bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Leibniz’s Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Machines
Authors: Raymont Paul
Published: November 2019

I maintain that Leibniz's distinction between 'organic machines of nature' and the artificial machine that we produce cannot be adequately understood simply in terms of differing orders of structural complexity. It is not simply that natural machines, having been made by God, are infinitely more complex than the products of our own artifice. Instead, Leibniz's distinction is a thoroughly metaphysical one, having its root in his belief that every natural machine is a corporeal substance, the unity and identity conditions of which derive ultimately from its substantial form. Natural machines are thus true unities, while artificial machines are mere aggregates of substances and are therefore only accidental unities. I briefly explore this connection between Leibniz's distinction between natural and artificial machines and his views about individuality. I conclude on a polemical note, in which it is suggested that these results undermine the currently popular view that Leibniz renounced corporeal substances toward the end of his life.
Bosanquet, Culture, and the Influence of Idealist Logic
Authors: Sweet William
Published: November 2019

I discuss some of the features of the analysis of culture provided by the Britist idealist philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). It has been suggested that Bosanquet's philosophical views, especially on topics related to culture, were determined by the 'absolutist' metaphysics he inherited from Hegel and F. H. Bradley, and that one can see a shift in his work from an early humanism, contemporary with his studies in logic, to a late anti-humanism. I argue that this account is problematic, that Bosanquet's discussion of cultural phenomena in fact consistently reflected principles present in his logic, and that these were articulated long before his explicitly absolutist metaphysical views. Specifically, I briefly outline three elements constitutive of a discussion of culture — aesthetics, religion and social life — and show how Bosanquet's account of each of them displays characteristics that are typically found in his logic. Since Bosanquet never abandoned the idealist logic of his youth — indeed, he wrote on the topic throughout his philosophical career — there is reason to doubt that he ever gave up the humanist values associated with them. This, I conclude, obliges us to reevaluate the standard assessments of Bosanquet's philosophy.
Reality as History
Authors: Venter Johannes J.
Published: November 2019

Most philosophers have noted the linguistic turn at the end of the nineteenth century. Few, if any, have noted the historical turn in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Living in a time of anxiety in which the universe and life present problems to be solved, the problem for this paper can be stated as: Why was history so imprtant until recently, and is narrative so important now? I examine the advent of irrationalism in order to provide some explanation for the substitution of story for history. Some find the origins of modern humanism in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's contention that human beings have been given the wonderfully unique ability to choose for themselves. But Pico still limited the options for humankind to provisions of the traditional hierarchical ontology of the Middle Ages. Thus, for him, the journey of humankind to itself was not a historical one, but rather the choice between a vertical descent into vegetative or brute state of being, or a mystical ascent along the hierarchy to the angelic or even divine level. But Modern thought relinquished this hierarchy in favour of a human centred teleology, framing the ontology in between nature (individuality, non-rationality) as the origin and culture (reason, the social) as its outcome. Thus the ontology became historicised from Defoe, Lessing, Rousseau, through Kant down to Marx. In irrationalism this became a mythical movement remaining within the non-rational, as in Nietzsche, and Mussolini, and finally story, as in Virginia Woolff, and films such as Dead Poets Society and A River Runs Through It, or New Age neo-romanticism.
La ficción y la verdad
Authors: Lamarche Juan
Published: November 2019

La filosofía clásica, adhiriendo a una concepción de la verdad como adecuación o correspondencia, con la garantía de la subjetividad moderna en sus distintas variantes, ubicó a la ficción como a una antítesis devaluada de la verdad. Luego de una revalorización de la ficción, en el siglo pasado, desde posiciones utilitaristas, abordamos una tesis de Paul Ricoeur, que correlaciona transculturalmente la actividad narrativa con el caracter temporal de la existencia humana. El eje fuerza de la obra analizada es la noción aristotélica de mímesis, desdoblada en tres dimensiones : I) prefiguración práctica en torno a la vida cotidiana II) configuración textual y III) refiguración receptiva a través de la lectura. La mímesis II , que abre el paso al "como si", opera como mediación entre el mundo de la vida -mímesis I- y la lectura refiguradora -mímesis III- y es la mediación entre el tiempo y la narración y entre la narración y la verdad. La confección de la trama, como actividad mimética fabuladora, está regulada en un proceso de esquematización, en el sentido kantiano, ya que subsume factores particulares en un todo -sensible e inteligible- bajo los parámetros del tiempo. La ficción y la verdad se relacionan entoces libremente bajo la éjida narrativa, sin la sujeción a un conciencia fundante, desplazándose a través de una identidad narrativa, que no es una yoidad formal, ni es un cambio indeterminado, al estilode Hume o Nietzsche, sino una ipseidad, que va de la vida al texto y del texto a la lectura, en una relación de inmanencia trascendencia.
Aristotle’s Ordinary versus Kant’s Revisionist De nition of Virtue as Habit
Authors: Cox L. Hughes
Published: November 2019

In what follows I examine the following question: does it make a difference in moral psychology whether one adopts Aristotle's ordinary or Kant's revisionist definition of virtue as habit? Points of commensurability and critical comparison are provided by Kant's attempt to refute Aristotle's definition of virtue as a mean and by the moral problems of ignorance (I don't know what I ought to do) and weakness (I don't do what I know I ought to do). These two problems are essential topics for moral psychology. I show two things. First, Kant's definition is revisionist because he excludes from moral habit-formation what Aristotle includes, that is, (i) practice in prudential calculation of a mean, and (ii) habit-formation by repetition. This follows from Kant's insistence that an act is virtuous only if the moral agent is willing freely and universally. Secondly, Aristotle's virtues modify behavior directly, whereas Kant's virtues modify behavior indirectly by creating moral feeling which, in turn, represses the temptations of the natural inclination. I suggest, thirdly, that as one approximates Kant's ideal of perfect virtue, entailed by the broad duties of beneficence and self-perfection, the difference in kind invented by Kant between virtue and prudence, as a morally neutral rational skill, erodes and becomes a difference in degree. I conclude that Aristotle's ordinary definition of virtue is better able to modify human behavior and solve these two moral problems.
Subtle Scripture for an Invisible Church
Authors: Shapshay Sandra L.
Published: November 2019

I argue for an interpretation of Kant's aesthetics whereby the experience of the beautiful plays the same functional role in the invisible church of natural religion as Scripture does for the visible churches of ecclesiastical religions. Thus, I contend, the links that Kant himself implies between the aesthetic and the moral (in the third Critique and the Religion) are much stronger than generally portrayed by commentators. Indeed, for Kant, experience of the beautiful may be necessary in order to found what Kant views as the final end of morality — the ethical community — since human moral psychology requires embodiments of moral ideas. Finally, I seek to modify Martha Nussbaums' argument in Poetic Justice (1995) for the increased use of the literary imagination as a means for improving public moral reasoning in this country, with the Kantian insight that aesthetic autonomy is the key to any aesthetic-moral link.
Music, Emotion and Language
Authors: Worth Sarah E.
Published: November 2019

There has yet to be a culture discovered which lacks music. Music is a part of our existence, but we do not fully understand it. In this paper, working in the tradition of Aristotle, Wittgenstein and Langer, I elucidate some of the connections between music and the emotions. Using contemporary philosophy of mind theories of emotion, I explain how we can have a better understanding of our emotive responses to music. I follow the pattern through representational painting and abstract painting to music, and show how each functions as an intentional object for the object of our emotions in response to each art form.
The Reliability of Heidegger’s Reading of Plato’s Gigantomachia
Authors: Berry John M.
Published: November 2019

At issue is the reliability of Heidegger’s contention that Greek thinking, especially Plato’s, was constricted by an unthought "pre-ontology." "The meaning of being" supposedly guiding and controlling Greek ontology is "Being = presence." This made "the question of the meaning of ousia itself" inaccessible to the Greeks. Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist is his most extensive treatment of a single dialogue. To test his own reliability, he proposes "to demonstrate, by the success of an actual interpretation of [the Gigantomachia], that this sense of Being [as presence] in fact guided [Plato’s] ontological questioning . . .". I will show Heidegger’s strategy in connecting what he takes to be Plato’s naive pre-ontology — Being = Presence — to the ontology of the Gigantomachia — Being = Power. I will show that Heidegger blatantly misreads the text to make the connection: he completely misses the distinction between bodies and bodiless things. The text makes sense, I will show, if and only if its explicit ontology — Being = Power — is its implicit pre-ontology. Plato wrote his text not to discuss, but to exemplify, Heidegger’s ontology-preontology distinction. He wrote the Gigantomachia for Heidegger, but Heidegger missed it.
Zur systemtheoretischen Verallgemeinerung des Kra begri es
Authors: Deppert Wolfgang
Published: November 2019

In order to generalize the concept of force due to its application within theoretical descriptions of biological systems, the Newtonian notion of force is used. So-called ‘wholenesslike’ (ganzheitliche) systems of notions allow us to define ‘wholenesslike’ states. There are two possible changes of such states: the changes of eigenstates and the change of the structure of systems. Therefore, two types of forces are discussed: systemeigenforces and systemcombinationforces.
The Ontology of Many-Worlds
Authors: Kachi Daisuke
Published: November 2019

There are two types of theories regarding many worlds: one is modal, while the other is temporal. The former regards reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, paying close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is not for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmoment identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space.
The Structure of Wholeness
Authors: Rahnfeld Michael
Published: November 2019

Using a part-whole-calculus the vague concept of wholeness is rendered precisely as the structure of an atomic boolean lattice. The so-defined prototypical structure of wholeness has the status of a category, since every element of our experience may be considered as an intended application of it. This will be illustrated using examples from different ontological spheres. The hypothetical and therefore fallible character of the structure is shown in its inadequacy in grasping quantum logical facts. This demands a differentiation of wholeness. The defined structure may be seen as circular in two respects: On the one hand it is the precondition for the understanding of its own syntactic and semantic basics, on the other hand there exists a mutual defineability between its atoms, which leads us to the thesis that wholeness cannot be defined in a non-circular manner.
Starting Philosophic Problem
Authors: Solodukho Nathan M.
Published: November 2019

The starting philosophic problem is related to the categories ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing.’ This is the problem of the relationship between being and nonbeing. The cardinal question of philosophy is: ‘What can be considered to be primary, being or nonbeing?’ In the history of philosophy, it is possible to speak about two basic philosophic paradigms: philosophy of being and philosophy of nonbeing. This paper is an elaboration of the ‘philosophy of nonbeing.’
Das Präphysiche Stadium und der Anfang der Welt
Authors: Szczesniak Malgorzata
Published: November 2019

This paper concerns the main physical, philosophical and existential aspects of the ‘pre-physical’ stage in the evolution of the universe. I will discuss the ways that contemporary cosmology tries to: (1) solve the problem about the time period of the ‘pre-physical’ state; (2) answer the question whether the beginning of time was at the same time as the beginning of the existence of the Universe; (3) answer another whether the Big Bang was an absolute beginning of the existence of the Universe or only a beginning of some stage of its evolution; (4) respond to another question whether the absolute beginning of the Universe inevitably implies its creation by God or whether it allows for the possibility of the creation of the Universe in a natural way; and (5) discuss the issue of the ‘singular’ moment. All of these questions, in particular the last one, will be discussed with reference to the latest achievements in the fields of physics and cosmology.
Aurobindonian Ontology: Salient Peculiarities
Authors: Vernekar Sanjyot D. Pai
Published: November 2019

Aurobindo envisages a cosmic salvation via an endlessly openended, eternally optimistic, and forward-looking ontology. The purpose of humankind is to go beyond its present form of ordinary (mental) consciousness until it attains the Supermind. Aurobindo says this can be done by a technique he calls Integral Yoga that enables humankind to purposefully cooperate with the cosmic evolutionary urge and thereby rise from the present mental stage to the supramental stage. Another peculiarity of Aurobindo’s ontology is his concept of Brahman. It negates illusionism and gives his metaphysical scheme a religious dimension. There is no room in his system for any adversary, anti-Divine or Satan as an independent entity. Thus, evil and suffering also stand accounted for. Peculiarities of this order make him the very first and, so far, the only ontologist claiming a preordained divination of the universe.
Why the Tractarian Objects Cannot Be Properties and Relations
Authors: Zhang Yiwei
Published: November 2019

One of the most frequently discussed notions in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is the notion of simple object. However, among the literature on Tractarian objects, recent or classic, none has treated configurations of objects as a major and non-trivial issue. In this paper, I show that a detailed study of configurations of objects will yield a series of interesting and important results: it leads to a new understanding of the picture theory, helps us calculate the maximum numbers of internal and external properties of objects, and enables us to reinterpret and reach a solution to the notorious debate on whether properties and relations should be included as Tractarian objects.
Explaining Modernism
Authors: Croddy W. Stephen
Published: November 2019

Modernism in the arts commenced during the second half of the 19th century and extended into most of the 20th. A significant feature of this period is that each type of art gave principal attention to dimensions of itself. This was a type of self-analysis. I consider those art forms consisting of an image on a flat two-dimensional surface. I give particular attention to painting, a familiar example of this type of image. Explanations of Modernism are philosophically relevant not only for aesthetics but also for epistemology. The reason is that an analysis of our perceptions as a result of seeing a painted image can contribute to philosophy's analysis of the process by which we obtain knowledge through perception. I argue that we should interpret Modernism as contributing to this investigation.
Paideia, Schole, Paidia: Then and Now
Authors: Gray Christopher B.
Published: November 2019

Aristotle centers the citizen’s education (paideia) on leisure (schole). Its features, especially of play (paidia), are evoked to remedy deficiencies in three contemporary philosophies of leisure: classical, critical and communitarian.
Rethinking Efficiency
Authors: Schipper Frits
Published: November 2019

This article aims to give an analysis of the concept of efficiency. The importance of such an analysis lies in the fact that the role which efficiency plays in different sectors of our society leads to opposite evaluations resulting in a clash of opinions concerning this role. In order to clarify this situation, I first trace the historical roots of the concept. This brief historical reconnaissance shows that ‘efficiency’ is not a unitary concept. Moreover, I also argue that our use of the concept of efficiency presupposes the decisions which we make with regard to the kinds of costs we recognize. Such decisions do not come out of the blue; they relate to the opposite evaluations of efficiency mentioned above. The decisions concerning what we consider to be costly determine in part the actual content of the concept of efficiency. I argue that this content must be in harmony with the meaning of the different practices in which we are engaged, otherwise this concept can easily lead us astray. Therefore, a proper use of the concept of efficiency demands a clear and reliable view of these meanings.
Difference and Identity
Authors: Gandler Stefan
Published: November 2019

While I am socially defined as "white," "male," "European," and so on, my theses are not formulated to affirm the social position(s) attached to these attributes but, rather, to indicate some of the limitations implicit in the concepts of identity and difference. Interestingly, two hundred years ago, the overcoming of oppression followed the concept of identity, whereas today the concept of difference is central. Why is this change not discussed in the present debates on difference?
Identity, Perception, Action and Choice in Contemporary and Traditional “No-Self” Theories
Authors: Glynn Simon
Published: November 2019

The ego is traditionally held to be synonymous with individual identity and autonomy, while the mind is widely held to be a necessary basis of cognition and volition, with responsibility following accordingly. However Buddhist epistemology, existential phenomenology and poststructuralism all hold the notion of an independent, subsisting, self-identical subject to be an illusion. This not only raises problems for our understanding of cognition (if the self is an illusion, then who does the perceiving and who is deluded) and volition (who initiates acts), as well as for the notion of responsibility (in the absence of an independently subsisting subject there appears to be no autonomous agent). For Buddhism, no-self theory raises serious problems for the doctrine of reincarnation (in the absence of a self, who is responsible for failing to overcome desires and attachments; furthermore, who gets reincarnated?). Arguing for such "no-self" theories, the paper attempts to demonstrate how such difficulties can nevertheless be resolved.
Foundation or Individual in a Determinate Universe
Authors: Tsuckerman Vitaly V.
Published: November 2019

The concept presented in this report makes a summary of the author’s attempts to find a solution to the problem of compatibility of determinism and the freedom of human choice. This problem becomes apparently an isoluble paradox if one admits that the notion of freedom of human choice includes negation of the predetermination of decisions taken. Denial of such an "inclusion" is based on an analysis of the reasons that have led to the notion of freedom of human choice. Basically, this notion is intimately linked with the actual mechanism of decision-making. However, the concept of freedom of human choice is not identical to this mechanism and should be regarded as a perception and self-interpretation of this mechanism by humans.
On the Futures of the Subject
Authors: Zuss Mark
Published: November 2019

This paper is intended as an inquiry regarding contemporary critical assays of subjectivity. In response to the contemporary politics of representation, both in expressions of essentialist identity politics and in versions of social constructivism, and their implication of all pedagogical practices in transfers of power, I wish to project the question of the subject’s futures. I choose to discuss the limits of the interior, monadic subject for consideration not only its historical and contemporary effects in the politics of representation, but also for the possibility of thinking beyond it. In the spirit of Foucault’s ethical project only a special kind of curiosity and a thinking ‘otherwise’ could, if luck and wit permit, allow us as individual subjects to go beyond ourselves. Thinking otherwise, when possible, could also suggest going beyond ourselves collectively in the creation of provisional critical pedagogical and ethical community.
La virtud como perfeccionamiento del individuo según J.S. Mill
Authors: Alvarez Valdés Lourdes Gordillo
Published: November 2019

En esta comunicación se presenta la concepción utilitarista de la virtud en John Stuart Mill. El cultivo y la adquisición desinteresada de la virtud se integran en el proceso de autorrealización humana. La virtud es necesaria para la consecución de la felicidad y para el interés general de la sociedad. Se analiza la virtud en Mill como un sentimiento moral que se trasmite por observación. Se finaliza con unas conclusiones críticas sobre esta perspectiva utilitaria de la virtud.
Mensch und Natur
Authors: Andrzejewski Bolesław
Published: November 2019

The following discussion is centered on German romantic philosophy. The founder of philosophical romanticism, F.W.J. Schelling, speaks of the identity of all spheres of the universe. This view is echoed by other romantic philosophers, e.g., Novalis, Hölderlin, von Baader, and Schubert, as well as later neoromantics such as Scheler and Heidegger. I wish to show homo sapien as homo universus. Homo sapien is tied to the universe and must be aware of this oneness. Such knowledge will ameliorate his alienation from nature.
Impossible Descriptions, Superfluous Descriptions, and Mead’s “I”
Authors: Johansson Ingvar
Published: November 2019

Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.
The Feeling of Pain
Authors: Márquez Pemartín Claudia
Published: November 2019

The metaphysical concepts of act and potency that are central to the Thomistic tradition can help us solve the problem of understanding pain, sorrow and grief. Human beings, as natural creatures, are composed of act and potency. If rightly understood, these concepts can give a rational explanation to the reality of pain-without having recourse to religious beliefs-by accepting it as a natural derivation of our natural limits.
Luctis Cogitatio and Noctis Reflectio as the Forms of Consciousness and Human Exploration of the World
Authors: Pivojev Vassily M.
Published: November 2019

The task of philosophy in the modern world consists in the construction of a methodology of self-consciousness and self-development in the person-the method of human knowledge. I suggest a binary approach to the development of human reason which is able to understand both the world and the place of the person in the world. This allocates two spheres and two forms of consciousness: 'day time' (practical) and 'night' (spiritual). The basic functions of the former are: cognitive-explanatory; service of the practical, economic, and industrial activity; praxis; methodological for engineering and technology; critical-reflecting control of mind; the blocking of 'night' consciousness and the curbing of irrational instincts; safety and preservation; establishment of norms. Functions of the former include elements related to axiology, teleology, creativity, understanding and mythology. Both forms of consciousnesses differ yet supplement each other and should therefore cooperate systematically through a shared educational dialogue.
El sentido radical de la técnica
Authors: López Pablo
Published: November 2019

In a radical and philosophical sense, technique is the way of rationally and systematically putting forward an ultimate cause of humanity in the world. Due to the increasing development of techniques in the last two centuries, technique has moved into the limelight of contemporary philosophy. A technological outlook favors some philosophical positions, but it raises perennial questions in a new fashion. Likewise the technique of philosophy is also considered. Philosophy has its own way or method of rational and systematic doing. Of course, there are varied methods in philosophy, but they must share some basic identity in order not to be confused with those not being philosophic. Also, since philosophy cannot examine techniques used by other domains, there cannot be a philosophy of technique without a self-examination of philosophy concerning its own techniques. What is more, our vision both of philosophy of technique and of technique itself corresponds to a vision both of the technique of philosophy and of philosophy itself. In terms of the limits of our human nature in its historical environment, technique can be understood as the historical way that human reason overcomes its limits. Nature and technique can merge and live together, provided that we are open to integrating them within ourselves.
Narrativity, Modernity, and Tragedy
Authors: Pihlström Sami
Published: November 2019

I argue that the modernist notion of a human self (or subject) cannot easily be post-modernistically rejected because the need to view an individual life as a unified ‘narrative’ with a beginning and an end (death) is a condition for asking humanly important questions about its meaningfulness (or meaninglessness). Such questions are central to philosophical anthropology. However, not only modern ways of making sense of life, such as linear narration in literature, but also premodern ones such as tragedy, ought to be taken seriously in reflecting on these questions. The tradition of pragmatism has tolerated this plurality of the frameworks in terms of which we can interpret or ‘structure’ the world and our lives as parts of it. It is argued that pragmatism is potentially able to accommodate both the plurality of such interpretive frameworks—premodern, modern, postmodern—and the need to evaluate those frameworks normatively. We cannot allow any premodern source of human meaningfulness whatsoever (say, astrology) to be taken seriously. Avoiding relativism is, then, a most important challenge for the pragmatist.
Constructivism, Educational Research, and John Dewey
Authors: Vanderstraeten Raf , Biesta Gert
Published: November 2019

Schools are expected to transmit knowledge to younger generations. They are, however, also increasingly criticized for distributing socalled inert knowledge, i.e., knowledge that is accessed only in a restricted set of contexts even though it is applicable to a wide variety of domains. The causes of limited knowledge transfer are mostly attributed to the disembeddedness of learning situations in schools. Instructional procedures that result in learning in the sense of being able to recall relevant information provide no guarantee that people will spontaneously use it later. "Authentic learning," acquiring knowledge in the contexts that (will) give this knowledge its meaning, is now being presented as an alternative. Underpinning these reform proposals is not only a (growing) concern with efficiency, but is also a new epistemological theory, labelled as constructivism. This paper will, first, focus on the layout of and diverging perspectives within recent constructivist research in education. Next, the epistemological approach of John Dewey will be discussed, which takes as its starting point the relation of knowledge to action. Finally, we will indicate what a Deweyan approach might add to the constructivist research in education.
Axiologie et Pedagogie du Droit
Authors: Angélis Nicolas K.
Published: November 2019

Le droit, considéré comme un ensemble de régles-normes ayant force ogligatoire et contraignante, régit les rappoerts entre les hommes dans une société donnée. En même temps, il est porteur à la fois de l'image d'organisation des rapports sociaux familiaux, économiques et politiques (structure de base de la societé), et des valeurs. A ce titre, le droit constitue un type-idéal qui, inscrit dans les textes (droit positif-objectif) et enraciné dans la conscience des individus, remplit les fonctions générales de la régulation sociale, de la résolution des conflits, de l'intégration sociale et de la reproduction des structures sociales. En suivant l'enseignement d'Aristotle, le droit en tant que véhicule de valeurs peut et doit contenir la valeur suprême de la vertu qui est au principe du bonheur humain. L'État est, donc, tâché d'enseigner moyennant la loi (droit positif) la vertu tant intellectuelle qu'éthique. Ainsi, le droit devient un moyen d'éducation et remplit, outre ses fonctions générales, les fonctions pédagogique et axiologique en contribuant de cette manière à la réalisation du bonheur des citoyens, La vertu, incorporée dans le droit, s'avère la condition sine qua non de l'actualisation de toutes les valeurs contenues dans le droit, telles que démocratie, liberté, justice sociale, respect de la personne et ainsi de suite.
Aristotle’s Psychology
Authors: Bos Abraham P.
Published: November 2019

The psychology of Aristotle has never been understood in a historically correct way. A new interpretation of the De anima will be proposed in which this work can be seen as compatible with the psychology that can be reconstructed from the fragments of Aristotle's lost dialogues and the De motu animalium and other biological works (in which the notions of pneuma and 'vital heat' play a crucial role) and the doxographical data gathered from ancient writers besides the commentators. In De anima, II, 412b5, where psychè is defined as 'the first entelecheia of a natural body that is organikon,' the words 'natural body' should not be taken to mean 'the body of a living plant, animal or human being' but to stand for 'elementary body.' And the qualification 'organikon' should not be understood as 'equipped with organs' (as it always has) but in the sense of 'serving as an instrument to the soul.' This 'instrumental body' that is inseparably connected with the soul is the seat of desire (orexis), which physically influences the parts of the visible body. Besides those two corrections there are the words ta merè in 412b18 that should be taken as meaning not 'parts of the body' but 'parts of the soul.' Aristotle is arguing there that even those parts of the soul that are not yet actualized in the embryo of a new living being can be said to be 'not without body.'
Mathematics as Paideia in Proclus
Authors: Cleary John J.
Published: November 2019

I examine one aspect of the central role which mathematics plays in Proclus's ontology and epistemology, with particular reference to his Elements of Theology. I focus on his peculiar views about the ontological status of mathematical objects and the special faculties of the soul that are involved in understanding them. If they are merely abstract objects that are "stripped away" from sensible things, then they are unlikely to reorient the mind towards the intelligible realm, as envisioned by Plato in the Republic. Thus, in order to defend the function of mathematics as a prodaideutic to dialectic, Proclus rejects Aristotelian abstractionism in favor of an elaborate account in terms of Nous projecting images of its Forms through the medium of the imagination. In metaphorical terms, he replaces the Aristotelian image of the soul as a blank tablet with that of a tablet that has always been inscribed and is always writing itself, while also being written on by Nous. The mediating function of mathematics for understanding the higher realities is grounded in the fact that its central principles of Limit and Unlimited have a universal provenance in Proclus's whole system of reality.
Philosophy is Education is Politics
Authors: Cohen Jonathan
Published: November 2019

The passage in question begins with a breakdown in the discussion between Socrates and Protagoras because of disagreement about what its ground rules will be and concludes with the discussion’s restoration. Though formally a mere hiatus from the main line of argument, this passage in fact contains a parable about politics, addressing the question, "How can people of differing abilities and preferences come together to form a community?" Since the passage appears in the middle of a dialogue explicitly concerned with education, the parable extends to education as well. The passage thus provides a springboard for insight into some essential interconnections between and among philosophy, education, and politics. On the one hand, a genuine practitioner of any of the three is ipso facto a engaged in the other two at the same time. And on the other hand, the three share an internal structure which is reflexive and transitive at the same time.
The Doctrine of the Indefinite Terms in the Ancient Commentators of Aristotle
Authors: Correia Manuel A.
Published: November 2019

The ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias (= De Interpretatione) give us important elements to understand more clearly some difficult passages of this treatise. In the case of the indefinite names and verbs (i.e. 'not-man', and 'does not recover', respectively), these commentaries reveal a doctrine which explains not only the nature of the indefinites, but also why Aristotle introduces these kinds of term in Peri Hermeneias. The coherence and explanatory capacity of this doctrine is entirely absent in modern exegesis of Peri Hermeneias. This fact has important implications: it can make us to think whether there will be another topics in which the ancient commentators are still indispensable to understand Aristotle. It can also make us to think to what extent a profounder reflection of the ancient commentators can modify our idea of Aristotle and the ancient world.
The Metaphor of Light and the Active Intellect as Final Cause: De Anima III.5
Authors: D’Onofrio Sandro
Published: November 2019

The classical unresolved problem of the active intellect, raised by Aristotle in De Anima III.5, has received several interpretations in the history of philosophy. In this paper, I will recover the old hypotheses according to which the active intellect is the god of Aristotle's metaphysics. I propose that if the active intellect is god, it is not an efficient cause but the final cause of human thought-the entelecheia of the human rational soul. Nevertheless, the problem of the active intellect is insoluble simply because we do not count with all the elements required to obtain a sound solution. Yet it can be attenuated by an approach that renders much more coherence to De Anima III.5 than other attempts. To this end, I will (1) analyse the classical conception of Aristotle's two intellects, (2) work on the explanation par excellence of the active intellect, the metaphor of light, distinguishing the double conception of potency and act that may be found in it, and (3) analyse the concept of entelecheia as the process by which the active intellect actualizes intelligibles in the sense of the final cause.
Aristotle on Paideia of Principles
Authors: George Marie I.
Published: November 2019

Aristotle maintains that paideia enables one to judge the method used by a given speaker without judging the conclusions drawn as well (I.1 De Partibus Animalium). He contends that this "paideia of principles" requires three things: seeing that principles are not derived from one another; seeing that there is nothing before them within reason; and, seeing that they are the source of much knowledge. In order to grasp these principles, one must respectively learn to recognize what distinguishes the subject matters studied in different disciplines, see first principles as coming from experience and acquire the habit of seeking them in one’s experience and, finally, see first principles as being the source of conclusions. While the second and third points might at first seem to pertain to "nous" and science, respectively, rather than to paideia, the case can be made that paideia involves more of a firm grasp of principles than "nous" and a less perfect way of relating conclusion to principles than science.
Aristotle's Political Virtues
Authors: Halper Edward
Published: November 2019

This paper argues that Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as the exercise of virtue in governing an ideal state. The best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all. Hence, a person who acts for his or her own good must also act for the good of all fellow citizens. It follows that discussions of Aristotle’s altruism and egoism are misconceived.
Socrates’ Last Error
Authors: Ivanovic Miroslav
Published: November 2019

In the dialogue, Crito, Socrates justified his decision to accept his death penalty. His decision was praised as principled and just. However, such a view was one of the greatest myths in the history of philosophy. Contrary to the accepted ideas, I wish to show that Socrates’ argument was erroneous, the crucial error being his failure to distinguish between substantial and procedural justice. In fact, the whole of the Crito refers to some deeper problems of the philosophy of law and morality.
Is Temperance Ever Properly Painful?
Authors: Konkoly Damian G.
Published: November 2019

Aristotle argues that temperance is the mean concerned with pleasure and pain (NE 1107b5-9 and 1117b25-27). Most commentators focus on the moderation of pleasures and hardly discuss how this virtue relates to pain. In what follows, I consider the place of pain in Aristotle’s discussion of temperance and resolve contradictory interpretations by turning to the following question: is temperance ever properly painful? In part one, I examine the textual evidence and conclude that Aristotle would answer no to our question. The temperate person does not feel pain at the absence of appropriately desired objects. In parts two and three, I reconstruct some reasons why Aristotle would hold such a view based. My discussion here is based upon Aristotle’s discussion of continence and the unity of the virtues.
Toward a Dynamic Conception of ousia
Authors: Long Christopher P.
Published: November 2019

This paper is an initial attempt to develop a dynamic conception of being which is not anarchic. It does this by returning to Aristotle in order to begin the process of reinterpreting the meaning of ousia, the concept according to which western ontology has been determined. Such a reinterpretation opens up the possibility of understanding the dynamic nature of ontological identity and the principles according to which this identity is established. The development of the notions of energeia, dynamis and entelecheia in the middle books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be discussed in order to suggest that there is a dynamic ontological framework at work in Aristotle’s later writing. This framework lends insight into the dynamic structure of being itself, a structure which does justice as much to the concern for continuity through change as it does to the moment of difference. The name for this conception of identity which affirms both continuity and novelty is "legacy." This paper attempts to apprehend the meaning of being as legacy.
Antisthenes’ Concept of Paideia
Authors: Luz Menahem
Published: November 2019

Antisthenes of Athens was an older student of Socrates who had previously studied under the Sophists. His philosophical legacy also influenced Cynic and early Stoic thought. Consequently, he has left us an interesting theory of paideia (reading, writing, and the arts) followed by an even more brief one in divine paideia, the latter consisting of learning how to grasp the tenets of reason in order to complete virtue. Once properly grasped, the pupil will never lose it since it is embedded in the heart with true belief. However, there is a danger of being confused by human learning, which may delay or obviate completing divine paideia. Nonetheless, with the help of a teacher who gives a personal example, like Socrates or the mythical Centaur Chiron, the pupil has a chance of reaching his or her goal. Through a series of myths, Antisthenes gives us the foundations of his logical and ethical theory together. Reasoning is both a way to grasp virtue and also to fortify it. Although he would have chaffed under a modern university educational system, we may learn from him to value concise philosophical studies as a necessary adjunct to basic lessons in liberal arts.
Loving Persons
Authors: Mooney Brian
Published: November 2019

A perennial problem in the philosophy of love has centered around what it is to love persons qua persons. Plato has usually been interpreted as believing that when we love we are attaching ourselves to qualities that inhere in the objects of our love and that these qualities transcend the objects. Vlastos has argued, along with Nussbaum, Price and many others that such an account tells against a true love of persons as unique and irreplaceable individuals. I argue that Plato’s account of love as present in the Lysis and Symposium is not so easily rejected. My concern is to show both that Plato can meet the objections and that his theory can still offer helpful insights into the understanding of love in our lives. In particular, I will identify two manners of loving persons; one which is context and individual specific, and another which might be termed metaphysical, thereby preserving aspects of the Platonic ascent of love. I will further argue that the two aspects are often noncontroversially linked, and that such linking helps explain something of the mysterious nature of love.
Two Kinds of Paideia in Plato’s Euthydemus
Authors: Sprague Rosamond Kent
Published: November 2019

The structure of the Euthydemus, together with other more subtle hints, shows that Plato's purpose in the dialogue is to contrast two educational methods: eristic, as represented by the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and dialectic, as represented by Socrates. Plato has made the educational failure of eristic so evident in the dialogue that the question arises why he should have thought it worth attacking at such length. The reply is suggested that it was the sophists' claim to teach virtue that was particularly galling to Plato. He wishes to show further, that the character of their eristic tricks is to deny the possibility of teaching at all, since the either/or basis of their arguments amounts to a denial of becoming. Plato brings these matters to a head less than half-way through the dialogue, at 286E, when he has Socrates ask his 'stupid question' as to what the sophists teach, if they really believe that there is no false speaking, no refutation, and no ignorance. The paper concludes by agreeing with Holger Thesleff that the Euthydemus is 'pedimental' in construction, although disagreeing with him as to where the central peripateia occurs. To place the turning point, as I would do, at 286E, is to show that the theme of the dialogue is paideia.
A Notion of μηδέv in the Philosophy of Aristotle
Authors: Swiderek Jolanta
Published: November 2019

This article shows that Aristotle created the first notion of a zero in the history of human thought. Since this notion stood in evident contradiction to the basic principles of his metaphysics and logic, he rejected it.
Gandhi and Comparative Religion
Authors: Barua Manisha
Published: November 2019

Mahatma Gandhi was deeply interested in the comparative study of religions since the days of his youth. His interest in religious matters was due to the background of India, which was saturated with religious ideas and spirituality. Religion, to Gandhi, was not a matter of individual experience: Gandhi found God within creation. The meaning of the word 'Dharma' is 'religion' in India. This is a comprehensive term which embraces all of humanity. Gandhi referred to "God" as "Truth," which has great significance. His mission was not only to humanize religion, but also to moralize it. Gandhi's interpretation of Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity made his religion a federation of different religious faiths. His views on proselytization are also included in the paper.
Michael Polanyi and Lucian Blaga as Philosophers of Knowledge
Authors: Botez Angela
Published: November 2019

Polanyi and Blaga are two centennial philosophers who could be compared. They both are philosophers who have abandoned the attempt to analyze science as the form of culture capable of complete objectivity and the language solely in terms of its referential force, to make representational knowledge impersonal and to split fact from value.