bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
A THREE-YEAR BASELINE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS STUDY OF PETROLEUM POLLUTANTS IN COASTAL LOUISIANA
Authors: Gisclair David , Iqbal Javed
Published: January 2013

The Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO) conducted a three-year study of baseline levels of oil spill constituents in South Louisiana as mandated by Act 740 of the Louisiana Legislature. The act mandated an environmental inventory concentrating on areas with a high probability of oil spills. The main goal of the project was to streamline restoration efforts in Coastal Louisiana, the Mississippi River, major tributaries and reduce associated risks to habitat. The study consisted of 3,540 composite sediment samples collected at 1,180 sites each year from 1997 through 1999. Results indicate that the mean level of total unresolved petroleum hydrocarbons (TUPH) in coastal Louisiana and major rivers during 1997 to 1999 was 44,608ng/g based on dry weight sediment. The mean total saturated hydrocarbons n-alkanes level (nC9-nC35) was 5,444ng/g. and mean total polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) level was 587ng/g. Results indicate chronic/degraded and recent input of petroleum contamination in coastal areas and the Mississippi river. These results indicated that petroleum constituents in Louisiana sediments are bio-available reservoirs of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons posing some risk to the ecosystem. Approximately 5% of the sites investigated have TPAH levels more than 1,000ng/g in three consecutive years while 51% of the samples have TPAH levels less than 100ng/g indicating low pollution. More than 98% of the samples were below NOAA sediments quality guidelines ERL (Effects Range – Low) values for PAHs. About 159 hot spots in 17 parishes (counties) were identified where all TUPH, TPAH and T-Sat exceeded the average concentration in at least one sampling year. The data suggests that current concentrations of contaminants in Louisiana are basically not in the toxic range to produce biological effects. However efforts would be necessary to monitor, control, and alleviate contaminants of concern especially in hotspot areas.
OPA 90: ENHANCED BY STATE PREVENTION AND RESPONSE PROGRAMS
Authors: Sullivan K.C. , Baccigalopi Michael , Jensen Dave
Published: January 2013

In the wake of the Exxon Valdez the federal government passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). A number of recent publications have discussed the effects of OPA 90 on the occurrence of unauthorized discharges, but nothing to date has included the additional influence of state regulations in their analysis.

To address oil spill response on a state level, agencies such as the Texas General Land Office Oil Spill Prevention and Response Division (TGLO) and the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO) were created. Each state, given authority under similar Oil Spill Prevention and Response Legislation, regulates heavily industrialized coastlines. These agencies have developed a level of expertise in management and response to oil spills that compliment the federal oil spill response capabilities.

This programmatic analysis of two adjacent state agencies will show that the interaction between state government, industry, and the public has a large influence on the effectiveness of OPA 90.
THE TRAJECTORY RECOVERY ANALYSIS PLANNER (TRAP): A TOOL FOR MODELING THE POTENTIAL SUCCESS OF RESPONSE PLANS1
Authors: Barker Christopher H. , Wesley David
Published: January 2013

A new approach to modeling potential success of skimmers and booming strategies has been developed to aid planners in assessing the use of limited resources in their response plans. The Trajectory Recovery Analysis Planner (TRAP) extends the approach of NOAA's Trajectory Analysis Planner (TAP) to provide a way for oil spill response planners to assess the likely effectiveness of their response plans across a wide variety of possible spill scenarios.

As a real spill could happen in a wide variety of conditions, multiple response scenarios need to be simulated on a wide variety of oil spill trajectories. Each trajectory represents a different historical spill start time with random initial tide phase and corresponding weather conditions at that time, based on past records for the location. For each trajectory, an approximation of the weathering of the oil is calculated, and booming and skimming operations are simulated. The response simulations take into account many of the limitations of actual response operations, including daylight hours, equipment shortages, wave height failure, skimmer travel times, skimmer encounter rates, and skimmer efficiencies.

The result is a wide variety of data about the simulated response. TRAP provides statistics summarizing those results. These results can give planners a realistic expectation of the likely success of their planned operations under both helpful and adverse conditions. The results also provide a summary of the shortcomings in the plan, allowing planners to determine where the weaknesses in their plans lie, including the reason for booming strategy failure, and less that expected skimmer recovery. The plan can then be altered and processed again, resulting in information about how those alterations might improve or degrade a response. The types of questions that can be addressed are: Is it better to have more small skimmers, or fewer large ones? Which booming strategies are most effective? Does boom need to be pre-positioned to speed the installation of a given strategy? TRAP thus gives planners a tool with which to quickly and easily explore a wide variety of possible response plans, and help determine where precious resources are best assigned.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR EMULSIFIED FUELS1
Authors: Gunter Paul
Published: January 2013

A considerable amount of research has been undertaken over the past 15 years into the fate / behaviour, potential impacts and response options for ORIMULSION®, a specific trademarked emulsified fuel. Although it is the only commercially available product of this kind at present, the same technology can also be applied to other heavy feedstocks to facilitate their handling and transportation. In the early 1990s a number of emulsions of refinery residues were trialed, and since then several other emulsified fuels have been developed, albeit so far with limited application or commercial success. However, as technology and economics change it is likely that other emulsified fuels will be developed.

The characteristics of any emulsified fuel and its formulation are developed to meet a number of criteria that take into account ease of production, handle ability, stability, economics and end-use together with environmental impact and spill behaviour. Consequently not all emulsified fuels will necessarily have the same characteristics or behave in the same way.

A key consideration is the surfactant package used to stabilise the emulsion. This will play a key role in determining the overall ecotoxicological impacts of the fuel and in dictating the dispersion / coalescence equilibrium for an emulsified fuel following a spill incident.

In extreme cases, differences in the surfactant package could make the difference between an emulsified fuel dispersing virtually entirely versus almost instantaneously coalescing. Given the extreme viscosity of the re-surfaced bitumen, this potential difference in fate and behaviour would have a considerable influence on potential impacts and, consequently, on the choice of appropriate spill response strategies.

This paper explains how the surfactant package in an emulsified fuel should be fully considered, and its potential influence on response options taken into account, in the Contingency Planning process.
OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANS: INCORPORATING WASTE MANAGEMENT AND FURTHERING ITS PROMOTION1
Authors: Richardson Cassandra
Published: January 2013

A fundamental problem exists with waste disposal in marine-based oil spill clean up, as up to ten times more waste can be generated than the actual oil spilled. Lessons learnt are rarely recognised until the clean up operation has finished and oiled waste has accumulated. In 1999 the oil tanker Erika broke in two and sank off the coast of Brittany, France. Spilling 20,000 tonnes of Heavy Fuel Oil but creating 250,000 tonnes of oiled waste.

The Author, during the Prestige spill has observed first hand how the handling and disposal of oily waste can have major implications for oil clean up operations. It can hinder the entire operation by causing bottlenecks and delays in further recovery of oil, unless suitable arrangements can be made. The promotion of a holistic approach to waste management is fundamental to effective oil recovery operations and should be incorporated into oil spill contingency plans.

The paper will highlight the importance of developing a proactive waste management strategy, emphasising good practice and the key issues involved. The paper is supported by existing reports, the author's practical experience and a published document, co-authored, on current waste disposal options for IPIECA's technical document series.
QUEBEC REGION'S SHORELINE SEGMENTATION IN THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER: RESPONSE TOOL FOR OIL SPILL
Authors: Laforest Sonia , Martin Vincent , Boulé Michel
Published: January 2013

The Quebec Region's shoreline description of the St. Lawrence River began in 1985 with the first shoreline interpretation by Environment Canada. This description was available as a paper version and was no longer adequate for oil spill response. An update was required in order to split the shoreline into segments and to digitize the information. A partnership was developed between Environment Canada, Eastern Canada Response Corporation and the Canadian Coast Guard to conduct the aerial survey and to do the segmentation.

The cartography of segmentation covers the fluvial part of the St. Lawrence River (Montreal Region) up to the Gulf (including the Lower-North Shore and the St. Lawrence Islands). The database, developed specifically for that project, is oil spill-oriented. It includes geomorphologic information, from the supratidal to the lower intertidal zone, some statistical information and other requirements for the cleanup operation.

For this operational database, useful for the response operation, links were developed with other databases and specialized oil spill software. The first system is GENIE Web, which is a Georeference Environmental Network for Information Exchange on the Web. The second system, ShoreAssess©, is a managing tool for SCAT teams in the field. Finally, a partnership with the Geography Department at the Université du Québec in Rimouski (UQAR) will help us to keep the St. Lawrence River coastal evolution up to date.
PIPELINE AND COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL SENSITIVITY MAPPING FOR THE BTC PIPELINE SYSTEM IN TURKEY
Authors: Gundlach Erich R. , Cekirge Murat , Anul Cihan , Orhan Cigdem , Sutherland Paul
Published: January 2013

Sensitivity mapping was completed for 1076 km (645 mi) of pipeline and for coastal areas of the eastern Mediterranean Sea in preparation for completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline Project. Pipeline sensitivity maps include environmental, human-use and archaeological features as well as drainage patterns indicating potential oil flow and downstream sites for spilled oil containment. The marine maps include environmental and human-use features, and appropriate oil spill containment sites. All information is compiled and stored using a Geographic Information System (GIS) from which hardcopy maps are created at various scales depending on purpose. Both integrated and stand-alone databases are used to quickly access needed environmental and response information. Map and text-based data are stored on a central server to provide internal accessibility and via a web-based, interactive internet mapping system. This is the first time that formalized sensitivity mapping has been carried out in Turkey.
DEVELOPMENT OF A RESPONSE NETWORK—THE KEY TO ESTABLISHING TRUE PORT READINESS
Authors: Miller Thomas C. , Holdren Catherine A. , DiLuna John C. , Harvey Stephen J.
Published: January 2013

Homeland Security Presidential Decision Directive Five (HSPD-5) directs federal agencies to work with state, county, and local governments and municipalities to establish a single, comprehensive approach for domestic incident management. It requires all levels of government throughout the Nation to develop the capabilities to work together in an efficient and effective manner. HSPD-5 directs the Federal Government to treat crisis and consequence management as a single integrated function rather than as two separate tasks.5 Similarly, the United States Coast Guards (USCG) Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security prescribes several guiding principles that dovetail with the philosophy of HSPD-5. The Maritime Strategy affirms that securing the homeland requires shared responsibility amongst all agencies. Further, the Maritime Strategy stresses the USCG must leverage assets, acquire new resources and partner with public and private stakeholders.6 As the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security and the Federal On Scene Coordinator, it is incumbent upon the USCG to spearhead joint planning and incident command initiatives to meet the requirements of HSPD-5 and the USCG Strategy for Homeland Security, and to adequately protect and respond to environmental and terror threats in the new normalcy of the post 9–11 world.

To this end, the requirement for development of an Area Maritime Security Plan (AMSP) is appropriate and timely as it is intended to provide the overarching philosophy to unify the port and its stakeholders—much like the Area Contingency Plan did post Exxon Valdez for pollution response. Further, it provides guidance to effectively and efficiently detect, deter, respond to, and recover from a Transportation Security Incident (TSI) which by all definitions may at some point include some sort of environmental response. The foundation of the AMSP is the development of a network of federal, state and local agencies that have a stake in preventing and recovering from a TSI or other port contingency. This is a critical step towards building a unified port response network, and if appropriately merged with the Area Committee and Area Contingency Plan efforts, will only bolster the pollution response preparedness in a given port region.

The Response Network concept provides tactical-level guidance for integrating the functional relationships required by the “Hierarchy of Readiness,” and the response infrastructure (a port incident management team) necessary to meet the requirements described in current and emerging federal guidance. This concept could be used as a map to facilitate every port in attaining true Port Readiness.
THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OF SHIELDS—NOAA'S SANCTUARIES HAZARDOUS INCIDENT EMERGENCY LOGISTICS DATABASE SYSTEM1
Authors: Bodnar Jill L.
Published: January 2013

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Sanctuaries Hazardous Incident Emergency Logistics Database System (SHIELDS) is an Internet-based information system designed to improve access to critical data, plans, and tools for National Marine Sanctuary (NMS) personnel and their partners for contingency planning and response situations. At the core of the SHIELDS project is a website developed for each of the thirteen National Marine Sanctuaries and one coral reef ecosystem reserve in the sanctuary designation process. Each site hosts general planning and response information, such as policies and contingency plans. More so, SHIELDS takes advantage of leading information technology to improve the availability of vital response information and folds it into one comprehensive website. The use of Geographic Information System (GIS) data has expanded from static hardcopy maps to web-based interactive mapping, allowing Internet users to easily examine Sanctuary-specific geographic data from any location. SHIELDS offers NOAA modeling tools to analyze the fate of pollutants and live buoy data for real-time oceanographic conditions. Web-based databases within SHIELDS allow the user to enter or query information on personnel contact and location, potential Sanctuary threats, geographic response plans (GRPs) and Resources and UnderSea Threats (RUST) data, post updated incident text and documentation, or look up response glossary terms. Although SHIELDS relies extensively on the use of the Internet to distribute its information, it has also been designed to work as a stand-alone product for those inevitable circumstances when Internet access is not available during a response. The user can load the SHIELDS webpages and data onto their personal computer and carry it to any remote location to access the same data found on the Internet.

SHIELDS provides the most comprehensive incident planning and response information for the National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP). This ensures that NOAA fulfills its role as stewards of Sanctuary resources and provides effective and timely response information about their trust resources.
MANAGING RISKS OF EXPLOSION DURING OIL RECOVERY, STORAGE, AND TRANSFER OPERATIONS
Authors: Romberg Barry A. , Maguire Dennis M. , Ranger Richard L. , Hoffman Rod
Published: January 2013

This paper examines explosion hazards while recovering spilled oil utilizing oil spill recovery barges. The risk of static accumulation and discharge is well understood after thorough investigations of several incidents in the 1970s and 1980s involving explosions on tank barges and vessels during petroleum cargo loading and unloading operations. However, those lessons learned only partially apply to oil spill recovery operations due to the differences in liquid properties, crew training, and additional tasks required during an oil spill response. While regulatory standards have been enacted for petroleum tankers and barges involved in commercial transportation of oil and other hazardous materials, the utility of these standards for oil spill response vessels has not been fully considered. Inverviews were conducted with marine transporters and response organizations to understand the wide range of operational risks and mitigation proceedures currently in use. This paper outlines the four basic conditions that must be present to create a static discharge-induced explosion during liquid cargo operations. A review of explosion casualty history was completed for cargo operations and compared to operations that create similar hazards during oil spill recovery operations. Specific processes that create additional risk of static-induced explosions during response operations were studied to review mitigation actions. Finally, recommendations for continued training are provided to help guide the spill response community when preparing for and responding to oil spills.
REVIEW OF DISPERSANT USE IN U.S. GULF OF MEXICO WATERS SINCE THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
Authors: Henry Charlie
Published: January 2013

Since the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), dispersants have been used as part of a combined response to mitigate seven oil spills in United States Gulf of Mexico (GOM) waters. Of the dispersant operations reported, four utilized the Regional Response Team VI pre-approval authority to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) that requires a monitoring plan. The successful integration of dispersant pre-authorization along with a fully funded ready response delivery system maintained by industry contributed to the successful use of dispersants to aid in mitigating spilled oil. A key element to gaining the original pre-approval authority was a functional operational monitoring plan. While each response was considered a successful dispersant operation, each incident provided valuable lessons learned that have been integrated into subsequent contingency planning and modifications to existing pre-authorization requirements in the GOM. This paper provides a chronological review of oil spill responses where dispersants were applied in the GOM since OPA 90.
NET ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT ANALYSIS (NEBA) OF DISPERSED OIL ON NEARSHORE TROPICAL ECOSYSTEMS DERIVED FROM THE 20 YEAR “TROPICS” FIELD STUDY1
Authors: Baca Bart , Ward Greg A. , Lane Christine H. , Schuler Paul A.
Published: January 2013

In November 1984, non-treated Prudhoe Bay crude oil and dispersed Prudhoe Bay crude oil were intentionally released into two separate sites, representative of near shore mangrove, seagrass and coral ecosystems, as part of the TRopical Oil Pollution Investigations in Coastal Systems (TROPICS) field study in Bahia de Almirante, Panama. Data on the relative effects of non-treated crude oil and dispersed crude oil on these ecosystems (compared to a reference site) were acquired and analyzed over various periods (30 days, 3 months, and 2.6, 10, 17, 18, and 20 years).

In the short term, the oil caused mortality to invertebrate fauna, seagrass beds, and corals at both sites. At the non-treated crude oil site, there was also significant mortality to the mangrove forest. Twenty-year observations and mangrove substrate core samples reveal the continued presence of oil and diminished mangrove repopulation, as well as substrate erosion, at the non-treated crude oil site. No oil was detected and no long-term impacts were observed at the dispersed crude oil and reference sites. These results provide baseline scientific data for developing a Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA) of dispersant use in nearshore tropical systems.

This paper is a review of TROPICS data and its application to NEBA preparation. Data and NEBA from the 20-year TROPICS study clearly show that the use of dispersant in the near shore environment is a sound strategy for both minimizing environmental damage to tropical ecosystems and for providing the best opportunity for recovery and repopulation in this environment. Results of this work should be applicable to similar tropical ecosystems.
FOSS 248-P2 OIL SPILL – A CASE STUDY
Authors: Hutley Tedd , Martinez Myola , Dix Mark
Published: January 2013

At 1205, on December 30, 2003, the Foss Maritime tank barge 248-P2 spilled nearly 6,000 gallons of bunker fuel oil during a loading operation at the Chevron-Point Wells facility in Shoreline, Washington. Approximately 4,637 gallons was discharged into Puget Sound. Upon notification, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO) Puget Sound, Washington Department of Ecology (DOE), and Foss Maritime launched an aggressive response, mobilizing numerous spill response personnel and nearly every major piece of spill response equipment in the Northwest. In less than 24 hours of the spill, nearly all the oil had moved ashore impacting only two miles of shoreline. The most heavily impacted area belonged to the Suquamish Indian Tribe, which included a highly sensitive and culturally significant saltwater marsh. A representative for the Suquamish Tribe quickly joined the Unified Command. Operational success can be linked to the frequent training and exercising of the responding agencies, preplanned geographic response plans, and use of incident command system. Despite the successes, weather and tides proved to be the leading contributor to the four-month shoreline clean up operation. Lessons learned identify response strong points in addition to areas needing improvement.
THE FOSS BARGE 248-P2 OIL SPILL: A CHALLENGE IN SPILL MANAGEMENT
Authors: O'Brien Paul S.
Published: January 2013

On December 30, 2003, a 4620 gallon spill of heavy oil occurred from the tank barge FOSS 248-P2 as it was loading bunker fuel at the Chevron Point Wells oil storage facility at Shoreline (Seattle), Washington. Under the Northwest Area Contingency Plan (NWACP), a unified command made up of a responsible party Incident Commander (IC) from Foss Maritime, a federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), a state OSC from the Washington Department of Ecology, a tribal OSC from the Suquamish Tribe and a local OSC from the Kitsap County Department of Emergency Management (KDEM) formed to manage the spill. A large on-water response force was mobilized but the oil quickly impacted an important environmentally sensitive marsh and beaches owned by both the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington. Commercial and recreational shellfish beds, beach sediments, a pristine marsh and high use public beaches were all affected by the spill. A significant four-month cleanup effort occurred on the beaches and marsh to remove the oil. Operational cleanup endpoints were established for the beaches and marsh. Shellfish and sediment sampling and monitoring plans were developed jointly by agency and tribal workgroups. The Suquamish Tribe was placed in the lead for conducting beach surveys under a long term monitoring plan approved by the unified command. The five members of the unified command faced major challenges during the spill due to overlapping federal, state, local and tribal jurisdictions, land ownership disputes, political consequences, cleanup/operational problems, shellfish and sediment contamination concerns, public outreach issues and the inexperience of several agencies involved. This paper will explore the unique challenges faced by the unified command in responding to the spill.
CHALLENGES OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE IN EGYPTIAN COASTAL ZONE OVERLOOKING THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA*
Authors: Bashat H.
Published: January 2013

The rapid growth of economic development in Egypt over the last few decades has led to numerous offshore projects, expanding maritime facilities and a vast spread of coastal tourist developments. However, adequate capacity building of existing national oil spill response facilities did not complement such growth. This has resulted in an imbalance between the degree of environmental exposure and level of preparedness to respond to potential oil and chemical spills that may occur along these highly sensitive coastal areas and to the marine environment of Egypt. Both the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts of Egypt support thriving ecosystems and a substantial tourist industry centered around golden beaches, crystalline waters, and a plethora of plant and animal species that exist nowhere else on earth. At the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula Ras Mohammad National Park alone shelters over 130 species of coral and 116 species of fish. Only a few kilometers away, the Gulf of Suez is one of the worlds busiest industrial shipping routes. More than 117 million tons of oil pass through Egyptian waters each year and cross Egypt's main land through the SUMED pipeline from Ain Sukhna terminal (at the head of the Gulf of Suez) to Sidi Krir terminal on the Mediterranean. Another 28 to 30 million tons of oil go through the Suez Canal directly and there is a 15000-ship movement every year in Egypt.

The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) has updated a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP), prepared in 1986 by the petroleum sector, in 1998. The NOSCP is the national framework for action in the event of an oil pollution incident. Updating, the NOSCP was just the beginning and not the end of the road. Challenges to take forward necessary action at all response levels to ensure efficiency of application of the NOSCP are enormous. Over the last few years concerned parties and stakeholders conducted several investigations and assessment to identify critical areas of concern and high exposure. Many assessment reports have identified gaps and addressed required measures needed to enhance bridging those gaps and restore the required balance between exposure and preparedness to recover from this situation.

This paper considers the present status of the imbalance between environmental exposure and oil spill response preparedness along Egyptian coastline, describes current status of the NOSCP and the recovery measures taken to improve the situation and ensure credible response to potential major spills.
MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION IN A MAJOR OIL SPILL. THE ERIKA AND PRESTIGE EXPERIENCES
Authors: Gouriou Vincent , Quintin Karen , Cabon Rozenn , Legrand Sébastien
Published: January 2013

In 1999–2000, the response operations to the exceptional Erika pollution (400 km of coastline affected, totalling 400 000 man days of work until summer 2002, 260 000 t of oily waste) highlighted the importance of a daily archiving of operations data and swift exploitation of that information. Satisfactory performance was achieved as regards the map production of overall activity and results, but no real time maps and diagrams, accurate enough to be used as decision aids, could be produced.

When the Prestige incident occurred, in 2003, Cedre proposed to the coordinating authorities in charge of coastline response in France (Civil Defence Zones) to install computerised networks in their Headquarters in order to collect and exploit data about quantity and origin of manpower involved in real time, the amount and characteristics of collected waste, the different techniques, material and products used on response sites. Thanks to this initiative, head response authorities had graphical summaries on their desks daily, synthesis maps weekly, and a complete, fully updated visual situation for each key meeting with the Central authorities, in which budgetary needs for the weeks to come were discussed.

The handling of data exploitation was managed according to the necessity of transmitting the information quickly to decision makers in a crisis context. We first had to send data in a hurry daily or weekly: they were diffused in an approximate and simplified way to enable a quick analysis of the information. Afterwards more time could be taken to complete and validate the information to allow a more detailed exploitation work. They can now be considered in retrospect.

The quick transmission, processing and communication of the information helped avoid some inappropriate responses like excessive waste collection for example (a situation which we had to face during the Erika response phase).

The Prestige experience proved once again the strength and significance of illustrations (graphics or maps) especially in an emergency situation as sensitive as this one: they carry much more power of conviction for decision makers and the public than pages of complex explanations.
ESTIMATING LNG SPREADING ON WATER1
Authors: Fingas Merv , Lehr William J. , Simecek-Beatty Debra
Published: January 2013

In order to meet the growing demands for energy, plans are currently being made to construct several new liquefied natural gas (LNG) off-load terminals in North America. While LNG provides a relatively clean source of fuel, increased shipment means increased potential for accidental releases. Governmental agencies have recognized the safety concerns about such a possible spill event and have recommended the proactive and preemptive addressing of such concerns.

Several recent studies have examined the likely thermal and other hazards from an LNG vessel accident. One possible threat from such an incident is a pool fire, which could be quite large since the volume of a single tank on an LNG vessel can contain as much as 25,000 m of liquefied gas. In general, there is agreement in the literature on the pool fire geometry, burn regression rate, and thermal emissive power of the fire but less concurrence on possible tank leak rate or surface spread rate on water.

The authors review the existing approaches to this latter phenomenon for unconfined spills. Comparison of model predictions with limited experimental data is also discussed

For low wave conditions, two methods, one by Fay and the other by Weber, have been the most widely used in past models, sometimes with modifications that are discussed in the paper. Similarly, two alternative algorithms have recently been suggested for high wave conditions. The authors review the merits of these two approaches, the expected consequences from each approach, and finally compare them to widely used oil spill spreading formulas under energetic wave conditions.
OIL COMPOSITION AND PROPERTY DATABASE FOR OIL SPILL MODELING
Authors: Wang Zhendi , Hollebone B. , Weaver J. , Yang Chun , Fingas M. , Fieldhouse B. , Landriault M. , Gamble L. , Peng X.
Published: January 2013

At the request of the US EPA Oil Program Center, the National Exposure Research Laboratory's Ecosystems Research Division (ERD) in Athens is developing an oil spill model that focuses on fate and transport of oil components under various response scenarios. A database of prototype oils for use in models is necessary. This multiple component composition data, however, is not typically available because of complexity of oil composition and the impossibility of immediate characterization in the event of a spill. Thus the creation of a database containing both physical property and chemical composition data for a number of common oils at various weathering percentages is highly desirable. The data set must be based upon fractionation of the oils into groups of compounds with similar structures and properties and further must reflect the changes to the oil over the course of the spill. Since 1984, the Emergencies Science and Technology Division (ESTD) of Environment Canada (EC) has developed a database on various physical and chemical properties of crude oils and petroleum products. Through many years endeavour, the database now contains information of hundreds of oils from all over the world. In 2002, funded by the US EPA and EC, the ESTD and ERD completed the cooperative project “Development of a Composition Database for Selected Multicomponent Oils,” to characterize ten prototype crude oils and refined petroleum products. The present work, Oil Composition and Property Database for Oil Spill Modeling, is a logical extension of the 2002 project. Nine new crude oils in common use and with potential to be spilled in the US waters were selected for inclusion in the model database. Comprehensive physical property measurement and chemical composition characterization have been performed for these oils at four weathered stages of each oil. This project provides the most complete and comprehensive database for the selected oils to date. The new composition data has been integrated into the existing US EPA and EC oil properties database. The results are made available to the public on the world wide web.
MAKING ICS WORK FOR YOU WHEN IT REALLY COUNTS! – HARD LESSONS LEARNED ON THE SHORES OF CALIFORNIA
Authors: Jochums Carl , Robberson William
Published: January 2013

The moment an oil spill occurs, response speed is of the essence. Yet how often have you participated in the Incident Command System (ICS) at a spill and been frustrated with the speed or the coordination of the response? How often has a response been declared a success but getting there was so frustrating and exhausting that you've sworn you won't work that way anymore?

ICS is here to stay; yet how you can consistently make it work optimally for you and the response remains a challenge. This paper is based upon the premise that ICS enables the right information to be communicated to the right people, in the right format, at the right time. However, during most response debriefs, at the top of the “needs improvement” list you will find numerous references to the failure of information flow and communications. In this paper we share some of the hard lessons-learned in spill response along the California Coast, and ways in which some of the agencies involved today are proactively “preparing to communicate” within the Incident Command System.

We use case histories of past and recent spills and the California Spill of National Significance 2004 exercise to illustrate the communications and coordination problems inherent in most response Incident Command structures. A variety of issues are considered; from the evolutionary paths of most responses; to the numerous personalities and egos involved; to the wide array of expectations amongst participants and stakeholders; and the often unique and varied authorities and agendas that multiple agencies bring to a response.

We also suggest innovative ways in which the process of communications within the ICS is being augmented, enhanced, and set-up for success. We introduce concepts such as “data mining,” “embedded information specialists,” “fault-tolerant” communications mechanisms, “message mapping,” and “NEBA front-end loading”. A number of communications tools and concepts are described, that if implemented, will greatly improve multi-agency coordination and communications during a response, leading to a less stressful and more successful response outcome.
HOW WILL THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN AND THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AFFECT OIL SPILL RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES1
Authors: Plourde Kristy L. , Hight-Allen LaDonn , Matthews Denise L. , Smith Martin L. , Gafkjen CDR Jeff
Published: January 2013

The United States faces a broad range of threats and hazards, both naturally occurring and manmade. Over the past few decades, efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from these varied threats and hazards have evolved into a patchwork collection of special-purpose plans including the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). These plans govern U.S. policy toward hazardous materials releases and oil spill response. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, mandates the creation of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP) to provide a single, comprehensive national approach to incident management. The NRP is intended to integrate the various prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into an all-discipline, all-hazard approach. NIMS provides a standard Incident Command System (ICS) for Federal, State, local and tribal government to work together to prepare for and respond to incidents. NIMS ICS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, technologies, multi-agency coordination systems, unified command, training, identification/management of resources, qualification/certification, and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources. Together, the NRP and NIMS provide a standardized framework to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations work in partnership to support domestic incident management regardless of cause, size, or complexity of the incident. How does this change what is being done in oil and hazardous materials response? The National Contingency Plan (NCP, 40 CFR 300) notes that “where practicable,” the framework for the response shall use ICS within a Unified Command (UC) system. OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910.120) also require the use of ICS for emergency response. The response community (federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations) has been using “ICS” in oil spill/HAZMAT response since the early 1990's in the United States. NIMS ICS will be used when responding to oil HAZMAT spills, however, there are differences in ICS implementation between responders in the response community and NIMS ICS will have stricter requirements to improve uniformity in application. These similarities and differences will be discussed at length in this paper.
PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR TIER 1 RESPONSE IS FUNDAMENTALTO EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AT ALL LEVELS1
Authors: Santner Richard
Published: January 2013

The oil industry concept of tiered preparedness and response has long been established as a valuable model for developing an appropriate response structure, with capabilities commensurate with oil spill events and their associated consequences. A Tier 1 incident is typically referred to as an operational one occurring at or near a company's own facilities, as a consequence of its own activities. An individual company would typically provide resources to respond to this type of spill. The Tier 1 part is often seen as the smallest and thus the least significant and this Paper asks whether enough planning and training is done at this level.

Different oil industry activities encompassing exploration, production, shipping transportation, oil handling facilities and even pipelines, give rise to a varied and broad range of scenarios that call for different Tier 1 solutions. In any spill event, speed and efficiency of first response, and the awareness of the integrated tiered solution that ensures an appropriate call for additional resources when required, will make a significant difference to the effectiveness of the overall response. Thus we need to spend time and effort planning well and training at the Tier 1 level.

This Paper describes some of the possible Tier 1 scenarios that may be applied to the planning process and the key issues that need to be considered, to ensure Tier 1 capabilities are appropriate, effective and robust, and can be relied upon to support the tiered escalation of response.
THE SHARING OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN BETWEEN THE SHIPPIING AND OIL INDUSTRIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION REGIMES
Authors: Nichols Joe , Morgan Miles
Published: January 2013

The international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage is based on international Conventions adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). When the international compensation Conventions were first elaborated over thirty years ago in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident, it was decided to establish a two-tier system whereby the economic consequences of marine oil spills from tankers should be shared between the shipping industry and those industries who either owned or received the cargoes transported by sea. Although the limits of liability and compensation under the Conventions have been revised from time to time, the concept of sharing has been maintained.

In 2004 the Secretariat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds undertook a study of the costs of oil spills from tankers worldwide, except the United States, over the past 25 years. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which the economic consequences of oil spills had been shared by the shipping and oil sectors under the Conventions as envisaged when they were elaborated and under the voluntary industry schemes which coexisted and interacted with the Conventions for much of that time. The results of the study and their impact on any future revisions of the international Conventions, particularly as regards the sharing of the financial burden, are the subject of this paper.
RESPONSE CAPABILITY: CAN ECONOMICS JUSTIFY SUSTAINABILITY?1
Authors: Grau Sharon E.
Published: January 2013

This paper explores the motivations for corporate engagement in environmentally sustainable behavior. Although there are several reasons for companies to apply environmentally sustainable business practices, the most enticing are economic. Like a pendulum, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 responded to a full left swing of potential major disasters and brought the weight to the far right. These regulations established requirements for the response equipment/personnel needed in the event of a worst-case discharge. Also due to the significant efforts of established pollution prevention regulations, the past decade has seen a drastic drop in the number of spills and the amount of oil discharged.

The strides toward improvement are impressive, but the reduction in spills, seems to be leading toward regionalization of local response assets and elimination of excess duplication by not replacing unserviceable equipment. Effective responses are also a key part of environmental sustainability. The end result could be a very expensive response, which could be simply averted by retaining current levels of local response capability.

Understanding that the primary objective of any company is profit, environmental protection can provide one path toward financial reward. This includes, but is not limited to a “green” public image, which generally increases the consumer base and profits. The economic benefits of environmentally sound business practices, however, are not always initially apparent. Therefore, monetary gain may not always present sufficient motivation. In this case, proponents of environmental sustainability can cite social responsibility as cause, or look to the federal government for support and control.

In an effort to stop the swing of the pendulum between a major disaster and the inability to respond, companies should be encouraged to maintain response capabilities at their current levels and to recognize that a loss of local response resources could be both an environmental and financial nightmare.
DISSOLVED- AND PARTICULATE-PHASE HYDROCARBONS IN INTERSTITIAL WATER FROM PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND INTERTIDAL BEACHES CONTAINING BURIED OIL THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL
Authors: Payne James R. , Driskell William B. , Lindeberg Mandy R. , Fournier Wyatt , Larsen Marie L. , Short Jeffrey W. , Rice Stanley D. , Janka David
Published: January 2013

Buried oil residues in selected beaches that were heavily contaminated by the 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) continue to leach oil-contaminated suspended particulate material (SPM) and dissolved-phase polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) into interstitial- and near-shore waters. Both are bioavailable forms of hydrocarbons that can be absorbed or consumed. On selected intertidal beaches in Prince William Sound (PWS) during June 2002, nearshore- and interstitial-water samples were collected during outgoing tides, first from a water depth of 10–15 cm above undisturbed sediments at water's edge and then from pits dug just above the waterline. At the time of collection, all samples were vacuum-filtered through 0.7-µm pore-size, glass-fiber filters using a Portable Large Volume Water Sampling System (PLVWSS) to separate dissolved- and oil-contaminated SPM fractions for detailed hydrocarbon analyses and fingerprinting.

From intertidal pits at oil-impacted sites, interstitial water and SPM displayed strong oil signatures and elevated (albeit variable) PAH and n-alkane levels compared to the trivial non-petrogenic signatures seen at the reference sites. The dissolved-phase samples at the oil-impacted sites were typically characterized by water-soluble, lower-molecular-weight PAH, while the SPM/oil-phase contained the relatively-insoluble, higher-molecular-weight PAH and n-alkanes. Water's-edge samples (collected before any pits were excavated) typically showed a diluted- and degraded-compositional signature traceable to the interstitial water from higher tide levels. Interstitial-water dissolved-phase concentrations (average 1,200 ng/L.; 76–4,600 ng/L vs. 18–27 ng/L for reference sites) were above those reported to cause impacts to herring and salmon eggs (<1,000 ng/L; Rice et al., 2001). At reference sites, the water's edge samples matched the interstitial water with very low, non-petrogenic signatures. A recent diesel spill at a nearby site showed dissolved-phase patterns similar to those at the current EVOS sites.
BENEFITS AND USE OF OPERATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY SYSTEMS FOR DRIFT FORECASTS
Authors: Daniel P. , Dandin Ph.
Published: January 2013

The use of products delivered from operational oceanography systems to oil spill drift applications is investigated. The evaluation is conducted with the French operational oil spill drift forecast system MOTHY and three operational oceanography systems, MERCATOR (MERCATOR-OCEAN, France), FOAM (MetOffice, UK) and MFS (INGV, Italy).

The present work focuses on evaluating the effects of introducing large scale currents in the MOTHY system. This effect is investigated in the Bay of Biscay and in the Western part of the Mediterranean Sea. Preliminary results are most encouraging.