Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable on the International Competitiveness of U.S. Capital Markets
Authors: Edwards Franklin , Scott Kenneth 
Published: September 2010

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation issued an Interim Report (known as the “Paulson Report”) near the end of 2006 that concluded that the U.S. “is losing its leading competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers abroad.” This report was quickly followed by a study, which reached similar conclusions, that was commissioned by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles Schumer and prepared by McKinsey & Co.

At its July 2007 annual meeting, the Financial Economists Roundtable (FER) — a group of senior financial economists at universities and other organizations recognized as having made significant contributions to the finance literature—discussed the issues raised by the Report and decided to publish its own report. The report makes the following four policy recommendations:

Securities class action suits —Abolish enterprise liability under rule 10b‐5 in situations arising out of security purchases and sales in the secondary trading market among outside shareholders, while retaining managerial and firm liability where the company itself or its insiders (officers and directors) transact to their own benefit. Imposing massive liability on a company that is not a party to the securities transactions and does not benefit from the fraud does not serve a deterrence function since it is the continuing shareholders of the corporation who bear the burden of what the company must pay if found guilty, either directly or indirectly through insurance premiums.

Shareholder rights—Require all corporations to obtain shareholder approval to adopt a poison pill, regardless of whether a company has a staggered board. This requirement would conform to the broad principle that the board of any company should not be able to deny its shareholders the opportunity to decide on the merits of a takeover bid, and it would help restore the market for corporate control as an effective disciplinary mechanism for poorly performing boards and managers.

Compliance costs associated with SOX §404—Adopt a statutory amendment that makes it optional for a company to adopt the §404 procedures for a management assessment and auditor attestation of the effectiveness of its internal controls, with the requirement that if the company chooses not to comply it must explain why in its financial statements. Thus, in effect, the FER effectively recommends that the market be allowed to determine the value of §404 compliance. If a company chooses not to comply, the market will assess its explanation for non‐compliance and will value the company accordingly.

Maintaining open markets—Allow both foreign and U.S. firms to choose to report in conformity with either IFRS or U.S. GAAP. The FER recognizes both IFRS and U.S. GAAP as high‐quality accounting standards that provide reasonable foundations for financial reporting for investors. Allowing both foreign and U.S. firms to adopt whichever of these standards they believe to be the most cost‐effective provides an opportunity for the market and investors themselves to sort out which reporting standard best serves their interests.