bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Whitehead's Extensive Continuum
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

It seems that Whitehead's original problem, as evidenced in his earlier works, was epistemological and metaphysical dualism. His method of extensive abstraction is an attempt to bring the factual world and the abstract world of thought together. So far as his books on nature are concerned, then, Whitehead denied the ultimate reality of a static world and accepted the reality of dynamic relations analogous to the relations found in a biological organism.
The Foundations of Experience
Authors: Phillips Dayton
Published: November 2002

W. H. Sheldon has recently remarked that philosophical naturalism of the type propounded by John Dewey and his followers boils down to materialism in a new guise. Of course, any effort to relate human experience to the physical world within which it arises is open to the general charge of “materialism.” But naturalism can be called “materialistic” in a more specific sense if it tends to pass cavalierly over those aspects of experience upon which older philosophers have based a sharp contrast between experience and nature. This, I take it, is the primary complaint against recent naturalism, and it has its roots, I believe, in the influence of modern psychological theory upon philosophical thought.
The Philosophy and Physics of Relativity
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood
Published: November 2002

There will be more philosophy than physics in this paper for I make no pretentions to an expert knowledge of physics. Categories are, however, in my line; and here I may have some insight.

In the theory of relativity much depends upon the conception of the velocity of light in empty space. Such is the expression Einstein employs. If this velocity is to be a quantity independent of the choice of the inertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. “It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.” Thus succinctly does Einstein express the c hoice in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Types and Similitudes
Authors: von Bonin Gerhardt
Published: November 2002

Morphology is the science of form. The word is used in various scientific disciplines, e.g. in geography, linguistics, etc., but it is most frequently employed to denote that part of Biology which deals with the forms of organisms. The mere description of spatial relations, however, scarcely constitutes a science. It may be hard to say by what property science is distinguished from other human endeavors, but that factual description does not suffice is generally admitted. To establish relations between facts may be taken as a preliminary answer. It would still remain to define these relations. The answer to that question, however, depends largely on the particular brand of philosophy to which an author happens to subscribe. Most answers have been formulated by focusing attention largely on physics and related sciences.
Philosophy of Psychotherapy
Authors: Eliasberg W.
Published: November 2002

In our times of social eruptions not only the hierarchies of life but also those of coralled knowledge have become floating and therefore, papers presenting ideas of a certain generality must become accustomed to forsaking the habit of defining at the start the basic concepts. Renouncing a definition of the Webster type we will start with a very provisional definition of psychotherapy, hopeful that once more it might prove true that lifting one's eyes to the general will be more fruitful, if it is preceded by a stage of intimate knowledge of the particulars. Moreover, it is hoped that from such at the same time intimate and “philosophical” knowledge of one particular field a wholesome criticism, nay enriching effect might arise. It is the problems of detail that in our times have definitely turned to philosophy and it is these same problems which philosophy should delve into in its own interest.
Corism
Authors: Randall John A.
Published: November 2002

The theory of specifying an organization of meaning by reporting the relationship of elements of meaning to a specified central meaning bears the coined name, ‘corism’.

'Meaning’ is here used as a collective noun and its referent is assumed to be an organized body of increments of meaning rather than a mere heterogeneous aggregation. Many such organized bodies with which we are concerned in this article are called either concepts or concept structures. The specification of the theory called ‘corism’ will be expanded by an illustration in which it is applied to recording and communicating meaning as organized in selected concepts and concept structures. The selected bodies of meaning relate to ‘operations called scientific’.
The Wit and Wisdom of Whitehead
Authors: Johnson A. H.
Published: November 2002

There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, concerning a visit made by Alfred North Whitehead to the University of Virginia. He drove from the station to the campus in a horse drawn vehicle under the guidance of a garrulous “darkie”. Said the driver, “Are you a traveller?” “Yes”, replied Whitehead. … long silence …. “What do you sell?”. “Wit and wisdom”, replied Whitehead. … long silence. … At the end of the drive the darkie remarked, “I've never seen a traveller before who wouldn't show me some of his goods.”
Metaphysics in Physics
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

In this article we will not undertake the more inclusive task of defining metaphysics or of discussing metaphysical principles, such as the principle of causation, or of considering the use of metaphysical entities in general. Rather our remarks will be confined primarily to metaphysical entities in the field of physics. A good example of such an entity is the electron.
Varieties of Unification
Authors: Churchman C. West , Ackoff Russell L.
Published: November 2002

“Unification of Science” is probably the most popular slogan in contemporary philosophy. This phrase has not only become the cry of a specific group of philosophers, but it is now accepted as one of the aims of philosophy by most of the contemporary philosophic schools, with but few exceptions. Each particular school believes that it has found the way of effecting such a unification, implicitly assuming that it knows the conditions for a unified science. One who concerns himself with the literature of the movements soon becomes aware of current confusion in the meaning of the expression, “Unification of Science“. The observer begins to wonder whether “Unity of Science” has not become a philosophic stereotype, designed to evoke feeling rather than thought.
Peirce's Theory of Abduction
Authors: Burks Arthur W.
Published: November 2002

One task of logic, Peirce held, is to classify arguments so as to determine the validity of each kind. His own classification is interesting because it includes a novel type of argument (called abduction) in addition to the two traditionally recognized types (induction and deduction). It is the purpose of this paper to discuss what Peirce thought to be sufficiently distinctive about abduction to warrant calling it a new kind of argument. But since one finds in his writings on abduction a number of different views it is first necessary to make a few remarks concerning the unity of Peirce's thought.
The Concept of ‘Field’ in Electrical Theory
Authors: Bowdery George J.
Published: November 2002

In this paper we shall consider the circumstances under which the concept of ‘field’ was introduced into electrical theory, the traditional use of the notion of field with particular reference to electrical theory, and sketch three characters of a field in this context. These are its pervasiveness, its independent existence, and its status as an elastic body. In each case we will briefly bring to bear more modern comment on these three facets of the traditional conception, attempting to salvage the meaning for the term field that is currently accepted. Following this, ‘field intensity’ will be compared with other terms such as ‘displacement current’ and the fictional character of terms and the conventional character of the equations in which ‘field intensity’ appears will be discussed. The paper closes with a summary of the points made.
Problem-Centering vs. Means-Centering in Science
Authors: Maslow A. H.
Published: November 2002

Resume

Means-centered approach to science is contrasted with a problem-centered orientation. Overstress on and too exclusive concern with method, instrument, technique or procedure fosters the following mistakes:

1) Emphasis on polish and elegance rather than on vitality, significance and creativeness.

2) Giving the commanding positions in science to technicians rather than discoverers.

3) Over-valuation of quantification for its own sake.

4) Fitting problems to techniques rather than vice-versa.

5) Creation of a false and pernicious hierarchical system among the sciences.

6) Overstrong compartmentalization between the sciences.

7) Emphasis on the difference rather than the similarities between scientists and other truth-seekers (poets, novelist, artists, philosophers).

8) Creation of a scientific orthodoxy, which in turn a) tends to block the development of new methods, b) tends to exclude many problems from the jurisdiction of science and c) tends to make scientists “safe” rather than daring and unconventional.

9) Neglect of the problems of values, with a consequent blurring of the criteria for judging the worth or importance of an experiment.
The Cultural Organization of Action
Authors: Meadows Paul
Published: November 2002

Life, said William James, is a series of flights and perchings. Action is the process of life, and when its natural tempo or freedom is blocked or thwarted, the costs are those of life. Action is the goal-seeking behavior of the organism. All organisms have “goals”; without them they perish. Goals function as satisfiers of needs; without such satisfaction there is no life. Goal-directed action makes claims upon the organism's environments, and the levies are the stuff of life. Action is commerce with a milieu; “drives”—or any other motivational terms—only suggest the intensity and the form of that exchange; “death” is its cessation. The whole organism is involved, and the involvement is insistent, recurring, cyclical: it is the whole body which acts.
The Determination of Past by Future Events
Authors: Berenda Carlton W.
Published: November 2002

Any physical theory which seriously proposes that events in the future may be the efficient causes of events in the past certainly may be regarded—at least at first glance—as a rather revolutionary doctrine. In a recent issue of the Reviews of Modern Physics (Vol. 17, Nos. 2 & 3, p. 157) commemorating Niels Bohr's sixtieth birthday, and under the editorship of the latest Nobel Prize winner in physics, W. Pauli, there appeared such a theory—written by Bohr's former student, J. A. Wheeler and Wheeler's associate (and former student) at Princeton, R. P. Feynman. The title of their paper appears harmless enough: “Interaction with the Absorber as the Mechanism of Radiation.” It is one part of a more comprehensive three-part paper intended for later publication as a general constructive critique of classical field theory (Maxwell's electrodynamics) and of the theory of action at a distance as propounded by Schwarzschild and Fokker. (In passing, we note that in this more general paper there is derived the Frenkel solution of the old problem of infinite self-energy of the point-charge electron.)
Three Decades of the Epistemological Dialectic 1900—1930
Authors: Klausner Neal W.
Published: November 2002

At the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophy in America and England began to respond to the rumors of unrest and dissatisfaction which were under way at the close of the nineteenth century. Many contemporary thinkers, who have had occasion to look backward, have remarked on the dominance of idealism at the turn of the period. Montague says it was “rampant” and points to the organization of the St. Louis school by W. T. Harris, the purpose being a study of Hegelian thought. Lovejoy also remembers the total sweep of idealistic thought. “The metaphysics of the philosophical teachers whose influence was dominant in most of the American universities thirty-five years ago had one common and fundamental premise which was supposed to be established beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt; to question it was simply to betray one's want of a genuine initiation into philosophy. It was the proposition that, in Bradley's words, 'to be real, or even barely to exist, is to fall within sentience; sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is not real. There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence.' As my first teacher in philosophy, George Holmes Howison, said, in summing up a memorable philosophical symposium in 1895: 'We are all agreed' in one 'great tenet;' which is 'the entire foundation of philosophy itself: the explanation of the world which maintains that the only thing absolutely real is mind; that all material and all temporal existences take their being from Consciousness that thinks and experiences; that out of consciousness they all issue, to the consciousness they are presented, and that presence to consciousness constitutes their entire reality.' With almost a whole generation of acute and powerful minds this passed for a virtual axiom.”
The Scope, Objectives and Limitations of Modern Science as Seen in the Light of its History
Authors: Witzemann Edgar J.
Published: November 2002

Ever since the beginning of the modern era of science, more than 300 years ago, the scipntist has been embarassed at times when he undertook to describe the scope and objectives of science. Part of this embarassment was due to the difficulty of setting up the scope and objectives in such a way as to leave room for future development, and at the same time to permit of seeing the limitations of science clearly and truthfully. Recently in an article “On the possible philosophies of science”, Professor Malisoff made use of the old practise in philosophical discussion of using conjugate terms. These terms as used are so selected that complementary pairs characterize or describe an entity or whole of some kind. The difficulty in describing the scope, objectives and especially the limitations of science, arises chiefly from the difficulty of establishing some simple entity that will contain all of this as well, as the remainders that must be included, and that involve the limitations of science, chiefly. This use of conjugate terms offered a solution of this difficulty.
The Psychical as a Biological Directive
Authors: Bawden H. Heath
Published: November 2002

It is a happy circumstance that this important aspect of method should be brought to our attention by a distinguished scientist in the field of biology. In the past any reference to the “psychical” by the scientific methodologist has been regarded as a dubious departure from his strict routine. But the recognition, finally, by a man of science, of the aleatory, autonomous character of a spontaneous universe, disclosed in biological directives as well as in the dynamics of the atom, is a stimulating enhancement of that philosophy which, as Dewey says, is “the critical theory of methods of criticism.”
On the Need for a Scientific Ethic
Authors: Mesthene Emmanuel G.
Published: November 2002

The use that the scientist makes of his principles is well known. In the normal course of scientific investigation, a hypothesis which explains some physical phenomenon adequately in every particular, but which runs counter to, say, the laws of inertia, cannot be held without further experimentation. Such experimentation must continue until the irreconcilability of the hypothesis with the laws is resolved. In most cases the hypothesis will fail to submit to further tests, will be declared inadequate, and will give way to a new one.
Entity and Aspects
Authors: Biser Erwin
Published: November 2002

It is too often forgotten that even the most “objective” science such as physics is but a description, interpretation and ordering of physical reality from a selected point of view.

In founding terrestial dynamics, Galileo, the father of modern experimental physics, selected concepts that could be given exact mathematical definitions and cast in a form conducive to quantitative results. The qualitative aspects of observed phenomena, such as the color of an accelerated body, and the ultimate cause of motion—a purely metaphysical problem—do not enter into the mathematical dynamical system of Galileo.
A Note on the Progressive Generalization of Data
Authors: Smith Mapheus
Published: November 2002

Although generalization is universally relied on in all scientific thought and is prerequisite to it, many students of scientific methods have neglected to analyze generalizing behavior. This is understandable in view of the fact that generalizing thought begins early in childhood and continues at simple or complex levels through the years of elementary school, high school and college. Most such generalization is clearly pre-critical, following the patterns of parents, playmates and teachers by means of suggestion, imitation and insight. In spite of its universality, however, the process of generalization deserves careful analysis in order that it be fully understood and that errors in interpretation of experience due to faulty generalizing may be avoided.
A. N. Whitehead and the Concept of Metaphysics
Authors: King Hugh R.
Published: November 2002

W. E. Hocking has written recently that Whitehead's descriptive generalization of concrete fact, namely, his actual occasion, is “… not a term of description in the direct sense. It is an hypothesis. It cannot be kept in place by pointing to its presence as a datum: it can only hold its own if it proves to be a valuable conceptual tool.” I further advance the thesis that all generality is hypothetical, and holds it own only if it proves to be conceptually useful. This is in accord with Whitehead's statement, the full implications of which have not been taken seriously enough, that metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities. But when these tentative formulations prove conceptually useful or are conceptually employed, they lose their “hypothetical air,” and often pass into what Whitehead calls a false state of “sober obviousness:”

“An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequate precision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into current literature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easily correlated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trust these verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analysed meaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations of what in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first principles they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness.”
Communication in Philosophy
Authors: Jones Philip Chapin
Published: November 2002

In the ultimate analysis, all philosophical differences are verbal. If by some intellectual X-Ray we could see into the minds of others, and perceive the exact nature of their concepts, we should be force to concede the correctness of their conclusions. The only alternative is that the mental processes—the laws of thought—differ from individual to individual.
Science, Causation, and Value
Authors: Fries Horace S.
Published: November 2002

The association of determinism with the coming of experimental science in the modern world was an unnecessary carry-over of certain aspects of the medieval belief that the aim of knowledge is to grasp or contemplate “eternal truth.” If we take a science such as chemistry or physics as typical instead of astronomy, it would seem that control of actual concrete transformations is the acid experimental test rather than prediction of “inevitable” future events. The latter surely has the smell of pre-scientific prophecy. If so, and if we choose to base our interpretation of science and our philosophy of nature on this consideration, we can avoid determinism without in any way limiting the efficacy or potential universality of science. At the same time we avoid the traditional metaphysical or theological notion of “free will.”
Pure Pragmatics and Epistemology
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid
Published: November 2002

The attempt to draw a clear distinction between Philosophy and the empirical sciences can almost be taken as the defining trait of the analytic movement in contemporary philosophical thought. The empirical science that has most frequently threatened to swallow up questions of particular interest to philosophers since the time of Descartes has been psychology. Characteristic, then, of analytic philosophy has been the rejection of what it terms psychologism, that is to say, the mistake of identifying philosophical categories with those of psychology, whether introspective or behavioristic. It is clear that to launch an attack on psychologism, thus conceived, presupposes that one has a list of philosophical categories which one is able to identify as such; and this in turn presupposes an ability to sketch, at least in a general way, a distinctly philosophical account of these concepts, although a systematic account along non-psychologistic lines may be a distant and ill-defined goal. The analytic movement in philosophy has gradually moved towards the conclusion that the defining characteristic of philosophical concepts is that they are formal concepts relating to the formation and transformation rules of symbol structures called languages. Philosophy, in other words, tends to be conceived of as the formal theory of languages. From this standpoint, consequently, psychologism is conceived of as the psychological treatment of concepts which are properly understood as formal devices defining a mode of linguistic structure.
Doubts about Empiricism
Authors: Demos Raphael
Published: November 2002

My beliefs during the first stage of my philosophical career were a mixed brew of ingredients taken from the Greek and Christian traditions. My tastes were conservative and even reactionary. I believed in the reality of substance, material and mental; I held that there are universal and necessary connections in nature which can be known. In short, I was a naive objectivist about things and about structures. I was a realist about values too. I believed that there are such traits in nature as good and bad, right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, independently of my preferences. I was convinced further that goodness was a supreme causal agent; that—to paraphrase the familiar quotation—righteousness is power. I believed in God. With Plato (in the Phaedo) I maintained that causality is not only efficient but final too; that nature exhibits both a mechanical and a moral order. And these two propositions were, to my view, but twin aspects of the one proposition that nature will not deceive my expectations.
Sociologists and Knowledge
Authors: Williams Elgin
Published: November 2002

It is the proudest boast of the sciences that they are objective, clean of moral judgments, wertfrei. This insistence was salutary as the physical sciences struggled to loose themselves from the bonds of tradition, and it was natural that the social sciences took over the emphasis. Yet by a quirk of history the latter disciplines in striving for objectivity and amorality are unscientific. Far from being the hallmark of scientific method that students of society think it, the doctrine of Wertfreiheit is of religious origin. It has always been the spokesmen of tradition who have said that science is without reference to morals and value, relegating this province to themselves.
Learning—Acquisition or Selection—Possibility versus Probability
Authors: Klee James B.
Published: November 2002

It is quite common in our texts and periodicals to run across formulations of the learning process in which the word acquire is used in some way as part of the description. Individuals are said to “acquire” habits or skills or languages or attitudes or solutions or emotions. The organism is said to “acquire” certain of its traits from the environment (sometimes through experience, sometimes not) and even to “acquire” from heredity. Such usage is not technically incorrect. Webster defines acquire as follows:

acquire. 1. To gain by any means, usually by one's own exertions; to get as one's own. 2. To take on as part of one's nature or qualifications; to establish by means of repetition or effort, as characteristic in one's behavior or range of ability; as to acquire a habit. Syn., attain, procure, win, earn, secure; receive, learn, adopt, cultivate, affect. See obtain.
Mechanisms and Mental Phenomena
Authors: Moulyn Adrian C.
Published: November 2002

One gains the impression from occasional remarks in the psychiatric literature that there is a feeling of dissatisfaction with the state of flux of the various concepts, serving as tools to help us understand our patients. This paper is submitted as an attempt to point out some of the reasons why psychiatric notions suffer from certain deficiencies. If, for the time being, we set aside the specific psychiatric problems confronting us in our daily work and muse over the structure of our psychological and psychiatric methods of explanation, we might come to the startling conclusion that these methods are quite inadequate. We medical people think in terms of the mechanistic natural sciences, particularly in terms of physics, chemistry and biochemistry. The importance of these auxiliary sciences to our art of healing the sick increases year after year and the outstanding results of chemotherapy, for instance, show how heavily our profession leans on chemistry. Beyond a doubt, the natural sciences are essential to the pursuit and the development of the practice of medicine, nevertheless, the question arises whether psychiatry should be based upon mechanistic methods in approaching our specific material, the human mind. Posed in this fashion, the question implies that psychiatric thinking is basically mechanistic in its general characteristics. I believe that one can prove this thesis on the premise that descriptions and explanations of human behavior are based upon neurological facts and theories. Since the purpose of neurology lies in a different direction than the goal of psychiatry, it was necessary to alter neurological concepts so that they would be more appropriate and fitting to psychic material, and this elaboration upon neurological principles when applied to mental phenomena leads to psychiatric conceptions with inherent deficiencies.
Morphological and Functional Aspects of Living Matter and Whitehead's Category of Actual Entity
Authors: Herrmann Heinz
Published: November 2002

It may seem trivial to state that one of the major trends in biological investigation consists in an attempt to explain the structural and functional aspects of living matter in chemical terms, in an effort to obtain insight into the equivalent of macroscopic phenomena on the molecular level. I am sure you are aware of, and this meeting of the Association has brought ample additional evidence, in how many fields this tendency has become apparent. It can be recognized in genetics with the molecular analysis of chromosomes and the enzymatic or metabolic interpretation of hereditary properties like the eyecolor of Drosophila. In a purely morphological branch like histology we do not ask merely for a differentiation of stained cell structure but we ask for the nature of the staining reaction; in nerve physiology we try to interpret conduction as alterations of protein lipoid layers; or in pathology where the age old syndrome of inflammation is explored with biochemical methods. I should mention molecular models of membranes and cell surfaces, the molecular interpretation of secretion and of the macroscopic phenomena of metabolism. Yet insofar as this yield of data could be designated as a trend, it would rather seem to be the natural outcome to be expected from the application of the analytic method of science. In one instance, however, this approach has been carried farther than in all the other fields, and it would seem to be worthwhile to pause for one moment to ask whether this case is important merely because of its technical implications or whether it is meaningful in a wider sense.
Incompatibilities and Conflicts: Breakdown
Authors: Lapan Arthur
Published: November 2002

The following is an analysis of the relationship between incompatibility, conflict and breakdown. It is restricted to situations of a certain sort — to the isolation of the conditions under which breakdowns occur. These conditions are specific and defineable. Under certain circumstances incompatibilities and conflicts culminate in growth, under others in separation, under others in outright destruction of one of the incompatible elements, under others still in dominance-subserviance relationships and under others in breakdown. This is a matter of some importance since influential current conceptions treat incompatibility and conflict as though they were uniform in outcome. The followers of Hegel regard them as always making for growth whereas certain contemporaries (Toynbee and others) look upon them as the prime movers of breakdown and decline. The truth of the matter would seem to be that neither of these theories is correct. Conflicts vary, their consequences vary and the conditions under which they occur vary. For empirical analysis the important thing is the disengagement of the differences making for different culminations as well as the relations common to all; and the working out, as far as possible, of the way in which alterations in certain basic factors make for changes in result. A specific analysis of this sort may be valuable for foresight and even for a degree of control where the conditions are accessible to our manipulation.
Methodology of Research and Progress in Science
Authors: Biser Erwin , Witmer Enos E.
Published: November 2002

With the advent of the relativity theory science has entered a transformative period in which previous certainties are undergoing critical scrutiny and renovation. Critical movements in science arise at periods of its history when its foundations are brought into question. True it is that natural philosophers still regard science as a growing body of propositions dealing with natural events enabling them to find the structural laws of the external world. But this “external world” about them changes in significance, interpretation, and meaning as new epoch-making theories are propounded and experimental verification of some of their consequences tend to give them scientific plausibility.
The Locus of Mathematical Reality: An Anthropological Footnote
Authors: White Leslie A.
Published: November 2002

“He's [the Red King's] dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he's dreaming about?”

Alice said, “Nobody can guess that.”

“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. “And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?”

“Where I am now, of course,” said Alice.

“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You'd be nowhere. Why, you're only a sort of thing in his dream!”

“If that there King was to wake,” added Tweedledum, “you'd go out—bang!—just like a candle.”

“I shouldn't!” Alice exclaimed indignantly. “Besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?”

“Ditto,” said Tweedledum.

“Ditto, ditto!” cried Tweedledee.

He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help saying “Hush! You'll be waking him, I'm afraid, if you make so much noise.”

“Well, it's no use your talking about waking him,” said Tweedledum, “when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real.”

“I am real!” said Alice, and began to cry.

“You won't make yourself a bit realler by crying,” Tweedledee remarked: “there's nothing to cry about.”

“If I wasn't real,” Alice said—half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous —“I shouldn't be able to cry.”

“I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?” Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt.

—Through the Looking Glass
An Experimental Measure of Personality
Authors: Churchman C. West , Ackoff Russell L.
Published: November 2002

The boundaries of psychology have never been very distinctly defined and, as a consequence, science has witnessed frequent border incidents. But it obviously is not psychology alone which suffers from such lack of delineation, but its neighbors, the biological and social sciences, do as well. Cooperation between sciences becomes difficult under these conditions. All agree that psychology is the science of mind, but few agree to what “mind” is. At least within our century “mind” has been taken to be “behavior”, for the present day outlook is that mind is behavior rather than that which is responsible for behavior (3). The metaphysical dynamism of a prime mover has been replaced by an experimental concept, i.e., one that is susceptible to scientific investigation. There is no need to review the complex history of behavioristic psychology in its many ramifications, ranging from Watson's mechanism to the various vitalistic teleologies. We turn instead to a fundamental problem on which there is little agreement: “What kind of behavior should be called mind?”
A Categorial Analysis of Value
Authors: Hall Everett W.
Published: November 2002

The major question—what is categorial analysis and how can it be reliably performed?—lies beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, I would presume that very little can be said significantly about it in general. One's convictions on the subject have to be shown by actual performance, which is my intention in the present instance. But it may help the process of communication if I try to indicate at the beginning the general frame in which this analysis of value occurs.
Dr. William M. Malisoff
Authors: Frank Philip , Churchman C. West
Published: November 2002

Since the turn of the century there has been a strong trend to break through the wall which has separated philosophy from the “special sciences” and to investigate the problems which require a good judgment in both philosophy and science. The evolution of science itself and the increasing relevance of science in human life have given immense momentum to this trend. But this momentum could not be appreciated in its actual strength because scientists who wanted to raise their voices had trouble in finding a Journal where they could communicate with the people who were interested, for almost all the scientific journals were devoted exclusively to technical papers. In founding Philosophy of Science Dr. Malisoff started the construction of a channel by which this important flow of scientific investigation could reach its public. This line of thought found in the journal a possibility of self-expression and it became a real force in the life of the community of scientists and scholars, and even of educated men in general. From the first volume, papers were published which have later been quoted in every discussion about the philosophy of science. I mention, as an example only, R. Carnap's paper on Testability and Meaning. Nobody who has wanted information and stimulation in this modern field of investigation could get it without looking into Malisoff's Philosophy of Science.
Epistemological Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge
Authors: Hinshaw Virgil G.
Published: November 2002

Since Protagoras' classic “man is the measure of all things,” claims of relativism and counter-claims have been tendered. The nineteenth century saw Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Westermarck, Pareto, Marx, and others, suggesting that institutions, customs, moral codes, and the like, are “relative” both to the culture and to the time. At the crest of this wave of “relativism” surged a vicious claim: that truth and knowledge itself were merely functions of particular conditions. The “validity” of knowledge was said to be at the whim of historic, social factors. Not only is no theory really true; no particular statement is ever so. Not only is no theory or statement really true; no theory of knowledge has thus far ever been free from the bias of its genesis. There have been no absolute insights for epistemology. Or so, at least, it was claimed.
The Validity of Unique Mathematical Models in Science
Authors: Altschul Eugen , Biser Erwin
Published: November 2002

Prior to statistical mechanics and especially before the advent of the new quantum mechanics, it was traditionally held, following in the main the Kantian philosophy, that the task of science is to attain a unique quantitative representation of reality. It was thought—and with justifiable zeal—that a scientific discipline is exact to the extent to which a mathematical pattern yielding quantitative relations can be applied to its subject matter. This view was based on the implicit assumptions that functional relatedness conducive to quantitative evaluation is bound to reveal the most generic, and hence, the most essential traits of events.
Atemporal Processes in Physics
Authors: Schlegel Richard
Published: November 2002

It can scarcely be said to be a self-contradictory property to be in two places at the same time any more than for an object to be at two times in the same place. The perplexities of the quantum theory of energy sometimes seem to suggest that the possibility ought not to be overlooked; …

A. S. Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, Cambridge, 1920

There are three elements involved in physical time. The most primitive of the three is the fact of extension in time. We express this fact by saying that things “endure” in time, or by saying that the universe is not an event of one moment only. Extension in time is such a fundamental and pervasive element of our experience, that we can hardly define it other than by denotatively indicating it. Time extension is basic to the other two elements of time.
A Set of Postulates and A Definition for Science
Authors: Feibleman James
Published: November 2002

The term science is used to cover three separate categories, to which throughout this paper we shall give three separate names. There is (1) the field in which science operates. This is the external world of natural phenomena, partly uniform and partly chance. There is (2) the science itself. This is the laboratory of instruments, techniques, operations, the method by which the field is studied. Finally, there is (3) the laws. This is the level of abstractions, of causal laws or of statistical probability averages, invariant or approaching invariance, mathematically expressed. The three, of course, belong together. Science carries the activity; it studies the field to find the laws.
The Mind We Measure and Its Dimensions
Authors: Leverett Hollis M.
Published: November 2002

The measurement of mind appears to constitute a problem generally different from that encountered in the measurement of matter. From the viewpoint of scientific methodology, however, the differences between mental measurement and physical measurement are not as great as they sometimes appear. The major difficulty involves a proper clarification of the mind we measure and, unfortunately, this clarification is a little more difficult than the clarification of the matter we measure. In order to achieve this clarification, it is necessary to reorient some of our habitual ways of thinking by taking several specific steps.
Mechanistic Replacement of Purpose in Biology
Authors: Bell Charles G.
Published: November 2002

Since essence examined from one point of view can always be dissolved into relationship, and since the act of this dissolution—which is the general analyzing act of science—seems at first to explain the essence or transcending cause (for as we move toward it the newly envisaged relationship may appear to replace and to render unnecessary the metaphysical whole), therefore in every science and with every such new discovery of material determining agents, there will be a period of enthusiasm when real explanation and cause seem to be revealed. But after the discovered relationship has been examined for a time, it becomes apparent both that further unexplored relationships are required to connect these agents we have found with the operations they are supposed to effect, and that a new transcendental unity must be postulated of the whole to bind the agents into the ordered pattern they maintain.
The Effect of The Concept of Evolution on Scientific Methodology
Authors: Miller David L.
Published: November 2002

Today there is almost universal agreement among scientists and philosophers that no factual statement or hypothesis about the world of fact has meaning apart from experienceable phenomena. In general we say we must find evidence for every hypothesis or theory before we can consider it as even probably true. But when we state the relationship between hypotheses and evidence in this way, by implication we are still holding that hypotheses have priority over data or that the function of data is to support pre-conceived ideas. This is, by implication, and acknowledgment of the primacy of rationalism over empiricism or of reason over sense data, or of explanation over that which is to be explained.
A Point of Departure
Authors: Klee James B.
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper, Maslow (12) has suggested that we turn from means-centering to problem-centering in science. In two other papers (6, 7) the present author offered a theoretical foundation which would make Maslow's suggestions psychologically (empirically) sound. For as he suggests, it is only by centering ourselves towards the task that the task is accomplished or towards the problem that the problem is solved. This does not mean that methods or means, or, in the broader sense, of means as ends or of ends per se, do not constitute problems. The whole problem of psychology is the means by which the organism obtains knowledge; the problem of education is that of means (the teaching), or the problem of communication is one of means (the language), or of any profession, e.g., engineering or medicine, the problem may be of means as a problem. Whichever is the case it is only so far as problems are solved that we are free to go on to tackle new ones or throw light on the more basic ones and thus enrich our lives. Problem solving, of course, does not mean that particular problems as framed are solvable. For example, if the rules state that one must connect each dot with every other dot on a piece of paper (a two dimensional limitation) with lines (straight or curved) that do not intersect, a four dot problem is solvable but a five dot situation cannot be resolved within these rules. In the latter case it may mean that the problem becomes: “can anyone solve it?” This has been the lesson of the mathematicians and the logical positivists. But what is problem solving?
Commentary
Authors: Gregory Ralph
Published: November 2002

If I miss not the tenor of points and counterpoints, a recent discussion in this journal has been a novelly natural transaction in behalf of a great question at which many philosophers have labored—What is the place of Mind? R. S. Lillie, an eminent physiologist has been working toward a philosophical justification of certain biological key-facts, and H. Heath Bawden, a pioneer naturalist in philosophy and psychology, has been urging a physiological counter-statement. Both are logical men of science and aim to rest on facts. Why do they define and value the “psychical” differently?
A Symposium; What the Natural Scientist Needs from the Social Scientist; Introductory Remarks
Authors: Adams John S.
Published: November 2002

The time has long passed when it was necessary to explain or to justify philosophy of science to a convention of scientists. The growing intent among philosophers and scientists to clarify and perhaps to unify the programs, methods, and results of the disciplines of philosophy and science is matched by a growing determination among the special sciences to cooperate in the examination of fundamental concepts and presuppositions in the light of the positive results of science, to cooperate in the systematic doubting of these positive results, and to cooperate in the thoroughgoing analysis and critique of logic and of language,—all of which are projects which can be carried out only by the joint effort of philosophers and scientists. In short, it has long since been realized that the special sciences cannot safely be abandoned to their devotees, exclusively. It was only twenty-five years ago that Santayana was able to say “I would gladly learn more of contemporary thinkers if they would only learn more of each other.” The implication that lies in that statement is hardly the case today, when the synoptic enterprise of philosophy-of-science is helping the scientific thinker to recognize the limitations of his task and the assumptions with which he starts, and to save him from being too easygoing in the criticism of his categories.
Some Thoughts on “What the Natural Scientist Needs From the Social Scientist”
Authors: Olmstead Paul S.
Published: November 2002

More and more, natural scientists are becoming aware that they must consider the human element as one of the variables in physical measurement. Its measure has usually been hidden in what has been called the error of measurement. Part of its measure has been qualitative for we often hear that Mr. Soandso is a good or a poor experimenter or observer. As we go to engineering research or to any applied field, we become more conscious of the human element. Here, an attempt is made to design apparatus and measuring equipment that will operate or make measurements with minimum variability associated with people. Some problems, such as those dealing with what consumers want, require an even more complete knowledge about the behavior of people. It is not possible to define or to specify a product that will be satisfactory to the consumer if we do not know what the consumer wants. Hence, it is our first observation that the natural scientist needs information about the human element that is always present to some degree in his work.
What the Physical Scientists need from the Social Scientists
Authors: Phelps Everett R.
Published: November 2002

The explosion of the first atomic bomb at the Alamagordo Bombing Range, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, was the start of a new era, the dawn of the atomic age. The preliminary work on atomic fission was done before the last world war, and as military leaders visioned its great destructive possibilities, several countries entered the race to be the first to harness atomic fission for military purposes. Our own country gambled two billion dollars, and with the aid of certain European scientists and in collaboration with England and Canada, succeeded in developing a fission chain reaction that made possible the atomic bomb.
Physical Science and the Social Sciences
Authors: Orens Irving P.
Published: November 2002

The very juxtaposition of the terms “physical science” and “social sciences” in the same sentence is indicative of the definitive trend now present in both physical science and in the thinking of the physical scientist. The two fields of human interest represented by physical science and the social sciences have drawn closer together, have coalesced at least in those areas of implication deducible from the fields themselves and this conjunction is fraught with consequences important to both fields.