bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Modeling a paranoid mind
Authors: Colby Kenneth Mark
Published: February 2010

Algorithmic model building in artificial intelligence provides a contemporary method for explaining certain kinds of human behavior. The paranoid mode of thought and action represents a kind of pathological behavior that has been well recognized for over twenty centuries. This article describes a computer simulation model embodying a theory that attempts to explain the paranoid mode of behavior in terms of strategies for minimizing and forestalling shame-induced distress. The model consists of two parts, a parsing module and an interpretation-action module. To bring the model into contact with the conditions of a psychiatric diagnostic interview, the parsing module attempts to understand the interview input of clinicians communicating in unrestricted natural language. The meaning of the input is passed to an interpretation-action module made up of data structures and production rules that size up the current state of the interview and decide which (linguistic) actions to perform in order to fulfill the model's intentions. This module consists of an object system which deals with interview situations and a metasystem which evaluates how well the object system is performing to attain its ends. The fidelity of the simulation has been tested using Turing-like indistinguishability tests in which clinical judges attempt to distinguish the paranoid model-patient from an actual paranoid patient. Since clinicians are unable to make the relevant distinctions, the simulation is considered successful at the input-output level of functional equivalence. Issues of underlying structural equivalence and the nature of generative pattern explanations are discussed in the light of the model's potential value in guiding clinicial decisions and intervention strategies in paranoid disorders.
Bait in arms: what happens when the wind blows?
Authors: Oscar-Berman Marlene
Published: February 2010

In the BBS multiple book review of Donald Symons, The Evolution of Human Sexuality, BBS 3(2), 1980 the full reference was inadvertently omitted: Symons, D. 1979. The Evolution of Human Sexuality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Possible mechanisms for a multiple-level model of evolution
Authors: Plotkin H. C. , Odling F. J.
Published: February 2010

Many of the commentaries cohere around two major points of criticism. The first is that we have omitted discussion of the mechanisms that are assumed to operate at levels 2, 3, and 4.Campbell, Cloak, Dewsbury, Eckberg, Mundinger, Pulliam, Richerson & Boyd, Slobodkin, Simon, Williams, andWahlstenall make comments that bear on this point. The second point is that we have omitted discussion of the fact that "organisms change the environment by their activities" (Lewontin) and thereby modify the selection pressures that act on them. Apart from Lewontin, this point has been raised in different forms byBarkow, Chase, Hull, Perzigian, Ruyle, and less directly bySlobodkin. Stemming from these two basic omissions there is a third general criticism. Numerous commentators have pointed out that we have failed to discuss sufficiently either the extent or nature of the constraints that may or may not be operating on supraordinate evolutionary processes as a function of their nested relationships to subordinate evolutionary processes within our scheme (Barkow, Campbell, Cloak, Chase, Lenington, Lewontin, Perzigian, Peterson, Pulliam, Richerson & Boyd, Simon, Slobodkin, andWilliams). We start by acknowledging these three basic omissions. We agree that they exist and that they are serious.
Taxa, life, and thinking
Authors: Ghiselin Michael T.
Published: February 2010

He who understands baboon

would do more toward metaphysics than Locke.

Charles Darwin, August 16, 1838

I shall answer the commentaries by proceeding from strictly philosophical matters to biology, to psychology, and then to politics and the social sciences.
The impending demise of the icon: A critique of the concept of iconic storage in visual information processing
Authors: Haber Ralph Norman
Published: February 2010

Without disputing the experimental evidence that subjects have available most of the content of brief displays for a fraction of a second, or that visual stimuli Persist after their physical termination for a similar time, I argue that this evidence is irrelevant to perception. Specifically, the notion of an icon as a brief storage of information persisting after stimulus termination cannot possibly be useful in any typical visual information-processing task except reading in a lightning storm. Since the visual world that provides the stimuli for perception is continuous and not chopped up by tachistoscopes, and since our eyes and heads are rarely motionless, no realistic circumstances exist in which having a frozen iconic storage of information could be helpful. Rather, the presence of such an icon interferes with perception. This paper examines instances of normal perception, and then reviews experimental evidence on temporal integration, saccadic suppression, masking, and the photoreceptor basis of visual persistence, to further demonstrate that a storage of excitation cannot be a useful device for storing information. Finally, I note that little would have to be changed in our theories of visual perception or information processing if we simply forgot all about the icon and iconic memory as an early stage of processing.
On the function of muscle and reflex partitioning
Authors: Windhorst Uwe , Hamm Thomas M. , Stuart Douglas G.
Published: February 2010

Studies have shown that in the mammalian neuromuscular system stretch reflexes are localized within individual muscles. Neuromuscular compartmentalization, the partitioning of sensory output from muscles, and the partitioning of segmental pathways to motor nuclei have also been demonstrated. This evidence indicates that individual motor nuclei and the muscles they innervate are not homogeneous functional units. An analysis of the functional significance of reflex localization and partitioning suggests that segmental control mechanisms are based on subdivisions of motor nuclei–muscle complexes. A partitioned organization of segmental control mechanisms could utilize (1) the potential functional diversity of muscle fiber types, (2) the variety of mechanical actions of individual muscles arising from their distributed origins and insertions, and (3) diverse architectural features such as intramuscular variations in pinnation and complex in-series and in-parallel arrangements of muscle fibers. The differentiated activity observed in some muscles during natural movements also calls for localized segmental control mechanisms. Partitioning may also play a role in mechanical interactions between contracting motor units and in increasing the stability of neuromuscular systems. The functional advantages of reflex localization and partitioning suggest they are probably common features of segmental systems, whose organization reflects the structure and function of their associated neuromuscular systems.
Multiple Book Review ofSpeech perception by ear and eye: A paradigm for psychological inquiry
Authors: Massaro Dominic W.
Published: February 2010

This book is about the processing of information in face-to-face communication when a speaker makes both audible and visible information available to a perceiver. Both auditory and visual sources of information are evaluated and integrated to achieve speech perception. The evaluation of the information source provides information about the strength of alternative interpretations, rather than just all-or-none categorical information, as claimed by “categorical perception” theory. Information sources are evaluated independently; the integration process insures that the least ambiguous sources have the most influences on the judgment. Similar processes occur in a variety of other behaviors, ranging from personality judgments and categorization to sentence interpretation and decision making. The experimental results are consistent with a fuzzy logical model of perception, positing three operations in perceptual (primary) recognition: feature evaluation, feature integration, and pattern classification. Continuously valued features are first evaluated, then integrated and matched against prototype descriptions in memory; finally, an identification decision is made on the basis of the relative goodness-of-match of the stimulus information with the relevant prototype descriptions.
The Maltese cross: A new simplistic model for memory
Authors: Broadbent Donald E.
Published: February 2010

This paper puts forward a general framework for thought about human information processing. It is intended to avoid some of the problems of pipeline or stage models of function. At the same time it avoids the snare of supposing a welter of indefinitely many separate processes. The approach is not particularly original, but rather represents the common elements or presuppositions in a number of modern theories. These presuppositions are not usually explicit, however, and making them so reduces the danger of slipping back into earlier modes of thought.

The key point is to distinguish between persisting representations and the processes that translate one representation into another. Various classes or groups of persisting representations can be distinguished by the experimental treatments that interfere with them. In particular, there now seem to be several kinds of short-term or temporary storage, different from each other as well as from longterm memory; the translating processes also have several different modes or kinds. A particularly important aspect of the current position is that a model of this general type no longer requires some external agent to direct and control long sequences of behaviour.
Game theory and the evolution of behaviour
Authors: Smith J. Maynard
Published: February 2010

Evolutionary game theory is a method of analysing the evolution of phenotypes (including types of behaviour) when the fitness of a particular phenotype depends onits frequency in the population. It was first applied to pairwise contests between animals. Such contests usually have some associated asymmetry, in size, prior residence, or age or sex status; the theory predicts that the asymmetry will be used as a cue to settlethe contest, and this is found to be the case. The theory can also be applied when individuals are competing against the population as a whole, or some part of it. In such cases, the evolution of variable behaviour - so-called mixed strategies - is predicted; actual examples of this are given. Game theory can be applied to the evolution of cooperative as well as of antagonistic behaviour. An analysis of the evolution of learning leads to testable predictions about learning behaviour.
What Are the Scope and Limits of Radical Behaviorist Theory?
Authors: Harnad Stevan
Published: February 2010

The following is an attempt to make explicit some of the questions to which commentators appear to have furnished default answers of their own, answers that have perhaps given rise to certain misunderstandings. It is hoped that in this explicit form the questions will allow Professor Skinner's position to be equally explicitly formulated. (Please note that there is some overlap with Professor Catania's questions 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 10.)
Moving forward on cultural learning
Authors: Lillard Angelina S.
Published: February 2010

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner make the very interesting and valid point that the transmission of culture must depend on understanding others' minds. Culture is shared among a people and is passed on to progeny. The sharing of culture implies that the purpose of (and therefore the meaning behind) any given cultural element (behavioral tradition, word, or artifact) is understood. Because meaning or purpose emanates from minds, something about others' minds must be understood in order to truly learn some element of a culture. It thus makes sense that cultural learning should depend on social-cognitive skills. But what exactly is cultural learning?

There are two rival interpretations of the term cultural learning. In the first, one would define a given type of cultural learning by the type of social-cognitive skill it entails. For example, imitative learning would be defined as any learning of a cultural element in which another's goals or intentions are taken into account. This definition of cultural learning, however, would force Tomasello et al.'s argument into a circle: Imitative learning relies on this social-cognitive skill because imitative learning is defined as learning that relies on this social-cognitive skill. Such a circular definition does not do their argument justice.
Cultural learning and educational process
Authors: Olson David R. , Astington Janet Wilde
Published: February 2010

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner relate the evolution of social cognition – the understanding of others' minds – to the evolution of culture. Tomasello et al. conceive of the accumulation of culture as the product of cultural learning, a kind of learning dependent upon recognizing others' intentionality. They distinguish three levels of this recognition: of intention (what isxtrying to do), of beliefs (what doesxthink aboutp), and of beliefs about beliefs (what doesxthinkythinks aboutp). They then tie these levels to three discrete forms of cultural learning – imitative, instructed, and collaborative – which children become capable of when they are 9 months, 4 years, and 6 years old respectively, at least in Western culture where relevant data are available.
Précis ofOrigins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition
Authors: Donald Merlin
Published: February 2010

This book proposes a theory of human cognitive evolution, drawing from paleontology, linguistics, anthropology, cognitive science, and especially neuropsychology. The properties of humankind's brain, culture, and cognition have coevolved in a tight iterative loop; the main event in human evolution has occurred at the cognitive level, however, mediating change at the anatomical and cultural levels. During the past two million years humans have passed through three major cognitive transitions, each of which has left the human mind with a new way of representing reality and a new form of culture. Modern humans consequently have three systems of memory representation that were not available to our closest primate relatives: mimetic skill, language, and external symbols. These three systems are supported by new types of “hard” storage devices, two of which (mimetic and linguistic) are biological, one technological. Full symbolic literacy consists of a complex of skills for interacting with the external memory system. The independence of these three uniquely human ways of representing knowledge is suggested in the way the mind breaks down after brain injury and confirmed by various other lines of evidence. Each of the three systems is based on aninventivecapacity, and the products of those capacities – such as languages, symbols, gestures, social rituals, and images – continue to be invented and vetted in the social arena. Cognitive evolution is not yet complete: the externalization of memory has altered the actual memory architecture within which humans think. This is changing the role of biological memory and the way in which the human brain deploys its resources; it is also changing the form of modern culture.
Neuronal death of the cancellation theory?
Authors: Prablanc Claude
Published: February 2010

The question of how the brain can construct a stable representation of the external world despite eye movements is a very old one. If there have been some wrong statements of problems (such as the inverted retinal image), other statements are less naive and have led to analytic solutions possibly adopted by the brain to counteract the spurious effects of eye movements. Following the MacKay (1973) objections to the analytic view of perceptual stability, Bridgeman et al. claim that the idea that signals canceling the effects of saccadic eye movements are needed is also a misconception, as is the claim that stability and position encoding are two distinct problems. It must be remembered, however, that what made the theory of “cancellation” formulated by von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) so appealing was the clinical observation of perceptual instability following ocular paralysis. Following the concept of corollary discharge, the theory of efference copy had the advantage of simultaneously solving three problems: the stability of the visual world during the saccade, the same visual stability across saccades, and the visual constancy problem of allowing the subject to know where an object in space is.
Repairing the brain: Trophic factor or transplant?
Authors: Bond Nigel W.
Published: February 2010

Three experiments on neural grafting with adult rat hosts are described. Working memory impairments were produced by lesioning the hippocampus or severing its connections with the septum by ablating the fimbria-fornix. The results suggest that the survival and growth of a neural graft, whether an autograft or a xenograft, is not a necessary condition for functional recovery on a task tapping working memory.
The structure, operation, and functionality of intracerebral grafts
Authors: Cassel Jean-Christophe , Will Bruno
Published: February 2010

The concept of structure, operation, and functionality, as they may be understood by clinicians or researchers using neural transplantation techniques, are briefly defined. Following Stein & Glasier, we emphasize that the question of whether an intracerebral graft is really functional should be addressed not only in terms of what such a graft does in a given brain structure, but also in terms of what it does at the level of the organism.
CNS transplant utility may surive even their hasty clinical application
Authors: Nieto-Sampedro Manuel
Published: February 2010

Neural cell transplants have been introduced in clinical practice during the last decade with mixed results, encouraged by success with simple animal models. This commentary is a reminder that although the ideas and techniques of transplantation appear simple, the variables involved in host-transplant integration still require further study. The field may benefit from a concerted, multidisciplinary approach.
Studying restoration of brain function with fetal tissue grafts: Optimal models
Authors: Silver Rae , LeSauter Joseph
Published: February 2010

We concur that basic research on the use of CNS grafts is needed. Two important model systems for functional studies of grafts are ignored by Stein & Glasier. In the first, reproductive function is restored in hypogonadal mice by transplantation of GnRH-synthesizing neurons. In the second, circadian rhythmicity is restored by transplantation of the suprachiasmatic nucleus.
Difficulties inherent in the restoration of dynamically reactive brain systems
Authors: Stanfield Brent B.
Published: February 2010

The responses displayed by an injured or diseased nervous system are complex. Some of the responses may effect a functional reorganization of the affected neural circuitry. Strategies aimed at the restoration of function, whether or not these involve transplantation, need to recognize the innate reactive capacity of the nervous system to damage. More successful strategies will probably incorporate, rather than ignore, the adaptive responses of the compromised neural systems.
Self-control: Beyond commitment
Authors: Rachlin Howard
Published: February 2010

Self-control, so important in the theory and practice of psychology, has usually been understood introspectively. This target article adopts a behavioral view of the self (as an abstract class of behavioral actions) and of self-control (as an abstract behavioral pattern dominating a particular act) according to which the development of self-control is a molar/molecular conflict in the development of behavioral patterns. This subsumes the more typical view of self-control as a now/later conflict in which an act of self-control is a choice of a larger but later reinforcer over a smaller but sooner reinforcer. If at some future time the smaller-sooner reinforcer will be more valuable than the larger-later reinforcer, self-control may be achieved through a commitment to the largerlater reinforcer prior to that point. According to some, there is a progressive internalization of commitment in the development of self-control. This presents theoretical and empirical problems. In two experiments – one with pigeons choosing between smallersooner and larger-later reinforcers, the other with adult humans choosing between short-term particular and long-term abstract reinforcers – temporal patterning of choices increased self-control.
Patterns yes, agency no
Authors: Baum William M.
Published: February 2010

Contrary to his own perspective, Rachlin introduces a ghostly inner cost to explain the persistence of behavioral patterns and agency to explain their origins. Both inconsistencies can be set straight by taking account of history and a context larger than the pattern itself. Persistence is explained by stimulus control, if one assumes that defection from a pattern has stimulus properties and is punished. The origins of patterns are understood as an outcome of selection in the larger context of cultural or biological evolution.
Internal commitment and efficient habit formation
Authors: Frank Robert H.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin's attack on the internal commitment model rests on the demonstrably false claim that self-punishment does not exist. He is correct that habits are an effective device for solving self-control problems, but his additional claim that they are the only such device makes it hard to explain how good habits develop in the first place. Someone with a self-control problem would always choose the spuriously attractive reward, which, over time, would create bad habits.
Choice between long- and short-term interests: Beyond self-control
Authors: Green Leonard , Myerson Joel
Published: February 2010

In the real world, there are choices between large, delayed, punctate rewards and small, more immediate rewards as well as choices between patterns and acts. A common element in these situations is the choice between long- and short-term interests. Key issues for future research appear to be how acts are restructured into larger patterns of behavior, and whether, as Rachlin implies, pattern perception is the cause of pattern generation.
The extended psychological present
Authors: Hineline Philip N.
Published: February 2010

Portraying psychological process as extended over time in multiply overlapping scales is a conceptual advance that can be understood as analogous to our understanding of spatial relationships. There may be a residual contradiction, however, when Rachlin invokes “cost” in ways that seem to imply earlier conceptions. The roles of superimposed or conditionally related stimuli also remain to be addressed.
My behavior made me do it: The uncaused cause of teleological behaviorism
Authors: Hughes Jordan , Churchland Patricia S.
Published: February 2010

Toward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength.
Teleological behaviorism and the intentional scheme
Authors: Lacey Hugh
Published: February 2010

Teleological behaviorism, unlike Skinnerian behaviorism, recognizes that “mental terms’ are needed to account adequately for human behavior, but it rejects the essential role in behavioral explanations of the subjective perspective of the agent. I argue that teleological behaviorism fails because of this rejection.
Form, function, and self-control
Authors: Logue A. W.
Published: February 2010

The target article's definition of self-control as a highly valued behavior pattern containing a less preferred element is consistent with other functionalist explanations of behavior. This definition falls within the more traditional definition of self-control as the choice of a larger, more delayed reinforcer over a smaller, less delayed reinforcer, and can provide new insights concerning our understanding of self-control.
Overcoming addiction through abstract patterns
Authors: Mosterin Jesus
Published: February 2010

You cannot overcome addiction or impulsiveness through abstract patterns alone. They show you the way to go, but do not fuel the effort. Some further variable is needed in the equation, some internal force or motivational mechanism, whatever its nature. Overlooking this leads to a neo-Socratic exaggeration of the role of cognition in selfcontrol.
The behavior of self-control
Authors: Plaud Joseph J.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin's view of self-control as a sequence or chain of behaviors is contrasted with traditional behavioral analyses of self-control which emphasize a simplistic interpretation of the hyperbolic function relating small-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) reinforcers to specific behaviors. The validity of Rachlin's teleological analysis is examined in relation to the acquisition and steady-state performance of self-control behaviors. Central to an analysis of self-control is the functional difference between behavior under the control of SS and LL reinforcers, because SS-reinforced behavior is more complex due to temporal parameters.
Why self-control is both difficult and difficult to explicate
Authors: Premack David , Premack Ann James
Published: February 2010

The present intractability of “self” and near intractability of “decision” make self-control a difficult topic.
Self-control: Acts of free will
Authors: Schirillo James A.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin overlooks that free will determineswhenand inwhatdirection acts that appear impulsive will occur. Because behavioral patterns continuously evolve, animals are not guaranteed when they will, or how to, maximize larger-later reinforcements. An animal therefore uses self-control to emit free acts to vary behavioral patterns to optimize larger-later rewards.
Distinguishing between acts and patterns
Authors: Shimoff Eliot
Published: February 2010

The costliness of disrupting a pattern may not be a useful criterion for distinguishing between acts and patterns; there are instances in which omitted components of patterns are hard to detect (e.g., typographical errors), or in which distortions are easily introduced (e.g., slurred words in a trite phrase). Are there behavioral criteria for distinguishing between acts and patterns?
Alternatives to radical behaviorism
Authors: Smith Terry L.
Published: February 2010

Operant psychologists are looking for alternatives to radical behaviorism. Rachlin offers teleological behaviorism, but it may pose as many difficulties as radical behaviorism. There is, however, a less drastic way to defend Rachlin's thesis of “order in the relationship between organisms and environment.” It portrays operant principles as relating distal efficient causes to behavioral effects.
Further choices for molar theory
Authors: Tonneau François
Published: February 2010

The target article extends molar behaviorism in two positive ways: beyond average aggregates and beyond restricted laws of “conditioning.” Although a molar framework based on purely overt events shows promise for advancing behavior theory, Rachlin's specific form of teleological behaviorism is in need of clarification.
Pattern proliferation in teleological behaviorism
Authors: Waller Bruce N.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin's teleological behaviorist account shows promise for extending our behavioral understanding of many aspects of self-control, particularly when self-control involves controlling behavior through larger behavioral patterns. However, it may face special challenges in dealing with instances of self-control that involve pattern breaking.
Brains evolution and neurolinguistic preconditions
Authors: Wilkins Wendy K. , Wakefield Jennie
Published: February 2010

This target article presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the emergence of the neural preconditions for language in the hominid lineage. In pleistocene primate lineages there was a paired evolutionary expansion of frontal and parietal neocortex (through certain well-documented adaptive changes associated with manipulative behaviors) resulting, in ancestral hominids, in an incipient Broca's region and in a configurationally unique junction of the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes of the brain (the POT). On our view, the development of the POT in our ancestors resulted in the neuroanatomical substrate consistent with the ability for representations in modality-neutral association cortex and, as a result of structure-imposing interaction with Broca's area, the hierarchically structured “conceptual structure.” Evidence from paleoneurology and comparative primate neuroanatomy is used to argue thatHomo habilis(2.5–2 million years ago) was the first hominid to have the appropriate gross neuroanatomical configuration to support conceptual structure. We thus suggest that the neural preconditions for language are met inH. habilis. Finally, we advocate a theory of language acquisition that uses conceptual structure as input to the learning procedures, thus bridging the gap between it and language.
Lending a hand
Authors: Corballis Michael C.
Published: February 2010

The precise manner in which language serves its communicative function suggests that natural selection, rather than exaptation or reappropriation, played the major role in its evolution. Natural selection is more readily invoked, I suggest, if it is assumed that language originated as a system of manual gestures, and later switched to an oral mode.
A case for auditory temporal processing as an evolutionary precursor to speech processing and language function
Authors: Fitch Roslyn Holly , Tallal Paula
Published: February 2010

Wilkins & Wakefield suggest that changes in the hominid brain made it uniquely “preadaptive” for language, yet no precursor functions served as adaptive substrates to the emergence of language. We present contrary evidence that the ability to discriminate and process rapid and complex auditory information is a cross-species function subserving communication processes including, but not limited to, human speech perception. We suggest that auditory temporal processing served as an evolutionary precursor to speech processing and consequent language development in humans.
Human language: Are nonhuman precursors lacking?
Authors: Hauser Marc D. , Wolfea Nathan D.
Published: February 2010

Contra Wilkins & Wakefield, we argue that an evolutionarily inspired approach to language must consider different facets of language (i.e., more than syntax and semantics), and must explore the possibility of nonhuman precursors. Several examples are discussed, illustrating the power of the comparative approach in illuminating our understanding of language evolution.
Coming of age in Olduvai and the Zaire rain forest
Authors: Leiber Justin
Published: February 2010

ProbablyHomo habilisis two species not one; similarly for Pan troglodytes. Although amenable to training, in naturePan paniscusmay be a “specialized insular dwarf.” Language is uniquely human, but symbolic behavior and intelligence are widespread among animals with little respect for phylogenetic closeness toHomo sapiens.
The hominid tool-language connection: Some missing evolutionary links?
Authors: Maryanski A.
Published: February 2010

This commentary criticizes Wilkins & Wakefield's thesis that the neurological precursors of language provide a cognitive Rubicon to linguistically divide human from nonhuman primates. A causal model of their theory is presented, followed by a discussion of the relationship between brain expansion and tool use, Broca's area and the parietaloccipital-temporal junction (POT).
Conceptual structure and syntax
Authors: Newmeyer Frederick J.
Published: February 2010

The syntactic structures of natural languages reflect conceptual categories more directly than they reflect communicative categories. This fact supports the main premise of the target article, namely, that the most important event in language evolution was the development of a hierarchical conceptual structure.
Bartering old stone tools: When did communicative ability and conceptual structure begin to interact?
Authors: Walker Stephen F.
Published: February 2010

Wilkins & Wakefield are clearly right to separate linguistic capacity from communicative ability, if only because other animal species have one without the other. But I question the abruptness of the demarcation they make between a period when hominids evolved enriched conceptual representation for other reasons entirely, and a subsequent later stage when language use became an adaptation.
Issues and nonissues in the origins of language
Authors: Wilkins Wendy K. , Wakefield Jennie
Published: February 2010

This response clarifies the nature of reappropriation and the definition of language. It explicates the relationship between neural systems and language and between homology and evolutionary gradualism. Through a review of ape capacities in the realms of language and tool use, it distinguishes human language acquisition from nonhuman learning. Finally, it suggests the appropriate sorts of evidence on which to base further evolutionary arguments relevant to the origins of language.
Consciousness without conflation
Authors: Atkinson Anthony P. , Davies Martin
Published: February 2010

Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness
Authors: Bachmann Talis
Published: February 2010

Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.
Phenomenal fallacies and conflations
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: February 2010

A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.
On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind
Authors: Katz Leonard D.
Published: February 2010

One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?
Authors: Shepard Roger N.
Published: February 2010

If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things (other than myself) enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap
Authors: Tye Michael
Published: February 2010

It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
Consciousness is not a natural kind
Authors: van Brakel J.
Published: February 2010

Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness (and its “subspecies”) is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
Preparedness and phobias: Specific evolved associations or a generalized expectancy bias?
Authors: Davey Graham C. L.
Published: February 2010

Most phobias are focussed on a small number of fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders). A review of the evidence supporting biological and cognitive explanations of this uneven distribution of phobias suggests that the readiness with which such stimuli become associated with aversive outcomes arises from biases in the processing of information about threatening stimuli rather than from phylogenetically based associative predispositions or “biological preparedness.” This cognitive bias, consisting of a heightened expectation of aversive outcomes following fear-relevant stimuli, generates and maintains robust learned associations between them. Some of the features of such stimuli which determine this expectancy bias are estimates of how dangerous they are, the semiotic similarity between them and their aversive outcomes, and the degree of prior fear they elicit. Ontogenetic and cultural factors influence these features of fear-relevant stimuli and are hence important in determining expectancy bias. The available evidence does not exclude the possibility that both expectancy biases and specific evolved predispositions coexist, but the former can explain a number of important findings that the latter cannot.
Heredity × environment or developmental interactions?
Authors: Delprato Dennis J.
Published: February 2010

This commentary acknowledges the importance of Davey's biocognitive approach to the uneven distribution of fears on the basis of its contribution to a human model for understanding fear. An integrated heredity-environment and developmental transactional approach based on field/system theory is recommended in place of the mechanistic heredity × environment interactionism that Davey uses to explain behavioral ontogeny.
Rule-governed and contingency-governed fears
Authors: Fantino Edmund , Goldshmidt Jay
Published: February 2010

Behavioral research suggests that rule-governed behavior should be less sensitive to environmental changes and thus more resistant to extinction (disconfirmation) than contingency-governed behavior. The opposite is implied in Davey's discussion of ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to fear development. The generality of the behavioral findings and their apparent inconsistency with the present article should be further explored with more sensitive research paradigms.
Biologically primed acquisition of aversions and association of expected stimulus pairs: Two different forms of learning
Authors: Hamm Alfons
Published: February 2010

The present commentary emphasizes that the acquisition of fear always involves complex changes in several quasi-independent response systems. Stimulus-specific electrodermal response differentiation as well as the bias to overestimate the belongingness of certain stimulus pairs mainly indicates cognitive processes of selective orienting and attention. Emotion, however, also involves the activation of subcortical motivational circuits. Why certain stimuli acquire rapid access to these basic motivational systems is not explained by the expectancy bias model.
Enhanced processing of threatening stimuli: The case of face recognition
Authors: Mealey Linda
Published: February 2010

Because of their evolutionary importance, threat-detection mechanisms are likely to exist at a variety of levels. A recent study of face recognition suggests that novel stimuli receive enhanced processing when presented as fear-related. This suggests the existence of a complex, context-dependent threat-detection mechanism that can adaptively respond to spatiotemporally varying and unique environmental features.
Expectancy bias as sole or partial account of selective associations?
Authors: Mineka Susan , Cook Michael
Published: February 2010

Davey reviews evidence purporting to distinguish between two accounts of selective associations – expectancy bias and evolved predispositions, although these hypotheses largely apply to different levels of causal analysis. Criticisms of primate studies in which subjects lack prior exposure to stimuli seem uncompelling. Expectancies may sometimes serve as proximal mediators in selective associations, but other factors, both proximate and ultimate, are clearly also involved.
Natural selection and fear regulation mechanisms
Authors: Nesse Randolph M. , Abelson James L.
Published: February 2010

Expectations can facilitate rapid fear conditioning and this may explain some phenomena that have been attributed to preparedness. However, preparedness remains the best explanation for some aspects of clinical phobias and the difficulty of creating fears of modern dangers. Rapid fear conditioning based on expectancy is not an alternative to an evolutionary explanation, but has, like preparedness, been shaped by natural selection.
Responses conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli survive extinction of the expectancy of the UCS
Authors: Schell Anne M. , Dawson Michael E.
Published: February 2010

Davey suggests that increased resistance to extinction of CRs conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli may be due to more persistent expectancies of the UCS following these stimuli. However, this viewpoint is contradicted by existing empirical evidence that fear-relevant CRs survive an extinction trials series producing extinction of expectancies whereas CRs conditioned to non-fear-relevant CSs do not.
Redefining cognitive psychology
Authors: Jonides John , Reuter-Lorenz Patricia
Published: February 2010

Posner & Raichle illustrate how neuroimaging blends profitably with neuropsychology and electrophysiology to advance cognitive theory. Recognizing that there are limitations to each of these techniques, we nonetheless argue that their confluence has fundamentally changed the way cognitive psychologists think about problems of the mind.
Is the human brain only responsive?
Authors: Kristeva-Feige Rumyana , Feige Bernd
Published: February 2010

Posner & Raichle's (1994) book is a fascinating and readable account of the studies the authors have conducted on the localization of cognitive functions in the brain mainly using PET and EEC evoked potential methods. Our criticism concerns the underrepresentation of some imaging techniques (magnetoencephalography) and some forms of brain activity (spontaneous activity). Furthermore, the book leaves the reader with the impression that the brain only responds to external events.
Another far more ancient tongue
Authors: Bradshaw John
Published: February 2010

Language started evolving early, before gesture; commonalities of generativity between language and praxis have been over-emphasized. Language did not drive hominid brain evolution, evolving multifactorially and interactively. More than communication, it permits a cognitive modelling of reality and hierarchical data management. As the interactive sum of various cognitive and linguistic systems, and of brain structures each semi-independently evolved, it is not part of a single, general-purpose cognitive processor, nor is it a separately-evolved quasi-independent module.
The origin of language: More words needed
Authors: Solso Robert L.
Published: February 2010

Dunbar's idea that neocortex size limits the number of relationships beings may be able to maintain is an engaging hypothesis for cognitive psychologists interested in a limited capacity model. It is suggested that the thesis would have been enhanced had the author considered the concept of peers as part of an information processing scheme.
Neocortical size and language
Authors: Dunbar R. I. M.
Published: February 2010

In my target article, I argued (1) that the relationship between neocortical size and group size in primates implies that there is a cognitive limit on the size of human groups, and (2) that time constraints forced the evolution of language as a more efficient means of bonding the large groups that humans evolved. The doubts about these claims raised by these additional commentaries largely reflect misinterpretation of my original claims.
Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion
Authors: Pust Joel
Published: February 2010

Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.
What are the mechanisms of photoreceptor adaptation?
Authors: Bownds M. Deric , Arshavsky Vadim Y.
Published: February 2010

This article evaluates each of the reactions known to be involved in visual transduction as a potential site for the regulation of light adaptation. Extensive evidence suggests that calcium acts as a feedback messenger at several different points and recent work suggests a role for cGMP in regulating the primary excitatory pathway. A conclusion is that adaptation is likely to be regulated by multiple and redundant mechanisms. The goal of future experimentation will be to determine the relative importance of each of these.
Recoverin and Ca2+ in vertebrate phototransduction
Authors: Hurley James B.
Published: February 2010

Recoverin is a 23 kDa Ca2+binding protein that has been detected primarily in vertebrate photoreceptors. The role of recoverin in phototransduction has been investigated using a variety of biochemical methods. Initial reports suggesting that recoverin regulates photoreceptor guanylyl cyclase have not been confirmed. Instead, recoverin appears to determine the lifetime of lightstimulated phosphodiesterase activity, perhaps by regulating rhodopsin phosphorylation. Retinal recoverin is heterogeneously fatty acylated at its ammo-terminus. The amino-terminal fatty acid appears to be involved in the interaction of recoverin with photoreceptor membranes.
Genetic and clinical heterogeneity in tapetal retinal dystrophies
Authors: Bergen A. A. B.
Published: February 2010

Large scale DNA-mutation screening in patients with hereditary retinal diseases greatly enhances our knowledge about retinal function and diseases. Scientists, clinicians, patients, and families involved with retinal disorders may directly benefit from these developments. However, certain aspects of this expanding knowledge, such as the correlation between genotype and phenotype, may be much more complicated than we expect at present.
Long term potentiation and CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclase: Long-term prospects
Authors: Heideman Warren
Published: February 2010

The type I CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclase is in a position to integrate signals from multiple inputs, consistent with the requirements for mediating long term potentiation (LTP). Biochemical and genetic evidence supports the idea that this enzyme plays an important role inc LTP. However, more work is needed before we will be certain of the role that CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclases play in LTP.
Recoverin is the tumor antigen in cancerassociated retinopathy
Authors: Polans Arthur S. , Adamus Grazyna
Published: February 2010

Considerable progress has been made toward understanding the involvement of recoverin in a cancer-associated retinopathy (CAR) that results in blindness. We describe the expression of recoverin in tumors of individuals afflicted with CAR, characterize the immunological response towards recoverin in these patients, and demonstrate how the disease can be induced in rodents using recoverin as an immunogen.