bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Enactment of one-to-many communication may induce self-focused attention that leads to diminished perspective taking: The case of Facebook
Authors: Chiou Wen-Bin , Lee Chun-Chia
Published: January 2023

Social networking sites (SNSs) provide users with an efficient interface for distributing information, such as photos or wall posts, to many others simultaneously. We demonstrated experimentally that this type of indiscriminate one-to-many (i.e., monologue) communication may induce self-focused attention and thereby impair perspective taking. The present study used multiple paradigms to explore the link between engaging in online one-to-many communication and a decrease in perspective taking. Experiment 1 revealed that Facebookers who published a personal photo to the public or their friends were less likely to adopt another person’s visual perspective than were those in the control group. Experiment 2 showed that Facebookers who engaged in indiscriminate one-to-many wall posting were more likely than those in the control group to rely heavily on their own perspectives. A state of self-focus, as measured by greater Stroop interference in naming the color of self-relevant versus neutral words, mediated the detrimental effect of indiscriminate one-to-many communication on cognitive perspective taking. These findings suggest that indiscriminate one-to-many communication on SNSs may promote public self-focus, leading to self-referential processing when making social judgments. Online monologue communication may be more harmful to perspective taking than previously understood.
The value of a smile: Facial expression affects ultimatum-game responses
Authors: Mussel Patrick , Göritz Anja S. , Hewig Johannes
Published: January 2023

In social interaction, the facial expression of an opponent contains information that may influence the interaction. We asked whether facial expression affects decision-making in the ultimatum game. In this two-person game, the proposer divides a sum of money into two parts, one for each player, and then the responder decides whether to accept the offer or reject it. Rejection means that neither player gets any money. Results of a large-sample study support our hypothesis that offers from proposers with a smiling facial expression are more often accepted, compared to a neutral facial expression. Moreover, we found lower acceptance rates for offers from proposers with an angry facial expression.
Revealed strength of preference: Inference from response times
Authors: Konovalov Arkady , Krajbich Ian
Published: January 2023

Revealed preference is the dominant approach for inferring preferences, but it is limited in that it relies solely on discrete choice data. When a person chooses one alternative over another, we cannot infer the strength of their preference or predict how likely they will be to make the same choice again. However, the choice process also produces response times (RTs), which are continuous and easily observable. It has been shown that RTs often decrease with strength-of-preference. This is a basic property of sequential sampling models such as the drift diffusion model. What remains unclear is whether this relationship is sufficiently strong, relative to the other factors that affect RTs, to allow us to reliably infer strength-of-preference across individuals. Using several experiments, we show that even when every subject chooses the same alternative, we can still rank them based on their RTs and predict their behavior on other choice problems. We can also use RTs to predict whether a subject will repeat or reverse their decision when presented with the same choice problem a second time. Finally, as a proof-of-concept, we demonstrate that it is also possible to recover individual preference parameters from RTs alone. These results demonstrate that it is indeed possible to use RTs to infer preferences.
A universal method for evaluating the quality of aggregators
Authors: Han Ying , Budescu David
Published: January 2023

We propose a new method to facilitate comparison of aggregated forecasts based on different aggregation, elicitation and calibration methods. Aggregates are evaluated by their relative position on the cumulative distribution of the corresponding individual scores. This allows one to compare methods using different measures of quality that use different scales. We illustrate the use of the method by re-analyzing various estimates from Budescu and Du (Management Science, 2007).
Using metacognitive cues to infer others’ thinking
Authors: Mata André , Almeida Tiago
Published: January 2023

Three studies tested whether people use cues about the way other people think—for example, whether others respond fast vs. slow—to infer what responses other people might give to reasoning problems. People who solve reasoning problems using deliberative thinking have better insight than intuitive problem-solvers into the responses that other people might give to the same problems. Presumably because deliberative responders think of intuitive responses before they think of deliberative responses, they are aware that others might respond intuitively, particularly in circumstances that hinder deliberative thinking (e.g., fast responding). Intuitive responders, on the other hand, are less aware of alternative responses to theirs, so they infer that other people respond as they do, regardless of the way others respond.
The relationship between crowd majority and accuracy for binary decisions
Authors: Lee Michael D. , Lee Megan N.
Published: January 2023

We consider the wisdom of the crowd situation in which individuals make binary decisions, and the majority answer is used as the group decision. Using data sets from nine different domains, we examine the relationship between the size of the majority and the accuracy of the crowd decisions. We find empirically that these calibration curves take many different forms for different domains, and the distribution of majority sizes over decisions in a domain also varies widely. We develop a growth model for inferring and interpreting the calibration curve in a domain, and apply it to the same nine data sets using Bayesian methods. The modeling approach is able to infer important qualitative properties of a domain, such as whether it involves decisions that have ground truths or are inherently uncertain. It is also able to make inferences about important quantitative properties of a domain, such as how quickly the crowd accuracy increases as the size of the majority increases. We discuss potential applications of the measurement model, and the need to develop a psychological account of the variety of calibration curves that evidently exist.
FFTrees: A toolbox to create, visualize, and evaluate fast-and-frugal decision trees
Authors: Phillips Nathaniel D. , Neth Hansjörg , Woike Jan K. , Gaissmaier Wolfgang
Published: January 2023

Fast-and-frugal trees (FFTs) are simple algorithms that facilitate efficient and accurate decisions based on limited information. But despite their successful use in many applied domains, there is no widely available toolbox that allows anyone to easily create, visualize, and evaluate FFTs. We fill this gap by introducing the R package FFTrees. In this paper, we explain how FFTs work, introduce a new class of algorithms called fan for constructing FFTs, and provide a tutorial for using the FFTrees package. We then conduct a simulation across ten real-world datasets to test how well FFTs created by FFTrees can predict data. Simulation results show that FFTs created by FFTrees can predict data as well as popular classification algorithms such as regression and random forests, while remaining simple enough for anyone to understand and use.
The value of vulnerability: The transformative capacity of risky trust
Authors: Bruni Luigino , Tufano Fabio
Published: January 2023

In an experimental gift-exchange game, we explore the transformative capacity of vulnerable trust, which we define as trusting untrustworthy players when their untrustworthiness is common knowledge between co-players. In our experiment, there are two treatments: the “Information” treatment and the “No-Information” treatment in which we respectively disclose or not information about trustees’ trustworthiness. Our laboratory evidence consistently supports the transformative capacity of trustors’ vulnerable trust, which generates higher transfers, more trustworthiness and increased reciprocity by untrustworthy trustees.
Normative arguments from experts and peers reduce delay discounting
Authors: Senecal Nicole , Wang Teresa , Thompson Elizabeth , Kable Joseph W.
Published: January 2023

When making decisions that involve tradeoffs between the quality and timing of desirable outcomes, people consistently discount the value of future outcomes. A puzzling finding regarding such decisions is the extremely high rate at which people discount future monetary outcomes. Most economists would argue that decision-makers should turn down only rates of return that are lower than those available to them elsewhere. Yet the vast majority of studies find discount rates that are significantly higher than market interest rates (Frederick et al., 2002). Here we ask whether a lack of knowledge about the normative strategy can explain high discount rates. In an initial experiment, nearly half of subjects did not spontaneously cite elements of the normative strategy when asked how people should make intertemporal monetary decisions. In two follow-up experiments, after subjects read a “financial guide” detailing the normative strategy, discount rates declined by up to 85%, but were still higher than market interest rates. This decline persisted, though attenuated, for at least one month. In a final experiment, peer-generated advice influenced discount rates in a similar manner to “expert” advice, and arguments focusing on normative considerations were at least as effective as others. These studies show that part of the explanation for high discount rates is a lack of knowledge regarding the normative strategy, and they quantify how much discount rates are reduced in response to normative arguments. Given the high level of discounting that remains, however, there are other contributing factors to high discount rates that remain to be quantified.
A Bayesian latent mixture model approach to assessing performance in stock-flow reasoning
Authors: Kary Arthur , Hawkins Guy E. , Hayes Brett K. , Newell Ben R.
Published: January 2023

People often perform poorly on stock-flow reasoning tasks, with many (but not all) participants appearing to erroneously match the accumulation of the stock to the inflow – a response pattern attributed to the use of a “correlation heuristic”. Efforts to improve understanding of stock-flow systems have been limited by the lack of a principled approach to identifying and measuring individual differences in reasoning strategies. We present a principled inferential method known as Hierarchical Bayesian Latent Mixture Models (HBLMMs) to analyze stock-flow reasoning. HBLMMs use Bayesian inference to classify different patterns of responding as coming from multiple latent populations. We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach using a dataset from a stock-flow drawing task which compared performance in a problem presented in a climate change context, a problem in a financial context, and a problem in which the financial context was used as an analogy to assist understanding in the climate problem. The hierarchical Bayesian model showed that the proportion of responses consistent with the “correlation heuristic” was lower in the financial context and financial analogy context than in the pure climate context. We discuss the benefits of HBLMMs and implications for the role of contexts and analogy in improving stock-flow reasoning.
Valuing bets and hedges
Authors: Chatterjee Subimal , Mookherjee Satadruta
Published: January 2023

Two studies replicate the anomaly identified by Frederick, Meyer and Levis (2015) and Frederick, Levis, Malliaris and Meyer (2018). People show typical risk averse behavior by valuing risk below the focal lottery’s expected value, but they do not bid above its expected value for the hedge that eliminates the risk. Following the authors, we conduct finer analyses by separating participants into two groups – “experts” who understand that acquiring the hedge makes winning certain versus “novices” who do not understand the winning implications of acquiring the hedge. We find that (1) “experts” are more inclined to purchase the hedge compared to the “novices” and (2) unlike the “novices,” they value the hedge significantly more than the risk instrument, but only if they are given the risk instrument free of charge. However, even there, the hedge valuations are significantly less than the lottery’s expected value suggesting that the anomaly described in Frederick et al. (2015, 2018) is robust and likely to affect the way our discipline conceptualizes and models risk behavior.
Moderators of framing effects in variations of the Asian Disease problem: Time constraint, need, and disease type
Authors: Diederich Adele , Wyszynski Marc , Ritov Ilana
Published: January 2023

This study examined framing effects in decisions concerning public health. Tversky and Kahneman’s famous Asian Disease Problem served as experimental paradigm. Subjects chose between a sure and a risky option either presented as gains (saving lives) or as losses (dying). The amount of risk varied in terms of different probabilities. The number of affected people was either small (low need) or large (high need). Additionally, the decisions were linked to three different types of diseases (unusual infection, AIDS, leukemia). We also implemented two different time constraints during which the subjects had to give a response. Finally, we tested a within-subject design. The data analysis assuming a linear mixed effects model revealed significant effects of framing, probabilities, and need. Furthermore, the type of disease and time constraints were moderating the framing effect. Across the different diseases, framing effects were amplified when decision time was short.
Bayesian methods for analyzing true-and-error models
Authors: Lee Michael D.
Published: January 2023

Birnbaum and Quispe-Torreblanca (2018) evaluated a set of six models developed under true-and-error theory against data in which people made choices in repeated gambles. They concluded the three models based on expected utility theory were inadequate accounts of the behavioral data, and argued in favor of the simplest of the remaining three more general models. To reach these conclusions, they used non-Bayesian statistical methods: frequentist point estimation of parameters, bootstrapped confidence intervals of parameters, and null hypothesis significance testing of models. We address the same research goals, based on the same models and the same data, using Bayesian methods. We implement the models as graphical models in JAGS to allow for computational Bayesian analysis. Our results are based on posterior distribution of parameters, posterior predictive checks of descriptive adequacy, and Bayes factors for model comparison. We compare the Bayesian results with those of Birnbaum and Quispe-Torreblanca (2018). We conclude that, while the very general conclusions of the two approaches agree, the Bayesian approach offers better detailed answers, especially for the key question of the evidence the data provide for and against the competing models. Finally, we discuss the conceptual and practical advantages of using Bayesian methods in judgment and decision making research highlighted by this case study.
Numerosity and allocation behavior: Insights using the dictator game
Authors: Shrivastava Sunaina , Jain Gaurav , Nayakankuppam Dhananjay , Gaeth Gary J. , Levin Irwin P
Published: January 2023

This paper investigates how the numerosity bias influences individuals’ allocation of resources between themselves and others, using the backdrop of the traditional dictator game. Across four studies including both hypothetical and real exchanges of money, we show that the form of the numerical value representing the quantity of the resource (e.g., $20 vs 2000 cents) systematically biases the decision-maker to perceive the quantity s/he is thinking of allocating as being “less than adequate” or “more than adequate”. Essentially, such a biased perception of adequacy with respect to the quantity of the resource consequently influences the decision-maker’s final allocation decision. We attribute this systematic bias to the “numerosity” of the resource. We find that bigger numerical values representing quantity (e.g., 2000 cents) bias decision-makers to over-infer the quantity, thus inducing them to allocate less to the entities they are focusing on.
Further evidence for the memory state heuristic: Recognition latency predictions for binary inferences
Authors: Castela Marta , Erdfelder Edgar
Published: January 2023

According to the recognition heuristic (RH), for decision domains where recognition is a valid predictor of a choice criterion, recognition alone is used to make inferences whenever one object is recognized and the other is not, irrespective of further knowledge. Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, and Mattern (2011) questioned whether the recognition judgment itself affects decisions or rather the memory strength underlying it. Specifically, they proposed to extend the RH to the memory state heuristic (MSH), which assumes a third memory state of uncertainty in addition to recognition certainty and rejection certainty. While the MSH already gathered significant support, one of its basic and more counterintuitive predictions has not been tested so far: In guessing pairs (none of the objects recognized), the object more slowly judged as unrecognized should be preferred, since it is more likely to be in a higher memory state. In this paper, we test this prediction along with other recognition latency predictions of the MSH, thereby adding to the body of research supporting the MSH.
Ambiguity and expectation-neglect in dilemmas of interpersonal trust
Authors: Evans Anthony M. , Krueger Joachim I.
Published: January 2023

Recent research suggests that people discount or neglect expectations of reciprocity in trust dilemmas. We examine the underlying processes and boundary conditions of this effect, finding that expectations have stronger effects on trust when they are made accessible and when they are provided as objective probabilities (Study 1). Objective expectations have stronger effects when they are based on precise, rather than ambiguous, probabilities (Study 2). We also find that trust decisions differ from individual risk-taking decisions: people are more willing to trust, and expectations have stronger effects on trusting behavior (Study 2). These results show that the availability and ambiguity of expectations shape trust decisions, and that people differentially weight expectations in dilemmas of trust and individual risk-taking.
Numeric and graphic risk information processing of high and low numerates in the intuitive and deliberative decision modes: An eye-tracker study
Authors: Keller Carmen , Kreuzmair Christina , Leins-Hess Rebecca , Siegrist Michael
Published: January 2023

The influence of numeracy on information processing of two risk communication formats (percentage and pictograph) was examined using an eye tracker. A sample from the general population (N = 159) was used. In intuitive and deliberative decision conditions, the participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario presenting a test result. The participants indicated their feelings and their perceived risk, evoked by a 17% risk level. In the intuitive decision condition, a significant correlation (r = .30) between numeracy and the order of information processing was found: the higher the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the percentage, and the lower the numeracy, the earlier the processing of the pictograph. This intuitive, initial focus on a format prevailed over the first half of the intuitive decision-making process. In the deliberative decision condition, the correlation between numeracy and order of information processing was not significant. In both decision conditions, high and low numerates processed pictograph and percentage formats with similar depths and derived similar meanings from them in terms of feelings and perceived risk. In both conditions numeracy had no effects on the degree of attention on the percentage or the pictograph (number of fixations on formats and transitions between them). The results suggest that pictographs attract low numerates’ attention, and percentages attract high numerates’ attention in the first, intuitive, phase of numeric information processing. Pictographs thus ensure low numerates’ further elaboration on numeric risk information, which is an important precondition of risk understanding and decision making.
Prosociality in the economic Dictator Game is associated with less parochialism and greater willingness to vote for intergroup compromise
Authors: Mosleh Mohsen , Stewart Alexander J. , Plotkin Joshua B. , Rand David G.
Published: January 2023

Is prosociality parochial or universalist? To shed light on this issue, we examine the relationship between the amount of money given to a stranger (giving in an incentivized Dictator Game) and intergroup attitudes and behavior in the context of randomly assigned teams (a minimal group paradigm) amongN= 4,846 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Using a set of Dynamic Identity Diffusion Index measures, we find that participants who give more in the Dictator Game show less preferential identification with their team relative to the other team, and more identification with all participants regardless of team. Furthermore, in an incentivized Voter Game, participants who give more in the Dictator Game are more likely to support compromise by voting for the opposing team in order to avoid deadlock. Together, these results suggest that – at least in this subject pool and using these measures – prosociality is better characterized by universalism than parochialism.
Contamination, association, or social communication: An examination of alternative accounts for contagion effects
Authors: Fedotova Natalie O. , Rozin Paul
Published: January 2023

Individuals avoid objects that have been in physical contact with morally offensive or disgusting entities. This has been called negative magical contagion, an implicit belief in the transmission of essence by physical contact. Alternatively, individuals may avoid a negatively contaminated object because: 1) the object is a strong reminder of the original contagion source (association account); or 2) the act of interacting with the object signals specific information about the self (social communication account). We report that: 1) people often prefer to interact with an entity that they believe is more associated with a negative source rather than an entity that is less associated but has made physical contact with the same negative source; 2) while an associative account requires that contact enhances association, a study of memory for visual pairings of objects indicates that when objects are touching, their associative link (recall) is no greater than when they are in proximity; and 3) subjects continue to show aversion to (prefer to wear gloves to handle) an object that contacted a negative entity even if they are handling the object in order to physically destroy it, hence strongly signaling their rejection of that object. Association and social communication are at best partial accounts for contagion effects.
Using Tversky’s contrast model to investigate how features of similarity affect judgments of likelihood
Authors: Galesic Mirta , Goode A. Walkyria , Wallsten Thomas S. , Norman Kent L.
Published: January 2023

The representativeness heuristic suggests that similarity judgments provide a basis for judgments of likelihood. We use Tversky’s (1977) contrast model of similarity to design tests of this underlying mechanism. If similarity is used to judge likelihood, factors that are known to affect similarity should also affect judgments of likelihood. In two experiments, we manipulated two such factors described in the contrast model of similarity: the nature of the task and context effects. In a between-subject design, respondents assessed either similarity of fictive citizens of 15th century Florence, or the likelihood that they belonged to the same family. The factors that affected similarity also affected the likelihood judgments. These results support the assumption that similarity is an important contributor to judgments of likelihood.
Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games?
Authors: Haesevoets Tessa , Van Hiel Alain , Dierckx Kim , Reinders Folmer Chris
Published: January 2023

Most prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials — with different payoff structures — to measure participants’ behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma. We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma. Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behaviorandprosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement.
Individual differences in receptivity to scientific bullshit
Authors: Evans Anthony , Sleegers Willem , Mlakar Žan
Published: January 2023

Pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is the tendency to perceive meaning in important-sounding, nonsense statements. To understand how bullshit receptivity differs across domains, we develop a scale to measure scientific bullshit receptivity — the tendency to perceive truthfulness in nonsensical scientific statements. Across three studies (total N = 1,948), scientific bullshit receptivity was positively correlated with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Both types of bullshit receptivity were positively correlated with belief in science, conservative political beliefs, and faith in intuition. However, compared to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, scientific bullshit receptivity was more strongly correlated with belief in science, and less strongly correlated with conservative political beliefs and faith in intuition. Finally, scientific literacy moderated the relationship the two types of bullshit receptivity; the correlation between the two types of receptivity was weaker for individuals scoring high in scientific literacy.
Consequences, norms, and inaction: A critical analysis
Authors: Baron Jonathan , Goodwin Geoffrey P.
Published: January 2023

Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter (2017, GACFH) presented a model of choices in utilitarian moral dilemmas, those in which following a moral principle or norm (the deontological response) leads to worse consequences than violating the principle (the utilitarian response). In standard utilitarian dilemmas, the utilitarian option involves action (which causes some harm in order to prevent greater harm), and the deontological response, omission. GACFH propose that responses in such dilemmas arise in three different ways: a psychological process leading to a deontological choice, a different process leading to a utilitarian choice, or a bias toward inaction or action. GACFH attempt to separate these three processes with new dilemmas in which action and omission are switched, and dilemmas in which the utilitarian and deontological processes lead to the same choice. They conclude that utilitarian and deontological responses are indeed separable, and that past research has missed this fact by treating them as naturally opposed. We argue that a bias toward harmful inaction is best understood as an explanation of deontological responding rather than as an alternative process. It thus should be included as an explanation of deontological responding, not an alternative response type. We also argue that GACFH’s results can be largely explained in terms of subjects’ unwillingness to accept the researchers’ assumptions about which consequence is worse and which course of action is consistent with a moral norm. This problem is almost inherent in the attempt to switch act and omission while maintaining equivalent norms. We support this argument with data from experiments with new and old scenarios, in which we asked subjects to judge both norms and consequences. We also find that GACFH’s results are not as consistent as they appear to be in the paper.
Patients prefer artificial intelligence to a human provider, provided the AI is better than the human: A commentary on Longoni, Bonezzi and Morewedge (2019)
Authors: Pezzo Mark V. , Beckstead Jason W.
Published: January 2023

We call attention to an important, but overlooked finding in research reported by Longoni, Bonezzi and Morewedge (2019). Longoni et al. claim that people always prefer a human to an artificially intelligent (AI) medical provider. We show that this was only the case when the historical performance of the human and AI providers was equal.  When the AI is known to outperform the human, their data showed a clear preference for the automated provider. We provide additional statistical analyses of their data to support this claim.
Algorithm aversion is too often presented as though it were non-compensatory: A reply to Longoni et al. (2020)
Authors: Pezzo Mark V. , Beckstead Jason W.
Published: January 2023

We clarify two points made in our commentary (Pezzo & Beckstead, 2020, this issue) on a recent paper by Longoni, Bonezzi, and Morewedge (2019). In both Experiments 1 and 4 from their paper, it is not possible to determine whether accuracy can compensate for algorithm aversion. Experiments 3A-C, however, do show a strong effect of accuracy such that AI that is superior to a human provider is embraced by patients. Many papers, including Longoni et al. tend to minimize the role of this compensatory process, apparently because it seems obvious to the authors (Longoni, Bonezzi, Morewedge, 2020, this issue). Such minimization, however, can lead to (mis)citations in which research that clearly demonstrates a compensatory role of AI accuracy is cited as non-compensatory.
Backward planning: Effects of planning direction on predictions of task completion time
Authors: Wiese Jessica , Buehler Roger , Griffin Dale
Published: January 2023

People frequently underestimate the time needed to complete tasks and we examined a strategy – known as backward planning – that may counteract this optimistic bias. Backward planning involves starting a plan at the end goal and then working through required steps in reverse-chronological order, and is commonly advocated by practitioners as a tool for developing realistic plans and projections. We conducted four experiments to test effects on completion time predictions and related cognitive processes. Participants planned for a task in one of three directions (backward, forward, or unspecified) and predicted when it would be finished. As hypothesized, predicted completion times were longer (Studies 1–4) and thus less biased (Study 4) in the backward condition than in the forward and unspecified conditions. Process measures suggested that backward planning may increase attention to situational factors that delay progress (e.g., obstacles, interruptions, competing demands), elicit novel planning insights, and alter the conceptualization of time.
The many obstacles to effective giving
Authors: Caviola Lucius , Schubert Stefan , Nemirow Jason
Published: January 2023

When people donate, they rarely give to the charities that do the most good per dollar. Why is this? One possibility is that they do not know how to give effectively. Another possibility is that they are not motivated to do so. Across six tasks (Studies 1a, 1b), we found support for both explanations. Among lay donors, we observed multiple misconceptions—regarding disaster relief, overhead costs, donation splitting, and the relative effectiveness of local and foreign charities—that reduced the effectiveness of their giving. Similarly, we found that they were unfamiliar with the most effective charities (Studies 2a, 2b). Debunking these misconceptions and informing people about effectiveness boosted effective donations; however, a portion of lay donors continued to give ineffectively to satisfy their personal preferences. By contrast, a sample of self-identified effective altruists gave effectively across all tasks. They exhibited none of the misconceptions that we observed among lay donors and overwhelmingly favored the most effective option in their choice set (Study 3). Taken together, our studies imply that donors need to be both informed and motivated to give effectively on a consistent basis.
Fewer but poorer: Benevolent partiality in prosocial preferences
Authors: Paolacci Gabriele , Yalcin Gizem
Published: January 2023

A prosocial action typically provides a more sizable benefit when directed at those who have less as opposed to those who have more. However, not all prosocial acts have a direct bearing on socioeconomic disadvantage, nor does disadvantage necessarily imply a greater need for the prosocial outcome. Of interest here, welfare impact may depend on the number of beneficiaries but not on their socioeconomic status. Across four preregistered studies of life-saving decisions, we demonstrate that when allocating resources, many people are benevolently partial. That is, they choose to help the disadvantaged even when this transparently implies sacrificing lives. We suggest that people construct prosocial aid as an opportunity to correct morally aversive inequalities, thus making relatively more disadvantaged recipients a more justifiable target of help. Benevolent partiality is reduced when people reflect beforehand on what aspects they will prioritize in their donation decision.
“Do the right thing” for whom? An experiment on ingroup favouritism, group assorting and moral suasion
Authors: Bilancini Ennio , Boncinelli Leonardo , Capraro Valerio , Celadin Tatiana , Paolo Roberto Di
Published: January 2023

In this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered, two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer a set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assorting on non-moral preferences), and morally relevant issues in another treatment (assorting on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assorting and four pre-registered individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).
Gaze patterns disclose the link between cognitive reflection and sophistication in strategic interaction
Authors: Zonca Joshua , Coricelli Giorgio , Polonio Luca
Published: January 2023

In social contexts, we refer to strategic sophistication as the ability to adapt our own behavior based on the possible actions of others. In the current study, we explore the role of other-oriented attention and cognitive reflection in explaining heterogeneity in strategic sophistication. In two eye-tracking experiments, we registered eye movements of participants while playing matrix games of increasing relational complexity (2x2 and 3x3 matrices), and we analyzed individual gaze patterns to reveal the ongoing mechanisms of integration of own and others’ incentives in the current game representation. Moreover, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), in addition to alternative measures of cognitive ability. In both classes of games, higher cognitive reflection levels specifically predict the ability to incorporate the counterpart’s incentives in the current model of the game, as well as higher levels of strategic sophistication. Conversely, players exhibiting low cognitive reflection tend to pay less attention to relevant transitions between the counterpart’s payoffs, and such incomplete visual analysis leads to out-of-equilibrium choices. Gaze patterns appear to completely mediate the relationship between cognitive reflection and strategic choices. Our results shed new light on the cognitive factors driving heterogeneity in strategic thinking and on theories of bounded rationality.
Preferences for rank in competition: Is first-place seeking stronger than last-place aversion?
Authors: Shechter Steven M. , Hardisty David J.
Published: January 2023

The use of gamification to motivate engagement has greatly increased the number of ways in which people compete. Many of these competitions allow individuals to see how they rank as a competition progresses. Our work aims to provide a better understanding of how individuals feel about different rank outcomes in competitions. We do this by applying the principles of expected utility theory to elicit utility curves for over 3,000 people across three studies using hypothetical competition scenarios. We find consistent support for the following generalizations: 1) individuals are risk-seeking when in second place, 2) they are risk-averse when in second-to-last place, and 3) the utility decrease going from first to second place is greater than their decrease going from second-to-last to last place. Our results suggest individuals are both last-place averse and first-place seeking, with an even stronger inclination towards the latter.
Reliance on small samples and the value of taxing reckless behaviors
Authors: Yakobi Ofir , Cohen Doron , Naveh Eitan , Erev Ido
Published: January 2023

New technology can be used to enhance safety by imposing costs, or taxes, on certain reckless behaviors. The current paper presents two pre-registered experiments that clarify the impact of taxation of this type on decisions from experience between three alternatives. Experiment 1 focuses on an environment in which safe choices maximize expected returns and examines the impact of taxing the more attractive of two risky options. The results reveal a U-shaped effect of taxation: some taxation improves safety, but too much taxation impairs safety. Experiment 2 shows a clear negative effect of high taxation even when the taxation eliminates the expected benefit from risk-taking. Comparison of alternative models suggests that taxing reckless behaviors backfires when it significantly increases the proportion of experiences in which a more dangerous behavior leads to better outcomes than the taxed behavior. Qualitative hypotheses derived from naïve sampling models assuming small samples were only partially supported by the data.
Decisions from experience: Competitive search and choice in kind and wicked environments
Authors: Frey Renato
Published: January 2023

Information search is key to making decision from experience: exploration permits people to learn about the statistical properties of choice options and thus to become aware of rare but potentially momentous decision consequences. This registered report investigates whether and how people differ when making decisions from experiencein isolationversusunder competitive pressure, which may have important implications for choice performance in different types of choice environments: in “kind” environments without any rare and extreme events, frugal search is sufficient to identify advantageous options. Conversely, in “wicked” environments with skewed outcome distributions, rare but important events will tend to be missed in frugal search. One theoretical view is that competitive pressure encourages efficiency and may thereby boost adaptive search in different environments. An alternative and more pessimistic view is that competitive pressure triggers agency-related concerns, leading to minimal search irrespective of the choice environment, and hence to inferior choice performance. Using a sampling game, the present study (N= 277) found that solitary search was not adaptive to different choice environments (M= 14 samples), leading to a high choice performance in a kind and in a moderately wicked environment, but somewhat lower performance in an extremely wicked environment. Competitive pressure substantially reduced search irrespective of the choice environment (M= 4 samples), thus negatively affecting overall choice performance. Yet, from the perspective of a cost-benefit framework, frugal search may beefficientunder competitive pressure. In sum, this report extends research on decisions from experience by adopting an ecological perspective (i.e., systematically varying different choice environments) and by introducing a cost-benefit framework to evaluatesolitaryandcompetitivesearch — with the latter constituting a challenging problem for people in an increasingly connected world.
On the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, political, religious, and science beliefs
Authors: Pennycook Gordon , Cheyne James Allan , Koehler Derek J. , Fugelsang Jonathan A.
Published: January 2023

Does one’s stance toward evidence evaluation and belief revision have relevance for actual beliefs? We investigate the role of endorsing an actively open-minded thinking style about evidence (AOT-E) on a wide range of beliefs, values, and opinions. Participants indicated the extent to which they think beliefs (Study 1) or opinions (Studies 2 and 3)oughtto change according to evidence on an 8-item scale. Across three studies with 1,692 participants from two different sources (Mechanical Turk and Lucid for Academics), we find that our short AOT-E scale correlates negatively with beliefs about topics ranging from extrasensory perception, to respect for tradition, to abortion, to God; and positively with topics ranging from anthropogenic global warming to support for free speech on college campuses. More broadly, the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence was robustly associated with political liberalism, the rejection of traditional moral values, the acceptance of science, and skepticism about religious, paranormal, and conspiratorial claims. However, we also find that AOT-E is more strongly predictive for political liberals (Democrats) than conservatives (Republicans). We conclude that socio-cognitive theories of belief (both specific and general) should take into account people’s beliefs about when and how beliefs should change – that is, meta-beliefs – but that further work is required to understand how meta-beliefs about evidence interact with political ideology.
The tide that lifts all focal boats: Asymmetric predictions of ascent and descent in rankings
Authors: Davidai Shai , Gilovich Thomas
Published: January 2023

In six studies, we find evidence for an upward mobility bias, or a tendency to predict that a rise in ranking is more likely than a decline, even in domains where motivation or intention to rise play no role. Although people cannot willfully change their height (Study 1), and geographical entities cannot willfully alter their temperature (Study 2), number of natural disasters (Study 3), levels of precipitation (Studies 4A and 4B), or chemical concentration (Study 5), subjects believed that each is more likely to rise than drop in ranking. This bias is due to an association between a ranking’s order and the direction of absolute change, and to the tendency to give considerable weight to a focal agent over non-focal agents. Because people generally expect change to be represented in terms of higher ranks, and because they tend to focus on specific, focal targets, they believe that any given target will experience a larger relative increase than other targets. We discuss implications for social policy.
Performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test is stable across time
Authors: Stagnaro Michael N. , Pennycook Gordon , Rand David G.
Published: January 2023

A widely used measure of individual propensity to utilize analytic processing is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a set of math problems with intuitively compelling but incorrect answers. Here, we ask whether scores on this measure are temporally stable. We aggregate data from 11 studies run on Amazon Mechanical Turk in which the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was administered and identifyN= 3,302 unique individuals who completed the CRT two or more times. We find a strong correlation between an individual’s first and last CRT performance,r= .806. This remains true even when constraining to data points separated by over 2 years,r= .755. Furthermore, we find that CRT scores from one timepoint correlated negatively with belief in God and social conservatism from the other timepoint (and to a similar extent as scores gathered at the same timepoint). These results show that CRT scores are stable over time, and – given the stable relationship between CRT and religious belief and ideology – provide some evidence for the stability of analytic cognitive style more generally.
Reversing the endowment effect
Authors: Pryor Campbell , Perfors Amy , Howe Piers D. L.
Published: January 2023

When given a desirable item, people have a tendency to value this owned item more than an equally-desirable, unowned item. Conversely, when the endowed item is undesirable, in some circumstances people have a tendency to swap it for an equally undesirable item, a phenomenon known as the reversed endowment effect. The fact that the endowment effect can reverse for undesirable items has been taken as evidence against loss aversion being the underlying cause of the endowment effect. This study represents the first time that the reversed endowment effect has been observed for choices with real consequences. However, we find that the reversed endowment effect occurs only when participants’ ability to compare the available choice options is limited. We further show that these endowment reversals can also be induced for choices between desirable options and removed for choices between undesirable options by manipulating the expectations participants have when making a choice. Finally, we show that our data, including endowment reversals, can in principle be explained by loss aversion.