bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Does electroconvulsive therapy cause brain damage?
Authors: Weiner Richard D.
Published: February 2010

Although the use of ECT has declined dramatically from its inception, this decrease has recently shown signs of leveling out because of ECT's powerful therapeutic effect in severely ill depressed individuals who either do not respond to pharmacologic alternatives or are too ill to tolerate a relatively lengthy drug trial. Notwithstanding its therapeutic benefits, ECT has also remained a controversial treatment modality, particularly in the eye of the public. Given the unsavory qualities associated with the word “electroconvulsive,” claims of possible, probable, or even certain brain damage with ECT have easily found listeners. A careful, nonselective assessment of data covering the areas of pathology, radiology, electrophysiology, biochemistry, and neuropsychology leads both to certain conclusions and to certain unanswered questions. ECT is not the devastating purveyor of wholesale brain damage that some of its detractors claim. For the typical individual receiving ECT, no detectable correlates of irreversible brain damage appear to occur. Still, there remains the possibility that either subtle, objectively undetectable persistent deficits, particularly in the area of autobiographic memory function, occur, or that a rarely occurring syndrome of more pervasive persistent deficits related to ECT use may be present. Clearly, more research directed toward answering these questions needs to be carried out so that the role of ECT can be more rigorously defined. While such research is pending, however, we cannot expect that the conditions that predispose to clinical referrals for ECT will disappear. Given the misery, anguish, and risk of death by suicide, starvation, or debilitation associated with severe depressive illness, for example, it still appears that ECT, at least for the present, must continue to be available.
Methods and theories in the experimental analysis of behavior
Authors: Skinner B. F.
Published: February 2010

We owe most scientific knowledge to methods of inquiry that are never formally analyzed. The analysis of behavior does not call for hypothetico-deductive methods. Statistics, taught in lieu of scientific method, is incompatible with major features of much laboratory research. Squeezing significance out of ambiguous data discourages the more promising step of scrapping the experiment and starting again. As a consequence, psychologists have taken flight from the laboratory. They have fled to Real People and the human interest of “real life,” to Mathematical Models and the elegance of symbolic treatments, to the Inner Man and the explanatory preoccupation with inferred internal mechanisms, and to Laymanship and its appeal to “common sense.” An experimental analysis provides an alternative to these divertissements.

The “theories” to which objection is raised here are not the basic assumptions essential to any scientific activity or statements that are not yet facts, but rather explanations which appeal to events taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation, described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different dimensions. Three types of learning theories satisfy this definition: physiological theories attempting to reduce behavior to events in the nervous system; mentalistic theories appealing to inferred inner events; and theories of the Conceptual Nervous System offered as explanatory models of behavior. It would be foolhardy to deny the achievements of such theories in the history of science. The question of whether they are necessary, however, has other implications.

Experimental material in three areas illustrates the function of theory more concretely. Alternatives to behavior ratios, excitatory potentials, and so on demonstrate the utility of rate or probability of response as the basic datum in learning. Functional relations between behavior and environmental variables provide an account of why learning occurs. Activities such as preferring, choosing, discriminating, and matching can be dealt with solely in terms of behavior, without referring to processes in another dimensional system. The experiments are not offered as demonstrating that theories are not necessary but to suggest an alternative. Theory is possible in another sense. Beyond the collection of uniform relationships lies the need for a formal representation of the data reduced to a minimal number of terms. A theoretical construction may yield greater generality than any assemblage of facts; such a construction will not refer to another dimensional system.
Behaviorism at fifty
Authors: Skinner B. F.
Published: February 2010

Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science of behavior must face the problem of privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior, without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way.

The search for copies of the world within the body (e.g. the sensations and images of conscious content) has also had discouraging results. The organism does not create duplicates: Its seeing, hearing, smelling, and so on are forms of action rather than of reproduction. Seeing does not imply something seen. We know that when we dream of wolves, no wolves are actually there; it is harder to understand that not even representations of wolves are there.

Mentalistic formulations create mental way stations. Where experimental analyses examine the effects of variables on behavior, mentalistic psychologies deal first with their effects on inferred entities such as feelings or expectations and then with the effects of these entities on behavior. Mental states thus seem to bridge gaps between dependent and independent variables, and mentalistic interpretations are particularly attractive when these are separated by long time periods. The practice confuses the order of events and leads to unfinished causal accounts.
Reply to Catania
Authors: Skinner B. F.
Published: February 2010

What is selected? Around the turn of the century, Samuel Butler made the point that a hen is only an egg's way of making another egg. He was anticipating the view that the organism is the servant of the gene. But the organism is needed by the gene. Variations occur in genes but must be selected in organisms. If we regard a culture as a social environment that shapes the behavior of new members of a group, then we can say that a culture is simply an individual's way of producing other enculturated individuals. Variations occur in the individual, but it is the culture with its practices that survives. Many practices evolve and survive independently of particular cultures, just as eyes, ears, wings, and legs – the “practices” of species – evolve and survive independently of particular species.
“What” and “where” in spatial language and spatial cognition
Authors: Landau Barbara , Jackendoff Ray
Published: February 2010

Fundamental to spatial knowledge in all species are the representations underlying object recognition, object search, and navigation through space. But what sets humans apart from other species is our ability to express spatial experience through language. This target article explores the language ofobjectsandplaces, asking what geometric properties are preserved in the representations underlying object nouns and spatial prepositions in English. Evidence from these two aspects of language suggests there are significant differences in the geometric richness with which objects and places are encoded. When an object is named (i.e., with count nouns), detailed geometric properties – principally the object's shape (axes, solid and hollow volumes, surfaces, and parts) – are represented. In contrast, when an object plays the role of either “figure” (located object) or “ground” (reference object) in a locational expression, only very coarse geometric object properties are represented, primarily the main axes. In addition, the spatial functions encoded by spatial prepositions tend to be nonmetric and relatively coarse, for example, “containment,” “contact,” “relative distance,” and “relative direction.” These properties are representative of other languages as well. The striking differences in the way language encodes objects versus places lead us to suggest two explanations: First, there is a tendency for languages to level out geometric detail from both object and place representations. Second, a nonlinguistic disparity between the representations of “what” and “where” underlies how language represents objects and places. The language of objects and places converges with and enriches our understanding of corresponding spatial representations.
Cultural and reproductive success in industrial societies: Testing the relationship at the proximate and ultimate levels
Authors: Pérusse Daniel
Published: February 2010

In most social species, position in the male social hierarchy and reproductive success are positively correlated; in humans, however, this relationship is less clear, with studies of traditional societies yielding mixed results. In the most economically advanced human populations, the adaptiveness of status vanishes altogether; social status and fertility are uncorrelated. These findings have been interpreted to suggest that evolutionary principles may not be appropriate for the explanation of human behavior, especially in modern environments. The present study tests the adaptiveness of social status with actual mating and reproductive data in a representative sample of males from an industrial society. Reproductive success, even when assessed by a more reliable measure ofactualmale fertility than the one commonly used, fails to correlate with social status. In striking contrast, however, status is found to be highly correlated withpotentialfertility, as estimated from copulation frequency. Status thus accounts for as much as 62% of the variance in thisproximatecomponent of fitness. This pattern is remarkably similar to what is found in many traditional societies and would result in a substantial positive relationship between cultural and reproductive success in industrial populations were it not for the novel conditions imposed by contraception and monogamy. Various underlying mechanisms are suggested for these findings, illustrating the value of current behavioral and reproductive data in the study of adaptation. It is concluded that evolutionary explanations of human behavior remain entirely relevant in modern societies.
Cultural learning
Authors: Tomasello Michael , Kruger Ann Cale , Ratner Hilary Horn
Published: February 2010

This target article presents a theory of human cultural learning. Cultural learning is identified with those instances of social learning in which intersubjectivity or perspective-taking plays a vital role, both in the original learning process and in the resulting cognitive product. Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning – in that order. Evidence is provided that this progression arises from the developmental ordering of the underlying social-cognitive concepts and processes involved. Imitative learning relies on a concept of intentional agent and involves simple perspective-taking. Instructed learning relies on a concept of mental agent and involves alternating/coordinated perspective-taking (intersubjectivity). Collaborative learning relies on a concept of reflective agent and involves integrated perspective-taking (reflective intersubjectivity). A comparison of normal children, autistic children and wild and enculturated chimpanzees provides further evidence for these correlations between social cognition and cultural learning. Cultural learning is a uniquely human form of social learning that allows for a fidelity of transmission of behaviors and information among conspecifics not possible in other forms of social learning, thereby providing the psychological basis for cultural evolution.
Kinesthetic-visual matching, perspective-taking and reflective self-awareness in cultural learning
Authors: Mitchell Robert W.
Published: February 2010

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner deserve congratulations for their well-reasoned ideas on the development of cultural learning. Their arguments are generally convincing, perhaps because their distinctions and developmental relations among types of cultural learning and agency mirror concepts of my own.
Express saccades and visual attention
Authors: Fischer B. , Weber H.
Published: February 2010

One of the most intriguing and controversial observations in oculomotor research in recent years is the phenomenon of express saccades in monkeys and man. These are saccades with such short reaction times (100 msec in man, 70 msec in monkeys) that some experts on eye movements still regard them as artifacts or as anticipatory reactions that do not need any further explanation. On the other hand, some research groups consider them not only authentic but also a valuable means of investigating the mechanisms of saccade generation, the coordination of vision and eye movements, and the mechanisms of visual attention.

This target article puts together pieces of experimental evidence in oculomotor and related research – with special emphasis on the express saccade – to enhance our present understanding of the coordination of vision, visual attention, and the eye movements subserving visual perception and cognition.

We hypothesize that an optomotor reflex is responsible for the occurrence of express saccades, one that is controlled by higher brain functions involved in disengaged visual attention and decision making. We propose a neural network as the basis for more elaborate mathematical models or computer simulations of the optomotor system in primates.
Coevolution of neocortical size, group size and language in humans
Authors: Dunbar R. I. M.
Published: February 2010

Group size covaries with relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. This regression equation predicts a group size for modern humans very similar to that for hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Similar group sizes are found in other contemporary and historical societies. Nonhuman primates maintain group cohesion through social grooming; among the Old World monkeys and apes, social grooming time is linearly related to group size. Maintaining stability of human-sized groups by grooming alone would make intolerable time demands. It is therefore suggested (1) that the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on developing a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and (2) that language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans accord with the predicted relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. In human conversations about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. Language may accordingly have evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than was feasible by direct observation alone.
Neuropsychological inference with an interactive brain: A critique of the “locality” assumption
Authors: Farah Martha J.
Published: February 2010

When cognitive neuropsychologists make inferences about the functional architecture of the normal mind from selective cognitive impairments they generally assume that the effects of brain damage are local, that is, that the nondamaged components of the architecture continue to function as they did before the damage. This assumption follows from the view that the components of the functional architecture are modular, in the sense of being informationally encapsulated. In this target article it is argued that this “locality” assumption is probably not correct in general. Inferences about the functional architecture can nevertheless be made from neuropsychological data with an alternative set of assumptions, according to which human information processing is graded, distributed, and interactive. These claims are supported by three examples of neuropsychological dissociations and a comparison of the inferences obtained from these impairments with and without the locality assumption. The three dissociations are: selective impairments in knowledge of living things, disengagment of visual attention, and overt face recognition. In all three cases, the neuropsychological phenomena lead to more plausible inferences about the normal functional architecture when the locality assumption is abandoned. Also discussed are the relations between the locality assumption in neuropsychology and broader issues, including Fodor's modularity hypothesis and the choice between top-down and bottom-up research approaches.
The representing brain: Neural correlates of motor intention and imagery
Authors: Jeannerod M.
Published: February 2010

This paper concerns how motor actions are neurally represented and coded. Action planning and motor preparation can be studied using a specific type of representational activity, motor imagery. A close functional equivalence between motor imagery and motor preparation is suggested by the positive effects of imagining movements on motor learning, the similarity between the neural structures involved, and the similar physiological correlates observed in both imaging and preparing. The content of motor representations can be inferred from motor images at a macroscopic level, based on global aspects of the action (the duration and amount of effort involved) and the motor rules and constraints which predict the spatial path and kinematics of movements. A more microscopic neural account calls for a representation of object-oriented action. Object attributes are processed in different neural pathways depending on the kind of task the subject is performing. During object-oriented action, a pragmatic representation is activated in which object affordances are transformed into specific motor schemas (independently of other tasks such as object recognition). Animal as well as human clinical data implicate the posterior parietal and premotor cortical areas in schema instantiation. A mechanism is proposed that is able to encode the desired goal of the action and is applicable to different levels of representational organization.
Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences
Authors: Wilson David Sloan , Sober Elliott
Published: February 2010

In both biology and the human sciences, social groups are sometimes treated as adaptive units whose organization cannot be reduced to individual interactions. This group-level view is opposed by a more individualistic one that treats social organization as a byproduct of self-interest. According to biologists, group-level adaptations can evolve only by a process of natural selection at the group level. Most biologists rejected group selection as an important evolutionary force during the 1960s and 1970s but a positive literature began to grow during the 1970s and is rapidly expanding today. We review this recent literature and its implications for human evolutionary biology. We show that the rejection of group selection was based on a misplaced emphasis on genes as “replicators” which is in fact irrelevant to the question of whether groups can be like individuals in their functional organization. The fundamental question is whether social groups and other higher-level entities can be “vehicles” of selection. When this elementary fact is recognized, group selection emerges as an important force in nature and what seem to be competing theories, such as kin selection and reciprocity, reappear as special cases of group selection. The result is a unified theory of natural selection that operates on a nested hierarchy of units.

The vehicle-based theory makes it clear that group selection is an important force to consider in human evolution. Humans can facultatively span the full range from self-interested individuals to “organs” of group-level “organisms.” Human behavior not only reflects the balance between levels of selection but it can also alter the balance through the construction of social structures that have the effect of reducing fitness differences within groups, concentrating natural selection (and functional organization) at the group level. These social structures and the cognitive abilities that produce them allow group selection to be important even among large groups of unrelated individuals.
Précis ofBeyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science
Authors: Karmiloff-Smith Annette
Published: February 2010

Beyond modularityattempts a synthesis of Fodor's anticonstructivist nativism and Piaget's antinativist constructivism. Contra Fodor, I argue that: (1) the study of cognitive development is essential to cognitive science, (2) the module/central processing dichotomy is too rigid, and (3) the mind does not begin with prespecified modules; rather, development involves a gradual process of “modularization.” Contra Piaget, I argue that: (1) development rarely involves stagelike domain-general change and (2) domainspecific predispositions give development a small but significant kickstart by focusing the infant's attention on proprietary inputs. Development does not stop at efficient learning. A fundamental aspect of human development (“representational redescription”) is the hypothesized process by which information that isina cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledgetothat system. Development thus involves two complementary processes of progressive modularization and progressive “explicitation.” Empirical findings on the child as linguist, physicist, mathematician, psychologist, and notator are discussed in support of the theoretical framework. Each chapter concentrates first on the initial state of the infant mind/brain and on subsequent domain-specific learning in infancy and early childhood. It then goes on to explore data on older children's problem solving and theory building, with particular focus on evolving cognitive flexibility. Emphasis is placed throughout on the status of representations underlying different capacities and on the multiple levels at which knowledge is stored and accessible. Finally, consideration is given to the need for more formal developmental models, and a comparison is made between representational redescription and connectionist simulations of development. In conclusion, I consider what is special about human cognition by speculating on the status of representations underlying the structure of behavior in other species.
Gene replacement therapy in the central nervous system: Viral vector-mediated therapy of global neurodegenerative disease
Authors: Neuwelt Edward A. , Pagel Michael A. , Geller Alfred , Muldoon Leslie L.
Published: February 2010

This target article describes the current state of global gene replacement in the brain using viral vectors and assesses possible solutions to some of the many problems inherent in gene therapy of the central nervous system (CNS). Gene replacement therapy in the CNS is a potential means of producing a stable expression of normal human proteins in deficient cells and thus curing certain genetically inherited enzyme deficiencies and metabolic diseases as well as cancers. The two major issues to be addressed in CNS gene replacement are the delivery of genetic material to the brain and the expression of recombinant genetic material in target cells within the CNS. Focal inoculation of recombinant virions or other genetic vectors has limitations in global CNS disease. A new approach is the blood-brain barrier (BBB) disruption technique developed in this laboratory, in which hypertonic mannitol transiently shrinks the BBB endothelium, allowing passage of high molecular weight compounds and even viruses. Gene therapy of the CNS will require a viral vector system that allows long-term, nontoxic gene expression in neurons or glial cells. Retroviral vectors have limitations in CNS gene replacement, although they are suitable for expressing recombinant genes in intracerebral grafts, or toxic genes in brain tumors. Using mutant neurotropic viruses with reduced neurotoxicity (such as defective herpes simplex virus type I [HSV-1], the HSV-1 amplicon vector system we have developed, or adenovirus mutants) has potential for direct treatment of neurons. Injecting these vectors into rodent brains can lead to stable expression of foreign genetic material in postmitotic neuronal cells. We discuss our BBB disruption delivery technique, our defective HSV-1 amplicon vector system, and our feline model for the neuronal lysosomal storage disorder Gm2-gangliosidosis (Sandhoff disease), which may prove to be a useful model system for CNS gene therapy.
Some practical and theoretical issues concerning fetal brain tissue grafts as therapy for brain dysfunctions
Authors: Stein Donald G. , Glasier Marylou M.
Published: February 2010

Grafts of embryonic neural tissue into the brains of adult patients are currently being used to treat Parkinson's disease and are under serious consideration as therapy for a variety of other degenerative and traumatic disorders. This target article evaluates the use of transplants to promote recovery from brain injury and highlights the kinds of questions and problems that must be addressed before this form of therapy is routinely applied. It has been argued that neural transplantation can promote functional recovery through the replacement of damaged nerve cells, the reestablishment of specific nerve pathways lost as a result of injury, the release of specific neurotransmitters, or the production of factors that promote neuronal growth. The latter two mechanisms, which need not rely on anatomical connections to the host brain, are open to examination for nonsurgical, less intrusive therapeutic use. Certain subjective judgments used to select patients who will receive grafts and in assessment of the outcome of graft therapy make it difficult to evaluate the procedure. In addition, little long-term assessment of transplant efficacy and effect has been done in nonhuman primates. Carefully controlled human studies, with multiple testing paradigms, are also needed to establish the efficacy of transplant therapy.
Immunobiology of neural transplants and functional incorporation of grafted dopamine neurons
Authors: Blount Jeffrey B. , Kondoh Takeshi , Pundt Lisa L. , Conrad John , Jansen Elizabeth M. , Low Walter C.
Published: February 2010

In contrast to the views put forth by Stein & Glasier, we support the use of inbred strains of rodents in studies of the immunobiology of neural transplants. Inbred strains demonstrate homology of the major histocompatibility complex (MHC). Virtually all experimental work in transplantation immunology is performed using inbred strains, yet very few published studies of immune rejection in intracerebral grafts have used inbred animals.
Multiple potential mechanisms of graft action is not a new idea
Authors: Dunnett Stephen B.
Published: February 2010

It is well established that neural grafts can exert functional effects on the host animal by a multiplicity of different mechanisms – by diffuse release of trophic molecules, neurohormones, and deficient neurotransmitters, as well as by growth and reformation of neural circuits. Our challenge is to understand how these different mechanisms complement each other.
Elegant studies of transplant-derived repair of cognitive performance
Authors: Dunnett Stephen B. , Torres Eduardo M.
Published: February 2010

Cholinergic-rich grafts have been shown to be effective in restoring maze-learning deficits in rats with lesions of the forebrain cholinergic projection system. However, the relevance of those studies to developing novel therapies for Alzheimer's disease is questioned.
Transplantation, plasticity, and the aging host
Authors: Felten David L.
Published: February 2010

Neural transplantation as a recovery strategy for neuro-degenerative diseases in humans has used mainly grafting following acute denervation strategies in young adult hosts. Our work in aged mice and rats demonstrates an age-related increase in susceptibility to oxidative damage from neurotoxins, a remarkably poor recovery of C57BL/6 mice from MPTP insult with transplantation and growth factors, even at 12 months of age, and diminished plasticity of host neurons. We believe that extrapolation of data from young adult animal models to aged humans without thorough investigation of transplantation and host response inagedrecipients is scientifically and ethically inappropriate.
Thinking about repairing thinking
Authors: Ridley R. M.
Published: February 2010

The work of Sinden et al. suggests that it may be possible to produce improvement in the “highest” areas of brain function by transplanting brain tissue. What appears to be the limiting factor is not the complexity of the mental process under consideration but the discreteness of the lesion which causes the impairment and the appropriateness and accuracy of placement of the grafted tissue.
Models of neurological defects and defects in neurological models
Authors: Schallert Timothy
Published: February 2010

The transition from research to patient following advances in transplantation research is likely to be disappointing unless it includes a better understanding of critically relevant characteristics of the neurological disorder and improvements in the animal models, particularly the behavioral features. The appropriateness of the model has less to do with the species than with how the species is used.
Neural grafting in human disease versus animal models: Cautionary notes
Authors: Steece-Collier Kathy
Published: February 2010

Over the past two decades, research on neural transplantation in animal models of neurodegeneration has provided provocative in sights into the therapeutic use of grafted tissue for various neurological diseases. Although great strides have been made and functional benefits gained in these animal models, much information is still needed with regard to transplantation in human patients. Several factors are unique to human disease, for example, age of the recipient, duration of disease, and drug interaction with grafted cells; these need to be explored before grafting can be considered a safe and effective therapeutic tool.
Will brain tissue grafts become an important therapy to restore visual function in cerebrally blind patients?
Authors: Werth Reinhard
Published: February 2010

Grafting embryonic brain tissue into the brain of patients with visual field loss due to cerebral lesions may become a method to restore visual function. This method is not without risk, however, and will only be considered in cases of complete blindness after bilateral occipital lesions, when other, risk-free neuropsychological methods fail.
Grafts and the art of mind's reconstruction
Authors: Sinden John D. , Hodges Helen , Gray Jeffrey A.
Published: February 2010

The use of neural transplantation to alleviate cognitive deficits is still in its infancy. We have an inadequate understanding of the deficits induced by different types of brain damage and their homologies in animal models against which to assess graft-induced recovery, and of the ways in which graft growth and function are influenced by factors within the host brain and the environment in which the host is operating. Further, use of fetal tissue may only be a transitory phase in the search for appropriate donor sources. Nevertheless, findings from our laboratory and elsewhere have made aprima faciecase for successful cognitive reconstruction by graft methods.
The future is uncertain: Eat dessert first
Authors: Fantino Edmund
Published: February 2010

There may be evolutionary as well as economic reasons why organisms generally act impulsively. I discuss this possibility and suggest some follow-up experiments that may clarify the exciting empirical and theoretical contributions made by the experiments discussed in the target article.
Conceptual problems in the act-versus-pattern analysis of self-control
Authors: Kanekar Suresh
Published: February 2010

The primary argument against Rachlin's act-versus-pattern analysis of self-control is that it is wrong to think of a temptation as a solitary act while the alternative is conceived of as an element of a pattern. Either both are solitary acts or both are members of patterns, however different the patterns may be in their complexity and abstractness.
The future of an illusion: Self and its control
Authors: Killeen Peter R.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin introduces a new theory before exhausting its predecessor. His earlier model of future-discounting may be developed by integrating over the duration of extended rewards and punishers. The difference in value of an event within a pattern over the event in isolation derives from the deprivation provided by the pattern; yet the pattern attracts because acute rewards are more potent than incremental deprivations.
Conceptualizing self-control
Authors: Mele Alfred
Published: February 2010

A pair of arguments suggests that self-control is not properly conceptualized on the pattern/act/preference model Rachlin proposes. The first concerns the irrational following of personal rules. The second concerns scenarios in which behavioral patterns an agent deems good come into conflict.
The cost of an interrupted response pattern
Authors: Zentall Thomas R.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin proposes that the mechanism underlying self-control involves the cost incurred in changing one's response pattern, but his account explains neither how the response pattern is originally established nor why a change in response pattern entails a cost. I suggest that response patterns occur because they tend to be effective (thus alternatives are more costly) and are maintained because the decision process itself is costly.
Complex behaviors: Evolution and the brain
Authors: Dingwall William O.
Published: February 2010

Three issues are addressed in this commentary. (1) Wilkins & Wakefield are commended for placing the complex behavior they discuss within an evolutionary matrix. (2) They err on a number of points in regard to their treatment of this complex behavior. These involve (a) their emphasis on the evolution of conceptual structure rather than language, (b) their equation of meaning with reference, (c) their minimalist view of learning theory, and (d) their separation of the evolution of speech from that of language. (3) They adopt a framework for neural preconditions that has been clearly discredited on both behavioral and neuroanatomical grounds. Finally, recent research involving modern neuroimaging techniques casts further doubt on the authors' postulated functions for the neural areas they discuss.
Solving the language origins puzzle: Collecting and assemblingallpertinent pieces
Authors: Gibson Kathleen R.
Published: February 2010

Wilkins & Wakefield fall short of solving the language origin puzzle because they underestimate the cognitive and linguistic capacities of great apes. A focus on ape capacities leads to the recognition of varied levels of cognition and language and to a gradualistic model of language emergence in which early hominid language skills exceed those of the apes but fall far short of those of modern humans or later fossil hominid groups.
Language as a multimodal sensory enhancement system
Authors: Jacobs Bob , Horner John M.
Published: February 2010

Several claims made by Wilkins & Wakefield require qualification. First, the proposed delineation of the parietal-occipital-temporal junction (POT) is overly restrictive. Second, focusing exclusively on the evolutionary importance of manual manipulation oversimplifies interacting evolutionary preconditions for language. Finally, Wilkins and Wakefield's perspective adheres to a homocentric, formal, linguistic definition of language instead of viewing language as a multimodal sensory enhancement system unique to each species.
Issues in neo- and paleoneurology of language
Authors: Jerison Harry J.
Published: February 2010

Wilkins and Wakefield's hypothesis that language is fundamentally a cognitive rather than cominunicational adaptation is reasonable, but there are flaws in their anatomical and fossil evidence. Their analysis of reorganization also needs clarification. Finally, the origin of language ability must have occurred with australopithecine rather than habiline adaptations on entry into the novel hominid adaptive zone.
Semiogenesis as a continuous, not a discrete, phenomenon
Authors: Liska Jo
Published: February 2010

This commentary confronts one of the central tenets advanced in Wilkins & Wakefield's target article: “language is unlikely to have evolved directly from communication-based precursors, nor is it likely to have been based on those structures that subserve communication.” By adopting a very narrow perspective on language, the authors have effectively limited discussion of earlier linguistic capabilities thought to be at least facilitative of, if not prerequisite to language defined as a “formal grammatical system.” An alternative conceptualization for describing semiogenesis is offered.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Authors: Block Ned
Published: February 2010

Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different “consciousnesses.” Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of “consciousness” based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct “guesses.” They cannot harness this information in the service of action, however, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field arebothaccess-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of accessconsciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness.
Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness?
Authors: Armstrong D. M.
Published: February 2010

Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
Fallacies or analyses?
Authors: Church Jennifer
Published: February 2010

To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that theconceptof phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
Phenomenal access: A moving target
Authors: Levine Joseph
Published: February 2010

Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
Access denied
Authors: Lloyd Dan
Published: February 2010

The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.
Should we continue to study consciousness?
Authors: Warren Richard M.
Published: February 2010

Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
More on prosopagnosia
Authors: Young Andrew W.
Published: February 2010

Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness
Authors: Zalla Tiziana , Palma Adriano P.
Published: February 2010

In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
A stochastic optimality theory of preparedness and plasticity
Authors: Figueredo Aurelio José
Published: February 2010

Many now consider “instinct” and “learning” opposite poles of a unidimensional continuum. An alternative model with two independently varying parameters predicts different selective pressures. Behavioral adaptation matches the organism's utilizations of stimuli and responses to their ecological validities: the mean validity over evolutionary time specifies the optimal initial potency of the prepared association; the variance specifies the optimal prepared plasticity.
Counterevidence from psychopharmacology, psychopathology, and psychobiology
Authors: Klein Donald F.
Published: February 2010

Davey's discussion of phobias is criticized because of the lack of distinctions between the various classes of phobias. Psychopharmacological evidence indicates differing pathophysiologies. Clinical psychopharmacological distinctions are not congruent with either a strict phylogenetic preparedness model or with cognitive biases. Davey's critique of the laboratory bred animal studies seems far fetched. His hypothesis concerning the importance of historical significance is clearly ad hoc rather than based on comparative data.
Why are phobias irrational?
Authors: Lovibond Peter F. , Siddle David A. T. , Bond Nigel W.
Published: February 2010

We endorse Davey's view that expectancy processes are intimately involved in fear reactions, but question his model on three grounds. First, the mechanism for generating expectancy bias to both ontogenetic and phylogenetic stimuli is not spelled out. Second, the selective association component is unnecessary. Third, the model fails to provide a clear explanation for the irrationality of phobic reactions.
Nonlinear experiential influences on the development of fear reactions
Authors: Miller David B.
Published: February 2010

Failure to find an obvious or linear relationship between a developmental experiential factor and a developmental outcome often leads investigators to posit concepts such as “biological preparedness” and “evolved predispositions” that allude to hypothetical geneticmechanisms that may not exist. However, experiential nonlinearities alone may explain the development of certain instinctive behaviors, as shown by studies on alarm call responsivity in mallard ducklings.
The generalized expectancy bias: An explanatory enigma
Authors: Plaud Joseph J.
Published: February 2010

According to Davey, generalized expectancy biases cause fearrelevant behavior and may complement Seligman's biological preparedness model. Expectancy biases do not explain the preparedness phenomenon, because such cognitive (or covert behavioral) processes are themselves controlled by social and other environmentally based contingencies. Davey's own examination of the importance of cross-cultural factors can show the relationship between FR stimuli and behavior without needing cognitive agency to explain the behavioral phenomenon.
What is the critical evidence favoring expectancy bias theory, and where is it?
Authors: Tomarken Andrew J.
Published: February 2010

Davey has failed to clarify the critical evidence that could corroborate the expectancy bias hypothesis and refute preparedness theory. Such a clarification is necessary because each theory could potentially allow for multiple distal and proximal influences on selective associations. Expectancies are not the only proximal mediators. Our recent findings indicate that affective response matching may be an additional factor promoting such associations.
Brain imaging, ethology, and the nonhuman mind
Authors: Burghardt Gordon M.
Published: February 2010

Posner & Raichle's (1994) exciting, wonderfully illustrated book describes the past successes and future potential of the relatively noninvasive imaging of the nervous systems of living people. The focus has been on cognitive processes but there is no reason why emotional and motivational systems cannot also be tapped. Although the authors do not formally address such contentious issues as consciousness and the private experience of other species, imaging methods may hold promise for helping us to understand these phenomena, as well as to integrate psychological processes into ethological and phylogenetic research in general.
Mindwatching
Authors: Cotterill Rodney M. J.
Published: February 2010

This book delivers much more than its title appears to promise; it is not merely a description of current methods for remotely monitoring brain activity. It primarily concentrates on just one such method: positron emission tomography, but it demonstrates beautifully how far that technique can now take us in the quest to discover the mechanisms underlying thought.
Broca's area: Motor encoding in somatic space
Authors: Fox Peter T.
Published: February 2010

Encoding articulate speech is widely accepted as the principal (or sole) role of the frontal operculum. Clinical observations of speech apraxia have been confirmed by brain-imaging studies of speech production. We present evidence that the frontal operculum also programs limb movements. We argue that this area is a ventral counterpart of the dorsal premotor area. The two are functionally distinguished by specialization for somatic and visual space, respectively.
The neurodynamics of heavy PETing, at/intention, learning, functional recovery, and rehabilitation
Authors: Goldberg Gary , Mayer Nathaniel H.
Published: February 2010

Research reported by Posner & Raichle may be usefully applied to the rehabilitation of persons with brain damage. Their findings are related to the “dual premotorsystems hypothesis” that reciprocally interactive medial and lateral brain systems are involved in attention and learning. Recent studies show that “brain healing” occurs through dynamic reorganization involving attentional networks postulated by Posner & Raichle.
Fables of the prefrontal cortex
Authors: Grafman Jordan , Partiot Arnaud , Hollnagel Caroline
Published: February 2010

On the basis of neuroiinaging studies, Posner & Raichle summarily report that the prefrontal cortex is involved in executive functioning and attention. In contrast to that superficial view, we briefly describe a testable model of the kinds of representations that are stored in prefrontal cortex, which, when activated, are expressed via plans, actions, thematic knowledge, and schemas.