bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Communist Education: Theory and Practice
Authors: Hu C. T.
Published: March 2009

Paradoxically, the contemporary phase of China's development under Communism is at once an extreme form of Westernisation and a partial reversion to traditional patterns. The totalitarian character of the present regime is not only reminiscent of the ancient autocratic order but is attributable to that tradition for its acceptance and acquiescence. On the ideological front, the state of confusion of thought, compounded by almost a century's cultural dislocation, has been brought to an abrupt end, with the promulgation of Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology which, though antithetic to Confucian orthodoxy in every essential way, is equally pervasive. Inasmuch as the ideological ‘reconditioning of the Chinese nation is first and foremost an educational task, education has become the exclusive concern of the Communist state. Moreover, within the Marxian ideological framework, the pursuit of concrete national goals requires the education of the Chinese people. Hence there are two major aspects in the study of Chinese education under Communism: Fundamental principles and actual implementation; in short, theory and practice.
How Much Grain Does Communist China Produce?
Authors: Field Robert Michael
Published: March 2009

How much grain does Communist China produce? Is total production over 200 million tons, or is it as low as 175 million tons? The purpose of this brief article is to explore the differences among presently available estimates of grain production in Communist China and to point out some of the implications of these differences.
Centralization and Decentralization in China's Fiscal Management
Authors: Lardy Nicholas R.
Published: March 2009

The economic decentralization measures introduced in the late 1950s have long been viewed as a watershed in the economic and political evolution of post-1949 China. The most widely accepted interpretation is that these edicts transferred broad economic powers from the Centre to the provincial governments and that, as a result, the ability of the central government to control the allocation of the nation's economic resources was substantially impaired. This fundamental realignment in the internal balance of economic power is, in turn, viewed as having far-reaching implications for China's capacity for national economic planning and for a broad range of other important issues related to our understanding of China's developmental experience.
The “Second Wang Ming Line” (1935–38)
Authors: Benton Gregor
Published: March 2009

The subject of this article is the development of the second united front in China between 1935 and 1938, and in particular the difference between the Comintern and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on this question. In the first part of the period these differences revealed themselves in the Comintern's criticisms of the CCP's slow rate of progress towards rapprochement with the Kuomintang (KMT). As progress towards the united front gathered speed, they more and more came to centre on how far the alliance should go and the status of the communist areas and armies in relation to the central power of the KMT. Eventually the Maoist interpretation emerged successful from this contest between the two centres, and Wang Ming, chief Chinese spokesman for the Comintern, was elbowed away from the levers of power in the Party.
Science Policy Shifts, Organizational Change and China's Development
Authors: Suttmeier Richard P.
Published: March 2009

One of the most notable features of post-1949 China has been its striking periodicity. Through their pronounced policy changes and frequent political campaigns, Chinese leaders have incidentally provided the foreign analyst with a set of periods according to which events may be readily classified. Indeed, the temporal variable is the chief qualifier on which our generalizations must be contingent. There are few statements about the People's Republic, particularly those dealing with its conscious efforts at “development,” which can be made without a modifying phrase such as “before the cultural Revolution …” or “as a result of the Great Leap….” Thus, though considerations of time are obviously important for any developmental analysis, they are particularly significant with regard to China where one is struck by the frequency, suddenness and apparent disjointedness of change. The untidy set of events since 1949 which comprises China's developmental experience violates the sense of orderly progress on which so much of our thinking about development has been based.
The Socialization of Children in China and on Taiwan: An Analysis of Elementary School Textbooks
Authors: Martin Roberta
Published: March 2009

This essay attempts to describe and contrast the social and political norms which the governments of China and Taiwan encourage their respective citizens to adopt. It endeavours to highlight contrasts in the goals of socialization in the two societies, so different in their vision of the ideal Chinese polity, by examining the norms presented to children through elementary school textbooks.
Notes on Chinese Higher Education: 1974
Authors: Prybyla Jan S.
Published: March 2009

I travelled in China in February 1974 as member of an academic group from the Pennsylvania State University, led by the university president, John W. Oswald. I visited the following institutions of higher learning: Canton Medical College, Chungshan University in Canton, Futan University in Shanghai, Nanking University, Nanking Normal (Teachers') College, Peking University, and the Central Institute of Nationalities in Peking. A member of our group (an engineer) visited Tsinghua University in Peking. In each of these institutions our group held lengthy conversations with personnel of the Revolutionary Committees, faculty members, and some students. In Shanghai I gave a lecture on the U.S. economy to faculty members from the departments of economics and international politics of Futan University.
Recent Developments in China's University Recruitment System
Authors: Casella Alexander
Published: March 2009

During the Cultural Revolution, many of the attacks directed against the university system which prevailed till the spring of 1966 were aimed at the methods by which students were recruited. According to evidence gathered by western scholars and expounded by Chinese educational authorities, China's educational system was contributing to social stratification and was essentially elitist. The system by which students were recruited allegedly rested on scholastic excellency and therefore discriminated against students of rural background or of simple origin. Ultimately, according to Chinese claims, it was the children of the educated who had access to education, while university recruitment tended to favour more and more the offspring of cadres and of former members of the “exploiting classes.”
The Assignment of University Graduates in China, 1974
Authors: Teiwes Frederick C.
Published: March 2009

In my article, “Before and after the Cultural Revolution” (Report from China, The China Quarterly, No. 58), I reported that while “most” graduates of Chinese universities were slated to return to their original production units some received assignments from the The Assignment of University Graduates in China, 1974 state. At the time (September–October 1973) Chinese officials were unable to provide a breakdown of the two types ostensibly because no university classes had yet graduated. In November 1974, a discussion with members of a delegation from the Academia Sinica to Australia provided important new information on this question. Speaking of Peking University which graduated its first post-Cultural Revolution class in January 1974, delegation members did not give a precise or even rough statistical breakdown but did say “most” had returned to their original posts or original localities – a significantly more elastic formulation than that used in 1973. Moreover, they further stated that students selected from factories mostly returned to those factories while students who had been educated youth sent to the countryside were mostly allocated by the central planning agency to various departments. The body doing the actual allocation is the Office for Science and Education under the State Planning Commission.
China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973–74
Authors: Goldman Merle
Published: March 2009

Observers of the current Chinese scene have found the anti-Confucian campaign which dominated the Chinese press from the autumn of 1973 through 1974 to be extremely puzzling. At one level, most observers agree that the attack on Confucianism was what it appeared to be – a continuation of the communist effort to eradicate traditional habits and attitudes that have persisted despite the revolution. It was a campaign against elitism, bureaucratism, scorn of physical labour, and the inferior condition of women. Most important, it was the rejection of the Confucian values of idealism, humanism and conservatism.
China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst Discontinuity
Authors: Barnds William J.
Published: March 2009

One of the more intriguing features of Chinese foreign policy has been the continuity of Peking's effort to maintain good relations with Pakistan despite the periodic upheavals in Chinese domestic politics and the alterations between moderation and militancy in China's policies towards the outside world. Although the goals of China's foreign policy – the recovery of Taiwan, the elimination (or the neutralization) of hostile military power from nearby areas, and the enhancement of China's status and influence in the world – have remained the same since 1950, changing international conditions and evolving Chinese perceptions have led to dramatic shifts in Peking's policies and in its relations with other powers. Former friends have become enemies and former enemies have become, if not friends, at least less dangerous antagonists. Yet China's relations with Pakistan, while not always smooth, have evidenced a high degree of stability.
The Radical Students in Kwangtung during the Cultural Revolution
Authors: Lee Hong Yung
Published: March 2009

The Cultural Revolution was a large-scale self-examination by the Chinese of their political system, involving all the ruling groups as well as the whole population. Not only specific policy issues but also social. economic and political institutions and their value premises were subjected to this examination. Hoping to reverse the trend towards social restratification based on Party bureaucratism, Mao sought to build a mass consensus on the future direction of the revolution. However, in the process of “freely mobilizing the masses,” some social groups found that their interests called for a radical restructuring of the Chinese political system, while those of others lay in the status quo. As the Cultural Revolution (CR) unfolded, the masses and the elite further divided among themselves over the various issues: elite groupings took conservative or radical positions, and formed coalitions with corresponding sections of the masses. Consequently, the division between the radicals and the conservatives cut through both the elite and the masses and set in motion forces that gave the Cultural Revolution its distinctive character.
Inequality and Stratification in China
Authors: Whyte Martin King
Published: March 2009

Vague and often somewhat contradictory impressions of equality and inequality in China abound. Some recent visitors to China have reported that income differentials there have been reduced to nominal levels. At the same time the recurring themes of the class struggle and the dangers of revisionism alert us to the continuing conflict within China over the inequalities that still exist. In this paper I try to draw together the scattered pieces of information already available in order to examine, first, the kinds of inequalities that do continue to exist in China, and then the policies designed to affect the transmission of these inequalities over time and from generation to generation, or, in other words, stratification. Although the available information is not precise enough to permit any systematic comparisons with other countries, I hope to be able to arrive at some rough impressions of the extent to which the Chinese elite has been successful in producing a society with more equality and less stratification than is generally the case elsewhere.
Science and the Open-Doors Educational Movement
Authors: Jen C. K.
Published: March 2009

I visited China for 46 days in the months of July and August 1974, almost exactly two years after my first visit in 1972. The interval between my two visits coincided very closely with the growth of the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, which reached an intense level at the time of my most recent visit. In my own view, the campaign was the second wave of the Cultural Revolution in succession to the first wave formed by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. In both, the educational movement or revolution has played and is playing a very prominent role and has in turn produced very visible effects on China's science and technology.
Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions Since the 11th Congress
Authors: Young Graham
Published: March 2009

The legacies of the Cultural Revolution have been nowhere more enduring than in the Chinese Communist Party organization. Since late 1967, when the process of rebuilding the shattered Party began, strengthening Party leadership has been a principal theme of Chinese politics; that theme has become even more pronounced in recent years. It is now claimed that earlier efforts achieved nothing, and that during the whole “decade of turmoil” until 1976, disarray in the Party persisted and political authority declined still further. Recent programmes of Party reform, therefore, still seek to overcome the malign effects of the Cultural Revolution in order to achieve the complementary objectives of reviving abandoned Party “traditions” and refashioning the Party according to the new political direction demanded by its present leaders.
The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung
Authors: Boorman Howard L.
Published: March 2009

Poetry and politics are rare companions in the competitive world of practical affairs today. In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev, with peasant shrewdness, is addicted to Russian proverbs to enliven his rhetoric; but there are few indications that he is sympathetic with the creative writer and none that he himself will rank with Pushkin in the annals of his nation's literature. In Washington, the appearance of Robert Frost at John F. Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961 was an event at once exceptional and gratifying to admirers of Frost's artistic integrity; the elderly poet's advice to the young president of the United States to stress the Irish and underplay the Harvard hi his background may yet have enduring significance. Only in Peking, however, do we find a world leader who combines distinctive political abilities and literary talents. Indeed the juxtaposition of strategic and artistic instincts hi Mao Tse-tung is so unusual in the post-Churchillian world that the case merits more than passing note.
Chinese Communist Literature: The Persistence of Traditional Forms
Authors: Birch Cyril
Published: March 2009

What pessimistic observers have lamented as the collapse of Chinese civilisation is exactly the necessary undermining and erosion without which there could not have been a regeneration of an old civilisation.… The product of this rebirth looks suspiciously occidental. But scratch the surface and you will find that the stuff of which it is made is essentially the Chinese bedrock which much weathering and corrosion have only made stand out more clearly—the humanistic and rationalistic China resurrected by the touch of the scientific and democratic civilisation of the new world.
The Image of Youth and Age in Chinese Communist Literature
Authors: Wilhelm Hellmut
Published: March 2009

Speaking in a very general way, youth and age have been taken in traditional Chinese literature as two stages in a continuous development of which the first represents the preparation and the last the goal. Respective values attached to these stages were derived from this concept. In a civilisation where literature, even polite literature, was to a large extent an amateurish pursuit of the scholar-official, this evaluation does not come as a surprise, particularly since it will not be easy to find another civilisation which was as strongly ideology-motivated as was the Chinese. Established attitudes concerning youth and age were thus, in general, accepted and taken for granted also by the poet.
The 1962 Harvest
Authors: Robertson Frank
Published: March 2009

First hard estimates of China's food production for 1962, a crucial year indeed, indicate a grains yield increase of from 8 to 10 per cent, over 1961, giving a total of 180–185 million metric tons; a fair enough year, all things considered, but not one promising any real relief from grey austerity, or an early end to the heavy industry pause.
Chinese Traditional Medicine: A Practitioner's View
Authors: Mann Felix
Published: March 2009

China had a system of medicine long before the advent of scientific medicine in the West. The first book about it, the Su Wen Nei Ching, was written about 300 B.C., and its detailed description of some medical phenomena cannot be surpassed even today. Despite the fact that much of the terminology is metaphysical, this traditional system of Chinese medicine is at the same time very much down to earth, being largely the result of minute observations. Consequently the symptoms of many diseases are much better described in traditional Chinese textbooks than in their modern scientific Western counterparts. Reading the Chinese books indeed opens up a new vista to a Western doctor, transforming the small range of obvious symptoms he learned at a Western medical school into a vast panorama of interconnected phenomena. It would seem that, with his reliance on laboratory procedures, the Western doctor may have been gradually losing this art of close observation; perhaps it is only artists who retain it today.
Why China Imports Wheat
Authors: Mah Feng-Hwa
Published: March 2009

The early 1960s witnessed significant changes in the commodity structure of Mainland China's international trade. One of the most striking developments during these years was that China became a net food importer, whereas in the 1950s, when Russia was her most important trading partner, China had been a net exporter of foodstuffs, and roughly one third to one half of China's exports to the Soviet Union had consisted of processed and unprocessed food. These exports were reduced to a mere 3 to 5 per cent, of China's total exports to Russia during 1961–63. Accompanying this change was a pronounced increase of China's imports of food from western countries. During 1952–60, China's purchase of “cereals and cereal preparations” had accounted for but 1 per cent, or less of her total imports from the West. This was augmented to approximately one-half of total imports in 1961–63, about one-third in 1964–66 and roughly one-fifth in 1967. The single most important item of the imported food has been wheat, amounting to four to five million metric tons a year since 1961, and coming mostly from Canada, Australia, Argentina and France.
Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution, 1958–69
Authors: Schram Stuart R.
Published: March 2009

In the history of the Chinese communist movement, the re-emergence of the term “permanent” or “uninterrupted” revolution is clearly associated with the Great Leap Forward of 1958. It is then that the concept was first put forward once more after an eclipse of 30 years, and though it has since been employed from time to time, the most important articles on the subject were published in 1958 and 1959. The Cultural Revolution, has, however, altered our perception of this as of so many other important matters, both by making available new information and by placing the events of the previous decade, in a new perspective.
The Statistical Evidence for Yang Ch'eng-wu's Manipulation of the Military Elite
Authors: Goodman David S. G.
Published: March 2009

William Parish in “Factions in Chinese Military Politics,” ( The China Quarterly, No. 56, p. 667) argues that military factions only assumed political importance during the Cultural Revolution. Part of this argument is based on the claim that Yang Ch'eng-wu, when acting chief of staff and secretary-general of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, attempted to influence the appointment of PLA cadres to provincial revolutionary committees in favour of the 5th Field Army. This influence, he demonstrates, by considering the distribution of PLA cadres with known Field Army affiliations on two groups of provincial revolutionary committees: those formed before and those formed after 8 March 1968 – the date of Yang's last public appearance. Parish argues that a significantly greater proportion of military cadres with a 5th Field Army background were appointed to those Provincial Revolutionary Committees formed before 8 March 1968, than one would have expected given the distribution of such cadres in military posts in 1966. Since he had previously argued that military appointments before 1967 were made without reference to Field Army affiliations, he concludes that Yang was engaged in factional politics. However, Parish's account of Yang Ch'engwu's activities is very much open to question on the grounds that the available evidence suggests that most military appointments to the leading positions (i.e. chairman or vice-chairman) on Provincial-level Revolutionary Committees were determined well before the formal establishment of these institutions and before Yang's dismissal.
The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order
Authors: Ahn Byung-joon
Published: March 2009

Since her traditional empire collapsed China has experimented with many political institutions. After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) imposed a revolutionary one-party regime, the pattern of political order has shifted from one form to another. Intra-Party conflicts preceded these shifts, of which the Cultural Revolution represented the culmination. But in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution another shift is taking place, so it too has raised a series of important questions about Chinese politics.
Li Hsi-fan on Modern Chinese Literature
Authors: Link Perry
Published: March 2009

Li Hsi-fan, currently Literature and Arts Editor of the People's Daily, is an influential leader in the shaping of China's literary policy. In recent issues of Chinese Literature he has written of the life and times of Lu Hsiin in terms which seem clearly intended to leave the reader inspired and eager to support China's continuing literary struggles. Perhaps justifiably, Li's judgments are expressed in black-and-white terms and girded with exclamation marks. This style, whatever its purpose, raises again the interesting question of the extent to which Chinese leaders actually view China's experience in such terms. Is the Chinese Literature style intended as a reflection of things as they are, or is it a tool used to project an ideal, while a fuller view of reality, including its various shades of grey, rests in the background?
Hua Kuo-feng's Pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan Years, 1949–66: The Making of a Political Generalist
Authors: Oksenberg Michel , Yeung Sai-cheung
Published: March 2009

Speaking to his comrades at the important Chengtu meeting in March 1958, nearly two months after he had already announced his intention to resign the chairmanship of the People's Republic, Chairman Mao described the dynamics of Chinese politics:

Comrades working in the provinces will sooner or later come to the Centre. Comrades at the Centre will sooner or later either die or leave the scene. Khrushchev came from a local area. At the local level the class struggle is more acute, closer to natural struggle, closer to the masses. This gives the local comrades an advantage over those at the Centre.
The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking as Seen Through Allegorical Articles, 1973–76
Authors: Lieberthal Kenneth
Published: March 2009

Mao Tse-tung died on 9 September 1976. On 6 October, with the arrest of four leading members of the Politburo, Hua Kuo-feng became Mao Tse-tung's successor. Since then the Chinese media have vilified the “gang of four” as “splittists” who had worked together for years to divide the Party and promote their own personal fortunes. According to the victors, policy issues had little to do with the activities of this nefarious “gang.” Rather, lust for personal power and desire for wealth alone inspired them to wage partisan warfare within the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.
Grain Self-sufficiency in North China, 1953–75
Authors: Walker Kenneth R.
Published: March 2009

According to the Chinese Government a large northern area comprising the three provinces of Honan, Hopei and Shantung, with a total population of around 180 million, became “self-sufficient” in grain during 1970 and followed this achievement by exporting grain in the period 1972–74. Reports appear to claim that Honan and Hopei attained self-sufficiency in 1970–71, and that it is these two provinces which have since provided the export surpluses. Shantung, on the other hand, did not break even until 1972 and no reports have been discovered which claim that it has exported any grain up to the end of 1975.
Li Jingquan and the South-west Region, 1958—66: The Life and “Crimes” of a “Local Emperor”
Authors: Goodman David S. G.
Published: March 2009

This article is concerned with one aspect of the spatial distribution of power in the People's Republicof China – the relationship between Centre and region during 1958–66. During the past decade or so several different interpretations of the spatial distribution of power have emerged amongst western analysts of China, polarizing between centralized and decentralized models of the Chinese decision-making process. The recordof the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution certainly suggests that political power was not only decentralized but also misused in the preceding period. Between 1966 and 1968 the impact of the attack on the Party-State system fell disproportionately on the provincial level, and most first secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) provincial committees and regional bureaus were criticized and removed from office. Moreover, many ofthese were accused of having created “independent kingdoms” in the areas under their leadership.
An Introduction
Authors: Halperin Morton H.
Published: March 2009

No reader of the polemics in the Sino-Soviet dispute can fail to have noticed the importance of issues of nuclear war and disarmament. Among the bitterest exchanges were the statements issued by the spokesmen of the two governments following the signing of the test ban treaty in 1963. The Chinese have launched a broad attack on the Soviet position on disarmament issues most notably in the Fifth Comment on the Soviet Open Letter published on November 8, 1963.
The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party-Soldiers 1959–1966
Authors: Powell Ralph L.
Published: March 2009

The events of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” have resulted in Lin Piao becoming the heir apparent of Mao Tse-tung while the armed forces have become the principal power factor in Communist China. However, much of the basis for the greatly expanded roles and power of Lin and the military establishment was actually laid in the period 1959–66. In considerable part, Lin Piao and his lieutenants gained power by establishing themselves as “the most loyal” supporters and potential heirs of the venerable, charismatic Mao Tsetung. In addition, for several years they have been carefully infiltrating into numerous key institutions of the state and Party and have played an important role in seeking to purge the opposition. Many of Marshal Lin's supporters and some of his opponents are professional party-soldiers, who have long been the Party's senior specialists in military affairs. Legally these men no longer have the title of marshal or general, for ranks were officially abolished in June 1965. However, since these powerful figures continue to dominate the massive armed forces, while extending their influence much further into the battered party and government structure, it will help to clarify a complex struggle if those who are primarily party-soldiers are still designated by their previous military ranks. For example, after the party reorganisation of August 1966 there were eight former marshals on the list of members of the new Politburo of the Party.
The People's Procuratorate in Communist China: The Institution Ascendant, 1954–1957
Authors: Ginsburgs George , Stahnke Arthur
Published: March 2009

In March 1954, the Central Committee of the CCP offered for discussion the initial draft of the Constitution which reflected the victories of the people's democracy and socialism. In this draft was systematised the new historical experience of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people and the accumulated experience of state building. In the discussion of the draft, which lasted more than two months, took part more than 8,000 representatives of various strata of the population.
Economic Growth and Change in China: A Twenty-Year Perspective
Authors: Eckstein Alexander
Published: March 2009

Maoist ideology and policy imposed on the realities of China's economic backwardness and the scarcities resulting therefrom have produced a peculiar and sharply contrasting pattern of development during the past two decades. The differences in economic performance were so marked – characterized by rapid expansion in the 1950s and stagnation in the 1960s – that it almost seems as though one were dealing with economies in two entirely different settings, perhaps even in two different countries.
The Chinese Machine-Building Industry: A Reappraisal
Authors: Field Robert Michael
Published: March 2009

The machine-building industry covers a very wide field: rolling stock for railroads, blast furnaces for new iron and steel complexes, trucks and tractors for agriculture, bicycles, radios, clocks and thermos bottles for personal use, not to mention thousands of other commodities. An interest in any of these things or in more aggregate measures such as the volume of construction or the growth of industry, presupposes an interest in the machine-building industry. As it was put in the first Five-Year Plan, “The machine-building industry is the key to the technological transformation of [the] national economy.”
Report from China: A Post-Cultural Revolution Look at Buddhism
Authors: John  , Strong Sarah
Published: March 2009

Since August 1966, apart from the scattered reports of a few visitors, the western world has seen nothing substantial of Buddhism in China. In this field, as in many others, the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution brought an almost total eclipse. But today Buddhism is beginning to re-emerge. There are two principal signs of this: in Peking, the Chinese Buddhist Association is starting to function again; and, throughout the country, a number of Buddhist monasteries are once more open to visitors. In addition, there are numerous minor indications: Peking University, for example, is planning a course on Chinese Philosophy which would include lectures on the history of Buddhism; Buddhist art treasures are on display in many of the recently re-opened museums; Mao Tse-tung is said to have patterned his calligraphy on that of a Buddhist monk in Hunan; and handicraft factories are once again producing ivory Kuan-yins and miniature pagodas for export.
Of Women and Washing Machines: Employment, Housework, and the Reproduction of Motherhood in Socialist China
Authors: Robinson Jean C.
Published: March 2009

Biology is not supposed to be destiny in socialist China. In contrast to class societies where supposedly “men occupy the position of the ruling class… and women become the household slaves of men and the instruments for producing more men,” in China men and women together are said to hold up the sky (biantian). Women are no longer enslaved by reproduction; if they are oppressed, it is merely because remnants of feudal thinking, superstition and backwardness still exist in China. Or so it is argued by representatives of the Chinese leadership. Here I will posit a different view. Rather than blaming feudalism or China's lack of development, I suggest that contemporary political and economic decisions have reinforced sex inequality in China. In this article, I argue that social and economic policies since the Third Plenum of the llth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party have created conditions which impose on women (and men) sex-differentiated roles in production and reproduction. These new public policies sustain the traditional definition of women as household labourers and reproducers of men.
The Cultural Revolution Revisited: Dissonance Reduction or Power Maximization
Authors: Hiniker Paul J.
Published: March 2009

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began with the publication of Yao Wenyuan's article, “Comment on the new historical play ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’,” which alluded to Chairman Mao's summary dismissal of Defence Minister Peng Dehuai six years earlier. The article first appeared in the 10 November 1965 issue of the ShanghaiWen Hui Dailyunder Chairman Mao's personal direction through the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. The curious unrolling of the Cultural Revolution during the subsequent three years through the consolidating Ninth Party Congress in the spring of 1969, exhibited three essential characteristics: first of all, an unprecedented increase in proselytizing for the Thought of Mao Zedong; secondly, an unprecedented leftist purging of the majority of the Politburo and Central Committee leadership; and finally, an unprecedented infusion of outside youth and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army to fill the vacated leadership posts.
Towards the Forging of a Chinese University Ethos: Zhendan and Fudan, 1903–1919
Authors: Hayhoe Ruth
Published: March 2009

Fudan is one of China's few universities to survive the vicissitudes of this century's political upheavals, with a tradition of almost 80 years' standing. Many of the colleges which sprung up at the same time perished with the 1911 Revolution, and others of similar character disappeared in the reorganization of Chinese higher education in 1952. It may be significant, therefore, that Fudan was chosen by Chinese Communist leaders to become one of the main comprehensive universities for south China in 1952, which suggests that certain aspects of the tradition for which it was known were considered acceptable and worthy of continuation under the new people's government. Perhaps its development had demonstrated some small measure of success in the exacting task facing Chinese higher education in this century, that of creating a modern Chinese-style university on the ruins of the traditional education system whose values persisted in spite of the abolition of the Imperial examinations in 1905, the year in which Fudan was born.
Imperialism in Transition: British Business and the Chinese Authorities, 1931–37
Authors: Osterhammel Jürgen
Published: March 2009

According to current Chinese views, in 1949 China was liberated from three major evils: feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic capitalism. The present article takes a closer look at the relationship between the two last mentioned. The period chosen is the early and mid 1930s, which was marked by growing tensions between the powers in East Asia, by acute economic depression and subsequent recovery, and by the gradual extension of the Nanjing Government's control over the country. On the foreigner's side, the focus will be on the British experience at a time when Great Britain's political position in the Far East was being overshadowed by Japan's thrust towards hegemony. It will be argued, the widening gap between Britain's political and economic presence in China was partly bridged by increasingly close co-operation between British business and the Chinese ruling elite.
Xinjiang and Wang Enmao: New Directions in Power, Policy and Integration?
Authors: McMillen Donald H.
Published: March 2009

At first glance, it would seem that over the past two decades Chinese Communist Party (CCP) power and policy in the distant Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China have travelled full circle. By late 1981 the region's foremost pre-Cultural Revolution leader, Wang Enmao, and many of the more moderate and pragmatic policies he had come to advocate for consolidating CCP (and Han) control without unduly provoking the sensitivities of the majority non-Han (and primarily Islamic) indigenous population, had returned.2 Thus, the stage was set for Xinjiang'sde novooverall integration with the rest of China. Against a brief historical backdrop this article will analyse recent leadership and policy trends in strategically-located Xinjiang, particularly the significance of Wang's return. It will then assess subsequent socio-economic developments and discuss their relevance to security and defence-related issues. Finally, some conclusions will be made concerning the always complex process of integration, in terms of both its nature and degree and its interaction with the processes of ‘modernization.’
Social Change and Continuity in South China: Overseas Chinese and the Guan Lineage of Kaiping County, 1949–87
Authors: Woon Yuen-Fong
Published: March 2009

For a variety of reasons, still hotly debated by social anthropologists and social historians, both Guangdong and Fujian have been home to many large tightly-organized lineages since at least the 17th century. For a variety of reasons, overseas Chinese emigration in the pre-1949 period was also more prevalent in Guangdong and Fujian than in other Chinese provinces.
Small Towns and China's Urbanization Level
Authors: Lee Yok-shiu F.
Published: March 2009

China'sde jureurbanization level more than doubled in the five years between 1982 and 1987, jumping from 20.8 per cent to 46 6 per cent (Table 1). The Chinese State Statistical Bureau (SSB) officials explained that this unprecedented increase was largely the result of an increase in the number of urban towns since the mid 1984 relaxation of criteria for urban town designation.1 This is, however, only a partial explanation. My own analysis shows that much of the gain in the town population was in fact due to the post-1984 governing system of“town administering village” (zhen guan cun). Many newly designated urban towns (and some existing towns as well) have enlarged their administrative territories to include a huge number of agricultural residents in their official urban population. Most of these rural persons, however, judged by strict occupational and residential criteria, should not have been counted as urban population. The inclusion of many agricultural persons in the urban sector since mid 1984 has thus greatly exaggerated the actual urbanization level.2
The Structural Evolution of ‘Criticism and Self-Criticism’
Authors: Dittmer Lowell
Published: March 2009

“ Criticism and self-criticism,” or inner-Party struggle as it is sometimes called, has always been a major mechanism of inner-Party decision making and discipline among Chinese political elites, but during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution it emerged as a form of mass mobilization and education as well. I shall argue here that this came about as a result of political decisions made in the context of a series of non-reversible structural changes in the Chinese system of communications
Household Expenditure Patterns in Tianjin,
Authors: Hu Teh-Wei , Bai Jushan , Shi Shuzhong
Published: March 2009

In recent years China has initiated economic reform. One objective of this reform is to improve consumer well-being by producing more agricultural and consumer goods. To achieve this objective, economic controls have been relaxed. A free market has been established and more economic incentives are provided for peasants and workers. The obvious questions to ask are: (1) have households increased their level of consumption? (2) Have the patterns or structure of consumption changed? (3) Has the change in price levels affected consumption? (4) To what extent has the establishment of a free market affected the consumption of free market goods versus goods from state stores? These are important policy questions for economists concerned with the Chinese economy.
Some Reflections on Chinese Communist Economic Policy
Authors: Schran Peter
Published: March 2009

Anyone who had hoped that the proceedings of the National People's Congress would shed more light on China's current problems and future prospects than previous pronouncements had done, could console himself after its adjournment with the thought that he had been right in his suspicions, after all. By convening behind closed doors, the Congress avoided having to provide information on the state of the economy in the customary detail and thus merely reinforced the common speculation that all was not well or all was ill, depending on one's predilections.
Political Aspects of the National People's Congress
Authors: Adie W. A. C.
Published: March 2009

Previous sessions of the National People's Congress (NPC), with their voluminous official reports on the ups and downs of Government work —particularly economic work—have provided some of the best data for tracking the course of political change in China during the last decade, and for trying to co-ordinate apparent changes of policy with the rise or fall of individual politicians. Although this year's NPC produced little more than a guarded summary of Chou En-lai's Report on Government Work, a Resolution on it and a People's Daily editorial, when these are read with the rest of current propaganda and compared with previous form, an attempt can be made to draw some tentative conclusions about the present political climate in Peking.
‘Line Struggle‘ in Theory and Practice: The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Reconsidered
Authors: Dittmer Lowell
Published: March 2009

The extent to which the Cultural Revolution has transformed the world-view of the Chinese masses remains among the psycho-cultural imponderables, but clearly it has revolutionized the western view of Chinese politics. The dominant pre-1966 image of a consensual solidarity disturbed only rarely by purges, also handled in an orderly way by a consensus excluding only its victims, was challenged by a sudden multitude of polemical claims to the effect that a struggle for power and principle had been raging behind the scenes for decades. This struggle was characterized as a “struggle between two lines”: a “proletarian revolutionary line,” led by Mao Tse-tung, and a “bourgeois reactionary line,” led by Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiaop'ing. This struggle allegedly represented a deep underlying ideological cleavage within the leadership that had repercussions on every aspect of Chinese life: foreign policy, strategies of economic development, techniques of leadership and administration, pay scales and living standards, delivery patterns for education, medicine, and other services; even scientific method. Allegations concerning this struggle were supported by a wealth of documentary evidence, culled from hitherto confidential Party and government files. Initially greeted with scepticism among western journalists and academic circles, some variant of the “two lines” paradigm has made increasing inroads into our attempts to understand the origins of the Cultural Revolution. The time has come to re-evaluate the conception of a two-line struggle in retrospect and to try to determine just what it means and how it functions.
Behavioural Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy
Authors: Kim Samuel S.
Published: March 2009

[W]hat the Soviet leadership is practising is certainly not socialism but, as Lenin put it, socialism in words, imperialism in deeds – that is, social-imperialism.… A simple but important principle of Marxism-Leninism is that one must judge a person not merely by his words but [also] by his deeds (Ch'iao Kuan-hua, 1971).
Hu Feng's Conflict with the Communist Literary Authorities
Authors: Goldman Merle
Published: March 2009

Hu Feng was a Marxist literary critic who for almost thirty years allied himself closely with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and left-wing groups. In 1955 the Chinese Communists launched an intensive nationwide campaign against him in which he was branded as everything from an exponent of bourgeois idealism to an agent of imperialism and of Chiang Kai-shek.
North Korea's Agricultural Development during the Post-War Period
Authors: Kuark Yoon T.
Published: March 2009

It is important to know the structure of the Korean economy prior to the division of the country in order to understand agricultural development in North Korea in terms of its capital expenditure and output during the post-war period.
The Institution of Contracts in the Chinese People's Republic (Part 1)
Authors: Pfeffer Richard M.
Published: March 2009

This article is concerned with the nature, functions and scope of the institution in the People's Republic of China that is commonly referred to as contracts. The paper as a whole ultimately focuses on three problems: (1) the nature of this institution; (2) whether this institution, if it is of a different nature from the Western contract, performs tasks in the Chinese context not unlike those of the institution of contracts in the West: and (3) how it performs those tasks.
The Development of Formosan Nationalism
Authors: Meisner Maurice
Published: March 2009

Eighteen years ago Formosa was liberated from half a century of Japanese colonial rule. When Kuomintang soldiers and administrators arrived to reassert Chinese sovereignty over the island province in October 1945 they were enthusiastically welcomed as liberators by the For-mosans. Within a few months, however, the Kuomintang had succeeded in alienating virtually all segments of the native population by inaugurating a military régime that treated Formosa as a conquered territory rather than a liberated area. The mass pillaging, official corruption and political repression that marked the early period of Kuomintang rule in Formosa set in motion the tragic events that culminated in the revolt of February 1947 in the course of which at least 10,000 Formosans were massacred. The Kuomintang has since done little to heal the scars of 1947 and today most of the 10,000,000 Formosans look upon the nearly 2,000,000 mainlanders who fled to Formosa with the collapse of Kuomintang rule as foreign overlords and describe the Chinese Nationalist régime as a colonial tyranny far more oppressive than the former Japanese rule. That the overwhelming majority of Formosans favour the establishment of an independent Formosan state, without ties to mainland China and, preferably, without the presence of mainlanders, is a fact that can no longer be ignored in considering the present condition and future status of Formosa.
Peking, Katmandu and New Delhi
Authors: Dai Shen-Yu
Published: March 2009

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in Katmandu on July 31, 1950, by Nepal and India, declared that “The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring State likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments” (Article II). Moreover, Nepal was “free to import, from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunition or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal” (Article V). With the Chinese Communists preparing to reassert China's claim to Tibet, it was obvious that India sought “to ensure” that Nepal, together with Bhutan and Sikkim, should not be “included in the Communist Chinese sweep” along the Himalayas.