bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Convergence to the Truth and Nothing but the Truth
Authors: Kelly Kevin T. , Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

One construal of convergent realism is that for each clear question, scientific inquiry eventually answers it. In this paper we adapt the techniques of formal learning theory to determine in a precise manner the circumstances under which this ideal is achievable. In particular, we define two criteria of convergence to the truth on the basis of evidence. The first, which we call EA convergence, demands that the theorist converge to the complete truth “all at once”. The second, which we call AE convergence, demands only that for every sentence in the theorist's language, there is a time at which the theorist settles the status of the sentence. The relative difficulties of these criteria are compared for effective and ineffective agents. We then examine in detail how the enrichment of an agent's hypothesis language makes the task of converging to the truth more difficult. In particular, we parametrize first-order languages by predicate and function symbol arity, presence or absence of identity, and quantifier prefix complexity. For nearly each choice of values of these parameters, we determine the senses in which effective and ineffective agents can converge to the complete truth on an arbitrary structure for the language. Finally, we sketch directions in which our learning theoretic setting can be generalized or made more realistic.
Dominance and the Disunity of Method: Solving the Problems of Innovation and Consensus
Authors: Laudan Rachel , Laudan Larry
Published: November 2002

It is widely supposed that the scientists in any field use identical standards for evaluating theories. Without such unity of standards, consensus about scientific theories is supposedly unintelligible. However, the hypothesis of uniform standards can explain neither scientific disagreement nor scientific innovation. This paper seeks to show how the presumption of divergent standards (when linked to a hypothesis of dominance) can explain agreement, disagreement and innovation. By way of illustrating how a rational community with divergent standards can encourage innovation and eventually reach consensus, recent developments in geophysics are discussed at some length.
Infinite Renormalization
Authors: Teller Paul
Published: November 2002

In quantum field theory divergent expressions are “discarded”, leaving finite expressions which provide the best predictions anywhere in science. In fact, this “renormalization procedure” involves no mystery or illegitimate operations. This paper explains, in terms accessible to non-experts, how the procedure really works and explores some different ways in which physicists have suggested that one understand it.
Holism without Tears: Local and Global Effects in Cognitive Processes
Authors: McClamrock Ron
Published: November 2002

The suggestion that cognition isholistichas become a prominent criticism of optimism about the prospects for cognitive science. This paper argues that the standard motivation for this holism, that ofepistemologicalholism, does not justify this pessimism. An illustration is given of how the effects of epistemological holism on perception are compatible with the view that perceptual processes are highly modular. A suggestion for generalizing this idea to conceptual cognitive processing is made, and an account of the holists' failure is offered.
Independent Evidence About a Common Cause
Authors: Sober Elliott
Published: November 2002

To infer the state of a cause from the states of its effects, independent lines of evidence are preferable to dependent ones. This familiar idea is here investigated, the goal being to identify its presuppositions. Connections are drawn with Reichenbach's (1956) and Salmon's (1984) discussions of the principle of the common cause.
In Defense of Proper Functions
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garrett
Published: November 2002

I defend the historical definition of “function” originally given in myLanguage, Thought and Other Biological Categories(1984a). The definition was not offered in the spirit of conceptual analysis but is more akin to a theoretical definition of “function”. A major theme is that nonhistorical analyses of “function” fail to deal adequately with items that are not capable of performing their functions.
Discussion: The Total Evidence Theorem for Probability Kinematics
Authors: Graves Paul R.
Published: November 2002

L. J. Savage and I. J. Good have each demonstrated that the expected utility of free information is never negative for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief by conditionalization on propositions learned for certain. In this paper Good's argument is generalized to show the same result for a decision maker who updates her degrees of belief on the basis of uncertain information by Richard Jeffrey's probability kinematics. The Savage/Good result is shown to be a special case of the more general result.
Discussion: Malament and Zabell on Gibbs Phase Averaging
Authors: Leeds Stephen
Published: November 2002

In their paper “Why Gibbs Phase Averages Work—The Role of Ergodic Theory” (1980), David Malament and Sandy Zabell attempt to explain why phase averaging over the microcanonical ensemble gives correct predictions for the values of thermodynamic observables, for an ergodic system at equilibrium. Their idea is to bypass the traditional use of limit theorems, by relying on a uniqueness result about the microcanonical measure—namely, that it is uniquely stationary translation-continuous. I argue that their explanation begs questions about the relationship between thermodynamic equilibrium and statistical equilibrium; I argue in addition that any account which supports their view of the relationship between these two notions of equilibrium will likely use the limit theorems in traditional ways, and thereby bypass the explanation they offer.
Discussion: Russell Versus Steiner on Physics and Causality
Authors: Rosenberg Alexander
Published: November 2002

In “Events and Causality” Mark Steiner argues that though Bertrand Russell was right to claim that the laws of physics do not express causal relations, nevertheless, Russell was wrong to suppose that therefore causality plays no role in physics. I argue that Steiner misses the point of Russell's argument for the first of these claims, and because of this Steiner's argument against the second fails to controvert it. Steiner fails to see that Russell's argument against causation, is in fact an argument against the existence of causal directionality or asymmetry. Steiner gives no reason to suppose physical theory requires this asymmetry after all.
Discussion: How To Solve Probability Teasers
Authors: Bar-Hillel Maya
Published: November 2002

Recently, Nathan (1986) criticized Bar-Hillel and Falk's (1982) analysis of some classical probability puzzles on the grounds that they wrongheadedly applied mathematics to the solving of problems suffering from “ambiguous informalities”. Nathan's prescription for solving such problems boils down to assuring in advance that they are uniquely and formally soluble—though he says little about how this is to be done. Unfortunately, in real life problems seldom show concern as to whether their naturally occurring formulation is or is not ambiguous, does or does not allow for unique formalization, etc. One step towards dealing with such problems intelligently is to recognize certain common cognitive pitfalls to which solvers seem vulnerable. This is discussed in the context of some examples, along with some empirical results.
The Pseudo-Problem of Creation in Physical Cosmology
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

According to some cosmologists, the big bang cosmogony and even the (now largely defunct) steady-state theory pose a scientifically insoluble problem of matter-energy creation. But I argue that the genuine problem of the origin of matter-energy or of the universe has been fallaciously transmuted into the pseudo-problem of creation by an external cause. A fortiori, it emerges that the initial “true” and “false” vacuum states of quantum cosmology do not vindicate biblical divine creation ex nihilo at all.
A Structural Approach to Defining Units of Selection
Authors: Lloyd Elisabeth A.
Published: November 2002

The conflation of two fundamentally distinct issues has generated serious confusion in the philosophical and biological literature concerning the units of selection. The question of how a unit of selection of defined, theoretically, is rarely distinguished from the question of how to determine the empirical accuracy of claims—either specific or general—concerning which unit(s) is undergoing selection processes. In this paper, I begin by refining a definition of the unit of selection, first presented in the philosophical literature by William Wimsatt, which is grounded in the structure of natural selection models. I then explore the implications of this structural definition for empirical evaluation of claims about units of selection. I consider criticisms of this view presented by Elliott Sober—criticisms taken by some (for example, Mayo and Gilinsky 1987) to provide definitive damage to the structuralist account. I shall show that Sober has misinterpreted the structuralist views; he knocks down a straw man in order to motivate his own causal account. Furthermore, I shall argue, Sober's causal account is dependent on the structuralist account that he rejects. I conclude by indicating how the refined structural definition can clarify which sorts of empirical evidence could be brought to bear on a controversial case involving units of selection.
Evolution and Continuity In Scientific Change
Authors: Shapere Dudley
Published: November 2002

The alleged problem of “incommensurability” is examined, and attempts to explain scientific change in terms of concepts of meaning and reference are analyzed and rejected. A way of understanding scientific change through a properly developed concept of “reasons” is presented, and the issues of reasons, meaning, and reference are placed in the context of this broader interpretation of scientific change.
Discovery and Ampliative Inference
Authors: Blachowicz James
Published: November 2002

An inference to a new explanation may be both logically non-ampliative and epistemically ampliative. Included among the premises of the latter form is the explanandum—a unique premise which is capable of embodying what we do not know about the matter in question, as well as legitimate aspects of what we do know. This double status points to a resolution of the Meno paradox. Ampliative inference of this sort, it is argued, has much in common with Nickles' idea of discoverability and, together with the mapping and correction procedures (briefly summarized) required for such inference, may suggest a broadening of the concept of justification which would incorporate much of what has been defended in theories of discovery.
Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope
Authors: Silvers Stuart
Published: November 2002

A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding intentional ascription from paper clips. Fodor (1986) has defended RTM against this slippery slope objection. He distinguishes between the kinds of creatures that exhibit selective responses to nomic properties of stimuli (for example, psychophysical properties) and the kinds of creatures that also respond selectively to nonnomic properties of stimuli (for example, being a crumpled shirt). The distinction marks the differences between two kinds of “primal scenes” in which lawful relations are said to hold between an organism's behavior, representational state, and stimulus property. The arguments for the distinction are provocative but counterexamples show them to be inconclusive.
Determinism, the Remote Past, and the Causal or Determinational Structure of the Universe
Authors: Sapire David
Published: November 2002

Łukasiewicz and, more recently, other philosophers have cast doubts on arguments from one version of determinism to another: roughly, from the view that every event (condition, state) has a cause or is determined, to the view that the remotest possible past determines the present and future. This paper defends a special class of such arguments. It identifies constraints on the relation of determination under which the arguments concerned are valid. And, by reference to the overall causal or determinational structure of the universe, it argues that the constraints themselves are highly plausible.
Discussion: Beatty on Chance and Natural Selection
Authors: Shanahan Timothy
Published: November 2002

In his (1984) John Beatty correctly identifies the issue of the role of chance in evolution as one of the liveliest disputes in evolutionary biology. He argues, on the basis of a carefully articulated example, that “Even on a proper construal of ‘natural selection’, it is difficult to distinguish between the ‘improbable results of natural selection’ and evolution by random drift”. His other remarks indicate that he is thinking of conceptual as well as practical indistinguishability. In this discussion I take issue with one of the consequences Beatty draws from his example. I argue that the example at most shows that the effects of drift and selection are sometimes difficult to separate in practice, but that the stronger conceptual claim is not warranted. The deeper problems raised by the example are seen to demand causal, rather then conceptual, analysis.
Discussion: Partly Deductive Support in The Popper-Miller Argument
Authors: Townsend Burke
Published: November 2002

Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.
Discussion: An Addendum to Demopoulos and Friedman (1985)
Authors: Solomon Graham
Published: November 2002

M. H. A. Newman (1928) criticized Russell's structuralist philosophy of science. Demopoulos and Friedman have discussed Newman's critique, showing its relevance to the structuralist positions held by Schlick and Carnap, and to Putnam's argument against “metaphysical realism”. I discuss Richard Braithwaite's (1940) appeal to Newman in a critique of Arthur Eddington. Braithwaite believed Newman had shown that “structure depends upon content”. Eddington, in his reply, misunderstood the generality of Newman's argument.
Critical Notice: John Earman's A Primer on Determinism
Authors: Wilson Mark
Published: November 2002

Your story is there waiting for you, it has been waiting for you there a hundred years, long before you were born and you cannot change a comma of it. Everything you do you have to do. You are the twig, and the water you float on swept you here. You are the leaf, and the breeze you were borne on blew you here. This is your story and you cannot escape it.

—Cornell Woolrich, I Married a Dead Man
Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: November 2002

My Representing and Intervening (1983) concludes with what it calls an experimental argument for scientific realism about entities. The argument is evidently inapplicable to extragalactic astrophysics, but leaves open the possibility that there might be other grounds for scientific realism in that domain. Here I argue for antirealism in astrophysics, although not for any particular kind of antirealism. The argument is conducted by a detailed examination of some current research. It parallels the last chapter of (1983). Both represent the methodological opinion that abstract or semantic realism/antirealism debates are empty, and typically lead to confused or wrong conclusions because they pay so little attention to the details of a science.
On Quantitative Relationist Theories
Authors: Mundy Brent
Published: November 2002

Mundy (1983) presented the formal apparatus of certain relationist theories of space and space-time taking quantitative relations as primitive. The present paper discusses the philosophical and physical interpretation of such theories, and replies to some objections to such theories and to relationism in general raised in Field (1985). Under an appropriate second-order naturalistic Platonist interpretation of the formalism, quantitative relationist theories are seen to be entirely comparable to spatialist ones in respect of the issues raised by Field. Moreover, it appears that even if accepted as sound, Field's general line of criticism would not diminish the significance of relationism for philosophy of science, since this derives primarily from its connection to physical rather than to mathematical or philosophical ontology.
Quantum Measurement and the Program for the Unity of Science
Authors: Scharf David C.
Published: November 2002

It is quite extraordinary, philosophically speaking, that according to the orthodox interpretation:

(a)

quantum mechanics is a complete and comprehensive theory of microphysics, and yet

(b)

the role of measurement, in quantum mechanics, cannot be analyzed in terms of the collective effects of the microphysical particles making up the apparatus.

It follows that, if the orthodox interpretation is correct, the measurement apparatus and its quantum physical effects cannot be accounted for microreductively. This is significant because it is widely believed that the relation between physical wholes and parts is microreductive. Indeed, many philosophers are persuaded of the inevitability of universal microreduction to the basic elements of microphysics. This is the viewpoint embodied in the program for the unity of science, espoused in recent years, most notably by Robert Causey (1977).
Stable and Retrievable Options
Authors: Rabinowicz Wlodzimierz
Published: November 2002

An option available to an agent is stable if it maximizes expected utility on the hypothetical assumption that the agent is going to choose it. As is well known, some decision problems lack a stable solution.

Paul Weirich (1986 and 1988) has recently proposed a decision principle which prescribes that the option chosen should be at least weakly stable—or “weakly ratifiable”, to use his terminology. According to him, full stability is an excessively strong demand. I shall argue that Weirich's proposal conflicts with the familiar condition of dominance. But I shall also prove that this difficulty can be avoided if we replace weak stability by “moderate” stability—where the latter property is somewhat stronger than the former.

It will be seen, however, that this modification does not help against other ailments connected with stability. In particular, to heed the demand of stability (of any kind) is to engage in a form of “wishful acting”. Also, the different stability demands all conflict with a close relative of the dominance condition: the condition of “indifference”. According to this condition, two actions are equally choiceworthy if they would always lead to the same outcomes—whatever state the world is in. On the other hand, the conditions of dominance and indifference would both be satisfied if we replaced a demand for stability (of some kind) by a related but distinct principle of “retrievability”. Retrievability and (full) stability are mutually independent properties of options, but each of them entails moderate stability. The paper ends with a discussion of the relevance of retrievability to theories of choiceworthiness and practical reason.
Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis
Authors: Menzies Peter
Published: November 2002

This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition.
Discussion: What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind
Authors: Frances Egan M.
Published: November 2002

Stephen Stich has argued that psychological theories that instantiate his Syntactic Theory of Mind are to be preferred to content-based or representationalist theories, because the former can capture and explain a wider range of generalizations about cognitive processes than the latter. Stich's claims about the relative merits of the Syntactic Theory of Mind are unfounded. Not only is it false that syntactic theories can capture psychological generalizations that content-based theories cannot, but a large class of behavioral regularities, readily explained by content-based theories, appear to be beyond their explanatory reach.
Discussion: On a Recent Objection to Popper and Miller's “Disproof” of Probabilistic Induction
Authors: Howson Colin
Published: November 2002

Dunn and Hellman's objection to Popper and Miller's alleged disproof of inductive probability is considered and rejected. Dunn and Hellman base their objection on a decomposition of the incremental support P(h/e)-P(h) of h by e dual to that of Popper and Miller, and argue, dually to Popper and Miller, to a conclusion contrary to the latters' that all support is deductive in character. I contend that Dunn and Hellman's dualizing argument fails because the elements of their decomposition are not supports of parts of h. I conclude by reinforcing a different line of criticism of Popper and Miller due to Redhead.
Discussion: Some Recent Controversy Over the Possibility of Experimentally Determining Isotropy in the Speed of Light
Authors: Clifton Robert K.
Published: November 2002

The most recent attempt at factually establishing a “true” value for the oneway velocity of light is shown to be faulty. The proposal consists of two round-trip photons travelling first in vacuo and then through a medium of refractive index n before returning to their common point of origin. It is shown that this proposal, as well as a similar one considered by Salmon (1977), presupposes that the one-way velocities of light are equal to the round-trip value. Furthermore, experiments of this type, involving regions of space with varying refractive indices, cannot “single out” any factual value for the Reichenbach-Grünbaum ∊ factor thus posing no threat to the conventionalist thesis.
Critical Notice: Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity
Authors: Gupta Anil
Published: November 2002

Some criticisms are offered of Barwise and Etchemendy's theory of truth, the principal one being that it violates a feature of truth called “supervenience”.
The Naturalist Conception of Methodological Standards in Science: A Critique
Authors: Doppelt Gerald
Published: November 2002

In this essay, I criticize Laudan's view that methodological rules in science are best understood as hypothetical imperatives, for example, to realize cognitive aim A, follow method B. I criticize his idea that such rules are best evaluated by a naturalized philosophy of science which collects the empirical evidence bearing on the soundness of these rules. My claim is that this view yields a poor explanation of (1) the role of methodological rules in establishing the rationality of scientific practices, (2) the debates scientists have over rival methodological rules, and (3) the reasons on the basis of which scientists actually embrace, challenge, or transform methodological rules. A better explanation is provided by treating at least some methodological rules as foundational standards of theory-appraisal which define the criteria of scientific truth, knowledge, evidence, proof, explanations, etc., for a certain tradition or community of scientific practice. Such standards are in turn grounded or challenged on the basis of their coherence or incoherence with a wider body of scientific judgments. This view leads away from a naturalized philosophy of science back to its more classical epistemological conception.
Renormalizing Epistemology
Authors: Leplin Jarrett
Published: November 2002

The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.
Normative Naturalism and the Role of Philosophy
Authors: Rosenberg Alexander
Published: November 2002

The prescriptive force of methodological rules rests, I argue, on the acceptance of scientific theories; that of the most general methodological rules rests on theories in the philosophy of science, which differ from theories in the several sciences only in generality and abstraction. I illustrate these claims by reference to methodological disputes in social science and among philosophers of science. My conclusions substantiate those of Laudan except that I argue for the existence of transtheoretical goals common to all scientists and concrete enough actually to have bearing on methodology. And I argue that Laudan is committed to such goals himself, willy nilly.
Normative Naturalism
Authors: Laudan Larry
Published: November 2002

Normative naturalism is a view about the status of epistemology and philosophy of science; it is a meta-epistemology. It maintains that epistemology can both discharge its traditional normative role and nonetheless claim a sensitivity to empirical evidence. The first sections of this essay set out the central tenets of normative naturalism, both in its epistemic and its axiological dimensions; later sections respond to criticisms of that species of naturalism from Gerald Doppelt, Jarrett Leplin and Alex Rosenberg.
Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason
Authors: Sobel Jordan Howard
Published: November 2002

Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that are relevant to the rationality of action. Another distinction is between actions that would, in one sense or another, maximize expected utilities given relevant beliefs and desires, and actions, decisions for which would, in one sense or another, be stable. There is disagreement about the relevance of these things to the rationality of actions. Here, in the first part below, several possible positions on these issues are explained and compared. In the second part, I contrast perspectives on these issues, and comment on arguments that might be brought against the position I favor. In the third part, I restate and elaborate on this position.
Induction, Conceptual Spaces and Ai
Authors: Gärdenfors Peter
Published: November 2002

A computational theory of induction must be able to identify the projectible predicates, that is to distinguish between which predicates can be used in inductive inferences and which cannot. The problems of projectibility are introduced by reviewing some of the stumbling blocks for the theory of induction that was developed by the logical empiricists. My diagnosis of these problems is that the traditional theory of induction, which started from a given (observational) language in relation to which all inductive rules are formulated, does not go deep enough in representing the kind of information used in inductive inferences.

As an interlude, I argue that the problem of induction, like so many other problems within AI, is a problem of knowledge representation. To the extent that AI-systems are based on linguistic representations of knowledge, these systems will face basically the same problems as did the logical empiricists over induction.

In a more constructive mode, I then outline a non-linguistic knowledge representation based on conceptual spaces. The fundamental units of these spaces are “quality dimensions”. In relation to such a representation it is possible to define “natural” properties which can be used for inductive projections. I argue that this approach evades most of the traditional problems.
Developmental Decomposition and the Future of Human Behavioral Ecology
Authors: Kitcher Philip
Published: November 2002

I attempt to complement my earlier critiques of human sociobiology, by offering an account of how evolutionary ideas might legitimately be employed in the study of human social behavior. The main emphasis of the paper is the need to integrate studies of proximate mechanisms and their ontogenesis with functional/evolutionary research. Human psychological complexity makes it impossible to focus simply on specific types of human behavior and ask for their functional significance. For any of the kinds of behavior patterns that have occupied human sociobiologists, the underlying proximate mechanisms are very likely to be linked to a broad spectrum of types of behavior, and we cannot expect that natural selection will have acted directly on any individual element from this spectrum. I illustrate this general point with a specific example, considering the traditional sociobiological account of human incest-avoidance and outlining an alternative approach to the phenomena. The example is intended to show the possibility of a more rigorous and sophisticated successor to human sociobiology, which I call “human behavioral ecology”.
Are Physical Properties Dispositions?
Authors: Averill Edward Wilson
Published: November 2002

Several prominent philosophers have held that physical properties are dispositions. The aim of this paper is to establish the following conjunction: if the thesis that physical properties are dispositions is unsupplemented by controversial assumptions about dispositions, it entails a contradiction; and if it is so supplemented the resulting theory has the consequence that either many worlds which seem to be possible worlds are not possible worlds or some properties which seem to be identical are not identical. In this way it is shown that a dispositional account of physical properties is implausible.
Discussion: Methodological Individualism and Explanation
Authors: Tuomela Raimo
Published: November 2002

This critical note concerns Harold Kincaid's “Reduction, Explanation and Empiricism” (this journal, December 1986). Kincaid criticizes methodological individualism on several grounds. The present note argues that Kincaid fails at least in his attempt to show that it is false that individualistic theory suffices to fully explain social phenomena. Kincaid's main reason for claiming that individualistic theory is insufficient is that it cannot adequately explain social kinds. The present note contends that an individualist can suitably reinterpret the social talk in question and so succeed in explaining social phenomena. In some cases his explanatory factors will presumably be direct counterparts to the holist's explanatory social kinds, whereas in some other cases they may not be—arguably need not be.
Discussion: Eliminativism and Methodological Individualism
Authors: Kincaid Harold
Published: November 2002

Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96–103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (3) the eliminativism that Tuomela favors verges on being self-refuting and is highly implausible short of a detailed empirical critique of the social sciences, something Tuomela does not provide and something there is little reason to think can be provided.
Discussion: Accardi on Quantum Theory and The “Fifth Axiom” of Probability
Authors: Van Den Berg Hans , Hoekzema Dick , Radder Hans
Published: November 2002

In this paper we investigate Accardi's claim that the “quantum paradoxes” have their roots in probability theory and that, in particular, they can be evaded by giving up Bayes' rule, concerning the relation between composite and conditional probabilities. We reach the conclusion that, although it may be possible to give up Bayes' rule and define conditional probabilities differently, this contributes nothing to solving the philosophical problems which surround quantum mechanics.
Discussion: Levi's Decision Theory
Authors: Leeds Stephen
Published: November 2002

Suppose my utilities are representable by a set of utility assignments, each defined for atomic sentences; suppose my beliefs are representable by a set of probability assignments. Then each of my utility assignments together with each of my probability assignments will determine a utility assignment to non-atomic sentences, in a familiar way. This paper is concerned with the question, whether I am committed to all the utility assignments so constructible. Richard Jeffrey (1984) says (in effect) “no”, Isaac Levi (1974) says “yes”. I argue for “no”, and raise in passing a problem for Levi.
The Conceptual Structure of the Chemical Revolution
Authors: Thagard Paul
Published: November 2002

This paper investigates the revolutionary conceptual changes that took place when the phlogiston theory of Stahl was replaced by the oxygen theory of Lavoisier. Using techniques drawn from artificial intelligence, it represents the crucial stages in Lavoisier's conceptual development from 1772 to 1789. It then sketches a computational theory of conceptual change to account for Lavoisier's discovery of the oxygen theory and for the replacement of the phlogiston theory.
Disappearance and Knowledge
Authors: Cling Andrew D.
Published: November 2002

Paul Churchland argues that the continuity of human intellectual development provides evidence against folk psychology and traditional epistemology, since these latter find purchase only at the later stages of intellectual development. He supports this contention with an analogy from the history of thermodynamics. Careful attention to the thermodynamics analogy shows that the argument from continuity does not provide independent support for eliminative materialism. The argument also rests upon claims about continuity which do not support the claim that the continuity of intellectual development is evidence for the elimination of folk psychology. Traditional epistemology and folk psychology should not yet be abandoned.
The Model-Theoretic Approach in the Philosophy of Science
Authors: Da Costa Newton C. A. , French Steven
Published: November 2002

An introduction to the model-theoretic approach in the philosophy of science is given and it is argued that this program is further enhanced by the introduction ofpartialstructures. It is then shown that this leads to a natural and intuitive account of both “iconic” and mathematical models and of the role of the former in science itself.
On Advancing Simple Hypotheses
Authors: Osherson Daniel N. , Weinstein Scott
Published: November 2002

We consider drawbacks to scientific methods that prefer simple hypotheses to complex ones that cover the same data. The discussion proceeds in the context of a precise model of scientific inquiry.
When Probabilistic Support is Inductive
Authors: Mura Alberto
Published: November 2002

This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of “going beyond” is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are purely inductive.
One Causal Mechanism in Evolution: One Unit of Selection
Authors: Kary Carla E.
Published: November 2002

The theory of evolution is supported by the theory of genetics, which provides a single causal mechanism to explain the activities of replicators and interactors. A common misrepresentation of the theory of evolution, however, is that interaction (involving interactors), and transmission (involving replicators), are distinct causal processes. Sandra Mitchell (1987) is misled by this. I discuss why only a single causal mechanism is working in evolution and why it is sufficient. Further, I argue that Mitchell's mistaken view of the causal mechanism in evolution prevents her from resolving the conflict between Dawkins and Brandon. I conclude that the unit-of-selection question remains very much alive.
Against Positing Central Systems in the Mind
Authors: Ross Don
Published: November 2002

This paper is concerned with a recent argument of Jerry Fodor's to the effect that the frame problem in artificial intelligence is in principle insoluble. Fodor's argument is based on his contention that the mind is divided between encapsulated modular systems for information processing and ‘central systems’ for non-demonstrative inference. I argue that positing central systems is methodologically unsound, and in fact involves a muddle that bears a strong family resemblance to the basic error in dualism. I therefore conclude that Fodor's position on the frame problem should be rejected.
Discussion: Does The Principle of Relativity Imply Winnie's (1970) Equal Passage Times Principle?
Authors: Brown Harvey R.
Published: November 2002

The kinematical principle of Equal Passage Times (EPT) was introduced by Winnie in his 1970 derivation of the relativistic coordinate transformations compatible with arbitrary synchrony conventions in one-dimensional space. In this paper, the claim by Winnie and later Giannoni that EPT is a direct consequence of the relativity principle is questioned. It is shown that EPT, given Einstein's 1905 postulates, is equivalent to the relativistic (synchrony independent) clock retardation principle, and that for standard synchrony it reduces to an isotropy condition for contraction (and dilation) effects.
Constructing or Completing Physical Geometry? On the Relation between Theory and Evidence in Accounts of Space-Time Structure
Authors: Carrier Martin
Published: November 2002

The aim of this paper is to discuss the relation between the observation basis and the theoretical principles of General Relativity. More specifically, this relation is analyzed with respect to constructive axiomatizations of the observation basis of space-time theories, on the one hand, and in attempts to complete them, on the other. The two approaches exclude one another so that a choice between them is necessary. I argue that the completeness approach is preferable for methodological reasons.
Irreversibility and Statistical Mechanics: A New Approach?
Authors: Batterman Robert W.
Published: November 2002

I discuss a broad critique of the classical approach to the foundations of statistical mechanics (SM) offered by N. S. Krylov. He claims that the classical approach is in principle incapable of providing the foundations for interpreting the “laws” of statistical physics. Most intriguing are his arguments against adopting a de facto attitude towards the problem of irreversibility. I argue that the best way to understand his critique is as setting the stage for a positive theory which treats SM as a theory in its own right, involving a completely different conception of a system's state. As the orthodox approach treats SM as an extension of the classical or quantum theories (one which deals with large systems), Krylov is advocating a major break with the traditional view of statistical physics.
Hidden Locality, Conspiracy and Superluminal Signals
Authors: Kronz Frederick M.
Published: November 2002

This paper involves one crucial assumption; namely, that the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics for Bell's variant of the EPR experiment will continue to be verified as detector efficiencies are improved and the need for coincidence counters is eliminated. This assumption entails that any hidden-variables theory for quantum mechanics must violate Bell's inequality—the inequality derived in Bell (1964). It is shown here that four locality conditions are involved in the derivation of Bell's inequality; and that a violation of any of the four locality conditions will either entail the existence of superluminal influences or the existence of superluminal signals (superluminal influences that can be used to transmit information), if conspiratorial theories can be ruled out. The attempts so far to rule out conspiratorial theories are all found to be rather dubious, but there are other considerations developed here that rule them out convincingly. Finally, it is demonstrated that violations of each of the four locality conditions can be used to transmit information superluminally, if certain auxiliary conditions are satisfied. This is of particular interest because one of these conditions corresponds to a condition dubbed “completeness” by Jon Jarrett. Jarrett and others have suggested that violations of completeness cannot be used to send information superluminally. Demonstrating otherwise is, perhaps, the most significant result obtained in this paper.
Mental Misrepresentation
Authors: Maloney J. Christopher
Published: November 2002

An account of the contents of the propositional attitudes is fundamental to the success of the cognitive sciences if, as seems correct, the cognitive sciences do presuppose propositional attitudes. Fodor has recently pointed the way towards a naturalistic explication of mental content in his Psychosemantics (1987). Fodor's theory is a version of the causal theory of meaning and thus inherits many of its virtues, including its intrinsic plausibility. Nevertheless, the proposal may suffer from two deficiencies: (1) It seems not to provide an adequate explanation of misrepresentation. (2) It may also fail, as a species of empiricism, to provide a correct explication of the content of observational concepts and those non-observational concepts whose meaning is to be traced to their causal connections with observational concepts.
There's More than One Way to Recognize a Darwinian: Lyell's Darwinism
Authors: Recker Doren
Published: November 2002

There are a number of reasons for doubting the standard view that scientific theories (understood as sets of connected statements) are the best units for investigating scientific continuity and change (that is, research programs continue as long as groups of scientists accept the central tenets of such theories). Here it is argued that one weakness of this approach is that it cannot be used to demarcate adequately scientific communities or conceptual systems (that is, it fails as a classificatory scheme). Recent alternative proposals by Philip Kitcher and David Hull are assessed in terms of their usefulness in demarcating “Darwinism” and the “Darwinians” in the first decade or so after the publication ofThe Origin of Species, focusing on the case of Charles Lyell.
Symptomatic Acts and the Value of Evidence in Causal Decision Theory
Authors: Maher Patrick
Published: November 2002

A “symptomatic act” is an act that is evidence for a state that it has no tendency to cause. In this paper I show that when the evidential value of a symptomatic act might influence subsequent choices, causal decision theory may initially recommend against its own use for those subsequent choices. And if one knows that one will nevertheless use causal decision theory to make those subsequent choices, causal decision theory may favor the one-box solution in Newcomb's problem, and may recommend against making cost-free observations. But if one can control one's future choices, then causal decision theory never recommends against cost-free observation.
On the Adaptations of Organisms and the Fitness of Types
Authors: Ettinger Lia , Jablonka Eva , McLaughlin Peter
Published: November 2002

We claim that much of the confusion associated with the “tautology problem” about survival of the fittest is due to the mistake of attributing fitness to individuals instead of to types. We argue further that the problem itself cannot be solved merely by taking fitness as the aggregate cause of reproductive success. We suggest that a satisfying explanation must center not on logical analysis of the concept of general adaptedness but on the empirical analysis of single adapted traits and their causal relationship to changes in allele frequencies.
Truth, Content, and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method
Authors: Grimes Thomas R.
Published: November 2002

After presenting the major objections raised against standard formulations of the H-D method of theory testing, I identify what seems to be an important element of truth underlying the method. I then draw upon this element in an effort to develop a plausible formulation of the H-D method which avoids the various objections.
Unbounded Operators and the Incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Heathcote Adrian
Published: November 2002

A proof is presented that a form of incompleteness in Quantum Mechanics follows directly from the use of unbounded operators. It is then shown that the problems that arise for such operators are not connected to the non-commutativity of many pairs of operators in Quantum Mechanics and hence are an additional source of incompleteness to that which allegedly flows from the EPR paradox. Finally, it will be argued that the problem is not amenable to some simple solutions that will be considered.
A Suspicious Feature of the Popper/Miller Argument
Authors: Good I. J.
Published: November 2002

The form of argument used by Popper and Miller to attack the concept of probabilistic induction is applied to the slightly different situation in which some evidence undermines a hypothesis. The result is seemingly absurd, thus bringing the form of argument under suspicion.
Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism: The “Theory-Informity” of Observation and the Quine-Duhem Thesis
Authors: Greenwood John D.
Published: November 2002

It is argued that neither the “theory-informity” of observations nor the Quine-Duhem thesis pose any in principle threat to the objectivity of theory evaluation. The employment of exploratory theories does not generate incommensurability, but on the contrary is responsible for the mensurability and commensurability of explanatory theories, since exploratory theories enable scientists to make observations which are critical in the evaluation of explanatory theories. The employment of exploratory theories and other auxiliary hypotheses does not enable a theory to always accommodate recalcitrant observations to preserve evidential equivalence with a rival theory. Explanatory theories become rapidly degenerating if exploratory theories or other auxiliary hypotheses which inform the original confirmation base are modified to accommodate recalcitrant observations.