bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Popper and the Quantum Theory
Authors: Redhead Michael
Published: November 2010

Popper wrote extensively on the quantum theory. In Logic der Forschung (LSD) he devoted a whole chapter to the topic, while the whole of Volume 3 of the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery is devoted to the quantum theory. This volume entitled Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics (QTSP) incorporated a famous earlier essay, ‘Quantum Mechanics without “the Observer”’ (QM). In addition Popper's development of the propensity interpretation of probability was much influenced by his views on the role of probability in quantum theory, and he also wrote an insightful critique of the 1936 paper of Birkhoff and von Neumann on nondistributive quantum logic (BNIQM).
The Grounds for Anti-Historicism
Authors: Macdonald Graham
Published: November 2010

In his seminal The Poverty of Historicism (hereafter PH) Sir Karl Popper deployed a number of arguments to prick the pretensions of those who thought that they were, or could come to be, in possession of knowledge of the (social) future. These ‘historicists’ assumed that they could lay bare the law of evolution of a society, and that their possession of knowledge of such a law justified (large-scale) political action which had the aim of removing obstacles to the progress of history. In arguing against historicism Popper was clearly motivated by his interest in removing the intellectual backing for such revolutionary political practice. My first reading of PH was in the company of people who were extremely dismissive of the anti-revolutionary message, and who tended to argue that if that was the conclusion of Popper's theoretical argument, then obviously the argument was flawed. Within their context, that of the implementation of apartheid policy in South Africa, there was much to be said for this attitude. There is no doubt that Popper's message was insufficiently contextualised, or rather that he did not signpost very clearly whether he intended the anti-revolutionary political prescription to have limited or universal application. In this paper I want to reconsider some of these issues, particularly whether the truth of anti-historicism, in the sense intended by Popper, has such conservative consequences for political action.
Philosophy in Different Cultural Contexts
Authors: Montefiore Alan
Published: November 2010

The question to which I seek here to address myself may be formulated in the following way. Is philosophy to be thought of as essentially one and the same subject in all its different manifestations, carried on, certainly, in noticeably differing ways by different people at different times and in different places, but to be understood nevertheless as consisting of one overall body of knowledge? Or should the term ‘philosophy’ be regarded rather as standing for a ‘family resemblance concept’, and the family in question as containing among its members some who may be hardly capable of establishing any mutually agreed channels of communication with each other? In what follows I shall try to display, if not necessarily to disentangle, some of the underlying complexities on which, as it seems to me, answers to these questions may depend.
William James, ‘A Certain Blindness’ and an Uncertain Pluralism
Authors: Skillen Anthony
Published: November 2010

‘Pluralism’ may be an ambiguous term. But it is not the multitude of the word's meanings but the multitude of sorts of thing that ‘pluralists’ might be claiming to be not-single-but-plural that generates unclarity about what any ‘pluralist’ position amounts to. Take ethics: a ‘pluralist’ might be maintaining, as against say an ethical hedonist of a Benthamite sort, that there is more than one sort of thing ‘good in itself. Another ‘pluralist’ might maintain that there is more than one sort of life that counts as a ‘good way of life’. Or that not all moral duties are forms of the duty to be truthful. Or that there is more than one framework in terms of which experiences, actions or lives can properly be assessed. There is a problem in understanding what it is that is supposed to be counted: one-or-many of what? While the value today of William James’s popular essays in what we might now call ‘value pluralism’ far exceeds their role in illustrating this difficulty, they do exemplify it. James of course described himself as a ‘pluralist’; he was on the flagship of that movement. But just to what extent and in what respects remains unclear.
Value-Pluralism
Authors: Skorupski John
Published: November 2010

A view with some considerable influence in current moral and political philosophy holds that there is a plurality of values, all of them fundamental and authoritative and yet, in some genuinely disconcerting way, in conflict. I shall call it ‘value-pluralism’.
Political Liberalism, Secular Republicanism: two answers to the challenges of pluralism
Authors: Audard Catherine
Published: November 2010

The main challenge facing democracies in the post-Communist era is probably not so much the threat of totalitarianism as the consequences of pluralism, of the existence within these societies of a plurality of incompatible cultural allegiances. How are they to survive their fragmentation into communities many of whom no longer share the basic moral requirements of a democratic regime: recognition of the liberty of conscience, of equality of rights, and the like?
Vico and Metaphysical Hermeneutics
Authors: Pompa Leon
Published: November 2010

My aim in this paper is to outline and discuss Vico's conception of the nature and importance of hermeneutics. Vico never used the word ‘hermeneutics’ but since we would now recognize one aspect of what he was offering in his New Science as a theory for the interpretation and understanding of past cultures, I shall occasionally talk in terms of a theory of hermeneutics. My procedure will be to indicate first the context which led Vico to think that it was important to have a theory of hermeneutics and why he thought that such a theory ought to have a certain form. I shall then try to show that there are two forms of the theory. The first, in which hermeneutics is dependent upon metaphysics, involves certain unacceptable features which arise from the context in which he originally formulated it. The second, in which metaphysics is dependent upon hermeneutics, requires that the theory be freed from an important aspect of this context. Finally, I shall ask whether, in this second form, the theory has something to commend it to contemporary thinkers.
Science and Psychology
Authors: Dilman İlham
Published: November 2010

I want to ask: what is knowledge of human beings and can it be acquired by experimental methods?

It is a widespread assumption in academic psychology that the methods which have been applied with great success in the physical sciences are applicable to investigations in other areas and hence to psychological investigation. The history of experimental psychology is the history of the adjustments psychologists have made to their subject to be able to apply the experimental method of the sciences to it. In the process of trimming the head to fit the cap on it they have emasculated psychology.
Feeling and Cognition
Authors: Falk Barrie
Published: November 2010

There is a common view that as well as being conscious of the world in virtue of having thoughts about it, forming representations of its various states and processes, we are also conscious of it in virtue of feeling it. What I have in mind is not the fact that we have feelings about the world—indignation at this, pleasure at that—but that we sensorily feel its colours, sounds, textures and so on. And this feeling form of consciousness, it's often thought, constitutes a peculiarly intimate and intense focus upon things. The feel of the first drops of rain on one's face and the sounds of the gull's cry will quickly be recognized for what they are; and the fact that events of this sort are occurring will thereafter hold one's attention just insofar as they are relevant to some current business. But what can also happen is that such experiences cut through any current concerns and cause a state in which, for a time, one does nothing except feel the soft coolness of the rain and the particular quality of the bird's cry. We can become absorbed, it seems, in the mere presence of these phenomena and this is an experience to which we attach great value.
Believing in order to Understand
Authors: Barrett Cyril
Published: November 2010

The theme of this season of lectures is hermeneutics, Verstehen and humane understanding. It is my contention in this paper that long before Droysen or Dilthey, Windelband or Rickert came up with the notion of cultural science (Geisteswissenschafte), it had been flourishing in the scholastic tradition of theology and philosophy of religion, though I am not sure that its practitioners would thank me for saying so.
Ecology and the Ethics of Environmental Restoration
Authors: Elliot Robert
Published: November 2010

Some people think that nature has intrinsic value, that it has value in itself quite apart from its present and future economic, intellectual, recreational and aesthetic uses. Some people think that nature's intrinsic value grounds an obligation to preserve it and to minimise human interference with it. I agree. It is important, however, to try to say exactly why nature has intrinsic value, to go beyond merely stating some idiosyncratic attitude and to provide some justification of that attitude with which others might engage. Presumably there are properties that wild nature exemplifies in virtue of which it is intrinsically valued. Only when these are indicated is rational debate as to whether wild nature has intrinsic value possible. Only when these are indicated is it possible to begin to persuade dissenters to change their views. Indeed, unless one can at least begin to say what these properties are it is not clear that the attitude could have any meaningful content. While it is perhaps possible to value something without immediately understanding what it is about the thing that makes it valuable, the failure to come up with any candidate value-adding property after some reflection suggests that the initial value-judgment is vacuous.
Values, Reasons and the Environment
Authors: Crisp Roger
Published: November 2010

By 2030, according to one reliable source, the world's population will have increased by 3 · billion, demand for food will have nearly doubled, and industrial output tripled (World Bank, 1992, p. 2 and passim). Consider two possible histories of the world in this period:

The Admirable (A) History. Wastage of energy and natural resources is reduced, as is poverty in developing countries. Pollution decreases. Greenhouse warming slows. Biodiversity is preserved. The natural environment is protected. Food is not short.
The End of Anthropocentrism?
Authors: Midgley Mary
Published: November 2010

Are human beings in some sense central to the cosmos? It used to seem obvious that they were. It seems less obvious now. But the idea is still powerful in our thinking, and it may be worth while asking just what it has meant.
Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena
Authors: Carruthers Peter
Published: November 2010

My topic in this chapter is whether phenomenal consciousness can be given a reductive natural explanation. I shall first say something about phenomenal—as opposed to other forms of—consciousness, and highlight what needs explaining. I shall then turn to issues concerning explanation in general, and the explanation of phenomenal consciousness in particular.
What has Natural Information to do with Intentional Representation?
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garrett
Published: November 2010

‘According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys.’ (Fodor, 1994, p. 32)

There is, indeed, a form of informational semantics that has this verificationist implication. The original definition of information given in Dretske'sKnowledge and the Flow of Information(1981, hereafter KFI), when employed as a base for a theory of intentional representation or ‘content,’ has this implication. I will argue that, in fact, most of what an animal needs to know about its environment is not available as natural information of this kind. It is true, I believe, that there is one fundamental kind of perception that depends on this kind of natural information, but more sophisticated forms of inner representation do not. It is unclear, however, exactly what ‘natural information’ is supposed to mean, certainly in Fodor's, and even in Dretske's writing. In many places, Dretske seems to employ a softer notion than the one he originally defines. I will propose a softer view of natural information that is, I believe, at least hinted at by Dretske, and show that it does not have verificationist consequences. According to this soft informational semantics, a creature can perfectly well have a representation of Xs without being able to discriminate Xs from Ys.
The Principle of Conservatism in Cognitive Ethology
Authors: Sober Elliott
Published: November 2010

Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. Attention is lavished on the question of the nature of mind, but questions concerning how we know about minds are discussed much less thoroughly. University courses in philosophy of mind routinely devote a lot of time to dualism, logical behaviourism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. But what gets said about the kinds of evidence that help one determine what mental states, if any, an individual occupies? Well, Skinner's puritanical disdain for postulating mental states gets raked over the coals, the problem of other minds gets solved by a perfunctory invocation of the principle of inference to the best explanation, and the Turing test gets discussed, mainly in order to emphasize that it can lead to mistaken answers.
Domains, Brains and Evolution
Authors: Wheeler Michael , Atkinson Anthony
Published: November 2010

According to Darwinian thinking, organisms are (for the most part) designed by natural selection, and so are (for the most part) integrated collections of adaptations, where an adaptation is a phenotypic trait that is a specialized response to a particular selection pressure. For animals that make their living in the Arctic, one adaptive problem is how to maintain body temperature above a certain minimum level necessary for survival. Polar bears' thick coats are a response to that selection pressure (surviving in extreme cold). A thick coat makes a positive difference to a polar bear's fitness, since polar bears with very thin coats left fewer offspring than those with thicker coats. The foundational idea ofevolutionary psychologyis that brains are no different from any other organ with an evolutionary function, insofar as brains too are systems shaped by natural selection to solve adaptive problems. Thus brains have a particular functional organization because their behavioural effects tend, or once tended, to help maintain or increase the fitness of organisms with those brains. Prominent evolutionary psychologists (for example: Cosmides and Tooby, 1987; Cosmides and Tooby, 1994 and Symons, 1992) have endorsed the view that the last time any significant modifications were made by natural selection to the human brain's functional architecture, we were hunter-gatherers, inhabiting a world quite different from that which we now inhabit. That world was the Pleistocene epoch, between about 2 million years ago and 10 thousand years ago. On this view, then, the Pleistocene constitutes what evolutionary psychologists often call ourenvironment of evolutionary adaptedness(or EEA), and the information- processing structure and organization of our present-day cognitive architecture is no different from that of our recent huntergatherer ancestors.
Evolution and the Human Mind: how far can we go?
Authors: Plotkin Henry
Published: November 2010

There is a close coincidence in time between the appearance of psychology as a science and the rise of evolutionary theory. The first laboratory of experimental psychology was established in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt just as Darwin's writings were beginning to have their enormous impact, especially as they might be applied to understanding the human mind (Darwin, 1871). Psychology is an important discipline because it straddles the boundary between the biological sciences and the social or human sciences (defined as those sciences that study exclusively human characteristics) of anthropology, sociology and economics. Given that importance, and given that new sciences lack the conceptual history within which older, established sciences might be mired, it might have been expected that psychology would have embraced in a way that established sciences did not the equally new, sensational and central theorem of biology which spoke to the origins of species as well as the origins of their traits and, crucially, the functions of those traits. Yet for over a century evolutionary theory had virtually no presence in psychology, despite having powerful friends like William James at court (James, 1880).
Technology and Culture in a Developing Country
Authors: Gyekye Kwame
Published: November 2010

Even though the subject of my paper is ‘Technology and Culture in a Developing Country’, it seems appropriate to preface it by examining science itself in the cultural traditions of a developing country, such as Ghana, in view of the fact that the lack of technological advancement, or the ossified state in which the techniques of production found themselves, in the traditional setting of Africa and, in many ways, even in modern Africa, is certainly attributable to the incomprehensible inattention to the search for scientific principles by the traditional technologists. I begin therefore with observations on how science and knowledge fared in the traditional culture of a developing country.
A Defence of Empiricism
Authors: Ayer A. J.
Published: November 2010

I am very much honoured to have been asked to make the closing speech at this Conference. Since this is the first time for over fifty years that a philosophical congress of this scope has been held in England, I hope that you will think it suitable for me to devote my lecture to the revival of the empiricist tradition in British philosophy during this century. I shall begin by examining the contribution of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore. Though he first owed his fame to his book Principia Ethica (Moore, 1903) regarded as a work of genius by the Cambridge Apostles and their associates in Bloomsbury, who did not venture to question Moore's mistaken view of ‘good’ as an unanalysable non-natural quality, his reputation now chiefly rests on his subsequent defence of common sense.
Ayer: the Man, the Philosopher, the Teacher
Authors: Wollheim Richard
Published: November 2010

I have told elsewhere the story of my first meeting with Freddie Ayer, but I shall re-tell it. It made a great impact on me, though, I believe, none on him. Certainly at no point in our friendship did he ever bring it up.

It was mid or late 1946. I was an undergraduate at Balliol, having returned from three years in the army, and I was reading for Part II of the History Schools. Most of my friends, most of my intellectual friends, were reading philosophy, and there was a necessity, which I already sensed, for my returning to Oxford once again to follow in their footsteps. This happened later in the autumn of 1947. Post-war Oxford was a very different place from the Firbankian hothouse of wartime Oxford, at least as I knew it. We were all said to be ‘more mature’, but within the confines of austerity, we were determined to enjoy ourselves. Oxford was not, in the famous words that Max Beerbohm put into the mouth of Mrs Humphrey Ward, ‘wholly serious’.
Ayer's Place in the History of Philosophy
Authors: Quinton Anthony
Published: November 2010

When A. J. Ayer arrived in Oxford in the autumn of 1929 he had no thought of becoming a professional philosopher. He intended to go to the Bar, but, in the manner of an Etonian, by way of Literae Humaniores rather than the study of law. He had read a couple of philosophical books. The first of them was Russell's Sceptical Essays (Russell, 1928), which he bought on its first appearance in 1928. The other was Principia Ethica (Moore, 1903), to which he had been led by a reverent aside in Clive Bell's Art (1914). These choices were significant. Ayer always thought of himself as Russell's successor. He modelled his thought on that of Russell, both in its content and in its unguarded expression and also, to some extent, his manner of life, both political and amorous. What he got from Moore is less obvious, although his respect for Moore is evident, as is shown by the preface to Language, Truth and Logic and by his devoting a book to a close examination of his ideas, along with those of Russell. An important likeness is that both Moore and Ayer were provoked to philosophize by the assertions of other philosophers, not by problems arising outside philosophy in mathematics or the sciences, in history or everyday life.
Logical Positivism and Intentionality
Authors: Putnam Hilary
Published: November 2010

When ‘Freddy’ Ayer asked me to contribute to his volume in the Library of Living Philosophers series (which, regrettably, has still not been published), I was delighted, and while the main topic of my contribution was the sense (if any) in which it can be a ‘necessary’ truth that water is H2O, I devoted a section of that essay to problems that I saw with Ayer's account of the paradigm intentional notion, the notion of reference. Ayer ended his reply by saying that he could not satisfactorily meet my objections, and with characteristic modesty and good humour he added that it was only small consolation that, in his opinion, no one else could satisfactorily account for reference either. The thoughtfulness, fairness, and responsiveness of Ayer's entire reply reminded me of the way in which the same qualities were displayed in Carnap's reply to my contribution to his volume in the same series. These two replies—Carnap's and Ayer's—display the virtues of the philosopher who searches for truth, and who genuinely welcomes serious criticism, in a truly exemplary way. I treasure both of them, and they are bound up with my memories of those two wonderful philosophers.
Three Varieties of Knowledge
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: November 2010

I know, for the most part, what I think, want, and intend, and what my sensations are. In addition, I know a great deal about the world around me. I also sometimes know what goes on in other people's minds. Each of these three kinds of empirical knowledge has its distinctive characteristics. What I know about the contents of my own mind I generally know without investigation or appeal to evidence. There are exceptions, but the primacy of unmediated self-knowledge is attested by the fact that we distrust the exceptions until they can be reconciled with the unmediated. My knowledge of the world outside of myself, on the other hand, depends on the functioning of my sense organs, and this causal dependence on the senses makes my beliefs about the world of nature open to a sort of uncertainty that arises only rarely in the case of beliefs about my own states of mind. Many of my simple perceptions of what is going on in the world are not based on further evidence; my perceptual beliefs are simply caused directly by the events and objects around me. But my knowledge of the propositional contents of other minds is never immediate in this sense; I would have no access to what others think and value if I could not note their behaviour.
Subjectivism and Toleration
Authors: Williams Bernard
Published: November 2010

Bertrand Russell said more than once that he was uncomfortable about a conflict, as he saw it, between two things: the strength of the conviction with which he held his ethical beliefs, and the philosophical opinions that he had about the status of those ethical beliefs—opinions which were non-cognitivist, and in some sense subjectivist. Russell felt that, in some way, if he did not think that his ethical beliefs were objective, he had no right to hold them so passionately. This discomfort was not something that Ayer noted or discussed in his account of Russell's moral philosophy and ethical opinions, at least in the book that he wrote for the Modern Masters series (RS). Perhaps this was because it was not a kind of discomfort that Ayer felt himself. His own philosophical views about the status of ethics were at all periods at any rate non-cognitivist, and I think that he did not mind them being called ‘subjectivist’. He did indeed argue that the supposed difference between objectivism and subjectivism in ethics did no work, and that philosophers who took themselves to be objectivists could not achieve anything more than those who admitted they were subjectivists. Ayer based this mainly on the idea that the claims made by objectivists for the factuality, objective truth, and so forth of moral judgments added nothing to those judgments—so far as moral conclusions were concerned, the objectivist was saying the same as the subjectivist but in a louder voice.
I. Emotions, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a ‘Cognitive Theory’ of the Emotions and Does it Neglect Affectivity?
Authors: Solomon Robert C.
Published: November 2010

I have been arguing, for almost thirty years now, that emotions have been unduly neglected in philosophy. Back in the seventies, it was an argument that attracted little sympathy. I have also been arguing that emotions are a ripe for philosophical analysis, a view that, as evidenced by the Manchester 2001 conference and a large number of excellent publications, has now become mainstream. My own analysis of emotion, first published in 1973, challenged the sharp divide between emotions and rationality, insisted that we reject the established notion that the emotions are involuntary, and argued, in a brief slogan, that ‘emotions are judgments.’ Since then, although the specific term ‘judgment’ has come under considerable fire and my voluntarist thesis continues to attract incredulousness the general approach I took to emotions has been widely accepted in both philosophy and the social sciences. When Paul Griffiths took on what he misleadingly characterized as ‘propositional attitude’ theories of emotion as the enemy of all that was true and scientifically worthy, I knew that we had made it. Such ferocious abuse is surely a sign that we had shifted, in Kuhnian terms, from being revolutionary to becoming the ‘normal’ paradigm. The current counter-revolution of affect programmes and neuro-reductionism says a lot about who we are and how far we have come. (Progress in philosophy is moved more by this drama of one outrageous thesis after another—once called ‘dialectic’—than by cautious, careful argument.)
II. The Emotions and their Philosophy of Mind
Authors: Wollheim Richard
Published: November 2010

When I was invited by Yale University to deliver the Cassirer lectures, I hesitated for a topic. I wanted something new. I proposed the emotions, and at that time my knowledge of the topic was so slight that I didn't know whether it was something that I had already written on or not.

I mention this fact because one thing that I have since learnt about the emotions is that such ignorance is in order. For it is one of those topics where grasping the extension of the term is inseparable from having some theory of the matter, however primitive. One way to explain this fact is to invoke the novelty of the term, for, in the sense in which it is used in this lecture, it is only about 300 years old. Another way, probably related, is to point to the fact that, not only are there belief and particular beliefs, desire and particular desires, but, when we refer to particular beliefs and to particular desires, we call them ‘the belief that this’ or ‘the desire that that’. However there is no locution ‘the emotion that this’, or ‘the emotion that that’, which would indicate the presence of an emotion. It seems that ordinary language is an intermittent guide to the circumscription of the emotions.
III. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions
Authors: Griffiths Paul E.
Published: November 2010

According to the distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim, an emotion is an extended mental episode that originates when events in the world frustrate or satisfy a pre-existing desire (Wollheim, 1999). This leads the subject to form an attitude to the world which colours their future experience, leading them to attend to one aspect of things rather than another, and to view the things they attend to in one light rather than another. The idea that emotions arise from the satisfaction or frustration of desires—the ‘match-mismatch’ view of emotion aetiology—has had several earlier incarnations in the psychology of emotion. Early versions of this proposal were associated with the attempt to replace the typology of emotion found in ordinary language with a simpler theory of drives and to define new emotion types in terms of general properties such as the frustration of a drive. The match-mismatch view survived the demise of that revisionist project and is found today in theories that accept a folk-psychological-style taxonomy of emotion types based on the meaning ascribed by the subject to the stimulus situation. For example, the match-mismatch view forms part of the subtle and complex model of emotion episodes developed over many years by Nico Frijda (Frijda, 1986). According to Frijda, information about the ‘situational antecedents’ of an emotion—the stimulus in its context, including the ongoing goals of the organism—is evaluated for its relevance to the multiple concerns of the organism. Evaluation of match-mismatch—the degree of compatibility between the situation and the subject's goals—forms part of this process.
XI. Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency
Authors: Jones Karen
Published: November 2010

Empirical work on and common observation of the emotions tells us that our emotions sometimes key us to the presence of real and important reason-giving considerations without necessarily presenting that information to us in a way susceptible of conscious articulation and, sometimes, even despite our consciously held and internally justified judgment that the situation contains no such reasons. In this paper, I want to explore the implications of the fact that emotions show varying degrees of integration with our conscious agency—from none at all to quite substantial—for our understanding of our rationality, and in particular for the traditional assumption that weakness of the will is necessarily irrational.
Mental Representation and Mental Presentation: Reflections on some definitions in The Oxford Concise Dictionary
Authors: McCulloch Gregory
Published: November 2010

To the memory of Alan White

The idea of mental representation occupies a rather prominent place in much contemporary discussion, both in philosophy and cognitive science, and not as a particularly controversial idea either. My reflections here, however, are intended to douse much of that discussion with some cold water. I should emphasize at the outset that I have no problems at all with the very idea of mental representation. What I find quite unsatisfactory is the philosophical or doctrinal underpinning of much current theorising about it. Anyway, I shall suggest that talk of mental representation needs at least to be supplemented with, if not actually replaced by, a distinct notion of mental presentation, which cannot be reduced to it. But I start with the notion of an impression.
What are these Familiar Words Doing Here?
Authors: Moore A. W.
Published: November 2010

My title is a quotation from Davidson's essay ‘On Saying That’. And although my concerns are at some remove from his, they do connect at one significant point. We (non-philosophers as well as philosophers) find ourselves under the continual pressure of theory to deny that ordinary familiar semantic features of ordinary familiar words equip them to serve certain ordinary familiar functions. One of Davidson's aims is to resist that pressure as far as the function of reporting indirect speech is concerned. In similar vein I want to look at some common things that we do with words and show how we can hold fast to a simple common-sense view of what we are doing despite the doubts to which reflection is apt to give rise. In fact I want to look at six things we do with words, six linguistic moves we make. These six moves are related in a number of important ways. Even so, they are really the subjects of six separate essays (six separate sketchy essays at that), and I am well aware that treating them together in the way that I shall be doing—worse still, trying thereby to make some headway with solving one or two extremely difficult philosophical problems, as I shall also be doing—will mean that in each case I can at best produce something highly programmatic.
The Domain of Folk Psychology
Authors: Bermúdez José Luis
Published: November 2010

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of (more or less similar versions of) folk psychology.
A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts
Authors: Tye Michael
Published: November 2010

There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan, 1996; Papineau, 1993; Sturgeon, 1994; Tye, 1995, 2000; Perry, 2001). There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
Dislocation Associated Incubational Domain Formation in Lightly Gadolinium-Doped Ceria
Authors: Li Zhi-Peng , Mori Toshiyuki , Ye Fei , Ou Ding Rong , Zou Jin , Drennan John
Published: November 2010

Nanosized incubational domain was observed in 10 at.% gadolinium-doped ceria (GDC) using high-resolution transmission electron microscopy. Dislocations were extensively observed in 10 at.% GDC instead of heavily doped 25 at.% GDC. By Fast Fourier Transform and Inverse Fast Fourier Transform analysis, it was noticed that the incubational domain existing in 10 at.% GDC has different lattice spacing and orientation from the neighboring ceria matrix. Furthermore, dislocations were usually observed in the interface region between the incubational domain and the ceria matrix. Based on experimental results, the formation mechanism of dislocation associated incubational domain in lightly gadolinium-doped ceria is rationalized.
Mechanical thrombectomy using the Rotarex catheter - safe and effective method in the treatment of peripheral arterial thromboembolic occlusions
Authors: Stanek  , Ouhrabkova  , Prochazka
Published: November 2010

Background: The aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of mechanical thrombectomy using the Rotarex catheter in the treatment of peripheral arterial thromboembolic occlusions and to assess long-term results. Patients and methods: The Rotarex catheter is a 6F or 8F polyurethane catheter, which contains a steel spiral powered by an electric motor and rotating at a speed of 40.000 rpm. The catheter tip is connected to the spiral. The rotating spiral produces a continuous vacuum and the thromboembolic material "drilled" by the tip is drawn into the catheter, where it is fragmented and transported via the spiral to the collecting bag. Results: We have conducted 43 interventions in 40 patients (20 men, 20 women), age 44 - 92 years (mean 76 years). The occlusion length varied from 2 - 37 cm (mean 8 cm); the duration of symptoms ranged from 2 - 180 days (mean 14 days), Thrombectomy as the only procedure was sufficient in 11 interventions (25.5 %); a combination with PTA was necessary in 21 procedures (49 %) and with stent implantation in 11 procedures (25.5 %). Angiographic success was achieved in 41 interventions (95 %). The most frequent transitory complication was embolization to the calf arteries (9 %). Subsequent thrombolysis was administered after 4 procedures (9 %). In one case (2 %) there was a minor perforation of the peroneal artery. Six-month post-intervention follow-up is available for 34 patients. Patency was preserved in 65 % and amputation had to be performed in 12 %. After 12 months, 12 patients are followed and 67 % of interventions have remained patent. Conclusions: The Rotarex system enables fast and efficient treatment of peripheral arterial thromboembolic occlusions. In most cases, this method is capable of replacing thrombolysis.
Substanzkonsum und substanzbezogene Störungen
Authors: Pabst Alexander , Piontek Daniela , Kraus Ludwig , Müller Stefanie
Published: November 2010

Ziel: Untersucht wurden Prävalenzen des Konsums sowie substanzbezogener Störungen von illegalen Drogen, Alkohol, Tabakwaren und Medikamenten. Methodik: Die Stichprobe des Epidemiologischen Suchtsurveys (ESA) 2009 umfasst 8.030 Personen im Alter zwischen 18 und 64 Jahren und wurde in einem zweistufigen Verfahren auf Grundlage der Einwohnermelderegister zufällig gezogen. Die Befragung erfolgte schriftlich, telefonisch bzw. über das Internet und erzielte eine Antwortrate von 50.1 %. Ergebnisse: In den letzten 12 Monaten haben 4.8 % der Befragten Cannabis, 0.8 % Kokain und 0.7 % Amphetamine konsumiert. Bezogen auf die letzten 30 Tage gaben 59.9 % einen risikoarmen und 16.5 % einen riskanten Alkoholkonsum an. Als aktuelle Raucher (30-Tage-Prävalenz) konnten 29.2 % der Befragten klassifiziert werden. Mit einer 12-Monats-Prävalenz von 61.6 % waren Schmerzmittel die am häufigsten eingenommenen Medikamente. Schätzungen zu substanzbezogenen Störungen ergaben für Cannabisabhängigkeit 1.2 % und für Nikotinabhängigkeit 6.3 %. Für problematischen Alkoholkonsum wurden 19.0 % und für problematischen Medikamentengebrauch 4.0 % ermittelt. Schlussfolgerungen: Die Ergebnisse belegen eine hohe gesundheitspolitische Bedeutung des Substanzkonsums in Deutschland. Um negative Konsequenzen des Konsumverhaltens zu vermeiden, sind eine effektive Versorgung behandlungsbedürftiger Personen sowie frühzeitige Präventionsbemühungen erforderlich.
Editorial
Authors: Petermann Franz , Jäncke Lutz
Published: November 2010

Das heutige Wissen um die adulte Neurogenese verdeutlicht, dass eine Wechselwirkung biologischer und umweltbezogener Faktoren lebenslang zu strukturellen Veränderungen führen kann. Dies erschwert die Suche nach eindeutigen Ursache-Wirkungsprinzipien. Hinzu kommt, dass für viele psychische Störungen ein hohes Maß an Heterogenität vorliegt und für diverse Subtypen auch unterschiedliche Ursachen/Folgen anzunehmen sind. Neuropsychologische Befunde erweitern unsere Krankheitsmodelle bei der Betrachtung biopsychosozialer Risiko- und Schutzfaktoren.
Perinatale und frühkindliche Schlaganfälle
Authors: Daseking Monika , Schlagheck Wiebke , Petermann Franz
Published: November 2010

Kinder mit frühen Schlaganfällen weisen vielfältige Entwicklungsprobleme und kognitive Beeinträchtigungen auf. In der Vorhersage von kognitiven Beeinträchtigungen erweisen sich das Alter zum Zeitpunkt des Schlaganfalls (perinatale vs. frühkindlich) sowie der Abstand zwischen Schlaganfall und Untersuchungszeitpunkt als besondere Einflussvariablen. Die vorliegende Studie berichtet anhand der Daten von 70 Kindern mit perinatalem und frühkindlichem Schlaganfall Ergebnisse zur kognitiven Entwicklung im Kindergartenalter. Die Kinder mit perinatalem Schlaganfall weisen in allen Entwicklungsbereichen die schwächeren Leistungen auf. So bleiben nicht nur die Mittelwerte in den Leistungstests signifikant hinter denen von Kindern mit frühkindlichen Schlaganfällen zurück, sondern liegen auch unterhalb des durchschnittlichen Leistungsbereichs der jeweiligen Normstichproben. Damit wird deutlich, dass umfangreiche Rehabilitationsbemühungen erforderlich sind, um Kindern mit einem perinatalen Schlaganfall einen erfolgversprechenden Übergang in die Schule zu ermöglichen.
Lese- und Rechtschreibstörung im Schulalter
Authors: Schulte-Körne Gerd
Published: November 2010

Die Lese-Rechtschreibstörung gehört mit einer Prävalenz um 5 % zu den häufigsten umschriebenen Entwicklungsstörungen, die nachhaltig die schulische, psychische und soziale Entwicklung der Kinder und Jugendlichen beeinflusst. Zu den neuropsychologisch am besten untersuchten Faktoren, die bedeutsam für den Lese- und Rechtschreibprozess sind, gehören phonologische Bewusstheit und orthographisches Wissen. Die neurobiologischen Korrelate dieser Faktoren konnten in einem Netzwerk des Lesens erfolgreich beschrieben werden. Funktionseinschränkungen wurden in der linken Hemisphäre des Gehirns in der visuellen Wortformregion, dem Gyrus temporalis superior und inferior frontalen Gehirnregionen wiederholt beschrieben.
Comment on “What Is the Atmosphere's Effect on Earth's Surface Temperature?”
Authors: Stanhill Gerald
Published: November 2010

A recent Forum pointed out an important, widespread error in the calculation of the atmosphere's role in raising the surface temperature of the Earth above its radiative equilibrium [Zeng, 2010]. Unfortunately, by using the inaccurate and misleading terms “greenhouse effect” and “greenhouse gases,” this Forum continues to spread an even more widespread and ancient error.
Further Comment on “What Is the Atmosphere's Effect on Earth's Surface Temperature?”
Authors: Weart Spencer R.
Published: November 2010

Xubin Zeng (Eos, 91(15), 134–135, 13 April 2010) has done a valuable service in pointing out that the conventional statement that Earth would be at a temperature of −18°C if its atmosphere were removed cannot be sustained, because the calculation incorporates an albedo that includes clouds. However, his own calculation of −5°C is equally untenable because it uses the current surface albedo.
Genetic tests: between risks and opportunities
Authors: Ramani Donato , Saviane Chiara
Published: November 2010

Commercial genetic testing challenges traditional medical practice and the doctor–patient relationship. Neurodegenerative diseases may serve as the practical and ethical testing ground for the application of genomics to medicine.
Characterization of GSK2334470, a novel and highly specific inhibitor of PDK1
Authors: Najafov Ayaz , Sommer Eeva M. , Axten Jeffrey M. , Deyoung M. Phillip , Alessi Dario R.
Published: November 2010

PDK1 (3-phosphoinositide-dependent protein kinase 1) activates a group of protein kinases belonging to the AGC [PKA (protein kinase A)/PKG (protein kinase G)/PKC (protein kinase C)]-kinase family that play important roles in mediating diverse biological processes. Many cancer-driving mutations induce activation of PDK1 targets including Akt, S6K (p70 ribosomal S6 kinase) and SGK (serum- and glucocorticoid-induced protein kinase). In the present paper, we describe the small molecule GSK2334470, which inhibits PDK1 with an IC50 of ~10 nM, but does not suppress the activity of 93 other protein kinases including 13 AGC-kinases most related to PDK1 at 500-fold higher concentrations. Addition of GSK2334470 to HEK (human embryonic kidney)-293, U87 or MEF (mouse embryonic fibroblast) cells ablated T-loop residue phosphorylation and activation of SGK isoforms and S6K1 induced by serum or IGF1 (insulin-like growth factor 1). GSK2334470 also inhibited T-loop phosphorylation and activation of Akt, but was more efficient at inhibiting Akt in response to stimuli such as serum that activated the PI3K (phosphoinositide 3-kinase) pathway weakly. GSK2334470 inhibited activation of an Akt1 mutant lacking the PH domain (pleckstrin homology domain) more potently than full-length Akt1, suggesting that GSK2334470 is more effective at inhibiting PDK1 substrates that are activated in the cytosol rather than at the plasma membrane. Consistent with this, GSK2334470 inhibited Akt activation in knock-in embryonic stem cells expressing a mutant of PDK1 that is unable to interact with phosphoinositides more potently than in wild-type cells. GSK2334470 also suppressed T-loop phosphorylation and activation of RSK2 (p90 ribosomal S6 kinase 2), another PDK1 target activated by the ERK (extracellular-signal-regulated kinase) pathway. However, prolonged treatment of cells with inhibitor was required to observe inhibition of RSK2, indicating that PDK1 substrates possess distinct T-loop dephosphorylation kinetics. Our data define how PDK1 inhibitors affect AGC signalling pathways and suggest that GSK2334470 will be a useful tool for delineating the roles of PDK1 in biological processes.
Angiotensin-(1–7) infusion is associated with increased blood pressure and adverse cardiac remodelling in rats with subtotal nephrectomy
Authors: Velkoska Elena , Dean Rachael G. , Griggs Karen , Burchill Luke , Burrell Louise M.
Published: November 2010

ACE (angiotensin-converting enzyme) 2 is expressed in the heart and kidney and metabolizes Ang (angiotensin) II to Ang-(1–7) a peptide that acts via the Ang-(1–7) or mas receptor. The aim of the present study was to assess the effect of Ang-(1–7) on blood pressure and cardiac remodelling in a rat model of renal mass ablation. Male SD (Sprague–Dawley) rats underwent STNx (subtotal nephrectomy) and were treated for 10 days with vehicle, the ACE inhibitor ramipril (oral 1 mg·kg−1 of body weight·day−1) or Ang-(1–7) (subcutaneous 24 μg·kg−1 of body weight·h−1) (all n = 15 per group). A control group (n = 10) of sham-operated rats were also studied. STNx rats were hypertensive (P<0.01) with renal impairment (P<0.001), cardiac hypertrophy (P<0.001) and fibrosis (P<0.05), and increased cardiac ACE (P<0.001) and ACE2 activity (P<0.05). Ramipril reduced blood pressure (P<0.01), improved cardiac hypertrophy (P<0.001) and inhibited cardiac ACE (P<0.001). By contrast, Ang-(1–7) infusion in STNx was associated with further increases in blood pressure (P<0.05), cardiac hypertrophy (P<0.05) and fibrosis (P<0.01). Ang-(1–7) infusion also increased cardiac ACE activity (P<0.001) and reduced cardiac ACE2 activity (P<0.05) compared with STNx-vehicle rats. Our results add to the increasing evidence that Ang-(1–7) may have deleterious cardiovascular effects in kidney failure and highlight the need for further in vivo studies of the ACE2/Ang-(1–7)/mas receptor axis in kidney disease.
Hunting for fibrosis progression genes in hepatitis C patients
Authors: Invernizzi Pietro
Published: November 2010

HCV (hepatitis C virus) represents one of the major health problems worldwide, as almost 170 million people are infected and most of these develop a chronic disease, often with the progression to cirrhosis and its complications. In the present issue of Clinical Science, Iwata and co-workers report an association between a variant of a gene regulating bile acid levels, ABCB11 1331T>C (where ABCB11 encodes ATP-binding cassette, subfamily B, member 11), and the progression to cirrhosis in patients with HCV, but not in fatty liver patients. They correlate this genetic variant with increased serum bile acid levels as a marker of cholestasis. These findings have important implications for researchers working to dissect the molecular mechanisms underlying liver fibrogenesis and disease progression; however, the implications for clinical hepatologists are less immediate.