bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Justice
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Justice is central to Aristotle's political theory because he holds that all constitutions are a form of justice. In so far as it is just in the universal sense, the constitution aims at the happiness of the political community; in so far as it is just in the particular sense of distributive justice, the constitution assigns rights to offices, property, or honours to the citizens in accordance with their worth (merit or desert). Aristotle also claims that political justice is partly natural and partly legal, but adds that ‘one constitution only is everywhere according to nature the best’, thus implying that the polis is in a natural condition when it has the best constitution and laws. Aristotle recognizes that justice may exist outside the polis, but he regards political justice as the highest form of justice.
Constitutions and Political Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

Aristotle's constitutional theory applies his theory of justice and rights to the unifying institutions of the polis (city‐state). He defines a citizen as one who has a liberty right to partake in deliberative or judicial office. He distinguishes between constitutions in terms of whether they are correct (just) or deviant (unjust) and on the basis of whether political rights are assigned to one, few, or many persons––resulting in a six‐fold classification of constitutions: kingship versus tyranny, aristocracy versus oligarchy, and polity versus democracy. In Politics IV, Aristotle develops a more complicated system of classification involving different modes of deliberation, adjudication, and magistracy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tasks of politics, including legislation in ideal and realistic situations and reform of defective constitutions.
Deviant Constitutions
Authors: Miller Fred D.
Published: October 2003

In addition to his study of correct constitutions, Aristotle investigated the entire spectrum of regimes existing in his day. Aristotle believes that it is a proper task for politics and legislation to deal with deviant or imperfect constitutions such as oligarchy and democracy (which he distinguished from polity or correct rule by the many). In seeking to preserve and reform imperfect constitutions and prevent revolution, Aristotle employs a maxim of superiority: that the part of the polis (city‐state) that supports the constitution ought to be superior to the part that does not. Although this maxim can clearly come into conflict with justice, Aristotle regards it as a defensible normative precept when it is the closest feasible approximation to justice that is attainable under adverse circumstances.
The Act Itself
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

The distinction between the consequences of an act and the act itself is supposed to define the fight between consequentialism and deontological moralities. This book, though sympathetic to consequentialism, aims less at taking sides in that debate than at clarifying the terms in which it is conducted. It aims to help the reader to think more clearly about some aspects of human conduct—especially the workings of the ‘by’‐locution, and some distinctions between making and allowing, between act and upshot, and between foreseeing and intending (the doctrine of double effect). It argues that moral philosophy would go better if the concept of ‘the act itself’ were dropped from its repertoire.
Demands
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

If making/allowing lacks basic moral significance, morality seems to be terribly demanding. It could be demanding in either of two ways: by answering too many practical questions, leaving too few to be resolved on non‐moral grounds, or by thwarting too many of our natural, non‐moral desires. The former is irrelevant to making/allowing but the ‘thwarting’ kind of demandingness is not, and attempts by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick to fend off the threat are failures. The ‘thwarting’ threat might be countered by adopting a morality that requires or permits more attention to one's own interests than to others’, but when that is combined with the moral neutrality of making/allowing, the result is requirement or permission for behaviour that no decent person would agree to.
Porphyrian Semantics
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

Focuses on Porphyry's semantic and more specifically on his theory of ‘imposition of names’, i.e. how names are related to things. Examines Porphyry's treatment of genus and species and also of individual, singular, and general terms to emphasize his peculiarity in Neoplatonic philosophy. Infers that Porphyry's attitude is not to develop a metaphysical and a logical semantics, but only a metaphysical one. Finally, considers how Porphyry's metaphysical approach towards semantics was maintained by eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine Neoplatonists.
Quasi‐Genera and the Collapse of Substance and Attribute
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers (Plotinus, Plotinus).
The Spiritual Circuit
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

Investigates how, given their ontological status between the One and animals, men can either ascend to the intellectual life or fall into the inferior kinds of life. Different issues involved in the doctrine of the rise to the intellectual life are considered. Firstly, the restriction to men of the possibility of an intellectual life is explained through the reference to Neoplatonists’ own personal experiences. Secondly, the experience of the ascent is defined by the term ‘inclination’ rather than the too broad ‘reversion’ used by most of the scholars. The former term, indeed, seems to fit better in the case of men. Finally, the experience of inclination is explained in terms of logical necessity.
Mysticism and Metaphysics
Authors: Lloyd A. C.
Published: October 2003

In contrast with the different views of some recent scholars, Ch. 7 constitutes an important attempt to point out the importance played by non‐discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus in several ways. Firstly, the differences between the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus are investigated. Secondly, it is considered the role of the ‘Loving Intellect’ in both Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophy. Thirdly, it is indicated how the One plays a crucial role in the mystical experience and how this kind of experience may be an evidence of the activity of the One. Finally, it is shown how some problems and difficulties of Plotinus’ philosophy may be explained through reference to the mystical experience.
The Light of the Soul
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.
Introduction
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

The Cartesian–Lockean conception of the mental may have won out in the seventeenth century, but only after encountering a powerful current of opposition. Here, the most important figure is Malebranche, who reverts to the Augustinian tradition by espousing vision in God and divine ideas. This study focuses on Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz as major participants in a dialogue on the nature of ideas, and ultimately, on the nature of the mind. One central issue in the debate is whether intentionality is the mark of the mental. By isolating the view of these three thinkers, it is possible to tell a historically important story, which is also philosophically coherent.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

In the first part of this chapter, I shall argue that Malebranche takes over three central doctrines from Descartes and transforms at least two of them; when they are combined, the result is vision in God. The three central doctrines are the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; the representative theory of perception; and the conclusion of the wax meditation—the thesis that bodies are perceived through the intellect, not the senses. In the second half of the chapter, I shall show how Malebranche uses Cartesian innovations to extend Augustine's theory of divine illumination. With the help of Descartes's teaching, Malebranche is able to argue that we can see bodies—changing and corruptible things—in God, without falling foul of divine immutability. In this way, he can overcome Augustine's scruples about the theological dangers of seeking to extend his theory of divine illumination.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

Malebranche is sometimes classified as a Cartesian, but on the issue of self‐knowledge he departs radically from Descartes; Malebranche completely rejects the thesis that the mind is better known than the body. On this issue at least, he belongs, not with Descartes or the other ‘rationalists’, but with the ‘empiricists’ Gassendi, Locke, and perhaps even Hume. Not surprisingly, Malebranche's position on self‐knowledge was subjected to vehement criticism from a Cartesian standpoint; in On True and False Ideas, Arnauld singled out Malebranche's denial that we have an idea of our mind as one of the main targets of his polemic. Among other criticisms, Arnauld argued cogently that, on Malebranche's view, it is difficult to see how we can have knowledge of such vital truths about the mind as its freedom and immortality, yet Arnauld failed to come to grips with Malebranche's central claims. Arguably, Malebranche had more insight into the weaknesses of Descartes's philosophy of mind and for this reason alone Malebranche's discussion of self‐knowledge is an important contribution to the subject.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

We cannot really understand Leibniz's polemic against Locke unless we grasp Leibniz's concept of ‘idea’. Moreover, the exclusive focus on the New Essays is historically misleading because it tends to obscure the fact that much of Leibniz's discussion of ideas is a response to issues raised by Malebranche and Arnauld. We shall see that much of Leibniz's discussion of ideas has wider philosophical significance, for his views are shaped by his nominalism; unlike Malebranche, Leibniz cannot tolerate irreducibly abstract entities. Like Malebranche, Leibniz attempts to do justice to the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination, but in adapting the doctrine to his own philosophical commitments, he tends to change its content, thereby depriving the doctrine of much of its real point. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that Leibniz's theory of mind has no significant theological dimensions, for we shall see that Leibniz's distinctive philosophical claims put him in a strong position to defend the Christian doctrine that the human mind is made in the image of God.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas
Published: October 2003

It would be foolish to try to pretend that Malebranche is always Leibniz's primary target in his writings on innate ideas. Obviously, the arguments of the New Essays are powerfully shaped by the polemical needs of replying to Locke, but it is surely significant that Leibniz has the resources in his philosophy for answering all Malebranche's objections, and it is not uncharacteristic of Leibniz to fight a war on two fronts. Indeed, the fact that Malebranche is a target can throw new light on Leibniz's sometimes obscure defence of innate ideas; for many features of Leibniz's case fall into place when they are seen as part of a coherent strategy for answering Malebranche's objections. In the first part of this chapter, we shall analyze Leibniz's strategy for defending a dispositional theory of innate ideas against both Locke and Malebranche; in the last part of the chapter, we shall see how Leibniz's defence of innate knowledge is supported by a psychologistic theory of necessary truth.
Meaning
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

The aim of this work is to demystify linguistic meaning—to characterize the underlying nature of this phenomenon in such a way that its familiar attributes become intelligible. To that end, one must consider whether a word's meaning derives from what it refers to, from the way it was defined, from some associated mental image, from its evolutionary function, from a prototype structure, from an inferential role, or from something else. The basic strategy adopted here for answering this question is to scrutinize a range of general features of meaning that have often been thought to provide clues to its origin—facts concerning the relationships between meaning and understanding, truth, a priori knowledge, complex expressions, what ought to be said, and actual word usage. It is a striking result, however, that only the last of these characteristics proves to be capable of guiding us towards a theory of how meaning arises: namely, that all our particular applications of a given word result, in part, from what we mean by it. This characteristic is explained—and can only be explained—by the theory presented here, whereby meaning properties are reduced to law‐like regularities of word use. More specifically, the theory is that each word means what it does in virtue of the fact that a certain ‘acceptance property’ of the word is explanatorily fundamental vis‐à‐vis its overall deployment (where an ’acceptance property’ specifies conditions in which designated sentences containing the word are held true). This proposal is forced to confront a formidable barrage of objections; but in each case an adequate reply is shown to be available.
Introduction
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

We begin by mentioning various important philosophical problems whose solutions call for an account of meaning: problems concerning the nature of truth, thought, justification, and philosophy. The chapter continues with a list of notorious puzzles about meaning that were highlighted by Frege, Brentano, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Dummett, Grice, Kaplan, Putnam, and Kripke. Then there is a summary of the main elements of the theory to be presented in the following chapters, which is designed to resolve these puzzles.
Truth
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

The reference or extension of a term—what that term is about—is determined by the concept it expresses: e.g. x means DOG → x is true of dogs. However, the minimalist/deflationary theory of truth (the theory that designates such conditionals as conceptually fundamental) shows that reference‐determination will take place regardless of how meaning properties are constituted. It is argued that only from an unreasonable ‘inflationary’ point of view (in which truth, satisfaction, and reference are not defined by such conditionals, but are instead assumed to be susceptible of reductive analysis) can there be a question (the ’problem of error’) about how to reconcile the basic nature of meaning (e.g. the analysis of ’x means DOG’) with its referential import (e.g. its capacity to ensure that x is true of dogs).
Norms of Language
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

It is often maintained (following Dummett and Kripke) that the normative aspects of language put a substantial constraint on our conceptions of meaning and truth—to the extent, some would say, of altogether precluding purely ’naturalistic’ or ’descriptive’ accounts of them. The purpose of this chapter is to establish that this is not so. It is not here denied that language is pervaded with normativity—with oughts and ought‐nots. But these phenomena are explained without supposing that truth and meaning are intrinsically normative notions. What is suggested, in other words, is that the evident normativity of language can give no reason to reject wholly non‐normative accounts of those notions—accounts such as the deflationary theory of truth and the use‐regularity theory of meaning.
A Straight Solution to Kripke's Sceptical Paradox
Authors: Horwich Paul
Published: October 2003

Kripke argues (in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language) that there are no genuine facts as to what words mean. The present chapter begins with a discussion of how this conclusion should be construed and proceeds to criticize the various considerations marshalled in favour of it. The central flaw is shown to be Kripke's explicit assumption that a given property of a word may provide it with a given meaning only if two interrelated conditions are satisfied: (a) that, from the information that some word possesses the given property, we may read off what it must mean, and (b) that we can explain why this property will engender that particular meaning. It is concluded that there are, after all, perfectly genuine empirical facts of meaning.
Kantian Pluralism
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

This essay characterizes the type of ethical theory that Kant developed, comparing it with contemporary theories along several dimensions. The essay distinguishes several senses in which an ethical theory might be pluralistic and argues that, in some important senses (but not others), Kant's theory is pluralistic. Issues considered are whether there is one basic principle or many, whether there are incommensurable values, in what sense the right is prior to the good, and to what extent Kantian ethics is intrusive, dogmatic, and judgemental. Kant's ethics, perhaps surprisingly, is responsive to many of the practical concerns commonly advocated under the label pluralism.
Kant on Responsibility for Consequences
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Moves beyond time‐worn debates as to whether we can determine what we ought to do independently of the predicted consequences. Rather, the questions concern moral blame and liability for the bad consequences of our deeds after we have acted. The essay interprets and examines objections to the answers suggested by Kant's remarks in The Metaphysics of Morals. If Kant's principles are construed as moral (rather than legal) guidelines, some objections miss the mark, but Kant's position is not adequately sensitive to differences in contexts.
The Problem of Stability in Political Liberalism
Authors: Hill Thomas E.
Published: October 2003

Examines the relation between two of the most influential Kantian works in political philosophy in this century, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice and his Political Liberalism. The rationale for Rawls's shift in position from the earlier book to the later, it is argued, is a recognized need to satisfy a deeply Kantian requirement on the legitimate exercise of state coercive power. In a pluralistic world where reasonable people differ about the truth of religion and morality, the requirement can be met only by showing the possibility of an overlapping consensus on shared political principles. Contrary to what Rawls at times suggests, the reason for his move from a ‘comprehensive moral theory’ to a ‘political conception’ of justice was not an (perhaps doubtful) expectation that consensus on his principles would be a stabilizing force, but instead a recognition of the need to provide a justification of these principles that is respectful of the diversity of moral and religious opinions among reasonable people.
Aristotle on Perception
Authors: Everson Stephen
Published: October 2003

In this book, Stephen Everson offers a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle's account of perception. Everson explains how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive such things as colours and sounds, as well as material objects. Everson has two main aims: the first is to place Aristotle's theory of mind within the context of his natural science, in particular, to show that Aristotle's account of perception is an application of the explanatory method of the Physics. To this end, Everson is keen to emphasize, against recent interpretations, that Aristotle explains perception in terms of material changes in the organs that possess perceptual capacities. The second aim is to argue that Aristotle's resulting method of explaining mental activity has substantive advantages over contemporary accounts in the philosophy of mind, such as functionalism and supervenience. Much of Everson's argument is directed against Myles Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotle’ philosophy of mind. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle argues that the sense organs undergo alteration without undergoing any material change: Everson calls this reading, the ‘spiritualist’ reading. Everson opposes this with the ‘literalist’ reading, according to which a sense organ is physically altered whenever it perceives something; it therefore takes on a property of the sensible object that affects it. In order to defend this reading, Everson presents a detailed account of the role of matter and material change in the perceptual activities of the each of the individual senses, and also of the perceptual system as a unified whole, including the activities of phantasia or imagination.
Perception and Its Proper Objects
Authors: Everson Stephen
Published: October 2003

Everson discusses the five senses and their proper objects; e.g. sound for hearing, colour for sight. The senses, Everson argues, are essentially related to their proper objects because they are essentially such as to be affected by them. There is thus an intrinsic (kath’hauto) relationship between a proper object and its proper sense, and this, Everson argues, is causal, rather than conceptual or logical. This being so, perception requires a scientific investigation.
Perceptual Change and Material Change
Authors: Everson Stephen
Published: October 2003

Everson introduces the ‘spiritualist’ and the ‘literalist’ readings. He offers some criticism of the ‘spiritualist reading’ in this chapter. The spiritualist must explain why the matter of a sense organ is not affected in perception. Everson argues that Aristotle's account implies that there is material change of the sense organ in perception. Firstly, there is Aristotle's insistence that each sense organ has a particular material constitution, and secondly, there is the claim that, in perception, the sense organ becomes like the object.
The Perceptual System
Authors: Everson Stephen
Published: October 2003

Everson gives an account of the perceptual system as a whole, and also examines the connection between perception and phantasia, or imagination. Everson argues that Aristotle has two notions of phantasia, a technical sense, and a more general sense. The technical sense refers to quasi‐perceptual states, such as dreams, or remembrances, where no sense object is present to the perceiver. The general sense takes phantasia in the sense of appearances generally speaking; thus in this sense, take all perceptions as a sub‐class of phantasia.
Knowledge and the State of Nature
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

This book is an inquiry in epistemology directed at understanding the concept of knowledge. Its point of departure is that the standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge arbitrarily restricts the subject matter and is based on risky theoretical presuppositions. Craig develops an alternative approach, akin to the ‘state of nature’ method in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs that it fulfils. Included in Craig's attempt to understand the concept is the endeavour to explain, in the light of his own theory, much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis, the obstacles to its analysis, and scepticism. Moreover, the book aims to show not only why many languages have such constructions as ‘knows whether’ and ‘knows that’ but also why they have equivalents of ‘knows how to’ and ‘know’ followed by a direct object.
Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State‐of‐Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult to make intuitive ‘extensional’ ascriptions of knowledge mesh with ‘intensional’ intuitions about what makes for knowledge. Second, the approach gives no answer as to why the concept of knowledge enjoys such widespread use and to which needs of human life and thought it answers. The suggested alternative approach is the naturalistic one of practical explication, i.e. to start with a reasoned hypothesis about the answer to this last question by considering the state of nature, and then to ask what conditions would govern the application of such a concept.
Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Outlines the core of the author's theory, according to which the concept of knowledge arises because of our interest in having true beliefs about our environment and thus in evaluating sources of information, and is used to flag approved ones. The hypothesis is used to account for epistemologists’ disagreement over the precise nature of the belief condition for knowledge. Ground is conceded to those who play down the requirement, in so far as an informant's being confident that p is not always taken as necessary for her to be a good informant. Equally, cases in which an informant is regarded as good, yet lacks belief entirely, are freakish and thus of little practical use, which explains both the attraction of the requirement and the feeling that there are genuine counter‐examples to it.
Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Argues that the core of the concept of knowledge is true belief plus some property indicative of true belief and that there is no detailed answer to the query ‘and what property is that?’ The Nozick–Dretske counterfactual analysis, Alvin Goldman's causal theory, reliabilism, and the justified true belief account are all good approximations to the concept of knowledge, for, in each case, there is justification for the addition(s) made to the minimal concept. This justification arises not so much from the concept of knowledge itself as from certain very general beliefs we hold about the world. Thus, when the conditions laid down in the minimal concept are satisfied, it will almost always be believed that the conditions of the above theories are satisfied too.
Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

‘Knows how to’ (‘knows’ in the capacity sense) appears synonymous with ‘can’, and yet ‘can’ does not primarily tell us about someone's capacity as an informant, suggesting that the practical explication cannot provide an account of ‘knows how to’. Three responses are considered: (1) the capacity sense exists only in some languages and therefore poses no problem; (2) there is no irreducible capacity sense; (3) the capacity sense is connected to the informational sense by the natural connection between agency and information. (3) is favoured, on the grounds that the needs of the inquirer and the apprentice, one who seeks an instructor from whom he may learn how, overlap in central cases. Craig concludes that the practical explication successfully explains both senses of ‘know’ in a unitary fashion.
Introduction
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter notes the paradox of the widespread admiration for Kant's criticism of dogmatic arguments about the mind and the scarcity of close analyses of Kant's procedure in his criticism. It also comments on the fact that many readers of the Critique have been put off by the fact that Kant's general doctrine of transcendental idealism immediately seems to bring with it absurd consequences—in particular, the striking implication that we cannot, theoretically, know our own self at all. I argue that Kant's general doctrine has some admirable ‘modest’ and critical dimensions, and that whatever worries one has about his idealism, these can, for the most part, be separated from the main innovations of his theory of the mind, which concern a perceptive unmasking of the so‐called ‘Cartesian’ claims about an immediate mental access to ourselves. In addition, the Introduction summarizes the pattern of the development of Kant's theory throughout his other works, and it gives an overview of Kant's main conclusions about the mind.
Immateriality
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins the detailed analysis of specific Kantian doctrines of the mind by pointing out that, despite its sharp critique of many rationalist arguments, Kant's Critical philosophy remains committed to the core rationalist claim that the mind ultimately cannot be material. This claim follows from transcendental idealism's general doctrine that nothing is material in itself. I explain in detail how this view is compatible with Kant's critical observations, in the first and second paralogisms, concerning traditional arguments for the self's substantiality and simplicity. Here, as elsewhere, it is useful to contrast Kant's views at four different levels (noumenal, phenomenal, scientific, and appearance), and to distinguish his thoughts about what is true, or even practically demonstrable, from what may be established a priori by theoretical reason.
Immortality
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This is a relatively brief chapter, giving a concise review of Kant's position on this issue throughout his writings. On the one hand, Kant treats the topic as the defining ‘Idea’ and goal of rational psychology as such; on the other, he is highly critical of all traditional theoretical arguments for it. His harsh criticism of these arguments has been a major factor in misleading readers into thinking that he has equally incisive or negative views about other, much more qualified rationalist claims. The unique a priori argument for our immortality (as a ‘postulate’ of pure practical reason) that Kant endorses in his Critiques can be understood as a weakened variation of a series of arguments that he had presented in early works, and that came to have an ever more peripheral significance.
Independence
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.
Pythagoras Revived
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

The Pythagorean idea that number is the key to understanding reality inspired Neoplatonist philosophers in Late Antiquity to develop theories in physics and metaphysics based on mathematical models. This book examines this theme, describing first the Pythagorean interests of Platonists in the second and third centuries and then Iamblichus's programme to Pythagoreanize Platonism in the fourth century in his work On Pythagoreanism (whose unity of conception is shown and parts of which are reconstructed for the first time). The impact of Iamblichus's programme is examined as regards Hierocles of Alexandria and Syrianus and Proclus in Athens: their conceptions of the figure of Pythagoras and of mathematics and its relation to physics and metaphysics are examined and compared with those of Iamblichus. This provides insight into Iamblichus's contribution to the evolution of Neoplatonism, to the revival of interest in mathematics, and to the development of a philosophy of mathematics and a mathematizing physics and metaphysics.
Varieties of Pythagoreanism in the Second and Third Centuries ad
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter compares the Pythagorean interests and tendencies of four Platonist philosophers, Numenius, Nicomachus of Gerasa, Anatolius, and Porphyry, in particular, as regards their views on the relation between Pythagoras and Plato and the place of number in their philosophy.
On Pythagoreanism V–VII: The Excerpts in Michael Psellus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

It is shown that extracts from books V, VI, and VII of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism are to be found in the work of the Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos. The contents of these lost books are reconstructed from Psellos's extracts: they concern number as applied in physics, in ethics, and in metaphysics.
Iamblichus' Work on Pythagoreanism: General Conclusions
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

This chapter provides an overview of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism and shows how its programme to Pythagoreanize Platonism can be found in what remains of Iamblichus's other philosophical works. Iamblichus's Pythagoreanism is compared with that of his Platonist predecessors.
Hierocles
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

The connections between Iamblichus's school in Syria and the beginnings of the Neoplatonist school in Athens are indicated, and, as a first case of the influence of Iamblichus's Pythagoreanizing programme, the works of Hierocles of Alexandria (a pupil of Plutarch of Athens) discussed, with reference, in particular, to Hierocles's views on the history of philosophy and his use of Pythagoreanism in his commentary on the Golden Verses.
Proclus on Mathematics
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

Proclus's use, in his commentary on Euclid, of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism book III is examined, as are his views on general mathematics, on the importance of geometry in relation to arithmetic, on Euclid, and on the method and uses of geometry.
Mathematics and Physics in Proclus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

Proclus's mathematizing approach to physics is discussed in relation to his adaptation of Aristotle's Physics and his interpretation of the physics of Plato's Timaeus, in which physics is geometricized in its method, and its claim to scientific status circumscribed. The transposition of mathematical truths to physics is also discussed.
Conclusion
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

The conclusion summarizes the main points established in the book concerning Iamblichus’ contribution to the development of Neoplatonism and to the emergence of a philosophy of mathematics and a mathematizing physics and metaphysics that are found in Proclus and that would be of considerable historical importance, as indicated briefly, in Medieval and Renaissance philosophy.
Existential Epistemology
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

I develop a Heideggerian response to the central traditional problem in epistemology—whether we can have (objective) knowledge of the external world. I introduce the main philosophical terms and claims of Being and Time, and try to use this system to amplify the book's brief and elusive treatments of that problem. Because Heidegger's early system is crucially ‘existential’, it gives a critique of epistemology from an existential stance—or an existential epistemology. This critique claims to ‘dissolve’ or ‘undermine’ that traditional problem, by showing how it is misguided or misformed. Heidegger's ultimate argument is that the problem rests on a mistake about time, or about the temporal character of reality, and of humans—Dasein—in particular. Heidegger thinks this mistake infects not just epistemology, but our whole theoretical stance, how we try to go beyond our ‘everyday’, pre‐theoretical understanding. But his point is not to return us to that ‘everydayness’, but to improve our thinking by turning it into a ‘phenomenology’, which—by Heidegger's existential twist—amounts to the same thing as authenticity. My three chapters focus respectively on these three basic stances—everydayness, epistemology, and phenomenology.
Epistemology
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

The second chapter examines the special theoretical attitude by which Heidegger thinks philosophy and science have traditionally tried to advance beyond that everyday understanding. This attitude involves ‘suspending’ those pragmatic projects and grasping ourselves and things ‘objectively’, which is to treat them not as ready‐to‐hand equipment, but as present‐at‐hand objects. But, Heidegger argues, our (Dasein's) own condition cannot be grasped as present‐at‐hand, because of the way it is crucially projecting ahead towards its ends— i.e. because of its temporal character. This limitation in the attitude is most exposed by the traditional effort of epistemology, best represented in Descartes. Its inability ever to ground its knowledge claims reflects its temporal limit in the present.
Phenomenology
Authors: Richardson John
Published: October 2003

The third chapter turns to the new theoretical stance Heidegger advocates to us, phenomenology, and the existential condition to which it is tied, authenticity. This requires examining, rather more selectively, the terms and claims in Being and Time's second Division. We find that both everydayness and epistemology are responses to existential deficiencies in Dasein's condition, which Heidegger calls ‘nullities’, and links with guilt and anxiety. Both our everyday absorption in equipment, and our theoretical relation to objects, are ‘falling’ avoidances of these nullities, which is reflected above all in their temporal character. Heidegger promotes to us instead the method of phenomenology, which faces those nullities, in the authentic stance in which Dasein's temporality is transparent to it.
The Existence of God
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

This book assesses the worth of arguments for and against the existence of God. Evidence confirms (makes more probable) a hypothesis that explains that (1) given the hypothesis, the evidence is to be expected, i.e. the hypothesis makes the evidence probable, (2) the evidence is not otherwise to be expected, (3) the hypothesis is simple, and (4) it fits with background knowledge (i.e. knowledge about how things behave in neighbouring fields of enquiry.) When we are assessing hypotheses (such as theism, the hypothesis that there is a God) purporting to explain everything, there will be no background knowledge. Theism is a very simple hypothesis. If there is a God, there is some reason to expect that he will create a universe, with laws of nature, leading to the evolution of humans (bodies connected to souls), who often have experiences which seem to them experiences of God. It is most impossible that all this evidence exists if there were no God. Taken together, therefore, all this evidence makes it probable that there is a God. The occurrence of evil, whether produced by humans or natural processes, does not diminish that probability.
The Explanatory Power of Theism: General Considerations
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Evidence e renders a hypothesis be more probable insofar as both the prior probability of b is high and its explanatory power (that is the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis divided by the prior probability of the evidence) is high. Different e increases the probability of the hypothesis of theism beyond its prior probability because it is quite probable that there would be that evidence if there is a God, and quite improbable if there is no God. There cannot be a best of all possible worlds.
The Problem of Evil
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

It is a good thing that humans should have the opportunity to choose freely between good and evil; and hence the “free will” defence to “moral evil”, that God has reason to allow such evil. There are two substantial reasons why God should bring about natural evil – to give us the knowledge of how to bring about good and evil consequence ourselves; and to give us the opportunity to react to it with courage, sympathy etc. and to do virtuous acts of a kind, which we would not otherwise have such opportunity to do.
Arguments from History and Miracles
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

God has reason to bring about occasional miracles in the sense of violations of laws of nature. (e.g., as answers to prayer or to show his approval of some particular teaching). He has reason to become incarnate in order to provide atonement for human sin, to reveal truth and to identify with our sufferers; and to show that he has done this by a super‐miracle such as the Resurrection. But for God such violations are not to be expected. Hence, violations in the right sort of circumstances is further evidence of the existence of God.
The Argument from Religious Experience
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Large numbers of people have religious experiences in the sense of experiences that seem to them to be experiences of God. It is a basic epistemological principle. The principle of credulity, that – in absence of counter‐evidence – we should believe that things are as they seem to be, the only kind of counter‐evidence which would tend to show a religious experience not to be veridical would be any evidence tending to show that there is no God. In the absence of any such evidence, any religious experience is evidence of the existence of God.
Constructibility and Mathematical Existence
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

A continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.
The Deductive System
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

The promised mathematical system—the Constructibility Theory—is presented as an axiomatized deductive theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order logical language. The axioms of the theory are specified and a justification for each of the axioms is given. Objections to the theory are considered.
Mathematical Structuralism
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

The first of six chapters in which rival views are critically evaluated and compared with the Constructibility view described in earlier chapters. The views considered here (forms of ‘Structuralism’) are those of Stewart Shapiro and Michael Resnik. A number of difficulties with these two views are detailed and it is explained how the Constructibility Theory is not troubled by the problems that Structuralism was explicitly developed to resolve.
Deflationism and Mathematical Truth
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Takes up Field's version of Logicism—a position that he calls ‘deflationism’. Unlike traditional Logicists, Field does not analyse mathematical propositions into purely logical ones, but he does analyse mathematical knowledge into logical knowledge. Several objections are raised to deflationism, revolving around Field's contention that mathematics consists mostly of falsehoods. Contends that, although mathematics, literally and platonically construed, is not true, it does convey genuine (true) information.
F. H.Bradley
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

Bradley's views are the ones to which Russell and Moore are most directly reacting. The author approaches those views by considering a criticism of the views of Green. This leads to a consideration of Bradley's views about relations and (relatedly) experience and reality. Bradley's views about judgement and truth occupy the second half of the chapter and are considered in the context of Bradley's criticism of the empiricist's views on the same topic.
Russell's Idealist Period
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

Concerned with Russell's early work, written when he was still an adherent of the idealist tradition (1895‐1899). The author pays particular attention to Russell's 1897 book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Russell argued that geometry was one stage in a ‘dialectic of the sciences’. Each stage would be shown, in Hegelian fashion, to be inadequate if taken by itself, and to lead naturally or inevitably to the next stage.
‘On Denoting’
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

Discusses Russell's famous 1905 essay, ‘On Denoting’. It places it in the context of his overall philosophical views at the time, and assesses the changes that it brought about in those view.