bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Languages and Ethnicity
Authors: Ben-Rafael Eliezer
Published: November 2023

Sociological approaches to ethnicity variously emphasize types of domination (Mason 1970), religious orientations (Hoetinck 1972; Van den Berghe 1978), or processes of acculturation (Glazer 1983). Parsons (1975) and Shils (1956) describe deethnicization as a necessary development. Ethnic identity may, however, survive through symbolic tokens (Gans 1979), ultimately accounted for by the political profitability of ethnic mobilization (Bell 1975; Barth 1969), or the social support that ethnic communities are able to offer their members (Glazer and Moynihan 1975), but a connection between ethnicity and class is explained in terms of the ethnics’ predispositions to modernity (Lenski 1972), discrimination (Simpson and Yinger 1958), power relations (Kuper 1965), or competition between subordinate groups (Bonacich 1980). Ethnic boundaries, primarily defined by primordial attributes, compete with societal identification, though when ethnic groups become socially heterogeneous by mobility, they may undergo heterogenization of ethnic consciousness as well. The better-off have more contacts with outsiders and tend to acculturate and assimilate to the dominant culture more than others (Burgess 1978; Lal 1983). Yet ethnics also react to dominant cultures, which, on their own, encourage either pluralism or uniformity (Tabory and Lazerwitz 1983; Hoetinck 1972; Van den Berghe 1978).
The Languages of the Religious Cleavages
Authors: Ben-Rafael Eliezer
Published: November 2023

We have seen that Israel’s ethnic divisions are germane to additional segmentations of this society, in particular, the religious cleavages. Among analyses of Israeli society, the class model of ethnicity pays little attention to religion (Swirski 1981), and the pluralist approach (Smooha 1978) deals with the division between religious and secular Jews as a separate division. Religion has been a more central focus of the cultural perspective on ethnicity (Deshen and Shokeid 1974; Shokeid and Deshen 1982).
The Diffusion of Arabic
Authors: Ben-Rafael Eliezer
Published: November 2023

Arabic widely dominates the space extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf; within this space, Israel appears as one of the few enclaves where Arabic is not the dominant language. However, Arabic is an important language in this country, too. There are about 1,200,000 Arabic-speaking Palestinians in the Territories (the lands occupied by Israel since 1967); a minority of734,000 Arabs (ICBS 1989) are citizens of the State of Israel (when including East Jerusalem). According to J. M. Landau (1987), Arabic is spoken as a first language by nearly two-fifths of the inhabitants of Israel and the Territories taken together. Furthermore, over 40 per cent of the Jewish population originate from Arabic-speaking countries. Among the Jews, one out of eight still use Arabic as a first or second daily language.
The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance: The Structure of Locke’s General Philosophy
Authors: Ayers M R
Published: November 2023

Gassendi, Hobbes, and Locke all categorically asserted the independent authority of the senses as knowledge-producing faculties. As Hobbes put it, ‘Knowledge of Fact ... is nothing else but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge.’ Locke announced the senses’ immediate authority on questions of existence just as bluntly: they are ‘the proper and sole Judges of this thing’. On the other side, Platonistic or Augustinian philosophers such as Mersenne, Descartes, and Arnauld firmly subordinated the senses to the intellect. This division constitutes one of the great watersheds of early modern epistemology, and is well illustrated by Locke’s response, as we may suppose it to be, to an argument in the Port Royal Logic. The Logic had argued, in effect, that the doctrine of transubstantiation does not contradict the senses, since even ordinarily the senses must be interpreted by reason. In the case of the Eucharist we simply have special reasons for taking the body of Christ to be behind a wafer-like
The Sources of Descartes’s Procedure of Deduaive Demonstration in Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen
Published: November 2023

It is often assumed that the deduction of truths from first principles that one finds in the Meditations and the Principles of Philosophy derives from an attempt to model metaphysical and natural philosophical reasoning on a mathematical, and more specifically geometrical, prototype. In the first section of this chapter I shall show that, if this is taken to mean that these truths are to be discovered deductively, then the axiomatic arguments of geometry cannot be the model, for Descartes explicitly rejects the idea that one can discover truths in geometry by deduction from first principles. I shall then look briefly at another possible model, a humanist-Aristotelian approach to the deduction of truths from basic principles. This model, as we shall see, is even less promising than the geometrical one. In the third section I shall argue that Descartes never in fact used deduction from first principles as a method of discovery, or even suggested that it should be used as such, but he did use it as a method of presentation. Consequently, what we need is a model for a method of presentation. In the final section I suggest a model for the use of deduction as a method of reconstructing and systematizing metaphysical doctrines and natural-philosophical results, namely the scholastic disputationes of Toletus, Fonseca, and the Coimbra commentators, which aimed at reconstructing Aristotle from first principles.
God without Cause
Authors: Rovane Carol
Published: November 2023

Descartes’s heavy reliance on a version of the principle of sufficient causation (henceforth ‘the Principle’) in his first proof of the existence of God is bound to frustrate —if not alienate —readers of the Meditations. However intuitive the Principle might be, its truth is not so evident (at the point of its introduction) as to meet the stringent requirements Descartes himself sets for rational credence. Granted, Descartes begins with what must have seemed in his time an absolutely straightforward point about sufficient causation: Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much [reality] in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause.
Truth, Error, and the Order of Reasons: Descartes’s Puzzling Synopsis of the Fourth Meditation
Authors: Cress Donald A
Published: November 2023

After he had decided to publish his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes sent pre-publication copies of the work to several philosophers and theologians who were asked to study it and to forward to him their queries and objections (letter to Mersenne of 13 November 1639: AT II 622, CSMK 141; letter to Mersenne of 30 July 1640: AT III 126-7, CSMK 149-50; letter to Mersenne of 30 September 1640: AT III 183-4, CSMK 153). Eventually Descartes decided to append these queries and objections to the printed edition of the Meditations, along with his own replies to each set of queries and objections (letter to Mersenne of 24 December 1640: AT III 265-7, CSMK 163-4). Descartes had hoped that, by raising and answering in advance problems voiced by learned critics in their own words, he could pave the way for greater acceptance of the method and the doctrines espoused in his Meditations. Moreover, to assist them in locating various doctrines and arguments and in better grasping the work’s order of reasons, Descartes forwarded to his readers an abstract which would eventually become the Synopsis that has accompanied that has accompanied the printed editions of the Meditations (letter to Mersenne of 24 December 1640: AT III 268, CSMK 164; letter to Mersenne of 31 December 1640: AT III 271-2, CSMK 165).
Human Nature, Reason, and Will in the Argument of Descartes’s Meditations
Authors: Schouls Peter
Published: November 2023

Is human nature such that it allows human beings to know, that is, to be absolutely certain in matters both of everyday life and of science whether applied or pure? Since all human knowledge necessarily requires human activity, one way in which we may approach this question is through another one: are human beings capable of the requisite activity and are they capable of discerning when, or whether, they are so active? That is the question which I shall use as my Ariadne’s thread in the reading of the Meditations which I am about to present. ‘I realized that it was necessary … to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.’2 Much has been written about these words from the opening paragraph of the Meditations, as commentators have paid attention to the grounds for the ‘necessity’ of the ‘demolition’, to the intended extent of the ‘demolition’ (how inclusive is ‘everything’ meant to be?) and to the ‘foundations’ and the ‘sciences’ to be (re-)constructed on them.
The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens
Authors: Romilly Jacqueline De
Published: November 2023

The arrival of the Sophists in Athens in the middle of the fifth century BC was an intellectual event of great importance. They brought a new method of teaching founded on rhetoric, and offered bold new doctrines which broke away from tradition. They have often been misunderstood - only fragments of their own work survive, and we have to rely on the testimony of Plato, who was an opponent. Athenians used their teaching to defend an amoralism which they did not themselves advocate. Through an original interpretation of the works of their disciples such as Thucydides, Euripides, and Isocrates, Professor de Romilly investigates the reasons for the initial success of the Sophists and the reaction against them, in the context of the culture and civilization of classical Athens.
The Dangers of the Tabula Rasa:Immoralism
Authors: Romilly Jacqueline De
Published: November 2023

IN the last quarter of the fifth century BC, a grave cns1s developed, in the course of which all kinds of people exploited the Sophistic critique to justify resolutely immoralist points of view. So much is established beyond doubt by the testimony of the various contemporary writers: Euripides, Thucydides, Aristophanes, and, a little later, Plato. The crisis was clearly not solely due to the influence of the Sophists. Many other circumstances contributed towards it, in the first place the war. Every year Attica was invaded. It was a pattern which continued until 421. Then, after a few years’ respite, it found itself under partial occupation by enemy forces. Each year the death-toll rose. People’s faith in the justice of the gods began to waver as they noticed that, in human society, it was the strong who triumphed. Such long, widespread wars are never conducive to the maintenance of moral values. As Thucydides remarked, ‘war ... is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition’ (3. 82. 2).
Experience
Authors: Schulte Joachim
Published: November 2023

In the course of his early attempt at a classification of psychological phenomena Wittgenstein wonders if he ought to call the whole field of the psychological the field of experience (seep. 28, above; cf. RPP i. § 836). But even independently of a discussion of the problem of whether or not this terminology can be justified, it is necessary to see how the concept ‘experience’, which is central to Wittgenstein’s entire philosophy of psychology, is to be understood.
Introduction
Authors: Robinson Howard
Published: November 2023

In recent philosophy the term ‘physicalism’ has been used both in broader and in more restricted senses. According to the broadest current sense it designates any form of materialism: the upshot of this is that it is the name for any form of materialism that is nowadays fashionable. In its restricted sense it is a particular species of materialism, and does not include all the current theories. The restricted sense can be approached in the following way. Materialism is the theory that all the substances that exist are physical substances. Materialism allows for the possibility that physical substances may possess, at a basic level, certain odd, non-physical properties, in addition to their physical properties. The ‘dual aspect’ or ‘attribute’ theory of mind is a theory of this sort. It might also allow that there can be immaterial abstract objects, because these are not substances in the relevant sense, and are not part of, and do not interact with, the spatio-temporal system. On this view, numbers, universals, or propositions might be held to exist and to be non-physical, consistently with materialism. Physicalism, in the restricted sense, is narrower and more ambitious and says that, at the basic level of characterization, all things and all properties are physical. Even here, there are weaker and stronger versions of the theory.
Thinking1
Authors: Myra George
Published: November 2023

The phenomenon of thinking has given rise to a great amount of philosophical puzzlement and controversy. Yet this itself seems paradoxical, since a classical philosophical view, extremely plausible to some and supported, I think, by certain of our ordinary, unreflective convictions, would seem to imply that thinking is among those matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy. So that, from a certain point of view, one may feel that the real philosophical puzzle about thinking is how there can be philosophical puzzles about it. How can a matter which is so clear to us be so unclear? Or does the fact of puzzlement and controversy all by itself refute one of the parties in the controversy: the one which maintains that thinking is among the matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy? It seems to me that even this is not clear! A vague and one-sided diagonsis of the situation at this point might be along the following lines.
Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology
Authors: Hornsby Jennifer
Published: November 2023

The attitude of philosophers to the physical sciences no doubt partly explains why the 'physical' has featured so prominently in their discussions of mind. If a subject-matter is shown to be reducible to physics, its metaphysical status is revealed, and, presumably (supposing that the reduction carries conviction), rendered unproblematic. A reduction of mentality to physics would, then, be satisfying if it were available. But suppose that we cannot be satisfied by such a reduction, because we are persuaded of its impossibility.
Elimination versus Non-reductive Physicalism
Authors: Loar Brian
Published: November 2023

There is reason to be pessimistic about the physicalist reduction of the mental, especially as regards propositional attitudes. But the straightforward alternatives are unappealing, namely, dualism and the eliminativist proposition that mental ascriptions are never strictly true. The question is whether some form of non-reductive physicalism is a more promising alternative, that is, commitment both to the comprehensively physical nature of things and despite non-reduction to the reality of mental facts. I am going to argue that current versions do not stand up. But the point is not that reduction or elimination must then hold (putting aside dualism as incredible). It is quite consistent with my argument here that we reach an impasse, that standard presuppositions permit no viable position. At least there is no easy non-reductive way out, despite the claims of two distinctive theses: Stephen Schifter's to the effect that nominalism about mental properties permits physicalism without reduction; and the widely prevalent doctrine of non-reductive supervenience. Non-reductive physicalisl views reject an atomist picture of how physical facts make mental ascriptions true, namely by correspondence: the mental ascription must correspond to a physical fact in such a way that the ascribed mental predicate stands for a physical-property constituent of the truth-making fact. Schiffer rejects this by rejecting properties, and supervenience views reject it by making the relation between ascription and the physical facts more oblique. The argument of this paper is in effect that the correspondence picture is not so easy to get rid of.
Values: Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by Ascent
Authors: Griffin James
Published: November 2023

I doubt that there is one metaphysical status for values. To take just ethics, the status of prudential values is different, I suspect, from that of most moral values, and moral values are not uniform among themselves. For that reason, we should, at the start, choose one sort of value to concentrate on. I shall choose prudential values. I use ‘prudence’ in the philosopher's broad sense, in which it has to do with everything that makes an individual life, seen on its own, good. I concentrate on the prudential case for two reasons. First, it seems to me a bit easier than the moral one, while raising all the central meta-ethical questions. It is easier, I think, even though it is impossible to make a sharp cut between prudence and morals. And secondly, human interests hold a particularly basic place among values generally. They get us into the subject not only more easily but also at a deeper point. Also, I do not myself find it fruitful to separate meta-ethics and normative ethics for long. I think that their best hope for advance is to advance together. It is hard to decide on the reducibility, or supervenience, or reality of values without a fairly full idea of what is valuable and what arguments are actually available to us in deciding this. So my way into this meta-ethical subject is through some normative ethics.
Bohr
Authors: Krips Henry
Published: November 2023

Bohr took it as the key fact of QT that neither of the models for describing the behaviour of systems offered by classical physics— neither the ‘particle picture’ nor the ‘wave picture’—fitted q-systems in all aspects of their behaviour. More particularly he took these two pictures to be ‘complementary’—when one fitted the other one did not. This failure of fit was seen by Bohr as usually only partial however, as a degree of’imprecision of fit’ rather than a total failure of fit; and it is in terms of this notion that Bohr was then able to give expression to his principle of complementarity, viz. that the degrees of imprecision of fit of the wave and particle pictures are reciprocally related: to the extent that one of the pictures fits well, the other fits badly. In this chapter I shall discuss these notions in the context of a more general discussion of Bohr’s philosophy of Quantum Theory.
Measurement
Authors: Krips Henry
Published: November 2023

In this chapter I shall consider particular models for the process of measurement of q-quantities, models which are constructed within QT itself. It is not of course necessary that QT by itself generates such models, any more than we require a description of the functioning of devices for measuring charge, say, to be given entirely from within electromagnetism (although arguably if QT is to be ‘complete’ then it must provide such models). Indeed Bohr for one seems to have denied precisely this requirement. For him the description of the measurement process for q-quantities ultimately had to be made in classical terms and he seems to have denied that these classical descriptions must in turn be reducible to quantum theoretic descriptions.
Introduction
Authors: Saunders Simon
Published: November 2023

The Ancient World knew many concepts of substance; some of them appeared to preclude the concept of 'the empty'. As for space, Aristotle used the word topos, 'place' or 'container'-a continuous, finite receptacle which persists through change and which is 'separable' from matter. What then is this distinction between matter and the 'container' of matter? It is only with the atomists that the concept of emptiness acquires an absolute character; the distinction is made out in terms of the existence or non-existence of atoms.
On the Ether
Authors: Einstein Albert
Published: November 2023

If we are here going to talk about the ether, we are not, of course, talking about the physical or material ether of the mechanical theory of undulations, which is subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics, to the points of which are attributed a certain velocity. This theoretical edifice has, I am convinced, finally played out its role since the setting up of the special theory of relativity. It is rather more generally a question of those kinds of things that are considered as physically real, which play a role in the causal nexus of physics, apart from the ponderable matter that consists of electrical elementary particles. Therefore, instead of speaking of an ether, one could equally well speak of physical qualities of space.
Game Theory and Rational Choice
Authors: Blackburn Simon
Published: November 2023

The third interpretation of the principle of maximizing expected utility that I distinguished in the last chapter said that it was definitional: a grid imposed upon the process of interpreting others. It is this that we now turn to explore.2 What I shall do is to introduce the bones of the classical analysis due to F. P. Ramsey.3 We have just learned from Bishop Butler that it is not at all true that people act so as to maximize the intensity or duration of some state of themselves. They do not even always act with their own interests in mind, where these interests are construed as states of themselves. Nor would we want them to do so. So we could conclude that the principle of acting to maximize expected utility has been exploded as empirically and normatively bogus.
Deductive Reasoning in Human Information Processing
Authors: Evans Jonathan ST B T
Published: November 2023

Information processing is the central concern of cognitive science and deductive reasoning is one of the most significant methods by which it is achieved. The programming language PROLOG, for example, designed for research into artificial intelligence, uses deductive reasoning based upon predicate logic as its basic method of operation. A deductive inference occurs whenever two or more pieces of information are taken together and some new information is derived as a consequence. Such reasoning has been central to the development of ‘expert systems’ (see Hayes-Roth et al. 1983)-one of the major fields of research into artificial intelligence in recent years. In attempting to simulate the function of a human expert such systems have generally been provided with huge databases of ‘facts’ and ‘rules’ together with an inference engine which permits deductions to be made.
Conclusion
Authors: Smilansky Saul
Published: November 2023

The importance of free will for morality in the wide sense and for our view of ourselves is great: it is so great that illusion is required. Illusion keeps, and ought largely to continue keeping, our moral and personal worlds intact. There is partial non-illusory grounding for many of our central free will-related beliefs, reactions, and practices, even in a world without libertarian free will. But in various complex ways, we require illusion in order to bring forth and maintain them. The two central aspects of this discussion—the ethical and personal dimensions of the free will problem and the role of illusion in this problem—are closely interwoven. Illusion is seen to flow from the basic structure of the free will issue, and its recognition is identified as an important key to our understanding. Revealing the large and mostly positive role of illusion concerning free will not only teaches us a great deal about the free will issue itself, but posits illusion as a pivotal factor in human life.
Minds, Brains, and Tools
Authors: Clark Andy
Published: November 2023

The selected texts for this discussion were two recent pieces by Dennett (‘Things about Things’ (forthcoming), and ‘Making Tools for Thinking’ (2000), henceforth TAT and MTT respectively) and one oldie-but-goodie (‘Styles of Mental Representation’ (I983), henceforth SMR). What was most striking, to me, was the way these three small texts seemed to fit together and, collectively, help to illuminate the shape of Dennett’s whole corpus, from the work on stances all the way to the work on consciousness and personhood. I found this exhilarating, and I hope my enthusiasm-tempered though it is by a few doubts and worries-shows through.
Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality
Authors: Cummins Robert
Published: November 2023

Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows.

It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins 1996a; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion in these terms will, I hope, help to identify points of agreement and disagreement between Haugeland and myself, and perhaps help to build a bit of a bridge.
Discussion
Authors: Clapin Hugh
Published: November 2023

Clark If something has content but it’s not representational content, that’s because there isn’t something there worth calling the representation on all our accounts, right? Smith Well, I thought you were disagreeing with Hugh when he was saying that the architecture can have content. [See Discussion point 6. -ed.] Clark I’m happy with the architecture having content, I’m just not happy with it having representational content.
Discussion
Authors: Clapin Hugh
Published: November 2023

Cummins This is what anti-realists do on purpose. Dennett Commit this inscription error? Cummins Just, lots of them. Smith Here’s a simple case to see what’s going on. Suppose you want to know if your cat recognizes you as an individual as opposed to as just more ‘Hughness’. And suppose people say,’Yeah,look,because here’s its neurophysiology and this cell lights up every time-same cell, so it must be the same person.’ But how do you know it’s the same cell? Maybe it’s just rein stantiating some type in there.
Objectivity and Insight
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

Mark Sacks presents an innovative study of the nature and scope of objectivity. He argues for a conception of objectivity that draws on the central insight of transcendental idealism, while preserving a non-metaphysical orientation. The first two parts of Objectivity and Insight explore the prospects for objectivity on the standard ontological conception, and find that they are not good. In Part I, under the heading of subject-driven scepticism, Sacks addresses the problem of securing epistemic reach that extends beyond subjective content. In so doing, he considers models of mind proposed by Locke, Hume, Kant, James, and Bergson. Part II, under the heading of world-driven scepticism, discusses the scope for universality of normative structure-a problem which survives even after the assumption of an epistemologically significant breach between subject and object has been rejected. In the third part of the book Sacks introduces an alternative conception of objectivity, and shows that there is good reason to accept it. This conception turns on an insight which is taken to be implicit in transcendental idealism, and responsible for its abiding appeal; but Sacks's articulation of that insight is neither idealist nor metaphysical..
Introduction
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

This book is concerned, primarily, with insight into the nature and scope of objectivity. This concern is addressed directly in Part III. The issue is set in relation to two forms of scepticism, in Parts I and II. While these serve to bring out the nature and costs of our standard conception of objectivity, to which the final part aims to be a corrective, the intention has been to present the discussion in such a way that all three parts can be read separately. Part I (Chapters 1-3) develops what can be called the subject-driven threat to the possibility of securing knowledge of such objective order as there might be. The concern is primarily with objectivity as that which is not merely subjective, which is not indexed to first-personal experience.
Empiricist Theories of the Mind: Locke and Hume
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

The concern in this and the next two chapters is with the question of objectivity as it emerges in the traditional epistemological framework. This question is perhaps best seen as a form of subject-driven scepticism. The present chapter draws selectively on largely familiar material in order to set up the discussion of such scepticism here. As we will see, at issue is the relation between conceptions of the subject and epistemological yield: the guiding question is whether we can find an adequate model of the mind that is also adequate to the task of securing objectivity. It is difficult to avoid the impression that for a long time philosophical models of the mind were, to a significant extent, adopted with a certain amount of inattentiveness, certainly without sufficient argument. It is as if a sense of familiarity with the mind’s workings obscured the extent to which a description of those workings would nevertheless be theory-laden.
From the Egological Subject to the Domestication of Reason
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

Much of philosophy in the past sixty years has been directed at, or has at least resulted in, questioning the traditional assumption of an epistemologically significant breach between subject and object. This raises the issue of the epistemic impact of this move. It might have been thought that in the absence of that assumption, with the subject regarded as perfectly at home in the world, epistemology would no longer be faced with sceptical worries, which might well have been the point of rejecting the traditional assumption. The three chapters comprising this part of the book make a case for thinking that no such simple deliverance ensues. It would be a mistake to think that rejecting the traditional assumption simply and incisively releases us from the related epistemological agenda. The orientation that brings about the blurring of that Cartesian dichotomy has been intimately bound up with other commitments, such as the withdrawal from metaphysics. And the combination of naturalism and the dissolution of the Cartesian chasm do not add up to an end to our epistemic troubles.
A Compulsion to Objectivity in Experience
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

The first two parts of this book set the agenda for this final part. In this chapter I will take a look at some arguments designed to pick up on the insights of the philosophers canvassed in Part I, while allowing them to stand uncluttered by doubtful characteristics of one model of the mind or another. The essentially Strawsonian attempt will be to uphold the interdependence between subjectivity and objectivity, but without reliance on any transcendental psychology. This is intended to get round the various problems seen earlier, in particular the fact that the availability of a Jamesian alternative to the Kantian model of the mind threatens to derail the train of the Transcendental Deduction at the outset. These arguments, however, have the character of transcendental arguments, and the upshot of Part II has precisely been to cast doubt on the credentials of any such arguments. The possibility of such arguments will accordingly be taken up again in Chapter 8, where I will provide grounds for thinking that the arguments in the present chapter may not succumb to the relativist pressure on objectivity identified in Part II, and in fact provide a way of resisting it.
A Defence of Transcendental Arguments
Authors: Sacks Mark
Published: November 2023

Transcendental arguments standardly attempt to argue from some undeniable facts about experience, or the psychological realm, to conclusions about how the world beyond that merely psychological domain must be. Such arguments attempt-as we might put it-to cross the appearance-reality gap: to cover the distance between our beliefs and the world they are about, or between how things seem to us and how they really are.1 Clearly, so construed, transcendental arguments hold out the promise of significant anti-sceptical mileage: they start from premisses drawn from the domain paradigmatically held to be beyond doubt, and end up with conclusions firmly within the domain paradigmatically held (by the sceptic) to be beyond knowledge. But transcendental arguments, on this standard construal, face two salient problems. There is, first, the problem of the inference to reality. Secondly, there is the problem of the universality of inference. The first concerns the spectre of idealism: the worry that in fact no argument is going to enable us to break out of the domain of how things appear to us, to bridge the gap between appearances and reality. The second is the relativist worry that, however persuasive the inference might seem, and however undeniable the conclusion, that argument might not always and in all places seem so persuasive, nor might there be some other leading to just that set of conclusions.
Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition
Authors: Kenny Anthony
Published: November 2023

During most of the Christian millennia Aristotle has been the most influential of all philosophers. This selection of essays by the eminent philosopher and Aristotle scholar Anthony Kenny traces this influence through the ages. Particular attention is given to Aristotle's ethics and philosophy of mind, showing how they provided the framework for much fruitful development in the Middle Ages and again in the present century. Also included are some contributions to the most recent form of Aristotelian scholarship, computer-assisted stylometry. All who work on Aristotle and his intellectual legacy will find much to interest them in these Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition.
Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness
Authors: Kenny Anthony
Published: November 2023

Aristotle’ s treatment of happiness in books 1 and 10 of the Nicomachean  Ethics has been in recent decades the subject of intense discussion by philosophers. It is perhaps surprising that contemporary writers should find so much to say about chapters that are in themselves tolerably dear and that have been carefully studied for centuries. Some recent readings of the texts are so perverse that they can only be explained by the desire to bring Aristotle’ s thought into line with contemporary fashion. It provides a useful antidote to any such temptation to play close attention to the Aristotle commentaries of medieval writers who had preoccupations very different from our own.
Duns Scotus on Freewill
Authors: Kenny Anthony
Published: November 2023

It is now generally agreed that Scotus made important innovations in the theory of modality. I wish in this essay to examine in detail the passages which contain these innovations; they come from his discussion of the relation between divine foreknowledge and contingency in human actions, and in particular, from his treatment, in that context, of certain theorems about the relation between time and necessity contained in the ninth chapter of Aristotle’ s De  Interpretatione.
The Methodology of the Second Voyage and the Proof of the Soul’s Indestructibility in Plato’s Phaedo
Authors: kanayama Yahei
Published: November 2023

Phaedo 96–I07 is oneof the most controversial passages in Plato’s corpus, where topics that constitute the essential part of his philosophy are concentrated: the methodology of Socrates’ so-called second voyage, i.e. the method of studying in logoi (henceforth, ‘the logoi method’) and the method of hypothesis, in contrast with the methodology of the natural philosophers; teleological and Formal aitiai in contrast with material aitiai; and the proof of the soul’s indestructibility. Although 96–I07 contains such a variety of topics, it has a unity in that all its parts are supposed to work together to accomplish the task of proving the soul’s indestructibility, through enquiring into the whole question of the aitia for coming-to-be and destruction (95 E). Socrates’ or Plato’s careful choice of the logoi method in 99 D–I00 A shows that deciding what methodology to adopt is essential to the success of his enterprise, and I suppose that 96-107 cannot be properly understood without exact understanding of the new methodology of the second voyage. The aim of this paper is to elucidate it and thereby to shed some new light on 96-107.
Flux and Language in the Theaetetus
Authors: silverman Allan
Published: November 2023

I Want to examine again Plato’s refutation of the Heracliteans at 181 B 8–183 c 4 of the Theaetetus. About how we are to read this argument in particular, and about how we are to view the dialectic of the first part of the Theaetetus of which it is a part, there are wellknown differences of opinion. One side, carrying the banner of a tradition dating back deep into antiquity, finds continuity between the Theaetetus and the middle-period dialogues. Another contingent finds dissonance between the earlier metaphysics and epistemology and the conclusions to be drawn from the arguments of the Theaetetus. While there are many different interpretations within each camp, a main, though surely not the only, source of contention between the two can be put in simple terms: Does the argument at 181 show that Forms are needed to save the phenomena of language or not? A representative of the first side answers affirmatively. Representatives of the other camp answer in the negative. I answer in the affirmative.
Epicurean Immortality
Authors: Warren James
Published: November 2023

The study of Epicurean theology is, and has been for some time, a battleground. Great effort has been expended in the discussion of what, and how θ  ϵoι … ϵισι  ν (Ep. Men. 123), but despite the vast majority of writing on this topic being concerned with the ontological and epistemological issues which arise from Epicurean theism, the major role played by the gods in Epicurus’ thought is ethical. They are, however they ‘are’, perfect Epicureans in the sense that they enjoy constant pleasure.
How to Forge a Musical Work
Authors: Kivy Peter
Published: November 2023

It is difficult for the younger philosophers of art to quite realize what state the discipline was in when the students of my generation entered graduate school in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was, frankly speaking, a desert with one great oasis: Monroe Beardsley’s Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1958). Further more, the British analytic philosophers of those years, whom we wished so to emulate, had declared Aesthetics a non-subject. Taste, criticism, art, and beauty were, they argued, not susceptible of a philosophical critique. For a graduate student in philosophy to declare an interest in Aesthetics, the ‘dreary science,’ was an embarrassment.
Rule Consequentialism
Authors: Mulgan Tim
Published: November 2023

Consequentialism derives much of its initial appeal from its apparent sim- plicity: it gives me the single moral project of making the world a better place. Complexities multiply as soon as I ask what this project involves. The division between Parts Two and Three of this book turns on a prior question: in what sense does Consequentialism give this project to me? In the Consequentialist tradition, two standard answers are interwoven. On the one hand, the Consequentialist project is seen as an individual project given to me as a single moral agent. Alternatively, Consequentialism may be a group pro- ject, which is mine only because (and in so far as) I belong to some particular group (which may be the set of all moral agents, or some subset of them). For generality, I shall refer to these approaches as Individual Consequentialism and Collective Consequentialism respectively.
Introduction
Authors: Allen James
Published: November 2023

Evidence has been used to draw inferences for as long as there have been human beings. The aim of the present enquiry is to explore some of the more important attempts that were made to understand the nature of evidence after it became an object for theoretical reflection in the ancient Greek and Roman world. Although the word is an ancient one, the nature of evidence was not discussed under the head of ‘evidence’ in antiquity. Cicero introducedevi dentia as a rendering of lνaργεια, the quality of being evident(Luc. 17). In this sense it entered European languages, including English, where, however, one tends to speak of ‘self-evidence’ because English uniquely recognizes the sense of ‘evidence’ at issue in this enquiry, viz. an item that is the basis of an inference or the ground for a conclusion. The relation between the two senses seems to be this: to serve as evidence for a conclusion, apart from supporting it, an item must be evident, or at least more evident than the conclusion. Only in this way can it permit us to infer a conclusion that we do not know from grounds that we do, thus adding to our stock of knowledge.
Epicurean Sign-inference in Philodemus
Authors: Allen James
Published: November 2023

As we have seen, the framework Sextus Empiricus used to classify the epistemological positions that he examines divides objects of knowledge into two classes: knowledge of evident matters is treated by the philosophers in their theories of the criterion, while the transition (µετaβασισ) from the evident by means of which non-evident matters are apprehended is discussed under the head of signs and demonstrations (σηµεlα, aποδεdξεισ)(M. 7. 24–6, 396; 8. 140, 319;PH 2. 96).
Conclusion
Authors: Allen James
Published: November 2023

Philippson compared ancient testimony about signs to the River Alpheus, which disappears from view to flow underground for part of its course. Much of the subject’s history is invisible to us and can only be conjectured. Were it not for the accident that preserved part of Philodemus’ De signis, for example, we would not know about the later Epicureans’ views or even that sign-inference had been an especially important concern of theirs. Sextus’ single mention of Epicurus and his followers as adherents of the view that the sign is a sensible is so plainly meant as a doxographical counterweight to the Stoic view that the sign is a lekton and, therefore, intelligible that we might have been forgiven for thinking that there was little to Epicurean sign theory had we had no other evidence (M. 8. 177).
Sidgwick and the Boundaries of lntuitionism
Authors: Crisp Roger
Published: November 2023

In the mid 1980s I attended a series of graduate seminars, run by Derek Parfit, on Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Parfit began the first seminar by claiming that the Methods was the greatest book on ethics ever written. This was not to say that Sidgwick was the greatest moral philosopher ever, since he had had the advantage of reading the works of past philosophers. Parfit went on to describe the common experience of thinking of some philosophical point, and then later finding it in Sidgwick. This struck a chord with me at the time. Writing a thesis on utilitarianism, I had found a central claim in my argument anticipated by Sidgwick-and, to make matters worse, hidden deep in a footnote.
An Unconnected Heap of Duties?
Authors: McNaughton David
Published: November 2023

Despite its name, the school of ethical intuitionism which flourished between the world wars, and whose greatest proponents were H. A. Prichard and W D. Ross, was not distinguished from its competitors by a distinctive epistemology. The dispute between intuitionism and its main rival, the utilitarian tradition, revolved around the issue of whether there was more than one fundamental moral principle.1 The utilitarian tradition in ethical thought can be represented as holding that there is just one fundamental duty or moral principle: the duty of beneficence. In the hands of G. E. Moore, whom Ross and Prichard saw as their main opponent, the theory had developed into a sophisticated consequentialism which subscribed to a pluralist account of the good.
The Three Phases of lntuitionism
Authors: Baldwin Thomas
Published: November 2023

In The Methods of Ethics Sidgwick distinguishes between three ‘phases’ of intuitionism, the ‘Perceptional’, the ‘Dogmatic’, and the ‘Philosophical’ phase. For Sidgwick these phases have a teleology-they are ‘three stages in the development of Intuitive Morality’;2 but one does not have to endorse his teleology to find his threefold distinction helpful in the context of critical reflection on ethical intuitionism.
Dictionaries and the Dictionary
Authors: Béjoint Henri
Published: November 2023

It is traditional to start with definitions, and this is particularly appropriate in the circumstances, since the main object of lexicography is to define words and terms. Of course, the central notion to be defined is the notion of ‘dictionary’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), the word dictionary is derived from the Latin forms dictionarius, used in 1225 by the English poet and grammarian Joannes de Garlandia (John of Garland) as the ‘title of a collection of Latin vocables’, and dictionarium, used about a century later by Peter Bechorius (or Becharius). The first recorded appearance of the word dictionary as such is dated 1526 by the OED; after that the word was used by Sir Thomas Elyot in 1538. The French word dictionnaire seems to have been used for the first time by Robert Estienne in 1539.
Phonetic Representations in the Mental Lexicon
Authors: Coleman john
Published: November 2023

In this chapter I shall argue that (i) our mental representations of the form of words are essentially phonetic, rather than symbolic-phonological; (ii) phonological competence includes and makes use of statistical properties of the time-course of phonetic representations; and (iii) a combination of phonetic, statistical, and semantic knowledge is sufficient to explain many aspects of phonological structure. Since generative grammar claims to be concerned with real linguistic knowledge, generative phonologists might regard the mental existence of phonological representations as pretty incontrovertible. Many psychologists of language too, though rarely so concerned with the kind of relatively abstract relations that phonologists focus on, are happy to speak of phonemes, syllables, and the phonological lexicon (see e.g. Dell 1986, Ellis and Young 1988, Cutler and Norris 1988, Fear, Cutler, and Butterfield 1995 ). It would be odd to deny the reality of such things.
Children’s Overregularization and its Implications for Cognition
Authors: Marcus Gary f.
Published: November 2023

In particular, I propose that humans have both a statistical mechanism which extracts, collects, and tabulates statistical contingencies in the environment, and a rule mechanism which suppresses variation between examples within a category, thereby treating all instances of a category as equal members. Of course, neither mechanism is entirely novel; indeed, much of the debate in cognitive psychology concerns such mechanisms. My goal here is to argue that both mechanisms are necessary. Section 8.2 presents detailed arguments for the existence of both mechanisms within a single narrow linguistic domain, inflection. Section 8.3 proposes that these same two types of mechanisms are used in many other domains of cognition.
Downslope Flows into a Stratified Environment - Structure and Detrainment
Authors: Baines Peter G
Published: November 2023

Observations of dense downslope flows into a density-stratified environment are described, and these observations are interpreted quantitatively in terms of dynamical processes. The system is two-dimensional (x -z), the slope is at 6° to the horizontal, and the dense fluid is released at a uniform rate at the top of the slope for a finite period of time. The main down flow has the form of a gravity current with a distinct upper interface, with some similarities to the flow into a homogeneous environment described by Ellison and Turner (1959), but with major differences.