bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Hume's Reason
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

Reason plays a central role in Hume's account of human understanding but just what that role is is a matter of continuing controversy. Many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses, and many of the positions he advocates, are expressed in terms of reason. It is central to his arguments about induction, belief, scepticism, the passions, and moral distinctions. Hume's Reason provides a new look at Hume's account of reason and discusses the first three of the aforementioned issues. Hume's theory is introduced by looking at the logic of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. Hume followed them in rejecting a formal, deductive account of the workings of the inferential faculty of reason. His account of demonstration is similar to their treatment. But he went farther, in what we now call the argument concerning induction, by showing that no account of reason as a separate faculty could explain our inferences to beliefs in the unobserved. Hume offers instead an associationist account of probable reasoning and a new account of belief. In the process, the picture of reason as an independent faculty is replaced by an explanation of reasoning in terms of properties of the imagination.
Descartes's New Theory of Reasoning
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

Descartes rejected syllogism and its associated formal account of deductive reasoning. One of his main reasons was his concern for truth, and the ability to recognize new truths and to distinguish truths from falsehoods. Formal logic is non‐ampliative; the conclusion of a deductively valid argument does not impose any constraints on the truths that we know are not already imposed by the premises. Instead of rejecting deduction in favour of induction, like Bacon, Descartes developed a new, ampliative theory of deduction in the Regulae. This theory of inference was based on intuition, a forerunner of his later account of clear and distinct perception. One directly intuited that two ideas were related in a certain way. One deduced that one idea was related to another by forming a chain of ideas, the connection between each idea and its neighbour being perceived by intuition.
Locke on Reasoning
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

Although they differed about the intellect and the nature of ideas, Locke's account of demonstrative reasoning is very similar to Descartes's account of deduction. Locke's demonstration is unlike both syllogistic and modern versions of deduction. It is not formal; the quality of a demonstration depends on the content of the ideas seen to be related. Like Descartes, Locke has an account of demonstration based on intuition. In some cases, one intuitively perceives the connection between two ideas. In other cases, one constructs a chain of ideas such that one indirectly perceives the connection between two ideas at the ends of the chain by directly or intuitively perceiving the connection between any idea in the chain and its neighbour. There is no probable analogue in Locke to intuition. There are no direct beliefs; all beliefs are the result of probable reasoning or judgement. The connection between two ideas is presumed, rather than perceived, in belief. This presumption is caused by the evidence for the belief.
Hume and Ideas: Relations and Associations
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

Hume had a particularly rigorous empirical methodology of refusing to go beyond experience. This is first realized in his derivation of all ideas from impressions. But it also results in his refusal to treat an appeal to a faculty as explanatory of the characteristic activity of that faculty. Instead, he traces the observable connections among perceptions of the mind. Ideas stand in certain relations to each other; some of these are the natural relations of association, others are philosophical relations. Hume makes a further distinction between two classes of relations: the members of the class remain the same as long as the related ideas remain the same, while the members of the other class can change even if the ideas do not.
Intuition, Certainty, and Demonstrative Reasoning
Authors: Owen David
Published: October 2003

In general, intuition and demonstration are explained in terms of the class of relations of ideas that remain the same as long as the ideas remain the same. The main negative point is that our concept of a deductively valid argument, even one with necessarily true premises, has little to do with Hume's conception of demonstration. Following Descartes and Locke, the emphasis is on content and certainty, not necessity and formal validity. Two ideas are intuitively related if the relation between them is immediately conceived. Two ideas are demonstratively related if the relation between them is conceived, not immediately, but via other intermediate ideas. The link between each pair of adjacent ideas in the resulting chain must be intuitive. With this background, some of Hume's more infamous claims are explained: we know in advance that two ideas cannot be demonstratively related if we can conceive one without the other; the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstratively known; the only relation capable of sustaining demonstrations is that of quantity and number.
The Meaning of ‘Right’
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This first chapter of Ross's book is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of right. The interest throughout is ethical, with value only being discussed as far as it seems relevant. The first aspect addressed is the ambiguity inherent in any definition of the meaning of right. G. E. Moore's three definitions of a horse are discussed: these may be designated the arbitrary verbal definition, the verbal definition proper, and the definition that involves the sense of being reduced to elements simpler than itself. These three types of definition are applied to the subsequent discussion of the meaning of right, which includes looking at the difference between right and duty, at moral goodness, at the reduction of right to elements simpler than itself, at right definable as productive of a certain outcome (the greatest good), at ethical principles, at hedonistic utilitarianism, and at the sociological school.
The Nature of Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.
What Things Are Good?
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This is the third of five chapters on good, and inquires into what kinds of things are intrinsically good. The first thing claimed as intrinsically good is virtuous disposition and action; the second is pleasure in itself. These two approaches are briefly analysed, with the goodness or badness of pleasure given particular attention. Ross concludes that four things can be seen to be intrinsically good—virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and to a lesser degree right opinion). He is unable to discover anything that is intrinsically good that is not either one or a combination of these.
Degrees of Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D.
Published: October 2003

This is the fourth of five chapters on good, and looks at the question of whether goods are commensurable—measurable in degrees. As a preliminary, the question is asked as to whether pleasures are commensurable, and as a preliminary to that question, whether pleasures are comparable, and whether one pleasure can be said to be greater or more pleasant than another. The chapter examines two of three aspects of degrees of goodness: the commensuration (calculus) of pleasures against one another; and the commensuration of different states of knowledge against one another, including the dependence of the value of a state of knowledge on the nature of the state of mind, and the value of a state of opinion (which is regarded as inferior to knowledge); the third aspect, the balancing of virtuous actions and dispositions against one another, is examined in the next (and last) chapter. The question is then addressed as to whether virtue, knowledge, and pleasure can be compared in value—measured against one another; here, evidence is put forward to support Ross's view that pleasure is inferior in value to virtue and knowledge. The last part of the chapter looks at the relative value of moral goodness (which is discussed in the next chapter) and value as ends in themselves.
Actions as Inner Causes
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

Actions are mental events (tryings, volitions) that typically cause bodily motions. This is strongly suggested by the semantics of causative constructions, like ‘She raised her hand’, which require event analyses (and appeal to thematic roles). Objections to this view can be rebutted, while a range of intuitions about the individuation of actions are preserved, given the right conception of actions and action sentences.
Fregean Innocence
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

In a belief ascription like ‘Sam believes that Hesperus rises in the evening’, the complementizer ‘that’ is a device for referring to the sense of the embedded sentence. On this Fregean view, substitutivity of co‐referential terms need not preserve truth. This accounts for the opacity of propositional attitude ascriptions, while preserving what Davidson called semantic innocence.
Other Things Being Equal
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

One can often explain the fact that a certain event occurred by citing the occurrence of a prior event, along with a suitable ceteris paribus law. Far from being vacuous, such laws have substantive (and disconfirmable) consequences. Apparent exceptions to a ceteris paribus law must be explicable in terms of real interfering factors—factors we idealize away from, when stating the law. Given the proposed interpretation of such laws, the proposed sufficient condition for explanation (and causation) avoids familiar counterexamples to traditional covering‐law accounts.
Personal Dualism
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

We can and should preserve certain Cartesian intuitions—e.g. that people are distinct from their bodies, and that at least many of our mental events are distinct from any biochemical events—while rejecting Descartes’ metaphysics. One can accept many dualistic conclusions, but follow Strawson in saying that our concept of a person is a primitive (irreducible) concept that applies to spatiotemporal individuals who have both physical and mental properties. Mental events are located in space, where they can bear causal relations to other events, including bodily motions. But mental events do not have the same spatial properties as biochemical events, which are ‘impersonal’ in ways that actions and their rationalizing causes are not.
Modal Concerns
Authors: Pietroski Paul M.
Published: October 2003

Given the view urged in Chs. 3 to 5, a bodily motion (say, the rising of someone's arm) can have mental causes distinct from any of its biochemical causes. But effects of mental causes are not overdetermined, in any objectionable way, given a proper understanding of the relevant counterfactuals. A deeper question, stressed by Kim and others, is why the mental supervenes on the physical, if identity theories are false. But supervenience may reflect the nature of possibility: if a ‘possible world’ w1 is physically indiscernible from a possible world w2, then w1 is w2; in which case, w1 is mentally indiscernible from w2. This is a defensible view given by Kripke's, as opposed to Lewis's conception of possibility.
Morality and Art
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Discusses the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgements, hoping to illuminate it by contrasting moral and aesthetic judgements. In her critical assessment of the nature of moral judgements, Foot concludes that some such judgements (as e.g. that Nazism was evil) are definitely objective. The concept of morality here supplies criteria independent of local standards, which function as fixed starting points in arguments across local boundaries, whereas by contrast aesthetic truths can ultimately depend on locally determined criteria. More problematic is the apparently different relation of moral and of aesthetic judgements to rational choice. Individuals may have no reason to choose what is beautiful, but we think that they must always have reason to choose what is morally right, which raises one of the most difficult problems in moral philosophy.
Moral Relativism
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Examines various definitions of moral relativism, first discussing the views of Charles Stevenson and Walter Stace and suggesting that neither of these two authors deals with the most troubling form that relativism can take. The important question is whether societies with widely differing moral codes may ultimately simply face each other without there being any common standard to which both must answer. Bernard Williams has argued in favour of the possibility of this ultimate confrontation and so supports a radical form of moral relativism. Foot, however, challenges it, suggesting that the use of the concept of morality brings with it the relevance of more or less determinate considerations of human goods and evils. During the discussion of Stace's views, there is also consideration of the important relativistic idea that rightness and wrongness is relative to each person's conscience. This too is denied, in agreement with Aquinas’ argument that even an erring conscience binds but cannot excuse. It is always wrong to go against one's conscience, but when conscience errs, it may also be wrong to do what one thinks one should do.
Killing and Letting Die
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Considers the moral relevance of a distinction between killing and letting die, which distinction is sometimes morally critical, as shown in the difference between killing one to save five and leaving one to die while rescuing them (here labelled Rescue I and Rescue II.) A more basic distinction is, she thinks, between initiating a harmful sequence of events and not interfering to prevent it. The latter is sometimes permissible where the former would not be, because in general we have a stronger right not to be interfered with than positively to be helped.
Von Wright on Virtue
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Examines and criticizes von Wright's attempt to distinguish virtues from skills, and to shape (as he thinks desirable) a new concept of a virtue. She points out that it will not help to connect skills particularly with activities as opposed to ends, and again that a concept of the virtues that links each virtue to the overcoming of a particular passion, as Von Wright suggests, excludes justice from the list. He also seems to err in ignoring Aristotle and Aquinas’ crucial insistence on the fact that skills differ from virtues in that it is possible to possess a skill but deliberately fail to exercise it, whereas a virtue necessarily ‘gives its use.’
Locke, Hume, and Modern Moral Theory:
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Analyses in detail the accounts given respectively by Locke and by Hume of the mental factors such as pleasure, pain, uneasiness, and desire, which they see as causing all human actions. Foot argues that this enterprise was misconceived. Philosophers should no more try to describe a mechanism underlying acting on a reason (as e.g. a prudential or moral reason) than a mechanism underlying believing on a reason. Practical and theoretical reasoning are here on a par, the first issuing in action and the second in belief.
Nietzsche's Immoralism
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

An in‐depth assessment of Nietzsche's attack on morality. Foot takes up the challenge by asking the fundamental question, ‘Can morality be discredited?’ Historically, Anglo‐American analytic philosophy has overlooked the significance of Nietzsche's views on morality by dismissing or ignoring his arguments. The central thrust of Nietzsche's attack is, according to Foot, that no kinds of action are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in themselves, whoever does them. This Nietzschean idea, Foot contends, puts us in a dangerous position. It cannot give a proper account of injustice and therefore seems tacitly to license it. By examining the central thesis of Nietzsche's immoralism and elucidating many of his key ideas, e.g. ‘the will to power’, ‘master–slave morality’ and the ‘overman’ (superman), Foot argues that although Nietzsche's immoralism should be given serious consideration, the emphatic conclusion is that, in the last analysis, no part of his attack on morality is convincing.
Rationality and Virtue
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Considers the age‐old problem of the rationality of obeying the precepts of justice even when this conflicts with self‐interest and desire. If this is irrational action, how can it be good action? And if not good action, how can it be an action required by the virtue of justice? Was Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic right to argue that justice is not a virtue? Foot suggests that we should ‘turn this problem on its head’ starting from an argument that shows the connection between justice and human goodness and insisting that an account of practical rationality in terms of individual desire and self‐interest is therefore shown to be deficient. In the course of the argument, Foot outlines the theory of human goodness that is to be central in her book Natural Goodness.
Moral Dilemmas Revisited
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

This essay is a continuation of one Foot had written ten years earlier under the title ‘Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma’. Foot attacks Ruth Marcus’ notion that some moral dilemmas involve circumstances in which one is guilty whatever one does: being ‘damned if one does something and damned if one doesn’t’. Foot's opposition to Marcus’ thesis rests on the argument that the guilty feelings one may experience when coping with some serious moral dilemma do not imply that one is indeed guilty. She expands this argument in order to attack Bernard Williams’ thesis that such feelings of guilt show that there are cases of ‘inescapable wrongness’. Re‐thinking the nature of moral dilemmas, Foot denies the existence of cases that involve inevitable wrongdoing.
Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?
Authors: Foot Philippa
Published: October 2003

Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.
Introduction
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin's main point in this book is that the question of Metaphysics Zeta, ‘what is substance?’, should be understood as the question, ‘what is the substance of c‐substances?’. In other words, in virtue of what are the substances of the Categories the sort of things they are—in virtue of what do they have the central, salient features mentioned but not explained in the Categories? Aristotle's answer is that it is in virtue of a structural component of the c‐substance—the form: form, then, is primary substance, but this primacy is explanatory and not ontological. Thus, in Zeta, c‐substances are subjected to hylomorphic analysis, i.e. in terms of form and matter, two entities that are not even mentioned in the Categories: for Wedin this shows that Aristotle in the Categories has no interest in the structure of primary substances, because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the treatise. Hence, the treatises are complementary because ontological primacy is given to c‐substances, and explanatory primacy to their forms.
Commitment and Configuration in the Categories
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only.
Tales of the Two Treatises
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents.
The Structure and Substance of Substance
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta (Z.1), before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter.
Form as Essence
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Wedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’ (Z.4, 1030a2–17), that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus (genous eidos); this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only (i.e. the differentiae) of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4.
The Purification of Form
Authors: Wedin Michael V.
Published: October 2003

Chapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal.
The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment
Authors: Dalton Russell J. , McAllister Ian , Wattenberg Martin P.
Published: October 2003

Assembles cross‐national data to demonstrate the behavioural consequences of partisan dealignment. Without the reinforcement of habitual party ties, more voters are waiting longer to decide for whom they will vote, and in the countries where ticket splitting is possible, more are dividing their party choices. Candidate‐centred politics appears to be on the rise, although this is much more pronounced in presidential than parliamentary systems, and signifying the different style of dealignment politics, participation in campaigns and volunteer work for political parties is decreasing. In short, partisan dealignment is transforming the relationship between some voters and political parties—a relationship that was once seen as an essential element in the process of representative government.
The Decline of Party Mobilization
Authors: Wattenberg Martin P.
Published: October 2003

Presents evidence that political parties are no longer performing their function of electoral mobilization as effectively as in the past. For instance, in 18 out of the 20 countries examined, recent turnout has been lower than those of the early 1950s. Party systems that are notoriously weak have seen the most pronounced drops in electoral participation, while the presence of strong parties appears to have dampened the decline of turnout. While mass attitudes may shift gradually over time, it takes a major shock to impact a habitual behaviour like participation in elections. Recent shake‐ups in the party systems of the OECD democracies may have provided the necessary jolt to send turnout plummeting.
Parties Without Members?
Authors: Scarrow Susan E.
Published: October 2003

Examines how parties have fared as membership organizations over the past half century. The most comprehensive series of party‐reported membership and survey data for the OECD nations finds that party membership rolls generally had decreased by the end of the 1990s. The chapter concludes by investigating the extent to which membership declines have diminished the organizational capacity of local parties and with a warning against overstating either the rise or obsolescence of membership‐based party organizing. It is true that membership parties are not what they once were, but it is also the case that strong membership parties were never as widespread as some accounts suggest.
Parties in Legislatures
Authors: Bowler Shaun
Published: October 2003

Assesses the degree to which parties still structure the legislative process. Party cohesion and party dominance within legislatures has usually been grounded in one of two explanations. One explanation sees legislative party discipline as a feature of the importance of party organization in fighting elections, which carries through to the legislative chamber itself, while a second explanation sees party discipline as a product of incentives facing individual legislators inside the legislative arena. The first argument would predict that party discipline inside the legislature should begin to falter because of the changes described in the previous chapters of this book. The second argument would predict that very little change should be seen and, further, that formal rules inside legislatures should underpin the importance of parties. In examining a range of behavioural data, such as roll‐call voting and internal Rules of Procedure, there is little evidence to support the view that party discipline has weakened or that parties are less important today in determining legislative outcomes. Changes in electoral behaviour, then, are not reflected in changes in the importance of parties inside legislatures where parties remain dominant actors.
Parties at the Core of Government
Authors: Strøm Kaare
Published: October 2003

Examines whether the behaviour of parties in cabinet formation and in control of the executive branch have changed over time. The evidence indicates that parties remain entrenched in the core of the executives studied, but party control seems to wane the further we move from this institution. The chapter concludes by examining the implications such changes have on the primacy of parties in government, arguing that among the several alternatives to representative democracy, pluralist democracy seems to be the most likely alternative to party government.
From Platform Declarations to Policy Outcomes
Authors: Caul Miki L. , Gray Mark M.
Published: October 2003

Examines whether the role of parties in policy‐making has changed substantially since the 1950s. The chapter uses data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and aggregate policy measures to assess long‐term trends in parties’ policy positions, and governing parties’ impacts on policy outcomes for 15 advanced industrial democracies. The chapter first analyses how the parties’ policy profiles have changed over time. Second, it examines whether parties are becoming increasingly flexible in terms of the issues they emphasize, moving from a strategy of selling a consistent package of policies toward marketing an increasingly volatile variety of issues. Third, it analyses changes in the degree of partisan impact on policy outputs, concluding that despite a pattern of ideological convergence, there is less evidence that the policy impact of parties has eroded over time.
Candidate Evaluations and Presidential Electoral Choices in France
Authors: Pierce Roy
Published: October 2003

There have been only six French presidential elections between 1965 and 1995, but there has been considerable variation between these in the extent to which the candidates’ leadership attributes might have contributed to voter choice and electoral outcomes, and during the same period there has been an unusual degree of constancy in the nature and strength of the underlying social and political forces. The theme of this chapter is the collision between these two forces (transient candidate qualities and long–term electoral forces), but before this analysis is made, a brief account is given of how presidential elections are conducted in France. The main part of the chapter is an analysis of the six elections between 1965 and 1995: the 1965 de Gaulle election; the 1969 election won by Pompidou; the 1974 election won by Giscard d’Estaing; the 1981 and 1988 elections won by Mitterrand; and the 1995 election won by Chirac. Constraints on personal candidate appeal are then discussed, before presenting a further analysis of the 1988 election. The study focuses on the extent to which the traditional left–right dimension has affected the electorate’s behaviour and electoral outcome, and whether there were elections in which one candidate had a clear advantage over the other in terms of personal popularity or leadership attributes; the objective was to determine whether the left–right factor was weaker at elections where personal qualities were presumed stronger, and this hypothesis received some support from the analysis presented.
The Challenges of Globalization and Europeanization: The Impact on National Autonomy and Control
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

While globalization has been a major economic, institutional, and ideational force for change, Europeanization has been an even more significant force for European Union member‐states, both as a conduit for global forces and as a shield against them. But however much sovereignty has been undermined by globalization and Europeanization, the resulting losses in national autonomy and control are largely offset by gains in shared supranational authority and control. This chapter considers the changing relations of power and influence between national and supranational authorities as it examines the debates on globalization with regard to the internationalization of financial markets and trade, the ‘statelessness’ of multinationals, and their spillover effects on the welfare state. It then contrasts the impact of globalization with the greater impact of Europeanization on European member‐states while discussing European monetary and market integration and their effects on the welfare state.
Still Three Models of Capitalism? The Impact of Changing Policies and Growing Pressures on Economic Practices
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter adds to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature by demonstrating that economic practices of countries are not converging on a one‐size‐fits‐all neo‐liberal model of capitalism, despite the fact that all have become more market‐oriented. Instead, they continue to be differentiable into not just two varieties of capitalism, conforming to liberal or coordinated market economies, but three, along lines of development from the original three postwar models of capitalism. The chapter contrasts the three varieties of capitalism in terms of interfirm relations, business‐government relations, and management‐labour relations; outlines the differential national pathways of adjustment of the countries conforming to the three varieties; highlights their continuing differences using indicators related to the financial markets and production systems; and considers their comparative advantages and disadvantages. It concludes that while British market capitalism has gone farther in its traditional market‐oriented direction, German managed capitalism is under strain, while French state capitalism has been transformed but has become neither market nor managed capitalist.
The Dynamics of Adjustment in Economic Practices in Britain, Germany, and France
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A.
Published: October 2003

This chapter details the different dynamics of economic adjustment in Britain, Germany, and France from the postwar period until today. For Britain, it describes the problems of business in the postwar period and the impact of the radical therapy of the Thatcher years that brought the country closer to the market capitalist ideal by making business relations more distant, government relations more arm's length, and labour relations more market‐reliant. For Germany, it outlines the minimal change from the postwar period until the 1990s, followed by efforts to make the managed capitalist system more competitive, which have left the system under strain, as interfirm relations have loosened, labour‐management relations have become less cooperative, and government has sought to facilitate adjustment, often unsuccessfully. For France, finally, the chapter examines the major transformation in state capitalism since the mid‐1980s with the move away from state‐led capitalism to a more state‐enhanced variety, where business is more autonomous and labour more market‐reliant, but the state still has a role to play.
What Makes a Character Trait a Virtue
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter provides arguments against eudaimonistic virtue ethics.
Love and Respect
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter provides an account of love and respect as modes of moral response that comprise virtuous response, and shows the relation between them, in virtue.
Expression
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter explores the idea that virtuous behaviour expresses a character state. The idea of expression is deployed to resolve some difficulties in virtue ethics, and the nature of virtue.
Objectivity
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter gives an account of the objective perspective in virtue ethical terms. It criticizes accounts that neglect the nature of the agent, and shows the importance of depth motivational factors.
Virtue and Constraints
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This Chapter gives a virtue ethical account of the problem of demandingness, showing how a virtue ethics may resolve the problem of ethics being excessively demanding.
Virtues of Practice
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter discusses moral epistemology from a virtue ethical perspective, rejecting an account of virtuous agent as oracle, and replacing it with a virtue ethical kind of dialogic ethics.
Indeterminacy
Authors: Swanton Christine
Published: October 2003

This chapter answers the common objection to virtue ethics that the ethical guidance given by virtue ethics is insufficiently determinate.
Chapter 1: Significant Utterances
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

The preliminary section of the treatise, a terse passage famous in the history of grammar and semantics, begins by setting out the relation between words, thoughts and things. Words are symbols, i.e. conventional tokens, for thoughts, as well as 'signs’ of things. Truth emerges from the correct or incorrect ’combination’ or 'separation’ (affirmation and negation) of these basic words in an assertion.
Chapter 2–3: The Name and Verb
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

Aristotle's definitions of the basic units of significant speech , and the way in which they are employed to form an assertion are seen here. Both 'signify something’, but the verb possesses a crucial additional role, the ’additional signification’ that its own signification and that of a ’name’ are combined, thus enabling an assertion to be true or false. The verb thus contains three elements: a basic signification, a copulative function equivalent to the role of the copula ’is’, and an indication of time, which forms a second type of ’additional signification’.
Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

Aristotle moves on to define longer utterances, distinguishing those, which possess truth‐value, from those such as prayers, which do not. Also, no single word can be an assertion, since an assertion must represent a predicate as truly holding of a subject; similarly, no part of a word can have signification. At best, the elements of a compound word can only ’tend to signify’.
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

The task of classifying contradictory pairs continues in the chapters that follow, but no new exceptions to RCP are found. Here, assertions are examined and their contradictory pairs set out, beginning with the most basic, in which ’is’ is added to a name. Next the role of the verb ’to be’ as an ’additional predicate’ is seen, in sentences such as ’man is just’, and finally assertions are considered in which there is no ’to be’, and a verb is simply added to a name. Contradictory pairs are examined which involve the use of negative subjects as well as negative predicates, universally and non‐universally. We see here a careful discussion of the different ways in which negation can be applied in a sentence, and guidance on how to tell which assertions are the contradictories of which others.
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A.
Published: October 2003

The discussion of modal assertions is now broadened to include the inferences, which may be drawn between them. The Modal Square of Opposition is set out, problems with the initial formulation are revealed and dealt with by ensuring that a single sense of possibility occurs throughout (possibility is implied by necessity, not excluded by it). In a final comment, Aristotle explains the importance of these assertions: possibility and necessity are the origins of the being, and not being of everything.
Grace and Christology in the Early Church
Authors: Fairbairn Donald
Published: October 2003

This book addresses the question of whether the fifth‐century pronouncements about Christ's person were reflective of a genuine theological consensus in the early Church, or whether they were merely the result of political pressure or compromise between opposing christological ‘schools.’ The book seeks to use the concept of grace to clarify the question of christology. The study finds that for Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, grace is God's gift of co‐operation to Christians as we seek to advance from the current age to a perfect future age, and Christ is the supreme example of this co‐operative grace. In contrast, Cyril of Alexandria views grace primarily as God's gift of himself to Christians by sharing with us the communion he has within himself, between the persons of the Trinity. This view of grace leads Cyril to argue that Christ must be the Son of God by nature in order to give grace to us. Furthermore, this study finds that Cassian holds to a view of grace very similar to that of Cyril. In the light of this connection between grace and christology, the book argues that the central issue of the christological controversy was whether God the Logos was himself personally present on earth through the incarnation. The study concludes by treating several other important writers from the christological controversy, and by suggesting that Cyril's understanding of grace and christology was not merely his own, but was in fact the consensus of the early Church.
Grace and the Central Issue of the Christological Controversy
Authors: Fairbairn Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter observes that some scholars see the fifth‐century christological debates as the result of politics, personal rivalry, and theological misunderstanding, others see them as the result of beginning with the duality of Christ versus beginning with his unity, and others see the debate as being over whether God was personally present in our world through the incarnation. The chapter argues that the idea of divine grace can provide a helpful clue for understanding which of these was actually the central issue of the debate, and it explains the rationale for concentrating on Theodore, Nestorius, Cyril, and Cassian. The chapter also introduces two concepts related to grace and christology: the question of the structure of salvation (three acts or two) and the concepts of the personal subject in Christ.
God's Own Son as the Source of Grace in Cyril's Later Writings
Authors: Fairbairn Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter deals with Cyril's writings during and after the controversy and argues that for Cyril, one cannot view the christological union as a communion between God and the assumed man. Instead, in order to share divine communion with us, Christ must be a unity, and his person must be that of God the Son himself. Only the Son of God can be the source of grace for Christians. The chapter discusses modern discussions about Cyril's understanding of Christ's unity, and it emphasizes the way Cyril uses a Greek term (idios) to insist on the immediacy of divine presence on earth.
Grace and the Saviour's Personal Subject in Cassian's De Incarnatione Domini
Authors: Fairbairn Donald
Published: October 2003

This chapter deals with Cassian's On the Incarnation of the Lord and argues that the understanding of grace and salvation developed in that work is consistent with that found in Cassian's monastic writings. Grace is God's giving himself personally to humanity, and only if Christ is personally God the Son is this possible. The chapter examines Cassian's insistence that Christ's person is God the Son in the light of his understanding of grace and deals with several troublesome aspects of his christology. The chapter concludes by noting the striking similarities between Cyril and Cassian, even though there was no known contact between the two men.
Introduction
Authors: Goodin Robert E.
Published: October 2003

Introduces Goodin's proposed model of reflective democracy, which is fundamentally liberal democracy. It starts by situating the overall project—which is an attempt to identify deliberative democratic methods for evoking more reflective preferences as inputs into the political process—in the more familiar traditions/theories of democratic discourse: democratic elitism, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy. It then goes on to discuss the model of reflective democracy chosen in more detail, by looking at its precepts. These are: that inputs matter, not just outputs; that thoughts matter, not just acts, and that the mute matter, not just the vocal. The plan of the book is then outlined, with a note on what it does not include.