bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Brussels and Contemporary Dance: Artistic Labor in a Creative City
Authors: Van Assche Annelies
Published: August 2016

Within my contribution, I present the research project “Choreographies of Precariousness. A Transdisciplinary Study of the Working and Living Conditions in the Contemporary Dance Scenes of Brussels and Berlin” (supervisors: Katharina Pewny, Rudi Laermans, Christel Stalpaert; UGent and KULeuven; sponsored by FWO). For this conference, I would like to concentrate on the specificity of the contemporary dance profession and to elaborate the landscape of working in Brussels.

Working formats in contemporary dance revolve around internationalization, mobility, transnationalism, and collaboration. Contemporary dance therefore requires an appropriate social security system taking into account the specificity of the profession.

Brussels attracts many foreign dancers, as it offers prominent training possibilities, and hosts several reputable companies and workspaces. Flanders has established a unique social security system for the performing arts professions; however I will elucidate where the system collapses when it comes to contemporary dance. I will demonstrate how dance artists question the working conditions they are confronted within Flanders by analyzing their performances of precaritiousness. Flemish dancer Benjamin Vandewalle uses his pieceCo-Productie(2011) to advert to the socio-economic situation, through abruptly stopping his performance in the middle of the piece, clarifying to the audience that he will not continue since the Minister of Culture decided to downsize project subsidies in the middle of the season. He calls for the investment of 2,500 euros by the audience so he can finish the piece. The latter tactic can be seen as one of many ways dance artists are bound to work collaboratively against their precariousness.
Strong pure infiniteness of crossed products
Authors: KIRCHBERG E. , SIERAKOWSKI A.
Published: August 2016

Consider an exact action of a discrete group $G$ on a separable C*-algebra $A$. It is shown that the reduced crossed product $A\rtimes _{\unicode[STIX]{x1D70E},\unicode[STIX]{x1D706}}G$ is strongly purely infinite—provided that the action of $G$ on any quotient $A/I$ by a $G$-invariant closed ideal $I\neq A$ is element-wise properly outer and that the action of $G$ on $A$ is $G$-separating (cf. Definition 5.1). This is the first non-trivial sufficient general criterion for strong pure infiniteness of reduced crossed products of C*-algebras $A$ that are not $G$-simple. In the case $A=\text{C}_{0}(X)$, the notion of a $G$-separating action corresponds to the property that two compact sets $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$, that are contained in open subsets $C_{j}\subseteq U_{j}\subseteq X$, can be mapped by elements $g_{1},g_{2}$ of $G$ onto disjoint sets $\unicode[STIX]{x1D70E}_{g_{j}}(C_{j})\subseteq U_{j}$, but satisfy not necessarily the contraction property $\unicode[STIX]{x1D70E}_{g_{j}}(U_{j})\subseteq \overline{U_{j}}$. A generalization of strong boundary actions on compact spaces to non-unital and non-commutative C*-algebras $A$ (cf. Definition 7.1) is also introduced. It is stronger than the notion of $G$-separating actions by Proposition 7.6, because $G$-separation does not imply $G$-simplicity and there are examples of $G$-separating actions with reduced crossed products that are stably projection-less and non-simple.
Generation of high-quality electron beams by ionization injection in a single acceleration stage
Authors: Hafz Nasr A.M. , Li Song , Li Guangyu , Mirzaie Mohammad , Zeng Ming , Zhang Jie
Published: August 2016

Ionization-induced electron injection in laser wakefield accelerators, which was recently proposed to lower the laser intensity threshold for electron trapping into the wake wave, has the drawback of generating electron beams with large and continuous energy spreads, severely limiting their future applications. Complex target designs based on separating the electron trapping and acceleration stages were proposed as the only way for getting small energy-spread electron beams. Here, based on the self-truncated ionization-injection concept which requires the use of unmatched laser–plasma parameters and by using tens of TW laser pulses focused onto a gas jet of helium mixed with low concentrations of nitrogen, we demonstrate single-stage laser wakefield acceleration of multi-hundred MeV electron bunches with energy spreads of a few percent. The experimental results are verified by PIC simulations.
A mid-Cretaceous angiosperm-dominated macroflora from the Cedar Mountain Formation of Utah, USA
Authors: Harris Elisha B. , Arens Nan Crystal
Published: August 2016

Angiosperms first appeared in the fossil record as pollen during the Valanginian–Hauterivian; they spread out of the tropics in the Aptian and Albian, and radiated in the Late Cretaceous. Despite these general patterns, details of the taxonomic, geographic, and ecological evolution of Cretaceous angiosperms are relatively poorly known because only a handful of Early and mid-Cretaceous macrofloras have been reported. This is the first detailed report of a fossil leaf flora from the Cedar Mountain Formation from the mid-Cretaceous of the Western Interior. We describe a flora that is overwhelmingly dominated by angiosperms (152 of 153 identified specimens are angiosperms) from the Albian–Cenomanian transition that is preserved in a clay- and carbonate-rich, lacustrine mudstone from the uppermost Cedar Mountain Formation of Emery County, Utah. We recognize 18 leaf morphotypes, all of which are dicotyledonous angiosperms. The majority of the Cedar Mountain morphotypes have taxonomic affinities with forms of similar age described from the Atlantic and Gulf coastal plains and other localities from the Western Interior. From this, we infer that a relatively diverse angiosperm flora grew along the margins of a small pond on the coastal plain. Palynological preparations of the fossil matrix were barren; however, previous studies of other facies within the formation showed that both conifers and ferns were important components of the regional vegetation during Cedar Mountain time. The effective absence of conifers and ferns in this macroflora and low leaf mass per area values among the angiosperms measured suggests that even at the Early–Late Cretaceous transition, angiosperms had come to dominate some sites, particularly those that were disturbed or seasonally ephemeral, where fast-growth or seasonal deciduousness would have been favored.
Performance of statistical methods to correct food intake distribution: comparison between observed and estimated usual intake
Authors: Verly-Jr Eliseu , Oliveira Dayan C. R. S. , Fisberg Regina M. , Marchioni Dirce Maria L.
Published: August 2016

There are statistical methods that remove the within-person random error and estimate the usual intake when there is a second 24-h recall (24HR) for at least a subsample of the study population. We aimed to compare the distribution of usual food intake estimated by statistical models with the distribution of observed usual intake. A total of 302 individuals from Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) answered twenty, non-consecutive 24HR; the average length of follow-up was 3 months. The usual food intake was considered as the average of the 20 collection days of food intake. Using data sets with a pair of 2 collection days, usual percentiles of intake of the selected foods using two methods were estimated (National Cancer Institute (NCI) method and Multiple Source Method (MSM)). These estimates were compared with the percentiles of the observed usual intake. Selected foods comprised a range of parameter distributions: skewness, percentage of zero intakes and within- and between-person intakes. Both methods performed well but failed in some situations. In most cases, NCI and MSM produced similar percentiles between each other and values very close to the true intake, and they better represented the usual intake compared with 2-d mean. The smallest precision was observed in the upper tail of the distribution. In spite of the underestimation and overestimation of percentiles of intake, from a public health standpoint, these biases appear not to be of major concern.
Phenomenology and De Re Interpretation: A Critique of Brandom's Reading of Hegel
Authors: Houlgate Stephen
Published: August 2016

At first sight Robert Brandom's two essays on Hegel in his book Tales of the Mighty Dead appear barely to be about Hegel at all. The first essay on holism and idealism, for example, talks of ‘sense dependence’ and ‘reference dependence’, and even invokes a point in logic made by Gilbert Harman (TMD 191-2, 194). Scarcely normal fare for the average commentator on Hegel. Brandom himself is acutely conscious of the impression his work on Hegel (and on the other philosophers discussed in Tales of the Mighty Dead) might have on his readers. ‘I am aware’, he writes, ’that the relations between the stories told here and my own philosophical views [ … ] may seem to some particularly problematic’ (TMD 90). In the section of his book called ‘Pretexts’, however, Brandom provides a subtle defence of his approach and makes it clear that he is by no means simply ‘foisting’ his ideas on the helpless dead (TMD 91; see also 389). He does so by distinguishing between two different modes of interpretation: de dicto and de re.

Brandom states that interpretation of a philosophical text seeks to establish the claims made in it and to determine what follows from them. This task, however, presupposes a ‘context’ of interpretation (TMD 95).

When a text is given a de dicto interpretation, the context is supplied by the author's own commitments. The aim is thus to determine what the author himself would have said in response to questions of clarification, given those commitments (TMD 99).
Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality
Authors: Kreines James
Published: August 2016

Recent debates about Hegel's theoretical philosophy are marked by a surprising lack of agreement, extending all the way down to the most basic question: what is Hegel talking about? On the one hand, proponents of ‘metaphysical’ interpretations generally read Hegel as aiming to articulate the overall structure or organisation of reality itself, and the nature of a highest or most fundamental being. Particularly influential is the idea that Hegel is reviving and modifying a form of Spinoza's metaphysical monism, according to which the organised whole of everything is the highest being, providing a ground or reason for everything real. On the other hand, proponents of ‘non-metaphysical’ interpretations argue Hegel's topic is something else entirely. The idea is that Hegel agrees with Kant in finding pre-critical forms of metaphysics to be uncritical or dogmatic. And the topic of Hegel's positive project is supposed to be not the nature of reality itself, nor any most fundamental being, but rather ‘forms of thought’ akin to Kant's categories and the objectivity, legitimacy, or normative authority of those forms of thought.

This is of course only a rough sketch of the most basic recent debate, about which there is more to say than can fit in this paper. My focus here is on what Hegel has to say about nature and natural kinds, in ‘Observing Reason’ from the Phenomenology, and also in similar material from the Logic and Encyclopedia. I intend to argue that this material suggests a surprising way of stepping beyond the fundamental debate sketched above. There can of course be no question of elaborating and defending here a complete interpretation of Hegel's entire theoretical philosophy. I will have to restrict myself to arguing for the unlikely conclusion that there is an approach that can combine and integrate the strongest points made by both sides in the most basic debate shaping recent Hegel interpretation.
On A Philosophical Model of Hegel's Phenomenological Method: A Reply to Kenneth Westphal
Authors: Fulkerson-Smith Brett A.
Published: August 2016

Hegel's Phenomenology is among the most difficult, if it is not in fact the most difficult, philosophical treatise ever published. Owing to its opacity of form and content, the Phenomenology, which Hegel quite accurately describes as the highway of despair upon which natural consciousness travels to its absolute knowing, has had its share of hitchhikers (§78). In their efforts to comprehend the scenery along this highway, many readers of this text rely on any number of analytical commentaries and expositions. Westphal (2003) offers a welcomed contribution to this kind of secondary literature.

As its title suggests, Westphal's text seeks to introduce Hegel's Phenomenology in a novel way, namely with explicit reference to the epistemological issue at its core. This is the Dilemma of the Criterion from Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism. (Benson 1996). In addition to introducing the central features and characteristics of the epistemological aim of the Phenomenology, Westphal devotes considerable effort to showing how, that is by what method, Hegel responds to at least Pyrrhonian skepticism.

Westphal's examination of Hegel's method is framed by two questions. The first question is: what is Hegel's method? The answer that Westphal offers, namely that Hegel employs a phenomenological method, agrees with a host of classic and contemporary commentators, including Ivan Iljin (1946:126), Alexandre Kojève (1980: Ch. 7), Kenley R. Dove (1969-70), William Maker (1982), Wendy Lynn Clark and J.M. Fritzman (2002). Nevertheless, Westphal does offer a detailed, sophisticated, and novel account of the characteristics of Hegel's phenomenological method that is unrivaled in the extant literature.
G. W. F. Hegel: Geometrical Studies Introduction
Authors: Paterson Alan L. T.
Published: August 2016

Throughout his life, Hegel showed great interest in physics and mathematics. His most sustained, surviving treatment of Euclidean geometry is his early work ‘Geometrische Studien’, which he completed while he was a private tutor [Hoffmeister] in Frankfurt, shortly before leaving for Jena to join Schelling. GS is not easy reading, but despite that, it seems to me that Hegel presents in it a remarkably erudite as well as interesting and insightful critique of geometry. He investigates some of the themes from the foundations of geometry, in particular from the first book of the Elements of Euclid. Like the mathematical philosophies of Kant and Frege, Hegel's understanding of geometry is conceptually based, but unlike them, it is also grounded in the classical Greek philosophy of mathematics, which achieved its definitive expression in Proclus's great commentary on Euclid 1. Much of this classical philosophy of geometry is forgotten nowadays, under the influence of the great modern mathematical philosophers (in particular, Cantor, Frege and Gödel). In my view, it well deserves reconsideration, especially since, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems, modern mathematical philosophy has failed in its attempt to ground mathematics within the framework of formal systems.

Much of GS has not survived, and what remains is condensed and fragmentary. It seems that originally, Hegel covered all of the propositions of Euclid 1 rather than just the 14 propositions (1-12, 26, 29) that are covered in what remains of the original GS. I have given detailed treatment of GS together with related material in Hegel's Jena dissertation elsewhere (Paterson 2004/2005). The objective of the present paper is to introduce the translation of GS.
Hegel on Historical Meaning: For Example, The Enlightenment
Authors: Pippin Robert B
Published: August 2016

“Reading the morning paper is a kind of realistic morning prayer”

Hegel's best known treatment of the European Enlightenment (in his Phänomenologie des Geistes) singles out the problem of religious faith, or the new, modern struggle between insight and faith, between enlightenment and what its defenders saw as mere “superstition”.

This treatment is distinctive and on the face of it highly controversial. For one thing, while the topic is simply announced as die Aufklärung, Hegel makes no attempt at a comprehensive survey. Bacon, Swift, Smith and the British seem to play no discernable role; oddly, neither do Lessing or Mendelssohn or the German, “Berlin” Enlightenment. If there is a focus in these highly typological and categorial distinctions, it is clearly le siècle du lumière, not die Aufklärung or the Battle of the Books; if there is a representative figure, it is unquestionably Diderot; if there is a theme, it is ethical and broadly normative, not scientific or even political.
Dissatisfied Enlightenment: Certain Difficulties Concerning The Public Use Of One's Reason
Authors: Deligiorgi Katerina
Published: August 2016

“Have the courage to use your own understanding!”. Thus Kant explicates the motto of enlightenment, sapere aude, inviting perhaps the readers of the Berlinische Monatschrift to follow suit. “[B]e for yourselves what you all are in yourselves – reasonable”. Thus Hegel introduces the pure insight of enlightened Spirit which addresses its emancipatory call to every consciousness. The apprised readers of the Phenomenology would know to temper their enthusiasm. Those who manage to get that far without doubting the clarity and simplicity of the Wahlspruch of enlightenment, are likely to be dissappointed by Hegel's subsequent analysis, which is largely intended to test such convictions. At the very least, the determined Aufklärer will have to consider whether the normative confidence of ‘dare to know’ is premised on unqualified theoretical certainty, and whether this instruction does not have an altogether more sombre half in the uncertainties of enlightened practice, let alone the terrifying certainty of the guillotine. In the following, I will argue that Kant modifies his initial definition of enlightenment by emphasising the collective and discursive dimensions of the enlightening process, the “freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters”. I will then argue that Hegel adopts a similar approach in the Phenomenology but evaluates differently the problems involved in establishing a public for reason and in assessing the rationality of this public and proposes a different model of public debate.
Hegel's System of Needs: The Elementary Relations of Economic Justice
Authors: Merrill David
Published: August 2016

The Philosophy of Right is not usually taken to contain a prescriptive ethics. Yet to establish as much regarding the elementary relations of the economy is the task of this essay. The project is cast into three parts. It begins with Hegel's account in the ‘Introduction’ of the free self prior to the exposition of the modes of just conduct or philosophy of right proper. It is an account of freedom not yet realized — without any particular content. Yet, the point is established that the philosophy of justice will be based on a twofold notion of self-determination. Most of the ‘Introduction’ concerns the argument that freedom or valid conduct has to do with pure self-determination, the self determining itself. The claim is also made that philosophy establishes its own legitimacy through its conceptual self-determination. Part two deals with the question of how freedom can be realized in civil society where the individual's governing orientation is particularity. The characteristic features of civil society do not encourage the expectation that freedom can be realized there. One, particularity itself appears to be rooted in a natural necessity which seems to preclude any possibility of freedom. Two, the inherently social character of civil society seems to rule out the exercise of a freedom that is about the self's relation to itself in self-determination. Three, the pursuit of particularity characteristic of civil society seems inherently antisocial and thus not a suitable mode of conduct for ethics. However, the argument will be made that the theory can conceive of the relations of particularity in a way that makes the free self inherently social and particularity both social and free from natural determinations.
Concept, Individuality and Truth
Authors: Winfield Richard Dien
Published: August 2016

Philosophers may disagree with unmatched zeal, but no philosophical controversy can free them from their common dependence upon the concept as a privileged vehicle of truth. Even when embracing the most radical empiricism or the most unyielding scepticism, philosophers cannot help but make conceptual arguments. All their efforts may aim at curing themselves of addiction to the concept, but so long as they reason on behalf of experience or the suspension of judgment, thinking remains the element in which their claims live and die.

Philosophers' perennial use of conceptual argument might seem a double curse, subverting all of philosophy's equally perennial aspirations to seize the truth. To begin with, if philosophical investigation constitutively employs concepts, how can it possibly establish the validity of conceptual determination? If philosophy cannot fail to use concepts to legitimate reason as a midwife of truth, will philosophical investigation not fall into the vicious circularity of relying upon an instrument that can never be certified without taking its reliability for granted? Secondly, if philosophy must always utilize concepts to arrive at truth, must philosophers not presuppose that the object of true knowledge is what is conceptually determinate? Besides being beyond philosophical justification, will this assumption not limit objectivity to a mortuary of changeless universals from which all becoming, all particulars, and indeed, all actual existence are excluded as some inconceivable illusions? Will the only objectivity that philosophy can conceive be a phantom realm of ideas that can never correspond to genuine reality?
Justification and Time in Hegel's Phenomenology
Authors: Collins Ardis B.
Published: August 2016

H. S. Harris, in his two-volume study of Hegel's Phenomenology, endorses both the titles that Hegel gave to this work. As a science of experience, Harris says, the Phenomenology situates us within the psychology of the singular self, the self's sense of its own consciousness, and exhibits therein “the conceptual structure of pure science.” As the phenomenology of spirit, the Phenomenology shows how an individual situated within his or her own experience and history belongs to the universal life of a spirit that encompasses all history and all selfhood. Thus, the Phenomenology demonstrates that the temporality of the singular self holds within itself eternity; and it conceives this eternity as the pure logic of philosophical science which is “the interpretation of its world by a rationally scientific community.” Harris intends to show that the Phenomenology is a continuous science in its own right, and that the logic developed in Hegel's philosophical system simply detaches this scientific, logical dimension from its embeddedness in the concreteness of human experience.
H.S. Harris' Commentary on Hegel's Phenomenology: A Review
Authors: Kainz Howard
Published: August 2016

Like Henry Harris, I began doing intensive research on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the mid-sixties. I recall going through all the chapters as a graduate student during one academic year, and looking around for commentaries. The only English-language commentary available was Loewenberg's Hegel's Phenomenology: Dialogues in the Life of Mind, which was suggestive of the dialectic taking place in the book, but not much help in getting over the “rough spots”. This gave me an incentive to work through Jean Hyppolite's commentary, not yet translated into English, with my basic reading-knowledge of French. My 1976 Hegel's Phenomenology, Part I: Analysis and Commentary was one of the first in a long line of Anglophone commentaries. Harris in his introduction to Vol. I. mentions this effort at “analysis”, along with Findlay's “analysis” accompanying the 1977 Miller translation of the Phenomenology, as incentives for the inclusion of his own improved running analysis in the present commentary.

I have included discussions of numerous partial or complete commentaries on Hegel's Phenomenology in review articles published in 1971 in the American Philosophical Quarterly and (in Spanish) Teorema, in 1979 in the American Philosophical Quarterly, and in 1981 in Hegel-Studien. Harris has the advantage of producing the most recent of all these commentaries, and in a way offers us a compendium of everything that has been done on the Phenomenology. His analysis and commentary includes a survey of the literature, in which almost all previous laborers in the field can find themselves commended or criticized in the endnotes. Thus I find comments like “Kainz has completely misunderstood the argument here” (I, 312), “This is a point which Kainz has grasped more definitely than most commentators” (I, 315), “[Kainz] does not deserve the brickbat Flay hurls at him” (I, 613), and so forth. Other commentators, living and dead – Flay, Pöggeler, Navickas, Kenneth and Merold Westphal, Heidegger, Lauer, Werner Becker, Kojève, Wahl, Hyppolite, Labarrière, Bonsiepen, Forster, Shklar, Solomon, Werner Marx, and Robert Williams (to name just a few!) — are similarly discussed and critiqued. For some of us Anglophone commentators, such remarks may seem like red marks on essays from a patient professor. But certainly no one will mind, since Harris has spent more time and energy on this very specialized project than any of us. In fact, some former commentators almost have a “conflict of interest” in reviewing Harris' work, since so many of us have benefited at various points in our research from Harris' personal support and criticism. But in academics, as in life, mentors cannot always be assured of loyalty.
Philosophy, Religion, and the End of Hegel
Authors: Walker John
Published: August 2016

I want to begin with two of Hegel's endings, one well known, the other less so. First, some words from the closing paragraphs of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy:

A new epoch has arisen in the world. It seems as if the world spirit has succeeded in casting off everything in objective reality which is alien to itself, in order to comprehend itself as absolute spirit: to produce its own objective world from itself and to keep that world serenely in its own power. The struggle of the finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness, which once appeared as an alien reality, is now coming to an end. The finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite; and, by the same token, the absolute self-consciousness has achieved the reality which it formerly lacked. The whole of world history and especially the history of philosophy is the representation of this conflict. History now seems to have achieved its goal, when the absolute self-consciousness is no longer something alien; when the spirit is real as spirit. For spirit is this only when it knows itself to be absolute spirit; and this it knows in speculative science (Wissemchaft).
The Relationship between Religion and State in Hegel's Thought
Authors: Moked Oran
Published: August 2016

To say that Hegel's position on the relationship between religion and state is not easy to categorise would be a vast understatement. Eluding comfortable labels, his ideas on the subject diverge from historically prevalent conceptions, which together are often thought to be exhaustive. On the one hand, Hegel's position contrasts sharply with theocratic doctrines that propose a simple identity of political and religious institutions, or subjugate the former to the latter. Almost equally distant from Hegel's position, however, are liberal and Enlightenment views that urge the complete separation of religion from secular authority and mundane politics.

This tension is characteristic of many of Hegel's writings on the subject, from the earliest to die most mature. On numerous occasions, Hegel voices his vehement opposition to the notion of a radical split between religion and the ‘ethical’ (sittlich) institutions of political power. In an early fragment from 1798 he writes, ‘if the principle of the state is a complete totality, then church and state cannot possibly be unrelated’, and similar sentiments are voiced in many other writings, including Hegel's very last lectures on the Philosophy of Religion from 1831. Yet, at other junctures he contends, rather, that only ‘in despotism church and state are one’. Of all Hegel's extended discussions of the subject, one — in the Remark and Addition to §270 of the Philosophy of Right — lays emphasis on the cleft between church and state; others — in §552 of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Third Edition), the aforementioned 1831 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and the final sections of the Philosophy of History — seem, on the contrary, to stress the essential and eventual unity of religious and political life. To reconcile such seemingly contradictory views within a coherent position (even a dialectically coherent one) and salvage Hegel's position from the muddle of apparent contradictions and oblique formulations is therefore a challenge.
Is Hegel a Retributivist?
Authors: Brooks Thom
Published: August 2016

Amongst contemporary theorists, the most widespread interpretation of Hegel's theory of punishment is that it is a retributivist theory of annulment, where punishments cancel the performance of crimes. The theory is retributivist insofar as the criminal punished must be demonstrated to be deserving of a punishment that is commensurable in value only to the nature of his crime, rather than to any consequentialist considerations. As Antony Duff says:

[retributivism] justifies punishment in terms not of its contingently beneficial effects but of its intrinsic justice as a response to crime; the justificatory relationship holds between present punishment and past crime, not between present punishment and future effects.

Punishment is given only to persons responsible for committing crime. In addition, the degree of punishment is set in proportion to the relative badness of the precipitating crime. Thus, retributivism can be understood as an individualistic theory because the only relevant factors pertain solely to the individual criminal himself.

The general attraction of Hegel's version of retributivism is that the punishments his theory is thought to endorse are commensurable in value with precipitating crimes, in contrast to the strict equivalence required by Kant's theory of punishment. As a result, Hegel's theory is praised both for being more acceptable to modern readers than Kant's so-called ‘pure retributivism’, as well as for being an ‘emphatically anti-utilitarian’ theory. Despite widespread agreement on these general features, it is hotly contested how exactly we are to understand the way in which punishment cancels crimes, and Hegel's difficult style has only served to make the controversy deeper. For example, Ted Honderich says: ‘A punishment is an annulment, a cancellation or a return to a previous state of affairs … All this, of course, is obscure. It is by Hegel’.
Glasnostalgia
Authors: Llewelyn John
Published: August 2016

On the first page of Glas Derrida writes in the left column that “This” is a legend, not a fable. “This” could be that or this pronoun. It could be Hegel's signature, Sa signature referred to a few lines earlier, Hegel's corpus, also referred to earlier, what Derrida is in the course of writing, and much else. Not Hegel's whole corpus, however, but two passages: the religion of flowers and the phallic column of India. On each page there are two columns. The right column has to do especially with Jean Genet, especially with Genet's writing about flowers, especially the flower of the broom, genêt; but genêt is also a common noun for a kind of Spanish horse. In other words, the religion of flowers and its role as an introduction to the religion of animals are in play also in the right column. And just as the right column plays on the possibilities of taking a mark as a proper and a common name, so too does the left column, for example on the chances of hearing the name of the eagle in the name of the philosopher when these names are pronounced à la française. So pronunciation has an important part in this. But reading has an important part in pronunciation, legein in logos. The fable thought of as pure thought without mark, immaculate conception, is at stake in Glas. “Glas” means the voice that speaks, as “fable” is from fari, to speak. So is the reader about to discover in Glas something that sticks in the throat of the Hegelian system, resisting digestion there, a materialism of the idea that resists Aufhebung to absolute knowledge? Or is Derrida lifted thither in the eagle's talons? For does not the dialectic thrive on resistance? Would it not be a bad reading of Hegel's text that failed to comprehend this? But

What would it mean not to comprehend (Hegel) the text Sa ? If it is a matter of a finite failure, the failure is in advance included, comprehended in the text. If it is a matter of an infinite fault or lack, one would have to say that Sa does not think itself, does not say itself, does not write itself, does not read itself, does not know itself, which no longer means anything, by definition. Sa always ends by being full, heavy, pregnant with itself.
Hegel and the End of History
Authors: Bubner Rüdiger
Published: August 2016

In what follows Hegel's philosophy of history as the zenith in historical thinking will be considered from three perspectives.

I I will begin by discussing the two major reactions among Hegel's nineteenth century successors to the problem of historical finality.

II Then I will go back to Hegel himself in order the analyze the speculative claims of his system with regard to historical time.

III And finally, I will clarify the role played by those formal structures in historical reflexion which continue to fuel the controversy over what Hegel meant by the end of history.
The Comedy of Hegel and the Trauerspiel of Modern Philosophy
Authors: Rose Gillian
Published: August 2016

The general ground for comedy is therefore a world in which man as subject or person has made himself completely master of everything that counts to him otherwise than the essential content of what he wills and accomplishes, a world whose purposes are therefore destroyed because of their unsubstantiality. Nothing can be done, for example, to help a democratic nation where the citizens are self-seeking, quarrelsome, frivolous, bumptious, without faith or knowledge, garrulous, boastful and ineffectual: such a nation destroys itself by its own folly.

Hegel is keen to distinguish the merely laughable from the comical in the sequel to this passage from page one thousand, one hundred and ninety-nine of the English translation of his Aesthetics. We may laugh at any contrast between subjective caprice and insubstantial action, while vice and evil are not in themselves comic: “There is also the laughter of derision, scorn, despair, etc. On the other hand, the comical as such implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised altogether above his own inner contradiction and not bitter or miserable in it at all; this is the bliss and ease of a man who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustrations of his aims and achievements.” (Is this condition of serenity, I wonder, attained by effort or by grace?) In comedy, “the ruling principle is the contingency and caprice of subjective life” whose nullity and self-destructive folly displays the abused actuality of substantial life. The aberration of the passions that rage in the human heart are drawn from “the aberrations of the democracy out of which the old faith and morals have vanished” (as Hegel describes Aristophanes's comedies). While in tragedy the powers which oppose each other as pathos in individuals are hostile, in comedy, “they are revealed directly as inwardly self-dissolving.” Comedy, as much as tragedy, is always divine comedy, “the Divine here in its community, as the substance and aim of human individuality, brought into existence as something concrete, summoned into action and put in movement.”
Coleridge's “ideal Realism”: an alternative to the “doctors of the Absolute”?
Authors: Perkins Mary Anne
Published: August 2016

A few months ago I read Peter Nicholson's The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists for the first time. In the index I found more than a hundred references to Hegel and only one to Samuel Taylor Coleridge. However, as many of the latter's writings, published for the first time in recent years, become generally accessible there is an increasing sense that he has been unfairly deprived of his due status as a philosopher. This is partly, no doubt, the syndrome of the prophet in his own country and partly the inevitable consequence of much of his later work remaining unpublished until recent years. Coleridge himself, with what some would take to be confirmation of an over-sensitivity to criticism, felt the neglect of his work went deeper and betrayed an anti-philosophical trait in British character.

Despite his close reading of the work of many of his German contemporaries it seems that he did not read more than sixtyone pages of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. His margin notes to this work are, on the whole, negative in their criticism. However, despite significant disagreements, there is much common ground in theme, argument and conclusion between his many drafts of the ‘Logosophia’, his intended magnum opus, and Hegel's system.
Kant, Hegel, and the Transcendental Material Conditions of Possible Experience
Authors: Westphal Kenneth R
Published: August 2016

For both methodological and substantive reasons Hegel owes us a thorough internal critique of Kant's transcendental idealism. He did not, however, set one out. I have become convinced, however, that Hegel's reading and re-thinking of Kant during his years in Jena is far more thorough and insightful than has generally been recognized, and that he was clearly aware of some very important main lines of internal criticism to which Kant's philosophy is subject.

Here I want to develop one case of an obliquely indicated but nevertheless sound objection Hegel makes to Kant's transcendental idealism. The issue concerns what Kant calls the “transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition.” This phrase denotes the necessary degree of regularity among the content of empirical intuitions such that we are both able and stimulated to comprehend that content under our general concepts and categories in empirical judgments. Kant is quite clear that this is a transcendental condition for the possibility of experience. It is also a formal condition, since it concerns the ordering of something, in this case, of the contents of empirical intuitions. Kant contends that transcendental idealism, and it alone, can account for the transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition. Against Kant, I shall contend that transcendental idealism cannot account at all for the occurrence of the transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition. Before turning to some of the details of Kant's views, I shall show that this problem is very much on Hegel's mind in Jena. Afterward I shall show that understanding Hegel's concern about Kant's views on the transcendental affinity of the manifold of intuition sheds light on some of Hegel's otherwise rather puzzling claims and aims.
Hegel Writes the Propaedeutic
Authors: Rauch Leo
Published: August 2016

What is remarkable about Hegel's creative activity (in the period 1808-12) is the diversity of its contrasts: his thinking and writing of The Science of Logic was going on while he was caught up in the daily tasks of newspaper editorship and then of school-teaching and administration. The contrast is enhanced if we include his Philosophical Propaedeutic here, and place it against The Science of Logic. (We can regard them as having been written almost simultaneously.) The latter book is intended for the learned specialist, and is concerned with elucidating the ultimate structure of reality in the most abstract terms. As a work of philosophy it is technical to an extreme; it is his most recondite work, making no concessions to the difficulties a reader might encounter. The Philosophical Propaedeutic, on the other hand, is intended for the student at secondary school and junior college, and is concerned in part with the concrete social values embedded in social morality and religion. As a work, it is entirely accessible and “open”, and it represents Hegel's attempt to lead his students from their view of the immediate social reality up to an all-encompassing world-vision. (There is a further contrast in the fact that it was not written as a book at all, but as a series of lecture-notes, and was put together as a book by Karl Rosenkranz, nine years after Hegel's death.)

Obviously it was because there was no university post for him that he accepted the position of Rector and Professor of Philosophy at the Aegidien Gymnasium in Nuremberg, in 1808. Yet his acceptance was not accompanied by the attitude of faute de mieux -- as though “the speculative Pegasus were being harnessed to the wagon of schoolwork.”
Language, Thought and Writing: Hegel after Deconstruction and the Linguistic Turn
Authors: Brockmeier Jens
Published: August 2016

“One of the most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher is, oddly enough, that we think with our heads, or in our heads.” Wittgenstein

… aber wir sprechen das Allgemeine aus;” Hegel

“Hegel is the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing.” Derrida

“Linguistic turn”, “pragmatic paradigm”, “Destruktion”, “deconstruction”, “condition postmoderne”, “pensiero debole” are not only philosophical labels. They are not only indices of intellectual positions which have inscribed themselves, as consequences as well as preconditions, in the end of traditional metaphysics. “Nothing is true, everything is permitted”, Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals announces, describing the empty space which the metaphysical concepts have left; and in doing so opening up a seemingly boundless dimension for new developments of thoughts. The dilemma of these developments of modernity is that the vacuum they left, caused by their ruthless critique, cannot be refilled. So the outlook of modernity remains necessarily heterogeneous and unstable, meandering towards the colourful and fashionable-macabre extremes of postmodemity which gain from the tragic certainty of rien ne va plus the happy imperative of anything goes. But these are also ciphers of a particular philosophical-historical constellation, a work situation, in which the potencies of reason, being verhimmelt for a long time, now are going to be situated into their real contexts. Only, as Habermas puts it, “under the premises of an unexcited postmetaphysical thinking”, the once heroic concept of theory, which was meant to explain the world of human beings and their history as well as Nature out of onto-theleological principles of rationality, falls to pieces.
Reply
Authors: Wood Allen W
Published: August 2016

It is not surprising that a book entitled Hegel's Ethical Thought (hereafter, “HET”) should attract the attention of Hegelians. But I hope the Hegelians who read HET will forgive me for the fact that they were not its intended audience. My principal aim in the book was to contribute to contemporary discussions of the history of ethics and ethical theory by showing the direct relevance of Hegel's thought to issues that still interest moral philosophers.

This aim does not presuppose (as Pinkard would have it) that philosophy consists of a “menu” of positions from which we are to choose arbitrarily. On the other hand, you can't expect a hearing from an audience of non-Hegelians if you arrogantly assume beforehand that Hegel's philosophy encompasses what is true in all others. (HET does include some attempts to argue that Hegel's ethical theory has such advantages, especially over eudaimonistic and Kantian theories. See HET, Chapter 3, §§ 7-8 and Chapters 8-9.) Hegel's thought is now taken more seriously among English speaking philosophers than at any time during my life, but a major obstacle to this welcome change has been the narrowminded sectarian arrogance often found among his admirers.

The same aim also dictated that I not read Hegel's ethical thought so as to make it dependent on his speculative logic. Here Hegelians must descend from the mists of speculation long enough to face up to some cold, hard facts. First, there is no generally accepted interpretation even of what Hegelian logic is about, not to mention matters of finer detail. Second, on no interpretation does Hegelian speculative logic have any credibility at all for philosophers today.
T.M. Knox: His Life and Scholarship
Authors: Pelczynski Zbigniew
Published: August 2016

For reasons of space only the first half of the article on T.M. Knox appears in this issue, of the Bulletin. The second half, dealing with his translating activities and Hegelian scholarship, will appear in the Spring/Summer 1901 issue.

The author wishes to thank warmly Mr. Andrew M. Knox and the many contemporaries, friends and colleagues of T.M. Knox for the valuable information they have kindly given him. He is also much obliged to Mr. Robert Smart, the Keeper of the Muniments at St. Andrews University Library, for his unfailing help in consulting the Knox papers in the Library, and for the kind loan of material for the Knox exhibition in September 1980. Mr. Andrew Knox's loan of his brother's photographs for the exhibition was also much appreciated. Thanks are due to Pembroke College, Oxford for a research qrant towards preparing this study.
T.M. Knox: His Life and Scholarship, Part II
Authors: Pelczynski Z.A.
Published: August 2016

There is no precise record when and why T.M. Knox decided to translate Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts. In the corpus of the writings of the British Idealists (with which Knox was familiar) the work had not featured very much. Although the Idealists developed a distinct social philosophy based on Hegel's thought they drew their inspiration from his fundamental meta-physical and religious ideas rather than directly from Hegel's most important philosophical work dealing with social reality. According to his correspondence he discussed publication of a translation with a representative of the London firm of Methuen in 1935 so he must have started work soon after returning to Oxford. Whenever it was, the translation only flourished in the mare tranquil atmosphere of St. Andrews. On 16 April 1938 Knox wrote to the Clarendon Press - the academic branch of the Oxford University Press - offering them the translation almost ready for publication. He justified it by the need to make Hegel's work accessible to English readers, especially undergraduates, at a time when there were signs of a revival of interest in Hegel's thought (he mentioned Sidney Hook's and M.B. Foster's recent books in this connection), and when ignorance and prejudice clouded people's judgement. Knox pointed out that the only complete English translation of the work by the Canadian professor S.W. Dyde (1896) was defective, without notes and long out of print. The response of the Clarendon Press was somewhat lukewarm. There was doubt whether the work merited retranslation and whether there was really a market for it.