bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Accurate, localized quantification of white matter perfusion with single‐voxel ASL
Authors: Pohmann Rolf
Published: June 2010

Quantification of perfusion in white matter is still difficult due to its low level, causing an often insufficiently low signal‐to‐noise ratio, and its long and inhomogeneous transit delays. Here, a technique is presented that accurately measures white matter perfusion by combining a spectroscopic single‐voxel localization technique (point‐resolved spectroscopy) with a pulsed arterial spin labeling encoding scheme (flow‐sensitive alternating inversion recovery) to specifically address the properties of white matter. The transit delay was measured by shifting the position of a slice‐selective saturation pulse between inversion and acquisition. Perfusion measurements resulted in values of 15.6 ± 3.2 mL/100 g/min in the left and 15.2 ± 4.8 mL/100 g/min in the right hemispheric white matter and 83.2 ± 15.2 mL/100 g/min in cortical gray matter. Taking dispersion of the transit times into account does not cause a significant change in the measured values. Magn Reson Med, 2010. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
eXtended finite element methods for thin cracked plates with Kirchhoff–Love theory
Authors: Lasry Jérémie , Pommier Julien , Renard Yves , Salaün Michel
Published: June 2010

A modelization of cracked plates under bending loads in the XFEM framework is addressed. The Kirchhoff–Love model is considered. It is well suited for very thin plates commonly used for instance in aircraft structures. Reduced HCT and FVS elements are used for the numerical discretization. Two kinds of strategies are proposed for the enrichment around the crack tip with, for both of them, an enrichment area of fixed size (i.e. independant of the mesh size parameter). In the first one, each degree of freedom inside this area is enriched with the nonsmooth functions that describe the asymptotic displacement near the crack tip. The second strategy consists in introducing these functions in the finite element basis with a single degree of freedom for each one. An integral matching is then used in order to ensure the 𝒞1 continuity of the solution at the interface between the enriched and the non‐enriched areas. Finally, numerical convergence results for these strategies are presented and discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Papillary thyroid cancer presenting as Horner syndrome
Authors: Yip Dana , Drachtman Richard , Amorosa Louis , Trooskin Stanley
Published: June 2010

Thyroid carcinomas are an uncommon entity in childhood. We report a case of papillary thyroid cancer presenting as Horner syndrome in a 14 year‐old child, which is the only reported such case in the pediatric population. Pediatr Blood Cancer. 2010;55:739–741. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
Langerhans cell histiocytosis with digestive tract involvement
Authors: Yadav Satya P. , Kharya Gaurav , Mohan Neelam , Sehgal Anupam , Bhat Sunil , Jain Sandeep , Kapoor Gauri , Sachdeva Anupam
Published: June 2010

Gastrointestinal tract (GIT) involvement in Langerhans cell histiocytosis (LCH) is not commonly described. We present two children presenting with GIT involvement with LCH, one successfully treated on standard protocol and other being treated on a protocol for relapsed disease. A review of literature showed almost 95% children were less than 2 years of age and 62% were females. Vomiting, abdominal pain, constipation, intractable diarrhea, malabsorption, bloody stools, protein‐losing enteropathy, and even intestinal perforation are some of the reported symptoms. More than 50% patients died within 18 months from diagnosis. Pediatr Blood Cancer. 2010;55:748–753. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
An update on sleep disorders and their treatment
Authors: Sie Michele
Published: June 2010

Over the past year, Progress in Neurology and Psychiatry has been running a series of articles on the major psychiatric drug groups, produced in association with the College of Mental Health Pharmacy. In the final article in the series, Michele Sie describes the main types of sleep disorder and their features, and provides an overview of their treatment. Copyright © 2010 Wiley Interface Ltd
Prescriber 1990‐2010: key developments in drug treatment
Authors: Williams Martin
Published: June 2010

Our editorial consultants have highlighted the significant advances made over the past 20 years. Here we look at developments in anti‐infectives, rheumatology and gastroenterology. Copyright © 2010 Wiley Interface Ltd
Vaginal discharge: recommended management in general practice
Authors: Schembri Gabriel , Malu Manoj
Published: June 2010

Our Drug review of vaginitis considers the diagnosis and recommended management of bacterial vaginosis, vulvovaginal candidosis and trichomoniasis, followed by a review of prescription data and sources of further information. Copyright © 2010 Wiley Interface Ltd
Sustainability and innovation in urban development: concept and case
Authors: Mieg Harald A.
Published: June 2010

This paper discusses commonalities between two planning‐related discourses: sustainable urban development and innovation. It is argued that one common denominator between these discourses is a resource‐based view of urban project management. Implementing sustainability and initiating urban innovation both can be reframed as a multilevel governance process of resource management. The paper discusses sustainable urban development and the innovation concept using Berlin‐Adlershof, one of Europe's largest urban science and technology parks, as an example. A resource‐based view reveals a particular governance‐related resource that seems to be underestimated both by the innovation and the sustainability discourse: identity. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.
Constructing a truly global model of Earth’s dynamics: basic principles*
Authors: Khain V.E.
Published: June 2010

This is a snapshot of the today’s views of the Earth with its geospheres, and terrestrial and extraterrestrial triggers of its dynamics and energy sources. Along with the presented brief historic outline of the planetary evolution, these data can make basis for creating in the future a truly global model of the Earth’s dynamics and evolution.
The three-dimensional shear velocity structure of lithosphere in the southern Baikal rift system and its surroundings
Authors: Mordvinova V.V. , Artemyev A.A.
Published: June 2010

The three-dimensional shear velocity lithospheric structure at depths from 0 to 70 km beneath the southern Baikal rift system and its surroundings has been imaged by inversion of P-to-SV receiver functions from 46 digital stations operated in two teleseismic international projects in southern Siberia and Mongolia. The receiver functions were determined from teleseismic P waveforms and inverted to obtain depth dependences of S velocities at each station which were related to tectonic structures. The computed vertical and horizontal sections of the 3D shear velocity model imaged a transition from relatively thin crust of the southern Siberian craton to thicker crust in the folded area south and southeast of Lake Baikal, with a local zone of thin crust right underneath the South Baikal basin. The velocity structure beneath the Baikal rift, the mountains of Transbaikalia, Mongolia, and the southern craton margin includes several low-velocity zones at different depths in the crust. Some of these zones may record seismic anisotropy associated with mylonite alignment along large thrusts.
Hume's Theory of the Self and its Identity
Authors: Ashley Lawrence , Stack Michael
Published: June 2010

It is a widely held view among philosophers that Hume's doctrine of personal identity is seriously mistaken, that he makes claims about the existence and nature of personal identity that are clearly false. The strongest statement of this view is to be found in Terence Penelhum's “Hume on Personal Identity.” According to Penelhum:

What he (Hume) is actually claiming is that we are constantly making a mistake in referring to a person from day to day as the same person … or in this way to anything that has changed in the slightest. For, strictly speaking, a changed person would be literally another person. A little effort of the imagination is enough to indicate just how much chaos would result from adopting Hume's diagnosis as the source of a prescription and using a different proper name whenever we noticed the slightest change, even in ourselves.
Two Dogmas of Linguistic Empiricism
Authors: King-Farlow John
Published: June 2010

The first person singular is the nucleus on which all the other referential devices depend… The final point of reference, by which a statement is attached to reality, is the speaker's reference to himself, as one thing and one person among others… The world is always open to conceptual re-arrangement. But the re-arrangement is only the addition of new tiers of discrimination to a foundation that remains constant: the recognition of persisting things singled out by active observers who have a statable standpoint as objects among other objects. It is in judgments of perception that the notion of identity, and principles of individuation, are given their earliest sense. That beings, who are capable of action and observation, are born into, and move among, a world of persisting objects is a logical necessity and not a contingent matter of fact. (Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action, London: Chatto and Windus, 1959, pp. 40, 87).
How Brains Think
Authors: Coder David
Published: June 2010

J.J.C. Smart once opined that if we were able to keep a human brain alive outside the skull, there would be no philosophical reason to believe that it could not think, and every physiological reason to believe that it could (“Materialism,” Journal of Philosophy, LX (1963), 651–662, pp. 659–660). Only a short time later, Wilfred Sellars asserted that if one were to deflesh and de-bone a human being, keeping the nervous system intact and discarding the rest, what one would have left would be, in all essentials, a person: a “core person,” Sellars says, thinking perhaps of apples (“The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” Review of Metaphysics, XVIII (1965), 430–451, pp. 441–442). Since then, Bernard Gert has provided this view with an argument, describing an example which proves, in his opinion, that it makes sense to speak of brains as thinking. (“Can a Brain Have a Pain?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII (1967), 432–436).
Is Conscientiousness Always—or Ever—a Virtue?
Authors: Govier Trudy
Published: June 2010

On most views of the nature of moral judgments, it is possible for a person to be mistaken in the belief that it is right to act in a certain way. When someone believes that it is right to do something, does that thing on the basis of such a belief, and yet in so doing commits deeds which are wrong by moral standards other than his own, we do not quite know whether to praise him for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions. He acts according to his conscience and does what he believes to be right, but his beliefs are erroneous and his actions wrong. Shall we praise the man for his conscientiousness while condemning his actions ?
Le rationalisme empiriste
Authors: Auroux Sylvain
Published: June 2010

On n'a jamais bien jugé l'empirisme, supposant d'emblée qu'il était l'opposé du rationalisme. En fait, qu'il s'agisse de l'empirisme ou du rationalisme, on déploie dans chaque cas une chaîne de séquences dont il s'agit de rendre les termes solidaires:

(a) rationalisme ═ a priorisme ═ principes généraux abstraits (i.e. pensée logique) ═ raison universelle ═ idéalisme ═ la vérité est raison pure

(b) empirisme ═ a postériorisme ═ pas de principes généraux abstraits ═ pas d'ordre rationnel (on renvoie à Bacon et à la chasse de Pan) ═ positivisme ═ réalisme (naïf).
Socrates, Obedience, and the Law: Plato's Crito
Authors: Dybikowski J.
Published: June 2010

The Crito does not set out to provide a complete theory of what subjects owe their governments in obedience. It is particularly concerned with what Socrates should do. On the way, however, it reveals general commitments which bear implications for judging other situations with which the dialogue is not directly concerned.

The first section of this essay outlines Crito's reasons for urging escape as well as Socrates' general strategy for disarming Crito's case. It particularly draws attention to the rhetorical devices Socrates cleverly exploits to alter Crito's perspective in judging his proposed plan. The second section examines the dialogue's arguments which purport to show why Socrates must refuse Crito's offer. Its object is to distinguish, and exhibit the logical implications of, positions which in the dialogue form part of a continuous story.
L'Intellectuel et le pouvoir
Authors: Lagadec Claude
Published: June 2010

La question que je voudrais poser ici porte sur la place et le rôle actuels de l'intellectuel par rapport au pouvoir. Je me demande dans quelle mesure l'intellectuel est et peut etre un agent d'opposition ou de révolution par rapport au pouvoir, et dans quelle mesure il est et doit être un agent de reproduction, un instrument du pouvoir.
Cassirer et Heidegger: histoire d'un affrontement
Authors: Nadeau Robert
Published: June 2010

La Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophic comprend maintenant un ouvrage où l'on trouve la traduction française de quatre textes importants pour l'historien du savoir. Le texte central est celui du Collogue Cassirer-Heidegger qui eut lieu à Davos en mars 1929, où les deux philosophes confrontèrent leur lecture de Kant. Les trios autres textes ont pour but de mettre un peu mieux en lumière le sens de cette confrontation: il s'agit

1. du résumé anonyme des « Conférences du Professeur Martin Heidegger sur la Critique de la Raison Pure de Kant et sur la tâche d'une fondation de la Métaphysique » et du résumé des « Conférences du Professeur Ernst Cassirer »;

2. du compte rendu fait par Cassirer du Kant-Buch de Heidegger;

3. du compte rendu fait par Heidegger du deuxième volume de la Philosophie der symbolischen Formen de Cassirer.
La Démesure de la philosophie
Authors: Lévesque Claude
Published: June 2010

Les critères qui ont cours dans les milieux de l'enseignement et de la recherche scientifique pour mesurer et jauger la « valeur » de la philosophie ne sont peut-être pas essentiellement différents ni tellement plus critiques que ceux, inaperçus mais non moins efficaces, que secrète notre vie journalière et anonyme, modelée et transie par un monde avili, intolérant, techniciste, axé principalement sur la consommation et l'accumulation du profit. La société postindustrielle dans laquelle nous vivons, soutenue toute entière par une volonté de puissance, c'est-à-dire par une recherche incontrôlée de rendement maximum, d'efficacité cumulative, peut difncilement accueillir, à l'intérieur de ses coordonnées habituelles basées sur des évidences palpables, une pensée qui, par essence, s'éloigne et de l'immédiateté et de l'efficacité et de l'évidence elle-même.
Why Determinism Cannot Be True
Authors: Ripley Charles
Published: June 2010

Determinism presents us with a sceptical problem by casting doubt upon the basic common sense conviction that we are free agents who are, on occasion, confronted with genuine alternatives. A genuine alternative is present in a situation in which an agent must choose between two actions, each of which he can both select and perform. Which of the actions he chooses and does is determined at the moment of his decision, but not prior to it. The non-determinist hangs steadfastly onto this conviction and seeks to bolster it by common sense arguments; yet the arguments of the determinist are so clear, simple and “scientific” that the would-be libertarian often finds himself at a loss. In this paper I shall argue that the seemingly irrefutable arguments of the determinist rest upon an implicit assumption which is inconsistent with determinism. This assumption is a quasi-Kantian one: that a human being is a rational agent who, on occasion, acts on the basis of reasons which justify but do not causally explain his action. The relation between the reason and the action which it justifies is logical rather than causal. Although the determinist explicitly rejects this assumption, he also holds determinism to be objectively true and supports his claim by appealing to justifying reasons. I shall argue that it is a logical consequence of determinism that appeals to justifying reasons and also the very concept of objective truth must be abandoned.
Remarques sur le Rapport entre subjectivité et société civile
Authors: Kortian Garbis
Published: June 2010

Hegel, dans l'introduction aux « Principes de la philosophic du Droit » entreprend de fonder ontologiquement le politique par l'auto-développement dialectique du concept pratique qui vise l'idée de la volonté libre. Dans le sillage de la « Science de la logique », il divise son ouvrage en trois parties se réglant en cela sur les déterminations de cette volonté: a) le Droit abstrait, b) la moralité subjective (Moralität), c) la moralité objective (Sittlichkeit). La volonté libre en-soi et pour-soi se détermine tout d'abord dans un moment abstrait de sa relation à l'extériorité — son concept reste ici abstrait et son existence (Dasein) une chose extérieure et immédiate.
Reflections on Frege
Authors: Kluge E. W.
Published: June 2010

A recent addition to the growing corpus of Frege literature is Reinhardt Grossmann's metaphysical study of Frege's philosophical theories. Grossmann approaches Frege as a metaphysician whose philosophical concern centers around four main problems: the nature of logic, the analysis of various kinds of propositions, identity and truth. He has a genetic view of Frege's answers to these problems, and this is reflected in the arrangement and content of the chapters. In chapter I, Grossmann considers Frege's introduction of these problems in the Begriffsschrift and his initial attempt at solutions in terms of the distinctions between thinking and judging, sentence and content, concept and object, function and argument. Grossmann here diagnoses Frege's alleged failure to recognize states of affairs as the fundamental shortcoming of these early views.
De Prométhée à Sisyphe Réflexions sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès
Authors: Delhaye Philippe
Published: June 2010

Prométhée, dieu du Progrès parce qu'il a apporté le feu et les arts aux hommes; Sisyphe, image de la désespérance puisqu'il voit éternellement échapper à ses mains le rocher qu'il a roulé au sommet d'une colline. Trois siècles ont vécu sous le signe de Prométhée, dans une folle confiance en l'homme. La génération actuelle lui préfère Sisyphe dont Camus a interprété le drame intérieur avec tout son génie philosophique. Peut-on rêver quelques instants sur ces thèmes en philosophe et en historien, ou mieux, en historien de la philosophie ?
L'Autoposition du moi par la conscience morale
Authors: Bergeron André
Published: June 2010

Le thème le plus fréquemment modulé par la philosophie actuelle, celui de l'intentionnalité de la conscience, s'inscrit à vrai dire dans le courant le plus constant de la philosophia perennis. Il s'agit du souci de rechercher le statut de l'esprit aux prises avec les objets qui ne sont tels que par rapport à sa présence. Un représentant accrédité de la philosophie contemporaine écrit que « le problème de l'existence du monde extérieur ne présente à la rigueur aucun sens quelconque ». En effet, le monde extérieur est affirmé par la conscience immédiate et la tâche dévolue a la conscience réfléchissante, c'est de revenir sur ces données pour les thématiser et établir les rapports essentiels qui les constituent dans l'existence. Une conscience pure qui existerait avant tout contact avec ce qui n'est pas elle semble bien un rêve à jamais évanoui. Avant la mise entre parenthèses prônée par Husserl, la philosophie cartésienne nous assurait que « tout état de conscience en général est en lui-même conscience de quelque chose, quoi qu'il en soit de l'existence réelle de cet objet et quelque abstention que je fasse de la position de cette existence ». Les termes d'intentionnalité et de visée intentionnelle caractérisent cette particularité de la conscience d'être toujours au moins conscience de quelque chose.
La Notion de maladie créatrice
Authors: Ellenberger Henri
Published: June 2010

La notion de maladie créatrice semble avoir été entrevue par Novalis: « Les maladies sont, certes, une chose importante pour l'humanité, puisque'elles sont si nombreuses et que chaque homme a tant à lutter contre elles. Mais nous ne connaissons que bien imparfaitement l'art de les utiliser. Elles sont probablement la matiére et le stimulant les plus importants pour notre pensée et pour notre activité. II y aurait là une récolte abondante à faire, me semble-t-il, dans le champ intellectuel, dans le domaine de la morale, de la religion, et Dieu sait dans quel autre merveilleux domaine ». A un autre endroit, Novalis déclare que l'hypocondrie est une maladie trés remarquable: « II y a une petite hypocondrie et une hypocondrie sublime. C'est par cette derniére qu'il faudrait essayer de trouver une voie d'accés vers l'âme ». Cette phrase semble indiquer que pour Novalis il existerait des maladies d'essence supérieure et, pourrait-on dire, plus saines que la santé. Inversement il existerait une fausse apparence de santé due à la maladie, comme celle dont une nation en révolution peut donner l'exemple: « II existe une énergie par maladie et par faiblesse, qui donne l'impression d'être plus puissante que la véritable énergie, mais qui céde en laissant dans un état de faiblesse encore plus profonde ».
On Bracketing the Epoché
Authors: Van De Pitte M. M.
Published: June 2010

“What is phenomenology? It may seem strange that this question has still to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. The fact remains that it has by no means been answered.” Merleau-Ponty made this observation in 1945. It is still substantially correct, except that it is now three-quarters of a century after the first works of Husserl.
L'inutile insistance sur le rapport des instances
Authors: Lagueux Maurice
Published: June 2010

Alors que, dans l'Allemagne du milieu du XIXe siècle, on paraissait s'obstiner à chercher dans le Concept et dans l'Idée le point de départ de l'analyse de la société et que, dans la France de la même époque, on comptait encore sur l'éducation et sur le culte des vertus morales pour transformer cette société, Karl Marx a era bon rappeler, avec les ressources combinées de son génie et de son bon sens, que « pour vivre, il faut avant tout boire, manger, se loger, s'habiller et quelques autres choses encore » et qu'en conséquence « le premier fait historique est done la production des moyens permettant de satisfaire ces besoins, la production de la vie matérielle elle-même … » Et si Marx formule parfois cette idée de façdon un peu plus systématique: « le mode de production de la vie matérielle conditionne le processus de vie social, politique et intellectuel en général » il n'en reste pas moins assez hasardeux, compte-tenu des nombreux passages concernant ce sujet, de prétendre voir se dessiner chez lui une thèse qui, sur cette question, prendrait des contours définitifs et bien arrêtés. Sans doute est-il plus prudent de voir d'abord dans ces propos l'affirmation agacée de ce qui aux yeux de Marx aurait dû s'imposer depuis longtemps, à savoir que n'importe quelles institutions, n'importe quelles activités culturelles ne sont pas compatibles avec les diverses conditions matérielles que l'humanité a connues au cours de son histoire: « personne n'ignore, souligne-t-il en ce sens, que déjà Don Quichotte a eu à se repentir pour avoir cru que la chevalerie errante était compatible avec toutes les formes économiques de la société »
The Status of the Propositions in the Tractatus
Authors: Bickenbach Jerome E.
Published: June 2010

It is indeed an odd work of philosophy which is prefaced with the remark that the author believes that he has found the final solutions to all philosophical problems and which concludes with the remark that the propositions found in the work must ultimately be regarded as nonsensical. Yet Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is just such a work. And for the reader, who has probably spent a good deal of time filling in gaps in important arguments and mastering a new vocabulary, the concluding remarks must leave him more dismayed than puzzled. Perhaps one of the most challenging tasks involved in the understanding of the Tractatus is that of making sense out of proposition 6.54 where we are told that the propositions of the Tractatus are 'elucidations' which, once understood, must be recognized as nonsensical, discarded like a unnecessary ladder and, finally, 'transcended'. But if the groundwork for this sort of concluding remark is nonsensical why should we be content with the sense of this remark; indeed, why shouldn't we keep the ladder and scurry down it before it, and our newly obtained elevated platform, crumbles under our feet ?
The Logical Form of Counterfactual Conditionals
Authors: Eisenberg J. A.
Published: June 2010

I shall here propose specific logical forms to express the structures of the counterfactual conditional and its cognate forms, the semifactual conditional and the undetermined conditional. Some of the proposals have been previously made in a different context by Nelson Goodman, but to my knowledge they have never been incorporated into definite, all-embracing logical schemata. Because of this failure, the astounding assertion that there is no definite logical form of the counterfactual conditional could be made.
Bertrand Russell in Retrospect
Authors: Blanshard Brand
Published: June 2010

As a centre for research in philosophy, McMaster University has added greatly to its strength and attractiveness by acquiring the papers of Bertrand Russell. He is the most voluminous, the most interesting, and—if the matter were determined by the vote of his colleagues—probably the most distinguished living philosopher. Yet to talk about the philosophy of Russell is curiously difficult, since in a sense there is no such thing. Russell has held not one but many philosophies.
Hegel's Attempt to Forge a Logic for Spirit
Authors: Schmitz Kenneth L.
Published: June 2010

If Hegel's philosophy were to be characterized by a phrase, it might be “The Dialectical System of Absolute Spirit.” The phrase would seem formidable to some but merely pretentious to others. There are recent signs of an exhumation of the systematic features of Hegel's philosophy in the English-speaking world, and it is to be hoped that the durable clichés of an earlier English period will not prevent a fresh look at Hegel's philosophy. There is, of course, no denying his systematic ambitions, nor any wish on my part to do so. It is just these that I find fascinating. He sought to bring within a comprehensive intellectual order the whole of reality—and a little more besides, say his detractors. In the Phenomenology of Spirit by a turbulent dialectic he scrabblesup to the top of Mount Parnassus in order to clutch the petticoats of the Absolute. In the Science of Logic and in the first part of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences he lays out the logical paradigm of intellectual necessities which are subsequently exhibited in the philosophy of nature and of concrete spirit.
La Philosophie et les ordinateurs
Authors: McKinnon Alastair
Published: June 2010

On tente souvent de calmer la frayeur de certains humanistes à l'égard de l'ordinateur en le qualifiant d' « infatigable idiot sans cervelle ». Je ne vois pas d'objection particulière à cette description sinon qu'elle suggère une fausse réponse à une question qui a troublé les philosophes récemment. Pour ma part, je m'intéresse très peu à la question très générale et, à mon avis, largement contrefaite de savoir si les ordinateurs peuvent « penser ». L'éventualité que dans un proche avenir l'ordinateur soit en mesure de résoudre les principaux problèmes de la philosophie ne m'effraie pas, mais, par contre, je suis heureux de profiter de toute aide là où je la trouve. Quant à moi, je ne me sens menacé ni en tant qu'individu ni en tant que philosophe. Ce n'est pour moi qu'une simple réalité de la vie contemporaine; un don de notre environnement technologique complexe; un outil passionnant dont nous pouvons profiter si nous sommes prêts à en payer le prix. S'il nous détruit dans l'avenir, éventualité concevable, ce ne sera pas parce que la machine est intrinsèquement mauvaise mais bien plus probablement parce que nous, les humanistes, aurons choisi de l'ignorer ou même de la mépriser plutôt que de nous en servir avec un esprit critique et constructif à nos propres fins. Ce sera parce que nous aurons préféré conserver notre virginité d'érudits plutôt que de nous mêler au tohu-bohu véritablement intellectuel et professionnel inhérent aux humanités les plus authentiques.
Hegel et l'idéologie française
Authors: D'Hondt Jacques
Published: June 2010

LES pensées ont-elles une patrie ? Cela semble universellement admis. Sans autre inquiétude, on parle de philosophie grecque, de philosophie allemande.

De ce point de vue, qu'en est-il de Hegel? Impossible de contester le caractère profondément allemand de ce penseur, si le mot allemand garde un sens! Cet ancrage national rend compte, du moins en partie, de sa démesure spéculative. C'est l'Allemagne qui l'appelle à la philosophie, et cette vocation lui impose un souci théorique qui s'emparera aussi, plus tard, de Marx.
Can a Woman be Good in the Same Way as a Man?
Authors: Garside Christine
Published: June 2010

Many philosophers would claim that sexual differentiation is irrelevant to philosophy. They would say that the philosopher is trying to understand the world and himself qua human being, not qua man or qua woman. While this may have been the intent, in ethics some curious results concerning women have occurred. In some cases, when one compares the analysis of what a philosopher considers to constitute a good person with what he says about the nature of woman, we must conclude that a woman cannot ultimately be good. In this paper I propose to show how two philosophers of widely differing traditions, namely Aristotle and Kierkegaard, have both maintained this.
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap
Authors: Wilson N. L.
Published: June 2010

Many of the essays in this volume were written about ten years ago and a fair amount of philosophical water has passed under the bridge since then. Nevertheless the appearance of the book at this delayed date is perhaps a good thing—and not just because it contains some of Carnap's final formulations. Philosophical fashions have shifted away from Carnap's preoccupations and the appearance of the book now may serve to remind the public how very impressive Carnap is, both in the substance of his work and the style with which he pursues the philosophical enterprise.
Moral Responsibility for Dreams
Authors: Mullane Harvey
Published: June 2010

If someone reports that he had been thinking that he would very much like to seduce his sister, an appropriate comment might be: “Shame on you for having such a nasty idea.” But if one reports that he dreamt he seduced his sister the situation appears quite different, for while we might be repulsed by the dream shaming seems, to say the least, far less appropriate.

We do not ordinarily, if ever, say things like, “It was bad (naughty, immoral, etc.) of you to dream that.” A child may be sent to bed without supper for saying that he hates his father, but not for reporting a dream which clearly expresses hate for his father.
The Failure of Nowell-Smith's ‘New Logical Apparatus’
Authors: Miller D. L. C.
Published: June 2010

When Hume observed that there is no apparent logical relationship between ‘is'-type and ‘ought'-type statements he of course posed one of the fundamental problems in modern philosophy; and the various approaches to his challenge serve in large part to distinguish various ‘camps’ of contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper I shall be concerned only with one such approach, that of Nowell-Smith in his Ethics in which he tries to make the point that what he terms “Hume's gap” is not really there at all. (pp. 82-83) In his attempt to eliminate “Hume's gap” Nowell-Smith introduces a “new logical apparatus” (p. 61) the special features of which are the related doctrines of “logical oddness” and “contextual implication”. I shall argue that there are serious short-comings in this ‘new logical apparatus', and that, in fact, he fails in his attempt to eliminate ‘Hume's gap'.
La Morale aristotélicienne d'après M. Jean Vanier
Authors: Trépanier Emmanuel
Published: June 2010

La morale d'Aristote a suscité ces dernières années des ouvrages d'envergure: les deux tomes d'Introduction, traduction et commentaire de l'Ethique à Nicomaque par les Pères Gauthier et Jolif (1959), le volume de Pierre Aubenque sur La Prudence chez Aristote (1963), puis cette thèse que M. Vanier présentait à l'Institut Catholique de Paris en 1962 et qu'il publie maintenant dans un texte « revu », « amélioré ». Des ouvrages qui se suivent mais ne se ressemblent pas. II n'est pas question de les confronter; indiquons seulement qu'aux aspects historique et philologique, à l'étude des sources, du milieu et du langage, M. Vanier préfère l'approfondissement des principes qui inspirent la morale du Philosophe, cet approfondissement dût-il conduire à des vérités que le texte même n'explicite pas pourvu que la doctrine les implique dans sa synthèse et sa cohérence (pp. 18-21).
Philosophy and Linguistics
Authors: Wheatley Jon
Published: June 2010

My task in this article is to discuss some of the recent research in linguistics and its relation, if any, to the traditional problems of philosophy. I do this in the light of two recently published books, more the first than the second. My problem is that there is so much to say, both about linguistics and about the books, that much must be left unsaid. For- instance, Chomsky has an extended discussion of the notion of innate ideas (pp. 47–59) and Katz provides a review of philosophical work in language in the last half century (pp. 15–96). I have found space for neither. I do not offer any discussion of matters internal to linguistics; that is, I do not criticize the quality of the linguistics in Chomsky's book—that belongs elsewhere and by another writer—but concern myself exclusively with the philosophical relevance of the linguistic matters.
Un médiéviste canadien-français : Le R.P. Éphrem Longpré, Franciscain (1890–1965)
Authors: Parent Édouard
Published: June 2010

« Je m'en voudrais de ne pas parler ici d'un autre Canadien, ancien élève de cette maison [Petit Séminaire de Montréal], qui jette par sa science beaucoup de lustre sur notre nom dans les milieux scientifiques de l'Europe. Le P. Éphrem Longpré nous avait été révélé par M. Étienne Gilson. L'éminent professeur de philosophic médiévale en Sorbonne avait avoué ne pas connaître d'homme plus au courant de cette difficile science que le P. Éphrem ».
Descartes et la connaissance intuitive
Authors: Bourassa André
Published: June 2010

René Descartes, émerveillé par la rigueur scientifique des théorèmes de géométrie, en vint à « imaginer » que pouvaient être démontrées avec la même rigueur les conclusions de la philosophie. Son but: s'accoutumer l'esprit « à se repaître de vérités ». Sa méthode : devant toute chose, « qu'on s'abstienne d'en recevoir aucune pour vraie qui ne le soit, et qu'on garde toujours l'ordre qu'il faut pour les déduire les unes des autres ». Son point de départ : les « raisons certaines et évidentes ». En somme, une dialectique consistant à

conduire par ordre mes pensées, en commençant par les objets les plus simples et les plus aisés à connaître, pour monter peu à peu, comme par degrés jusqu'à la connaissance des plus composés; en supposant même de l'ordre entre ceux qui ne se précèdent point naturellement les uns les autres.
Réflexions autour d'un petit livre
Authors: Breton Stanislas
Published: June 2010

L'ouvrage de Jean Piaget: Sagesse et illusions de laphilosophie n'a point fini de faire parler de lui et de donner à penser. La pierre que le maître genevois a lancée dans le lac des Cygnes, a provoqué un ébranlement salutaire qui remet en question, non seulement un mode contemporain de philosophic mais la philosophic elle même. Substance et modes sont à nouveau soumis à cette interrogation salutaire qui, périodiquement, confronte la philosophie au problème crucial de sa propre possibilityé. À ce titre, même s'il dût être le seul (ce qui n'est point le cas), ce petit livre mériterait la reconnaissance des intéressés.
Innate Ideas—Then and Now
Authors: Bracken Harry M.
Published: June 2010

John Locke is famous for, among other things, his attack on innate ideas. At one time it was felt that Locke had attacked a straw man. But John Yolton has shown that many of Locke's contemporaries held strange views about innate ideas. Appealing to innate ideas was apparently a popular method of establishing principles that might otherwise be difficult to defend. Locke's attack is in good measure directed at those who preferred not to provide arguments. However, when one tries to sort out Locke's own arguments and to reconstruct what the more articulate defenders of innate ideas were interpreted to hold, matters become complicated.
What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Croce?
Authors: Harris H. S.
Published: June 2010

When Croce published his celebrated essay on “What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel” in 1907, Hegel was already seventy-six years dead. In 1966 we reached the centennial of Croce's birth; but even now, in 1968, it is only sixteen years since death took the pen from the hand of the indefatigable “Don Benedetto.” Clearly therefore, it is still too early to draw up anything like a final balance sheet for the heritage that he has left us. But since the centennial was marked for us by the appearance of an English translation of the great anthology of essays on Philosophy, Poetry, History selected by the author himself at the very end of his life and often referred to in Italy as “Croce in one volume,” it is perhaps appropriate now to raise the question about the enduring heritage of Croce, if only to see more clearly how far, and in what ways, we are still not in a position either to appropriate it or to estimate it.
Explanations of Human Action
Authors: Ackermann Robert
Published: June 2010

In order to explain the behavior of a human organism, it is necessary to take its environment into consideration. Except for very severe psychotic withdrawal, this has been recognized as a near triviality since Aristotle. But although consideration of the environment may be necessary, it is not sufficient, and it is now generally conceded that a man's behavior cannot be explained solely from a consideration of his present environment and a history of his responses to past environments.
Le Contenu du Cogito augustinien
Authors: Allard Guy-H.
Published: June 2010

Sous sa forme définitive, le cogito augustinien apparaît, en réponse aux arguments des Académiciens, comme un “si enim fallor, sum: si je me trompe, je suis”. Parallèlement à la Cité de Dieu, Augustin écrivait dans son traité sur la Trinité que cette vérité originaire est une certitude du type “je sais que je vis”. C'est par une science intime (intima scientia) que mon âme a l'intelligence de sa vie si elle se trompe, tout comme elle a la certitude du bonheur même si elle s'égare sur l'objet de sa béatitude.
Moral Judgments and Emotional Displays: A Comment
Authors: Jack Henry
Published: June 2010

Professor Braybrooke has presented some interesting and novel points in support of the emotive theory in his recent paper. I imagine that his points are designed to worry objectivists or antiemotivists. In this note I will try to show that they need not worry very much.

1. In addition to moral sentences and factual sentences (M-locutions and F-locutions) we should pick out for comparison a class of expressive sentences (E-locutions) whose function is to express or evince emotions. I much prefer “express” to Braybrooke's “display” here. Examples of expressive sentences are: “I am angry,” “I am afraid,” “I am furious,” “I am very pleased,” etc.
Another Look at Emergent Evolutionism
Authors: Goudge T. A.
Published: June 2010

The doctrine of emergent evolutionism has been before the philosophical world for over fifty years, but there are several reasons why another look at it may be opportune. In the first place, the concept of emergence has been analysed with considerable precision during recent decades so that its meaning is more evident now than when it was first introduced. Secondly, new versions of evolutionary theory have made their appearance in this period, and the extent to which they support or undermine the notion of emergence needs to be investigated. Thirdly, the semi-popular writings of Teilhard de Chardin have shown how much vitality evolutionary ideas have in the present intellectual climate. Yet these writings also show how much confusion will be engendered if the treatment is not philosophically adequate, and especially if it fails to grapple with the concept of emergence. Hence it may be useful to look afresh at this whole subject.
The Justification of Belief
Authors: Johnson Oliver A.
Published: June 2010

To know is to believe but to believe is not necessarily to know. The latter, unfortunate fact gives rise quite naturally to the question: How can we distinguish between those beliefs that qualify as items of knowledge and those that do not? The standard reply given to this question by philosophers is that knowledge is justified belief. Although the reply sounds eminently reasonable it does not really answer the question. Rather than settling the issue it succeeds instead in stirring up a host of philosophical problems of the most thorny and baffling kind. So difficult do these problems become that they have driven many philosophers to the skeptical conclusion that it is impossible to provide any justification for our beliefs at all. My main object in this paper will be to pursue what seems to me to be the most important and difficult of these problems and to examine some of the recent solutions that philosophers have offered for it. Before beginning this task, however, it might be well to clarify the notion of knowledge (as it is normally understood) a bit more fully. Just what qualifies a belief as a justified belief and thus as an item of knowledge?
Dray's Philosophy of History
Authors: Fell Albert P.
Published: June 2010

The philosophy of history has achieved, in the last decade or two, a place of importance in English-speaking philosophy which it has long had on the continent. Professor Dray has been one of the most active contributors to recent discussions on this group of related topics, first with his Laws and Explanation in History (Oxford University Press, 1957), later in articles published in journals or collections of essays, and most recently in Philosophy of History, an introduction to the subject published in the Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series.

Once thought to be on the periphery of philosophical interest, the philosophy of history can no longer be so considered both because of the increasing importance and accuracy of historical knowledge—and the desirability of a correct analysis of it—and because the attempt to achieve this analysis raises problems in the philosophy of mind and epistemology which are generally admitted to be central philosophical interests.
Amour et Violence dans la dialectique platonicienne
Authors: Lafrance Yvon
Published: June 2010

Nous partirons du thème cent fois rebattu de l'allégorie de la Caverne. Les interprétations classiques du célébre passage de la République sont connues de tous. Il ne s'agit pas pour nous de les répéter, mais de proposer une nouvelle lecture de l'allégorie qui nous sortirait des sentiers battus.
Problèmes relatifs à la formation d'une théorie de la monnaie
Authors: Godin Guy
Published: June 2010

Dans cet article, je me propose deux buts: 1) illustrer les difficultés éprouvèes par un philosophe — i.e. un profane en tout — au moment ou il tente de faire la synthése des points de vue des spécialistes; 2) tenter de clarifier la façon dont se pose le problème d'une théorie de la monnaie.
La Conscience engagée dans le régime des significations selon Merleau-Ponty
Authors: Bergeron André
Published: June 2010

L'être, au monde dont nous parle la phénoménologie contemporaine l'homme mondain qui se reconnaît situé dans réseau inextricable de relations par lesquelles il se rattache à tout ce qui est, se découvre par la vertu de la description phénoménologique engagé dans un régime de significations. Entre l'homme et son monde, les connexions sont apparues telles qu'il est devenu impossible de choisir entre les explications de type classique de soumission au réel que préconisait le réalisme et de domination constitutive dont se prévalait i'idéalisme. L'homme apparaît irrémédiablement solidaire du monde qui l'engage dans la temporalité et l'historicité. Conditionné de tout bord par ses attaches au monde, l'homme de la phénoménologie ne peut trouver de refuge assuré dans une conscience pure qui prétendrait laisser le monde en suspens pour permettre une explication définitive du moi avec lui-même dans la solitude de l'ego transcendantal.
Les rédactions successives de la secunda via de « Contra Gentiles » I 13
Authors: Décarie Vianney
Published: June 2010

Au chapitre 13 du livre I du Contra Gentiles, Thomas d'Aquin présente deux arguments en faveur de l'existence de Dieu, ex parte motus; il affirme en outre que ces viae sont tirées d'Aristote.

On ne pouvait mettre en doute cette assertion que confirme ridentification facile des textes d'Aristote utilisés par Thomas d'Aquin. On s'est plutot interrogé sur les influences qui ont poussé l'auteur du Contra Gentiles à répartir des textes tirés des livres VII et VIII de la Physique en deux arguments très longs, mais fortement charpentés et clairement articulés. Le père Salman a souligné l'influence d'Averroès que monsieur Gilson retenait récemment.
Abstract Individuals
Authors: McCall Storrs
Published: June 2010

The title of this paper may seem to involve a contradiction: my purpose is to show that it does not.

Individuals fall into two categories; those which depend for their existence upon the existence of other individuals, and those which do not. In the second category are found such things as shoes, ships, cabbages, kings, and discrete bits of sealing wax. These may be calledindividual substances, and the way in which the existence of a cabbage depends upon water and earth, or in which Descartes says the existence of all things depends upon God, will not be in point here. The individuals of the first category are characterized by a much more obvious kind of dependence. They include the sound of an individual shoe falling on the floor, the sinking of theBismarck, the stupidity of George I, the centre of gravity of a bit of sealing wax. All these are individuals, though they are not individual substances. They are what I shall callabstract individuals, orabstract particulars.
Le rôle de la Philosophie dans la culture canadienne
Authors: Langlois Jean
Published: June 2010

Mon intention n'est pas de proposer ici un programme d'action ni un manifeste de pensée. Je voudrais seulement tenter de déterminer quel devrait être le rôle de la philosophie au Canada: sa place dans l'édification de cet immense pays qui est le nôtre, sa fonction dans la préparation et le développement d'une culture authentiquement canadienne.