bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Fundamental Measurement of Force and Newton's First and Second Laws of Motion
Authors: Krantz David H.
Published: November 2002

The measurement of force is based on a formal law of additivity, which characterizes the effects of two or more configurations on the equilibrium of a material point. The representing vectors (resultant forces) are additive over configurations. The existence of a tight interrelation between the force vector and the geometric space, in which motion is described, depends on observations of partial (directional) equilibria; an axiomatization of this interrelation yields a proof of part two of Newton's second law of motion.

The present results (which were derived from a curious and deep isomorphism between force measurement and trichromatic color measurement) yield a kind of subunit, which needs to be incorporated into more complete axiomatizations of mechanics that would fulfill the Mach–Kirchhoff program.
“Becoming” and the Asymmetries of Time
Authors: Freundlich Yehudah
Published: November 2002

We consider the mind-dependence or independence of the “now,” of “becoming,” and of “time's arrow,” by considering the various senses in which these notions might be mind-dependent or not. These matters cannot be sensibly discussed without taking a stand regarding criteria of “reality.” Proceeding from a basically phenomenalist position we conclude that merely to differentiate between appearance and reality is implicitly to assume a directed flow of time. We discuss the relationship between phenomenological and physical time and their possible asymmetries. We find that physical time acquires meaning only through phenomenological time, and that phenomenological time is fundamentally asymmetric. This still leaves room for the question: Is there anything in physical time which reflects the fact that it, to be meaningful, must be applied asymmetrically? The relevance of relativity theory to this question is discussed.
Falsifiable Predictions of Evolutionary Theory
Authors: Williams Mary B.
Published: November 2002

Many philosophers have asserted that evolutionary theory is unfalsifiable. In this paper I refute these assertions by detailing some falsifiable predictions of the theory and the evidence used to test them. I then analyze both these predictions and evidence cited to support assertions of unfalsifiability in order to show both what type of predictions are possible and why it has been so difficult to spot them. The conclusion is that the apparent logical peculiarity of evolutionary theory is not a property of evolutionary theory; it is a property of our human-sized perspective on evolutionary theory.
The Logico-Linguistic Mind-Brain Problem and a Proposed Step towards its Solution
Authors: Bohnert Herbert G.
Published: November 2002

This paper argues that if a person's beliefs are idealized as a set of sentences (theoretical, observational, and mixed) then the device of Ramsey sentences provides a treatment, of the mind-brain problem, that has at least four noteworthy characteristics. First, sentences asserting correlations between one's own brain state and one's own “private” experiences are, on such treatment, reconstrued as neither causal, coreferential, nor as meaning postulates, but as clauses in an overall hypothesis (Ramsey sentence) whose only nonlogical constants have “private” meanings. Second, sentences asserting psycho-physical correlations in general, or in other individuals, remain theoretical and susceptible to scientific reduction, though not prejudged to be so. Third, communication between persons having mutually exclusive, “private,” observational vocabularies can be made intelligible. Fourth, it becomes possible in principle (though not necessary) that the world could ultimately be given a total description in a scientific language, Lφ, without mental primitives. However, such a language would be susceptible to interpretation by a given individual using a metalanguage whose primitives (not among those of Lφ) were privately observational to that individual. His procedure in accomplishing such an interpretation would be to construct a Tarskian truth definition in a metalanguage MLφ and then to incorporate it, by Ramsifying its descriptive terms, in his own overall Ramsey sentence. The physical language, Lφ, while not containing a person's primitives, would, of course, be able to define their physical correlates, thus providing a certain sort of mutual mirroring, and a certain sort of relativity.
An Attempt to Add a Little Direction to “The Problem of the Direction of Time”
Authors: Earman John
Published: November 2002

It is argued that the main problem with “the problem of the direction of time” is to figure out what the problem is or is supposed to be. Towards this end, an attempt is made to disentangle and to classify some of the many issues which have been discussed under the label of ‘the direction of time’. Secondly, some technical apparatus is introduced in the hope of producing a sharper formulation of the issues than they have received in the philosophical literature. Finally, some tentative suggestions about the central issues are offered. In particuar, it is suggested that entropy and irreversibility are much less crucial to the central issues than most philosophers would have us believe. This suggestion is not made because of any firm conviction of its correctness but rather because it helps to focus the discussion on some basic but long neglected assumptions which underlie traditional approaches.
A Pragmatic Analysis of Idealizations in Physics
Authors: Barr William F.
Published: November 2002

A brief discussion is offered of what it means to say that a set of statements provides D-N explanation with special emphasis given to approximative D-N explanation. An idealized theory is seen to provide approximative D-N explanation. An ideal case provides explanation only if postulates are offered which connect the ideal antecedent condition with actual conditions. Such postulates will help in accounting for deviations between what the consequent of the ideal case entails and what actually occurs. Three ways are presented for deciding on the acceptability of idealizations: (i) as actual conditions more closely approximate the ideal antecedent conditions specified in an ideal case, the more closely actual cases ought to approximate the consequent of the ideal case; (ii) the additional postulates connecting ideal antecedent conditions with actual conditions ought to account for deviations between what is entailed by an idealized theory and what actually occurs ; and (iii) an idealized theory is explained by a more general theory when certain state variables in the more general theory are given extreme values. It is argued that (iii) is not a necessary condition for the acceptability of idealizations.
Toward a Theory of Event Identity
Authors: Stenner Alfred J.
Published: November 2002

This paper takes the first steps in the construction of a theory of event identity as that theory applies to historical sentences. The theory is extensional throughout. Following statements of criteria of adequacy for the construction, Davidson's method of regimenting sentences is adopted in order to allow for variables ranging over events. Events in this theory are only partially construed, that is, to the extent of treating them as concrete individuals rather than as classes or repeatable universals. The paper concludes with a statement of several theorems and definitions and an example of how the theory works.
Spielman and Lewis on Inductive Immodesty
Authors: Lewis David
Published: November 2002

An inductive method Cλ in the λ-system of Carnap [1] is immodest, on evidence e, iff its estimate, on e, of its own accuracy is higher than its estimate, on e, of the accuracy of any rival method Cλ′. Immodesty seems to be a condition of stable trust: if you trusted a modest Cλ, you should start by trusting its advice to replace it by a rival that it estimates to be more accurate. One might guess that any Cλ would be immodest on any evidence. But in [2] I proved that, under a certain accuracy measure taken from Carnap [1], §§ 20–21, there would be exactly one immodest Cλ. Unfortunately, that one sometimes turns out to be C0 (the straight rule); and since nobody in his right mind would trust C0 we are then left with no acceptable Cλ. Stephen Spielman [3] has proposed a remedy: an estimate of accuracy, on evidence e, should disregard accuracy under circumstances that are ruled out by e. Spielman proves that if this change is made, any Cλ is immodest on any evidence.
Models, Theories, and Kant
Authors: Bushkovitch A. V.
Published: November 2002

A large number of definitions of the concept “model” have been given by various authors in recent years. Thirty-seven definitions are listed by A. I. Uyemov in a recent monograph (see [9]). This list is somewhat one-sided since it contains a disproportionate number of references to the work of Soviet authors. However, most of the important definitions given by Western writers are included. I shall give three definitions, all of great generality, so that various types of models, replicas, maps, theories and, most importantly, cybernetic models, are included. The advantage of this high degree of generality, or all-inclusiveness, is that the task of the investigator of uses of models in science, is reduced to classifying the various types of models, their construction, function, and structure, thus avoiding indecisive arguments (historically important, of course) such as the Duhem–Campbell controversy, so perceptively discussed by Mary Hesse ([2], [3]).
Progress as a Demarcation Criterion for the Sciences
Authors: Quay Paul M.
Published: November 2002

It is argued that two aspects of the progress of mature science characterize, at least in combination, no other fields; hence, that these aspects can usefully serve as a demarcation criterion. Scientific progress is: (1) cumulative, regardless of crisis or revolution, from the viewpoint of concrete applications; (2) capable of unrestricted growth towards universal coerciveness of argument and evidence. Before these aspects of progress are discussed, some clarifications are made and corrections offered to Kuhn's view of the nature of scientific progress across revolutions; afterwards, the suggested criterion is used to distinguish, concretely, various fields from science. Finally, it is shown that the “style” of scientific progress is not a useful demarcation criterion.
Maxwell's Demon and Computation
Authors: Laing Richard
Published: November 2002

In this paper we show how a form of Maxwellian Demon can be interpreted as a computing automaton. We then point out some ways in which the Demon systems can be generalized, and briefly describe and discuss the properties of some of the corresponding automata. It is shown that a generalized Maxwell Demon system can carry out arbitrary Turing computations.

Finally, the association developed between classes of thermodynamic systems and classes of computational systems is employed to suggest approaches to some fundamental problems of the relationships between computation, the information obtained by computation, and energy.
Kuhn, Scheffler, and Objectivity in Science
Authors: Meiland Jack W.
Published: November 2002

In his valuable book [3], Israel Scheffler presents an extended critique of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. Scheffler argues against Kuhn's “main thesis,” namely that “... paradigm change in science is not generally subject to deliberation and critical assessment” ([3], p. 89). Scheffler does recognize, though, that there are important elements of Kuhn's view that themselves seem to conflict with this “main thesis.” For these elements seem to make possible deliberation, critical assessment, and objectivity in the discussion of scientific paradigms. So it appears from Scheffler's critique that Kuhn's position is inconsistent. The puzzle is compounded by Kuhn's admission—indeed, insistence—that his book does contain “a preliminary codification of good reasons for theory choice. These are ... reasons of exactly the kind standard in philosophy of science: accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like” ([1], p. 231). In his recent reply to (and further critique of) Kuhn, Scheffler quotes this passage from Kuhn and says: “If these reasons are not ... to be construed as utterly free of all constraints or themselves paradigm-dependent, then they allow the comparison of rival paradigms and make paradigm debates intelligible. Such intelligibility is, however, at odds with Kuhn's statement that the proponents of competing paradigms ‘will inevitably talk through each other’” ([4], p. 369). In this interchange between Scheffler and Kuhn, one gets the impression of people, if not paradigms, talking “through each other.” I think that this nonmeeting of minds is due to interpreting Kuhn as an opponent of objectivity when in fact he is not an opponent but a proponent. It is this misinterpretation which produces the apparent inconsistency in Kuhn's position. In this paper I suggest a way of understanding Kuhn which resolves this apparent inconsistency in his work and might help to focus discussion on the real issue between Kuhn and many of his critics. This suggestion has the crucial consequence of shifting the focus from objectivity to the real issue, namely truth.
The Quartercentenary Model of D–N Explanation
Authors: Thorpe D. A.
Published: November 2002

This paper presents a new formal model for D–N explanation that gives intuitive criteria of acceptability, avoids the known trivializations, and links explanation with confirmation theory. Although set in the twenty-five year tradition of attempts to formalize D–N explanation, it proposes a new direction for the model that is to be distinguished from the syntactical and informational approaches by its introduction of restrictions which derive from the use which the D–N model can have in hypothesis testing. This model, illustrating the verificational approach, revises the classic H–O requirements and amends the notion of partial self-explanation to meet a criticism to which the H–O notion is vulnerable.
Inductive Immodesty and Lawlikeness
Authors: Pietarinen Juhani
Published: November 2002

David Lewis [2] suggests that an adequate inductive method should be immodest, i.e. recommend itself as at least as accurate as any of its rivals. On this basis he works out a solution to the intricate problem of choosing among Carnap's λ-methods. Lewis himself points out certain undesirable consequences of his solution. I will argue that the solution breaks down for a more general reason than that indicated by Lewis; like other procedures for estimating degrees of belief I am familiar with, it overlooks the component of lawlikeness of inductive situations. This is not to object to the requirement of immodesty; I only want to draw attention to certain assumptions which Lewis makes in deriving his equations and which seem to be unjustified.
Van Fraassen's Modal Model of Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: November 2002

Bas van Fraassen in [4] has recently tried to use modal logic to solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. His model is based on a method of expressing quantum states developed by Hugh Everett [1] called the “relative state formulation.” Unfortunately, Everett's mathematics cannot be generalized as van Fraassen requires. The difficulty itself is elementary enough. But a revision of van Fraassen's postulates (such as the one he adopted on p. 341 after he had been told of the problem) can save the mathematics only on pain of making the whole study irrelevant to the physics. I shall explain the dilemma in this note. In a later paper [5], van Fraassen avoids this dilemma by developing an abstract modal interpretation which does not rely on any expression for quantum states.
The Logic of Tests of Significance
Authors: Spielman Stephen
Published: November 2002

In spite of the fact that the Neyman–Pearson theory of testing is the official theory of statistical testing, most research publications in the social sciences use a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic of Fisherian tests of significance. The exact structure and rationale of this pattern of reasoning is widely misunderstood. The goal of the paper is to describe precisely the pattern and its rationale, and to show that while it is far more cogent than Fisher's critics have realized, it does not logically sustain the inferences it sanctions.
The New Riddle of Radical Translation
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: November 2002

This paper presents parts of a theory of radical translation with applications to the problem of construing reference. First, in sections 1 to 4 the general standpoint, inspired by Goodman's approach to induction, is set forth. Codification of sound translational practice replaces the aim of behavioral reduction of semantic notions. The need for a theory of translational projection (manual construction on the basis of a finite empirical correlation of sentences) is established by showing the anomalies otherwise resulting (e.g. from Quine's position). Then in section 5 a partial characterization of what constitutes an “admissible translation manual” is developed in the form of rules of translational projection governing correspondence of sentence-parts of a language-pair. Finally, in section 6, we give applications of the theory to the problem of construing reference. The general rules of section 5 suffice to rule out deviant referential schemes which have been held inscrutable alternatives to standard schemes.
The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery
Authors: Maxwell Nicholas
Published: November 2002

In Part I (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 41 No. 2, June, 1974) it was argued that in order to rebut Humean sceptical arguments, and thus show that it is possible for pure science to be rational, we need to reject standard empiricism and adopt in its stead aim oriented empiricism. Part II seeks to articulate in more detail a theory of rational scientific discovery within the general framework of aim oriented empiricism. It is argued that this theory (a) exhibits pure science as a rational enterprise (b) enables us to resolve problems associated with the key notions of simplicity and intelligibility (c) has important implications both for philosophy of science and for scientific practice itself.
Quantum Theory and Cosmolog
Authors: Clarke C. J. S.
Published: November 2002

Interpretations, or generalizations, of quantum theory that are applicable to cosmology are of interest because they must display and resolve the “paradoxes” directly. The Everett interpretation is reexamined and compared with two alternatives. Its “metaphysical” connotations can be removed, after which it is found to be more acceptable than a theory which incorporates collapse, while retaining some unsatisfactory features.
The Ignorance Interpretation Defended
Authors: Grossman Neal
Published: November 2002

The “Ignorance Interpretation” of quantum mechanical mixtures holds, roughly, that whenever a system S belongs to an ensemble, which is represented by a mixed statistical operator U = Σpi P[ψi] (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, Σipi = 1, P[ψi] is the projection operator for the state ψi), then S is in some pure state, although we are ignorant as to which one. It has been concluded, e.g. by van Fraassen, that “the ignorance interpretation is untenable,” and he presumably favors adopting “the position that mixtures of pure states are themselves new states ... to say that a system is in a proper mixture is to say that it is not in a pure state.” I wish to argue in this paper that there are no good grounds for rejecting the ignorance interpretation.
Mechanisms and Purposive Behavior III
Authors: Wright Larry
Published: November 2002

It is commonly thought that the dispositional view of purposiveness is itself incompatible with the programmatic claims of neurophysiologists. In this paper, various versions of four arguments for this incompatibility are examined, and rejected as unsound. Central to the argument is a rough sketch of a “mechanistic” position which seems clearly compatible with a dispositional view of purposiveness.
Extensive Measurement Without an Order Relation
Authors: Holman Eric W.
Published: November 2002

This paper states two sets of axioms sufficient for extensive measurement. The first set, like previously published axioms, requires that each of the objects measured must be classifiable as either greater than, or less than, or indifferent to each other object. The second set, however, requires only that any two objects be classifiable as either indifferent or different, and does not need any information about which object is greater. Each set of axioms produces an extensive scale with the usual properties of additivity and uniqueness except for unit. Moreover, the axioms imply Weber's Law: whether two objects are indifferent depends only upon the ratio of their scale values.
Measurement Without Archimedean Axioms
Authors: Narens Louis
Published: November 2002

Axiomatizations of measurement systems usually require an axiom—called an Archimedean axiom—that allows quantities to be compared. This type of axiom has a different form from the other measurement axioms, and cannot—except in the most trivial cases—be empirically verified. In this paper, representation theorems for extensive measurement structures without Archimedean axioms are given. Such structures are represented in measurement spaces that are generalizations of the real number system. Furthermore, a precise description of “Archimedean axioms” is given and it is shown that in all interesting cases “Archimedean axioms” are independent of other measurement axioms.
The Role of Genidentity In The Causal Theory of Time
Authors: Hoy Ronald C.
Published: November 2002

A recent version of the causal theory of time makes crucial use of a concept of the genidentity of events when it attempts to define temporal betweenness in terms of empirical, physical properties. By presenting and discussing an apparent counterexample it is argued that the role of genidentity in an empirical theory of time is problematic. In particular, it may be that the temporal behavior of objects is used to decide which events are genidentical, and, if so, the definition of temporal betweenness is circular. On the other hand, though there are strategies for avoiding the charge of circularity, in certain hypothetical situations the definition may yield inconsistent temporal orders. Then, the definition would have to be supplemented by a choice of temporal orders, and this choice may introduce an element of conventionality into the causal theory of time.
Better Theories
Authors: Darmstadter Howard
Published: November 2002

It is argued that a better theory neither (I) proves better at enabling us to realize our goals, nor (II) enables us to make more accurate predictions than a worse theory. (I) fails because it, tacitly, erroneously assumes, in talking of our goals, that individual preferences for theories can be aggregated into a social preference ordering; (II) fails because it cannot distinguish between important and unimportant predictions. Neither of these failures can be patched up by appealing to the notion of a true theory. The conclusion is that we as yet possess no adequate understanding of the relationships among theoretical progress, goal realization, and predictive accuracy.
Ramsey Sentences for Infinite Theories
Authors: Hendry Herbert E.
Published: November 2002

Ramsey's device [2], for eliminating theoretical terms from a theory assumes that the theory has only finitely many axioms. Paul Berent [1], has recently suggested a modification of Ramsey's method that is designed to cover the infinite case. But, his modified method is quite unlike Ramsey's in that it involves an ascent from the original theory to a suitable metatheory. Thus, it is perhaps of some interest to note that there is an extension of Ramsey's method that covers the infinite case and at the same time is much closer in spirit to his original suggestion.
A Relative Notion of Natural Generalization
Authors: Stemmer Nathan
Published: November 2002

According to our intuitions, certain generalizations are better confirmed by positive instances than others. In order to characterize the difference between these generalizations, I have proposed in [3] to investigate the generalizing behavior of living beings. Such an investigation makes it possible to classify into different categories the generalizations that are intuitively confirmed by their positive instances and those that are not intuitively confirmed by such instances. One important aspect of my treatment, however, has been shown to be unsatisfactory: sentences that are logically equivalent may belong to different categories. In this paper, I shall first give a short summary of the relevant parts of my previous paper, and then I shall try to improve it in order to avoid the undesirable result.
A “Revolutionary” Philosophy of Science: Feyerabend and The Degeneration of Critical Rationalism Into Sceptical Fallibilism
Authors: McEvoy John G.
Published: November 2002

The works of Paul K. Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson and Thomas S. Kuhn have come to occupy a central place in the annals of contemporary philosophy of science. Some of their contemporaries, ([1], [14], [20]), tend to regard them as the vanguard of a new “revolutionary” intellectual movement. Reacting against the views of their positivist predecessors, they embrace and propagate the idea that “pervasive presuppositions” are fundamental to scientific investigations. Thus, Feyerabend thinks that, “... scientific theories are ways of looking at the world; and their adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our experiences and our conception of reality” ([5], p. 29). This is in stark contrast to the positivist view that the aim of science is the systematization of experience that exists independently of any scientific theories ([12], p. 178). This new view of scientific theories also involves a “radical” conception of the nature of theoretical change. Rejecting the positivist notion of any constant element (experience, observation language, etc.) through such change, Kuhn regards a basic theoretical change as a conceptual revolution and “wants to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world” ([14], p. 110). Hanson uses the phrase ‘theory-loaded’ to give expression to a view of the semantic content of observation statements that follows from this general position ([11], pp. 19 ff.).
A Reinterpretation of Harré's Copernican Revolution
Authors: Mackinnon Edward
Published: November 2002

Rom Harré's proposed Copernican Revolution in the philosophy of science is a very ambitious undertaking. It challenges established views, proposes a radically new model for scientific explanation, and forces a rethinking of the foundations of the field. In his treatment of the natural sciences, Harré rejects all deductivist accounts of scientific explanation (whether these accounts are fashioned by rationalists or empiricists) basically on the grounds that such accounts seriously distort the methods of explanation actually operative in science. In the social sciences Harré, in collaboration with Secord, rejects mechanistic, positivistic, and behavioristic accounts of human behavior [5]. In place of these discarded interpretations he substitutes a new realism which stresses the role that models play in supplying accounts of observed patterns of phenomena in terms of the things and processes whose interactions are responsible for the manifest phenomena. This revolution, if successfully carried out, would indeed be a valuable contribution to the philosophy of science.
What Do We Talk About?
Authors: Tichý Pavel
Published: November 2002

By observing a black swan, one ascertains an interesting zoological fact. The fact involves two items, a specific object and the property of being a black swan, and consists in the former instantiating the latter. The object is in itself of little interest. Our environment abounds in objects, and knowledge is hardly enhanced by one of them being merely picked out for consideration. The same goes for the property. Properties are at least as plentiful as objects and one does not get to know anything by merely focussing attention upon one of them. What is of interest is the combination of the two items, i.e. the circumstance that the object instantiates the property. And this is what the said fact consists in.
A Set of Independent Axioms For Positive Hölder Systems
Authors: Falmagne J. C.
Published: November 2002

Current axiomatizations for extensive measurement postulate the existence of infinitely small objects. This assumption is neither necessary nor reasonable. This paper develops this theme and presents a more acceptable axiom system. A representation theorem is stated and proved in detail. This work improves some previous results of the author.
On Global Theories
Authors: Hooker C. A.
Published: November 2002

Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically, and merely accidentally connected. Moreover, such theories typically require all or most of the entire remainder of science to be properly applied in any given situation and theoreticians' models play a crucial role in such applications. (I call these respectively the internal and external globalnesses of theories.) A discussion of the consequences of these global features of theories for philosophy of science is offered in the context of specific examples and a structural model for science.
More Philosophical Aspects of Molecular Biology
Authors: Wendell-Waechtler S. , Levy E.
Published: November 2002

In his [1], David Berlinski explores, among other things, both what could be called a “sophisticated” and a “basic” analogy between languages and the genetic code. The basic analogy stems from the observation that the relationship between English and “Morse” appears to be formally similar to the relationship between DNA and protein. That is, just as sentences of the English language can be encoded into Morse, sequences of bases within strands of DNA are “transcribed” into polypeptides. (See Table 1.) To some, this “basic” analogy

(NB: There is no isomorphism between B″ and P′ since some codons do not code for amino acids; these codons appear to act as signals, e.g. for terminating polypeptide chains. Also note that the code is degenerate and thus G is not an embedding.)
Relative Truth, The Correspondence Principle and Absolute Truth
Authors: Nowak Leszek
Published: November 2002

The present paper is intended to take up the basic issue in Marxist epistemology: does the development of human cognition include mechanisms that ensure the attainment of, or approximation to, the absolute truth?

But to take up this issue we have to define the concept of absolute truth. This is why the paper begins with comment on the assumptions we adopt. This is followed by explanations of the concept of the absolute truth and that of relative truth and some of derivative concepts, too. Section 3 is concerned with the problem of whether the absolute truth is attainable, and with the role played in the process by the correspondence principle, which is reconstructed in a specified way.
A Note on A Definition of ‘Observation Term‘
Authors: Ostien Philip A.
Published: November 2002

In a recent series of articles, and in his latest book, James Cornman has proposed and defended a definition of ‘observation term’. The original definition appeared in [3]; in [4] Cornman defended this definition against some criticisms offered by P. K. Machamer ([5]), and also revised it somewhat; the revised definition is restated in [2] and used there in Cornman's discussion of the identity theory of the mind. Finally, in [1], Cornman again invokes his definition in defending scientific instrumentalism, and defends it against various generalized attacks on the very possibility of drawing a distinction between observational and theoretical terms which will do the sort of work Cornman wants it to do.
The Meaning of ‘Marketing‘
Authors: Angelmar Reinhard , Pinson Christian
Published: November 2002

One of the most persistent problems of marketing has been the question of what is meant by ‘marketing’. In the fifties and sixties discussion focused on the alleged scientific character of marketing. “Is marketing an art or a science?” was the principal question of the day [14], [5], [28]. This preoccupation with the procedures and the conceptual framework of marketing was followed by an eager interest in the contributions which clarification of marketing concepts could make to attaining the objectives of marketing managers. Managerial marketing and management science in marketing are the results of this identification of marketing with the objectives of its managerial users [16], [25]. More recently the emphasis has switched from procedures, conceptual framework, and objectives to the problem of the proper boundaries of marketing [19], [23], [18].
On Purely Probabilistic Theories of Scientific Inference
Authors: Blair David G.
Published: November 2002

This paper derives a mathematical expression giving the development of the probability of a scientific hypothesis with the number of confirming tests, as determined by Bayes's theorem, in a special case in which all the tests are “independent” of one another. The simple expression obtained shows clearly how the various factors influence the growth of the probability. The result is used to set a numerical lower bound on the probabilities representing the a priori beliefs of humans in generalizations that become accepted. By making a comparison with the predictions of a “logical atomic” model in the case of physical laws, it is argued that humans have significant a priori “knowledge” in a weak sense.
Two Grades of Evidential Bias
Authors: Churchland Paul M.
Published: November 2002

It is argued herein that there are two distinct ways in which all observation vocabularies are prejudiced with respect to theory. An argument based on the demands of adequate translation is invoked to show that even the simplest of our observation predicates must display the first and more obvious grade of bias—intensional bias. It is also argued that any observation vocabulary whose predicates are corrigibly applicable must manifest a second and equally serious grade of bias—extensional bias—independently of whatever intensional bias its predicates may or may not have.
Duhem's Thesis, Observationality, and Justification
Authors: Goosens William K.
Published: November 2002

Adolf Grünbaum, [1], and Philip Quinn, [7], have proposed two problems as sharpened versions of theses suggested by Pierre Duhem. (1) Can an hypothesis which in itself has no observational consequences ever be falsified by the evidence ? (2) When a theory has observational consequences only in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses and some of these consequences fail, can the theory always be reasonably defended by constructing alternative auxiliary hypotheses ?
The Replacement of Scientific Theories: Reduction and Explication
Authors: Gaa James
Published: November 2002

An examination of earlier views yields an account of theoretic change on which changes in theory which do involve changes in meanings of terms are classified as a special (and by no means exhaustive) case of theoretic change which, latter, is construed as a more general phenomenon. Only the general problem is given detailed consideration here. The account given considers the problem of how replacement of intensional theories by extensional ones may be treated within the general framework provided. Among its results is the conclusion that rational changes in a scientific theory may be cogently construed as determined by warranted decisions that a new theory is more adequate (than the old one it replaces) with regard to purposes for which a theory is sought.
‘True’ and Truth
Authors: Stroll Avrum , Alexander Henry
Published: November 2002

In Parts I, II, and III of the paper, the authors show that an argument essential to Alan White's defense of the Correspondence Theory of truth is unsuccessful. They argue that some of the premises of White's argument are false, and others incoherent. They show, further, that certain widely accepted assumptions in the philosophy of language, which underlie White's argument, must also be abandoned. In Part IV, they attempt to say something new about ‘true’, ‘false’, truth and falsity, and related notions. They do not offer a competing theory to White's, but instead stress features of the use of these words and concepts which philosophers have either ignored or insufficiently emphasized.
The Bifurcation of Scientific Theories and Indeterminacy of Translation
Authors: Hockney Donald
Published: November 2002

In this essay I present a statement of Quine's indeterminacy thesis in its general form. It is shown that the thesis is not about difficulties peculiar to so-called “radical translation.” It is a general thesis about meaning and reference with important consequences for any theory of our theories and beliefs. It is claimed that the thesis is inconsistent with Quine's realism, his doctrine of the relativity of reference, and that the argument for the thesis has the consequence that the concept of stimulus meaning is empty.

The sense in which linguistic science, as a branch of behavioral science, is “part of physics” is discussed. An alternative to Quine's view of the nature and content of linguistic science is proposed. It is shown to be consistent with Quine's assumptions concerning the legitimate scope of behavioral science and not to involve the notions of analyticity, synonymy and ‘ “prevalent attitudes toward meaning, idea and proposition” rejected by Quine.
Is Biology a Provincial Science?
Authors: Munson Ronald
Published: November 2002

My thesis is that biology is most plausibly regarded as a universal, as distinct from a provincial, science. First, I develop the general notion of a provincial science, formulate three criteria for applying the concept, and present brief examples illustrating their use. Second, I argue that a consideration of population genetics as a characteristic example of a basic biological theory strengthens the prior presumption that biology is not a provincial science. Finally, I examine two arguments to the effect that biology is a provincial science. The first concerns biology's exclusively terrestrial evidence base, the second the logical character of its laws. I introduce considerations that weaken the persuasiveness of the first argument and then show that the second one rests upon a false premise and so should be rejected.
On the Concept of a System
Authors: Marchal J. H.
Published: November 2002

The area of investigation known as general systems theory or research features the study of systems as interesting in its own right or one fruitful approach to the study of science in general. This leads to an interesting and still open problem, namely, explicating the concept of a system that seems to unify the interests of researchers in this area. Contrary to received opinion, I argue that there is a unique and interesting concept of a system that underlies the expressed interests of general systems researchers and that it can be given a satisfactory explication. The concept in question has systems as extralinguistic entities that we theorize about, namely, certain sorts of sets of re-related elements. Criteria for its explication are suggested; examples of systems, earlier analyses, and various objections are all considered in leading up to a partial formal explication of the concept and a statement of additional open problems.
Inertia, Gravitation and Metaphysics
Authors: Sklar Lawrence
Published: November 2002

Several variant “Newtonian” theories of inertia and gravitation are described, and their scientific usefulness discussed. An examination of these theories is used to throw light on traditional epistemological and metaphysical questions about space and time. Finally these results are examined in the light of the changes induced by the transition from “Newtonian” to general relativistic spacetime.
Negative Probabilities and the Uses of Signed Probability Theory
Authors: Allen Edward H.
Published: November 2002

The use of negative probabilities is discussed for certain problems in which a stochastic process approach is indicated. An extension of probability theory to include signed (negative and positive) probabilities is outlined and both philosophical and axiomatic examinations of negative probabilities are presented. Finally, a class of applications illustrates the use and implications of signed probability theory.
Peirce and the Economy of Research
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

The theory of the economics of research played a central role in the analysis of scientific method of Charles Sanders Peirce. The present paper describes Peirce's project as he saw it and then puts its machinery to work in an analysis of current issues in the philosophy of science. The aim is to show that, even apart from their historical interest, Peirce's ideas on this subject have a substantial systematic interest.
Hilbert's Epistemology
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: November 2002

Hilbert's program attempts to show that our mathematical knowledge can be certain because we are able to know for certain the truths of elementary arithmetic. I argue that, in the absence of a theory of mathematical truth, Hilbert does not have a complete theory of our arithmetical knowledge. Further, while his deployment of a Kantian notion of intuition seems to promise an answer to scepticism, there is no way to complete Hilbert's epistemology which would answer to his avowed aims.
Are Statistical Explanations Possible?
Authors: Krüger Lorenz
Published: November 2002

The intuitive notion of a statistical explanation has been explicated in different ways; recently it has even been claimed that there are no statistical explanations at all. In an attempt to clarify the disputed issue, the approaches adopted by Hempel, by Jeffrey, Salmon and Greeno, and by Stegmüller are analyzed critically, as far as they are concerned with the explanation of particular events. A solution of the controversy is proposed on the basis of a concept of explanation which refers essentially to a causal analysis of the explanandum. The possibility of statistical explanations, then, becomes contingent upon the existence of indeterministic causation. In conclusion, therefore, a conception of causality is sketched which shows that indeterminism and causal connection are compatible, at least from an epistemological point of view, so that statistical explanation can be seen to represent a specific and possibly irreducible scientific activity.
Is Preacceleration of Particles in Dirac's Electrodynamics a Case of Backward Causation? The Myth of Retrocausation in Classical Electrodynamics
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Is it a “conceptual truth” or only a logically contingent fact that, in any given kind of case, an event x which asymmetrically causes (“produces”) an event y likewise temporally precedes y or at least does not temporally succeed y? A bona fide physical example in which the cause retroproduces the effect would show that backward causation is no less conceptually possible than forward causation. And it has been claimed ([9], p. 151; [4], p. 41) that in Dirac's classical electrodynamics (relativistic and non-relativistic), the preacceleration of charged particles before any forces are applied to them furnishes a genuine case of retrocausation by later forces.

An exposition of the pertinent physics furnishes the basis for arguing the following: Whereas the non-zero acceleration of a neutral NEWTONIAN mass particle is, of course, causally connected as such to the simultaneously applied non-zero force, the non-zero acceleration of a DIRACIAN charged particle is not causally connected at all as such to the applied forces. A fortiori, in Dirac's electrodynamics, the applied forces do not qualify asymmetrically as the causes of a non-zero acceleration as such; nor does a non-zero acceleration as such qualify as an effect produced by forces. This is shown by means of two considerations as follows: (1) In Dirac's theory, no functional dependence of the value of a non-zero acceleration on the weighted time-average of the forces is vouchsafed as a matter of physical LAW alone without any value of a constant of integration, just as no Newtonian law(s) alone can guarantee a functional dependence of the non-zero value of the velocity of a Newtonian mass particle on the applied forces. Instead, both functional dependencies alike are vouchsafed only with the crucial aid of some de facto boundary condition pertaining to either the past or to the future, so that (2) Non-zero preaccelerations of Diracian charged particles can no more be causally attributed as such to the retrocausal action of later forces than non-zero “prevelocities” of Newtonian mass particles can be held to be caused as such by later applied forces. The retrocausal interpretation of Dirac's preaccelerations is just as invalid as the retrocausal interpretation of Newtonian prevelocities.
On the Logic of Natural Kinds
Authors: Cocchiarella Nino
Published: November 2002

A minimal second order modal logic of natural kinds is formulated. Concepts are distinguished from properties and relations in the conceptual-logistic background of the logic through a distinction between free and bound predicate variables. Not all concepts (as indicated by free predicate variables) need have a property or relation corresponding to them (as values of bound predicate variables). Issues pertaining to identity and existence as impredicative concepts are examined and an analysis of mass terms as nominalized predicates for kinds of stuff is proposed. The minimal logic is extendible through a summum genus, an infima species or a partition principle for natural kinds.
Probability Logic and ℱ-Coherence
Authors: Dale A. I.
Published: November 2002

In order that a degree-of-belief function be coherent it is necessary and sufficient that it satisfy the axioms of probability theory. This theorem relies heavily for its proof on the two-valued sentential calculus, which emerges as a limiting case of a continuous scale of truth-values. In this “continuum of certainty” a theorem analogous to that instanced above is proved.
Verisimilitude or the Approach to the Whole Truth
Authors: Keuth Herbert
Published: November 2002

Science progresses if we succeed in rendering the objects of scientific inquiry more comprehensively or more precisely. Popper tries to formalize this venerable idea. According to him the most comprehensive and most precise description of the world is given by the set T of all true statements. A hypothesis comes the closer to T, or has the more verisimilitude, the more true consequences and the fewer false consequences it implies. Popper proposes to order hypotheses by the inclusion relations between the sets of their true and of their false consequences (“truth contents” and “falsity contents”). A partial ordering would permit one to decide whether the substitution of theory t1 by t2 represents scientific progress. But because of the logical relations between the elements of the sets of logical consequences, or contents, false hypotheses cannot be compared. As our theories usually turn out to be false sooner or later, they can seldom be compared as to their verisimilitude and when they can, the result depends only on which theory implies the other and on their truth-values. Popper even tries to define a measure of verisimilitude on the partial ordering. It has to fail for the same reason. In addition he tries to relativize the concept of a content and fails. What is more, any attempt at defining a measure of better or worse correspondence to the whole truth must fail, as there is no justification for saying that any true primitive sentence asserts as much about reality as some other primitive sentence, or more.