bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Mathematics for the Doctor in the Million
Authors: Pavlov Vassily
Published: November 2002

My discussion will concern itself with mathematics, medicine and the possible relations between the two. It will be an exercise in logical analysis, a review of some sad, sad facts, and in some sense a promise of glad tidings. In short, it will be an effort to bring the immortal inhabitants of the mathematical heaven into harmonious relations with the mortal ills of man's vale of tears.

As to the curious role of mathematics with respect to the natural sciences, several preliminary observations insist on prompt consideration. It is a matter of common knowledge, for example, that mathematics is being constantly applied to physics. With great success, Galileo wedded the two in his study of motion down an inclined plane. The mathematics he used to describe the physical phenomenon involved the equation of a parabola. His daring genius thus got far beyond the conventional circles that were permitted to motion by theology. His courageous use of the then “higher mathematics” was followed by centuries of application of still higher and higher mathematics, till now a small army of mathematicians is busy almost exclusively with the problem of inventing or discovering new varieties of mathematics which could serve physics better and better. The mathematical physicist of to-day is a specialist, nine-tenths mathematician, one-tenth physicist, with the nine-tenths serving the one-tenth.
The Scientific Use of Historical Data
Authors: Meadows Paul
Published: November 2002

The cogency of a scientific study utilizing historical data tends to be, unfortunately, very largely a matter of the methodological presuppositions of the reader. Indeed, the barriers to a more general and thorough scientific use of history are, for the most part, methodological. There are two such barriers: (1) the uncertainty as to the validity of an intensive scientific investigation of historical problems, and (2) the lack of a clear delineation of the fields of research.

Concerning the first, two problems must be considered: on the one hand, the nature of historical knowledge (the methodology of “history”) and on the other, the nature of scientific knowledge (the methodology of “science”). The predictive assumption of the present discussion is that to understand the essential identity of historical and scientific knowledge (though not of methods and problems) is to justify the scientific manipulation of data which are unquestionably historical. The thesis which is being argued here is that all data are historical, that all reality—whatever its level or type—is event-structured, that events have an existential dependence on one another, that therefore relationships of relevance and causation may be established, and that the determination of such relationships is the function of scientific research in any field.
Logic in our Common Knowledge or Logic in the Light of Common Sense, Common Knowledge, and Common Understanding
Authors: Ritter William E.
Published: November 2002

For thirty years at least, I have designated myself as a zoologist interested in the “philosophical aspects of biology”. But I have now to admit that not until within the last two or three years have I recognized that logic, particularly in its inductive aspect, is involved in such interest.

For me as a zoologist with a predilection for natural history, observation has had a place of wide application and of implicit confidence. Until recently, I had rested in the supposition that after all of the devices practiced by naturalists to insure certainty of their observations, nothing further was needed so far as the information and understanding they gained was concerned. I had gone ahead with my reasoning, my logic, with no more qualms about the trustworthiness of the “inductive” than of the “deductive” side of it. I had not taken seriously the assertion, made years ago in my hearing by an eminent philosopher, that no one can be a philosopher without being skeptical and critical of the use of his senses in getting knowledge. Latterly, however, I have come to see that traditional philosophers take themselves very seriously in such assertions. This realization has been due to the discovery that the recent advances in physics and mathematics have led most of the leaders in these fields to believe that observation and the inductive side of logic may be left where they were a hundred years ago. These scientists seem to be about where John Stuart Mill was in his effort to improve Lord Bacon's effort for a better understanding of both observation and induction.
The Pragmatist Theory of Truth
Authors: Hinshaw Virgil G.
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper I criticized the pragmatist theory of truth from the frame of reference of modern logical positivism (scientific empiricism). By showing the similarity between Karl Mannheim's claims of epistemological relevance for sociology of knowledge and certain pragmatist notions concerning truth I made criticism of the latter with the former. The aim of this present paper is to extend and elaborate upon those critical remarks regarding pragmatism both in order to answer objections raised since and to clarify what was said there. Moreover, the evaluation of the pragmatist theory of truth may have been surprising to some since so much lately has been made of the points of agreement between pragmatism and modern positivism. It is thus also my intent to delimit agreements and disagreements and compare the respective emphases in pragmatist and positivist thought concerning the nature of truth.
Grading, A Study in Semantics
Authors: Sapir Edward , E. S.
Published: November 2002

The first thing to realize about grading as a psychological process is that it precedes measurement and counting. Judgments of the type “A is larger than B” or “This can contains less milk than that” are made long before it is possible to say, e.g., “A is twice as large as B” or “A has a volume of 25 cubic feet, B a volume of 20 cubic feet, therefore A is larger than B by 5 cubic feet,” or “This can contains a quart of milk, that one 3 quarts of milk, therefore the former has less milk in it.” In other words, judgments of quantity in terms of units of measure or in terms of number always presuppose, explicitly or implicitly, preliminary judgments of grading. The term four means something only when it is known to refer to a number which is “less than” certain others, say five, six, seven, arranged in an ordered series of relative mores and lesses, and “more than” certain others, say one, two, three, arranged in an ordered series of relative mores and lesses. Similarly, a foot as a unit of linear measure has no meaning whatever unless it is known to be more than some other stretch, say an inch, and less than a third stretch, say a yard.
The Mythology of Science
Authors: Feibleman James
Published: November 2002

The complexity and the technical obscurity of the scientific method have rendered science ever likely to be misunderstood both by scientists themselves and by the general public. Difficulties which remain unrecognized constitute the most formidable obstacles to success in any field. There are such difficulties lurking in the treatment which the scientific method accords its subject-matter. In this essay, I propose to point to one such pitfall in the path of the progress of science. By exposing it, something will already be accomplished toward its avoidance and elimination, and the vast public of uninstructed persons will be able to skirt one more confusion in the effort to understand what the scientists are trying to do.
Value, Valuation, and Natural-Science Methodology
Authors: Hull Clark L.
Published: November 2002

One of the initial obstacles to the study of the theory of value is the fact that practically every author whom the student consults on the subject characterizes value and valuation differently, and seems to trace them ultimately to a different source. For example, one writer will formulate a theory of value in terms of pain and pleasure (1); another, in terms of feeling (16, p.22); another, in terms of desires or wants (3, p.1); still others, in terms of “requiredness” (8, p.63), of interest (11, p.115), of striving (4, pp.1–29); and so on.
Outline of a Logical Analysis of Law
Authors: Oppenheim Felix E.
Published: November 2002

This study purports to demonstrate the possibility of applying logical analysis in the field of jurisprudence, and the usefulness of this method for exhibiting some essential features of the law.

logical analysis applies to language systems. To carry out the logical analysis of a language, is to construct a simplified model language “in close connection with” the given language, and to study the conditions of validity of the sentences of this model language. The given language is subjected to a kind of purifying chemical process. To deal with this simplified language seems to be a detour; it is, however, the most direct way to an ultimate insight into the logical structure of the given language.
Vital Organization and the Psychic Factor
Authors: Lillie Ralph S.
Published: November 2002

If we may rely for our evidence on simple observation, it would appear that the tendency of random or unguided activity in external nature is opposed to the development of complex organization and favorable to structural simplicity—in the sense of uniformity in the distribution of elements. This anti-organizing trend of purely physical processes is illustrated in ordinary large-scale mixing and stirring operations, as well as in the automatic increase of entropy with time in systems subject to the laws of thermodynamics (material or molecular systems in general). It is common experience that complex systems which are the seat of physical activity tend to become simpler when left to themselves, i.e., they lose organization. Recently Eddington has given the whole matter an admirably clear expression: “Entropy may most conveniently be described as the measure of disorganization of a system. ... We can see chance creeping in where formerly it was excluded.” Unless counteracted by directive action the casual or random element in nature tends to increase. If things are left to chance, not only does organization of any high degree of complexity fail to develop, but what organization there is tends to lapse or disappear. Hence in those cases, such as living organisms, where the existence and activity of the system depend on a special and complex organization, it appears necessary to assume the continued operation of a stable directive influence or factor which pervades the whole system and excludes or compensates casual factors as far as possible. The presence of this factor is what makes possible the development and maintenance of the organization required for vital activity.
Organization
Authors: Dunlop W. R.
Published: November 2002

Only those whose work and interests have led them to notice it, will have realised, in all probability, the remarkable extent to which the term organization has gained currency, or acquired new and special emphasis, throughout the entire range of scientific and sociological literature during the last ten or twenty years.

In biology and bio-chemistry organization has been discussed or used as a technical term, mostly since 1930 by at least thirty well-known authors; amongst the more prominent are Huxley, Wilson, Woodger, Cannon, Waddington, McDougall, Needham, Block, Hopkins and Sherrington. Under this magic term some authors refer to the physico-chemical nature of the cell or cytoplasm, and usually with special reference to selective or directive catalysis; others to the general constitution or structure of the organism and almost indistinguishable from general morphology and physiology; others to embryological development as such (i.e. progressive differentiation under specific chemical stimuli); others more especially to “relations” between cells, organs and structural parts, often in an abstract sense; others refer more particularly to a hypothetical integrating and/or co-ordinating factor (“entelechy', ”field“, ”formative force“, ”telepathic hierarchial monads“, ”diffused Maxwell's Demon“, and so forth): a few refer to re-constitution from dissociated cells (so-called ”re-organization“) as observed in experiments with Sponges and Hydroids.
The Method of Infinite Descent and the Method of Mathematical Induction
Authors: Montague Harriet F.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper may be found in the following quotation. “Whenever an argument can be made to lead to a descending infinitude of natural numbers the hypothesis upon which the argument rests becomes untenable. This method of proof is called the method of infinite descent; .... It would be interesting and valuable to compare this method with the method of mathematical induction.”
The Exclusion Principle and its Philosophical Importance
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

It is strange to note so little discussion of the exclusion principle in the philosophical literature. Philosophers, largely engrossed in their perennial problems, are hardly aware of the fact that, during the last two decades, there has been introduced into physical methodology a principle of utmost philosophical importance, easily rivaling that of relativity and, in some respects, indeed that of causality. Discovered by Pauli in 1925, it immediately elucidated a whole realm of physical facts and was accepted by physicists with wide acclaim. Called the exclusion principle—or Pauli principle, or principle of anti-symmetry—it was embodied in the axiomatics of quantum mechanics; its peculiar methodological significance passed out of view.
Holism, Historicism, and Emergence
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

In a recent article P. Henle gave an analysis of the notion of emergence. His inquiry deals with what he calls, quite appropriately, the emergence of characteristics. Such emergence, that is, the emergence of qualities and relations is undoubtedly the primary connotation of the term, and I feel that Henle has been very successful in clarifying it. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss in some detail one special aspect of Henle's analysis. This is done because the precise formulation of this particular aspect sheds light on the notion of elementarism. And the opposite of this notion, holism or organicism, belongs undoubtedly to the variety of fused and confused meanings the idea of emergence has come to cover.
The Subject in Whitehead's Philosophy
Authors: Gentry George
Published: November 2002

The most direct manner of formulating the objective of this paper is to consider some passages in which Whitehead states the conception of the “subject” espoused by the organic philosophy.

“The subjectivist principle is that the whole universe consists of elements disclosed in the analysis of the experiences of subjects.” “The reformed subjectivist principle adopted by the philosophy of organism ...” is “... that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.”
A Mass-Time Triangle
Authors: Dodd Stuart Carter
Published: November 2002

When all sorts of material entities from atoms to people and from bacilli to stars are plotted on a scale of time and a scale of mass some very interesting alignments and symmetries emerge. It is observed that the data of the physical, biological, psychological, and social sciences form a neat isosceles triangle as shown in Figure 1 below. The facts are simple as graphed in Figure 1 on logarithmic scales; their explanation or interpretation is not apparent. Is Figure 1 merely an interesting diagram useful in teaching the masses and evolutionary ages of the phenomena of various classes of science, or has it some more fundamental scientific significance? The graph will be first described and then its uncertainties and possible implications will be discussed.
Levels of Research in the Biological Sciences
Authors: Bailey Orville T.
Published: November 2002

Scientific data are often subjected to two contradictory over-simplifications. People who have no personal experience in science often say that a certain idea has been scientifically established and feel that the question is therewith settled. They do not distinguish among methods, or generalizations in different fields. This implies that all science is infallible. The other oversimplification comes from the specialist; he may dismiss the work of men who study the problems approaching his own but who use methods different from his. This view implies that only one type of scientific investigation is really sound. Both groups are wrong, for science is neither infallible nor wholly untrustworthy. In fact, science as an abstract whole is nothing; it is the name given collectively to all methods which men have used to explore natural processes and the results obtained by the use of such methods. Some problems are sufficiently simple and accessible to be explored in detail while others can be treated only after a set of postulates have been set as a starting point. A mechanism must be established within which it is possible to deal with the problems at hand. In other words, there are levels of scientific research which may be arranged in a series based on increasing assumptions. The more complex levels are formed by assuming the data and methods of those simpler and adding to them a new set of assumptions with the aid of which it is possible to treat the phenomena to be studied. Material cannot be carried directly from one level to another unless attention is given to the premises on which the conclusions have been drawn. Since such attention is not always given, entire fields of research have sometimes been brought into suspicion on the part of those working in what they themselves style “a more fundamental field.” Yet there may be data available at a different level which, when properly used, would be of value in their own work.
What is Scientific Planning?
Authors: Rautenstrauch Walter
Published: November 2002

Among the issues before the American People today none are of greater importance than that of National Planning. The gradual evolution of the processes of civilization to their present state has brought National Planning to public attention as the next logical step. No one can explore the facts of our natural resources, our tool-power and our man-power without becoming aware of their interdependences and the need of intelligent coordinated action concerning them, if an orderly progressive society is to be established and maintained. If planning is to be incorporated in National Policy, the very nature of the problem itself and the facts and relationships to be dealt with should command the sincere and devoted attention of all groups of scientific workers in every field of human interest. It is not the purpose of this paper to argue this point. It will be assumed, before this group, that the planning process is a scientific process and therefore should be of great interest to the members of this association. In the short period assigned to the consideration of this subject, all that can be accomplished is to indicate what are some of the problems involved in scientific social planning. The inadequacies of the type of planning such as attempted by the German, Italian and Japanese Governments, to mention a few, and its comparison with the types of planning from which evolves a democratic social power, must be left for consideration at another time. The planning process as related to democratic social objectives is concerned with setting up a framework of relationships among the processes of civilization which has a high probability of attaining optimum social satisfactions. Modern civilization is founded on three primary dynamic systems each having its own characteristics. These dynamic systems will be termed “Systems of Power” and are:

1. Systems of Resources Power

2. Systems of Tool-Power

3. Systems of Man-Power
The Future of Medical Research
Authors: Simms Henry S.
Published: November 2002

Medical research is still in its infancy. Within the memory of many of us, medical knowledge has made more progress than had been achieved in all the preceding time since the beginning of history. We have witnessed the reduction of our death rate, the extension of our life span and the achievement of a general state of health hitherto unknown.
Soviet Science and Dialectical Materialism
Authors: Somerville John
Published: November 2002

What is the relationship between the field of science and the philosophy of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union? Ninety-five per cent of the fears and misgivings expressed by American writers in regard to this subject are quite unwarranted. They have been arrived at, not by any use of the scientific method of carefully examining observable facts, but by accepting the superficialities and distortions of the sensational press, and by making sweeping “deductions” from wholly unverified premises, or from isolated and exceptional instances. Some scientists who would not dream of approaching their own field of specialty in any such manner apparently feel that the complex problem of the relations between science and a certain philosophy within a new society can be so approached.
Conceptual Difficulties in Modern Economic Theory
Authors: Winthrop Henry
Published: November 2002

The use of the marginal concept in academic economic theory is found to underlie a good deal of current orthodox economic analysis. The marginal concept is used by thinkers with a collectivist bent as well as thinkers of an orthodox stamp. Marginal analysis is reasonably serviceable on some occasions but fraught with difficulties on others. When the marginal concept refers to a measurable factor, such as the marginal product of an additional unit of capital, it is unquestionably useful for analysis. When it refers to a subjective situation, such as a marginal increase or decrease in satisfaction or demand, the analysis which rests upon it is often somewhat shaky. This paper is an attempt to point out some difficulties in the use of marginal analysis when such analysis refers to internal psychological states of economic men. The points made here will center about the concept of marginal satisfaction in income, that is to say, the assumption that the increment of satisfaction resulting from an additional unit of income, diminishes with size of income.
An Institute of Scientific Humanism
Authors: Reiser Oliver L.
Published: November 2002

Recently I was asked by a somewhat disillusioned but well informed official of one of the important Foundations how long I thought it would be before we attained Utopia. My reply was that I thought we would make substantial progress toward a better world within the next one hundred years.

The reply to this, as the reader may surmise, was that my estimate was much too optimistic, the intimation being that anyone who hopes for such rapid progress in this world must be rather naive in practical matters. Such a judgment represents a widely prevailing view, but one which is supposed to be “realistic.” According to this view, social advancement is a slow business. It will be said that there is no evidence that we are much better off than the ancients. Rather than that we have progressed beyond antiquity, we find that we, as of old, have our evidences of social degradation and maladjustment. Crimes, wars, unemployment, divorce, racial and religious conflicts, even W. P. A. projects—all these are as old as recorded history. Man cannot hope to go far in the next one hundred years because in the last one thousand years he has not improved his lot in terms of fundamental human values. All he has done is multiply his gadgets and invent some new ones. Perhaps—my critic opined—we can make some headway in the next thousand years, but it will be a slow and painful process.
Normative Organization and Empirical Fields
Authors: Feibleman James , Friend Julius
Published: November 2002

We must begin by distinguishing between sciences and empirical fields. The empirical fields are the elementary divisions of the natural world into levels for purposes of examination. The sciences consist in the method of examining those fields, together with the presuppositions and findings of such a method. Throughout this essay, we shall consider only the empirical fields as the subject-matter of the sciences, and the way in which the sciences describe their subject-matter, but not the sciences themselves. Thus the adjective “physical” will be employed, for instance, to describe the physical empirical field, and not “physics” to describe the science.
The Natural History of Experience
Authors: Herrick C. Judson
Published: November 2002

“All experience is an arch wherethro’ gleams” an untravell'd world and through which come the joyous adventures of life and also grief and pain. Since all that we know and hope to know and think we know must come through this arch and since the primary task of science is the validation and enlargement of knowledge, science is vitally interested in this experience and its interpretation. This interest stems not from the philosopher's epistemology but it is strictly operational. We want to know what kind of experience yields reliable knowledge when checked against other experience and applied in practical adjustment to things as they are and to prediction of the probable future course of events. In short, the field of natural science (empirical as distinguished from normative science like mathematics) embraces everything that comes within the range of human experience. Its specific functions are to codify this mixed experience, to search out those uniformities which yield classification, verification and prediction, and from these observed uniformities to construct by sound reasoning verifiable laws, hypotheses and theories, that is, to find the meaning of the experiences had. First we want to know the facts, but what we are after in the upshot is the interpretation of the facts.
On Inductive Logic
Authors: Carnap Rudolf
Published: November 2002

Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability1’ and ‘probability2'. Probability1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences (or, alternatively, between two propositions); it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c(h, e)” for “the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on the evidence e“; the evidence is usually a report on the results of our observations. On the other hand, probability2 is an empirical concept; it is the relative frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another. The controversy between the so-called logical conception of probability, as represented e.g. by Keynes, and Jeffreys, and others, and the frequency conception, maintained e.g. by v. Mises and Reichenbach, seems to me futile. These two theories deal with two different probability concepts which are both of great importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each other.
A Definition of “Degree of Confirmation”
Authors: Hempel Carl G. , Oppenheim Paul
Published: November 2002

1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. And secondly, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence which does represent an empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence.
Normative, Descriptive, and Ideological Elements in the Writings of Laski
Authors: Zerby Lewis
Published: November 2002

Laski has been and remains one of the most erudite and influential of the English liberals—indeed, regardless of which of his books the liberal reads, he finishes it with the feeling that Laski is a force for good in political life. However, for the kind of philosopher who is accustomed to make distinctions between morality, ethics, ideology, and descriptive science, there are certain confusions in Laski's writings that give grounds for criticism of both a theoretical and practical nature.
I. Background
Authors: Churchman C. W.
Published: November 2002

It is a curious fact that in the many writings on the theory of probability, one rarely finds an instance of a clear cut definition of the fundamental problem of the subject. On intuitive grounds, one grasps the intent of most of the authors: it is to define the concept of probability and to show its relationship to the other concepts of science; and yet since the criterion of adequacy in the answering of this question is rarely stated, one must feel that the problem itself has remained undefined.
II. Postulates of Experimental Method
Authors: Churchman C. W.
Published: November 2002

In order adequately to refute the charge that relativism makes against any absolute answer to problems of science, it will be necessary for us to generalize upon the principal theme and attempt a characterization of experimental methodology. Only by thus determining what constitutes experimental inquiry in general can we hope to define that particular aspect of it which involves the concept of probability.
III. Non-Mechanical Concepts
Authors: Churchman C. W.
Published: November 2002

The reader will be a patient one indeed who has not long since raised in his mind what appear to be pertinent and pressing problems concerning the description of experimental method that has so far been given. These questions are mainly concerned with matters of omission: for example, we have said that if a lack of control is shown, then the image should be changed. But how changed? What principle or method guides the selection of a new image of nature when the old is no longer permissible? Or again, we have said that “observations should be made“. But what is an observation? What principle or method guides the experimenter in deciding which of his activities are observations?
Mathematical Formalism and the Physical Picture
Authors: Beck Guido
Published: November 2002

A physical theory intends to provide us with a picture of a certain domain of physical phenomena. We have become accustomed to deal rather with physical pictures than with phenomena themselves. This is indispensable, even if the number of phenomena contained in the picture is so large that we cannot have them in mind all at the same time or if the phenomena are not directly accessible to our senses and cannot be studied without the help of a set of very complicated apparatus.
A Theory on Causal Factors in the Origin of Life
Authors: Kavanau J. Lee
Published: November 2002

In this paper a theory relating to the causal factors operative in the origin of living systems is presented.

Let us consider living forms as material systems exhibiting, in addition to those properties held in common with all matter, systemic properties of a specific nature. If, then, the matter of the earth is classified from this standpoint, it is found that these systems are distributed only over the surface of the earth or in a shallow upper layer. This fact indicates that the special properties of these systems are related in some manner to factors introduced at the surface and not operative elsewhere.
The Hypothesis of Esthetic Measure
Authors: Feibleman James
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction: the three parts of the essay: (I) reply to criticism of attempts at esthetic measure, (II) a glance at the pioneers, and (III) the development of a new approach.
A Note Concerning Winthrop's “Conceptual Difficulties in Modern Economic Theory”
Authors: Hull Clark L.
Published: November 2002

In the article referred to in the title of this note, Winthrop quotes a paragraph from a recent article by me with italics inserted by him, and then proceeds to “translate” it into the language of an economic theory. Winthrop thoughtfully adds in a following paragraph the phrase, “… if I have not mistranslated him [Hull] into marginal terms.” The purpose of the present note is to correct what appears to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of the passage, rather than an error of translation; at all events, it is only with the original meaning of the passage that this note is concerned. The paragraph as it originally appeared is as follows (p. 135) :

“Economic value in one of its more obvious and primitive aspects involves the exchange of an amount of commodity X possessed by person No. 1 for an amount of commodity Y possessed by person No. 2. This type of behavior can come about voluntarily and continuously only on the condition that person No. 1 has a striving potential for Y which is greater than would be his striving potential for X when he no longer has X; and when person No. 2 has a striving potential for X which is greater than would be that for Y when he no longer has Y. Thus the total striving potential of both persons is reduced by the transaction.”
A Challenge
Authors: Churchman C. W. , Cowan T. A.
Published: November 2002

In recent issues of the Journal of Philosophy John Dewey and Arthur Bentley have been making an attack on certain logical positivists and other logicians on the ground, of all things, that they display amazing contempt for clear and consistent definition of the terms they use. That logicians, whose business it is to define consistency, should themselves be inconsistent in the use of their basic terms is not really so surprising. It may merely prove them to be human, the victims of a simple failure to practice what they preach. If this were the case, the situation would not be so bad, for who better than a drunkard knows the evils of drink? And yet it is equally human to require preacher to be practitioner as well. So that the spankings which Bentley and Dewey are currently administering to Carnap, Cohen, Nagel, Ducasse, Lewis and Morris are quite in order. In fact in the case of the logical positivists they are long overdue. Carnap, particularly, has long outraged patience as well as common sense with rambling verbal analysis of the meaning of terms used in the exposition of logical positivism.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Authors: Hawkins David
Published: November 2002

The literature of economic theory, like that of philosophy, abounds in prefaces and prolegomena. Methodology and analysis of concepts take an important place in a science which has not found the sure path of development. But there is no sure path for methodology either. The selfconscious methodology of social science has been largely a borrowing from that of physical science, where procedures have developed to a stage of considerable maturity. But the analogy falls down where guidance is most needed, at the points where social science is most likely to develop new concepts and new types of structure. Philosophers have not been lacking, indeed, to belittle the entire enterprise, and to deny the possibility of anything that could strictly be called social science.
On the Possible Philosophies of Science
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

The use of the word “possible” without qualification invariably leads us to the endless, or at least well beyond our finite powers of analysis. Yet, to qualify possibility may itself become an endless task, if only because of the multitude of the available modes of approach. Somewhere in the middle of the realm of possibility one must parachute down and start ordering the scattered riches for our finite purposes with our limited and only newly acquired perspectives. What we have glimpsed of the realms of possibility before our descent may still be of use, but our immediate tasks will bind us to the sternly empirical gravitational pulls of what happens to have erupted in the historical fields of discovery.
Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence and Criticism
Authors: Johnson A. H.
Published: November 2002

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.

Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.
Hypothesis vs. Problem in Scientific Investigation
Authors: Smith Mapheus
Published: November 2002

It is widely stated that a hypothesis is necessary to the execution of a scientific investigation. However, the dogmatic acceptance of this, as of every other proposition, is to be condemned until its implications have been adequately explored.

It is the writer's view that hypotheses are not prerequisite to every study which contributes to organized and systematic knowledge of the observable world. It is also concluded that the recognition of a problem requiring a solution or a question deserving an answer is a step that must be taken in every sort of systematic study, and, therefore, that a problem is a more important characteristic of scientific method than a hypothesis.
The Semiotic Status of Commands
Authors: Bohnert Herbert Gaylord
Published: November 2002

The large number of writers who have in recent years attacked the problem of the logical nature of commands appear generally in agreement in accepting the distinction of common grammar between imperative and declarative sentences as representing, albeit in no clear one-to-one manner, some real difference in the logical character of the two types of expression, and possibly in the psychological sign-functioning mechanism itself. The crucial logical difference adduced is that commands can apparently rot be classified as true or false. One is then, however, confronted with the problem of interpreting arguments involving imperatives which appear syllogistic in form, such as:

Keep your promises!

You promised to pay on Wednesday.

Pay on Wednesday!
The Role of Models in Science
Authors: Rosenblueth Arturo , Wiener Norbert
Published: November 2002

The intention and the result of a scientific inquiry is to obtain an understanding and a control of some part of the universe. This statement implies a dualistic attitude on the part of scientists. Indeed, science does and should proceed from this dualistic basis. But even though the scientist behaves dualistically, his dualism is operational and does not necessarily imply strict dualistic metaphysics.
On the Non-Existence of the Atomic Secret
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

My contention in what is to follow is that in a very important sense we have no atomic secret whatsoever. It is not ours to hide or to share. More than ever it is ours to seek. So far it remains quite undiscovered.

Like good philosophers we must pay attention to the terms used in our assertions. We must point out where we meet the requirements of usage and where we decide to use terms in a definite way, although usage is vague. Thus, the term “atomic” is a misnomer, but it is a misnomer here to stay. It means “nuclear.” Like all good people we must continue saying “atomic” in this connection when we mean “nuclear,” but we must not forget this fact and substitute what we know about the atom for what we do not know about the nucleus. We must also realize that the term “secret” has at least a double use: one, which means that the knowledge is possessed by an exclusive few; another, which means that the knowledge is possessed by no one, as in the expression “a secret of Nature.”
Logicians’ Underlying Postulations
Authors: Bentley Arthur F.
Published: November 2002

Among the subject matters which logicians like at times to investigate are the forms of postulation that other branches of inquiry employ. Rarely, however, do they examine the postulates under which they themselves proceed. It long contented them to offer something they called a “definition” for logic, and let it go at that. They might announce that logic dealt with the “laws of thought,” or with “judgment,” or that it was “the general science of order“; More recently they are apt to connect it in one or another obscure way with linguistic ordering.
On the Meaningfulness of Questions
Authors: Cowan T. A. , Churchman C. W.
Published: November 2002

The history of Western culture exhibits a profound cleavage of opinion on the nature of what its members take to be reality. On the one hand, there are those for whom certain aspects, at least, of the “real” exist in the human mind only. Others assign as the sole basis of reality the world of non-mental objects. This difference of temperament is so pervasive that it forms a perennial theme, not only for philosophers, but also for scientists, poets, and other students of the vast panorama of the world and its people.
The Logic of Value Imperatives
Authors: Storer Thomas
Published: November 2002

This paper represents an attempt to indicate the idea of a logic slightly more general than sentential calculus, which is applicable to many philosophical issues. In particular, I shall use this generalized calculus to discuss a variation of the logic of imperatives. In part I, certain general considerations about indicative calculi provide the basis, as well as indicate the need, for the more formal construction of part II. Part III illustrates the analytical power of the tool constructed, and tries to show its relevance for philosophy.
Mind and Nature
Authors: Winn Ralph B.
Published: November 2002

Extensive and profound as philosophic speculation on the nature of knowledge may have been during the last twenty-five centuries, it must be conceded that it has, on the whole, failed in its undertaking. In fact, we do not seem to be much closer to the solution of the epistemological problem than were Kant and Hegel or, for that matter, Plato and Aristotle. Obviously enough, the problem should now be approached in some new way, perhaps one growing out of recent scientific findings.
In Quest of an Heuristic Approach to the Study of Mankind
Authors: Thompson Laura
Published: November 2002

The epoch-making revolution that has been taking place in mathematics and physics during the past hundred years is gradually changing our whole conception of reality and of the function of science in regard to it. We have discovered that the “common sense” view of the world which has become ingrained in the feeling-thought habits of Western man, especially since the seventeenth century, contains elements of serious limitation and even an illusion both from the standpoint of immediately intuited experience and from that of demonstrated scientific fact. Moreover, by a long drawn out tortuous process, lasting over many centuries and involving the constant creation and correction of an enormously complicated scientific structure, we have finally arrived at an understanding of what may be the root of our difficulty. It seems that certain peculiarities of the over-all grammatical structure of those languages that have conditioned the feeling-thought world of the West have tended to lead us astray. Their correction, however, has so far been possible only through the invention of new esoteric languages, such as the symbolism of mathematics and the new logic. By means of these “languages of science” modern mathematicians and physicists have at last succeeded in freeing themselves from the shackles of their everyday speech and “common sense” concepts, at least so far as their scientific work is concerned.
Mechanism, Vitalism, Naturalism
Authors: Singer Edgar A.
Published: November 2002

The literature of our day shows experimental scientists to be divided between two schools of thought, now generally called Mechanist and Vitalist. The literature of any day these last 2000 years would tell the same tale, but for occasional changes of name. Where an issue dividing scientists is seen to be an experimental issue, it presents no challenge to the philosopher. His interest is limited to the question, How shall we find out? and where all are agreed as to the way of settling a difference of opinion, he can wait with patience to learn the result. But the very history of this world-old and world-wide conflict between schools of experimental science shows that it never has been, is not now, could never become one whose issue turned on the outcome of this or that experiment; nor in all the 2000 years the conflict has lasted, has science been able to come upon any other type of evidence by which the issue might be settled. As one of a class of similar issues, ancient, pervasive, persistent, the manner of whose decision lies still beyond the grasp of experimental science, this Mechanist-Vitalist controversy gives the philosopher much to think about.
A Behaviorist Analysis of Emotions
Authors: McGill V. J. , Welch Livingston
Published: November 2002

Since James defined emotion as consciousness of bodily reactions and Cannon and others detailed the nature of these reactions, there has been an increasing tendency among behaviorists to equate emotions with visceral reactions (1) and to neglect some of the genetic and adaptive aspects of emotion which had been discussed by Darwin (3).
Salvaging Physiological Psychology
Authors: Rusk George Yeisley
Published: November 2002

Bruno Petermann in his The Gestalt Theory and the Problem of Configuration (tr. Meyer Fortes, Harcourt, Brace: New York, 1932, Pp. 344) and S. H. MacColl in her A Comparative Study of the Systems of Lewin and Koffka with special reference to Memory Phenomena (Duke University Press: Durham, 1939, Pp. 160) have shown that the gestalt concept is fundamentally valid but that as a tool of psychological explanation it has been developed with unrecognized inconsistencies and without a successful correlation with physiological facts. And John J. Ryan in his “Volition” (Readings in Psychology, ed. Skinner, C. E., Farrar: New York, 1935, Pp. 853, p. 646) has shown that psychology must provide a place for ethical responsibility. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the gestalt concept when conceived in accord with the fundamentals of experimental psychology and of theoretical mathematics and physics: (1) avoids unrecognized inconsistencies; (2) opens the gates to an increasingly refined mensurational correlation between physiological facts and psychological experience; and (3) provides a place within a comprehensive psychology for freedom and purpose, integrated with conditioning, which result in understanding and cooperation in the achievement of ideal purposes.
Towards an Interpretation of Contemporary Philosophy
Authors: Ackoff Russell L.
Published: November 2002

There is no period in the history of philosophy so difficult to understand as that period beginning upon Kant's death and extending up into the present. Attributing this difficulty to the proximity and contingence of the period to our own is not a satisfactory excuse, though we would be willing to admit we lack some of the clarity that “time passed” gives. If we give up the challenge of making a meaningful interpretation of this history because we lack perspective, we are surrendering a period whose lessons might prove immeasurably valuable to us. What is more important than such negative motivation for making a meaningful study of the philosophy of the last 100 years is the positive demand that we begin to develop techniques for understanding the present and immediate past, in order that we can more effectively face and contribute to the present and future.