bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Schopenhauer's Reputation in Its Changing Historical Context
Authors: Magee Bryan
Published: October 2003

For some 35 years after the publication of his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer was virtually ignored. Then the mood of pessimism brought about across Europe by the failure of the revolutions of 1848 created a climate of opinion favourable to him. After the 1850s, he enjoyed a reputation as one of the ‘great’ philosophers. But in the twentieth century, his work fell into neglect once again. Now a revival of interest is taking place.
Misunderstanding Schopenhauer
Authors: Magee Bryan
Published: October 2003

The commonest misunderstanding of Schopenhauer is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Then there is the mistake that this noumenon is the will understood in a conative sense, the will as we experience it in agency, or the will to live, or the will to power. A careful reading of Schopenhauer's work is able to show that these are misinterpretations. He does not believe we can know the noumenon; and by ‘will’ he means a blind force that is as present in inorganic nature as elsewhere. It was an error on Schopenhauer's part to use the term ‘will’ in a way that invites these misunderstandings; but the damage has been done.
‘A Learned and Eloquent Piety’
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: October 2003

Extracts from Descartes's correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia explaining his ideas on the passions lead to a psychological analysis of Descartes and a discussion of melancholia. Childhood is described, with reference to the social milieu to which he belonged. Sets the religious scene by reviewing the state of Christian religion in early seventeenth‐century France. Erasmus’ educational reforms are discussed, and the rise of the municipal collèges organized by the gentry.
An Education in Propriety 1606–1618
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: October 2003

Charts the history of the Jesuits in France, their organization, teaching methods and aims, with particular reference to La Flèche and the relationship between Christianity and Classical philosophy in the philosophical curriculum followed there by Descartes. This was the Jesuit version of the liberal arts, based mainly on works by Aristotle, including dialectic, natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics. Speculation as to Descartes's activities in the period 1614–1618, in between finishing his studies at La Flèche, his law studies, and joining Prince Maurice of Nassau's army.
The Apprenticeship with Beeckman 1618–1619
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: October 2003

Details Descartes's relationship with Beeckman, and their collaboration on three projects in mathematics, dealing with music, falling bodies, and hydrostatics. Presents Beeckman's version of corpuscularianism, its differences from traditional atomism, and its relevance to their collaboration. Letters to Beeckman give details of Descartes's mathematical discoveries on the subject of longitude, compasses, and his attempt to revive a traditional mathematical art, mathesis universalis.
A New System of the World 1630–1633
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: October 2003

Discusses the structure and content of Le Monde, which deals with corpuscularianism, a theory of matter based on fluid mechanics containing the contentious theories of conservation of motion and the non‐existence of vacua. The work also presents a definition of the nature of colour, uses a hypothetical ‘new world’ (which when compared with the real world will be found to be indistinguishable from it) to define his cosmology, and sets out a theory of light that explains the behaviour of light rays with particular reference to rainbows. By analogy with Le Monde, L’Homme presents the mechanistic physiology of imaginary beings. Discusses psycho‐physiological functions, by means of reference to the actions of automata, and the implications these have for the difference between human and animal cognition, and whether animals have souls.
The Years of Consolidation 1634–1640
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: October 2003

Discusses various works of Descartes's and their reception, including objections to them and his response to those objections. Météors deals with meteorology, which includes a corpuscular model of light, an account of refraction, and vision, and its links with optical instruments; the Dioptrique is a practical treatise on the construction of these optical instruments; and Géométrie compares arithmetic with geometry and extends Descartes's treatment of the Pappus problem and the classification of curves. The organization of material in the Discours appears arbitrary unless interpreted autobiographically. The Meditationes contains a fuller treatment of scepticism, in comparison with Pyrrhonism, and hyperbolic doubt, a defence of mechanism (which Descartes also saw as a defence of Copernicanism), discussions of the cogito and the transcendence of God, the classification of ideas, a new version of the doctrine of clarity and distinctness, and the nature of the thinking self, the identification of the self with the mind and mind/body dualism.
What Is Divine Eternity?
Authors: Helm Paul
Published: October 2003

Addresses the coherence of the idea ‘divine timeless eternity’. In particular, its relation to divine simplicity and the implications of it for God's relation to what is temporal. It is denied that eternity is a kind of simultaneity, and that if God is related to a temporal universe, then he also must be temporal.
Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Although past commentators saw Aristotle as recognizing the rights of individuals, recent interpreters have objected that no single Greek word corresponds to the modern word ‘rights’. In reply, it is shown with evidence from Aristotle and other writers that the ancient Greek discourse of law and politics included distinct locutions corresponding to the different senses of ‘rights’ distinguished by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld: to dikaion corresponds to Hohfeld's claim right, exousia to a liberty or privilege, kurios to authority or power, and adeia and ateleia to immunity (compare also akuron). A right for Aristotle is essentially a just claim that a person has against other members of the same community, and a natural right is a just claim based in nature. Recent arguments that rights have theoretical implications inimical to Aristotle's principles are also found to be unpersuasive, because they rely on tendentious assumptions that would rule out many modern theories of rights as well. The chapter also indicates how a respect for the rights of others might be justified on the basis of Aristotelian practical wisdom.
The Best Constitution
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Aristotle states that ‘there is only one constitution which is everywhere according to nature the best.’ This constitution (Aristotle's version of utopia) is unqualifiedly just and ‘according to nature’ because it promotes the common advantage (or public interest). The interpretation of ‘common advantage’ is problematic: does it consist in the advantage of the citizens considered as distinct individuals (individualism) or the advantage of the polis (city‐state) considered as a whole (holism or collectivism)? Only on the former, individualistic interpretation would the best constitution be deeply committed to individual rights, and it is argued that a moderate version of individualism is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's best constitution. The chapter goes on to consider difficulties in Aristotle's account of the best constitution, including his views on education and the question of which is better: virtuous kingship or the rule of law.
The Second‐Best Constitution
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Recognizing that the best or ideal constitution is generally unattainable, Aristotle employs a principle of proximity: although the highest end is best, if it is unattainable, legislation should aim at the result that is closest to the end and thus the best attainable outcome. In politics, this is called the ‘second sailing’, and Aristotle discusses such a constitution under the headings of polity, mixed constitution, and middle constitution. Although this constitution is correct and just, the standard is lowered in the face of necessity. Still, the second‐best constitution serves as a norm for evaluating the various deviant constitutions that are forms of democracy and oligarchy. The second‐best constitution emulates the ideal constitution and it satisfies the maxim of unanimity, which in its strongest form requires that if a constitution is to be preserved, all the citizens should wish that it exist and continue unchanged.
Property Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Supports Ernest Barker's interpretation that Aristotle offers a ‘vindication of the right of private property.’ Although Aristotle emphasizes the common interests of the citizens, he also provides a place for private property in all of his constitutions, including the best constitution. The chapter argues that Aristotle gives a basic account of property ownership that is similar to modern concepts of property rights. He offers justifications of private property, states conditions under which property may be justly acquired, defends private property against Plato's communism, and argues that property is indispensable for the exercise of citizenship.
Aristotle's Politics Reconsidered
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Assesses the presuppositions underlying Aristotle's political theory. The principle of teleology holds that human beings strive to fulfil certain natural ends such as rationality and social cooperation; the principle of perfectionism holds that the good for human beings consists in the attainment of these ends; the principle of community holds that individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of the community, including the state (political community); and the principle of rulership holds that the community (including the state) can function successfully only if order is imposed on it by rational agents. This chapter considers the extent to which these principles may be defended against powerful objections that have been raised by modern philosophers and scientists. Finally, it is pointed out that the modern theory of rights, which assumes a version of extreme individualism, faces serious difficulties, so that Aristotle's theory of rights, based on a moderately individualistic theory of justice, is an alternative still worthy of serious consideration.
Analysis
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is presented as an underlying assumption of the book, and related to the desire for consistency and generality in moral theory. Hare's notion of two levels of morality is defended.
Facts About Behaviour
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

A case is made for focusing less on acts than on facts about behaviour. This fits with the use of fact‐causation, which is conceptually superior to event causation; it fits with the ‘by’‐locution, on the only viable analysis of that given so far (the one in this chapter), and it avoids needless difficulties that arise when one tries to make the act concept do work for which it is not fitted.
Moral Judgement
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This book is mainly concerned with first‐order morality (right and wrong) as distinct from second‐order morality (blameworthiness etc.). It is argued here that the agent's state of mind has nothing to do with the rightness/wrongness of his conduct, though the latter is affected by what the agent could know at the time of acting. At a deeper level, it depends on what consequences the behaviour in question makes probable. When some horrible consequence ensues through bad luck, we may have emotions that feel like blame, but they are really something different.
Making/Allowing
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

The ground is cleared for an analysis of the distinction between making something happen and allowing it to happen. Warnings are given against undue attention to superficial verbal niceties of ‘allow’ and ‘let’, especially the ‘bubble phenomenon’ and ‘the match phenomenon’.
Moral Significance
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

The making/allowing distinction tends to be accompanied by three other considerations that do have moral significance: ease of avoidance, motive, and knowability of consequences. Much discussion of making/allowing is based on intuitions about contrasted pairs of cases—a procedure that has dangers against which this chapter warns. Any thesis to the effect that making/allowing sometimes makes a moral difference is a sign of uncompleted work; the result is not interesting until we know the differentia.
Positive/Negative
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This chapter analyses making/allowing in terms of positive/negative: you allow something to happen if an explanation of its happening requires only a negative fact about your behaviour. A negative fact about your behaviour is a highly general or uninformative one; it corresponds to almost the whole of the logical space of your possible ways of moving. An objection to this analysis, based on giving a very special status to immobility, is described and countered. The possibility space might have a different metric, i.e. be structured in terms of something other than possible ways of moving. One such alternative metric is discussed.
Active/Passive
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Alan Donagan offered an account of making/allowing in terms of so conducting yourself that what ensues is not (making) or is (allowing) what would have happened in the course of nature. On a reasonable understanding of ‘the course of nature’, this analysis nearly coincides in its output with the analysis in terms of positive/negative, including relating in the same way to the ‘immobility’ objection to the latter (Ch. 6). Differences are discussed, and found to be too recherché to yield decisive intuitions.
Other Attempts
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This chapter discusses attempts by Dinello, Kamm, Kagan, Bentham, Warren Quinn, and others to explain the making/allowing distinction. In each case, it is shown that if the proposed account can be tightened up into something significant and defensible, that always turns it into something equivalent to the analysis of Bennett (Ch. 6) or, more often, that of Donagan (Ch. 7). It is argued that on either of the latter analyses, making/allowing certainly has no basic moral significance, though it may often be accompanied by factors that do have such significance.
Atrocities
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

A ‘crisis’ is defined as a situation in which if a person does not do something atrocious there will ensue a state of affairs that is even worse. This chapter discusses Anscombe's absolutism about atrocities, and the near‐absolutism of Fried and Williams, and, more sympathetically, Hampshire's view that absolutism ought to be adopted as a policy though not defended as a theory. Issues about atrocity and moral character, about the relevance of an atrocity's involving other agents as well, and about Williams's concept of ‘projects’, are discussed. An account is given of the real conceptual structure that is at work in moralities known as ‘deontological’.
Intentions
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

This chapter analyses and criticizes the view, contained in the ‘doctrine of double effect’, that it is worse to act intending to produce a bad result than to act merely foreseeing that your action will produce a bad result. The analysis makes use of the decision in Ch. 2 to proceed in terms of facts about behaviour rather than acts, and gains strength from that chapter's analysis of the ‘by’‐locution.
The Anatomy of Neoplatonism
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

Neoplatonism is traditionally considered a mystical philosophy; on the contrary the aim of this book is to show the importance of a logical and epistemological approach for the understanding of Neoplatonic basic ontological problems. In doing that, Lloyd considers a very wide range of philosophers from Plotinus up to Byzantine Neoplatonists. After a preliminary discussion of how the Neoplatonic semantics and logical concepts are a result of their understanding of previous philosophers (in particular Aristotle), Lloyd introduces the key point of the book, i.e. his theory of the P‐series. A P‐series is a group of terms ordered according to priority a posteriority in which the first term is universal and common to all the others. This logical theory is applied to explain how the reality is structured (procession and emanation from the One) and how knowledge is constituted. The book ends with an analysis of how mystical apprehension differs from the union with the One.
Attitudes to Logic
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

Examines the role played by the Aristotelian logic in Neoplatonic philosophers. To start with, it is remarked that Aristotelian Organon was regarded not only as a corpus of logical texts but also as an introduction to philosophy. Focuses on several Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Byzantine thinkers, presenting both the characteristics of their works and their lack of interest in discussing their own philosophical view. Finally, it is observed that, although not original, these commentaries provide a rather reliable and correct investigation of Aristotle.
Procession and Decline
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

Devoted to the key Neoplatonic concepts of procession and emanation. The two terms are taken to express the same idea, although procession is preferred as more neutral. Points out how procession can be explained in Aristotelian terms. More specifically, it is demonstrated how Plotinus’ notion of procession uses the Aristotelian theory of the actualization of an activity by a potency in order to explain how a higher activity can actualize a lower one. Finally, considers the doctrine of Proclus who expresses the procession, involving the theory of causal relation, in a way opposite to Plotinus.
Descartes
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

Taking our cue from Descartes, we can see that his break with scholasticism can be aptly characterized by saying that in his philosophy the mind has become godlike. We shall use this hint that Descartes provides us to define some of the main features of his opposition to scholasticism in the philosophy of mind. But, first, we must explore the more familiar features of the Cartesian revolution to which Kenny draws our attention. For, to say that ideas, for Descartes, are not divine archetypes but mental or psychological entities leaves a number of questions unanswered. We shall see that in his mature writings Descartes advances theories of ideas as events, as objects, and (less explicitly) as dispositions.
Descartes
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

It is well known that Descartes revived the ancient doctrine of innate ideas. However, it is doubtful whether Descartes advanced a single doctrine that employs the same concept of innateness throughout. We shall see that Descartes appeals to innate ideas in response to a number of different philosophical questions; he invokes them not just in his account of a priori knowledge but also in connection with his anti‐Scholastic theory of perception and his strange doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths. We shall see further that Descartes's position on innate ideas was accepted as it stands by none of his rationalist successors, and that at the centre of subsequent debate was the nature of ideas themselves.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

The dispositional theory may be Leibniz's most prominent account of innateness, but it is not the only one, even in the New Essays; as is well known, Leibniz attempts to construct a theory of innateness on the basis of Locke's admission of ideas of reflection. Traditionally, Leibniz's claim that ideas of reflection are really innate ideas has been seen as something of an embarrassment because, for one thing, it is doubtful whether what we may call the reflection account can really perform the role that Leibniz seems to require of a theory of innateness. Moreover, there are obvious difficulties concerning the relationship of the two accounts that Leibniz seems not to have noticed, so it would be foolish to pretend that all these problems can be solved, and no attempt will be made to minimize them in the present chapter. But we can throw light on the reflection account of innateness if we place it in the wider context of Leibniz's concern with the issue of self‐knowledge; as we have seen, this issue became central in philosophy after Descartes. In the first half of this chapter, we will explore Leibniz's response to the pessimistic claims about self‐knowledge advanced by both Locke and Malebranche; in the second half, we will seek to tie in Leibniz's reflection account of innateness with the whole issue of self‐knowledge.
Pseudo‐Constraints on an Adequate Account of Meaning
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

A good theory must explain (1) the possibility of knowing what words mean; (2) the nature of the relation, ‘x means y’; (3) the fact that language can be used to represent reality; (4) the epistemological import of understanding; (5) compositionality—i.e. the dependence of the meanings of sentences on the meanings of their component words; (6) the normative character of meaning; and (7) the explanatory and evidential relations between the meaning of a word and its deployment. It is argued that these constraints have often been imposed in unreasonably inflated forms but that they can be satisfied, when properly understood, by a neo‐Wittgensteinian use theory of meaning.
Meaning as Use
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

It is proposed here that the meaning of each word, w, is constituted by its ‘basic acceptance property’—a property roughly of the form, ‘Our acceptance of such‐and‐such sentences containing w explains our overall use of it’. Seven arguments in favour of this idea are developed—the principal one (in light of constitution issues elsewhere in science) being that what engenders the meaning of a word will be the property that explains the symptoms of that meaning, which are the word's various uses. Objections to this position are then considered, on the basis of considerations of indeterminacy, determination of reference, holism, pragmatics, propositions, ambiguity, synonymy, definition, individualism, externalism, and the relation between language and thought.
Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and A Priori Knowledge
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

This chapter criticizes the standard truth–theoretic model of implicit definition whereby we stipulate that a word is to have whatever meaning will make true a certain set of sentences containing it. The alternative model proposed here is that, in such cases, the word derives its meaning from our way of using it, from our regarding those sentences as true—and so it acquires that meaning even if they are not true. It is argued, on this basis, that there is no route from meanings, so constituted, to our a priori knowledge in logic, arithmetic, or geometry.
The Composition of Meanings
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

Each sentence derives its meaning from what its component words mean and from its syntactic structure. And the thesis of this chapter is that this is so because the meaning‐property of a sentence (e.g. ’x means DOGS BARK’) is nothing over and above the property of being constructed in a certain way from primitives with certain meanings (e.g. ’x results from substituting words whose meanings are DOG and BARK into a schema whose meaning is NS V’). In this explanation of how sentence meanings are ’composed’, absolutely nothing is presupposed about the source of word meaning (e.g. about which properties constitute ’x means DOG’, ’x means BARK’, or ’x means NS V’). Thus (contrary to Fodor and Lepore) the possibility of compositionality imposes no constraint on how the meanings of words are engendered. In particular, we see that compositionality gives us no reason to accept Davidson's explication of meaning in terms of truth conditions.
Quelling Quine's Qualms
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

This chapter scrutinizes Quine's three‐stage critique of meaning. It starts by considering how one might get from the existence of multiple adequate translations (his thesis of the ‘indeterminacy of translation’) to the non‐existence of meanings. Next it examines the main premise of this argument and shows how Quine derives it from his view of the conditions sufficient for adequate translations: that is, how he gets to the lemma that many non‐equivalent translation manuals will exist from his assumption that any good predictor of assent/dissent dispositions will be an adequate translation manual. Then it considers the basic stage in Quine's critique (which is the one that is most debatable): his derivation of the adequacy of any assertibility‐preserving manual from the pragmatic raison d’etre of translation. At the end of the chapter, the main defect in this reasoning is rectified and it is shown that proper standards of adequacy will leave us with unique translations and with a use theory of meaning.
Respect, Pluralism, and Justice
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This is a collection of essays that interpret, examine critically, and extend Kant's moral and political thought on several important topics. The aim is to understand Kant, to address serious objections to his positions, and to explore ways in which contemporary Kantian theory can be fruitfully developed.

The first two essays concern fundamental elements of a Kantian theory: the type of theory it is, the ways in which it is (and is not) pluralistic, and the framework for moral deliberation that it proposes. The next three essays focus on basic respect for humanity: its implications regarding cultural diversity, the grounds for extending basic respect to all persons regardless of their offences, and reasons for treating basic respect as a guide and constraint on deliberation about moral principles rather than a source of rigoristic moral principles. The remaining five essays address recurring questions about social issues: responsibility for the consequences of one's wrongdoing, the justification of punishment, political violence, liberalism's grounds for the legitimacy of state coercion, and the conflict between conscience and authority.
A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Sets the stage for subsequent discussions by sketching a deliberative framework drawn from a combination of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Ideas of willing universal laws, humanity as an end in itself, and autonomy are elements of the framework, which is analogous to Kant's idea of a ‘kingdom of ends’, an ideal commonwealth in which rational autonomous members legislate the laws that bind them. The framework is meant to guide and constrain reflection about how moral rules, or intermediate level principles, are to be understood and qualified, but it is not intended to be an exact decision procedure and it concerns only aspects of life for which moral rules are appropriate. Several problems in using this sort of heuristic framework are identified, and brief suggestions are made regarding ways in which the Kantian theory might be developed to meet them. The Kantian perspective has structural similarities to rule‐utilitarianism and to Rawls's theory of justice, but it differs from those in important ways.
Basic Respect and Cultural Diversity
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Explores the implications of respect for humanity when interpreted as appropriately valuing persons as valuers. After briefly contrasting other historical views, the essay proposes ways for supplementing Kant's ethics by a richer account of how we actually value various things—i.e. an account sensitive to the fact that we are not merely ‘free and rational’ but also socially and historically embedded persons. The essay then explores the significance of this expanded perspective for dealing with problems raised by cultural diversity, concluding with comments on whether the ‘canon’ of college and university literature should be replaced by more culturally diverse readings.
Must Respect Be Earned?
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Addresses the questions, why should we respect humanity in all persons? and why not regard extremely immoral persons as having forfeited all respect? Respect for persons as persons is distinguished from respect for personal merit and conventional roles, but that someone is a person is not sufficient to explain why we must respect the person. The essay sketches some Kantian grounds, formal and substantive, for presuming that all human beings ought to be respected, and then addresses several objections. For example, should we respect sociopaths? The Kantian legislative perspective sketched earlier suggests reasons for a strong presumption for treating basic respect for humanity as non‐forfeitable, and arguably neither self‐protection, just punishment, nor legitimate moral censure require that we set aside the presumption.
Donagan's Kant
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Reviews at length Alan Donagan's Kantian ethical theory, as primarily expressed in his book, The Theory of Morality. Donagan's method of developing the theory by examining a tradition of Judeo‐Christian ethical beliefs is contrasted with Kant's method, which like Rousseau's, analyses relatively formal features of moral judgements to determine their basic presuppositions. Then, doubts are raised about Donagan's attempt to derive a list of strict substantive moral rules from the imperative to respect humanity. Arguably, at least in the Groundwork, Kant's idea that rational nature is an end in itself is a ‘thinner’, a more formal moral requirement than Donagan's. Thus interpreted, the idea makes the Kantian basic moral framework better able to serve as a guide for conflict resolution and conscientious judgement in a world of diverse values, moral disagreement, and uncertainty.
Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Although Kant is often regarded an extreme retributivist regarding judicial punishment, the need to deter crime also plays a significant role in his theory of criminal law. Kant's special way of combining deterrence and retribution, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. Kant thought that criminal punishments should be designed to match the victim's empirically discernible losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; for courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals. Arguably, Kant's justification of the practice of punishment is not deeply retributive, but punishment is also not a mere disincentive in a ‘price’ system of social control. For better or worse, punishment tends to convey a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct; and, though this de facto expressive function is not for Kant, the purpose or justification of punishment, it may help explain his concern for making the severity of punishments proportional to the gravity of crimes and his refusal to allow exceptions for merely pragmatic reasons.
A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This essay is a critical examination of Kant's strict opposition to political violence even against corrupt rulers. Granting that Kant's arguments are inadequate to support his extreme position, in order to develop a more reasonable Kantian position, the essay develops the framework for moral deliberation suggested in earlier chapters, a framework that combines core ideas from each of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Though only a perspective for deliberation, not a decision procedure, this arguably rules out the most extreme positions, prohibitive and permissive, about political violence and revolution. Despite Kant's personal beliefs, although the values implicit in his fundamental principle fail to support easy, inflexible solutions, they impose strong presumptions against lawless coercion and killing, undermining social order, treating persons as dispensable, underestimating options, arrogant faith in one's own judgement, and reckless simplicity in political thinking.
Conscience and Authority
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Sketches three distinct ways of conceiving of conscience, arguing that none of these gives us reason to suppose that conscience guarantees morally justifiable decisions about when to resist authoritative orders. These are a popular religious conception, a cultural relativist conception, and a Kantian conception. In Kant's view, conscience can at best signal that our practices are at odds with our moral beliefs or that we have failed to scrutinize them sufficiently; and hence, although Kant holds that conscience cannot err, its role, in effect, is limited to warning us and punishing us for doing less than our best to live by our considered moral judgements. To justify moral judgements there can be no substitute for reasonable moral deliberation and discussion. Even from a Kantian perspective, our particular moral judgements are fallible and conscience presupposes moral judgement.
Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's truth‐tracking analysis of knowledge. First, it is not necessary that the informant be a good tracker in all close possible worlds, merely those that are open possibilities, those the inquirer cannot rule out as being non‐actual. Second, the inquirer cannot set herself directly to pick out a good tracker of p, so Nozick's favoured knowledge‐conferring property lacks the necessary epistemic accessibility.
Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

The author distinguishes between informants (people who tell us things) and sources of information (like arboreal growth rings or states of human beings), and argues that the concept of knowledge is tied to the former and not the latter. The distinction is then used to cast light on the (quasi‐) necessity of the belief condition for knowledge and on comparativism, the view that a person might be said to know p in circumstances in which the alternative is q, but not to know p if the alternatives include r. Goldman's famous papier‐mâché barn thought experiment is also discussed. Craig concludes that where belief is lacking or knowledge appears comparativistic, the subject does not have genuine knowledge, for she is a mere potential source of information, not an informant.
Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

The practical explication is employed to explain why accidental fulfilment of the conditions for knowledge leads us to withhold the ascription of it, and what is meant by accidental in this context. The inquirer wants her informant to have some detectable property, X, possession of which correlates well with being right about p, and for this correlation to be law‐like, and for the continuation of the correlation in any given instance to be non‐accidental. At this point, a dilemma arises: either X must entail that S is right about p (too strong), or X must give a high probability of being right as to p (but then it is possible for X to be present but for S to be wrong on p). This property of p, inherent in the explicated concept of knowledge, thus mirrors a feature which, to judge by the discussion of the Gettier problem, the analysed concept has too.
Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Discusses the relative merits of local reliabilism (exemplified by Nozick's theory) and global reliabilism (exemplified by Colin McGinn's theory). Craig concludes that the explicated concept of knowledge implies, in nearly all cases, the idea of a wider competence on the part of the informant (as espoused by global reliabilism), even though it does not entail it. This is because, in most cases, we will trust our informant over p if and only if we believe her to be good at discerning the truth over a range of related matters.
Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

The practical explication suggests that all attempts to state necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge will either produce a set of conditions that is insufficient, or will achieve sufficiency only by including conditions too strong to be necessary. This is illustrated with respect to the JTB (justified true belief) analysis, reliabilism, the causal theory, and the NFL (no false lemmas) principle. For the first three, it is always possible to think of circumstances such that, even though the subject reached the belief p by the required means, she was right against all the odds, given those further circumstances. And if justification (or some other condition) is stipulated to entail the truth of p, then this imposes an impossibly strong condition or serves merely to reiterate the famous first condition for knowledge. As for NFL, this calls for a near‐omniscience on the inquirer's part, so that it is too strong to be a necessary condition for knowledge.
Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Introduces the principle of objectivization, which explains how concepts interpreted subjectively in the early stages of the state of nature, concepts that answer to the relatively immediate needs of the isolated individual, become objectivized, i.e. refer to entities that fulfil more universal needs, as the individual both becomes more reflective and finds himself in a social setting. This principle is invoked by Craig in the context of admitting that someone may know without being a good informant, for the fully objectivized concept of knowledge seems not to be identifiable with the concept of a good informant, but he insists that the point and nature of the former is still best understood in terms of the latter.
Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Discusses scepticism of the kind exemplified by Descartes's deceitful demon thought experiment, and argues that we need to find the seeds of both scepticism itself and of the resistance to it in the everyday concept of knowledge. Operating with the explicated concept, this means attributing to it a suitable degree of objectivization. Peter Unger's argument for scepticism, which suggests that the objectivization involved is absolute, is rejected on the grounds that there are no identifiable practical factors that would push the process that far and that the suggestion leaves the extent of the resistance to scepticism a mystery. Craig concludes that the explicated concept reflects practical factors that cause objectivization to stop short of scepticism but that the very impetus of objectivization also pushes us towards it.
Two explanations of scepticism: the first‐person approach, and the absolute perspective
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Considers and rejects two common explanations of the roots of scepticism. The first, that finds them in a first‐person approach to epistemology that takes as its central question ‘what do I know?’, is rejected on the grounds that first‐personalism results from thinking about certain normally ignored possibilities and gives no explanation of why they are so ignored, and therefore no adequate explanation of scepticism. The second, that scepticism is the offspring of an ‘absolute’ conception of truth, is espoused by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. Craig argues that since no explanation is given of why it is impossible in principle to attain the absolute conception, the only way adhering to the idea of such a conception can lead to scepticism is if we raise independently the traditional sceptical possibilities.
Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Considers the transmission of knowledge by testimony and the principle that if someone who knows that p tells me that p, I myself then know that p. When considered with the notion of the good informant in mind, the principle as it stands is false. The inquirer must in general, to gain knowledge in this way, acquire her information from a person who believes that p, and be disposed to tell others that p as a result of being told that p by the informant (without traversing any deviant route to the belief that p), and have an indicator property that correlates well with having the right answer to whether p. Michael Wellbourne's claim that ‘believing the speaker’ is sufficient for knowledge transmission is criticized as being either straightforwardly false, or relatively unilluminating.
Kant's Theory of Mind
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This book presents the first extensive analysis in English of Kant's systematic criticism of dogmatic accounts of the mind as a distinctive object.

This criticism has been much admired, especially in Anglophone circles, but interpreters have rarely paid attention to its full historical context and the many different dimensions of its treatment of the mind.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant organizes his criticism in terms of four fundamental fallacies or ‘paralogisms’ of ‘rational psychology’, and he discusses these under the heading of four traditional topics: substantiality, simplicity, identity, and ideality of the soul.

A close analysis of Kant's earlier work, including notes from his lectures on metaphysics (most of which have been only recently published in German), demonstrates that Kant's most fundamental views here concern several topics that are not listed as one of the four explicit paralogism headings.

In particular, his views on causality, judgement, and the mind's immateriality, independence (freedom), and immortality have a hidden and central importance.

Throughout his career, Kant's views evolved on these topics, especially in the period of the extensive revisions of the paralogisms for the second ed. of the first Critique, when Kant published his major works on ethics, the Groundwork and the second Critique.

In this period, he also developed his most sophisticated discussions of apperception and transcendental idealism.

The volume outlines and evaluates the history and structure of each of Kant's major arguments in this area, and it comments on their relation to major lines of interpretation and developments in contemporary philosophy.

It concludes that Kant's ultimate position on most doctrines concerning the mind is much closer to rationalism than is generally appreciated, and that this position also maintains, for the most part, a revolutionary critical perspective that remains highly relevant for current discussions.
Ideality
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter discusses the most general aspects of Kant's discussion of the self and gives an overview of the full range of topics that he covered in his philosophical discussion of ‘psychological’ issues. There are two especially important issues requiring further discussion here: apperception and idealism. I explain the significance of Kant's Critical distinction between ‘apperception’ and ‘inner sense’, and discuss different views on how these terms might be defined. I then discuss the radical nature of Kant's claim about the transcendental ideality of all our determinate theoretical self‐knowledge, and evaluate various hypotheses about how to interpret transcendental idealism in general.
Approach to Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank
Published: October 2003

Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.
Syrianus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

Plutarch of Athens's successor, Syrianus, held views on the history of philosophy, in particular, concerning Pythagoras's place in that history, similar to those of Iamblichus and Hierocles. These views as reflected in Hermias's commentary on Plato's Phaedrus, are described, as is Syrianus's use of Iamblichus's On Pythagoreanism, in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, with regard to the structure of reality, and number in psychology, physics, and metaphysics.
Proclus: Some Preliminary Issues
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

Some preliminary issues concerning Proclus are discussed: his rivalry with the mathematician Domninus; his views on the history of philosophy, with regard, in particular, to the relation between Pythagoras and Plato; his conception of the revelation and discovery of philosophy.
The Limits of Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly
Published: October 2003

This book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.
Everydayness
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

The first chapter gives Heidegger's account of our (Dasein's) everyday or ordinary condition. This requires laying out the system of Being and Time's first Division, which offers that account; I try to give its terms and claims (relative) analytic clarity. Heidegger stresses the pragmatic character of our everyday stance: we know things by way of knowing how to do things with them. We ‘project’ towards certain ends, and understand things in being able to use them as ‘ready‐to‐hand’ equipment within those projects; this understanding is implicit and largely inarticulate. The full network of this know‐how is our world; our relation to this world is one of concern or ‘care’.