Bank Entry Into the Venture Capital Industry
Authors: Fiet James O. , Fraser Donald R. 
Published: January 2008

This study explores the potential benefits and costs of bank entry into venture capital investing. Data are obtained from a survey of banking organizations regarding their perceptions of the effects of such venture capital investing. Also, evidence on the portfolio diversification effects of such investments is provided using stock price data. These data are consistent with the existence of net benefits from bank entry into this industry. The implications for entrepreneurs are also discussed. Venture capital firms (professionally managed organizational investors) and business angels (private individual investors) invest in new and growing businesses. Their aim is to maximize their risk‐adjusted return on investment through the ex ante assessment of risk and the ex post monitoring of their client entrepreneurs. Because they invest in businesses that are inherently newer and smaller, often without substantial collateral, their deals are riskier than the loan packages that are funded by commercial banks. However, by investing in risk‐ reducing information and sharing it among coinvestors, these venture capitalists often generate returns that are the envy of many bankers. Many venture capitalists expect to earn more than 30% annually on their investments. At a time when banks have been experiencing earning problems, particularly those located in the West and Southwest, there are at least four possible benefits that could come to them and also to entrepreneurs from the entrance of banking organizations into venture capital financing. First, if banks were able to manage the increased risk, they might be successful in improving their earnings. The increased earnings would contribute to the elimination of the capital deficiency facing the banking industry. Second, if they funded entrepreneurs, the total supply of venture capital would increase and it could become much easier to locate seed money. Third, participation by banks would also contribute to the elimination of the widely reported capital gap that may exist for funding new ventures. Fourth, in the long run, if they provided venture capital, they might find that they were providing start‐up financing for future customers, customers that would not otherwise exist. This study contemplates a future role for commercial banks as a potentially huge source of funding for new ventures. It explores the possibility that under certain conditions commercial banks may be able to effectively manage the greater risk associated with venture capital investing. It concentrates on the potential effects of bank entry into venture financing on the risk of failure of the bank, a concern that underlies the existing prohibition for U.S. banks. The proposal to allow U.S. commercial banking organizations to enter the arena of venture capital investments may seem somewhat questionable in a period of massive numbers of bank failures. Yet there are reasons to believe that the potential effects of these activities may not be risk‐increasing as often argued and may, under certain circumstances, even be risk‐reducing. To understand this view, consider the reaction of commercial banks to the changes in their external environment that accompanied financial deregulation during the 1980's. The elimination of deposit rate ceilings that accompanied deregulation increased sharply the cost of bank funds. Banking organizations reacted to that increase in costs by reaching for higher‐risk loans. But, in the United States, these banks were unable through regulatory and market constraints to obtain complete compensation for the increased risk. If these banks had been able to take equity positions in venture capital investments, the upside potential from these commitments of funds to more risky undertakings could be realized, a potential that is impossible with the conventional loan contract. If commercial banks become major players in the market for venture capital, it seems likely that they will rely upon different strategies for controlling risk than those used by venture capital firms and business angels. Basic differences in their approaches to risk management could be a reflection of their costs of access to risk‐reducing information, their visibility in the community, and their tendencies to coinvest with similar types of investors. This study examines the possibility that the size of a bank will largely determine whether it views venture capital investing as a prudent means of doing business. This expectation is based on the assumption that the larger a bank, the more likely it will be to hold a portfolio of diversified venture capital investment. Thus, we would expect to find greater enthusiasm for venture capital investing among large banks than among small banks. If commercial banks were to be permitted to make venture capital investments in the United States, such a move could be so influential that no entity that depends upon this market for its survival would be unaffected. Business angels and venture capital firms could be overshadowed by the resources that banks would have at their disposal, while entrepreneurs and public policy makers would find it difficult to ever again suggest that there was insufficient capital available to fund deserving ventures. This study reviews the roles of venture capital firms and business angels and compares them to the role that could be played by banks. It also compares the perceptions of large bankers (assets >$1 billion) and small bankers (assets <$1 billion) regarding their institution's competence in managing different types of risk. This research will first examine how venture capital firms and business angels emphasize managing different types of risk. Hypotheses related to bank strategies for reducing venture capital risk will be proposed and tested. Finally, implications for entrepreneurs and public policy makers will be discussed.