bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Elections 1992 and the Thomas Appointment
Authors: Palley Marian Lief
Published: May 2006

It is tempting to look at the results of the 1992 election season and to observe women candidates' successes and say, yes, it was the “year of the woman.” It might also be inviting to attribute women's electoral gains to the attention that the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings received and the anger many women felt towards the all-white male Senate Judiciary Committee with its cavalier treatment of Anita Hill and its insensitivity to sexual harassment. Yet, women's electoral gains must be viewed within the wider lens focus of changing patterns of American politics.

The Thomas-Hill interaction was seen by some as a reflection of institutionalized gender inequality and insensitivity (Palley and Palley 1992). It underscored the need to press forward with the liberal cultural agenda, which incorporates feminist concerns with gender equity and electoral opportunity. Though the Thomas confirmation hearings made many people aware and angry, other conditions also helped to make 1992 an opportunity year for women and minorities. In particular, there was redistricting, a large number of retirements from Congress, and anti-incumbency feelings running high among American voters. Furthermore, though women were serving in political office, albeit in state and local positions and thus were in “the pipeline” and ready for the opportunity to contest state-wide and congressional positions, they were often seen as the ultimate outsiders. To be perceived as an outsider in an anti-incumbency era enhanced the candidacies of many women. Also, due to redistricting, many seats which women candidates contested were open seats for which their opponents lacked high degrees of political organization and the ability to “call in favors.”
An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum
Authors: Johnston Richard
Published: May 2006

In the constitutional referendum held on October 26, 1992, Canadian voters said “No” to a constitutional package, the “Charlottetown Accord,” contrived explicitly to win pan-regional support. Instead, it evoked pan-regional opposition.

The package Canadians rejected was formidably complex. It became so by a decade's accretion of elements, each calculated to appeal to, or to offset concessions to, groups excluded at an earlier stage—Quebec, the western provinces, and aboriginal peoples. Negotiators hoped that by 1992 they had finally found an equilibrium, a logroll sufficiently inclusive to survive referral to the people. Instead they seem to have gotten the logic of the logroll upside down: they may have overestimated both how much each group wanted what it got and how intensely some groups opposed key concessions to others.

Quebec. At the heart of the package were proposals contrived to induce the political class of Quebec to acquiesce in the political settlement embodied in the Constitution Act, 1982. Although the government and legislature of Quebec had rejected the 1982 settlement, no one contested that it applied to the province. But many agreed, on grounds of either justice or expediency, that the pill had to be made less bitter. The first attempt to bring Quebec on side was the Meech Lake Accord, struck in 1987 and buried in 1990. The failure of this attempt was the immediate background to the 1992 events.
The Feminization of Leadership in State Legislatures
Authors: Jewell Malcolm , Whicker Marcia Lynn
Published: May 2006

Throughout the past two decades, the number of women in elected politics has been increasing slowly, but incrementally. Women remain most underrepresented at the national level, with little prospects of parity in the near future (Whicker et al. 1993). By 1992, women held only 30 or 5.6% of the 535 seats in the 102nd Congress, 28 in the House and two in the Senate (CAWP 1992). Much media focus on increased activism and advances caused the 1992 elections to be labeled in the press as “The Year of the Woman.” Indeed, the number of female members of Congress did jump to 54 or 10.1%, not quite doubling (47 in the House and seven in the Senate) (Krauss 1992), but substantial percentage gains in the number of seats held by women obscured the fact that women remained underrepresented relative to their proportions in the population by over 40%.

At the state level, the number of women is larger, but still proportionately less than their share of approximately 50% of the population. In 1991, women were still only 18.3% of all state legislators, but nationwide, their numbers had increased from 344 in 1971 to 908 in 1981, to 1365 in 1991. The numbers of women in state legislatures, then, have been increasing incrementally, if slowly (Dodson and Carroll 1991). Incremental growth in women attaining state legislative office continued in the 1992 elections. For the 1993 session, the total number of women members was 1517 (20.4%), of which 338 were state senators (17%), and 1179 were state representatives (21.7%) (CAWP).
Measuring Electoral Change in Three-Party Systems: An Alternative to Swing
Authors: Dorling D. F. L. , Pattie C. J. , Johnston R. J.
Published: May 2006

In a recent paper in this journal, Butler and Van Peek (1990) advocated analyzing patterns of electoral change in the USA with the swing statistic—the average change in the share of the vote won by two parties contesting successive elections. The generality of their case was countered by Rose (1991), who showed that most liberal democracies do not have two-party systems; thus the swing statistic, which involves comparing the performance of two parties only, conceals more than it reveals of the pattern of electoral change in most situations. His preference was for the separate study of the “ups and downs” of each party.

In a riposte to Rose, Gibson (1992) argued for the superiority of swing over the single party measures. His case was built on a curious argument, however. On the basis of goodness-of-fit statistics, he showed that a combination of independent variables relating to the characteristics of constituencies in Greater London predicted variations in swing better than they predicted variations in the performance of individual parties. Such analyses in no way indicate the superiority of swing as a measure of electoral change, however; they merely demonstrate that swing is more closely correlated to some independent variables than is another measure of change. Gibson's argument is a case of a spurious correlation.
Japanese Democracy and Political Culture: A Comparative Perspective
Authors: Pempel T. J.
Published: May 2006

Japan is an excellent case for the comparative study of the connections between democracy and culture.

—It is a country with a well established system of constitutional democracy with roots in the nineteenth century. Politically, the country has been constitutionally and electorally democratic for the entire period since the end of World War II.

—Democracy in Japan also has strong social and cultural underpinnings. Despite a hierarchical Confucian tradition, the country is largely egalitarian in its educational, economic, and informational systems. The Japanese citizen enjoys a democratic day-to-day existence.

—Because Japan's democracy, like that of all countries, is far from perfect, it is a good case study for examining ideal conceptions of democracy in contrast to practical democratic realities.
The Policy Process and Social Policy in Japan
Authors: Anderson Stephen J.
Published: May 2006

Is Japan enigmatic because it is unique? Problems of social and economic policy in contemporary Japan challenge myths about uniqueness. By focusing on comparable problems, this essay notes the limits of world views about Japanese uniqueness and the exceptionalism of countries.

An aim is to unbundle areas that illustrate the policy process and reflect on models of policymaking. In the diversity within Japan, policy-making in specific areas reflects on the approaches of corporatism, pluralism, and state-centered theorists.

Across policy areas, instructors will discover problems of Japan's industrial society that are nonetheless comparable to elsewhere. Throughout East Asia, scholars note the distinct social, ideological, and historical contexts that challenge past social theory. A leading Asian country can offer rich additions to a course on comparative politics and public policy. In Japan, one also can emphasize familiar features of industrial society, economy, and polity that test various approaches and models of policymaking. Using areas of labor, welfare, agriculture, and education as examples, instructors may pursue these and additional topics found from the bibliographies and readings.
The Future of the Soviet Political System
Authors: Odom William E.
Published: May 2006

Beginning with the leadership succession after Brezhnev, first Andropov's spurt of new policy initiatives, then an interregnum of drift under Chernenko, and finally the emergence of the vigorous and relatively youthful leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the future of the Soviet political system has been thrust once again into wide public attention. It promises to remain there for some time, maybe several years, as the new General Secretary tries to push through major reforms and to engage the West to support him in his undertaking.

To keep our bearings in the flood of Gorbachev's novel rhetoric and its amplification through the Western media, it would be useful to put the issue into a context more historically grounded than the turmoil of current events and fashions. To do that, we need to ask at least two questions. First, what features of the Soviet historical legacy constrain and direct change in the USSR? Second, against this legacy, can we recognize the practical dilemmas any would-be reformer must face? In light of the answers, it is possible to reduce our surprise about the way the present reform efforts eventually turn out.

The Historical Legacy

It is commonplace to speak of continuities in Russian history, to observe that authoritarianism has deep roots in Russia and that much of the present Soviet system is a historical legacy. It is also commonplace to observe that autocratic systems in other parts of the world have evolved into liberal systems and that one should not rule out liberalization in the Soviet Union a priori simply because of its long tradition of authoritarianism.
Microcomputer Simulations and Simulation Writing Tools
Authors: Grafton Carl , Permaloff Anne
Published: May 2006

A simulation is a working model of a system. Simulations are useful when interaction with real systems is not possible (e.g., giving students a chance to be president) or when mathematical models cannot be solved but only approximated.

One of the many ways that simulations may be described or categorized is in terms of how they may be utilized (such as teaching or research). Another important distinction, completely independent of the first, is whether a simulation is interactive or noninteractive. An interactive simulation involves a set of transactions or turns between or among participants and a computer. The operation of a noninteractive simulation generally involves the setting of values for variables after which the simulation is begun and operates on its own with no user intervention. Simulations may also be distinguished by whether they are based on theory and include little data (e.g., prisoner's dilemma) or whether they are based primarily on empirical data supported more or less rigorously by a theory. They may also be characterized in terms of technical concerns such as whether they model continuous or discrete change.
Candidates, the Need to Know and the Press
Authors: Elving Ronald D.
Published: May 2006

In conversation with a German Daron in 1807, Thomas Jefferson remarked that, “when a man assumes a public trust, he should consider himself a public property.”

Recalling Jefferson as the intellectual father of American democracy, we may read this comment as an approving aphorism—a tenet of political philosophy. But Jefferson was, at the time, also an embattled president. He had suffered personal attacks as scurrilous as any in his day or ours.

So the remark may have been less an affirmation of democratic ideal than a recognition of political reality. Its tone implies resignation. Whether or not a public figure had a right to privacy and individuality, Jefferson seemed to regard at least some loss of both as inevitable.

In a free society with a free press, the demands of public life inevitably exceed the functional obligations of office. It is not enough for elected officials to make a straightforward accounting of the public business—the inarguably proper province of the public's right to know. The politics of a democracy also demand contact on a personal level. The public has a right to know what sort of people are running its affairs.
Strategy on the Campaign Trail in Iowa
Authors: Brady Henry E.
Published: May 2006

We expect to find calculating, even Machiavellian, politicians in Cook County, Illinois or Placquemines Parish, Louisiana. It comes as something of a surprise to find them in Johnson County, Iowa, but with the quadrennial recurrence of the Iowa caucuses lowans become subtle calculators of their own advantage. Around caucus time, Iowa is a land of political strategists.

In the following pages, I summarize my notes from several days spent observing the strategies of politicians, the media, and citizens in Iowa in 1988.
Our Political Condition
Authors: Price David E.
Published: May 2006

Although I have enjoyed five productive and stimulating years in the House of Representatives, my satisfaction is tempered by the conviction that our collective response has often been inadequate to our country's needs. In the near term we are faced with a stubborn recession, the need to ease its pain and to promote economic recovery. But the long-term challenges are even more daunting: laying the groundwork for improved economic performance and an enhanced quality of life by investing in research, education, and training; rebuilding and extending our infrastructure; broadening access to adequate health care; stimulating savings and investment; and achieving budgetary accountability and control.

The 102nd Congress has made some progress on these issues, most notably by approving a major high-way-transit program and an ambitious rewrite of the Higher Education Act. But on many other fronts Congress has found it difficult to act, and the president has offered little in the way of a domestic program save occasional vetoes of Democratic initiatives.

The most obvious immediate barrier to effective governmental action is the federal budget deficit. The failure to correct the problem in the 1980s, when the economy was healthier and could have more easily withstood austerity measures, has left Congress and the president with equally unpromising alternatives: either rely on symbolic, hortatory, and largely ineffectual actions to counter economic adversity, or fund more serious recovery measures at the expense of a dangerous deepening of the deficit.
E. E. Schattschneider, the New Deal, and the Rejection of the Responsible Party Doctrine
Authors: Milkis Sidney M.
Published: May 2006

E. E. Schattschneider's Party Government, published fifty years ago, is one of the early classics of behavioral political science. The enduring popularity of this book, however, stems less from its impressive analysis of the actual workings of American party politics than its advocacy of democratic reform. Party Government was a strong blow in behalf of “responsible party government,” a creed that has had an important influence on political science. Schattschneider later chaired the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, which produced the famous report “Towards a More Responsible Two-Party System,” published in 1950. Much of the argument of the report was anticipated by Party Government, which advocated “party centralization” to overcome the local and sectional tendencies that defined traditional partisan politics in the United States (Schattschneider 1942; Committee on Political Parties 1950).

Schattschneider considered political parties as perhaps the most archaic institutions in the United States: the American party system continued to operate as it had before the Civil War, that is, as two loose coalitions of state and local organizations, with very little national machinery and cohesion. The major parties were able to control the electoral process and bring people to the polls. Nevertheless, they failed to organize the nominees they elected to office into an effective, cohesive team for control of government. “Nearly all of the conflict and confusion of American government,” Schattschneider (1942, 30) claimed, “can be traced to the failure of the parties on this point.”

With the growth of the federal government's responsibilities during the twentieth century, this failing of the traditional decentralized parties represented a distressing deterioration of representative democracy.
Comparing the Wilder and Gantt Campaigns: A Model for Black Candidate Success in Statewide Elections
Authors: Strickland Ruth Ann , Whicker Marcia Lynn
Published: May 2006

Racism has been a part of black American heritage for over three centuries. Across the centuries, the systematic discrimination and oppression of blacks has raised barriers to opportunity as well as normality. Racism can take several forms including individual racism, institutional racism and cultural racism. Individual racism is fostered by individuals who categorize blacks as inferior. Even interracial contact under favorable conditions may not reduce this racist outlook. Institutional racism consists of institutions which are conceived as mechanisms to systematically oppress and limit the opportunities of black people. Cultural racism is exhibited by those who would like to homogenize black Americans—making them more white (Jones 1988: 127–31). We expect these forms of racism to have an impact on the political success of black candidates for office.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, efforts were made at the national level in particular to eliminate barriers to equal opportunity for black Americans. Many whites were unwilling to support full racial equality. The turbulent riots in predominantly black ghettos and the formation of black groups, such as the Black Panthers, spawned fear among some white populations.
Political Participation and “Teledemocracy”
Authors: Arterton F. Christopher
Published: May 2006

The signs are abundant that many of the institutions and processes of American politics are becoming increasingly direct. As communication technologies erode the mediating roles played by secondary leadership, citizens and public officials interact directly with each other more intensively and more frequently.

As this gale has moved through our political system, different scholars have noted their own particular “straw in the wind.” By far the most attention has been given to the declining capacity of party as a mechanism mediating between voters and office holders (Polsby, 1983; Kirkpatrick, 1978). A different viewpoint comes from Samuel Kernell, who has revised Richard Neustadt's work on the presidency by arguing that presidential power is increasingly secured and exercised through public opinion influence (Kernell, 1986). Those who have studied the activities of incumbent Congressmen and Senators note that they have also extended their direct contact with constituents: not only have the flows of mail into and out of congressional offices increased markedly over the past two decades, but the establishment of C-Span has brought congressional business into literally millions of homes (Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, 1988). Moreover, in a constant search for new ways of contacting citizens, congressmen are in the forefront of experimentation with cable television, satellites, VCRs and computer communications (Arterton, 1987).
Bertrand de Jouvenel: A Remembrance
Authors: Hale Dennis
Published: May 2006

Bertrand de Jouvenel, who died a year ago this March, at the age of 83, is best known to American political scientists for three books—On Power (1945), Sovereignty (1957), and The Pure Theory of Politics (1963)—and several essays, among them “The Chairman's Problem” and “The Nature of Political Science.”

I almost met Bertrand de Jouvenel in the summer of 1964, when I was 20 years old, a political science major at Oberlin College, and the editor of a student political magazine called The Activist. I was also a student of Wilson Carey McWilliams, a prolific source of article ideas for the magazine, and a reliable guide to the academics and journalists who we often tapped for free copy. Since I was about to spend two months in France, and since Carey had been de Jouvenel's student at Berkeley when de Jouvenel was a Visiting Professor there, why not take a letter of introduction and get an Activist article from one of Europe's most famous political scientists?
Some Lessons from Reagan's HUD: Housing Policy and Public Service
Authors: Moore Charles H. , Hoban-Moore Patricia A.
Published: May 2006

There are multiple housing and community development programs involved in scandal at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The New York Times reports that “H.U.D. officials have said that at least 28 of the department's 48 programs and activities have ‘significant problems’ attributable to fraud, mismanagement, and favoritism” (August 13, 1989).

Among the most significant (in both dollar volume and public visibility) are: Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation, Urban Development Action Grants, Title X Land Development Mortgage Insurance, Mortgage Coinsurance, sales of HUD-foreclosed properties, Retirement Service Centers, and the Secretary's Discretionary Fund. Dozens of former government officials, many from HUD, some presidential appointees and cabinet members, and Republican Party officials have profited through both consulting fees and by securing subsidies for their housing or development projects through these programs. There are now multiple congressional investigations, led by the House of Representatives Government Operations Sub-Committee on Employment and Housing (Rep. Tom Lantos, Chair) and the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (Rep. Henry Gonzales, Chair). The Times reports that the Department of Justice is pursuing 600 HUD-related cases (August 13, 1989).
The Long Legacy of Proposals to Rewrite the U.S. Constitution
Authors: Vile John R.
Published: May 2006

The Symposium on “Divided Government and the Politics of Constitutional Reform” in the December 1991 issue of PS highlighted the way that critiques of current governmental policies and perceived ailments in the body politic are so often followed in America by proposals for constitutional change. While it is possible, as a number of the symposium participants indicated, to question whether modern diagnoses of the problems are accurate or whether constitutional reforms are the answer, Petracca is certainly correct in telling fellow political scientists that “debate about constitutional and political reform is healthy for the polity because it is an opportunity to rediscover and reconsider America's first principles of government” (1991, 635).

While Petracca (1991, 634) reminded readers that critiques of divided government go at least as far back as Bryce's discussion in The American Commonwealth and Thurber mentioned Woodrow Wilson's reform efforts (1991, 653), it is rare to see a modern reformer who is fully aware of the legacy of reform proposals that now go back over 125 years. Even those who know the most about such history have been unaware of many plans. (See bibliography in Robinson 1985, 328-32; compare to Vile 1991b, 188-92.) This lack of knowledge is unfortunate because such information helps to put modern proposals like those of the Committee on the Constitutional System in perspective.
Why the Democrats Lose Presidential Elections: Toward a Theory of Optimal Loss
Authors: Erikson Robert S.
Published: May 2006

In 1988, as in four of the previous five presidential elections, the Republicans won the White House with remarkable ease. Pundits have been busy explaining the inevitability of this result. Many attribute the Republican victory to ideology, repeating the familiar line that the Democrats now are too liberal to win a national election. Another popular explanation is the economy. The incumbent party never loses, we are told, when the economy is prosperous. Some even blame the Electoral College.

Other explanations have been offered as well (e.g., Sigelman, 1988). Despite this disagreement on the details, two things appear certain. The Democrats had no chance in 1988. And the Democrats are in the throes of a painful electoral decline.

But is any of this conventional wisdom correct? If we ignore the presidency, the current Democratic party enjoys a period of national hegemony perhaps unequaled since the Era of Good Feeling. For the past quarter century, the Democrats have almost continuously controlled more state legislatures and governorships than the Republicans. And the Democratic hold on Congress is even stronger than its hold on state government. After enjoying majority control for over three decades, the Democrats' lock on the U.S. House never was safer. Following the recent interruption of Republican control, the Senate now seems safely Democratic too. Add to all this a continuous Democratic plurality in party identification and one cannot doubt that the Democrats are the dominant party in the U.S. today and have been for decades.
The 1988 Presidential Nominations: Whatever Happened to Momentum?
Authors: Sigelman Lee
Published: May 2006

‘Big Mo’ has just switched uniforms.

—Dandy Don Meredith, football commentator

According to a staple item of conventional wisdom about the politics of presidential nominations, it has become essential for a candidate to perform well early in the primary and caucus season, weighing in with an early victory or, what is probably more important, an unexpectedly strong early showing. Toward that end, serious presidential aspirants now gear up their campaigns years in advance of the first primaries and caucuses, in the belief that in order to stand any chance of being nominated, they must establish from the very outset the viability of their candidacy. Since nomination contests are, in effect, winnowing processes (see, e.g., Matthews, 1978), presidential aspirants who fail to establish their credibility very early in the race may find themselves left at the post, their supporters having forsaken them for other, seemingly more electable candidates. On the other hand, those who do well early in the fray live to fight another day. Indeed, they are likely, according to a related bit of conventional wisdom, to hop aboard a victory bandwagon, with impressive early performances enhancing their support and this increased support in turn bolstering their subsequent performance.

Taken in tandem, the ideas that it is vital to do well early and that doing well becomes self-perpetuating form the keystones of momentum-based interpretations of the presidential nomination process.
The Contributions of Theodore Lowi to Political Analysis and Democratic Theory
Authors: Sanders Elizabeth
Published: May 2006

Lowi, like Gaul, can be divided into three parts: (1) the policy analysis (arenas of power) scheme; (2) democratic theory (juridical democracy, the critique of pluralism, rule of law); and (3) constitutional advocacy centering on designs for parliamentary government. It is in the second category, I believe, that he has made the most significant and lasting contribution.

The first and earliest segment, the policy analysis scheme, was developed in articles, in and after the seminal 1964 book review in World Politics (Lowi 1964, 1972, 1976). Lowi's students have directly employed the policy typology in work on national institutions and policy development (Spitzer 1983; Sanders 1981). However, Lowi himself has not fully developed the implications of the typology in such a way that it could generate an integrated set of testable hypotheses and has failed to clear up essential definitions. The words used to label the four cells of the typology (distributive, regulatory, redistributive, and constituent) have fallen into common currency, but are used in a muddle of ways not consistent with the meanings I believe (as an alumna of Lowi's graduate public policy workshop) that he wants to attach to them. Much of this confusion, and the failure of this set of tantalizing ideas to bear much theoretical fruit, must be laid at the creator's doorstep for neglecting to draw out at length and in detail the typology's implications.
Socialism and Militarism: Confronting Ideology with Evidence
Authors: Dye Thomas R. , Zeigler Harmon
Published: May 2006

Socialism is not merely a way of organizing an economy; it is also a secular religion. And as a religion it cannot be falsified; it cannot be dis-confirmed by empirical evidence in the minds of its adherents. Non-believers might think that the spectacular collapse of socialism around the world—its demonstrated unpopularity and illegitimacy—would impress Marxists in American universities. But academic Marxists remain insulated from world events, spinning out theoretical webs undisturbed by critical evidence.

Recent events provide more dramatic evidence of the centrality of military force to socialist regimes. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe came about as a direct result of Mikhail Gorbachev's decision not to use military force to sustain these regimes; socialism survives in the People's Republic of China only because of the violent repression of Tiananmen Square.
Cultural Issues and Images in the 1988 Presidential Campaign: Why the Democrats Lost—Again!
Authors: Lieske Joel
Published: May 2006

How do you explain the outcomes of modern presidential elections? This is the central dilemma of American politics. Why, for instance, did the Democrats, the so-called majority party, lose again in 1988? And why have they gone down to defeat in five of the last six presidential elections? Curiously, there appears to be no dearth of answers to these questions.

Many pundits, such as neoconservative William Schneider (1988), have argued that the Democrats are too liberal to win a national election. Others maintain that presidential elections are retrospective referenda on the economy and peace issues. According to this view, the incumbent party never loses when times are prosperous and the nation is at peace. Still others argue that presidential elections are actually beauty contests in which voters select the candidate who demonstrates the most attractive combination of personality traits, leadership qualities, and political credentials (Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Yet others contend that most losing Democratic candidates have run notoriously inept campaigns. In the Yiddish vernacular, Dukakis was a “Putz.” Finally, some analysts (Burns, Peltason, and Cronin 1989: 276–77) try to please everyone by advancing umbrella explanations that include all of these arguments.

Unfortunately, none of these explanations, taken individually, is particularly persuasive. And most appear to be little more than post hoc rationalizations. Of course, when something cannot be fully understood, we are prone to make fun of our ignorance.
Lessons of Athenian Democracy: Editor's Introduction
Authors: Grofman Bernard
Published: May 2006

First, the good news: 1992-93 is the 2500th anniversary of the birth of democracy. It was in 507-508 B.C. that the reforms of Cleisthenes took place in Athens. In a world seemingly devoid of much to cheer about, here's an excuse to celebrate.

Now, for the quibbles. If Cleisthenes is so important, why have I never heard of him? Moreover, why should I celebrate Athenian democracy when I know from both Madison and Hamilton in theFederalist Papersthat it was really mob rule, an example to be avoided at all costs in shaping a constitution for a republic in search of stability and good government? Hasn't Thucydides taught us that the fickleness of the Athenian populace led to repeated Athenian military disasters after the death of Pericles, the Athenian “first citizen” whom Thucydides sees as having ruled over Athens while permitting the masses the illusion that they were in control? Wasn't it an Athenian people's jury that forced the world's greatest philosopher to drink hemlock? Perhaps even more importantly, isn't it (politically) incorrect to call Athens a democracy? How can a militaristic society built on the backs of slaves and the revenues of imperialism, in which women couldn't own property or participate in politics, ever be something to celebrate?!
Democracy Ancient and Modern
Authors: Euben J. Peter
Published: May 2006

With the collapse of communism and consequent disrepute of Marxism, there is a danger that liberalism will overwhelm democracy and that liberal political theory will become hegemonic despite the efforts of “communitarians” and postmodernists. I want to suggest that, given these developments, Athenian democracy and classical political theory read in its terms is a worthy political and theoretical interlocutor for both. (For a more detailed argument see the “Introduction” to Euben, Ober, and Wallach 1993.) This is not to engage in yet more polis envy, indulge in yet more Hellenic romanticism about “The Glory That Was Greece,” or endorse the uncritical worship of “great books.” My aim, rather, is to avoid the self-congratulation, complacency, and presentism that too often attends “our victory” in the Cold War and to make a contribution to the ensuing debate about American political identity.

As this suggests, my concerns here are partly political. I want to indicate the strategies by which “Athenian democracy” is delegitimated as a challenge to contemporary democracy and question the way classical political theory is used to legitimate an antidemocratic political and educational agenda. That democratic Athens should be understood in terms of contemporary political controversies is nothing new. The Federalist Papers used it as an object lesson by which to justify limiting democracy in the name of republicanism, and debates over reform of the British Parliament and French Revolution found conservatives criticizing the politics of their own day in terms of the putative excesses of democratic Athens, much as Allan Bloom has done in our own time (Turner 1981, chaps. 1 and 5).
Athenian Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists
Authors: Saxonhouse Arlene W.
Published: May 2006

Recent archaeological and textual studies by classical scholars give us new ways of thinking about Athenian democracy. Morgens Hansen, for example, has calculated the seating capacity of the Pnyx, the site where the Athenians held their assemblies. By figuring out how much space a seated adult Athenian male would occupy, he has concluded that the assembly in the fourth century B.C. could have held at most 6,000 people. That is a third or fourth of the potential participants (Hansen 1983, 18). Another classical scholar argues that attendance was considerably below this and concludes: “The Athenians had never seen a full meeting of the citizen body, though the very idea of democracy is predicted on it. From the very start they must have accepted that any assembly was bound to be a sample of the citizenship—and not even a random sample” (Carter 1986, 193). Other questions worthy of being asked but not asked before are now raised: How were votes actually counted? How does one calculate a closely divided vote when there are 6,000 people sitting in the assembly?

In one of the classic books on Athenian democracy published in 1957, the author claimed: “Prima facie the Athenian democracy would seem to have been a perfectly designed machine for expressing and putting into effect the will of the people” (Jones [1957] 1964, 3). Hansen, with his calculations of the seating capacity of the Pnyx, and scholars questioning the degree to which and how citizens really engaged in the political life of Athens, are motivated by this perspective on ancient democracy.
The Case of the Failed Nomination: Subtexts in a State Legislature
Authors: Florestano Patricia S.
Published: May 2006

Just nine days after what was to have been a routine confirmation hearing, John S. Arnick, a 23-year member of the Maryland House of Delegates, withdrew his name from consideration for a position on the Baltimore County District Court. Arnick became the first gubernatorial nominee for a judgeship since 1968 who did not receive confirmation. This event touches upon a number of underlying subtexts of interest to political scientists, especially those who follow state legislatures and their processes—judicial confirmation procedures at the state level, prevalence of “insider-vs.-outsider” mentality within a state legislature, persistence of sexism in the environment of a state capital, impact of women legislators on the political culture and procedures, citizen attentiveness to the political process, and the consequences of the growing use of radio shows and telephone calls to influence the actions of elected officials.
Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science
Authors: Almond Gabriel A.
Published: May 2006

“Miss Cooper: Loneliness is a terrible thing don't you agree?

Anne: Yes, I do agree. A terrible thing ….

Miss Meacham: She's not an ‘alone’ type.

Miss Cooper: Is any type an ‘alone’ type, Miss Meacham … ?”

(From Terence Rattigan's Separate Tables, (1955, 78, 92)

In Separate Tables, the hit of the 1955 New York theatrical season, the Irish playwright, Terence Rattigan, used the metaphor of solitary diners in a second-rate residential hotel in Cornwall to convey the loneliness of the human condition. It may be a bit far fetched to use this metaphor to describe the condition of political science in the 1980s. But in some sense the various schools and sects of political science now sit at separate tables, each with its own conception of proper political science, but each protecting some secret island of vulnerability.

It was not always so. If we recall the state of the profession a quarter of a century ago, let us say in the early 1960s, David Easton's (1953) and David Truman's (1955) scoldings of the profession for its backwardness among the social science disciplines, had been taken to heart by a substantial and productive cadre of young political scientists. In 1961 Robert Dahl wrote his Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest reflecting the sure confidence of a successful movement, whose leaders were rapidly becoming the most visible figures in the profession. Neither Dahl nor Heinz Eulau, whose Behavioral Persuasion appeared in 1963 made exaggerated or exclusive claims for the new political science.
An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes
Authors: Abramowitz Alan I.
Published: May 2006

There is probably no subject which has been studied more thoroughly by political scientists than American presidential elections. A vast literature has developed examining the effects of attitudes toward the parties, candidates, and issues on voter decision-making in these quadrennial contests (for a comprehensive review of this literature see Asher, 1988). Despite the proliferation of literature on this topic, however, relatively little research has addressed what is perhaps the most basic question about presidential elections: who wins and who loses?

A few scholars have developed models for predicting the national outcomes of presidential elections. Brody and Sigelman (1983) proposed a model based on the incumbent president's approval rating in the final Gallup Poll before the election. This extremely simple model yielded an unadjusted R2 of .71. Hibbs (1982) proposed a different bivariate model based entirely on the trend in real per capita disposable income since the last presidential election. This model yielded an unadjusted R2 of .63. Thus, neither of these bivariate models proved to be highly accurate.

Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) have developed a forecasting model which combines economic conditions and presidential popularity, Their model, which uses the president's approval rating in May and the change in real per capita GNP during the second quarter of the election year to predict the popular vote for president, yields an unadjusted R2 of .82.
Is the Pen Mightier Than the Word? Editorial Cartoons and 1988 Presidential Nominating Politics
Authors: Buell Emmett H. , Maus Mike
Published: May 2006

If a picture is worth a thousand words, then 1988 presidential nominating politics was a gold mine for editorial cartoonists. Exaggeration and distortion are the cartoonist's stock-in-trade, Colin Seymour-Ure (1986, 168) tells us, and—with Gary Hart's dalliance, Joseph Biden's plagiarism, Pat Robertson's direct line to God, Robert Dole's tantrums, Jesse Jackson's ego, and George Bush's image problems—there was much to exaggerate and distort in the 1988 races.

Like other journalists, editorial cartoonists follow and interpret campaigns for the public. Like columnists, cartoonists openly praise or condemn candidates and campaigns. But the power of pictures sets cartoonists apart from other editorialists. According to Doug MaHette of the Atlanta Constitution, the fundamentals of cartooning are distortion, hyperbole, and subjectivity. Cartoons, he writes (1988, 158), “distort and reflect reality like fun-house mirrors.” Seymour-Ure (1986, 170) agrees: “The comments and insults conveyed by the graphic imagery of a cartoon have a crudity and offensiveness that might well be unacceptable if spelt out in words.”

As long as editorial cartoonists have caricatured politicians, politicians have feared for their public images. Thomas Nast helped topple Boss Tweed in the 1870s by repeatedly drawing him and his ring as corrupt. “Stop them damn pictures!” Tweed reportedly roared after an especially tough Nast cartoon appeared in 1871. Vice President Bush may have harbored similar resentment when he recently complained about Gary Trudeau's representations of him in “Doonesbury.” A particularly painful stab of the Trudeau pen was placing Bush's manhood in a blind trust.
Women at the 1988 Democratic Convention
Authors: Freeman Jo
Published: May 2006

The activities of feminist and other women's organizations at the 1988 Democratic convention were driven by an over-riding desire to elect a Democratic administration in November. There was universal agreement that the Reagan years have been disastrous for women, and that four more years of Republican rule will, at the very least, result in a Supreme Court that will limit women's options for decades to come.

This goal more than anything else explains the relative quiescence of the 15 organizations' that formed Women's Central and held the usual women's caucus every day of the convention. Indeed when Ellie Smeal and Molly Yard, past and current Presidents of NOW, expressed some mild disaffection with the amount of attention feminist issues and representatives received from the Dukakis campaign, it was quickly countered with a press conference by heads of six Women's Central organizations to extol the fact that women were now insiders. And Kate Michelman, executive director of NARAL, lauded Vice-Presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen's voting record on abortion even though he opposes federal funding.

The sense of unity and common purpose these women expressed was not artificial, because, to a greater extent than ever thought possible, when contemporary feminists first made demands at the 1972 convention, women were insiders. The Dukakis campaign emphasized that women held a large number of the top positions—including campaign manager Susan Estrich. Texas Treasurer Ann Richards, a member of the NWPC, was a bit hit as the keynote speaker.
A Reply to Bennett
Authors: Piven Frances Fox , Cloward Richard L.
Published: May 2006

Bennett is confused. That we advocate voter registration reform does not mean we are single-factor analysts. Bennett does not understand the distinction between our analysis of the complex causes of low turnout, on the one hand, and our analysis of the limited options for reform, on the other.

As to the first, we wrote Why Americans Don't Vote because we thought the “party behavior,” “legal institutional,” and “social-psychological” schools were each inadequate, taken alone, as explanations of low turnout. The party system explanation rests too much of its historical account on the impact of the single election of 1896 in stifling party competition and increasing internal oligarchy and fragmentation, and it is evasive on the question of why the restoration of party competition in the 20th century did not raise turnout in 19th century levels. Legal-institutional explanations fail to provide an account of the political origins of legal arrangements, and of the uneven implementation of these rules by party organizations. And social-psychological explanations do not confront the anomaly that correlations between social traits and non-voting are unique to the contemporary United States. In fact, turnout was high in the 19th century when education levels were low, and then fell in the 20th century as education levels rose.
Political Science and the Savings and Loan Crisis
Authors: Brintnall Michael
Published: May 2006

The savings and loan crisis is one of the more extraordinary developments in contemporary domestic affairs. It represents both public and private policy failures of major proportions, imposes costs on the public of between $100 and $500 billion, and creates exceptional new public management responsibilities. The Resolution Trust Corporation, created to “resolve” this crisis, is now the largest real estate agency in the nation, and, remarkably, the country's largest single employer of lawyers.

This disaster has left the public angry and mystified: What is a savings and loan (also called a thrift) and how is it different from a bank? What is FSLIC, and why did we have it if it couldn't prevent the trouble? Why does fixing the problem cost so much, and where does all the money go? Whose fault was it? Does this portend the collapse of the entire financial system?

Some reasons for the crisis are simple to see. Policy designed in the 1930s to create new financing opportunities for home mortgages was flawed and allowed to outlive its time. Thrifts were designed on the popular principle of local banks raising local funds to help local homeowners, and given a protected market. In their time, the thrifts created financing for housing where none existed before. Their capacity to do this was sustained by regulatory controls, tax policies, interest rate controls, and deposit insurance. But when interest rates rose in the 1970s, no amount of tinkering with the original scheme could protect an industry locked into long-term loans earning low rates, and paying out high rates to compete for new funds, and the thrifts could not survive.
What Did We Know and When Did We Know It? GAO's Role in Analysis of the Savings and Loan Crisis
Authors: Anderson Teresa
Published: May 2006

As the taxpayers' bill for the cost of the savings and loan debacle continues to increase—recent estimates suggest total costs of about $500 billion—and the insurance fund for the nations' banks runs close to empty, many people are asking how and why we got here, and where is the accountability for such a disaster? What was the government doing while all of this was happening? While much has been written about who should be blamed and the lessons learned from this crisis, it is important for those of us in government to evaluate our contributions to the analysis of this issue and examine what we have learned.

As an evaluator of the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congress' “watchdog” agency, I will focus on GAO's evolving role in the analysis of the savings and loan crisis. GAO combines the expertise of accountants, economists, and analysts familiar with the internal operations of the federal agencies to provide a unique and comprehensive analysis of major policy issues. The S&L issue is a particularly useful case study for GAO because it illustrates the dramatic growth in our expertise and ability to contribute to policy analysis over the last decade. In 1980 GAO issued no reports relating to the thrift industry, while in 1989 GAO issued 28 reports and testimonies specifically about thrifts.