gave but one public recital: in the Thomas-Kirche in Leipzig in 1840. In England, however, he evidently felt more comfortable on the organ bench and played there often before large crowds. Indeed, he performed as Guest Organist twice at the Birmingham Music Festivals in 1837 and 1842. Given Mendelssohn's profound affinity for the organ, it is remarkable that he composed but relatively little for the instrument, and assigned an Opus number to only two works: his Three Preludes and Fugues for Organ (Op. 37) and his Six Sonatas for the Organ (Op. 65). A small number of organ works, plus sketches and drafts, were scattered among his musical papers; most of these only gradually found their way into print, and it was not until the late 20th century that an edition of his complete organ works was finally published. This volume is intended as a companion to that edition.
Mendelssohn: The Mature Years, 1839–1847
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter details the life of Mendelssohn from 1839-47. It includes a description of his public organ recital in Leipzig, which he regarded as a critical moment in his career. Although he earned an enviable reputation as a skilled organist in Britain, Germany was das Organistenland supreme, and could boast a whole array of superlative players. Johann Schneider (1789-1864), Adolf Friedrich Hesse (1809-63), Carl Ludwig Haupt (1810-91), August Gottfried Ritter (1811-85) — simply to name a few of Mendelssohn's exact or close contemporaries — were all household names in the German musical community. And now Mendelssohn was about to make his bid to join that elite circle of German organ virtuosos.
Mendelssohn As Organist: Performance Characteristics
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on Mendelssohn's organ technique. Whether improvising or performing his own works, or the organ works of Bach, Mendelssohn amazed his audiences by the clarity and brilliance of his playing — even on instruments with the heaviest action. As Henry Gauntlett observed, “One thing which particularly struck our organists was the contrast between his massive effects and the lightness of his touch in rapid passages. The touch of the Christ Church [Newgate Street] organ was both deep and heavy, yet he threw off arpeggios as if he were at a piano.” The pianist, Otto Goldschmidt (1829-1907), one of Mendelssohn's pupils, also noted that “his mechanism was extremely subtle, and developed with the lightest of wrists (never from the arm). Though lightness of touch and a delicious pearliness of tone were prominent characteristics, yet his power in fortes was immense. ” According to Joseph Joachim, “his staccato was the most extraordinary thing possible for life and crispness”.
Mendelssohn's Organ Parts To Handel's Oratorios
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on Mendelssohn's employment of the organ in performing Handel's oratorios. In Germany, Mendelssohn was the first to introduce the organ into performances of Handel's oratorios, and in doing so, particularly when those performances took place in a church, the ecclesiastical aura of the venue was inescapable. Moreover, it should be stressed that all performances of Handel's oratorios that Mendelssohn conducted after 1838 took place in churches, and it would have been pointless, as well as historically incorrect, for him not to utilize the organ. Once Mendelssohn began to incorporate the organ into the orchestral accompaniment of Handel's oratorios, the public rapidly came to expect the organ to play a major role in their production.
Six Sonatas For The Organ, (op. 65), 1844–1845
Authors: Little Wm. A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents commentary on Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas. Composed, compiled, culled, and revised over a period of some nine months, from 21 July 1844, to April/May 1845, Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas are an amalgam of movements expressly written for his Coventry project, as well as movements that had lain dormant among his papers for years. Combining old with new, polyphonic with homophonic/monodic, and classic with romantic, the composer shaped this heterogeneous collection into six separate and distinct entities, each having its own tonal center of gravity. Ranging in length from two to four movements, the set lacks as a whole any single cohesive element that would endow it with an overarching unity. At least one critic has suggested that Mendelssohn, “permanently under pressure to produce, had no option but to assemble these various [small] pieces into a formally imbalanced structure.” The absence of a cohesive element linking these Sonatas together, however, has never proven to be a deterrent either to their popularity or their claim to a place in the classic canon for the instrument.
SHELXL
Authors: Müller Peter
Published: September 2010

This chapter introduces the crystal structure refinement program SHELXL, a program written and maintained by George M. Sheldrick. SHELXL is by far the most popular refinement program for small molecules and, together with CNS by Axel Brünger and Refmac by Garib Murshudov, it is one of the three most commonly used programs for the refinement of protein structures. The chapter describes the basic program organization of SHELXL as well as the input and output file structure. It also explains the concept of the connectivity table.
Pseudo-Symmetry
Authors: Müller Peter
Published: September 2010

Having more than one molecule in the asymmetric unit occurs predominantly in space groups of low symmetry. In most of these cases, the independent molecules are not related by simple symmetry operators such as twofold axes, mirror planes, or inversion centres, but are different rotamers of the same molecule. This chapter deals with structures where there is in fact non-crystallographic symmetry present, relating two or more crystallographically independent molecules. Two cases are distinguished: true non-crystallographic symmetry (NCS), and global pseudo-symmetry. The latter especially can cause systematic errors which need to be addressed by the crystallographer. Two detailed examples, one for of each type of pseudo-symmetry, are given, one of which demonstrates that pseudo-symmetry can also occur within a single molecule.
Artefacts
Authors: Müller Peter
Published: September 2010

Like every physical method, crystallography is affected by errors. However, there are two kinds of errors: unavoidable errors such as artefacts and avoidable errors. A good crystallographer knows how to manage avoidable errors, how to live with unavoidable errors and, most importantly, how to distinguish between the one from the other. This chapter is more about scientific work ethics than about structure refinement. Nothing can be done to overcome an artefact, but the words ‘this is an artefact’ should never be used as an excuse for sloppy workmanship or to explain the seemingly inexplicable. Examples for artefacts are shortened bond lengths due to libration or high electron density between the nuclei, inaccurately determined hydrogen positions, spurious features in the electron density map on special positions, and close to heavy atoms. One example structure is given that shows an interesting feature in the different Fourier synthesis.
Moral Testimony and Moral Disagreement
Authors: Hills Alison
Published: September 2010

If you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were their only important function, it would not be epistemically rational to trust moral testimony or to suspend judgment in response to moral disagreements. However, the epistemic rationality of moral beliefs is more complex, because moral beliefs have another function: they play a role in morally right action too. Yet it is still typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements.
The Place of Truth in Epistemology
Authors: Sosa Ernest
Published: September 2010

Suppose we think that knowledge is belief that is both true and derives from intellectual virtue. And if we also assume that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, then where does the value of knowledge in addition to truth come from? This chapter provides an answer to the value problem by arguing that truth is the only fundamental epistemic value (with qualifications for values as understanding that is not directly connected to knowledge.) It suggests that humans prefer their epistemic success to be attributable to their own doing. More specifically, there is a so-called ‘performance value’: that is, the kind value afforded to a belief performance which normally produces truth belief when operating in a suitable environment. Such performances can have this value even when the acquired belief is false. But the chief intellectual good involves getting the truth through the quality of one's performance.
How to be a Virtue Epistemologist
Authors: Hookway Christopher
Published: September 2010

This chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.
Humility and Epistemic Goods
Authors: Roberts Robert C. , Wood W. Jay
Published: September 2010

Some of the most interesting works in virtue ethics are the detailed, perceptive treatments of specific virtues and vices. This chapter aims to develop such work as it relates to intellectual virtues and vices. It begins by examining the virtue of intellectual humility. Its strategy is to situate humility in relation to its various opposing vices, which include vices like arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, haughtiness, and self-complacency. From this list vanity and arrogance are focused on in particular. Humble persons are not distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or unconcerned with entitlements; rather, they lack the arrogance that entails a specific kind of motivation called ‘ego-exalting potency’. Humble people are motivated by pure interests regarding entitlements given their ability to serve as means to some valuable purpose or project. The chapter ends by considering a wide variety of ways intellectual humility can promote the acquisition of epistemic goods.
Foundations of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This book offers an account of the formation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character, explaining its particular modes of operation, and specifying its unique task. Public law is conceived broadly as a type of law that comes into existence as a consequence of the secularization, rationalization, and positivization of the medieval idea of fundamental law. Formed as a result of the changes that give birth to the modern state, public law establishes the authority and legitimacy of modern governmental ordering. Public law today is a universal phenomenon, but its origins are European. Part I of the book examines the conditions of its formation, showing how much the concept borrowed from the refined debates of medieval jurists. Part II then examines the nature of public law. Drawing on a line of juristic inquiry that developed from the late 16th to the early 19th centuries — extending from Bodin, Althusius, Lipsius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Pufendorf to the later works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Smith, and Hegel — it presents an account of public law as a special type of political reason. The remaining three parts unpack the core elements of this concept: state, constitution, and government. By explaining the way that these core elements of state, constitution, and government were shaped respectively by the technological, bourgeois, and disciplinary revolutions of the 16th–19th centuries, public law is revealed to be a subject of considerable ambiguity, complexity, and resilience.
Introduction: Rediscovering Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This introductory chapter explains the nature of the concept of public law examined in this book. Public law is not conceived simply to be a subset of positive law: public law as distinct from private law. Public law is the modern expression of the medieval idea of fundamental law, the law that establishes the authority of government. The book is an inquiry into questions of ‘right’ relating to the conferral of authority and legitimacy on modern governmental ordering. This concept of public law is of European origin and is formed as the code of an autonomous public sphere that emerges as a consequence of modernity.
Medieval Origins
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines the way the modern concept of public law evolved from a series of debates within medieval jurisprudence. In these debates theological and political questions were invariably intertwined and the main points of contention often arose from disputes concerning the governing arrangements of the Roman church. The struggles for authority between popes, emperors, and princes were variously expressed in the languages of law, whether divine law, Roman law, canon law, natural law, and common law. Public law acquires its basic grammar and vocabulary from this rich ideological battlefield.
The Architecture of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

This chapter considers the extent to which a common early-modern metaphor — that of envisioning collective association as a spatial arrangement with public law as its architectonic form — offers a solution. It explains that the architectural metaphor was associated with the medieval idea of fundamental law and argues that the modern logic of sovereignty makes the concept of fundamental law redundant: the architecture of constitutional law thus became subordinate to the sovereign will of the people. From the time of the drafting of the American Constitution, the architectural metaphor gradually came to be replaced by the immanent logic of ‘self-binding’; this yields the science of political right.
The New Architecture of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin
Published: September 2010

Modern governments have greatly expanded the range of their activities and now assume responsibility for furthering economic and social development, managing the economy, and providing for the welfare of their citizens. For the purpose of promoting security, liberty, and prosperity, government has acquired a large and sophisticated administrative apparatus. With this growth in administrative power, the efficacy of constitutional checks is placed in question. This chapter examines legal and institutional responses to the establishment of administrative regimes of government — such as the emergence of administrative law and the rise of agencies — and considers the implications of these developments for conceptualizing public law today.
Agency and Answerability
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

This volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives?’ The author develops a unified account of human agency and responsibility in terms of our capacity for critical evaluation, or normative competence. We are agents because we have (and to the extent that we exercise) this capacity, and we are responsible to each other for our lives as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The account is developed in these essays largely by considering possible sources of normative incapacity, such as compulsion, addiction, manipulation, childhood deprivation, and one's own desires. Many of these essays engage critically with contemporary accounts of free will, action, and moral responsibility.
Excusing Addiction
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: September 2010

Chapter 3 showed that we have good reason to believe that addiction impairs responsiveness to reasons and volitional control. This chapter considers whether this sort of impairment should ever legally excuse criminal behaviour. The law has understandably resisted such an excuse for evidentiary reasons, but also because addicts are thought to be responsible for their plights. In the end these reasons may be decisive, but it is important to a sound jurisprudence to articulate what is at stake. The chapter argues that the circumstances of the addict are often very like those who are subject to coercive threats, and that therefore much addictive behaviour can be likened to duress: the addictive agent is often subject to duressful ‘pressures’ that are not literally irresistible but which it would be unreasonable to expect anyone to tolerate. This makes a strong case for mitigation if not excuse.
Moral Fictionalism
Authors: Kalderon Mark Eli
Published: September 2010

Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.
Wandering in Darkness
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

Can one hold consistently both that there is suffering in the world and that there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God? This book argues that one can. The opening section presents current research related to autism spectrum disorder to contend that some philosophical problems, including the problem of evil, are best considered with the help of narratives. Then the book investigates the moral psychology and value theory within which one typical medieval theodicy — that of Thomas Aquinas — is embedded. It also makes use of recent work in developmental psychology to illuminate these views. In the third section, the book presents detailed, innovative exegeses of the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany, each of which is exemplary of a different form of suffering. In the context of the interpretations of these stories and the previous examination of Aquinas's views, the book then argues that an extended Thomistic theodicy can constitute a consistent and cogent defence for the problem of suffering.
Narrative as a Means of Knowledge: Francis and Dominic
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents an argument for the claim that there are things to know that cannot be known as well or at all apart from narratives. For this purposes, the chapter uses hagiographical stories of the lives of St. Francis and St. Dominic, so that Francis and Dominic can serve as types of different modes of knowledge and different modes of the transfer of knowledge. It argues that certain fundamental assumptions in contemporary epistemology need to be altered or supplemented in order to take account of the knowledge of persons. It extends the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge at issue to analogous cases of desire, emotion, and memory, among other things.
The Story of Samson: Self‐Destroying Evil
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

Samson is an exemplar of a person who suffers greatly but whose suffering stems from his own wrongdoing. This chapter examines the problem of suffering as regards not the victims of human evil but as regards the perpetrators of it, whose own lives are wrecked in consequence of the evil they do. It concentrates on the biblical story of Samson and gives a detailed philosophical examination of many parts of the story. In the process, the chapter also explores Milton's understanding of the story in his Samson Agonistes, as well as Sophocles's portrayal of an analogous case in his Oedipus at Colonus. The chapter shows that in the story what redeems Samson's suffering for him is the role of his suffering in bringing him into relationship with God.
What We Care about: The Desires of the Heart
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter develops Aquinas's theodicy by considering the way in which the suffering stemming from the loss or deprivation of the desires of a person's heart can be defeated. It discusses the possibility — supported by one strand in the Christian tradition, deriving from John Cassian's thought, among other sources — that the desires of the heart are to be given up. It argues against this approach on the grounds that it is incompatible with the nature of love, of oneself or others. It develops Aquinas's theodicy to take account of suffering of this sort.
The Defense of the Defense: Suffering, Flourishing, and the Desires of the Heart
Authors: Stump Eleonore
Published: September 2010

This chapter finishes the defence of the defence that is the object of the book by considering possible objections to the developed Thomistic theodicy and the evidence by which it can be supported. In particular, it discusses some results from psychological research on human reactions to trauma, which can include adversarial growth or post-traumatic growth. With this defence of the defence, Aquinas's theodicy, developed in the context of biblical narratives and examined using the methodology argued for in the first section of the book, is complete as a defence against the argument from evil.
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts
Authors: Fitch Frederic B.
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents Fitch's seminal 1963 paper, which has been the logical fuel or foil for the literature on the knowability paradox. The paper provides a partial logical analysis of a few concepts that may be classified as value concepts or as concepts that are closely related to value concepts. Among the concepts considered are striving for, doing, believing, knowing, desiring, ability to do, obligation to do, and value for.
Fitch's Paradox of Knowability
Authors: Dummett Michael
Published: September 2010

This chapter defends p→¬¬Kp as the best expression of semantic antirealism.
Beyond the Limits of Knowledge
Authors: Priest Graham
Published: September 2010

This chapter develops the Routley/Beall proposal by countenancing the mere possibility of truth-value gluts and appealing to a paraconsistent logic with excluded middle.
Actions That Make Us Know
Authors: Benthem Johan van
Published: September 2010

This chapter looks at the Paradox of the Knower in a dynamic-epistemic perspective where learning means changing the current epistemic model. The problematic Moore sentence driving the paradox turns out to be the typical ‘probe’ for investigating the sometimes surprising, but always useful, effects of successive assertions. Moreover, the multi-agent setting of epistemic logic places Verificationism in a richer interactive setting. This change in perspective trades the atmosphere of paradox and disaster for one of free exploration of dynamic typology of epistemic assertions, learning, and reachability, and many further surprising twists in the logic of communication.
Fitch's Paradox and the Philosophy of Mathematics
Authors: Bueno Otávio
Published: September 2010

This chapter considers the impact of the Fitch paradox on particular epistemological views about mathematics. It assumes therefore, for the sake of argument, that the reasoning leading to Fitch's paradox is valid (which is indeed the case given the logical assumptions made). Having this focus provides a specific context to assess the nature and limitation of the paradox, while also showing the paradox's significance for current debates in the philosophy of mathematics. The chapter examines two versions of Platonism (standard and full-blooded Platonism) and two versions of nominalism (mathematical fictionalism and agnostic fictionalism). It argues that, given the specific assumptions about mathematical knowledge that these views make, (FP) brings trouble for some, but not for all, of them. In particular, full-blooded Platonism and — to a certain extent — mathematical fictionalism are in trouble with the paradox, but traditional Platonism and agnostic fictionalism don't seem to be. The chapter concludes with a dilemma that this situation poses for Platonism, and the prospects it offers for nominalism.
Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and Hierarchy
Authors: Lee Maria
Published: September 2010

Authority for the regulation of GMOs in the European Union is far from straightforward. Profound and long-lasting disagreement over the proper role for agricultural biotechnology led to legislation that attempts to share authority and avoid hierarchy. However, the disagreement is such that compromise and accommodation is not proving possible through the mechanisms of consultation, transparency, and deliberation provided in the legislation. In these circumstances, there is a reversion to hierarchy, and the Commission ultimately takes responsibility for moving GMOs through the regulatory process. Yet, such turn to hierarchy is not straightforward either: decisions are slow and contested, and disagreement rumbles on. These difficult circumstances force us to face squarely the proper place for authoritative decision making on GMOs. The current approach, including the Commission's misguided efforts to centralize authority, simply postpones that process.
Chrysippus on Physical Elements
Authors: Cooper John M.
Published: September 2010

This chapter advances a new interpretation of what is perhaps the main source for Chrysippus' theory of physical elements (fire, air, water, and earth): a passage from Stobaeus' 5th-century ad anthology, Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, at 1. 129-30 Wachsmuth. The chapter also sheds light on (a) the nature of the corporealism of the Stoics in connection with their theory of principles — what it is for both god and matter to be bodies — and (b) Chrysippus' conception of cosmogony as distinct from that of Zeno and that of Cleanthes.
Stoic Themes in Peripatetic Sources?
Authors: Kupreeva Inna
Published: September 2010

This chapter presents a brief preliminary survey of several texts which might suggest a close affinity between the Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines of principles. The goal is to see to what extent these parallels may amount to a genuinely shared position on any of the issues under examination. The discussion starts with the Antiochean account of the physics of ‘Old Academy’ presented in Cicero's Acad. 1. 24-9. Section 2 deals with ‘physical’ fragments of Peripatetic Critolaus; it tries to see whether they could provide any ground for Antiochus' incorporation of Peripatetic physics. The third section deals with the ‘suspect’ cases of Stoicizing in the Peripatetic tradition: Xenarchus' arguments against the fifth body and the use of the concept ‘prime matter’ by Boethus of Sidon and Nicolaus of Damascus. Section 4 looks at some parallel discussions in Alexander of Aphrodisias.
Why Physics?
Authors: Inwood Brad
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on Seneca, and attributes to him a set of positions that is similar to the one attributed to the Stoics in general. It argues that Seneca recognizes two quite different reasons for studying physics and for attending to its doctrines, reasons which might well seem to be opposed to each other. Studying physics provides direct instrumental support to what we might call the enterprise of ethics, but it also fulfils something very important and fundamental in our natures, the built-in drive for contemplation of nature. This double motivation is most conspicuous in two texts: the Natural Questions as a whole and the later books of the Letters to Lucillius. These texts show how these apparently opposed motivations turn out to be complementary to each other.
The Self‐Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content
Authors: Bealer George
Published: September 2010

This chapter targets functionalism as the most cogent form of contemporary materialism. In particular, it takes aim at ‘ontic’ or reductive functionalism: a theory that attempts to specify the essences of mental states, in a non-circular fashion, by means of physicalistic functional definitions (i.e., by means of the Ramsification of causal theories of the mind). The chapter points out that functionalism must account for thoughts that have psychological attitudes embedded within them. It effectively sets asides worries that the intensionality of the context of thought renders the argument invalid. It also draws attention to the devastating consequences of the other strategies for avoiding the dilemma. including language-of-thought functionalism. When the language-of-thought theorists attempt to define the content-of relation, they face a dilemma concerning the content of psychological predicates in the language. The language-of-thought theorist must either accept a definitional circularity incompatible with materialism, or resort again to Ramsified definitions that misdescribe the contents of self-conscious thoughts. In addition, such language-of-thought functionalism readily leads to epiphenomenalism. Finally, attempts to avoid the definitional circularity by means of something like a Tarskian hierarchy of distinct psychological attitudes founder on the type-free nature of introspection. The chapter concludes that the only viable functionalism is a non-reductive one that accepts mental properties as ontologically primary, on a par with physical properties.
Persons and the Unity of Consciousness
Authors: Hasker William
Published: September 2010

We have a conception of the human person as constituted in part by a self, a unified, coherent center of consciousness which is a rational agent, capable of being responsive, and responsible, to other agents. There are, however, empirical phenomena — in particular, commissurotomy and multiple personality syndrome — that seem to threaten this unity both theoretically and practically. As a counterpoise to these phenomena, this chapter puts forward the unity of consciousness argument, deriving from Leibniz and Kant. While this argument might seem to conflict with the empirical evidence of disunity, the chapter maintains that there is no inconsistency between the evidence and the argument. The combination of the two, in fact, both places a barrier in the way of a materialist account of mind and consciousness, and at the same time points out a severe difficulty for standard (especially Cartesian) varieties of dualism. The chapter closes by sketching out my own preferred view of the metaphysics of persons, emergent dualism.
Modest Dualism
Authors: Burge Tyler
Published: September 2010

This chapter begins with a detailed response to the previous chapter's review of Burge's previous work on the mind-body problem, centering on empirical doubts about compositional materialism regarding psychological states. It then presents a new argument for a modest mind-body dualism. The argument centers on the point that propositional structures that support rational transactions, such as formal deductive inference, are constitutive aspects of propositional psychological states, but that since Newton, it has been a fundamental feature of physical science that the physical world is not constitutively propositional in structure. It follows from these premises, both defended briefly, that propositional psychological states and events are not physical states or events. Contrasts with traditional Cartesian dualism are sketched.
Descartes' Revenge Part II: The Supervenience Argument Strikes Back
Authors: Judisch Neal
Published: September 2010

The most compelling reason to accept materialism in the philosophy of mind derives from our common commitment to mental causation: inasmuch as mental phenomena are causally efficacious, and inasmuch as whatever has a cause has a physical cause, there is considerable pressure to identify mental with physical phenomena. At the hands of Jaegwon Kim, this argument has been formulated in such a way as to force the choice between eliminativism, since causally inefficacious mental properties would be in some sense unreal; and reductionism, since mental properties are causally efficacious only if they can be physically reduced. This chapter shows that if Kim's argument against antireductionist theories of mind is successful, then his own reductionist theory falls victim to the same plight: for Kim's Supervenience Argument entails that a theory of mind salvages mental causation only if, on that theory, mental properties (1) are multiply realizable; (2) are physically reducible; and (3) have instances that are causally efficacious in virtue of being mental property-instances; yet Kim's reductionist theory is unable jointly to satisfy these conditions. The result is that the argument from mental causation is either too weak to force acceptance of materialism, or too strong to allow for the consistency of mental causation with any theory of mind but classical type physicalism, a theory with well-advertised problems of its own.
Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Authors: Horgan Terry
Published: September 2010

This chapter formulates and motivates the current favored articulation of the metaphysical doctrine of materialism. It describes an alternative metaphysical position called minimal emergentism, which has two versions; and then contrasts it with stronger kinds of emergentism. Minimal emergentism posits certain inter-level necessitation relations — either nomically necessary connections, or metaphysically necessary connections — that are metaphysically brute. The chapter sets forth what it takes to be some very powerful challenges to materialism — challenges involving features of human consciousness. Finally, the chapter argues that in light of these challenges, minimal emergentism is a viable and theoretically appealing non-materialist metaphysic of mind.
Varieties of Naturalism
Authors: De Caro Mario
Published: September 2010

It is a commonly held view that in the last few decades a vast naturalistic turn has taken place in the philosophical world, especially in the analytic community. However, in the philosophical tradition naturalism has taken several forms. Therefore, in order to distinguish most forms of contemporary naturalism from the traditional ones, the label ‘scientific naturalism’ can be usefully employed. ‘Scientific naturalism’ is characterized by three fundamental claims: (a) philosophy should not appeal to any supernatural concept; (b) philosophy has no foundational role to play with regard to science; and (c) philosophy should be seen as continuous with science. According to some philosophers, however, scientific naturalism is nothing more than a sophisticated form of scientism. In light of these premises, it is not very surprising that contemporary metaphilosophy is mostly concerned with either analyzing marginal aspects of scientific naturalism (which do not really address its basic claims) or discussing the polarization between scientific naturalism and anti-naturalism. It need not be so, however. Significant indications of what one may call ‘liberal naturalism’ can in fact be found in the works of some important contemporary philosophers. What is still missing, though, is a clear definition of what the boundaries of liberal naturalism are with regard to both scientific naturalism, on the one hand, and antinaturalism, on the other hand. In general, it can be said that liberal naturalists tend to be partially critical of the three scientific naturalist claims given above, without refusing them altogether (as most antinaturalists would). The notion of compatibility of philosophy and science is a complex one. Some proposals for making it more precise are discussed in this chapter.
Substance Dualism: A Non‐Cartesian Approach
Authors: Lowe E. J.
Published: September 2010

Substance dualism in the philosophy of mind is, naturally enough, commonly thought of on a Cartesian model, according to which it is a dualism of two radically different kinds of substance, one (the ‘body’ purely material and the other (the ‘mind’ wholly immaterial in nature. This view is subject to many familiar difficulties. However, the almost universal rejection of Cartesian substance dualism has blinded many philosophers to the possibility of formulating other and more plausible versions of substance dualism. Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD), as it may most perspicuously be called, is a dualism not of minds and bodies, but of persons — or, more generally, of subjects of experience — and their ‘organized’ bodies. This is an ontological distinction that is chiefly motivated not by some fanciful notion that there could be disembodied persons — although NCSD does not rule out that possibility — but by much more solid considerations which require us to distinguish between the identity-conditions of persons and their bodies. Much of the intuitive appeal of Cartesian dualism is retained and explained by NCSD, without any of the former's counterintuitive features and metaphysical difficulties. NCSD is, however, still a non-materialist position, because it is incompatible even with very weak forms of non-reductive physicalism.
Decoherence and Ontology (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love FAPP)
Authors: Wallace David
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues for the view that the Everett (‘many worlds’) interpretation is nothing more or less than a literal reading of the formalism of unitary quantum mechanics. The central component of this story is decoherence: the process by which the evolution of the quantum state acquires a branching structure. The chapter gives a conceptual introduction to decoherence and its conceptual role, emphasizing the significance of its effects on the dynamics of degrees of freedom which are undergoing decoherence. It then argues that, although the branching structure generated by decoherence is ‘for all practical purposes’ in the sense that it is not part of the microscopic formalism of quantum theory, nonetheless it is a perfectly real, observer-independent feature of reality — it is emergent from that microscopic formalism in a way very familiar from many other parts of science.
Decisions, Decisions, Decisions: Can Savage Salvage Everettian Probability?
Authors: Price Huw
Published: September 2010

Critics object that the Everett view cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or it cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections by appealing to an Everettian version of Savage's rational decision theory. Deutsch argues not only that an analogue of classical decision under uncertainty makes sense in an Everett world; but also that under reasonable assumptions, the betting odds of a rational Everettian agent should be constrained by the Born rule. Deutsch's proposal has been defended and developed by David Wallace, and in a different form by Hilary Greaves. This chapter offers some objections to the Deutsch–Wallace–Greaves argument, focussing in particular on the supposed analogy with classical decision under uncertainty.
Time Symmetry and the Many‐Worlds Interpretation
Authors: Vaidman Lev
Published: September 2010

This chapter reviews an attempt to solve the collapse problem in the framework of a time-symmetric quantum formalism. Although the proposal does not look very attractive, its concept — a world defined by two quantum states, one evolving forwards and one evolving backwards in time — is found to be useful in modifying the many-worlds picture of Everett's theory.
Division and Definition in Plato'sSophistandStatesman
Authors: Louise Gill Mary
Published: September 2010

This chapter focuses on the method of division as developed by Plato in the Sophist and in the Politicus, and examines the ways in which Plato engages in these dialogues with important problems in the method itself. It notes a number of important and little-studied modifications to the method of division which Plato develops in these dialogues. The chapter contains detailed discussion of all the instances of definition by division considered in these two dialogues.
Logical Necessity
Authors: Rumfitt Ian
Published: September 2010

This chapter explains the notion of broadly logical necessity via the principle that ‘It is logically necessary that A’ is equivalent to ‘It is logically contradictory that not A’. The relevant notion of logical contradiction is cognate to that of absolute logical consequence: a conclusion is an absolute consequence of some premisses if it follows from them no matter what ancillary or background assumptions are made. The notion of logical necessity (so understood) is defended against sceptics (notably Russell). The relationship between logical and metaphysical necessity is explored, and Ian McFetridge's thesis that logical necessity is the strongest form of non-epistemic necessity is defended. The account of logical necessity is then deployed in elucidating Gareth Evans's distinction between deep and superficial forms of necessity, and that distinction is in turn employed to rebut Dummett's argument that the logic of metaphysical necessity cannot include the Brouwerian axiom.