bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
On Wisdom
Authors: Godlovitch S.
Published: June 2016

When I first began to study philosophy I was introduced to the discipline in that magically traditional way by being assured that what lay before me was the love of wisdom. Why this had any adolescent appeal still puzzles me, but, like many others, I joined in as spectator to and occasionally as a removed participant in all the rough and tumble of a Socratic sparring match in the Athenian marketplace. There was some talk of wisdom, to be sure, which seemed to link it with a humble admission of ignorance or a pitch against yielding to temptation, but neither was ever deeply revealing. I waited for more. My next encounter a few years later turned up little more than the surname of an English disciple of Wittgenstein. Somehow the trail had gone to brush, despite the apparent health and energy of philosophy.
Demarcating Actions and their Effects
Authors: Thalberg Irving
Published: June 2016

C.A. Macdonald's incisive note, ‘On the Unifier-Multiplier Controversy', gave me fresh thoughts regarding the method of actindividuation which he defends against Jonathan Bennett's and my own misgivings. I believe a second look at the Reductive Unifying account, in light of Macdonald's apology for it, will help us size up the issues, notably those involving causation and time.

I shall follow previous debaters and dwell upon examples of mayhem, where one individual kills another by carrying out a more rudimentary action. Here is Donald Davidson's case. A queen murders her royal husband by emptying a vial of poison into his ear as he sleeps. To be exact: she rotates her wrist, and the lethal drug cascades toward his ear.
Can Inconsistency be Reasonable?
Authors: Campbell Richmond
Published: June 2016

We cannot know something unless it is true. The things that we know, therefore, must be logically consistent. Moreover, we cannot know something unless we are justified in believing it. But it does not obviously follow that the things that we are justified in believing must be consistent with each other. For we can be justified in believing something that turns out to be false. Knowledge entails truth and hence consistency. Rationally justified belief does not entail truth and it may not entail consistency.

Knowledge, however, requires especially good justification. We can have reason to believe something that happens to be true, even good reason (say, strong circumstantial evidence linking a suspect to a crime), without our belief being so well-grounded that we know it to be true.
Human Habits
Authors: Brett Nathan
Published: June 2016

In this discussion I shall argue that some fairly widely held views about human habits are mistaken. These misconceptions are important because of the pervasiveness of the habitual in human behavior and because it is the concept of habit that has served as the prototype of various conceptions of conditioned response which are used in psychological explanation. One major task of this analysis is to show that accounts in which actions are explained by reference to rules are not incompatible with accounts in which the same behavior is seen as the product of habit.
Truth and Universal Assent
Authors: Kirwan C.A.
Published: June 2016

One of the theses defended by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics books VII and X is that pleasure is good (VII. 13, 1153b4) or is one of the good things (X. 2, 1172b26): and Aristotle thinks that it follows from this that the best thing is a pleasure, or is pleasure in a certain way (VII. 13, 1153b26). Among his arguments for the latter we find the following:

The fact that all things, both brutes and men, pursue pleasure is an indication that the best thing is in a certain way that (VII. 13, 1153b25-6).
Reference to Abstract Entities
Authors: Oldfield Edward
Published: June 2016

Platonism, considered as a philosophy of mathematics, can be formulated in two interestingly different ways. Strong platonism holds that numerals, for example, refer to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. Weak platonism holds only that numerals uniquely apply to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. (Of course, there may even be weaker views that deserve to be called ‘platonistic.’

The distinction between referring to an object and uniquely applying to an object may be illustrated as follows. If there is a tallest person and I say, ‘the tallest person is over seven feet tall,’ without knowing who that person is, then my use of ‘the tallest person’ uniquely applies to someone, but it does not refer to anyone. The distinction is at least as old as Russell, for we might put his views in our terms by saying that for Russell only logically proper names refer to things, while ordinary proper names and definite descriptions at best uniquely apply to things.
Liberty, Equality, and Capitalism
Authors: Exdell John
Published: June 2016

According to conventional wisdom, the causes of economic inequality under capitalism are different in kind from those operating in a socialist system. In socialist societies today the distribution of wealth and income is determined by political authority, whereas in capitalism it is thought to arise mainly from the choices of individuals freely transferring goods and services in the competitive market. Robert Nozick's account of the workings of a ‘free society’ expresses this view clearly:

There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchange and actions of persons … The total result is the product of many individual decisions which the different individuals involved are entitled to make.
Utilitarian Generalization, Competing Descriptions, and the Behavior of Others
Authors: Gruzalski Bart
Published: June 2016

According to Utilitarian Generalization (hereafter ‘UG’) an act is right or wrong depending on what would happen if everyone were to do acts of that kind. One chief difficulty in applying UG is to determine which acts share the same relevant properties and are therefore acts of the same kind. In focusing on this problem I first examine the criteria of relevance proposed by Jonathan Harrison and by David Lyons. I show that each of their proposals is inadequate because each allows us to designate as relevant some properties we noncontroversially take to be irrelevant. I next propose a criterion which not only allows us to designate as irrelevant every property that we noncontroversially take to be irrelevant, but which also expresses the underlying causal and generalization features of UG. Since the acid test of any such proposal will be its response to the highly controversial issue of whether the behavior of others is relevant for applications of UG, I turn to this important issue.
Spinoza: A Response to De Vries
Authors: Trompetter Linda
Published: June 2016

The most devastating objection against Spinoza's thesis that there is only one substance in the universe is that raised by his contemporary Simon De Vries: If substance has an infinite number of distinct essences and substance is identical to its essence, how can there be only one substance?

The majority of Spinoza scholars have considered De Vries’ objection an insoluble problem. Joachim, for example, has stated:

We must therefore admit that there is a serious defect in Spinoza's general theory of the nature of Reality. The unity of Substance which seemed so absolute — the unity which was more than the unity of a system — resolves itself into a mere ‘togetherness’ of an infinite multiplicity. The Reality falls apart into a substratum without character …
Method, Social Science, and Social Hope1
Authors: Rorty Richard
Published: June 2016

Galileo and his fellowers discovered, and subsequent centuries have amply confirmed, that you get much better predictions by thinking of things as masses of particles blindly bumping each other than by thinking of them as Aristotle thought of them — animistically, teleologically, anthromorphically. They also discovered that you get a better handle on the universe by thinking of it as infinite and cold and comfortless than by thinking of it as finite, homey, planned, and relevant to human concerns. Finally, they discovered that if you view planets or missiles or corpuscles as point-masses, you can get nice simple predictive laws by looking for nice simple mathematical ratios. These discoveres are the basis of modern technological civilization. We can hardly be too grateful for them. But they do not,paceDescartes and Kant, point any epistemological moral.
Discretion and Dispositive Concepts
Authors: Levenbook Barbara Baum
Published: June 2016

In this paper, I will argue against a way of approaching the issue of Judicial discretion that finds its clearest exposition and highest development in recent works by Ronald Dworkin. I will argue that this approach is too narrow, and that it ignores a kind of Judicial discretion whose existence has been maintained by Jurists with discretionist sympathies, and which is philosophically significant. The kind of discretion it ignores raises the issue of the Justification of adjudication as clearly as does the kind of discretion that it recognizes. Moreover, discussion of the kind of discretion ignored is in some respects the natural starting place for a discussion of Judicial discretion in general.
Beyond Russell and Meinong
Authors: Bourgeois V. Warren
Published: June 2016

In 1972 Gilbert Ryle published a eulogy to Meinong's theory of objects:

Let us frankly concede that Geganstandstheorie itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected. Nobody is going to argue again that, for example, “there are objects concerning which it is the case that there are no such objects.”

Since that time, the firm of Routley, Routley, Chisholm and Parsons has vigoruously defended Meinong's theory. Are they advocates for a dead client?
Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibility
Authors: Graham George
Published: June 2016

The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.

My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and to the exoneration of God for the production of evil. In particular, I shall try to show, first, that the American Medical Association's recent attempt to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia is seriously defective. Second, I shall try to show that a popular version of the so-called Free Will Defense of God for Evil is also seriously defective.
‘Can,’ Compatibilism, and Possible Worlds
Authors: Zimmerman Michael J.
Published: June 2016

Most compatibilists have sought to defend their view by means of an analysis of the concept of ‘can’ in terms of subjunctive conditionals. Keith Lehrer opposes this analysis; he nevertheless embraces compatibilism. In a recent paper he has proposed a novel analysis of the concept of ‘can’ within the framework of possible-world semantics. The paper has provoked considerable discussion. In it Lehrer claims that he demonstrates the truth of compatibilism (p. 241). Others have claimed that this is not so, but at least one commentator has asserted that Lehrer's analysis strongly supports compatibilism. In this section I shall give a brief exposition of relevant portions of Lehrer's account of ‘can’ and then in the next section I shall seek to show that it fails to render compatibilism any more plausible than incompatibilism. Indeed, I shall seek to show that, if one of Lehrer's primitive concepts (the concept of an ‘advantage’) is understood as it seems it should be understood, then there would seem to be good reason to believe that his analysis supports not compatibilism but incompatibilism.
L'antimodèle platonicien de la nouvelle rhétorique
Authors: Bouchard Guy
Published: June 2016

Selon Charles Perelman, la logique, étude des moyens de preuve, a été, dans le prolongement du rationalisme cartésien, progressivement réduite à la logique formelle, étude des techniques démonstratives des mathématiciens. Corrélativement, le champ du rationnel a été considérablement rétréci, et les moyens de preuve utilisés dans les sciences humaines ont été mis au rencart. La raison est devenue incompétente dans tousles domaines qui échappent au calcul, les abandonnant aux forces irrationnelles, aux instincts, à la suggestion, à la violence. Refusant cette dichotomie entre la raison calculatrice et l'irrationnel, Perelman, à la recherche d'une voie intermédiaire, découvrit non pas ce qu'il escomptait, c'est à dire une logique des Jugements de valeur, mais la rhétorique. Celle-ci de nos Jours, est tombée en désuétude. Si l'on veut la rani mer, c'est des Anciens qu'il faut s'inspirer: d'Aristote surtout, mais aussi de Platon. C'est à ce dernier que nous voulons consacrer les pages qui suivent.
Events and the Essentiality of Time
Authors: Lombard Lawrence Brian
Published: June 2016

It is obvious that identical events must occur at the same time. This follows simply from the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals and from the fact that events have temporal features among which are those which attribute to events times of occurrence. Thus,

(1) (x) (y) (x is an event & y is an event ﬤ (x=y ﬤ (t) (x occurs at t ≡ y occurs at t))).

But from the fact that (1) is true, and is, indeed, true necessarily, it does not follow that events necessarily occur at the times at which they in fact occur. This latter claim about events is expressed as follows:

(2) (x) (t) (x is an event & t is a time & x occurs at t ﬤ ◻ (y) (y=x ﬤ y occurs at t)),
Hare, Universalizability, and The Problem of Relevant Descriptions
Authors: Milkman Kenneth Alan
Published: June 2016

Many significant moral theories, ones to which a large number of philosophers pledge themselves, employ in a fundamental way the criterion of universalizability. This is true not only of Kant and his more illustrious successors, but also utilitarians of many sorts. But concomitant with adherence to universalizability as a moral criterion is adherence to the belief that certain features (properties) of putatively moral (right) acts and immoral (wrong) acts are relevant and others irrelevant to the determination to the rightness or wrongness of those acts. Despite the fact that this belief is problematic, few moral philosophers have openly struggled with the problem of relevant descriptions (or ‘relevance’ for short). It is as if investigation of this problem would invite unsettlable doubts about universalizability itself.
The Petitio: Aristotle's Five Ways
Authors: Woods John , Walton Douglas
Published: June 2016

If one looks to the current textbook lore for reliable taxonomic and analytical information about the petitio principii, one is met with conceptual disarray and much too much nonsense. The present writers have recently attempted to furnish the beginnings of a theoretical reconstruction of this fallacy which is at once faithful to its formidable complexity yet useful as guide for its detection and avoidance. The fact is that the petitio has had a lengthy and interesting history, and in this paper we shall want to explore certain features of its development, such as it may have been. The principal origins of the concept of circular argument are to be found in Aristotle. The Aristotelian doctrine recurs with variations in the sophismata literature of the middle ages and in logic texts and manuals right up to the present day.
Good and Bad
Authors: Simpson Robert W.
Published: June 2016

What are the philosophically significant grammatical constructions in which the term ‘good’ is used? It is not possible, I think, to base the philosophical analysis of a concept such as goodness on linguistic considerations alone; but an adequate analysis must be able to give an account of the principal uses of the term, and noting usage can be very helpful in providing a starting-point for philosophy. There are three constructions in which ‘good’ is typically used: (1) ‘Good for X,’ (2) ‘A good X,’ and (3) ‘Good at Фing’ or ‘To Ф well.’ In (1) and (2) X is the name of a substance; in the case of (1) either of an individual or of a kind (for example, ‘good for John,’ ‘good for men’), and in the case of (2) of a kind ('a good man’). In (3) Ф is the name of an activity ('good at hunting,’ ‘to teach well’).
Axiological Foundationalism
Authors: Audi Robert
Published: June 2016

Epistemological foundationalism has typically been thought to hold that in order to account for human knowledge we must countenance the direct Justification of some specific kind of beliefs, such as one's beliefs to the effect that one is having a certain sensation. How else, it may be thought, can one analyse Justification without confronting an infinite regress or a vicious circle? I believe that this conception of foundationalism has been so influential that most foundationalists and nearly all their critics have failed to appreciate that foundationalism may be plausibly construed as a thesis mainly about the structure of a body of Justified beliefs. Central to the thesis, so interpreted, is that one's Justified beliefs divide into foundations and superstructure; but no particular content on the part of either set of beliefs need be required. This latitude regarding content is altogether appropriate; for if we use, as a guide to understanding foundationalism, the famous regress argument, from which the thesis derives much of its plausibility, then the only foundations required by the thesis are beliefs whose Justification does not depend on that of other beliefs. Precisely what beliefs these are is a controversial matter on which foundationalists may differ.
Scheffler on Morality and Ideals of the Person
Authors: Darwall Stephen L.
Published: June 2016

Scheffler's paper divides into two parts. In the first, he argues that Parfit's argument from the complex view of personal identity neither can, nor is intended to, establish any moral theory; in particular, it cannot establish utilitarianism. Rather, Parfit's aim must have been simply to weaken our attachment to non-utilitarian theories. In discovering that the only philosophically respectable view of personal identity holds it to consist simply in bodily or psychological continuities and connections, we come to see that the distinctness of persons is a less deep fact than we naively supposed that it was. And this weakens the attraction of moral theories which take the distinctness of persons as fundamental and reject utilitarianism on that account. Scheffler points out that Parfit's argument cannot establish, nor can it be extended to establish, anything stronger than this. For the complex view can only rule out nonutilitarian theories if it simply denies that in any sense persons exist over time. But this view rules out not only non-utilitarian moral theories, but every moral theory.
Optimific, Right, But Not Obligatory
Authors: Attfield R.
Published: June 2016

Utilitarianism has recently been criticised on two counts in a recent number of Ratio. According to Terrance C. McConnell, it represents many of the acts which are ordinarily regarded as supererogatory as obligatory, and some (perhaps all) of the others as actually wrong. In support of the latter criticism, he gives two kinds of examples: cases of self-sacrifice, and cases of trivial favours. Acts of self-sacrifice performed for the sake of others’ good, but which result in a greater balance of harm over benefits than alternative acts would produce, would, he claims, normally be regarded as heroic, but are forbidden as wrong by the utilitarian: and of two alternative trivial favours, either of which would ordinarily count as supererogatory (i.e. desirable but not obligatory) the utilitarian must treat the more beneficial as an obligation, and the less beneficial alternative as unallowable. These departures from ordinary responses are considered grounds for seriously doubting the adequacy of utilitarianism.
Set—Theoretical Representations of Ordered Pairs and Their Adequacy for the Logic of Relations
Authors: Dipert Randall R.
Published: June 2016

One of the most significant discoveries of early twentieth century mathematical logic was a workable definition of ‘ordered pair’ totally within set theory. Norbert Wiener, and independently Casimir Kuratowski, are usually credited with this discovery. A definition of ‘ordered pair’ held the key to the precise formulation of the notions of ‘relation’ and ‘function’ — both of which are probably indispensable for an understanding of the foundations of mathematics. The set-theoretic definition of ‘ordered pair’ thus turned out to be a key victory for logicism, providing one admits set theory is logic. The definition also was instrumental in achieving the appearance of ontological economy — since it seemed only sets were needed — although this feature was emphasized only later.
How do we Learn from Argument? Toward an Account of The Logic of Problems
Authors: Goode Terry M. , Wettersten John R.
Published: June 2016

From the pre-Socratics to the present, one primary aim of philosophy has been to learn from arguments. Philosophers have debated whether we could indeed do this, but they have by and large agreed on how we would use arguments if learning from argument was at all possible. They have agreed that we could learn from arguments either by starting with true premises and validly deducing further statements which must also be true and therefore constitute new knowledge, or that we could start from putative premises and validly deduce false consequences thereby showing that our premises were false. Our aim in this paper is to suggest a third alternative: we can learn from plausible arguments (invalid arguments which meet some other unspecified desiderata of approximation to valid arguments) through criticism of such arguments which enable us to discover new problems.
Frege, Perry, and Demonstratives
Authors: Yourgrau Palle
Published: June 2016

'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thinghonourwhen they dehistoricize it,sub specie aeternitatis— when they make a mummy of it.'

Nietzsche,Twilight of the Idols
Mechanics on Duty: The Limitations of a Technical Definition of Moral Expertise for Work in Applied Ethics
Authors: Caplan Arthur L.
Published: June 2016

A former Prime Minister of Israel is alleged to have said that her country would never ascend to the status of authentic statehood until it possessed certain well-known social attributes — organized crime, prostitution, and corruption. These features, while obviously undesirable, were she felt, reliable indices of societal maturation. This anecdote is suggestive in understanding current events pertaining to the field of applied ethics.

Philosophers have produced a massive body of opinion and argument on a diverse range of subjects under the rubric of applied (or practical) ethics. Moreover, they have assumed positions on various panels, commissions, governmental bodies and committees in the hope of making an informed contribution to the formulation of institutional and public policy. These accomplishments have begun to elicit the kinds of attributes commonly associated with philosophical maturation — exposées, debunkings, refutations, and ideologically informed critiques.
The Ethics of Consent
Authors: Kleinig John
Published: June 2016

We would not be far wide of the mark if we suggested that the prevailing social ideology is structured round the presumption that interpersonal and political relationships ought to be, and for the most part are, based on the mutual consent of the parties involved. Liberal democratic theory has secured for consent a crucial role in the justification of political obligation and authority. In law, the maximvolenti non fit injuria,to the one who consents no wrong is done, constitutes a defence in cases where one person invades the interests of another. In the bioethical field, there is a preoccupation with the formulation of a standard of ‘informed consent’ in patient-doctor and subject-researcher relationships. And in the broader domain of ethical theory there is an influential view that consensual acts do not differ in moral quality from selfregarding behaviour.
Rape and Mens Rea
Authors: Thornton M.T.
Published: June 2016

‘Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.’ But when is a mens rea? In the last twenty years discussions of this question have been stimulated by controversial decisions in the English House of Lords in the cases of Smith, Morgan and Majewski.

The case of Smith decided that a man might be guilty of murder if a reasonable person, knowing the circumstances, would have foreseen that death would result even if the agent himself did not so foresee. This appeal to the ‘reasonable person’ imports what is known as the ‘objective test’ as opposed to the ‘subjective test’ of the agent's actual foresight or knowledge. The case of Morgan inclined per contra to the subjective test.
Moral Contracts and the Morality of Abortion
Authors: Nuyen A.T.
Published: June 2016

The question concerning the morality of abortion has been debated thoroughly over the past fifteen years, so thoroughly that it is difficult to add anything new to the debate. However, as the number of arguments has become numerous, it is still possible to formulate a new moral stance based on a new combination of old arguments. In what follows I shall develop and defend a moral stance based on the concept of moral contract and the concept of intentional pregnancy. Though these concepts are not new, the way they will be interpreted and combined here is unique.

The analysis that I shall provide presupposes that the traditional arguments either for or against abortion are problematical. (In what follows, ‘for’ and ‘against’ are used in the moral sense only.) The first part of this paper is devoted to surveying briefly the principal arguments and to showing why they are problematical. In the second part I shall discuss a couple of arguments which I regard as of the right sort, although they too seem unsatisfactory. Finally, I shall attempt to indicate in my own way whether and when abortion is morally permissible.
Does Ronald Dworkin Take Rights Seriously?
Authors: Shapiro Danny
Published: June 2016

One of the aims of Ronald Dworkin's recent book, Taking Rights Seriously, is to provide a theory of natural rights. His theory is novel and interesting in two respects. First, Dworkin argues that the commonly held belief that liberty and equality are fundamentally opposed to one another is false. Rights to various liberties are themselves derived from a form of a right to equality — what Dworkin calls the right to equal concern and respect. Second, Dworkin thinks that the notion of a general right to liberty, which can be opposed to egalitarian claims, is incoherent.
Analyticity by Way of Presumption
Authors: Ullmann-Margalit Edna , Margalit Avishai
Published: June 2016

Given a descriptive word, what is the nature of the relation between it and the features of the object(s) to which it is supposed to apply? What is it that entitles one to assert ‘this is a horse’?

A traditional answer has been in terms of ‘Merkmal’: a (minimal) collection of features, or properties, severally necessary and Jointly sufficient for the application of the word in question. This relation - call it the Merkmal relation - between word and features is common to a variety of theories of meaning that may otherwise be in disagreement about the status of the features themselves in their relation to the object: whether they be actual or believed, perceptual or ‘essential,’ phenomenal or ‘real,’ etc.
Seeing Art
Authors: Allen Barry G.
Published: June 2016

Seeing art is not as easy as it looks, because there is more to seeing art than meets the eye. This essay examines some of the presuppositions involved in seeing somethingasart. In opposition to the view of A.C. Danto that to see something as art is merely toidentifyit as art, I shall suggest that to see something as art is toappreciateit in a specifiable way. In addition, I shall argue that considerations sometimes deemed adventitious are in fact inescapably involved in the appreciation of all works of art, and in particular, that it is impossible to entirely eliminate intentional and genetic considerations from our critical Judgments.
Moral Reasons, Moral Action, and Rationality
Authors: Cohen Stephen
Published: June 2016

I want to examine a relationship between rationality and moral behavior (morally right behavior). To do this, I shall first set out some basic intuitions. Then, within that framework I shall raise a problem about the relationship between rationality and moral behavior; in particular, I shall suggest that present in these basic intuitions is an inconsistency which can be remedied only by a radical alteration of one intuition.

It is rational to perform a morally right action. The sense of this claim is fairly clear, but the claim itself needs further articulation. For example, it is rational to conclude that the sum of 37 and 22 is 59, but the conclusion has not been reached rationally if the way in which one hit on 59 as the answer was to pluck a pea - luckily enough, number 59 - from the bingo basket. In speaking about a belief or an action being rational, reference must be made to an agent, to reasons, and to the agent's reasons.
Tooley's Theory of Laws of Nature
Authors: Hetherington Stephen C.
Published: June 2016

This paper contains a discussion of a theory of laws of nature formulated recently by Michael Tooley. He sees the truth-makers for laws of nature as consisting of particular sorts of contingent relations between universals. He is not alone in this idea; it has also been advanced by Fred Dretske and D.M. Armstrong. However, its most thorough and detailed presentation is by Tooley. Being a challenging and stimulating idea, it merits investigation.
Skepticism Disarmed
Authors: Carrier L.S.
Published: June 2016

If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger conclusion of ‘universal ignorance,’ the thesis that nobody ever knows anything to be the case. I view Unger's thesis and the arguments that led him to it as a challenge to be overcome, not by an appeal to dogmatism - which Unger sees as the only alternative to skepticism - but by recourse to hard-biting arguments of the sort in which Unger himself puts his faith. In what follows I shall attempt to restate Unger's three main skeptical arguments with a view to showing that their bite is not nearly so hard as he imagines.
Scheid on Punishment
Authors: Snook I.A.
Published: June 2016

In the English-speaking world conceptual analysis was seen for some years as the principal method of philosophizing and at times was even taken as equivalent to philosophy itself. In recent years it has come under attack as socially conservative and intellectually barren. It is my view that in many ways conceptual analysis was beneficial to philosophy: in its concern for clarity and precision it reminded us of much which philosophers must never forget. I would hope, however, that we are now in a position to see it more as a tool of philosophy than as a substitute for it.
De Re Belief Ascriptions and Action Explanations
Authors: Stiffler Eric
Published: June 2016

The well known fact that beliefs may be ascribed either de dicto or de re raises a problem about the role of belief ascriptions in the explanation of action because it suggests that both kinds of ascriptions may help explain why an agent acted. Some explanations may require only de dicto belief ascriptions, others only de re ascriptions, while still others require ascriptions of both types. As a first step toward sorting out these alternatives I want to consider whether de re ascriptions which impute to the agent beliefs about himself or about some other person ever help to explain actions. I shall discuss this question from the perspective of two radically different theories of de re belief, assuming throughout that de dicto belief ascriptions are explanatory.
Hayek, Justice and the Market
Authors: Cragg A.W.
Published: June 2016

It is Alistair Macleod's view that what he calls Justice Judgments are at root Judgments abput states of affair and only derivatively about actions. His interest in Fredrick Hayek's book, The Mirage of Social Justice, derives at least in part from the fact that assessing the Justice of actions is logically prior to assessing the Justice of situations or states of affairs. Thus evaluating Hayek's views offers a way in which Macleod can test his own position.

In responding to Professor Macleod's interesting and provocative paper, I shall begin by criticising his own position with respect to the relation of Judgments about situations to Judgments about actions. I shall argue that contrary to what Macleod asserts Judgments about the Justice of actions and Judgments about the Justice of situations are inextricably intertwined. Second, I shall argue that Macleod's criticism of the view that Judgments about the Justice of actions are more basic than Judgments about the Justice of situations is a sound one. However, Hayek's attack on social Justice is not rooted in this position.
Plato's Timaeus: Mass Terms, Sortal Terms, and Identity through Time in the Phenomenal World
Authors: Zembaty Jane S.
Published: June 2016

Several recent papers dealing with Plato's position on the imperfection of the phenomenal world draw heavily on the differences between two kinds of predicates in order to show the following: (1) In the middle dialogues, Plato posits Forms only (or primarily) as referents of what the writers call incomplete predicates (e.g., relational or attributive ones). He does not posit Forms as referents for complete predicates (e.g., sortal or mass predicates). (2) When interpreters ignore the differences between these kinds of predicates, they ascribe too radical a view regarding the imperfection of the phenomenal world to the middle dialogues. (3) The ontology of these dialogues includes sensible particulars which retain their identity over time even though they are continually changing in some respect or other.
Platos Parmenides Theory of Relations*
Authors: McPherran Mark L.
Published: June 2016

Hector-Neri Castaneda has argued that in the Phaedo we can find a logically viable Platonic theory of relations. I am in agreement with this view. Furthermore, I find there to be a clarification of Plato's theory in the ‘worst difficulty’ argument of the Parmenides (133a-135a).
Where do lmplicatures come from?
Authors: Bertolet Rod
Published: June 2016

There is trouble at the foundations of Grice's theory of conversational implicature, or so I shall argue. Grice's commentators seem to agree, and some of Grice's own remarks suggest, that every case of implicature is one in which ‘the speaker gets across more than he says…. ’ The problem is that there are cases in which nothing is said - in which case it is not clear that there is any vehicle by which the implicature might be carried, and consequently not clear that Grice's theory can account for the implicature which does appear to be carried.
A Legacy of Ethical Atomism
Authors: Benson P.J.
Published: June 2016

I want to deal in this essay with the group of philosophers that G.E.M. Anscombe includes under the term ‘modern moral philosophy’ in her essay by that name. The stars of this group are Hobbes, Hume, Adam Smith, Mill, Sidgwick, Moore. I mean to include as well generally the last hundred years of emotivists, utilitarians, and those theorists who have emphasized universalizability in its various versions. For reasons which I hope will soon become clear, I will refer to this broad group as the ‘atomistic tradition.’ I will be assuming, though not often saying, that the most forthright and thorough spokesman of the tradition is David Hume who, in his purely skeptical moments, was so atomistic and extensionalist that he even denied personal identity over time. Anything less than that is not purely atomistic.
Réalisme et théorie Russellienne des descriptions
Authors: Lepage François
Published: June 2016

La théorie des descriptions de Bertrand Russell est sans aucun doute l'une des thèses philosophiques qui, au vingtième siècle, ont donné lieu au plus grand nombre de commentaires, de critiques, voire de querelles. Portée aux nues par certains-Ramsey l'a qualifiée de ‘paradigme de philosophie’-elle sera violemment contestée par d'autres, en particulier par Strawson qui s'avisera, quelque quarantecinq ans plus tard, qu'elle comporte des ‘erreurs fondamentales.’
On Identifying the Mental with the Physical
Authors: Smith Peter
Published: June 2016

Our states of belief and desire are no doubt supervenient on the overall pattern of our physical states. But can this minimal physicalist presumption be strengthened into a claim to the effect that our mental states are each identical with some specific corresponding physical state? A developed identity theory will need, in a sense to be made clear, a schema for specifying the physical state which is supposed to be identical with a given mental state. And there are problems in formulating such a schema. The special difficulties faced here by a type identity theory are well known, and will not be discussed further in this present paper. But equally, there are problems in constructing an identification schema for employment with a token identity theory.
What is Aristotle's Theory of Essence?
Authors: Lewis Frank A.
Published: June 2016

In this paper, I attempt to set out some of the main views about essence which Aristotle puts forward in Book Z of theMetaphysics.A central feature of Aristotle's account, as we shall see, is his distinction between primary and secondary cases of essence, and a similiar distinction in connection with the related notions of substance and definition. This division between primary and secondary cases means that Aristotle may well have two very different sorts of remark to make about essence, or definition, or substance, according to which of the two kinds of case he has in mind. There is no reason to suppose the same logical properties apply to both the primary and the secondary cases. And when we come to define the various notions, we shall see that if our definitions are right, the logical properties in the two kinds of case are in fact quite different.
Relevantism, Material Detachment, and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument
Authors: Routley R.
Published: June 2016

Relevantism, as a matter of definition, rejects classical logic as incorrect and adopts instead a relevant logic as encapsulating correct inference. It rejects classical logic on the grounds that the rule of Material Detachment, from A and not A or B to infer B, (that is, Disjunctive Syllogism considered as an inferential principle), sometimes leads from truth to falsity. Relevantism — although promoted by some relevant logicians (Routley and Routley), and an integral part of ultralogic (i.e. universal, all purpose, ultramodallogic; cf. [1], [8]) — has recently encountered heavy, but interesting, criticism from relevance logicians themselves (from Belnap, Dunn, and Meyer).
Lucas Against Mechanism II: A Rejoinder
Authors: Lucas J.R.
Published: June 2016

David Lewis criticizes an argument I put forward against mechansim on the grounds that I fail to distinguish between OL, Lucas's ordinary potential arithmetic output, and OML, Lucas's arithmetical output when accused of being some particular machine M; and correspondingly, between OM the ordinary potential arithmetic output of the machine M, and ONM, the arithmetic output of the machine M when accused of being a particular machine N. For any given machine, M, N, O, P, Q, R,... etc., I can in principle (my critics are often very charitable in speaking as though I could in practice, but let me revert to an ideal mind) calculate a Godel sentence for that machine - indeed infinitely many, depending on the Godel numbering scheme adopted. The Godel sentence of a particular machine can, I claim, be seen to be true, if that machine is adequate for Elementary Peano Arithmetic. Hence, if I were accused of being M, I can on that supposition see that the Godel sentence of M is true, since I am capable of Elementary Peano Arithmetic and the machine M is said to be an adequate characterization of me.
Formal Traces in Cartesian Functional Explanation
Authors: Rorty Amelie Oksenberg
Published: June 2016

In the Passion of the Soul Descartes sets out to explain the origins and structure of intentional voluntary action, to give an account of physical behavior and motion that (in some sense) has psychological and intellectual causes.

Actually of course this is not at all what he says. He announces an analysis of the passions of the soul. But why does he define his subject as he does? His correspondence had forced a concern with questions of virtue. How is he to introduce an account of virtue in his metaphysically, scientifically oriented philosophy of mind, a theory which must accommodate his normative epistemology on one hand and his mechanistic physiological psychology on the other? Other pressures forced closely related questions. Just what is the character of the ‘substantial’ union of mind and body? What is the psychological status of perception, and what are the relations among various types of perceptions? It is these questions that Descartes sets out to answer.
The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds
Authors: De Sousa Ronald
Published: June 2016

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most ‘natural’ in that sense is always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose.
Skepticism and the Cartesian Circle
Authors: Broughton Janet
Published: June 2016

Perhaps the most venerable objection to Descartes’ Meditations is the charge that Descartes argues in a circle when he tries to show that his clear and distinct perceptions are true. Arnauld and others raised this objection to Descartes himself, and Descartes’ reply to them, far from clearing the matter up, seems to be entirely unresponsive to their criticism. There has since grown an enormous literature about what is often called the Cartesian Circle, partly because in interpreting the work of someone as important as Descartes we feel obliged to try to read him so that he is not making a patent blunder, and partly because seeing whether a project like Descartes’ is doomed from the start is of intrinsic philosophical interest. But the size of this literature alone suggests how complex and difficult the interpretative and philosophical issues surrounding the Circle are.
On Praising the Appearance of Justice in Platos Republic
Authors: Mackenzie P.T.
Published: June 2016

In Book II of Plato'sRepublic,Glaucon, after putting on the mantle of Thrasymachus, concludes that in order for Socrates to show that justice is to be valued for its own sake, he must show that the just man who appears to be unjust is happier than the unjust man who appears to be just. In other words, according to Glaucon, Socrates must show that the just man who as a result of appearing to be unjust is thrown in prison, scoured and racked, has his eyes burned out and is finally impaled, presumably on a spear, is happier than the unjust man who through appearing to be just is rewarded with high office, wealth and is permitted to marry into the best of families. Adiemantus it will be noticed reaches a similar conclusion.
On Basic Knowledge and Justification
Authors: Johnsen Bredo C.
Published: June 2016

Robert F. Almeder believes he has discovered a ‘pressing problem': ‘stating the conditions under which we determine whether a person's basic belief is true without introducing an evidence condition for knowledge’. He believes further that this is ‘a problem needing resolution before any ultimately satisfying explication of basic knowledge can be offered’.

My aim is to show that Almeder has failed to discover any problem at all, but I begin by asking: how could the question how we determine the (mere) truth of another's basic belief (regardless of how we do so) have any bearing on the correct explication of the concept of basic knowledge?
Referring to Oneself
Authors: Taschek William W.
Published: June 2016

In her influential paper, ‘The First Person,’ Elizabeth Anscombe brings together a number of considerations which, she believes, lead to the startling conclusion that the first person pronoun is not a referring expression — that ‘I’ is never used to refer. This is startling, because if we consider even superficially the logical properties of first person statements, nothing could, prima facie, seem more obvious than that in any such statement, the first person pronoun functions logically as a singular referring expression. Moreover, Anscombe herself offers the following informal gloss on the truth conditions of first person assertions: ‘If X asserts something with ‘I’ as subject, his assertion will be true if and only if what he asserts is true of X.’
Form and Origin
Authors: Denkel Arda
Published: June 2016

Regarding the identity of artifacts in time, four positions may be discerned: first, the view reducing the continuing identity of an object to the continuing identity of its parts; second, the more generally accepted position that spatiotemporal continuity under a kind is necessary; third, the claim that while continuity is not a necessary condition, the sameness of parts and the sameness of form are sufficient together; and fourth, the suggestion that continuity of form is a sufficient and non-defeasible condition for reidentifying artifacts. Others such as Scaltsas believe that the different conditions claimed to be sufficient by the views mentioned are, in fact, only criteria of identity applicable in different circumstances, and that no sharply defined hierarchy can be said to hold between them.
The Connection Between Impressions and Ideas
Authors: McIntyre Jane L.
Published: June 2016

Hume contributed to the theory of ideas by distinguishing impressions from ideas. This refinement of Locke's theory is usually held to be a clarification of Locke's broad use of the term ‘idea,’ and yet the distinction has remained problematic. The bifurcation of the Lockean realm of ideas necessitated an explanation of the relations between the newly named entities. The most basic aspects of this relationship, as presented in the Treatise, are that impressions cause ideas and that ideas represent impressions. In this paper I will argue that Hume's theory cannot accommodate the claim that impressions cause ideas, and that this fundamental inability to trace the causal history of an idea is the source of several other problems in Hume's philosophy of mind.