bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Objectivization forces the requirement of a high likelihood that an informant will be right if she is to be classified as a good one, but this does not, argues Craig, equal 1, for that figure has little basis in practical life. Nevertheless, the example of a lottery, and, in particular, the claim that one will not win, brings closer to our real experience the idea that one may not always be advised to act on information that has a chance of less than 1 of being true. A similar push towards this stringent idea is sometimes exerted by the wish to draw inferences from multiple premises and to be able to rely on the result. However, though real situations can require a very high likelihood, they do not force us to set it at 1; that final push comes from reflection lying outside the framework of everyday practice.
Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

The concept of knowledge is a concept formed and operated by active beings who need to direct their activity. This, according to Craig, explains two features associated with the concept of knowledge: (1) the fact that we want true beliefs (for if we are genuinely to direct our activity, we must have true beliefs about the consequences of such and such an action or inaction), and (2) the fact that we actively seek the truth and therefore try to ‘track’ it, rather than merely hoping to hit it.
Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
Authors: Craig Edward
Published: October 2003

Discusses what it is to know X (e.g. to know Fred) rather than to know whether p. The early parts give reasons for assimilating ‘knows Fred’ to ‘knows whether p’, while giving methodological justification for not regarding this assimilation as hindered by the fact that some languages translate ‘know’ differently in the two cases. The claim that ‘knows X’ means, at core, being sensorily acquainted with X or being in the company of X, is rejected; possessing certain types of information about X is what the core meaning consists in. Later parts relate ‘knows X’ to ‘knows how to’, suggesting that it implies a capacity. Clarification of the relationship between this assimilation and the earlier one is left to the next section.
Interaction
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.
Identity
Authors: Ameriks Karl
Published: October 2003

This chapter concerns Kant's views on the issue of personal identity, the topic of the third paralogism. This is an especially complicated topic for Kant because it immediately requires bringing together non‐temporal (noumenal) and temporal (phenomenal) aspects of the self: something is one and the same ‘person’ only if in a certain way it is one and the same mental substance over time. I note the striking diversity of readings of Kant's argument here—some suggest the issue is primarily epistemological and empirical, others see that it is metaphysical. I also show how the range of recent analytic discussions of personal identity mirrors the basic options that Kant anticipated, at least implicitly.
Iamblichus' Work on Pythagoreanism: Title, Plan, the First Four Books
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, the first four (extant) books of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism are examined as relating to a unitary scheme. Iamblichus's interpretation of the role of Pythagoras in the revelation of philosophy, of the nature of Pythagorean philosophy, and of the place and nature of mathematics and of arithmetic in that philosophy are described.
Mathematics and Metaphysics in Proclus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J.
Published: October 2003

Proclus's use of geometry in developing a science of metaphysics (called ‘dialectic’ or ‘theology’), in its method and conclusions, is described through a study of his Elements of Theology and of his other major metaphysical works.
Arguments from Consciousness and Morality
Authors: Swinburne Richard
Published: October 2003

Humans are conscious beings – they have mental events – sensations, thoughts, and intentions. Science might one day produce a list of correlations between mental and brain events, but it is immensely improbable that science would ever be able to explain why a particular mental event was correlated with a particular brain event, or with any event at all. Theism can explain this in terms of God choosing to being about certain kinds of mental life. By contrast, moral truths being in essence necessary truths, have no possible grounds for a good argument to God.
The Constructibility Quantifiers
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Sketches the basic idea for the approach taken. A mathematical system is to be developed in which the existential theorems of traditional mathematics are to be replaced by constructibility theorems: where, in traditional mathematics, it is asserted that such and such exists, it will be asserted in this system that something or other can be constructed. Thus, constructibility quantifiers are introduced in this chapter as logical constants of formal systems. The logic of the constructibility quantifier is explained in each case via possible worlds semantics, which is used as a didactic or heuristic device.
Constructibility and Open‐Sentences
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

Since the constructibility quantifiers, used in the mathematical system to be developed, will all assert the constructibility of open sentences, an explanation is given of the kinds of open sentences that will be asserted to be constructible. Each of these open sentences will be assigned to a specific ‘level’, depending on the kind of objects or open sentences that can satisfy it, thus providing the basis for the Simple Type Theoretical characteristic of the system to be developed. The satisfaction relation under discussion will be taken to be a primitive of the system. The relevance of Quine's objections to modality for this system is taken up.
Cardinality and Number Theory
Authors: Chihara Charles S.
Published: October 2003

The fundamentals of cardinality theory are laid out within the framework of the Constructibility Theory. Finite cardinality theory is developed along the lines described by Frege in his Foundations of Arithmetic, and applications of theory are discussed.
T.H.Green
Authors: Hylton Peter
Published: October 2003

A discussion of the neo‐Hegelian metaphysics of T. H. Green. In particular, the author emphasizes Green's criticism of empiricism and of his Hegelian reading of Kant, which is opposed to the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding.
Mathematics without Numbers
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey
Published: October 2003

Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.
Maximization: Some Evaluative Problems
Authors: Stocker Michael
Published: October 2003

Addresses the central claim of maximization that we must do what is best. It is argued that maximization is neither morally nor rationally required. Maximization cannot adequately deal with the ethical concepts of superogation, self‐regard, amusement, and friendship; furthermore, the central claims of moral and rational choice do not involve maximization. Moral and rational appraisal of a choice of action requires evaluating its contribution to a whole (a life or a project), where the whole need not be the best available, only good enough.
The Necessity of Natures
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

I argue that each object has many essences (sometimes referred to as ‘hacceities’ or ‘natures’). A property E is an essence of object x if and only if E is essential to x and in every possible world everything distinct from x has the complement of E essentially. I then elaborate on the nature of essences and examine the relationship between essences and proper names. My view is that John Stuart Mill was mistaken in his belief that proper names do not express properties. In fact, proper names express essences and I make use of this fact in addressing the famous problem of Hesperus and Phosphorus.
God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.
From Ignorance to Irrationality
Authors: Unger Peter
Published: October 2003

Defends the claim that skepticism about knowledge entails skepticism about rationality. It argues that if anybody is ever justified or reasonable in believing anything, then he or she must know something to be so. Hence, if nobody can ever know anything, nobody can ever be justified or reasonable in believing anything either. This argument is supported by considerations about the entailments of sentences of the form “S's noun is that p.” Even if only a limited form of skepticism about knowledge is endorsed, the chapter argues, the principle that it should be possible for one to know one's reasons yields a far‐reaching skepticism about rationality.
Descriptivism and the Error Theory
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral words, and their logic, lead us to believe that moral judgements are universal or universalizable prescriptions that are either overriding or related to overriding principles. When ordinary people use moral words, they are not intending to ascribe objective prescriptive properties to action. They are, in fact, intending to ascribe ordinary descriptive properties like the property of being, or the breaking of a promise. However, as a result of this state of affairs, individuals can very easily fall into the conceptual error of thinking that there are objective prescriptive properties. Hare seeks to show why philosophers make this mistake.
Interpersonal Comparison
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Provides a defence against the objection to utilitarianism that it requires individuals to make comparisons between utilities to different people. It is argued that an adequate response to the problem concerning our knowledge about other people's experiences can be achieved if we focus on interpersonal comparisons of degrees or strengths of preferences, and not pleasures or any other kind of utilities. We need to be impartial between our own and other people's preferences, not altruistic in its correct sense of giving more weight to the preference of others. We have to treat everyone as one, including ourselves: to do to others as we wish they should do to us.
Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life
Authors: Stroud Barry
Published: October 2003

Chapter 2 focuses on the challenge to the sceptical reasoning that what Descartes says is a requirement for everyday knowledge of the world – and would destroy all everyday knowledge of the world if it were a genuine requirement because it cannot be fulfilled – is in fact no such requirement at all.

A particularly persuasive and influential version of that line of criticism is found in the work of J. L. Austin, who in his paper ‘Other Minds’ tries to show how the traditional philosophical investigation of knowledge significantly deviates from our normal practices. Austin observes that in our ordinary assessments of claims to knowledge we always presuppose a specific doubt about some specific knowledge claim, and he insists that a specific doubt about a specific knowledge claim can only be raised if there is some reason to think that a specific possibility that would undermine that knowledge claim actually obtains; if so, it would seem that there is no room for doubts about knowledge claims that rest on purely abstract considerations about possiblities that might obtain, or cannot be excluded, and therefore no room for a completely general scepticism of the kind Descartes envisions.

Drawing a distinction between conditions of assertion and conditions of truth, Stroud argues that even if we grant the point Austin makes about our ordinary assessments of knowledge it still does not follow that Descartes deviates in his reasoning from our everyday standards and procedures and changes or distorts the meaning of the word ‘know’. The requirement that there must be some ‘special reason’ for thinking a certain possibility might obtain should be seen as a requirement on the appropriate or reasonable assertion of knowledge, but not necessarily as a requirement on knowledge itself; and if the possibility that one is dreaming is a possibility that one must know not to obtain if one is to know something about the world, as the sceptic can plausibly insist it is, then one will simply not know that thing about the world if one has not been able to eliminate that possibility – even though it might be completely inappropriate or unreasonable on particular occasions in everyday life to insist on ruling out that possibility before saying that one knows.
Close‐up: The Later System
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Outlines Wittgenstein's later philosophy in the light of the interpretations sketched in Ch. 2. The concepts of solipsism and the ego provide the basis on which Pears introduces crucial elements of Wittgenstein's later thought, such as rule‐following and the possibility of a logically private language.
Logical Atomism
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Pears examines and evaluates the metaphysics of the Tractatus and scrutinizes the relevant differences between Russell's and Wittgenstein's versions of logical atomism. Pears criticizes Wittgenstein's logical atomism for its separatist nature, but argues that the decisive step towards holism is foreshadowed in the early work.
The Basic Realism of the Tractatus
Authors: Pears David
Published: October 2003

Is concerned with the relation between names and objects in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. Pears deduces from the conclusions of the previous chapter his prominent ‘basic realism’ interpretation of the Tractatus, which is based on the idea that once a name has been attached to an object, the nature of the object takes over and controls the logical behaviour of the name, and defends it against rival interpretations.
Authority and Reason
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

This chapter addresses the question: what is authority? Authority cannot simply be regarded as a right to rule, as Robert Ladenson has claimed. The recognitional conception of authority, which regards authoritative utterances as reasons to believe that one has a reason to act as instructed, fails to explain why authoritative utterances are also reasons for action. The inspirational conception of authority describes authority in terms of love, but this conception cannot account for authorities that are not ‘loved’ by those whom it rules, nor can it account for the conceptual distinctness of love and authority. Authoritative utterances provide content independent reasons for action, as do promises, threats, offers, and requests, in the sense that there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason.
Right‐Based Moralities
Authors: Raz Joseph
Published: October 2003

It is argued that rights alone cannot provide a complete account of morality. Personal autonomy is incompatible with moral individualism and strong rights against coercion, since autonomy requires not just options but acceptable options, requiring the provision of collective goods. Collective goods are public goods that are intrinsically valuable, public goods being goods that are valuable for many people in society. There are, then, fundamental moral duties that do not derive from rights. We should not seek to draw a fundamental distinction between moral principles concerned with one's personal goals and those independently concerned with others.
The Development of Sidgwick's Thought
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

This chapter presents an overview of Henry Sidgwick’s life and the factors that influenced his writing of The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick’s mature views on religion, morality, and philosophic methods were formed even before he wrote the book. The details of his development are of interest in their own right.
The Cambridge Moralists
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

The views of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was neither a teacher at Cambridge nor primarily a philosopher, influenced the thought of the university’s moral philosophers. Coleridge’s thoughts were first represented strongly at Cambridge by Julius Hare, a classical scholar who taught as a Fellow of Trinity from 1822 to 1832. Hare was a close friend of Whewell, and a teacher of F.D. Maurice, the most important exponent of Coleridgean religious thinking in Victorian Britain. Whewell was followed as Knight-bridge Professor by John Grote, who in turn was succeeded by Maurice. All these men were known by Sidgwick.
Reason and Action
Authors: Schneewind J. B.
Published: October 2003

This chapter examines Sidgwick’s views on morality as expressed in the different editions of The Methods of Ethics. Sidgwick holds that morality involves an ‘elementary concept’ which is unique to it and cannot be defined. Thus, it follows that the basic premises of ethical reasoning cannot be deduced from non-ethical premises.
Willing and Acting
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Presents Schopenhauer's claims about the relation between willing and action. Willing is for him fundamentally a moving of the body, not a mental volition that causes bodily movement. His theory here is clearly opposed to dualism. Human action is distinguished from other bodily events by its having motives as its causes. The chapter suggests that this discussion of will and action had some influence on Wittgenstein and thereby perhaps on more recent action theory.
Remarks on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche
Authors: Janaway Christopher
Published: October 2003

Gives some of the background to the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, and then examines the influence on each of them of Schopenhauer's conceptions of self and will. In Wittgenstein's early notebooks and Tractatus, the notion of the subject's not being a part of the world and of happiness lying in not willing are distinctly Schopenhauerian notions. Wittgenstein's later pre‐occupation with the relation of willing and acting show a lasting influence from Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's case, The Birth of Tragedy is transparently influenced by Schopenhauer's views on the thing in itself and individuation, while the later doctrine of will to power is designed as an alternative to Schopenhauer's will to life. Nietzsche's later philosophy makes continual reference to Schopenhauer even in its determination to oppose metaphysics and the unitary ‘I’.
Universals
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

The existence of universals (general properties or kinds) is disputed because of fears of myth‐making, and argued against on the grounds that they are dispensable as objects of reference and that they lack general principles of identity. Ripostes: they are unavoidable as objects of thought, and each, as essence, is its own individual principle of identity. The fundamental ground of the continuing dispute is the strong human disposition to believe that to exist at all is to exist as an object in time in the natural world; whereas universals are abstract objects of thought, exemplified in the natural world and related inter se by conceptual necessities.
Direct Singular Reference: Intended Reference Andactual Reference
Authors: Strawson P. F.
Published: October 2003

In the ideal (and normal) case of successful direct reference to an individual particular (1) there exists a particular individual that the speaker means (i.e. intends to refer to), (2) the singular term (name or description) the speaker uses applies to that individual, (3) there is an individual the audience would, in the circumstances, naturally take to be the object of reference, and (4) the latter is identical with the intended object of reference. There can occur cases of failure of one or more of these conditions. Various possibilities of description of such cases are listed. What is important is not to choose between them but to understand both the normal case and these possibilities.
Taxonomy
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the meaning and logical properties of moral words. Hare offers a ‘Taxonomy’ of ethical theories in the sense of a classification into genera and differentia, beginning with what he sees as the basic dichotomy in ethical theory between descriptivism and non‐descriptivism. The difference between descriptivist and non‐descriptivist ethical theories is that, according to the former, the meaning of moral statements is determined entirely by their truth conditions; the latter deny that this is so. Hare divides descriptivism into ‘Naturalism’ (Ch. 4) and ‘Intuitionism’ (Ch. 5), and non‐descriptivism into ‘Emotivism’ (Ch. 6) and ‘Rationalism’ (Ch. 7).
Naturalism
Authors: Hare R. M.
Published: October 2003

Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected.
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Considers the increasingly popular, so‐called ‘No‐Miracles’ argument that we do have a valid inductive argument for supposing that our current theories, at any rate in physics, are substantially, if not wholly, true: it would be incredibly improbable that theories very far from the truth could make such extremely precise predictions, verified experimentally up to one part in a billion. Such ‘miracles’ of chance agreement can clearly be ruled out as themselves too improbable to be true. This apparently plausible argument is examined carefully and shown to consist in a number of separate steps, all of which are fallacious.
Deductivism
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Discusses the view, often called Deductivism, put forward independently by the philosopher Karl Popper and the statistician and geneticist R. A. Fisher, that deductive logic suffices to tell us which is the best theory in the light of observational data. In Fisher's case, this view supported his theory of significance tests. Deductivism purports to be a radical solution of Hume's problem because, according to it, there are no specifically inductive inferences. This, and the related views of the statisticians Neyman and Pearson, are shown to be untenable.
Chance and Probability
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: October 2003

Considers the nature of chance and its role in statistical hypotheses. It is argued that the best way to understand chance is as tendency, naturally measured by the frequency in repeated trials of the occurrence of the event in question. The relationship with von Mises's theory is briefly examined. It is shown how, via Bayes's Theorem, statistical data can support or undermine chance hypotheses even though there is no deductive relation between the hypotheses and the data.
Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

Even before Hegel, philosophers opposed to Kant's dualism of reason and inclination, and to other similar dualistic oppositions of morality and self‐interest, have looked to the ancient Greeks for an alternative conception of ethics and the human personality that is to be guided by it. For this purpose these philosophers fixed on Greek ethics, stressing its harmonizing eudaimonist elements and its use of the notion of virtue.

This book argues to the contrary that if we picture Greek ethics as simply a form of harmonizing eudaimonism we seriously distort its true character. First, Greek ethics is far too variegated to fit under a single such label. Second, the Classical ideas of Plato and Aristotle contain important elements that are characteristic neither of harmonizing eudaimonism nor of an ethics of virtue. Greek thinkers did not as a group believe in a consistency of one's happiness with one's conformity to ethical norms or with a full regard for the happiness of others. Rather they took seriously the idea that ethical standards can possess a rational force that does not derive from any contribution that they might make to one's own well‐being.

Even Plato and Aristotle believed that under certain circumstances there can be a genuine clash between obeying ethical standards and achieving one's greatest good. The project of ruling out any such clash was developed not in the Classical period but rather in the Stoic ethics of the Third Century. Thus Greek ethics does not eliminate ethical dualisms, and many Greek views exhibit many of the same contours, and the same deep philosophical problem of the conflict of individual and social good, as modern ethics does.
Individual Good and Deliberative Conflict in Aristotle
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

Although Aristotle's ethics is rightly characterized as eudaimonist, in making the happiness of an individual his preeminent aim, it does not adopt the harmonizing eudaimonist position that all constituents of human happiness are consistent with each other. For one thing, he holds that there can be conflicts between friends. In addition, he maintains that conflicts within happiness can break out, between the value of acting in a morally virtuous way and that of pursuing intellectual virtue or contemplation (theoria). Aristotle thus admits the possibility of conflict within virtue, and therefore within happiness, which is defined as activity in accordance with virtue. He accordingly does not use the notion of virtue, let alone an ethics of virtue, to construct a harmonizing view of happiness.
Conflict and Individual Good in Hellenistic Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas
Published: October 2003

Contrary to the hegelian thought that harmonizing eudaimonism was manifested most fully in the Classical period of Greek ethics, it is in fact the Hellenistic period after Aristotle that shows the most forthright attempts to produce ethical views that do not generate conflicts between rational aims. This is partly the result of the Hellenistic attempts to generate positions that, unlike the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, possess a high degree of systematic coherence. Epicurean hedonism is a case in point, as is Stoic ethics, which goes a considerable way toward eliminating the very idea of a distinction between what is good for oneself and what is good in a global, non‐self‐referential way.
Actuality and Actuality as of a Time
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Characterizes certain notions that are needed for stating the central claim of the book.Facts are to be identified with states of affairs, which are the truth‐makers for true propositions. The concept of a state of affair's existence or actuality should be taken as basic and unanalysable.

The dynamic view of time to be defended requires that not only the concept of actuality simpliciter but also the concept of actuality as of a given time is treated as basic.
Philosophical Objections
Authors: Tooley Michael
Published: October 2003

Discusses several philosophical objections against the view of time defended in the book. Objections against the unreality of the future that relate to bivalence are rejected by denying that disjunction is truth‐functional. The charge that a vicious regress of meta‐times is entailed is shown not to apply to the dynamic view defended here. Mellor's and Dummett's variants of McTaggart's argument against the reality of time are rejected, as are independent arguments of Mellor's against the reality of tensed facts.
Animals That Think
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Explains why Leibniz held that matter cannot think (the grounding principle). His ‘mill’ thought‐experiment and his account of animals; the role of the dominant monad in an animal; the scope of animality in the material world; and corporeal substances are also dealt with in this chapter. An aside: Locke's argument for the existence of a god. A coda: Leibniz's need for, and difficulty in having, a sound concept of confused perception.
Knowledge of Necessity
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Deals with Locke's attack on, and Leibniz's defence of, the belief in innately possessed knowledge. The debate is made more complex when Leibniz introduces the idea of innate dispositions to have knowledge. While Locke attempts to explain modal knowledge without help from innatism Leibniz attempts to explain it with that help. The debate over innately possessed ideas is hard to get into focus because ‘ideas’ is a blurry term.
Secondary Qualities
Authors: Bennett Jonathan
Published: October 2003

Gives an exposition of the view of Descartes and Locke about the nature of secondary qualities. Of the many interpretations of these texts, one is supreme: it fits far more of the texts than any other, it alone satisfies the demands of corpuscularianism, and it alone is true.
The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith
Authors: Evans C. Stephen
Published: October 2003

The story of Jesus of Nazareth, as recounted in the New Testament (incarnational narrative), has always been understood by the Church to be historically true. It is an account of the life, death, and resurrection of a real person, whose links with history are firmly signalled in the creeds of the early Church, which affirm that Jesus ‘suffered under Pontius Pilate’. Contemporary historical scholarship has, however, called into question the reliability of the Church’s version of this story, and thereby raised the question of whether ordinary people can know its historical truth. This book argues that the historicity of the story still matters, and that its religious significance cannot be captured by the category of ‘non-historical myth’. The commonly drawn distinction between the Jesus of faith and the Jesus of history cannot be maintained. The Christ who is the object of faith must be seen as historical; the Jesus who is reconstructed by historical scholarship is always shaped by commitments of faith. A reconsideration of the Enlightenment epistemologies that underlie much historical scholarship shows that historical knowledge of this story is still possible. Such knowledge can be inferential, based on historical evidence. Newer accounts suggest that this knowledge can also be epistemologically basic, although never groundless. A careful look at contemporary New Testament studies, and the philosophical and literary assumptions upon which they rest, shows that this scholarship should not undermine the confidence of lay people who believe that they can know that the Church’s story about Jesus is true.
Critical History and the Supernatural
Authors: Evans C. Stephen
Published: October 2003

A variation on the epistemological objection to special acts of God (miracles) investigated in the previous chapter is the claim that such acts cannot be recognized by anyone who is committed to critical, historical investigation. This kind of argument, which rests on the nature of historical knowledge and critical historical method, is considered in this chapter. If the incarnational narrative necessarily includes such divine actions, then the argument claims that we cannot have historical knowledge of it. The different sections of the chapter are: rationalism about religious knowledge; can the rationalist conception of religious knowledge be defended?; Hans Frei and the character of the biblical narrative; the assumptions of the ‘critical historian’; Troeltsch’s principles of correlation and analogy; and the sociology of knowledge and appeals to authority.
The Incarnational Narrative as Historical: Evidence for Belief
Authors: Evans C. Stephen
Published: October 2003

This chapter is the first of three asking how knowledge of the incarnational narrative might be acquired. To do this an examination is made of two distinct theological traditions that give rather different answers to the question of how Christians gain this historical knowledge: the first, which is examined in the next chapter, gives great emphasis to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; the second, which is the subject of this chapter, puts the central focus on objective evidence, and regards the knowledge of the incarnational story as based on other things that we know or believe. It is commonly claimed that all historical beliefs must be based on evidence, and so it is not surprising that there is a long tradition of Christian apologetics that attempts to show that there is indeed good evidence for Christian beliefs about the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. This is the evidentialist approach, which, philosophically, has often been characterized by at least an implicit acceptance of epistemological internalism, although it is possible for an evidentialist apologetic to be developed that is not committed to internalism. The different sections of the chapter are: Classical examples of the two-stage approach (the first phase is mainly natural theology and attempts to show the reasonableness of believing in a God with at least some characteristics of the Christian faith, the second attempts to show that the events recorded in the Bible are a true revelation of God and his activities); Swinburne’s contemporary evidentialist apologetic; problems with evidentialist accounts; and, conclusions: values and limits of an evidentialist case.
Putting the Two Stories Together
Authors: Evans C. Stephen
Published: October 2003

In the last two chapters an examination was made of two plausible accounts (the evidentialist ‘story’ and the Reformed ‘story’) of how knowledge of the incarnational narrative might be gained; both were shown to have difficulties, although in neither case were they insurmountable. It is suggested here that the fact that these two stories face different kinds of problems is a clue that they are not necessarily designed to do the same job. In fact that they offer complementary answers to different questions, rather than rival answers to the same question (although it is seen later that, in some cases, they may also be seen as offering alternative versions of the same answer to the same question). A proposal is made to understand the two accounts as related in the following way: the Reformed story is the story that the Church tells when it is attempting to understand how Christians gain the knowledge they claim to have; the evidentialist story is the story the Church tells when it is attempting to convince or persuade someone of what it takes to be the truth. This view is a promising one for dealing with the major difficulties of each approach, so there seems to be potential in seeing the two accounts as complementary. A short section at the beginning of this chapter asks whether the Holy Spirit can work through human arguments; the rest of it is devoted to a detailed analysis of the complementarities of the evidentialist and Reformed stories.
Historical Scholarship and the Layperson: A Case Study
Authors: Evans C. Stephen
Published: October 2003

This chapter begins with a brief survey of what has been covered in the book. It then goes on to look at the problem of questions about the truth of the incarnational narrative, pointing out that an attempt to answer such questions is not the same as an account of how the knowledge is gained, and that what is called for here is apologetics; the task of apologetics and the task of understanding how one knows can then be linked by the situation of the possible defeater. To some degree New Testament scholarship that takes a sceptical attitude towards the incarnational narrative is grounded in anti-supernaturalistic assumptions, but a good deal of scepticism is also fuelled by such factors as discrepancies between the four Gospels, and features of the narrative that seem to reflect in a transparent way the needs of the early Church rather than the historical situation in early-first-century Palestine. This difficulty is addressed both in the concluding chapter and in the rest of this chapter, which contains a ‘case study’ of ‘James’, a young man raised in a non-Christian home who is converted to Christianity but subsequently exposed to sceptical claims about the New Testament. After a consideration of what is essential to the incarnational narrative, a number of possible responses that James could make to the sceptical claims against it are considered (on the assumption that James himself lacks the ability to make an informed scholarly judgement himself).
The New Monastic Orders
Authors: Morris Colin
Published: October 2003

The experiments with hermits (Ch. 3) grew into new and elaborate orders, extending throughout Christendom, and these in turn gave rise to fierce controversy with the champions of older orders. With the new orders came a new (and arguably more oppressive) pattern of landowning.
Christianity and Social Ideas
Authors: Morris Colin
Published: October 2003

There was a new element of humanism in twelfth‐century thinking, and with this came a concern for the ordering of an increasingly technical society. The older idea of ‘orders’ in society was increasingly superseded by the idea of ‘estates’. There was a massive commitment to the relief of the poor, and a new theology of marriage was elaborated. Commercial ethics were an important issue, especially the question of usury, and so was the elaboration of an ideal of knighthood.
The Pontificate of Innocent III (1198–1216)
Authors: Morris Colin
Published: October 2003

Innocent was one of the youngest popes ever to be elected and was outstanding among the popes of this period. He built up the Papal State in Italy in its later form, and in his attempt to disrupt Hohenstaufen power, sustained a long civil war in Germany, while elaborating the theory of papal authority and defining the limitations of kingship. He was actively committed to reform of the clergy. He also sponsored the Fourth Crusade and planned the Fifth, while taking steps against heresy in the West. Most aspects of his work were summed up in the huge Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.
The Conciliar Movement
Authors: Hess Hamilton
Published: October 2003

Church councils and synods (terms used in the West and the East, respectively) began as gatherings of leaders and representatives from several church congregations for the resolution of issues of shared concern by discussion and collective decision‐making. From the evidence available to us, such gatherings first appeared during the latter part of the second century, but the practice may have begun earlier. By the third century, strong congregational leadership by bishops had become almost universally established; and, as fully evidenced by the letters of Cyprian of Carthage, councils and synods became occasions for the assembly of neighbouring bishops for deliberation together with the bishop, clergy, and people of the host congregation. The procedures employed at these gatherings were patterned on those of civil government, the most directly influential model having apparently been the Roman Senate. While the strength and effectiveness of episcopal leadership continued to increase, during the third century the clergy and laity of the local congregation where the council or synod was held retained a voice in the proceedings. Two other conciliar styles—dialogic discussion and judicial investigation—were also adopted from civil models to ecclesiastical use during the third and fourth centuries.
The Emergence of Canonical Legislation
Authors: Hess Hamilton
Published: October 2003

Although rule making within the local churches probably began during the second and third centuries, no concrete evidence exists for collective enactments among the churches prior to the fourth century. By the early fourth century, conciliar gatherings, formerly focusing at least partially on local issues, had become exclusively episcopal and were generally concerned with interests on the regional level or beyond. Beginning with the Spanish Council of Elvira (c.309), numerous councils and synods in all parts of Christendom produced series of enactments, which by the end of the fourth century came to be called canons. These councils and synods, which are identified in this chapter by place, date, and pertinent information, were held in a variety of locations in the Greek East, one at Seleucia‐Ctesiphon in the Syriac‐speaking church, numerous cities and towns in Roman North Africa, most notably at Carthage, and in Gaul, Italy, and Spain. The chapter concludes with a description of the growing number of collections of canons, East and West, that were made between the mid‐fourth century and the sixth.
A Summit Observed
Authors: Wilkins John
Published: October 2003

John Wilkins observes that the Resurrection Summit, as the essays in this book show, was concerned to do much more than simply offer a riposte to the reductionist conclusions of the Jesus Seminar. Indeed, evident was the conviction that the full impact of the Resurrection had still not been realized in Christian life and ethics.
Biblical Criticism and the Resurrection
Authors: Alston William P.
Published: October 2003

This paper is a defence of the (by and large) historical accuracy of the resurrection appearance narratives in the Gospels. The defence is carried out not by giving positive argument that this or that feature of the narratives is accurate, but rather by displaying the failure of attempts by NT scholars to show that a particular feature of the narratives (the appearance of the risen Jesus in embodied, perceptible form) is not of historical value. That argument takes the form of a detailed critique of the contentions of one scholar, Reginald Fuller. To the extent that Fuller's treatment can be taken as representative, this essay, if successful, will have removed a crucial obstacle to the rational acceptance of the appearance narratives as factually correct in the main. The essay ends by identifying certain disqualifying features of Fuller's treatment that, it is claimed, are pervasive in twentieth‐century gospel criticism.

Alston presents, in Coakley's view, a convincing case against the dogmatic scepticism of Reginald Fuller's treatment of the bodily resurrection, though he overstates his case, she suggests, in denying significance to the redactional strands of the Gospel‐writers’ thinking. There is also a puzzling continued appeal to the objective historical ‘facts’ of the case granted that Alston explicitly disavows at the outset anything other than an intra‐Christian approach. His overriding concern to support a ‘literal’ bodily resurrection leads him, she believes, to understress some important dimensions of the resurrection accounts on which she urges him to further explication: the ‘atypical’ nature of the risen body, the consequent importance of metaphorical speech in discussing it, the epistemic transformation required in recognizing it, and the gender dimensions possibly implicit in such recognition.
Lines of Enquiry
Authors: Burton Philip
Published: October 2003

What is the status quaestionis in Old Latin studies? Is the term Itala helpful or confusing? What is the relative value of the manuscript evidence vis à vis the patristic citations? Within the field of textual criticism, how far is it legitimate to reconstruct unattested variants?
Origins—The Synoptic Gospels
Authors: Burton Philip
Published: October 2003

Are the extant texts of the Old Latin Synoptic Gospels the result of monogenesis or polygenesis? What is their relationship to the so‐called Itala and Afra text?
Number, Size, and Quantity
Authors: Burton Philip
Published: October 2003

An analysis of the treatment of terms involving number, size, and quantity in the Old Latin Gospels. Such features may appear to the speaker of a given language to be natural categories, but in fact they are often idiomatic and language‐specific. Particular attention is given to rare plurals, pluralia tantum nouns, to specialized senses of singular and plural, and to the treatment of adjectives of size and quantity.