bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Antioxidant Function and Health Implications of Vitamin E
Authors: Chow Ching Kuang , Chow-Johnson Hannah S
Published: January 2013

Superoxide, a key precursor of important reactive oxygen/nitrogen species (ROS/RNS), may release iron from its protein complex. By mediating the generation and/level of superoxide, vitamin E, the most important fat-soluble anti-oxidant and free radical scavenger, may exert its antioxidant function by limiting the formation of reactive hydroxyl radi-cals and peroxynitrite. The antioxidant function of vitamin E is augmented by GSH peroxidase and related metabolic sys-tems which respond adaptively and compensatively to oxidative stress. By mediating the levels of ROS/RNS, vitamin E may also modulate the activation and/or expression of redox-sensitive biological response modifiers, and thereby attenu-ate the cellular events leading to the onset and development of aging and other degenerative disorders. Earlier epidemiol-ogical data and retrospective studies show an association between increased intake of vitamin E and reduced risk of car-diovascular disease, cancer, and other disorders. However, subsequent prospective randomized placebo-controlled studies and interventional trials have provided inconsistent findings. Data available from recent large-scale interventional trials suggest that vitamin E supplements at high doses are not beneficial.
The Induction of Cytokine Release in Monocytes by Electronegative Low-Density Lipoprotein (LDL) Is Related to Its Higher Ceramide Content than Native LDL
Authors: Estruch Montserrat , Sanchez-Quesada Jose , Beloki Lorea , Ordoñez-Llanos Jordi , Benitez Sonia
Published: January 2013

Electronegative low-density lipoprotein (LDL(−)) is a minor modified LDL subfraction that is present in blood. LDL(−) promotes inflammation and is associated with the development of atherosclerosis. We previously reported that the increase of cytokine release promoted by this lipoprotein subfraction in monocytes is counteracted by high-density lipoprotein (HDL). HDL also inhibits a phospholipase C-like activity (PLC-like) intrinsic to LDL(−). The aim of this work was to assess whether the inhibition of the PLC-like activity by HDL could decrease the content of ceramide (CER) and diacylglycerol (DAG) generated in LDL(−). This knowledge would allow us to establish a relationship between these compounds and the inflammatory activity of LDL(−). LDL(−) incubated at 37 °C for 20 h increased its PLC-like activity and, subsequently, the amount of CER and DAG. We found that incubating LDL(−) with HDL decreased both products in LDL(−). Native LDL was modified by lipolysis with PLC or by incubation with CER-enriched or DAG-enriched liposomes. The increase of CER in native LDL significantly increased cytokine release, whereas the enrichment in DAG did not show these inflammatory properties. These data point to CER, a resultant product of the PLC-like activity, as a major determinant of the inflammatory activity induced by LDL(−) in monocytes.
Twin-Screw Extrusion Processing of Rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) Feeds Using Graded Levels of High Protein Corn-Based Distillers Dried Grains (HP-DDG) and Conventional Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles (DDGS)
Authors: Fallahi Parisa , Rosentrater Kurt A. , Muthukumarappan Kasiviswanathan , Brown Michael L.
Published: January 2013

Twin-screw extrusion cooking trials were performed to investigate the differential effects of conventional DDGS (DDGS) and HP-DDG inclusion, as fishmeal replacers, on physical properties (moisture content, water activity, thermal properties, expansion ratio, unit density, bulk density, water absorption, solubility and pellet durability indices, and color) of Rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) feed. Four ingredient blends were formulated with 20 and 40% C- DDGS, and 20 and 40% HP-DDG, along with other required dietary ingredients. Each diet was extruded using two replications; a fishmeal based diet acted as the control diet. The highest and the lowest extrudate moisture content and water activity were observed for the diets containing 20% DDGS and 40% HP-DDG, respectively. Compared to the control diet, increasing HP-DDG content from 20 to 40% had no effect on the bulk density of the products, while increasing DDGS content from 20-40% led to a considerable rise in bulk density of the extrudates by 14.2 and 6%, respectively. Also, extrudates with the lowest brightness, greenness, and yellowness values were obtained from the diet containing 20% DDGS, whereas the most color intensity values were observed for the diets containing 40% DDGS and 20% HP-DDG. Increasing DDGS and HP-DDG from 0-40% caused a remarkable increase in water absorption index, by 72 and 30%, respectively. Likewise, the water solubility index increased, but in a considerably lesser order of magnitude. High pellet durability index of more than 99% was achieved with inclusion of either DDGS or HP-DDG. None of the diets impacted the thermal properties of the extrudates. Inclusion of 20 and 40% DDGS resulted in the extrudates with the largest and the smallest unit density values of nearly 887 and 750 kg/m3, respectively. As was expected, expansion ratio decreased with increasing unit density. Increasing inclusion levels of HP-DDG did not show any effect on unit density or expansion ratio of the products. Future research should concentrate on investigating the effects of both extrusion processing and graded levels of different types of DDGS on Rainbow trout feeds.
Naturalistic Fallacy
Authors: Suikkanen Jussi
Published: January 2013

[1] The phrase “naturalistic fallacy” is used in two distinct senses which are not always distinguished clearly enough. This tends to lead to unfortunate confusions (see, e.g., Hauser 2006: 5). Hence, one of my aims in this essay is to clarify the distinction between these uses in the hope that further confusions could be avoided.
Error Theory
Authors: Joyce Richard
Published: January 2013

To hold an error theory about morality is to endorse a kind of radical moral skepticism – a skepticism analogous to atheism in the religious domain. The atheist thinks that religious utterances, such as “God loves you,” really are truth‐evaluable assertions (as opposed to being veiled commands or expressions of hope, etc.), but that the world just doesn't contain the items (e.g., God) necessary to render such assertions true. Similarly, the moral error theorist maintains that moral judgments are truth‐evaluable assertions (thus contrasting with the non‐cognitivist), but that the world doesn't contain the properties (e.g., moral goodness, evil, moral obligation) needed to render moral judgments true. In other words, moral discourse aims at the truth but systematically fails to secure it. If there is no such property asmoral wrongness, for example, then no judgment of the form “X is morally wrong” will be true (where “X” denotes an actual action or state of affairs). Advocates of this position include Hinckfuss (1987), Joyce (2001), and Mackie (1977;seeMackie, J. L.). Various forms of moral skepticism – some of which are arguably instances of the error theoretic stance – have been familiar to philosophers since ancient times (seeSkepticism, Moral).
Vegetarianism and Veganism
Authors: Fox Michael Allen
Published: January 2013

Most people, past and present, have never seriously questioned whether it is morally acceptable to eat animals and treat them as resources. However, vegetarianism and veganism, which have a lengthy history in both Western and non‐Western cultures, challenge these assumptions and clash with prevailing views about how humans should conduct their lives and make use of the natural world. Religious practices and ideas about diet energized early outlooks of this sort more than clearly focused ethical reflections; but the latter have surfaced periodically, from the Greco‐Roman period to the present. Strong, sustained vegetarian and vegan movements today coincide with the rise of the animal rights/liberation movement, and are fueled by concerns about factory farming, climate change, healthy eating, and how to feed a rapidly increasing human population.
Companion Animals
Authors: Palmer Clare
Published: January 2013

Companion animals are nonhuman beings with whom humans choose to cohabit for reasons such as companionship and entertainment, rather than for food or profit. Households across the world include companion animals, most commonly domesticated dogs and cats, but also other small domesticated mammals, reptiles, fish, and even insects. Keeping companion animals raises a variety of ethical issues, both general (in that such issues arise in all human–animal interactions) and specific (concerning the domestication, breeding, and keeping of animals in human homes).
Conflict of Interest
Authors: Davis Michael
Published: January 2013

Conflict of interest is regularly in the news – in business, government, the professions, and even the sciences – because, it seems, we cannot help dividing loyalty, for example between family and employer (seeFamily; Loyalty). We cannot help “serving two masters.”
Nursing Ethics
Authors: Edwards Steven D.
Published: January 2013

We can think of nursing ethics as the inquiry into how nurses ought to act in their professional lives. Nursing ethics is one form of healthcare ethics; other forms within the more general category of healthcare ethics include medical ethics and paramedic ethics. Healthcare ethics is a subclass of applied ethics, which in turn is a subclass of ethics (seebioethics).
Sentience, Moral Relevance of
Authors: Bortolotti, Lisa , Mameli,and Matteo , Blasimme Alessandro
Published: January 2013

Sentience is a capacity that only some organisms have. It is often assumed that this capacity has moral significance and should have a prominent role in moral thinking. The commonsense notion of sentience (as indicated by the etymology, from the Latinsentienswhich means “capable of feeling”) suggests that sentience is a capacity to bein certain kinds of mental states. In the ethical literature, the term “sentience” is often used to refer to the ability to feel pain and pleasure. More generally, sentience can be said to be the capacity to have feelings or sensations, which include pain and pleasure but also visual and auditory sensations, hunger, sadness, and so on.
Strict Liability
Authors: Green Stuart P.
Published: January 2013

The termstrict liabilityrefers to a legal rule or regime in which liability is imposed in the absence of proof that the defendant was at fault in causing the alleged harm or injury. Strict liability is imposed in order to prevent or limit conduct that is harmful or dangerous even when performed by one who is using due care. It is common in both tort law and criminal law (seeCriminal Law; Torts), though its use is more controversial in the latter because criminal law in general is more concerned with the blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct.
Children's Rights
Authors: Archard David
Published: January 2013

Any discussion of children's rights must ask whether children do have rights and, if they do, what rights they have. It should at the outset acknowledge the basic distinction between moral and legal or positive rights (seeRights). The latter are those rights which, as a matter of fact, have been accorded to persons in law or by existing institutional rules; the former are those rights whose ascription to individuals can be morally justified. Clearly moral rights need not be positively recognized, and, conversely, those rights that individuals are given in law may lack any moral warrant.
Pacifism
Authors: Hawk William J.
Published: January 2013

Pacifism involves a number of related moral positions, endorsed for different reasons, often evoking powerful emotional responses. To understand pacifism, we need to identify what pacifism is, or what pacifisms there are, by (1) looking at pacifism's core meaning, etymology, uses, near neighbors, and relationship to just war theory; (2) distinguishing absolute versus contingent pacifism; (3) categorizing pacifism's chief motivators such as nonviolence, nonkilling, moral autonomy, libertarianism, nuclear war, and religious teachings; (4) highlighting pacifism's role in international relations in the United Nations, pacifist nations, the human rights debate, and legal standing as conscientious objectors; and (5) articulating and responding to pacifism's perennial criticisms.
Mozi
Authors: Fraser Chris
Published: January 2013

Mozi (fl. ca. 430BCE) was the charismatic founder of an influential philosophical, political, and religious movement that flourished during the Warring States era (479–221BCE) in ancient China. Arguably the first real philosopher in the Chinese tradition, Mozi initiated the practice of ethical argumentation in China. He was the first figure to undertake – as Socrates did in ancient Greece – an explicit, reflective search for objective moral criteria and to support his views with tightly constructed arguments. He and his followers – the Mohists (Mo zhe) – developed a systematic set of ethical, political, and epistemological doctrines that included history's earliest version of a consequentialist ethical theory (seeConsequentialism), a state of nature argument for the existence of government, and an inchoate just war theory (seeJust War Theory, History of). The Mohists played a pivotal role in shaping the central concepts, premises, and issues of classical Chinese ethics, political theory, epistemology, philosophy of language, and logic (Graham 1978, 1989; Hansen 1992). They also contributed to early Chinese science and mathematics. The Mohist movement continued for two to three centuries after Mozi's death before eventually fading away during the Western Han dynasty (206BCE–8CE).
Intrinsic Value
Authors: Bradley Ben
Published: January 2013

Intrinsic value is the central concept ofaxiology, or the philosophical study of value. To say that something is intrinsically valuable is, roughly speaking, to say that it is valuable in itself, or for its own sake – as opposed to, for example, money, which is valuable only for the sake of something else (seeInstrumental Value). But what is it for something to be valuable “in itself”? Is it the same as to be valuable for its own sake? Is it possible for something to be valuable in such a way? If so, what things are intrinsically valuable? More generally, whatkindsof things (people, objects, properties, facts) are intrinsically valuable? Is the intrinsic value of something determined by the values of its parts? Why should we care about intrinsic value? These are the fundamental questions of axiology.
Surrogacy
Authors: Fabre Cécile
Published: January 2013

Surrogacy is a practice whereby prospective (or commissioning) parents who cannot gestate children entrust another woman with that particular task. There are many reasons why those parents resort to a surrogate mother. Typically, the female partner in a heterosexual couple is unable to bear children, because (for example) she had to undergo a hysterectomy, or suffers from severe endometriosis. In other cases, gay males who do not wish to adopt a child have no choice but to use a surrogate mother.
World Hunger
Authors: Dower Nigel
Published: January 2013

Hunger is the lack of food needed to avoid malnutrition, and world hunger is the aggregated version of this, with by far the most hunger located in the Third World. Malnutrition, as the lack of some or all the nutrients necessary for health, affects approximately one billion hungry people in the world. Almost all hunger is caused by absolute poverty, defined as living on US$1.25 per day or less. This also affects approximately one billon people – many children – or nearly one‐fifth of the world's population. Even with a rising world population, the world produces enough food to meet everyone's nutritional needs. If the poor do not have enough, it is because, in the absence of external intervention, they either do not produce enough from their land or do not earn enough to buy it.
Free Will
Authors: Mele Alfred
Published: January 2013

The familiar claim that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility (seeMoral Agency; Responsibility) links free will to ethics. Whether the claim is true depends on what “free will” means. If one defines free will as the power or ability to act freely (Mele 2006: 16–17), one should ask what acting freely amounts to. There are readings of “freely” that render the following sentence true: “While Ann was traveling the world, mice ran freely about her house.” These readings hold no special interest for most philosophers who have written about free will. A major interest of such philosophers is what might be called “moral responsibility‐level free action” – roughly, free action of such a kind that, if all the freedom‐independent conditions for moral responsibility for a particular action were satisfied without that sufficing for the agent's being morally responsible for it, the addition of the action's being free to this set of conditions would entail that the agent is morally responsible for it. This essay is about free action of this kind.
Buddhist Ethics
Authors: Keown Damien
Published: January 2013

Buddhism is well known for its belief in karma and rebirth and its teachings on nonviolence (
ahiṃsā
) (
see
Nonviolence in Religions) and compassion (
karuṇā
). However, there has been little critical or systematic study of its ethics, and scholarship in this field is still at an early stage. A few scholars have proposed tentative theoretical models adapted from Western typologies in an attempt to classify Buddhist ethics but so far none commands universal assent. Other scholars doubt whether Western classifications are appropriate for an Asian tradition and fear that imposing them too rigidly may produce a distorted picture of Buddhist teachings. This essay has three main objectives. The first is to inform the reader about the major Buddhist moral teachings; the second is to offer some preliminary reflections in terms of ethical theory; and the third is to give a brief introduction to contemporary Buddhist activism. The first section, therefore, is mainly descriptive and summarizes the teachings found in Buddhist scriptures. It makes reference to foundational concepts such as dharma and karma, the most important precepts, and the key virtues Buddhists seek to cultivate. The second section is more analytical, and examines Buddhist moral teachings from a Western perspective drawing on the concepts, categories, and terminology familiar to students of Western ethics. The third describes the contemporary phenomenon of “engaged Buddhism” as a force for social change. It should be borne in mind that Buddhism is a diverse tradition encompassing many schools and geographical regions, and that while this essay endeavors to focus on common elements, students will almost certainly encounter variations in interpretation, belief, and practice at a local level.
Toleration
Authors: Cohen Andrew Jason
Published: January 2013

Contemporary philosophical debates surrounding toleration have revolved around three issues: what is toleration? Should we tolerate and, if so, why? What should be tolerated? These questions are of central importance to social and political thought. While I cannot also do justice here to the history of toleration, its pedigree should be noted.
Marion, Jean‐Luc
Authors: Gschwandtner Christina M.
Published: January 2013

Jean‐Luc Marion (born 1946) is one of France's leading Descartes scholars and phenomenologists. He teaches at the Sorbonne and the University of Chicago and is a member of the Académie française. While his early work focuses primarily on Descartes, he has also written extensively in theology and phenomenology (
see
Phenomenology, Moral). Ethics is not one of his central concerns; in fact, he thinks that ethics in the traditional sense is no longer possible today. This essay will briefly present Marion's overall philosophical work, then explicate the few explicit remarks he makes about ethics, and finally give some suggestions about what type of ethics might still be possible within the parameters of his phenomenology.
Deterrence
Authors: Ellis Anthony
Published: January 2013

To deter is to discourage an action, or inaction, by threatening, or warning of, retaliation in the event of noncompliance – as in, say, “Trespassers will be prosecuted.” Deterrence should be distinguished from prevention, since a deterrent threat typically does not actuallypreventthe agent from carrying out the action. (However, deterrence is often listed as one of the ways in which punishment contributes to “crime prevention.”) Deterrence is often said to work by instilling fear, but this is true in only the most general sense; one may wish to avoid a disbenefit without, in the strict sense, fearing it. It is therefore multiply inaccurate to say “Deterrence is the straightforward, commonsense notion that if you do something wrong, you will be punished, and the punishment will prevent you from doing that wrong thing again. According to this notion, fear of a future punishment dictates the actions people choose” (Levinson 2002: 512). The words “prevent,” “fear,” and “dictate” are quite misleading, as are the ideas that punishment, as opposed to the threat of punishment, can deter and that it can work only after one has first been punished.
Existentialism
Authors: McBride William L.
Published: January 2013

The word “existentialism” came only gradually into general usage. Gabriel Marcel (
see
MARCEL, GABRIEL
) is often identified as the first philosopher to suggest it as a name for his philosophy in the 1920s; by the late 1930s it and its German counterpart,
Existenzphilosophie
, had been deployed by such diverse writers as the Russian exile in France, Lev Shestov (1866–1938), and the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (
see
JASPERS, KARL
); and in the period immediately following World War II it became something of an intellectual household word, associated first and foremost with the Parisian Left Bank and its reigning
vedettes
, Jean‐Paul Sartre (
see
SARTRE, JEAN‐PAUL
), Simone de Beauvoir (
see
BEAUVOIR, SIMONE DE
), and Albert Camus (
see
CAMUS, ALBERT
). A kind of virtual Pantheon of existentialist philosophers was assembled, thanks in considerable measure to the scholarly efforts of Jean Wahl (1888–1974), with Søren Kierkegaard (
see
KIERKEGAARD, SøREN
) assuming the place of father of these gods and Martin Heidegger (
see
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN
) occupying a special niche among twentieth‐century figures outside of France.
Utilitarianism
Authors: West Henry R.
Published: January 2013

Utilitarianism is a tradition in modern philosophy that an act, moral rule, public policy, law, or institution is ultimately to be evaluated by its utility and only by its utility. By utility is meant the intrinsic value (seeIntrinsic Value) of the act and its consequences. The “classical” utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832;seeBentham, Jeremy), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873;seeMill, John Stuart), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900;seeSidgwick, Henry), interpreted utility in terms of the greatest happiness principle (seeGreatest Happiness Principle). Mill (1861: 210) formulated utilitarianism as follows: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”
Gender and Patriarchy in Religions
Authors: Gudorf Christine E.
Published: January 2013

When living conditions change, they demand different human traits and modes of activity and organization. The messages and structures of culture and religion are then reinterpreted to meet the new conditions. Thus it should not be surprising that the treatment of gender in religions and cultures has changed throughout history. Until very recently, most religions and cultures recognized two sexes on the basis of external genitalia at birth and assigned social gender roles on the basis of those genitalia.
Love
Authors: Thomas Laurence
Published: January 2013

Since antiquity, there have been three primary categories of love:
agape
,
eros
, and
philia
. The basic idea behind agape love has been anchored in the Christian view of love for humanity. Eros love obviously refers to the sentiments and sensuous bond between lovers. And philia love is generally understood as referring to the love between friends (
see
Friendship). We would do well to mention a forth category of love, namely parental love (
see
Parents' Rights and Responsibilities), which is so clearly unlike any of the other three categories of love.
Harm
Authors: Hanser Matthew
Published: January 2013

The main philosophical questions regarding harm are, first, what exactly it is, and, second, whether it matters morally. The questions are connected: whether harm has moral significance must surely depend, at least in part, upon how it is understood. Not every moral theory assigns fundamental significance to harm. According to act utilitarianism, the right action to perform is the one that would result in the greatest sum of well‐being among sentient creatures. The theory attributes no independent significance to how actions affect particular individuals. Furthermore, even if a utilitarian were to take an interest in a particular individual's fate, he would ask only which of the available actions would be best for that individual. He would not care whether any of the actions harmed the individual. If A gives B a small benefit when he could instead have given him a larger one, he may not harm B, but he does not do what's best for him either; and, if A chooses the least harmful option when he cannot help but harm B, he harms B, yet he does do what's best for him. There is no necessary connection between doing what's best for someone and avoiding harming him. As a first approximation, let us say that A harms B if and only if one of A's acts or omissions negatively affects B's interests or well‐being. On this maximally broad understanding, an action's harming someone is much the same as its being bad for him. If a moral theory's interest in how an action affects someone is exhausted by the question whether its performance is good or bad for him, that theory has no special need for the concept harm. It need only employ the concept bad for. It is possible, however, to understand harm more narrowly than this, and to see the narrower notion as having moral significance. Our more public actions almost invariably affect other people's interests, if only indirectly; and, while we should perhaps always bear these effects in mind when deciding what to do, many think that we needn't in general give them all that much weight in our deliberations. But harming someone – say, by physically assaulting him – can seem a much more serious matter, morally speaking, than merely negatively affecting his interests. A deontological theory might well hold that we have an especially strong reason – perhaps even an obligation – not to harm people. Likewise, it might hold that we have an especially strong reason – perhaps even an obligation – to prevent people from suffering harm and to come to the aid of those who are already suffering it. On such a view, to harm someone is to inflict an especially important kind of negative effect upon him.
Human Subjects, Research Use of
Authors: Wachbroit Robert
Published: January 2013

It is difficult to imagine the achievements of scientific medicine in the last century without the practice and findings of human experimentation. Even with research on animals or the use of sophisticated computer models, our knowledge of human biology has been too meager to allow us to forgo examining how humans respond to experimental treatments or settings. The scientific challenge is immense, particularly regarding the design and interpretation of experiments. This is because the goal is to discover (clinically useful) generalizable knowledge from the particular responses of a limited number of people. And these people might not all respond in the same way, for reasons we might not even be able to identify, much less predict. Moreover, characterizing the response might not be at all straightforward. Is the response a reflection just of the experiment's hypothesis, or are other factors involved, including idiosyncratic ones? To rule out plausible alternative explanations of the results, we may need to expand the experimental setup so as to incorporate controls, placebos, double‐blinds, and so on, which we hope will clarify or disambiguate the data. Human experimentation can thus be a blunt tool in medical research; but we often have no better.
Sensibility Theory
Authors: Sneddon Andrew
Published: January 2013

Sensibility theories present a view of moral truths as constitutively dependent on human sensibilities. The historical roots of this sort of view are the sentimentalist theories of such British philosophers as David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (seeHume, David; Hutcheson, Francis; Sentimentalism; Shaftesbury, Third Earl of). However, sensibility theories were most distinctively developed in late twentieth‐century English‐language philosophy. All versions of sensibility theories portray moral judgment as having two features: first, it expresses beliefs and hence is fully capable of being either true or false; second, it is intrinsically connected to human motivation via such psychological capacities as our emotions. Sensibility theories are commonly represented as being committed to the reality of moral properties. However, some prominent versions do not share this commitment. Some proponents claim that the view derives some appeal from the way it portrays the experience of moral values and judgments, whereas other versions disavow any commitment to a distinctive portrayal of moral experience.
Racism
Authors: Boxill Bernard R.
Published: January 2013

Several important debates dominate the study of racism. Perhaps the most important of these debates is over what racism is: a prejudice, an emotion, an attitude, a vice, an ideology, a doctrine, a theory, a belief, a kind of behavior, or the domination of one race over another? Closely related to and dependent on the results of that debate is the dispute over what exactly makes racism the very special evil it is generally supposed to be; if racism is the domination of one race by another it will be evil because it is an injustice; if it is a doctrine or a belief the exact nature of its evil will be less clear. Then there are the debates over the varieties of racism like anti‐black racism, Nazism, and anti‐Semitism, and over its relation to other similar evils like sexism, ethnocentrism, speciesism, and on some accounts nationalism (seenationalism and patriotism). And of course there are debates over the relations between the different kinds of racism like anti‐black racism, anti‐Semitism, the racism directed at Native Americans, and anti‐Asian racism. Yet other debates are over the sources or origins of racism. How did it start? Or is it an innate and perhaps ineliminable aspect of human nature? One special case of this dispute is whether anti‐black racism resulted from the enslavement of Africans in the New World or whether it preexisted and helped to cause that enslavement, and if so, what areitscauses. And finally of course there are debates over the very idea of race without which presumably there could not be racism (seerace). Some of the disputants in those debates argue that race is or can be a natural kind, others that race is a social construct and was invented to justify slavery and other systems of domination. And these debates have led to other debates, for example, over the date of the invention of race, over the identity of its inventors, and over when it first reared its ugly head. It is now widely agreed that the word “race” (if not the idea) began to be used with scientific pretensions in Europe and America in the last two decades of the eighteenth century, and that Thomas Jefferson, Georges‐Louis Buffon, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, and Immanuel Kant are among those most responsible for this development, but some philosophers have argued that Kant is the crucial figure, and that the dangerous implications of the idea it stood for affected his moral philosophy and Western moral philosophy generally (seekant, immanuel).
Paradox of Happiness
Authors: Eggleston Ben
Published: January 2013

The paradox of happiness is the puzzling but apparently inescapable fact that regarding happiness as the sole ultimately valuable end or objective, and acting accordingly, often results in less happiness than results from regarding other goods as ultimately valuable (and acting accordingly). That is, in many circumstances, happiness is more effectively achieved when other objectives are regarded as worth pursuing for their own sakes than when happiness alone is regarded as worth pursuing for its own sake (seeHappiness; Hedonism; Intrinsic Value). These other objectives might be regarded as ultimately valuable instead of happiness, or merely in addition to happiness; but they must be valued for their own sakes, and not merely as means to the achievement of happiness. These other objectives may include loving family relationships and friendships, meaningful professional relationships, immersion in rewarding work, the exercise of skills and abilities, accomplishments and triumphs, participation in religion or a large cause or movement, and contributions to one's culture or nation.
Happiness
Authors: Tiberius Valerie
Published: January 2013

Everyone wants to be happy. Happiness is obviously a good thing and, if we can get it without sacrificing other important things, we would. Most people wish not just for their own happiness but also the happiness of the people they love; some compassionate souls may even wish for the happiness of all sentient creatures. What exactly is it that we all want? Is it to be pleased or satisfied? To feel tranquil or joyous? To attain certain objective goods? And what role does happiness play in morality? Is the production of happiness the goal of morally right action? Is it the organizing principle of moral theory? Or is it just one contingent value among many?
Thick and Thin Concepts
Authors: Kirchin Simon
Published: January 2013

Many issues that drive modern metaethics are found in the debates that focus on thick and thin concepts (seeMetaethics). We will begin with brief definitions of these concepts, before following with a short history of the distinction. We will end by discussing three of the many questions they prompt.
Derrida, Jacques
Authors: Russon John
Published: January 2013

Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) was born to a Jewish family and grew up in Algeria. When he was 22, he began studies at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, where he studied with the Hegel scholar Jean Hyppolite, earning his philosophy degree in 1956. He taught at the Sorbonne (1960–4), and then (1965–84) at the École Normale Supérieure, and subsequently became director of the École Pratique des Hautes Études en Science Sociales in Paris. In 1983 he cofounded the Collège International de Philosophie. He held many visiting and permanent positions at universities, including Visiting Professor at Yale University and Johns Hopkins University and (from 1986) Professor of Philosophy, French, and Comparative Literature at the University of California at Irvine. He was awarded many honorary degrees including, in 1992, an honorary doctorate from Cambridge University. His initial studies were in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (seeHusserl, Edmund). In 1967 he published three books,Of Grammatology,Speech and Phenomenon, andWriting and Difference, which became the inaugural and definitive texts of the philosophical movement of “Deconstruction.” He was the author of roughly 70 books.
Hartmann, Nicolai
Authors: Jordan Robert Welsh
Published: January 2013

Nicolai Hartmann was born in Riga, Latvia on February 20, 1882. His early education occurred there and in St. Petersburg, Russia (Leningrad from 1924 to 1991). He graduated (Gymnasialabitur) in 1901 from the Gymnasium of St. Petersburg. His initial university studies were in medicine, classical philology, and philosophy at the university of Tartu (Russian: Yur'yev; German: Dorpat) in Estonia and in classical philology and philosophy in St. Petersburg. He moved to Marburg in Germany to continue studying philosophy. There he completed his doctoral studies under Hermann Cohen (seeCohen, Hermann) and Paul Natorp, leading figures in the Marburg neo‐Kantian movement. His dissertation was onThe Problem of Being in Greek Philosophy Prior to Plato(1908). Writing onThe Logic of Being in Plato(1965) under their mentorship, he qualified as a university teacher of philosophy in 1907. During World War I Hartmann served in the German army on the Eastern front from 1914 to 1918. He attained an associate professorship at Berlin in 1920 and succeeded Natorp in 1922 as professor at Marburg. He moved to a professorship at Cologne in 1925 and then at Berlin in 1931, where he spent the years of the national socialist regime and of World War II; in 1945 he moved to Göttingen, where he died on October 9, 1950 (see Hartmann 1949–50).
Harm Principle
Authors: Ten C. L.
Published: January 2013

The harm principle is most closely associated with John Stuart Mill's (1806–73) defense of individual liberty in his famous essayOn Liberty(1859), although he himself did not give it that name (seeHarm; Mill, John Stuart). Mill wanted to set certain limits to “social control” over the conduct of individuals, and he proposed the harm principle as the “one very simple principle” for that purpose: “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self‐protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (1977: 223).
Weapons Research and Development
Authors: Forge John
Published: January 2013

The best‐known example of weapons research and development (WRD) is the Manhattan Project, which produced the first three nuclear weapons and the only ones to have been used in wartime (seeNuclear Weapons). This project made use of discoveries in nuclear physics which were recent at the time, as well as other scientific theories and state‐of‐the‐art experimental and computational techniques. However, if WRD is defined as a species of applied science (Arrigo 2000: 303), then it becomes a relatively recent endeavor and much else that should be included under the heading will be ruled out. For instance, Mikhail Kalashnikov designed the AK‐47 assault rifle, at about the same time as the Manhattan Project, without consciously applying any scientific theory. The AK‐47 is sturdy, well‐made, reliable, easy to operate and is the most widely used weapon since World War II – and was surely the product of WRD. For this reason, a definition of WRD such as the following is recommended: WRD is research and development aimed at thedesignof new weapons, improvements of existing weapons, or the design and improvement of ancillary and support structures (Forge 2008: 153). The latter includes weapons platforms, such as ships, and methods of command, control, and communication. Given this broad characterization, and provided that research is not defined too narrowly, WRD can be dated from at least the fourth century BCE, if not earlier, when there were systematic and codified attempts to make siege artillery (Rihill 2007). WRD in this general sense, as opposed to specific examples of WRD directed towards particular weapons such as weapons of mass destruction, is a neglected but nevertheless important topic in applied ethics. What, then, are the issues that need to be addressed from this general perspective?
Virtue
Authors: Brewer Talbot
Published: January 2013

In sweeping and abstract terms, we can say that virtue is the achieved state of character that makes one a good human being (
see
Character; Moral Character). Yet things get complicated as soon as we ask “Good in what sense?” Different theorists have answered this question in fundamentally different ways, and this rules out any simple or succinct account of the notion of virtue. The idea itself is deeply contested. It takes on strikingly different contours in the works of the Greeks than in the works of most contemporary moral philosophers. We must be alive to this contest – to its basic terms, and its stakes – if we are to attain a clear understanding of particular philosophical writings about virtue.
Biotechnology
Authors: Wolf Clark
Published: January 2013

In the broadest sense of the term, “biotechnology” refers to any technological process that essentially involves the use of biological systems. Biotechnology in this broad sense is involved in many practices, such as making bread, brewing beer, and the selective breeding of agricultural crops. Human beings have been involved in biotechnology of this kind for more than 10,000 years.
Eudaimonism
Authors: Beaton Ryan Stuart , Whiting Jennifer
Published: January 2013

There are various forms of eudaimonism, each so called because of the central role played in it by what ancient speakers of Greek calledeudaimonia(commonly but not uncontroversially rendered “happiness”). Each claims that a human beingought, in some fundamental sense of that term, to live his or her life so as to realize eudaimonia (seeAncient Ethics). But the various forms differ from one another not just in presupposing different conceptions of eudaimonia (some stressing subjective satisfaction and others stressing objective conditions such as those involved in naturalistic conceptions of what it is for any organism to flourish;seeNeo‐Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism); they also differ in degree of egocentricity. Although the eudaimonist label has at times been applied to utilitarian views, with their emphasis on promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number (seeUtilitarianism), classical forms of eudaimonism tend to be formally egocentric if not substantively egoistic: they tend to assume that each agent should live so as to realize herowneudaimonia, which however is often construed broadly, to include the interests of others (such as family and friends) to whom she stands in certain special relations (seeEgoism). But even this broad construal is not enough to preempt the predominantly Kantian charge – based on a strict separation of the ethical sense of “ought” from the prudential sense – that eudaimonist theories are merely prudential (Prichard 1929;seeKant, Immanuel). It is however not clear whether ancient eudaimonists accepted – or whether eudaimonists in general need accept – the separation on which this charge is based: they may claim, not unreasonably, to use “ought” in a sense that involves (without however clearly distinguishing) both “ethical” and “prudential” aspects.
Corporate Culture
Authors: Goodpaster Kenneth E.
Published: January 2013

The phrase “corporate culture” is used in a more general sense to mean the culture of any organized group or institution. In a narrower sense, “corporate culture” refers to the culture of a business corporation. In most contexts, however, the two senses are interchangeable. A corporation's culture impacts its behavior in significant ways, as much as if not more than strategy, which is often thought to be overriding in decision‐making. The subject of corporate culture, however, goes beyond the debate over which is more important. The 2009 National Business Ethics Survey reflects the ethics component of culture. Its results show that an ethical corporate culture “continues to have a profound impact on pressure, observed misconduct, reporting of observed misconduct, and rates of retaliation against reporters” (Ethics Resource Center 2009). It also found that “actions and perceptions of top managers drive the ethical culture of the company and have a significant impact on outcomes.”
Spinoza, Baruch
Authors: LeBuffe Michael
Published: January 2013

Baruch, or Benedictus, Spinoza (1632–77) is the author of works, especially theEthicsand theTheological‐Political Treatise, that are a major source of the ideas of the European Enlightenment. TheEthicsis a dense series of arguments on progressively narrower subjects – metaphysics, mind, the human affects, human bondage to passion, and human blessedness – presented in a geometrical order modeled on that of Euclid. In it, Spinoza begins by defending a metaphysics on which God is the only substance and is bound by the laws of his own nature. Spinoza then builds a naturalistic ethics that is constrained by, and to some extent is a product of, his strong metaphysics. Human beings are individuals that causally interact with other individuals and are extremely vulnerable to external influence. They are not substances. Moreover, human beings are bound by the same laws that bind all other individuals in nature, so Spinoza presents accounts of goodness, virtue, and perfection that are consistent with these perfectly general laws. Spinoza's principal influences include René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (seeHobbes, Thomas), Moses Maimonides (seeMaimonides, Moses), the Roman Stoics (seeStoicism), and Aristotle (seeAristotle). Although his innovative philosophical views undoubtedly contributed to the strong writ ofcherem, or ostracism, that Spinoza received from the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656, his work nevertheless also shows the influence of the study of Scripture and of Jewish law.
Pleasure
Authors: Sumner L. W.
Published: January 2013

Pleasure has been a subject of philosophical interest in the Western tradition since the time of the Greeks. Both Plato and Aristotle devoted extended attention to the place of pleasure in the good life, and the Epicureans made it the centerpiece of their ethical thought (seePlato; Aristotle; Hellenistic Ethics). More recently, pleasure was restored to this position of prominence by the nineteenth‐century utilitarians (seeUtilitarianism). Whether a principal theme or not, the pursuit of pleasure plays some role in virtually all ethical traditions. Indeed, few would deny that pleasure is one of the important goods in life, if not the only one. Through the twentieth century and into the twenty‐first century, philosophers have continued to ask two basic questions about pleasure: (1) What is its nature? In what does it consist? (2) What is its value? What place does it have in a theory of ethics or of the good life?
Falk, W. D.
Authors: Piker Andy
Published: January 2013

W. D. Falk (1906–91) wrote extensively on moral philosophy from the 1940s to the 1980s. He never subscribed to the dominant moral theories of his time: the intuitionism of Prichard and Ross (seeIntuitionism, Moral; Prichard, H. A.; Ross, W. D.), or the emotivism (seeEmotivism) and prescriptivism (seePrescriptivism) of Stevenson and Hare (seeStevenson, C. L.; Hare, R. M.). Instead, he raised important objections to those theories, and explored issues – such as the relation between duty and motivation, the practical role of reason, and the nature of value and morality – that he did not believe they adequately addressed. Falk's own positions are rooted in a variety of historical sources, including the natural law (seeNatural Law) tradition and Kant's ethics (seeKant, Immanuel). His ideas (on moral obligation, for example) had a significant impact on the development of moral theory among his contemporaries. They also remain relevant to current work in moral philosophy; his views on the nature of value, for instance, might shed some light on the moral realism debate.
Gratitude
Authors: McConnell Terrance
Published: January 2013

Gratitude can refer to a feeling of appreciation or to a sense that one ought to make a positive response to an act of kindness. Here the term is used in the latter sense, to designate an obligation or duty that an agent might have to another under certain conditions. The phrase “debt of gratitude” is sometimes used to describe this obligation or moral requirement. There are at least two fundamental questions that must be asked about gratitude. What conditions must obtain before one person owes gratitude to another? When an agent owes another person gratitude, what is the content of that requirement? Let us begin with examples.