bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Is Indeterminism Supported by Quantum Theory?
Authors: Workman Rollin W.
Published: November 2002

Two initially different arguments for indeterminism are often based either upon the Uncertainty Relations or the statistical interpretation of the wave equation of quantum mechanics. Both arguments ultimately involve three factors: (1) the assumption that elementary entities are enough like classical particles for it to make sense to say they are either determined or indetermined, (2) the fact that no exact measurements are possible of quantities supposed to characterize elementary entities, (3) the pragmatic supposition that determinism is false unless exact predictions are theoretically possible.

If it is legitimate to use (3) to prove indeterminism, then an equally legitimate argument can be based upon (2) which denies (1). Thus, it is doubtful that quantum mechanics supports indeterminism, though it may show that the concepts of ‘determined’ and ‘indetermined’ are inapplicable to the world.
The Antinomy of Designation
Authors: Matheson Gordon
Published: November 2002

A new semantical antinomy, the antinomy of designation, is introduced into a metalanguage M with respect to a modal object language L. Carnap's device of restricting the principle of interchangeability for L does not suffice to prevent occurrence of this new antinomy. To achieve this result it seems most natural to replace the rules of designation for L by more complicated rules. This replacement suffices to prevent occurrence of the antinomy with respect to L. Moreover, it seems likely that analogous replacement will suffice to prevent occurrence of the antinomy with respect to languages which in means of expression are richer than L.
Authorship and Purpose
Authors: Leonard Henry S.
Published: November 2002

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two “presupposed theories”: of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading.

The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. 'Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. 'Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed.

The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes ‘Rt(a,p,q)‘ as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q.

The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so.

The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus “meaning” of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.
A Mechanistic Theory of Extra-Atomic Physics
Authors: Hartley R. V. L.
Published: November 2002

Recent impasses reached by nuclear theory, a recurrent desire to interpret quantum phenomena in mechanistic terms and a certain loss of glory suffered by the general theory of relativity make it appear timely, perhaps, to review discarded attempts at common-sense explanations of atomic and relativistic physics, making sure that they have not been too hastily rejected. Mr. Hartley has been a persistent and circumspect advocate of a mechanical view which, even if it cannot claim to solve all problems in the universal flash of brilliance for which physicists and philosophers have waited in vain for decades, raises worthwhile points for consideration. The nature of this task and the preoccupation of technical journals with imminent matters singles out our journal as the proper carrier for Mr. Hartley's thoughts. They are here presented without mathematical detail but in a manner suggestive of the unity of his treatment. Technical details are discussed in some of the items of the bibliography.
Determinism Versus Continuity
Authors: Hinshaw Virgil
Published: November 2002

Prompted by Alfred Landé's appraisal of individual indeterminacy in both ordinary and quantum games of chance [Mind, n.s. 67: 174-181 (April, 1958)], this paper suggests an alternative assessment in terms of the model-structure of physical theory. Whereas Landé explains such indeterminacy by appeal to “the Leibnitzian principle” of causal continuity, the author sees no need for such a special explanation. Instead, he indicates how the partial interpretation of the kinetic and quantum models limits us to statistical generalities—to limited “areas of relative chance.” The alleged indeterminism of physics thus resides in the model and its partial interpretation in the sense that the statistical nature of statements about “the next throw” or about individual particles is built into the model that enables the scientist to talk at all about such outcomes or entities.
Five Cautions for the Copenhagen Interpretation's Critics
Authors: Hanson Norwood Russell
Published: November 2002

Within the past decade there has grown an acute and highly articulate group of critics of the orthodox interpretation of quantum theory,—the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The writings of people like Bopp, Janossy, and particularly Bohm and Feyerabend, must be taken very seriously indeed. The future of some important discussions in the philosophy and the logic of science rests with these individuals. But they have, in their own writings, occasionally matched the inelegancies of Bohr and Heisenberg with as many inelegancies of their own. The present paper is meant to present a quintet of considerations which may possibly lead to a reassessment of the issues between Bohr, Heisenberg, and their critics, especially Bohm and Feyerabend.
On Deciding whether Protistans are Cells
Authors: Gregg John R.
Published: November 2002

There is a biological controversy of long standing between proponents of the Wilsonian view that all organisms of a certain class have at least one part that is a cell and proponents of the contradictory, or Dobellian, view that some organisms in the same class have no parts that are cells. The controversy is considered from the standpoint of the methodology of explication. It is concluded that on the grounds of prevalent biological usage, precision, utility and generality the Wilsonian view may be defended successfully against attacks that have been made upon it.
Linguistic Superfluity in Science
Authors: Dettering Richard W.
Published: November 2002

The lessons of “logical empiricism” still need learning by scientific philosophers who continue to give ultimate descriptions of ultimate things. Even attempts to assign some basic transformative role to language must fail, as this role can always be reversed on some higher language level. Final philosophical characterizations of the universe collapse when we see their arbitrary linguistic nature. Similarly, the effort to force scientific philosophy into an ontology, as shown by a recent example, turns out to be only a conventional way of talking, rather than a legitimate appeal to something in the universe. More vulnerable recent examples of scientific metaphysical descriptions of “reality” reveal a deceptive linguistic superfluity in no way necessary for science or scientific philosophy. Within the inevitable circularity of language, semantic analysis can still fasten to the goal of predictability; and predictability can do without uneconomical symbolism.
Reply to Barker's Criticism of Formalism
Authors: Jack Henry
Published: November 2002

Professor S. F. Barker has recently argued that the theory of the status of theoretical concepts in natural science put forward by Hempel and Braithwaite is mistaken. Essentially this “formalistic” theory says that these concepts “take on” meaning from their place in a total theoretical system which as a whole implies testable observation statements. In the paper it is argued that Barker's criticism of the Hempel-Braithwaite theory is mistaken because (a) he does not sufficiently consider the operative empirical restrictions on concept formation in scientific theorizing, and (b) his criticisms are based on an acceptance of a narrow empiricism which would reject most existing theoretical natural science as empirically meaningless.
Reply to Linhart
Authors: Darlington Jared L.
Published: November 2002

The passage criticized by Mr. Linhart as “misleading” may be clarified as follows. Linhart is quite right that a method of interval estimation including a formula equivalent to my VI may be based on inverse probability, and that probability values considerably greater than zero may be thus obtained. The method of inverse probability to which I refer in the criticized passage, however, is that of Carnap, according to which (as indicated in the preceding paragraph of my paper, and on p. 16) the inverse probability of a law on the basis of finite evidence is zero. My statement that “... our method of interval estimation is superior to that of inverse probability, in that the probability values yielded by the former are considerably greater than those given by the latter...” remains true, since it is Carnap's method, which is not an interval method, of which I am speaking.
Professor Darlington and the Confirmation of Laws
Authors: Leblanc Hugues
Published: November 2002

The author discusses Professor Darlington's recent paper “On the Confirmation of Laws.” He criticizes Professor Darlington for not writing out in full the evidence sentence in formula III of his paper, and expresses doubts as to whether Professor Darlington's solution to the problem of the confirmation of laws follows from the complete version of that formula.
On Ostensive Definitions
Authors: Kotarbinska Janina
Published: November 2002

The first part deals with the problem of the external form of ostensive definition. It is concluded that the definition statement is not complete. The proper form of this statement is not a sentence, but a sentential function, namely a sentential function of the type: “IIx [N(x) = x is in the respect R and in the degree D such as A, B ... and not such as K, L ...]” where “N” stands for the term being defined.

Thus the ostensive definition informs about the criteria of applicability of the defined term in a partial way only, and the rest must be supplied by the addressee for whom the given definition was destined.

In the second part the conditions are analysed on which depends the possibility of solving that problem, and consequently the conditions on which depend the informational value and the efficacy of ostensive definition. The concluding remarks deal with the properties of the terms introduced by the ostensive method.
Some Problems of Causal Interpretation of Statistical Relationships
Authors: Nowak Stefan
Published: November 2002

In following paper an attempt will be made to analyse the statistical relationships between variables as the functions of causal relations existing between them. Our basic assumption here is that statistical relationships between traits, events, or characteristics of objects, may be logically derived from the pattern of their mutual causal connections, if this pattern is described by appropriate concepts and with sufficient precision.

The first part of the paper presents basic concepts, which according to author's view may serve for the description of different patterns of causal relations in such a way, that statistical relationships corresponding to each pattern may be derived. It gives also examples of such a derivation for some less complicated cases. The second part of the paper is an attempt of application of proposed method to the understanding and critical consideration of some standard techniques of statistical analysis, especially those mostly used in social sciences.
Duration and the Specious Present
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

The problem I shall discuss is specific, even minute. Yet, being philosophical, it arises and can be profitably discussed only in a context anything but minute, namely, that of a conception of philosophy and its proper method. I could not possibly unfold my conception once more for the sake of a minute problem. Nor do I believe that as things now stand this is necessary. I shall merely recall two propositions which are crucial in the context, and, in stating them, shall freely use its vocabulary. The undefined descriptive terms of the ideal language all refer to phenomenal things wholly presented. These things all are either individuals or characters, and, if characters, either relational or nonrelational. These are the two propositions. It may throw light on another crucial point not always well understood if I imagine someone to ask: Wholly presented to whom ? The answer is: To the person to whose world the philosopher, who, himself always speaks commonsensically, fits the ideal language.
Scientific Reasoning and the Summum Bonum
Authors: Schlaretzki W. E.
Published: November 2002

C. S. Peirce argued that inductive reasoning and probability judgments are adequately secure only in the indefinitely long run, and that therefore it is illogical to employ these modes of inference unless one's chief devotion is to the interests of an ideal community of all rational beings, past, present, and future. He thought of this devotion as a “social sentiment”, involving self-sacrifice. An examination of his argument shows that the attitude presupposed by his conceptions of induction and probability is in fact not self-sacrificial and is social only in a very special sense. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that this attitude is characteristic of practicing scientists; and this is a reason for questioning Peirce's analysis of induction and probability.
Pragmatism and the Science of Behavior
Authors: Burns Hobert W.
Published: November 2002

Many pragmatic philosophers insist that causality in human behavior is to be explained by psychological field theorism rather than by modern behaviorism. This paper attempts to demonstrate (1) that pragmatists often support one aspect of an untenable disjunction in psychological theory, (2) that the asserted disjunction is but a methodological distinction, and (3) that the causal order in human behavior is most likely to be profitably described, predicted, or explained by the methods of modern behaviorism.
The Duhemian Argument
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that thefalsifiabilityof an isolated empirical hypothesis H as anexplanansisunavoidably inconclusive.Its central contentions are the following:

1.

No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as anexplanansof any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction with which H functions as anexplanans.For Duhemcannotguarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from anexplanansconstituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case.

2.

The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only anon-sequiturbut actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis.

3.

The possibility of a quasia priorichoice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearlydistinguishedfrom the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincaré. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations.
On the Theory of Measurement in Quantum Mechanical Systems
Authors: Durand Loyal
Published: November 2002

This paper is concerned with the description of the process of measurement within the context of a quantum theory of the physical world. It is noted that quantum mechanics permits a quasi-classical description (classical in the limited sense implied by the correspondence principle of Bohr) of those macroscopic phenomena in terms of which the observer forms his perceptions. Thus, the process of measurement in quantum mechanics can be understood on the quasi-classical level by transcribing from the strictly classical observables of Newtonian physics to their quasi-classical counterparts the known rules for the measurement of the former. The remaining physical problem is the delineation of the circumstances in which the correlation of a peculiarly quantum mechanical observable A with a classically measurable observable B can result in a significant measurement of A. This is undertaken within the context of quantum theory. The resulting clarification of the process of measurement has important implications relative to the philosophic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Psychological Research and Humean Problems
Authors: Naess Siri , Naess Arne
Published: November 2002

In this article the question is raised whether philosophers, studying Humean problems, might profit from the empirical findings of contemporary psychology. A text from Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is analyzed in an attempt to find out (1) whether his problems are open to empirical testing. Each sentence in the text is classified into normative, declarative, analytic and synthetic. A prevalence of declarative, synthetic sentences is found. Further, the question is examined (2) whether contemporary empirical psychology has contributed to the testing of Hume's hypotheses. The answer is affirmative for some of the statements, and it is suggested that philosophical discussions around these problems should not be carried out as if psychological research were irrelevant.
On the Analysis of History and the Interdependence of the Social Sciences
Authors: Fisher Franklin M.
Published: November 2002

One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following another as wave follows wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize ... the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. H. A. L. Fischer

[The scientist] says, ‘I will seek for relationships among events that seem always to hold in fact, and when it occurs that they do not hold, I will search for additional conditions and a broader model that will (until new exceptions are discovered) restore my power of prediction.‘ Herbert A. Simon

The views of some historians and philosophers of history as to the possibility of fruitful historical generalization seem at odds with the underlying methodology of the other social sciences. A formal model of the world historical process is here presented within which this apparent contradiction is seen to be resolvable in terms of modern theories of probability and stochastic processes. This is done by giving rigorous form to procedures and statements in the social sciences. A formal treatment of the dependence of an investigation in one discipline on previous studies both in that area and in other social and natural sciences then follows naturally.
Do Stimuli Elicit Behavior?—A Study in the Logical Foundations of Behavioristics
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

It has become customary in modern behavioristics to speak of stimuli as though they elicit responses from organisms. But logically this is absurd, for analysis of the grammatical roles of stimulus and response concepts shows that stimuli and responses differ in logical type from causes and effects. The “S elicits R” formula thus stands revealed as elliptical for a more complicated form of assertion. The trouble with this ellipsis, however, is that by suppressing vital components of formal structure in behavioral principles, it has led to gratuitous assumptions about the environmental antecedents of behavior and seriously undermined the ability of behavior theory to assimilate the “higher mental processes.”
The Action of Mind on Body
Authors: Luce David Randall
Published: November 2002

Terminology and symbolism are introduced, which facilitate the precise statement of propositions concerning the action of mind on body. The minimal meaning of “the action of mind on body” is contrasted with some of the more radical interactionistic positions to be found in the literature. These more radical positions are defined in precise formulations. It is noted that radical interactionism, or “exceptionalism” as it is here called, is a contingent, empirically-decidable issue which is quite independent of metaphysical views regarding “mind” and “matter.” For that very reason it should not be the object of special philosophic concern.
Universals and Particulars an a Phenomenalist Ontology
Authors: Klemke E. D.
Published: November 2002

A phenomenalist philosophy which employs the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) plus the Principle that what exists are the referents of certain meaningful terms, defined by PA, cannot include either universals or particulars in its ontology, but is limited to instances of universals as constituting the range of ontological existents. Universals must be omitted since they are repeatable and, hence, never wholly presented or contained, whereas the objects of direct acquaintance are wholly and exhaustively presented. Furthermore, no entities beyond characters (qualities and relations) are given in direct acquaintance; hence, particulars, too, must be omitted for the phenomenalist who relies on PA.
The Place of Induction in Science
Authors: Bunge Mario
Published: November 2002

The place of induction in the framing and test of scientific hypotheses is investigated. The meaning of ‘induction’ is first equated with generalization on the basis of case examination. Two kinds of induction are then distinguished: the inference of generals from particulars (first degree induction), and the generalization of generalizations (second degree induction). Induction is claimed to play a role in the framing of modest empirical generalizations and in the extension of every sort of generalizations—not however in the invention of high-level hypotheses containing theoretical predicates. It is maintained, on the other hand, that induction by enumeration is essential in the empirical test of the lowest-level consequences of scientific theories, since it occurs in the drawing of “conclusions” from the examination of empirical evidence. But it is also held that the empirical test is insufficient, and must be supplemented with theorification, or the expansion of isolated hypotheses into theories. Refutation is not viewed as a substitute for confirmation but as its complement, since the very notion of unfavorable case is meaningful only in connection with the concept of positive instance. Although the existence of an inductive method is disclaimed, it is maintained that the various patterns of plausible reasoning (inductive inference included) are worth being investigated. It is concluded that scientific research follows neither the advice of inductivism nor the injunction of deductivism, but takes a middle course in which induction is instrumental both heuristically and methodologically, although the over-all pattern of research is hypothetico-deductive.
On a Proposed Revolution in Logic
Authors: Castaneda Hector Neri
Published: November 2002

In his The Uses of Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1958), S. Toulmin presents serious charges against ordinary logical theory, e.g., that it does not distinguish between analytic or formally valid or conclusive or warrant-using arguments, that the distinction between premises and conclusion is a bad oversimplification, that “major premise” conceals the distinction between inference-warrant and inference-backings, that logicians have been mistakenly working under an ideal of geometrical form.

The paper argues that none of the charges is proven, that most of them cannot be proven, that Toulmin's new logic is at best only vaguely hinted at and that his suggestions are positively obscure or mistaken.
Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions among Hypotheses
Authors: Finch Henry A.
Published: November 2002

Experimental observations are often taken in order to assist in making a choice between relevant hypotheses ~H and H. The power of observations in this decision is here metrically defined by information-theoretic concepts and Bayes' theorem. The exact (or maximum power) of a new observation to increase or decrease Pr(H) the prior probability that H is true; the power of that observation to modify the total amount of uncertainty involved in the choice between ~H and H: the power of a new observation to reduce uncertainty toward the ideal amount, zero; all these powers are systematically shown to be exact metrical functions of

where the numerator is the likelihood of the new observation given H, and the denominator is the “expectedness” of the observation.
Panpsychism or Evolutionary Materialism
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood
Published: November 2002

I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments on William James's radical empiricism as tied in with his view of perception as direct and immediate—roughly speaking, the alternative to Locke's representation of “unperceived things”—and bring in my own theory of sensations as guiding perceiving. Russell's neutral monism, connected historically with James's radical empiricism, will be touched on here in connection with his rejection of materialism. Phenomenalism and materialism exclude each other. Materialism, as an ontology, requires a realistic epistemology. I shall also make some comments on Dewey's biological experientialism. One can often best explain a perspective by means of contrasts.
Is the Philosophy of Science Scientific?
Authors: Benjamin A. Cornelius
Published: November 2002

It is helpful for any enterprise to stop occasionally and examine itself. Science has done this rather infrequently in its long and eventful history, and there has not been, in general, any continuity in these self-examinations. As a result the history of the philosophy of science has been a rather spotty affair. My belief is that the philosophy of science should also, at times, become self-critical. When a study is concerned primarily with methods of other disciplines it tends to underemphasize the role played by the methods which it itself uses. What is the method of the philosophy of science, and is it justifiable? Can there be a satisfactory study of science and can this be scientific?
Studies in The Empiricist Theory of Scientific Meaning
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

Part I is concerned with the tenet of modern Emperical Realism that while the theoretical concepts employed in science obtain their meanings entirely from the connections their usage establishes with the data language, the referents of such terms may be “unobservables,” that is, entities which cannot be discussed within the data language alone. Such a view avoids both the restrictive excesses of logical positivism and the epistemic laxity of transcendentalism; however, it also necessitates a break with classical semantics, for it follows from the empirical realistic position that a theoretical term must in principle be capable of simultaneously designating not just one entity, but indefinitely many.

Drawing upon the Carnapian explication of “analytic truth,” Part II examines a possible axiomatic basis for the empiricist theory of scientific meaningfulness to demonstrate that even if theoretical terms are able to designate entities inaccessible to the observation language, as held by Empirical Realism, so long as the meanings of theoretical terms derive from their connections with the observation language, the meaning content of a theory is exhausted by its observational consequences.
Imperatives, Logic, and Moral Obligation
Authors: Turnbull Robert G.
Published: November 2002

It is claimed that 'Do x!“ means 'Then you will do x'. Answering a “Why?” question concerning the former may take either of two forms, viz., 'Because ——' or 'If you wish to ——'. The second answer completes the truncated hypothetical. “Ought” sentences are treated as a species of imperatives involving universality in the “if” clause ('If anyone wished to ——'). Moral “ought” sentences involve a double universality, viz., the one mentioned above and universality connecting the action with social harmony (e.g., “If everyone were to do x, then there would be social harmony').
Confirming Power of Observations Metricized for Decisions among Hypotheses, Part II
Authors: Finch Henry A.
Published: November 2002

At this juncture, we must not minimize grave concerns which remain. As Jeffreys [28, 29] and Carnap [10] have candidly admitted, and as Fisher [20] has strenously insisted in his luminous assessment of the meaning and limitations of Bayes' theorem, there apparently must exist for the possibility of the successive application of Bayes' theorem to a hypothesis on the basis of a sequence of experimental observations, an initial evidence or judgment base, say e′, which is not itself compounded out of new observation and a prior evidence base. For e′, Pr(H) must be estimated for the first time, so to speak. Setting aside any investigation here as to whether an epistemology [52, 53, 54] which looks to Carneades as well as Plato-Aristotle, and to Hegel as well as Locke, must be bound eternally to the notion of unreconstructible “first” terms in the sequences of controlled inquiry, it must in any case be admitted that attainability of the initial estimate Pr(H/e′) is a task of enormous difficulty, as one may for example, notice in Peirce's [44] very bitter struggle with it. To assume that “initial” prior probabilities are impossible of achievement is an a priori dispair which is, as usual, no more warranted than a priori optimism. There do exist interesting proposals for making the required kind of “first” estimates in Carnap, Wald, and Jeffreys; in Jeffreys [28] the entire situation is vividly characterized and the ingenious suggestion offered that even for an infinite number of relevant hypotheses each of them may be assigned positive probabilities “even on no observational information at all” by ordering these positive probabilities in a converging series, whose sum is equal to 1, by judgments of comparative (mathematical) simplicity. Those like myself who have never encountered, even in Einstein [18], an independent or simple criterion of simplicity of laws will not, of course, consider Jeffreys' proposal to be even nearly definitive; yet it serves well to challenge the dogmatic despair concerning the usefulness and relevance of Bayes' theorem.
Concerning Mr. Feigl's “Vindication” of Induction
Authors: Kading Daniel
Published: November 2002

I wish to examine the “justification” or “vindication” of inductive procedure that has been set forth in various places by the late Professor Reichenbach and by Professor Feigl, most recently by the latter. Although Professor Feigl has explicitly referred to this kind of a “vindication” as “trivial,” it is nevertheless evident, from the stress placed upon and the space devoted to this proposal, that both Professors Feigl and Reichenbach attach considerable importance to it. Thus Professor Feigl says:

It has to be shown that the normal inductive procedure is reasonable, not merely by definition in the light of common usage, but that this definition itself is not merely a result of linguistic habituation or of an arbitrary fiat. This can be achieved, as I have tried to show..., largely in agreement with Reichenbach's ideas, if the adoption of the rule of induction is made a matter of practical justification (vindication) rather than a matter of theoretical justification (validation).
Physics and Ontology
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

The recent philosophy of physics is confronted with the new ontology, as it emerges after philosophy proper has fully articulated the linguistic turn. The classical ontologists asserted or denied, controversially, that certain entities “existed.” Rather than adding to these controversies, the new ontology uncovers their dialectics. The ontologically problematic entities of physics are of two kinds, represented by forces and particles, respectively. The dialectics has been dominated by eight patterns. Two of these, independence and realism, belong to philosophy proper. The latter is here considered in order to relieve the philosophy of physics of a burden only philosophy proper can bear. That leaves six patterns: concreteness (including the orbit feature), acquaintance, simplicity, significance, process, and model. The paper sketches how each of these may be used and probably has been used, either explicitly or implicitly, in the recent controversies.
Two Solutions to Galton's Problem
Authors: Naroll Raoul
Published: November 2002

Two solutions are offered to the problem of distinguishing “historical” from “functional” associations in cross-cultural surveys. The underlying logic of the mathematical model is discussed and three kinds of association distinguished: hyperdiffusional or purely “historical” association, undiffusional or purely “functional” association, and semidiffusional or mixed “historical-functional” association. Two overland diffusion arcs constitute the test sample; the relationship of social stratification to political complexity constitutes the test problem. A sifting test establishes a bimodal distribution of interval lengths between like types and sifts out repetitions with a lesser interval length than the second mode. A cluster test shows that for the test problem, the “hits” cluster more than the “misses”.
A Logic of Questions and Answers
Authors: Harrah David
Published: November 2002

A logic of questions and answers exists within the logic of statements, if we make the following identifications (roughly): “Whether” questions are identified with true exclusive disjunctions, and “which” questions are identified with true existential quantifications. The question-and-answer process is interpreted as an information-matching game. The question mark is not needed except as a device of abbreviation. Complete and partial answers can be distinguished and various relations of relevance, independence, and resolution defined.
A Reply to Professor Wheatley
Authors: Leonard Henry S.
Published: November 2002

I am grateful to Professor Wheatley for his note, [3], on my analysis of interrogatives, [1]. His comments bring out very clearly a number of considerations that deserve our closest attention. For example, he shows that if we can classify interrogatives as true and false—as I proposed to do—then we can properly inquire about what sentences contradict them, and what sentences are contingently or logically equivalent to them. Furthermore, he shows that, on my analysis, no indirect question can contradict any other indirect question and he accordingly, and correctly, looks for such contradictories among declarative sentences. (Different considerations than any that Professor Wheatley brought out will equally well show that no direct question will contradict any other direct question: “Is Freeman Governor of Minnesota?” and “Is not Freeman Governor of Minnesota?” express different concerns with one and the same topic of concern, hence, are equivalent.) Finally, he notes, [3], p. 54, that in my article, I have treated only inquisitive questions and have said nothing about deliberative or practical questions. While practical questions (as well as their practical answers) demand a different kind of treatment than that which Wheatley speculatively, albeit very tentatively, extrapolates for me, still these questions do form a kind of interrogative that did not get any attention in my article. (But the problems are so complex that I shall not try to say anything about them in this Reply.)
Braithwaite's Inductive Justification of Induction
Authors: Coburn Robert C.
Published: November 2002

One of the recurrent temptations in theory of knowledge is to try to provide an inductive justification for employing the principles of inductive inference. The purpose of the present paper is to suggest that this approach is misguided by exposing the deficiencies of what appears to be the most carefully constructed attempt of this kind which has thus far been made. I refer to the attempt made by R. B. Braithwaite in his Scientific Explanation.
Mario Bunge on Causality
Authors: Schlegel Richard
Published: November 2002

The physics of the past half-century has thoroughly discredited the simple atomistic view that an ultimate explanation of all natural processes may be found in a mechanism of cause-and-effect relations among such clearly defined entities as point-like particles. And yet, physics and the other sciences continue to find nature to be orderly and lawful. How do we reconcile this breakdown of what once seemed to be the causal basis for the order of nature with the continued discovery of new manifestations of that order? The subject book [3] of this paper, written by the Professor of Theoretical Physics and Philosophy of Science at Buenos Aires University, may be considered to be a response to this question. There are many other things too in the book: it provides a much needed collecting, and sorting, of various questions that have been asked and answers that have been given with respect to causality. (The book could well serve as a textbook for a course on this topic.) There are statements in the book that may be justifiably criticised, as I hope later to show; but in all I believe that Professor Bunge has given us a work that makes a contribution of importance to philosophical discussions of causality.
The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories
Authors: Bunge Mario
Published: November 2002

One of the most difficult and interesting problems of rational decision is the choice among possible diverging paths in theory construction and among competing scientific theories—i.e., systems of accurate testable hypotheses. This task involves many beliefs—some warranted and others not as warranted—and marks decisive crossroads. Suffice to recall the current conflict between the general theory of relativity and alternative theories of gravitation (e.g., Whitehead's) that account for the same empirical evidence, the rivalry among different interpretations of quantum mechanics (e.g., Bohr-Heisenberg's, de Broglie-Bohm's, and Landé's), and the variety of cosmological theories (e.g., Tolman's cyclical model and the steady-state theory). They all account for the same observed facts although they may predict different kinds of as yet unknown facts; they are consequently, up to now, empirically equivalent theories even though they are conceptually different and may even involve different philosophical views—i.e., they are conceptually inequivalent.
Safety, Strength, Simplicity
Authors: Goodman Nelson
Published: November 2002

When the evidence leaves us with a choice among hypotheses of unequal strength, how is the choice to be made?

Caution would counsel us to choose the weakest, the hypothesis that asserts the least, since it is the least likely to fail us later. But the principle of maximum safety quickly reduces to absurdity; for it always dictates the choice of a hypothesis that does not go beyond the evidence at all.
Inductive Simplicity
Authors: Ackermann Robert
Published: November 2002

The fact that simplicity has been linked with induction by many philosophers of science, some of whom have proposed or supported criteria of “inductive simplicity,” means that the problem must be given some serious attention. I take “inductive simplicity” as a title, however, only by way of concession to these historical treatments, since it is precisely the burden of my paper to show that there is no such thing. So much for the conclusion. I shall spend the remainder of my time arguing for it.
What is Length?
Authors: Henmueller Frank , Menger Karl
Published: November 2002

One does not only talk about the length in inches of this sheet of paper but also about the length of this sheet, about length in inches and about length. A clarification of these and related concepts results from a combination of the theory of the length in a definite unit as a fluent, developed by one of the authors, with the other's concept of 2-place fluents. The length ratio L is defined by pairing a number L (α, β) to any two objects of a certain kind, α, β (in a definite order). L thus may be described as the class of all pairs (α, β), L (α, β) for any objects α, β of the said kind. Length of this sheet and length in inches are specializations of this 2-place fluent.
Numerosity, Number, Arithmetization, Measurement and Psychology
Authors: Nelson Thomas M. , Bartley S. Howard
Published: November 2002

The paper aims to put certain basic mathematical elements and operations into an empirical perspective, evaluate the empirical status of various analytic operations widely used within psychology and suggest alternatives to procedures criticized as inadequate.

Experimentation shows the “manyness” of items to be a perceptual quality for both young children and animals and that natural operations are performed by naive children analogous to those performed by persons tutored in arithmetic. Number, counting, arithmetic operations therefore can make distinctions that are not inevitably arbitrary, and conceptual operations can obviously have a status as natural events with psychology. If the elements and conceptual operations involved in mathematical systems were not inherent in physiological process, various primitive discriminations could not be possible. Also, since some calculi have a natural status in a given empirical circumstance, the axioms of others can not be satisfied. Therefore the psychologist when acting as an empirical scientist seeks a calculus having a structure whose elements are isomorphic with natural units of stimulus and response and whose operations are isomorphic with whatever natural processes are involved.

Measurement poses a special problem for the empirical scientist. It concerns but a single class of natural qualities and this only in a limited way. The concept of quantity has a natural counterpart but quantity and measurement are not wholly analogous. Measurement is defined, as H. S. Leonard suggests, as a theoretical activity. Measurement theory has a formal structure but empirical end. Measurement hypothesizes about the position of a particular quality within a definite range of qualities. It therefore is beholden to definite empirical restrictions.

Some hypotheses-making systems use terms and relations per se as the context and starting point for dealing with discriminable events. Such procedures are “transcendent.” In empirical science, questions are part of problem-solving activity and their reference is naturally restricted. In providing description and explanation, psychological researchers frequently use calculi in a transcendent way. This results in theories that are only quasi-empirical and “half” true.

The roles measurement plays in psychology are discussed. Of particular concern are those cases in which the results of measuring or a theory of measurement are used to define the “real” units, or the “real” relations involved in problematic psychological events, and thence to describe and explain behaviors of interest. Metaphysical or ontological usages of measurement sometimes occur. The implication of these arguments with regard to a view of empirical science is discussed.
A Note on Prediction and Deduction
Authors: Canfield John , Lehrer Keith
Published: November 2002

This paper argues against the deductive reconstruction of scientific prediction, that is, against the view that in prediction the predicted event follows deductively from the laws and initial conditions that are the basis of the prediction. The major argument of the paper is intended to show that the deductive reconstruction is an inaccurate reconstruction of actual scientific procedure. Our reason for maintaining that it is inaccurate is that if the deductive reconstruction were an accurate reconstruction, then scientific prediction would be impossible.
Putnam's Review of Gödel's Proof
Authors: Nagel Ernest , Newman James R.
Published: November 2002

In his review of our Gödel's Proof in the April 1960 issue of Philosophy of Science Professor Hilary Putnam severely criticizes the crucial chapter, in which we attempt to make intelligible to the non-specialist the general character of the argument for Gödel's main conclusions. Indeed, he asserts that “the chapter culminates in an extremely serious misstatement,” and that we “fail to give the proof that G [the Gödel sentence upon which the argument hinges] is not provable.” “The book,” he declares, “has thus a serious shortcoming (in a very literal sense of ‘shortcoming’: it comes right up to the heart of Gödel's argument and then stops short with a misstatement')” (p. 205). These assertions impugn the competence of our exposition of Gödel's achievements, and we therefore ask for the privilege of replying to Dr. Putnam's allegations.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox Re-Examined
Authors: Sharp David H.
Published: November 2002

This paper discusses the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox from a new point of view. In section II, the arguments by which Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen reach their paradoxical conclusions are presented. They are found to rest on two critical assumptions:

(a)

that before a measurement is made on a system consisting of two non-interacting but correlated sub-systems, the state of the entire system is exactly represented by:

(b)

that the exact measurement of an observable A in one of the sub-systems is possible.

In section III it is shown that assumption (b) is incorrect. Thus we conclude, as did Bohr, that the results of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are not valid.

The arguments of section III are quite distinct from Bohr's, and therefore in Section IV this work is related to that of Bohr.
Comments on the Paper of David Sharp
Authors: Putnam Hilary
Published: November 2002

Mr. Sharp's resolution of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox is, in my opinion, the right one. However, the resolution does not in my opinion show that “God's in his heaven; all's right with the world (quantum mechanics).” This is in no way a criticism of Sharp; rather, it is inevitable that any resolution of this paradox, dealing as it does with the quantum mechanical concept of “measurement”, must tangle with some of the real difficulties which are lurking in the notion. The purpose of these comments is to use Mr. Sharp's remarks as a basis for bringing out one of the serious conceptual difficulties connected with measurement.