bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Science and Essence
Authors: Cassam Quassim
Published: January 2009

The terminology of ‘essence’ and ‘accident’, which it is customary to trace back to Aristotle, has been given a new lease of life by recent writing on logic and metaphysics. Aristotle's notion of ‘essence’ is notoriously difficult and obscure, but the works of Putnam1 on natural kinds, Kripke2 on naming and Wiggins3 on identity may be seen as providing a new rationale, with a distinctive scientific twist, for talk of essences. This revival in the fortunes of essentialism merits closer examination, for whilst it may be that modern versions of essentialism have avoided some of the difficulties of Aristotle's account, they have imported others which may prove no less intractable.
Doubts About Projectivism
Authors: Price A. W.
Published: January 2009

How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values. Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home.1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world (just as a mathematical Platonist does not simply say ‘There are numbers’). I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value-terms (perhaps with a blind eye to values not so labelled); I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn is the only way to put values in their place (also whether values deserve to be singled out for relegation).
Desire, Evil and Grace
Authors: Reinhardt Lloyd
Published: January 2009

In Plato's Meno, there is a famous discussion of desire and evil. This paper is not a contribution to Platonic scholarship, but a direct taking up of the issue whether someone can desire evil. One stock interpretation of the putative impossibility of desiring what is evil or bad is the interpretation which emphasizes an internal or conceptual tie between desire and good. This interpretation compares pairs of terms such as ‘fear—danger’, ‘belief—truth’ and ‘desire—good’. To fear something is to regard it as, or believe that it is, dangerous (or harmful); to believe something is to regard it as, or believe it to be, true (in this case the connection is trivially obvious); to desire something is to regard it as, to believe it to be, good. Since it is obvious that people believe things which are false, it is maintained that it is equally obvious that people may desire what is (in fact) bad and fear what is (in fact) harmless or of no danger. Let us call this interpretation of the doctrine that it is impossible to desire evil the weak thesis. The weak thesis allows what seems a plain fact of human reality, that people believe falsehoods, fear things that cannot harm them and desire things which are not good. Equally obviously, it allows that people fail to believe truths, fail to desire goods, and fail to fear things that are dangerous. On this weak interpretation, the manner in which wickedness to others and self-destructiveness are due to ignorance is that people are ignorant about the nature of things and ways of acting, ignorant about what it would be like to possess something or ignorant about what it would be like to do something or other.
The Child in the Moral Order
Authors: Schrag Francis
Published: January 2009

In the early 1700s the Flemish explorer Sicnarf Garhcs discovered a society, the Namuh, which he described in his two-volume compendium of primitive societies. As this society bears on my present topic, I begin with a summary of its salient features:

(i) It consists of two classes of people, the Tluda and the Dlihc, whom I shall hereafter refer to as the T's and the D's. Relative to the D's, the T's are (on the average) strong, intelligent and knowledgeable about the world. The D's are (with some exceptions) weak, ignorant and dim-witted.
Animals and the Unity of Psychology
Authors: Matthews Gareth B.
Published: January 2009

By ‘the unity of psychology’ I mean something one might also express by saying that the psychology of human beings is part of the psychology of animals generally.

Perhaps there are several different ways of trying to trace out the ramifications of the idea that psychology is one. A central consideration, I think, is likely to be some sort of principle of continuity up and down the scale of nature. The idea would be that up and down the scale of animated or ensouled things (‘psyched up’ beings, empsucha) there are always psychological continuities, never any strict discontinuity. If human beings can get angry, can want to get ahead in life, can see an illusion, can develop an Oedipus complex, then so can some lower animal do either the very same thing, something similar, or at least something analogous.
Examples in Epistemology: Socrates, Theaetetus and G. E. Moore
Authors: Burnyeat M. F.
Published: January 2009

Theaetetus, asked what knowledge is, replies that geometry and the other mathematical disciplines are knowledge, and so are crafts like cobbling. Socrates points out that it does not help him to be told how many kinds of knowledge there are when his problem is to know what knowledge itself is, what it means to call geometry or a craft knowledge in the first place—he insists on the generality of his question in the way he often does when his interlocutor, asked for a definition, cites instead cases of the concept to be defined (Plato, Theaetetus 146ce).
Obligation, Supererogation and Self-sacrifice
Authors: Jacobs Russell A.
Published: January 2009

Can an action cease to be required of a moral agent solely because it comes too costly? Can self-sacrifice or risk of self-sacrifice serve as a limit on our moral obligations? Two recent articles in Philosophy, concerned primarily with the possibility of supererogatory action, suggest very different answers to these questions.
Moral Tales
Authors: Sharpe R. A.
Published: January 2009

In the 11th chapter of the second book of Samuel, we read how King David saw Bathsheba in the evening: ‘v.2. And it came to pass in an eveningtide, that David arose from off his bed, and walked upon the roof of the king's house: and from the roof he saw a woman washing herself; and the woman was very beautiful to look upon.’
The Entity Fallacy in Epistemology
Authors: Wright Edmond
Published: January 2009

In order to entertain the argument to be presented here, you have to begin by casting away a presupposition. The ultimate aim will be to restore it again as a presupposition, but the immediate aim will be to test for and make clear its undoubted worth and usefulness by imagining what happens to our knowledge-system when we remove it.
Locke on Punishment and the Death Penalty
Authors: Calvert Brian
Published: January 2009

At the end of the opening chapter of his Second Treatise of Government, Locke describes political power in the following terms: ‘Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Publick Good.’
Duty and Desolation
Authors: Langton Rae
Published: January 2009

This is a paper about two philosophers who wrote to each other. One is famous; the other is not. It is about two practical standpoints, the strategic and the human, and what the famous philosopher said of them. And it is about friendship and deception, duty and despair. That is enough by way of preamble.
Goodness and Truth
Authors: Gaita Raimond
Published: January 2009

I begin with the common distinction between study which is for its own sake and study which is for some other reason. It is often assumed that when study is not for its own sake then it is for the sake of a career. But there are many and subtle ways in which a student's concern with his or her subject may be deflected from its intrinsic good. And there are ways of being concerned with its intrinsic good which are quite trivial. Therefore, if we are concerned with what may go deep in a student's life—as surely we must be if we are concerned with its ethical or spiritual possibilities—then we cannot rest with the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goods. A student with a vocation for healing who studies medicine in response to it, or a student who loves justice and who studies law in that spirit and with a view to practising it, is doing something finer than is a philosophy or history student who is merely enchanted with natural pleasures which come with the disciplined exercise of the powers of the mind.
The Power of Words
Authors: Radford Colin
Published: January 2009

The origin of this paper is a problem: I had long been struck by the fact that if my glance happened to fall on a newspaper, a message on a note pad, printing on a label, etc., I would begin to read what was there written or printed—if I could see it and it was in English. If I can see it, and it is in English, I cannot but read what my glance falls on, even if I wish not to do so. So my reading—at least on these occasions and of this brief sort—seemed to be involuntary. The illiterate person, of course, cannot read and, in that way, is not free to read. The person learning to read does not read freely. But the ‘free’ reader is not free not- to read that on which his glance falls.
Cambridge Philosophers V
Authors: Baldwin Thomas
Published: January 2009

Moore much disliked the names ‘George Edward’ which his parents had bestowed upon him. Hence he was always known just as ‘Moore’ in his professional life, although at home there seems to have been a profusion of names—in his Commonplace Book he writes1: ‘I used to be called “Jumbo’, and used to be called “Tommy”; & also “Georgie”, & am still called by my brothers and sisters “George”; by Dorothy & others I am called “Bill”…‘
Sartre and the Drug Connection
Authors: Curtis-Haynes Carole
Published: January 2009

Sartre's experimentation in February 1935 with the drug mescalin has been well documented by Simone de Beauvoir in her book The Prime of Life.1 She recalls that Sartre experienced under the influence of the drug not exactly hallucinations, ‘but the objects he looked at changed their appearance in the most horrifying manner:’ [POL 209]. The residual effects of this nightmarish experience left Sartre, not only for several days ‘in a state of deep depression’ [POL 210], but also produced moods that ‘recalled those that had been induced by mescalin.’
Epicurus: ‘Live Hidden!’
Authors: Earle William James
Published: January 2009

Epicurus, though popularly and indeed nominally associated with a doctrine advocating the procurement of rather expensive pleasure, lived very simply in his garden with a circle of friends. The 14th of his Sovran Maxims or Cardinal Tenets (kuriai doxai), as collected by Diogenes Laertius, reads: ‘When tolerable security against our fellowmen is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford support and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude’ R. D. Hicks, the translator, gives, as an alternative to ‘power sufficient to afford support’, ‘power to expel’, but on either reading, we are to think of Epicurus's garden, both the real place and the conceptualized, or tropologized, topos of wisdom and earthly felicity, as enclosed and exclusive. This enclosure, exclusivity, and—what is also implied—abstention of its inmates from participation in the affairs of state are given apophthegmatic expression in ‘Live hidden!’ We contemplate this adage, or slogan, from an enormous cultural distance and, for most of us, ‘Live hidden!’ is much more likely to trigger secondary reflections about the relations between ethics and politics, private and public, perfection of self and improvement of the world, than it is to constitute an actual, or potential, piece of advice we might think about whether, and how, to follow.
What Computers Can't Do
Authors: Hunter Geoffrey
Published: January 2009

My aim in this article is to make accessible to non-mathematicians the groundwork of the theory of effective methods and unsolvable problems. The beauty of the theory is that it needs hardly any hard work to get very quickly from simple intuitive ideas to some extraordinarily interesting and surprising results.
Prejudice, Reason and Force
Authors: Wachterhauser Brice R.
Published: January 2009

Perhaps no other aspect of Hans-Georg Gadamer'sWahrheit und Methodehas generated more controversy and caustic criticism than his attempt to defend the role of ‘prejudice’ (Vorurteil) in human understanding. Gadamer's goal in challenging what he calls ‘the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice’ is not to defend irresponsible, idiosyncratic, parochial or otherwise self-willed understanding in the human sciences, but to argue that all human cognition is ‘finite’ and ‘limited’ in the sense that it always involves, to borrow Polanyi's phrase, a ‘tacit dimension’ of implicit judgments, concerns, or commitments which shape definitively our grasp of the subject matter in ways we cannot anticipate or control. This implies a ‘finite’ or ‘limited’ view of human understanding in at least two ways. First, Gadamer seems to use the word ‘finite’ in conscious opposition to Hegel's notion of an ‘infinite’ intellect. For Hegel the ‘infinite’ was the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘self-determining’. An ‘infinite’ intellect would be its own master, an autonomous, spontaneous source of all its essential activities and contents.
Purity and Judgment in Morality
Authors: Kekes John
Published: January 2009

There are some people whose actions are much more often good than evil. If their infrequent immorality does not cause much harm, it is reasonable to regard such people as morally good. Nevertheless, moral goodness remains an elusive quality, because it is difficult to identify good actions. Motives, consequences, knowledge of alternatives and of the conventions prevailing in the context, the agent's history, character, and information all have a bearing on whether particular actions are good. These facts are not easy to ascertain in any case, but when we are looking for a pattern formed of countless good actions over a lifetime, the difficulties are compounded.
A Dream of Socrates
Authors: Crombie I. M.
Published: January 2009

The other night I had a very strange, and strangely coherent, dream. Socrates and Meno appeared to be arguing with each other in my presence. They talked English, I suppose, since I clearly thought I followed them; but I seem to remember that Greek words occurred from time to time. When I woke it seemed to me that the dream had some bearing on disputed matters of Platonic interpretation, so I shall try to reconstruct it here. Meno speaks first:

Tell me, Socrates, do you think that the just and the admirable are the same thing?

I should hardly think so; for we call many things admirable—for example a young lad's cheek—which we would hardly call just; and perhaps vice versa. But I am only guessing, of course, because I cannot know whether A is the same as B unless I know what A is and what B is.
Human Beings and Giant Squids
Authors: Cockburn David
Published: January 2009

A television nature programme a year or two ago contained a striking sequence in which a giant squid was under threat from some other creature (no doubt a human being with a video camera). The squid responded in a way which struck me immediately and powerfully as one of fear. Part of what was striking in this sequence was the way in which it was possible to see in the behaviour of a creature physically so very different from human beings an emotion which was so unambiguously and specifically one of fear.
So You Think You Are a Darwinian?
Authors: Stove David
Published: January 2009

Most educated people nowadays, I believe, think of themselves as Darwinians. If they do, however, it can only be from ignorance: from not knowing enough about what Darwinism says. For Darwinism says many things, especially about our species, which are too obviously false to be believed by any educated person; or at least by an educated person who retains any capacity at all for critical thought on the subject of Darwinism.
Wittgenstein′s Romantic Inheritance
Authors: Rowe M. W.
Published: January 2009

A number of writers have noted affinities between the form and style of Wittgenstein′s Philosophical Investigations and the Christian confessional tradition.1,2 In this paper, however, If the Christian tradition, than of the Christian inheritance refracted through, and secularized by, German Romanticism. I shall argue that Wittgenstein′s work is less a direct continuation on this context, not only do many of the features of the Investigations which seem eccentric or wilful become naturalized, but light is also thrown on Wittgenstein′s claim that the twentieth and late nineteenth century play no part in his spiritual makeup, and that his ‘cultural ideal’ derives from ‘Schumann′s time.’3
Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: January 2009

It is persons who are ontologically committed. But a person is not ontologically committed by virtue of his character, his height, his social standing or whatever, but by virtue of the sentences he assents to. Hence we should look to sentences for a criterion of ontological commitment. This is precisely what is done by advocates of what I will call the Referential theory. In this paper I argue that the Referential theory faces serious objections related to the role paraphrase must play in it. I then present a modified Referential theory and go on to discuss certain implications of the modified theory. More precisely, the paper divides up as follows. In §1 I present the Referential theory. In §2 I argue that it is in trouble over paraphrase. In §3 I consider a general objection to the arguments of §2. In §4 I present the modified theory. In §5 I consider the implications of the modified theory for polemic over what there is and for the existence of properties or universals.
More Brain Lesions
Authors: Wilkes Kathleen V.
Published: January 2009

As philosophers of mind we seem to hold in common no very clear view about the relevance that work in psychology or the neurosciences may or may not have to our own favourite questions—even if we call the subject ‘philosophical psychology’. For example, in the literature we find articles on pain some of which do, some of which don't, rely more or less heavily on, for example, the work of Melzack and Wall; the puzzle cases used so extensively in discussions of personal identity are drawn sometimes from the pleasant exercise of scientific fantasy, at times from surprising reports of scientific fact; and there are those who deny, as well as those who affirm, the importance of the discovery of rapid-eye-movement sleep to the philosophical treatment of dreaming. A general account of the relation between scientific, and philosophical, psychology is long overdue and of the first importance. Here I shall limit myself to just one area where the two seem to connect, discussing one type of neuropsychological research and its relevance to questions in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology.
How to Say Things with Walls
Authors: Skillen A. J.
Published: January 2009

I want to discuss a view of punishment which stresses its ‘expressive’ character and seeks in that its justification. While I shall label this view ‘expressionism’, I should warn that most theorists who express an ‘expressionist’ view do not present it as an exhaustive account, but rather claim to be highlighting an aspect that tends to be neglected within the rationalist framework common to retributivism and utilitarianism. Among contemporary writings I shall focus on Joel Feinberg's article, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’ inThe Monist49, No. 4 (1965). While I accept that ‘expression’ usefully sums up much of what underlies punitive practices, I shall urge that the term conceals a variety of more or less amalgamated ingredients which need to be disentangled for critical inspection. I shall argue that under those aspects, punishment's justification continues to be elusive. I do not imagine that these arguments will deter my more punitive colleagues from continuing to seek such justification, but I hope they will search elsewhere. Feinberg writes:

Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has asymbolic significancelargely missing from other kinds of penalties.
Suicide and Self-inflicted Death
Authors: Frey R. G.
Published: January 2009

The most common view of suicide today is that it is intentional self-killing.1 Because of the self-killing component, suicide is often described as self-inflicted death or as dying by one's own hand, and the victim is in turn often described as having done himself to death or as having taken his own life. But must one's death be self-inflicted in order to be suicide? The answer, I want to suggest, is arguably no.
Moral Delusion
Authors: Beehler Rodger
Published: January 2009

My question is whether a prevalent conception of morality can admit the existence of moral delusion. The conception of morality I refer to is that of a set of rules, or principles, ‘accepted’ or ‘assented’ to by persons, which stipulate that certain kinds of human act or behaviour are permitted, or required, while other kinds are to be avoided. This conception of morality can be found virtually everywhere, outside as much as within philosophy, in anthropology, sociology, political studies, history, literary criticism, psychology, and law. But it is to a particular philosophical instance that I shall attend here. The instance in question is an essay by Jonathan Bennett which appeared in this journal seven years ago under the title ‘The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn’. My reason for addressing myself to Bennett's paper will become clear as I proceed.
On Defining Away the Miraculous
Authors: Colwell Gary
Published: January 2009

It has been argued that even if miracles such as those recorded in the Bible do occur, it does not follow necessarily that God is the author of them. One alternative to the theistic interpretation, so the argument goes, is that a candidate miracle is really an undisclosed extension of natural law. If, on the other hand, it can be shown either that miracles cannot occur or that the evidence for them can never be strong enough to warrant their rational acceptance, then the question of God's authorship becomes superfluous. Here I shall not be concerned with the question of theistic interpretation but with the logically more fundamental question of whether or not miracles can have occurred. Hume and some of his philosophic children in our day have tried unsuccessfully to establish the impossibility of miracles on the sole basis of an appeal to the concepts of miracle and natural law. If my argument is correct, their failure illustrates graphically the pitfalls in trying to solve an empirical problem by definition.
The Definition of Person
Authors: Teichman Jenny
Published: January 2009

In one of the Theological Tractates, Boethius wrote ‘ we have found the definition of Person, viz: “The individual substance of a rational nature”’. He justifies the definition partly by a consideration of Latin and Greek etymologies and partly by stating ‘what Person cannot be affirmed of’. Person cannot be affirmed of Universals, accidents, relations, lifeless bodies, living bodies without sense (e.g. trees), nor of ‘that which is bereft of mind and reason’.
Tense and the New B-Theory of Language
Authors: Craig William Lane
Published: January 2009

New B-Theorists of language, while conceding the untranslatability of tensed sentences by tenseless sentences, deny that the ineliminability of tense implies the reality of tensed facts. Thus, New BTheorist Nathan Oaklander explains,

For a variety of reasons, ... recent defenders of the tenseless view have come to embrace the thesis that tensed sentences cannot be translated by tenseless ones without loss of meaning. Nevertheless, recent detensers have denied that the ineliminability of tensed language and thought entails the reality of temporal properties. ... Tensed discourse is indeed necessary for timely action, but tensed facts are not, since the truth conditions of tensed sentences can be expressed in a tenseless meta-language that describes unchanging temporal relations between and among events.
Character, Virtue and Freedom
Authors: Esheté Andreas
Published: January 2009

In recent years, much uncertainty and outright scepticism surrounds the notion of character. In the arts—painting, the novel, drama, film—the notion of character has receded into the background. The loss of character is especially conspicuous in those artistic forms in which it traditionally occupied centre-stage: drama, the novel, films. The withdrawal of character from the arts has in fact become a topic of debate in the theory and criticism of the arts. In the arts themselves, the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of attaining character is a common subject. Since ordinary sentiments are readily reflected in the fine arts, it is natural to suspect that character is not held in high regard in everyday life. Even if we take a dim view of the suggestion that the arts mirror ordinary sentiments with little distortion, a decline in the importance of character is evident in other humane disciplines: history is a striking example. Indeed, if we attend to our major social institutions—the family, the courts, the bureaucracy—it would be difficult to point to any in which the question of character is more than a peripheral concern. Indeed, it appears that the appraisal of character is of central concern in modern society only when the individual is in some way beyond the pale: in institutions of punishment, rehabilitation, mental health.
Against Human Rights
Authors: Nelson John O.
Published: January 2009

Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, grossly wicked, amounting indeed to genocide.
Conservatism and Conservation
Authors: Wenz Peter S.
Published: January 2009

Utilitarians believe that personal decisions and public policies should be made so as to maximize the public good, or, as Jeremy Bentham put it, to produce the greatest good of the greatest number. Bentham identified the public good with the maximization of happiness, and believed that many traditional practices were inimical to the production of happiness. So in the name of maximizing the public good, Bentham advocated, for example, extending the franchise, reforming the criminal code and re-designing prisons. People's prejudices and traditional habits of thought must yield in the face of utilitarian-inspired reforms.
Stories, Pictures, Arguments
Authors: Deutscher Max
Published: January 2009

There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the (admittedly) vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘are only the embellishments, the relief from work, the appetizers or the post-prandial delicacies.’
Popper and Historicist Necessities
Authors: Flew Antony
Published: January 2009

The performance which follows, like Caesar's Gaul, falls into three parts. Part I consists in a sympathetic and reconstructive criticism of Sir Karl Popper's The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957). Part II offers a somewhat less sympathetic critique of the critique of Popper offered in E. H. Carr's Trevelyan Lectures What is History? (London: Macmillan, 1961; and since Pelicanned). Finally, in a shorter Part III, there will be some conclusions concerning what sociologists and historians can and cannot hope to discover about necessities and impossibilities in human affairs.
Against the Fantasts
Authors: Thomas J. L. H.
Published: January 2009

Amongst Kant's lesser known early writings is a short treatise with the curious title Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Explained by Dreams of Metaphysics, in which, with considerable acumen and brilliance, and not a little irony, Kant exposes the empty pretensions of his contemporary, the Swedish visionary and Biblical exegete, Emanuel Swedenborg, to have access to a spirit world, denied other mortals. Despite his efforts, it must be feared, however, that Kant did not, alas, succeed in laying the spirit of Swedenborg himself to rest once and for all, for there has arisen in our own day, and within philosophy itself, a movement of thought, if such it can be called, which, like that of Swedenborg, is founded upon an unbridled and unhealthy exercise of the imagination, and apparently believes that philosophical problems can be discussed and resolved by the elaboration of fantastical, and at times repulsive, examples; if we require a name for this contemporary pretence at philosophy, we could take as our model the Italian word for science fiction, fantascienza, and call it ‘fantaphilosophy’: it is my aim to show that this fantaphilosophy is a phantom philosophy.
Moral Dilemmas, Compromise and Compensation
Authors: Day J. P.
Published: January 2009

Moral dilemmas, or moral conflicts, present a leading problem in Ethics. Ross calls them the problem of conflicting prima facie moral obligations. Lemmon calls them ‘moral dilemmas’, and Sinnott-Armstrong in his recent book discusses them thoroughly and provides extensive references to relevant literature.
Knowing and Saying that I Know
Authors: Pappas Nickolas
Published: January 2009

Of course there's every difference in the world between my merely saying something and its being so. My claim that I have a toothache is a far cry from the toothache itself. Words are not things: I neither sit in the word ‘chair’ nor eat the word ‘food.’
Responding to Plato′s Thrasymachus
Authors: Flew A.G.N.
Published: January 2009

It was with this bitter intervention from Thrasymachus, occurring halfway through the first of its ten Books, that that work begins to come urgently alive. For the remainder of Book I the Socrates of the Dialogue asks questions and raises objections, while Thrasymachus keeps urging that in fact the just become through their very justice the victims of exploitation–the suckers!
Hare's Moral Thinking
Authors: Griffiths A. Phillips
Published: January 2009

This book is the fruit of well over thirty years' reflection on moral philj osophy. A complete appreciation of it requires reference to The Language of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1952) (LM), Freedom and Reason (Oxford University Press, 1962) (FR) and many of Hare's extensive shorter writings. To some, it will appear to represent a radical, if gradual, reversal of his early views. His early position was thought by some to be one similar, in certain respects, to that of certain existentialist thinkers: that the most fundamental moral attitudes must be the outcome of sheer choice, or commitment. Whereas in the latest book Hare argues that to think fully rationally about moral questions requires us to be Utilitarians (unless we are amoralists, as we shall see below).
The Refutation of Determinism
Authors: Shutte Augustine
Published: January 2009

In his Christian Theology and Natural Science, E. L. Mascall refers to a criticism by Elizabeth Anscombe of C. S. Lewis's well-known argument against determinism that appears in his Miracles. Both Lewis's argument and Anscombe's response appeared originally as papers delivered in the 40s to the Oxford Socratic Club. A certain historical interest attaches to that exchange in that Lewis seems to have been ‘deeply disturbed’ by it.2 I think he need not have been. But, more importantly, the sequence of Lewis's article followed by Anscombe's reply and then Mascall's comments on both, provides a suggestive presentation and examination of a certain kind of argument against determinism. Essentially it is a negative rebuttal of a retortive kind, such as Aristotle uses against the sceptic in the Metaphysics. But its treatment by these three writers indicates a metaphysical insight that could possibly furnish a positive refutation of any kind of radical determinism.
An international comparison of adolescent non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI) and suicide attempts: Germany and the USA
Authors: Plener P. L. , Libal G. , Keller F. , Fegert J. M. , Muehlenkamp J. J.
Published: January 2009

Background

This study examined the prevalence of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI), suicide attempts, suicide threats and suicidal ideation in a German school sample and compared the rates with a similar sample of adolescents from the midwestern USA by using cross-nationally validated assessment tools.

Method

Data were provided from 665 adolescents (mean age 14.8 years, s.d.=0.66, range 14–17 years) in a school setting. Students completed the Self-Harm Behavior Questionnaire (SHBQ), the Ottawa Self-Injury Inventory (OSI) and a German version of the Center for Epidemiological Studies–Depression Scale (CES-D).

Results

A quarter of the participants (25.6%) endorsed at least one act of NSSI in their life, and 9.5% of those students answered that they had hurt themselves repetitively (more than four times). Forty-three (6.5%) of the students reported a history of a suicide attempt. No statistically significant differences were observed between the German and US samples in terms of self-injury or suicidal behaviors.

Conclusions

By using the same validated assessment tools, no differences were found in the prevalence and characteristics of self-injury and suicidal behaviors between adolescents from Germany and the USA. Thus, it seems that NSSI has to be understood as worldwide phenomenon, at least in Western cultures.
Christianity as Insurrection
Authors: Matheson P.
Published: January 2009

To suggest that authentic Christianity is an insurrectionary faith, a standing provocation to the conventional values of society is, on the face of it, to invite derision. Yet the ferocity with which the first Christians were persecuted was in no small part due to their subversive teachings and practices which gave women, slaves and artisans ideas above their station. This subversive dimension may often have been forgotten. It can hardly have been very evident to the inhabitants of Wittenberg in 1515, for example, yet within a decade Germany was to be embroiled in an unprecedented crisis of authority, one which led not only to turmoil in the world of student and scholar and cleric, but to the greatest social upheaval prior to the French Revolution, to the uffrur we know as the Peasants' War.
Christianity, Divine Law and Consequentialism
Authors: Porter Jean
Published: January 2009

In 1971 John Rawls remarked that ‘During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism.’ Although utilitarianism is no longer the dominant school of moral philosophy, it continues to flourish, generating new defenses and reformulations. Yet with the notable exception of Joseph Fletcher, there have been very few Christian ethicistswho have been prepared to declare themselves to be utilitarians or consequentialists.
To Hear the Master's Voice: Revelation and Spiritual Discernment in the Call of Samuel
Authors: Moberly R. W. L.
Published: January 2009

The call of Samuel in the temple at Shiloh (1 Sam. 3) is probably one of the better known stories of the Old Testament. There is an obvious imaginative appeal about the mysterious voice of God coming to a child who is unable to understand what is happening and yet who becomes able to hear the word of God for himself. But although the story has received frequent commentary in recent Old Testament scholarship, and has even had a monograph devoted to it by R. Gnuse, the most memorable part of the story, God's repeated calling to Samuel and Samuel's running to Eli, has received relatively little attention. This paper will try to remedy that omission.
Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: The Nature of Doctrine and The Possibilities for its Development
Authors: Clutterbuck Richard
Published: January 2009

Moltmann derives much of the power of his theology from his willingness to endure the tensions of paradox, a willingness signalled early in his career with the title of his work, The Crucified God. Such paradoxes, however, leave unanswered questions and the need for further explorations. It is the argument of this article that an aspect of Moltmann's theology in particular need of exploration is the area of the status of Christian doctrine and its appropriate development. There is a major tension, we will suggest, between the disavowal of‘doctrine’, ‘dogma’, ‘tradition’ and ‘system’ as helpful concepts, and the strongly doctrinal and systematic content of Moltmann's theology. This tension, we believe, has something to do with the ambivalence in Moltmann's attitude to the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment, to ‘modernity’. We shall try to show that Moltmann operates with a mixture of internal criteria (based on key doctrines) and external criteria (based on perceived human needs) for assessing authenticity in doctrine. Finally, within the dynamic of Moltmann's theology, with what we shall identify as its emphasis on historicality, there are resources for advancing an account of the theological significance of the development of doctrine. We explore these and ask why Moltmann himself has not put them to greater use.
A Response to Professor Rowland
Authors: Watson Francis
Published: January 2009

I'm grateful for your open letter, your generous comments and the critical questions you raise. Two general concerns seem to emerge, and it is to these that I shall respond here. The first is that I am too dismissive of the real value of the historical-critical method. Rightly objecting to its ‘hegemony’ in modern biblical studies, I'm in danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The second is that the theological orientation that I bring to biblical interpretation is too ‘cerebral’: this makes me insufficiently attentive to the provisionality of our knowledge of God and to the particularities of a place called ‘the real world’.
Atonement: The Rite of Healing
Authors: Barker Margaret
Published: January 2009

There has recently been a number of books on the Christian understanding of atonement. What has been fascinating for me is the extent to which these books do, or more often do not, use the Old Testament material on atonement as the basis for what they have to say. The New Testament speaks in a variety of ways about atonement and this has become the centre of Christian dogmatics; but this ‘atonement’ is only loosely related to its Old Testament roots. Did the first Christians, then, radically alter what was understood by atonement, or was this radical alteration made by subsequent expositors of their ideas? The latter is more likely; in other words, the original ‘model’ for New Testament theology has been lost.
The Contribution of John Howard Yoder to Recent Discussions in Christian Social Ethics
Authors: Zimbelman Joel
Published: January 2009

The publication ofThe Politics of Jesusin 1972 established John Howard Voder as the most intellectually compelling, critical, and constructive Mennonite theologian of this generation. In that volume, Voder articulated an interpretive method and a substantive doctrinal position that affirmed his sectarian and ‘restoration’ theological vision but at the same time gained him a serious hearing in several corners of the North American Christian community. His recent tenure as President of the Society of Christian Ethics and appointment in the Department of Theology at Notre Dame University are only two examples of his standing among ecumenically-minded Christians.
Newman on Liberal Education and Moral Pluralism
Authors: Magill Gerard
Published: January 2009

The moral pluralism that characterises contemporary living can largely be attributed to the education that differentiates modern life from previous generations. During the industrial revolution in Britain in the nineteenth century John Henry Newman (1801–1890) was very sensitive to the importance of a more educated society, especially with regard to the development of religious faith and morals in an increasingly secular and sceptical age. Although his dedication to the advancement of knowledge remained throughout his life, his career commitment to formal learning began as an Anglican when he became a tutor at Oriel College, Oxford in 1826. In a sense his academic calling reached its zenith in 1852 as rector of the Catholic university at Dublin when he had the opportunity to express his view of liberal education by writing his university discourses.
The Social Model of the Trinity and Its Critics
Authors: Gresham John L.
Published: January 2009

One of the analogies used by the Cappadocian Fathers and other early theologians to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity was the social analogy in which Father, Son and Spirit were likened to three human persons. Beginning with Augustine however, Christian Theology, particularly in the Western Church, shifted away from the social to the psychological analogy. Augustine found analogies to the Trinity in all of creation but the clearest analogy to the Trinity, in fact its unique image, was the human soul. The divine image was not found in the union of three persons but in the unity of three activities, remembering, knowing, willing in the individual human soul. The social analogy reappeared in the twelfth century in Richard of St Victor's argument for the existence of three persons in God based on the premise that supreme charity required shared interpersonal love. Though some of Richard's insights were taken up by Bonaventura, the impact of his trinitarian theology was overshadowed by the dominant influence of Thomas Aquinas with his masterful use of the psychological analogy to probe and illuminate the inner being of the divine Trinity. Following Aquinas's further development of Augustine's psychological analogy, the interpersonal approach of the social analogy all but disappeared from subsequent trinitarian theology. Even with a later shift away from the Augustinian-Thomistic model, modern theology retained its unipersonal image of the trinitarian God.
The Child as Solution: The Problem of the Superordinate-Subordinate Ordering of the Male-Female Relation in Barth's Theology
Authors: Frykberg Elizabeth A.
Published: January 2009

In examining the similarities and differences between God and humanity in his analogia relalionis, Karl Barth correlates three I-Thou relations: God to Godself in similarity and difference (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit); humans to humans in similarity and difference (male and female); God to humanity and humanity to God in similarity and difference. For all three, Jesus Christ is the master analogue. Christ relates to God in a God-God ‘I-Thou’ relationship, to humanity in a human-human ‘I-Thou’ relationship, and God to humanity and humanity to God in a God-human ‘I-Thou’ relationship.
Intimate Narratives: The Letters of Hildegard of Bingen
Authors: Schütz Connie
Published: January 2009

This article will utilize some of the letters of Saint Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179) and several of the autobiographical passages included in her Vita to demonstrate how she constructed herself in these writings as a prophetess, a woman imbued with the authority of spirit, which could, at times, override the authority of office of the male ecclesiastics around her.
Human Community and Divine Presence: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Theological Critique of Hegel
Authors: Marsh Charles
Published: January 2009

Karl Barth once said that we must always think three times before contradicting Hegel's system, ‘because we might find that everything we are tempted to say in contradiction to it has already been said within it’. Hegel wanted his thought to mirror the full movement of life, and to Barth (avid moviegoer no less than Mozart aficionado), this movement proceeds like the film of the cinematograph, though one so extraordinary that it depicts ‘the rhythm of life itself’, running exhaustively through the fullness of history, capturing the ‘exact recollection’ of the observed plenitude of being. When Hegel in the Phenomenology concludes the magisterial section on absolute knowledge with the statement that here ‘Spirit has wound up the process of its embodiment’, he is not, as Richard Rorty cavalierly suggests, recommending a new and improved vocabulary, but is celebrating the complete infusion of truth into the dialectic of knowing. As Barth says, ‘Truth is necessary to [Hegel] and, indeed, necessary to him in its unity, in its actuality, in the divine rigor inherent in it.’
Rembrandt Reads the Gospels: Form, Context and Theological Responsibility in New Testament Interpretation
Authors: Marsh Clive
Published: January 2009

Art is part of the history of the church, and relates to spirituality and to the practical expression of Christian faith. It illustrates theological loci and biblical themes. Often, the art which fulfils this function does so with the conscious intent of the artist; sometimes not. Attempts have been made, however, to argue that art not only illustrates theology, but also contributes to it. Even so, systematic theologians and biblical scholars — when they do talk to each other — still converse on the basis of largely word-centred approaches to their tasks. I am neither systematic theologian nor biblical scholar, precisely because I attempt to keep a foot in both camps. I am even less of an art critic. Yet it is clear that in the world of art there is a whole area of exploration yet to be ventured into not only historically (have we really sufficiently explored how biblical interpretation and doctrinal theology have been influenced by art?) but also from the perspective of constructive theology (what contribution can art past and present make to the very reformulation and expansion of Christian doctrine?). This paper offers a brief reading of three paintings by Rembrandt, of the Emmaus Road story in Luke 24.13–35. The theological significance of the changing interpretations of the passage is drawn out and the implications of the use of the paintings, in terms of the creative use of the Bible in Christian theology.
The Dimension of Depth: Thomas F. Torrance on the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper
Authors: Hunsinger George
Published: January 2009

‘All the gifts of God set forth in baptism,’ wrote John Calvin, ‘are found in Christ alone’ (Inst. IV.15.6). The baptismal gifts, for Calvin, were essentially three: forgiveness of sins, dying and rising with Christ, and communion with Christ himself (FV.15.1, 5, 6). They were ordered, however, in a particular way. Communion with Christ, Calvin considered, was in effect the one inestimable gift that included within itself the other two benefits of forgiveness and rising with Christ from the dead. Forgiveness and eternal life were thus inseparable from Christ's person and so from participatio Christi through our communion with him. Only by participating in Christ through communion could the divine gifts set forth in baptism be truly received. Any severing of these gifts from Christ himself would result only in empty abstractions. No spiritual gift—neither forgiveness nor eternal life nor any other divine benefit—was ever to be found alongside Christ or apart from him. Christ's saving benefits were inherent in his living person. Only in and with his person were they set forth and available to the church. Communion with Christ was thus bound up with Christ's person in his saving uniqueness. He himself and he alone, for Calvin and for the whole Reformation, was our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption (1 Cor. 1:30).