bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Compensation vs. Fair Equality of Opportunity
Authors: RANKEN NANI L.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In this paper I attempt to show that our commonly shared ideas of justice, which include principles of fair distribution and of compensation for past injustices, tend to come into conflict in practice, and generate serious dilemmas for persons in certain positions of authority, such as managers. I identify the source and nature of such dilemmas, and sketch a rough pattern for analysing and partially resolving conflicts between the duty not to discriminate unfairly and the duty to compensate for past unfair discrimination. After stating what I regard as widely shared ideas of justice, I emphasise their application to actual policy decisions of the small‐scale sort, using general precepts for avoiding or minimising conflicts. The precepts include a commitment to the priority of compensatory justice. The paper includes theoretical portions, principally defences of my position against other views on the relationship between compensation and fair distribution. I end with an examination of the virtues and limitations of money as a tool for compensatory social policies.
Philosophical Scrutiny of the Strategic ‘Defence’ Initiatives
Authors: SCHONSHECK JONATHAN
Published: February 2008

Abstract  Many people have misgivings about the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Some of those misgivings centre on issues of effectiveness: safety depends entirely upon the dissuasion of an adversary. Other misgivings centre on moral concerns: the essence of deterrence is the threat, and the conditional intention, to kill millions of noncombatants. US President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative promised an alternative to deterrence, a strategic posture of interception of an adversary's weapons rather than preclusion of the decision to attack. It is conceived as a means of ‘defending’ the United States that does not threaten anyone. In this essay I examine various SDI proposals. I argue that only one of these could justify the transition to a strategic posture of ‘defence’, and might be a genuine alternative to deterrence—the one that is least feasible technologically. Only that one could plausibly be claimed to be morally superior to deterrence—and for strategic reasons, even its claim is dubious at best. Technologically more feasible proposals are not ‘defences’, but variants of deterrence. Since that is so, the most common and dramatic claim of their moral superiority to deterrence is incoherent.
Extraordinary Evil or Common Malevolence? Evaluating the Jewish Holocaust
Authors: LACKEY DOUGLAS P.
Published: February 2008

Abstract  This essay considers and rejects the hypothesis of Fackenheim, Wiesel and others that the Jewish Holocaust contains some qualitatively or quantitatively distinct moral evil. The Holocaust was not qualitatively distinct because the intentions and vices of the mass murderer are qualitatively indistinguishable from the intentions and vices of the common murderer. The Holocaust was not quantitatively distinct either because the sum of the evils of the Holocaust is quantitatively indistinguishable from six million randomly selected individual murders or because the notion of a ‘sum’ of moral evils is conceptually incoherent.
China's Case Against the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty: rationality and morality
Authors: HUNT GEOFFREY
Published: February 2008

Abstract  China, India, Brazil and other major Third World nations have long refused to sign the Nuclear Non‐proliferation Treaty. This position might at first sight appear to be without any question morally unjustified and even irrational. Yet their claim that the treaty is ‘discriminatory’ merits the serious attention which it has not received. Only if certain aspects of this claim are accepted by the nuclear weapons signatories does a moral and rational onus to sign become unquestionable.
Icons, Sacred Relics, Obsolescent Plant
Authors: CLARK STEPHEN R. L.
Published: February 2008

Abstract  Whether churches should be demolished, rebuilt, restored or preserved is a contentious issue. Some hold that the needs of a present worshipping community should take precedence over antiquarian or aesthetic interest, others that we owe a debt to the ages. Arguments mirror those between developers and environmentalists. It is argued here that it is not abstract rights that matter, but a sense of history, and of the sacred. Church buildings and landscapes are to be maintained not as museum pieces but as living elements of a humane piety.
A Critique of Deep Ecology
Authors: GREY WILLIAM
Published: February 2008

Abstract  Our environmental crisis is commonly explained as a product of a set of attitudes and beliefs about the world which have been developed by post‐Cartesian technological society. Deep ecologists claim that the crisis can only be overcome by adopting an alternative non‐technological paradigm, such as can be discovered in non‐Western cultures. In this paper I (a) express misgivings about the use of the expression ‘Paradigm’ by deep ecologists, (b) question the claim that a science‐based world‐view inevitably fosters manipulative and exploitative attitudes to the natural world, (c) suggest that non‐technological cultures do not necessarily provide exemplary and superior models for relating to the natural world, and (d) defend a scientific naturalism as a satisfying way of realising our unity with the natural world.
The Two Sides of Love
Authors: GREGORY PAUL
Published: February 2008

Abstract  The kind of love under consideration here is that between equal persons as it typically occurs within the context of a friendship. It is assumed that love opens the way to a sense of meaning or purpose for the individual, the difficulty addressed being that of how to pursue or recognise love. Is it primarily a form of action or of feeling? Can love be said to consist of giving? How does love relate to freedom and dependence? The consideration of these questions leads to the argument that love necessarily involves the creation of needs and therefore of vulnerability. The essay closes with a conception of how the conflict between love as action and love as feeling (‘the two sides of love’) may be resolved.
Desert, Effort and Equality
Authors: MILNE HEATHER
Published: February 2008

Abstract  Desert theories of distributive justice have been attacked on the grounds that they attempt to found large inequalities on morally arbitrary features of individuals: desert is usually classified as a meritocratic principle in contrast to the egalitarian principle that goods should be distributed according to need. I argue that there is an egalitarian version of desert theory, which focuses on effort rather than success, and which aims at equal levels of well‐being; I call it a ‘well‐being desert’ theory. It is argued that this egalitarian conception of desert is preferable to a meritocratic conception, and that its adoption would encourage greater clarity in arguments over wage differentials and in debates about criteria for job and educational competitions.
Michael Tooley and the Jolly Nasty Conclusion
Authors: HARRIS JOHN
Published: February 2008

Abstract  Some recent powerful and persuasive arguments seem to imply that a world of people with lives that are barely worth living is preferable to a world which contains fewer people all of whom have extremely satisfying lives. This ‘repugnant conclusion’ is clearly to be rejected if possible—but is it possible? Many attempts to reject or avoid it have failed. One of the latest, by Michael Tooley, looked promising but the present essay argues that this attempt has also failed.
Moral Reasoning about the Environment
Authors: HARE R. M.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper deals in the main with the problem of delimiting the classes of beings to which we have moral duties when making environmental decisions, and of how to balance their interests fairly. The relation between having interests, having desires and having value (intrinsic or other) is discussed, and a distinction made between entities which can themselves value and those which can have value. Its conclusion is that duties are owed directly to, and only to, sentient beings, and that these duties can be ascertained by weighing their interests impartially strength for strength. It ends with some suggestions about procedures for doing this. Examples are taken from proposals to develop a beach commercially, and to construct a new road in an environmentally sensitive area [1].
AIDS and Confidentiality
Authors: GILLETT GRANT
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT AIDS raises the moral problem of confidentiality because those in sexual contact with the patient may contract a life‐threatening and incurable disease. Medicine has a tradition in which a patient's condition is regarded as confidential information held by the doctor alone. In this case there is a clear moral inclination to inform those at risk from the disease. In most cases no problem will arise but when it does the moral justification for a violation of confidentiality comes into question. Confidentiality is important because of our respect for certain human values and their importance to our patient. Where that patient acts so as to disregard the welfare of others with whom they are in close relationship, those values are lacking. This lack warrants a departure from our normal canons and provokes a suspension of normal moral privileges. The contention that any transgression, however slight, could be held to justify such a response posits a slope down which we, in fact, have no tendency to slide.
Are there Intrinsic Values in Nature?
Authors: SPRIGGE T. L. S.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Some think we should look at aspects of what is commonly thought of as non‐sentient nature as having a value in themselves apart from the use or recreation they provide for humans or even animals. But to what extent does nature, in the character it presents to us, exist apart from presence to consciousness such as ours? Surely at least many of its aspects cannot. However, that does not stop them having a genuinely intrinsic value, just as works of art do, whose existence also is impossible apart from their display to a consciousness such as ours. But can nature, as it exists quite apart from human or animal consciousness, have any intrinsic value? It is suggested that only a panpsychic, and perhaps pantheist, view of nature (a view for which there are excellent metaphysical grounds) can give a positive answer, and even that must be a very vague one [1].
Social Liberty and the Physically Disabled
Authors: COLE PHILLIP
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Liberal political philosophy has little of interest to say about the social liberty of the physically disabled. It accepts that the physically disabled and the able‐bodied are equally at liberty, even though the former can do far less than the latter; and it concludes that there are no interesting political statements we can make about their situation. In this essay, I assume that the physically disabled are unfree, not merely unable, to use public facilities which do not take their disability into account, thereby excluding them. I criticise liberal theories of liberty by exposing and questioning the assumptions which entail the liberal theorist's rejecting this claim. I conclude that there is a form of negative liberty which does enable the liberal theorist to make political statements about the freedom of the disabled [1].
Morality in Business: disharmony and its consequences
Authors: RANKEN NANI L.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper examines the claim that what is ‘really’ good for business will in the end harmonize with the requirements of morality. In searching for a plausible interpretation of what might be ‘really’ good for a business enterprise, the paper explores analogies to traditional philosophical accounts of the ‘true good’ of man. The conclusion is that while such accounts can make sense of the claim that a person's true good requires a moral commitment, they can suggest no solution applicable to business. The reason is that the analogy between natural persons and business enterprises breaks down at a crucial point. It follows that any radical improvement in the moral quality of business activity cannot come from appealing to a ‘true good’ of business. And since external means of control are not sufficient, the paper concludes that we must rely on the moral motivation of individuals filling positions in business. What is indicated then is the need for a strengthened consciousness of the range of freedom and responsibility of persons in their work roles.
What Women Want
Authors: BABER H. E.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Even in the absence of overt discrimination, women are often channelled into different directions from their male counterparts by the network of incentives and disincentives which constitute what has been called a ‘discriminatory environment’. On the account of freedom and coercion developed in this essay, the incentives and disincentives which typically figure in discriminatory environments are not coercive. Nevertheless such environments, it is argued, are morally objectionable on independent grounds.
Sex Discrimination in Insurance
Authors: BEIDER PERRY C.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The public controversy over sex‐based differentials in insurance pricing makes heavy use of terms like ‘fairness’ and ‘discrimination’; in particular, both sides argue that their position is the one dictated by considerations of fairness. Appeal to a basic principle of distributive justice shows that these differentials are not fair. Nevertheless, there is a substantial ethical argument to be made for the industry's status quo, based on the liberty of the low‐risk insurees. The paper considers an alternative reform proposal, with a qualitatively different freedom cost; seven factors are then identified as useful in evaluating the trade‐off between the freedom and justice at stake in any questionable insurance classification variable. A brief concluding section attempts to generalise this analysis to provide a broad framework for the analysis of other discrimination issues.
Fairness in Financial Reporting
Authors: HARRIS N. G. E.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Public companies in most countries are legally required to publish annual accounts, and these are widely used for making financial decisions. To prevent users of accounts being misled into making disastrous decisions, all major Western countries have introduced controls on the ways accounts are presented. By British and EEC law a company's accounts must give a ‘true and fair view’ of its financial state.

It has become widely accepted that if accounts are prepared according to standards drawn up by the accounting profession itself, then they can be considered as being ‘true and fair’. In this paper it is argued that such an interpretation of ‘true and fair’ gives inadequate protection to users. How users' interests might be better protected is discussed. Finally, it is suggested that Rawls’ notion of a ‘veil of ignorance’ could be used to ensure that in the preparation of accounts equal regard is paid to the interests of different types of user.
On Evading Responsibility
Authors: COOPER NEIL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The paper examines J. Glover's 1970 account of the evasion of responsibility. Attention is focused on the Eichmann case and Glover's contention that moral condemnation of Eichmann depends on the view that there is a duty to submit one's actions to moral criticism. Two uses of the word ‘moral’ are distinguished (one use for moral commitment, the other for logical diagnosis) and it is argued that Glover's thesis is accordingly ambiguous. It is contended that Glover must either abandon his stipulative account of the concept of morality or accept the objectivity of moral judgements or modify his unqualified thesis that everybody ought to submit his conduct to moral criticism. An account of problems of evading responsibility involves us, it is maintained, in an area of moral philosophy, the Dialectic of Morals, where knock‐down arguments are sparse.
Moral Risks in Social Work
Authors: HOLLIS MARTIN , HOWE DAVID
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Social workers must often decide whether a child, at possible risk from its parents, should be removed from home. Each year some children, left at home, are abused or killed. If the procedures have been duly followed, is a bad result to be put down to incompetence or to bad luck, and, if to the latter, does that cancel moral responsibility? We examine the claim that the case is one of ‘moral luck’ and argue that the system licences greater risk than is morally justified. This is because it embodies conflicting imperatives of welfare and justice. Anyone who becomes a social worker must face a constant risk to moral integrity [1].
Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: the concept of a retributive policy
Authors: MYERS DAVID B.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The primary aim of the paper is to apply the concept of retribution to nuclear defence policy. Nuclear defence policy, as I conceive it, is concerned with addressing the threat Soviet nuclear weapons pose for Western security. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, MAD is not a retributive doctrine—that in fact it violates two constitutive principles of retribution: culpability and proportionality. After explicating these constitutive principles, I apply them to retaliatory strategy—showing that the culpability criterion restricts retaliation to the agents of aggression while the proportionality criterion requires a just measure of retaliation. The result is a defence policy continuous with the just war tradition—one which rules out deterrence based on threats against the civilian population. I show why a retributive policy requires non‐nuclear forces and discuss the feasiblity of replacing all nuclear forces with conventional weapons. I anticipate and answer major objections to the denuclearization of U.S. and NATO forces. Finally, I conclude that an advocate of a retributive policy—specifically, a policy calling for a proportional or measured response against combatants only—must be willing, in the name of justice, to accept the risk of making war more thinkable by making it less horrible.
Aggression: myth or model?
Authors: EYKEN ALBERT VAN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The word, aggression, refers in general usage to unjustified attack, and any serious writer who uses it extensively in some figurative or newly‐coined technical sense should leave his meaning in no doubt. Unfortunately some ethological writers fail to do this and deceive themselves into the bargain.

They somewhat naively claim to find aggression built into the fundamental nature of animals, a kind of instinct which cannot be resisted, indeed which must figure in their social cohesion. If the word really retains the moral connotation which I have indicated, then much animal biology is vitiated. Not only are animals misjudged, but, since conclusions are then applied to our human selves, we too are misjudged and recommended to adopt false moral principles.

It is possible that ensuing armchair pseudo‐cures may be responsible for a real increase in human violence.
Some Supposedly New Sorts of Discrimination
Authors: SOMERVILLE JAMES
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Whether reverse discrimination is justifiable cannot be determined, it is argued, until what is meant by ‘reverse discrimination’ has been. Recent talk of ‘reverse discrimination’ and ‘discrimination in favour of’ suggests that there are some new sorts of discrimination. But the two qualifications ‘reverse’ and ‘in favour of’ seem often to be confused in so far as it is assumed that reverse discrimination is only in favour of. After noting differences between the use of ‘discrimination’ in fiscal contexts—where the phrase ‘discrimination in favour of’ has an established usage—and in political contexts, a sense of the phrase to fit the latter is proposed: to discriminate in favour of a group is to favour it at the expense of some other group so that the other group is discriminated against. The meaning of the qualification ‘reverse’ is then sought. Ambiguities in the terms ‘reverse’ and ‘compensatory’ are noted. In so far as policies described as being reverse discrimination are genuinely discriminatory, for it is not clear from their characterisation that they need constitute discrimination of any sort, it is only within a historical context that they can be distinguished from the old sort of discrimination. It is thus concluded that there are no new sorts of discrimination.
Homosexuality and Nature: happiness and the law at stake
Authors: MURPHY TIMOTHY F.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In this essay the argument set forth by Michael Levin regarding the abnormality of homosexual behaviour is reviewed and criticized. Against his argument which holds that homosexual behaviour is abnormal because it constitutes an evolutionary aberration, I argue that Levin's and all similarly constructed arguments fail to show that evolutionary origins of sexual behaviour have any significant normative force. I contend that his notion of homosexuality is confused and that he fails to consider alternative methods of how homosexuality might have indeed served evolutionary adaptive purposes or been the result of surplus adaptations. I argue, too, that Levin's linking of unhappiness with homosexual behaviour is spurious and ill‐supported. Consequently, I reject Levin's claims that public policy ought to do what it can to minimize the incidence of such behaviour. I argue by contrast that if happiness is the end of public policy decisions, then society ought to take what measures it can to protect persons in respect of their homosexual behaviour and identities.
Just War: theory and application
Authors: GILBERT PAUL
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT How should just war theory be applied to assess a community's claim to defend itself? The IRA's claim to be fighting a just war to end British rule in Northern Ireland is upheld against the objection (e.g. by Simpson in this Journal, 1986) that they have a right only to self‐defence against indigenous tyranny. Under just war theory no unclarity concerning the alien status of British rule could render the IRA claim unjustifiable: only the well‐grounded denial of its alien status might serve (though this is doubtful). But if that denial is argued for by identifying a separate British community in Ireland then the IRA must be granted a right to repel alien occupation of nationalist areas. However the IRA's rejection of the ‘two communities’ view can be defended; for what constitutes a single community is subject to moral considerations. Accordingly a genuine community's claim to self‐defence is against being wronged, rather than harmed. It is concluded that just war theory cannot be applied without antecedent moral judgements identifying the community potentially wronged.
Thinking Critically in Medicine and its Ethics: relating applied science and applied ethics
Authors: MOROS DANIEL A. , RHODES ROSAMOND , BAUMRIN BERNARD , STRAIN JAMES J.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT While interest in philosophy and medicine has burgeoned in the past two decades, there remains a need for an analysis of the intellectual activity embodied in good medical practice. In this setting, ethical and scientific decision‐making are complexly interrelated. The following paper, collaboratively written by physicians and philosophers, presents a view of applied (clinical) science and applied ethics. Making extensive use of illustrations drawn from routine case material, we seek to indicate a variety of philosophic issues to be found in daily practice, elucidate various levels of critical reasoning within the medical setting, and demonstrate a remarkable similarity between medical and ethical decision‐making.
Human Bonds
Authors: ALMOND BRENDA
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT There are three kinds of bonds between human beings: biological and natural; legal and artificial; social and voluntary. Marriage can be seen as an artificial and legal means of shifting the loose bonding of the third category of relationship into the deep and inescapable bonding of the first. The desire to create bonds of this type is widespread, but non‐bonding, too, has been recommended either as good in itself—a way of achieving peace of mind or personal emancipation through wider relationships—or as necessary self‐denial for some higher cause. In the latter case, the bonds of family are seen as a positive good, a view shared, though for different reasons, by religious and political conservatives and by revisionist feminists.

In contrast to this, three philosophical conceptions which would favour unbonding, or detachment from emotional ties, are categorised here as (a) the Stoic, (b) the Existentialist and (c) the Feminist. Within the Feminist ideal, it is radical, rather than liberal or socialist feminism that has most in common with Stoic or Existentialist ideals. These ideals are considered, together with various alternatives to marriage, and are judged not to override the need for deep personal bonds between human beings. These personal bonds of love and commitment are compared with the alternative bonds of religion and politics and it is concluded that, whatever forms they take, personal bonds have fundamental moral priority in the lives of human beings.
The Future of Big Science
Authors: AGASSI JOSEPH
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The period of government‐sponsored research and development, involving military and industrial intervention in academic life, especially in the USA, was brief and yet its characteristics were declared universal by two historians of science there, Derek J. de Solla Price and Thomas S. Kuhn, who justified coercion and boredom in research work organized hierarchically. The reform of work movement is now attempting to introduce ideas in the opposite direction. Clearly, the institutions of big science should be interested in the improvement of the quality of research done on their premises and in the changes in world situation which might greatly change the agenda of research. To that end research into the general character of big science is very advisable and may be instigated either by large research institutions or by some of their umbrella organizations which may create incentives and alter the character of big science radically to everybody's advantage.
Poverty: absolute or relative?
Authors: SHAW BEVERLEY
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In recent decades poverty has been defined as a relative rather than absolute notion. Those in poverty have been seen as poor relative to a level of income, or social condition, accepted as average or normal for a society. Poverty has been redefined as ‘relative deprivation’. This paper argues, first, that the redefinition of poverty as relative to social norms is a radical departure from the traditional notion of poverty. Secondly, it considers whether such a redefinition gives support to the view that the claims of those in poverty (relative) may be considered as morally equivalent to the claims of those in poverty (absolute). The paper concludes by arguing that the notion of relative poverty is advanced to give support to social and economic policies whose primary aim is equality rather than the relief of poverty.
Original Populations and Environmental Rights
Authors: AIRAKSINEN TIMO
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT This paper deals with a conflict between our sense of social justice and the need to protect the environment. It is argued that original populations do not own the land and other relevant aspects of their environment. However, immigrant newcomers will work on them and claim them for their own. The original populations are an integral part of the environment. When the newcomers realize that they must protect the vanishing natural environment, they must also control the lives of the original populations. The problem is that the newcomers have brought about the problems which will harm the others, too. In order to analyse this situation I distinguish between different types of rights, the value of nature and our alienation from it. The basic dilemma is described in normative terms and it is suggested that the rights claims of the original populations are quite strong. At the same time it is clear that it is impossible to return to any ‘original position’. Some piecemeal solutions are suggested.
The Ethics of Enforced Medical Treatment: the balance model
Authors: EASTMAN NIGEL L. G. , HOPE R. A.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT When is it right to enforce medical treatment on a patient who is refusing that treatment? English law recognises two ethical principles as of paramount importance: the autonomy of the patient; and the consequences of not treating compared with treating. The law, by and large, operates these principles in succession. Thus, in the case of a patient refusing treatment, the law asks first, is the patient competent? Only if the answer is no, are the consequences considered.

We criticise the position taken by English law and argue, first, that competence is a graded and not a binary concept, and secondly, that the two ethical principles should be applied not sequentially but at the same time. These two ideas form what we have called the balance model.

This model could be used for an empirical study of individuals’ ethical beliefs, and in particular to test the hypothesis that the ethical beliefs of most individuals conform to the balance model rather than to the position taken by English law.
Sudden Infant Deaths: models of health and illness
Authors: GREAVES DAVID
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The assumptions underlying the traditional biomedical model of health and illness and criticisms of it are described. An examination of the historical development of ideas concerning cot (crib) deaths shows how early explanations, which were congruent with this model, came to be discredited. Because subsequent explanations have also been considered unsatisfactory, cot deaths have come to be regarded as medically problematic. The relationship of models of health and illness to cot deaths has therefore been exposed to an unusual degree of scrutiny. Two possible contending models, social epidemiological and socio‐economic are identified, and their status vis‐à‐vis the biomedical model is considered. The choice as to which of these models is applied to cot deaths is shown to be not only of theoretical interest but also to have ethical implications for health care policy and medical practice.
Intention and Coercion
Authors: WALL EDMUND
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Typically, philosophers have taken an external approach to the problem of defining ‘dispositional coercion’. However, a description of the surrounding circumstances of an allegedly coercive action is not the correct approach. What is required is an account of ‘dispositional coercion’ primarily in terms of personal motivation. ‘Dispositional coercion’ involves an agent threatening someone with a sanction if the latter fails to act as the agent requests. In order to define ‘dispositional coercion,’ I believe, the intentions of both the coercer and the victim need elucidation. In this essay, I defend the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining this concept (where X is the coercer, Y is the victim and A is the action that Y is coerced into performing).

(1) X threatens Y, that is, X intentionally attempts to create the belief in Y that X will be responsible for harm coming to Y should Y fail to do A. X's motive for attempting to create this belief is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A.

(2) X successfully creates the belief in Y that Y may be harmed if he fails to do A, that is, X is successful in causing Y to recognise that harm may come to him should he fail to do A.

(3) Y intends to do A, and Y's motive for intending to do A is Y's desire to avoid harm to himself.

(4) Y does A.
Love and Lust Revisited: intentionality, homosexuality and moral education
Authors: STAFFORD J. MARTIN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT In his book Sexual Desire, Roger Scruton wrongly maintains that human sexual experience is essentially intentional. His thesis depends on his highly revisionary definitions of ‘sexual arousal’ and ‘sexual desire’, the artificial nature of which I expose and criticise.

He admits that homosexual desire is capable of the same kind of intentionality as heterosexual desire, and is therefore not intrinsically obscene or perverted, but he advances reasons why homosexuality is morally different from heterosexuality and is therefore an object of disapproval. His arguments presuppose ‘an impassable moral divide’ between the sexes and are, on his own admission, not very cogent.

Since he allows that homosexual desire is a natural and spontaneous phenomenon and also proposes that moral education should guide us towards a state in which our sexuality is entirely integrated within a life of personal affection and responsibility, consistency requires that he adopt a sexual ideology which does not discriminate against homosexuality. For homosexuals are unlikely to achieve the ‘sexual integrity’ which Scruton advocates (and which I endorse) if they are constantly encouraged to disparage their own sexual nature and if social institutions make no positive provision for them.
On Reasoning Morally about the Environment
Authors: HILL DONALD
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT R. M. Hare argues that moral reasoning about the environment requires the setting out of the various interests at stake and adjudication between them, strength for strength. Though there are possible objections to some aspects of his programme, it is clearly intended to be fair. However, it is not clear that in his concluding discussion, of the building of new roads, the interests at stake are set out with total impartiality. Some further relevant interests are listed, in an attempt to redress the balance.
Terrorism and Morality
Authors: KHATCHADOURIAN HAIG
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The paper addresses the fundamental issue of the morality of terrorism. It distinguishes four types of terrorism—‘predatory,’‘retaliatory,’‘political’and ‘moralistic’—and argues that in all of them terrorism (in a ‘descriptive,’value‐neutral sense of the word) is always wrong. After a short introductory section the paper considers in some detail the conceptual problem of defining ‘terrorism’. Next it considers the possible application to terrorism, with the necessary modifications, of two main conditions of a ‘just war’; viz. the Principles of Discrimination and of Proportion. It argues that these conditions support the paper's central contention. Additional support is then found in the concept and principles of human rights. In the final section the paper evaluates utilitarian arguments brought forth by Kai Nielsen in Violence and Terrorism: its uses and abuses, in support of so‐called ‘revolutionary terrorism’.

Throughout the discussion is illustrated by some actual examples from the recent past.
Public Bodies, Private Selves
Authors: MARSHALL SANDRA E.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT A patient whose case notes had been used, without her permission, during a disciplinary inquiry on the conduct of Wendy Savage (her obstetrician) complained that this was a breach of confidentiality. Her complaint cannot be understood as based on a concern about the possible adverse consequences of this use of the notes: rather, her concern was just with the fact that medical information about her had been made known to others.

My concern is with the meaning and status of the right to privacy, to which the Savage patient appealed. Such a right cannot be reduced to a property right, since this cannot capture what concerned the Savage patient. A proper understanding of what lies behind her complaint requires us to recognise the way in which facts about oneself—in this case facts about one's body—are intimately bound up with one's self, with one's identity, and thus with one's autonomy. What kinds of fact, and thus what conception of the self, are involved in such a conception of privacy need not everywhere be the same; the crucial point is that privacy and the self are concepts which, whatever their particular content, are internally related [1].
The Modernist Fallacy: philosophy as art's undoing [1]
Authors: HALDANE JOHN
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The essay is concerned with the widely held view that contemporary fine art is obscurantist, shallow and unrewarding of attention. It is argued that the opposition between common opinion and the advocates of modernism rests upon a philosophical disagreement about the nature and value of art. An account of aesthetic experience is then presented and illustrated by reference to Raphael's The School of Athens. This account shows the reasoning implicit in modernism to rest upon a fallacy relating to the possible forms of explanation. The essay concludes by endorsing Augustine's claim that culcural intelligibility rests not on abstract reasoning but on shared affections. This sets a requirement for artists to return to making work that engages the interests of their fellow citizens.
Oskar Schindler and Moral Theory
Authors: JACKSON M. W.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Imagine Oskar Schindler before the bar of moral theory. Schindler, a minor industrialist, sheltered more than 1000 Jews during the Holocaust. This would seem to be a record of virtue. Or is it? The dominant consensus in moral theory stresses a rationality and universality of judgement and action that Oskar did not even consider. Efforts to interpret Schindler in universal terms by reference to human rights or to the tenet that ought implies can are entertained and denied. If Schindler's deeds are moral reality, the consensus in contemporary moral theory is the poorer for being unable to recognise them. Schindler's virtue is noteworthy in its own right and also as a limiting case for the mainline of contemporary moral theory.
Parental Autonomy
Authors: BIGELOW JOHN , CAMPBELL JOHN , DODDS SUSAN M. , PARGETTER ROBERT , PRIOR ELIZABETH W. , YOUNG ROBERT
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT We argue that in societies like our own the prevailing view that parents have both special responsibilities for and special rights over their children fails to give a proper understanding of the autonomy both of parents and of children. It is our claim that there is a logical priority of the separable interests of a child over the autonomy of its parents in the fulfilment of their special responsibilities for and the exercise of their special rights over their children. However, we believe that in acknowledging the child as a distinct locus of interests appropriate weight can still be given to parental autonomy. In particular, since raising a child is a long‐term commitment which plays a central role in the life‐plans of many adults it will be a legitimate exercise of an adult's autonomy strongly to influence the future of any children involved in such a plan. Such influence will be quite separate from paternalistic concern for those children. But the logical priority of the child's interests will at the same time show why parents are not entitled to behave proprietorially toward their children, even when paternalistic concern is called for.
The Case for Pacifism
Authors: NORMAN RICHARD
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT I present the case for pacifism by formulating what I take to be the most plausible version of the idea of respect for human life. This generates a very strong, though not necessarily absolute, moral presumption against killing, in war or any other situation. I then show how difficult it is for this presumption to be overridden, either by the considerations invoked in ‘just war’theory, or by consequentialist claims about what can be achieved through war.

Despite the strength of the moral case against war, people sometimes say that they have no choice but to fight. In the concluding section of the paper I attempt to identify the relevant sense in which this could be said, and I discuss briefly how this affects the case for pacifism.
The Honey Trap: the social and cognitive adequacy of language in educational contexts
Authors: WINCH CHRISTOPHER
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT The attack on bidialectal approaches to the teaching of writing mounted by John Honey in The Language Trap is examined and critically discussed. It is argued that Honey confuses the issues of the social and the cognitive adequacy of a particular variety of language. In particular, his critique of bidialectalism, in so far as it is based on a version of verbal deficit theory and/or cognitive relativism, is misconceived. There are valid criticisms to be made of the bidialectal approach, but they centre on the social rather than the cognitive adequacy of different varieties of language. When the critique is formulated in this way, it is more enlightening and less misleading.
Meeting Needs: charity or justice?
Authors: FLEW ANTONY
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT Paul Russell's ‘Nozick, need and charity’, published in Vol. 4, No. 2 of the Journal of Applied Philosophy develops an attack on Nozick's thesis that “the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others’’in order “to contribute to our positive understanding of the nature of distributive justice”. Against Russell the present paper argues: first, that although these kinds of use of the coercive apparatus of the state are indeed justified—even if not necessarily for the reasons which he gives—such justified uses are nevertheless not mandated by any sort of justice; and, secondly, that by collapsing the distinction between justice and the less fundamental virtue of charity Russell detracts from the credit due to the charitable.
Area Bombing, Terrorism and the Death of Innocents
Authors: WALLACE GERRY
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  This paper is concerned with the view that, in so far as they involve the deliberate targeting of innocent people, neither terrorism nor area bombing is ever morally permissible. Four attempts to justify this view are considered, all of which are based on the intuition that deliberately killing innocent people is wrong. By means of a detailed examination of the introduction of area bombing by Britain in 1940–41, it is argued that in certain circumstances there are other equally powerful and accessible intuitions which support the opposite view. It is further argued that only moral theories which provide for the weighing of competing moral intuitions are capable of avoiding this kind of impasse and the biased selection of intuitions that this form of absolutism involves.
Ethical Responsibility and Historical Biography
Authors: GRIFFIN NICHOLAS
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Lately, the demand for historical biography has remained strong, fresh works appearing with increased regularity. My concern is with the subjects of these efforts—the dead figures whose lives and natures form the bulk of the contents. The ethics of the professional historian provide writers of historical biography with some guidelines, but are these sound, substantial and enduring enough to ensure the just treatment of the subjects? My contention is that they are not, and I set out tentatively in this brief essay to speculate on some grounds upon which a fuller sense of ethical responsibility, respect and commitment may be built. The major difficulty in attempting this exercise rests with the actual nature of the subject towards whom any duty or responsibility is to be felt, and it is on ambiguity respecting this issue that any serious conclusions may risk shipwreck. Alternatively, if any sense of ethical concern is thought demonstrable in this context, it may rest upon premises that are fundamentally egoistic in nature.
On Living in an Unjust Society
Authors: BROOKS DAVID
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Can it be wrong to simply live in an unjust society? Four moral principles: group responsibility, unjust enrichment, a general duty to prevent injustice and the need to preserve one's moral integrity indicate that it might be. I explore the implications of each of these principles and conclude that while the possibility of doing good might counterbalance the threat to moral integrity, a person who continues to live in an unjust society should repudiate the injustice to avoid being held responsible for it and has a duty to compensate those deprived if he is unjustly enriched. Moreover, the general duty to prevent injustice bears more heavily on those who are closest to it.
Utilitarianism, Human Rights and the Redistribution of Health through Preventive Medical Measures
Authors: HÄYRY HETA , HÄYRY MATTI
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  Public health authorities sometimes have to make decisions about the use of preventive medical measures—e.g. vaccination programmes—which could, if realised, save millions of lives, but could also kill a certain (small) number of those subjected to the measures. According to a rough‐and‐ready utilitarian calculation, such measures should be taken, but there are also possible objections to this view.

A liberal objection to the use of mandatory preventive measures which might harm human beings is that people have a right to decide for themselves whether or not they want to participate in the programme. A further objection is based on the claims that first, the authorities are directly killing those who die because of, say, vaccination programmes, and second, directly killing human beings is forbidden (since every human being has a right to live).

The latter objection is discussed at length in the present paper. The validity of three doctrines, the doctrines of the double effect, of acts and omissions, and of killing and letting die, are considered with reference to the use of preventive measures, and found inapplicable. The objection is, however, refuted by comparing some hypothetical examples, and the initial utilitarian calculation is reinforced.
Killing Under Duress
Authors: UNIACKE SUZANNE
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  The House of Lords ruled in R v Howe (1987) that Duress is not a defence to murder in English law. Some of the central arguments rested on a simple view about the nature of duress and the way in which duress is relevant in moral evaluation. This paper discusses legal and non‐legal senses of duress, and argues that duress can be relevant to moral evaluation in a number of different ways. Some acts under duress are morally justified (here the defence of Duress is like that of Necessity) and some others are excusable; some excuses deny full responsibility on the part of the agent (here Duress is more like Provocation) and others do not. The judicial description of duress in Howe is too specific to notice this, with the consequence that some of the central claims made in dismissing Duress as a defence to murder are confused.
Practising Doctors, Resource Allocation and Ethics
Authors: CHANT A. D. B.
Published: February 2008

ABSTRACT  In order to slow down the inexorable increase in spending on health care, the British government has implemented an initiative proposed by Griffiths. This initiative is designed to make doctors more accountable for the decisions they may take. In this essay I argue first, that the conflation of two decisions (financial and clinical) leads to unnecessary ethical dilemmas and secondly, that as psychologically it is difficult to take two decisions simultaneously, inevitably the clinician is forced to name either the financial or the clinical decision as the prior problem. To decide for the former inevitably strains the traditional doctor/patient relationship of mutual trust.