bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Principal Principle and Probability in the Many‐Worlds Interpretation
Authors: Schack Rüdiger
Published: September 2010

In the decision-theoretic approach to the many worlds interpretation due to Deutsch and Wallace, probabilities are taken to be Bayesian degrees of belief. Their connection to the quantum mechanical wavefunction, derived from a set of decision-theoretic axioms, can be regarded as a quantum version of Lewis's principal principle. This chapter shows that applying the principal principle in quantum mechanics is problematical because it is impossible to give precise criteria for what constitutes a repeated quantum-mechanical trial. This difficulty is resolved in a full quantum Bayesian theory where quantum states, as well as probabilities, are interpreted as expressing an agent's degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. A similar resolution exists in the many worlds interpretation; this resolution, however, raises a new question for the latter.
Everett and Wheeler: the Untold Story
Authors: Byrne Peter
Published: September 2010

In the beginning, Wheeler was Everett's champion. But in the end he rejected his proposal. This chapter tells this story and discusses the views of Bohr and others on Everett's ideas.
Carried Away in the Euthyphro
Authors: Judson Lindsay
Published: September 2010

This chapter discusses Socrates' refutation of Euthyphro's definition of piety as what is all the gods love (Euthyphro 9e1-11b5), which begins with the famous question, ‘is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?’ It considers what light the argument sheds on Plato's conception of definition, and advances a new interpretation of the argument as a robust reductio of Euthyphro's definition. It argues that despite Plato's obvious commitment to the elaboration of very general structures in the refutation, these general structures do not provide all the resources needed to make the argument to go through, but that considerations specific to the subject matter of the argument (the gods' love of the pious) make the argument much more powerful than is generally thought.
Explanation and Essence in Plato's Phaedo
Authors: Politis Vasilis
Published: September 2010

This chapter makes several proposals concerning Plato's discussion in Phaedo (95e f.), where causes or explanations are said to be or be based on forms or essences. It states that Plato's argument involves not a contentious notion of a Platonic form but only the notion of essence in the sense of the correct answer to a question of the type ‘What is’, with which we are familiar from earlier in this dialogue, from Plato's earlier dialogues. Second, the chapter suggests, Plato's argument does not rely on a presupposed notion of essence but rather serves to establish the need for such a notion in the context of explanation. Third, it contends, Plato's argument does not rely on the principle ‘like-explains/causes-like’ but rather on the requirement that explanations must be uniform, which Plato spells out independently of that principle. Fourth, the chapter argues, in Plato's account of explanation, which involves basic essences, physical or material components of things can be genuinely part of explanations. Finally, Plato's argument is to be understood as conducted according to a general method of argument and inquiry. This method of argument and inquiry consists in first articulating a particular aporia about explanation in general, and then arguing that a particular account of explanation is both necessary and sufficient to resolve this aporia. The aporia is that, on the one hand, no proposed explanation is genuinely explanatory unless it is uniform; but, on the other hand, no currently proposed explanations, be they everyday or the scientific ones favoured by the natural philosophers, are uniform or begin to indicate how the uniformity-requirement is to be satisfied in the explanations that we propose.
Aristotle on Essence and Defining‐Phrase in his Dialectic
Authors: Chiba Kei
Published: September 2010

This chapter clarifies the meaning and role of ‘to ti ên einai’ (‘the what it was to be’) and its account called ‘horos’, which is translated as ‘defining-phrase’, in Aristotle's dialectic. It distinguishes the theory of dialectic — an attempt to systematize and improve on the Socratic method of dialogue on the basis of ‘the method of formal (logikôs) argument’ — from its practice, which is described using a different adverb ‘dialectically’ (dialektikôs). The chapter suggests that defining-phrase (horos) is a sub-component of the proposition which is used to express a definition. The phrase ‘the what it was to be’ (to ti ên einai) is designed to capture the ideal answer which Socrates was seeking for in his ‘What is F?’ question. Aristotle's distinctive phrase emerges from his reformulation of the Socratic ‘What is F?’ question in a context in which the interlocutor had overlooked what Socrates sought. The question ‘What was then it for F itself to be F?’, in using the past tense, reminds the interlocutor that he has overlooked the thing F itself in his initial answer, offering, for instance, only an example of F.
The Ancient Commentators on Concept Formation
Authors: Sorabji Richard
Published: September 2010

How did the ancient commentators understand Aristotle's account of concept formation in Posterior Analytics 2.19? They focus on his re-statement at 100a14. They do not agree with the interpretation in this chapter of his first statement at 100a3ff (but then neither do many contemporaries). The chapter considers the commentators' views on these texts in which they saw perception as passing on information about universals to be worked on by reason, imagination (surprisingly), or nous, understood as one or more of the three kinds of intellect that they detect in On the Soul 3.5. Their view preserves Aristotle's wish to offer an empirical alternative to Plato's account of concept formation as recollection of concepts known before birth. They differ on whether Aristotle's account can be squared with Plato's. Some went to the length of saying that Aristotle believed in Plato's recollected concepts; some said that Neoplatonists should believe in both types of concept; some that Aristotle was simply wrong to postulate concepts based on perception. Certainly, they thought that empirically based concepts could not be processed and improved, unless one had recollected concepts to guide one. This chapter investigates these disagreements and their bases in conflicting views of the role of perception and intellect.
Galen's Aristotelian Definitions
Authors: Hood Jane
Published: September 2010

This chapter discusses the Galen's attempts to incorporate Aristotelian definitional theory within his own, Stoic, views of language and definition. He thus tries to combine an Aristotelian search for the essence with the Stoic notion of ennoia, a term linked to language use. Definition is important for Galen not only as a philosopher, but also as a medical expert. He urges doctors not to waste time on defining everything, itself likened to a disease, ‘definitionitis’. However, he claims that definitions are crucial when they can be used as tools to help the doctor heal.
Sceptical Enquiry
Authors: Fine Gail
Published: September 2010

In PH 2.1-10, Sextus considers a paradox of sceptical inquiry, according to which sceptics can't inquire. He explains how sceptics can inquire, and argues that it's the dogmatists who can't inquire. This chapter explores the paradox of sceptical inquiry, along with Sextus' defense of the sceptic's ability to inquiry. It also considers Sextus' challenge to the possibility of dogmatic — especially Stoic — inquiry.
Merely Possible Propositions
Authors: Stalnaker Robert
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that some propositions exist only contingently. Among the contingently existing propositions are ‘possible worlds’, which are understood as maximal consistent propositions. The chapter sketches a picture of propositions and possible worlds that tries to make sense of this thesis, and defends it against two closely related arguments (by Alvin Plantinga and Timothy Williamson) that aim to refute it. The thesis and the response to the arguments require a distinction between the claim that a proposition has the monadic property of truth and the claim that it is true of a given possible world; this distinction is explained and defended.
Semantic Necessity
Authors: Fine Kit
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that the semantics for a given language should be taken to be given by a body of semantic requirements — in contrast to the two standard conceptions of a semantics, under which it is taken either to be an assignment of semantic values to the expressions of the language or to be a theory of truth for the sentences of the language.
Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?
Authors: Efird David
Published: September 2010

Timothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, a new argument is presented for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson's argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, nevertheless, a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent is distinguished: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.
Permission and (So‐Called Epistemic) Possibility
Authors: Yablo Stephen
Published: September 2010

David Lewis in ‘A Problem About Permission’ asks about the effect on context of permitting the previously forbidden. The set of permissible worlds expands, but how? One can ask in a similar vein about the effects of calling a circumstance possible which had previously been ruled out. This chapter proposes a unified rule. Permission to take the day off adds in world W if the reasons W was initially ruled out all imply taking the day off. W remains impermissible if the reasons it was initially ruled out include some that could still have obtained even if one had remained at work. Similarly, ‘It might rain’ adds a world to the context set if and only if was ruled out for rain-implying reasons. These rules turn out to have non-trivial effects even if the new possibility was not previously ruled out. This runs counter to Lewis, but is arguably the right result.
Possible Worlds and the NecessaryA Posteriori
Authors: Jackson Frank
Published: September 2010

W. V. Quine's famous objection to essentialism has provoked two responses. The unfriendly response is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response does not dispute the point about conflation but argues that, behind Quine's argument, lies an important epistemological problem for essentialism. This chapter argues that the problem can be solved by looking at the issue through the lens of possible worlds approaches to modal questions. This serves as a preamble to addressing the corresponding issue for the necessary a posteriori. There is an important epistemological problem for the necessary a posteriori but the possible worlds approach to modal questions offers a solution to it. The solution turns out to be version of two-dimensionalism about the necessary a posteriori.
Conceivability and Apparent Possibility
Authors: Gregory Dominic
Published: September 2010

Why do we tend to ascribe possibility to what we can imagine? One strategy for answering that question involves the thought that, just as sensory episodes often involve its seeming to us as though the world is certain ways, so imaginings involve its seeming to us that what we have imagined is possible. This chapter argues that while some imaginings do feature appearances of possibility, very many others do not; and it explores the broader relevance of its conclusions for modal epistemology.
Intentionality without Exotica
Authors: Sainsbury R. M.
Published: September 2010

Exotic objects are objects that are nonexistent, nonactual, or nonconcrete. Some have posited such objects as a way to preserve and simplify their preferred semantic theories and to intentionality. This chapter is devoted to arguing that we do not need to countenance any exotic objects to do justice to intentionality or to the behavior of intensional verbs.
2 Australia
Authors: Joshua Castellino , David Keane
Published: September 2010

This chapter emphasizes the causes of violations against minorities and indigenous peoples within the state. It seeks to explain the extent to which law has sought to address the position of the more vulnerable groups in Australian society. The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 2.1 identifies the key historical moments that are important in understanding the backdrop to the plight of minorities and vulnerable peoples in Australia. Section 2.2 focuses on an identification of ‘Minorities’, ‘Indigenous Peoples’, and others that are covered by this chapter. Section 2.3 provides an analysis of the legal framework that regulates indigenous peoples' and minorities' entitlements in Australia. Section 2.4 reflects on the existing remedies available in Australian law, testing their efficacy. The chapter concludes by addressing the question of what ‘Australian-ness’ means and how its construction impacts the experience of vulnerable groups within society.
1 What Can Be Learned about the Economies of China and India from Purchasing Power Comparisons?
Authors: Heston Alan
Published: September 2010

Comparisons of India and China have been made for over fifty years. This chapter focuses on purchasing power estimates in China and India in the 2005 round of the UN International Comparison Program (ICP) that was coordinated by the World Bank, the Regional Banks and Economic Commissions. The 2005 ICP round provides estimates of purchasing power parities of currencies and real product per capita for 146 countries, and the results for China and India are discussed in the context of the size of these economies. It also provides insights into the prospects of future economic growth in China and India and also evaluates policy recommendations of others for these countries.
5 Law, Institutions, and Finance in China and India
Authors: Allen Franklin , Chakrabarti Rajesh , De Sankar , Qian Jun ‘QJ’ , Qian Meijun
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines and compares the legal and institutional set-ups in China and India. China differs from most of the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature: Its legal and financial systems as well as institutions are all underdeveloped, but its economy has been growing at a very fast rate. Despite its English common-law origin and British-style judicial system and democratic government, there is enough documented evidence to suggest that the effective level of investor protection and the quality of legal institutions in India are quite weak as well. However, this has evidently not prohibited growth in either country. Small and high growth firms in both countries make extensive use of informal and relationship-based arrangements to finance growth.
6 China and India: A Tale of Two Trade Integration Approaches
Authors: Kowalski Przemyslaw
Published: September 2010

Despite the fact that China has gone further than India in terms of economic reform and opening, China's integration process so far remains characterized by a certain duality. On the one hand the opening up of trade and FDI in manufactured goods has spurred the emergence of a largely private sector. On the other hand the high level of public ownership and important regulatory barriers continue to dominate the services sectors. India has gone a long way in reducing its tariffs on nonagricultural products as well as selected non-tariff barriers but moderate protection still persists which likely adds to the hurdles faced by the Indian manufacturing sector. India has revealed a comparative advantage in certain segments of the services sector but its services trade policy is still very restrictive. More generally the extent of liberalization achieved so far in India suggests that the remaining goods and services trade barriers are just one item on the list of reforms that the country needs to tackle in order to promote trade-led expansion of more labor-intensive activities.
7 China's Growth Model: Choices and Consequences
Authors: Prasad Eswar S.
Published: September 2010

China has maintained a phenomenal rate of growth over the last two decades (until very recently), with annual GDP growth averaging about 10 percent. What accounts for this impressive growth performance? How long is this growth pattern likely to last and what are the risks? This chapter attempts to address these questions by providing a critical evaluation of the combination of macroeconomic and structural policies that has resulted in high rates of growth in recent years. The main argument is that the set of policies that has generated impressive headline GDP growth masks a number of problems that have led to unbalanced growth and portend serious risks for the future. It then discusses the main elements of a reform agenda that would ensure the sustainability of China's growth, improve the economic welfare of its citizens in a commensurate manner, and make the economy more resilient to shocks.
8 Deconstructing China's and India's Growth: The Role of Financial Policies
Authors: Aziz Jahangir
Published: September 2010

The links between financial and economic development are well established in theory, but country-specific empirical evidence is hard to come by. This chapter shows that one empirical measure, the investment wedge or the gap between household's rate of intertemporal substitution and the marginal product of capital, is large. It is a significant determinant of Chinese and Indian growth in the last two decades. In China, distortions caused by nonperforming loans, borrowing constraints, and uncertainty over changes in government guidance in bank lending have implied large transfers from households to firms that have kept capital cost low and encouraged investment. In India, post-1992 financial sector reforms, particularly the reduction in the funds pre-empted by the government from the banking system, have played an important role in reducing the cost of capital. Simulations show that for rebalancing growth in China and sustaining high investment rate in India, financial sector reforms and financial market development will be key.
10 What Constrains Indian Manufacturing?
Authors: Gupta Poonam , Hasan Rana , Kumar Utsav
Published: September 2010

India has undertaken extensive reforms in its manufacturing sector in the last two decades. However, an acceleration of growth in manufacturing, and a concomitant increase in employment, has eluded India. What might be holding the sector back? Using Annual Survey of Industries data at the three-digit level and difference in estimates this chapter finds that the post-reform performance of the manufacturing sector is heterogeneous across industries. In particular, industries dependent on infrastructure or external finance, and labor-intensive industries have not been able to reap the maximum benefits of reforms. The results point to the importance of infrastructure development and financial sector development for the manufacturing sector's growth to accelerate further. They also emphasize the need to clearly identify and address the factors inhibiting the growth of labor-intensive industries.
Lying
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

This chapter defines lying roughly as follows: a lie is a deliberate false statement that the speaker warrants to be true. Two features of this definition are noteworthy. First, contrary to most standard definitions, it argues that lying does not require that the liar intends to deceive others. (The chapter appeals to cases in which one is compelled or enticed to make false statements, cases of lying in which one can benefit by making false statements even if they do not deceive others, and cases of bald‐faced lies in which the liar knows that others know she is lying and therefore has no hope or intention of deceiving them.) Second, the chapter holds that in order to tell a lie, one must make a statement that one warrants to be true. According to the definition, any lie violates an implicit promise or guarantee that what one says is true. The definition makes sense of the common view that lying involves a breach of trust. To lie, on this view, is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, and at the same time to betray that trust by making a false statement that one does not believe to be true. The chapter discusses several published criticisms of the definition. The chapter isolates several criticisms that, while it is not certain, may require a refinement of the basic definition, and the chapter formulates a revised version of the definition that clearly answers them. According to the revised definition, lying requires that one intends to warrant the truth of what one says but does not require that one actually warrants its truth, as in the original definition. Nothing that is said in the book depends on the subtle difference between these two definitions.
Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

In several works, Kant claims that lying is always wrong, no matter what. He is probably the most well‐known defender of an absolute prohibition against lying in the history of Western philosophy. The chapter surveys what Kant says about lying in his writings. It is noteworthy that he never directly appeals to the categorical imperative in any of his arguments to show that lying is always wrong. The chapter argues that the universal law version of the categorical imperative does not imply that lying is always wrong – one can consistently will that everyone follows maxims or principles that sometimes permit lying. Korsgaard to the contrary, the second version of the categorical imperative, which says that we should never treat another person as a mere means, does not imply that lying is never permissible. The chapter contends that Korsgaard's arguments rest on contentious interpretations of several ambiguous passages in Kant. None of the versions of the categorical imperative commits Kant to an absolute prohibition against lying. Not only does Kant fail to give a compelling argument for an absolute prohibition against lying, there are positive reasons to reject his absolutism. The duty not to lie can conflict with other moral duties. If lying is always wrong no matter what, then the duty not to lie must always be more important than any conflicting duty. However, it is most implausible to hold that the duty not to lie is always more important than any conflicting duty. Kant's own example of lying to thwart the plans of a would‐be murderer is one of the best illustrations of this.
Act‐Utilitarianism
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

Act‐utilitarianism implies that lying is morally permissible when, and only when, there is no alternative course of action open to one that has better consequences than lying. Many critics contend that utilitarianism is too permissive about the morality of lying. Mill attempts to answer this objection in Utilitarianism where he claims that lying always has indirect bad consequences (lying makes one less honest and undermines trust between people). Mill claims that, therefore, utilitarianism implies that there is a strong moral presumption against lying. The chapter defends Mill's argument and note two ways in which it can be extended and strengthened. First, there is another indirect bad consequence of lying that Mill does not mention – the difficulties that liars incur in trying to “keep their stories straight.” Second, in addition to the indirect bad consequences of lying (and deception), there are also direct bad consequences. We are (generally) harmed when we are deceived because we cannot effectively pursue our ends and interests if we act on the basis of false beliefs.
Bluffing and Deception in Negotiations
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

This chapter discusses deception and bluffing in negotiations and focuses on the following kind of case: I am selling a house and tell a prospective buyer that $350 000 is absolutely the lowest price that I will accept, when I know that I would be willing to accept as little as $320 000 for the house. In this case, I make a deliberate false statement about my intentions and bargaining position. Despite the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception in commercial transactions, lying and deception in negotiations can sometimes be justified on the ground of “self‐defense” if others are engaging in lying/deception and thereby gaining an advantage over one.
Lying and Deception about Questions of War and Peace: Case Studies
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines cases in which political leaders and public figures told lies or engaged in deception as a pretext for fighting wars. The examples given here include William Randolph Hearst, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, George W. Bush, and Dick Cheney. The chapter devotes particular attention to the case of Bush and Cheney and argues that they lied and attempted to deceive the public. Although this claim will strike many readers as obvious, it has not been adequately defended by those who make it. The journalists, public officials, and commentators who have accused Bush and Cheney of lying and deception do not offer careful definitions of lying and deception, much less a careful application of those definitions to the cases at issue. Certain features of my definition of lying are salient in these cases and help to show that Bush and Cheney lied and attempted to deceive the public – they strongly warranted the truth of claims that they knew were open to serious doubts. In most of these cases, lying and deception led to disastrous consequences and were morally wrong. However, the chapter argues that Franklin Roosevelt was morally justified in his lying and deception in order to aid Britain during the early stages of WWII. The chapter also discusses cases in which Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dwight Eisenhower may have engaged in lying and deception in order to avoid wars. These also seem be to cases of justifiable lying/deception.
Honesty as a Virtue
Authors: Carson Thomas L.
Published: September 2010

Honesty is generally regarded as a cardinal virtue. In order to assess this conventional wisdom the chapter examines the arguments of several dissenters who reject it. Some argue that as lying and deception are frequently justified in certain spheres of life/activity, honesty is not a virtue (in those spheres). We need to distinguish between what, for lack of better terms, this chapter calls “honesty in a negative sense” (having a strong principled disinclination to tell lies or deceive others) and “honesty in a positive sense,” which (in addition to involving being disinclined to tell lies or deceive others) involves being candid, open, and willing to reveal information. The chapter argues that honesty in the negative sense (or something that closely resembles it) is a cardinal virtue in ordinary circumstances, but often honesty in the positive sense is not a virtue. The chapter also identifies spheres of activity in which candor and openness are virtues.
Feature hierarchies and contrast in phonology
Authors: Dresher B. Elan
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that there is a deep connection between feature ordering, contrast, and phonological activity. Contrasts are governed by language‐specific feature hierarchies; only contrastive features so determined are active in the phonology. These claims are supported and illustrated by case studies involving vowel harmony, consonant co‐occurrence, and loanword adaptation.
Towards a typology of grammatical features
Authors: Kibort Anna
Published: September 2010

This chapter offers a typology of features which express meanings or functions correlating with different forms of inflected words. Morphosyntactic, morphosemantic, and purely morphological features are distinguished on the basis of their available realization options. It is suggested that the tense‐aspect‐mood‐polarity affixes of Kayardild (Tangkic) realize morphosemantic features.
Features in categorization, or a new look at an old problem
Authors: Plaster Keith , Polinsky Maria
Published: September 2010

This chapter reanalyses noun classification in the Australian language Dyirbal. While earlier analyses have proposed intricate class assignment principles rooted in conceptual features, we argue that Dyirbal noun classification is sensitive to salient phonological cues and a small core of cross‐linguistically common semantic cues in keeping with other familiar noun classification systems.
The definiteness feature at the syntax–semantics interface
Authors: Danon Gabi
Published: September 2010

Based on cross‐linguistic differences in the interpretation of genitive constructions, this chapter argues that there are two strategies for interpreting complex nominals: one that relies on sharing a monovalent morphosyntactic definiteness feature, and one that does not; the former is restricted to languages like Hebrew that have a definiteness feature.
Feature geometry and predictions of locality
Authors: Sag Ivan A.
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that grammar is a set of local constraints. The Sign‐Based Construction Grammar architecture is feature‐based and model‐theoretic, utilizing constructs (mother–daughter configurations) as the structures over which grammatical dependencies are defined in localist terms. I examine a number of non‐local dependencies (agreement, case assignment, control, and filler–gap dependencies), providing localist analyses that embody precise hypotheses about the nature of non‐locality in language.
Inessential features and expressive power of descriptive metalanguages
Authors: Pullum Geoffrey K. , Tiede Hans‐Jörg
Published: September 2010

Linguists feel intuitively that genuine features, those reflecting properties of natural language, are distinguishable from spurious ones – mere tricks exploiting feature machinery. Unfortunately, no such distinction is formally capturable, because eliminability of syntactic features in descriptions of sets of trees correlates with expressive power of the theoretical metalanguage assumed.
Social Relationships and Dependency
Authors: Lovett Frank
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that domination should be understood structurally, as a condition experienced by persons or groups when they are related to other persons or groups in a particular way. One of the structural features present in all social relationships characterized by domination is dependency; dependency is analyzed in terms of the costs of exit faced by the subjects of domination. This chapter also briefly considers the role of reflective equilibrium in developing a descriptive account of domination.
Matter Matters
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

Why is there a material world? Why is it fundamentally mathematical? This book explores a seventeenth‐century answer to these questions as it emerged from the works of Descartes and Leibniz. What we learn is the sense in which these philosophers held that an analysis of the material world must inevitably lead to mathematics, and that mathematics must inevitably take matter as its object. Here the connection between matter and mathematics was cast in terms of the conditions of intelligibility—matter is what underwrote the very intelligibility of mathematics. Thus, in every world in which mathematics in intelligible, matter exists, and vice versa. On this view, then, matter is not seen as a cosmic anomaly or divine afterthought, but as an essential constituent of the universe. As the title of the book asserts: matter matters.
The Visible and the Intelligible
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

In this chapter, Plato's analogy of the divided line, introduced in Book VI of the Republic, is discussed. Here, the distinction between two realms of object, the Visible and the Intelligible, is developed, and this introduces two kinds of investigation known to Plato and the ancients: analysis and synthesis.
Plato's Early and Late Methods
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

In this chapter, Plato is shown to have developed two methods of investigation: the first is his method of hypothesis, the second his method of collection and division. This latter method was a method of classification, which emerged as the method of analysis. The chapter shows how this method produces a scheme of categories, which looks to be the system of ideas or forms. The chapter explains how the method relates to the division of objects as established by the divided line analogy.
Matter and Division
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

This chapter explores two conceptual systems of division developed in the medieval period—one connected to the division of an immaterial substrate, the other connected to the division of a material substrate. This latter sort of division resulted in the numbers, which were additive. Here, an historical sketch is offered that traces a connection made between a certain conception of matter and mathematics, a connection that would have been available to the early moderns.
Enumeration, Quantity, and Measurement
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

This chapter shows how Descartes's concept of the enumeration underwrites the concepts of quantity and measurement in physics. Here it is shown how Descartes established what the chapter calls the master enumeration. Modes of body, it is found, are understood within Descartes's system as classes of ‘dimensions’ which are determined by systems of measurement. These systems are what today are called ratio scales. It is shown how the enumeration, the paradigm of a nominal scale, underwrites the ratio scale.
Synthesis and System Building
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

This chapter shows how the classes of the enumeration can be combined to form equations in physics. Several critiques of Cartesian physics are considered, specifically originating in Leibniz.
Material Structure and Calculating Machines
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

In this chapter it is shown how Leibniz and others in the period understood bodies to be mathematically informed (structured). This led to their designing and constructing calculating machines—the operations of mathematics being inherent in the manipulation of bodies. The chapter considers how Ramond Lull's combinatorial machines may have inspired both Descartes and Leibniz. And, the chapter shows how John Napier's famous calculating machines, the slide rule and the ‘bones’ worked.
How Analysis and Synthesis are Related
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

This chapter shows how the combinatorial nature of bodies expresses the permutation group concept, the latter expressing the conditions underwriting a genuine mathematical system. The chapter explains how synthesis, or a synthetic system, is isomorphic to a permutation group. What is more, it is shown how analysis, or the system of concepts resulting from analysis, is isomorphic to a synthetic system. This, it is argued, establishes a sense in which analysis and synthesis are ‘flip sides’ of the same conceptual coin. Since an analytic‐synthetic system is a group, and a group is a genuine mathematical system, it is seen the important role that Descartes's enumeration played in establishing a ‘mathematized’ physics.
Tying up the Loose Ends—Closing Remarks
Authors: Smith Kurt
Published: September 2010

The last chapter summarizes the book's main arguments and conclusions. Matter is what underwrites the intelligibility, the possibility, of mathematics. Given that God creates a mathematical reality, and that matter is the medium by way of which this reality is manifested, matter matters.
On Some Properties of Criterial Freezing
Authors: Rizzi Luigi
Published: September 2010

This chapter first examines the factors that render moved A′‐elements in the vicinity of C inert for further movement operations. Topic and Focus heads in the Complementiser Field are reconceived as criterial positions and a Criterion is formulated as a requirement for these heads to probe the derivation for a suitable goal in order to establish a Spec‐Head relation with it. In such a configuration, the goal is frozen into place once it has entered into a Spec‐Head relation with the criterial head. Extending the above to subjects, an independent Subject ‘criterial’ category with nominal properties, which expresses aboutness is posited. Although the constituent that satisfies the criterion, freezes into place and cannot undergo further movement, subconstituents from within may be subextracted, such as complements or adjuncts from within a subject.
(Non-)Extraction from Subjects as an Edge Phenomenon
Authors: Kotzoglou George
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines the lack of Subject Condition violations in null subject languages (and, most prominently, Greek). The chapter proposes that Subject Condition effects are due to a prohibition on multiple phase‐internal movement. Modifying Nunes's (1999, 2004) proposal, and in the spirit of Richards (2001, 2006), Boeckx (2003, 2008) the chapter argues for a Restriction on Copy Reduction, an anti‐locality princple which bans the PF‐silencing of more than one movement copies of a single element within the lifespan of a syntactic phase. It is shown that this principle follows as soon as we assume that the notion ‘chain’ has no place in a derivational model of grammar.
Subextraction from Phase Edges
Authors: Gallego Ángel J.
Published: September 2010

This chapter investigates Chomsky's (2008) phase‐based analysis of CED effects, which capitalizes on an opacity created by phasal specifiers (so‐called ‘edges’). After reviewing different pieces of evidence, it is argued that an Agree/Activity Condition approach to islandhood phenomena is theoretically and empirically superior, a conclusion that is pushed to A‐over‐A situations where sub‐extraction takes place from dependents displaced to the CP edge.
On the Necessity of Phi‐features: The Case of Bavarian Subject Extraction
Authors: Mayr Clemens
Published: September 2010

This chapter deals with long‐distance extraction of subjects in Bavarian, which violates the comp‐trace filter. It is argued that complementiser agreement licenses such extraction. In particular complementiser agreement allows subjects to be probed by higher functional heads. That is, agreement makes subjects visible for the computation. Objects, on the other hand, do not need to be in such an agreement relation, as selection by the verb render elements visible for probing once and for all.
The Structure and Interpretation of (Romance) Complementizers
Authors: Manzini M. Rita
Published: September 2010

The Romance che‐type complementizer belongs to the same morpholexical series as wh‐phrases. This chapter proposes that both as a wh‐phrase and as a complementizer, che is nominal and argumental — therefore not a functional projection (C) of the sentence. This chapter argues that this proposal optimally accounts for fine variation across Romance.
Non-Traditional Models of Armed Conflict
Authors: Lubell Noam
Published: September 2010

This chapter addresses the question of whether the reference to a transnational ‘war on terror’ is merely rhetoric or in fact covers a situation which can be defined as armed conflict. This is followed by an analysis of whether non-traditional situations demonstrate a need to consider new categories of armed conflict. The chapter also examines the source and scope of the applicable rules of humanitarian law for armed conflicts that defy easy categorisation.
Extraterritorial Applicability of Human Rights Law
Authors: Lubell Noam
Published: September 2010

This chapter provides detailed analysis of the question of whether states are bound by human rights law when acting outside their borders. The background and objective of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are examined, as is the concept of jurisdiction in the context of human rights treaties and cases of human rights bodies. The different types of actions by a state are examined in this context, including acts of diplomatic and consular agents, detention, and authority or control outside formally acknowledged detention facilities. The chapter raises the possibility of a contextual approach to obligations, and of non treaty-based extraterritorial human rights obligations.
Concurrent Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law
Authors: Lubell Noam
Published: September 2010

This chapter examines the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law in the context of extraterritorial force against non-state actors. The concurrent applicability of the two legal frameworks is established, and obstacles to parallel applicability in practice are examined. The two frameworks are compared on the issues of rules on use of force, in particular in the resort to lethal force.
The Value Problem for Knowledge
Authors: Pritchard Duncan
Published: September 2010

This chapter introduces the value problem for knowledge and distinguishes various forms of this problem. It shows that one such form of the problem — the swamping problem — poses a difficulty for a certain conception of epistemic value which is termed epistemic value T-monism. Various responses to this problem are canvassed. It is argued that the putative final value of knowledge is important to assessing the value problem, since if knowledge is indeed finally valuable then all the different forms of the value problem, including the swamping problem, are thereby seemingly resolved.
Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology
Authors: Pritchard Duncan
Published: September 2010

This chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.
Knowledge in Recent Epistemology: Some Problems
Authors: Millar Alan
Published: September 2010

This chapter argues that there is a tension — the central tension — between the assumption that knowledge admits of reductive conceptual analysis along traditional lines and the roles that knowledge and thinking about knowledge plays in our lives. While an analysis of knowledge should reflect the logical role of the concept, the prospects for providing a reductive analysis that meets this desideratum are dim. The chapter explores two further clusters of problems for the traditional ways of theorising about knowledge: the problem of making sense of how strong evidence must be for justification that satisfies the justification requirement for knowledge; and the problem of making sense of a justification requirement for some modes of knowledge. It explains why the discussion has placed such emphasis on concepts and conceptual enquiry. It indicates the way forward is indicated and outlines the construction of an epistemology that avoids the problems.
Knowledge and Justification
Authors: Haddock Adrian
Published: September 2010

This chapter sketches an account of visual knowledge according to which the justification involved in knowledge not merely guarantees the truth of the belief which knowledge involves, but guarantees that this belief is knowledgeable. It is argued that unlike the dominant alternatives, this account stays in tune with our pre-theoretical conception of knowledge and enables us to make sense of its value. Two potential problems for the account are presented: first, that it is vulnerable to the Argument from Illusion; secondly, that it generates a devastating regress. The first problem is despatched, but the second — more serious — problem is postponed until the next chapter.
Introduction
Authors: Houston R. A.
Published: September 2010

The introduction reviews the French‐influenced historiography of British suicide then considers social‐science approaches to its study, the sources and methods available for analysing English and Scottish suicide in the past, and the need for a comparative British approach.
Forfeiture in England and Wales
Authors: Houston R. A.
Published: September 2010

In England the crown gave the proceeds of forfeiture to its almoner for charitable distribution. Almoners dealt constructively with survivors, recreating community from the disorder left by a sudden death and imposing settlements on survivors, sometimes using powerful central courts like Star Chamber; they also negotiated, adjudicated, and mediated in pursuit of agreed local resolutions. However, the fragmented jurisdictional structure of England meant that subordinate lay lords could also have an interest in suicides, and the problems of competing lordship are assessed. Local social relations are explored, showing how lords and people interacted at a local level. The law and practice of ‘deodand’, the forfeiture of objects that caused death, and the changing nature of coroners' verdicts are examined; a new interpretation proposed of why they changed from felo de se to non compos mentis. The conclusion explains why intervention in suicide was especially necessary between 1500 and 1700.
Burial Practices
Authors: Houston R. A.
Published: September 2010

Some suicides were denied normal Christian burial. In separate sections dealing with England and Scotland this chapter explains the laws on burial and the reasons why some suicides were given profane burial. In England this could mean interment at a crossroads with a stake through the heart without any religious rites, though this was a local practice not a national one, and only selectively enforced against those poorly integrated into communities. The simplicity of Calvinist burial rituals means that the treatment of suicides in Scotland was less remarkable, except for their being excluded from the community of Christians. Scots did not stake the bodies of suicides.
Corporal Punishment
Authors: Houston R. A.
Published: September 2010

Across Europe the early modern period saw a creative period in punishment. Culprits were created, suicides among them. This chapter looks mostly at Scotland, showing how Roman law influenced the use of distinctive ‘corporal’ sanctions against suicides: the dragging and gibbeting of their bodies. These punishments were both judicial and ‘popular’ or extra‐judicial, their co‐existence highlighting important aspects of how communities made law in early modern Europe. Changing ideas of the body are shown in attitudes towards the anatomical dissection of the bodies of suicides and executed criminals. A section on northern England shows that punishments there resembled those of Scotland in focusing on public shame; the cultural and legal reasons for this are explored, as is the decline of corporal punishments after c.1650.