bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism?
Authors: O’Connor Timothy
Published: June 2016

In his recently published two-volume work in epistemology, Alvin Plantinga rounds out the discussion (in characteristic fashion) with a subtle and ingenious argument for a striking claim: in this case, his conclusion is that belief in evolutionary naturalism is irrational. Now this claim is not of itself so very surprising; the tantalizing feature here lies rather in the nature of the argument itself. Plantinga contends that taking seriously the hypothesis of evolutionary naturalism (hereafter, N & E) ought to undermine one's confidence in the reliability of our basic cognitive faculties. And if one withholds belief in cognitive reliability, it seems that one ought likewise to refrain from believing propositions that are the output of such faculties. And, for evolutionary naturalists, one such output is belief in evolutionary naturalism itself. Hence, quite apart from comparative evidential considerations that might lead one to prefer theism (or one of its competitors) to N & E, but rather owing to a sort of internal inconsistency (in a suitably broad sense), belief in N & E is shown to be epistemically defective. This is a bold and intriguing suggestion indeed. Let us take a closer look.
Is Marx a Moral Consequentialist?
Authors: Vogel Jeffrey S.
Published: June 2016

Derek Allen, Richard Boyd, and Alan Gilbert have suggested that Marx’s normative political views should be reconstructed as a sophisticated version of moral consequentialism. This paper investigates whether Marx’s ostensible anti-moralism differs in any interesting way from Mill’s sophisticated utilitarianism plus some Marxist social science. I present an account of the social meaning and implications of moral language and argument, based on Marx’s description of morality as a social practice based on distinctive motives, emotions and sanctions, to explain why Marx would reject moral consequentialism. This account will explain how Marx can consistently reject morality yet retain a normative basis for his social criticism.
Of Epicycles and Elegance
Authors: Adams Frederick
Published: June 2016

I am pleased to be able to respond to Al Mele’s reply to my paper on trying and desire (‘Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams’ and ‘Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try,’ respectively, both this volume). My remarks will bebriet.

First, it is not thesis T (as stated in Mele’s reply) that I find objectionable. It may be possible for me to want TO TRY to quit smoking (prior to trying), while currently not wanting TO QUIT smoking (nor trying to quit). I may want to try because I want to ACQUIRE the desire to quit, since people persist in nagging me to quit. So I accept thesis T because it is not the issue. The issue is whether one can PERFORM THE ATTEMPT to quit smoking WHILE one lacks the desire to quit smoking. THAT is what I find objectionable and impossible. Mele accepts that it is possible. I believe such an attempt to be merely ‘going through the motions’ in bad faith and not a genuine attempt at all. I believe this for the controltheoretic reasons that I outlined in my original paper and elsewhere.
Gender and the Biological Sciences
Authors: Okruhlik Kathleen
Published: June 2016

Feminist critiques of science provide fertile ground for any investigation of the ways in which social influences may shape the content of science. Many authors working in this field are from the natural and social sciences; others are philosophers. For philosophers of science, recent work on sexist and androcentric bias in science raises hard questions about the extent to which reigning accounts of scientific rationality can deal successfully with mounting evidence that gender ideology has had deep and extensive effects on the development of many scientific disciplines.

Feminist critiques of biology have been especially important in the political struggle for gender equality because biologically determinist arguments are so often cited to ‘explain’ women’s oppression. They explain why it is ‘natural’ for women to function in a socially subordinate role, why men are smarter and more aggressive than women, why women are destined to be homebodies, and why men rape.
Individualisms
Authors: Levine Andrew
Published: June 2016

Individualisms of various kinds are pervasive in the social sciences and in moral, social and political theory. Thus some social theorists maintain that individual human beings exist but that there is nothing distinctively social in their interactions that we must countenance ontologically (metaphysical individualism). Others argue that ‘social facts,’ whatever their ontological status, should be explained by facts about individuals (methodological individualism). And virtually all philosophers assume that the point of departure for addressing normative questions about social and political arrangements should be individuals and their interests. These are, of course, distinct claims. But they are sustained by similar intuitions. I believe that in general these intuitions are sound, but that the full-blown doctrines they suggest are importantly mistaken. In what follows, I shall focus on one aspect of this very general claim. I shall dispute the form of individualism that nowadays pervades (normative) political theory while endorsing the individualist intuitions that motivate it.
Biological and Social Constraints on Cognitive Processes: The Need for Dynamical Interactions Between Levels of Inquiry
Authors: Bechtel William
Published: June 2016

For most philosophers of psychology and cognitive science, inquiry into human cognitive activity begins at the level of intrapersonal processes. A central question is whether these processes are sufficiently autonomous from more basic neurophysiological processes to be investigated in their own terms, or whether all explanations must be in neurophysiological terms. Some philosophers have insisted on the relative autonomy of the cognitive level. One currently quite popular view, eliminative materialism, however, holds that the explanations that have been advanced at the intrapersonal cognitive level are misguided, and must be replaced by accounts developed from an understanding of the underlying neurophysiological processes.
Methodological Individualism and Reductionism in Biology
Authors: Dupré John
Published: June 2016

Methodological individualism is a thesis generally associated with the social sciences, the thesis that ultimately all social explanations should be given in terms of properties only of individuals, never of social groups, societies, etc. It is a methodological thesis grounded on a metaphysical view: it is impossible for a social group to have any property not entailed by properties of its constituent individuals. This latter thesis, finally, is a straightforward consequence of a standard reductionist assumption, that the behavior of wholes can be fully accounted for in terms of the behavior of their parts.
Managing Complexity and Dynamics: Is There A Difference Between Biology and Physics?
Authors: Thompson Paul
Published: June 2016

The question ‘Are there inherent differences among the phenomena studied by different sciences which require inherently different methodologies?’ has received considerable attention during the last century. Much of the debate has been fueled by logical positivism and logical empiricism, both of which embrace a commitment to the reduction of theories and the ultimate unity of science. This commitment presupposes that there are no inherent fundamental differences since any inherent differences would undermine the connected goals of reduction and unification. Hence, logical positivists and logical empiricists have attempted to show that the supposed differences are illusory. For example, Hempel and Nagel both argued vigorously that there are no inherent differences. Their strategy was to analyze a purported difference and argue either that the feature(s) responsible for the difference was not really present in the non-physical science or that it was after all present in the physical sciences as well.
Unsettled Problems with Vague Truth
Authors: Mills Andrew P.
Published: June 2016

A tempting solution to problems of semantic vagueness and to the Liar Paradox is an appeal to truth-value gaps. It is tempting to say, for example, that, where Harry is a borderline case of bald, the sentence

(1)

Harry is bald

is neither true nor false: it is in the ‘gap’ between these two values, and perhaps deserves a third truth-value. Similarly with the Liar Paradox. Consider the following Liar sentence:

(2)

(2) is false.

That is, sentence (2) says of itself that it is false. If we accept the Tarskian schema

(T) S is true iff p

where ‘S’ is a name of a sentence ‘p,’ we are led into paradox. Both the assumption that (2) is true, and the assumption that (2) is false lead us, via (T), to

(3)

(2) is true if and only if (2) is false.

Given this result, a natural reaction is to place (2) in a ‘gap’ between true and false.
Ontological Progress in Science
Authors: Burian Richard M. , Trout J.D.
Published: June 2016

In the grand tradition, philosophical ontology was considered logically and epistemologically prior to scientific ontology. Like many contemporary philosophers of science, we consider this to be a mistake. There is two-way traffic between philosophical and scientific ontologies; the more we learn about what there actually is, the more we learn about what can be and what must be, and vice versa. But that is not the present topic; here we focus on the ontology or ontologies of science, not traditional philosophical ontologies or the traffic between scientific and philosophical ontologies.
Reference and Unity in Kant's Theory of Judgment
Authors: Gibson Martha I.
Published: June 2016

An account of judgment ought to explain the fact that a judgment is, or may be, about some object. A judgment may be about some object if it contains some part, or term, which is related to the object, on the one hand, and related to- ‘combined with’ — the other parts of the judgment, on the other, in such a way that the whole judgment is consequently about that object. The relation of that term to the object may be called ‘reference.’ (If the judgment is analyzed into intuition and concept, then it is the relation whereby the intuition is of whatever it may be of.) It is the relation of ‘reference’ that might make a judgment ‘objective,’ and make it be about one or another particular object; and it is the relation combining the referring term (perception, intuition) with another term (concept, predicate) that makes the whole thing a judgment; that is, that makes the whole thing represent something as being true of the object referred to.
Etchemendy and Logical Consequence
Authors: Priest Graham
Published: June 2016

Logical consequence is a notion that every person who reasons must possess, at least implicitly. To give a precise and accurate characterization of this notion is the fundamental task of logic. In a similar way, the notion of effectivity is a concept that anyone with a basic training in mathematics possesses, and the most fundamental task of a theory of computability is to give a precise characterization of this notion. The problem concerning effectivity was solved (at least to the satisfaction of most people) in the 1930s, almost as soon as it was raised, by the work of Turing, Church, and others. By contrast, the correct and precise characterization of logical consequence has been hotly contested through the two and a half thousand-year history of logic.
Voting and Democracy
Authors: Christiano Thomas
Published: June 2016

Analysis of the nature of voting is fundamental to an understanding of the nature and value of democracy. Three questions ought to be distinguished concerning voting. First, how are we to conceive of the activity of voting? What is its nature? Second, what is it that people aim at when they vote? What are the grounds on which people vote, the reasons with which they justify their vote? And third, what ought people to aim at when they vote? What are the relevant grounds for voting in one way or another? These last are explicitly normative questions. At times individuals vote on the basis of concerns which are not appropriate to the issues involved. The first question is not a question ofpsychologyor ofvalue;it is ametaphysicalquestion. What is the nature of voting? How is it possible to count votes? Two answers are widely given in the literature. The first is that voting consists in the expression of preference. On this kind of view, either a vote is a preference or it is a fairly direct and unambiguous expression of the preference of the voter.
Rape and Persuasive Definition
Authors: Burgess-Jackson Keith
Published: June 2016

If we [women] have not stopped rape, we have redefined it, we have faced it, and we have set up the structures to deal with it for ourselves.

[T]he definition of rape, which has in the past always been understood to mean the use of violence or the threat of it to force sex upon an unwilling woman, is now being broadened to include a whole range of sexual relations that have never before in all of human experience been regarded as rape.

In 1989 the philosopher and self-described feminist Christina Sommers published a short essay — ‘an opinion piece,’ she called it — that was eventually developed into and published as a philosophical article. In this essay Sommers criticized ‘feminist philosophers’ (her term) for being ‘oddly unsympathetic to the women whom they claim to represent.’ Specifically, Sommers accused these philosophers of ignoring the ‘values of the average woman’ and of being caught up in an ‘ideological fervor.’ To emphasize her point that the so-called feminist philosophers have lost touch with ‘the average woman,’ Sommers wrote that ‘One must nevertheless expect that many women will continue to swoon at the sight of Rhett Butler carrying Scarlett O'Hara up the stairs to a fate undreamt of in feminist philosophy.’
Beyond Singular Propositions?
Authors: Soames Scott
Published: June 2016

Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with the precise nature of propositions, and the attitudes, like belief, that we bear to them.

I will assume both that propositions are the semantic contents of sentences, and that the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structured complex made up of the semantic contents of the parts of the sentences that express it.
Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and Normalization
Authors: Richard Mark
Published: June 2016

Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says (quite roughly) that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belief to a single individual - as happens, for example, when we say that Odile believes such and such, that the woman in the corner believes so and so, but are ignorant of the identity of Odile and the woman in the corner.

I will distinguish two objections along these lines, and argue that neither is forceful. The objections differ as to whether or not the speaker mistakenly presupposes that the believers under discussion are distinct.
In Defence of Theory in Ethics
Authors: Tännsjö Torbjörn
Published: June 2016

Particularism is in vogue in ethics today. Particularism is sometimes described as the idea that what is a sufficient moral reason in one situation need not be a sufficient moral reason in another situation. Indeed, it has been held, on particularism, what is a reason for an action in one situation might be a reason against the same type of action, or might not be a reason at all, in another situation. However, this description is insufficient. Even a generalist, such as a utilitarian, may admit that, what is in one situation a sufficient reason for the rightness of an action may, in another situation, be a sufficient reason for its wrongness. For example, the fact that if I shoot at a certain person, I kill him, may, in one situation, be a sufficient reason not to shoot at him. It is sufficient for the wrongness of shooting at him if, in the situation, shooting at him suffices to guarantee that welfare does not get maximized. He is killed, say, and deprived of future pleasure, with no positive ‘side-effects’ whatever.
Hume's Extreme Skepticism in Treatise I IV 7
Authors: Singer Ira
Published: June 2016

Hume finds himself in an appalling state during Treatise I iv 7 (the conclusion of Book I). He is almost bereft of beliefs; he believes, for a short time, only that he cannot believe anything else. But, being an assiduous student of human nature, Hume makes this extreme skeptical crisis into material for naturalistic study. He carefully reports how extreme skepticism comes about, what it is like, and how it passes. So I iv 7 has two aspects: involved personal experience of a skeptical crisis, and detached naturalistic reflection on that crisis. Interpreting the text correctly requires taking both these aspects seriously.

An old interpretive tradition ignores or downplays Hume's detached naturalistic reflections in I iv 7, and focuses only on his involved personal experience of skepticism. Oddly enough, interpretations in this tradition tend to treat Hume's experience dismissively and derisively.
On Metaethics: A Reverie
Authors: Sparshott Francis
Published: June 2016

People engaged in teaching and research in philosophy departments are under strong and constant -pressure to believe that what they are doing makes sense. Their belief may well be rooted in an initial project, formed autonomously under the guidance of teachers and fellow students; even so, it will continue to be shaped and confirmed by the requirements of peer approval and student satisfaction. The hungry sheep keep looking up. Sheer humanity requires us to show enthusiasm for what we dispense as nutrition, and a convincing display of conviction requires that we start by convincing ourselves. But in retirement all this falls apart. Often, perhaps usually, an element of belief and devotion is maintained, because the formed ego of the retiree is that of self-as-teacher or self-as-philosopher. But if, as may well be, the retiree's philosophizing was undertaken merely as gainful employment, things rapidly come to pieces. In these circumstances, a request for a paper on metaethics or any other loosely defined topic may bewilder. What, really, could be at issue here? Or so it seems. But there is something factitious in this bewilderment.
Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory
Authors: Railton Peter
Published: June 2016

The general facts about human needs and abilities are perhaps clear enough and I shall assume that commonsense knowledge suffices for our purposes here.

John Rawls

Theorizing is a distinctive activity. Within almost any discipline, for example, one finds a recognized distinction between theorists and nontheorists, theoretical work and non-theoretical work. To be sure, the distinction is often a matter of degree. Typically, theorists are identified by their commitment to developing an understanding of their subject matter that possesses certain characteristic features- they aim for generality, comprehensiveness, coherence, well-foundedness, and explanatoriness. They aim to formulate and justify systematic representational systems.

Theorizing is not to be confused with reflection, which can be more or less lacking in theoretical ambition. Nor is theorizing to be confused with criticism, which can be piecemeal. Theorizing is a form of reflection, and it can be critical, but theories can be vindicatory, even apologetic.
Naturalism and Moral Reasons
Authors: Hampton Jean
Published: June 2016

Why are traditional ‘objectivist’ theories of morality, such as those put forward by Aristotle, or Kant, or even Bentham, commonly thought not to pass ‘scientific muster’ insofar as they are not ‘naturalist’? My interest in this question is based on my being a moral objectivist, but answering this question is one that moral skeptics should be as interested in as I. The view that the commitments of science preclude us from accepting such theories is the basis of the moral skeptic's position. Yet showing what is wrong with a moral objectivist position is surprisingly difficult. It involves reflecting on what ‘scientific muster’ is supposed to be, and on why a theory is commonly thought to be disreputable unless it passes it. It also involves locating the ‘queer’ element in objectivist moral theory that makes it scientifically disreputable. Yet, as I hope to show in this article, there is no commonly accepted statement of what makes a theory scientifically acceptable or unacceptable, and (perhaps even more surprisingly) no rigorous account of what the queer component of objectivist moral theory is that makes any such theory scientifically unacceptable.
Perception as Input and as Reason for Action
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: June 2016

John McDowell (1979) suggests that virtuous agents have a perceptual sensitivity allowing them to determine reliably what to do in any specific context of deliberation. Moreover, the reliable perception yields an accurate depiction not only of the facts of the situation but of the morally right act to do. Finally, the reliably kind behavior of a kind person

is not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct, like the courageous behaviour- so called only by courtesy- of a lioness defending her cubs. Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behaviour is … his reason for behaving in that way, on each of the relevant occasions (331). Perception delivers a reason for action.
Afterword: Whither Moral Philosophy?
Authors: Couture Jocelyne , Nielsen Kai
Published: June 2016

Most of the essays collected here are essaysinmetaethics seeking in exacting and interesting ways to resolve problems raised by the familiar options in metaethics we outlined in our Introduction. Richard Brandt, for example, forcefully argues, going much against the at least modestly holistic grain of our time, for a foundationalism (noncognitivist though it be) which would be foundational in both metaethics and normative ethics. R.M. Hare makes a brief but systematic defense, which is both spirited and clear, of his prescriptivism (a species of what we, following tradition, have called ‘noncognitivism,’ but which he argues should instead be called ‘nondescriptivism’). His arguments here for his position - call it nondescriptivism or noncognitivism- are directed forcefully against ethical naturalism (descriptivism) and specifically against the naturalism of Philippa Foot. Nicholas Sturgeon and David Copp contribute elaborate and rigorously argued defenses of ethical naturalism, or, as they might prefer to call it, ‘moral realism.’
Is Language a Game?
Authors: Heath Joseph
Published: June 2016

Recent developments in game theory have shown that the mathematical models of action so widely admired in the study of economics are in fact only particular instantiations of a more general theoretical framework. In the same way that Aristotelian logic was ‘translated’ into the more general and expressive language of predicate logic, the basic action theoretic underpinnings of modern economics have now been articulated within the more comprehensive language of game theory. But precisely because of its greater generality and expressive power, game theory has again revived the temptation to apply formal models of action to every domain of social life. This movement has been fuelled by some notable successes. Game theory has provided useful insights into the logic of collective action in the theory of public goods, and strategic models of voting have illustrated important aspects of institutional decision-making. But this extension of formal models into every area of social interaction has also encountered significant difficulties, despite the fact that contemporary decision theory has weakened its basic assumptions to the point where it teeters constantly on the brink of vacuity.
Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment
Authors: Reitan Eric
Published: June 2016

There seems to be nearly universal agreement that society cannot do without some form of criminal punishment. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that punishment, involving as it does the imposition of hardship and suffering, stands in need of justification. What form such a justification should take, however, is a matter of considerable contention, in part because of basic theoretical disagreements on the nature of moral obligation, and in part because of disagreements concerning the nature and purpose of criminal punishment itself.

These disagreements have given rise to a number of rival ‘theories’ of punishment - rival accounts of the purposes of punishment and the conditions which justify it. The traditional theories can be broadly categorized as deterrence theories, incapacitation theories, retributive theories, and rehabilitative theories (broadly conceived to include moral education theories). My purpose here is to contribute to this discussion on punishment by introducing a largely overlooked theory of punishment, one whose outlines can be found in the writings of Simone Wei!, but which has yet to be fully developed and discussed. This theory, which I call the ‘reintegrative theory,’ has, I believe, a number of advantages over more traditional theories of punishment.
Searle, Syntax, and Observer Relativity
Authors: Endicott Ronald P.
Published: June 2016

In his bookThe Rediscovery of the Mind(hereafter RM), John Searle attacks computational psychology with a number of new and boldly provocative claims. Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled ‘The Critique of Cognitive Reason,’ Searle targets what he calls ‘cognitivism,’ according to which our brains are digital computers that process a mental syntax. And Searle denies this view on grounds thatthe attribution of syntaxisobserver relative.A syntactic property is arbitrarily assigned to a physical system, he thinks, with the result that syntactic states ‘do not even exist except in the eyes of the beholder’(RM,215). This unabashed anti-realism differs significantly from Searle's earlier work. The Chinese room argument, for example, was intended to show that syntactic properties will not suffice for semantics, where the syntax was realistically construed. But now Searle claims that physical properties will not suffice to determine a system's syntactic properties.
Nietzschean Genealogy and Hegelian History in The Genealogy of Morals
Authors: Kain Philip J.
Published: June 2016

I would like to offer an interpretation of the Genealogy of Morals, of the relationship of master morality to slave morality, and of Nietzsche's philosophy of history that is different from the interpretation that is normally offered by Nietzsche scholars. Contrary to Nehamas, Deleuze, Danto, and many others, I wish to argue that Nietzsche does not simply embrace master morality and spurn slave morality. I also wish to reject the view, considered simply obvious by most scholars, that the Übermensch develops out of, or on the model of, the master, not the slave. And to make the case for all of this, I want to explore the relationship between Hegel's master-slave dialectic and the conflict Nietzsche sees between master morality and slave morality. That Nietzsche does not intend us to recall the famous master-slave dialectic of Hegel's Phenomenology as we read the Genealogy of Morals, I find difficult to believe. Yet very few commentators ever notice, let alone explore, this connection.
The Beginning of the Universe and of Time
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: June 2016

What does it mean to say that the Universe had a beginning? There are different ways of spelling this out. I shall develop them, consider the logical relations between them, and support one as best capturing our intuitive understanding of this notion. I shall then draw a conclusion about whether Time could (it is logically possible) have a beginning. Finally I shall consider, on my preferred understanding of what it is for the Universe to have a beginning, what physical cosmology can show about whether it did in fact have a beginning.

I understand by a Universe, a system of substances temporally connected to each other. I understand by a substance a thing with causal powers or liabilities, that is able to act or be acted upon. Substances will thus include both material objects and any other physical objects there may be such as chunks of energy or the fluctuating ‘vacuum’ of quantum field theory, and immaterial objects, if there are any, such as souls and ghosts. I understand by two substances being temporally connected that they exist for periods of time which are either earlier than, overlap with, or are later than each other.
The Argument from Divine Hiddenness
Authors: Howard-Snyder Daniel
Published: June 2016

Do we rightly expect a perfectly loving God to bring it about that, right now, we reasonably believe that He exists? It seems so. For love at its best desires the well-being of the beloved, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly participating in her life in a personal fashion, allowing her to draw from that relationship what she may need to flourish. But why suppose that we would be significantly better off were God to engage in an explicit, personal relationship with us? Well, first, there would be broadly moral benefits. We would be able to draw on the resources of that relationship to overcome seemingly ever present flaws in our character. And we would be more likely to emulate the self-giving love with which we were loved. So loved, we would be more likely to flourish as human beings. Second, there would be experiential benefits. We would be, for example, more likely to experience peace and joy stemming from the strong conviction that we were properly related to our Maker, security in suffering knowing that, ultimately, all shall be well, and there would be the sheer pleasure of God's loving presence.
Priority and Time
Authors: McKerlie Dennis
Published: June 2016

Some of us believe in giving priority to people who are badly off in designing social policies and in acting ourselves to help others. As Thomas Nagel puts it, the badly off should be first in the queue when benefits are distributed. This idea is one way of explaining moral views that are called ‘egalitarian.’ Egalitarian moral views can depend either on the idea of valuing equality itself or on the idea of giving priority to the interests of the badly off (some egalitarians might accept both ideas). This paper is concerned with the second kind of egalitarianism.

The purest form of the idea explains the priority in this way: a benefit for someone badly off can be more important morally, or can have more value, than a benefit of the same size for someone better off. This is to suppose that the priority in question cannot be explained by thinking in utilitarian terms and accepting the principle of diminishing marginal utility.
Locke's Theory of Original Appropriation and the Right of Settlement in Iroquois Territory
Authors: Bishop John Douglas
Published: June 2016

James Tully and others have argued recently that the theory of property Locke defends in the Second Treatise was designed to justify European settlement on the lands of North American Natives. If this view becomes generally accepted, and Tuck suggests it will be, doubts may arise about the impartiality of Lockean property theories. Locke, as is well established and documented again by Tully, had huge vested interests in the European settlement of North America and possibly in the enslavement of Native Peoples. Doubts about Locke may reflect on all rights theories of property and thus bring into question ‘one of the major political philosophies of the modem world’ (Tully, ‘Rediscovering America,’ 165). Raising these doubts is part of Tully's declared intention (Tully, ‘Rediscovering America,’ 166). His article tries to show that the Native systems of property and government which Locke defines away as illegitimate are in fact interesting and potentially beneficial alternatives to Lockean individual rights theories.
In Search of a Post-National Identity: Who are My People?
Authors: De Wachter Frans
Published: June 2016

The Nation as Philosophical Problem

The problem of the nation is well articulated in a speech given in 1985 by then president of the Federal Republic of Germany, R. Von Weiszäcker:

I belong to a people, the German people. What are the characteristics which we Germans share as a people? What does it mean to belong to such a people? What does the fact that I am German have to do with my identity as a person? Does this fact place a claim on me? Does it mark me? Does it include responsibilities for me? Does it include obligations to me as a German, obligations which I would otherwise not have to fulfil?(…) It is up to us to give content to the term ‘German,’ a content with which we ourselves and the world would like to live in peace.

This is not a psychological comment. It is not about the deep-seated need of people to express feelings of collective identity. The question of the nation here is asked from a normative perspective. That will also be the starting point of this study.
Beyond the Opposition: Civic Nation versus Ethnic Nation
Authors: Schnapper Dominique
Published: June 2016

The political and scientific debate surrounding the concepts of nation, ethnicity, and nationalism is so deeply loaded with values and passions that it should be the sociologist's highest priority to define those terms as precisely as possible in order to distinguish a new debate from the common discourse and to subject the definitions to scrutiny. It is often acknowledged that a clarification of the terms used in the debates of ethnicity, the State, the nation and nationalism is necessary, but such work is rarely done. It is important to make a distinction between the term ‘nation’ and other terms with which it is often confused — and differently in the different nations — and to clear up the ambiguities that affect the political, ideological, and scientific discourse. In the common discourse and even in the scientific literature, such terms as ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ are often used indifferently, and the ‘nation’ is subject to contradictory criticisms as it is sometimes understood as referring to the ‘nation’ and sometimes to the ‘ethnic group.’ There is always a connection between the concepts used by a given author and that author's theoretical frame of reference.
Liberal Restrictions on Public Arguments: Can Nationalist Claims be Moral Reasons in Liberal Public Discourse?
Authors: Nootens Geneviève
Published: June 2016

Asserting the relationship between liberalism and nationalism is no easy matter. Liberal philosophers have been very suspicious of the phenomenon of nationalism, partly for historical reasons (e.g., national socialism) and partly for philosophical ones (amongst which a belief that liberal principles would override people's need for identification with ethnocultural communities). But even if some still consider the expression ‘liberal nationalism’ to be an oxymoron, most of current Anglo-American liberal work on the subject leans toward a more nuanced approach, trying to specify how hospitable liberalism should be to nationalistic claims. The challenge, from this point of view, is to explain why and how political philosophy can incorporate national attachments to amoralargument on people's identity and distributive justice. In fact, it seems that nationalist rhetoric has found in identity politics a rather safe (even if narrow) way of entering liberal discourse.
Secession and the Principle of Nationality
Authors: Miller David
Published: June 2016

The secession issue appears to many contemporary thinkers to reveal a fatal flaw in the idea of national self-determination. The question is whether national minorities who come to want to be politically self determining should be allowed to separate from the parent state and form one of their own. Here the idea of national self-determination may lead us in one of two opposing directions. If the minority group in question regards itself as a separate nation, then the principle seems to support its claims: if the Québécois or the Catalans come to think of themselves as having national identities distinct from those of the Canadians or the Spanish, and to seek political independence on that basis, then if we are committed to national self-determination we should support their claims. But we then face the challenge that once national identities begin to proliferate there is no feasible way of satisfying all such claims, given elementary facts of geography and population spread.
What's So Special About Nations?
Authors: Buchanan Allen
Published: June 2016

Until quite recently, most Anglo-American political philosophers have had little if anything to say about national self-determination. However, a growing number of prominent political philosophers are now endorsing national self-determination. This new-found enthusiasm is surprising if not ironic, since it comes at a time at which genocidal ethno-nationalist conflicts (in the Balkans, in Rwanda and Burundi, etc.) might seem to lend credence to the view that the doctrine that every nation should have its own state is both impractical and dangerous, and that the nationalist mentality is often racist, xenophobic, exclusionary, and morally regressive. In this essay I will question the wisdom of this new-found enthusiasm for national self-determination. I will probe what I shall call the Strong National Self-Determination Thesis (or, more briefly, the Strong Thesis). This is the assertion that every nation as such has a right to some substantial degree of self-government and there is a presumption that every nation as such has a right to its own independent state (where this includes the right to secede from another state). I call this the Strong Thesis because it is more robust than the thesis that nations have a right to some form of self-government.
The Nation-State as a Political Community: A Critique of the Communitarian Argument for National Self-Determination
Authors: Dahbour Omar
Published: June 2016

The principle of national self-determination has usually been justified by extending to national groups an entitlement that individuals are regarded as having, namely, to the conditions necessary for their self development. In order to extend the concept of self-determination to nations in this way, an argument that it is important for nations to exist within their own political communities must be given. In this essay, I describe and criticize one type of argument for such a principle of national self-determination – what I will call the communitarian argument.

Contemporary communitarians (such as Michael Walzer and David Miller) usually contend that determining who rightfully has membership in a political community must precede the allocation of rights and responsibilities between members. Community is understood to mean a national community; membership in communities therefore results from the ascription of national identities to individuals and to the consequent sorting out of loyalties that follows from this ascription. A right of self-determination for nations is required, on this view, in order to ensure that political communities are legitimately formed in accordance with national identities.
Barbarous Nationalism and the Liberal International Order: Reflections on the ‘Is,’ the ‘Ought,’ and the ‘Can’
Authors: Prager Carol A.L.
Published: June 2016

It's a mistake to endow the Holocaust or any other massive case of crimes against humanity with cosmic significance. We want to do it because we think the moral enormity of the events should be balanced by an equally grand theory. But it's not. The attempt to do so is poignant.

Alain Finkielkraut

Savage ethnonationalism, dating back to the end of the eighteenth century, and violent ethnic conflict, as ancient as history, are sometimes viewed as if for the first time in the post-Cold War era. Still, it is the case that the end of the discipline imposed by the bipolar international system has permitted temporarily repressed ethnic and nationalist passions to reassert themselves. In response, a vast literature has sprung up discussing what states should do about genocide and ethnic cleansing, the gravest human rights abuses. In what follows I will consider barbarous nationalism in the context of the liberal international order put into place at the end of the Second World War, the roles of politics, law and morality forming a sub text to that discussion.
The Bounds of Nationalism
Authors: Pogge Thomas W.
Published: June 2016

Nationalism is generally associated with sentiments, ideologies, and social movements that involve strong commitments to a nation, conceived as a potentially self-sustaining community of persons bound together by a shared history and culture. Recent empirical and normative discussions have been concentrated on revisionist instances of nationalism, that is, on sentiments, ideologies, and social movements that aim to gain power, political autonomy, or territory for a particular nation. I will here take a somewhat broader view of nationalism, focusing on persons who have a bland and conservative commitment to their own country. Quite content with thestatus quo,these persons view it as legitimate and even admirable that they and their political leaders should show a pre-eminent concern for preserving and enlarging their own collective advantage. Most citizens of the affluent countries – however condescendingly they may regard the revisionist nationalisms of the Serbs, Kurds, Tamils, Irish, and Québécois – are nationalists in this sense, and extreme ones at that.
“Seek Ye First the Economic Kingdom!” In Search of a Rational Choice Interpretation of Quebec Nationalism
Authors: Prager Joel
Published: June 2016

In Eastern Europe, when someone dies, the custom is to drape mirrors in the house with black muslin or a dark sheet. According to folklorists, this is done so that the deceased, who is believed to wander through his or her house for nine days saying goodbye to friends and family, will not be frightened when he or she cannot find his or her reflection in the mirror. While it is easy to scoff at such superstitious customs, there is much to learn from them. The draping of the mirrors is a vivid metaphor, but it is also useful when it comes to making a counterintuitive point: namely, little systematic attention has been paid to the role of economic preferences, markets, and the pace of development in shaping Quebec's nationalist objectives and strategy. And it is this failure to comprehend the impact that economics, from a microscopic and macroscopic level, has had on ‘nation-building’ and, more concretely, on the October 30th referendum (where in answer to the question “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”, 49.5 percent of Quebeckers voted ‘Yes’) that is tantamount to a ‘draping of the mirrors,’ of providing an incomplete explanation about the bases of Quebec's nationalism.
Practical Steps and Reasons for Action
Authors: Clark Philip
Published: June 2016

There is an idea, going back to Aristotle, that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief. Not surprisingly, the idea has almost always led to some form of inferentialism about reasons for action. In this paper I argue that reasons for action can be understood on a parallel with reasons for belief, but that this requires abandoning inferentialism about reasons for action. This result will be thought paradoxical. It is generally assumed that if there is to be a useful parallel, there must be some such thing as a practical inference. As we shall see, that assumption tends to block the fruitful exploration of the real parallel. On the view I shall defend, the practical analogue of an ordinary inference is not an inference, but something I shall call a practical step. Nevertheless, the practical step will do, for a theory of reasons for action, what ordinary inference does for an inferentialist theory of reasons for belief. The result is a general characterization of reasons, practical and theoretical, in terms of the correctness conditions of the relevant sorts of step.
Can the Eleatic Principle be Justified?
Authors: Colyvan Mark
Published: June 2016

The Eleatic Principle or causal criterion is a causal test that entities must pass in order to gain admission to some philosophers’ ontology. This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world. The idea of such a test is rather important in modem ontology, since it is neither without intuitive appeal nor without influential supporters. Its supporters have included David Armstrong (1978, Vol2, 5), Brian Ellis (1990, 22) and Hartry Field (1989, 68) to name but a few.

Clearly though, if such a principle is to be anything more than just a statement of a certain version of physicalism, it must be argued for. In this paper I will look at the arguments that have been put forward for the principle and suggest some problems for each of these.
Burge on Epistemic Paradox
Authors: Lee Byeong D.
Published: June 2016

In his papers ‘Semantic Paradox (1979)’ and ‘The Liar Paradox: Tangles and Chains (1982),’ Tyler Burge provides a hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox. And in his paper ‘Epistemic Paradox (1984)’ Burge extends his hierarchy approach to the epistemic paradox of belief instability, which I shall explain shortly. Although Burge's views on the Liar paradox have been widely criticized (e.g., Gupta 1982, Grim 1991), his views on the paradox of belief instability have not received notable attention (except Conee 1987). In this paper I shall argue that Burge's proposal is inadequate as a solution to the paradox of belief instability. For this purpose, I shall criticize Burge's claim that a circular evaluation of a thought (or a belief) is impossible, which is crucial for his proposal. The question of whether or not a circular evaluation of belief is possible is of its own philosophical interest as well.
Hegel's Critique of Kantian Practical Reason
Authors: Kain Philip J.
Published: June 2016

While many philosophers have found Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics to be interesting in certain respects, overall most tend to find it rather shallow and to think that Hegel either misunderstands Kant's thought or has a rather crude understanding of it. For example, in examining the last two sections of Chapter V of the Phenomenology— ‘Reason as Lawgiver’ and ‘Reason as Testing Laws’ (where we get an extended critique of the categorical imperative)- Lauer finds Hegel's treatment to be truncated and inadequate. The only trouble, though, is that like most other readers of the Phenomenology, Lauer does not recognize that Hegel had been examining and criticizing Kantian ethics throughout a much greater part of—indeed, more than half of—Chapter V. Once we do understand this, I think we must concede that Hegel's treatment is hardly truncated and that it cannot be described as shallow or inadequate. I will try to show that Hegel demonstrates a rather sophisticated understanding of, and gives a serious and thorough critique of, Kantian practical reason.