bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Having attacked a number of features that some views have regarded as constitutive of the concept of ‘the self’, Davidson now discusses those features that he thinks should replace the traditional ones. He especially emphasizes the special authority that our propositional attitudes are equipped with and the irreducible role of indexical sentences. In Davidson's opinion, the thoughts expressed by indexical sentences relate us to the world around us and thereby form a constitutive component of our concept of the self.
Rational Animals
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter is an attempt to specify some of the constitutive components of human rationality. Drawing on conclusions previously defended (mainly in his essay ‘Thought and Talk’), Davidson argues for the mutual dependence of thought and language. Given the characteristically holistic framework of the discussion, Davidson regards this conclusion as being established by antecedent empirical knowledge rather than by considerations that secure a necessary footing.
Empirical Content
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Explores Schlick's and Neurath's dispute over the foundations of empirical knowledge, and thereby equips ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ with commentary and historical background. Davidson works out the difficulties involved in drawing epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning and argues that there are promising hints of a better theory, akin to Davidson's coherence theory of truth and knowledge, in the logical positivists’ writings.
Epistemology and Truth
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

As the title of the paper suggests, chapter 12 discusses the relation between epistemology and truth. Davidson criticizes two main (and apparently opposing) positions according to which truth is, respectively, radically non‐epistemic or to be spelled out in modal epistemological terms. Instead, Davidson suggests a partial reconciliation of the two positions by arguing that truth has to be in one way or other connected to true belief.
Epistemology Externalized
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

Attempts to radically revise the still predominant Cartesian underpinnings of epistemological theorizing, by attacking the belief that all knowledge is and all epistemology should be primarily based on first‐person knowledge. Davidson holds that a necessary condition of knowledge is third‐person knowledge, in the sense that all kinds of knowledge presuppose the concept of objective truth and such a concept is only accessible to communicative creatures that share a common world of objects in space and time. Knowledge, therefore, far from arising through moves from the subjective to the objective, emerges holistically.
Three Varieties of Knowledge
Authors: Davidson Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter could function as an introduction to the current collection of Davidson's papers, in that it deals with the three types of knowledge the book is concerned with, namely knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of an external reality. Davidson's main aim is to sketch the project of examining the nature and status of each type of knowledge and the connections between them, and he hints at the answers he is about to give.
The Heirs of Plato
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

In this book, John Dillon investigates the development of the Academy in the 70 years after Plato's death in 347 b.c. He discusses the careers of the Academy's chief figures, in particular, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo, the three successive heads in the period generally known as ‘The Old Academy’. Dillon's main thesis is that these philosophers set the agenda for the major intellectual traditions that were to follow: Speusippus stimulated developments in what became known as ‘Neopythagoreanism’, which itself was to prove fruitful for ‘Neoplatonism’; Xenocrates initiated much of what we call ‘Middle Platonism’; while Polemo anticipated the chief ethical doctrines of the Stoics. Dillon proposes to argue that the basis of all later Platonism, and to some extent Stoicism as well, is laid down during the period in question by a series of innovations in, and consolidations of, Plato's teachings; furthermore, Dillon considers how, and how much, of the philosophy of Aristotle was absorbed into Platonism. Ch. 1 discusses the physical and organizational structure of the Academy under Plato, focussing on problems to do with the actual location of the Academy and on the methods, goals, and themes of its research. Special attention is paid to the relationship between Plato's written and unwritten doctrines. Ch. 2, 3, and 4 are devoted to individual studies of lives and doctrines of the three heads of the Academy after Plato: Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo respectively. Ch. 5 discusses the contributions of four minor figures connected with the Academy: Philippus of Opus, Hermodorus of Syracuse, Heraclides of Pontus, and Crantor of Soli. In the Epilogue, Dillon discusses the relations of the Academy with both Peripatos and the Stoa.
The Riddle of the Academy
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Dillon explores a number of questions regarding, firstly, the nature and structure of the Academy that Plato founded and bequeathed to his successors, and, secondly, the nature and doctrines he arrived at before his death. After examining the evidence, Dillon concludes that Plato purchased a private property, with its own garden, in the late 380s, located alongside a grove, or public park, which was outside the walls of Athens, and which was called the Academy after the hero for whom the park was named: Hekademos. Academic discussion in the last stage of Plato's career centres on the Theory of Forms as Form Numbers; in logic, the doctrine of diairesis or the logical divisions; and, in Ethics, the understanding of the virtues as means between extremes of ‘too much’ and ‘too little’; also important is the distinction made in the Laws between goods of the soul and external goods. Much of the physical or cosmological speculation of the Old Academy is focussed on the interpretation of the nest of problems presented by the Timaeus, which is not taken literally by Plato's successors; and on the attempt to reconcile this with Plato's oral teachings, i.e. the Unwritten doctrines.
Speusippus and the Search for an Adequate System of Principles
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

Plato's nephew Speusippus was already over 60 when he assumed the headship of the Academy on his uncle's death, and his reign was short (347–339). Aristotle is our principle source for the Old Academy (i.e. prior to 322), which is problematic, as Aristotle tends to be rather tendentious in the way he treats his contemporaries; but apart from Aristotle's evidence, we have very little to go on regarding Speusippus’ philosophy, as only two of his works, On Pythagorean Numbers and the Letter to Philip survive. The most original and influential aspect of Speusippus’ thought is his discussion of the nature of the first principles, in particular, his development of Plato's notions of the One and the indefinite Dyad (which Speusippus called the ‘One and Multiplicity’), and his attempt to explain how the totality of being came to be from these principles. Speusippus was innovative in his understanding of Platonic cosmology, as presented in the Timaeus, although his innovations, e.g. the notion of World‐Soul, did not make their mark until the Neopythagoreanism of the first two centuries A.D. Speusippus’ ideas on happiness and pleasure were already criticized by Plato in the Philebus, but he may have influenced the stoics on this point; while Aristotle, despite his barbed comments, probably learnt a lot from Speusippus’ logic, which included work on genera and species, and on ambiguity as the source of Sophist fallacies.
Xenocrates and the Systematization of Platonism
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

Xenocrates, who had accompanied Plato on one of his visits to Sicily, became head of the Academy in 339 B.C. Xenocrates stays close to what he takes to be the cosmological doctrine of Plato's Timaeus; indeed Xenocrates’ doctrine may be seen as something of a retreat from Speusippus’ radical position, perhaps in response to Aristotle's criticisms. Dillon reconstructs Xenocrates's cosmological or metaphysical scheme as comprising a pair of first principles, the Monad, or Nous, and the Dyad, or the ‘Everflowing’, to which the Pythagorean tetraktys corresponds as the active counterpart; and a World‐Soul, which receives the forms from the Supreme God's mind, and projects them upon the physical plane. In Logic, Xenocrates remained faithful to Platonic logic, rejecting the Aristotelian categories, although he did argue that the species was prior to the genus; in Ethics, while keen to formalize Plato's teachings, Xenocrates ends up with a position very similar to Aristotle's, in that he emphasizes the needs of the body as well as those of the soul. Xenocrates had a dominant effect on the development of Platonism, because he systematized what he took to be Plato's philosophical system, thus laying the foundation for the ‘Platonic’ system of philosophy; it is Xenocrates’ definition of Form, for instance, which became the standard definition of a Platonic Form.
Polemo, Champion of EthicalPraxis
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

Polemo, who was converted to philosophy after hearing Xenocrates lecture, presided over the Academy for much longer than either of his predecessors (from 314–276 B.C.). Polemo is best known for emphasizing the practical application of ethics over theory, and for his doctrine that the purpose of life is to live ‘in conformity with nature’, which he may well have adopted from Xenocrates. While it is difficult to disentangle Polemo's ethical theory from that of Xenocrates, Polemo tends to be credited with an increase in the austerity of ethical theory, which anticipates and may have influenced the ethical theory of Zeno of Citium, who had been a pupil of Polemo. There is also a possibility that Polemo anticipated Stoic materialism. Dillon draws upon Cicero's De Finibus to point to many subtle distinctions between the ethics of Polemo and Zeno; nevertheless, it is clear that Polemo was an important bridge between Platonism and Stoicism.
Minor Figures
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Dillon considers four minor figures of the Academy: Philippus of Opus, Hermodorus of Syracuse, Heraclides of Pontus, who were all students of Plato; and Crantor of Soli, a contemporary of Polemo. Philippus is best known for editing Plato's Laws for publication, and he was the real author of the Epinomis: as a philosopher, he is distinguished for elevating the rational World‐Soul to the status of the supreme principle, and for identifying astronomy as the true path to the knowledge of God. Hermodorus composed a book on Plato's life and works; philosophically he is interesting for his interpretation of Plato's first principles, and in particular, his denial that matter, or the Unlimited, is a principle. Heraclides, who supervised the Academy during Plato's third trip to Sicily, was nevertheless remarkably free from academic orthodoxy: his most distinctive philosophical position is that the soul is light, or aether, and therefore a quasi‐material substance. Cantor's major contribution to the development of Platonism is the idea of the commentary; Proclus identifies him as the first commentator, because he wrote an exposition, as distinct from an exegesis, of Plato's Timaeus.
Epilogue: Arcesilaus and the Turn to Scepticism
Authors: Dillon John
Published: October 2003

Arcesilaus of Pitane succeeded Crates as head of the Academy in the mid‐270s, and is credited with instigating the era of the ‘sceptical’ Academy. Dillon shows that this radical change of direction was in fact inspired by Arcesilaus’ desire to return to the original spirit and methods of Plato's philosophy. Faced with the challenge of Zeno of Citium's nascent Stoicism, which in many ways was a logical development and intellectual heir of Platonism, Arcesilaus revived the dialectic of Plato's ‘Socratic’ dialogues and attacked the Stoic belief in the certainty of sense perception. Arcesilaus thus reinvigorated the sceptical and aporetic strand of his Socratic–Platonic heritage, as represented in a work like the Theaetetus, while eschewing the Timaeus‐inspired cosmological speculation that had characterized the preceding 70 years.
Images of Excellence
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

The book is an examination of Plato's philosophy of art. Central to the book are Plato's arguments in the Republic that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are of questionable value, on the grounds that they do not arise from knowledge on the part of artists, and that they can be harmful because they appeal to the emotional side of the psyche. The book suggests that Plato has a better case for his views than has often been claimed, given the context of his ethics and epistemology, and that his views challenge much of what is accepted as good art in modern thought. To understand Plato's position, his views on inspiration, craft expertise (techne), beauty, moral education, and representation (mimesis) are examined through the discussion of a number of his early and middle‐period dialogues. It is argued that Plato's later writings do not significantly retract the critical views of the arts found in the Republic. Throughout, links are made with recent philosophical aesthetics, and the question posed is what defence of art modern thinking can or should make against Plato.
Rhapsody
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Discusses Plato's dialogue Ion, in which it is claimed that poets and performers of poetry succeed in their arts not by knowledge or the expertise (techne) of a craftsman, but by inspiration. A link is suggested with modern views, stemming from romanticism, that art is the domain of irrationality and genius rather than the application of generalizable rational principles. However, Plato gives a low evaluation of poetry because of its alleged distance from this kind of knowledge.
Arts, Crafts, and the Production of Pleasure
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Argues that Plato has the beginnings of a conception of aesthetic pleasure, but that he does not use it to assign autonomous value to the arts. In his Gorgias, Plato argues that rhetoric and music are not genuine exercises of craft‐like expertise (techne) because they do not work on general principles that can specify what is a good outcome and what steps will achieve it. Instead, he alleges, these art forms simply aim at providing pleasure or gratification to their audience. Aiming at pleasure is seen as a haphazard enterprise, quite distinct from aiming at the good, which requires generalizable knowledge rationally applied. In the later dialogue, Philebus Plato gives a complex account of pleasure, including some discussions of a ‘pure’ pleasure that is arguably aesthetic.
The Formation of Character
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Concerns Plato's discussion in Republic Books 2 and 3 of the role of the arts in education in his ideal city. He advocates widespread censorship of poetry, including the works of Homer, on the grounds that poetry should represent only the truth and be conducive to developing a moral character that fits the young for their role as rulers or guardians in the city. The other part of the discussion concerns mimesis, here construed as dramatic enactment or characterization, which Plato argues can diversify the individual too much and detract from a concern with what is ethically good. The chapter argues that Plato's assessment of the nature of poetry and its psychological impact is less problematic than his political programme, in which not only the arts are severely regulated.
Mimēsis
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Gives an analysis of the concept of mimesis, which in Book 10 of the Republic emerges as a wider concept of artistic representation, applicable to poetry and the visual arts. The practitioner of mimesis makes no real thing, for Plato, but only the image or appearance of a thing of some kind. The chapter also argues that there is no need to believe that Plato limits the arts to a crude or mechanical copying or to the making of literal illusions.
Against Mimetic Poetry
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

A discussion of the arguments against mimetic poetry in Republic Book 10. Plato criticizes poetry and drama, especially tragedy and Homer, on the grounds that, in engaging the emotions, they appeal to an unstable emotional part of the psyche and subvert reason, while yet seeming to proceed from, and transmit, knowledge. He is concerned that poets are regarded as possessing and conveying knowledge in the sphere of ethics, when in fact they have only an ability to produce pleasurable and convincing ‘images of excellence’. On the basis of epistemological and psychological arguments, mimetic poetry is banished from the ideal city.
Myth, Madness, Pleasure, and Play
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

In works later than the Republic, Plato continues to pursue many of the themes so far discussed in the book. In Phaedrus, he addresses issues concerned with rhetoric, poetry, and inspiration, seeming to give a more positive account. It is argued that his view is, however, not radically different from that taken in the Republic. Other later dialogues contain systematic discussions of mimesis and techne. The late dialogue Laws revisits the question of the place of the arts in the life of a community.
Plato and the Philosophy of Art
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Raises the question how to give a ‘defence of art’ against Plato's criticisms, drawing on elements of modern philosophy of art. It is argued that modern thinking is unclear over the nature of art: in particular, as to whether we should grant it the kind of ethical value and cognitive seriousness that Plato faults it for not having, or whether we should defend art's autonomy on the grounds of its providing aesthetic value. Plato is clearer than much modern thinking as to what he requires from art, and because of this, can still prompt us to think profoundly about the nature and value of art.
Providence and the Problem of Evil
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Unless he has very strong reason for supposing that there is a God, a theist needs a theodicy (or at least needs to begin to develop one) in order justifiably to believe that there is a God. Part 2 of this book describes the good goals that God might be seeking to produce in his Universe—beauty; creatures having knowledge (in a largely internalist sense), having their good desires satisfied, with a free will to do actions that promote each others’ well‐being, being of use to others, and worshipping God. Part 3 shows how the possibility of moral evil, and the actual occurrence of natural evil (providing knowledge of possible good and bad actions, and the scope for good response) are necessary to secure these ends. God has the right to allow some creatures to suffer for the benefit of others, so long as he compensates them in this life or after death. The expected value of allowing the evils in order to achieve the good goals is positive.
The Need for Theodicy
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

In order for God to allow a bad state E to occur, (1) he must have the right to allow it (or an equally bad state) to occur, (2) to allow it must be the only morally permissible way in which he can bring about a good G, (3) God does everything else logically possible to bring about G, and (4) the expected value thereby of allowing E is positive. Unless he has strong prior reasons for believing that there is a God, a theist needs to have (or have to begin to construct) such a theodicy with respect to all known evils, explaining why a good God would allow them to occur, if his belief that there is a God is to be rational.
Theodicy in Christian Tradition
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

There have been various strands of theodicy in Christian tradition—that evil is simply the absence of good, that evil was caused by the Fall of Adam or of the angels, that human free will requires the possibility of moral evil, and that evil is needed to promote the growth of souls. The first strand is worthless, and the value of the second has been exaggerated; but the other two strands are important.
Beauty
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Part 2 (Chs. 3–6) of this book considers the goals that a good God would have in creating a universe. This chapter considers the goal of making a beautiful universe.
Thought and Feeling
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

A second goal that a good God would have would be to create creatures with knowledge, thought, desires for what is good and which get satisfied, and have rightly formed emotions.
Action
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

A third goal that a good God would have would be to give creatures the free will to choose between good and bad (or, alternatively, spontaneous desires to do what is good), so that by their actions they can make great differences to the characters, powers, and knowledge of themselves and each other. One way of doing this is to create finite embodied creatures. It is a great good for someone to be of use to others by their actions (chosen or unchosen) or by what they suffer.
Worship
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

A final goal that a good God would have in creating would be to create creatures who could know, interact with, and worship their holy creator. He will thus sometimes answer their petitionary prayers, and give them the opportunity to discover and love him or to fail to do so, before giving to those who take that opportunity to enjoy the Beatific Vision of himself in life after death.
The Range of Moral Evil; and Responsibility
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

If God is to give to creatures significant responsibility for themselves and others, he must allow them to damage their characters, and to cause pain and ignorance. It is good that humans, who do not seek to benefit their fellow humans, should have the temptations of sloth—to hurt them by doing nothing, as well as the more serious temptation of actively causing them hurt.
Natural Evil and the Scope for Response
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The ‘higher‐order goods’ defence claims that natural evils (bad states caused by processes over which humans have no control) give humans the opportunity to react to them in the right way by actions, which otherwise they would have little opportunity to perform. Humans can show courage and sympathy in response to suffering, and by doing such good actions in difficult circumstances, gradually form their characters for good. It is good too that animals should have some opportunity for heroic actions.
Natural Evil and the Possibility of Knowledge
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

The opportunity to study natural processes that produce good and bad effects gives humans the opportunity to acquire knowledge of how to produce good and bad effects themselves, and thus to make the efficacious choices, which the ‘free will defence’ sees as such a good thing. If God gave us this knowledge in some other way, this would give us too evident an awareness of his presence.
God's Right
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

God has the right to allow humans to suffer if this suffering is logically necessary to achieve a great good so long as he compensates them for that suffering. The great good of being of use by suffering in this way provides at least partial compensation. But if there are humans whose life on earth is on balance bad, God must compensate them in a life after death.
Weighing Good Against Bad
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

When we appreciate the great value of life itself, of having opportunities to make significant choices, and of being of use (a value stressed in the New Testament), we can see that for God to allow evils of the limited kind that occur on earth is compatible with God's perfect goodness. On a Christian view, the point of this life is to form ourselves so as to be capable of enjoying the Beatific Vision of God in a life after death.
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.
Rationality
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Distinguishes logic from the theory of reasoning, rejects special epistemic foundations in favour of a general epistemological conservatism and discusses the role in reasoning of coherence and simplicity. The difference between theoretical and practical reasoning is discussed, as is the role that practical considerations play in theoretical reasoning.
Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Simplicity is used in curve‐fitting and can be illustrated by Goodman's ‘new riddle of induction.’ Taking the simplicity of a hypothesis to depend entirely on the simplicity of the way it is represented does not work, because simplicity of representation is too dependent on the method of representation, and any hypothesis can be represented simply. An alternative ‘semantic’ theory also has problems. A ‘computational’ theory is defended that considers how easy it is to use a hypothesis to get answers to questions in which one is interested.
Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Discusses how to explain the distinction between epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and conservatism. After noting difficulties with trying to explain epistemic reasons in terms of connections with truth or the goal of believing what is true, the chapter discusses issues about the nature of probability, suggesting that epistemic reasons connect with conditional probability in a way that non‐epistemic reasons do not.
The Death of Meaning
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Provides a sympathetic account of Quine's rejection of analyticity, language‐independent meanings, and other intensional objects. Explains Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation in terms of the example of various ways to translate number theory to set theory. Elaborates a positive Quinean theory of meaning, which puts weight on translation, where translation is not a strict equivalence relation.
Doubts About Conceptual Analysis
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

A response to a paper by Frank Jackson. Although philosophers sometimes defend certain ‘analyses’ as analytic or a priori truths, such analyses are far from obviously true and are defended inductively. Contrary to Jackson's claim, the rejection of analyticity is based on consideration of central cases.
Analyticity Regained?
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Comments on a defense of analyticity by Paul Boghossian that appeals to linguistic convention.
Three Levels of Meaning
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Three conceptions of meaning of meaning can be distinguished — meaning as conceptual role, meaning as communicated thought and meaning as speech‐act potential. At one time, these were conceived as competing conceptions, but it is better to see them as potentially compatible theories that are concerned with different aspects or levels of meaning.
Language, Thought, and Communication
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Consider the idea that a natural language like English is in the first instance incorporated into the system of representation one thinks with. This ‘incorporation’ view is compared with a translation or ‘decoding’ view of communication. Compositional semantics makes sense only given the implausible decoding view.
Language Learning
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Discusses the relevance to philosophy of language of the fact that children can understand more than they can themselves say. Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation is to be rejected, but considerations of translation do not argue against the incorporation view.
Meaning and Semantics
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Rejects several arguments for the claim that a theory of meaning ought to take the form of a theory of truth. Sketches a conceptual role semantics in which the meanings of logical constants are determined in large part by implications involving those logical constants, where implication is to be explained in terms of truth. Although truth‐conditions are sometimes relevant to meaning, this is only the case for the meanings of logical constants.
(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

The use of symbols in calculation and other thinking is to be distinguished from the use of symbols in communication. Grice's analysis of speaker meaning fails for certain uses of symbols in calculation. Words and concepts have uses, not sentences or whole thoughts. Concepts have uses or functional roles in perception; inference and practical reasoning are to be understood in terms of ways an organism functions in relation to a presumed normal environment.
Wide Functionalism
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Psychological explanation is a kind of functional explanation, like some biological explanation, where the relevant functions tend to have to do with perceiving and acting in relation to the environment. Pain serves as a kind of alarm system; perception allows an organism to get information about the environment etc. Although there are defenders of a narrow, more solipsistic psychological functionalism, the dominant trend has involved the wider version. In any event, the wider functionalism is clearly more plausible and methodological solipsism in psychology is incoherent.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Replies to three related arguments against wide functionalism. The first says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for such an awareness in a purely functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third holds that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.
Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to Meaning and Mind
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

There are two approaches to the understanding of the experiences and uses of language of others. One emphasizes translation. The other restricts itself to an objective description of use and function. Each approach by itself must leave something out. We need both approaches.
Explaining Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?
Moral Relativism Defended
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

A version of moral relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that morality derives from an implicit agreement and moral judgements are true or false only in relation to such an agreement. This thesis explains otherwise puzzling aspects of some of our own moral views, in particular, why we think that it is more important to avoid harm to others than to help others avoid harm. Traditional objections to implicit agreement theories can be met.
What Is Moral Relativism?
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Discusses three forms of moral relativism—normative moral relativism, moral judgement relativism, and meta‐ethical relativism. After discussing objections to each view, it is shown that the objections can all be met and that all three versions of moral relativism are correct.
Justice and Moral Bargaining
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Substantive principles of justice derive from actual agreements that result from an actual usually tacit moral bargaining, contrary to arguments by Gewirth, Nagel, and Kohlberg, for thinking that all rational or normal people must recognize certain requirements of justice. Mere hypothetical agreements could not give people reasons. Moral bargaining explains moral concern and respect in a way that does not undermine the moral force of the principles we accept. Being more explicit about moral bargaining will improve moral argument and lead to greater tolerance.
Is There a Single True Morality?
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Although people appear to be quite evenly divided between moral relativists and moral absolutists, there is a tendency to suppose that the view one takes about relativism is obviously correct and that who takes the opposite view is just denying the plain truth. Some of the disagreement can be traced to methodology and to the attitude one takes about how ethics fits with a scientific conception of the world. Those who take it to be important how one's moral views cohere with science tend to be moral relativists; those who do not take that issue to be all important tend to be moral absolutists.
Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Concerned with what would or would not be a good or worthwhile or desirable states of affairs, as when one says, ‘It would be a good thing if P’. Some theorists have attempted to provide such a theory by providing a theory of intrinsic value. It is not clear whether a theory of intrinsic value can be developed along the lines of what has been the standard account. If one is to develop such a theory, one will need to introduce a notion of ‘basic intrinsic value’ in addition to the notion of ‘intrinsic value’. Several different theories of intrinsic value may account for the same judgements concerning desirability and it may be arbitrary to choose one such theory over another.
Desired Desires
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Argues against appeals to second‐order desires in order to explain freedom of the will, valuing, or values. Further points are that positive intentions are reflexive or self‐referential, that intrinsic desires are not just non‐instrumental desires, that to value something is in part to want it, that there is sometimes a difference between believing that something is good and valuing it, and that there is a difference between valuing something and having something as one of your values.
Intrinsic Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Good news might be desirable to you even though it is not of value to you. Something not valued intrinsically might be valued as contributing to a larger whole that is valued intrinsically in the sense that the whole with that part is intrinsically preferred to the whole without that part. These points shed light on the value of some good news, to retributive punishment, and Dworkin's account of sacred value.
Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Problems are raised for attempts to derive at least some of morality from a conception of human flourishing and those character traits or virtues that would contribute to human flourishing.
Explaining Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Discusses ways in which people's moral values might be explained, starting with Hume's account of our different attitudes toward chastity in men and in women, Hume's somewhat utilitarian explanation of moral sentiments in general, various theories of moral development, explanations of aspects of morality in terms of natural selection, Posner's explanation of aspects of morality in terms of wealth maximization, explanations that appeal to principles like Double Effect, and sociological and historical explanations of aspects of morality.
Moral Philosophy and Linguistics
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: October 2003

Languages are at least as diverse on the surface as moralities, yet linguistics thrives by studying linguistic universals. Perhaps linguistics provides a model for a theory of moral universals.
Knowledge in a Social World
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

A certain conception of social epistemology is articulated and applied to numerous social arenas. This conception retains epistemology's traditional interest in truth and reliable inquiry, but replaces its customary emphasis on solitary knowers with a focus on social institutions and interpersonal practices. Postmodernism, science studies, and pragmatism pose worries about the meaning and attainability of objective truth and knowledge. After laying these concerns to rest, “veritistic” social epistemology is advanced as a normative discipline seeking practices and institutions that would best foster knowledge. The book explores forms and methods of communication, including norms of argumentation, information technology, and institutional structures governing speech and the media. Social dimensions of knowledge quests are explored in science, law, democracy, and education. The book examines popular topics in contemporary epistemology such as testimony and Bayesianism, while breaking new ground by connecting epistemology with historically unrelated branches of philosophy such as political and legal theory. Democracy's success, it is argued, requires the attainment of certain epistemic desiderata, and substantive justice depends on well‐chosen procedures of legal evidence.
Epistemology and Postmodern Resistance
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

Both natural curiosity and practical concerns fuel our desire for true belief, i.e., knowledge (in a weak sense). The value of true belief can trumped by other values, but it is of special concern to epistemology. Many writers and contemporary movements (social constructivism, postmodernism, pragmatism) repudiate realist truth as a viable criterion of epistemic phenomena. This chapter responds to six criticisms of truth‐based epistemology, criticisms that appeal to a consensus theory of truth, the social construction of facts, the alleged unknowability of truth, and the denial of epistemic privilege.
Truth
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

This chapter surveys several philosophical approaches to the meaning or nature of truth, including instrumentalism, epistemic or verificationist approaches, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. Different versions of the first three approaches are examined, and each faces serious difficulties. The virtues of the correspondence theory are emphasized, including its up‐front acceptance of “worldly” truth‐makers. However, deflationism is also compatible with a realist conception of truth, and if it could surmount its technical problems, it might be acceptable.
The Framework
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

From a veritistic standpoint, true belief is better than either ignorance or error, and higher degrees of belief in truths are better than lower degrees of belief, at least on topics of interest. These sorts of states have “fundamental” veritistic value (in varying degrees), and practices that produce changes in veritistically valuable states have “instrumental” veritistic value (V‐value). Veritistic social epistemology evaluates actual and possible social practices in terms of instrumental V‐value. This conception is preferable to rivals such as consensus consequentialism, utility consequentialism, and pure proceduralism. The feasibility of veritistic analysis is defended, worries about circularity are allayed, and various technical details are explored.
The Technology and Economics of Communication
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

Innovations in communication technology make a difference to states of knowledge by changing the “message infosphere”: the set of messages that are sent and selectively retrieved by senders or receivers. Expanding the message infosphere, however, does not guarantee improvements in social knowledge. That depends on the veritistic quality of the messages sent and the ability of receivers to sift the true from the false, the relevant from the irrelevant. This chapter reviews highlights of the digital revolution in terms of its impact on knowledge. The economics of communication regimes is also veritistically significant, as illustrated by the influence owners and advertisers exert on message content in the mass media.
Speech Regulation and the Marketplace of Ideas
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

A classical rationale for the freedom of speech, traceable to John Milton and John Stuart Mill, is the argument that truth will emerge in an open marketplace of ideas. Given an economic twist, it is claimed that the competitive market for speech will maximize truth just as competitive markets in other goods are best in economic terms. If government does not interfere with this market, knowledge will be maximized. Is economic theory sustaining this argument? No, this chapter traces the reasons why no such simple formula for the (non‐) regulation of speech is implied by economic theory, especially when market failures are taken into account.
Science
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

Some sociologists of science debunk science by describing it as historically contingent convention or the politics of persuasion. Another challenge to science's pretensions to truth is a reminder of the motivation that often drives scientific research, viz., desire for credit from one's peers. This challenge is addressed by showing that, under natural assumptions of credit assignment, credit‐driven motivation will still lead researchers to perform experiments that can lead to expected increases in knowledge. Science also depends on deference to authorities, and the chapter concludes with an analysis of the ability of novices to recognize genuine authorities.
Law
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

The fundamental aim of legal adjudication is to render substantive justice, but this requires true judgements to be made about material (nonlegal) facts. What institutional provisions for the disposition of evidence and the rendering of judgements will generate the highest ratio of true judgements? The chapter compares the civil‐law system of the Continent with the Anglo‐American adversarial system, pinpointing several aspects of the adversarial system that pose substantial risks of distorting the truth. For example, adversarial control of proceedings implies that lawyers in cross‐examination can make opposing witnesses appear unreliable or untrustworthy even when they are not, thereby leading the jury in the direction of error. If neutral judges conduct witness interrogation, as they do in the civil‐law system, this potential distortion is avoided.
Democracy
Authors: Goldman Alvin I.
Published: October 2003

Epistemic theories of democracy suggest that a prime virtue of democracy is the prospect of making good decisions by utilizing the collective knowledge of the electorate. This chapter argues that good democratic decision‐making depends on voters’ possessing accurate electoral knowledge. In any given race, each voter confronts his/her “core voter question”, i.e., “which candidate, if elected, would produce the best outcomes according to my standards?” It is shown that the more voters have core knowledge (rather than core ignorance or error), the more likely it is they will elect officials whose decisional outputs will serve a majority's interests. A key question facing democracies is: What reporting practices by the press or policies vis‐à‐vis campaign advertising would maximize voters’ core knowledge?
Being Known
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

The Integration Challenge is the task of reconciling a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them. In any domain for which the challenge is difficult, we may revise either our conception of the epistemology of that domain, or our conception of its metaphysics, or both. Successfully meeting the Integration Challenge involves the development of a theory of understanding with both metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. Understanding involves an integrated grasp both of truth conditions, and, via a theory of possession conditions, and of circumstances in which one can come to know that certain of those conditions obtain. Two different models for meeting the Integration Challenge can be developed: the model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles. A model of the first kind is developed for a realistic account of our understanding of past‐tense contents. A model of the second kind is developed for our understanding of contents involving metaphysical necessity; an account that treats modal statements as not mind‐dependent, but not as involving Lewisian modal realism. The Integration Challenge is also addressed for various classical and recent problems of philosophy: the nature of one's knowledge of the contents of one's own mental states; the distinctive nature of first‐person knowledge; and the classical problem of the freedom of the will.
Truth, Content, and the Epistemic
Authors: Peacocke Christopher
Published: October 2003

Some concepts can be individuated partly or wholly in terms of the conditions for knowing certain contents containing those concepts (‘the Linking Thesis’). For these concepts, the conditions for outright judgement mentioned in their possession conditions suffice both for the truth of the contents in question and for the knowledge of those contents. Proper analysis of these conditions provides a means of meeting the Integration Challenge in cases in which the Linking Thesis holds. The model of constitutive causal sensitivity and the model of implicitly known principles are distinguished. Indicators of which model is appropriate for a given domain include a priori status, the role of causal explanation of knowledgeable judgement about the domain, and the role of principles concerning the identity of properties.