bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Idealism and Its Relation to Science
Authors: Jones Philip Chapin
Published: November 2002

To one not philosophically inclined, idealism seems a rather fantastic doctrine—one quite obviously false. The great Dr. Johnson thought he could adequately refute it by kicking his toe against a stone. In one form or another, however, it has existed wherever men have thought deeply on the fundamental nature of mind and of the external world. One cannot go far in a study of the sources of knowledge without becoming aware that the only immediate evidence of external objects lies in our sense impressions. The mind has no way of putting itself in contact with things external to itself except through the five senses. Up to this point there is fairly general unanimity. The difficulty lies in correctly interpreting this fact.
Decrassifying Dewey
Authors: Bentley Arthur F.
Published: November 2002

Most discussions of Dewey's Logic evade what I take to be its main characteristic. This is its crass display of our intellectual activity as a going process—as living inquiry—literally, biologically, as life. It is the blunt, forthright treatment of even our most formal logical procedures as events occurring within that new world of knowledge that Darwin opened up and that Peirce sketched in his fallibilism, his pragmaticism, and his late-life efforts to attain a functional logic. Lacking are the trailing clouds of logical and philosophical glory; present is only the bare body of inquiry.
The Meanings of “Meaning”
Authors: Gomperz H.
Published: November 2002

The following analysis has been undertaken mainly for the purpose of presenting a sample of a method which, as the writer holds, would, if widely and consistently applied, tend considerably to reduce the number and the significance of epistemological problems. The presuppositions characteristic of this method might be summarized in these five statements:

1)

You cannot make discoveries by changing the meaning of terms.

2)

There is wisdom in common sense since it represents the accumulated experience of the race.

3)

It cannot be impossible to work out common sense into a consistent terminology.

4)

It is when we lack the patience to do this that epistemological problems seem to arise.

5)

But when such a terminology is worked out, it will prove rather disappointing since it will just express, in a somewhat clarified form, what all the world has always been aware of.
Anthropomorphic Tendencies in Positivism
Authors: Hartshorne Charles
Published: November 2002

The theme of this paper is that positivism, whether old or new, is a version of the doctrine of Protagoras, that man is the measure of things. Certain limitations of the human mind are mistaken for characteristics of the universe. I am not primarily concerned with the particular views of actual positivists, but with a general alternative of thought. If no one is in all respects a positivist in the sense criticized in this article, it is certainly true that there are many who would not accept what I suggest is the only satisfactory alternative to positivism; so that existent positivisms will, if my reasoning is correct, consist in more or less arbitrary compromises between the unmitigated form, and the real overcoming, of that anthropomorphic narrowness which all positivism (and some forms of so-called realism and naturalism) involves.
The Probability Concept
Authors: Kemble Edwin C.
Published: November 2002

The writer of this paper is not an expert on probability from either the mathematical or the philosophical side, but a theoretical physicist forced by the exigencies of work in his own field to make his peace with the concept of probability. The present contribution is a sequel to remarks on two different types of probability in a recent paper on the relation between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics.
Psychoanalysis and Psychology
Authors: Kardiner A.
Published: November 2002

Psychoanalysis is the name of a practical psychology, which seeks to make intelligible the aberrant phenomena in the stream of human experience which often are coincident with suffering and ineffectuality. In addition, it has another distinguishing characteristic in that it seeks to create a teachable method for the systematic treatment of these disturbances in adaptation. The application of scientific method to a psychology with these objectives created problems which are unique. These problems stem from the nature of the subject matter with which it deals and the particular objectives of the scientific maneuvers. Its subject matter constitutes material which no other psychology has seen fit to deal with and the objective, namely, therapy, is one which imposes upon this scientific discipline a social responsibility.
Towards a Value Theory of Mind
Authors: Norton William J.
Published: November 2002

My interest is to examine the nature of mind in relation to value, for I suspect that the neglect by the psychologist of the true status of value has deterred his work in two respects: first, that it has prevented a genuine theory of mind's being arrived at, and secondly that it has prevented him in his clinical work from achieving for the individual the fuller expression of mind or self that makes for satisfaction or happiness.
Meanings in Multi-valued Logics
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

The aim of this contribution is to trace the transformation of the meanings of certain terms as the order of the logics in which they appear is raised. By “order of the logic” we simply refer to the number of truth-values characterizing the logic, so that if the number of truth values shows symptoms of traveling to infinity we may speak of the goal as a logic of infinite order.
Note on Liouville's Theorem and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle
Authors: Van Vleck J. H.
Published: November 2002

It is well known that, in classical theory, Liouville's theorem shows that if an ensemble of systems is distributed over a small element of volume in phase space, the ensemble fills a region of equal volume at all later instants of time. In quantum mechanics, the uncertainty principle is associated with the products of the errors in conjugate coordinates and momenta, and such products can be interpreted in terms of volume elements in phase space. Comparison of these two facts leads to the assertion in the interesting volume on “Statistical Mechanics” recently published by J. E. and M. G. Mayer that “The Liouville theorem is essential for the complete understanding of the uncertainty principle.
Protoplasmic Activity
Authors: Heilbrunn L. V.
Published: November 2002

One of the most essential characteristics of living material—indeed, according to many, its most essential characteristic—is the fact that it is irritable. A living cell responds to sudden environmental changes (which we call stimuli), and typically a cell of a given sort responds in a definite and particular way no matter what the nature of the stimulation. Thus when a muscle cell is exposed to sudden heat, to sudden cold, to a sharp mechanical impact, to ultraviolet radiation, or to an electric current, it shortens. Similarly, a nerve fiber responds in its own characteristic way, and this response is independent of the nature of the stimulation. In general, mechanical impacts, ultraviolet radiation, electric shocks, and certain types of chemical substances are stimulating agents for many diverse types of protoplasm and they serve to arouse it to activity. The response of protoplasm to stimulation may be prevented by anesthetics. These are substances (or agents) which nullify the effect of a stimulus without killing or seriously injuring the protoplasm. The remarkable fact is that there are general anesthetics, substances which in much the same concentration can prevent protoplasmic activity in widely different protoplasmic systems. Many fat solvents, such as ether, are general anesthetics. Magnesium salts also behave as anesthetics for many different types of cells.
An Introduction to a Study of Instruments
Authors: Weiss Paul
Published: November 2002

An instrument is any object which makes possible the attainment of desired ends. It is not essential to the being of the instrument that it be inanimate, worked over, or its mode of operation understood. A pigeon can carry a message; a stone as well as a hammer can be employed to break a glass; a child can start an automobile. The instrument need not function in the interests of men, be set into operation by living beings, or even be used at all. Leaves serve some insects as umbrellas do men; the rays of the sun may turn a screw; a new knife has not yet had a chance to cut. A cow is an instrument for the production of milk, a hen for the production of eggs, though neither is inanimate, worked over, nor its operation understood; they can serve the interests of other animals, are able to initiate their own movements, and may not yet have had occasion to produce the desired results. But they are instruments because they are acknowledged means for the production of the desired milk and eggs.
Ignorance and Equal Probability
Authors: Dotterer Ray H.
Published: November 2002

According to the Laplacian definition, the probability of an event is the ratio of “favorable” cases to possible cases. It is obvious that the definition presupposes the equal probability of the possible cases; and to make the definition of probability depend upon the conception of equal probability has the appearance, at least, of a vicious circle. Moreover it is hard to see how we can assure ourselves that each possible case is really no more and no less probable than any other. But even if we define probability as the relative frequency of occurrence of events under a given set of conditions, or of true conclusions from premises of a given type, we still require the conception of equal probability, unless indeed we choose to renounce entirely the mathematical expression and calculation of probabilities.
Some Ambiguities in the Theory of the Conservation of Energy
Authors: Keeton Morris T.
Published: November 2002

The theory of the conservation of energy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics have been described as the two most firmly established “findings” of modern science. Scientists frequently refer to them, not as theories or assumptions, but as facts. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, however, Edmund Montgomery—an unsung Texas philosopher—repeatedly challenged, not only the notions that energy is convertible and is indestructible, but the very idea that there is such a thing as energy which can be imposed ab extra upon matter. For his trouble he received censure and ridicule on every hand; friends usually apologized for this eccentricity of his. Montgomery, of course, has not been entirely alone in criticizing the theory of the conservation of energy, though he was the first to make a persistent attack on the merits of the theory as a principle of scientific explanation. Busse, for one, contended that if, as he thought likely, the theory were incompatible with psychophysical interactionism, it should be discarded on the grounds that the evidence in its behalf is far from compelling. Emergent evolutionists remind us occasionally that it is still within the province of reason to question this great dogma notwithstanding the fact that it is a god at whose feet many scientists worship with blind and jealous devotion. Of all these critics Montgomery attacked the theory where its greatest weaknesses lie.
The Metaphysics of a Logical Empiricist
Authors: Erickson Ralph W.
Published: November 2002

While the members of the school of Logical Empiricism may differ in various details, nearly all of them are opposed to metaphysics on the ground that a scientific metaphysics is the only possible one. All philosophy is to become scientific. This assumption is based on their epistemological criterion of verifiability which appears to be a basic doctrine of this school. The implications of this doctrine have not been worked out in detail by many, but one of the most explicit accounts has been given by A. J. Ayer in his book on Language, Truth and Logic, which can be taken as a representative work in its attack on metaphysics.
Truth, Verifiability, and Propositions about the Future
Authors: Ducasse C. J.
Published: November 2002

The contentions of this paper are essentially two. One is that truth does not consist of verifiability—and still less of verification—in the sense in which this has been maintained by some pragmatists, operationalists, and positivists. The other is that in a certain other sense of “verifiability”, which will be described, truth is the same thing as verifiability. The paper, it should be understood, attempts only to make clear what is and what is not the relation between truth and verifiability. It does not attempt in addition to carry the analysis of verification itself to the point where it would, by implication, furnish a terminal answer to the question, what is truth. The latter task, because of space limitations, must be reserved for some future occasion.
Class and Number
Authors: Ushenko A. P.
Published: November 2002

To bring clearly before the mind what is meant by class and to distinguish this notion from all the notions to which it is allied, is one of the most difficult and important problems of mathematical philosophy.”

When Russell wrote this in 1903, he could illustrate the difficulty of the problem by his own confusing attempt at a solution. He was able to demonstrate the importance of classes for mathematical philosophy in his later work: the definition of cardinal number as a class of classes similar to a given class served him as a cornerstone for the derivation of mathematics from logic.
Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism
Authors: Chisholm Roderick M.
Published: November 2002

Although it is difficult to exaggerate the similarities between the philosophical doctrines of contemporary scientific empiricists and those which were expounded by Sextus Empiricus, the Greek physician and sceptic of the third century A. D., Sextus seems to have been neglected by most historians of empiricism. An account of his position may be of some pertinence at the present time, for a striking parallel can be drawn without any distortion. His most significant contributions are: first, the positivistic and behavioristic theory of signs which he opposed to the metaphysical theory of the Stoics; secondly, his discussion of phenomenalism and its relation to common sense claims to knowledge; and, thirdly, his account of the controversy over the principle of extensionality in logic, where the anticipation of contemporary doctrines is perhaps most remarkable.
Exploitation of the Creators
Authors: Harding T. Swann
Published: November 2002

About a decade ago Sir Frederick Soddy, a distinguished creative scientist, wrote: “The exploiters of the wealth of the world are not its creators. ... So far the pearls of science have been cast before swine, who have given us in return millionaires and slums, armaments and the desolation of war.” Today we see the end-product of this process: Unrealized democracies fighting desperately against a ruthless imperialism based on the most extensive functional exploitation of science and scientists the world has ever known.
The Problems of Thermodynamics
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

The claim of this communication is to present an outline of a program of research and development of thermodynamics. The scope of this and subsequent discussions will be “materialistic,” by which the author means a combination of both formal and experimental aspects.
The Microcoulomb Experiment
Authors: Ehrenhaft Felix
Published: November 2002

The present paper deals with the determination of the size and charge of a single submicroscopic particle, measured in a small horizontal condenser of a diameter of approximately 8 mm., using the author's method first stated April 1910. To obtain the highest sensitivity, author used solid particles (spheres) of an order of magnitude under 3 × 10–5 cm. and found charges less than that of the electron. Various objections were raised against his findings, namely that the particles investigated were not spheres, and that their density was not that of the macroscopic substance, so that his findings of charges less than the electronic charge were merely imaginary. The author has succeeded in precipitating and measuring a particle after having observed it in the condenser under normal and also very high gas pressures. The particles were shown to be perfect spheres. A new method is indicated whereby it is possible to determine the size of sub-microscopic spheres by pushing together two equal spheres with a micromanipulator; the two diffraction disks overlap and render it very easy to determine the actual size. It is also possible to show that the density of each individual sphere is that of the macroscopic substance, since it can be computed easily from the velocity of fall at high gas pressures (according to Stokes' law). These two data being accurately determined, the author still found charges considerably less than the electronic charge, and the deviations are too great to be accounted for by errors of observation. The reason that the author has used a solid substance (red amorphous Se) and not oil, which is a liquid, was in the first place, that liquids evaporate, and therefore do not yield correct results, and secondly, because liquid spheres are not certain to preserve their sphericity when precipitated. Thus charges less than that of the electron are to be considered as actually existing.
Is There “True Magnetism” or Not?
Authors: Ehrenhaft Felix , Banet Leo
Published: November 2002

According to generally accepted views every material body has always just as much North as South magnetism, meaning that the total value of the North and South magnetism is always zero (div H = 0). One says therefore that there is no “true magnetism”. A body directs itself in the direction of the magnetic lines of force like a compass needle but it does not move from its place. On the other hand, it is known that there are electrically charged bodies (positive or negative electric ions) which move in homogeneous electric fields along the lines of force. There is thus a preponderance of positive or negative electricity on ions. One says also that there exists “true electricity”. A movement of charged matter in a homogeneous field is called a current. Consequently until now electric currents were known to exist, but no magnetic currents.
On the Postulates of Empiricism
Authors: Malisoff William Marias
Published: November 2002

In undertaking a discussion of the postulates of empiricism, I am confronted by the necessity of being empirical concerning the very postulates themselves. Were those postulates directly accessible to the average mind it would hardly be necessary to enter upon an analysis the success of which seems but a remote possibility even to one who has spent years in the effort to trace the priceless ingredient of the method of experiment in the cheap madness of scientific success. How these postulates reveal themselves to more than the average mind would, of course, be very difficult for me to surmise, except by an ambitious extrapolation. It would have to be an extrapolation of the kind which telescopes a multitude of small rational steps into one swift unerring instinctive flight to the goal of goals. Yet, though genius with one intuitive glance may perceive the postulates as revelation—why not grant that there may be seers who can contemplate eternal objects unblinkingly?—it would still have to descend to mundane means to inform the average mind of its transcendental perceptions. Must not everyone indeed attend to the demands of the average mind?
Modes of Scientific Explanation
Authors: Benjamin A. Cornelius
Published: November 2002

I suppose it is generally agreed that the task of science is to render intelligible, or in some way account for, the objects and events of our experience. Usually we say that the job of science is to explain. While this is a satisfactory formulation for most purposes, it hides a difficulty. What is meant by “explanation”? The many interpretations of this word divide scientists and philosophers of science into sharply differentiated schools. For some “explanation” means answering the question, Why?; for others it means merely describing. For some it means finding causes; for others it means finding effects or abandoning entirely the search for causes and effects. For some it means employing quantitative methods only; for others it means supplementing or replacing quantitative methods by qualitative. For some it means interpreting or understanding; for others it means merely adjusting oneself in a practical way.
Conventions and Norms
Authors: Bowdery George J.
Published: November 2002

The problem of this paper is the discovery of criteria to identify conventions and the description of some of the more general properties of conventions with particular reference to scientific inquiry. Numerous specialized methodological investigations testify to the importance of conventions in inquiry, but none provide a general account of their operation. This paper aims to provide a necessary, if not sufficient, basis for such an account. The discussion falls into three parts: (I) common senses of the term ‘convention’, (II) a provisional formulation of conditions under which a certain type of behavior, which we shall call conventional, occurs, as well as a description of its characters, and (III) a brief consideration of one context of inquiry in which it appears.
Rigidity, Force and Physical Geometry
Authors: Weinberg Carlton B.
Published: November 2002

From the desire to find support and confirmation for our personal sensory observations, and from the human interest in sharing our experiences with others, there emerges a basic principle of scientific method: We demand the possibility of intelligible communication and agreement concerning individuals' sensory perceptions in particular and their experiences in general. This requirement is made both for the natural and social sciences. The raw material offered for logical organization must be capable of exhibiting an inter-subjective character—such material, or protocols, must be acceptable in common to all concerned. And it must be acceptable for logical organization or systematization in some science.
Causality and Retribution
Authors: Kelsen Hans
Published: November 2002

If we are to accept the results of modern physics and the significance ascribed to them by eminent exponents of this most exact of all natural sciences, we are in the midst of an important transformation of our conception of the universe. The notion that the law of causality absolutely determines all events has been shaken, and if this law is not to be entirely eliminated from scientific thinking, its formulation must at least be essentially modified. In the course of this controversy the question arises as to the source of the belief that events are determined by an absolute law, that is, the origin of the assumption, which we take for granted, that each event must be the necessary effect of a cause according to an inviolable law. We must try to show how the belief in causality has arisen in the evolution of human thought.
Umbrellaology, or, Methodology in Social Science
Authors: Somerville John
Published: November 2002

Let us invoke philosophic license for a moment to suppose you receive the following letter:

“Dear Sir:

I am taking the liberty of calling upon you to be the judge in a dispute between me and an acquaintance who is no longer a friend. The question at issue is this: Is my creation, umbrellaology, a science? Allow me to explain this situation. For the past eighteen years, assisted by a few faithful disciples, I have been collecting materials on a subject hitherto almost wholly neglected by scientists, the umbrella. The results of my investigations to date are embodied in the nine volumes which I am sending to you under separate cover. Pending their receipt, let me describe to you briefly the nature of their contents and the method I pursued in compiling them. I began on the Island of Manhattan. Proceeding block by block, house by house, family by family and individual by individual I ascertained 1) the number of umbrellas possessed, 2) their size, 3) their weight, 4) their color. Having covered Manhattan after many years, I eventually extended the survey to the other boroughs of the City of New York, and at length completed the entire city. Thus I was ready to carry forward the work to the rest of the state and indeed the rest of the United States and the whole known world.
Physics and the Problem of Historico-sociological Laws
Authors: Zilsel Edgar
Published: November 2002

The question as to the existence of laws in history has frequently been discussed. A new discussion may yet be useful, since some misconceptions based on incorrect comparisons with the natural sciences have been brought forward by both advocates and opponents of historical laws. We shall try to clarify the problem by applying a few ideas familiar to physicists and astronomers to the conditions peculiar to history. Physics is the most mature of all empirical sciences as to method. In physics the law-concept has been used for three hundred years. It may be assumed, therefore, that most of the difficulties in its application to other fields have their physical counterpart and can be clarified most easily with the help of physical concepts. A few preliminary examples of historical laws will be given towards the end of the article.
Social Insight, Nuance, and Mind-Types: A Polar Hypothesis
Authors: Humphrey Norman D.
Published: November 2002

The complexity of social data has been a barrier which sociology has seemingly been unable to surmount. Consequently sociology, like other social sciences, has tended to divide itself into groups advocating different emphases in approach, concerning themselves respectively with the “quantitative” or “qualitative” aspects of social data. These two camps may be seen to diverge along distinct lines, the former approaching material from what is conceived to be a “scientific” frame of reference, posing problems which—it is hoped—will be “explained” by the mathematical arrangement of materials; whereas the latter constructs questions the answer to which will make for “understanding”—ordinarily of behavior—through verbal symbolizations. Explanation usually is accomplished through the achievement of a formula—if couched in mathematical terms it is viewed as the highest order—and this group views the achievement of “understanding” a useless procedure, for—since “understanding” is not mathematically exposited—it is necessarily incapable of being validated. On the other hand, he of the group desirous to understand behavior, finds the problems posed by the “positivist” irrelevant to the larger problems in which his interest lies, and unenlightening for all of the devious steps taken to arrive at a solution; more in the manner than in the spirit of science.
The Cosmological System of Pierre Bayle
Authors: Carnus Juliette
Published: November 2002

The philosopher whose work best represents the type of thought and expresses the aspirations of the French writers of the eighteenth century is, beyond any doubt, Pierre Bayle (1647-1706). Not so well known as many of the others, it was he, nevertheless, who started the dialectic movement of philosophic thought which was very characteristic of that era. Furthermore, in his extensive writings, he accumulated material from which his successors could draw freely and copiously.
On the Forces Between Positive Ions and Neutral Molecules
Authors: Margenau Henry
Published: November 2002

In theories of the mobilities of ions in gases a rather precise knowledge is required of the forces which are called into play when an ion approaches a neutral molecule; for it is by virtue of these forces that ions are deflected from their paths and that their drift along the electric force is impeded. Again, the current question whether ions, in their motion through a gas, form “clusters”, that is, whether they surround themselves by one or even more layers of neutral molecules, can be decided theoretically only on the basis of a rather precise knowledge of the interactions.
The Neutrino Concept
Authors: Stern Alexander W.
Published: November 2002

Quantum mechanics was initiated with the object of allowing only observable concepts to enter into the theory. The new mechanics has, however, inherited the old difficulty with the conservation laws involved in beta decay, and this led Pauli, about 1931, to introduce the idea of the neutrino, with the object of reconciling the facts of beta decay with the conservation laws. The neutrino, as it was proposed by Pauli and as accepted today, is a particle devoid both of mass and charge, but having a spin 1/2 and obeying the Fermi statistics. In 1934 Fermi founded his theory of beta disintegration based on the neutrino. The Fermi theory assumes that this hypothetical particle is emitted simultaneously with the disintegrating electron and carries off the excess energy, thereby reconciling the conservation laws with beta disintegration. It will be remembered that the continuous distribution in energy of the beta particles is such that, except at the maximum energy end point of the beta spectra, there is more energy available from the disintegration than is emitted in the form of beta particles.
Rigidity, Force and Physical Geometry
Authors: Weinberg Carleton B.
Published: November 2002

In our discussion of rigidity, we agreed to set external differential forces equal to zero, or to correct our instruments for the effects of such forces. Let us suppose that we were in the presence of an electrostatically charged gravitational body. That is, the gravitational body (e.g. the sun) would have some electrostatic charge (as is probably the case for the sun). If we corrected our rods and clocks for the effect if any of this differential force (which would certainly be negligible in any case, so far as spatial geometry is concerned), we might then expect that the geometry of the field would be the same as when the gravitational body is uncharged. But is this the case? Not at all! And the explanation is not far to seek: the charge contributes energy to the field; but energy, by relativity theory, is equivalent to mass, and mass always modifies the gravitational potential. Hence, the geometry of the charged gravitational field (which depends on the potential) must be different from the uncharged.
Philosophy and Science
Authors: Winn Ralph B.
Published: November 2002

Many centuries ago, at the very beginning of the systematic development of philosophy, Plato declared that the thinker's domain comprises “the wholeness of things;” and indeed, the earlier thinkers took all knowledge for their province and did not hesitate to discuss problems now referred to art, psychology, economics, mathematics, or physics. Since then the meaning of philosophy has appreciably changed, however, and the intellectual descendants of the great founder of the Academy no longer claim the monopoly of all fields of study. For there appeared in the meantime a mighty competitor—or should we say a partner?—in the pursuit of truth, namely, science.
The Limits of Freedom in Philosophy
Authors: Miller Cecil H.
Published: November 2002

This paper is a study in restraint on freedom of speculation. In view of the subtlety of the subject it has seemed advisable to begin the report with a list of the presuppositions initiating and determining the study. These are as follows:

1). That freedom of speculation is a prerequisite to sound mental health, in individuals as well as in large-scale social units.

2). That, consequently, individual and institutional faculties are alike deficient if and insofar as they prevent or abridge such freedom.

3). That the same factors operating in one aspect to restrain the influence of promulgated theories operate in another aspect to inhibit the free conception and hamper the expression of speculation not so promulgated.

4). That as it is the purpose of individual philosophizing to surround with coherent speculation or theory subjects of primarily individual interest, it is the purpose of institutional philosophizing similarly to invest with theory subjects of common social interest.

5). That speculation in general, whether individual or institutional, is free when the prevalent tendency is for subjects of comparable interest to be accorded comparable quantities of speculation; and that when and insofar as this tendency does not prevail speculation is to that extent not free but restrained.
The Greatest Common Component in Science
Authors: Smith Mapheus
Published: November 2002

Two different aspects of knowledge are frequently distinguished by the logician and philosopher: the non-repetitive and the repetitive. However, this distinction is imperfectly supported by careful observation, since no two objects or events are known to be exactly alike, and no two objects or events are completely different. In spite of this relativisitic state of affairs, there is some value in distinguishing between the thinker or student who is primarily interested in the unique, peculiar and non-repetitive phenomena of experience and the person whose emphasis is on general, repetitive and predictable observations. The approaches and mental operations of these two classes of agents are essentially different, although the world they experience may be the same. The first concentrates on one item at a time, the result being a restriction of his attention away from other objects or events of the same class. The generalizing student usually controls his mental operations fully as much, but in this case attention to the unique is held in abeyance and comparisons are deliberately fostered. The essential difference thus becomes a matter of the rejection of the comparative method of procedure by the first and overwhelming dependence on that method on the part of the generalizer.
The R-Being
Authors: Lafleur Laurence J.
Published: November 2002

The R-Being is, by definition, that entity which possesses all qualities which, expressed in English adjectives, begin with the letter R. It is of course unknown, at the commencement of our inquiry, whether any such entity exists, but it is nevertheless possible to determine the characteristics which such a being, whether existent or not, must possess.
Logical Systems and the Principles of Logic
Authors: Farber Marvin
Published: November 2002

Doubts concerning the validity of logic are as old as the empirical criticism of science. In the last two decades the idea that truth is relative to given sets of basic assumptions has been prominent; and the controversy about the principle of excluded middle has focussed renewed attention upon the nature of logic and its fundamental principles.

Recent investigations in formal logic have contributed greatly to the understanding of the principles of logic. It is simply a misunderstanding to conclude from them that the logical principles have been suspended, despite the various formal structures which are called “logics.” The purely formal treatment of problems concerning the foundations of logic, while necessarily undertaken as far as it can go, has essential limitations.
The Problem of Synthesis in Biology
Authors: Lillie Ralph S.
Published: November 2002

The problem of synthesis in biology may have reference to the evolutionary origin of living organisms in past time, a process not directly observable but conceivably reconstructible in broad outline: thus to the biochemist this evolution may appear as the evolution of the special biological compounds, to the psychologist as the evolution of “mind”—or at least of types of behavior. Or the problem may refer to the synthesis of the individual animal or plant, a process of construction which typically starts from a detached portion of a parent organism, such as an egg or seed; this is the problem of individual development or ontogeny and is not essentially different from the general problem of growth. But it is clear that the processes of phyletic evolution and of ontogeny must be considered together, since evolutionary history is in reality the history of a succession of individual organisms, each developing from its germ, i.e. of ontogenies; and the ontogenetic process, so faithfully repeated in each individual as it comes into existence, is itself a product of evolution, having originated (apparently by slow and tentative efforts) in the remote past. The succession of individuals has undergone progressive diversification, culminating in the present condition. We may describe our problem, then, as the problem of the factors underlying the synthesis of a highly special process, that by which the diffusely distributed nonliving materials and energies of nature are brought together in a special kind of unification and transformed into a living organism.
An Empiricist Schema of the Psychophysical Problem
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

This paper does not purport to present a fully developed argument. Rather, it intends to delineate, in broad strokes and in a synoptic manner, the total frame of reference of Scientific Empiricism as far as it is necessary for an integration of the several contributory clarifications of the complex, usually referred to as the psychophysical problem. Several considerations seem to justify such an attempt. It is desirable, from time to time, to free the results of logical and methodological analysis from their specialized contexts. Only thus can they be presented in a way which brings to the fore their continuity with more traditionally worded epistemological thought. By doing this such a presentation should also help to dissolve the current objections of formalism, scientism, and philosophical irrelevance so frequently based on misunderstanding. It is only fair to admit, however, that these misunderstandings have been facilitated by the preoccupation with the technical, and the brevity with regard to the nontechnical, which characterize the modern analysts.
The Principle of Insufficient Reason
Authors: Dubs Homer H.
Published: November 2002

The principle of insufficient reason is one of those philosophic concepts that are highly symptomatic concerning the ultimate presuppositions of the person who accepts them as fundamental. This principle asserts that where we do not have sufficient reason to regard one possible case as more probable than another, we may treat them as equally probable. It has been violently rejected by various logicians, asserted to produce absurdities, and yet has remained persuasively attractive, being accepted, for example, by such an outstanding logician as Dotterer. It may hence be worth while to inquire what the acceptance of this principle implies and what is the source of its persuasiveness.
The Problem of Causal Inference
Authors: Ushenko A. P.
Published: November 2002

This essay is a refutation of Hume on causal inference. The decisive point of the refutation is that Hume's argument is invalid unless it is assumed, contrary to his own relational theory of time, that mere difference in dates can affect the course of nature. In the preliminary discussion of sections II and III the words “cause,” “effect,” and “causal relation” are employed in a nontechnical sense, which is exemplified in such statements as “Fire causes heat”, “Lightning and thunder are causally related”, “When one turns the steering wheel to the right, the effect is that the car moves to the right”, and so on. But in order to forestall rebuttals in defense of Hume one needs a greater precision in terminology as well as in conception of causality. Section IV aiming at precision gives a statement of the principles of causality which is in accordance with the position of modern science. An examination of this statement shows that the validity of causal inference must be accepted along with a relational theory of time. A comment on causal inference in relation to induction brings the discussion to a close.
Causation and Selectivity
Authors: Phillips Herbert J.
Published: November 2002

In this paper certain basic assumptions about causation will be made explicit and then an attempt will be made to show, on the basis of those assumptions, that causation must be supplemented by an extra-causal operation of a selective nature. It is hoped that our assumptions will have in their own right a certain general acceptability, but since assumptions or “postulate sets”, whether antecedently acceptable or not are usually chosen for the purpose of proving something already deemed desirable, a word should be said as to why it was thought desirable to argue for selectivity.
The Rational, Functional Language of Science and Technology
Authors: Gerr Stanley
Published: November 2002

“Reason,” said Lao Tze some twenty five hundred years ago, “is of all things the emptiest. Yet its use is inexhaustible.” With equal justice, he might have said the same of language. But Lao Tze, whose profound metaphysical probing appeared to carry him beyond the reach of linguistic aid, was led to insist that “Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know.” Yet the “Old Philosopher,” as he is known to the Chinese, might be said to admit, by the very implications of his insistence, that language can exercise the greatest influence on thought, if only, in his viewpoint, to nullify it. Today we acknowledge this influence by reversing the great metaphysician's statement, those without speech (i.e. language) in some form or other cannot know.
The Purpose of Purpose
Authors: Weiss Paul
Published: November 2002

Most of man's organs can be utilized in more than one way. His hands can be used to grip and to push, his throat can serve to swallow and to expel, he uses his tongue to taste and to talk, his nose to breathe and to smell.

If each mode of activity required the use of a different organ, a man would have to be much more cumbersome than he now is, or he would have to give up doing some of the things of which he is now capable. He would need at least a score of hands if he needed one with which to grasp, another with which to lift, a third with which to push, a fourth with which to twist etc. Because he has only two, capable of doing twenty different things, he is much more compact and flexible than he otherwise would be.
Philosophy and This War
Authors: Cerf Walter
Published: November 2002

Science has become independent of its possible applications and misapplications to human welfare. In so far as the practical application of his theories has created, and is creating instruments of war more devastating than man has ever known, the scientist might perhaps feel responsible for the fate of our world. However, this pernicious application of science is purely incidental—just as incidental as the beneficial uses to which science can be put. Science and the pursuit of theoretical truth should be unaffected by world events even of the most catastrophic nature. Yet this conviction, however natural we may deem it, is not unchallenged. On the contrary, this war is being waged between two groups of powers, one of which frankly declares science to be solely in the service of the race and the state, while the other group still holds to a science for truth's sake.
Prime Number and Cosmical Number
Authors: Hartman Robert S.
Published: November 2002

The conformity of mathematics and physics has so far been taken for granted. Philosophical explanations of that fundamental fact have never been satisfactory, mathematical explanations never had been attempted. In the following a fundamental theorem for the conformity of mathematics and physics will be demonstrated.

Mathematics can be defined as the science of Number, physics as the science of Matter. The elementary constituents of mathematics are the prime numbers, those of matter the particles, particularly protons and electrons. The only essential property of these elements as such is their existence, given within a given complex or space. Their fundamental relation is their distribution within their respective spaces. The theorem of the distribution of primes in the arithmetical series of numbers is the fundamental theorem of mathematics. The fundamental theorem of physics would be a theorem of the distribution of particles in geometrical space. If it were shown that both theorems were equal, the essential conformity of mathematics and physics would be mathematically demonstrated.
A Physical Theory of Sensation
Authors: Culbertson James T.
Published: November 2002

Up to the present time the science of physics has given us no purely physical theory by which the characteristic formal properties of sensation can be derived. No explanation of the sense world purely in terms of the postulated physical world has been forthcoming, so that the psychologist has had either to ignore sensations or consider them as at least partially unaccountable additions to the entities of physics.

That there is, nevertheless, a purely physical explanation of the sense world we hope the following pages will make clear. We will present a theory in which the characteristic properties of sensation are derived from postulated physical entities.
Syntactical Analysis of the Class Calculus
Authors: Bergmann Gustav
Published: November 2002

In a paper read before the last Congress for the Unity of Science, Dr. Milton Singer distinguishes three main phases in the recent history of logic. The achievement he considers most characteristic of the first period is the development of the class calculus or so-called Boolean algebra. It begins with the work of Boole and DeMorgan and culminates in Schroeder's Algebra of Logic. In a minimum formulation, the results of this first stage can be summed up as, first, simplification and generalization of the traditional syllogistic machinery by means of a rather efficient new symbolism, and, second, adoption of the axiomatic method. To restate the last point: Boolean algebra was, since Leibniz, the first explicit attempt to construct what we call a formal system or calculus. Not realized at that time, however, or at least not adequately expressed, was the importance of the more recent distinction between scientific calculi on the one hand and purely linguistic or logical calculi on the other. As a consequence of this lack of explicit insight, the class calculus appeared to be on a par with scientific calculi, say, for instance, axiomatized geometry, Euclidean or otherwise. Its analytical character, even if it was seen, could not be formulated.
The Logical Destiny of Data
Authors: Hester William
Published: November 2002

The nature of universals became an explicit problem for Western philosophy with Socrates. From the Milesians on, the search for a fundamental substance underlying and connecting all phenomena implied the conception; but it was not until Socrates disentangled the question of universality from that of reality in his theory of definitions that it emerged as the traditional problem we know, and one even capable of solution. In so doing, Socrates may be called the founder of a type of inquiry at once abstract and yet specific which we characterize as “phenomenological”. But Plato, coming immediately after him, again muddied the waters by re-introducing the notion of reality in the Ideas before philosophers had a chance to profit by the separation of the two difficulties. In this manner the composite problem was passed on to Aristotle, who, though he differed in his conception of the nature of the reality, nevertheless considered it involved. And from Aristotle the confusion was handed down to posterity, culminating in the deadlock of the theological debates of the Middle Ages.