Anonymous testimony and epistemic responsibility
Authors:   , Ajiboro Aderonke Adeyinka 
Published: June 2024

In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony.