bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
An Approach To The Problems Of Punishment
Authors: Benn S. I.
Published: February 2009

I SHALL develop, in this article, certain distinctions suggested by recent contributions to the philosophical discussion of punishment, which help to clarify the issues involved. Having separated out what I consider the four central philosophical questions, I shall suggest an approach to them, which, while mainly utilitarian, takes due account, I believe, of the retributivist case where it is strongest, and meets the main retributivist objections.
Faith And Logic
Authors: Paton H. J.
Published: February 2009

The most surprising development of philosophy in recent years has been the sudden interest, friendly or hostile, in theology—or at least in the philosophy of religion. Hence the present volume, Faith and Logic, appears at a propitious time. As a series of essays composed by teachers of theology or philosophy in the University of Oxford it follows in the succession of Essays and Reviews (1860), Lux Mundi (1890), and Foundations (1912). Like all of these works it endeavours to adjust Christian, and more specifically Anglican, doctrines to the changing intellectual problems of the contemporary world. Yet perhaps it is the differences that are most striking.
Contemporary British Philosophy
Authors: Prior A. N.
Published: February 2009

Before taking this book with the seriousness which at least parts of it deserve, it is necessary to dispose of a criticism which is basically frivolous but has already been made too often to be ignored. “Contemporary British Philosophy”—the title conjures up the names that everyone is currently bandying about (“this is going to be another Flew book,” you feel, “only on a grand scale”); and then you find with a jolt that you are being served with fare by such cooks as Ewing, Findlay, Kneale, Mabbott, Price, and—of all people—Paton. People, clearly, who for the most part wouldn’t even pretend to be “contemporary” in the ordinary use of this word, and who indeed in these very papers subject the real “contemporary” philosophers to endless sniping and sharp-shooting. Almost the only contributor one can imagine wishing to be thought “contemporary” is Ryle; and even he—well, did Freud really think of himself as a Freudian? Ayer might be put up as another exception, but that would be shallow— there's no one so completely and hopelessly out of date as the conductor of the bandwagon that's just gone past. Even from the point of view of crass physical age, the baby of this bunch (Hampshire), works out (from the biographies at the back) at about 43.
An Attempt To Defend Theism
Authors: Hudson W. D.
Published: February 2009

The fact of evil has worried theists for a long time. The earliest clear statement of this worry is perhaps to be found in the book of Habbakuk: ‘Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity: wherefore lookest thou upon them that deal treacherously, and holdest thy tongue when the wicked devoureth the man that is more righteous than he?’ (i, 13). More precisely formulated, it comes to this: if God is good and omnipotent, why evil ? From his goodness it would follow necessarily that he does not will evil and from his omnipotence that he could prevent it; why then should it occur? Theists have attempted to escape from this dilemma by means of an argument which turns on the claim that human beings are, to some degree at any rate, free to choose and act as they will. They are free to do good or evil; frequently they choose the latter and that is why evils, or at least many of them, occur. This human freedom, however, is a necessary condition of personality and, as such, a great good; so it is perfectly consistent with the goodness of God that he should will it. But what of his omnipotence? The point of the argument is that God has to allow those evils which result from men making evil choices, and this certainlylooks, at first blush, like a limitation of his power. But, we are assured,it is not really a limitation because all it amounts to is that God cannot do the logically impossible, viz., make beings who, at one and the same time, are both free to do what they will and pre-determined to do good.To deny that God can do the logically impossible, of course, is not to den his omnipotence; it is merely to point out that there are some things which it would not make sense to say that he had done.
The Elements Of Meaning
Authors: Whiteley C. H.
Published: February 2009

I Take ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ as correlative terms: to say of words or other symbols that they have meaning is to say that they are understood, or could be understood, by some interpreter. To specify a meaning fully, one must specify the interpreter or class of interpreters who do or might understand the symbols in a given way. There aretwo ways of doing this for a given utterance of words: we can take the interpretation which the utterer intended (‘meant’) the words to receive, or the interpretation which would be given to them by the majority of speakers of the language to which they belong (or a specially qualified group of such speakers). In the vast majority of cases these interpretationswill coincide; in a small minority of cases they will not. Sometimes a speaker will coin a new word, or use an old word in a new sense. Sometimes he will ignorantly or carelessly intend his words to be interpreted in a way inwhich they would not be interpreted by most understanders of his language. In cases of this kind, we have to distinguish between ‘what the words mean’ and ‘what he meant by the words’. (English judges, in interpreting statutes, are supposed to consider only the former, ignoring the latter; but usually it is rather the latter which matters.) Normally,however, an utterer of words uses them with meanings already determined independently of his use of them (though not, of course, independently of the totality of uses of them).
Principia Metaphysica
Authors: Bambrough Renford
Published: February 2009

If he had not been discouraged by the opposition of the farmers, Mein Herr could surely have done better still. He could have made his map into a relief map, with mountains and valleys represented on the scale of one foot to the foot; he could have represented every blade of grass and every pool of water, every pillar box and every fence, every mouse and every man, by a full-scale model in the appropriate and authentic materials. And all the models could have been working models, programmed to represent exactly every waterfall and every thunderstorm, every birth, marriage anddeath, every renaissance and every reformation. If he had done all this the country would not simply do nearly as well, but just as well as the map. He could throw the country away, and still have the country. He could throw the map away, and still have all that he needed, unless for some reason he wanted to have two copies of his map.
Affirmation And Assertion
Authors: Palmer H.
Published: February 2009

Positivists have always objected to people talking about God.

Their objection rests on quite general logical grounds. They have discovered a simple, formal test by which to tell significant remarks from nonsensical collections of words. There must, they say, be some minimal conditions of intelligibility. From these we can construct a Principle of Meaning. Now religiousremarks, on any positivist Principle, are demonstrable nonsense.

What are these conditions of intelligibility ? Speaker and hearer, we suppose, must use the same language; must possess a rather similar background of information; must both have some interest or other in communication.… Such matters of ‘more and less’ will vary with the topic, the parties, and the occasion.
The Frankenstein Problem
Authors: Wilson John
Published: February 2009

My chief purpose in this paper is to direct attention towards a problem which has received little attention from philosophers, but which I think has a greater claim to importance than any other problem that would naturally arise from a consideration of robots and cybernetic machines: both because it seems of greater intrinsic philosophical interest, and because it represents more nearly than any other problem the kind of worry that afflicts ordinary people. This problem may be roughly formulated in the question ‘What can men do that machines can't ?’
Models And Method
Authors: Theobald D. W.
Published: February 2009

The construction of models plays a vital part in scientific thought.And many questions about the characteristics demanded of a good model, and the implications of using models are often asked by philosophers of science. Although models are frequently and successfully used in scientific explanation, this does not imply that they are a necessary feature of such explanation, though it does provide some justification for their use. However, any attempt to provide a model for a scientific theory undoubtedly leads to a clearer understanding of that theory. Models and theories are often considered as separate features in a scientific explanation, but a theory is not usually devised and then consciously provided with a model.
Definition of a Moral Judgment
Authors: Sprigge Timothy L. S.
Published: February 2009

An Important distinction between statements of fact and statements of value is widely recognised. Some philosophers are now saying that the distinction has been treated as more determinate than it is, but most philosophers would agree that the distinction is definite and important. The major contributions to Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy of this century have set out to illuminate the nature of this distinction. Ethical statements have been thevalue statements mainly at issue, but on the whole the aim has not been to show wherein they differ from other value statements, but to show what distinguishes them in common with other value statements from factual statements. The characterisations of ethical statements which have become famous areones which if they apply to ethical statements at all apply equally to many(or all) other value statements as well.
Aristotle and the Punishment of Psychopaths
Authors: Haksar Vinit
Published: February 2009

In A paper called ‘The Responsibility of Psychopaths’, I think I succeeded in establishing that we cannot rule out a priori the possibility that psychopaths may be shown to be lacking in responsibility. I also examined some arguments that try to show the psychopathto be lacking in responsibility, but I concluded that these arguments were not very successful. In this paper I intend to make and examine some more attempts at showing the psychopath to be lacking in responsibility. But before I do that there is one point to keep in mind.
Models And Metaphors
Authors: Odegard Douglas
Published: February 2009

Like his earlier Language and Philosophy (1949). and Problems of Analysis (1954), Models and Metaphors is a collection of Black's papers unified by the belief that linguistic considerations can play an important part in framing and solving philosophical problems. Broadly speaking, the linguistic approach takes two forms: (1) examining the uses of a word, or of a set of related words, frequently occurring in philosophical inquiries, either for the general purposes of clarification (e.g., of ‘model’, ‘rule’) or as a useful aid to the solution, or dissolution, of a specific philosophical problem (e.g., of ‘implies’ in connection with ‘What is the relationship between an assertion and its presuppositions ?’); (2) considering questions about language, meaning, and related subjects (e.g., ‘Can one draw valid inferences from premises about grammar to ontological conclusions?’, ‘Do the accusatives of meaning-formulae designate anything?’, or ‘Are necessary statements validated by appealing to linguistic rules?’). Obviously, given that the concepts involved are of language or meaning, the former approach can be readily incorporated in the latter.
What Does the Term “Ethical Value” Really Denote?
Authors: Corkey R.
Published: February 2009

The terms we use in putting forward arguments may be ambiguous. When this is the case, our reasoning, however strictly we adhere to formal syllogistic rules, is apt to be fallacious. Here is a familiar text–book example of such a faulty process of thought.
The Philosophical Relevance of Religious Experience
Authors: Copleston Frederick C.
Published: February 2009

The meaning of the title of this essay is not clear. And something must be done towards clarifying it, in order that the question at issue may be understood.
What is a “Work of Art”?
Authors: Saw Ruth
Published: February 2009

This examination of the concept “work of art” has been prompted by the desire to find a starting point for aesthetic inquiry which, to begin with at any rate, will arouse no dispute. A claim for general agreement such as Clive Bell's: “The starting point for all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a pecular emotion”, is countered by I. A. Richards's “the phantom aesthetic state”, and any attempt to claim “beauty” as the central concept is straightway confused by the varied contexts in which “beauty” and “beautiful” may function. We hear much more often of a beautiful stroke in cricket than in painting, and many of our moral judgments have an aesthetic flavour. An action may be bold, dashing, mean, underhanded, unimaginative, cringing, fine, as well as right or wrong. Aesthetic adjectives and adverbs may occur in any context, and part of our job is to separate out the various uses and establish their inter-relationships,
Art-Names and Aesthetic Judgments
Authors: Khatchadourian Haig
Published: February 2009

In an earlier paper I have attempted to show, among other things; that the names (primarily) of human artifacts and man-devised activities and processes involve in their uses the notion of some end-in-view, function, or use (more or less different in the case of different names), which partially regulates these uses. In this paper I shall limit myself to a somewhat detailed discussion of one very important class of such common names which requires a separate treatment. I mean art-names.
Imagination in Hume's Treatise and Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding
Authors: Furlong E. J.
Published: February 2009

“Imagination doth denote the mind active”, said Berkeley. And the activity of the mind, finite as well as infinite, was a cardinal point in his philosophy. Imagination showed that minds, or spirits, to use the term Berkeley preferred, were causal agents.
Burke on the Sublime and Beautiful
Authors: Quinton Anthony
Published: February 2009

Burke's Enquiry is one of those books that hovers, importantly but ineffectively, at the fringes of the attention of most modern readers of philosophy. It is something that they have always meant to read some time but yet which they all too seldom get around to actually reading. Its neglect, no doubt, is mainly to be accounted for as part of the generally rather forlorn position of aesthetics in our intellectual landscape. Students of literature disregard aesthetics as at once too schematic and abstract for their purposes and as too often the work of people inadequately equipped for and experienced in the direct criticism of literature and the arts. Although the dominant style of modern criticism had as one of its principal sources a fairly consciously philosophical inquiry into the nature of literature, namely Richard's Principles of Literary Criticism, in its prevailing form, as manifested in the writings of Dr. Leavis and his fol-lowers, it is hostile to any pretensions to critical relevance on the part of academic philosophy. If it rejects impressionism for determinedly intellectual analysis of the detail of literature, it still relies on philosophy only in the loosest and most colloquial sense of the word in so far as it embodies a definitely articulated point of view on questions of morality. (This is not true, it should be added, of the corresponding American New Criticism.) On the other hand, aesthetics has only figured in the most fitful and peripheral manner on the agenda of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.
Minds, Machines and Gödel
Authors: Lucas J. R.
Published: February 2009

Gödei's Theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met. This I attempt to do.
Beliefs and Attributes
Authors: Weiler Gershon
Published: February 2009

In a philosophical paper the point one wishes to make should be stated at the very outset. And in dealing with a problem which is as controversial as religion, the bias should be confessed before any points are made. I want to conform at once to both these requirements. I want to discuss beliefs, ordinary beliefs but mainly religious ones, for the expression of which, oddly enough, we use the same word. “Belief” and “Faith” are admittedly different in English, but many languages possess only one word for these and further I shall try to show that even in English the difference is not very great and that they have, if not the same, at least a very similar logical grammar. The point of my argument is that beliefs can be discussed rationally and that they should be so discussed. Religious arguments have been going on for a very long time, and I find it incredible that people of immense intellectual qualities, who devoted their time and energy to these discussions, have been working under a simple delusion, not understanding the very nature of the thing they were doing.
Hayek on Liberty
Authors: Rees J. C.
Published: February 2009

Professor Hayek'S book is a massive contribution to the persistent question of the limits of state action. It runs counter to prevailing notions about the role of government in economic and social matters to such an extent that a common reaction to its publication has been to simply shrug it off as eccentric or antediluvian. But the rarity of any fundamental discussion of our political ideals and the assumptions of our social policy ought of itself to ensure a wide welcome for a work that constitutes a formidable challenge to accepted standards in this realm. Unfortunately, opinions about its value are likely to continue along established lines.
My Hand Goes Out to You
Authors: Yolton John W.
Published: February 2009

‘When a dog runs, the dog is moving his legs; when a sea urchin runs, the legs are moving the sea urchin.’ Philosophers have come to appreciate the importance of understanding what action is. Their attempts at the clarification of ‘action’ have led them to talk of arms going up, muscles contracting, psychokinesis, bodies moving. They want to distinguish between sea urchins and dogs. Joined with the concept of action there is that of the person. Some are inclined to say we fail to understand action when we treat the agent as the responding organism; in such a view there is no room for ‘responsibility’, ‘duty’, ‘ought’, ‘intention’, ‘volition’. Man as responding organism cannot be distinguished from sea urchins or from complex mechanisms.
The Use of Moral Concepts in Literary Criticism
Authors: Gilman Eric
Published: February 2009

It is probable that few critics, if directly challenged, would admit to believing that a work of literature which was, in some sense, morally objectionable was therefore necessarily totally lacking in literary merit. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for a man—in the language he uses, in the conclusions he draws, in his obiter dicta—to seem yet to hold a view which, in its bald statement, he has denied. Certainly, those critics who most vehemently wish to dissociate themselves from any claims that art exists for art's sake, or that there are peculiarly ‘aesthetic’ criteria, and who believe that such claims lead to irresponsibility, such critics often use moral concepts extensively in their criticism. Furthermore, they often do this in such a way as to suggest that if a work is morally objectionable, then there is no way of redeeming it aesthetically; for, it would seem, moral criticism exhausts the critical possibilities; no aesthetic saving graces are allowed.
After-Images and Pains
Authors: Margolis Joseph
Published: February 2009

After-images, I believe, hold the key to certain much-debated issues regarding meaning and verification. In particular, an analysis of the relevant features of our discourse shows that views often held to be untenable or unintelligible or avoidable regarding our discourse about pain and similar sensations are not so easily escaped in the context of after-images.
The Function and Nature of Authority in Society
Authors: Handcock W. D.
Published: February 2009

The subject you have set me is a vast and daunting one, but I have my consolation that if I must inevitably trench a little-though as little as possible-on the issues my distinguished successors are to speak upon, they must equally come back on the ground assigned to me, and will be able to supplement for you my deficiencies and correct my mistakes.
Reason and Desire
Authors: Mabbott J. D.
Published: February 2009

I propose to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.
An Analysis of Society
Authors: Murray R. J. K.
Published: February 2009

“A society is more than a set of entities to which the same class-name applies” (Process and Reality, Pt. II, Chap. 3, Sect. II). Taking this obiter dictum of Whitehead's seriously, the present paper seeks to elucidate some of the more abstract properties of a society. By “society” I understand primarily human society in the sense in which it is an object of study for social theory, though part of what is said may admit of application to societies in some wider sense. An apology should perhaps be offered for the terminology introduced. The writer's only excuse is that there seemed no other way of expressing the ideas in question.
Man's Ideas About the Universe
Authors: Samuel Viscount
Published: February 2009

When man emerged from the millions of years of evolution in the Early and Late Stone-ages he had shed his ape-like characters; he was erect, large-brained, and he had become an agriculturist and a craftsman. He must have wondered—as we wonder still—at the sun, the moon and the stars, the land and the sea, the thunder and lightning, at his own birth, and growth and death. Endowed with intuition and reason, and with curiosity, he must have concluded— as we conclude—that all this did not explain itself. There must have existed, and still exist, Something Else, that he could not perceive and did not understand. Endowed also with imagination, he peopled the earth and the sky with spirits—gods and demigods, ghosts and fairies, demons and angels. There followed beliefs in direct communication from this other world, through dream or trance, ecstasy or intuition; sometimes an individual assurance of personal contact and inspiration. So religion came to be: in the form, first of animism, then of mythology, finally of monotheism.
On the Philosophy of Hegel
Authors: Walsh W. H.
Published: February 2009

In asking me to talk about Hegel in your series on synoptic philosophies, I take it that you were anxious to discover whether there are any positive merits in Hegel's ideas. I need hardly remind you that such an approach to this particular philosopher is not a very common one in this country to-day. Indeed, of all those who have been thought, at one time or another, to have produced ideas of lasting philosophical importance, Hegel is at present easily the least in repute. Nor is it the case with him as with certain other writers (Spinoza, for instance, or some of the Scholastics) that his ideas are uninteresting or unintelligible to the present generation but are thought all the same to be likely to have an appeal and an importance at some future date when the general intellectual climate has changed; the common verdict on him is far less friendly than that. If opinions on the subject were canvassed among students of philosophy in Great Pritain to-day, there can be little doubt that the majority would write Hegel off as the supreme example of a philosopher who tried to construct an elaborate metaphysical system in the most blatantly a priori manner, and who succeeded in getting himself taken seriously only because of his adroitness in verbal tricks.
Two Conceptions of Philosophy
Authors: Knox T. M.
Published: February 2009

In the summer of 1921 the newspapers in this country carried long reports of a Conference of Modern Churchmen at Cambridge. Many of the contributions to their proceedings were unorthodox; they resulted from an historical and philosophical approach to the New Testament and certain fundamental Christian doctrines. There was nothing particularly new to scholars in all that was said, but the eminence of some of the speakers, their intellectual distinction, and their outspokenness created a public sensation. It looked almost as if the Modernist movement which had been stifled in the Roman Church were advancing in the Anglican.
Locke And The Categories Of Value In Eighteenth century British Aesthetic Theory
Authors: Stolnitz Jerome
Published: February 2009

It would be, at this hour of the day, supererogatory to argue the pre-eminence of Locke's influence on eighteenth-century thought. But though this claim has been made often enough,1 and has often enough been shown to be true, it has not been shown for aesthetics. I believe it to be true of aesthetics as well, but that the fact has gone unremarked, because the line of influence here is not so overt as in the case of, say, political theory or epistemology. It is, rather, oblique and devious; that the influence is there at all is, even, paradoxical.
Error and the Will
Authors: Evans J. L.
Published: February 2009

Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a sustained interest in the concepts of knowledge, truth and meaning; interest in the concepts of error, falsity and nonsense, on the other hand, has been intermittent and spasmodic. Error, for example, has suffered at the expense of knowledge to such an extent that sometimes its very existence has been denied, or it has been explained away as being merely the absence of or privation of knowledge; many theories of truth are so constructed that no place can be found for falsity, and theories about what constitutes making sense pay, on the whole, little heed to what constitutes nonsense. In this paper I hope to do something to redress the balance so far as error is concerned. My remarks are prompted by the hope that, just as we may best understand health through the study of disease, so a consideration of error or failure may throw light on knowledge or success. It is clearly not very informative to say of error, falsity and nonsense that they are merely the absence of knowledge, truth and sense; indeed it is just as laconic as a proposed medical definition of disease as the absence of health.
Normality
Authors: Alexander Peter
Published: February 2009

I wish to ask what it is for something to be normal, what ‘normal’ means. In one sense we all know, since we freely use conceptions of normality in our everyday talk about things and people. Normality is what the conservative hopes to return to and the progressive hopes to establish. Normal weather is what we usually get at a given season; a normal day is one that is unrelieved by great strokes of either good or ill fortune. In some contexts, to be normal is to be upright; in others to be average or mean. A normal person is one who is not diseased or crooked or mad, can learn and may forget, sleeps well, performs some job of work adequately, is not unbearably sensitive or thick-skinned, and so on. Sometimes a normal person is one who doesn't stand out from the crowd. Often, normal is what I am, and what you are if you are lucky enough to resemble me in certain respects (for any value of ‘I’).
‘Because You Are a Woman’
Authors: Lucas J. R.
Published: February 2009

Plato was the first feminist. In the Republic he puts forward the view that women are just the same as men, only not quite so good. It is a view which has often been expressed in recent years, and generates strong passions. Some of these have deep biological origins, which a philosopher can only hope to recognize and not to assuage. But much of the heat engendered is due to unnecessary friction between views which are certainly compatible and probably correct. And here a philosopher can help. If we can divide the issues neatly, at the joints, then we need not quarrel with one another for saying something, probably true, because what is being maintained is misconstrued and taken to mean something else, probably false.
Cosmology and Infinity
Authors: Huby Pamela M.
Published: February 2009

Mr Newton-Smith and Mr Boyce, in discussion notes in the January 1972 number of Philosophy, have raised a number of interesting points about my original paper. But I feel that they have not gone beyond a simple denial of the central argument, which is to be found on pp. 124–126 and 128–130 of the April 1971 number, and that much of what they say therefore fails by petitio.
Personal Identity: A Defence of Locke
Authors: Hughes M. W.
Published: February 2009

The theory of personal identity should illuminate and be illuminated by the theory of personality, of which it is a part. I believe that Locke's theory succeeds in this more than that of any other great philosopher, and the modifications which it may need are not fundamental ones. The problems raised by Butler and Flew can be made to disappear.
Aesthetic Appraisal
Authors: Simpson Evan
Published: February 2009

In the twenty-five years since philosophers began to bemoan ‘the dreariness of aesthetics’, students in Wittgenstein's wake have done a great deal to eliminate the grounds of the complaint. Unfruitful essentialist theories have been largely displaced by the vigorous, if somewhat uncontrolled, growth of an enterprise which attempts to characterize and explicate aesthetic phenomena outside the desert of definition. The resulting view portrays typically aesthetic concepts as being indivisibly characterizing and evaluative, relativistic in application, necessarily linked to human attitudes, irreducible to non-aesthetic concepts, and yet as having social conditions which make them capable of intersubjective comparison and test. These characteristics are usefully summarized in saying that aesthetic concepts are concepts of appraisal. The theory of aesthetic appraisal discussed here is clearly incompatible with views which postulate dichotomies between objectivity and subjectivity, fact and value, and it is quite analogous to ‘descriptivist’ theories in ethics which reject these absolute distinctions. Moral examples are thus often useful for explicating the notion of aesthetic appraisal and the theory embodying that notion likewise has an important bearing on contemporary controversies in ethics.
Respect For Persons as a Moral Principle—II
Authors: Maclagan W. G.
Published: February 2009

In Part I of this discussion I considered the nature and validity of the principle of respect for persons as distinguished from its practical import and application. Before I proceed to that second topic let me draw together in summary fashion the main points of the view I have put forward.
Philosophy and Quantum Physics
Authors: Harré R.
Published: February 2009

The conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics.
German Philosophy
Authors: Heinemann F. H.
Published: February 2009

Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen (R. Piper, München) is the topical title of Karl Jaspers's latest book. His intention is excellent, he wants to arouse the conscience of man in face of the deadly danger of atomic warfare. It would be most interesting to compare this book of more than 500 pages with Bertrand Russell's corresponding short publications which concentrate on practical proposals. In order to do justice to Jaspers the English reader should, however, keep in mind that the author had to overcome formidable obstacles. His subtitle, Politisches Bewusstsein in unserer Zeit, indicates that he does not only wish to discuss the present dangerous situation and the means for mastering it, but also to lay the foundation of a Political Philosophy. But here he is faced with two brute facts. First, the Germans are almost by nature un political and falsify by their existence a famous Aristotelian dictum. Their political sense or instinct is, for complex psychological and historical reasons, underdeveloped; a fact which is, paradoxically, of great political importance. Secondly, a German Political Philosophy in the Anglo-American sense does not exist; it forms part of the Rechts-und Staatsphilosopie (cf. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts, which should not be translated as Philosophy of Right) or of sociological studies. Consequently, Jaspers has to construct his Political Philosophy on the basis of his own Philosophy of Existence, an interesting experiment, beset with formidable difficulties. Here again he remains the gliding philosopher (der schwebende Philosoph), whose analysis of our political predicament moves in “possible perspectives” so that in the end everything remains in suspense (Es bleibt alles in der Schwebe). Indeed, Jaspers holds that rationally atomic warfare cannot be eliminated and that the total destruction of mankind is probable. He therefore appeals to every human being for a radical change of heart which alone could avert the disaster. This change of the “essence of man” remains a Utopian hope. Nevertheless, Jaspers is right in appealing to everybody's conscience. He confirms, moreover, that his existentialism cannot provide the basis for a Political Philosophy.
It Serves you Right
Authors: Manser A. R.
Published: February 2009

In this paper I want to examine the notion of desert, which seems to have been neglected by contemporary philosophers. Apartfrom its interest in its own right, it is important to be clear about the meaning of the word if there is to be any understanding of the idea of punishment. And that we are confused over the whole issue of punishment is obvious both from the remarks of professional philosophers and from the comments of the ‘man in the street’. Because of this confusion, the discussion of any actual punishment seems to take place between two parties who never get to grips with the arguments of the other, as in the whole debate over the death penalty. To one set of people, it is obvious that the retention of hanging depends to a large extent on the question of its effectiveness in deterring murderers; to another it is equally obvious that the murderer ‘deserves’ to hang, and that there is no more to be said about the matter. Capital punishment is not a good starting-point for a discussion of punishment in general, for death is clearly unique among penalties; in addition, the topic gives rise inevitably to much sentimentality and resulting muddle-headedness.
Two Concepts of Morality
Authors: Cooper Neil
Published: February 2009

It is a surprising fact that moral philosophers have rarely examined the distinction between what I shall call ‘positive’ or ‘social’ morality on the one hand and ‘autonomous’ or ‘individual’ morality on the other. Accordingly, conceptual and moral issues of the greatest importance have been neglected. The distinction is, I take it, recognised by Hegel, when he contrasts Sittlichkeit with Moralität. However, the rival sides who give a conceptual or a moral preference to one concept over the other rarely come to grips with one another, and the deep conflicts between them are concealed instead of being brought out into the open. Only in Burke's diatribe against Rousseau, Bradley's critique of Sidgwick (Collected Essays I, 122), Hobhouse's crusade against Bosanquet (Metaphysical Theory of the State), Prichard's attack on Green (Moral Obligation, p. 75), Hart's criticism of Hare (‘Legal and Moral Obligation’ in Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by Melden), and above all in Oakeshott's onslaught on Rationalism (Rationalism in Politics, passim) do we get a glimpse of one of the main issues of moral philosophy and of morality. For just as we have two concepts, so we have two moral conceptual schemes, each of which gives a central place to one concept at the expense of the other. Those who suppose that morality is or ought to be wholly or mainly a social concept may recommend submission to a tradition. Those, on the other hand, who suppose morality to be primarily an individual or independent concept will recommend independent decisions. I want in this paper, firstly, to explain the differences between the two concepts, secondly, to show that neither of them is conceptually illegitimate or degenerate, and lastly, to determine what place, if any, each ought to have in a rational morality.
Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience
Authors: Jones David H.
Published: February 2009

Freud is often assumed to have given an explanation of how human beings acquire a morality, especially as it is manifested in the phenomenon of moral conscience. Freud himself certainly lends credence to such an interpretation of his theory, as the following passage testifies.
“The Justification of Punishment”
Authors: Flew Antony
Published: February 2009

I want to discuss philosophically, to glance at the logic of, the parts of this expression “the justification of punishment” and then to draw from this discussion one or two morals for discussions of the justification of punishment. This paper is based on one originally given to the Scots Philosophy Club at its Aberdeen meeting in 1953, as the third part of a symposium on The Justification of Punishment (no inverted commas).
The New Götterdämmerung
Authors: Inge W. R.
Published: February 2009

Philosophy is keenly interested in the new cosmological theories. For, whatever view we take of the nature of ultimate reality, the world in space and time is an appearance of that reality, and must bear some relation to it. That the discoveries of Copernicus and Darwin have deeply influenced both philosophy and religion is universally admitted. Many think that Einstein and his colleagues may produce a revolution not less momentous.
The Obsequies of Realism
Authors: Laird John
Published: February 2009

It is the custom, nowadays, to say that “realism” is very dead indeed, and to speak of it invariably in the past tense, or only in the historical present. What happened, we are told, was that, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, two distinct bodies of men propounded either “naïf” or “new” realism. The naif realists followed Mr. G. E. Moore—to some extent and without his consent; and they were called naif (by some misogynist) because the masculine form of the adjective expressed their rugged creed better than the more usual feminine form. (They were esprits forts rather than esprits fins).
Vice and Illusion: The Psychology of Vice
Authors: Murray Gilbert
Published: February 2009

It is a pleasure to all of us to hold forth upon subjects about which we know very little. It is particularly a temptation to university professors to get away from the subjects of their own chairs and lecture as dogmatically as their nature demands on subjects of other people's chairs. That is why I am speaking to-night about Psychology. As to Vice, the case is a little different. Even if my own experience is regrettably limited, I have for some years studied the Chairman, and I bring my observations before a society full of persons whose range and profundity of knowledge will be sufficient to correct any hasty generalizations on my part.
Locke As An Empiricist
Authors: Odegard Douglas
Published: February 2009

John Loke is often referred to as the first of a triumvirate of major British Empiricists, and sometimes even as the father of British Empiricism. In many cases the reference is extremely guarded, and at times the word ‘empiricist’ is being used merely as a convenient label for organising university courses, amounting to little more than a synonym for ‘Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and to some extent Bacon, Hobbes, Reid, and Mill’. Given that ‘empiricist’ is being used in a philosophically interesting way, however, there is some question as to just how guarded its application to Locke should be
Against Equality
Authors: Lucas J. R.
Published: February 2009

Equality is the great political issue of our time. Liberty is forgotten: Fraternity never did engage our passions: the maintenance of Law and Order is at a discount: Natural Rights and Natural Justice are outmoded shibboleths. But Equality—there men have something to die for, kill for, agitate about, be miserable about. The demand for Equality obsesses all our political thought. We are not sure what it is—indeed, as I shall show later, we are necessarily not sure what it is—but we are sure that whatever it is, we want it: and while we are prepared to look on frustration, injustice or violence with tolerance, as part of the natural order of things, we will work ourselves up into paroxysms of righteous indignation at the bare mention of Inequality.
On Morality's having a Point
Authors: Phillips D. Z. , Mounce H. O.
Published: February 2009

In 1958, moral philosophers were given rather startling advice. They were told that their subject was not worth pursuing further until they possessed an adequate philosophy of psychology. What is needed, they were told, is an enquiry into what type of characteristic a virtue is, and, furthermore, it was suggested that this question could be resolved in part by exploring the connection between what a man ought to do and what he needs: perhaps man needs certain things in order to flourish, just as a plant needs water; and perhaps what men need are the virtues, courage, honesty, loyalty, etc. Thus, in telling a man that he ought to be honest, we should not be using any special (moral) sense of ought: a man ought to be honest just as a plant ought to be watered. The ‘ought’ is the same: it tells us what a man needs.
Demonstrative without Descriptive Conventions
Authors: Coval S. C.
Published: February 2009

I TRY to do the following things in this paper. I. To show briefly how one might argue for the mutual dependence of our demonstrative and descriptive conventions as they now stand. II. To suggest that this duality of convention may be a dispensable, though in some ways desirable, aspect of language and that if one of these conventions is non-essential it is our descriptive conventions. III. To show something of the philosophical implications of such a ‘non-word’ language. Perhaps not the least uninteresting among these implications is what may then be said about our demonstrative and descriptive conventions as they now stand and especially what this might mean for attempts to reduce our demonstrative to our descriptive conventions, which involves us again in section I. It might be said that, while section I offers some linguistic facts, sections II and III attempt to show the contingency of some of these linguistic facts.
Fuelwood scarcity, energy substitution, and rural livelihoods in Namibia
Authors: PALMER CHARLES , MACGREGOR JAMES
Published: February 2009

In Namibia, as in many parts of Africa, households are highly dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods, including energy needs. Using data originally collected for Namibia's forest resource accounts and insights from a non-separable household model, this paper estimates household fuelwood demand. Specifically, the factors underlying the substitution between fuelwood collected from open access forest resources, cow dung, and fuelwood purchased from the market are analysed. Heckman two-step estimates show that households respond to economic scarcity, as measured by the opportunity costs of collecting fuelwood, by reducing energy consumption slightly more than by increasing labour input to collection. There is limited evidence for substitution from fuelwood to other energy sources, particularly with declining availability of forest stocks. Market participants may be more sensitive to price changes than non-participants. All estimated elasticities are low, similar to those observed in previous studies.
The value of arts and humanities research to life in the UK
Authors: Borden Iain
Published: February 2009

The document that follows was written by Iain Borden as the contribution on ‘Architecture’ to the Arts and Humanities Research Council's report for the UK Government on ‘The Value of Arts and Humanities Research to Life in the UK’ and offers a further contribution to arq's ongoing discussions about the nature of architectural research.
The Hydra drawings: digital imperfection
Authors: Pedersen Claus Peder
Published: February 2009

The Hydra drawings are the result of a research-by-design project involving architectural students. The drawings have been produced during intensive work sessions organised in March for the last four years on the Greek island of Hydra. The project has been run by architects Cort Ross Dinesen and Claus Peder Pedersen in close dialogue with contributors from other fields such as art history, literary criticism and philosophy: Henrik Oxvig, Fredrik Tygstrup, Steen Nepper Larsen and Malene Busk. The drawings that accompany the text published here were done by Tove Rosén, Emelie Saltas, Guro Sollid and Flemming Rafn Thomsen.
Angels of suburbia
Authors: Stringer Ben , McAllister Jane
Published: February 2009

Suburbia is dependent on a global economy but, in spite of this, suburban domesticity in the UK is still very often framed within images of the ‘local’ whereas other parts of suburbia, such as business parks and airports, seem to embrace globalisation through sleek, high-tech, ‘non-place’ aesthetics that seem to eschew the local. The way that these aesthetic differences polarise local and global imagery within suburbia is questionable.
Grid effects
Authors: Stoppani Teresa
Published: February 2009

Zaha Hadid's Kartal Pendik Masterplan (2006) for a new city centre on the east bank of Istanbul proposes the redevelopment of an abandoned industrial site located in a crucial infrastructural node between Europe and Asia as a connecting system between the neighbouring areas of Kartal in the west and Pendik in the east. The project is organised on what its architects call a soft grid, a flexible and adaptable grid that allows it to articulate connections and differences of form, density and use within the same spatial structure [1]. Its final overall design constitutes only one of the many possible configurations that the project may take in response to the demands of the different areas included in the masterplan, and is produced from a script that is able to generate both built volumes and open spaces, skyscrapers as well as parks. The soft grid in fact produces a ‘becoming’ rather than a finite and definitive form: its surface space does not look like a grid, but is derived from a grid operation which is best explained by the project presentation in video animation. The grid here is a process of ‘gridding’, enacted according to ancient choreographed linear movements of measuring, defining, adjusting, reconnecting spaces through an articulated surface rather than superimposed on an ignored given like an indifferent colonising carpet.