bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
A General Black Box Theory
Authors: Bunge Mario
Published: November 2002

A mathematical theory is proposed and exemplified, which covers an extended class of black boxes. Every kind of stimulus and response is pictured by a channel connecting the box with its environment. The input-output relation is given by a postulate schema according to which the response is, in general, a nonlinear functional of the input. Several examples are worked out: the perfectly transmitting box, the damping box, and the amplifying box. The theory is shown to be (a) an extension of the S-matrix theory and the accompanying channel picture as developed in microphysics; (b) abstract and applicable to any problem involving the transactions of a system (physical, biological, social, etc.) with its milieu; (c) superficial, because unconcerned with either the structure of the box or the nature of the stimuli and responses. The motive for building the theory was to show the capabilities and limitations of the phenomenological approach.
Reflexive Predictions
Authors: Buck Roger C.
Published: November 2002

Certain predictions are such that their accuracy can be affected by their dissemination, by their being believed and acted upon. Examples of such reflexive predictions are presented. Various approaches to the precise delineation of this category of predictions are explored, and a definition is proposed and defended. Next it is asked whether the possible reflexivity of predictions creates a serious methodological problem for the social sciences. A distinction between causal and logical reflexivity helps support a negative answer. Finally, we consider the thesis that “this characteristic of predictions is peculiar to human affairs” (Merton), and an attempted rebuttal (Grünbaum). It is argued that Grünbaum's rebuttal is ineffective.
Comments on Professor Roger Buck's Paper “Reflexive Predictions”
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Professor Buck has given an illuminating account of the logical status of reflexive predictions in the social sciences. He tells us that the classification of a prediction as reflexive is predicated on a tacit distinction between the “normal” and the “abnormal” or perturbed conditions under which it is made. This seems to me to be a perceptive and sound circumscription of the class of reflexive predictions as encountered in the social sciences. He goes on to show helpfully how the social scientist can cope with the pitfalls of spurious disconfirmation and spurious confirmation which are created by “self-frustrating” and “self-fulfilling” predictions respectively. And Professor Buck then offers some searching doubts concerning the adequacy of regarding self-fulfilling predictions as the pattern of racial discrimination against minority groups. Finally, he presents objections to my critique ([1], pp. 239–240) of Robert Merton's claim that self-defeating and self-fulfilling predictions are endemic to the domain of human affairs and are “not found among predictions about the world of nature.” ([2], p. 181).
Diversity in the Behavioral Sciences
Authors: Sacksteder William
Published: November 2002

It is fairly usual to argue or to assume that there is a single pattern of proper scientific endeavor for the behavioral sciences. This is based, one is inclined to say, on the superb model afforded by the natural science successes of the past few hundred years and on the common method which underlies and determines that model. Consequently, a protagonist can argue that within his own science, all opposed modes of thinking are archaic, peripheral, or unscientific, while his own at least prefigures fulfillment of true science. And it may even be claimed that other behavioral fields are special offshoots, subordinate provinces, or particularizations which are reducible to his favored scheme of analysis. Such diversity and disagreement as there is, it can be said, stems from either of two causes. The first is the stubbornness of men, whereby they refuse to face the facts, to employ reasoning processes properly, or to foresake sinister interests. The other is the relative immaturity of behavioral science, an immaturity which will be eliminated by patient progress.
The Concept of the Unconscious: Some Analytic Preliminaries
Authors: Edel Abraham
Published: November 2002

To illustrate one way in which philosophy may be helpful rather than merely critical in the present state of psychoanalytic theorizing, an attempt is made to disentangle issues in controversies about the unconscious. Eleven questions are distinguished and discussed. Logical, linguistic, methodological, metaphysical, empirical, and pragmatic components are set apart. It is found that there are no logical barriers to a construct of the unconscious, that it is linguistically feasible, need violate no methodological concepts, nor foreclose a metaphysical issue, nor have deleterious pragmatic effect. Feasibility and desirability of the construct in all these respects will depend on the character and extent of the scientific findings. Some issues are also raised concerning desirable types of models in the explanation of conduct, and concerning the relevance of recent studies of consciousness.
On the Argument by Analogy
Authors: Wilson P. R.
Published: November 2002

Conditions are stated under which the “argument by analogy” is consistent with the principle of inverse probability. It is contended that the argument by analogy, in conjunction with a crucial test, has a legitimate place in scientific logic. As an example the astrophysical problem of solar granulation is discussed in detail and other examples are mentioned more briefly.
Thermodynamics and Some Undecidable Physical Questions
Authors: Rothstein Jerome
Published: November 2002

It is shown that a number of questions, usually considered philosophical rather than scientific, can be reformulated to apply to a world of automata or “well-informed heat engines.” In some cases they admit of physical answers, but in many cases obtaining answers entails violation of the second law of thermodynamics. This is demonstrated explicitly for the problem of determinism and free will, for the discovery of the origin or ultimate fate of the universe, or for the discovery of causes or purposes in nature.
Theory of Definition
Authors: Pap Arthur
Published: November 2002

Definitions can be classified from (at least) two different points of view. We can ask what sort of statements definitions are, how they are to be justified, and what purpose they serve in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge. For lack of a simpler word, let us call a classification of definitions from this point of view epistemological. We can also distinguish different forms of definition; and a classification from this point of view is naturally called formal.
Counterfactual Conditionals and the Presuppositions of Induction
Authors: Todd William
Published: November 2002

In this paper I will argue that Professor Goodman was correct in thinking that there is a problem concerning counterfactual conditionals, but that it is somewhat different from the problem he thought it to be, and is one that is even more basic. I will also try to show that this problem is distinct from Hume's “problem” of induction, and that additional assumptions have to be made for counterfactual induction beyond those required for other kinds of induction.
The Causal Efficacy of Space
Authors: Shapere Dudley
Published: November 2002

Through an analysis of conditions under which the question of spatial anisotropy can be raised, the present paper brings out intimate conceptual relationships between the scientific concept of space and the concepts of entities, behavior, and explanation specified by scientific theories. Thus scientific departures from ordinary usage (or from usage in other scientific theories) of the term “space” entail corresponding shifts in the use of other terms not generally seen to be connected. As a case study of the relations between these terms, and of the refusal to allow the possibility of spatial anisotropy, Newtonian mechanics is examined.
The Explanatory Value of the Unconscious
Authors: Martin Michael
Published: November 2002

It is common knowledge that the notion of the unconscious is an essential part of psychoanalytic theory. In recent years, however, Arthur Pap and A. C. MacIntyre have argued that Freud's theory of the unconscious is not explanatory. But a close examination of Pap's and MacIntyre's arguments reveals that they are invalid. If one wishes to show that the theory of the unconscious is unexplanatory, different arguments will be necessary.
Particular Reidentification
Authors: Dretske Fred I.
Published: November 2002

A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the “same place” at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that “objects with some endurance through time” must be accepted as fundamental is examined and found inconclusive. A sketch is then given of an alternative scheme which does allow the relevant spatial comparisons, but which does not countenance the reidentification of particulars. The discussion is intended to show that the relationist can, as indeed he must, deny the second horn of this delemma.
Induction as Vindication
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid
Published: November 2002

I shall attempt in this paper to give a rounded, if schematic, account of the concept of probability. My central concern will be to clarify the sense in which law-like statements (including ‘statistical’ law-like statements) are made probable by observational data which, in a sense equally demanding analysis, ‘accord’ with them.
The Gibbs’ Paradox and the Distinguishability of Physical Systems
Authors: Rosen Robert
Published: November 2002

The Gibbs’ Paradox is commonly explained by invoking some type of “principle of indistinguishability,” which asserts that the interchange of identical particles is not a real physical event, i.e., is operationally meaningless. However, if this principle is to provide a satisfactory resolution of the Paradox, it must be operationally possible to determine whether, in fact, two given systems are identical or not. That is, the assertion that the Gibbs’ Paradox is resolvable by an indistinguishability principle actually is an assertion that we can in principle possess a complete set of effective procedures for determining the identity or non-identity of arbitrary physical systems. We show that, in rather general situations, an assertion of this type is not well founded. It is further pointed out that a failure to recognize an incomplete set of “sameness criteria” can lead to serious blunders in physics and in biology.
Disconfirmative Results and Prior Commitments
Authors: Krause Merton S.
Published: November 2002

One style of conducting scientific research involves the application of theoretical propositions to an empirical domain under investigation. The investigator plans his research in terms of the theoretical propositions and states his findings in these terms as well. We wish to examine not the merits of this style of research but a difficulty inherent in it. The difficulty concerns what is to be done when disconfirmative results are produced by some discrete study or experiment in the course of such research.
What Makes an Explanation
Authors: Workman Rollin W.
Published: November 2002

Newtonian theory has usually been accepted as a paradigm example of an explanation. There are two widely known analyses of what makes it so. According to one analysis, the deductive and predictive nature of the theory is what counts. The second analysis emphasizes the ability of the theory to connect widely different events and laws. The present paper proposes a third analysis stressing three characteristics. (1) The explanation includes a description which is in part of something unobserved. (2) The description is true in the sense of corresponding to the facts. (3) Through the description, the explanation confers “naturalness” upon the thing explained.
Mathematical and Philosophical Analyses
Authors: Rogers Robert
Published: November 2002

In this paper I shall argue that to a very significant extent mathematics is concept analysis, and that though the analysis of mathematical concepts is in a number of ways different from the analysis of philosophic concepts, the similarities between these two types of concept analyses are as important and far reaching as the differences. I shall argue that because mathematics and philosophy are each concerned with the analysis of concepts, they are much more like one another epistemologically than is often recognized. In insisting upon fundamental similarities between mathematics and philosophy, I shall be agreeing with the classical rationalists, but on a very different conception of both philosophy and mathematics from that held by the rationalists. The rationalists wished to assimilate philosophy to mathematics as understood in their time; viz. as a body of necessary propositions, which followed from self-evident axioms and postulates, revealed to the natural light of reason. As against this rationalistic position, I wish to make a comparison in the reverse direction, in which I shall presuppose a certain conception of philosophy as something given, and then insist that mathematics is in many important respects similar to philosophy as so understood. In particular, I wish to insist that there is a significant comparison between mathematics on the one hand, and philosophy as understood by probably a majority of philosophers today on the other—viz., philosophy understood as concept analysis—, where it is conceded that the analysis of philosophic concepts is inherently a tentative matter, wherein it is impossible—at least in the usual case—to offer any one analysis of a given philosophic concept as absolutely certain and beyond all revision. I shall argue that by virtue of the fact that mathematics, like philosophy, is concerned with the analysis of concepts, many at least of the propositions advanced within it are inherently revisable, and do not possess the kind of certainty the rationalists ascribed to them.
On the Cosmological Indeterminacy Principle of McCrae
Authors: Berenda Carlton W.
Published: November 2002

A recent proposal by Dr. W. H. McCrae, cosmologist and mathematician, to the effect that decisions between such cosmogonies as those of Hoyle and of Gamow are experimentally impossible by virtue of a general cosmological indeterminacy principle, is here examined and elaborated upon. Some comments on the “antinomies” in Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason” are made in reference to this principle as well as to the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle. If McCrae's principle is accepted, we will have moved a long way toward Kant's conclusion that a logically consistent understanding of an underlying “ultimate reality” is outside the confines of science—whatever one may think of Kant's own line of reasoning.
Sub-Quantum Entities
Authors: Fleming John J.
Published: November 2002

The possibility of a sub-quantum mechanical realm has been investigated in recent years by DeBroglie, Bohm, Vigier, and others. It is felt that what is needed in this investigation is some simple and direct resolution of the problem as to whether sub-quantum entities exist or not. By restricting attention to quanta of light energy there is presented a theoretical expression for a sub-quantum or micro-photon which has proven to be testable. It is possible by this development to bridge the particle-wave duality wherein these two conceptions become arithmetically commensurate with one another. The theoretical expression derived for the micro-photon also leads to a different interpretative approach to Planck's constant as well as the appearance of a new unit or element of mass.
Discussion: Professionalism and Disciplinarianism: Two Styles of Sociological Performance
Authors: Horowitz Irving Louis
Published: November 2002

During the last decade, in 1958 to be precise, an organizational confrontation took place: the essential issue before its membership was this: should the American Sociological Society (ASS) be rechristened the American Sociological Association (ASA). The results of the vote conclusively demonstrated that for a majority of the participants, it was preferable to be known as a group of ASA's rather than a bunch of ASS's.
Discussion: Of Selection Operators and Semanticists
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

As anyone who has ever seriously attempted to analyze the semantico-epistemological status of scientific theories has soon discovered, it is not easy to reconcile the belief that theoretical terms (i.e., terms which cannot be explicitly defined in the observation language) have genuine cognitive properties with the empiricist tenet that all knowledge derives from experience. Even if it be granted that knowledge can originate in experience without being about experience, it still remains to develop a coherent metalinguistic account of the truth-conditions of theoretical propositions and the designata of denotative expressions in the theory language. In a recent article, “On the use of Hilbert's e-operator in scientific theories” [1], Carnap has broadened his analysis of theories to include provision for the referential properties of individual theoretical terms. But while his account focuses more closely than ever upon the fundamental semantical problems of a theory language, his specific proposals amount to a repudiation of the very logical empiricism which he has so strongly championed these many years. In what follows, I use Carnap's notation and terminology throughout (including a pejorative sense of the term “metaphysics” borrowed from Carnap's earlier writings).
Discussion: The Epistemology of Causality from the Point of View of Evolutionary Biology
Authors: Barr H. J.
Published: November 2002

In 1958 I set down some thoughts that arose from an attempt to consider epistemological problems on the assumptions that (1) The biology of the human nervous system is relevant to epistemology and (2) The human nervous system, like every other object of biological investigation, is a product of evolution by natural selection. These thoughts lay more or less neglected until they were brought stunningly to mind by Professor George Gaylord Simpson's [1] recent paper on “Biology and the Nature of Science”. In that paper Professor Simpson writes:

“Still another consideration seems to me the most interesting of all, and yet I have never seen it clearly expressed elsewhere. It is, in a sense a validation of the ‘animal faith’ given by Russell (after Santayana) … as sole basis for assuming that we really can obtain knowledge of the outer world. The fact is that man originated by a slow process of evolution guided by natural selection. At every stage in this long progression our ancestors necessarily had adaptive reactions to the world around them. As behavior and sense organs became more complex, perception of sensations from those organs obviously maintained a realistic relationship to the environment. To put it crudely but graphically, the monkey who did not have a realistic perception of the tree branch he jumped for was soon a dead monkey-and therefore did not become one of our ancestors. Our perceptions do give true, even though not complete, representations of the outer world because that was and is a biological necessity.”
Discussion: A Reply to Mr. Mattick's Article on Marxism and the New Physics
Authors: Frings Manfred S.
Published: November 2002

It will be recalled that Mr. Mattick stated that Marxism does not derive its social theory from physical theory, and that any attempt to do so is an aberration from marxism. It is maintained that Marx is not a determinist or indeterminist in the ususal sense of these terms. Furthermore, it was argued that ideologies are no longer decisive weapons and that Marxists put little trust in the dialectical course of history.
Discussion: Physical and Social Facts in Anthropology
Authors: Barnes J. A.
Published: November 2002

In his recent paper Gellner singles me out for special comment and some reply is called for. He attributes to me several propositions which he says I made in my note on ‘Physical and social kinship’ in this journal, and he then refutes them. Reading his paper I cannot avoid thinking that he exaggerates the differences between us, thereby apparently strengthening his argument. Some substantial differences there are, but others are fictional. A line-by-line analysis of what he says about me in his paper might be amusing but would be of only ephemeral interest. In this reply I confine myself to a few important issues.
Stability Proofs and Consistency Proofs: A Loose Analogy
Authors: Hanson Norwood Russell
Published: November 2002

A loose analogy relates the work of Laplace and Hilbert. These thinkers had roughly similar objectives. At a time when so much of our analytic effort goes to distinguishing mathematics and logic from physical theory, such an analogy can still be instructive, even though differences will always divide endeavors such as those of Laplace and Hilbert.
Analogy and Confirmation Theory
Authors: Hesse Mary
Published: November 2002

The argument from analogy is examined from the point of view of Carnap's confirmation theory. It is argued that if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must contain elementary analogical inferences. Carnap's system as originally developed (the λ-system) is not strong enough to take account of analogical arguments, but it is shown that the new system, which he has announced but not published in detail (the η-system), is capable of satisfying the conditions of inductive analogy. Finally it is shown that an elementary analysis of analogical inference yields postulates of the η-system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions.
Models, Analogies, and Theories
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: November 2002

Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims involving an emphasis on logical structure and similarity in form between theory and analogy. While formal considerations are often relevant in the employment of an analogy they are neither as extensive as proponents of this viewpoint suggest, nor are they in most cases sufficient for allowing analogies to fulfill the roles imputed to them. Of major importance, and what these authors generally fail to consider, arephysicalsimilarities between analogue and theoretical object. Such similarities, which are characteristic in varying degrees of most analogies actually employed, play an important role in affording a better understanding of concepts in the theory and also in the development of the theoretical assumptions.
Discussion: Analogies as Generalizations
Authors: Agassi Joseph
Published: November 2002

Analogies have been traditionally recognized as a proper part of inductive procedures, akin to generalizations. Seldom, however, have they been presented as superior to generalizations, in the attainability of a higher degree of certitude for their conclusions or in other respects. Though Bacon definitely preferred analogy to generalization, the tradition seems to me to go the other way—until the recent publication of works by Mary B. Hesse (pp. 21-28 and passim) and, perhaps, R. Harré (pp. 23-28 and passim).
On the Nature of Dimensions
Authors: Ellis Brian
Published: November 2002

In the first part of this paper it is shown that unit names, whether simple or complex, whether of fundamental, associative or derivative measurement, may always be regarded as the names of scales. In the second it is shown that dimension names, whether simple, like “[M]”, “[L]” and “[T]”, or complex dimensional formulae, may always be regarded as the names of classes of similar scales. Thus, a new foundation for the theory of dimensional analysis is provided, and in the light of this, its nature and scope are examined. Dimensional analysis is shown to depend upon certain conventions for expressing numerical laws.
Functional Explanation in Biology
Authors: Lehman Hugh
Published: November 2002

This paper is concerned with the problem of giving a correct analysis of function statements as they are used in biology. Examples of such statements are (1) The function of the myelin sheath is to insulate the nerve fiber and (2) The function of chlorophyll is to enable photosynthesis to take place. After criticizing analyses of such statements developed by Braithwaite, Nagel and Hempel an analysis is presented by the author. Finally the question of whether function statements are explanations is discussed briefly.
The Problem of Infinite Matter in Steady-State Cosmology
Authors: Schlegel Richard
Published: November 2002

The creation-of-matter hypothesis of the Bondi-Gold-Hoyle steady-state cosmology requires that in an infinite time to which the first transfinite number may be assigned the number of atoms of matter produced would be equal to the cardinal number of the set of mathematical points in the continuum. The existence of a set of finite atoms with that cardinal number is physically unacceptable. The argument for the production of a non-denumerable set of atoms, in infinite time, is given in terms of a model which is shown to be isomorphic with the original Cantor “diagonal” proof for the existence of a non-denumerable infinity. An alternative model which meets the requirements of the steady-state theory is presented; in this model, the number of atoms is explicitly no greater than countably infinite, and remains countably infinite as long as the past time of the universe is restricted to the unlimited set of finite unit-time intervals. If the origin of the steady-state universe is taken as being within that infinite set, expressed by the negative natural numbers, the contradiction of an atom at every mathematical point does not arise. The contradiction does arise if the origin is not within the set of finite numbers, and accordingly there is a restriction as to which concept of infinite past may properly be maintained in the steady-state theory.
Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability
Authors: Vickers John M.
Published: November 2002

The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief.
Measuring Measuring Rods
Authors: Graves John C. , Roper James E.
Published: November 2002

In this paper, we show that a restricted form of time travel both accords with special relativity kinematics and avoids several prima facie objections. We argue that such time travel provides a reasonable way to interpret certain phenomena which can readily be described, and the analogues of which have already been observed at the level of elementary particle reactions. We then describe how a time-traveling object could measure itself, and demonstrate how, in the appropriate circumstances, such an experiment could convince a theorist who insisted on a single criterion for length measurements that his standard had itself changed in length. The same experiment can shed light on the possibility of detecting a universal expansion; and we show that, given certain experimental results, one must conclude that every member of a class of time travelers has changed in length simultaneously, though perhaps only while going backwards in time.
Of Minds and Molecules
Authors: Raab Francis V.
Published: November 2002

“Of Minds and Molecules” attempts to show the difficulties in mental-state brain-state monism. By exploring the differences in meaning between mental-state sentences and brain-state sentences, and by analysing the implications of the theory of the molecular composition of matter, a kind of dualism is arrived at that no scientist should feel uncomfortable with. It is a dualism without mental substance but it does not deprive mental states of their uniqueness. Arguments are given for the propriety of asserting causal connections and dependency relations between mental states and molecular states of the brain.
Hospers on Psychoanalysis: A Critique
Authors: Brender Myron
Published: November 2002

At the Second Annual Meeting of the New York University Institute of Philosophy convened to consider the scientific status of psychoanalysis, Professor John Hospers was one of the few participating philosophers who undertook to defend the scientific status of psychoanalysis against the cogent criticisms of his fellow philosophers. In this paper I shall examine Hospers’ defense, “Philosophy and Psychoanalysis”, as it appears in the published proceedings of the meeting [12] and in the process of so doing I shall attempt to demonstrate that Hospers (a) misunderstood the critique of his opponents, (b) argued invalidly on several crucial issues and (c) neglected to take into account the possibility of alternative explanations.
Experimental Error and Deducibility
Authors: Mellor D. H.
Published: November 2002

The view is advocated that to preserve a deductivist account of science against recent criticism, it is necessary to incorporate experimental error, or imprecision, in the deductive structure. The sources of imprecision in empirical variables are analyzed, and the notion of conceptual imprecision introduced and illustrated. This is then used to clarify the notion of the acceptable range of a functional law. It is further shown that imprecision may be ascribed to parameters in laws and theories without rendering the deductive structure untestable. It is claimed that this analysis explicates the relation between laws and theories in a way that invalidates certain arguments against its deductive nature.
On Being and Being Presented
Authors: Hochberg Herbert
Published: November 2002

Some philosophers have claimed that one must be acquainted with the elements of one's ontology. Also, believing that substrata and universals are required in an adequate ontology, these philosophers have claimed acquaintance with such objects. This paper attempts to analyze what is involved in such claims and to argue that they result from a number of confusions. The paper deals largely with the claim that substrata, or bare particulars, are presented since numerical difference is a simple fact that is presented. It further attempts to argue that while neither substrata nor universals, as such, are objects of acquaintance, there are some distinctions to be drawn between talk of universals as presented objects and talk of substrata being presented.
The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

A consideration of some basic problems that arise in the attempt to provide an adequate characterization of statistical explanation is taken to show that an understanding of the nature of scientific explanation requires us to deal with the philosophical problems connected with the nature of prior probabilities.
Salmon's Paper
Authors: Kyburg Henry E.
Published: November 2002

First, a comment on a pessimistic note: Salmon says we can't be sure there is any such thing as inductive inference: in demanding that some explanations have the form of correct inductive inferences, “we may be laying down a requirement which cannot be fulfilled.” To doubt that we can fulfill that requirement is to doubt that we can formalize inductive logic. It may be true, but why begin the fight by throwing in the sponge ? It is also true that there are difficulties involved in formalizing acceptance rules for inductive conclusions, but these difficulties may be overcome. It is false to claim that we ‘cannot claim to know exactly’ what these acceptance rules are. Only two years ago I did just that. It was true that my claim was shown to be erroneous a year later, but that fate can befall almost any worthwhile claim.
Reply to Kyburg
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

This rejoinder will be divided into two parts. The first part will be devoted to what appear to be serious disagreements between Professor Kyburg and me. I shall try to show that these disagreements are far more apparent than real. The second part will contain my criticism of Kyburg's constructive suggestion on the nature of explanation.
Deductive Scientific Explanation
Authors: Ackermann Robert
Published: November 2002

In this paper, I shall examine attempts to furnish formal models for deductive scientific explanation. All such attempts have had certain defects. The most serious of these defects is to be found in the fact that the extant models seem to be formally restrictive in ways that do not allow any obvious generalization of their conditions which will encompass the full range of all those scientific explanations which must be considered plausible candidates for translation into deductive models.
Explanation Sketches
Authors: Newman Fred
Published: November 2002

According to Hempel, historians do not offer full-blown explanations. Rather, they typically present explanation-sketches which need filling out. On his account,

… Such a sketch consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and initial conditions considered as relevant, and it needs ‘filling out’ in order to turn into a full fledged explanation. This filling out requires further empirical research for which the sketch suggests the direction …
Reflexive Prediction
Authors: Grunberg Emile , Modigliani Franco
Published: November 2002

In his article “Reflexive Predictions” in a recent issue of this Journal [1], Professor Roger C. Buck refers to our theorem concerning correct public prediction of economic and, in general, social events [2]. Unfortunately he misunderstands the nature of our theorem. He begins by stipulating the infinite regress which originally led to the belief that correct public prediction in the social sciences might be impossible: the forecaster who attempts to take into account the agent's reaction to his public prediction, finds his adjusted public prediction again falsified by the agent's reaction to it, and so on ad infinitum [3]. Professor Buck then makes an admittedly tempting mistake. He argues that, provided the sequence of public predictions—each one adjusted for the agent's reaction to its predecessor—converges towards some value, correct public prediction is possible: at the end of a sequence of falsified predictions the forecaster, as it were, catches up with the agent.
On Walsh's Reading of Whewell's View of Necessity
Authors: Butts Robert E.
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper,[3], Harold T. Walsh has argued that (1) Whewell's commentators have in the past misunderstood his use of “necessary,” that (2) Whewell's theory of necessary truth developed only gradually through thirty years of scholarly activity, finally finding a “mature” expression in Philosophy of Discovery, published in 1860, and that (3) a proper understanding of Whewell's “mature” theory of necessary truth leads to a fundamental re-interpretation of the nature of the Ideas and of their role in scientific systems—that the meaning of “necessity” as Whewell expresses it in Philosophy of Discovery leads, in short, to a new and more illuminating reading of his philosophy of inductive science. It is my view that the three propositions asserting Walsh's view are incorrect, expecially the two important and crucial ones (2) and (3). In what follows, I shall state what seem to me to be the grounds for rejecting Walsh's view that Whewell's theory of necessity was not arrived at before 1860, and hence for rejecting his interpretation of some basic aspects of Whewell's philosophy of science.
Towards a Synthetization of the Sciences
Authors: Lamb Matthew L.
Published: November 2002

The rapidity with which new sciences are being formed and the older ones are becoming further specialized calls for a complementary effort to interrelate the sciences. A genuine synthetization must be completely open to all future discoveries and developments within science. Such an openness would be possible only if scientific understanding possesses certain invariable patterns according to which the synthetization could be constructed. Lonergan's Insight (New York, 1958) seems to have uncovered these basic and irrevisable patterns. Not only do they demonstrate the complementarity of classical and statistical methods but the isomorphic Emergent Probability operative in world-process may well provide the framework for an open synthetization. In the present essay this possibility is demonstrated by interrelating, according to it, certain generic fields of the scientific endeavor, from physics to cultural anthropology.
Solution of the Gibbs Entropy Paradox
Authors: Landé Alfred
Published: November 2002

In his paper ‘The Gibbs Paradox and the Distinguishability of physical Systems’ (this Journal, July 1964) Robert Rosen discusses the discontinuity of the diffusion entropy S of two gases, A and B.
E. G. Boring's Philosophy of Science
Authors: Madden Edward H.
Published: November 2002

Professor Boring is best known for his work in the history of psychology and for good reason: his History of Experimental Psychology and his Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology are truly impressive works. However, he has also written numerous articles in the philosophy of science, the psychology of scientific discovery, and the sociology of scientific production, but unfortunately this material has not heretofore been readily accessible. This deficiency, however, has been corrected efficiently by the recent publication of Boring's History, Psychology, and Science: Selected Papers, edited by Robert I. Watson and Donald T. Campbell. The essays in this book represent the whole range of Boring's interests and make essential reading for any serious student of the philosophy of science. Of especial value to philosophers are the essays listed under the titles “The Scientific Method” and “The Mind-Body Problem.” Since the groupings overlap, however, the following essays in other categories are also crucial: “The Nature and History of Experimental Control,” “William James and the Psychology of the Present,” and “The Influence of Evolutionary Theory Upon American Psychological Thought.” All of these essays are interesting but the ones on operationism and theory in psychology, and the one on evolutionary notions in American psychology, are classics and worth very careful consideration and comment.
Measurement and Statistics: Towards a Clarification of the Theory of “Permissible Statistics”
Authors: Robinson Richard E.
Published: November 2002

Much of the criticism of Stevens's criterion for permissible statistics as applied to measurement data results from a lack of clarity in Stevens's position. In this paper set-theoretical notions have been used to clarify that position. We define a sig-function as a function defined on numerical assignments. If u and ℜ are empirical and numerical relational systems, respectively, then a sig-function F is constant on u with respect to ℜ if, and only if, the value of F is the same for all numerical assignments for u with respect to ℜ. Using these notions we prove rigorously certain generalizations of Stevens's results.
The Theory of Evolution as Personal Knowledge
Authors: Manier Edward
Published: November 2002

Dr. Marjorie Grene has argued that criteria taken from a personalist philosophy of science have regulative force in the dispute between orthogenetic and synthetic or neo-Darwinian theories of evolution, and that these criteria commend the acceptance of the orthogenetic position. Grene's position includes two basically correct theses concerning the limitations of operationism and reductionism. However, she fails to show that personalist tenets are necessary for the validation of these two theses. Moreover, the proposed modifications of evolutionary theory depend upon additional premisses: that biology must study individuals rather than populations, and that the synthetic theory must prove that natural selection and mutation are the only possible factors for control of the direction of evolutionary change. The evidence for these premisses is called into question.
On Failing to Vindicate Induction
Authors: Skyrms Brian
Published: November 2002

The structure of Reichenbach's pragmatic vindication of induction is analysed in detail. The argument is seen to proceed in two stages, the first being a pragmatic justification of the frequency interpretation of probability which is taken as a license for considering the aim of induction to be the discovery of limiting relative frequencies, and the second being the pragmatic justification of induction itself. Both justifications are found to contain flaws, and the arguments used to support Reichenbach's definition of the aim of induction presuppose the availability of a type of predicate which generates paradoxes closely related to Goodman's “grue-bleen” paradox.

Next, Salmon's “Criterion of Linguistic Invariance” is evaluated as a canon of inductive logic, which singles out the “straight rule” from an infinite class of convergent inductive rules. Upon close examination, its credentials are seen to be unimpressive. In connection with Salmon's work on linguistic invariance, we take a closer look at the impact of the Goodman paradox on probability estimator rules like Reichenbach's “straight rule.” We find that its undesirable consequences for such systems of inductive logic cannot be escaped by Salmon's solution, or indeed by any solution whose motivating idea is to rule “queer” predicates out of court.

Finally, the discussion of the Goodman paradox leads us to a modest methodological proposal for systems of inductive logic which incorperate probability estimator rules of the type at issue.
Discussion: Salmon's Vindication
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: November 2002

The conclusion urged in Mr Salmon's recent article ([1], pp. 252-261) is so remarkable that it may be worth recording some difficulties. He claims to rescue Reichenbach's notorious vindication of induction. This is essentially concerned with estimating long-run frequencies. By an estimator let us mean any rule for making estimates appropriate to various bodies of information. Reichenbach thought an estimator is sensible only if it is convergent, that is, roughly speaking, only if its estimates tend to approach the truth as more and more data is collected. Mr Salmon observes that an estimator should, in addition, be independent of the language in which the information is expressed. He contends that this criterion of linguistic invariance, when added to the rest of Reichenbach's train of thought, suffices to justify the “straight rule” for estimation: if m of the n observed A's are B, estimate the long-run frequency of B among A's as m/n.
General Ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance
Authors: Clatterbaugh Kenneth C.
Published: November 2002

What one is acquainted with has always been important for the rejection or acceptance of any ontological description. Yet the relevance of acquaintance to ontology has not always been clearly stated. Some philosophers have held that they were acquainted with the simple entities of ontological analysis. They also held that if they were not acquainted with such entities, their analysis would be inadequately supported. In this paper I argue that acquaintance with ontological simples cannot be a reason for accepting or rejecting any ontological analysis. At the same time, I examine what I believe to be the relevance of acquaintance to ontological description.
Ontology and Acquaintance: A Reply to Clatterbaugh
Authors: Allaire Edwin B.
Published: November 2002

Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a, red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-recognizable as such, whereas red and circle are natured, i.e., not bare, and, further, are universal, i.e., they may be exemplified by several particulars (or, somewhat differently, they may be in several things).
“∊” and Common Names
Authors: Sinisi Vito F.
Published: November 2002

In [6] I tried to show how an objection to “the nominalist's” analysis of (a) “This is red” and (b) “That is red” on the basis of “the doctrine of common names” might be overcome. The objection is that “the nominalist,” attempting to analyze (a) and (b) by construing the pronouns in these sentences as two different proper names and “red” as a common name, is forced thereby to construe the copula in both sentences as the “is” of identity, and hence (it is claimed)thisandthatare identical, i.e., that there is only one red spot and not two. I attempted to show that by using Leśniewski's original axiom ofontology“the nominalist” could construe the pronouns in (a) and (b) as proper names, and “red” as a common name without taking the copula to express identity; he would not be forced to identifythiswiththat.
In Defense of Duhem
Authors: Seaman Francis
Published: November 2002

Adolph Grünbaum has argued that Duhem's conventionalism is false for the case of Euclidean geometry ([6], [7], [8]). According to Duhem, any portion of a physical theory can be preserved from falsifiability by providing suitable modifications elsewhere in the theory. Grünbaum argues that physical theory is composed of two parts: A geometrical part H, and a physical part A. For his test case—Euclidean geometry—he contends that by a suitable specification of A, a falsification of H is possible; i.e., H can be rendered “accessible to experimental ascertainment in isolation from other physical regularities.”
Grünbaum on “The Duhemian Argument”
Authors: Laudan Laurens
Published: November 2002

In several recent publications, Professor Adolf Grünbaum has inveighed against the conventionalism of writers like Einstein, Poincaré, Quine and especially Duhem. Specifically, Grünbaum has assailed the view that a single hypothesis can never be conclusively falsified. Grünbaum claims that the conventionalists’ insistence on the immunity of hypotheses from falsification is neither logically valid nor scientifically sound. Directing the weight of his argument against Duhem, Grünbaum launches a two-pronged attack. He insists, first, that conclusive falsifying experiments are possible, suggesting that Duhem's denial of such experiments is a logical non-sequitur. He then proceeds to show that, more than being merely possible, crucial falsifying experiments have occurred in physics. I do not intend to make a logical point against Grünbaum's critique so much as an historical and exegetical one. Put briefly, I believe that he has misconstrued Duhem's views on falsifiability and that the logical blunder which he discusses should not be ascribed to Duhem, but rather to those who have made Duhem's conventionalism into the doctrine which Grünbaum attacks. Whether there are any writers who accept the view he imputes to Duhem, or whether he is exploiting “straw-men” to give weight to an otherwise trivial argument is an open question. For now, I simply want to suggest that his salvos are wrongly directed against Duhem.