bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Semantic activation without conscious identification in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual masking: A survey and appraisal
Authors: Holender Daniel
Published: February 2010

When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of time that allows for further processing. This semantic activation is generally accompanied by conscious identification, which can be demonstrated by the ability of a person to perform discriminations on the basis of the meaning of the stimulus. The idea that a sensory input can give rise to semantic activation without concomitant conscious identification was the central thesis of the controversial research in subliminal perception. Recently, new claims for the existence of such phenomena have arisen from studies in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual pattern masking. Because of the fundamental role played by these types of experiments in cognitive psychology, the new assertions have raised widespread interest.

The purpose of this paper is to show that this enthusiasm may be premature. Analysis of the three new lines of evidence for semantic activation without conscious identification leads to the following conclusions. (1) Dichotic listening cannot provide the conditions needed to demonstrate the phenomenon. These conditions are better fulfilled in parafoveal vision and are realized ideally in pattern masking. (2) Evidence for the phenomenon is very scanty for parafoveal vision, but several tentative demonstrations have been reported for pattern masking. It can be shown, however, that none of these studies has included the requisite controls to ensure that semantic activation was not accompanied by conscious identification of the stimulus at the time of presentation. (3) On the basis of current evidence it is most likely that these stimuli were indeed consciously identified.
Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures
Authors: Buss David M.
Published: February 2010

Contemporary mate preferences can provide important clues to human reproductive history. Little is known about which characteristics people value in potential mates. Five predictions were made about sex differences in human mate preferences based on evolutionary conceptions of parental investment, sexual selection, human reproductive capacity, and sexual asymmetries regarding certainty of paternity versus maternity. The predictions centered on how each sex valued earning capacity, ambition— industriousness, youth, physical attractiveness, and chastity. Predictions were tested in data from 37 samples drawn from 33 countries located on six continents and five islands (totalN= 10,047). For 27 countries, demographic data on actual age at marriage provided a validity check on questionnaire data. Females were found to value cues toresource acquisitionin potential mates more highly than males. Characteristics signalingreproductive capacitywere valued more by males than by females. These sex differences may reflect different evolutionary selection pressures on human males and females; they provide powerful cross-cultural evidence of current sex differences in reproductive strategies. Discussion focuses on proximate mechanisms underlying mate preferences, consequences for human intrasexual competition, and the limitations of this study.
Selection by consequences
Authors: Skinner B. F.
Published: February 2010

Human behavior is the joint product of (i) contingencies of survival responsible for natural selection, and (ii) contingencies of reinforcement responsible for the repertoires of individuals, including (iii) the special contingencies maintained by an evolved social environment. Selection by consequences is a causal mode found only in living things, or in machines made by living things. It was first recognized in natural selection: Reproduction, a first consequence, led to the evolution of cells, organs, and organisms reproducing themselves under increasingly diverse conditions. The behavior functioned well, however, only under conditions similar to those under which it was selected.

Reproduction under a wider range of consequences became possible with the evolution of processes through which organisms acquired behavior appropriate to novel environments. One of these, operant conditioning, is a second kind of selection by consequences: New responses could be strengthened by events which followed them. When the selecting consequences are the same, operant conditioning and natural selection work together redundantly. But because a species which quickly acquires behavior appropriate to an environment has less need for an innate repertoire, operant conditioning could replace as well as supplement the natural selection of behavior.

Social behavior is within easy range of natural selection, because other members are one of the most stable features of the environment of a species. The human species presumably became more social when its vocal musculature came under operant control. Verbal behavior greatly increased the importance of a third kind of selection by consequences, the evolution of social environments or cultures. The effect on the group, and not the reinforcing consequences for individual members, is responsible for the evolution of culture.
The operational analysis of psychological terms
Authors: Skinner B. F.
Published: February 2010

The major contributions of operationism have been negative, largely because operationists failed to distinguish logical theories of reference from empirical accounts of language. Behaviorism never finished an adequate formulation of verbal reports and therefore could not convincingly embrace subjective terms. But verbal responses to private stimuli can arise as social products through the contingencies of reinforcement arranged by verbal communities.

In analyzing traditional psychological terms, we need to know their stimulus conditions (“finding the referent”), and why each response is controlled by that condition. Consistent reinforcement of verbal responses in the presence of stimuli presupposes stimuli acting upon both the speaker and the reinforcing community, but subjective terms, which apparently are responses to private stimuli, lack this characteristic. Private stimuli are physical, but we cannot account for these verbal responses by pointing to controlling stimuli, and we have not shown how verbal communities can establish and maintain the necessary consistency of reinforcement contingencies.

Verbal responses to private stimuli may be maintained through appropriate reinforcement based on public accompaniments, or through reinforcements accorded responses made to public stimuli, with private cases then occurring by generalization. These contingencies help us understand why private terms have never formed a stable and uniform vocabulary: It is impossible to establish rigorous vocabularies of private stimuli for public use, because differential reinforcement cannot be made contingent upon the property of privacy. The language of private events is anchored in the public practices of the verbal community, which make individuals aware only by differentially reinforcing their verbal responses with respect to their own bodies. The treatment of verbal behavior in terms of such functional relations between verbal responses and stimuli provides a radical behaviorist alternative to the operationism of methodological behaviorists.
The psychology of folk psychology
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: February 2010

Folk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.
A perspective for viewing the history of psychophysics
Authors: Murray David J.
Published: February 2010

Fechner's conception of psychophysics included both “outer psychophysics” the relation between stimulus intensity and the response reflecting sensation strength, and “inner psychophysics” the relation between neurelectric responses and sensation strength. In his own time outer psychophysics focussed on the form of the psychophysical law, with Fechner espousing a logarithmic law, Delboeuf a variant of the logarithmic law incorporating a resting level of neural activity, and Plateau a power law. One of the issues on which the dispute was focussed concerned the appearance of contrasts if the overall illumination was increased or decreased; another issue was the question of whether a sensation of a “just noticeable difference” established for one value of a sensory dimension appeared the same for a value elsewhere on the dimension. The development of “inner psychophysics” led through the works of Delboeuf, Solomons, Jastrow, and Thurstone to modern signal detection theory. A third line of research, devoted to the question of what was meant by the “measurement” of sensation strength, stemmed from the criticism of Fechner's work by von Kries (1882) and others. Although a valid body of science could be built up without the intervening variable called “sensation strength,” such a science might be a cumbersome representation of reality. When an optical contrast is set up, and its overall illumination is increased or decreased, subjective contrasts involving medium levels of lightness vary little as illumination varies (as a power law based on sensation ratios or a logarithmic law based on sensation differences predict), but subjective contrasts involving extreme levels of lightness might be subject to the effects of other variables.
Précis ofDeduction
Authors: Johnson-Laird Philip N. , Byrne Ruth M. J.
Published: February 2010

How do people make deductions? The orthodox view in psychology is that they use formal rules of inference like those of a “natural deduction” system.Deductionargues that their logical competence depends, not on formal rules, but on mental models. They construct models of the situation described by the premises, using their linguistic knowledge and their general knowledge. They try to formulate a conclusion based on these models that maintains semantic information, that expresses it parsimoniously, and that makes explicit something not directly stated by any premise. They then test the validity of the conclusion by searching for alternative models that might refute the conclusion. The theory also resolves long-standing puzzles about reasoning, including how nonmonotonic reasoning occurs in daily life. The book reports experiments on all the main domains of deduction, including inferences based on prepositional connectives such as “if” and “or,” inferences based on relations such as “in the same place as,” inferences based on quantifiers such as “none,” “any,” and “only,” and metalogical inferences based on assertions about the true and the false. Where the two theories make opposite predictions, the results confirm the model theory and run counter to the formal rule theories. Without exception, all of the experiments corroborate the two main predictions of the model theory: inferences requiring only one model are easier than those requiring multiple models, and erroneous conclusions are usually the result of constructing only one of the possible models of the premises.
Species and individual differences in communication based on private states
Authors: Lubinski David , Thompson Travis
Published: February 2010

The way people come to report private stimulation (e.g., feeling states) arising within their own bodies is not well understood. Although the Darwinian assumption of biological continuity has been the basis of extensive animal modeling for many human biological and behavioral phenomena, few have attempted to model human communication based on private stimulation. This target article discusses such an animal model using concepts and methods derived from the study of discriminative stimulus effects of drugs and recent research on interanimal communication. We discuss how humans acquire the capacity to identify and report private stimulation and we analyze intra- and interspecies differences in neurochemical mechanisms for transducing interoceptive stimuli, enzymatic and other metabolic factors, learning ability, and discrimination learning histories and their relation to psychiatric and developmental disabilities.
Communication and internal states: What is their relationship?
Authors: Bamberg Michael
Published: February 2010

Common folks “have” emotions and talk to others; and sometimes they make “their” emotions the topic of such talk. The emotions seem to be “theirs,” since they can be conceived of as private states (or events); and they can be topicalized, because we seem to be able to attribute or lend a conventionalized public form (such as a linguistic label or name) to some inner (and therefore nonpublic) state or event. This is the way much of our folk-talk and folk-thinking about emotions, the expression thereof, the role of language in these expressions, and communication in general are organized. However, as we have shown (Bamberg & Lindenberger 1984), such talk serves the purpose of communicating effectively and reaching mutual understanding.
A theory of visual stability across saccadic eye movements
Authors: Bridgeman Bruce , Van der Heijden A. H. C. , Velichkovsky Boris M.
Published: February 2010

We identify two aspects of the problem of maintaining perceptual stability despite an observer's eye movements. The first, visual direction constancy, is the (egocentric) stability of apparent positions of objects in the visual world relative to the perceiver. The second, visual position constancy, is the (exocentric) stability of positions of objects relative to each other. We analyze the constancy of visual direction despite saccadic eye movements.

Three information sources have been proposed to enable the visual system to achieve stability: the structure of the visual field, proprioceptive inflow, and a copy of neural efference or outflow to the extraocular muscles. None of these sources by itself provides adequate information to achieve visual direction constancy; present evidence indicates that all three are used.

Our final question concerns how information processing operations result in a stable world. The three traditionally suggested means have been elimination, translation, or evaluation. All are rejected. From a review of the physiological and psychological evidence we conclude that no subtraction, compensation, or evaluation need take place. The problem for which these solutions were developed turns out to be a false one. We propose a “calibration” solution: correct spatiotopic positions are calculated anew for each fixation. Inflow, outflow, and retinal sources are used in this calculation: saccadic suppression of displacement bridges the errors between these sources and the actual extent of movement.
Motion perception during selfmotion: The direct versus inferential controversy revisited
Authors: Wertheim Alexander H.
Published: February 2010

According to the traditional inferential theory of perception, percepts of object motion or stationarity stem from an evaluation of afferent retinal signals (which encode image motion) with the help of extraretinal signals (which encode eye movements). According to direct perception theory, on the other hand, the percepts derive from retinally conveyed information only. Neither view is compatible with a perceptual phenomenon that occurs during visually induced sensations of ego motion (vection). A modified version of inferential theory yields a model in which the concept of extraretinal signals is replaced by that of reference signals, which do not encode how the eyes move in their orbits but how they move in space. Hence reference signals are produced not only during eye movements but also during ego motion (i.e., in response to vestibular stimulation and to retinal image flow, which may induce vection). The present theory describes the interface between self-motion and object-motion percepts. An experimental paradigm that allows quantitative measurement of the magnitude and gain of reference signals and the size of the just noticeable difference (JND) between retinal and reference signals reveals that the distinction between direct and inferential theories largely depends on: (1) a mistaken belief that perceptual veridicality is evidence that extraretinal information is not involved, and (2) a failure to distinguish between (the perception of) absolute object motion in space and relative motion of objects with respect to each other. The model corrects these errors, and provides a new, unified framework for interpreting many phenomena in the field of motion perception.
Neural transplants are grey matters
Authors: Anderson Britt , Chatterjee Anjan , Graham George
Published: February 2010

The lesion and transplantation data cited by Sinden et al., when considered in tandem, seem to harbor an internal inconsistency, raising questions of false localization of function. The extrapolation of such data to cognitive impairment and potential treatment strategies in Alzheimer's disease is problematic. Patients with focal basal forebrain lesions (e.g., anterior communicating artery aneurysm rupture) might be a more appropriate target population.
Therapeutic uses for neural grafts: Progress slowed but not abandoned
Authors: Baisden Ronald H.
Published: February 2010

In spite of Stein and Glasier's justifiable conclusion that initial optimism concerning the immediate clinical applicability of neural transplantation was premature, there exists much experimental evidence to support the potential for incorporating this procedure into a therapeutic arsenal in the future. To realize this potential will require continued evolution of our knowledge at multiple levels of the clinical and basic neurosciences.
Principles of brain tissue engineering
Authors: Freed William J. , Smith Thressa D.
Published: February 2010

It is often presumed that effects of neural tissue transplants are due to release of neurotransmitter. In many cases, however, effects attributed to transplants may be related to phenomena such as trophic effects mediated by glial cells or even tissue reactions to injury. Any conclusion regarding causation of graft effects must be based on the control groups or other comparisons used. In human clinical studies, for example, comparing the same subject before and after transplantation allows for many interpretations of the causes of clinical changes.
Therapeutic neural transplantation: Boon or boondoggle?
Authors: Haring John H.
Published: February 2010

Despite reports of recovery of function after neural transplantation, the biological interactions between transplanted neurons and the host brain that are necessary to mediate recovery are unclear at present. One source of confusion is in the variety of models and protocols used in these studies. It is suggested that multisite experimentation using standard protocols, models, and recovery criteria would be helpful in moving neural transplantation from the laboratory to the clinic.
Intraretrosplenial grafts of cholinergic neurons and spatial memory function
Authors: Li Ying J. , Low Walter C.
Published: February 2010

The transplantation of cholinergic neurons into the hippocampal formation has been well characterized. We describe our studies on the effects of cholinergic transplants in the retrosplenial cortex. These transplants were capable of ameliorating spatial navigation deficits in rats with septohippocampal lesions. In addition, we provide evidence for the modulation of transplanted neurons by the host brain.
Lessons on transplant survival from a successful model system
Authors: Moffett Stacia B.
Published: February 2010

Studies on the snailMelampusreveal that connectivity is crucial to the survival of transplanted ganglia. Transplanted CNS ganglia can innervate targets or induce supernumerary structures. Neuron survival is optimized by the neural incorporation that occurs when a transplanted ganglion is substituted for an excised ganglion. Better provision for the trophic requirements of neurons will improve the success of mammalian fetal transplants.
The NGF superfamily of neurotrophins: Potential treatment for Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease
Authors: Mufson Elliott J. , Sobreviela Teresa
Published: February 2010

Stein & Glasier suggest embryonic neural tissue grafts as a potential treatment strategy for Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease. As an alternative, we suggest that the family of nerve growth factor-related neurotrophins and their trk (tyrosine kinase) receptors underlie cholinergic basal forebrain (CBF) and dopaminergic substantia nigra neuron degeneration in these diseases, respectively. Therefore, treatment approaches for these disorders could utilize neurotrophins.
The spinal cord as an alternative model for nerve tissue graft
Authors: Privat A. , y Ribotta M. Giménez
Published: February 2010

The spinal cord provides an alternative model for nerve tissue grafting experiments. Anatomo-functional correlations are easier to make here than in any other region of the CNS because of a direct implication of spinal cord neurons in sensorimotor activities. Lesions can be easily performed to isolate spinal cord neurons from descending inputs. The anatomy of descending monoaminergic systems is well defined and these systems offer a favourable paradigm for lesion-graft experiments.
Gene replacement therapy in the CNS: A view from the retina
Authors: Seigel Gail M.
Published: February 2010

Gene replacement therapy holds great promise in the treatment of many genetic CNS disorders. This commentary discusses the feasibility of gene replacement therapy in the unique context of the retina, with regard to: (1) the genetics of retinal neoplasia and degeneration, (2) available gene transfer technology, and (3) potential gene delivery vehicles.
Pathway rewiring with neural transplantation
Authors: Strata Piergiorgio , Rossi Ferdinando
Published: February 2010

A lesion to the brain is not necessary for a successful neural transplantation. Embryonic Purkinje cells placed on the surface of an uninjured adult cerebellum can develop and migrate into the host molecular layer. Both the Purkinje cells that migrated into the host cerebellum and those that remained in the graft were innervated by collateral sprouting of adult intact climbing fibers.
Are fetal brain tissue grafts necessary for the treatment of brain damage?
Authors: Stein Donald G. , Glasier Marylou M.
Published: February 2010

Despite some clinical promise, using fetal transplants for degenerative and traumatic brain injury remains controversial and a number of issues need further attention. This response reexamines a number of questions. Issues addressed include: temporal factors relating to neural grafting, the role of behavioral experience in graft outcome, and the relationship of rebuilding of neural circuitry to functional recovery. Also discussed are organization and type of transplanted tissue, the “trophic hypothesis” of transplant viability, and whether transplants are really needed to obtain functional recovery after brain damage.
Transcendence, guilt, and self-control
Authors: Baumeister Roy F.
Published: February 2010

Transcendence, defined as the capacity to perceive the immediate stimulus environment in relation to long-range or abstract concerns, is a key aspect of self-control, and indeed self-regulation often breaks down because attention becomes focused exclusively on the immediate stimuli (i.e., transcendence fails). Factors that restrict attention to the here and now will weaken self-control, whereas factors that promote transcendence will enhance it. Guilt may be one example of the latter.
When is a pattern a pattern?
Authors: Branch Marc N.
Published: February 2010

Rachlin argues that according to “teleological” behaviorism self-control is evident in instances where an act is contrasted with an element of a temporally extended behavioral pattern. A strength of the argument is that it incorporates an important role for temporally extended context in identifying self-control. Weaknesses of this viewpoint are that it de-emphasizes the identification of manipulable controlling variables in defining and accounting for the origins of patterns.
Self-control as habit
Authors: Hocutt Max
Published: February 2010

Self-control has traditionally been explained in the terms of faculty psychology, as the exercise of free will or the use of reason in choosing between different individual acts. Rachlin explains self-control behavioristically, as the preference for habits over individual acts. His explanation resolves the paradoxes faced by the others and has the additional advantage of being verifiable.
Patterns, acts, and self-control: Rachlin's theory
Authors: Kane Robert
Published: February 2010

Regarding Rachlin's behavioral act/pattern theory of self-control, it is argued that some cases of self-control involve pattern/ pattern conflicts rather than merely act/pattern conflicts and that – if all cases of self-control are to be accounted for – some patterns must be viewed as internal representational states of mind (plans) rather than merely as patterns of actual overt behavior.
Teleological behaviorism and internal control of behavior
Authors: Silverstein Albert
Published: February 2010

The Aristotelian position on causality advocates explaining biological events by the configuration of outcomes they normally achieve. Rachlin's analysis follows this strategy as an alternative to explanation via hypothetical “inner” events, though he omits considering one definition of “inner” explanation (historical definition) as being complementary to teleological explanation. He also fails to provide a detailed teleological analysis of the role of bridging responses in allowing animals to select larger-outcome alternatives.
The role of discounting in global social issues
Authors: Summers Craig
Published: February 2010

The willingness to trade off large but ill-defined future consequences for immediate work characterizes social problems such as environmental sustainability. This commentary argues that important applications of behavioral models of self-control are being overlooked in the experimental literature. Tying the experimental literature to longterm health, environmental, and other risks makes the experimental work more germane, and raises new research questions for experimental modeling.
Is preadaptation for language a necessary assumption?
Authors: Bryant David J.
Published: February 2010

Preadaptation for language is an unnecessary assumption because intermediate stages of linguistic ability are possible and adaptive. Language could have evolved through gradual selection from structures exhibiting few features associated with modern structures. Without physical evidence pertaining to language ability in prehabilis hominids, it remains possible that selective pressures for language use preceded and necessitated modern neurolinguistic structures.
Evidence for POT expansion in earlyHomo: A pretty theory with ugly (or no) paleoneurological facts
Authors: Holloway Ralph L.
Published: February 2010

If POT (parieto-occipital-temporal junction) reorganization came earlier in australopithecines than inHomo, it is likely that the selective pressures were different, and not necessarily directed toward language. The brain endocast evidence for the POT inA. afarensisis actually better than it is for earlyHomo.
Neural preconditions for proto-language
Authors: Hurford James R. , Kirby Simon
Published: February 2010

Representation must be prior to communication in evolution. Wilkins & Wakefield's target article gives the impression that communicative pressures play a secondary role. We suggest that their evolutionary precursor is compatible with protolanguage rather than language itself. The difference between these two communicative systems should not be underestimated: only the former can be trivially reappropriated from a representational system.
Apes and language: Human uniqueness again?
Authors: Mitchell Robert W. , Miles H. Lyn
Published: February 2010

Wilkins & Wakefield's intriguing model of language evolution is deficient in evidence of human uniqueness in metaphorical matching, amodal representation, reference, conceptual structure, hierarchical organization, linguistic comprehension, sign use, laterality, and handedness. Primates show communicative reference, laterality, and handedness, and apes in particular show hierarchical organization, conceptual structure, cross-modal abilities, sign use, and displaced reference.
Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness
Authors: Baars Bernard J.
Published: February 2010

Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.
The path not taken
Authors: Dennett Daniel
Published: February 2010

The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
Guilty consciousness
Authors: Graham George
Published: February 2010

Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
Triangulating phenomenal consciousness
Authors: Kitcher Patricia
Published: February 2010

This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
Access and what it is like
Authors: Kobes Bernard W.
Published: February 2010

Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
We've only just begun
Authors: Lycan William G.
Published: February 2010

Block contends that the concept of consciousness is a mongrel concept and that researchers go astray by conflating different notions of “consciousness.” This is certainly true. In fact, it is truer than Block acknowledges, because his own notion of P-consciousness runs together two, or arguably three, quite different and separable features of a sensory state.
Phenomenal and attentional consciousness may be inextricable
Authors: Morton Adam
Published: February 2010

In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the (single) way an experience feels, the (single) line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
A-consciousness: The local newspaper of the mind?
Authors: Navon David
Published: February 2010

A-consciousness may be regarded as the visibility of information that is the output of a process within a community of other processes. The most prominent function of “public” dissemination of information is giving access to it to processes whose relevance is not clear at the moment of dissemination. The function of P-consciousness may be outside the realm of cognition.
Conscious and nonconscious control of action
Authors: Revonsuo Antti
Published: February 2010

I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
Block's philosophical anosognosia
Authors: Rey G.
Published: February 2010

Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
How many concepts of consciousness?
Authors: Block Ned
Published: February 2010

With some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need explanation.
Eggs in more than one basket: Mediating mechanisms between evolution and phobias
Authors: Öhman Arne
Published: February 2010

The evolutionary origin of phobias is strongly supported by behavioral genetics and monkey vicarious conditioning data. Prepared Pavlovian conditioning may be only one of the mechanisms mediating the evolutionarily determined outcome in phobias, avoidance. Davey's alternative biased expectancy hypothesis has merit in accounting for some aspects of laboratory data, but it is insufficient to explain the unconscious origin of phobic fear.
Précis ofImages of Mind
Authors: Posner Michael I. , Raichle Marcus E.
Published: February 2010

This volume explores how functional brain imaging techniques like positron emission tomography have influenced cognitive studies. The first chapter outlines efforts to relate human thought and cognition in terms of great books from the late 1800s through the present. Chapter 2 describes mental operations as they are measured in cognitive science studies. It develops a framework for relating mental operations to activity in nerve cells. In Chapter 3, the PET method is reviewed and studies are presented that use PET to map the striate cortex and to activate extrastriate motion, color, and form areas. Chapter 4 shows how top down processes involving attention can lead to activation of these same areas in the detection of targets, visual search, and visual imagery. This chapter reveals complex networks of activations. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the presentation of words. Chapter 5 illustrates PET studies of the anatomy of visual word processing and shows how the circuitry used for generating novel uses of words changes as the task becomes automated. Chapter 6 applies high density electrical recording to explore these activations in real time and to show how a constant anatomy can be reprogrammed by task instructions to produce and perform different cognitive tasks. Chapter 7 shows how studies of brain lesions and PET converge on common networks underlying attentional functions such as visual orienting, target detection, and maintenance of the alert state. Chapters 8 and 9 apply the network approach to examine normal development of attention in infants and pathological conditions resulting from brain damage, and psychiatric pathologies of depression, schizophrenia, and attention deficit disorder. In Chapter 10, new developments such as functional MRI are discussed in terms of future developments and integration of cognitive neuroscience.
Tough times for dualists
Authors: Donald Merlin
Published: February 2010

Images of mindmarks a new era in human cognitive neuroscience. Despite the difficult conceptual problems associated with using group-averaged data and paired subtractions, human PET images converge well with existing data from other areas of cognitive neuroscience while opening up new theoretical and experimental possibilities. However, greater attention to individual differences might prove necessary in the study of culturally driven adaptations such as literacy.
A major advance in neuropsychology
Authors: Freides David
Published: February 2010

Posner & Raichle's book presents methods and data that increase support for mind-brain unity and provide a method for studying and verifying brain dysfunction objectively. Their incorporation into the assessment technology of neuropsychology should accordingly constitute a major advance. In addition, these techniques may help clarify longstanding controversies in cognitive psychology such as whether perception is multimodal or amodal.
Regions, networks: Interpreting functional neuroimaging data
Authors: Horwitz Barry
Published: February 2010

The subtraction and covariance paradigms are two analytic techniques used with functional neuroimaging data. The first assumes that a brain region participating in a task should show altered neural activity (relative to a control task). The second assumes that tasks are mediated by networks of interacting regions.Images of mindattempts to link results from the subtraction paradigm with a network interpretation that could have been more explicitly done using the covariance paradigm.
Mind mappers and cognitive modelers: Toward cross-fertilization
Authors: Jacobs Arthur M. , Carr Thomas H.
Published: February 2010

It is argued that current neuroimaging studies can provide useful constraints for the construction of models of cognition, and that these studies should be guided by cognitive models. A numberof challenges for a successful cross-fertilization between “mind mappers” and cognitive modelers are discussed in the light of current research on word recognition.
If a picture is worth a thousand words, how many pictures is a word worth?
Authors: Paller Ken A.
Published: February 2010

Pictures of normal brain activity during human thought can be worth a great deal. Electrophysiology and functional neuroimaging together allow both temporal and spatial dimensions of neurocognitive functions to be explored. Although these techniqueshave their limitations, the Cognitive Neuroscience approach is well-suited to pursuing questions about how words are perceived, understood, and remembered.
Neural images and neural coding
Authors: Perrone Antonio L. , Basti Gianfranco
Published: February 2010

In Posner & Raichle's (1994) book, two essential and strictly related limitations of cognitive neurophysiology are not sufficiently enhanced: (1) The problem of “coding,” namely the capability of a natural brain to redefine its own “basic symbols” as a function of a changing environment; (2) the inadequacy of a Hebbian rule to reckon with complex computational problems such as those solved by real brains.
Bright red spots or – the meaning of the meaning
Authors: Schmitt G. J. E.
Published: February 2010

There are methodological problems with the new techniques reviewed by Posner & Raichle. Some brain mechanisms are not detected by the temporal and spatial resolution. Questions are also raised by the stimulation paradigms.
Interaction of method and theory in cognitive neuroscience
Authors: Posner Michael I. , Raichle Marcus E.
Published: February 2010

We divided the many diverse comments on our book into categories. These are: theory, scope and goals of our project, methods, comments on specific anatomical areas, the concept of attention, consciousness and cognitive control, and finally other issues. Although many of the points of the critics are certainly well taken, we believe studies that have emerged since our book provide strong evidence that the general approach taken in our book is now yielding important new data on the relation of cognitive processes to underlying brain activity.
Future directions for rhodopsin structure and function studies
Authors: Hargrave Paul A.
Published: February 2010

To understand how the photoreceptor protein rhodopsin performs in its role as a receptor, its structure needs to be determined at the atomic level. Upon receiving a photon of light, rhodopsin undergoes a change in conformation that allows it to bind and activate the C-protein, transducin. An important future goal should be to determine the structure of both the inactive and the photoactivated state of rhodopsin, R*. This should provide the groundwork necessary for experiments on how rhodopsin achieves its signaling state R*, and how R* functions to activate transducin. To do this, the crystal structure of both rhodopsin and R* must be determined. Few membrane proteins have been successfully crystallized, so this is not a trivial undertaking. Two- or three dimensional crystals of rhodopsin must be prepared that are well ordered, to produce a high-resolution structure. Rhodopsin must be purified to homogeneity and the appropriate detergent(s) selected for crystallization experiments. Long-term thermal stability of the rhodopsin-detergent complex must be achieved in the presence of a precipitant. Two-dimensional crystals may offer advantages in investigating the structure of R*, but the structure obtained may be limited in resolution. It is necessary to work with rhodopsin in the dark, unless suitable light-stable retinal derivatives are developed. Protein engineering of rhodopsin offers attractive opportunities to improve its ability to crystallize, but is presently hindered by the absence of a high-yielding expression system. Knowledge of the structure of rhodopsin will have general importance. Because rhodopsin is a member of the family of C-protein-coupled receptors, knowledge of the structure and the mechanism of action of rhodopsin suggests by analogy how other members of the receptor family may function.
The determination of rhodopsin structure may require alternative approaches
Authors: Albert Arlene D. , Yeagle Philip L.
Published: February 2010

The structure of rhodopsin is a subject of intense interest. Solving the structure by traditional methods has proved exceedingly challenging. It may therefore be useful to confront the problem by a combination of alternate techniques. These include FTIR (Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy) and AFM (atomic force microscopy) on the intact protein. Furthermore, additional insights may be gained through structural investigations of discrete rhodopsin domains.
Mechanisms of photoreceptor degenerations
Authors: Barnstable Colin J.
Published: February 2010

The candidate gene approach has identified many causes of photoreceptor rod cell death in retinitis pigmentosa. Some mutations lead to increased cyclicGMP concentrations in rods. Rod photoreceptors are also particularly susceptible to some mutations in housekeeping genes. Although many more cases of macular degeneration than retinitis pigmentosa occur each year, there is much less known about both genetic and sporadic forms of this disease.
Molecular insights gained from covalently tethering cGMP to the ligand-binding sites of retinal rod cGMP-gated channels
Authors: Brown R. Lane , Karpen Jeffrey W.
Published: February 2010

A photoaffinity analog of cGMP has been used to biochemically identify a new ligand-binding subunit of the retinal rod cGMP-activated ion channel, as well as amino acids in contact with cGMP in the original subunit. Covalent tethering of this probe to channels in excised menbrane patches has revealed a functional heteogeneity in the ligand-binding sites that may arise from the two biochemically identified subunits.
The atomic structure of visual rhodopsin: How and when?
Authors: Garavito R. Michael
Published: February 2010

Strong arguments are presented by Hargrave suggesting that the crystallization of visual rhodopsin for high resolution analysis by X-ray crystallography or electron microscopy is feasible. However, the effort needed to achieve this goal will most likely exceed the resources of a single laboratory and a concerted approach to the research is necessary.
Structure and physiology of photoreceptor cGMP-gated cation channels
Authors: Haynes Lawrence W.
Published: February 2010

The primary sequence of two subunits of the rod and one subunit of the cone cGMP-gated channel have been described, but describing how structure determines function is only just beginning. The discovery that the affinity of the rod channel for its agonist can be modulated indicates that the relationship between intracellular cGMP and the channel's open probability (current) during the course of the photoresponse may be more complex than previously thought.
Unsolved issues in S-modulin/recoverin study
Authors: Kawamura Satoru
Published: February 2010

S-Modulin is a frog homolog of recoverin. The function and the underlying mechanism of the action of these proteins are now understood in general. However, there remain some unsolved issues including; two distinct effects of S-modulin; Ca2+-dependent binding of S-modulin to membranes and a possible target protein; S-modulin-like proteins in other neurons. These issues are considered in this commentary.
Structure of the cGMP-gated channel
Authors: Oprian Daniel D.
Published: February 2010

The subunit structure of the cGMP-gated cation channel of rod photoreceptors is rapidly being defined, and in the process the mode of regulation by Ca2+-calmodulin unraveled. Intriguingly, early results suggest that additional subunits of unknown function are associated with the channel and remain to be identified.
Adenylyl cyclase, G proteins, and synaptic plasticity
Authors: Rasenick Mark M.
Published: February 2010

It has been suggested that type I adenylyl cyclase may play a unique role in long-term potentiation, due to both unique regulatory properties as well as a specialized distribution within the mammalian brain. This would allow an integration of the signals wrought by increased intracellular calcium with those conveyed into the cellular milieu via increased cAMP. These results are discussed in the context of changes in cellular structure, because of changing interactions between G proteins and cytoskeletal components, which might be expected to accompany chronic synaptic activation.