bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Transcendental Arguments and ‘Epistemological Naturalism’
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Stroud discusses Jay Rosenberg's Peirce‐inspired epistemological naturalism in relation to the requirements of a Kantian epistemological project that answers scepticism. Stroud explores the question of the possibility of conclusions of a special metaphysical status required for the success of such a project and sketches answers that vary with the status and strength of the conclusions in questions.
The Allure of Idealism
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Stroud explicates what is required of the Kantian project in order for it to establish the failure of scepticism or a significant contribution thereto. Stroud works out the conceptual relations between transcendental arguments in epistemology and an idealist background, and concludes that the Kantian project cannot fully answer the challenge of scepticism. Stroud further argues that Jonathan Lear's Kantian reading of the later Wittgenstein, alluring the latter into the realm of idealism, does not succeed to the extent desired by Lear.
Understanding Human Knowledge in General
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Returns to the problem of working out the framework of posing the questions that a theory of knowledge is supposed to answer and the status of scepticism in such a project. Stroud argues that owing to the generality of the question and the limitations we conceptually impose on what counts as human knowledge, no satisfactory answer to the question, posed in the right way, is or could be possible. Turning to counter‐arguments against his argument, Stroud discusses externalist strategies, which are found equally unsatisfactory.
Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Stroud emphasizes, against Michael Williams, the ‘naturalness’ of epistemological theorizing and the apparent irresistibility of scepticism. Stroud argues that even if philosophical assumptions or theories, rather than natural reflection on the basis of our knowledge, are the foundations of scepticism, understanding what seems to support them is likely to prove philosophically rewarding, and hence disagrees with Williams, who regards this fact as a main premise in an argument for the insignificance of philosophical scepticism for theorizing about knowledge.
The Synthetic a Priori in Strawson's Kantianism
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Deals with the project of demonstrating the possibility of conclusions with a distinctive metaphysical status, both in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which for its success depends on the analytic‐synthetic distinction, and analogously in Strawson's Kantian project that does not appeal to transcendental idealism but which nevertheless exploits the notion of a priori knowledge. Stroud identifies two conditions for the possibility of propositions with a distinctive metaphysical status: first, necessary conditions between the possession of certain concepts or conceptual capacities and others can be discovered; and secondly, certain conceptual capacities can be shown to be required for the possibility of any thought or experience at all. The distinctive status of these propositions, Stroud argues, can be described without any appeal to the analytic‐synthetic distinction and without supposing that if we know them, we know them a priori.
Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Disputes the attribution to Wittgenstein of a ‘conventionalist’ account of necessity. Conventionalism can seem appropriate given Wittgenstein's denial that there is anything in a person's understanding of the premises and rules he or she accepts, which can ‘force’ him or her to accept a particular conclusion. This conventionalist interpretation (ascribed to Michael Dummett) is resisted.
Inference, Belief, and Understanding
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Lewis Carroll's story ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’ shows that a truth's being necessary, even if it links a set of premises with a deducible conclusion, will not explain any sense in which someone is forced to draw that conclusion despite accepting the premises. The chapter attempts to bring out the implications for conceiving of a belief's being based on, or being a reason for, another belief. A theory of meaning that provides for understanding in terms of a capacity or ability on the part of the speaker must take into account the threat of regress experienced in Achilles’ predicament.
Evolution and the Necessities of Thought
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Examines the notion of necessity and the special problems it poses for knowledge. The conventionalist response is to see necessary truth as the product of thinking and the decision to act in certain ways. Against this view, it is argued that the complex grammar of the notion of necessity can be appreciated without seeking a definition of it, let alone an explanation of its source. Even though contingent facts about the processes of human knowledge cannot hope to explain the necessary truths, attention to those contingent facts might explain our acceptance of necessary truth and the role it plays in the ways we think about the world.
Quine's Physicalism
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Takes up the idea that meaning and intentional phenomena in general are indeterminate or underdetermined with respect to physical facts. What notion of physicalism is, then, needed to make physicalism a tenable thesis? The emerging characterization of physicalism—as the thesis that physical predicates are sufficient for a description of things as they are ‘fundamentally’—raises another version of the problem of indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts.
Quine on Exile and Acquiescence
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Discusses Quine's views on the impossibility of taking up a vantage point outside conceptual schemes (linguistic frameworks). It explores issues in Quine's theory of language, among which are the theory of the inscrutability of reference and the doctrine of ‘being at home’ in our language.
The Theory of Meaning and the Practice of Communication
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Donald Davidson has claimed that there is no such thing as language, if language is understood as most philosophers and linguists understand it. This essay reflects on the nature of the misconstrual in question, and relates it to the book's running concern with the inability of semantic theories focused exclusively on rules and knowledge to account for meaning and communication.
Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Contains an examination of David Pears’ interpretation of the private language argument. Reasons are given to doubt Pears’ account both with regard to its content and as a reading of Wittgenstein. Remarks about Wittgenstein's philosophical enterprise are culled from the matter at hand.
Life and Times
Authors: Louth Andrew
Published: October 2003

An account of the transformation of the Middle East as a result of the rise of Islam, the Arab conquest of the region and the establishment of the Umayyad Empire, especially as it affected Jerusalem and Palestine, including a discussion of what little can be gleaned about John's own life.
Defining the Faith
Authors: Louth Andrew
Published: October 2003

An exposition of the doctrines of the Christian Faith as John sets them forth in his On the Orthodox Faith, and his polemical writings against Monophysites, Monothelites, and Nestorians. Doctrines treated include the Trinity, Christology, creation, and human nature, prayer, and sacraments. Also included are brief accounts of the history of these doctrines up to John Damascene.
Χρυσορρόας (‘Flowing With Gold’): John the Preacher
Authors: Louth Andrew
Published: October 2003

Discussion of John's contemporary reputation as preacher and his extant sermons; of his use of rhetoric and the nature of his audience; detailed analysis of sermons on the Transfiguration of Christ and on the Dormition of the Mother of God (Theotokos), and its Mariology.
Γλυκορρήμων (‘Sweetly Speaking’): John the Poet
Authors: Louth Andrew
Published: October 2003

A brief account of the development of Byzantine liturgical poetry, and the role of Palestinian monasticism in his development, especially the evolution of the canon. Theological and literary analysis of three canons attributed to John Damascene: on Easter, the Transfiguration of Christ, and the Dormition of the Mother of God.
Introduction
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

In the early modern period, reason was considered to be one of the higher cognitive faculties, and could be considered to function independently of the other cognitive faculties, such as the senses, the imagination, and memory. The faculty psychology of the period centrally involved ideas, rejected scholastic formalism, and was both psychologically descriptive and logically normative. The primary function of reason was to account for inference. Hume's account must be understood against this background, as he uses its vocabulary and shares many of its perspectives. He departs from the tradition in rejecting faculty psychology, at least to the extent of treating reason as an independently functioning faculty. The inferential activities of reason, both demonstrative and probable, are given a distinctively new treatment in terms of the properties of the imagination.
Reason, Belief, and Scepticism
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

Hume's treatment of scepticism with regard to reason is analogous to his account of probable reasoning. In neither case is Hume concerned with the justification of beliefs or the warrant of reason as much as with the explanation of the presence of beliefs. In his account of probable reasoning, the issue was the origin of beliefs; in his account of scepticism with regard to reason, the issue is the retention of beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments. The sceptical arguments threaten to lessen the degree of force and vivacity characteristic of our beliefs to the extent that they are in danger of becoming mere ideas and not beliefs at all. We know, as a matter of fact, that this result does not obtain, and Hume attempts to explain this by an appeal to a feature of his account of reasoning: lengthy chains of abstruse reasoning have little effect on us. Hume considers his ability to respond to these sceptical arguments to be a vindication of his theory of belief.
The Right and the Good
Authors: Ross David
Published: October 2003

The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
What Makes Right Acts Right?
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).
The Meaning of ‘Good’
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

Having discussed right in the first two chapters of the book, the remaining five discuss good, starting here with an analysis of the meaning of good. The analysis starts by showing that the senses in which ‘good’ is used can essentially be divided into two: adjunctive or attributive—to persons or things; and predicative. These two different usages are discussed in detail in the rest of the chapter.
Moral Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This is the last of five chapters on good, and examines moral goodness. Ross explains the concept of morally good as either being a certain sort of character or being related in one of certain definite ways to a certain sort of character. The matter of what kinds of things are morally good is then addressed, and further advances made in defining moral goodness. These begin by considering Immanuel Kant's views on the desire to do duty, and go on to consider conscientious—or virtuous—actions, scales of moral goodness (or badness), types of good desire, and bad actions.
Causing Actions
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.
From Explanation to Causation
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

Causation is (primarily) a description‐insensitive relation between events, while explanation is a description‐sensitive relation between facts, which (for these purposes) can be identified with true Fregean thoughts. Events are thus individuated more coarsely than facts, which are the senses of true sentences. But given the event analysis defended in Ch. 1, some facts are about particular events. And if a fact about one event explains a fact about another event, then the first event is a cause for the second.
Natural Causes
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

The proposed account of causation, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind‐independence of causal relations. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ (or ‘ways of thinking about’) events. Causation remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation.
Moral Dilemmas
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas contains the best of Prof. Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays, she develops further her influential critique of the ’non‐cognitivist’ approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of evaluations in general (or moral judgements in particular) as distinguished from ‘statements of fact’ by a special connection with the feelings, attitudes, or commitments of an individual speaker. Instead, she portrays thoughts about the goodness or badness of human action as like (though also unlike) the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and those of all living things. She also discusses moral relativism, utilitarianism, and moral dilemmas, as well as some subjects of special relevance to medical ethics. This work contains a select bibliography of the publications of Philippa Foot. With Prof. Foot's other two books, these essays present her distinctive and lasting contributions to twentieth‐century moral philosophy.
Utilitarianism and the Virtues
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Attacks Utilitarianism as a moral theory. Utilitarianism is a particular form of Consequentialism, and as such it is radically flawed; depending as it does on a vacuous use of expressions such as ‘best state of affairs.’ Genuine uses of such words are ‘agent relative,’ requiring as a background the desires or interests of particular individuals or groups. But in moral philosophy this relativity is supposed to be left behind. Right or wrong is supposed to be determined in relation to a best possible state of affairs ‘from a moral point of view.’ But what does this mean? It is true that a more or less determinate end is internal to the virtue of benevolence, but benevolence is not the whole of morality.
Morality, Action, and Outcome
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

This essay is an expansion and refinement of the key ideas and distinctions that Foot advances in ‘Killing and Letting Die’ (V.). Here, she defends two morally relevant distinctions: firstly, that between ‘what we do’ and what ‘we allow to happen’ and secondly, what we aim at (‘direct intention’) and what we only foresee as the result of what we do (‘indirect intention’). Utilitarianism as a moral theory is, Foot claims, at fault in overlooking these important distinctions. She describes cases in which although it would be thought permissible to let one person die if we could then save a greater number, we should be outraged by the idea that we could kill one person in order to save them (Rescue I and Rescue II in Essay V.). Moreover, the impermissibility of even allowing one person to die deliberately in order to use the body to save others shows that the distinction between doing and allowing must be supplemented by the distinction between direct and indirect intention. Foot therefore argues that Utilitarianism is a deficient moral theory in that it overlooks these complexities of agency. This mistake came from the attempt to ground all moral judgements in purely causal relationships to better or worse ‘states of affairs,’ and in the latter part of the essay Foot calls into question the whole idea of ‘good states of affairs from a moral point of view’ that Utilitarians suppose to stand as the one foundation of all moral judgements.
The Plan of the Categories
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin argues, against prevailing opinions, that Aristotle's account of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, with which the Categories begins, must be understood as an integral part of the treatise. The three ‘onymyies’, as Wedin calls them, are grouping principles, or one‐over‐many principles, that each collect a number of items under a single term. Wedin focuses on synonymy in particular, because it enables Aristotle to construct a theory of the fundamental kinds of things that are, and as such provides the basis for the system of the categories. For Wedin, the Categories is not just concerned with classification but also with ontology and semantics: it offers a theory about the underlying ontological implications of standard categorical statements, with the aim of determining what must exist, and in what relations these things must stand, in order for the statements to be true.
Nonsubstantial Individuals
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items.
Zeta 6 on the Immediacy of Form
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin discusses Aristotle's claims in Metaphysics Zeta 6 that the essence of a thing is to be sought among its per se attributes, and that each thing that is primary and spoken of per se, e.g. primary substance, is the same as its essence. Wedin argues that the Zeta 6 Thesis, i.e. that the essence of a thing is the thing's immediate essence, is a crucial requirement of the explanatory role of essence as the substance of c‐substances. According to Wedin, Aristotle introduces this requirement in order to establish that a thing's essence cannot depend on another essence. Form must be the essence; if form cannot explain the nature of the thing of which it is the form, there would be the threat of a regress of explanatory forms. At the end of the chapter, Wedin considers the problem that the identity of a thing and its essence is a requirement that can be met by non‐substance items, but he denies that this leads to a dilution of the conception of substance.
Generality and Compositionality: Z.13's Worries About Form
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin offers an interpretation of Metaphysics Zeta 13, a very important and difficult chapter, where Aristotle apparently denies that substance is a universal, having, on most accounts, already claimed that form is substance, and that form is a universal. This interpretation of the argument of Z.13, Wedin argues, threatens the possibility of attaining a definition of substance, and places in doubt what has gone before in the treatise. According to Wedin, what Aristotle is concerned with in Z.13 is not the denial that substance is a universal but rather with the denial that anything predicated universally of a c‐substance is the substance‐of the c‐substance, which Wedin calls ‘Weak proscription’. In Wedin's account of Z.13, then, Aristotle is continuing to pursue issues first raised in Z.10–11 that have to do with the relations between form and definition, and form and the universal. Wedin also argues that the dilemma at the conclusion of Z.13, regarding the definability of substance, is resolved in Z.16, with the notion of ‘Dual Complexity’, according to which the parts of a form exist potentially in the form, just as the parts of the c‐substance exist potentially in the c‐substance.
Form and Explanation
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Aristotle claims in Metaphysics Z.17 that form is both a cause and principle of c‐substances. In this chapter, Wedin argues that the explanatory, or causal, role of form is in the background of the entire discussion, and indeed directs much of the argumentation of Metaphysics Zeta. Form is the cause of some matter being a unity and not a heap, because form alone explains how the material parts of a thing are united in a single whole. Wedin draws together the main results of the preceding investigation of Zeta—that form is essence, that form must not contain matter or actual parts, and that form must not be a certain kind of universal—and he argues that these constraints on form are designed to serve the explanatory role that Aristotle explicitly gives to form in Z.17. Wedin emphasizes that the notions isolated in the examination of the earlier chapters, such as the purity of form, weak proscription, and dual complexity, each contribute to the account of form as the explanatory principle of c‐substance.
Parties Without Partisans
Authors: Wattenberg Martin P.
Published: October 2003

This is a broad cross‐national study of the role of political parties in contemporary democracies. Leading scholars in the field assess the evidence for partisan decline or adaptation for 20 OECD nations. This book documents the broadscale erosion of the public's partisan identities in virtually all advanced industrial democracies. It demonstrates how political parties have adapted to partisan dealignment by strengthening their internal organizational structures and partially isolating themselves from the ebbs and flows of electoral politics. Centralized, professionalized parties with short time horizons have replaced the ideologically driven mass parties of the past. Parties without Partisans is the most comprehensive cross‐national study of parties in advanced industrial democracies in all of their forms—in electoral politics, as organizations, and in government.
Unthinkbale Democracy
Authors: Dalton Russell J. , Wattenberg Martin P.
Published: October 2003

Discusses the many important functions that parties play within the democratic process, classifying them according to V.O. Key's general framework of parties in the electorate, as organizations, and in government. The chapter then asks whether social and political changes in advanced industrial democracies are eroding these roles. Two competing hypotheses are outlined to possibly account for these trends—dissatisfaction with party performance and the process of modernization.
Political Parties as Campaign Organizations
Authors: Farrell David M. , Webb Paul
Published: October 2003

Considers the organizational consequences for parties of the professionalization of election campaigning. This process has gone through three main stages, from pre‐modern, through the TV‐dominated modern stage, and onto the current advanced‐modern stage of campaigning personified by the use of new telecommunications technology. The chapter shows party organizations to be highly adaptive, investing heavily in time and resources in the new campaign techniques, professionalizing, and centralizing their organizations (particularly around their top leaderships), and paying far more attention to image and specific campaign issues as opposed to traditional ideological standpoints. There has been a shift from parties selling themselves to voters to designing an appropriate product to match voter needs. Because of these changes, contemporary political parties have repositioned themselves to survive the uncertainties of operating as representative institutions in the increasingly participatory age of the end of the millennium.
From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation
Authors: Scarrow Susan E. , Webb Paul , Farrell David M.
Published: October 2003

Assembles new cross‐national evidence on changes in the internal distribution of power within political parties. It hypothesizes that ongoing changes in candidate selection, leadership selection, and policy‐making enable more party supporters to participate in party decision‐making, but that these changes may coincide with a strengthening of central party powers. The chapter concludes that grass‐roots party members (and sometimes even non‐member supporters) commonly play a significant role in selecting legislative candidates and in legitimizing election programmes, though party elites generally retain vetoes over candidate‐selection and enjoy considerable autonomy in shaping party policy. However, the remains of the classic mass party model are especially evident in the significant number of parties that have congress delegates decide on the question of leadership. In these cases, the influence of the sub‐leadership stratum has not been completely eroded. Although patterns are mixed, there are now more instances around the democratic world where party leaders operate a coalition of power in which grass‐roots members are significant junior partners.
On the Primacy of Party in Government
Authors: Thies Michael F.
Published: October 2003

Argues that despite voluminous evidence of party decline in the electorate, parties in government can survive, even prosper, because the core of the party is and always has been located at the level of government. As long as the organizational structure of the government party serves members in their attainment of policy goals, the parties will survive, irrespective of the strength of partisan loyalties. Thus, the observed decline of partisan attachments in the electorate does not spell doom for the partyness of government. Instead, it may simply mean that the core issues that define the current slate of parties in government are not as salient to voters as in the past. If partisan cues do not help voters to choose whom to support at election time, party in the electorate might seem to decline without any particular consequences for party in government.
Partisan Change and the Democratic Process
Authors: Dalton Russell J. , Wattenberg Martin P.
Published: October 2003

This summarizes the findings of this book. Partisanship in the electorate is clearly declining in many respects, but there has been little impact on parties in government to date. In the meantime, parties as organizations have neither declined nor stayed stable, but rather adapted to a much‐changed political environment. Thus, V.O. Key's distinction between the three different levels of parties becomes crucial to keep in mind when considering the topic of partisan change in advanced industrialized democracies. The chapter offers several scenarios concerning how foreseeable changes in communication technology may affect parties in the near future.
The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections
Authors: Bartels Larry M.
Published: October 2003

The aim of this chapter is to provide a systematic test of the conventional wisdom that personality is key in contemporary American electoral politics. Using survey data from the six most recent presidential elections, the contours are examines of the candidates’ images (traits), the bases of those images in voters’ more fundamental political predispositions, and the impact of voters’ assessments of the candidates’ personal qualities on individual voting behaviour and on aggregate election outcomes. In stark contrast with the popular conception of contemporary electoral politics as candidate–centred and image–driven, it is argued that candidates’ images are largely epiphenomenal and have only a modest impact on election outcomes. This conclusion is underlined by the analysis given of the 2000 (Bush vs. Gore) presidential election, in which the estimated impact of voters’ assessments of the candidates’ personalities was even smaller than in the previous five elections considered here, although quite probably large enough to be decisive in an election decided by a few hundred votes in a single state.
The Nonpersonalization of Voting Behavior in Germany
Authors: Brettschneider Frank , Gabriel Oscar W.
Published: October 2003

The federal elections of 1998 were the first time in Germany that notions of personalization and presidentialization were discussed during an election; before that German voters chose, at least formally, between competing parties rather than between competing chancellor candidates, and only a minor role was accorded to the personalities and circumstances of candidates. The first part of this chapter analyses the role that voters’ orientations towards the chancellor–candidates has played in the broad context of electoral choice, paying particular attention to the influence of candidate orientations on the voting choices of people lacking any long–term party identification; this part of the analysis is based on data pertaining to all the electoral contests fought in Germany from 1961 to 1998. The second part of the chapter analyses the various components of the chancellor–candidates’ images: does the way in which voters evaluate the candidates simply reflect existing patterns of party identification, or do the voters construct their own candidate orientations by fitting separate pieces into a pattern, each of which refers to specific attributes of the candidates as perceived and evaluated by them; and are the proponents of the personalization thesis right in assuming that the candidates’ images are largely determined by the voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ personalities rather than by their performance? These questions are answered with specific reference to data collected by the 1998 German Election Study. Despite the apparent personal favouring of Schröder over Kohl in 1998, it is concluded that there is no real evidence that chancellor–candidates’ personalities and other personal characteristics play any stronger role in German voting patterns than they have in the past.
The Leadership Factor in the Russian Presidential Election of 1996
Authors: Colton Timothy J.
Published: October 2003

There are good reasons to suppose that electoral politics will be more leadership driven in a democratizing or semi–democratic nation than in older democratic polities possessing entrenched party systems and coherent issue agendas. The Russian Federation’s watershed election of June–July 1996, in which its founding president, Boris Yeltsin, staged a stirring comeback to defeat the neo–Communist opposition and earn a second term in office, offers an opportunity to put this proposition to the test. The chapter demonstrates that the perceptions of the personal characteristics of the presidential candidates exerted substantial effects on the choices of the Russian electorate in 1996. Thorough examination discloses that these, and the underlying dynamic of transitional politics, were highly complex. The different sections of the chapter are: The New Russia and the 1996 Election; Sizing up the Candidates; Leadership Evaluations and the Vote – taking third variables into account, modelling the phenomenon, estimating leadership effects, differences across candidates and voters; and Conclusion.
The Futures of European Capitalism
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

European countries’ political‐economic policies, practices, and discourses have changed profoundly in response to Europeanization, even more so than in response to globalization, but they have not converged. National policies may now be more similar, especially where they follow from common European policies, but they are not the same. National practices, although moving in the same general direction toward greater market orientation continue to be distinguishable into not just one or even two but three varieties of capitalism. And national discourses that generate and legitimize changes in policies and practices not only remain distinct, they matter. The book spans fields and combines theoretical insights with innovative methods to show that European countries have followed very different pathways of economic adjustment, and will continue to do so into the future. Of the three cases used in illustration, France is shown to have undergone the greatest amount of adjustment, having largely abandoned its interventionist policies and transformed its state‐led capitalism in response to both globalization and Europeanization, but without the benefits of a fully legitimizing discourse. Britain, by contrast, adjusted mainly in response to globalization while anticipating many of the pressures of Europeanization, and came up with a transformative discourse that largely legitimized its neo‐liberal policies and its move toward greater market capitalism. Germany, finally, felt global and European pressures latest, not until the 1990s, at which point it slowly began to alter its social market policies and to make its managed capitalism more competitive, also without the benefits of a fully legitimizing discourse.
The Dynamics and Mechanics of Policy Adjustment in Britain, Germany, and France
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

Whatever the convergent pressures of globalization and Europeanization, countries have manifested divergent policy responses, depending upon a number of significant variables. This chapter identifies five mediating factors that shed light on the dynamics of policy adjustment—economic vulnerability, political institutional capacity, policy legacies, policy preferences, and discourse—to elucidate the different sequencing of responses of Britain, Germany, and France in monetary, industrial, labour, and social policy. It then adds the EU‐specific institutional constraints—the decisions that may provide more or less specified rules, suggested rules, or no rules at all—to help explain the mechanics of policy adjustment in such sectors as European monetary integration, financial services, telecommunications, electricity, and transport.
Discourse as Framework for Analysis: Policy Construction and Legitimization for Changing Policies and Practices
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

To explain the often radical changes in policies and practices that depend on overcoming entrenched interests, institutional obstacles, and cultural blinkers to change, the usual explanations in terms of rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalism will not do. This chapter provides a new framework for the analysis of such change, by examining discourse in institutional context or discursive institutionalism. Discourse consists of both a set of ideas containing cognitive and normative elements and an interactive process consisting of a coordinative discourse of policy construction among policy actors and a communicative discourse of policy legitimization between political actors and the public. In Britain, France, and Germany, such discourse differs not only in ideational content but also in the relative importance of the coordinative or communicative discourses—largely related to differences in single‐actor and multi‐actor systems—which is only further complicated by the addition of the European level. After discussing how discourse matters in terms of its substantive content and where discourse matters in terms of institutional context, the chapter ends with a discussion of the causal influence of discourse or when discourse matters.
The Role of Discourse in the Political Dynamics of Adjustment in Britain, France, and Germany
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

The different trajectories of Britain, France, and Germany cannot be understood without reference to the substantive content and interactive processes of their discourses of policy construction and legitimization. The sustainability of Britain's early, radical move to neo‐liberal policies and more market capitalist practices has much to do with political actors’ transformative, communicative discourse that convinced the public that change was both necessary and appropriate in monetary policy, industrial policy, labour policy, as well as in the social assistance areas of social policy. France's later, more moderate neo‐liberal policies and its radical transformation of state capitalism owe much to political actors’ communicative discourse that was convincing on the necessity of reform in monetary and industrial policy arenas, but was unable to speak to the appropriateness of reform in social policy until the late 1990s. Finally, Germany's long delay on reform of its economic policies as well as of its managed capitalist practices are in part the result of the difficulties of generating a coordinative discourse capable of building agreement among policy actors on either the necessity or appropriateness of reform of the ‘social market economy’, in particular with regard to social and labour policy change.
Conclusion: The Futures of European Capitalism
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

With regard to changes in policies, the book concludes that while countries have internationalized at different rates to varying degrees in different ways—with ‘internationalization’ rather than ‘globalization’, the better word to describe the process—Europeanization is a much stronger process, leading to much greater similarities in policies, even though differences remain. Moreover, Europeanization affects not only economic policies but also practices. Although nationally based varieties of capitalism continue to predominate today, in the future industrial sector‐based varieties reflecting the most internationally competitive of national varieties are more likely in an increasingly integrated Europe. As for discourse, these are certain to remain distinct even as they may serve to legitimate policies that are more and more similar and practices that are increasingly differentiated in terms of industrial sectors rather than national varieties of capitalism.
Virtue Ethics
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different ’modes of moral response’ such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology.
The Anatomy of Virtue
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives the definition of virtue and provides an account of its nature.
Normative Dimensions of Virtue
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives an account of the types of response that comprise virtuous response to the world, and an argument, against consequentialism, for the view that these modes of response are plural.
Virtue and the Good Life
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter explores the relation between virtue and the good life.
Demandingness
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter shows how virtue ethics can accommodate the sort of constraints on the realization of goals that are central to deontological ethics.
A Virtue‐Ethical Account of Right Action
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter provides a new target‐centred virtue ethical account of right action.
Aristotle's De Interpretatione
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

The De Interpretatione is one of Aristotle's core works, containing highly influential analyses of the basic elements of language and the nature of truth and falsehood, as well as the famous Sea‐battle paradox. As a whole, however, the treatise has been neglected; attention has concentrated on a few oases of interest, and scholars have been satisfied with the medieval view that the treatise is a discussion of the proposition, and forms the second part of the Organon, building on the categories and anticipating the formal logic of the Analytics. This book argues that the subject of the De Interpretatione is not the proposition, as has conventionally been supposed, but the contradictory pair of assertions, and that it is oriented not towards the formal logic of the Analytics, but to the Topics and Sophistic Refutations, the works in which Aristotle describes dialectic, the method of argument consisting in the asking and answering of dialectical questions. In posing a dialectical question, the questioner presents a contradictory pair of assertions and invites the answerer to select one or the other as true, hoping in the end to lead to a refutation, i.e. a proof that the contradictory of the answerer's thesis is true, and therefore the thesis itself is false. The ability to assign assertions to their pairs correctly, and to know in which cases the truth of one member of a pair does not imply the falsehood of the other, are vital tasks for the dialectician. The De Interpretatione's discussion of contradiction thus provides the theoretical background essential for dialectic.
Chapter 6: Contradictory Pairs
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter, which concludes the introductory section of the work, narrows the focus to simple assertions. Aristotle demonstrates with brilliant neatness that all such assertions either affirm or deny, and that moreover they may be ordered into pairs, one representing a pair of simple elements as combined, the other as separated. His approach reflects his ’internal’ theory of negation: very different from the Stoic ’external’ view more familiar to later logicians. His definition of negation does not presuppose anything about the truth or falsehood of the two members of a contradictory pair.
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP; Hidden Complex Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

Here, Aristotle exposes assertions that appear to make a single claim but which, because of the hidden complexity of one of their terms, actually make two claims. In such cases, both members of a contradictory pair may be false, and so RCP once again is violated. The background to this interest lies once again in the Topics, where we find a discussion of questions which are declared to be unanswerable, and which correspond to the contradictory pairs here in Ch.8. To answer a dialectical question is to select one member of a contradictory pair as true and reject the other as false: thus, by isolating those pairs in which RCP is violated, Aristotle marks out an area of questioning which a true dialectic must avoid.
Chapter 11: Sophistic Puzzles Concerning Simple and Complex Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter takes up the question of simple and complex assertions from Chs. 5 and 8. This thinking is applied to solving sophisms involving double predications, such as ’Is Socrates a pale walking man?’, different parts of which demand different answers. There is a discussion here of dialectical questions, and what kinds of assertions constitute proper answers. This chapter is closely tied to discussions in the Topics and Sophistic Refutations. Like the discussion of RCP in Chs. 7 to 9, it is aimed at drawing the line between the safe ground of genuine dialectic, and the dangerous region of questions, which seem to have answers, but do not.