bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Inductive Arguments
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Inductive arguments are arguments from premises that add to the probability of conclusion and may render it probable overall (i.e., more probable than not). I consider in this book, how far arguments from contingent phenomena (such as the existence of the Universe and its conformity to natural laws) render probable the existence of God. They are all arguments to God as purported explanation of the phenomena. The structure of such probabilistic argument is elucidated by the probability calculus.
The Nature of Explanation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

There are two kinds of explanation of phenomena – the scientific explanation in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions, or better in terms of things and their process as bio?; and personal explanation in terms of pe?. their capacities, intentions, and beliefs. Some observable phenomena explained as brought about by pe, others as brought about by natural laws. But there can only be two explanations of a phenomenon if one explains the operation of the factors involved in the other. Explanations of phenomena as brought about by God are personal explanations.
The Justification of Explanation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

An explanatory hypothesis (whether of the personal or scientific kind) is probable insofar as it makes probable the occurrence of many observed phenomena, the occurrence of which is not probable otherwise and insofar as it is simple and fits with background knowledge. This account of the probability of hypothesis is given precise form by Bayes's Theorem.
Complete Explanation
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

In a full explanation, the explaining factors necessitate the phenomena to be explained. A special kind of full explanation is a complete explanation, one where none of the explaining factors can themselves be explained by factors operating at the time in question. A special kind of complete explanation is an ultimate explanation, one in which one of the explaining factors has any explanation at all by further factors, and the explaining factors constitute the ultimate brute facts. A special kind of ultimate explanation is one where the explaining factors are either self‐explanatory or logically necessary. There can be no absolute explanations of contingent phenomena. Our grounds for believing that we have reached a complete or ultimate explanation is that we have reached a probably true explanation, and that there is a good reason to suppose that there is no probably true explanation of it.
The Intrinsic Probability of Theism
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The major factor determining the probability of a hypothesis is its simplicity. The hypothesis of theism is a very simple hypothesis. It postulates one personal being, God, essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly free, and eternal. Having powers, beliefs, and intentions are essential for being a person at all; theism postulates a person of such a kind that there are no limits to his powers, beliefs, and choice of intention, and his temporal existence except those of logic. God's perfect goodness follows from the other properties.
The Cosmological Argument
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The cosmological argument is the argument to God from the existence of a complex physical universe. God can create such a universe (by keeping it in existence as long as it exists ‐ whether for a finite or infinite time) and has some reason to do so because it is a theatre for finite agents which they can shape and in which they can develop. But it is a far less simple beginning of things than is God, and so a priori not to be expected but for the action of God.
Teleological Arguments
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The argument from temporal order (from the operations of laws of nature) is one form of teleological argument, expanded by Aquinas as his ‘fifth way’. God can make a universe subject to laws of nature, and has reason to do so in that only thereby can finite agents grow in power and knowledge. But it is extremely improbable that the universe would be governed by laws of nature if there is no God.
The Argument from Providence
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

It is good that there should be a world in which agents have the opportunity to help themselves and each other to grow in power and knowledge, and in other ways to benefit or harm each other. In order to prevent too much harm happening too soon, it is good that humans should be subject to deter to bad action. Our world is in this way providential, and that provides a further argument for God: if there is a God, we have reason to expect all this, but otherwise not. Death is not such an evil, but merely the end of a good state.
The Balance of Probability
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

If we ignore religious experience, there is enough evidence considered in this book, to make the existence of God as probable as not. Theism is a simple hypothesis that leads us to expect many phenomena, which are not otherwise to be expected. The principle of credulity considered in Ch. 13 has the consequence that we ought to believe that what we appear to experience is really there unless there is on balance counter‐evidence. Hence, the religious experience (of ourselves or others) when added to the other evidence makes it probable on balance that there is a God.
The Problem of Existence in Mathematics
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Concerns the ‘problem of existence’ in mathematics: the problem of how to understand existence assertions in mathematics. The problem can best be understood by considering how Mathematical Platonists have understood such existence assertions. These philosophers (‘Literalists’) have taken the existential theorems of mathematics as literally asserting the existence of mathematical objects. They have then attempted to account for the epistemological and metaphysical implications of such a position by putting forward arguments that supposedly show how humans can come to know of the existence of mathematical objects. The reasoning of the most prominent philosophers in this Literalist tradition, Quine and Gödel, are critically discussed. By way of contrast, an alternative position, Heyting's Intuitionism, is examined.
Measurable Quantities and Analysis
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Briefly sketches a standard form of the development of analysis within the Constructibility Theory. Then develops an axiomatized theory of lengths, in terms of which a system of rational and real numbers is specified. These developments are used to provide the basis for a theory of functions of real and complex variables.
Science Without Numbers
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Focuses on Hartry Field's Instrumentalism. The ‘Conservation Theorems’, upon which Field bases so much of his form of Instrumentalism, are examined in detail, as is Field's attempt to ‘nominalize’ physics. Doubts are raised about the adequacy of Field's views of mathematics and physics, and a detailed comparison with the Constructibility Theory is presented.
Why Burgess Is a Moderate Realist
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Concerns an attempted refutation of nominalism put forward by John Burgess in the form of a dilemma argument. Argues that Burgess's argument is based upon a false dilemma.
Maddy's Solution to the Problem of Reference
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Penelope Maddy has attempted to develop a form of realism in mathematics (Set Theoretical Realism) that is not plagued by the sort of epistemological problems that beset traditional Platonism. Maddy advances the radical doctrine that we can and do causally interact with sets. We can see them, feel them, smell them, and even taste them. This chapter raises a series of objections to Maddy's version of realism.
Kitcher's Ideal Agents
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Compares and contrasts Philip Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics with the constructibility view of this work. Raises a variety of doubts about the cogency of Kitcher's account and points out several weaknesses in the account.
Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

In this book, the author seeks to shed light on the tradition of analytic philosophy by examining one important phase in its formation. This phase is Bertrand Russell's rejection of Absolute Idealism, and his development of a new philosophy based, in part, on the logic that he developed. The book begins by examining the British Idealism of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley. Against this background, it discusses Russell's own early work, which was in this idealist tradition. The author then considers the philosophical views that G. E. Moore and Russell initially developed in reaction to that tradition (around 1900). In Russell's work, this philosophy was soon combined with the logic that he developed (following Peano) and with the thesis of logicism: that mathematics can be reduced to logic, and so makes no philosophical demands beyond those made by logic. The book examines subsequent developments in Russell's thought, to about 1912, in some detail; these include the theory of descriptions and the theory of types. It concludes with a less detailed discussion of the evolution of Russell's thought over the next few years. In this latter period, Russell develops a constructivist programme, which makes evident the continuity of this phase of his thought with that of later analytic philosophers.
Introduction
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

A general discussion of the problematic relationship between philosophy and its history; an argument against a common view as articulated by Richard Rorty. By contrast with that view, the aim of this book is neither to refute Russell nor simply to appropriate aspects of his thought. It is, rather, to come to terms with his thought in this crucial period as a way of coming to terms with the beginnings of analytic philosophy. For those of us trained within the analytic tradition, this should be a route to an understanding of ourselves and our own philosophical position.
The Underlying Metaphysics
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

Deals with the initial phase of the reaction, by Moore and Russell, against Idealism. In opposition to that view, they developed an extreme form of realism, which the author calls ‘Platonic Atomism’. The idea of a ‘proposition’ is fundamental for this view. Truth is undefinable, and facts are merely those propositions that happen to be true. Among the most important works here are Moore's ‘Nature of Judgement’ and Russell's 1901 book on Leibniz; the same metaphysical view underlies Moore's Principia Ethica.
Russell's Principles of Mathematics
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

The focus of this chapter is on the book mentioned in its title. There, Russell combines the metaphysics of Platonic Atomism with the logic of relations, which he developed on the basis of Peano's logic and with logicism. Logicism is deployed as an argument against Idealism; in particular, it is used to defend the idea that the truths of mathematics are absolutely true, not merely relatively true as the Idealists had held. And it is also used to argue that consistent theories of space and time are available (contrary to the view Russell put forward in his 1897 book on geometry). This fact, Russell claims, undermines the Idealist claim that our ordinary knowledge is inconsistent. The chapter also raises some of the problems thrown up by Russell's view, in particular the paradox that bears his name.
Judgement, Belief, and Knowledge: The Emergence of a Method
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

Deals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern of Russell's than before and is dominated by the idea of acquaintance, a presuppositionless relation between the mind and entities outside the mind. In both fields, Russell develops a constructivist method, greatly influenced by logic, which was to have a far‐reaching influence on later analytic philosophy.
Mathematics and Physical Reality
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: October 2003

Strategies for extending the modal‐structural approach to applications of mathematics are explored. The basic idea is to entertain what relationships would hold between a non‐mathematical system of interest and ‘non‐interfering’ additional hypothetical objects that may be needed to carry relevant mathematical structure. Usually, structures for real analysis suffice, although still more ‘abstract’ structures may arise in modern physics. Certain interesting connections between the modal‐structural approach and a minimal scientific realism are exposed (the latter aiding the former), and comparisons are drawn with Hartry Field's nominalization program.
Moral Immorality
Authors: Stocker Michael
Published: October 2003

Considers a cognate issue, which is whether what is immoral can nevertheless be admirable. It is argued that admirable immorality, like dirty hands, does not pose special problems for ethical theories. At the heart of admirable immorality lies a conflict of moral virtues, which is unavoidable and necessitates conflict. Looks at two case studies, the painter Paul Gauguin and Winston Churchill.
Plurality and Choice
Authors: Stocker Michael
Published: October 2003

Engages with the thesis that plurality is an obstacle to choice. Tackles the worry that incommensurable values make sound comparisons and judgments impossible. It is argued that plural and incommensurable features are ubiquitous to moral life as well as ordinary practical deliberation. Despite this predicament, we are nevertheless able to make sound judgements and to bring together disparate and incommensurable values in complex wholes.
Akrasia: The Unity of the Good, Commensurability, and Comparability
Authors: Stocker Michael
Published: October 2003

Looks at akrasia (weakness of will), monism, and pluralism. Many deem akrasia conceptually incoherent (the problem of the Protagorean Predicament). Others, notably David Wiggins, argue that coherence is secured in so far as incommensurable values are present. Against these views, it is argued that coherent akrasia is possible, and that it requires the distinction between the cognitive and the affective, and not between comparable and commensurable values. Akrasia extends to monistic theories––a monistic theory, e.g. hedonism, is compatible with akrasia. Akratic conflict does not require plurality. An account of reasons, which goes beyond value finality (the view that only what are seen as good reasons can motivate) and value maximization, emerges.
Preliminary Distinctions and Remarks
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section , I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self‐evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm.
Modality De Re: Explanations
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

I explain modality de re in terms of modality de dicto because there are those who feel that modality de dicto is easier to understand. I argue that the de dicto properties of what I call the kernel proposition can indicate whether x has P essentially. I then provide directions on how to determine the kernel proposition for an object x and a property P. I conclude by addressing some objections. In particular, I argue that my account is not circular despite its reliance on proper names.
Worlds, Books, and Essential Properties
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

I begin by introducing the ideas of possible worlds, books on worlds, and essential properties. A possible world is a broadly logically possible state of affairs that is maximal. Furthermore, for any possible world W and proposition p, let the book on W be the set S of propositions such that p is a member of S if W entails p. Finally, an object x has property P essentially if and only if x has P and has it in every world in which x exists. I use the above three concepts to give a sound argument for the conclusion that human persons are essentially immaterial.
Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)—i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so‐called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate.
Possible But Unactual Objects: On What There Isn't
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Chapter 7 concluded with the claim that the Classical Argument for possible non‐existent objects depends on both the possibility of singular negative existentials and the Ontological Principle. The Ontological Principle is the principle that any world in which a singular proposition is true is one in which there is such a thing as its subject, or in which its subject has being if not existence. In this chapter, I show that the Ontological Principle is false and that whatever plausibility it enjoys is explained by the truth of a similar principle, namely, the Restricted Ontological Principle (which is the Ontological Principle applied only to predicative singular propositions). Thus, the Classical Argument fails. Moreover, I give an account of how fictional names function in order to show that statements about fictional subjects, for example, ‘Othello is a Moor’, do not express predicative singular propositions.
A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument
Authors: Unger Peter
Published: October 2003

Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.
An Argument for Universal Ignorance
Authors: Unger Peter
Published: October 2003

An argument for universal ignorance is defended, ruling out even the Cartesian knowledge that “I exist now.” This argument involves normative premises: if someone knows something to be so, then it is at least all right for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so. But, on pain of dogmatism, it is never even all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so. Therefore, nobody ever knows that anything is so. This result is supported by the analysis of “S knows that p” as “it is clear to S that p”.
Some Wages of Ignorance
Authors: Unger Peter
Published: October 2003

Explores the consequences of universal ignorance that arise from the centrality of the concept of knowledge in the semantics of our language. For many verbs and adjectives, it argues, sentences of the form “S verbs (that) p’” and “S is adjective (that) p” entail “S knows that p.” For instance, “S regrets that p” and “S is happy that p” both entail “S knows that p.” However, since we cannot know anything, it follows that the sentences for which this entailment holds can never be true; for instance, it follows that we can never regret anything or be happy about anything.
The Cement of the Universe
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.
Hume's Account of Causation
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

This chapter is concerned with examining Hume's analysis of causation. Mackie discusses the problems associated with Hume's two definitions of ‘cause’. Hume's argument regarding causation is set out as consisting of 15 distinct premises. Two concepts of necessity are distinguished: one that concerns the distinguishing feature between causal and non‐causal sequences, and a second that concerns the warrant for a priori inference. Mackie takes the Humean account of causation as bringing into focus the questions that he will be concerned with in the following chapters.
Causal Regularities
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

This chapter offers a consideration of the regularity theory of causation. Mackie argues for the claim that regularity can account only for part of our account of causal statements. Also discussed is Mill's treatment of causation, and in particular his contribution in raising certain complications associated with Hume's account. Mackie suggests a revised version of Mill's Method of Difference, with which he argues that we can establish generalizations of singular causal statements. He concludes that an account of causal regularities still has an important contributory role in giving an account of causation ‘in the objects’.
Kant and Transcendentalism
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Mackie examines Kant's account of causation and also that of some more recent Kantian approaches such as those of Bennett and Strawson. He raises questions regarding certain assumptions involved in the formulation of a transcendental account of causation such as the requirement of self‐consciousness. The problematic nature of the contingency of the limits of human imagination is also raised. Strawson's examination of Kant's account of causation in the Second Analogy is discussed. Mackie concludes that the general Kantian approach is incapable of giving a satisfactory account of causation.
Functional Laws and Concomitant Variation
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Mackie argues against Russell's claim that the concept of causation is redundant for scientific explanation and that it should be replaced with the notion of functions. Mackie draws the distinction between the ‘functional causation’ that Russell recommends and the more traditional ‘neolithic causation’ that Mackie has been concerned with in the preceding chapters. He argues that functional causation should be properly considered as merely a limiting case of neolithic causation. Mackie adopts another of Mill's methods, which is entitled the Method of Concomitant Variation, and claims that by means of this method, the concept of a functional notion can be shown to be a refinement of the neolithic concept of cause rather than an entirely different concept.
The Direction of Causation
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

This chapter addresses the issue of the direction of the relation between cause and effect. Mackie first argues for a conceptual distinction between causal priority and temporal priority and claims that the former is not reducible to the latter. Neither is it the case that causal priority is reducible to a mere asymmetry in the form of causal regularities. Mackie instead proposes an analysis of causal priority that relies on a contrast between the ‘fixity’ and ‘unfixity’ of events. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the relation between Mackie's notion of causal priority and determinism.
The Necessity of Causes
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

Chapter 8 is concerned with providing a defensible account of necessity to accompany the account of causation already suggested. Mackie first examines notions of necessity found in regularity theories and lists seven tasks that necessity may be expected to perform. Mackie argues that one of the central tasks of the notion of necessity is the provision of a basis with which to distinguish causal from non‐causal regularities. Mackie puts forward his own theory of necessity and argues that although counterfactual conditionals can lend support to this account, they are not to be thought of as being identical with the account.
Statistical Laws
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Mackie offers an analysis of what constitutes a statistical law. He suggests that the theory of limiting frequency is crucial to the notion of statistical laws. Mackie outlines three different types of statistical laws that he claims require distinguishing. He concedes that his analysis is in a sense incomplete and that there remains a lack of clarity regarding the intelligibility of the notion of what constitutes a statistical law. Nevertheless, Mackie concludes that the analysis of statistical laws given can be shown to accord with the account of causation developed in the previous chapters.
Teleology
Authors: Mackie J. L.
Published: October 2003

This chapter considers the relevance of teleology for an account of causation. Mackie questions whether there are final causes that can be seen to operate in objective processes which are distinguishable from efficient causes. Examples from the natural world are considered and Mackie suggests that in each case an alternative explanation such as evolutionary theory or functional appropriateness of organs in organisms can provide a sufficient account of them. Mackie concludes that the account of causation that he has developed and argued for can provide a satisfactory account of all natural laws.
Prudence, Morality and Supererogation
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

The relationship between morality and prudence and the extent to which a proper utilitarian account can accommodate acts of supererogation is examined. There are prudential principles that coincide with moral principles, which are supported by firm dispositions of character. Hare argues that the prescriptivity of moral judgements demonstrate the tight connection between moral judgements and dispositions to act, and shows how it is possible to reach certain conclusions if we do our moral thinking correctly.
The Problem of the External World
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Chapter 1 sets out the Problem of the External World to which scepticism is a natural response: the problem, first posed by Descartes in his First Meditation, of how to show that we have any knowledge about the world around us.

Reflecting on the nature of his sensory experiences, Descartes finds himself unable to rule out the possibility that he is dreaming and, on that account, driven to the devastating conclusion that he knows nothing at all about the world around him. Stroud argues that if Descartes is right to insist that in order to know something about the world around him he must know that he is not dreaming, then he is also right that he has no such knowledge, because the condition for knowledge that Descartes accepts can never be fulfilled: fulfilling it would require knowledge which itself would be possible only if the condition were fulfilled.

The more promising strategy in the face of the sceptical argument, therefore, is to examine more carefully the requirement that we must know that we are not dreaming if we are to know anything about the world around us.

But if that requirement is a fact of our ordinary conception of knowledge, as it seems to be, we must accept it, because there is no notion of knowledge other than the ordinary one that is embodied in the procedures and practices of everyday and scientific life; and unless we find a way of rejecting the problem altogether, we will have to accept with it the conclusion that no one knows anything about world around us.
Internal and External: Meaningful and Meaningless
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.

This line of criticism, which has been presented forcefully by Rudolf Carnap in his papers ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ and ‘Pseudoproblems in Philosophy’, is inspired by verificationism in the philosophy of language: the view that a sentence that is not rendered at least more likely to be true by one possible course of sensory experience than another has no meaning, and thus cannot be considered either true or false. On the basis of the verifiability principle, Carnap argues that only ‘internal’ questions about knowledge – questions that pertain to some empirically verifiable matter of fact – can be meaningfully asked; by contrast, the question whether there are any material objects at all, taken as an ‘external’ question by the sceptic, is literally meaningless, and should instead be understood as a merely ‘practical’ question about which ‘linguistic framework’ to adopt.

Stroud observes, first, that this strategy not only appreciates the force of philosophical scepticism but is in fact in complete agreement with it: it denies that there is any theoretical justification for adopting one linguistic framework, such as that of a world of material objects, rather than another, which is precisely the point the sceptic wants to make; and it accepts a version of the ‘conditional correctness of scepticism’. The view that, if the traditional philosopher did manage to raise a meaningful question about our knowledge of the world, then his sceptical answer to it would be correct. Second, Stroud argues that neither the ‘internal’–‘external’ distinction used in the argument against scepticism nor the status of the verifiability principle itself on which it rests are made sufficiently clear to render them efficient and acceptable; moreover, as long as the verifiability principle is not independently shown to be a condition of meaningfulness, philosophical scepticism will itself provide a powerful objection to it.
Naturalized Epistemology
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Stroud discusses W. V. Quine’s project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’, and assesses its consequences for philosophical scepticism.

According to Quine, science and everyday knowledge and the languages and thought processes in which they are pursued and expressed are to be seen as natural phenomena which can be studied and described and explained scientifically like any other part of the natural world: all attempts to find out about ourselves and the world must be made from within the conceptual and scientific resources we have already developed for finding out about anything.

Stroud points out that this can make it look as if Quine is simply changing the subject; that would leave open the possibility, sometimes apparently endorsed by Quine, that scepticism is and remains the only answer to the traditional question, and that nothing he says in his naturalized epistemology affects the answer one way or the other. But Quine also appears to want to resist scepticism on the grounds of his naturalized account of our epistemic situation; the argument is that scientific knowledge can be used to meet the sceptical challenge because the challenge arises from, and within, the domain of science itself.

This is ineffective as a response to scepticism, according to Stroud, because the fact that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts does not put the epistemologist who raises such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible; in fact, the view endorsed by Quine turns out not only to tolerate scepticism but to be committed to it: the argument is that I cannot understand my own knowledge of the world as a mere ‘projection’ from ‘meagre sensory data’, and since my own knowledge of what the world is like is required for me to be able to ascribe knowledge of the world to other people, I cannot ascribe knowledge to anyone, and this is scepticism.
Coda: The Quest for a Diagnosis
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Chapter 7 discusses two related attempts to diagnose a mistake in the sceptical reasoning on the basis of the insight that what an expression means is a function of what it is used to mean or to say on specific occasions by human beings.

S. Cavell argues that scepticism should be rejected because every claim to knowledge needs a specific context in which it is made; without such a specific context, no sceptical question can arise because no knowledge claim is made, and within such a context no sceptical question can arise either because every concrete claim to knowledge carries with it specific conditions that cannot be generalized. Stroud replies that the absence of a specific, concrete claim to knowledge does not make it impossible for us to assess our epistemic situation, and that it is so far unclear why the sceptic, in the course of such an assessment, cannot reach the kind of general conclusion he seeks.

T. Clarke employs a distinction between a ‘plain’ and a ‘philosophical’ way of understanding knowledge claims to show that the dream possibility could not be used to bring all of our knowledge of the world into question in the way the sceptic intends. But, Stroud argues, the argument rests on the assumption that, in order to call some knowledge into question, some other actual or at least possible knowledge must be presupposed, and this assumption seems mistaken, or at least highly questionable. The traditional conception of objectivity, which is bound up closely with scepticism, seems to be correct: the truth of ‘I am dreaming’, which must be ruled out if I am to know, depends on what state I am in with respect to the world around me, but not on whether anyone else does or could know about that world.
Wide‐Angle View
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

‘Wide‐angle View’ introduces the reader to Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, its general outlook, style, and conclusions. Pears argues that Wittgenstein's later thought is whole‐heartedly critical in the Kantian sense, while his earlier project, and the Tractatus in particular, are to be thought of as semi‐critical.
Sentences as Pictures
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Delineates Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning, the view that explanation of how sentences acquire and keep their sense must appeal to the concept of pictorial representation. Pears introduces a vital element of Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy, namely the so‐called ‘saying–showing distinction’.
Solipsism
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Pears outlines Wittgenstein's argumentative move against the doctrine of solipsism, and connects the different lines of thought that accumulate in Wittgenstein's reaction to the doctrine. Pears examines the doctrine that the limits of one's language are the limits of one's world, and sets the stage for the discussion of Wittgenstein's later philosophy by critically examining the earlier conception of the subject.
Review and Prospect
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Pears provides a general assessment of Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy as well as a brief review of comments Wittgenstein himself made in retrospect.
The Problem of Political Freedom
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

Central to liberalism is the concept of political freedom. Revisionists wrongly claim that liberty has only instrumental value, but they do nevertheless contribute several cogent arguments relevant to the question of how the value of liberty is to be justified. The doctrine of the presumption of liberty and the thesis that liberty ‘just has’ intrinsic value are rightly rejected by revisionists, since neither can ground distinctions between different freedoms. Linguistic analysis is of limited use to the justification of the value of liberty, since distinctions between notions of freedom and unfreedom do not match normatively relevant distinctions. This book seeks to defend a liberal theory of limited government without resort to the mistaken premises of individualism, which it rejects.
The Authority of States
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

The normal justification of authority, as examined in Ch. 3, yields the conclusion that the extent of governmental authority varies from person to person. It cannot justify the authority that governments, in fact, claim for themselves in the case of most people. An analysis of consent is provided in order to explore the prospect that consent might serve to extend the scope of the authority of states. It is argued that consent can ground an extension of political authority only so far as it is non‐instrumentally valuable. Those who, as a mode of expressing identification with their community, consent to the authority of reasonably just governments or respect their laws, are subject to that authority since such modes of consent have non‐instrumental value.
The Exclusion of Ideals
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

Political neutrality, conceived of as the exclusion of ideals, prevents governments from acting for reasons, which appeal to conceptions of the good, whether valid or invalid. Such a position relies on an elusive distinction between one part of morality, the good, and another, the right. Political welfarism, which allows governments to act specifically to increase want satisfaction, is mistaken in regarding want satisfaction as an intrinsic good. The Nozickean style aversion to coercion cannot be effectively grounded in autonomy, since no agents enjoy complete autonomy, and not only human intervention but also nature can restrict autonomy.
Liberty and Rights
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

The doctrine of liberty is underpinned by the ideal of autonomy. While the rights that have traditionally been of concern to liberals serve the interests of the individuals protected by those rights, they also tend to promote collective goods, such as the good of toleration, and the good of membership. What accounts, in part, for the force of these rights is their ability to serve such collective goods. The connection between rights and collective goods shows that rights should not be constitutionally entrenched in such a way that they are forever beyond the reach of political action.
Consequentialism: An Introduction
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

Against Rawls's ‘separateness of persons’ objection to consequentialism, it can be replied that consequentialism does take into account differing personal viewpoints in legitimating trade‐offs between persons’ interests. Nozick's Kantian‐inspired view of rights as side‐constraints is also indecisive, as this view can only proscribe trade‐offs between individuals’ interests that have already been deemed, on independent grounds, to be impermissible. The appearance of agent‐relativity, which underlies both Nozick's case for constraints, and Nagel's argument for partiality, can to some degree be rendered consistent with consequentialism's commitment to agent‐neutrality. More precisely, what might appear to be agent‐relativity may be just agent‐neutrality, but agent‐neutrality as applied to agents’ action's reasons, rather than to their outcome reasons. Williams's argument from integrity, despite its elusiveness, may offer more promising materials for challenging consequentialism.
Autonomy and Pluralism
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

Autonomy is an ideal of self‐creation, or self‐authorship; it consists in an agent's successful pursuit of willingly embraced, valuable options, where the agent's activities are not dominated by worries about mere survival. Autonomy in its primary sense is to be understood as the actual living of an autonomous life; autonomy in its secondary sense is to be understood as the capacity to live autonomously. To be autonomous, agents have to meet three conditions: they must possess certain mental capacities, they must have an adequate range of valuable options, and they must enjoy independence from coercion and manipulation. Autonomy should be distinguished from self‐realization, as autonomous persons may choose not to realize their capacities. Autonomy itself, in an environment that supports autonomy, is not similarly optional, as living autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy‐supporting environment.
Laws and Symmetry
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality, and that conception played a role in the birth of modern physics some centuries ago, but today physicists speak in terms of symmetry, transformations, and invariance. Laws and Symmetry's three main objectives are: first, to show the failure of current philosophical accounts of laws of nature; second, to refute arguments for the reality of laws of nature; third, to contrib ute to an epistemology and a philosophy of science antithetical to such metaphysical notions. The latter involves an inquiry into the character and role of symmetry and of symmetry arguments in the physical sciences.
Introduction
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

The historical role of the concept of a law of nature in medieval and early modern physics engendered a view of science as continuous with metaphysics, which has tended to dominate philosophy of nature and of science. Meanwhile, with the development of mathematical methods, the advanced sciences began to focus on the structural characteristics and constraints of models, now generally described in terms of symmetry. Simple historical examples illustrate this trend.
What Are Laws of Nature?
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

This chapter concentrates on isolating criteria of adequacy for any philosophical account of what laws of nature are. Sources include David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, Donald Davidson, David Armstrong, and David Lewis. Criteria examined pertain to universality, necessity, intensionality, explanation, prediction, confirmation, counter‐factuals, objectivity, and inference to the best explanation. Two main problems are presented: the problem of inference (that it is a law that A should imply that A is the case) and the problem of identification (there should be some identifiable aspect of nature that makes for laws). These two problems together constitute a dilemma, since a solution to one tends to pre‐empt any solution to the other.
Necessity, Worlds, and Chance
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

This chapter concentrates on philosophical theories of laws of nature that take for granted certain concepts of possibility, possible worlds, necessity, or physical probability. The accounts of Wilfrid Sellars, Storrs McCall, Peter Vallentyne, and Robert Pargetter are criticized. Crucial to any such account that draws on a notion of objective chance or probability is the ’horizontal‐vertical problem’ (of accounting for statistical predictions based on assumptions about chance). It is argued that if the metaphysical point of view is maintained, then this problem is unsolvable.
Inference to the Best Explanation: Salvation by Laws?
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

Induction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of traditional notions of Induction, and offer new foundations for inductive methods. This chapter and the next argue that neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion.
Towards a New Epistemology
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

The underground river of probabilism, slowly growing in force over three centuries, burst forth above ground in the twentieth century and brought new hope for epistemology. Probabilism sees its historical origin in the work of Blaise Pascal in the seventeenth century, but has for the main part been developed in the last 100 years, notably by Leonard Savage, Rudolf Carnap, Bruno De Finetti, Isaac Levi, Richard Jeffrey, and many other writers on the interface of statistics, probability theory, and epistemology. This chapter provides a liberal version of probabilism, as basic framework for descriptive epistemology. Benefits include proofs of the incoherence of Inference to the Best Explanation and related ideas pertaining to Induction or, in general, to rule‐governed notions of rational opinion change. It is argued that this is not a form of scepticism and does provide a basis for an empiricist epistemology adequate for philosophy of science.
Symmetry Arguments in Science and Metaphysics
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

Starting with the paradigm example of mirror image symmetry, this chapter provides a sustained analysis of the different forms of arguments that draw on, or exploit symmetries in, nature and in theoretical models. Specific applications are made to the postulation of hidden variables, the role of invariance in the scientific representation of nature, and the problem of adequately characterizing the notion of determinism.
Symmetries Guiding Modern Science1
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van
Published: October 2003

The concepts analysed and developed in the previous chapter are applied to discussions of the development of modern mechanics, including symmetries of space and time, relativity, conservation laws, invariance and covariance, and the relation to older ideas of laws of nature.