bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
A Jurisdição da ICANN: Desafios Atuais e Prospectivas Futuras
Authors: Tuffi Saliba Aziz , Notini Moreira Bahia Amael
Published: November 2019

O presente artigo visa analisar os meios existentes de atribuir imunidades jurisdicionais à ICANN para evitar sua submissão às cortes e leis dos Estados Unidos, de forma que a missão e os procedimentos dessa organização não sejam prejudicados. Para tal fim, será apresentado o desenvolvimento histórico da ICANN em vista de demonstrar a relação histórica desta com o governo norte-americano, bem como a recente transição que os distanciou. Em seguida, serão apresentadas e discutidas possibilidades para eliminar a influência da jurisdição doméstica dos Estados Unidos da América sobre a ICANN, sendo elas a internacionalização da organização, a alternância de jurisdição e as imunidades jurisdicionais provenientes do International Organizations Immunities Act. A primeira alternativa demonstra-se vinculada ao reconhecimento da personalidade jurídica internacional da ICANN pela comunidade internacional, o que se demonstra improvável no curto prazo devido ao contexto recente de transição dessa organização. A segunda proposta foi expressamente vetada no estatuto da própria ICANN, de forma que sua efetivação está submetida à uma reforma institucional. Por fim, a última alternativa se demonstra a mais adequada para conferir imunidades de jurisdição à ICANN, visto que ela se baseia em precedentes similares e recebe um apoio significativo da comunidade internacional.
A evolução da solução de controvérsias nos ACFIs
Authors: Freitas Ana Rachel
Published: November 2019

A evolução da solução de controvérsias nos ACFIs
The evolutionary behavior of chromophoric brown carbon during ozone aging of fine particles from biomass burning
Authors: Fan Xingjun , Cao Tao , Yu Xufang , Wang Yan , Xiao Xin , Li Feiyue , Xie Yue , Ji Wenchao , Song Jianzhong , Peng Ping'an
Published: November 2019

Abstract. Biomass burning (BB) emits large amounts of brown carbon (BrC), however, little is known about the evolutionary behavior of BrC produced by BB (BB-BrC) in atmospheric processes. In this study, the transformation of levels and the chromophoric characteristics of BrC in smoke particles emitted by the burning of rice straw (RS), corn straw (CS) and pine wood (PW) under O3 aging are investigated. The O3 aging induced the reduction of light absorption and fluorescence for the BB-BrC, suggesting the decomposition of chromophores and fluorophores. These changes were accompanied by a decrease of aromaticity, average molecular weight and the light absorption capacity for the chromophores, and an increase of humification for the fluorophores. The excitation emission matrix combined with a parallel factor analysis revealed that protein-like components (C3) were predominantly decomposed by O3 aging, while the relative distribution of a humic-like component with highly oxygenated chromophores (C4) gradually increased. In general, the humic-like substances (C1+C2+C4) were transformed to be the most abundant fluorophores for all the BB-BrC samples, which accounted for 84 %–87 % of the total fluorophores in final O3-aged BB-BrC. Two dimensional correlation spectroscopy (2D-COS) was performed on the synchronous fluorescence, which suggested that the RS- and CS- BrC exhibits the same susceptible fluorophores changes upon O3 aging. It showed that O3 firstly reacted with protein-like fractions (263–289 nm), and then with fulvic-like fractions (333–340 nm). In comparison, the changing sequence of susceptible fluorophores in the PW-BrC to O3 were in the order of fulvic-like with shorter wavelengths (309 nm) > protein-like fluorophores (276 nm) > fulvic-like fluorophores with longer wavelengths (358 nm). The 2D-FTIR-COS analysis showed conjugated C=O and aromatic C=C and C=O groups were the most susceptible functional groups to O3 aging for all BB-BrC. Moreover, it also revealed a consistent sequential changes, which is in the order of aromatic OH, conjugated C=O groups and aromatic C=O, aromatic COO−, and finally lignin-derived C-C, C-H and C-O groups. Our results provide new insights into the evolutionary behavior of the chromophoric and fluorescent properties of BB-BrC during O3 aging. They have important implications for the heterogeneous oxidation of BB emission to form BrC, and are of great significance for improving the accuracy of climate models and source apportionment models parameterized by the optical properties of BrC.
Filosofía y ensayismo
Authors: Cragnolini Mónica B.
Published: November 2019

Múltiples son los puntos de contacto entre Nietzsche y Musil en lo referente al modo en que piensan la configuración de lo real, y a sus respectivos diagnósticos de la sociedad finisecular. Desarrollaré en este trabajo el tema de la forma del ejercicio del pensamiento como modo de constitución de lo real, aquello que en Nietzsche se puede caracterizar desde el término 'perspectivismo,' y en Musil alcanza su veradadero sentido desde la consideración del 'ensayismo,' en las consideraciones que realiza en El hombre sin atributos. Tanto en uno como en otro autor, esta noción ensayístico-perspectivista se halla en estrecha relación con la pérdida del centro ordenador último de la realidad, con las posibilidades del decir desde un yo sin atributos, y con el carácter erótico del ensayo mismo, como forma de tensión. Interpretando la Wille zur Macht nitzscheana como 'razón imaginativa,' como fuerza tensionante entre la unidad y la disgregación, es posible entender el carácter múltiple de las perspectivas que, de la misma forma que el amor, no se agotan en ninguna figura última del pensar.
The Fragility of Freedom Gadamerian
Authors: Mellos Koula
Published: November 2019

This paper examines the nature of freedom in Hang-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It focuses on the last section of Wahrheit und Methode advancing the hypothesis that Gadamer’s model of understanding is derived from his particular appropriation of the Platonic notion of the beautiful which poses a passive interpretative posture toward the object of understanding and deprives the activity of interpretation the essential creative quality of freedom. I argue that to the extent that the object of understanding presents itself as immediate revelation of truth, the interpreting subject is reduced to a mere acknowledger of truth as opposed to a creative producer.
Dialectics of Internal and External: Structure and Speech Contamination
Authors: Gorbyleva Janna V.
Published: November 2019

The central topic of this paper is the analysis of the dialectical interdependency of internal and external in the theory of language as a symbolic system. Referring to and analyzing the philosophic legacy of W. von Humboldt, B. Russell, L. Wittgenstein, F. de Saussure and G. Spet, the author concludes that the dialectics of internal and external is not an accidental and episodic phenomenon of language. It rather is an intrinsic, ontological trait apart from which an adequate cognition of the essence of language is impossible. Taking the internal form as a logical structure, it is possible to view it as something "higher and fundamental" in language, something that is attainable more by intuition than by research. The internal intellectual base of this grammatical stability lies in the sphere of purely logical forms. If internal word formulations are related to and governed by the spirit, then the external forms in fact conceal an inner grammatical and syntactic edifice. The laws of external speech functioning are manifested, for example, in bilingualism, which may be viewed either as a social phenomenon related to individual thinking and classificatory abilities or as an evidence of the existence of common verbal structures in human consciousness. The author proposes to transfer such linguistic terms as "bilingualism" and "contamination" into a different context as a way of seeking new topical domains within the linguistic philosophy and the philosophy of language. The empiricism of specific language functioning in the form of bilingual language contamination brings us back to the assumption of the existence of uniform internal metalanguage structures of verbal thinking.
Mind, Soul, Language in Wittgenstein
Authors: Krebs Victor J.
Published: November 2019

I show that the latter Wittgenstein's treatment of language and the mind results in a conception of the human subject that goes against the exclusive emphasis on the cognitive that characterizes our modern conception of knowledge and the self. For Wittgenstein, our identification with the cognitive ego is tantamount to a blindness to our own nature — blindness that is entrenched in our present culture. The task of philosophy is thus transformed into a form of cultural therapy that seeks to awaken in us a sensitivity to different modes of awareness than the merely intellectual. Its substance of reflection becomes not only the field of conscious rational thought, but the tension in our nature between reason and vital feeling, that is, between culture and life.
How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be?
Authors: Lillegard Norman
Published: November 2019

Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the place of constitutive rules in practices.
Language Games, Writing Games
Authors: Orbán Jolán
Published: November 2019

The concept of deconstruction was firstr used by Derrida in transforming Heideggerian "destruction." The deconstruction of Derrida is a textintern, intertextual, in-textual activity. He plays a double game inside of philosophy, emphasizing that our thinking is embedded in metaphysics, while at the same moment he questions metaphysics. Wittgenstein's deconstruction, however, involves a new kind of reading, a Zerzettelung of the traditionally argumentative and linear thinking modes. The game plays an important role in both philosophers' texts. I would like to investigate this role and function under the two following viewpoints. First, I think that the game has a strategic role. Second, both philosophers stress that their game is not a founded game but is bounded to knowledge and forms of knowledge.
Realism, Modality and Truths about the Past
Authors: Pataut Fabrice
Published: November 2019

Anti-realists about the past claim that no one has yet manifested a knowledge of the truth of tensed instances of the realist schema '‡ (s is true · there is no evidence for s),' instances such as '‡ ('Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is true · there is no evidence for 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon'). It is true that we cannot decide specific instances of the realist schema and that, consequently, neither our understanding of these instances, nor our knowledge of their truth may be constituted by the recognitional and executive capacities which, according to Michael Dummett's antirealism, constitute grasp of meaning. Although we cannot decide these issues, we can meet Dummett's anti-realist's manifestability challenge by arguing for them from contingency. While no recognitional and decisional skills may constitute our knowledge that their truth-conditions are satisfied, we can, without begging the question, derive that knowledge from our folk and scientific theories of the workings of nature. The evidence we have in favor of the fact that evidential relations between us and past facts are naturally contingent allows us to infer tensed instances of the fundamental realist modal claim. The joint possibility of truth and undecideability pro tempora is a natural possibility and, thereby, a logical and metaphysical possibility.
Pragmatica del lenguaje moral y juridico en Austin
Authors: Patiño Arango Alejandro
Published: November 2019

En una exposición informativa de la doctrina de Austin (1911-1960), nos encontramos de manera explícita con la teoría de los performativos y con la teoría de los ilocucionarios, teorías que desarrolla en las doce conferencias que aparecen en su libro Cómo Hacer Cosas con Palabras. Sin embargo, detrás de estas teorías, que flotan en la superficie, se esconde de modo implícito una concepción del análisis del lenguaaje moral y del lenguaje jurídico. Pretensión del filósofo de Oxford que desarrollamos en este breve trabajo. Recordemos que mediante su concepción Austin recupera zonas del discourso que habían sido excluídas del logicismo de los neopositivistas. Así tanto el lenguaje moral como el jurídico poseen significado, construyen acciones y constituyen formas de comportamiento. No debemos olvidar que desde la primera conferencia de su libro, en mención, concibe los actos de habla del lenguaje moral y jurídico; actos de habla que afectan de manera primeria nuetra vida cotidiana.
How Did They Do It?
Authors: Richers Nikolaj
Published: November 2019

A crucial phase in the child's development comes with its acquisition of language, but before we can engage in any pedagogical efforts to further infant development or to aid atypical cases, we need to understand methodologically what occurs during language learning. Jerome Bruner, in a methodological adaptation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's middle and later work in an extension of Noam Chomsky's LAD, has put forth one influential proposal (Bruner 1983). Ludwig Wittgenstein's own remarks on the topic also furnish an interesting story independent of Bruner's selective use of his corpus, especially insofar as his approach results in an irreducible riddle and a hypothesis by his own account (Wittgenstein 1953 and 1958). The two views are explored, contrasted and critiqued. In the end, neither will do to resolve problems in our methodological understanding of language acquisition, for which the most important reasons are given.
Social Externalism and Non-Empirical Errors
Authors: Wikforss Åsa Maria
Published: November 2019

I consider an individualist reply to Burge's well-known anti-individualist thought experiment. It is commonly assumed that the individualist has one of two options: accept that reference is socially determined and opt for a bifurcation of content (the internalist option); or reject the conclusions of the thought experiment and insist that Burge's patient uttering "I have arthritis in my thigh" has her or his own "arthritis"-concept and utters a true belief. I suggest that neither of these options is very attractive and thus the individualist seems faced with a dilemma. However, Burge's thought experiment rests on problematic philosophical assumptions that the individualist need not accept. One such assumption is that the speaker uttering "I have arthritis in my thigh" makes a non-empirical error. This assumption, as Burge himself makes clear, is crucial if the thought experiment is to go through. So, Burge presents an account of the notion of a "non-empirical error" which is very problematic and fails to support the conclusions of the thought experiment. Once this account is questioned, the individualist can reject the claim that meaning is determined by the speaker's social environment without falling into the dilemma.
Toward a Postmodern Theory of Law
Authors: Bozo de Carmona Ana Julia
Published: November 2019

Law at the end of the twentieth century is a practice based on legal-philosophical concepts such as the representational theory of truth, neutrality, universality, and legitimacy. The content of such concepts responds to the tradition of the western cultural paradigm. We share the experience of fragmentation in this cultural unanimity: we live in a world of heterogeneousness and multiplicity that upholds the claims of different concepts of the world and of life shared by dwellers in microspaces. The theory of law should be adapted to take this experience into account. We propose a change in direction oriented toward the creation of operational legal concepts: creative justice, perspectivist rationality, a systemic theory of truth and a judicial process that guarantees the multicultural experience. Postmodernity affirms the urgent need for a new form of legal reasoning.
The Relation of Rights to the Real
Authors: Kellogg Frederic R.
Published: November 2019

This paper approaches Bentham's ontology of rights from a viewpoint influenced by American philosophical pragmatism. I examine how rights are conceived and discussed in relation to the real. Jeremy Bentham maintained that all rights are "fictitious entities." But, in privileging "political" over moral and natural rights, Bentham implies that legal rights stand in a privileged position over natural rights with regard to the relation of mind to the actual. By reason of its enforceability through sanctions, a legal right for Bentham has a privileged connection to the real. I argue that nonlegal rights can be conceived as bearing a roughly parallel relation to the real in guiding human conduct by suasion rather than sanctions. Their relationship to "something real and observable" is their relation to voluntary conduct through belief. Bentham's ontology dictates a distinct legal and political system. Practically, it leaves the real existence of rights entirely in the hands of government officials, and the only choice of humans interested in securing rights lies in their enactment and enforcement in and through a legal regime.
Logic and Law in Russian and Western Culture
Authors: Sorina Galina
Published: November 2019

The purpose of my paper is to compare those texts of Russian and Western thinkers where the relations between logic and law are discussed, and especially to show both the differences and the agreements of their understanding of this connection. Second, I would also like to show and contrast the place of logic and law in Russian and Western systems of education. Third, I propose to clarify some conclusions from my analysis of these relations for understanding the social life of a country and its culture. I believe that this is possible since the relations between logic and law, which are a special subject-matter, are only a part of a larger whole. There is no hard and fast line separating the place of these relationships from the whole of culture. The quality of this relationship is an indicator in some sense of the nature of culture and of its democracy. I would like to show with regard to the West that the classical logical culture determines the types of rationalities, argumentation patterns, and various kinds of political and juridical rhetorics. The consequences of the lack of logical culture in Russia will also be shown.
A Neo-Formalist Approach to Mathematical Truth
Authors: Weir Alan
Published: November 2019

I outline a variant on the formalist approach to mathematics which rejects textbook formalism's highly counterintuitive denial that mathematical theorems express truths while still avoiding ontological commitment to a realm of abstract objects. The key idea is to distinguish the sense of a sentence from its explanatory truth conditions. I then look at various problems with the neo-formalist approach, in particular at the status of the notion of proof in a formal calculus and at problems which Gödelian results seem to pose for the tight link assumed between truth and proof.
On Predicting Behavior
Authors: Andrews Kristin
Published: November 2019

I argue that the behavior of other agents is insufficiently described in current debates as a dichotomy between tacit theory (attributing beliefs and desires to predict behavior) and simulation theory (imagining what one would do in similar circumstances in order to predict behavior). I introduce two questions about the foundation and development of our ability both to attribute belief and to simulate it. I then propose that there is one additional method used to predict behavior, namely, an inductive strategy.
Conceivability Arguments or the Revenge of the Zombies
Authors: Balog Katalin
Published: November 2019

There is a tradition, going back at least to Descartes, of arguing against physicalism on the basis of claims about conceivability. Philosophers in this tradition claim that we can conceive of any physical facts obtaining without there being any phenomenal experience. From this conceptual claim it is further argued that it is metaphysically possible for any physical fact to obtain without the occurrence of any phenomenal experience. If this is correct, then physicalism as it is usually construed is false. In this paper I examine and refute the new conceivability arguments due to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. I will argue, namely, that the crucial premiss of the arguments, the one that links conceivability with metaphysical possibility, is self-undermining. I proceed in two steps. First, I lay out the two arguments, and show that the crucial premiss in Jackson's argument, and so Chalmers' corresponding premiss as well, is self-undermining, and so that the alleged link between conceivability and metaphysical possibility does not exist. This does not amount to an argument for physicalism, except indirectly; what I show is that the argument on which non-physicalists most rely is ineffective.
Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object
Authors: Boltuc Piotr
Published: November 2019

Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically weak. Hence, we have no argument able to dismiss physicalism by consideration of first-person qualia (contra Jackson); however, it does not force us to endorse qualia-reductionism. In the second part of my paper I defend non-reductionism in a different way. Following Nagel and Harman, I try to avoid criticisms usually presented against Nagel, seeing subjectivity and objectivity as two complementary structures of the subjective and objective element of our language. I refer to classical German philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist dialectics which have developed a complementary approach crucial in the reductionist/anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of mind.
Why Isn’t Consciousness Empirically Observable?
Authors: Ellis Ralph
Published: November 2019

Most versions of the knowledge argument say that if a scientist observing my brain does not know what my consciousness 'is like,' then consciousness is not identical with physical brain processes. This unwarrantedly equates 'physical' with 'empirically observable.' However, we can conclude only that consciousness is not identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically unobservable? Some suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-realizable; that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still have been the same relation. C might even be a 'self-organizing' process, appropriating and replacing its own material substrata. How can this account explain the empirical unobservability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by generating them. Thus, experiencing someone's consciousness entails executing his or her motivations.
From “Mind” to “Supermind”
Authors: Kunkolienker Kamaladevi R.
Published: November 2019

In contrast to Western theories of mind, Aurobindo’s theory is comprehensive and holistic. This theory derives from his ontology. With respect to mind, Aurobindo contends that evolution will not stop with homo sapien. Rather, he posits higher levels of consciousness: Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Intuitive Mind, Overmind, and Supermind. Higher Mind is an intermediary between the Truth-light above and the human mind. Illumined Mind is Spiritual light. Intuitive Mind possesses swift revelatory vision and luminous insight. Overmind acts as an intermediary between Supermind and Intuitive Mind. Supermind contains the self-determining truths of Divine Consciousness; it is the Real-Idea inherent in all cosmic force and existence.
The Depictive Nature of Visual Mental Imagery
Authors: Teng Norman Yujen
Published: November 2019

Tye argues that visual mental images have their contents encoded in topographically organized regions of the visual cortex, which support depictive representations; therefore, visual mental images rely at least in part on depictive representations. This argument, I contend, does not support its conclusion. I propose that we divide the problem about the depictive nature of mental imagery into two parts: one concerns the format of image representation and the other the conditions by virtue of which a representation becomes a depictive representation. Regarding the first part of the question, I argue that there exists a topographic format in the brain but that does not imply that there exists a depictive format of image representation. My answer to the second part of the question is that one needs a content analysis of a certain sort of topographic representations in order to make sense of depictive mental representations, and a topographic representation becomes a depictive representation by virtue of its content rather than its form.
The Active Future as Divine
Authors: Ford Lewis S.
Published: November 2019

Normally, activity is regarded as discernible, but according to relativity theory whatever is discernible lies in the past of the discernible. Only the present subjective immediacy is properly active. Subjectivity is properly understood as present becoming; objectivity as past being (so Whitehead). I propose that we extend the domain of subjective immediacy to include the future as well as the present. This future universal activity is pluralized in the present in terms of the many actualities coming into being. Subjectivity is the individualization of becoming, and so can apply to the future as a whole as well as to particular present subjects. The future as divine grows out of Whitehead's revisions of traditional notions of omnipotence and omniscience. But he separates creativity (best understood in terms of Hindu and Buddhist thought) from the God of Western theism. This separation can be overcome if God is future creativity individualized in its own realm, which is the source of the creativity within each of us.
Is Kierkegaard’s Absolute Paradox Hume’s Miracle?
Authors: Kivelä Jyrki
Published: November 2019

I clarify Hume's concept of miracle with Kierkegaard's concept of absolute paradox. I argue that absolute paradox is like that miracle which, according to Hume, allows a human being to believe Christianity against the principles of his understanding. I draw such a conclusion on the basis that Kierkegaard does not think Christianity is a doctrine with a truth value and, furthermore, he holds that all historical events (such as miracles) are doubtful. Kierkegaard emphasizes the absolute paradox as the condition of faith in such a way that it becomes close to Hume's idea of personal miracle which causes the subversion of the believer's principles of understanding. Hence, the absolute paradox cannot be a possible supporting event (Hume's first miracle) for the credibility of Christianity. Absolute paradox more closely approximates Hume's second miracle insofar as it makes persons believe contrary to their custom and experience.
La Virtud en los Paganos Segun San Agustin
Authors: Rojo Josefa
Published: November 2019

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the reason why Augustine rejected the idea that pagans have virtues is not because he conceived of true virtue only in a supernatural way—that is to say, that pagans do not have the grace of God-but because they lack the right intentions in their acting. In fact, it is not that they are not capable of virtues because they do not have faith, but rather it is because they are not loyal to the natural law of God; they do not follow the right order of nature. It follows theoretically that pagans who have right intentions are capable of true virtues, as everyone else; and also, that every person who misses right intentions, although having faith, is not capable of true virtues.
Jewish Philosophers on Reason and Revelation
Authors: Shear-Yashuv Aharon
Published: November 2019

Are reason and revelation different sources of truth? Do they contradict or complement each other? The present article tries to give an answer to these ancient questions from a Jewish pluralistic point of view. I describe the essential views of the most important representatives of the two main schools of Jewish thought: the rationalists Maimonides, Moses Mendelssohn, and Hermann Cohen, and the antirationalists Judah Halevi and Solomon Levi Steinheim. I show that even the antirationalists use the tools of rationalism, by which Talmudic-rabbinic thought is characterized, in an attempt to show that they are not irrationalists. The comparison of this attitude with the general philosophic tradition shows that Aristotle’s notion of potential knowledge is closer to Jewish thought than Plato’s view of recollection.
¿Tiene Derecho a Existir la Filosofía de la Ciencia?
Authors: Comesaña Manuel
Published: November 2019

En este trabajo se suscribe la tesis de que la filosofía de la ciencia-al igual que las demás ramas de la filosofía-consiste en discusiones interminables sobre problemas que no se pueden resolver, pero se sostiene también que, a pesar (o a causa) de eso, tiene derecho a existir debido a que cumple funciones importantes, entre ellas precisamente la de dar lugar a discusiones interminables sobre problemas que no se pueden resolver, actividad que a las personas con genuina vocación filosófica les produce una satisfacción intelectual difícil de entender para quienes no comparten esa vocación.
Thoughts on a Possible Rational Reconstruction of the Method of “Rational Reconstruction”
Authors: Davia Gregg Alan
Published: November 2019

Rational reconstructions standardly operate so as to transform a given problematic philosophical scientific account-particularly of a terminological, methodological or theoretical entity-into a similar, but more precise, consistent interpretation. This method occupies a central position in the practice of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, we encounter-even if only in a very few specific publications-a vague image of it. This is due on the one hand to the problem of the intentions of application, i.e., of the normativity of rational reconstruction (descriptive/prescriptive-ambivalence). It is also due on the other hand to the problem of the significance of the method in the field of history of philosophy (systematic/historical-dichotomy). The varied usage within analytic philosophy, as well as the increasingly inflationary and interfering usage outside, contribute to make rational reconstruction somehow appear a Proteus in contemporary philosophical methodology. This paper attempts to administer first aid and to close a bit of the theoretical gap and thus to reach a more exact image for the interests of analytic philosophy. Self-application of the method appears to be the right remedy. A graduating rational reconstruction of a standard concept of rational reconstruction will be suggested, differentiating the concept of rational reconstruction according to normativity, and explicating the method of rational reconstruction into two such variants.
“Top-Down” or “Bottom-Up”
Authors: Flores Francisco
Published: November 2019

Wesley Salmon has suggested that the two leading views of scientific explanation, the “bottom-up” view and the “top-down” view, describe distinct types of explanation. In this paper, I focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e., explanations of physical laws. Using explanations of E=mc2, I argue that the distinction between bottom-up explanations (BUEs) and top-down explanations (BUEs) is best understood as a manifestation of a deeper distinction, found originally in Newton’s work, between two levels of theory. I use Einstein’s distinction between ‘principle’ and ‘constructive’ theories to argue that only lower level theories, i.e., ‘constructive’ theories, can yield BUEs. These explanations, furthermore, depend on higher level laws that receive only TDEs from a ‘principle’ theory. Thus, I conclude that Salmon’s challenge to characterize the relationship between the two types of explanation can be met only by recognizing the close relationship between types of theoretical explanation and the structure of physical theory.
The Not-so-trivial Truth of Methodological Individualism
Authors: Franssen Maarten
Published: November 2019

I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.
The Limits of Science
Authors: Gherdjikov Serghey Stoilov
Published: November 2019

Does science have any limits? Scientists say no. Philosophers are divided in their response. The humanities say that science is not "humanitarian," and thus not metaphysically deep. In response, scientists and some philosophers contend that science is the best knowledge we have about the world. I argue that science is limited by its form. Science has no object that derives from the human form. Everything that is incomparable to the dimension of the human body is reducible to notions that are commensurable to that body. This phenomenologically clarifies some of the most important discoveries in contemporary science. The Special Theory of Relativity shows the dependence of space and time on the accounting system. Quantum mechanics displays the limits of observation (Heisenberg) and logical indefiniteness by compelling the creation of a macropresentation of micro-objects and gets around logic (Feyerabend) through the principle of additionality. Experimental science has come out as an artificial projection of human expansion, not as a reflection of the transcendent order of the world itself. "The life world" successfully takes the place of "the objective world" of modern rationality.
On Explanation
Authors: Gruender David
Published: November 2019

Given the great historical distance between scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel saw it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, especially the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination.
Epistemological Positions in the Light of Truth Approximation
Authors: Kuipers Theo A. F.
Published: November 2019

I discuss in a systematic order the most important epistemological positions in the instrumentalism-realism debate, viz., instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, referential realism, and theory realism. My conclusions are as follows. There are good reasons for the instrumentalist to become a constructive empiricist. In turn, the constructive empiricist is forced to become a referential realist in order to give deeper explanations of success differences. Consequently, there are further good reasons for the referential realist to become a theory realist.
Les “Théories de L’image” De Helmholtz et de Hertz et les Motifs de Carnap Dans L’aufbau
Authors: Leroux Jean
Published: November 2019

I propose to sketch and compare the "picture theories" of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz. These semiotic conceptions of scientific knowledge are forerunners of the now prevailing semantic views of scientific theories in philosophy of science, and my intent is to bring out the respective main features that either proved to be influential or, as such, retained in contemporary formal approaches to the semantics of physical theories. For our purposes, "picture theories" can be characterized as conceptions that (a) take as a departure the fact that scientific theories are embodied in a system of signs and (b) involve a systematic treatment of the relation that obtains between the semiotic system and the world. Essentially, such a theory will have in its core an answer to the question: "What does it take for a picture to be a picture of something?" In concludion, I outline a filiation between Helmholtz, Hertz and Carnap pertaining to the question of monomorphism or categoricity in the general semantics of physical theories.
First Revelation: When Theoretical Becomes Visible
Authors: Miguel Hernán
Published: November 2019

En las teorías científicas se postulan entidades teóricas que de alguna manera se relacionan con lo observable. Sin embargo con el avance científico y tecnológico, los científicos a menudo sostienen poder observar, co ayuda de algún artefacto, las entidades que tiempo atrás habían sido postuladas por la teoría. Esta transición de algunas entidades del reino de lo teórico al de lo observable con carga teórica presenta características interesantes para un análisis sobre la articulación de las teorías. En este trabajo se presenta una descripción de tal transición en la que se pone en evidencia que además de la aceptación de la teoría involucrada en garantizar el funcionamiento y construcción del artefacto, la carga teórica asociada a la observación con instrumentos, también se debe aceptar un postulado de reducción que establece una relación entre entidades pertenecientes a distintas teorías. También se sugiere una dificultad intuitiva en sostener una postura antirealista de entidades teóricas frente a la posibilidad de que tales entidades puedan revelarse como ‘visibles’ con la ayuda de algún desarrollo tecnológico aceptado por la comunidad científica.
Polemica imaginaria entre Popper y Kuhn sobre el progreso de la ciencia según un punto de vista evolucionista
Authors: Palma Héctor A.
Published: November 2019

Habida cuenta de los intensos debates de los años '60 y '70, al interior de la tradición anglosajona en filosofía de la ciencia, y que minaron los postulados más básicos de la Concepción Heredada, apareció la necesidad de explicar el desarrollo de la ciencia en la historia, es decir el despliegue mismo de la racionalidad científica. Las epistemologías evolucionistas constituyen uno de esos intentos, aunque de su analogía con la teoría de la evolución biológica surge como problema el desajuste de explicar una empresa teleológica (la de la ciencia) mediante un modelo no teleológico (el de la evolución de las especies). En este trabajo se realiza un polemica imaginaria entre un epistemólogo evolucionista (Popper) y otro que no lo es (Kuhn) respecto de la cuestión del progreso de la ciencia: el primero, comprometido ontológicamente con un punto de vista evolucionista, mientras que el segundo realiza sólo una analogía.
The Heuristic Function of the Axiomatic Method
Authors: Peckhaus Volker
Published: November 2019

This lecture will deal with the heuristic power of the deductive method and its contributions to the scientific task of finding new knowledge. I will argue for a new reading of the term 'deductive method.' It will be presented as an architectural scheme for the reconstruction of the processes of gaining reliable scientific knowledge. This scheme combines the activities of doing science ('context of discovery') with the activities of presenting scientific results ('context of justification'). It combines the heuristic and the deductive side of science. The heuristic side is represented, e.g., by the creative methods to find the 'best' hypotheses (abduction), to design experimental systems for empirical research in order to formulate general laws (induction), or to create axiomatic systems. The other side consists of the production of deductive knowledge. This combination leads to a clear hierarchy: the heuristic side provides the basic presuppositions from which the deductive side takes off. The former is used to make deductions possible. The deductive method can be presented as an analysis-synthesis scheme as it can be found, e.g., in the tradition of Kant, Jakob Friedrich Fries, and Leonard Nelson. Nelson's critical philosophy can be seen as a key for understanding the philosophy behind David Hilbert's early axiomatic method. This axiomatic method is usually restricted to a non-philosophical approach to pure mathematics ('formalism'). But Hilbert was not an exclusive formalist; he proposed a mathesis universalis in the Cartesian-Leibnizian sense according to which mathematics is the syntactical tool for a general philosophy of science, applicable to all scientific disciplines. In this function, mathematics takes its problems from the sciences. Hilbert did not deny that mathematics should play a role in explaining the world. The analysis-synthesis scheme helps to provide a consistent interpretation of these two sides of Hilbert's attitude towards his working field.
La Vida en sus Origenes
Authors: Riofrio Rios Walter
Published: November 2019

De acuerdo al título la presentaciòn se refiere a un analísis del origen de las funciones consideradas como propiedades insertas en la realidad. Para ello me dedico al estudio de ciertas propiedades biológicas que considera se encuentran en los organismos vivos desde el principio, esta es la razón que incido en la visión molecular de la biología por considerarla como las mas apta para estudiar esta problemática. Cuando abordamos los procesos de regulación y expresión de la información genética, vemos que se tenía la convicción de que las variantes encontradas eran indicadores de distintas estrategias que obedecían a un único patrón establecido en los orígenes mismos de la vida. Dicho patrón, involucra la presencia de ciertas estructuras con ciertas propiedades que, a escala molecular, permiten el despliegue de la evolución biológica. Aunque no es mi intención discutir aquí los detalles de la problemática que surge del análisis de las cuestiones teóricas en biología evolutiva, si me interesa dejar claro que los temas que trato tienen, necesariamente, que ponerse en relación con esta área teórica; en particular, con el problema de las unidades de selección y el problema de los criterios de normalidad y adaptación, entre otros. En esta breve presentación me dedico al análisis de los supuestos teóricos que subyacen al problema de la génesis de la expresión genética. Espero mostrar que dicho análisis sugiere una vía para el desarrollo de una teoría de las funciones consideradas como propiedades reales de ciertas cosas del mundo. Vinculado a lo anterior, el objetivo principal de esta presentación es brindar al menos tres argumentos que sustenten la afirmación de considerar a las funciones como un tipo especial de propiedades que se encuentran en ciertos sistemas fisico-químicos. Dichas propiedades, que resultan ser emergentes con respecto a las estructuras moleculares subyacentes, nos permiten hablar de una visión holista compatible con la versión estructural del realismo.
Quantum Holism as Consequence of the Relativistic Approach to the Problem of Quantum Theory Interpretation
Authors: Tsekhmistro I.Z.
Published: November 2019

In modern physics the common relational approach should be extended to the concepts of element and set. The relationalization of the concepts of element and set means that in the final analysis the World exists as an indivisible whole, not as a set (of one or another kind of elements). Therefore, we have to describe quantum systems in terms of potentialities and probabilities: since quantum systems cannot be analyzed completely into sets of elements, we can speak only of the potentialities of isolating elements and sets within their structure. On the other hand this quantum property of the world as an indivisible whole accounts for the astonishing logical properties of the structure of the potentialities of quantum systems which it brings forth. This has been confirmed by quantum-correlation experiments (A.Aspect and oth.). These effects have a relational nature, not a physical-causal or material one, and they are brought forth by the changes (resulting from measurement or physical interaction) in the structure of the relations of the mutually complementary sides of reality. One of these sides expresses an actually existing structure of the system as a real (and physically verifiable) but only relatively separable set, and the other expresses the sets of potentialities in it which arise from the astonishing property of finite non-analyzability of the system into elements and sets (i.e. by the quantum property of the world as an indivisible unit).
Historical Types of Rationality
Authors: Cernik Vaclav , Vicenik Jozef , Visnovsky Emil
Published: November 2019

In this paper we suggest that the contemporary global intellectual crisis of our (Western) civilization consists in the fundamental transformation of the classical (both Ancient and Modern) types of rationality towards the nonclassical one. We give a brief account of those classical types of rationality and focus on the more detailed description of the contemporary process of the formation of the new HTR which we label as nonclassical. We consider it to be one of the historical possibilities that might radically transform the fundamentals of our human world; in fact, this process has already begun. The paper mentions some of the main features of this process, such as formation of a new type of scientific object; new conceptual schemes; new logical and methodological equipment of scientific research; and new understanding of human nature, human mind, human action, and social order.
When the Scientist turns Philosopher
Authors: Weinert Friedel
Published: November 2019

This paper examines how such fundamental notions as causality and determinism have undergone changes as a direct result of empirical discoveries. Although such notions are often regarded as metaphysical or a priori concepts, experimental discoveries at the beginning of this century—radioactive decay, blackbody radiation and spontaneous emission—led to a direct questioning of the notions of causality and determinism. Experimental evidence suggests that these two notions must be separated. Causality and indeterminism are compatible with the behavior of quantum-mechanical systems. The argument also sheds some light on the Duhem-Quine thesis, since experimental results at the periphery of the conceptual scheme directly affect conceptions at the very core.