bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
An Urgent Summons and a Terrible Charge
Authors: Pettinger Andrew
Published: September 2012

This chapter provides a brief narrative of Drusus Libo’s trial in the senate, and then explores the significance of senatorial investigations during the early Principate. It is established that Drusus Libo was accused of having planned revolution. This argument falls into two parts. The first part shows that, by calling an emergency meeting of the senate, the consuls took Drusus Libo to be an immediate threat. The second part establishes that Drusus Libo was not, as is commonly held, accused of a criminal fascination with the occult, but rather of intending to cause revolution. He was charged with treason (maiestas). The law regarding astrology and magic is misunderstood. Consulting an astrologer or magician about the health of the Princeps was not, as is supposed, prima facie treason during the early Principate.
The Treatment of an Enemy
Authors: Pettinger Andrew
Published: September 2012

This chapter, along with the previous chapter, proposes that Drusus Libo was treated as an enemy of the State. The evidence is as follows: Drusus Libo was abandoned by family and friends; he was placed under a guard of praetorians; efforts were made to remove him from public memory (damnatio memoriae); the day of his suicide was made a holiday; and public thanks were given to the goddess Concordia, who was usually invoked when a great social disturbance had occurred. Republican precedents are explored to place Drusus Libo’s treatment in context. It is argued that Drusus Libo’s treatment is best explained by placing him among those involved in the conspiracy of Clemens, which occurred at the same time.
The Adoption of Agrippa Postumus and the Friends of Gaius Caesar
Authors: Pettinger Andrew
Published: September 2012

This chapter explains Augustus’ decision to adopt Agrippa Postumus in ad 4 by proposing that Augustus and Tiberius were concerned Agrippa was being courted by the ‘wrong people’ and was behaving inappropriately. The treatment of Tiberius’ nephew, the future emperor Claudius, is offered as a comparison. The ‘wrong people’ were former allies of Agrippa’s elder brother, Gaius Caesar. They had encouraged Gaius’ dislike of his stepfather Tiberius, and were blamed by Augustus for leading Gaius astray. The second part of the chapter investigates the enmity between Tiberius and Gaius’ entourage in more detail. It is proposed that when Gaius died in ad 4, Gaius’ friends were in no position to reconcile with the now ascendant Tiberius.
The Buck Stops Where?
Authors: Pettinger Andrew
Published: September 2012

This chapter offers a political explanation for Agrippa’s abdicatio. A combination of crises in ad 5 and 6 led to popular anger at the government’s inability to manage. Revolutionary pamphlets spread across Rome. L. Aemilius Paullus, the husband of Augustus’ granddaughter Julia and a relative of Agrippa’s, is identified as the chief architect of the protest. It is proposed that Gaius’ supporters, and Tiberius’ enemies, lurked behind Paullus. They were trying to destabilise Tiberius’ relationship with Augustus and the people. Agrippa was ‘abdicated’ and sent to Surrentum because he displayed sympathy for the troublemakers. L. Aemilius Paullus was prosecuted for treason. This chapter contains a refutation of R. A. Bauman’s theory regarding covert defamation as treason; it is shown that the case did not involve covert defamation, but overt sedition.
The United States: The Strange Survival of (Neo)Liberalism
Authors: Wilson Graham K.
Published: September 2012

The consequences of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the United States have differed significantly between the short and longer terms. The initial consequences were to strengthen the center-left (nowadays synonymous with the Democrats) politically and to discredit faith in markets and other neoliberal nostrums. The longer terms consequences have been to strengthen the center-right (the Republicans), to leave little legacy in terms of financial reform, and to open up the possibility of a major shift to the right in public policy more generally. The chapter attempts to explain these apparently contradictory consequences.
Institutional Failure and the Global Financial Crisis
Authors: Sinclair Timothy J.
Published: September 2012

Who could have imagined the obscure, arcane business of debt rating would become — in the context of the worst economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression — a matter for serious public comment by presidents and prime ministers? The public debate about the role of the rating agencies in the generation of the subprime crisis revolved around an idea which now seems deeply entrenched in popular, financial market and academic understandings of the agencies and their incentives. The core element of this thinking is that how the agencies are regulated generates a significant weakness in the ratings they produce. This chapter argues that the concern with regulation of the rating agencies is largely mistaken. Regulation is concerned with the ‘rules of the road’, not with the design of the road itself. The road is the problem, not the rules we invent to govern it. Although criticism of the agencies may serve a useful political purpose, too much attention to this issue will produce complacency about the inherent volatility of global finance, setting the world up for a repeat of the Global Financial Crisis once the appetite for risk returns.
What Happened to the State-Influenced Market Economies (SMEs)? France, Italy, and Spain Confront the Crisis as the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: September 2012

The economic crisis that began in 2008 had a differential impact on France, which had a pretty good crisis; Italy, which had a pretty bad one; and Spain, for which the crisis was downright ugly. All three can be categorized as part of a third variety of capitalism, as state-influenced market economies (SMEs) in which the state’s role is central as the main driver of capitalism, as a state of mind as much as the state in action, by contrast with market-driven liberal market economies and network-based coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs). But to understand these countries’ trajectories over time as well as their responses to the economic crisis, the chapter supplements the consideration of the political economic institutions with an examination of the differences in these countries’ policies, political institutions, and politics — encompassing not just the role party-based coalitions and interest-based bargains but also the role of leadership, ideas, and discourse—along with the role of the EU.
Overview
Authors: Uribe‐Etxebarria Myriam , Valmala Vidal
Published: September 2012

This chapter introduces the chapters included in the volume and discusses the importance of the proposals contained in them for our understanding of the operations, triggers, and constraints involved in structure-building in natural languages. The different approaches to structure-building defended in the chapters are put into context, and the way in which recent developments in the theory have paved the way for their emergence are made explicit.
Clitic Placement and Multidominance
Authors: Gračanin‐Yuksek Martina
Published: September 2012

According to Kayne”s (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA), the linear order of terminals in a structure depends on asymmetric c-command relations among the non-terminals. Since the LCA is incompatible with multidominance (MD), the questions arise: how are MD structures linearized, and what constrains MD? Recently, several proposals have argued that an MD representation is admissible if it is linearizable by (some version of) the LCA. This chapter argues against this view. The chapter shows that an MD compatible version of the LCA cannot linearize Croatian non-MD structures containing the clitic je. The problem re-emerges in Croatian coordinated wh-questions (Q&Qs), and German Subjektlücke in finiten Sätzen. The chapter concludes that in MD representations, linear order is not predictable from the structure. Consequently, the claim that MD is constrained by linearization becomes moot. The data are explained if we adopt the claim that what constrains MD is a syntactic constraint, the COSH.
Structure Building That Can't Be
Authors: Epstein Samuel David , Kitahara Hisatsugu , Seely T. Daniel
Published: September 2012

This chapter proposes and explores a “new” deduction of cyclic Transfer. A new account of cyclic Transfer is motivated since Chomsky’s (2007, 2008) “valuation-induced” account has both conceptual and empirical problems. The proposal is guided by strict adherence to: Strong Minimalist Thesis (optimal satisfaction of the interfaces) and 3rd factor considerations. There is one necessary, and simple, structure building operation, Merge. Minimizing search, External Merge can apply only to root nodes. Internal Merge can apply only if all External Merges have been exhausted. Internal Merge, based on the simplest form of Merge, creates structures which trigger Transfer. cyclic Transfer is then a natural and immediate consequence of strict adherence to SMT and 3rd factor.
Structure Building From Below: More on Survive and Covert Movement
Authors: Lechner Winfried
Published: September 2012

In derivational models, syntactic dislocation can be motivated by one of two requirements. Either a node moves in order to obtain a closer relation with a matching set of features higher in the tree, or movement evacuates a category from a local environment with which it is incompatible. This chapter discusses the second conception: movement is not teleological but serves the purpose of resolving local conflicts. Specifically, it proposes that various aspects of dislocation are best understood as a consequence of The Survive Principle (TSP; Stroik 2009). Based on Lechner (2009), the chapter suggests that syntactic movement and type driven dislocation are induced by one factor that shows up in two guises: incompatibility of a node with its sister node and its feature specification and/or logical type. The chapter also shows that the TSP model admits a unified analysis of scope restrictions on double object construction and inverse linking.
Feature‐Splitting Internal Merge: The Case ofTough‐constructions
Authors: Obata Miki , Epstein Samuel David
Published: September 2012

This chapter seeks to shed new light on the formal properties of Merge. Chomsky's (2007, 2008) feature-inheritance system makes it possible that two heads such as T and C simultaneously attract a single element. Obata and Epstein (2008, 2011) propose a new kind of structure building operation called Feature-Splitting Internal Merge (FSIM): which splits a single element into two syntactic objects. FSIM gives a new derivational, agreement-based, phi-featural account of improper movement phenomena, some of which converge. The FSIM hypothesis is applied to other types of structure building with the proposal that as there are three kinds of T/C there are also three kinds of v/V (including one licensing null-Case). One consequence is that tough-constructions are, in fact, derivable by a kind of “proper” (i.e. convergent) improper movement derivation. In addition, the analysis implies that Case on a tough-subject is revised" in the course of the derivation.
REBUTTING THE CIVILIAN PRESUMPTION: PLAYING WHACK-A-MOLE WITHOUT A MALLET?
Authors: Maxwell Colonel Mark “Max”
Published: September 2012

This chapter outlines how the law of war regarding targeted killing can be tailored to combat international terrorism. To accomplish this objective, it grapples with the principal legal question raised by the targeting of terrorists: how can a state determine that an individual is a belligerent, a vice civilian, and therefore a legitimate target under the law of war, just as a combatant is a legitimate target because of his status as a member of an armed force? The chapter first provides the history of targeted killing from a U.S. perspective. It explains how terrorism has traditionally been handled as a domestic law enforcement matter and how this approach limits the U.S. government's ability to combat terrorism. It then explains the U.S. position that certain terrorists hold a different status than the civilian population. This position has been met with resistance from those who posit that terrorists are civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities against the state and can be targeted only for such time as they do so. A new approach within the law of war to categorize individuals as either civilians, who are not targetable, or as belligerents who are targetable because of their status is outlined, which furthers the cause of states in effectively combating terrorism. The chapter concludes that while status is paramount in targeting decisions, the determination of status should be based on the individual's pattern of conduct and that pattern must be sufficient to rebut the presumption that the individual enjoys the protected status of a civilian.
TARGETED KILLING AS PREEMPTIVE ACTION
Authors: Finkelstein Claire
Published: September 2012

The policy of the Bush Administration with regard to terror suspects focused on detention and interrogation: detention as a temporary immobilization of potential terrorists, and interrogation to gather information needed to fight the war on terror. No one was surprised, then, when the new Obama Administration wanted to distance itself from the tactics of the former Bush Administration. It sought ways of addressing the threat of terrorism that avoided the brutality in interrogations, indefinite detentions, and the moral and legal thicket of conducting legal proceedings against terror suspects, whose situations were dramatically different from ordinary criminal defendants. It is perhaps no accident, then, that targeted killing emerged as the central strategy for fighting the war on terror. This chapter begins by arguing that the justification that applies to the practice of killing in war, in its traditional form, cannot properly be extended to the practice of targeting previously identified individuals in a way that abstracts from the proximity of their connection to active hostilities. The practice of targeted killing, as currently fashioned, is for this reason not easily justifiable under the traditional laws of war. It suggests however, that there are yet other rationales for killing those who pose a danger to national security that do not rely on either traditional just war theory or on the domestic law of personal justifications. The chapter advances an argument for an expansive approach to prevention called ‘preemptive killing’. Preemption, unlike prevention, extends the preventive privilege to a number of cases in which the anticipated harm is non-imminent.
GOING MEDIEVAL: TARGETED KILLING, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE JUS AD BELLUM REGIME
Authors: Martin Craig
Published: September 2012

This chapter analyzes the U.S. claims that the targeted killing policy is justified under the jus ad bellum doctrine of self-defence. It argues that this very broad and general claim, as a basis for strikes against targets in countries that are not sufficiently responsible for the actions of the terrorists, and in which the United States is not clearly a belligerent in an armed conflict, is not consistent with current international law principles. Arguments that the targeted killing policy is unlawful are not of course new or novel — others have already made this point quite persuasively. But the jus ad bellum issues raised by the policy have not received as much attention in the literature as the international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law aspects. Moreover, in addition to assessing the policy from a jus ad bellum perspective, the chapter considers the impact that the policy may have on the legal regime itself. The manner in which the targeted killing program is being prosecuted, together with its justifications and rationales, may lead to changes to the jus ad bellum regime, and to the nature of the relationship between it and the IHL regime, and the analysis here explores how such changes could have harmful unintended consequences for the entire system of constraints on the use of force and armed conflict.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITERIA-BASED REASONING IN TARGETED KILLING DECISIONS
Authors: Guiora Amos N.
Published: September 2012

This chapter presents an account of how targeted killing does, and should, work on the ground. The discussion is based on the author's twin perspectives of having served as a legal advisor in the Israeli Defence Forces and now as a professor of law with numerous opportunities to reflect on decisions in which he was involved. His concentration on ‘process’ stems from the belief that a criteria-based model of decision-making is essential to minimizing collateral damage and enhancing the effectiveness of existing policies. Simply put, beyond the legal, moral, and theoretical underpinnings, lawful targeted killing must be based on criteria-based decision-making, which increases the probability of correctly identifying and attacking the legitimate target. A state's decision to kill a human being during a counterterrorism operation must be predicated on an objective determination that the ‘target’ is, indeed, a legitimate target. Otherwise, the state's action is illegal, immoral, and ultimately ineffective. Subjective decisions based on fear or perception alone pose grave danger to both the suspected terrorist and innocent civilians.
ARE TARGETED KILLINGS UNLAWFUL? A CASE STUDY IN EMPIRICAL CLAIMS WITHOUT EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Authors: McNeal Gregory S.
Published: September 2012

Critics of the U.S. policy of targeted killing by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) generally lack credible information to justify their critiques. In fact, in many instances their claims are easily refuted, calling into question the reliability of their criticism. This chapter highlights some of the most striking examples of inaccurate claims raised by critics of the U.S. policy of drone-based targeted killing. Specifically, it offers a much-needed corrective to clarify the public record or offer empirical nuance where targeted killing critics provide only unsubstantiated and conclusory statements of fact and law. The chapter is organized as follows. Section I discusses the decision protocol used by the U.S. military before launching a drone strike, a process that goes to extraordinary lengths to minimize civilian casualties. Section II addresses the critics' unsubstantiated claims about the legal, diplomatic, and strategic results of drone strikes.
OPERATION NEPTUNE SPEAR: WAS KILLING BIN LADEN A LEGITIMATE MILITARY OBJECTIVE?
Authors: Govern Kevin H.
Published: September 2012

This chapter takes the killing of Osama bin Laden as a test case for considering the moral and legal status of intentionally killing individuals deemed a threat to national security, under conditions in which the object of the targeted attack is offered little or no opportunity to surrender to attacking forces. The target in such operations, in short, is treated as though he were a belligerent: a person placed on a kill list may be targeted in a way that would be legitimate if he were an enemy combatant. It is argued that bin Laden was a legitimate military target, and that the decision-makers involved in his killing had thoroughly considered the range of options available to stop bin Laden from further terroristic acts, and were warranted in the decision to lean towards targeted killing in lieu of a capture operation. Thus, those who carried out the killing were within their scope of authority and responsibility for killing rather than for capturing bin Laden.
The Antinomy of Pure Reason Section Nine (A515–67/B543–95)
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

The aim of this essay is to analyze the ninth section of Kant's chapter on the antinomies in the first Critique (Critique of Pure Reason). Inasmuch as Kant discusses the resolution of all four antinomies it was necessary to discuss them all, but the emphasis is on the Third Antinomy, which deals with an apparent contradiction between freedom and causal determinism. The essay analyzes the various steps in Kant's resolution, with special attention to his insistence that the free will problem is “transcendental” rather than “psychological” and the connection between Kant's account of freedom and his conception of rational agency. It argues that Kant is best read as offering a conceptual thesis regarding what is built into the thought of rational agency rather than a metaphysical thesis regarding an inaccessible noumenal self.
On the Very Idea of a Propensity to Evil
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay analyzes Kant's attempt to ground radical evil, understood as the root of all moral evil, in the concept of finite rational agency. Kant is seen as holding that such evil consists in a fundamental orientation of the will, which in order to count as moral must be imputable to the agent. Accordingly, he asks what must be presupposed if such evil is to be imputable and he finds the answer in the paradoxical notion of a freely chosen propensity. In addition to defending the coherence of this notion, the essay discusses Allen Wood's effort to naturalize radical evil by identifying it with “unsociable sociability.” Although the importance of this conception for understanding Kant's view of evil is acknowledged, it is denied that this can be the whole story, since it is unable to deal with the question of imputation.
Kant's Practical Justification of Freedom
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

After providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.
Is theCritique of Judgment“Post‐Critical”?
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay contains a response to Burkhard Tuschling's thesis that already in the third Critique Kant abandoned his original “critical” view in favor of a “speculative” approach that anticipated later forms of idealism. Against this, it is maintained that, while it is true that this work contains a significant development of Kant's previous thought, it involves a deepening rather than an abandonment of “critical” principles. More specifically, it is argued that Kant's account of the principle of “logical” or “formal” purposiveness develops a line of thought that was already in place in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the first Critique. Finally, in support of the “critical” nature of Kant's position in the third Critique, his conception of an intuitive intellect is contrasted with that of the young Hegel.
TheCritique of Judgmentas a “True Apology” for Leibniz
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay argues that Kant's ironical remark in his response to Eberhard that “the Critique of Pure Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz” is applicable (without irony) to the third Critique. Appealing to the principle of the purposiveness of nature, it shows that this principle provides the basis for a “critical” restatement of the line of argument that Leibniz formulated against Locke in his New Essays on Human Understanding. Common to both thinkers is the necessity of presupposing a harmony between the order of nature and the cognitive requirements of the human understanding, according to which observable similarities reflect the inner organization of nature. The difference is that for Leibniz the justification for this presupposition is metaphysical, namely, a pre‐established harmony, whereas for Kant it is “critical” involving the subjective principle of the purposiveness of nature.
The Gulf between Nature and Freedom and Nature's Guarantee of Perpetual Peace
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay examines the relation between Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace and the nature–freedom problem posed in the third Critique. The problem concerns the “immense gulf,” which separates the supersensible from appearances and which seems to stand in the way of their influencing one another (KU 5: 175). According to Kant, this gulf arises because the ends set by the “laws of freedom” (various aspects of the highest good) ought to be realized in the sensible world, even though this world is governed by mechanistic laws that are indifferent to these ends. After spelling out Kant's approach to the problem and its connection with his conception of the reflective power of judgment, this analysis is applied to Kant's account of how human nature may, apart from any moral considerations, be thought to lead to the institution of republican forms of government and perpetual peace.
Kant's Conception ofAufklärung
Authors: Allison Henry E.
Published: September 2012

This essay analyzes Kant's conception of enlightenment. It argues that, contrary to the view of Mendelssohn and many of his contemporaries, for whom enlightenment consists in the acquisition of basic truths regarding the human condition, Kant viewed it in more negative and practical terms as the escape from a condition of “Unmündigkeit,” understood as an incapacity to think for oneself. As such, enlightenment involves the will as well as the intellect. This connection of enlightenment with the will is affirmed in Kant's controversial claim that this condition is self‐incurred and therefore imputable, but it has been criticized in both Kant's time and our own. Kant is defended against this criticism by suggesting a comparison with Dostoevsky's “Grand Inquisitor.” It is further argued that Kant's conception provides the basis for a response to Gadamer's critique of enlightenment as a “prejudice against prejudice,” which denies the importance of tradition.
The Contradiction (i): The Problem
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

The chapter gives some background on the mathematical achievements of Cantor and Dedekind, and describes how Russell aimed to show that all mathematics can be derived from a purely logical starting point (logicism). But it also describes Russell’s discovery of what he always called ‘the contradiction’, which we call ‘Russell’s paradox’, which presented a serious obstacle to that derivation. It gives Russell’s first reactions, namely the early theory of types sketched in 1903, the ‘zigzag’ theory, and the theory of limitation of size. The last is compared with the set theory of Zermelo-Fraenkel that is common nowadays.
On Denoting
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

The chapter outlines Russell’s early theory of denoting in 1903, and the reasons why it should be abandoned. The new theory of 1905 contains objections to the rival views of definite descriptions due to Meinong and to Frege, and these are endorsed. (But there is no full discussion of what Russell saw as his main argument, using the example of ‘Gray’s Elegy’.) Russell’s new theory does solve the puzzles that he mentions, at least for definite descriptions, but since the puzzles seem to apply also to names the solution is only partial at this stage. In this article Russell was concerned with our ordinary language, which leaves him open to the kind of objections raised by Strawson (1950). But in later developments he moves from language to thought, and then to a supposedly ‘perfect’ language.
Acquaintance
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell invokes acquaintance with particular objects, with universals, and (tentatively) with the concepts of logic, in each case as the explanation of our understanding of propositions. The first does appear to be needed, for definite descriptions cannot account for all reference to particular objects, and ‘direct reference’ is therefore required. But Russell himself later came to recognise that acquaintance with universals was not required, and the same surely applies to the concepts of logic. As for particulars, Russell supposed that one could be acquainted only with one’s own sense-data; one refers to these by using a ‘logical proper name’, e.g. the demonstrative ‘this’. He failed to see Kaplan’s point, that in common use this word is accompanied by a demonstration, which associates it with what Frege might call a ‘sense’, i.e. a ‘mode of presentation’. But, to use Kripke’s language, this ‘sense’ merely ‘fixes the reference’, and does not ‘give the meaning’. Once this point is seen, one can resist Russell’s claim that only sense-data can be objects of ‘direct reference’.
Knowledge and its Foundations
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell thinks of knowledge in terms of justification, perhaps because that is also how the sceptic thinks, and this leads quite naturally to a foundationalist theory. Among the foundations Russell counts our knowledge of deductive and inductive methods of reasoning, of a priori connections between universals, and of the properties and relations of one’s present sense-data. In pursuit of the last, he came gradually to see that it is difficult to separate the sense-datum, as what is given, from the various interpretations that we ourselves add to it. He always did think of our sense-data as providing us with what he called ‘hard data’, though it is difficult to see any way in which our knowledge of our sense-data is somehow ‘more secure’ than our knowledge of physical objects.
Logical Constructions (ii): Minds
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell initially rejected neutral monism, but later came to accept a version of it, aiming to construct both matter and minds from the same ‘neutral’ stuff. This neutral stuff was sensibilia (or, as they became, events of sensing), except that minds also have an extra ingredient, namely events of imaging. The idea is that a mind may be identified with the class of all those events of sensing and imaging which occur in it. Russell explains that two such events occur in the same mind when there are experiences of temporal relations between them, but he also adds connecting links of ‘mnemic causation’. To obtain the right results one must invoke merely possible experiences and causation, and this is awkward. Russell tries to account for beliefs, desires, and other mental states (including being conscious of something), all in terms of sensings and imagings, but these analyses are highly questionable.
Propositions
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell began with a realist theory of propositions: they exist quite independently of anyone’s thought, and their ingredients are ‘in the world’. But when he saw how quantification over all propositions leads to paradox, he embraced the opposite theory that there are no such things as propositions. There are judgments, but in a judgment the judger is multiply related to the various ingredients of the fact that makes his judgment either true or false. This theory is proposed in 1910 and 1912, and was to have been further elaborated in a book that he was working on in 1913, but which he discontinued because of criticisms from the young Wittgenstein. In 1919 he proposed a new theory, according to which a proposition is an arrangement of symbols – either words or images – in a mind. So its ingredients are now mental items, and not what those items stand for.
Universals
Authors: Bostock David
Published: September 2012

Russell argued in 1912 that particulars exist, as well as universals. In fact he recanted this argument much later, in 1940, and the recantation shows how weak that argument actually is. He always believed in universals (for what seem to be quite inadequate reasons), but there is a question over how this relates to his acceptance of propositional functions. The best solution seems to be that simple propositional functions correspond to universals, but others are merely arrangements of symbols, as also are the propositions that they are abstracted from. (But one may well ask whether this provides enough propositional functions, for the reduction of mathematics to logic apparently requires an uncountable infinity of them.)
Early loanwords from Latin and Greek
Authors: Miller D. Gary
Published: September 2012

The main phonological changes from Latin to Vulgar Latin / Romance and from early Germanic to Old English are outlined in order to devise criteria for dating prehistoric borrowings. This is followed by a discussion of about 40 Old English words from Greek and some 90 from Latin. While this is a small number compared to the 600–700 Old English words from Latin and Greek, the words in this chapter are sufficiently important culturally as to survive into Modern English, and have some phonological or other property that permits dating. Reborrowings feature prominently in the history of the words in this chapter.
The Kaiserchronik
Authors: Matthews Alastair
Published: September 2012

This book presents a narratological analysis of the Kaiserchronik, or chronicle of the emperors, an account of the Roman and Holy Roman emperors from the foundation of Rome to the run-up to the Second Crusade that was remarkably popular in medieval Germany. Previous research has concentrated on the structure and sources of the work and emphasized its role as a Christian narrative of history, but this study shows that the Kaiserchronik does not simply illustrate a didactic religious message: it also provides an example of how techniques of story-telling in the vernacular were developed and explored in twelfth-century Germany. Four aspects of narrative are described (time and space, motivation, perspective, and narrative strands), each of which is examined with reference to the story of a particular emperor (Constantine the Great, Charlemagne, Otto the Great, and Henry IV). Rather than dogmatically imposing a single analytical framework on the Kaiserchronik, the book takes account of the fact that modern theory cannot always be applied directly to works from premodern periods: it draws critically on, and where necessary refines, a variety of approaches, including those of Gérard Genette, Boris Uspensky, and Eberhard Lämmert. Throughout the book, the narrative techniques described are contextualized by means of comparisons with other texts in both Middle High German and Latin, so that the place of the Kaiserchronik as a literary narrative in the twelfth century becomes clear.
Introduction
Authors: Matthews Alastair
Published: September 2012

This chapter introduces the Kaiserchronik and summarizes what is known about the origins of the work, which is generally associated with the Regensburg of the mid-twelfth century. On the basis of manuscript transmission and the critical literature, it is suggested that an analysis of narrative technique will allow what Walter Haug called the ‘literary side’ of the Kaiserchronik to be described in more detail. With the help of an analysis of the prologue, the Kaiserchronik is then contextualized in relation to Latin historiography, vernacular religious literature, and the new Middle High German narratives of the later twelfth century, showing that a broader range of narrative techniques are at stake than the preoccupation with questions of fictionality and structure in modern theory and criticism would suggest.
Time, Place, and Space: Constantine the Great
Authors: Matthews Alastair
Published: September 2012

This chapter investigates how the temporal and spatial world of the narrative is configured in the episode about Constantine the Great in the Kaiserchronik. The chapter describes how medieval texts engaged with time, place, and space, as well as how modern theorists have approached them. It then shows that time in this episode of the Kaiserchronik is presented as something that characters experience and think about, in contrast to other vernacular versions of Constantine's conversion experience such as Priester Konrad's sermon. The chapter also demonstrates with reference to Constantinople that concepts of place and movement define this episode of the Kaiserchronik, which lacks the detailed depiction of city spaces found in several other medieval texts such as the Mirabilia Romae.
Motivation: Charlemagne
Authors: Matthews Alastair
Published: September 2012

This chapter describes how events are caused and explained in the episode about Charlemagne in the Kaiserchronik, showing that they do not happen merely because they illustrate God's will or the consequences of immoral behaviour: intentionality also affects the course of the action. To demonstrate this, the chapter draws on and refines the theoretical framework of Matías Martínez and Michael Scheffel after explaining its origins in the work of Clemens Lugowski. The roles of God and the narrator in the causal and rhetorical structures of this episode of the Kaiserchronik are analysed in detail; the chapter concludes by considering the role of Charlemagne in passages from the Trierer Aegidius and the Rolandslied as examples of other ways in which motivation could operate in twelfth-century vernacular narrative.
Conclusion
Authors: Matthews Alastair
Published: September 2012

The conclusion draws together the findings about individual Kaiserchronik episodes obtained in the book, arguing that the chronicle's narrative technique is at least as important as its religious-didactic function. To reinforce the argument, four subsequent Middle High German works that feature figures encountered in the Kaiserchronik are considered—Konrad von Würzburg's Silvester and Schwanritter, Rudolf von Ems's Der guote Gêrhart, and the anonymous Kreuzfahrt des Landgrafen Ludwigs des Frommen. Finally, the chapter suggests that the various aspects of narrative technique described in the book converge in the concept of the literary character in the Kaiserchronik.
Reason, Contract, and the Obligation to Obey: The Dhimmī as Legal Subject
Authors: Emon Anver M.
Published: September 2012

This chapter addresses the different theories by which premodern Muslim jurists argued that the dhimmī is subjected to Islamic law, with a focus on the argument of contract.
Conclusion
Authors: Emon Anver M.
Published: September 2012

The conclusion provides an overview of the argument of the book, and raises doubts about whether the hegemony of the law can ever be avoided. The conclusion suggests that at the intersection of law, governance and the minority claimant, arises a particularly important imperative to be vigilant regarding the potential for hegemony over and against the interests of minorities.
Two Cheers for the ‘New’ Wittgenstein?
Authors: McGuinness Brian
Published: September 2012

This chapter discusses the attribution to the early Wittgenstein of a therapeutic intent and of the view that there is only one kind of nonsense.
State Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the Future
Authors: Alvarez José E.
Published: September 2012

The Westphalian system of nation-states remains the system that we have. State sovereignty, though not unfettered, is not withering away. States have pooled, shared, delimited, or delegated away some of their powers through treaties, but they but can always take back powers that they have previously negotiated away. Now nations are reasserting their ‘sovereignty’ vis-à-vis foreign investors through changes to their national laws or their treaties. Three lessons can be drawn for the future. To the extent there are choices to be made between global regulation and sovereign control, the outcome may not reflect a progress narrative but a historical dialectic that periodically swings back and forth as international norms encounter resistance at the national level, thereby triggering re-evaluation and modification of the international regime or its rules. All international regimes, no matter how well constructed, ultimately rely on states to implement them at the domestic level; how that implementation occurs is subject to considerable state discretion; and much can occur to an international regime as its rules are translated for domestic consumption or application. We need to remain vigilant when it comes to the North/South dimensions of international regimes and reactions to them.
The Possible Contribution of International Civil Society to the Protection of Human Rights
Authors: Palma Mauro
Published: September 2012

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have benefited from the new opportunities offered by information and communication technologies to increase their visibility and consequently their presence in areas and countries that in the past were more objects of analysis than places of active presence, of direct membership of people living in them. We are plunged into a global cultural flow that conveys not just information but also ideas, representations of the world, languages, and images. The role of civil society is to bring this immersion to life as a factor for overall growth in the cultural construction of a community. Two suggestions are made: full and free access to the network and the construction through it of a diff used knowledge drawing on the experiences of individuals and associations and organizations; and emphasis on cooperation among NGOs, to overcome the risk of duplication or of competition, through the initiation of joint programmes aimed at raising social awareness and building common practices to monitor the actions of governments in the protection of rights.
Can Legality Trump Effectiveness in Today's International Law?
Authors: Zappalà Salvatore
Published: September 2012

Traditionally the principle of effectiveness represented a cornerstone of international law. Its role has been twofold. Firstly, it has been based on specific provisions of international law which require factual elements to be taken into account for legal consequences to arise. Secondly, tthe factual dimension has been a broader distinctive trait of the international legal system as a whole. It follows that effectiveness has permeated the structure of international law and influenced it in its entirety by systematically connecting the world of law to its ability to display effects in the world of facts and vice versa. However, the aspiration of international law to impose itself as a legal system and the emergence of universal values which cannot be derogated from have inevitably entailed increasing limitations on effectiveness. There are three case scenarios. There are cases in which facts can produce legal effects as provided for by specific rules of international law, in line with the traditional function of effectiveness. There are areas in which some of the new universal values that have emerged in the international community are of such importance as to bar any effect to factual situations in conflict with them (e.g., no foreign occupation can deprive peoples of their right to self-determination; no ethnic cleansing policy can be condoned; no government can be recognized if it is established on the basis of principles of apartheid and racial discrimination). There are other cases in which the question is more doubtful since conflicting universal values may be at issue — a sort of grey area in which effects can materialize only where certain conditions are met.
The Future of International Investment Law and Arbitration
Authors: Reisman W. Michael
Published: September 2012

International agreements and their dispute-resolution mechanisms have assumed a role in establishing the minimum standards for the governance of foreign investment by host states and supervising and implementing them. There are now some 2,800 bilateral investment treaties, most of which allow the qualifying investor itself, acting without the intervention or permission of its state of nationality, to invoke an international tribunal to review host state action, in terms of, inter alia, whether it has constituted ‘fair and equitable’ treatment. This is a procedural change with far-reaching substantive implications which make international investment law unique in international law. To respond to current stresses within the legal arrangements now collectively referred to as international investment law, five alternative futures are delineated: global integration (more and more direct foreign investment would be made worldwide, on the basis of economic rather than political considerations; in addition, there would be more decisions by international investment tribunals with respect to the quality of governance within states which hosted foreign investment); regional and sub-regional integration; recrudescence of protectionism and mercantilism; revival of the New International Economic Order system; and continuation of the present heterogeneous system. It is argued that in the future the first option is the most desirable, for its promise of enhanced production and the efficient use of the resources of our planet and the resulting interdependence which, one hopes, will act as a restraint on the use of violence.
Ensuring Compliance with Standards on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Authors: Rockwood Laura
Published: September 2012

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has provided unbiased independent verification for over fifty years, within the legal authority granted to it by its member states and the resources which it has been given to carry out that authority and has been able to respond to shifting perceptions of proliferation threats. It has also been engaged in verifying the disarmament of nuclear weapon programmes in Iraq, South Africa, and Libya, and developed ‘black box’ techniques for verifying material dismantled from nuclear weapons in non-nuclear states. To ensure the continued adherence by states to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to their respective safeguards agreements, and to reduce the risk that additional states attempt to circumvent their non-proliferation undertakings, it is necessary: to strengthen the IAEA's verification capabilities; to minimize the risk of break-out; and to address the underlying motivations of states. A set of concrete steps that could be taken under each of these headings are suggested.
How to Depart from the Existing Dire Condition of Development
Authors: Jouannet Emmanuelle
Published: September 2012

Classical International Development Law (IDL) has not kept its promises despite continuing attempts to implement it. Major legal principles such as the right of peoples to self-determination, sovereignty over natural resources, and the right to nationalize against just compensation have helped to found and consolidate the sovereignty of newly independent states and let them properly consider their development. However, the set of legal norms that were subsequently adopted, which are legally binding and have been provided with some effectiveness, have proved extremely disappointing in their application. The new IDL of the post-Cold War years, which currently applies concurrently with conventional law on the matter seems no more effective. To change the existing dire condition, three options are open: sticking to the neo-liberal pro-market paradigm — an economically efficient but socially unfair solution; jettisoning any model of development — a blind alley; and changing the rules of the global economic system, and creating a new and fair New International Economic Order. This third option aims at changing the rules of the global economic system, recasting the Bretton Woods financial institutions, changing the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and revising the World Trade Organization in a more equitable direction so that it finally refocuses relations between the various North(s) and South(s).