TRANSITION OF QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF CORRUPTION TO THE QUALITY OF EXTREME FORMS OF DENIAL OF LEGAL VALUES
Authors: Kolomoiets Tatiana , Makarenkov Oleksii 
Published: July 2022

The article reveals the transition of quantitative indicators of corruption into the quality of extreme forms of denial of legal values, such as war. The tolerant attitude of citizens to corruption and the high level of involvement of society in corrupt relations eventually weakens such a nation to the point that it becomes incapable of resisting external military aggression. The fact of such a failure is proof of the transition of the quantitative indicators of corruption into the quality of violence and war as extreme forms of denial of legal values, which are reflected at the level of the constitution and the norms of international law, including humanitarian law. It has been established that the main burden of destroying and weakening key economic and state institutions of power in peacetime is borne by corrupt and traitorous individuals. Their activities range from illicit enrichment through the decline of entire sectors of the economy to espionage (the transfer of secret information to foreign states), propaganda of the values of other nations/states, terrorism and other subversive activities. Bribery, appointments to positions based on kinship and personal ties rather than professional qualities, and other ways of corruption reveal the social danger of the motive (subjective side) of the perpetrator and the method (objective side) of the customer of the crime. War is caused by the inability of law enforcement agencies to neutralize corruption in peacetime. This pattern is characteristic of both sides of the war. The state had the advantage of striving to integrate into a civilization whose standards allowed for much greater anti-corruption efforts (legislative, organizational-institutional, etc.) than a state not integrated into a highly developed civilization. The desire to return the occupied territories becomes an additional incentive to improve the activities of law enforcement agencies and other components of state power. At the same time, the aggressor state, which violates international law, has no such incentives to eradicate corruption and improve (organizational and technological) law enforcement. The author also emphasized that military law is a fully dynamic matter of change in the rules at the national and international level in the territory of war and in time of war. It is a system of generally binding rules. It regulates the legal relations between military personnel, and in wartime extends to the entire population. It is also noted that all national legislation during martial law and its transformation due to war, variations in the legal requirements of the occupiers in territories under their control, the norms of international humanitarian law and the practice of its application by the International Committee of the Red Cross, relevant judicial and other acts of law. The author recognized that the implementation of national law in time of war is limited by the need for organizational, economic and other costs to counter the enemy. Its effectiveness is also shown by the inertia of great corruption in peacetime, namely: insufficient technical equipment of troops; underdevelopment and psychological weakness of civil servants in a number of positions, etc. Public authorities are forced to focus on informing and educating the population through programs adequate to the military challenges for civil servants (ideological level). There is a growing need to formulate timely and adequate changes in legislation to meet the changing conditions of war. It is important to activate existing and form other organizational institutions to neutralize the enemy as quickly as possible and restore constitutional order throughout the country (volunteers, volunteers, territorial defense of local communities, and other forms of self-organization).