bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Two varieties of unconscious processes
Authors: Franklin Stan , Baars Bernard J.
Published: March 2014

Unconscious processes come in two varieties, the preconscious, whose contents may become conscious, and the never-conscious, whose contents may not. In this chapter we make use of Global Workspace Theory and its LIDA model to catalogue never-conscious and preconscious processes, and offer an explanation of the functionally of the distinction. The LIDA/GWT model suggests that the functional distinction between never-conscious and preconscious processes derives from one of the major purposes of an agent’s consciousness mechanism: that is to select the most salient portion of the agent’s current situation to which to attend, in order for it to be broadcast globally, in order to choose the best next action.
Operating characteristics and awareness
Authors: Clifford Colin W.G. , Harris Justin A. , Arabzadeh Ehsan
Published: March 2014

Although a large proportion of the human brain is dedicated to processing incoming sensory information, much of this processing is not accessible to consciousness. In an effort to understand what differentiates conscious from unconscious processing, we are concerned here with methodological issues in exploring the limits of unconscious processing. We first consider a conscious perceptual experience and establish an operating characteristic to disambiguate perceptual sensitivity from decision criterion. We then apply the same method to dissociate explicit measures of perception from implicit measures of sensory processing. Finally, we evaluate post-decision wagering as a proposed method for measuring awareness.
Social consciousness
Authors: Vogeley Kai
Published: March 2014

Experiencing oneself as autonomous agent who interacts with others depends on the cognitive capacities of self-consciousness as awareness of ones own mental states and social consciousness as knowledge of other persons minds. The study of neural correlates of these capacities elicits an impressive overlap with the so-called “default mode of brain function” as a neurobiological universal of mammalian brains. This empirical observation stimulates the speculation that one major cognitive function of the neural default mode is social cognition which conversely implies that humans have a disposition for social cognition that is reflected in this neural default mode.
Consciousness and language
Authors: Sharwood Smith Michael , Truscott John
Published: March 2014

Our conscious control of language and its acquisition is strictly limited. A processing-oriented perspective to explain this will be outlined called MOGUL according to which some linguistic processes are inherently unconscious while others can be either conscious or not. The former involve representations, found in the dedicated, uniquely human language module, whose sealed-off nature does not permit the  activation levels necessary for conscious experience to take place. However, language knowledge created by cognitive processes that are not specifically linguistic, that is, created outside the language module, can indeed be raised to consciousness. This is because they are more directly connected to the perceptual system and are accordingly open to much higher levels of activation.
Cognitive illusions
Authors: Kuhn Gustav
Published: March 2014

Magicians have developed powerful techniques to manipulate our perception and awareness. Many of these techniques share similarities with phenomena typically investigated by psychologists and neuroscientists. Here a novel approach to the study of consciousness is proposed which utilizes the magician’s expertise to complement more traditional experimental laboratory based research. It is argued that this approach offers new and exciting insights into wide areas of consciousness, such as attention, visual awareness and top-down modulation of perception.
Why depression feels bad
Authors: Solms Mark , Panksepp Jaak
Published: March 2014

We believe that conscious mental phenomena (such as feelings) are not epiphenomenal to the workings of the brain. Feelings evolved for good biological reasons; they make specific, concrete contributions to brain functioning. Notwithstanding all the philosophical complexities, therefore, the non-conscious/conscious interactions that are the focus of this book are, in our view, causal interactions. To marginalize consciousness in relation to what is ultimately a cdualistic scientific understanding of how the brain works is likely to lead us astray. We illustrate this view by trying to address the question: why does depression feel bad?
Dementia and the boundary between conscious and nonconscious awareness
Authors: Collerton Daniel
Published: March 2014

Dementing illnesses massively damage the structures and processes thought to underlie consciousness. However, maintained alertness, preserved awareness, and the appearance of hallucinations in people with dementia all suggest that consciousness survives extreme challenge; implying that conscious processes are extremely robust, and conscious content invariably present.
Believing is hearing is believing
Authors: Sedley William
Published: March 2014

Auditory consciousness takes many forms. Some of these, such as auditory perception and imagination, are familiar to nearly all people, which others, such as tinnitus or hearing voices, are rare and unfamiliar to most. This chapter proposes a simplified conceptual model of the auditory system, involving bottom-up influences from the lower auditory pathways and top-down influences from higher evaluative mechanisms. This model is used to explain auditory perception, hallucinations and illusions based, for each phenomenon, on only minor variations from the normally functioning system. Neuroimaging and electrophysiological correlates of these processes are discussed, along with their inability to qualitatively differentiate conscious from unconscious processes, and how we might approach this problem in future.
Conscious and unconscious placebo responses
Authors: Benedetti Fabrizio
Published: March 2014

The study of the placebo response is basically the study of the psychosocial context around the therapy, which constitutes the ritual of the therapeutic act, and of its effects on the patient’s brain. Many mechanisms are involved, both conscious, like expectation of a future outcome, and unconscious, such as classical conditioning. Overall, recent research indicates that different social stimuli, first and foremost the therapist’s words, may induce cellular and molecular changes in the patient’s brain, thus placing psychotherapy into the neurobiological domain.
Chapter 2. Body memory and the genesis of meaning
Authors: Summa Michela
Published: March 2014

This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formation of meaning. To this aim, the theory of embodied meaning put forward by experientialism and the phenomenological account of Typoi and typological constitution are comparatively considered. First the difficulties in the experientialist theory of embodied meaning are discussed. Second Husserl’s phenomenology of typological apprehension is presented as offering a more appropriate account of the genesis of meaning in relation to implicit body memory. Third it is argued that the refined conceptual background in contemporary cognitive linguistics opens up the field for a fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive linguistics regarding the constitution of meaning.
Chapter 4. Comment on Thomas Fuchs
Authors: Gendlin Eugene T.
Published: March 2014

The body has at last entered our current intellectual discourse. Fuchs provides another advance in that development. Until recently the most common question my philosophy would elicit was “But why the body?” Fuchs systematically describes how the body’s memory functions in all present living. He brings its ubiquitous performances together and classifies them. I will comment on this valuable treatise, and extend its import. I will add a distinction. I propose concepts of a different kind for some of his major terms.
Chapter 5. Enduring
Authors: Behnke Elizabeth A.
Published: March 2014

This investigation describes a particular form of traumatic body memory that I term “enduring.” This is an inner bodily gesture that allows us to endure (withstand, survive) difficult experiences while we are undergoing them, yet may continue to endure (in the temporal sense) long after these experiences are over, whether we are aware of its effect on our ongoing style of embodiment or not. I use a Husserlian phenomenological approach to elucidate the kinaesthetic structure of “enduring,” linking it with boundary violation and examining its temporal structure before suggesting some ways in which movement and awareness practices can help to restore a more open, fluid relation to the world in the here and now.
Chapter 6. Body memory and dance
Authors: Alarcón Dávila Mónica E.
Published: March 2014

Memory implies the retention of the present as well as the expectation of future events, even though these, as soon as they are perceived, pass by and belong to the past. This article investigates the possibility of a subjective bodily experience of time as a form of body memory. In dialog with Husserl’s later phenomenology of the body and with the phenomenology of dance, it will be argued that the body is the unconstituted condition of the constitution of time and space.
Chapter 7. Implicit body memory
Authors: Jansen Petra
Published: March 2014

The dichotomy between explicit and implicit memory systems or memory processes seems to be prominent in cognitive psychology literature. Recently it was discussed that this dichotomy is due to different measurement methods (Buchner & Jansen-Osmann 2006; Reder, Park & Kieffaber 2009) and does not provide directly evidence for two different processes or even systems. Graf and Schacter (1985) used the term “implicit memory” for describing a situation where a task performance is influenced by a prior experience without the necessity of becoming aware of that prior experience. In this sense, “implicit body memory” does not mean in any case unconsciousness. From a cognitive psychology point of view, it means that implicit measurements are used. In “classical” memory tasks implicit memory measurements are category production, word identification or word fragmentation. But what are the explicit and implicit measurements of body memory? It is the goal of this chapter to propose new insights in different measurements of body memory analogous to “classical” memory research.
Chapter 9. Cognitive perspectives on embodiment
Authors: Jung Christina , Sparenberg Peggy
Published: March 2014

This chapter focuses on theories of embodiment and relevant empirical findings. The embodied approach in cognitive science claims that cognition is based on action. It argues that external stimuli evoke sensorimotor activations in the observer. Specially, it has been suggested that during action observation, corresponding motor programs are activated in the observer. This is supported by the discovery of mirror neurons and evidence of interactions between perception and action production. Moreover, it has been argued that humans represent other people’s intentions and beliefs in an interpersonal setting. Humans seem to be able to automatically integrate other individuals’ (anticipated) behaviour into their own (re-)actions, which allows the prediction of other people’s actions and fast and flexible reactions in social situations.
Chapter 11. Testing Fuchs’ taxonomy of body memory
Authors: Koch Sabine C.
Published: March 2014

In this chapter, we tested the body memory taxonomy of Fuchs (2003) using content analysis of interviews and questionnaire data – a widely used method for approaching a new concept or phenomenon in the cognitive or social sciences (Mayring 1995; Merten 1995). We conducted interviews on body memory with 61 experienced and inexperienced movers (Study 1) and analyzed questionnaire data of 77 participants (Study 2) in order to find out whether Fuchs’ taxonomy encompasses all relevant aspects of what comes to peoples’ minds when they think about the phenomenon of body memory. As a result, all of Fuchs’ categories emerged in participants’ narratives. Some categories were further differentiated, such as traumatic memories related to a physical or a psychic insult. In particular, situational memory was identified as an overarching category that can be differentiated into various sense modalities (haptic, auditive, olfactory, kinaesthetic, visual). Fuchs’ taxonomy of body memory was thus validated on the basis of this first qualitative empirical test.
Chapter 12. Metaphorical instruction and body memory
Authors: Böger Claudia
Published: March 2014

The aim of this chapter is to discuss how and why metaphorical instructions work during movement learning. The claim of subject-oriented research in movement science and cognitive semantics is that meaning articulation is grounded in movement execution. Movement is considered as a transmodal meaning-articulation, which is important for the relationship between the environment and the subject. Image schematic processes of meaning generation will be examined in detail. At the level of image schemata there are explicit interferences between the contents of natural language and movement, because language is bodily anchored. Experimental evidence suggests that semantic processing of metaphoric information within a dynamic agent-environment interaction is more efficient than processing of non-metaphorical information.
Chapter 14. Moved by God
Authors: Sax William , Polit Karin
Published: March 2014

We review the history of the anthropological study of “body memory” and argue that it was developed in a fruitful way only with the advent of practice theory and performance studies, which focused on embodied meanings in addition to purely linguistic ones. We provide two case studies of embodied memory. In the first, collective memories of oppression and exploitation are activated by the recitation of particular stories, sometimes resulting in mass possession. In the second, practices associated with the periodic processions of a Western Himalayan deity are shown to be based on local forms of embodied memory.
Chapter 16. Sensation, movement, and emotion
Authors: Caldwell Christine
Published: March 2014

Though cognitive neuroscience locates all memory systems in the brain and has gone to great lengths to understand the issues involved in the various forms that memory takes, where these forms are stored, and how they interact, it may be ‘neurocentric’ to think of memory as only occurring in and mediated by the brain. Undoubtedly, neural networks for memory abound in many different areas of the brain, and are absolutely essential hubs for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of human experience. Yet emerging work in neuroscience also confirms the crucial role of sensorimotor and affective processing in the shaping and reshaping of human memory. A case for ‘body memory’ can be made, and the role of the moving, sensing, feeling, and emoting body can now be seen as fundamental to the developmental structuring of and subsequent neurogenetic changing of memory, particularly implicit memory. This understanding of the phenomenological body’s centrality in the navigation of non-verbal and affect-laden learning and remembering has profound impacts for our understanding of attachment, enactment, the therapeutic relationship, and psychotherapeutic procedures.
Chapter 20. Emotorics
Authors: Shahar-Levy Yona
Published: March 2014

This chapter is not a scientific discourse based on erudite quotations. Its purpose is rather (a) to present the typological model of Emotorics, a theory I have developed for the purpose of tentative reconstruction of the subjective meaning embedded in the evoked memory fragments, and (b) to share with my readers selected episodes in which obscure body behavior suddenly comes to the surface presenting entries from my personal professional diary. The basic premise of Emotorics is that motor behavior patterns and emotive body language develop from core biological-relational prototypes. I present selected episodes in which early memories were first “replayed” by obscure body behavior which seems out of any present context. Each episode will be followed by some personal reflections about their possible meaning in light of Emotorics’ typology.
Chapter 3. Psychophysical evaluation of pain and olfaction
Authors: Gracely Richard H.
Published: March 2014

Psychophysical methods used to evaluate the chemical senses have been instrumental for investigations of pain and pain treatment. The evaluation of chemosensory quality has a direct parallel in the use of instruments that aid diagnosis of pain and choice of treatment by the determination of pain quality, such as pulling, throbbing, radiating and burning. The use of hedonic psychophysics in the chemical senses recognizes that tastes and smells can be described by two principal dimensions. The first is the intensity of the sensation, which is the target of most psychophysical methods. The second is the hedonic valence associated with the sensation, i.e., the degree of pleasantness or unpleasantness. These hedonic dimensions are sensitive to internal state; for example, the pleasantness of sugar solutions increases during hunger and decreases during satiety. The concept of hedonics has been successfully applied to pain, albeit with only a negative valence. The dimensions of pain intensity and unpleasantness have been shown to be independent and changes in internal state can modify unpleasantness without altering sensory intensity. In addition, the amount of unpleasantness for a given intensity has been shown to vary over painful conditions (low in childbirth, high in cancer) with consequences for treatment strategy. Methods used for olfaction have been applied to healthy control subjects using experimentally applied painful stimulation and more recently these methods have been applied directly to patients, providing information about the many unknown mechanisms of pain, and the development of more effective treatments. This chapter will describe similarities in the measurement of pain and olfaction and highlight important differences in the evaluation of these two sensory modalities.
Chapter 4. Olfactory comfort in close relationships
Authors: McBurney Donald H. , Streeter Sibyl A. , Euler Harald
Published: March 2014

Smelling the unwashed clothing of a loved one when separated is at the same time little known but widely practiced (McBurney et al., 2006). A majority of persons surveyed reported that they did it to remember an absent romantic partner and because it smells good; additionally, it made them feel happy and comfortable. Shoup et al. (2008) found that such olfactory comfort behavior extended to relatives as a function of degree of relatedness. In both American and German subjects, olfactory comfort correlated with adult attachment style: positively with Secure attachment, and negatively with Dismissive attachment. Number of personal photos displayed in a student’s dorm room correlated with olfactory comfort behavior and showed the same relationships with attachment. Streeter (2008) experimentally demonstrated the role of olfactory comfort by having subjects smell various T-shirts after experiencing a stressor. Smelling a partner’s T-shirt increased comfort, and reduced anxiety and negative affect. The smell of an unknown individual also reduced anxiety and negative affect, but did not influence comfort. Those with Secure attachment showed greater reduction in anxiety than those with other attachment styles. Euler (unpublished) found that smelling of clothing correlated positively with the love styles (Lee, 1973) mania, agape, and eros. In this contribution we review these findings and suggest that they indicate a system of olfactory comfort that relates to Harlow’s contact comfort (e.g, Harlow, Harlow, & Suomi, 1971) as well as Bowlby’s (1969) theory of attachment as extended to adult romantic attachment (Hazan & Shaver, 1987).
Chapter 6. Odor memory and the special role of associative learning
Authors: Herz Rachel S.
Published: March 2014

The field of odor-memory comprises both memory for odors and the ability for odors to evoke autobiographical recollections. Trygg Engen pioneered the psychological investigation of memory for odors. His observation that odor recognition memory was based on associative learning was pivotal to igniting the study of odor-evoked memory and to developing an understanding of the fundamental mechanisms of olfactory perception and cognition. In this chapter, I review Engen’s contributions to the field of odor memory and research in odor-evoked memory from its origins to the present. Engen’s work on odor memory led him to posit that it may be a unique memory system, and this chapter discusses what has led to the conclusion that odor memory is distinct from other memory systems. In particular, I highlight that the special features of odor-associative learning, from proactive interference to the unique predisposition for change on the basis of experience, are the basis for odor memory’s distinguishing characteristics.
Chapter 9. Olfactory function in Parkinson’s disease
Authors: Doty Richard L. , Tekeli Hakan
Published: March 2014

Olfactory dysfunction is an early ‘pre-clinical’ sign of Parkinson’s disease (PD). In this chapter I briefly review what is known about such dysfunction in PD and related diseases. In general, the dysfunction is robust and bilateral, anosmia is not the norm, women exhibit less loss than men, and some monogenetic forms of the disease exhibit the dysfunction. The loss is unrelated to disease stage or magnitude of the motor symptoms, save perhaps in the earliest stages of the disorder. Lewy body pathology, a hallmark of PD, appears to be correlated with the olfactory dysfunction, although it is not known whether this reflects a causal relationship. Dopamine is over-expressed in the olfactory bulbs of PD patients. Interestingly, deficiencies in other neurotransmitters, most notably acetylcholine, are correlated with the olfactory loss. A number of diseases often misdiagnosed as PD have little or no smell loss, including essential tremor, vascular parkinsonism, and progressive supranuclear palsy, making olfactory testing of value in differential diagnosis. The limited data suggest that the physiological basis of PD-related olfactory dysfunction is likely multifactorial, representing a combination of environmentally and genetically determined pathologies that involve multiple transmitter systems.
Chapter 11. Olfactory impairment in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease
Authors: Nordin Steven
Published: March 2014

This chapter provides a broad review of early and recent findings on the neuropsychology of olfactory impairment in normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in a growing population of elderly. Neural and anatomical changes in these populations underlying olfactory impairment are described, and effects on behavioral measures of olfactory function are presented. These functions span from sensory to cognitive in character, and include detection sensitivity, discrimination, recognition memory, familiarity, identification and semantic networks. Furthermore, the role of awareness of olfactory impairment is discussed with respect to normal aging and AD. Other aspects provided in this chapter include olfactory testing for early signs of AD, and consequences of olfactory impairment on quality of life, food intake and health. Finally, future research needs are identified and discussed.
Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind?
Authors: Kiverstein Julian , Farina Mirko
Published: March 2014

Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be “yes” to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009), a founder and leading proponent of the hypothesis of the extended mind, demurs, arguing that as matter of fact the biology of consciousness doesn’t allow for a brain, body and world boundary crossing architecture. We begin by looking at one of the arguments for DSM, the variable neural correlates argument. We then outline two criticisms that Clark has made of this argument and endorse his criticisms. However we finish up by using the case of sensory substitution to argue that something of this argument for DSM nevertheless survives. We suggest that Clark ought to concede sensory substitution as a case in which the conscious mind extends. Keywords: variable neural correlates; action-space view; dynamic sensorimotor theories; extended consciousness; sensory substitution devices
Showtime at the Cartesian Theater?
Authors: Madary Michael
Published: March 2014

Vehicle externalists hold that the physical substrate of mental states can sometimes extend beyond the brain into the body and environment. In a particular variation on vehicle externalism, Susan Hurley (1998) and Alva Noë (2004) have argued that perceptual states, states with phenomenal qualities, are among the mental states that can sometimes spread beyond the brain. Their vehicle externalism about perceptual states will be the main topic of this article. In particular, I will address three strong objections to their vehicle externalism, objections by Ned Block (2005a), Jesse Prinz (2006), and Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (2008). Though in some ways these objections appear disparate, I will argue that all of them depend on a crucial presupposition, one which Hurley, Noë, and their sympathizers should reject. This presupposition is that perceptual character is fixed by an instantaneous snapshot of neural states, a view that Hurley dubbed ‘temporal atomism’. To put the presupposition in more familiar terms, all three objections are implicitly committed to something like Dennett’s Cartesian Theater (1991).In the first part of the article, I will discuss Hurley and Noë’s views, and include reasons why their views entail the rejection of the Cartesian Theater. In the next part of the article I will introduce the three objections and show how they presuppose something like a Cartesian Theater. I will also show that, if the Cartesian Theater is rejected, the objections all vanish. In the final part of the article I address the charge that Noë and Hurley confuse causation with constitution. This charge reveals a lack of appreciation for the way in which dynamical explanation motivates Hurley’s externalism. Keywords: vehicle externalism; perceptual states; dynamical explanations; Cartesian Theater
Mindshaping and the intentional control of the mind
Authors: Vierkant Tillmann , Paraskevaides Andreas
Published: March 2014

Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role for a theoretical understanding of psychological states in human cognition. We argue that this is because a theoretical understanding is necessary for all intentional control of the mind. Keywords: mindreading; mindshaping; narrative control; manipulative control; folk psychology
Recognition of emotion in others
Authors: Frijda Nico H.
Published: March 2014

This chapter argues that recognition of emotion has a simple basis and a highly complex edifice above it. Its basis is formed by catching intent from expressive and other emotional behavior, using elementary principles of perceptual integration. In intent recognition, mirror neurons under particular circumstances do play a role, but under other circumstances visual perception and prediction may suffice. To arrive at full understanding of emotions of others, and in particular to arrive at empathy, much more elaborate information, and activities of mentalising, are required. Keywords: emotion recognition; emotional behavior; intent understanding; mentalizing.
From sensation to consciousness
Authors: Riccio Monica
Published: March 2014

The paper deals with the transformation of sensation concept throughout modern thinking. A particularr focus is laid on the transition of sensation from the external – the body and his surface – into the inside – the depth and darkness of human consciousness. If “nothing but a body can touch and be touched” (Lucretius, De rerum natura, I, 304), it is namely in the passivity, in the stance of “being touched”, that sensation forces a passage towards the inside, the mind, the soul, and modifies it. Modern philosophy changes the way of thinking this passage, in accordance with a new concept of subject and consciousness, and with a renewed approach to the mind-body connection. Focus of the paper are the theories of Malebranche and Condillac, as, notwithstanding the basic difference of their argumentative stance, they both propose a new path for this transition. Both Malebranche, by twisting from within meaning and extent of Cartesian dualism, and Condillac, pursuing Lockean anti-innatism, acknowledge the fundamental passivity of the sentient subject. The pervasive power ascribed to sensation is instrumental in engendering a new enlarged representation of the inner space of consciousness. Keywords: sensation; passivity; inside/outside; modifications of the soul
Theories of consciousness in early-modern philosophy
Authors: Palaia Roberto
Published: March 2014

A semantic shift of the word consciousness (conscientia, conscience, Gewissen, Bewusstsein, coscienza) occurred in 17th- and 18th-century European languages. While in pre-modern times the term consciousness had been related to theology and ethics, in early modern thought, a new meaning was added to the term, somehow different from the original one. Early modern philosophers and scientists used consciousness to refer to the knowledge of Self. In addition, it is apparent that the syntagms relating to the word consciousness – as, for instance, freedom of consciousness, casus conscientiae – became more frequent in political, religious, scientific and philosophical texts. My contribution will analyse the occurrences of these semantic fields in some important philosphical and scientific texts and will examine their specific uses and contexts. Keywords: consciousness; conscience; bewusstsein; modern philosophy; philosophical dictionary
Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
Authors: Malach Rafael
Published: March 2014

For a neuroscientist working under the assumption of a complete correspondence between mind and brain, conscious awareness poses a profound mystery. It is a unique phenomenon in which a state of a physical system – i.e. a distributed pattern of neuronal activity is inexplicably transformed into an absolutely private and internal mental experience. Thus, the relevant point of view that needs to be taken when considering neuronal mechanisms underlying phenomenal experience must also be intrinsic – that of the brain’s neurons themselves. In contrast, the perspective taken by most neuroscience research examines neuronal activity from an external observer perspective. Here I will conjecture that the intrinsic perspective is implemented in the brain through rapid and recurrent neuronal activity – local neuronal “ignitions”. In this dynamics, the information about the state of a local neuronal assembly is distributed back to the neurons that form the assembly through recurrent activations. A conscious percept emerges when, through these neuronal reflections, the ambiguity inherent in the activity of isolated neurons is converted into a unique and meaningful assembly state. The rapid distribution of assembly information necessitates high firing rates, sustained activity, and dense local connectivity. All these conditions fit nicely with recent experimental findings. The fourth consequence – the founding of conscious awareness on local reverberatory activity – is still highly controversial – and should be viewed, at this stage, as a prediction of the local “ignition” hypothesis.
From probabilities to percepts
Authors: Merker Bjorn
Published: March 2014

A brain charged with guiding its body through a complex and lively world from a position of solitary confinement inside its opaque skull faces a set of functional challenges beset with inverse and ill-posed problems at every turn. Uncertainty and ambiguity therefore encumber all cortical labors, making probability distributions the natural medium of its disambiguating inferential operations. This chapter proposes that those operations take place unconsciously, in keeping with Helmholtz’ original suggestion, and that the functional logic of an inherently probabilistic cortex implies a need for an extracortical “global best estimate buffer” as a means to complete cortical sensory disambiguation through a definitive but ephemeral estimate of current sensory circumstances. It further proposes that the contents of that extracortical buffer are conscious, not by virtue of anything being “added” to buffer operations in order to “make them conscious”, but by virtue of the format of buffer contents alone: its dynamics issue in a nested arrangement placing an ego-center in perspectival relation to a neural model of body-world interactions. Finally, the organization of the higher order nuclei of the dorsal thalamus are scrutinized for their suitability to implement the putative global best estimate buffer, with particular attention to the possibility that the caudal reaches of the dorsal pulvinar might host its specifically sensory aspects, i.e. sensory awareness. Keywords: ambiguity; architecture of consciousness; best estimate buffer; constraint satisfaction; format of sensory awareness; phenomenal content; probabilistic operations; pulvinar
The (lack of) mental life of some machines
Authors: Fekete Tomer , Edelman Shimon
Published: March 2014

The proponents of machine consciousness predicate the mental life of a machine, if any, exclusively on its formal, organizational structure, rather than on its physical composition. Given that matter is organized on a range of levels in time and space, this generic stance must be further constrained by a principled choice of levels on which the posited structure is supposed to reside. Indeed, not only must the formal structure fit well the physical system that realizes it, but it must do so in a manner that is determined by the system itself, simply because the mental life of a machine cannot be up to an external observer. To illustrate just how tall this order is, we carefully analyze the scenario in which a digital computer simulates a network of neurons. We show that the formal correspondence between the two systems thereby established is at best partial, and, furthermore, that it is fundamentally incapable of realizing both some of the essential properties of actual neuronal systems and some of the fundamental properties of experience. Our analysis suggests that, if machine consciousness is at all possible, conscious experience can only be instantiated in a class of machines that are entirely different from digital computers, namely, timecontinuous, open analog dynamical systems.
Fuzzy consciousness
Authors: Huette Stephanie , Spivey Michael J.
Published: March 2014

This chapter explores the consequences of treating consciousness as a fuzzy dynamical system. A fuzzy dynamical system is one in which labeled concepts and percepts are altered as a function of context and conditions, and these changes occur continuously in time. We offer speculations on the groundwork for a consciousness state space in which the sets of trajectories over time form tube-like structures called cylinder sets. Consciousness is a trajectory within this structure, and it passes by or through those fuzzy concepts. When the trajectory of a mental event travels close to a particular concept or percept, one experiences awareness of that concept or percept. As these constrained pathways in mental state space become more heavily traveled, they develop increased density (or attraction strength) in their central threads, and more and more nearby trajectories get captured by that cylinder. At the same time, these tubes slowly gravitate toward short cuts in the state space over the lifespan, thus gradually straightening out and skipping past intermediating concepts that used to get visited as part of the sequence. The fringes of these concepts become a part of conscious experience, and for everyday coping, do not need to be recruited for explicit awareness. The formation and streamlining of cylinder sets over the course of learning may have the paradoxical result. of producing an increase in tacit conscious experience (of “being in time”) and a decrease in explicit awareness (of this or that labeled concept).
An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness
Authors: Dale Rick , Tollefsen Deborah P. , Kello Christopher T.
Published: March 2014

We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selfhood, awareness, and conscious experience. The mechanisms that have been identified for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. The first is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic.
Constituents, organization and processes of the human brain
Authors: Hannan Anthony J. , Kirkcaldie Matthew T.K.
Published: March 2014

The human brain is an extraordinarily complex biological system underpinning cognition and experience. This complexity is evident at all levels, from genetics to molecular, cellular, network and systems constituents. This article provides an overview of these constituents, their organization and the processes in which they are engaged. We discuss the shaping influences of development and evolution, and describe the brain’s structure and function at several levels: cellular features, the organization of neurons into functional systems, the gross anatomy of the nervous system and the specific structural and functional properties of the cerebral cortex. There is considerable evidence that cortical activity – though not all cortical activity – is correlated with conscious experiences, but exactly which activities constitute consciousness is unclear.
Overview of visual system structure and function
Authors: Price Nicholas S.C.
Published: March 2014

The fundamental role of the visual system is to analyze properties such as form, color and motion in the environment, facilitating the generation of behaviors conducive to survival. A (happy) outcome of these computations is that humans are endowed with conscious visual perception. Despite the complexity of processing in the visual system, we experience a single, unified and continuous percept. This review describes the general anatomy and physiology of the primate visual system, emphasizing four organizational principles and processing strategies that ultimately inform perception and behavior: information processing is functionally segregated; information is encoded in a multiplexed manner; information is hierarchically processed, dependent on feedback and feedforward connectivity; vision is an active sense, with perception and eye movements tightly integrated.
Binocular rivalry, brain stimulation and bipolar disorder
Authors: Ngo Trung T. , Barsdell Wendy N. , Law Phillip C.F. , Miller Steven M.
Published: March 2014

Mechanistic understanding of binocular rivalry (BR) has drawn upon psychophysical, electrophysiological and brain-imaging studies. The first brain stimulation approach occurred in the late 1990s and assessed a new mechanistic proposal, the interhemispheric switch (IHS) hypothesis. Both caloric vestibular stimulation (CVS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) modulated rivalry predominance when applied unilaterally. We describe the IHS model, its genesis and the brain stimulation evidence on which it rests. We also review more recent CVS and TMS rivalry studies, and discuss the findings of slow BR in bipolar disorder (BD) and genetic contribution to individual variation in BR rate. Finally, we describe a recent Drosophila model that can shed light on genetic, molecular and neurophysiological aspects of both BR and BD.
High-level modulations of binocular rivalry
Authors: Bressler David W. , Denison Rachel N. , Silver Michael A.
Published: March 2014

The selection and maintenance of a specific percept during binocular rivalry have often been considered to be relatively automatic and influenced primarily by low-level stimulus attributes such as contrast and luminance. However, numerous studies have identified other, higher-level, factors that substantially influence perceptual selection, dominance, and suppression in binocular rivalry. These factors include the configuration of stimulus elements, the spatial and temporal context in which the rivaling stimuli are presented, and manipulations of attentional and pharmacological state. The studies summarized in this chapter broaden traditional conceptions of binocular rivalry as a competition between populations of stimulus-selective neurons and demonstrate that multiple factors can operate over extended spatial and temporal scales to modulate the competitive processes underlying perceptual selection.
Binocular rivalry
Authors: Wilson Hugh R.
Published: March 2014

This chapter will first examine the neural circuitry necessary to generate binocular rivalry. Such neural circuits entail both neural cooperation within and competition between monocular images. Evidence will also be presented that rivalry must occur at multiple hierarchic levels in the visual system in order to explain relevant data. In light of this, the suggestion that rivalry can elucidate the neural correlates of conscious vision will be challenged. Following this, generalizations of rivalry to competition among multiple spatial patterns will be developed. It will be argued that such generalized rivalry can provide significant insights into the nature of high level visual decisions in the presence of ambiguous or incomplete information.
Do chimpanzees have voluntary control of their facial expressions and vocalizations?
Authors: Hopkins William D. , Taglialatela Jared , Leavens David A.
Published: March 2014

It has been argued that only humans have volitional control of their vocalizations and that this ability allowed for the evolution of speech. Here we argue that recent studies in chimpanzees suggest that they do, in fact have some degree of voluntary control of both their vocalizations as well as their facial expressions. We further argue, based on recent studies, that chimpanzees understand the functional significance of using vocalizations or sounds in communicative and social contexts, specifically as a means of obtaining the attention of an otherwise inattentive human. The ability of chimpanzees to voluntarily produce vocal signals and functionally manipulate social agents with them may be an important precursor in the evolution of human spoken language.
Helping robots imitate
Authors: Alissandrakis Aris , Syrdal Dag Sverre , Miyake Yoshihiro
Published: March 2014

Towards informing the design of more ‘natural’ (non-expert) human–robot interaction (HRI) systems, this chapter presents two studies, focusing on a scenario where a human has to teach a robot how to perform an everyday household task.The first study considered the humans’ acknowledgment of feedback from a robot, to which they had to demonstrate how to do a task. The research questions were if (and how) the participants would modify their teaching instructions when the robot stated a misunderstanding, and whether they would remain consistent for the remainder of the task.In the second study, the robot feedback increased in complexity, in order to elaborate on what the human had demonstrated. The research question was if the participants, based on the robot feedback, would be able to resolve any misunderstandings by modifying their teaching instructions.Besides illustrating that people express a wide variety of teaching behaviors when faced with the task of demonstrating to a robot, the results from the second study support our design suggestion that robots should actively and accurately advertise their cognitive and manipulative capabilities via form (appearance) and function (behavior) to improve the dialogic interaction.
The role of expectations and situations in human-robot interaction
Authors: Lohse Manja
Published: March 2014

In human-robot interaction, the behaviour of the robot is usually predefined and can easily be predicted. However, this is not true for the behaviour of the users. Throughout the interaction, users employ various behaviours which often cannot be foreseen intuitively. Therefore, theoretical models need to be developed to predict and explain the users’ behaviour in order to enable the robot to better understand its interaction partner. The current work suggests such a model which is based on the concepts of situations and expectations. It claims that both concepts support the prediction of user behaviour in the interaction and demonstrates the usefulness of the model in a case study based on data from human-robot interaction in a home tour situation.
Attitudes toward robots and factors influencing them
Authors: Nomura Tatsuya , Suzuki Tomohiro , Kanda Takayuki , Yamada Sachie , Kato Kensuke
Published: March 2014

Attitudes toward robots, in particular, negative attitudes are important factors influencing human perception and behaviors toward robots. The chapter surveys the existing studies using the Negative Attitudes toward Robots Scale for measuring these attitudes, and then reports a current study based on a social research, showing influences of experiences of robots, educational backgrounds, and generations into negative attitudes toward robots. In particular, the results of the survey suggested that experiences of humanoid robots decreased negative attitudes toward interaction with the robots. Finally, the chapter discusses the future direction of the research on negative attitudes toward robots.
Toward making robots invisible-in-use
Authors: Takayama Leila
Published: March 2014

A major challenge facing human-robot interaction is understanding how people will interact and cope with increasingly agentic objects in their everyday lives. As more robotic technologies enter human environments, it is critical to consider other models of human-robot interaction that do not always demand focused attention. Drawing from the ubiquitous computing perspective and its theoretical foundations in phenomenology, we present the analysis and results from interviews (N = 19) and surveys (N = 46) regarding personal experiences with tools that became invisible-in-use, shedding light upon ways that robots might do the same, and regarding equestrian (N = 6) perspectives on working with animal agents. This chapter presents lessons learned from these studies and recommendations for designing robots to be more invisible-in-use.