bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Can Public Choice Theory Explain the U.S. Budget Surpluses of the 1990s?
Authors: Sobel Russell S.
Published: December 2019

Abstract Rapid U.S. federal expenditure growth and budget deficits became commonplace during the second half of the twentieth century. Public choice models explained this by continual special interest group pressure for spending, rationally ignorant voters, and shortsighted
politicians finding deficit financing attractive. However, the late 1990s saw budget surpluses and a slowdown in government expenditure growth. This paper uses public choice theory to explain this turn of events. I find that a slowdown in U.S. interest group activity growth is responsible
for this shift.
Economic Integration, Legitimacy and European Union Enlargement
Authors: Kyriacou Andreas P.
Published: December 2019

Abstract The enlargement of the European Union generates socio-economic costs and benefits for the citizens of new members and as such it is bound to affect their perceived legitimacy of the whole enterprise. The legitimacy of EU accession is likely to be enhanced by the
inclusion of compensatory transfers and transition periods in the terms of accession, by the perception that EU membership represents the most favorable terms of exchange available and by the linking of accession to a sustained period of economic growth, a favorable movement in prices, improving
relative incomes and the consolidation of a level playing field across new members.
Backhaus, J.G. - Wagner, R.E. (eds), 2004, Handbook of Public Finance
Authors: Galli Emma
Published: December 2019

Abstract Backhaus, J.G. - Wagner, R.E. (eds), 2004, Handbook of Public Finance, Kluwer, Dordrecht, US$ 150, pp. 554, ISBN 1-4020-7863-3.
Ryan, C.K., 2002, Harry Gunnison Brown – An Orthodox Economist and His Contributions
Authors: da Empoli Domenico
Published: December 2019

Abstract Ryan, C.K., 2002, Harry Gunnison Brown - An Orthodox Economist and His Contributions, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 270, US$ 35.00, ISBN 1-4051-1156-9.
Ranking Italian Universities and Other Research Institutions Taking into Account Public Economics Publications
Authors: Molero Juan Carlos , Pujol Francesc
Published: December 2019

The different ways to rank universities regarding their research production include a great number of factors. The quality of journals where faculty members are publishing is one of the most relevant aspects in order to determine the quality of the affiliation institution. Among other more traditional ways determining the quality of journals, this paper takes into account a new one based on the publishing behavior of top ranked authors, supposing a matching model approach among journals and authors. Using this methodology, the article establishes a ranking of the Italian universities and other research institutions regarding public economics journals.
Duncan Black and Ronald Coase: A Lifelong Friendship Rooted in Economics
Authors: Brady Gordon L.
Published: December 2019

Duncan Black, the Scottish economist, met Ronald H. Coase in 1932 when they became assistant lecturers at the recently opened the Dundee School of Economics and Commerce, an institution of higher learning modeled after the London School of Economics. In the 1970s and 1980s when he reflected on his work, Black identified and described the influence of Coase’s theory of the firm (1937) and in particular his use of transactions cost on his own theory of the committee (late 1940s through 1958). Black wrote up his reflections on discussions with Coase in the 1930s and 1940s which led to their respective contributions. Black sincerely felt their two theories had common roots. This paper examines Black’s arguments and concludes that Coase had a long lasting effect on Black’s thinking although some of the ideas Black saw in reflection were never fully developed in his work.
Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Organizational Design Problems, and Tiebout
Authors: Garzarelli Giampaolo
Published: December 2019

This work intends to contribute to the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism that studies fiscal federalism through contemporary economic and industrial organization theory. First, it establishes context by introducing the two classic motivations in support of federalism, namely, incentives and knowledge. Second, it succinctly discusses the incentive-based organizational approach of the SGT. Third, it shows that the Tiebout model already embeds an organizational approach, which instead rests on a knowledge motivation.
The Political Economy of Immigration Policy: Some Simple Interest Group Analytics
Authors: Kaempfer William H. , Lowenberg Anton D. , Mertens William
Published: December 2019

Immigration policy is viewed as endogenously determined by interest group competition. The political effectiveness of each interest group depends on its ability to control free riding. Support maximizing politicians supply policies in response to the pressures exerted by interest groups of differing political effectiveness, such differences being the main factor accounting for the adoption of socially inefficient policies. The model demonstrates that immigration policy outcomes are explained by the skill levels of immigrant workers, lengths of stay in the destination country, ethnic and family ties, and the costs of enforcing immigration laws, together with possible voter prejudices toward immigrants.
Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow? An Investment Approach to Lawmaking
Authors: Parisi Francesco , Ghei Nita
Published: December 2019

The process of implementing new laws in an environment of social change shares many characteristics with the process of making investment decisions under uncertainty. In any society that is not totally static, the law maker faces uncertainty about its evolution. Thus, the lawmaker cannot know with certainty what the appropriate law will be in the future, and therefore cannot know with certainty what the future stream of benefits from the law will be. In addition, implementing a new law necessitates the outlay of resources in formulating and enforcing the law, just as investment in a new project does. The costs of implementing a new law are largely sunk, and irreversible. In determining the optimal timing of adoption of new laws, the value of the option of waiting must be taken into account. We present a formal model drawn from the investment literature to demonstrate the value of waiting, and discuss its implications in the context of two real world legislative problems, environmental laws and privacy regulation.
Do the Arrangements of Political Regimes Shape Policy Choices and Policy Outcomes?
Authors: Murrau Luca
Published: December 2019

This work presents an overview of the literature on political process formation and the role of institutions in economic development. The first category refers to works describing models of citizen candidacy and candidate choice in which different scenarios of equilibrium under plurality rule elections are examinated. The second category includes the main empirical works studying the chain existing between political institutional features and different paths of economic development. Finally, I describe a model of comparative politics. Specifically, I compare two different political regimes, congressional-presidential regime and parliamentary regime, giving insights on policy choices and economic outcomes.
The Regulatory Management in the Energy and Electronic Communications Sectors: Towards Institutional Convergence?
Authors: da Empoli Stefano
Published: December 2019

Regulatory authorities in the energy and electronic communications sectors have followed a parallel pattern due to the liberalization process that has interested the two sectors during the last decade in Europe. The reason can be partly traced back to a same legislative origin (EU directives promoted by the European Commission). In some European countries, a single authority is envisioned as a conclusion to such a common institutional path. This article inquires if institutional convergence may be justified by similar regulatory needs. Based on several critical factors, it is argued, however, that a different institutional design for the two regulatory authorities would be a more efficient solution.

These findings are then applied to the Italian case, where the Energy Authority (AEEG) and the Communications Authority (AGCOM) were set up during the late 90s. In this case, no particular convergence can be found. However, differences reflect a heavily inefficient institutional design.
On the Importance of the Margin in the Demand–Revealing Process
Authors: Brooks Michael
Published: December 2019

Extant expositions of the demand revealing process have failed to give sufficient attention to the importance of marginal and inframarginal demand. In this brief note, I demonstrate that the Clarke tax may not provide an incentive for individuals with inframarginal demands to reveal their true willingness to pay.
From Taxation to Justice: Extending the Search for a ‘Just Tax’
Authors: Bessard Pierre
Published: December 2019

Current systems of taxation imply that governments have a prior claim on the fruits of a person's labor. Such a notion is fundamentally immoral and can never be just, despite governments’ claims to the contrary. Since most government spending has been shown inefficient, there cannot be any rationalization of taxation on the grounds of raising government revenue at arbitrary levels, either. Any tax policy based on the concept of justice should seek to minimize the tax burden by discontinuing most government activities, reinforcing civil society and the free market economy.
From Lindahl’s Garden to Global Warming: How Useful is the Lindahl Approach in the Context of Global Public Goods?
Authors: Giersch Thorsten
Published: December 2019

In what sense is the Lindahl approach useful for analyzing global public goods? After introducing the positive and normative parts of the Lindahl approach we look at the relation to the Nash-Cournot model of voluntary provision. An integration of both blurs the subtle difference between an explicit bargain about the cost sharing and the implicit bargain by providing individual quantities of the collective good. We take a closer look on the possible relevance of this difference in relation to problems of global public goods that are usually seen more in line with a private provision process not envisaged by Lindahl.
Abuse of Dominance: How Far are the EU and the US?
Authors: Heimler Alberto
Published: December 2019

In recent years economic analysis has become more and more important in antitrust enforcement in Europe. First in merger control, then in vertical agreements the case by case approach based on a substantive appreciation of the restrictions of competition is becoming more and more prevalent. On abuse of dominance the difference between the US and the EU is still relevant. However, especially after the December 2005 publication by the European Commission of the Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses the gap has been reduced, at least in terms of the general approach to abuse cases. In practice, even though the role of economic analysis is much more refined and relevant than in the past, the European Commission continues to be more interventionist than US antitrust enforcers. This outcome depends very much on the widespread use of presumptions and truncated analysis on both sides of die Atlantic. A number of examples are provided on predation, discounts, refusal to deal, tying and bundling.
The Economics of Illusion. A Discussion Based on Fiscal Illusion
Authors: Mourão Paulo Reis
Published: December 2019

What do optical illusions (like a mirage) and economic illusions have in common? The answer was suggested by Amilcare Puviani, who started a methodological and fiscal revolution when he wrote Teoria dell’illusione finanziaria in 1903. The work of Buchanan [1960 and 1967] gave rise to a large debate on the issue of fiscal illusion, about its sense, its consequences and its solutions. This article presents the historical evolution of the debate on fiscal illusion and its empirical evidence.
The Chicago Roots of the Virginia School of Political Economy
Authors: Brady Gordon L.
Published: December 2019

The story of the Virginia school of political economy is in large part the story of how graduates of the University of Chicago developed a new paradigm in a new location. Their work was characterized by a deep and abiding respect for the intellectual tradition of economics at the University of Chicago and through their achievements reflected well on their alma mater. This paper goes beyond economics to include the sociology of knowledge and an account of the strong-willed personalities at Chicago who had a major influence on the founders of the Virginia school. By focusing primarily on Buchanan as the principal founder of the Virginia school, this paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what are the distinctive characteristics of the Virginia school? Second, which of these characteristics have roots in the Chicago school?
Modeling the Impact of Localism in U.S. Presidential Elections
Authors: Mixon Franklin G. , King Ernest W. , Lawing Matthew L.
Published: December 2019

This paper reconciles previous approaches to measure the ‘home-state effect’ in U.S. presidential elections by using the latest data [i.e., 1972-2004], with additional techniques designed to flesh out the role that state size and presidential term play in the determination (or not) of the U.S. presidential vote share of the home state's candidates. From this study, three compelling themes emerge: (1) the home-state effect in presidential elections generally falls in the 4.0 to 6.0 percentage points range, (2) any home-state effect that does exist seems to emanate from the role localism plays in smaller environments (e.g., Arkansas and Georgia), and (3) the home-state effect shown here and in previous studies appears to also be rooted in a first-term effect, which one would expect given the lack of information on the governing behavior of freshmen presidents.
Capitalism and the 2008 crisis
Authors: van Meerhaeghe Marcel A.G.
Published: December 2019

The theory underlying free-trade policy and its application in real life are examined in the first two sections. Then the international financial disequilibria which contributed to die crisis, are dealt with. The next sections discuss die capitalist decline and the crisis that led to the collapse of capitalism. An appraisal concludes this paper.
Testing the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ Hypothesis in Constitutional Choice: A «Walk-Talk» Approach
Authors: Imbeau Louis M.
Published: December 2019

Looking at a constitutional document as a ‘discourse’ that implicitly speaks about the motivations of its drafters, it is argued that a test of the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ hypothesis is possible. This paper describes how such a test could be conducted. It first proposes a conceptual framework based on power analysis to distinguish three distributions of power that decision-makers want to maintain or to modify through their choices. This conceptual framework helps identify which power relations pertain to an area of uncertainty and which do not. Then, adopting a ‘walk-talk’ approach, the paper details a content analysis method that allows one to extract the power relations embedded in a constitutional document. The paper concludes by showing the kind of results that such an analysis can generate.
The Spillover Benefits of AIDS Prevention
Authors: Mathers Rachel L.
Published: December 2019

This paper determines whether there exists a public goods problem pertaining to AIDS prevention spending, which is measured using Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) AIDS prevention policy cost data for the United States over the years 1998-2007. Panel regressions are utilized to measure the degree to which AIDS prevention is a public good. If prevention spending is a Samuelsonian public good, the costs of such programs should not be a function of the number of people covered by the program. The results of this analysis have important implications for the funding of AIDS prevention programs and indicate that this spending has spillover benefits.
Barriers to Entry: Abolishing the Barriers to Understanding
Authors: Keppler Jan-Horst
Published: December 2019

The concept of a barrier to entry has been discussed least since Bain [1956] with important contributions by Spence [1977], Dixit [1980] and Milgrom - Roberts [1982]. The more recent discussion is synthesized in the contributions to a dedicated session at the 2004 AEA meeting. Yet, a ‘barrier to entry’ remains a surprisingly elusive concept, which even accomplished theorists fail to define in an unequivocal manner. This article shows that past and current contributions to the subject fail to resolve the issue, because they insist on analyzing barriers to entry in the context of identical firms in homogenous goods industries. This inevitably leads to logical inconsistencies as each theorist provides his own ad hoc definition of a barrier to avoid Bertrand competition. We show that the notion of a barrier to entry has economic pertinence only if interpreted as a fully sunk cost in the form of a unique, indivisible, non tradable factor of production. This, however, implies monopolistic competition with welfare implications of a barrier to entry being positive as well as negative. Regulators thus need to ensure the ability of all competitors to create their own welfare-enhancing ‘barriers to entry’ in a dynamic context rather than to focus on their existence in purely negative and static terms.
New Empirical Estimates of Rent Seeking: An Update of Sobel – Garrett [2002]
Authors: Hall Joshua C. , Ross Justin M.
Published: December 2019

The SIC sectors for direct, indirect, and in kind rent seeking activity have been identified and verified empirically in Sobel - Garrett [2002] by comparing capital counties to noncapital counties. We convert these industries from SIC to NAICS codes and provide measures of direct, indirect, and in-kind rent seeking for the year 2005. In addition, we extend their work by switching from counties to Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, which are defined as economically integrated counties. Our measures are consistent with theirs and provide a starting point for creating a time series of rent-seeking activity in the United States.
Complexity of Personal Income Tax Design: An Index of Measurement
Authors: Tondani Davide
Published: December 2019

This article puts forward an index of complexity of personal income tax design. Deductions and tax exemptions, etc., are often linked to legal tax brackets in order to increase fairness in the distribution of tax burden. But increased fairness tends to make the tax structure less comprehensible to the non-perfectly informed taxpayer. The proposed index gives a quantitative measurement of the distortion between legal and effective tax rates along the gross income scale and allows for intertemporal and interspatial comparisons. An application of the index to Italian personal income tax concludes the article.
Public Sector Quality Assurance and Building Codes
Authors: Sutter Daniel
Published: December 2019

Building codes have been stressed as a means to reduce losses from hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural hazards. Almost all U. S. states have adopted a building code, but codes must be enforced to actually strengthen the built environment. This paper explores the determinants of building code enforcement across states using ratings from the Insurance Services Office. Overall enforcement is not outstanding, as only five communities nationwide have the best rating of 1, and less than 7% have one of the three top ratings. Although stressed as a means to reduce natural hazards losses, enforcement is not better in states vulnerable to hurricanes and is actually lower in earthquake vulnerable states. Enforcement generally improves with a larger state and local government, while political corruption reduces enforcement. Building codes are better enforced in more urban states, consistent widi beneficial competition between local governments, while inequality does not significantly affect enforcement.
Investment and Consumption: A Critique of Rothbard’s Claim that There Can Be No Such Thing as Governmental ‘Investment’
Authors: Barnett William , Block Walter
Published: December 2019

We take Rothbard to task for claiming that governmental agents must of necessity engage in consumption in their expenditures; that it would be equivalent to a logical contradiction to suppose the inverse.
Entangled Political Economy and the Two Faces of Entrepreneurship
Authors: Podemska-Mikluch Marta , Wagner Richard E.
Published: December 2019

This paper contrasts two forms of entrepreneurship - genuine and parasitical- within a framework of entangled political economy. In 1911, Joseph Schumpeter described entrepreneurship as the locus of leadership within a capitalist economy. At that time state participation in economic activity was dramatically less than it is now. Entrepreneurship was largely free of political entanglement. After a century of governmental expansion, however, entrepreneurship has increasingly become entangled in parasitical political relationships. Where genuine entrepreneurship is a feature of a constitution of liberty, parasitical entrepreneurship is a feature of a constitution of control.
An Analogy: Symmetric Tragedies and Calculus of Consent
Authors: Yoon Yong J.
Published: December 2019

Any thoughtful reader would recognize the similarity between the anticommons [BUCHANAN - YOON, 2000] and the decision making costs in The Calculus of Consent [BUCHANAN - TULLOCK, 1962]. In both cases, the veto power of participants generates inefficient or costly outcomes. This analogy may suggest that there is an internal logic between the two literatures. The analogy, however, stops here and the internal logic cannot be generalized. The Calculus of Consent is concerned with a selection of a collective decision making rule from behind a veil of uncertainty in a constitutional convention, while anticommons considers individual decision making over alternatives under already defined existing rules. Yet, it can be instructive to clarify the differences. External costs and decision making costs in calculus are compared to commons and anticommons problems by introducing different property regimes.
Political Arithmetic: New Evidence on the ‘Small-State Bias’ in Federal Spending
Authors: Matthews Michelle B. , Shughart William F. , Stevenson Taylor P.
Published: December 2019

This paper revisits the literature identifying a small-state bias in federal spending, according to which the distribution of federal funds favors the less populous states because they are ‘overrepresented’ in the U.S. Senate. Estimating a panel data model of die determinants of government spending per million capita across the 50 states over a longer time period [1972- 2000] than studied hitherto, and controlling for heterogeneity in the memberships of the House and Senate by including the tenures of die states’ congressional delegations, we report evidence supporting the existence of a bias toward states that are overrepresented in both chambers. Our key finding, however, is that the small-state bias is sensitive to the time period considered.
Lincoln’s Wartime Incumbency Network: Vertical Trust, Informal Payments, and the U.S. Presidential Election of 1864
Authors: Crisp Alice M. , Mixon Franklin G.
Published: December 2019

Public choice interpretations of historical events represent a growing literature in economics. This particular study follows in, and builds upon, this tradition by examining, through the public choice lens, events leading up to die U.S. presidential election of 1864. We posit that die modern theory of bureaucracy, as described in Breton and Wintrobe [ 1982], perhaps best explains die way in which Abraham Lincoln’s subordinates assisted, sometimes even manipulating the gears of die federal (Union) government in doing so, in his re-election effort. That bureaucracy, which we refer to herein as Lincoln's wartime incumbency network, was based on a system of «vertical trust», and included an incentive structure wherein subordinates provided Lincoln with «informal services» related to his re-election in 1864, and were provided in return with «informal payments», which often consisted of ex ante/ex post promotions and/or nominations for other government positions.
Local Sales Tax and Revenue Volatility
Authors: Hou Yilin , Seligman Jason S.
Published: December 2019

States have long used the sales tax as a revenue source. Since the 1970s states started granting localities the option of levying local sales taxes to enrich their revenue portfolio. Local sales taxes are often structured to reduce local property taxes; in most localities this strategy prevails in referendum. Since sales taxes are more elastic than property taxes, substituting away from the latter poses the threat of increased revenue volatility. We employ a panel dataset of counties in the state of Georgia to examine the effects of local option sales tax on own-source revenue volatility. We decompose volatility into the long- and short-run, use a mean-variance approach in considering correct revenue portfolios across tax-instruments, and find that substitution towards sales tax amplifies revenue variability. Our study fills a niche in die revenue volatility literature; our results imply that sales taxes may have been overweighed in current revenue portfolios.
Unintended or Intended Consequences? The Effect of Below–market Housing Mandates on Housing Markets in California
Authors: Means Tom , Stringham Edward P.
Published: December 2019

Inclusionary zoning, also known as below-market housing mandates, is now in place in one-third of California cities and is spreading around the United States. Supporters of this policy advocate making housing more affordable by placing price controls on a percentage of new homes. But if almost all economists agree that price controls on housing reduce quantity and cause shortages, why do so many policymakers or voters support them? Ellickson [1981] argued that inclusionary zoning may be popular precisely because, contrary to the expressed goals of the program, it actually restricts supply and leads to higher prices. Incumbent homeowners and policymakers catering to them can benefit from restricting new supply. Using panel data and a first difference model, we test how the policy affected the price and quantity of housing in California cities between 1980, 1990, and 2000. Under various specifications we find that cities adopting below-market housing mandates end up with higher prices and fewer homes. Between 1980 and 1990, cities imposing below-market housing mandates end up with 9 percent higher prices and 8 percent fewer homes overall. Between 1990 and 2000 cities imposing below-market housing mandates end up with 20 percent higher prices and 7 percent fewer homes overall. Consistent with Ellickson's hypothesis, the program may not be about increasing die supply of housing or making it more affordable overall.
The Evolution of Legislative Tenure in the United States Congress: 1789–2004
Authors: Ryan Matt E.
Published: December 2019

How has tenure evolved over the history of the United States Congress? A rudimentary analysis of both Senator and Representative tenure rates finds average legislative tenure to be constant for nearly ninety years, only to rise significantly in the late 1800s. An empirical breakpoint analysis isolates the most probable breakpoint in both time series. Possible causes of this shift are explored.
Some Remarks on Preference Revelation for Public Goods
Authors: da Empoli Domenico
Published: December 2019

This paper questions the long-established view in the Musgrave-Samuelson public goods theory about voters’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences for public goods. The arguments are structured as follows: The concept of‘democracy’ as ‘government by the people’ presupposes that voters freely express their own views in order to influence government's decisions; the idea of governments introducing demand-revealing mechanisms to detect people's ‘true’ preferences seems inconsistent with this view. Voters’ disclosure of their preferences typically is not immediately related to their tax obligations, whose enforcement takes place after approval of the budget, which makes unprofitable any strategic behavior by the voters. From an historic viewpoint, the ‘preference revelation problem’ for public goods goes back to Wicksell's essay on «A New Principle of Just Taxation» and, through Musgrave, it was conveyed to Samuelson. However, the Wicksellian statement was based on an incorrect interpretation of Mazzola's theory.
Constitutional Rules of Overlapping Taxation among Multi–Tiered Governments
Authors: Yokoyama Akira
Published: December 2019

The literature of public choice and constitutional political economy argues for fiscal decentralization and for enlarging the tax and spending powers of sub-national tiers of government. Numerous investigations of vertical tax externalities caused by overlapping and uncoordinated taxation appeared in the 1990s after Brennan - Buchanan [1980] and Flowers [1988]. The literature, however, seldom discussed constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation in federal or multi-tiered governmental structures. This paper closes that gap in the literature. It explicates the criteria for selecting constitutional rules governing overlapping taxation and demonstrates that a competitive tax regime constrained by a maximum tax rate surpasses a competitive tax regime without rate constraints as a constitutional rule. It concludes that constraining maximum tax rates applicable to any tax base is highly important in multi-tiered governmental structures.
James M. Buchanan and Me: Reminiscing about a 50–Year Association
Authors: Wagner Richard E.
Published: December 2019

This essay commemorates James M. Buchanan's life and work by reflecting on my 50 years of association with him, starting in 1963 when I entered graduate school at the University of Virginia and ending with his death in 2013. This essay does not try to add to the substantial secondary literature that has arisen about Buchanan and his scholarly contributions. Objective contributions in that vein will doubtlessly continue; indeed, I have written some myself. Instead, this essay portrays Jim Buchanan through offering a personal reflection on some of my experiences with him over our half-century's association. Jim Buchanan was a pivotal figure in my life, as in many ways I have tried to carry forward what I acquired from through observation and interaction. I even thought I was carrying forward that acquisition when divergences arose between us, as they did increasingly as the years passed.
Reference Prices and Standard Costs in Public Procurement as Tools Against Corruption
Authors: Santoro Sergio
Published: December 2019

This paper analyzes the development of standard costs of goods and services assessed in the context of the intermediate consumption of public administration. The author discusses their effects in terms of decrease of the expenditure through a reduction in the purchase price of the PA, on the one hand, and in terms of preservation of the quality and quantity of goods and services, on the other.
Corruption in Public Procurement: How to Fight and Prevent it?
Authors: De Rose Claudio
Published: December 2019

Corruption and public procurement often go together, at least in Italy. Corruption must be continuously fought and it is also necessary to find appropriate ways for preventing it. However, this is not easily achieved, because of the wide-ranging features of corruption, the variety of its causes and the sensitivity of the issue, including at political level and in particular where public procurement is concerned. This type of corruption has its own specific characteristics, stemming from the specificities of public procurement such as: the need for direct interaction between public officials and the private sector at every stage, from die award up to the execution of the contracts; the complexity of the legal and technical regulations on public procurement; the difficulties related to financing and thus also to payments. In all these aspects, public procurement can create opportunities for corruption, not only for sporadic, individual corruption but also for systemic corruption, which affects public administration and society as a whole, and involves organised crime to a steadily increasing extent. Since a long time, national, European and international bodies and institutions, as well as legal doctrine, have been looking into appropriate solutions to corruption in public procurement, giving also useful advice to lawmakers. In Italy, since 2012, such a reflection has led to the adoption of new legislative measures, which have recently culminated in the setting up of the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority.
On the Problem of Quality Enforcement in Centralized Public Procurement
Authors: Albano Gian Luigi
Published: December 2019

Demand aggregation is widely recognized as a efficiency-enhancing solution in public procurement. The technique of framework agreements represents possibly the most effective solution to struck a balance between contract standardization and customization. Central purchasing organizations in many countries are progressively relying on framework agreements to aggregate demand of different public buyers. By splitting the procurement process (until the award phase) between separate entities, such an organizational model in public procurement may, however, generate low incentives to enforce quality at the contract execution stage. In this paper, we review some evidence of contract mismanagement borrowing from the experience of the National Frame Contracts awarded by Consip S.p.A. in Italy and also discuss possible remedies.
Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty: A Comparative Systems Perspective
Authors: Wagner Richard E. , Yokoyama Akira
Published: December 2019

Federalism is commonly thought to be a pro-liberty system of government, in contrast to a unitary system. Within a unitary system, people face but a single government that taxes and regulates. Within federal systems, however, people face two or more governments that tax and regulate. In light of this multiplicity of independent governments, it is reasonable to wonder why federalism is widely thought to be favorable to liberty. Whether federalism is or is not favorable to liberty depends on some institutional features of a federalist system. In particular, we distinguish between two systems of federalist governance: competitive federalism and cartel federalism. Where competitive federalism entails competition among all units of government, cartel federalism entails collusion among governments. Competitive federalism has a polycentric structure where no single government dominates the other governments. In contrast, cartel federalism has a monocentric structure that is dominated by the cartelizing unit of government.
Dangling at the Abyss: How Deadweight Costs and Political Attitudes May Prevent (or Induce) Collapse
Authors: Clark J. R. , Garen John
Published: December 2019

Analysts have considered what might check the 20th century growth in government, thereby avoiding Leviathan and economic collapse. We develop a model where political economy equilibrium pushes the economy to the brink of collapse, but rising marginal welfare costs may prevent collapse. For small reductions in welfare from government, rational ignorance enables special interests to gain. When deadweight costs become large, taxpayers provide political opposition that prevents collapse. Optimistic views of government may alter this conclusion and induce collapse. However, if favorable attitudes toward government are revised downward in light of poor economic performance, this concern is lessened.
Rent Seeking and the Treaty of Methuen
Authors: Anderson R. Warren
Published: December 2019

In 1703 Portugal and England signed a trade agreement - the Treaty of Methuen - that involved only two goods: wool from England and wine from Portugal. I present a public choice analysis of the treaty's formation. The key British and Portuguese agents involved in writingit all acted in a self-serving manner. The effects of the treaty persisted, with England importing wine from Portugal instead of France - the superior wine producer. David Ricardo used the wool-wine trade of Portugal and England in his famous example of comparative advantage. However, France had the comparative advantage in wine production but lacked access to the English market partly due to the Treaty of Methuen. Thus the premier example of comparative advantage is partly an example of the persistence of rent seeking.
Micro–Level Catallactic Public Finance
Authors: Hebert David
Published: December 2019

This paper seeks to provide a sketch of a micro-level explanation of public finance. De Viti De Marco [1936] and Buchanan [1949] provide initial starting points for understanding this view of public finance, which was subsequently extended by Wagner [1992, 2007a] and Yoon [2000], among others. While these scholars focus on the fiscal commons created by communal property rights within public sectors, this paper focuses on the power to tax and provide public goods. Building off of Hebert and Wagner [2013], this paper provides a catallactic explanation of taxation and provision of public goods within the individualistic state, where the state is represented as the sum of its individual members acting in a collective capacity.
Federalism and Intergovernmental Networks: Reflections on Friedrich and Tullock
Authors: Yokoyama Akira
Published: December 2019

The concept of federalism has been discussed in various ways. In general, federalism means the doctrine or system of federal government. Federal government means a particular structure of government in which the division of powers between a central authority and regional authorities has been defined by a constitution. But there are many thoughts regarding federalism. The word federalism is often discussed as the process of federalizing rather than the structure of multi-tiered governments. Friedrich [1968] discussed federalism as the process of federalizing. Federalizing implies operating in the direction of not only disintegration but also integration. Tullock [1969] showed a theoretical model for deciding the degree to which government should be federalized. The degree depends on the cost and benefit of federalization. This paper explores the link between the process and outcome of federalizing from the viewpoints of intergovernmental networks and individual behavior.
Design vs. Emergence in a Theory of Federalism: Toward Institutional Reconciliation
Authors: Wagner Richard E.
Published: December 2019

It is common to think of federalism as a governmental arrangement that entails competition among governments. Thinking this way, however, is problematic. A competitive system is generally associated with the notion of polycentricity, as illustrated by a market system of free and open competition. The structure of such a system emerges through a competitive process and changes continually as that process operates. By contrast, a federalist system of governments is typically designed as against being emergent, and with that design involving some assignment of powers, duties, and competencies among the member governments. A genuinely competitive federalism must thus be designed in such a fashion as to mirror the workings of a spontaneously generated order. While it is comparatively easy to think of competition among a horizontal array of governments, it is more difficult to do that when those governments are nested within a vertical array of governments. Furthermore, the problem of the anti-commons comes into play in dealing with federal systems because the inalienability of property rights within governmental entities works to stifle the continual adaptation in governmental structure that a genuine system of competitive federalism requires.
On the Determinants of Congressional Bill Sponsorship and Voting Behavior with an Application to Government Growth Theories
Authors: Sobel Russel S. , Wagner Gary A.
Published: December 2019

This paper analyzes two new data sets measuring the total amount of spending reflected in each legislator's aggregate voting record and his or her bill sponsorship activities. The results are contrasted with identical models for legislators’ votes on specific bills. We are able to provide the first exploration of differences in the determinants of the bill sponsorship and voting behavior of legislators. Our data allow tests of the theories of government expenditure growth in a manner more true to public choice foundations. Finally, the bill sponsorship data provide a unique opportunity to explore the presence of vote trading in Congress.
The Main Determinants of Public Deficits in Italy (1951-1991): Testing Three Alternative Explanations
Authors: Galli Emma , Padovano Fabio
Published: December 2019

The paper simultaneously tests the Keynesian, the optimal finance and the Public Choice theories of the determinants of public deficits on Italian 1951-1991 data using a cointegration analysis. The estimated model suggests that the Keynesian and the contingent liability theories show the highest explanatory power of deficits creation. The diagnostics of the estimates show that some conclusions are valid for the overall period and suggest the inclusion of other variables to increase the explanatory power of the model.
The Reduction of Decision Complexity: Normative Policies and the Role of Information
Authors: Mittone Luigi
Published: December 2019

The principal aim of this work is to interpret the function of the state as a mechanism for reducing the complexity of the decisional process of the economic agents. The paper takes the hit from a famous case reported by Thomas Schelling - the ‘hockey players dilemma’ - to develop a model based on a modified version of the prisoner dilemma. The model compares two alternative strategies implemented by the government, the production of information versus the production of rules, both aimed to reduce irrational behaviours. The main result is that the production of information cannot by itself restore the perfect information.
Externalities in the Economic Theory of Regulation
Authors: Sutter Daniel
Published: December 2019

This article considers the regulation of externalities within the interest group model of politics. A group concerned about correcting an externality generates zero marginal support at the efficient level of regulation. Politicians respond to interests directly affected by policy and thus inefficiently correct externalities.
Italy’s Economic Policy in the Age of the Euro
Authors: Zecchini Salvatore
Published: December 2019

Italy’s participation in the EMU entails majors shifts in its economic policy approach, involving the full spectrum of policy domains, and not just the monetary area alone. The author presents an overview of the main changes, highlighting a number of critical issues that have emerged. Italy’s need for higher growth over the business cycle can hardly be met through a unified monetary policy that is attuned to the requirements of the larger and more developed part of the Eurozone. Extensive constraints stemming from EMU on fiscal policy and other adjustment tools leave die country no choice but to press ahead with far-reaching reforms of its structures and markets. But progress in this direction is hampered by social resistance and inadequate mechanisms to ease adjustment costs. Under these conditions, the partial policy co-ordination stemming from EMU raises for Italy problems of sustainability over the longer term, especially in prolonged phases of stagnation or recession.
Adaptive Partisan Theory
Authors: Heckelman Jac C.
Published: December 2019

Previous empirical studies designed to test the rational expectations partisan model of Alesina [1987] have generally looked for changes in real macroeconomic variables following a change in party power (incumbent party loss), whereas the model predicts these variables should fluctuate in a predictable manner even when the incumbent party is reelected. It is shown in this paper that the previous evidence is supportive of a partisan policy model where agents employ adaptive expectations, in which case only changes in party power lead to partisan economic fluctuations of real variables.
Are Italians also Fiscal Conservatives?
Authors: Greene Kenneth V. , Pagliero Mario
Published: December 2019

Data on former Christian Democratic Party and Communist Party voters shares in nineteen Italian regions in the post-war era are analyzed to see if voters punish or reward politicians for economic performance and for big growth in government spending. We find that the DC was harmed by inflation and employment but benefitted from economic growth. Some evidence is also presented which implies that its potential constituents acted as fiscal conservatives.
Hyperspectral imaging from a raw mosaic image with end-to-end learning
Authors: Fu Hao , Bian Liheng , Cao Xianbin , Zhang Jun
Published: December 2019

Hyperspectral imaging provides rich spatial-spectral-temporal information with wide applications. However, most of the existing hyperspectral imaging systems require light splitting/filtering devices for spectral modulation, making the system complex and expensive, and sacrifice spatial or temporal resolution. In this paper, we report an end-to-end deep learning method to reconstruct hyperspectral images directly from a raw mosaic image. It saves the separate demosaicing process required by other methods, which reconstructs the full-resolution RGB data from the raw mosaic image. This reduces computational complexity and accumulative error. Three different networks were designed based on the state-of-the-art models in literature, including the residual network, the multiscale network and the parallel-multiscale network. They were trained and tested on public hyperspectral image datasets. Benefiting from the parallel propagation and information fusion of different-resolution feature maps, the parallel-multiscale network performs best among the three networks, with the average peak signal-to-noise ratio achieving 46.83dB. The reported method can be directly integrated to boost an RGB camera for hyperspectral imaging.
Large depth-of-field tracking of colloidal spheres in holographic microscopy by modeling the objective lens
Authors: Leahy Brian , Alexander Ronald , Martin Caroline , Barkley Solomon , Manoharan Vinothan N.
Published: December 2019

Holographic microscopy has developed into a powerful tool for 3D particle tracking, yielding nanometer-scale precision at high frame rates. However, current particle tracking algorithms ignore the effect of the microscope objective on the formation of the recorded hologram. As a result, particle tracking in holographic microscopy is currently limited to particles well above the microscope focus. Here, we show that modeling the effect of an aberration-free lens allows tracking of particles above, near, and below the focal plane in holographic microscopy, doubling the depth of field. Finally, we use our model to determine the conditions under which ignoring the effect of the lens is justified and in what conditions it leads to systematic errors.