bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?1
Authors: Johnson Richard C.
Published: January 2013

The response to the Exxon Valdez incident showed that the nation needs to be better prepared to respond to a spill of that magnitude. In research conducted on the Valdez response, several inadequacies were noted in the National Response System (NRS). A key deficiency identified was the critical need for a standardized management system to direct the response effort more effectively and efficiently.

The most pressing question for preparedness planners in improving the NRS is “where do we go from here?” In answering this question, planners must address another question, “how long is it going to take?” There has been widespread failure to put existing knowledge into practice. To fill the management void identified in the NRS, it is imperative that a response management system be adopted as soon as possible. Once adopted, it can be modified and refined to provide a more effective response.

The system proposed in this paper uses the sound management practices of an incident command system and modifies and/or expands these practices to fit onto the foundation built by the NRS. This response management system could be used for all spills from minor ones to large, catastrophic spills of national significance (SONS).
APPLICABILITY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO INDIAN TRIBES—MAY TRIBES STOP OR CONSTRAIN A CLEANUP?1
Authors: Emge Michael L.
Published: January 2013

Indian tribes retain their sovereign rights of self-government and self-determination unless it is specifically waived by the tribe or abrogated by the U. S. Congress, through treaty or statute. The Clean Water Act does not specifically abrogate tribal sovereignty. This raises the issue of what would occur if an on-scene coordinator decides that cleanup of tribal lands is necessary to protect the public health and welfare, but the tribe does not want the cleanup activities to proceed? May a tribe impede cleanup efforts? During the cleanup of the barge Nestucca oil spill, this occurred when the Quinault Tribe did not allow the OSC to clean lands that the tribe holds sacred.

This issue with the Clean Water Act has not been decided by Congress, nor by the courts. Recently, courts have applied at least three different approaches to determine if a statute of general application, such as the Clean Water Act, applies to Indian tribes. The different tests do not always yield the same result.

An on-scene coordinator, when confronted with this scenario, might handle the situation in several different ways, or perhaps move to prevent such an occurrence. The different approaches used by the courts can be taken together to gain a sense of whether the Clean Water Act may preempt tribal sovereignty.
EXPERIMENTAL CONTINGENT VALUES FOR REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE FROM OIL SPILLS1
Authors: Dunford Richard W. , Hudson Sara P. , Desvousges William H.
Published: January 2013

Recently, government agencies, acting as trustees for natural resources, have sought substantial claims from potentially responsible parties for natural resource damages resulting from oil spills. Often, non-use damages, which involve losses suffered by people who never use the injured resources, constitute large components of these damage claims. To date, the only method used for measuring these non-use damages is contingent valuation (CV), which uses survey questions to elicit respondents' expressed values for non-market goods. Because CV is the only method available for measuring non-use damages, its estimates need to accurately reflect the true damages. Our results indicate that CV does not provide accurate estimates of these values, which implies that CV is not sufficiently reliable for assessing non-use damages from oil spills. (As part of the same study, we conducted another experiment on valuing different levels of protection for migratory waterfowl in the central fly way, the results of which also indicate that CV does not yield accurate estimates of non-use values for damage assessments.6)
DEVELOPING STANDARDIZED FACILITY CONTINGENCY PLANS
Authors: Davidson David A.
Published: January 2013

Texaco consists of several operating departments that are, in effect, independent companies. Each of these departments is responsible for complying with all environmental laws and regulations. This includes the preparation by each facility to respond to an oil spill at that location. For larger spills, however, management of the response will rest with corporate regional response teams. Personnel from all departments make up the regional teams.

In 1990, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act. In 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard began developing oil spill response contingency plan regulations, which they are still working on. Meanwhile, four of the five west coast states have also passed laws requiring contingency plans. (Only Hawaii has chosen to wait and see what the federal regulations will entail.) Three of the states have already adopted regulations. Given these laws and regulations, along with its corporate structure, Texaco addressed the need to standardize local facility plans as well as its response organization.

This paper discusses how, by working together, the Texaco corporate international oil spill response staff and the Texaco western region on-scene commander developed:A standard contingency plan format crossing corporate boundaries and meeting federal and state requirements.A response organization applicable to any size facility or spill.A strategy to sell the standard contingency plan and response organization to the operating units.
WASHINGTON'S MARINE OIL SPILL COMPENSATION SCHEDULE—SIMPLIFIED RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
Authors: Geselbracht Laura , Logan Richard
Published: January 2013

The Washington State Preassessment Screening and Oil Spill Compensation Schedule Rule (Chapter 173–183 Washington Administrative Code), which simplifies natural resource damage assessment for many oil spill cases, became effective in May 1992. The approach described in the rule incorporates a number of preconstructed rankings that rate environmental sensitivity and the propensity of spilled oil to cause environmental harm. The rule also provides guidance regarding how damages calculated under the schedule should be reduced to take into account actions taken by the responsible party that reduce environmental injury. To apply the compensation schedule to marine/estuarine spills, the resource trustees need only collect a limited amount of information such as type of product spilled, number of gallons spilled, compensation schedule subregions the spill entered, season of greatest spill impact, percent coverage of habitats affected by the spill, and actions taken by the responsible party. The result of adding a simplified tool to the existing assortment of damage assessment approaches is that resource trustees will now be able to assess damages for most oil spill cases and shift more effort than was possible in the past to resource restoration.
NRDA CASE STUDY: THE ARTHUR KILL OIL SPILL1
Authors: Desvousges William H. , Dunford Richard W. , Mathews Kristy E. , Banzhaf H. Spencer
Published: January 2013

The natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) methods used to estimate the damages from the Arthur Kill oil spill employed a transfer methodology. The base-case estimate for use damages was $46,000 and for non-use damages was $525,000.
EVALUATION OF COMPENSATION FORMULAE TO MEASURE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES1
Authors: Robilliard Gordon A. , Fischel Marion , Desvousges William H. , Dunford Richard W. , Mathews Kristy
Published: January 2013

Most of the oil spills in marine, estuarine, or freshwater environments of the United States are small (less than 1,000 gallons) and result in minimal injury to natural resources or little to no loss of services. However, federal, state, and Indian tribe trustees for natural resources are entitled under a variety of laws, including the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, to collect damages (money) from responsible parties to compensate for the foregone services and restoration of the services provided by the natural resources.

Alaska, Washington, and Florida have developed a formula-based approach to calculating natural resource damages resulting from most spills; the federal National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and several other states are considering developing a compensation formula. The ideal compensation formula is a simplified assessment process that (a) can be applied rapidly, (b) requires relatively small transaction or assessment costs, (c) requires minimal site- and spill-specific data as inputs, (d) is based on generally accepted scientific and economic principles and methods, and (e) results in damage values acceptable to both the trustees and the responsible party. In theory, a compensation formula could be applied to most small oil spills in United States waters.
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BURNING SPILLED OIL
Authors: Allen Alan A. , Ferek Ronald J.
Published: January 2013

The full potential for in situ burning as a controlled oil spill response technique is a subject of growing interest throughout the world. Information now available from burning oil during accidental fires, war-related fires in Kuwait, spillage from the Exxon Valdez, and controlled test burns, permits an objective and comprehensive assessment of both the positive and negative aspects of in situ burning. A thorough analysis has been made of direct and indirect impacts and concerns typically associated with the decision, to burn or not to burn. These factors, together with the comparative costs of various response techniques, have been identified and described to provide spill control planners and response organizations with a means of assessing the potential use of burning to clean up offshore oil spills.
A PRO-ACTIVE SPILL RESPONSE TRAINING PROGRAM
Authors: Waldron Darryle
Published: January 2013

Training is necessary, required by agencies, and cost-effective in dealing with response to oil spills. Clean Seas has for the past 22 years, developed and provided over 10,000 training days to member company personnel as well as contractors and regulatory agencies. The practice of having an annual drill, reviewing the contingency plan, having a cookout, and going back to real work is over. Member companies in the Santa Barbara Channel work in a tightly regulated environment that hasn't noticed the change that other areas felt after the Exxon Valdez. On-the-job training has no place when a spill occurs. A proactive training program has proven to be cost-effective whenever contingency plans have had to be used.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OIL SPILL RESPONSE: A PROGRAM OF JOINT IMO/OIL INDUSTRY REGIONAL SEMINARS
Authors: Bavister Richard , Wonham Jon
Published: January 2013

Cooperative efforts between the oil industry and governments at the national and local levels have resulted in a series of reports for both technical and general audiences on subjects relating to oil spills, as well as an ongoing series of government/industry regional seminars for senior executives. The seminars emphasize the crucial importance of joint government/industry attention to contingency planning. These activities, which are continuing, are organized under the auspices of an International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association working group, and the International Maritime Organization. Feedback is solicited from seminar participants for use in planning further seminars and to give the IMO a clear picture of follow up activities that have resulted from the seminars.
IMPLEMENTING THE SHORELINE CLEANUP ASSESSMENT TEAM PROCESS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
Authors: Debusschere Karolien , Penland Shea , Ramsey Karen E. , Lindstedt Dianne , Westphal Karen A. , Seal Robert , McBride Randolph A. , Byrnes Mark R. , Owens Ed
Published: January 2013

Louisiana State University (LSU) and Woodward-Clyde Consultants are working with state and federal agencies, and industry through the LSU Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Research and Response Program to establish a shoreline cleanup assessment team program (SCAT) in the Gulf of Mexico. Each SCAT team consists of a coastal geomorphologist and ecologist (and archaeologist when appropriate), as well as representatives from the responsible federal, state, and private agencies. This cooperative effort is aimed at identifying oil spill impact and interagency coastal resource concerns and recommendations, and developing a cleanup strategy based on interagency cooperation and concurrence within a systematic and standardized framework. The SCAT program provides interagency coordination, SCAT preparedness, spill drill participation, interagency training, geographic information systems services, monitoring, and routine aerial videotape surveys. It also offers technical support to the decision-making process within spill response operations.
DEVELOPING THE STATE ON-SCENE COORDINATORS' COURSE FOR ALASKA
Authors: Young Harry , Dietrick Larry , Pilot Arthur , Harben Geoff , Burger Mark
Published: January 2013

Before the development of the state on-scene coordinators’ course, spill response training available to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation focused on technical aspects, safety, and the incident command system. To function in a unified command and carry out legislatively mandated tasks, a program was needed to instruct responders in the department's duties. As the course evolved, a synergistic relationship developed, which is redefining the response program.
ALASKA NEARSHORE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
Authors: Dietrick Larry , Harben Geoff , Burger Mark
Published: January 2013

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) was appropriated $1.2 million to design and conduct nearshore demonstration (NSD) projects in the Gulf of Alaska and southeast Alaska. The objective of these projects was to demonstrate response equipment positioned in coastal communities using local resources and local vessels of opportunity to contain and recover oil from orphan spills or spills that have escaped primary containment efforts. Depending on the coastal communities involved, the vessels of opportunity may be seiners, trollers, gill-netters, crabbers, or tenders. The NSD project successfully served as a prototype for the development of a statewide nearshore coastal oil spill response capability.
DRILLING FOR REALITY1
Authors: Levine Robert A.
Published: January 2013

ARCO Marine, Inc. (AMI) has been holding regular oil spill drills for its spill team members since the mid-1970s. Over the years the drills have gotten more elaborate and more costly, employing equipment and testing initial response and transition management. By the 1993 drill, it was found, the drills were losing their educational benefits and for the most part had become well-rehearsed stage plays, with spill team members and other participants as actors and equipment as props. The drills were not providing the education necessary to develop team members for their roles as response managers. AMI rethought the drill process and, with the concurrence of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, and the Ship Escort and Response Vessel System, decided that it was time to “drill for reality.”
DISPERSANT EFFECTIVENESS AT SEA
Authors: Lunel T.
Published: January 2013

Information from five incidents in U.K. waters since 1980 in which dispersants have been used in responses, and two experimental spills using dispersants in 1993, shed light on the questions of whether dispersion of oil can reduce the overall environmental impact at a spill, whether we can demonstrate that dispersants enhance the rate of natural dispersion, and whether we can quantify how effective dispersants are.
SHORELINE CLEANSING BY INTERACTIONS BETWEEN OIL AND FINE MINERAL PARTICLES
Authors: Bragg James R. , Owens Edward H.
Published: January 2013

Interactions of fine mineral particles with oil stranded on shorelines following spills has been shown to be an important natural cleansing process, capable of accelerating oil removal in most environments, and particularly in low energy environments where wave action and abrasion are negligible. This process involves formation of solids-stabilized oil-in-water emulsions by flocculation of micron-sized mineral fines with oil droplets in the presence of water containing ions (such as sea water). Once flocculated, the oil droplets do not coalesce, and the oil no longer adheres strongly to shoreline sediments, facilitating its removal and dispersion by waves and tidal currents.

The importance of the flocculation process to the rate of oil removal from sediments, the conditions needed for the process to occur, and the properties of the resulting floe have been studied in detail for the Exxon Valdez spill. Its potential role in shoreline cleansing also has been studied for other recent spills: Metula (1974, Chile), Arrow (1970, Nova Scotia), BIOS test spill (1981, Cape Hatt, Northwest Territories), Nosac Forest (1993, Tacoma, Washington), and Fred Bouchard (1993, Tampa, Florida). This paper summarizes the various laboratory and field studies and discusses the findings within the contexts of natural shoreline cleansing, and the use of certain treatment techniques.
ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES OF SALVAGE-BASED POLLUTION DEFENSE
Authors: Witte John Arnold
Published: January 2013

Given the inherent difficulties of oil spill cleanup, salvage-based pollution defense has come to the fore in political and regulatory circles. This is partially a response to public concern over large spills and agrees with the logic of the International Salvage Union's position that preventing a spill is more important, and easier, than cleaning up after one. The report of the Donaldson Inquiry—set up after the grounding of the Braer in 1993—focused on defense against pollution rather than cleanup. The report advocated, among other things, franchises of salvage companies paid for by potential polluters. Members of the International Salvage Union can be active partners in this type of defense against oil spills. Some international agreements are needed to make their efforts more effective.
OPA 90 AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGIMES CONCERNING OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION: ARE THEY SO FAR APART, MUST THEY REMAIN SO?1
Authors: Sheehan Daniel F.
Published: January 2013

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) set a new course for the United States with respect to oil spill liability and compensation. For 15 years preceding the passage of OPA 90, the United States sought to become party to the international regimes. A 1984 international conference was held at the request of the United States, to modify provisions of existing conventions. Passage of OPA 90 rejected those efforts and implemented a more comprehensive and farther reaching regime. Structurally, the regimes are similar, yet they are far apart with respect to key issues of levels of liability, ease with which those limits may be broken, and scope and extent of compensable damages. The issue examined is whether they must remain so far apart and whether there is a mechanism to bring them back together.
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLEANUP OF MARINE OIL SPILLS
Authors: Harper John , Godon Ann , Allen Alan A.
Published: January 2013

The cost of offshore and coastal cleanup of spilled oil varies greatly from spill to spill but is of high interest in risk assessments, because cost is often used as the basis of comparison. We present data on the costs associated with mechanical offshore cleanup, shoreline cleanup, and offshore burning. A review of eight offshore recovery operations in North America indicates a mean offshore, on-water cleanup cost of approximately $2,500/bbl, with a range of $10 to $6,000/bbl. Smaller spills (1,000 to 2,000 bbl) have a higher per-unit recovery cost than large spills (≥10,000 bbl)—at about two to three times the cost. Review often shoreline cleanup operations indicates a mean cleanup cost of approximately $8,000 to $9,000/bbl, an average of 2.5 to 4 times higher than the cost of offshore recovery. Variability in shoreline cleanup costs is high, and costs are highly dependent on both the size of the spill and the remoteness of the spill location; small, widely dispersed spills, such as the Nestucca (British Columbia and Washington coasts), involve cleanup costs of more than $20,000/bbl. Although there are few spills where offshore in situ burning has been used as a response option, preliminary estimates indicate comparable unit “elimination” costs of about $500/bbl, five times less expensive than offshore on-water recovery and more than an order of magnitude less than mean shoreline cleanup costs.
TUG USAGE FOR ESCORT AND RESCUE TOWING IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND, ALASKA
Authors: Gray David L. , de Jong Johan H.
Published: January 2013

The second part of the Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker Towing Study was undertaken to evaluate, using computer simulations, the capability of existing escort vessels in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and to examine alternatives that could enhance escort and rescue towing capabilities. The study was undertaken by The Glosten Associates, Inc., the Maritime Simulation Centre the Netherlands, and the Maritime Research Institute Netherlands on behalf of the Disabled Tanker Towing Study Group. A brief discussion of the project background, methodology, and results is contained herein.
EVALUATION OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD'S TANKER INSPECTION PROGRAM: TANKER INSPECTION IMPACTS1
Authors: Meers Christine S. , Ameer Paul
Published: January 2013

A study mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 assessed the effectiveness and adequacy of the U.S. Coast Guard's inspection program for oil tankers. The inspection standards study was conducted in two parts. The first part surveyed the range of inspection programs of the Coast Guard, International Maritime Organization, classification societies, and industry to identify significant gaps and/or duplicate requirements among these programs. The second part analyzed a number of issues related to the effectiveness of the Coast Guard's program. The study was intended to help the Coast Guard determine whether overlap exists in inspection requirements affecting tank vessels and whether increasing, decreasing, or targeting Coast Guard inspection resources would have a measurable impact on the occurrence of marine casualties. The recommendations and conclusions will be presented during the 1995 Oil Spill Conference and are intended to help the Coast Guard improve its marine inspection program's effectiveness.
TRACKING BUOYS FOR OIL SPILLS
Authors: Goodman Ron H. , Simecek-Beatty Debra , Hodgins Don
Published: January 2013

The use of tracking buoys in oil spill response, planning, and training and criteria for the selection of these buoys were studied in conjunction with an experiment conducted in the Gulf of Mexico during March 1994 on the relative motions of several oil spill drifter buoys. For the test, wood chips and cottonseed hulls were used to simulate the motion of the oil. Six different types of buoys and three different positioning and tracking systems, in various combinations, were tested. The first day of the program was conducted in Galveston Bay, the second in the Gulf of Mexico off Galveston. Significant differences were noted in the movements of the various buoys. Analysis of the data from these experiments suggests that tracking of the buoys should occur for a longer time period than in the experiments in order to reduce the influence of positioning errors.
SALVAGE OR PREVENTIVE MEASURE? A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
Authors: Noble John M.
Published: January 2013

The Salvage Convention provisions incorporated in the 1990 Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement have increased the spill responder's armory. The hitherto accepted “primary purpose” test, used in determining whether an operation is salvage or a preventive measure, is being challenged increasingly. Salvors’ operational priorities have changed; in conducting operations under LOF 90 contracts they are much more environmentally aware. Such awareness is closely linked with the special compensation now available, and salvage is increasingly treated by some as a preventive measure. The shipowner, now obliged to fund special compensation, may seek to have salvage services provided under contracts other than LOF 90 if he considers the financial burden too onerous. This reluctance to readily agree to LOF 90 may force authorities with statutory responsibility to use intervention powers more readily.
A COOPERATIVE APPROACH FOR MEASURING DIRECT-USE DAMAGES: THE 1992 AVILA BEACH (CALIFORNIA) OIL SPILL
Authors: Dunford Richard W. , Mathews Kristy E. , Banzhaf H. Spencer
Published: January 2013

A cooperative approach was used to estimate natural resource damages from the Avila Beach, California, spill. The approach was cooperative because we, on behalf of Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL), and the economist working for the State of California shared data collection and damage estimation responsibilities. Cooperative assessments have several advantages, including reduced costs and less duplication. Because this case was not settled when this paper was submitted, we provide no damage estimates.
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENTE RIVERA OIL SPILL, DELAWARE RIVER1
Authors: Helton Douglas , Lawson Donna , McHugh Martin
Published: January 2013

On June 24, 1989, the Uruguayan merchant marine tanker Presidente Rivera, loaded with 19 million gallons of No. 6 fuel oil, ran aground in the Delaware River near Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, spilling between 200,000 and 300,000 gallons of oil. Currents spread the oil over approximately 29 miles of shoreline in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, reaching upstream as far as Little Tinicum Island, a wildlife refuge near Philadelphia, and downstream as far as Reedy Island, south of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal.

Natural resources under the trusteeship of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce) were affected by the spill, including shoreline parks, fisheries, marshes, birds, and wildlife. Additionally, portions of the river were closed to vessel traffic and nearby creeks were boomed off, preventing access to marinas and boat ramps.

After three years of damage assessment, pretrial discovery, and negotiations, the trustees reached a settlement on natural resource damages with the responsible party. This paper discusses the strategy used by the trustees in developing a natural resource damage claim and highlights some of the lessons learned during the assessment and settlement process.
INNOVATIVE PROCEDURES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT1
Authors: Hansen Ingrid K.
Published: January 2013

The State of Texas has developed an innovative scheme for resolving contentious issues in assessing natural resource damages from coastal oil spills. The Texas statute and regulations provide for mediation among state natural resource trustees to resolve differences among them when assessing natural resource damages. The state trustees have formally signed a memorandum of agreement to institute mediation whenever they have disputes about any aspect of damage assessment in a case.

The statute and regulations also require the responsible person (the spiller) to mediate any disagreement about the assessment as a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of any court. This provision gives both the trustees and the responsible person an opportunity to reach a negotiated agreement without initiating expensive and lengthy litigation.

The regulations implementing damage assessment procedures and protocols were developed through the use of a negotiated rulemaking process. This process brought together representatives from state trustee agencies, the regulated community, and citizen environmental groups.

The Texas statute and rules require the state natural resource trustees to invite the responsible person to participate in all phases of the damage assessment process. By specifically providing for a negotiated assessment process, this provision encourages cooperation and discourages duplication and withholding of vital information. The regulations are designed to encourage the trustees and the responsible person to coordinate information, studies, and assessment procedures. The goal is to initiate restoration of the injured resources as quickly as possible without a “battle of the experts.” The regulations require the state trustees to coordinate their assessment activities in conjunction with federal natural resource trustees. The obvious benefits of the arrangement are to promote intergovernmental cooperation and coordination and to allow the responsible person to deal with a unified trustee response to damage assessment. The benefits to all parties are the swift initiation of restoration actions, efficient use of expended funds, and an open process.
OIL SPILL CHEMICALS IN FRESHWATER ENVIRONMENTS: TECHNICAL ISSUES
Authors: Walker Ann Hayward , Kucklick Janet H. , Steen Alexis E. , Fritz David
Published: January 2013

This summary of current protocols and on-going research for effectiveness and toxicity testing of chemical agents also discusses data interpretation and analyses for these tests. In addition, a decision tree to provide an initial framework for discussing the development of authorization for the use of chemical treating agents is proposed. For the purposes of the study, chemical treating agents include herding agents, emulsion treating agents, elasticity modifiers, solidifiers, shoreline cleaning agents, shoreline pretreatment agents, and dispersants.
AQUATIC RESOURCE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UPPER OHIO RIVER BASIN USING A GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEM
Authors: Arway John , Nieman Douglas , Proch Thomas , Shulte Jerry
Published: January 2013

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania successfully negotiated a $1.75 million settlement with Ashland Oil Company for injuries to aquatic resources and recreational users resulting from the January 1988 oil spill into the lower Monongahela and upper Ohio Rivers. The commonwealth's natural resource trustee agencies reserved these funds for special studies to learn more about the aquatic resources of the impacted rivers.

A project team including commonwealth agencies, consulting experts, and the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission agreed to use the framework of a geographic information system (GIS) to organize geo-referenced natural resource data spatially. This paper discusses the development of a GIS base map of a river system modified by a series of navigation dams and outlines the ecological basis of the aquatic habitat classification system. This system divides individual navigation pools into component parts along longitudinal, cross-sectional, and vertical axes. These components are then combined to delimit aquatic areas and habitat conditions to define aquatic habitat types. These habitat types will serve as the basis for making an inventory of environmentally sensitive areas; and the completed GIS will have coverages of infrastructural, monitoring/regulatory, recreational, and environmental themes. The GIS will be used by Pennsylvania agencies in the management and protection of the natural resources supported by the Ohio River and its tributaries.
FATE AND EFFECTS OF CRUDE OIL IN A SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA STREAM DRAINAGE1
Authors: Mancini Eugene R. , Chamberlain Dilworth W. , Lowe Mark A. , Fischel Marion , Greenwood Eric J. , Rankin Susan
Published: January 2013

On April 6, 1993, a crude oil pipeline ruptured releasing an estimated 6,200 bbl of blended San Joaquin Valley crude oil (2T API gravity) which flowed overland and through interstate freeway storm-water culverts to a small stream in Kern County, southern California. A mixture of crude oil and water flowed 12 km downstream to an emergency containment/underflow dike. Response operations were completed within 21 days resulting in recovery of approximately 3,400 bbl of liquid crude and an additional 1,200 bbl of oil contained in nearly 19,000 yd3 of excavated soil and streambed sediments (74 percent recovery).

Water quality data collected throughout the stream within 24 hours of the release demonstrated total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH; method 8015-modified, GC/FID) concentrations ranging from 55 to 120 mg/L with BTEX (total benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene isomers; method 5030/8020) concentrations less than 145 ≤g/L. Within 72 hours of the spill, TPH concentrations were less than 8 mg/L and total BTEX concentrations were less than 25 ≤g/L. Within five weeks of the spill, TPH and most BTEX constituents were below detection limits. Average sediment TPH concentrations in impacted stream segments ranged from <100 to 21,733 mg/kg prior to cleanup while postcleanup samples ranged from <50 to 1325 mg/kg. Average September concentrations ranged from 11 to 299 mg/kg.

Qualitative benthic macroinvertebrate samples collected within a few days of the spill indicated reduced taxonomic diversity and numerical abundance in impacted stream segments. Quantitative macroinvertebrate samples collected five months after the spill, however, identified diverse and abundant benthic macroinvertebrate populations, relative to reference stations, where streamflow volumes were sufficient to maintain such invertebrate communities.

Upstream vegetation was characterized as cottonwood-willow riparian woodland that may have experienced some spill-related stress in the form of leaf drop, which was photographically documented. A transition riparian zone, dominated by mule fat, tamarisk, and red willow, exhibited no symptoms of stress following the spill. Annual grassland dominated by nonnative grasses, forbs (broad leaved, nonwoody plants), and native wildflower species occurred along the lower portions of the creek and was not affected by the spill except for the physical impact of cleanup operations.

Avian surveys conducted in riparian habitat in April and June suggested that bird populations utilizing oiled and unoiled reaches of Grapevine Creek were similar. Lower species richness and abundance in April was attributed to extensive response operations. Avian surveys conducted along downstream, dry wash portions of the creek in June, however, indicated greater species abundance and diversity along these previously oiled reaches of the creek relative to an unoiled reference channel.
WEATHERING EXPERIMENT ON SPILLED CRUDE OILS USING A CIRCULATING WATER CHANNEL
Authors: Tsukihara Tsutomu
Published: January 2013

Crude oil spilled in the sea is mixed with the sea water by the wind and waves resulting in increases in its water content and viscosity as time passes. We have constructed a small, transfer type circulating water channel of an elliptical cuit-track form. Using an attached circulating unit, together with a war tunnel, artificial waves are generated to enable simulation corresponding to the natural circumstances in the sea. The experiment disclosed the following results.Drastic changes in the properties (water content and viscosity) of the oil depend on the power of waves.Contrasting processes are observed between heavy and light crude oils during weathering.Heavy crude oils form a massive water-in-oil emulsion (mousse) with increases in both water content and viscosity.Light crude oils behave differently at summer sea temperatures,
DISTRIBUTION AND WEATHERING OF OIL FROM THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT OIL SPILL WITHIN INTERTIDAL HABITATS—TWO YEARS LATER
Authors: Hayes Miles O. , Michel Jacqueline , Montello Todd M. , Aurand Don V. , Sauer Theodor C. , Al-Mansi Ahmed , Al-Momen Abdul Halim
Published: January 2013

The heavily oiled coastal bays of Dafi and Musallamiyah on the Saudi Arabian coast were surveyed in 1992 and again in 1993, two years after the Iraq-Kuwait conflict oil spill. All habitat types showed little improvement or recovery from their condition one year earlier. Oil on the exposed outer beaches was beginning to form asphalt pavements, much like the ones still present from the 1983 Nowruz spill. Moderately exposed sand flats with bars showed no change in the distribution of surface oil; but in some areas, the subsurface oil migrated deeper, up to twice the depths in 1992. The heavy surface oil on moderately exposed sand flats was hardening into incipient pavements, which are sealing off the heavy subsurface oil from natural removal and weathering processes. Sheltered habitats showed even less improvement, with contamination likely to remain for decades. Factors contributing to the long-term persistence of oil in these intertidal habitats include the initial, heavy oil loading; deep penetration into porous sand substrates, even on the lower intertidal zone; deep penetration into animal burrows in muddy sediments; and subsequent formation of extensive asphalt pavements, which have sealed the subsurface oil from physical removal processes and slowed chemical weathering.
RESPONSE TO A MAJOR GASOLINE RELEASE INTO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER1
Authors: Hartley Jane M. , Hamera Donald F.
Published: January 2013

On January 18, 1994, unleaded gasoline began entering the Mississippi River through the bank adjacent to an oil distribution/storage facility in St. Louis, Missouri. Reported as a minor, per the National Contingency Plan, it developed into a major discharge. Of the 364,930 gallons lost, 140,000 gallons discharged into the river. The amount of product recovered from all sources was 107,000 gallons. The emergency phase of the response ran from January 18 to 24. Not until January 24 was the cause determined to be a 10.7 ft by ¼ in fracture near the center of the floor of a two million gallon tank. Secondary containment showed no evidence of the catastrophic release. The extreme cold permitted the initial booming of the gasoline, but recovery was complicated by flowing river ice, ice shelves, temperatures that froze equipment, and access down 45 feet of snow-covered riprap. Elastol, fire-fighting foam, barges, weir and barrel skimmers, and vacuum trucks were utilized for water and land recovery operations. Safety concerns were paramount for the federal, state, and local personnel and yet there was a demonstrated weakness in timely development and enforcement of the comprehensive site safety plan. This unusual spill heightened the awareness of many prevention and response issues.
THE COLONIAL PIPELINE SPILL: A CASE STUDY
Authors: Koob Kevin , Lafferiere Roger , DeVeaux Jennie , DeMarco Greg
Published: January 2013

The response to the Colonial Pipeline spill in Fairfax County, Virginia, provided an opportunity to apply the emergency response concepts of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Protection of human health and the environment was the paramount goal of the response. This goal was successfully achieved through the establishment of a unified command system to coordinate federal, state, and local interests and activities. The major operational objectives of the response were to secure the source of the spill, limit its migration through the use of containment boom, and recover spilled oil by using skimmers and other mechanical means. For the most part, these operational objectives were achieved in an efficient manner. However, some difficulties were encountered due to the inaccessibility of the major recovery area, debris-clogged skimmers, and insufficient supply of on-scene response resources. Such problems were addressed through the use of additional federal resources and innovative response principles, such as the construction of a temporary pipeline to transport recovered oil. Agencies involved in the response noted strengths and weaknesses in the areas of logistics, notification, communication, resource availability, and response actions and highlighted areas for improvement. The review and future implementation of such lessons learned can enhance the level of preparedness for spills of a similar nature.
CHALLENGES OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN A SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATE—TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Authors: Adams Oswald M. , Haynes Kenrick
Published: January 2013

The oil industry is the engine of the economy of Trinidad and Tobago, with a production of around 125,000 barrels of oil a day, of which 55,000 come from offshore on the east coast and 31,000 from the west coast of Trinidad. Two refineries with total capacity of 230,000 barrels a day are located along the west coast of Trinidad.

For these local oil operations an average of 50 and 800 tankers, annually, visit ports on the east and west coast, respectively. The daily crude tonnage of tankers passing through the south Caribbean now exceeds 2 million metric tons (t). Tanker traffic, therefore, creates a major risk for oil spills and complicates contingency planning in Trinidad and Tobago, and the southern Caribbean.

Small island states with serious deficiencies in financing their contingency plans can utilize tiered emergency response schemes to offset the obvious weaknesses in their response capabilities; but unless multilateral funding is available, the benefits of tiered response would be limited. Assistance to small island states to help ratify the IMO conventions and protocols remains the best form of insurance against all oil spill perils.
INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, AND REGIONAL EFFORTS IN OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANNING: MALAYSIA'S PERSPECTIVES
Authors: Rahmat Hussein Bin , Yusof Mohd Radzuan Bin
Published: January 2013

The increasing incidence of oil spills in the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea has resulted in growing concern about Malaysia's capability to respond to oil spills in its waters. This concern is compounded by the ever-growing number of oil tankers plying the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, as well as the intensifying exploration and development of offshore petroleum resources.

Various measures were taken by the government to deal with the problem, including a review of its National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) and incorporating a coordinated and a cost-effective response mechanism among the various government agencies. The incorporation of the Petroleum Industry of Malaysia Mutual Aid Group (PIMMAG), which enables the oil industry to pool its oil spill response resources, reflects the industry's commitment to strengthen the NOSCP. Since the mid 1970s, a number of regional plans have been instituted including the Traffic Separation Scheme for the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Revolving Fund, the Lombok-Macassar Oil Spill Contingency Plan, the Brunei Bay Oil Spill Contingency Plan, the ASEAN Oil Spill Response Plan, and the proposed ASCOPE Oil Spill Contingency Plan.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE EXERCISE PROGRAM1
Authors: Kurgan W. Michael , Laney Karen
Published: January 2013

The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) was developed to meet the intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). PREP is a unified federal effort and incorporates the exercise requirements of the Coast Guard; Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), Office of Pipeline Safety; and the Minerals Management Service. (MMS).

Each year 20 PREP area exercises are held: six led by the federal government and 14 led by the industry. Five of the six government-led exercises are conducted in coastal areas where the Coast Guard is designated as the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC). One is held in an inland region where the EPA is the FOSC.

Each government-led pollution simulation typically involves more than 40 agencies and more than 400 participants. The PREP simulations focus on a geographical community response to a pollution incident with a unified command structure. The unified command is supported by the four basic elements of an incident command system: planning, operations, logistics, and finance.

Area PREP exercises create realistic situations focusing on specific objectives. Emphasis is placed on the realism and decision-making process throughout the entire 30 weeks it takes to prepare an exercise. The National Strike Force Coordination Center collects data from critiques and other aspects of the exercise to help create and develop a standard for exercise evaluation. Data collected and lessons learned at each exercise are disseminated throughout the oil spill industry.
RECOVERY OF SUBMERGED OIL AT SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO 1994
Authors: Burns George H. , Benson C.A. “Ben” , Eason Tom , Michel Jacqueline , Kelly Steve , Benggio Bradford , Ploen Mark
Published: January 2013

The January 1994 grounding and discharge of over 800,000 gallons (3,028,000 liters/3,028 m3) of low API gravity No. 6 oil from the tank barge Morris J. Berman at San Juan, Puerto Rico was one of those infrequent but typically major events that set in motion a massive skimming and shoreline cleanup operation. As these actions proceeded effectively along the northern coast of Puerto Rico, it quickly became apparent that significant quantities of oil from the Berman had submerged and continued to recontaminate economic, historic, and environmentally sensitive coastal areas after the leaking barge and floating oil had been removed. Recognizing the unique nature of the problem and general lack of Coast Guard or industry-wide experience in the emerging field of submerged oil recovery, the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) formed a group within the overall organization to respond to the situation. The methods implemented by this group recovered approximately 145,000 gallons of oil from the seabed at an estimated cost of $8 million.
EVALUATING OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY AND PREVENTION PLANS USING MEASURES OF QUALITY, NOT QUANTITY1
Authors: Abordaif Faisal , Harrald John R. , Mazzuchi Thomas A.
Published: January 2013

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has led to a dramatic increase in the number and volume of formal plans intended to mitigate the impacts of spilled oil. The U.S. Coast Guard and state regulatory offices have not developed evaluation methodologies that will ensure that contingency planners capture essential information rather than simply mass-producing documentation for bureaucratic review. This paper reports on a methodology for evaluating contingency and prevention plans based on a structured representation of the plan and assignment of relative importance weights by experts using a commercially available decision support aid. The methodology is tested using two examples: a comparison of the plans used during the Exxon Valdez response, and the development of a prevention plan evaluation tool for the State of Washington. The evaluations show that the elements of a plan are typically of very unequal importance. The elements evaluated as least important by the experts, however, are typically the easiest to provide. The evaluation methodology proposed will help focus reviewers and planners on those elements critical to pollution prevention and response.
TAMPA BAY SPILL: COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES
Authors: Harbert Richard W.
Published: January 2013

A three-vessel collision in the Tampa Bay entrance channel on August 10, 1993, caused a huge explosion and fire, major damage to all vessels, and spills of 330,000 gallons of No. 6 oil and 32,000 gallons of a mixture of light petroleum products. A dynamic team was forged to respond to a complex series of problems. Functional command centers and forward command posts were established, a unified command system was implemented, and federal, state, and local governments and the multiple responsible parties coordinated efficiently. The unified command dealt effectively with considerations such as vessel control, fire fighting, lightering, salvage, pollution cleanup, and impacted wildlife. An active approach to the media resulted in critical information being relayed to the public and the response effort being portrayed accurately. The development of trust with multiple local governments enabled the response team to meet local needs while gaining their support. The unified command dealt with difficulties such as communicating effectively with the field and ensuring safety for large number of responders involved in a variety of hazardous activities.