bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause
Authors: Brown James Robert
Published: January 2016

Scientific realism is the doctrine that our theories are intended to literal descriptions of the world. It is the claim that there is a realm of non-observable entities and processes, and that science legitimately appeals to this realm in its explanations of the observable world. This is a sketchy characterization, and with it go some sketchy arguments. These are the miracle arguments for scientific realism. Here is the way J.J.C. Smart puts his version:

If the phenomenalist about theoretical entities is correct we must believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove the surprising character of these phenomena....[But is] it not odd that the phenomena of the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true?
Approximate Generalizations and their Idealization
Authors: Adams Ernest W.
Published: January 2016

This paper describes recent work on a theory of approximate generalizations which, following J.S. Mill (1895, Book III Chapter XXIII), are propositions often expressed in the form Most A's are B's, and whose degrees of truth (“probabilities’ in Mill's terms) are the proportions of A's that are B's. Earlier work by Ian Carlstrom and myself studied the logic of approximate generalizations — the theory of necessary connections among their degrees of truth — and basic ideas and results of that work will be briefly summarized here, along with a related extension of this study. However our present concern is primarily with two matters having to do with the effects of small changes in the extensions of predicates on degrees of truth. One is the question of which generalizations are continuous in that small changes in the extensions of “empirical” predicates would not entail large changes in the degrees of truth of the generalizations.
Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations
Authors: Fitzgerald Paul
Published: January 2016

Several philosophers in recent years, e.g., Baker (1974-5, 1979), Grünbaum (1971), Rescher (1973) and Salmon (1974) have argued that something they call “temporal becoming” is mind-dependent. They see the issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do directly seen colors, felt coldness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? We know how the dialectic dances around that question….

“Roses are red, violets are blue, in the same way that some of our afterimages and sense-data are.”

“No, roses and violets don't really have colors. Roses only have the property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red. Science shows that.“
Saving the Differences: Gadamer and Rorty
Authors: Guignon Charles B.
Published: January 2016

Professor Bernstein has shown how, coming from three distinct orientations in twentieth century philosophy, Gadamer, Habermas and Rorty have arrived at strikingly similar conclusions. The upshot of their thought, as Professor Bernstein points out, is a powerful critique of traditional foundationalism. There is no uninterpreted “given”, no theory-neutral set of “facts”, no timeless structure of reason, no disinterested vantage point for research, outside of the interpretations and interests of the community of interpreters that are embodied in our current social practices. The collapse of the bad old dream of firm foundations and of ultimate convergence on the truth is taken as a fait accompli by Bernstein. The question that confronts us now is what to make of this situation. On the face of it there appear to be two types of stance open to us.
Arguments for Randomizing
Authors: Suppes Patrick
Published: January 2016

I have organized my remarks about randomizing under four headings: computation, communication, causal Inference, and complexity. It Is hard to think of a wore controversial subject than that of randomization. My remarks are simpler and more extreme than they ought to be. I have put them in a rather bald and definite way in order to draw the lines more sharply and to make my message as clear as possible. I do not doubt that under extended debate it would be necessary to qualify some of the things I have to say, but I would insist on the point that I would be offering qualifications, not retractions.

It is often said by pure Bayesians that once the likelihood function is available knowledge of any randomization scheme used is superfluous Information. It seems to me that this argument misses an Important point which I want to illustrate by a simple artificial example.
Autonomous Psychology: What it Should and Should Not Entail
Authors: Bechtel William
Published: January 2016

Cognitivism is now rather clearly the dominant approach in psychology. Philosophers such as Putnam (1975), Dennett (1978), Lycan (1981), and Cummins (1983) have supported the cognitivist strategy by proposing that mental states are to be defined functionally in terms of their interactions with other mental states. One of the most prominent features of the cognitivist-functionalist position is the autonomy it is thought to bestow upon psychology. Psychology, as viewed from this perspective, describes the processing of mental representations within the mind-brain and does not need to concern itself with the neurological activity that underlies its operation.

The arguments that are raised to support the autonomy of psychology from neurophysiology are arguments against a strong reductionist position that makes psychology dispensable (a view held, for example, by P.S. Churchland (1980)). The arguments are designed to show that there are regularities in nature that are not captured in the laws of physics.
On Explaining Experiences of a Quantum World
Authors: Healey Richard
Published: January 2016

“the view advanced by H. W. Everett (1957)—that there simply is no reduction—quite fails to account for the actual phenomena of physics, which we may summarize as the appearance of reduction: namely, our experience of definite observations.” (Stein 1983, p. 573.)

In an interesting recent paper, Geroch (1984) has sought to state the content of, “and to some extent to advocate” a view toward quantum mechanics which is at least closely akin to the view advanced by Everett, known popularly (but, arguably, misleadingly) as the many-worlds interpretation. While sensitive to objections along the lines of that by Stein quoted above, Geroch believes that these can adequately be answered. The key to answering such objections is to argue that physics is not responsible for accounting for our experience of physical phenomena—it is enough that it account for the physical phenomena themselves. It is this last argument that I wish to examine in this paper, both in general, and specifically in its application to Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Scientific Progress and Conceptual Consistency
Authors: MacKinnon Edward
Published: January 2016

There is a conflict between the intuition of scientists, and even many nonscientists, who see science as making progress, as being, in fact, the paradigm case of what it means to have progress in knowledge, and the writings of many philosophers of science who may be labeled ‘historicists’. For the most part the historicists do not deny progress outright. However, they have undercut previously accepted accounts of how science progresses.
Science Policy from a Naturalistic Sociological Epistemology
Authors: Campbell Donald T
Published: January 2016

Philip Kitcher and his program committee hoped to stimulate a lively debate this evening on the role which philosophers of science might play as advisors to government and the professional institutions of scientists. It is my guess that they had two changes in mind. They wanted more philosophers of science advising in Washington's science policy decisions. They also want you philosophers of science to develop those aspects of your field which are relevant to such decisions. They believe (I would guess) that not all of the scholarship of this association has such relevance, but that much of it does; that the relevant parts can still retain a genuinely epistemological,focus; and that science policy advice is better done by philosophers of science than by any other profession (e.g., the sociology of science). Perhaps I have merely projected these beliefs on to the program committee. They are, in any event, ones I hold and hope that they share.
Causal Decision Theory
Authors: Eells Eller
Published: January 2016

Philosophers concerned with the nature of rational decision making have distinguished two paradigms for rational deliberation. According to evidential decision theory, one, should, when faced with alternative courses of action, perform an act whose performance would constitute the best possible evidence that one will, get the good outcomes and not get the bad outcomes. On this paradigm, therefore, deliberation consists in trying to figure out which of the available actions is such that performing it should cause one's beliefs to be altered in such a way that the good outcomes will be as subjectively probable as possible and the bad outcomes as subjectively improbable aspossible, given the constraints imposed by one's prior beliefs. According to causal decision theory, on the-other hand, one should be explicitly concerned with the causal relations between the available acts and the possible outcomes.
Causation in Physics: Causal Processes and Mathematical Derivations
Authors: Cartwright Nanc
Published: January 2016

Physics is, above all else, mathematical. But its causal stories can be told in words. How then does mathematics bear on causal claims in physics? I want to make some very simple philosophical points about derivations, mathematical dependencies, and causal relations in physics. I am going to focus on the question, “How does mathematics provide theoretical support for physics’ causal claims?” Theoretical support is only one among a variety of kinds of support that a causal claim may have, but-I am not going to discuss how to balance these various kinds of support. Instead I will concentrate entirely on theoretical support and lay out some necessary conditions for the ideal case.’ Although the points I will make are not very involved philosophically, I will flesh them in with a very detailed example concerning gas lasers.
Background Knowledge in Science: A Naturalistic Critique
Authors: Giere Ronald N
Published: January 2016

There is a common theme in the papers by Levi (1985) and Shapere (1985). Both are much concerned with the nature and role of background knowledge in science. Yet the approaches to this common problem represented in these two papers are so different as to be almost incommensurable. This divergence, I think, is not solely the fault of the authors, both of whom are distinguished and experienced philosophers of science. It reflects widespread features of the philosophy of science as it is now practiced. I will begin by saying what I think these features are and by suggesting an alternative conception of our enterprise as philosophers of science. Then I will comment on some specific points in each of these papers from the standpoint of this alternative conception. Finally, I will give my own account of the role of background knowledge in a specific scientific case.
Niels Bohr, Complementarity, and Realism
Authors: Folse Henry J.
Published: January 2016

The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject.

Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
What Happens to Accounts of Mind-Brain Relations If We Forego An Architecture of Rules and Representations?
Authors: Bechtel William
Published: January 2016

While some philosophers have assumed that there are only two options for characterizing the ontological status of mental models in cognitive information processing psychology--treating them as nearly autonomous from theories of brain activity (Putnam 1975 and Fodor 1974) or eliminating them in favor of neuroscience accounts (Churchland 1979)-- cognitive scientists have often tacitly assumed a third option. This involves treating the mental models as systems of rules and representations that are instantiated in the nervous system much in the way computer programs are instantiated in computers. While this seems to be the position of those endorsing the autonomy of psychology, it, in fact is consistent with a much weaker interpretation if one recognizes that the vehicle in which mental processes or computer programs are instantiated may limit and constrain what kinds of mental processes or computer programs can be instantiated.
Probabilistic Causality, Randomization and Mixtures
Authors: Plato Jan von
Published: January 2016

The scheme of abstract dynamical systems will represent repetitive experimentation: There is a basic space of events X1 and the denumerable product … contains all possible sequences of events x = (x1, x2, … ). There are projections qn which give the nth member of x: qn (x) = xn. A transformation T is defined over X by the equation qn (Tx)= q n+1 (x). It removes the sequence by one step, T(x1 ,x2 ,…) = (x2 ,x3 ,…) and is known as the shift transformation. It comes as an abstraction of the dynamical transformations of classical theories. Here it represents the performance of ‘the next’ experiment.
Arguments for Experimentation in Biology
Authors: Maienschein Jane
Published: January 2016

“An experiment,” the Oxford Dictionary of the History of Science records, “unlike an experience, is a designed practical intervention in Nature; its upshot is a socially contrived set of observations, carried out under artificially produced and deliberately controlled, reproducible conditions. At the experiment's core is the notion that the conditions for producing a given effect can be separated into independently variable factors, in such a way as to demonstrate how the factors behave in their natural (i.e. the non-experimental) state.” (Dictionary 1981, p. 136). Around 1900, some biologists would have acceded to such a definition, yet many would have offered alternatives. Some would have denied that the conditions in question must be “designed” or artificially produced; nature may also provide experiments. Others would have emphasized the use of experimentally-derived observations for hypothesis testing; experimentation goes beyond the mere experiment itself, that is. A variety of additional definitions would have been advanced as well, illustrating the lack of one such orthodox interpretation as the Dictionary now offers.
Regarding the Raven Paradox
Authors: Levy Robert J.
Published: January 2016

In this paper I take Hempel’s raven paradox as the claim that statements of the form ‘∼Ru v Bu’, ‘u is not a raven or u is black,’ confirm the hypothesis h ‘(x)(Rx → Bx)’, ‘All ravens are black.’ Although Hempel discusses this using a criterion of confirmation expressed wholly in terms of deductive logic (see 1965, pp. 35-9), it has become more common to articulate criteria of confirmation using concepts of probability and, in particular, to employ the positive relevance criterion of confirmation which says that, given background knowledge k, (i) e confirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)>P(h/k); (ii) e disconfirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)<P(h/k) and (iii) e is irrelevant to h if and only if P(h/e.k)=P(h/k).
Reasoning From Imagery and Analogy in Scientific Concept Formation
Authors: Nersessian Nancy J.
Published: January 2016

How do vague notions about how one might understand certain physical phenomena get transformed into scientific concepts such as “field”, “quark”, and “gene”? Philosophers of as disparate views as Reichenbach and Feyerabend have held that the process through which scientific concepts emerge is not a reasoned process. In a manner completely mysterious and unanalyzable, scientific concepts emerge fully grown, like Athena from the head of Zeus. However, when one examines actual cases of concept formation in science, a different picture can be painted: Scientific concepts do not pop out of heads, but are constructed in response to specific problems by utilizing methods appropriate to the solution of the problem. Thus, as with other aspects of the scientific enterprise, concept formation is a problem-solving process that involves the application of systematic procedures in the attempt to solve specific problems. It is a reasoned process.
Minimal Disturbance in Quantum Logic
Authors: Martinez Sergio
Published: January 2016

In this paper I formalize the notion of minimal disturbance, as this seems to be required by usual interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics, and construct a quantum logical (lattice) model of the type of situation that seems to be at the root of the problem of the interpretation of Luders’ projection rule as a criterion of minimal disturbance for individual state transformations. What is particularly interesting in the situation to be depicted here is that, on the basis of a simple model, which depends only on some very general features of the lattice structure of the theory (and its semantical interpretation), usual interpretive assumptions on minimal disturbance appear to be wanting.

If we restrict our attention to the statistics of measurement results, Luders’ rule can, easily be interpreted as a formula describing ‘minimal change’ for statistical states.
Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community
Authors: Seager William
Published: January 2016

The ability to observe is the ability to reliably detect, but that is not all observation is. A thermometer reliably detects temperature yet does not observe the temperature, whereas I do, even though in terms of reliability I cannot match the thermometer. An observation is detection accompanied by active classification and, typically, the subsequent formation of opinion. Even when we say of an animal that it can see something we mean more than that it reliably detects things of a certain sort but also that it deals with such things as objects, gauging their usefulness or lack thereof in relation to its interests and to other aspects of the world. This crucial addendum to the notion of observation can be enshrined in slogan: observers are potential believers. This marks the difference between mere detecting mechanisms and observers.

The contemporary scientific anti-realism of one such as van Fraassen, which is developed in detail under the label of “constructive empiricism” in van Fraassen (1980), can be characterized in terms of detecting mechanisms.
Individuality and Macroevolutionary Theory
Authors: Ereshefsky Marc
Published: January 2016

The issue of whether species are individuals is now an old one; the literature abounds with arguments, counter-arguments and counter-counter-arguments for their individuality. The question I want to take up in this paper is not whether species are indeed individuals, but what ramifications their alleged individuality has for macroevolutionary theory.

According to those biologists who argue for a new theory of macroevolution, the individuality of species is one of the fundamental premises of that theory. For example, Joel Cracraft writes of himself and others that

The issue of individuality… is at the heart of arguments of those evolutionary biologists who see a need to view the patterns and processes of evolution as being hierarchically arranged into microevolutionary and macroevolutionary levels (1987, p. 332).
Philosophy Versus Science: The Species Debate and the Practice of Taxonomy
Authors: Gross Alan G.
Published: January 2016

Although generally informed by an intimate knowledge of evolutionary biology and taxonomy, the controversy over the nature of species is clearly philosophical; it consists almost entirely of the clarification of old, and the invention of new arguments for or against calling the species category a class, The debate seems firmly divided between those, like Kitts and Bernier, who see homo sapiens as a class, and those, like Hull and Ghiselin, who see it as an individual. In the first case, particular human beings are members; in the second case, parts. To the champions of class, the essentialists, each species can be defined by means of a unique set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and every organism can be placed without equivocation into a particular species. To the individualists, nothing could be further from the truth. As a contingent, product of evolution, each species shares that crucial characteristic of an individual, spacio-temporal identity; each is a chunk of genealogical nexus.
Scientific Reasoning or Damage Control: Alternative Proposals for Reasoning with Inconsistent Representations of the World
Authors: Smith Joel M.
Published: January 2016

Logical analyses of scientific representations of the world have usually focused on axiomatized or axiomatizable theories. As practiced, science seldom employs such theories. Rather, we find aggregations of claims, the logical relations of which are not as neat as philosophers of science might like them to be. Indeed, a common feature of such aggregations is the presence of certain “theoretical anomalies,” statements that are in some way incompatible with the remainder of the corpus. Huygens’ description of light as exhibiting an asymmetry with respect to its direction of propagation in polarization phenomena was such an anomaly because of its inconsistency with his account of light as longitudinal waves in a medium. (See Sabra 1981, pp. 226-227.) Although the occurrence of these anomalies is indicative of a problem that must be dealt with, inconsistent representations of the world are not without significant heuristic value.
The Role of Skill in Experimentation: Reading Ludwik Fleck’s Study of the Wasserman Reaction as an Example of Ian Hacking’s Experimental Realism.
Authors: Stump David
Published: January 2016

Ludwik Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact is an extended argument for the inclusion of social factors in the history and philosophy of science. Fleck uses the history of syphilis as his case study, which falls into two parts. In the first two chapters of his book, Fleck presents a history of the change of the concept of syphilis as a “carnal scourge with strong moralistic connotations” in the middle ages to the modern concept of syphilis as an infectious disease (1979, 77). In the second part of the book, he presents a detailed account of the development of a serum test for syphilis, the Wasserman reaction. Fleck also argues that perception is theory-laden, for example, in his comparative study of anatomical drawings, and for the importance of social pressures on the development of science, for example, in his discussion of the rivalry between nations to first develop a cure for syphilis, as demanded by politicians (1979, 133 ff. and 68).
The Anthropic Principle: A Primer for Philosophers
Authors: Tipler Frank J.
Published: January 2016

Let's begin with a

Definition: The Anthropic Principle is the drawing of scientific inferences from a consideration of Man's Place in Nature.

There are various versions of the Anthropic Principle. The most conservative version of the Anthropic Principle is nothing but a systematic working out of the fact that the astrophysical (and other scientific) data we have is self-selected due to the fact that Homo sapiens is a particular type of intelligent being. This conservative version of the Anthropic Principle is called the

Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): The observed values of all physical quantities are not equally probable, but rather take on values restricted by the fact that these quantities are measured by a carbon-based intelligent life-form which spontaneously evolved on an earthlike planet around a G2 type star.

Again, the Weak Anthropic Principle is just a warning to take into account a grandiose type of selection bias when interpreting data.
Science, Certainty, and Descartes
Authors: Hatfield Gary
Published: January 2016

It is difficult to determine the place of experience in Descartes’ philosophy and science. His a priori, rationalist metaphysics would seem, on the face of it, difficult to reconcile with the explicit appeal he makes to sensory evidence in both his scientific practice and methodological remarks. Although earlier descriptions of Descartes as a pure a priorist in natural science (e.g., Koyré 1978, pp. 89-94) have rightly been rejected, it would be a mistake to embrace the other extreme, as does Clarke (1982), with his bold revisionist thesis that Descartes was, in actuality, an empiricist. And yet the possibility of combining the rationalist and empiricist elements in Descartes’ thought has also seemed problematic, for it has been assumed that Descartes required that experientially based knowledge meet the standard of absolute certainty set by the the method of doubt in the First Meditation (Garber 1978).
Positivism and the Pragmatic Theory of Observation
Authors: Oberdan Thomas
Published: January 2016

The most influential critique of the Logical Positivists’ analysis of scientific observation was posed by Paul Feyerabend in his classic essay, “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism”. Feyerabend countered the later Positivist conception with his so-called ‘Pragmatic Theory of Observation’ which was founded on two ideas. The first is that observation reports are ‘theory-laden’, in the sense that they are always interpreted in the light of the best current theory and are subject to reinterpretation when one theory succeeds another. Feyerabend traced the development of this idea in the early writings of the Positivists, especially Rudolf Carnap, in the classic discussion of protocol sentences. In that context, Feyerabend finds that the theory-ladenness of observation leads inexorably to the second idea of the Pragmatic Theory, that what counts as an observation report does not depend on either its empirical content or its logical form, but on its causal or pragmatic features.
Independence from Future Theories: A Research Strategy in Quantum Theory
Authors: Rueger Alexander
Published: January 2016

Renormalization in Quantum Field Theory (QFT) has frequently been regarded, by philosophers as well as by scientists, as an exemplary case of bad methodological behavior. The feeling that renormalization was somehow an illegitimate way to extract results, an ad hoc maneuver without an independent rationale, was (and is) common among physicists and philosophers, who wonder, at the same time, about the unprecedented accuracy of the empirical results achieved by the illegitimate method. Teller (1989) has recently tried to dispel the air of illegitimacy around this technique. His lucid presentation, however, leaves one wondering why any sufficiently well-informed person could ever have thought of renormalization as an ad hoc move.

Part of the reason, I think, is that renormalization — or so the common view goes — came to the rescue of a sadly lingering theory, the pre-1947 Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). A theory with such a bad record of solved empirical and conceptual problems could simply not be correct.
How the Models of Chemistry Vie
Authors: Hofmann James R.
Published: January 2016

Recent work by historians and philosophers has called attention to the complexity of modern experimental physics and its intricate relation to interpretive and explanatory theory (Franklin 1987, Hacking 1983, Galison 1987 and 1989, Pickering 1984 and 1987). One point of general agreement has been that the contexts of discovery and justification often significantly overlap and do not uniformly correlate with experiment and theory. Instead, intended applications, instrumentation, experiment, phenomenological description, explicative models, and explanatory theory all act both as incentives and as constraints during the production of scientific knowledge. The present paper investigates how one node of this network operates in the domain of solid state physics and chemistry. In particular, a case study analysis of how models function in transition metal oxide research provides ample support for several conclusions.

First, it must be emphasized that the term “theory” can have misleading connotations in this domain if it is allowed to imply a single and foundational level of explanatory generality.
Island Biogeography, Species-Area Curves, and Statistical Errors: Applied Biology and Scientific Rationality
Authors: Shrader-Frechette Kristin S.
Published: January 2016

In 1986-1987, a number of ecologists were involved in a dispute over design of wildlife reserves and species losses resulting from deforestation. The battle was played out largely in the pages of the Ecological Society of America Bulletin. The most focused aspect of the controversy began in August 1986 when P. C. Kangas gave a paper at the meetings of the Fourth International Congress of Ecology, held in Syracuse, New York.

Using data on trees in Costa Rica and the “objective approach” of species-area curves, Kangas argued that extinction rates due to deforestation in the tropics are actually much lower than most other researchers have alleged (Kangas 1986, p. 194). Ecologists in the audience disagreed with Kangas’ claim that extinction rates were indeed lower, complained that his questionable results would be used to justify more rapid and widespread deforestation, and claimed to have “sharply trounced his [Kangas’] arguments” (Noss 1986, pp. 278-279).
Mapping Ecologists’ Ecologies of Knowledge
Authors: Taylor Peter J.
Published: January 2016

Ecologists, particularly those who consider socially generated effects in the environment, grapple with complex, changing situations. Historians, sociologists and philosophers studying the construction of science likewise attempt to account for (or discount) a wide variety of influences, which make up what historian Charles Rosenberg has called “ecologies of knowledge” (Rosenberg 1988). This paper introduces a graphic methodology, mapping, designed to assist researchers at both levels—in science and in science studies—to work with the complexity of their material. By analyzing the implications and limitations of mapping, I aim to contribute to an ecological approach to the philosophy of science. Let me start with two diagrams to open up the territory I will be exploring.

Dansereau’s diagram (Fig. 1) conveys a dynamic equilibrium of energy and resource import, export, flows up a trophic hierarchy, and down again to exert control over lower levels in an ecosystem (Dansereau 1973).
Newton’s Classic Deductions from Phenomena
Authors: Harpe William
Published: January 2016

I take Newton’s arguments to inverse square centripetal forces from Kepler’s harmonic and areal laws to be classic deductions from phenomena. I argue that the theorems backing up these inferences establish systematic dependencies that make the phenomena carry the objective information that the propositions inferred from them hold. A review of the data supporting Kepler’s laws indicates that these phenomena are Whewellian colligations—generalizations corresponding to the selection of a best fitting curve for an open-ended body of data. I argue that the information theoretic features of Newton’s corrections of the Keplerian phenomena to account for perturbations introduced by universal gravitation show that these corrections do not undercut the inferences from the Keplerian phenomena. Finally, I suggest that all of Newton’s impressive applications of Universal gravitation to account for motion phenomena show an attempt to deliver explanations that share these salient features of his classic deductions from phenomena.
“From the Phenomena of Motions to the Forces of Nature”: Hypothesis or Deduction?
Authors: Stein Howard
Published: January 2016

There is a passage in Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that I have always found striking and rather charming. It concerns a metaphysical theory that Hume regards as bizarre; and he offers two philosophical arguments in its confutation. It is the first of these that I have in mind:

First, [he says,] It seems to me, that this theory… is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience.
Some Complexities of Experimental Evidence
Authors: Morrison Margaret
Published: January 2016

Traditional accounts of the relationship between experimental evidence and hypotheses have been challenged in the recent work of Hacking (1983), Galison (1987), and Franklin (1986,1990). These authors have pointed to the independent aspects of the experimental tradition and forced us to rethink the view that experiment is simply the handmaid of theory. As a result we have come to recognize the tremendous intricacies involved in theory testing and experimentation and have come to appreciate the various ways experiment shapes scientific practice.

In what follows I want to extend this discussion by taking a closer look at the way in which theories are supported by empirical evidence. In addition to the traditional testing model the method of deduction from phenomena, made famous by Newton, is also thought to furnish experimental evidence insofar as the theory itself is supposedly deduced from empirical data.
Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and EPR
Authors: Clifton Robert , Pagonis Constantine , Pitowsky Itamar
Published: January 2016

The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics involves two assumptions: one about locality and the other about when it is legitimate to infer the existence of an element-of-reality. Using one simple thought experiment, we argue that quantum predictions and the relativity of simultaneity require that both these assumptions fail, whether or not quantum mechanics is complete.

EPR’s (1935) argument for the incompleteness of QM turns upon the following sufficient condition:

“If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.“

EPR apply this condition in a case where knowledge gained from measuring one quantum system allows one to predict with certainty a value for a physical quantity on another.
Kings and Prisoners (and Aces)
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: January 2016

What we make of information we come to have should take into account that we have come to have it, and how we think we have come to have it

I relate this homily to several puzzles. In one, three cards, of which I know one is a king, lie face-down. After I select, without inspecting, a card and bet that it is a king, you reveal that a certain other card is not a king. I wonder what this does to my chances on that bet. In another puzzle I am one of three prisoners and learn that one of us will be released. Then I learn that a certain other prisoner will not be released. Again I wonder what this does to my chances.
Jacques Monod’s Scientific Analysis and Its Reductionistic Interpretation
Authors: Spassov Spas
Published: January 2016

Ever since the publication of his biophilosophical ideas in the early seventies, Jacques Monod has always been criticized quite severely for his old-fashioned philosophical reductionism. These numerous critiques have created a picture of an eminent scientist whose philosophical considerations are founded on the mechanistic worldview of Cartesian metaphysics, a view which is completely unacceptable to contemporary philosophers. Today it is the usual practice to cite Monod as one of the strongest and most radical reductionists in modem biology.

Monod’s biophilosophical conception arose at a moment when vigorous discussions on reductionism followed the great successes of molecular biology. His ideas were criticized namely for their strongly reductionistic interpretation of biological knowledge, and for their mechanistic model of life which, as Monod believed, reflected the spirit of modem science.
Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism?
Authors: Elsamahi Mohamed
Published: January 2016

Hacking (1983) introduces an attempt to defend scientific realism on the
basis of the reality of theoretical entities. This position, which is called
entity realism, is based on disconnecting the reality of theoretical
entities from the truth and explanatory power of theories that account for
them. In this way, two problems can be avoided. First, if theories about
theoretical entities are rejected, the entities themselves do not have to go
with them and the realist thesis that we can have knowledge of what exists
in the world can be sustained. Second, theoretical entities, which will
replace theories as the grounds for the realist position, would be protected
from attacks on the validity of the inference to the best explanation which
underlies classical or “theory” realism. In other words, theoretical
entities would be able to survive the collapse of the inference to the best
explanation.
The Bohmian Model of Quantum Cosmology
Authors: Callender Craig , Weingard Robert
Published: January 2016

Philosophers of science have not paid much attention to recent
developments in quantum cosmology. This fact is surprising, since quantum
cosmology is replete with conceptual issues involving (e.g.) the fundamental
nature of time and space, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the
ultimate meaning of probability. One notable exception, Quentin Smith, has
recently examined the Hartle-Hawking (1983) proposal. Trying to make sense
of the view, he resorts to an instrumentalist picture, which treats the
proposal as merely a heuristic device for the algorithm responsible for
predictions. While we do not examine Smith's account here, we would like to
contrast it with the model presented in this note, in which a fully
realistic interpretation of quantum cosmology is developed.

Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the de Broglie-Bohm
causal interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The Scope of Psychology
Authors: Butler Keith
Published: January 2016

Psychology is a scientific discipline whose universe of discourse is the
mind. What could be so controversial about that? Plenty; and (almost) all of
the controversy involves questions about the
scope of mind. The traditional view on this
matter is most closely associated with Descartes. Though Descartes supposed
that the mind is essentially nonmaterial, this dualism is not a part of the
legacy Descartes left to the modern student of mind. What modern cognitive
science has inherited from Descartes is the view that the mind is a private
place, separated (in a number of respects) from the body and the environment
that lies outside the physical boundries on an individual. There is,
however, a rising tide within the philosophy of psychology that seeks to
push the boundries of the mind outside the skin (or at least the
cranium).
Deciding on the Data: Epistemological Problems Surrounding Instruments and Research Techniques in Cell Biology
Authors: Bechtel William
Published: January 2016

The primary focus of philosophy of science in this century has been on theories and theoretical knowledge. Except for concern about whether phenomenal reports or reports of objects and events should count as data reports and whether data might be theory-laden and what consequences that might have for objectivity of science, data have been taken to be relatively unproblematic. But for scientists, questions about what are the data are often of paramount concern. Such controversies often overshadow controversies over theories or explanatory models. Scientists’ questions about data, moreover, do not turn on the philosophical questions just identified. Instead, for scientists, the overriding question is whether purported data is actually informative about the phenomenon in nature under investigation or whether it represents an artifact; that is, whether it was so much the product of the procedures used to generate the data that it could not be interpreted as providing information about the underlying phenomenon.
Poincaré on Mathematics, Intuition and the Foundations of Science
Authors: Folina Janet
Published: January 2016

In his first philosophy book, Science and Hypothesis, Poincaré gives us a picture which relates the different sciences to different kinds of hypotheses. In fact, as Michael Friedman has pointed out (Friedman 1995), Poincaré arranges this book—chapter by chapter—in terms of a hierarchy of sciences. Arithmetic is the most general of all the sciences because it is presupposed by all the others. Next comes mathematical magnitude, or the analysis of the continuum, which presupposes arithmetic; then geometry which presupposes magnitude; the principles of mechanics which presuppose geometry; and finally experimental physics which presupposes mechanics. Poincaré's basic view was that experiment in science depends on fixing other concepts first. In particular he believed at the time that our concept of space had to be fixed before we could discover truths about the objects in space.
Methodological Judgment and Critical Reasoning in Galileo's Dialogue
Authors: Finocchiaro Maurice A.
Published: January 2016

The aim of this paper is to suggest that Galileo's Dialogue may be fruitfully interpreted and evaluated from the viewpoints of methodological judgment and critical reasoning. This approach has significant historical precedents in the readings of Thomas Salusbury and the Port-Royal logicians. This focus on the book's philosophical dimension is not meant to exclude its scientific, historical, rhetorical, and aesthetic dimensions; indeed, such anti-reductionism is suggested by methodological judgment applied at the metalevel; the latter also suggests a criticism of the excessively rhetorical readings prevalent today, as well as viable ways for resolving the problems of hermeneutical pluralism, interpretation versus evaluation, and theory versus practice. Finally, the book's methodological judgment and critical reasoning can be shown to correspond to Galileo's intentions and self-reflections.
Explaining Scientific Change: Integrating the Cognitive and the Social
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: January 2016

In 1979, Dr. J. Robin Warren of the Royal Perth Hospital in Australia discovered bacteria in the biopsies of stomach tissue taken from patients with digestive complaints. His colleague Dr. Barry Marshall followed up on Warren's work and found the bacteria in many patients with stomach inflammation and peptic ulcers (Marshall and Warren 1984). When Marshall claimed at a medical conference that bacteria are the principal cause of peptic ulcers, his remarks were rejected as preposterous. It was widely believed that the human stomach's caustic gastric juices made it too antiseptic for bacteria to survive for long. Moreover, alternative explanations of the principal cause of ulcers were available, focusing on excess acidity and emotional stress. Stung by rejection of his theory and failure of animal experiments, Marshall resorted in 1984 to drinking the bacteria himself, and underwent endoscopy and biopsy to show that his stomach had indeed become inflamed (Monmaney 1993).
Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries
Authors: Kristeller Paul Oskar
Published: January 2016

Since Professor Marti has been in Europe for the past year and expects to stay there for another year, Professor Bradner has agreed to join the Executive Committee, first as an acting member and later as a regular member. This Committee has held three meetings since October 1954.

The place of Miss Sanford as a member of the Editorial Board and as Section Editor for Latin Commentaries of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries has been filled by Professor Revilo P. Oliver of the University of Illinois.
Monitoring chicken flock behaviour provides early warning of infection by human pathogen
Campylobacter
Authors: Colles Frances M. , Cain Russell J. , Nickson Thomas , Smith Adrian L. , Roberts Stephen J. , Maiden Martin C. J. , Lunn Daniel , Dawkins Marian Stamp
Published: January 2016

Campylobacter
is the commonest bacterial cause of gastrointestinal infection in humans, and chicken meat is the major source of infection throughout the world. Strict and expensive on-farm biosecurity measures have been largely unsuccessful in controlling infection and are hampered by the time needed to analyse faecal samples, with the result that
Campylobacter
status is often known only after a flock has been processed. Our data demonstrate an alternative approach that monitors the behaviour of live chickens with cameras and analyses the ‘optical flow’ patterns made by flock movements.
Campylobacter
-free chicken flocks have higher mean and lower kurtosis of optical flow than those testing positive for
Campylobacter
by microbiological methods. We show that by monitoring behaviour in this way, flocks likely to become positive can be identified within the first 7–10 days of life, much earlier than conventional on-farm microbiological methods. This early warning has the potential to lead to a more targeted approach to
Campylobacter
control and also provides new insights into possible sources of infection that could transform the control of this globally important food-borne pathogen.
The social and ecological costs of an ‘over-extended' phenotype
Authors: Jordan Lyndon Alexander , Maguire Sean M. , Hofmann Hans A. , Kohda Masanori
Published: January 2016

Extended phenotypes offer a unique opportunity to experimentally manipulate and identify sources of selection acting on traits under natural conditions. The social cichlid fish
Neolamprologus multifasciatus
builds nests by digging up aquatic snail shells, creating an extended sexual phenotype that is highly amenable to experimental manipulation through addition of extra shells. Here, we find sources of both positive sexual selection and opposing natural selection acting on this trait; augmenting shell nests increases access to mates, but also increases social aggression and predation risk. Increasing the attractiveness of one male also changed social interactions throughout the social network and altered the entire community structure. Manipulated males produced and received more displays from neighbouring females, who also joined augmented male territories at higher rates than unmanipulated groups. However, males in more attractive territories received more aggression from neighbouring males, potentially as a form of social policing. We also detected a significant ecological cost of the ‘over-extended' phenotype; heterospecific predators usurped augmented nests at higher rates, using them as breeding sites and displacing residents. Using these natural experiments, we find that both social and ecological interactions generate clear sources of selection mediating the expression of an extended phenotype in the wild.