bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Protein level affects the relative lysine requirement of growing rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) fry
Authors: Bodin Noelie , Govaerts Bernadette , Abboudi Tarik , Detavernier Christel , De Saeger Sarah , Larondelle Yvan , Rollin Xavier
Published: January 2009

The effect of two digestible protein levels (310 and 469 g/kg DM) on the relative lysine (Lys; g Lys/kg DM or g Lys/100 g protein) and the absolute Lys (g Lys intake/kg0·75 per d) requirements was studied in rainbow trout fry using a dose–response trial. At each protein level, sixteen isoenergetic (22–23 MJ digestible energy/kg DM) diets were tested, involving a full range (2–70 g/kg DM) of sixteen Lys levels. Each diet was given to one group of sixty rainbow trout fry (mean initial body weight 0·78 g) reared at 15°C for 31 feeding d. The Lys requirements were estimated based on the relationships between weight, protein, and Lys gains (g/kg0·75 per d) and Lys concentration (g/kg DM or g/100 g protein) or Lys intake (g/kg0·75 per d), using the broken-line model (BLM) and the non-linear four-parameter saturation kinetics model (SKM-4). Both the model and the response criterion chosen markedly impacted the relative Lys requirement. The relative Lys requirement for Lys gain of rainbow trout estimated with the BLM (and SKM-4 at 90 % of the maximum response) increased from 16·8 (19·6) g/kg DM at a low protein level to 23·4 (24·5) g/kg DM at a high protein level. However, the dietary protein content affected neither the absolute Lys requirement nor the relative Lys requirement expressed as g Lys/100 g protein nor the Lys requirement for maintenance (21 mg Lys/kg0·75 per d).
Energy density and 6-year anthropometric changes in a middle-aged adult cohort
Authors: Vergnaud Anne-Claire , Estaquio Carla , Czernichow Sébastien , Péneau Sandrine , Hercberg Serge , Galan Pilar , Bertrais Sandrine
Published: January 2009

Dietary energy density (ED) may be a good predictor of weight gain because of its association with the regulation of appetite control signals. Among the participants of the ‘SUpplementation en VItamines et Mineraux AntioXydants’ prospective study, 2707 subjects were included in the present study. Changes in weight, waist circumference (WC), hip circumference (HC) and waist:hip ratio were calculated using measured data collected in 1995/1996 and 2001/2002. The mean changes in various anthropometric indicators according to baseline body-weight status (BMI <  or ≥ 25 kg/m2) and sex-specific tertiles of baseline ED level or 6-year changes in ED were compared by covariance analysis. In overweight subjects, weight gain was positively associated with high dietary ED at baseline (P for trend  =  0·03) and with increasing ED during the follow-up (P for trend  =  0·0008). Both the WC and HC changes were also positively related to baseline ED and change in ED in overweight subjects. However, the relationships observed for the WC and HC changes were no longer significant after adjustment for weight change. These results support the hypothesis of a deleterious effect of high-energy-dense diets on weight change for overweight subjects. This relationship could be mediated by physical activity level. Further research needs to be performed in other populations to determine whether ED could be effective strategies to prevent weight gain.
Impact of nutritional status at the onset of elementary school on academic aptitude test achievement at the end of high school in a multicausal approach
Authors: Ivanovic Daniza M. , Rodríguez María del Pilar N. , Pérez Hernán T. , Alvear Jorge A. , Almagià Atilio F. , Toro Triana D. , Urrutia María Soledad C. , Cruz Arturo L. , Ivanovic Rodolfo M.
Published: January 2009

Like in many other countries, few investigations have been carried out in Chile to measure the long-term effects of nutritional status at an early age on scholastic achievement in a multicausal approach. The objectives of the present study were to describe the impact of nutritional, intellectual, family, educational and socio-economic variables at the onset of elementary school in 1987 that may affect achievement on the academic aptitude test (AAT) taken in 1998 at the end of high school, and to quantify the impact of these independent variables on the AAT. The present study comprises two cross-sectional stages: in 1987, a representative sample of 813 elementary school first-grader Chilean children from the Metropolitan Region was randomly chosen; in 1998, 12 years later, 632 school-age children were located and only 351 of them graduated from high school and, from these, 260 students took the AAT. In 1987 nutritional status was assessed through anthropometric parameters, intellectual ability by the Raven's Progressive Matrices Test, scholastic achievement through Spanish language and mathematics tests, and socio-economic status using Graffar's modified scale; family variables were also recorded. Maternal schooling, scholastic achievement, intellectual ability and head circumference-for-agez-score (anthropometric indicator of both nutritional background and brain development) all in 1987 were the independent variables with the greatest explanatory power for AAT variance in 1998 (r20·402). These results provide a foundation to identify the risk factors at an early age that affect AAT scores and should be useful to improve nutritional and educational policies.
Clay ingestion enhances intestinal triacylglycerol hydrolysis and non-esterified fatty acid absorption
Authors: Habold Caroline , Reichardt François , Le Maho Yvon , Angel Fabielle , Liewig Nicole , Lignot Jean-Hervé , Oudart Hugues
Published: January 2009

Consumption by animals and humans of earthy materials such as clay is often related to gut pathologies. Our aim was to determine the impact of kaolinite ingestion on glucose and NEFA transport through the intestinal mucosa. The expression of hexose transporters (Na/glucose co-transporter 1 (SGLT1), GLUT2, GLUT5) and of proteins involved in NEFA absorption (fatty acid transporter/cluster of differentiation 36 (FAT/CD36), fatty acid transport protein 4 (FATP4) and liver fatty acid binding protein (L-FABP)) was measured (1) in rats whose jejunum was perfused with a solution of kaolinite, and (2) in rats who ate spontaneously kaolinite pellets during 7 and 28 d. Also, we determined TAG and glucose absorption in the kaolinite-perfused group, and pancreatic lipase activity, gastric emptying and intestinal transit in rats orally administered with kaolinite. Glucose absorption was not affected by kaolinite perfusion or ingestion. However, kaolinite induced a significant increase in intestinal TAG hydrolysis and NEFA absorption. The cytoplasmic expression of L-FABP and FATP4 also increased due to kaolinite ingestion. NEFA may enter the enterocytesviaendocytosis mainly since expression of NEFA transporters in the brush-border membrane was not affected by kaolinite. After uptake, rapid binding of NEFA by L-FABP and FATP4 could act as an intracellular NEFA buffer to prevent NEFA efflux. Increased TAG hydrolysis and NEFA absorption may be due to the adsorption properties of clay and also because kaolinite ingestion caused a slowing down of gastric emptying and intestinal transit.
Replacing foods high in saturated fat by low-saturated fat alternatives: a computer simulation of the potential effects on reduction of saturated fat consumption
Authors: Schickenberg Bilbo , van Assema Patricia , Brug Johannes , Verkaik-Kloosterman Janneke , Ocké Marga C. , de Vries Nanne K.
Published: January 2009

This simulation study aimed to assess the change in saturated fat intake achieved by replacing one to three of the products contributing most to individual saturated fat intake by alternative products low in saturated fat. Food consumption data of 750 participants (aged 19–30 years) from a recent Dutch food consumption survey were used. For each participant, the three products (from different product groups) that contributed most to their saturated fat intake were ranked in order of diminishing contribution. These products were sequentially replaced by lower saturated fat alternatives that were available in Dutch supermarkets. Mean percentage energy (en%) from saturated fat and energy intake in kJ per d were calculated before and after each of the three replacements. Dutch cheese, meat (for dinner) and milk were the main contributors to saturated fat intake for most participants. Starting at a mean en% from saturated fat of 12·4, the three replacements together resulted in a mean reduction of 4·9 en% from saturated fat. The percentage of participants meeting the recommendation for saturated fat ( < 10 en%) increased from 23·3 % to 86·0 %. We conclude that the replacement of relatively few important high-saturated fat products by available lower-saturated fat alternatives can significantly reduce saturated fat intake and increase the proportion of individuals complying with recommended intake levels.
The level of sugars and synthesis of trehalose inAscaris suumtissues
Authors: Dmitryjuk M. , Łopieńska-Biernat E. , Farjan M.
Published: January 2009

The activities of trehalose-6-phosphate synthase (TPS) and trehalose-6-phosphate phosphatase (TPP) were observed in muscles, individual parts of the reproductive system and haemolymph ofAscaris suum. The highest activity of TPS was detected in the upper uterus, while the lowest activity of TPS was detected in the ovary and oviduct of the nematode. Relatively high activity was detected in muscles, haemolymph and two remaining parts of the uterus. The TPP activity was the highest in lower length of the uterus, following muscles, ovary, central and upper uterus. The lowest activity of TPP was detected in the haemolymph and oviduct ofA. suum. Besides TPS and TPP, trehalose was also detected in the studied tissues except the cuticle and the intestine. Glucose was present in all organs, but the highest concentration was found in the cuticle and intestine.
Isolated sphenoid fungal sinusitis and vision loss: the case for early intervention
Authors: Hu L , Wang D , Yu H
Published: January 2009

Objective:

We report two extremely rare cases of isolated sphenoid ‘fungal ball’ in conjunction with vision loss.

Method:

Case reports and a literature review concerning diagnosis and management of isolated sphenoid fungal ball in conjunction with vision loss.

Results:

A mycetoma or fungal ball resulting from isolated sphenoid fungal sinusitis is a rare disease. It is frequently difficult to diagnose, as patients present with nonspecific symptoms such as headache, visual disturbance and cranial nerve palsies. Diagnosis of the disease is typically not made until advanced imaging has been performed. We present two cases of patients with sphenoid sinus fungal ball who developed headaches and vision loss. One patient had symptoms of IIIrd cranial nerve palsy and the other partial visual field impairment. After a timely sphenoidotomy, both patients recovered fully, with resolution of all symptoms.

Conclusion:

These two cases of sphenoid fungal ball in conjunction with vision loss suggest that the otolaryngologist should keep this disease in mind even when symptoms are nonspecific. Endoscopic surgery can be a safe and viable therapeutic approach for this condition.
Effectiveness of hyperbaric oxygen therapy in management of sudden hearing loss
Authors: Çekin E , Cincik H , Ulubil S A , Gungor A
Published: January 2009

Objective:

To evaluate the effectiveness of hyperbaric oxygen therapy in the management of sudden hearing loss.

Study design:

Patients with sudden hearing loss were divided into study and control groups. The 36 patients in the study group were treated with hyperbaric oxygen therapy in addition to standard medical therapy, whereas the 21 patients in the control group were treated with only standard medical therapy.

Subjects and methods:

Both groups were treated with standard therapy, comprising prednisolone starting at a dose of 1 mg/kg and reducing over three weeks. Patients in the study group received hyperbaric oxygen therapy in addition to standard drug therapy.

Results:

Success rates were 78.95 per cent in the study group and 71.30 per cent in the control group. However, this difference was not statistically significant (p > 0.05).

Conclusions:

Considering the cost of hyperbaric oxygen therapy and its inconvenience to patients, this treatment should only be considered in patients suffering sudden hearing loss if there are contraindications to standard medical treatment.
Patch testing in allergic contact dermatitis
Authors: Keir J , English J , Fergie N
Published: January 2009

A deterioration in chronic inflammatory ear disease despite topical medication, or failure of the condition to improve with such treatment, should raise the possibility of allergic contact dermatitis. Allergen testing (patch testing) is the ‘gold standard’ method of identifying an agent causing allergic contact dermatitis.

We describe an ENT patch test series applied by our department as a screening device for this condition.
Effect of steady flow and Newton's cooling on the propagation and damping of small-amplitude prominence plasma oscillations
Authors: SINGH K. A. P. , DWIVEDI B. N.
Published: January 2009

We study the propagation and damping of small-amplitude prominence oscillations invoking steady flow and radiative losses due to Newton's cooling with constant relaxation time. We find that the strength of steady flow has a large influence on the propagation (e.g. period, phase velocity) of wave modes. In the presence of steady flow, the thermal mode is a propagating wave and hence it can be observed in solar prominences. The thermal mode contributes to the non-thermal line broadening in the solar atmosphere. The steady flow does not affect the damping time of the wave modes. The damping of slow and thermal modes is highly dependent on the radiative relaxation time. The thermal perturbation, in the presence of steady flow, is found to be larger in the case of the thermal mode than in the slow and fast modes. The energy flux (~300 W m−2) associated with the thermal mode is sufficient to heat the quiet regions of the Sun. The slow mode contribution to non-thermal broadening has been estimated. The non-thermal broadening is found to be large in the case of the prominence with large characteristic length. The steady flow, in the presence of Newton's cooling, breaks the symmetry between the forward and backward propagating modes. No modes with negative energy have been found. For strong flows (above 10 km s−1), the canonical backward wave propagates in the forward direction, which can play an important role in wave detection and prominence seismology.
Rationality in Agreement
Authors: Harman Gilbert
Published: January 2009

Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the person has accepted in dealing with other people. Gauthier's view is different from either of these sorts of contract theory. Instead, he holds that certain basic principles of impartiality are prior to actual agreements.
Rationality, Value, and Preference
Authors: Baier Kurt
Published: January 2009

Gauthier's magnificent book erects a conception of morality, “morals by agreement,” on the foundation of his own theory of practical rationality. This is as it should be if, as he claims, following Hobbes and others, there is an initial “presumption against morality” (MA, p. 13) and no theory of morals “can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are also truly endorsed in each individual's reason” (MA, p.1), indeed, that it is a requirement of rationality that one always satisfy the requirements of morality (MA, p.5). This means, however, that the initial assumption against morality is inherited by his theory of practical rationality. His theory of morals therefore can serve a useful purpose only if his theory of rationality is sound. In this paper, I want to explore some of the more dubious aspects of that theory to see whether it can bear the heavy load of justification that “morals by agreement” places on it.
The Gauthier Enterprise
Authors: Buchanan James M.
Published: January 2009

I take it as my assignment to criticize the Gauthier enterprise. At the outset, however, I should express my general agreement with David Gauthier's normative vision of a liberal social order, including the place that individual principles of morality hold in such an order. Whether the enterprise is, ultimately, judged to have succeeded or to have failed depends on the standards applied. Considered as a coherent grounding of such a social order in the rational choice behavior of persons, the enterprise fails. Considered as an extended argument implying that persons should (and possibly must) adopt the moral stance embodied in the Gauthier structure, the enterprise is, I dunk, largely successful. Considered as a set of empirically falsifiable propositions suggesting that persons do, indeed, choose as the Gauthier precepts dictate, the enterprise offers Humean hope rather than Hobbesian despair.
The Relation between Self-Interest and Justice in Contractarian Ethics
Authors: Morris Christopher W.
Published: January 2009

One of the most noteworthy features of David Gauthier's rational choice, contractarian theory of morality is its appeal to self-interested rationality. This appeal, however, will undoubtedly be the source of much controversy and criticism. For while self-interestedness is characteristic of much human behavior, it is not characteristic of all such behavior, much less of that which is most admirable. Yet contractarian ethics appears to assume that humans are entirely self-interested. It is not usually thought a virtue of a theory that its assumptions are literally false. What may be said on behalf of the contractarian?
Three Ways to Kill Innocent Bystanders: Some Conundrums Concerning the Morality of War
Authors: Mack Eric
Published: January 2009

1. Introduction

This essay deals with the hard topic of the permissible killing of the innocent. The relevance of this topic to the morality of war is obvious. For even the most defensive and just wars, i.e., the most defensive and just responses to existing or imminent large-scale aggression, will inflict harm upon – in particular, cause the deaths of – innocent bystanders.1 The most obvious and relevant example is that of innocent Soviet noncombatants who would be killed by even the most precise defensive strike against Soviet strategic weapons or troop formations that is now possible. Should there be no vindication or, at least, no excuse for some killings of such innocent bystanders, morality would dictate that even defensive counterforce measures against largescale attacks should be renounced.
The International Defense of Liberty
Authors: Brody Baruch A.
Published: January 2009

It seems to me that those who place great value on the right to human freedom can be badly divided on the question of the use of force by states to defend the liberties of those who are not citizens of that particular state. Concerned about the liberties to be defended, they might be enthusiastic supporters of the use of such force by liberty-loving countries throughout the world. Concerned about the liberties that might be violated when the state marshals its forces for use internationally, they might adopt a more isolationist approach to this issue. This paper is an attempt to help clarify this conflict by looking at some of the philosophical issues it raises. Because I wish to avoid factual debates about current conflicts, I will give no real-life examples. However, they are on my mind, and I hope the reader will keep them in mind as well.
Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control: Ethical Issues for the 1980s
Authors: Pfaltzgraff Robert L.
Published: January 2009

The threat of atomic destruction has heightened the criminal irresponsibility of aggression, the employment of war as an instrument of national or bloc policy. Correspondingly, the moral obligation to discourage such a crime or, if it occurs, to deny it victory, has been underscored. The consequences of a successful defense are fearful to contemplate, but the consequences of a successful aggression, with tyrannical monopoly of the weapons of mass destruction, are calculated to be worse. While the avoidance of excessive and indiscriminate violence, and of such destruction as would undermine the basis for future peace, remain moral imperatives in a just war, it does not seem possible to draw a line in advance, beyond which it would be better to yield than to resist. Reinhold Neibuhr.

… the person who deeply desires peace rejects any kind of pacifism which is cowardice or the simple preservation of tranquility. In fact, those who are tempted to impose their domination will always encounter the resistance of intelligent and courageous men and women, prepared to defend freedom in order to promote justice. Pope John Paul II

For two generations the United States has maintained with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, a security relationship based upon the deterrence of war by the possession of means deemed adequate to inflict unacceptable levels of damage in response to a Soviet attack upon the United States or its allies. Against the Soviet Union, the world's largest land power, in possession of superior conventional forces that could be launched against Western Europe and other peripheral regions of the continents of Europe and Asia, the United States has held nuclear capabilities as the ultimate weapon to be invoked in support of those interests deemed to be most vital to American security.
Morality and Paradoxical Deterrence
Authors: Lee Steven
Published: January 2009

Nuclear deterrence is paradoxical. One paradox of nuclear deterrence we may call the rationality paradox:

(RP) (1) While it is a rational policy to threaten nuclear retaliation against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons, it would not be rational to carry out the retaliation should the threat fail to deter; and (2) what would not be rational to do is not, in the circumstances characteristic of nuclear deterrence, rational to threaten to do.

This is a paradox in the standard sense that it involves contradictory claims, for it implies that adopting a policy of nuclear deterrence is both rational and not rational, yet we have strong reason to believe that each of the claims is true. Claim (1) is a recognition that, though we believe nuclear deterrence works, there would seem to be no reason to carry out the threat if it were to fail. Claim (2) is part of the logic of all forms of deterrence, military and nonmilitary, and it relates to the important notion of credibility: if an opponent knows that one has no reason to carry out a threat, the threat would not be credible and so one would have no reason to make it. Further, it is characteristic of a state of nuclear deterrence that the opponent would recognize that one would have no reason to carry out the threat.

The rationality paradox is but one of the paradoxes raised by nuclear deterrence. Some other of the paradoxes of nuclear deterrence have the same form as the rationality paradox: for a certain set of predicates x,

(PND) (1) the act of threatening nuclear retaliation (against an opponent with nuclear weapons) is x, while the act of carrying out the threat would be not-x; and (2) if it is not-x to perform some action, then, in the circumstances generally characteristic of a situation of nuclear deterrence, it is not-x to threaten to perform that action.
No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics
Authors: Wildavsky Aaron
Published: January 2009

I wish to consider the possibility that a good part of the opposition to the main lines of American foreign policy is based on deep-seated objections to the political and economic systems of the United States. This is not to say that existing policy is necessarily wise or that there may not be good and sufficient reasons for wishing to change it. Indeed, at any time and place, the United States might well be overestimating the threat from the Soviet Union or using too much force. What I wish to suggest is that across-the-board criticism of American policy as inherently aggressive and repressive, regardless of circumstance – a litany of criticism so constant that it does not alert us to the need for explanation – has a structural basis in the rise of a political culture that is opposed to existing authority.

To the extent that this criticism is structural, that is, inherent in domestic politics, the problem of fashioning foreign policies that can obtain widespread support is much more difficult than it is commonly perceived to be. For if the objection is to American ways of life and, therefore, “to the government for which it stands,” only a transformation of power relationships at home, together with a vast redistribution of economic resources, would satisfy these critics. If the objection is not only to what we do but, more fundamentally, to who we are, looking to changes in foreign policy to shore up domestic support is radically to confuse the causal connections and, therefore, the order of priorities.
Marxism-Leninism and its Strategic Implications for the United States
Authors: Seabury Paul
Published: January 2009

My central concern in this paper is with the implications of Marxist-Leninist ideology for Western defense policy and for United States strategic policy in particular. However, this is an extremely complex issue, and consideration of it will lead me to examine the ways in which ideas are related to interests, interests to strategy, and strategy to actions.

I

I begin with an important observation: Americans in general, and for various reasons, have not taken Marxism-Leninism seriously for a long time. This is true even of many experts who consider the Soviet challenge to be very serious, affecting our very survival as a free society. At the risk of oversimplification, I would claim that many quite well-informed Americans, hardened to the realities of the Soviet “empire” and its activities, have come around to the view that Marxist-Leninist ideology has simply degenerated into a rigid system of enforced belief administered by authorities who have no particular commitment to it other than to employ it in order to remain in power. In this regard, “Marxism” (like “God” in America in the 1960s) is deemed “dead,” surviving only in the publicity offices of formal establishments as a means of maintaining their authority. Marxism-Leninism is thought to be no different from the moribund “divine right of kings,” which undergirded the monarchical establishments of 17th Century Europe.

Oddly enough, the “socialism-is-dead” theme is today found in the writings of such prominent American neo-conservatives as Irving Kristol, George Gilder, and many others. It is also echoed in Europe in the writings of such eminent philosophers as Leszek Kolakowski of Poland and Paul Johnson of England.
Tocqueville On War
Authors: Cohen Eliot A.
Published: January 2009

The title of this article has been chosen deliberately, for we find interesting parallels in the careers and outlooks of Alexis de Tocqueville and the great Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz whose master work,On War, remainssui generis. They overlapped in time (Tocqueville lived from 1805 to 1859, Clausewitz from 1780 to 1831), but, more importantly, their major theoretical works dealt in large measure with the same problem – the democratic revolution and its impact on politics. As Clausewitz argued, the warfare of the new era was

caused by the new political conditions which die French Revolution created both in France and in Europe as a whole, conditions that set in motion new means and new forces, and have thus made possible a degree of energy in war diat odierwise would have been inconceivable.

It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.
On the Mutual Compatibility of Democracy and Marxian Socialism
Authors: Cropsey Joseph
Published: January 2009

Much of the high politics of our time is affected by the hostility and suspicion that pervade relations between the Western democracies and the socialist world. Is it possible that the hostility and suspicion are misplaced, and that the two world systems can find a common ground on which to acknowledge each other as compatible co-denizens between whom there is no difference so potent that the being of one must be a reproach to the being of the other? With a view to this question, I wish to ask whether it is possiblefor a Marxist society to be democratic or for a democracy to elect Marxism or to elect to remain Marxist. Putting the question in the form, “Is it possible …” would enable us to answer it by pointing to even one example of a Marxist democracy, thus to dissolve what seems like a theoretical matter in an empirical medium.
Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality: Part II
Authors: Cohen G. A.
Published: January 2009

1. The present paper is a continuation of my “Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality,” which began with a description of the political philosophy of Robert Nozick. I contended in that essay that the foundational claim of Nozick's philosophy is the thesis of self-ownership, which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, consequently, that each is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against others. To be sure, he may not harm others, and he may, if necessary, be forced not to harm them, but he should never be forced to help them, as people are in fact forced to help others, according to Nozick, by redistributive taxation. (Nozick recognizes that an unhelping person may qualify as unpleasant or even, under certain conditions, as immoral. The self-ownership thesis says that people should be free to live their lives as they choose, but it does not say that how they choose to live them is beyond criticism.)
Self-Realization in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Life
Authors: Elster Jon
Published: January 2009

In arguments in support of capitalism, the following propositions are sometimes advanced or presupposed: (i) the best life for the individual is one of consumption, understood in a broad sense that includes aesthetic pleasures and entertainment as well as consumption of goods in the ordinary sense; (ii) consumption is to be valued because it promotes happiness or welfare, which is the ultimate good; (iii) since there are not enough opportunities for consumption to provide satiation for everybody, some principles of distributive justice must be chosen to decide who gets what; (iv) the total to be distributed has first to be produced. What is produced depends, among other things, on the motivation and information of the producers. The theory of justice must take account of the fact that different principles of distribution have different effects on motivation and information; (v) economic theory tells us that the motivational and informational consequences of private ownership of the means of production are superior to those of the various forms of collective ownerships.

In the traditional controversy over the relative merits of capitalism and economic systems, the focus has been on proposition (v). In this paper, I consider instead propositions (i) and (ii). Before one can even begin to discuss how values are to be allocated, one must consider what they are – what it is that ought to be valued. I shall argue that at the center of Marxism is a specific conception of the good life as one of active self-realization, rather than passive consumption.
Marxian Freedom, Individual Liberty, and the End of Alienation
Authors: Gray John
Published: January 2009

It is a commonplace of academic conventional wisdom that Marxian theory is not to be judged by the historical experience of actually existing socialist societies. The reasons given in support of this view are familiar enough, but let us rehearse them. Born in adversity, encircled by hostile powers, burdened with the necessity of defending themselves against foreign enemies and with the massive task of educating backward and reactionary populations, the revolutionary socialist governments of this century were each of them denied any real opportunity to implement Marxian socialism in its authentic form. Nowhere has socialism come to power as Marx expected it would – on the back of the organized proletariat of an advanced capitalist society. For this reason, the historical experience of the past sixty years can have no final authority in the assessment of Marxian theory. The failings of Marxist regimes – their domination by bureaucratic elites, their economic crises, their repression of popular movements and of intellectual freedoms, and their dependency on imports of Western technology and capital – are all to be explained as historical contingencies which in no way threaten the validity of Marx's central conceptions. It is not that Marxian socialism has been tried and found wanting but, rather, that it has never been tried.
Marxism, Violence, and Tyrann
Authors: Friedman George
Published: January 2009

The problem of Marxism is the problem of tyranny. The central argument against Marxism is an empirical one: the universally tyrannical nature of all hitherto existing Marxist regimes. Defenders of Marxism must continually defend themselves against the charge that Marxism, when it comes to power, increases the sum total of human misery by increasing political oppression. Marxists have answered in several ways. Some have argued that the social and economic benefits of Marxism outweigh the political misery it causes. Others have argued that while tyranny might count against any particular regime, it is not intrinsic to Marxist regimes as such. Some have argued that tyranny is a transitional phase, necessary but impermanent. Finally, some Marxists have denied that the regimes they defend are tyrannical at all.
Marxism and Dirty Hands
Authors: Lukes Steven
Published: January 2009

Lenin asked the question: what is to be done? A second question, which Lenin did not ask is: What is not to be done? A third question arises when answering the first and second yields incompatible directives. How are we to understand and respond to such situations, in which, as Machiavelli put it, the Prince must learn, “among so many who are not good,” how “to enter evil when necessity commands” for the good of the Republic? This is the Classical Problem of dirty hands. What, if anything, does Marxism have to say about it?
Mercy and Legal Justice
Authors: Murphy Jeffrie G.
Published: January 2009

Internal and External Questions. The most profound questions in ethics, social philosophy, and the philosophy of law are foundational; i.e., they are questions that call the entire framework of our ordinary evaluations into doubt in order to determine to what degree, if at all, that framework can be rationally defended. Such questions, called “external” by Rudolf Carnap, are currently dominating my own philosophical reflections and are forcing me to rethink a variety of positions I have in the past defended.
Law's Halo
Authors: Regan Donald H.
Published: January 2009

Like many people these days, I believe there is no general moral obligation to obey the law. I shall explain why there is no such moral obligation – and I shall clarify what I mean when I say there is no moral obligation to obey the law – as we proceed. But also like many people, I am unhappy with a position that would say there was no moral obligation to obey the law and then say no more about the law's moral significance. In our thinking about law in a resonably just society, we have a strong inclination to invest law with a sort of moral halo. It does not feel right to suggest that law is a morally neutral social fact, nor to suggest that law is merely a useful social technique.

In this essay, I shall try to account in part for law's moral halo. (Let me emphasize “in part”; I do not purport to say everything that could be said.) Because I share the widespread inclination to invest law with this halo, I shall not be interested in a merely historical account of how we come to see law with a halo – a pure “error theory” of law's halo, if you will. I want to justify the halo. On the other hand, the main way to justify the halo is to get clear just what law's moral significance is. It is unlikely that at the end of the process of clarification the halo will have exactly the shape or luminance that it had at the beginning.
Taxation in a Lockean World
Authors: Epstein Richard A.
Published: January 2009

'Tis true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit everyone who enjoys a share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e., the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them. For if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself.
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Meaning
Authors: Lyons David
Published: January 2009

I. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM

By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters. At least since Marbury, in which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the significance of our Constitution's being a written document, originalism in one form or another has been a major theme in the American constitutional tradition.
Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: January 2009

I shall be concerned in this paper with some philosophical puzzles raised by so-called “wrongful life” suits. These legal actions are obviously of great interest to lawyers and physicians, but philosophers might have a kind of professional interest in them too, since in a remarkably large number of them, judges have complained that the issues are too abstruse for the courts and belong more properly to philosophers and theologians. The issues that elicit this judicial frustration are those that require the application to border-line cases of such philosophically interesting concepts as acting, causing, and the one that especially interests me, harming.

I first became interested in the concept of harming in my work on the moral limits of the criminal law, where I had to come to terms with John Stuart Mill's famous “harm principle”–the principle that it is always a good reason in support of a criminal prohibition, indeed, the only legitimate reason, that it will prevent harm to persons other than the actor. I could not very well criticize that principle until I decided what the word “harm” must mean in its formulation. I gave what I took to be the requisite analysis of harm in my book Harm to Others. Here I wish to improve that analysis, examine its implications for civil as well as criminal liability, and test it on conceptually hard cases, especially cases of prenatal harming, that is, cases in which the wrongful causative conduct occurs before the victim's birth, and the harmed state that is its upshot consists in being born in an impaired condition.
Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights
Authors: Barnett Randy E.
Published: January 2009

I. Introduction

Two kinds of remedies have traditionally been employed for breach of contract: legal relief and equitable relief. Legal relief normally takes the form of money damages. Equitable relief normally consists either of specific performance or an injunction – that is, the party in breach may be ordered to perform an act or to refrain from performing an act. In this article I will use a “consent theory of contract” to assess the choice between money damages and specific performance. According to such a theory, contractual obligation is dependent on more fundamental entitlements of the parties and arises as a result of the parties' consent to transfer alienable rights.

My thesis will be that the normal rule favoring money damages should be replaced with one that presumptively favors specific performance unless the parties have consented to money damages instead. The principal obstacle to such an approach is the reluctance of courts to specifically enforce contracts for personal services. The philosophical distinction between alienable and inalienable rights bolsters this historical reticence, since a right to personal services may be seen as inalienable.

I will then explain why, if the subject matter of a contract for personal services is properly confined to an alienable right to money damages for failure to perform, specific enforcement of such contracts is no longer problematic. Finally, I shall consider whether the subject matter of contracts for corporate services is properly confined to money damages like contracts for personal services, or whether performance of corporate services can be made the subject of a valid rights transfer and judicially compelled in the same manner as contracts for external resources.
Practical Wisdom and Professional Character
Authors: Kronman Anthony
Published: January 2009

I

The existence of the legal profession is something most lawyers take for granted. Lawyers of course do many different things, and lead different sorts of lives, but those who make their living in the law tend to assume, without much reflection, that they have a bond or association of some sort with others who do the same and believe they share something important in common with them. It is not at all clear, however, what this common element is, and the great diversity of tasks that lawyers perform – representing litigants, counseling clients, advising legislators, administering government programs, and deciding cases – can easily make one doubt whether the search for a link leads to anything but empty generalities.

One may, of course, conclude that the main law jobs, as Karl Llewellyn called them, have nothing important in common, and that the legal profession is only a name for a disconnected collection of pursuits with no substance or reality of its own. This is not, however, a very satisfying view, to lawyers at least, and is likely to provoke the quick reply that what lawyers share in common is after all quite easy to discern. All lawyers, regardless of the nature of their work, possess a general knowledge of the law which they have acquired through a specialized program of instruction; laypersons lack such knowledge and it is this, one might argue, which marks the line between those who are lawyers and those who are not and, thus, defines the scope and nature of the profession.
Beneficence/Benevolence
Authors: Frankena William K.
Published: January 2009

I begin with a note about moral goodness as a quality, disposition, or trait of a person or human being. This has at least two different senses, one wider and one narrower. Aristotle remarked that the Greek term we translate as justice sometimes meant simply virtue or goodness as applied to a person and sometimes meant only a certain virtue or kind of goodness. The same thing is true of our word “goodness.” Sometimes being a good person means having all the virtues, or at least all the moral ones; then goodness equals the whole of virtue. But sometimes, being a good person has a narrower meaning, namely, being kind, generous, and so forth. Thus, my OED sometimes equates goodness with moral excellence as a whole and sometimes with a particular moral excellence, viz., kindness, beneficence, or benevolence; and the Bible, when it speaks of God as being good sometimes means that God has all the virtues and sometimes only that he is kind, mereiful, or benevolent. When Jesus says, “Why callest thou me good: None is good, save one, that is God,” he seems to be speaking of goodness in the inclusive sense, but when the writer of Exodus has God himself say that he is “merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth,” God is using “goodness” in the narrower sense in which it means benevolence, for he goes on to make it clear that he is also just and severe. Similarly, “good will” may mean either “morally good will” in general, as it does in Kant, or it may mean only “benevolent will,” as it usually does; in “men of good will” it is perhaps ambiguous.
Benevolence: A Minor Virtue
Authors: Kekes John
Published: January 2009

Morality requires us to act for the good of others. This is not the only moral requirement there is, and it is, of course, controversial where the good of others lies. But whatever their good is, there can be no serious doubt that acting so as to bring it about is one crucial obligation morality places on us. Yet the nature of this obligation is unclear, because there are difficult questions about its aim and about the motivational sources required for realizing it. Who are the others for whose good we are obligated to act? Are they only people in our immediate context, or members of our society, or all human beings? And, as a matter of moral psychology, what leads us to honor this obligation? Is it a sense of justice, decency, prudence, benevolence, or some combination of these and perhaps other virtues? The answers we give will shape our understanding of the nature of the obligation. For the character traits which we think should move us will influence the choice of people we aim to benefit and the inclusiveness we attribute to the obligation will affect the motives we wish to cultivate in ourselves and others.
The Role of Private Philanthropy in a Free and Democratic State
Authors: Brody Baruch
Published: January 2009

This paper will attempt to defend the thesis that it is impossible to understand the proper role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic society without examining certain fundamental questions about the proper roles of the state and about the rights and obligations of owners of private property. It will defend that thesis by presenting arguments for four subordinate theses: (a) there are historical and philosophical reasons for being skeptical about the role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic state; (b) these reasons can be met by certain familiar responses, but these responses are not fully satisfactory; (c) certain radical libertarian views, and more moderate versions of those views, would provide a basis for an alternative understanding of the role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic state; (d) whether or not one accepts those views, one can also better understand that role if one adopts a view of the state which emphasizes its role in the promotion of the virtues.

(1) Historical and Philosophical Doubts

The skeptical challenge to the claim that there is an important role for private philanthropy in a free and democratic state can be put very simply. It is the challenge that the emergence of strong but democratic states, with the concurrent emergence of a proper understanding of the extensive nature of legitimate state functions, has undercut the need for private philanthropy and its corresponding favorable tax treatment. It is the further claim that these developments, both historical and conceptual, have left private philanthropy with no significant role.