bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Citizenship and Federations: Some Preliminary Reflections
Authors: Choudhry Sujit
Published: October 2003

Some preliminary reflections are offered on the place of citizenship in a theory of federalism. Citizenship is one of the central concepts in political theory, and an account of citizenship, at the very least, defines the criteria for, and the method for the acquisition of, membership in a political community; more importantly, it also lays down the rights and responsibilities that attach to membership. The first section in this chapter makes the point that the three chapters following in this last section of the book further the debate on citizenship and federalism by invoking three different conceptions of citizenship, ethnocultural (Ch. 17), civic (Ch. 15), and economic (Ch. 16), which in turn express different underlying conceptions of political community; these different conceptions are discussed. The second section argues that the three chapters do not fully address the complication that federalism poses for citizenship, which is termed here the problem of divided, multiple or conflicting allegiances/loyalties; this is done by discussing conceptions of citizenship in the EU, and contrasting them with the situation in the USA.
The Constitution of Institutions
Authors: Meehan Elizabeth
Published: October 2003

Begins with a brief reference to the constitutional and institutional frameworks of allegiances, identification, and citizenship rights, and goes on to argue that there are grounds for questioning the customary conceptual and political overlap between nationality and citizenship. Some decoupling has taken place in the EU, opening, according to some commentators, the possibility of a new paradigm in citizenship praxis. Thus, the chapter explores Carlos Closa's idea that supranational citizenship has more potential than national citizenship to be democratic, and draws on Joseph Weiler's ideas, which in some respects are similar to those of Closa but differ in respect of the significance of nationality and national identity; Weiler's acknowledgement of national forces is, however, consistent with Closa's suggestion that civil society in the EU is too weak to take advantage of the more democratic potential of supranational citizenship. Both ideas can be used to infer that difficulties in European citizenship may be reinforced by enlargement, not because of the introduction of a further set of nationalities per se into a supranational citizenship system, but because of a new complexity in the principled norms that Closa says have to be present in a site of democratic citizenship. In view of this, there are lessons to be learned from American theories of republican federalism, which, as expounded by S. H. Beer (1993), have much in common with a modern interest among radical democrats in deliberative or dialogic democracy; in this respect, Weiler's ideas about a European public space must be taken seriously
European Citizenship: The Relevance of the American Model
Authors: Lacorne Denis
Published: October 2003

Draws an analogy between the threats posed by social heterogeneity in the USA and the threats posed by differing national allegiances in the EU. The author reminds USA that core political identities can vary over time and that early conceptions of citizenship in the USA focussed almost exclusively on state, not federal, citizenship; in his view, within unitary states communities of identity are fine so long as individuals do not conflate these with their core political identity. In a federal system, the problem or challenge is exactly that of belonging to several political communities. Lacorne argues that pure constitutional patriotism will not suffice, since individuals require a substantial citizenship; what is needed instead are ‘common and concrete political experiences’ that would give rise to ‘a new European ethics of responsibility’. The two sections of the chapter are: The Irrelevance of the American Model of Federal Citizenship; and The Relevance of the American Multicultural Model.
Objects and Persons
Authors: Merricks Trenton
Published: October 2003

There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.

The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.

I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.

A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.

Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.
Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism
Authors: Merricks Trenton
Published: October 2003

I argue that anything a baseball causes—if baseballs exist—is also caused by the baseball's atoms working in concert. Moreover, a baseball is ‘causally irrelevant’ to what its atoms cause. These two claims imply that baseballs, if they existed, would be at best mere overdeterminers of whatever they cause. From this we can draw two conclusions. First, our perceptual reasons for believing in baseballs are no good and whether baseballs exist, just like whether arbitrary sums exist, can be decided only by philosophical argument.Second, there aren’t any baseballs. For, we should resist causal overdetermination and assume, unless forced to do otherwise, that effects are not systematically causally overdetermined. Baseballs would systematically causally overdetermine the effects of their constituent atoms. And so, the bias against systematic causal overdetermination gives a positive reason—in addition to those of Ch. 2—to deny that baseballs exist.
Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us?
Authors: Merricks Trenton
Published: October 2003

I show that the arguments of Ch. 2, while giving good reasons to eliminate statues and other inanimate composita, do not provide equally good reasons to eliminate us human organisms. As with Ch. 2, the arguments discussed touch on a variety of topics, including vagueness and the ‘Sorites Game,’ worries about co‐location and constitution, and the way a thinker (such as a person) is related to her brain.
Belief and Practice
Authors: Merricks Trenton
Published: October 2003

Argues that—because eliminativism is true—folk beliefs about statues and chairs are indeed false. But I make the case that, insofar as practical matters and justification are concerned, such beliefs are ‘nearly as good as true.’ And I argue that whether a claim of (e.g.) statue identity over time is ‘nearly as good as true’ can be, to some extent, a matter of convention. But, I argue, nothing similar can be said about claims of personal identity over time. Thus, my ontology yields a principled defence of the intuitively plausible claim that personal identity over time can never be a matter of convention, whereas the ‘identity of artifacts’ can be.
The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians
Authors: Heine Ronald E.
Published: October 2003

It has long been known that Jerome depended on Origen to some extent in producing his own commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. Several excerpts from Origen's commentary on Ephesians have been preserved in Greek. This book demonstrates the extent of Jerome's dependence on Origen by placing English translations of these excerpts from Origen's Commentary on Ephesians parallel to the English translation of Jerome's commentary on Ephesians. These parallels show that in every case where Jerome's commentary can be compared with Origen's, Jerome has followed Origen, either by translating his text or paraphrasing his thought. By this and other means, all the passages that can be attributed in some degree to Origen have been identified in Jerome's commentary in order to allow Origen's comments on Ephesians to be heard again, even if muffled at times, through the words of Jerome. This is important because Origen's commentary, in all probability, was the first complete commentary ever composed on the Epistle to the Ephesians. Origen's comments are sometimes philological, discussing the meaning of Greek words in the text and the syntax of the phrases in the Greek sentences of Paul. His comments deal also with theology, for Ephesians provided many texts that were key elements in some of his theological views, such as the pre‐existent church, the constitution of the foundation of the material world after the fall, God's foreknowledge, the unity of revelation based on the ancient prophets’ knowledge of God's future work in Christ, and the Christian struggle against hostile spiritual powers.
Book II
Authors: Heine Ronald E.
Published: October 2003

Contains a translation of the second book of Jerome's Latin commentary on Ephesians along with a translation of all the parallel passages from Origen's commentary on Ephesians. The book has a brief prologue where Jerome describes the haste with which he is working, followed by a commentary on Ephesians 3: 1–4: 30. Origen makes numerous remarks about the peculiarities of Paul's grammar. Major subjects discussed in the commentary in this section of the epistle include the mystery of God's plan to save the Gentiles, the unity of revelation in the two testaments, the final restoration of all things, and the meaning of Paul's statement about ‘all paternity’ in heaven and Earth being named from God, and his references to maintaining ‘unity in the Spirit’ and attaining ‘unity of the faith’.
Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A.
Published: October 2003

The Discourses of Epictetus, an emancipated Graeco‐Roman slave, are the most powerful surviving record of an ancient Stoic teacher at work. This book offers a comprehensive analysis of Epictetus’ philosophy as a guide to life, focusing on his dialectical methodology, principal ideas, and long‐term influence. It also shows, for the first time, how strongly he aligned his thought and educational goals with those of the Platonic Socrates. The first part of the book treats Epictetus’ intellectual and cultural context and the conversational style of the Discourses. In the second part, the core of his philosophy is found to consist in four fundamental themes: freedom, judgement, volition, and integrity. The book is also intended to serve as a guide to reading and sampling Epictetus, and it includes numerous excerpts from the Discourses in the author's original translations. Long finds Epictetus a thinker whose theism (though non‐Christian) is strikingly personalist, and whose acute psychological analysis scarcely needs updating.
The Socratic Paradigm
Authors: Long A. A.
Published: October 2003

Discusses the presence of Socrates in Epictetus’ Discourses. Plato's Gorgias was a principal source of inspiration for Epictetus, especially for his understanding and incorporation of the Socratic elenchus. On the basis of his concept of innate moral preconceptions, Epictetus arrived at an understanding of the Socratic elenchus strikingly similar to that proposed by Gregory Vlastos. He also shared with Plato's Socrates the belief that everyone has the motivation to pursue what they take to be good, with error due to failure of judgement and mental conflict. The chief aim of the Discourses is to undermine error by facilitating self‐examination and self‐discovery in terms of autonomous volition.
Reading Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A.
Published: October 2003

Offers detailed analysis of two of Epictetus’ Discourses: ’On rationality as self‐studying’, and ’On lapsing from integrity’. Epictetus explains the importance of making correct use of mental impressions, criticizes Epicurus, outlines the essentials of Stoic value theory, contrasts external power with self‐mastery, treats loss of integrity as supremely damaging to its former owner, and advocates internal dialogue as the essential resource for monitoring experience.
Epilogue: The Afterlife of Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A.
Published: October 2003

Concludes with a survey of Epictetus’ influence on later authors, ranging from classical antiquity and early Christianity up to the present. Those discussed include Simplicius, Justus Lipsius, Pascal, Descartes, Joseph Butler, and The Earl of Shaftesbury. Also included are Epictetus’ presence in American literature, and a discussion of his prospects for the new millennium.
Archetypal Heresy
Authors: Wiles Maurice
Published: October 2003

Arianism is a fourth‐century heresy, which affirmed Christ to be divine, but not in the same full sense in which God the Father is divine. Traditional Trinitarianism, with its classical expression in the Nicene Creed, emerged out of controversy with Arianism and defined Christ as being of one substance with the Father. The overall aim of the book is to trace when and where beliefs of an Arian nature have recurred in the subsequent history of Christianity. It begins with an account of the main findings of recent scholarship on fourth‐century Arianism, which involve substantial revision of the traditional picture of the faithful orthodox defending sacred truth against the evil heretics. It goes on to provide survey accounts of Gothic Christianity, of references to Arianism in the Middle Ages, and of the resurgence of Arian‐type beliefs in the continental Reformation. There is a major concentration on eighteenth‐century Britain, where many leading intellectual figures favoured a view of the Trinity close to that of early Arianism. In particular, there are detailed studies of the theological beliefs of Isaac Newton, William Whiston, and Samuel Clarke. The collapse of these views (and the similar views of many leading heterodox dissenters) into Unitarianism is traced out, and reasons for that development offered. The final chapter looks at the development of the historical study of Arianism in Britain from John Henry Newman to Rowan Williams, with special regard for the relation between the scholars’ faith and scholarly judgement. Finally a brief epilogue asks about the implication of this historical study for contemporary Trinitarian faith.
The Rise and Fall of British Arianism
Authors: Wiles Maurice
Published: October 2003

Looks briefly at anti‐Trinitarian tendencies in sixteenth‐ and seventeenth‐century Britain (with special attention to Ralph Cudworth and John Locke), but concentrates on the eighteenth century, when Arianism was a significant feature of the ecclesiastical scene, especially among leading intellectual figures both in the Church of England and among the Presbyterian churches. Detailed studies of the theologies of Isaac Newton, William Whiston, and Samuel Clarke. Traces the collapse of this Arian‐style anti‐Trinitarianism in the Church of England and the tendency of heterodox dissenters, such as Joseph Priestley, to adopt a Unitarian view. Suggests that the diminishing acceptance in the wider culture of belief in a transcendental spirit world was an important factor in that tendency, leading to a third death of Arianism.
Epilogue
Authors: Wiles Maurice
Published: October 2003

Poses a question that the preceding historical survey raises for contemporary faith. Orthodox Trinitarianism, and the Nicene Creed in which it finds classical expression, were hammered out in the course of the fourth‐century debate with Arianism. How far does the revised understanding of that debate, to which modern historical study points, put in question the kind of authority that traditional faith has normally ascribed to its outcome? The eighteenth century was able to pursue the issues in terms close to that of the original debate, because its understanding of the world and of the nature of scripture was closer to that of the fourth century than to that of the twenty‐first. Is the historical survey outlined in the book one where historical study should be freeing us from being too closely bound by our historical past?
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This essay argues that giving the reason for which an action was done, thus ‘rationalizing’ it, is giving a causal explanation––a claim that ran counter to the then prevailing orthodoxy inspired by the later Wittgenstein. We rationalize an action, says Davidson, by specifying the agent's intention; i.e. we specify that the agent did something X because he desired such and such and believed that doing X would bring about what he desired. Because intentions (‘primary reasons’) are composed of beliefs and desires, they do not themselves refer to distinct entities such as acts of will; further, on the basis of those beliefs and desires we can form practical syllogisms from which the desirability of the action (or its execution) follows deductively. In asking why an agent did such and such, we want to be given a reason that not only justifies his action but tells us for which reason he actually did it; for he might have had the justificatory reason, and acted, but not because of it––this ‘because’ must be specified causally lest the explanatory connection between reason and action be left utterly mysterious. By distinguishing events from how we describe them, Davidson discharges several objections to the causal thesis, among them the apparent logical distinctness that pertains to causal but not rationalized relata; he salvages the identification of beliefs and desires with ‘mental’ events, and stresses that action and the reason re‐describing it (which , we saw, presented no distinct entity) are not two distinct entities but only one under different descriptions.
Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This essay continues Davidson's exchange with Chisholm on the nature of events, started in Essay 9. Davidson emphasizes that his own ontological approach, as opposed to Chisholm's, grows out of a need to provide a semantic analysis for sentences stating that a (causal) change occurred; and that Chisholm is wrong to divorce matters of metaphysics from matters of entailment. Entailments matter because for Davidson a correct analysis yields the logical form of the sentence, which in turn captures the inferential relations of the sentence to those it entails (Essay 6 develops this at greater length). He stresses that sentences do not, as Chisholm claims, refer to particular events but are only existentially and generically committed to them (see Essay 8, Essay 9), and demotes additional evidence marshalled by Chisholm on behalf of the sentential theory, including sentences that apparently demand the existence of recurrent (‘eternal’) events on top of non‐recurrent (‘ephemeral’) ones. Replying to Chisholm's objection that he has not sufficiently clarified what he means by talking of an event or action ‘under a description’, Davidson classifies the locution as an intensional idiom for which we require a more general analysis––one he prefers to give in terms of utterance tokens rather than Chisholm's events.
Mental Events
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

In this essay, arguably the most debated paper in twentieth century, The Philosophy of Mind, Davidson establishes a non‐reductive variant of the identity of the mental and the physical; he does so by reconciling three prima facie inconsistent principles: first, that mental events interact causally with physical ones; second, that all events related as cause and effect fall under strict laws; third, that there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted. Davidson calls the last feature the ‘anomalism’ of the mental, which he defends at length in this essay; he combines it with an ontological bias towards the physical––i.e. while not all events are necessarily mental, they can all be given purely physical explanations––to yield ‘anomalous monism’. Davidson says that claims of identity and causal interaction hold off events regardless of how we describe them, whereas statements of law subsume them under specific (i.e., physical) descriptions (see Essay 7); it follows that if, as the first principle allows, a mental event causes a physical one, then (on the second principle) there is a description of it under which it instantiates a strict law––this description is physical, hence the mental event is identical to a physical one (the paper clarifies early on what warrants calling an event ‘mental’ or ‘physical’). In a short appendix, Davidson defends his analysis of nomological statements against Nelson Goodman's: it is not single predicates that are (or aren’t) intrinsically apt to figure in statements of strict laws but rather pairs of predicates which are (or aren’t) inductively suited to one another. And Davidson's claim in Essay 11 is that ‘mental and physical predicates are not made for one another’ because their respective ascription conditions (which he terms the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’ and subsumption under strict law) allow at best for contingent, not nomological, generalizations; relatedly, the mental supervenes on the physical in the absence of strict laws correlating them.
Psychology as Philosophy
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This essay develops the relation, implicit in Essay 11, of intentional action to behaviour described in purely physical terms; Davidson repeats from Essay 3 that an action counts as intentional if the agent caused it, and asks to which degree a study of action thus conceived permits being scientific. Davidson stresses the central importance of a normative concept of rationality in attributing reasons to agents (i.e. in attributing beliefs and desires that, in Essay 1, make up their reasons); because this concept has no echo in physical theory, any explanatory schema governed by the concept is irreducible to physical theory. Davidson adduces several facts that prevent us from giving strict laws connecting reasons and action: first, we cannot give conditions that are not only necessary but also sufficient for an action to be intentional, using only the concepts of belief, desire, and cause––for we cannot specify the ‘right way’ in which beliefs and desires cause actions (see Essay 4); second, a certain holism of the mental pervades explanations of human behaviour: we cannot assign beliefs and desires independently of and prior to the actions they cause, a point Davidson takes Ramsey's work on subjective probability to have shown. Davidson appends a set of replies to critics, which clarify his attitude to psychology as a science, his analysis of statements of law, the principle of causal interaction (see Essay 11), and the relation between mutually irreducible explanatory schema.
Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson works Hume's remarks on pride into a coherent propositional theory free from Hume's ‘epistemological machinery’. Hume claims that the causal basis for feeling pride is a belief relating the proud person to the object he feels proud about (occasionally identical to himself): one isn’t proud of a house unless it is one's own. Davidson spells out which formal conditions have to hold for the analysis to go through, indicating that the agent must be referred to pronominally in the belief, and that the agent needs to appraise the property he self‐ascribes rather than the one he ascribes to the object of his pride. Davidson explores whether Hume's own theories of ‘simple impressions’ (here, of pride), self, and causality can sustain the account and, if not, whether they are needed to sustain it. After subjecting the account to criticism, Davidson concludes that by causally explaining pride (in terms of the aforementioned belief plus the attitude of appraisal), Hume helps rationalize both pride and the further actions it may motivate and cause.
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of language. Its key insight is that the concept of truth can shed light on various issues connected to meaning: Davidson, who assumes a partial and primitive understanding of the truth predicate, reverses Tarski who had succeeded in elucidating the concept of truth by taking the notion of ‘translation’ (preservation of meaning) for granted. In the first of five subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson develops the systematic constraints a theory of meaning has to meet and shows how an approach to semantics based on the concept of truth meets these demands better than any rival approach. Sect. 2 explores whether one can give semantic analyses of quotation, intensional contexts, and force within the extensional limitations of the truth‐theoretic framework. Viewing the theories of meaning developed in the first section as empirical, Sect. 3 inquires into their testability: can we verify these theories without presupposing concepts too closely aligned to that of meaning, interpretation, and synonymy? Davidson develops constitutive constraints on applying truth theories to interpret the speech behaviour of others: we have to view utterances for the most part as assertions of the speaker's beliefs and those beliefs as largely true and consistent (he terms this the ‘Principle of Charity’). Sect. 4 combines these interpretative constraints with the semantic concept of truth developed in Sect. 1 to tackle metaphysical issues. Davidson claims that truth is not relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world; consequently, by studying those languages via the semantic concept of truth we can derive ontological conclusions. Sect. 5 explores aspects of linguistic usage that form a particular threat to theories of meaning (such as Davidson's) that focus on the literal meaning of sentences: for truth theory to be adequate as a general theory of language, it must give valid accounts of sentence mood, illocutionary force, and metaphorical meaning.
On Saying That
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson asks what the logical form of belief and utterance attributions are. We have to specify ‘Galileo said that p’ for a potentially infinite number of sentences that can occupy the place of p; yet in doing so we must resort to finite means (something he is not sure Quine's analysis succeeds in), i.e. we must assign subsentential structure to p and referents to its components. Yet, as soon as we do this we are forced to license substitutions within p of coreferring expressions; as these are known to fail, Davidson argues that we must be wrong either about the referents in p or about the logical form of the attribution as a whole. After ruling out the first diagnosis, insisting against Frege that the expressions occurring in intensional contexts must have their standard reference, Davidson develops an ingenious analysis of the attribution's logical form. On this analysis, called ‘parataxis’, the attribution splits into two sentences, ‘Galileo said that. p’, where the ‘that’ in the first sentence functions as a demonstrative picking out the second sentence only if the two ‘say the same’ or are identical in meaning (a notion Davidson then analyses in truth‐theoretic terms familiar from Essay 2).
Belief and the Basis of Meaning
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson continues the analysis of the evidential base required for radical interpretation from Essay 9 and extends it into a systematic methodology. The ascription of meanings to utterances and intentions to speakers must proceed simultaneously because we lack a prior grasp on either (Davidson illustrates this by appeal to Ramsey's work on subjective probability); by the same token, if interpreters are to get anywhere at all they must start by an interpretative ‘Principle of Charity’ on which they assume at the outset that the speaker's beliefs are mostly true and that his utterances are, for the most part, assertions of what he believes or ‘holds true’. Consequently, interpreters must avoid attributing inexplicable error to the speaker, but rather ‘maximize agreement’. Davidson explains how these assumptions operate independently of detailed knowledge of what the speaker believes or asserts, and why they are indispensable to the process of radical interpretation; in specific, how we can have no independent foothold on propositional attitudes or speaker meaning (see Appendix); and he discusses the degree to which his interpretative constraints leave it indeterminate what the speaker means.
12 Reply to Foster
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

In reply to a critical paper by John Foster, Davidson recognizes that his truth theory's axioms (from which the truth conditions of each sentence in the object language can be deduced) must not be merely true but law‐like, i.e. viewed as empirical axioms. That is, to rule out that p in ‘S’ is true iff p’ is not replaced by a coextensive p (say, ‘p and q’ for any q alike in truth value to p), the left and right hand sides of the biconditional must be linked counter‐factually. Second, Davidson's characterizations (in Essays 9 and 10) of the relation of a truth theory to its supporting evidence does not rule out the case in which someone knows both (E) the evidence and (T) the propositions composing the theory, yet fails to realize that (E) entailed (T) and that (T) constituted a theory apt to facilitate radical interpretation. In reply, Davidson analyses the required intensional idioms (in particular ‘S knows that . . .’) to remedy these criticisms by recourse to the paratactic method envisaged in Essay 7.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme‐content dualism. He argues that such dualism (the ‘third, and perhaps, last dogma of empiricism’) is untenable since: (1) not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence (as Quine's rejection of the analytic‐synthetic distinction had shown) but also (2) the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the related notion of a theory ‘fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non‐intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability (developed in Essays 9 and 10): if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ‘there is no ground for speaking of two.’
Reality Without Reference
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson replies to critics (in particular Hartry Field and Gilbert Harman) who have objected that truth theories cannot do the duty of meaning theories if they fail to elucidate the concept of reference on which they rely (Hartry Field, Gilbert Harman). In response, Davidson explains precisely why truth theories do not and need not explain or analyse the concepts of satisfaction and denotation (cf Essay 14) once these are characterized recursively (which requires that the basic vocabulary is finite, as Essay 1 had demanded on grounds of the language's learnability). He further shows how taking the relation of reference as being central when explaining the relation of language to world collapses into a discredited ‘building‐block theory’ of language (see Essay 1) and neglects the semantic primacy of the sentence. This primacy, argues Davidson, can only be acknowledged by making truth and sentential structure one's central semantic concepts; further, truth theories are testable only at the sentential level, not at that of subsentential reference.
The Inscrutability of Reference
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Davidson discusses two related claims of Quine: ontological relativity and the indeterminacy of reference. By comparing these claims to the related indeterminacies of truth and logical form, he suggests how we can minimize them by investigating them from within truth theories and radical interpretation. They can be minimized to a greater degree than Quine's own framework permits, but not to the high degree a causal theory of reference claims. Davidson objects to this theory, as he had in Essay 15, on the basis that reference assignments are tested at the sentential level, and that two interpretations which agree on that level may differ however much they like about subsentential assignments. Davidson then suggests a way of formulating Quine's insights without trace of relativism (cf Essay 13).
The Wave of Power‐Sharing Democracy
Authors: Lijphart Arend
Published: October 2003

Sets out the basic theory of consociational democracy, and reviews the main points of agreement and disagreement among political scientists concerning its utility as a model of democratic power‐sharing in divided societies. The theory suffers from an unavoidable unquantifiability, which should not, however, operate as a bar to its application as a fruitful source of guidelines for constitutional design.
Presidents, Parliaments, and Democracy: Insights from the Post‐Communist World
Authors: Frye Timothy
Published: October 2003

Examines how institutional features combine with other factors to exacerbate one particular threat to democracy—the expansion of presidential power. It identifies three key conditions under which presidents in societies undergoing regime change expand their formal powers: first, that economic reforms producing concentrated benefits may lead the winners from those reforms to seek institutional change in the powers of the presidency; second, that countries with fragmented parliaments tend to experience an increase in presidential powers; third, that presidents in countries with newly crafted constitutions are just as likely to seek expansion of their powers as those in countries with revised versions of communist‐era constitutions. It then reviews the generally negative consequences of increases in presidential power for democracy, with examples from various formerly communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.
Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy
Authors: Ghai Yash Pal
Published: October 2003

Examines and compares three constitutional mechanisms for the political recognition of ethnic minorities and their potential to ameliorate or aggravate ethnic tensions—communal representation through the electoral process (with examples from Cyprus, India, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, and Fiji), territorial autonomy through asymmetric federalism, and cultural autonomy.
Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve
Authors: Taagepera Rein
Published: October 2003

Addresses three issues. On what basis are electoral rules actually chosen in new democracies, and what are the consequences? On what basis should they ideally be designed? And in how much detail should the electoral rules be specified in constitutions?
Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria
Authors: Suberu Rotimi T. , Diamond Larry
Published: October 2003

Explores six topics for which Nigerian politics offer rich material for analysis: the relative impacts of democratic constitutionalism and military authoritarianism on inter‐ethnic relations; the relationship between the form and character of federalism on the one hand, and success or failure in the management of ethnic conflict on the other; the relative auspiciousness of presidential and parliamentary government for deeply divided developing countries; the latent tensions between integrative and accommodative (consociational) solutions to the dilemmas of national unity; the duality and complementarity of formal and informal practices for the management of ethnic conflict; and the possible elements of a reform agenda for promoting stable, peaceful, and democratic management of ethnic conflict.
From Perfection to Infinity
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

Aquinas now takes up a different methodology—what is called the ‘relational method’—to provide a systematic basis for developing the consideration of God's substance. The introduction of universal perfection appears to provide an opportunity for investigating specific relationships between God and one or another kind of thing. An understanding of the relationship of causal dependence is indispensable to natural theology. Aquinas then introduces his arguments for God's divine attributes of goodness, uniqueness, and infinity.
Intellect
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

The natural theology we have been investigating has undertaken to show that there must be a necessarily unique and absolutely simple being that constitutes the ultimate explanation of everything. The accounts that Aquinas has provided of certain important metaphysical attributes seem to anticipate the attribution of mind to God. Aquinas indicates that applying a creaturely predicate to God in the way prescribed by the relational method is rarely, if ever, a matter of simply extending the use of a familiar term. Only intellectivity, not reason or wisdom, is the best choice of perfection, specific to humans. Aquinas gives various arguments showing intellect's place in the extensive aspect of God's universal perfection, which underlies divine causation.
Will
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

Since intellect and will are conceptually distinct, and since intellect without will would not constitute a person, showing that personhood must be attributed to reality's ultimate principle remains incomplete until it can be shown to be characterized essentially by will as well. Before taking up Aquinas's arguments for will in God, his conception of will generally is examined, as the absolutely universal appetitus for what is good, associated with all being. Aquinas's arguments proposing to derive divine will from divine intellect as well as the argument from freedom are presented. The Dionysian principle, which Aquinas accepts: goodness is by its very nature diffusive of itself and (thereby) of being, commits him to a necessitarian explanation of God's willing of things other than himself.
Joy, Love, and Liberality
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

There can be no passions of any sort in God because, for instance, passions are associated with the sensory part of the human soul. If the having of intellective attitudes, however, is simply a corollary of the having of intellect and will, then Aquinas's relational method mandates attributing joy and pleasure to God. Patterned on the attribution of pleasure and joy, active divine love is a corollary of intellective appetite in God. Aquinas approaches the associative aspect of God's love when he takes as primary what appears to be God's volition of union with other things, and then uses that as the basis for one of his arguments for the thesis that God loves himself and other things. Aquinas argues that some virtues, such as truthfulness, justice, and liberality, which are sources of activities devoid of passion, are divine attributes. Liberality is the virtue most pertinent to the subject matter of this chapter because liberality is the one that is indispensable to love.
The Metaphysics of Creation
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

The Metaphysics of Creation is a continuation of the project begun in The Metaphysics of Theism, moving the focus to the second book of Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. Building upon his account of God's existence and nature, Aquinas argues that the existence of things other than God must be explained by divine creation out of nothing. Arguments follow to identify God's motivation for creating, to defend the possibility of a beginningless universe, and to explain the origin of species. Aquinas focuses exclusively on creatures with intellects, with the result that more than half of his natural theology of creation constitutes a philosophy of mind.
Nature from the Top Down
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

The practical purpose of SCG is to teach theism. In Book II, Aquinas will argue carefully and specifically for divine creation, then undertake to explain the fact of nature's prolific diversity, and will then, after developing the distinction between immanent and transeunt divine activity, devote the rest of Book II to considering the results of God's transeunt activity, sharply focused on the existence of intellects in nature. This book will examine all three of those aspects of Aquinas's metaphysics of creation, sometimes offering criticisms or extensions of various features of them.
Creation as Doubly Universal Production
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

With respect to God's producing of things, the divine transeunt activity is considered in this chapter; Aquinas argues that God is for all things, the cause of being. God's production of things is distributively universal (for all things) and intrinsically universal (the cause of being). This characterization of intrinsic universality is entailed by the production's being absolutely independent of antecedent matter (and, therefore, devoid of any operation on any pre‐existing stuff). The notion of prime matter must be included among the products (or at least among the by‐products) of God's universal production for Aquinas, although the justification he offers is not the strongest sort available to him. One way of combining the distributive and intrinsic universality of God's production of things is to view the primordial universe as its single immediate effect. God's creating involves no movement, successiveness, or change.
Metaphysical Hybrids
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

Aquinas investigates how intellective substances can be united with corporeal substances. After ruling out several kinds of union: mixing, contact (taken literally), fastening, continuity, and composition, Aquinas goes on to consider power contact distinct from corporeal contact and unconditional union of intellective and corporeal substances in respect of a defining characteristic. The only way this would be possible is for one of the substances to be the substantial form for which the other is the matter. At this point, Aquinas shifts to the nature of human beings and human souls. Many arguments are examined and rejected by Aquinas before arriving at his account of a soul as the first principle of life in a living body, not part of that body, but rather its substantial form.
Souls Before Birth and at Death
Authors: Kretzmann Norman
Published: October 2003

In Aquinas's attempt to explain the origin of an individual human being's soul (his embryological account), he argues that a human soul does not begin to exist at conception, or for some time thereafter. After opposing 12 naturalistic explanations previously given by others of the origin of new human souls, Aquinas claims that, consequently, only particular creation can account for human reproduction. Aquinas thinks he has good, natural–theological arguments to show that at least at death a human soul or intellect is not corrupted along with the human body with which it has been united. The organlessness of intellection is his key to arguing for the intellective soul's survival of death.
Aristotle: Explanation and Nature
Authors: Hankinson R. J.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses Aristotle's conceptions of nature, change, and potentiality; the four causes, spontaneity, and chance; teleology and hypothetical necessity; and also Aristotle's account of action, freedom, and responsibility. The choice facing Greek philosopher‐scientists is simple: show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or pursue a teleological explanation, insisting on the activity of divine intelligence in the cosmos. Aristotle, Hankinson writes, pursues a middle way between these options, although, ultimately, Aristotle takes the whole structure of the cosmos to be teleologically organized. Aristotle rejects Plato's metaphysics of perfect hypostasized forms and divinely directed teleology: relying heavily on his concept of phusis or nature, Aristotle makes teleology an internal principle governing the development of natural objects. Aristotle distinguishes four causes or causal factors in explanation: matter, form, agent, and end, and he distinguishes sharply between regular natural events that can be explained by means of these causes, and chance events, which do not admit full explanation.
The Sceptics
Authors: Hankinson R. J.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses the sceptical attacks on dogmatic accounts of cause and explanation, beginning with the Eight Modes of Aenesidemus, before moving on to discuss Sextus Empiricus’ general attack on the very coherence of the notions of causation. Aenesidemus’ Eight Modes (or tropoi, i.e. general patterns of argument) are a set of arguments of varying scope and power against the Aetiology of the Dogmatists; they demonstrate the fundamental difficulties in any attempt to investigate the hidden structures of things, and also raise methodological difficulties. Sextus Empiricus argues that the very concepts of cause and effect are incoherent, and he also criticizes the notions of agent and patient, and the dogmatist account of sign‐inference. Hankinson also discusses the Modes of Agrippa, according to which an explanation is either circular, infinitely regressive, or arbitrary. The sceptical attacks on astrology and divination are also important in that they undermine the claims of pseudo‐science; such arguments, Hankinson adds, contribute to the understanding of the standards towards which genuine science must strive.
Explanation in the Medical Schools
Authors: Hankinson R. J.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Hankinson discusses the major Hellenistic Medical theories and figures, from the Alexandrian doctors Herophilus and Erasistratus in the third century bc to the Empiricist, Rationalist, and Methodist schools of the early Imperial period. Hankinson argues that the practical basis of medical science broadened and deepened the debate about the nature of causal explanation. The Empiricists were sceptics in their attitude to causes, thinking that observation and report of evident conditions and their cures was sufficient for medical science, and thus eschewing causal theory. Rationalist doctors attacked the inadequate methodology of the Empiricists, and they try to explain why the antecedent cause should bring on such and such an effect, while emphasizing the need to decide rationally the proper use of induction, and the relevancy of similarities. The Methodists treat as irrelevant antecedent causes or factors, and they recognized just two pathological conditions—relaxation and constriction; the doctor's concern is to determine by direct observation in which state is the body.