bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Self-Regard and Other-Regard: Reflexive Practices in American Psychology, 1890–1940
Authors: Morawski Jill G.
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Psychology has been frequently subjected to the criticism that it is an unreflexive science — that it fails to acknowledge the reflexive properties of human action which influence psychologists themselves as well as their subjects. However, even avowedly unreflexive actions may involve reflexivity, and in this paper I suggest that the practices of psychology include reflexive ones. Psychology has an established tradition of silence about the self-awareness and sell-consciousness of its actors, whether those actors are experimenters, theorists, or participants (subjects) in research, yet this silence has been established and maintained through sophisticated exercises in self-regard — through sustained reflexive work. Historical analysis reveals some of the ways in which psychologists recognized and then neglected, covered over, or denied reflexivity. Study of those instances where psychologists have engaged in self-conscious reflection or have attended to the sell-consciousness of research subjects indicates both the dangers of reflexivity to governing investigative practices and the resilience which psychology has built against reflexive work. Canonized procedures for scientific work reproduce selves of experimenters and subjects alike, selves who acknowledge only part of their reflexive engagements. Historians of psychology have a special opportunity (and obligation) to explore the reflexive dynamics of investigative practices, and, hence, to theorize aboutscientists, along with their actions and interactions, just as we theorize about science, its products, and its evolution.
Einstein at the Patent Office: Exile, Salvation, or Tactical Retreat?
Authors: Schulmann Robert
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Soon after finishing his studies in 1900, Einstein makes a tactical retreat to the Patent Office in Bern where he develops a plan for returning to the academic fold. He is assisted in this by a central figure in the Zurich establishment, Alfred Kleiner, who grooms him for the return. More generally, I argue that Einstein's role in the emergence of theoretical physics as a discipline results from the interaction of two developments, one external and institutional, the other internal and personal. Certain institutional constraints influence Einstein's early academic career by providing a professional opportunity to which he can adjust his career plans. The existence of this professional context for Einstein's early work in physics plays a role in encouraging him to pursue the speculative work in physics that became his distinctive hallmark. The other side of the coin is that Einstein's personal legitimation as professor of theoretical physics in 1909 also confers legitimacy on his speculative research, which in turn infuses the term “theoretical physics” with new meaning. The key factor uniting Einstein's personal development with institutional opportunities is the special relationship that he enjoys with Kleiner, who serves as the focus of interactions between the external and internal developments described in the paper.
The Witches' Sabbath: The First International Solvay Congress in Physics
Authors: Barkan Diana Kormos
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This paper is about the context of Albert Einstein's concerns at the time of a most intense intellectual effort — his own and that of a small group of scientists concerned with classical quantum theory. I describe contemporaneous interactions and differing views about the prospects for and the significance of the First Solvay Congress of 1911 as voiced by major participants. There are two axes around which the paper evolves: the Einstein-Nernst-Lorentz dialogue and the public institutional creation of the “Solvay” stage. In certain ways, this paper is about personal and institutional patronage: the working out of a difficult theoretical impasse requires individual and collective moral support. It is about the forging of the identity of a scientific problem and the personal and institutional setting, the public space, in which this problem was collectively addressed. But I also uncover heuristic playfulness and flexibility which accompanies theoretical change.
Dark Bodies and Black Holes, Magic Circles and Montgolfiers: Light and Gravitation from Newton to Einstein
Authors: Eisenstaedt Jean
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The question of the possible existence of black holes is closely related to the question of the action of gravitation on the propagation of light. It has been raised recurrently from the when that Newton referred to a possible bending of light in hisOpticks. And it relies on apparently simple questions: Is light subject to gravitation? What is the effect of a gravitational field on the propagation of light? Could a particle of light emitted by a star be retained by its gravitational field?

From the end of the 1960s, the black hole idea has had a very important place in the relativistic literature, not to speak of the popularization of the theory. It turned out to be not only an important concept but also a tool that permitted us to understand general relativity better, indeed a tool that contributed greatly to changing the interpretation of Einstein's theory of gravitation. Here too I want to use this concept of the black hole to assist our understanding of the history of general relativity: the black hole is a fundamental milestone in the evolution of general relativity.
The Reaction to Relativity Theory I: The Anti-Einstein Campaign in Germany in 1920
Authors: Goenner Hubert
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Developments in theoretical physics, even when they are revolutionary for physics, usually donotenter public awareness. The reaction to the special relativity theory is one of the few exceptions. The conceptual changes brought by special relativity to our notions of space and time, induced a lively debate not only within intellectual circles but in many strata of the educated middle class. In this article, I focus on a particular moment of public reaction to special and general relativity theory and to its creator Albert Einstein. I try to paint a picture of the anti-Einstein campaign in Germany of 1920, with finer brush strokes than those applied previously by others. My aim is to embed the campaign into the cultural and political climate of the Weimar republic. Without leaving the realm of physics only a superficial understanding of what happened seems possible. My thesis is that the anti-Einstein-campaign was organized, and the physicists involved in it (ab)used, mainly in order to rally support for one of the German right-wing parties, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei.
Einstein and Bohr's Rhetoric of Complementarity
Authors: Beller Mara
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The aim of this paper is to provide a critical perspective for Einstein's opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, by analyzing the ingenious rhetoric of Bohr's principle of complementarity. I argue that what Bohr presents as arguments of “inevitability” are in fact merely arguments for the consistency of the quantum-mechanical scheme. Einstein's resistance to being persuaded by this potent technique of argumentation, and his rejection of Bohr's interpretation of quantum physics, appear consequently as an eminently reasonable position and not as a conservative stand, as it is often presented by the adherents of the Copenhagen orthodoxy.
Struggling with Causality: Einstein's Case
Authors: Ben-Menahem Yemima
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Einstein's concept of causality as analyzed in this paper is a thick concept comprised of: (a) regularity; (b) locality; (c) symmetry considerations leading to conservation laws; (d) mutuality of causal interaction. The main theses are: 1. Since (b)–(d) are not elements of Hume's concept of causality, Einstein's concept, the concept embedded in the theory of relativity, is manifestly non–Humean. 2. On a Humean conception, Newtonian mechanics is a paradigmatically causal theory. Einstein, however, regarded this theory as causally deficient, for it fails to comply with both (b) and (d). Special relativity was (partly) motivated by the wish to correct the first of these failures; general relativity the second. 3. Ironically, general relativity, based on the thick concept of causality, opens the way for a conventionalist understanding of that concept. 4. With regard to human freedom, Einstein professed to be a Spinozist. However, he suggested a version of soft determinism, not found in Spinoza.
Einstein as a Disciple of Galileo A Comparative Study of Concept Development in Physics
Authors: Renn Jürgen
Published: September 2008

The Argument

In this paper I present and argue for a model of conceptual development in science and apply it to the transition from classical to modern physics associated with Einstein. The model claims a continuous and rational transition between incompatible subsequent conceptual systems in mathematical science and explains its mechanism. The model was developed in a study of the transition from preclassical to classical mechanics. I argue for a strong structural analogy between the transition from preclassical to classical mechanics on the one hand and from classical to modern physics on the other. The first transition is briefly sketched here by reference to Galileo and his disciples; in the second transition Planck and Lorentz on the one hand and Einstein on the other play the respective roles.

A detailed and documented reconstruction of the transition from preclassical to classical mechanics on the basis of this model has already been published and is only briefly referred to in the paper. The transition from classical to modern physics is portrayed here much more extensively—though of course merely in broad brush strokes. Einstein–s role in this transition is reconstructed in the light of a conceptualization of his scientific knowledge as an active structure of thought, shaped by his intellectual experience. In this way, the development of his individual thinking is shown to be part of the overall process of conceptual transformation from classical to modern physics. The reconstruction sketched in this paper is to be considered as a proposal to be substantiated, reformed, and improved by future detailed studies.
Carl Gottfried Neumann
Authors: Disalle Robert
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Carl Gottfried Neumann was born in Königsberg, Prussia, in 1832 and died in Leipzig in 1925. His father was the physicist Franz Neumann (1798–1895), notable for his contributions not only to the study of electricity and magnetism but also to the development of physics education in nineteenth-century Germany. Carl Neumann studied at the University of Königsberg and received his doctorate in 1855 with a work on the application of elliptic integrals to mechanics (Neumann 1856). In 1858 he became Privatdozent, and in 1863 Professor of Mathematics at Halle. Later that same year he moved to Basel, and in 1865 he became Ordinary Professor of Mathematics at Tübingen. Finally in 1868 he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Leipzig, a post he held until he retired in 1911; of the two mathematics professorships at Leipzig, this was the one formerly held by F. A. Möbius, and it was officially devoted to “the higher mathematics, especially physics” (quoted in Jungnickel and McCormmach 1986, 1:181). So Neumann's academic career, along with his role as one of the founding editors of the Mathematische Annalen beginning in 1869, can be seen as reflecting the enormous advance in mathematical sophistication that German physics underwent in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
On the Principles of the Galilean-Newtonian Theory
Authors: Neumann Carl
Published: September 2008

If, as is universally acknowledged, the proper goal of the mathematical sciences is the discovery of the least possible number of principles (notably principles that are not further explicable) from which the universal laws of empirically given facts emerge with mathematical necessity, and thus the discovery of principles equivalent to those empirical facts, then it must appear as a duty of indubitable importance to reflect carefully on the principles that have already surfaced with some certainty in one area of the natural sciences and present them in a form that really fulfills the equivalence requirement.
Intertextual Reference in Nineteenth-Century Mathematics
Authors: O'Neill John
Published: September 2008

The Argument

A scientific work presupposes a body of texts that are a condition for its intelligibility. This paper shows that the study of intertextual reference — of the ways a text indicates its relation to other texts — provides a fruitful perspective in the study of science that deserves more attention than it has hitherto received. The paper examines intertextual reference in early nineteenth-century mathematics, first surveying a variety of mathematical texts in the period and then examining in detail W.R. Hamilton's work on quaternions.

Three questions are addressed: (1) What forms of intertextual reference are employed? (2) What is the range of intertextual reference? (3) What are the functions of intertextual reference? The answers to the first two questions provide an unexplored perspective on the institutional changes in science during the period. The transitional status of the period in the development of later professional science is reflected in the relative openness in the forms of intertextual reference employed and the range of texts to which reference was made. In virtue of these features the period is particularly fruitful in the study of the functions of intertextual reference. With some major qualifications, the paper defends a Mertonian view that intertextual reference needs to be understood in terms of the claim to intellectual property rights.
Narrative Constraints on Historical Writing: The Case of the Scientific Revolution
Authors: Feldhay Rivka
Published: September 2008

The Argument

In this paper three canonical studies of the scientific revolution are subjected to narratological analysis. Underlying this analysis is the assumption that in any single product of historical writing it is possible to distinguish, for analytical purposes, between three levels of reference: the object of the text — the events; the representation of the events — the narrative; and the text in which a story is represented by means of narrative. Through texts one learns about historical events (the object of the text), but also about the process of producing the texts (the narrative). Techniques of representation are means of production of texts that represent, in addition to the events, also the producer and his or her authority. The distinction made for any specific text allows the reader to play the two levels against each other in order to create a space within which historical writing should be criticized. Such criticism may draw attention to the difficulty of controlling the meaning of historical stories, and to the need to analyze narrative structures in order to appreciate the ideological changes of historical texts.
Tropes and Topics in Scientific Discourse: Galileo'sDe Motu
Authors: Gal Ofer
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This paper contains two main sections. In the first I suggest a mechanism of interpretation, based on a distinction between two aspects of meaning, analyzed using two kinds of rhetorical-poetical constructions:tropesto explore the linguistic relations—metaphors, metonyms, synecdoches, etc.—that endow terms with content, andtopicsto account for the structuring function of key expressions, which enables the recognition and adjudication of phrases, arguments, texts, genres, etc. In the second section I substantiate my claims by demonstrating how new light is shed on Galileo Galilei's neglected and obscureDe Motuif these two aspects of the meaning of its central theoretical terms are taken into consideration; interpreted through this approach it is revealed as a text revolutionary in its ideas, while the communicative efficacy of its continuous use of the traditional terminology is unveiled.
Ideology, Rhetoric, and Boyle's New Experiments
Authors: Krips Henry
Published: September 2008

The Argument

In this paper I show that in its original setting Boyle's New Experiments was not only rhetorical but also ideological. By employing a Lacanian theory of the subject, I show that this text not only disguised various “real contradictions“ in the fabric of Restoration society but also acted as a site for certain textual practices that played a role in the constitution of a new form of subjectivity for scientists. I also address the philosophical question of whether the ideological and rhetorical nature of scientific texts impugns the status of their theoretical claims as paradigms of knowledge and rational belief.
“Every Path Will End in Darkness” or: Why Psychoanalysis Needs Metapsychology
Authors: Brunner José
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This article focuses on the dialectic of metapsychology and hermeneutics in psychoanalysis. By combining the causal language of the former with the inten tional terminology of the latter, Freud's discourse continuously transgresses the narrowly conceived boundaries of scientific disciplines and places its stakes in both the humanities and the natural sciences. The argument is made that attempts to reduce psychoanalytic theory to either causal explanation or interpretation of meaning turn it into a closed thought system and rob it of its vitality. It is argued, moreover, that although Freud understood himself to be a scientist, by eschewing the dichotomous reductionism characteristic of both his orthodox followers and critics who tried and still try to turn psychoanalysis into either a natural-science- like discipline or a hermeneutics, Freud demonstrated that his self-understanding was far more sophisticated than admitted by either of these two groups. This argument is supported by a detailed discussion of Freud's epistemological pre mises, his conception of science and reality, and especially, the place he allocated to metapsychology in his interdisciplinary science. It is claimed that metapsy chology served Freud as a double-edged sword, both enabling creative and metaphorical thought about the mind's hidden reality and revealing the necessary incompleteness of hermeneutics. The article concludes with the claim that psy choanalysis needs metapsychology in order to pursue this dual task.
Memoirs, Memory, and Historical Experience
Authors: Motzkin Gabriel
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Against the idea that modern historiography developed in the eighteenth century as a completely new way of looking at the past, this paper argues that modern historical science borrowed its sense of experience from seventeenth-century memoirs. However, seventeenth-century rnemorialists made very different as sumptions than modern historians about the relations between time, memory, and history. One consequence of their introduction of lived subjectivity into the depiction of the past was a debate in early eighteenth-century France about the relations between history and fiction, some arguing that fiction is a better way of grasping the subjective truth of the past. These debates about the relations between history and memory and between history and fiction have resurfaced recently. The historical moods that are one context for paradigm shifts share common motifs, such as a sense of defeat, of distance between the present and the immediate past, and a need for consolation through the elaboration of a new mode of experiencing the past.
The Crystallization of a New Narrative Form in Experimental Reports (1660–1690)
Authors: Licoppe Christian
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This essay describes the emergence and stabilization in French and English experimental accounts, in second half of the seventeenth century, of the narrative sequence: X did (some process in the laboratory) and X saw (something happen), where X stands for a pronoun, I or we in English,je, nousoronin French. Focussing on the French case, it shows how the use of the collective pronounonin the experimental accounts registered in the files of the Académie des Sciences is directly related to the will of this newly created institution to assert a collective authority on the production and legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact produced in the laboratory. It is argued, through the case of the discovery of the blind spot in the eye by Mariotte, that this new narrative form imbeds a construal of the experiment as a public spectacle, and of the proof as a witnessing event, which eludes the Academy's attempts to monopolize the process of fact validation and favors the diffusion and display of experiments in front of larger audiences. The question of whether a privileged witness such as the King of France who patronized the Academy could not have constituted by himself a suitable audience to ensure a full legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact while remaning within the bounds of academic practices is addressed. It is answered in the negative by providing evidence for the lack of interest of the absolute monarch in experiments. On the other hand, the outdoor practices of observation and measurement are shown to interfere in a constructive manner with the absolutist power and to capture the attention of the absolutist monarch, where laboratory experiments had failed. It is proposed that natural philosophers in the early modern period bear the burden of proof in buying credibility for the phenomena they try, by paying a tribute to the standing of the patrician elites that witness their experiments. This makes sense in a straightforward manner of the lack of interest of the King of France in a practice which exalts the power of the very group he is trying hard to control through the absolutist structure of power.
From the Science of Accounts to the Financial Accountability of Science
Authors: Power Michael
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This introductory essay describes some intellectual intersections between the history and sociology of science and the history and sociology of accounting. These intersections suggest a potential field of inquiry that concerns itself explicitly with science and economic calculation, a potential that is partly realized in the essays that follow. It is possible to describe a broad shift from concerns for the scientific credentials of accounting to a recognition of the constitutive role that accounting plays for science. In other words the so-called cultural hegemony of the scientist is giving way to that of the accountant. This shift has a number of loosely related but complementary elements. The first is to be found in some recent historical work that links ideals of scientific objectivity to administrative and political values. A second element is a body of work that is critical of theorydominant approaches to experiment and concerns itself with laboratory practice in social context. A third element is an emerging interest in the economics of science. I argue that such a program is weak where it abstracts from processes of economic calculation, and this suggests the fourth element: a contextual approach to economic calculation to be found in sociologically informed accounting research. In the light of these four elements, the essay concludes by considering directly the implications of accounting for science, particularly given recent initiatives to make science more accountable.
Making Things Quantitative
Authors: Porter Theodore M.
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Quantification is not merely a strategy for describing the social and natural worlds, but a means of reconfiguring them. It entails the imposition of new meanings and the disappearance of old ones. Often it is allied to systems of experimental or administrative control, and in fact considerable feats of human organization are generally required even to create stable, reasonably standardized measures. This essay urges that the uses of quantification in science, social science, and bureaucratic social and economic policy are analogous in important ways to accountancy.
Perception, Expression, and Social Function of Pain: A Human Ethological View
Authors: Schiefenhövel Wulf
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Pain has important biomedical socioanthropological, semiotic, and other facets. In this contribution pain and the experssion of pain are looked at from the perspective of evolutionary biology, utilizing, among others, cross-cultural data from field work in Melanesia.

No other being cares for sick and suffering conspecifics in the way humans do. Notwithstanding aggression and neglect, common in all cultures, human societies can be characterized as empathic, comforting, and promoting the health and well-being of their members. One important stimulus triggering this caring response in others is the expression of pain. The nonverbal channel of communication, particularly certain universal — i.e., culture-independent facial expressions, gestures, and body postures, convey much of the message from the painstricken person to the group.

These behaviors signal the person's physical and psychical pain, sadness, grief, and despair in ways very similar to the signs given by infants and small children: the body loses tonus and sinks or drops to the ground, the gestures are those of helplessness. Pain and grief may be so strong that control is lost not only over the body's posture but also over the mind's awareness. In such cases the afflicted person may carry out actions endangering himself or others. In general, these behavior patterns resemble those of infants in situations of distress and danger, and it is not surprising that the response of the members of the group is basically parental: taking care, assisting and consoling.

Perceptive and behavioral patterns which developed in the course of avian and mammalian phylogeny to serve the well-being of the young have proven, as was shown by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989), to be powerful building blocks for actions in other spheres of human interaction. Love is one such field, the reactions to a conspecific suffering pain is another.
Towards a History of European Physical Sensibility: Pain in the Later Middle Ages
Authors: Cohen Esther
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The study of pain in a historical context requires a consideration of the cultural context in which pain is sensed and expressed. This paper examines attitudes toward physical pain in the later Middle Ages in Europe from several standpoints: theology, law, and medicine. During the later Middle Ages attitudes toward pain shifted from rejection and a demand for impassivity as a mark of status to a conscious attempt to sense, express, and inflict as much pain as possible. Pain became a positive force, a useful tool for reaching a variety of truths. While this attitude stemmed from the religious wish to identify with Christ's passion, it permeated and affected all spheres of cultural expression and investigation. Late permeated and affected all spheres of cultural expression and investigation. Late medieval medicine accepted pain, trying to relieve it only when it became dangerous to the patient. Given the existence of analgesic medicines at the time, this attitude is comprehensible only within the cultural context of the period.
Medical Similes in Religious Discourse: The Case of Giovanni di San Gimignano OP (ca. 1260–ca. 1333)
Authors: Ziegler Joseph
Published: September 2008

The Argument

By the beginning of the fourteenth century, medicine had acquired a cultural role in addition to its traditional functions as a therapeutic art. Medical subject matter infiltrated the religious discourse via the new thirteenth-century encyclopedic literature. Preachers came to employ in their moral analogies a wider range of medical topics, using sophisticated medical examples and citations attributed to recognized medical authorities. These developments coincided with the growing prestige of medicine as an academic discipline.
Beyond Nature and Culture: A Note on Medicine in the Age of Molecular Biology
Authors: Rheinberger Hans-Jörg
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The paper is divided into the two parts. In the first, I examine the relations among molecular biology, gene technology, and medicine as some aspect of the consequences of these relations with respect to the human genome project of the consequences of these relations with respect to the human genome project. I argue that the prevailing momentum of early molecular biology resided in argue that the prevailing momentum of relay molecular biology resided in crating the technical means for an extracellular representation of intracellular configurations. Assuch, its medical impact was rather limited. With the advent of recombinant DNA technology is based on the prospects of an intracellular representation of extracellular projects—the “rewriting” of life. Its medical impact is potentially unlimited. In the second part, I question the very opposition between nature and culture that implicitly underlies the notion of medicine as a “cultural system.” I argue that both on a macroscopic level (global ecological changes) and on a microscopic level (genetic engineering), the “natural” and the “social” are no longer to be seen as ontologically different.

In its uncanny oscillation between retrospection and foresight, between description and proclamation, and between assertion and hesitation, this essay translates an uneasiness that I have not been able to overcome while writing it. The essay conveys the tangled views of a hybrid author who himself cannot but oscillate between the perspectives of an actor in the field of molecular biology, a participant in the field of science studies, and a citizen
Biological Medicine and the Survival of the Person
Authors: Atlan Henri
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The status of the person is analyzed as represented by the life sciences under the influence of modern physico–chemical and molecular biology.

At the same time the linguistic structure of reality as seen through formalized scientific discourse is not that of a language, but rather that of operational symbolisms, so that the judeo–Greek tradition of Verb as creating and Logos as procreating — which is probably at the origin of the surprising confidence in the possibility of dominating nature through words and formulae — could be suc–cessful only through the depersonalization of language.

Notwithstanding appearances, the phenomena of structural and functional self–organization do not really change this situation.

In this context the question of the status of the person and of the intentional subject has to be dealt with pragmatically, giving up the notion of a unified scientific theory that would take into consideration at the same time the experi–mental sciences (physics, chemistry, biology and “objective” human) and the human sciences as linking subjectivity and intentionality.
Technology in Culture: The Meaning of Cultural Fit
Authors: Wallace Anthony F. C.
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The thesis of this paper is that there are three basic processes by which a technological innovation is fitted into an existing culture: (1) Rejection, in situations where all interested groups are satisfied with a traditional technology and reject apparently superior innovations because they would force unwanted changes in technology and ideology; (2) Acceptance, in situations where a new technology is embraced by all because it appears to serve the same social and ideological functions as an inferior, or inoperative, traditional technology; and (3) — most commonly in complex societies — conflict over acceptance or rejection, in situations where a new technology introduced or proposed by one group, who perceive it as advancing their interests, is resisted by another group, who perceive it as threatening their welfare. A traditional tripartite concept of culture is employed, distinguishing technology, social organization, and ideology. Four case studies are introduced to illuminate the issue: the Thonga tribesmen of Mozambique, whose occupation as gold and diamond miners at first suited perfectly the requirements of the Thonga lineage and marriage system; the Yir Yoront of Australia, an aboriginal group who found that the steel axe introduced by whites disrupted the patriarchal status system and confounded their mythology; the Senecas, an American Indian tribe that for generations rejected male plow agriculture because their way of life was organized around female horticulture, but who took up male agriculture at the urging of a prophet when traditional male roles disintegrated on the reservation; and the anthracite miners and mine operators of nineteenth-century Pennsylvania, who discovered that fundamental changes in both social organization and ideology were needed in order to cope with catastrophically high rates of industrial accidents attendant on the new system of deep-shaft mining.
Politics and Technology in Eighteenth-Century Russia
Authors: Rieber Alfred J.
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The question posed by this paper is why the Russian autocracy failed to pursue successfully Peter the Great's conscious policy of creating a society dominated by technique and competitive with technological levels achieved by Western Europe. The brief answer is that Peter's idea of a cultural revolution that would create new values and institutions hospitable to the introduction of technology clashed with powerful interests within society. The political opposition centered around three groups which were indispensable to the state in fulfilling his vision: the nobility, the clergy, and the scientific establishment. Peter's original intention was to combine theoretical models and technology transfer from the West with educational reforms in Russia to produce new cadres of technical specialists. He attempted to adapt the Leibniz-Wolff cosmology to Russian conditions in order to reconcile ideological conflicts between military service and technical training, science and religion, theory and practice. The embodiment of his ideas in Russian science and religion were Mikhail Lomonosov and Feofan Prokopovich. Under his successors Peter's supporters encountered increased resistance: from the nobility to technical education, from the clergy to the scientific outlook, and from the Academy of Sciences to practical work. All three interest groups were willing to sacrifice real political rights for a recognition by the states of their autonomy to define their social roles. In the end the compromise was effected at the expense of Peter's ideal of the society dominated by technique.
The Politices of Production: Technology, Markets, and the Two Cultures of American Industry
Authors: Scranton Philip
Published: September 2008

The Argument

As the American economy became more complex and differentiated in the post-1850 decades, so too did the demand for manufactured products, creating wide markets for both mass-produced standard goods and batch-produced specialties among consumers and producers alike. These developments conditioned the emergence of distinctive work cultures within the two broad spheres of manufacturing, as well as distinct approaches to technological selection and use, labor, marketing, and management. As the mass production dynamic has been well documented, this essay focuses principally on elaborating the practices of industrial specialists for comparison with those of “managerial capitalism.” Conditions and controversies in the textile, woodworking, and metalworking trades provide an in-depth example of larger patterns among batch-oriented sectors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including issues of the politics (i.e., power relations) in production and the recording of masculine identity and values. The role of public policies in facilitating the universalization of mass production rhetorics and practices is considered at the close.
Aesthetics, Technology, and the Capitalization of Culture: How the Talking Machine Became a Musical Instrument
Authors: Siefert Marsha
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This article uses the history of early sound recording technology in the united States between 1878 and 1915 to show how published discourse contributed to the way the talking machine was defined and situated as a commercially viable product. Comparing the published accounts of Edison's phonograph and Berliners gramophone in popular scientific articles between 1878 and 1896 illustrates that technological advances in sound recording technology take on important cultural meanings. Critical to these meanings is the way in which the technological “fidelity” is linguistically transformed into an aesthetic quality, projected and interpreted within demonstrable values of musical culture. Beginning in 1902, the Victor Talking Machine Company, formed to market the gramophone, took advantage of these cultural meanings to claim a technological advantage over Edison's cylinder recorder. Whose voice was recorded became part of the claim to technological superiority. The Victor Company succeeded in capitalizing “Culture” by promoting their recordings of opera stars like Enrico Caruso as technologically and culturally faithful to live musical performance and as a democratically available access to a privileged lifestyle. Thus did the Victor Company use a terrier and a tenor to legitimate their talking machine as an American musical instrument
The Anthropology of Misfortune and Cognitive Science. Examples from the Ivory Coast Senufo
Authors: Alice Sindzingre Nicole
Published: September 2008

The Argument

This paper applies the approach developed by the congnitive sciences to a classical field of social anthropology—i.e., the analysis of represetations and behaviors relative to misfortune in “traditional” societies.

The initial argument is that the conceptual division and the modes of description and explanation of anthropology suffer from serious weaknesses: these concepts cannot serve to understand empirical phenomena (utterances and/or behavior); they rely on a confused and erroneous conception of the different domains involved and the causalities between them; and they use simplistic hypotheses about the existence and causal status of the entities that usually form the ultima ratio of anthropological reasoning (e.g., lineage organization, ancestors, witchcraft, etc.). These entities would directly “cause” other individual representations or behaviors. This simplification also affects the analysis of states of belief in these entities, to which individuals would supposedly “adhere”.

I argue here that the cognitivist approach, within a “methodological individualism” framework, provides a more adequate description of phenomena observed in the field. This enables the various levels and domains to be more finely defined. The analysis of “typical” utterances and inferences in a “tranditional” society, the Senufo of the Ivory Coast, is here used to clarify these anthropological problems. Two levels can be distinguished: (1) a priori representations, which are underdetermined, enabling them to occur within valid inferences; (2) perception and/or action, which obeys different cognitive constraints. The existential status of unobservable entities appearing in causal inferences is not equivalent (“symmetrical”) depending on whether they are determined as antecedent or consequent.

This paper suggests a theory of interpretive processes and beliefs having flexible references, because they are incomplete and domain-specific. It allows a comparison with facts observed in Western societies. It is also in contrast to the ordinary conception of religious states of belief — i.e., these states would be purely psychological, states of “adherence,” collective, autonomous, obligatory, part of a systemized set of knowledge; collective notions (of God, church, etc.) would here logically precede individual representations.
Alexandre Koyré versus Lucien Lévy-Bruhl: From Collective Representations to Paradigms of Scientific Thought
Authors: Zambelli Paola
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Alexandre Koyré is one of the most important historians of philosophic and scientific though since the thirties. Research on the Scientific Revolution, on Galileo, Descartes, Newton, as well as on Paracelsus and Boehme has deeply changed under his influential method: it has been a model for Kuhn's methodology of paradigms and revolutions in the histroy of science. Whereas Koyré used to be considered opposed in his ideology and method to sociological approaches, he has recently been characterized by Yehuda Elkana as a sociologist of knowledge. In fact, until now one of the main sources of his method had not been identified: it is only by acknowledging the influence of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl on Koyré that it is possible to explain how the latter wrote his thesis on Boehme's mystical thought just before his Etudes galiléennes. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl was teaching history of philosophy at the Sorbonne, and Koyré was strongly influenced by his idea of “prelogical thinking” as a universel phenomenon and in a general way by the sociological school of Durkheim. Conceptual analysis deriving from Husserl, collective representations and attitude mentale(the latter invented not by Lucien Febvre but by Lévy-Bruhl), came together in Alexandre Koyrè's method
Postmodernism and Immune Selfhood
Authors: Tauber Alfred I.
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Two research traditions in immunology, supposedly centered on the same issue of immune identification, have followed different theoretical goals and originated form competing phillosophical foundations. these may be labelled modernist and postmodernist, respectively, thereby applying cultural and philosophical categories to immunology in order to articulate potential scientific resonances with the broader culture. To accept that exercise and important caveat is imposed, namely, this translation is most appropriately discussed at the level of metaphor. In other words, I will structure my treatment of these issues as expressed in the metaphorical language of the disipline, and thus the bulk of this discussion will focus on how the language and modeling of the science draws from the culture-at-large. Scientists seek images from their eveir everyday lives to describe phenomena that may be poorly articulated in their technical discourse; such is the utility and importance of metaphors generally, and thus it is not surprising that we might discern echoes of a postmodernist sentiment in the metaphors borrowed from post–World War II culture. I Will also discuss, to a more limited extent, how postmodernists have sought support for their own ideological arguments in immunology. This last topic server only to illustrate the bidirectionality of scientific discourse with the society in which it is embedded.
The Meaning and Value of Invention
Authors: Guéry François
Published: September 2008

The Argument

The secret of invention or the art of inventing has recently become the object of positive or experimental research, aimed at discovering the logic of the initial mental processes that lead to “innovation.” But the problem is old and goes back to antiquity: The art of memory, rhetoric, symbolics. Does the succession of thought in invention follow a rule, such that its variations could be classified? Here I offer but a general direction: There is an analogy between the two relations: invention/innovation and fecundation/maturation – namely, a male and a female principle.

The Ancients thought that inventing was a divine art and that man receives the spark to then brood over its fruit in his mind. Today's still dominant materialist tendency insists on the importance of this secondary maturation and minimizes the role of the primordial spark.

Thus becomes possible the ranking according to a unique order — but not without hesitations and guilt — of thinkers as far apart as Mandeville, Adam Smith, Hegel, Buffon, Rousseau, and Herder, to find the contemporary trend to which François Dagognet belongs.
Algorithmics and the Limits of Complexity
Authors: Parrochia Daniel
Published: September 2008

The Argument

Dagognet's work shows that making algorithmic compressions seems to be one of the major targets of scientific progress. This effort has been so successful that until recently one might have thought everything could be algorithmically compressed. Indeed, this statement, which might be seen as a scientific translation of the Hegelian thesis in its strong form (“the real is rational and the rational is real”), admits to some objective limits in computer science. Though a lot of algorithms are successful, there exist today, and perhaps forever, logical and physical limits that cannot allow us to cherish the dream of a “theory of everything.” Moreover, a complete mastery of complexity does not seem possible — because some domains of reality are too complicated to be computable, because the human brain is too limited, because computers cannot do that much better than the human brain, and because, ultimately, there are some kinds of things it would make no sense to compress. This paper shows that Dagognet's work came to recognize what a glance at the history of algorithmics has made evident.
The Last Scientist, the First Magician: Dramatic and Epic Theater as Alternative Images of Science
Authors: Barkan Diana L. Kormos
Published: September 2008

In his “A Programmatic Attempt at an Anthropology of Knowledge,” published in 1981, Yehuda Elkana briefly introduced the notions of dramatic and epic theater as metaphors for distinct and opposite conceptions of history. He elaborated more fully on this theme in a paper published in 1982 on the occasion of the Albert Einstein centenary celebration. Elkana there criticized the “myth of simplicity” surrounding Einstein, and proposed to replace a “facile holism” often attributed to Einstein with “two-tier thinking.” According to Elkana, Einstein's historical epistemology was a blend of an epic, contingent view of historical scientific change coupled with strong scientific realism.
Two-Tier Thinking: A Moral Point of View
Authors: Ophir Adi
Published: September 2008

Among those who know Yehuda's work, the term “two-tier thinking” is usually associated with a problematic relativist position (Elkana 1978). But “two-tier thinking” is not a name for a philosophical argument; it is best understood, I think, as a term designating certain conditions of knowledge: universal, or modern, or perhaps only postmodern conditions, but in any case, they are generalizations derived from anthropological and psychological observations on matters of facts. This is how things actually work in the sphere of knowledge: Western intellectuals and scientists tend to acknowledge that their truth claims and certainly their normative claims are incompatible with other claims that stem from other belief systems, frameworks of thought or genres of discourses, and there is no final, impartial instance of judgment to adjudicate between the incompatible claims and the conflicting systems. Lack of “final,” impartial judgment does not hinder people from taking their truth claims seriously and acting as realists within the world constituted by their particular belief systems — tier 1. But when they come to reflect upon it, as some of them do, sometimes, they acknowledge the context-dependence of this realism and the fact that there is no way to make good on its claim to universality; theirs, they know, is but one particular “belief system,” or “genre of discourse,” among many.