bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Regulation of adenylyl cyclase in LTP
Authors: Roberson Erik D. , Sweatt J. David
Published: February 2010

Our results on hippocampal long-term potentiation are considered in the context of Xia et al.'s hypothesis. Whereas the target article proposes presynaptic PKC involvement in adenylyl cyclase activation by phosphorylation of nenromodulin, we suggest an additional postsynaptic role involving RC3/nenrogranin. Finally, we examine the possibility that the adenylyl cyclase mutant mouse may display normal learning with a selective impairment of memory.
Unique lipids and unique properties of retinal proteins
Authors: Sanada Kamon , Fukada Yoshitaka
Published: February 2010

Amino-terminal heteroacylation has been identified in retinal proteins including recoverin and α subunit of G-protein, transducin. The tissue-specific modification seems to mediate not only a proteinmembrane interaction but also a specific protein-protein interaction. The mechanism generating the heterogeneity and its physiological role are still unclear, but an interesting idea for the latter postulates a fine regulation of the signal transduction pathway by distinct N-acyl groups.
Na-Ca + K exchanger and Ca2+homeostasis in retinal rod outer segments: Inactivation of the Ca2+efflux mode and possible involvement of intracellular Ca2+stores in Ca2+homeostasis
Authors: Schnetkamp Paul P. M.
Published: February 2010

Inactivation of the Ca2+extrusion mode of the retinal rod Na- Ca + K exchanger is suggested to be the mechanism that prevents lowering of cytosolic free Ca2+to < 1 nM when rod cells are saturated for a prolonged time under bright light conditions. Under these conditions, Ca2+fluxes across disk membranes can contribute significantly to Ca2+homeostasis in rods.
Glutamate accumulation in the photoreceptor-presumed final common path of photoreceptor cell death
Authors: Tamai Makoto
Published: February 2010

Genetic abnormalities of three factors related to the photoreceptor mechanism have been reported in both animal models and humans. Apoptotic mechanism has also been suggested as a final common pathway of photoreceptor cell death. Our findings of increased level of glutamate in photoreceptor cells inrdsmice suggest that amino acid might mediate between these two pathological mechanisms.
The genetic kaleidoscope of vision
Authors: Wahlsten Douglas
Published: February 2010

Site-specific phenotypic effects of the 73 known alleles in the rhodopsin gene that cause retinal degeneration are difficult to interpret because most alleles are documented in only one case or one family, which means variation in effects could actually arise from interactions with other loci. However, sample sizes necessary to detect epistatic interaction may place an answer to this question beyond our grasp.
More answers about cGMP-gated channels pose more questions
Authors: Wensel Theodore G. , Angleson Joseph K.
Published: February 2010

Our understanding of the molecular properties and cellular role of cGMP-gated channels in outer segments of vertebrate photo-receptors has come from over a decade of studies which have continuously altered and refined ideas about these channels. Further examination of this current view may lead to future surprises and further refine the understanding of cGMP-gated channels.
Is the lifetime of light-stimulated cGMP phosphodiesterase regulated by recoverin through its regulation of rhodopsin phosphorylation?
Authors: Yamazaki Akio
Published: February 2010

In the current model of visual transduction, the lifetime of active cGMP phosphodiesterase depends upon the period of its interaction with GTP-bound transducin. If recoverin regulates the lifetime of light-activated cGMP phosphodiesterase through inhibition of rhodopsin phosphorylation, rhodopsin should directly interact with cGMP phosphodiesterase and/or GTP-bound transducin complexed with cGMP phosphodiesterase. Is this true?
How many light adaptation mechanisms are there?
Authors: Bownds M. Deric , Arshavsky Vadim Y.
Published: February 2010

The generally positive response to our target article indicates that most of the commentators accept our contention that light adaptation consists of multiple and possibly redundant mechanisms. The commentaries fall into three general categories. The first deals with putative mechanisms that we chose not to emphasize. The second is a more extended discussion of the role of calcium in adaptation. Finally, additional aspects of cGMP involvement in adaptation are considered. We discuss each of these points in turn.
Recoverin, a calcium-binding protein in photoreceptors
Authors: Hurley James B.
Published: February 2010

Recoverin is a Ca2+-binding protein found primarily in vertebrate photoreceptors. The proposed physiological function of recoverin is based on the finding that recoverin inhibits light-stimulated phosphorylation of rhodopsin. Recoverin interacts with rod outer segment membranes in a Ca2+-dependent manner. This interaction requires N-terminal acylation of recoverin. Four types of fatty acids have been detected on the N-terminus of recoverin, but the functional significance of this heterogeneous acylation is not yet clear.
Testing Mealey's model: The need to demonstrate an ESS and to establish the role of testosterone
Authors: Archer John
Published: February 2010

Two specific aspects of Mealey's model are questioned: (1) the application of the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to all alternative strategies, including those that involve reduced lifetime reproductive success; and (2) the evidence for the dual role of testosterone, which is based mainly on studies of a modulating effect on aggression.
Group differences ≢ individual differences
Authors: Bergeman C. S. , Seroczynski A. D.
Published: February 2010

Mealey's etiological distinction between primary and secondary sociopathy blurs the delineation between individual and group differences. She uses physiological evidence to support her claim of genetic influences, neglecting variability within social classes, frequency of delinquent behavior in upper and middle classes (measured by self-report), and discontinuity of criminal behavior across the life span. Finally, Mealey's proposals for differential intervention fall short of a future agenda, which should tailor to individual needs, not social classes.
The sociopathy of sociobiology
Authors: Crusio Wim E.
Published: February 2010

Mealey's evolutionary reasoning is logically flawed. Furthermore, the evidence presented in favor of a genetic contribution to the causation of sociopathy is overinterpreted. Given the potentially large societal impact of sociobiological speculation on the roots of criminality, more-than-usual caution in interpreting data is called for.
The role of emotion in sociopathy: Contradictions and unanswered questions
Authors: Eisenberg Nancy
Published: February 2010

Emotion is critical in Mealey's conceptual arguments. However, several of her assertions about the role of emotion in sociopathy are problematic. Questions are raised regarding the link between lack of anxiety and low levels of secondary emotions such as love and sympathy, the argument that sociopaths are low in anxiety but high in neuroticism, and the designation of anxiety as a secondary emotion.
Extending arousal theory and reflecting on biosocial approaches to social science
Authors: Ellis Lee
Published: February 2010

This commentary extends arousal theory to suggest an explanation for the well-established inverse correlation between church attendance and involvement in crime. In addition, the results of two surveys of social scientists are reviewed to reveal just how little impact the biosocial/sociobiological perspective has had thus far on “mainstream” social science.
The epigenesis of sociopathy
Authors: Figueredo Aurelio José
Published: February 2010

Mealey distinguishes two types of sociopathy: (1) “primary,” or obligate, and (2) “secondary,” or facultative. Either sociopathy evolved twice, or one form is derived from the other, e.g., through: (1) genetic assimilation generating polymorphism in the relative strength of biases favoring the development of otherwise facultative strategies, or (2) independently heritable but strategically relevant characteristics biasing the optimal selection of facultative strategies.
Implications of an evolutionary biopsychosocial model
Authors: Holcomb Harmon R.
Published: February 2010

Mealey's work has several interesting implications: It refutes the charge that sociobiology paints a cynical portrait of human nature and adopts a one-sided reductionism; it exemplifies a general theoretical scheme for constructing evolutionary biopsychosocial models of human behavior; and it has the practical effect of promoting and informing early intervention in children at risk for psychopathic disorder.
Al Capone, discrete morphs, and complex dynamic systems
Authors: Kenrick Douglas T. , Brown Stephanie
Published: February 2010

We consider four mechanisms by which apparent discontinuities in the distribution of antisociality could arise: (1) executive genes or hormonal systems, (2) multiplicative interactions of predisposing factors, (3) environmental tracking into a limited number of social roles, and (4) cross-generational gene—environment interactions. A more explicit consideration of complex self-organizing dynamic systems may help us understand the maintenance of antisocial subpopulations.
Fatherless rearing leads to sociopathy
Authors: Lykken David T.
Published: February 2010

Endorsing Mealey's analysis, it is pointed out that increasing rates of crime and violence are due to increasing proportions of children being reared in circumstances radically different from the extendedfamily environment to which we are evolntionarily adapted, that is, they are reared without fathers.
“Genetics” and DNA polymorphisms
Authors: Plomin Robert
Published: February 2010

Four questions are raised about Mealey's genetic argument: (1) Where is the evidence that secondary sociopathy is less heritable than primary sociopathy? (2) What is the genetic correlation between the two types of sociopathy? (3) How does genotype-environment interaction relate? (4) How strong are the links between our evolutionary past and current heritability?
Emotions and sociopathy
Authors: Plutchik Robert
Published: February 2010

Questions are raised about several issues discussed by Mealey: (1) the nature of the distinction between primary and secondary sociopaths, (2) some difficulties with a general arousal theory of criminality, and (3) the possible role of countervailing forces in the development of sociopathy. An important area that calls for attention is the patterning of different specific emotions in the lives of sociopaths as compared to other groups.
Psychopathy is a nonarbitrary class
Authors: Quinsey Vernon L. , Lalumière Martin L.
Published: February 2010

Recent evidence that psychopathy is a nonarbitrary population, such that the trait may be categorical rather than continuous, is consistent with Mealey's distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths. Thus, there are likely to be at least two routes to criminality, and psychopathic and nonpsychopathic criminals are likely to respond differently to interventions.
Psychopathy and violence: Arousal, temperament, birth complications, maternal rejection, and prefrontal dysfunction
Authors: Raine Adrian
Published: February 2010

The key questions arising from Mealey's analysis are: Do environmental factors such as early maternal rejection also contribute to the emotional deficits observed in psychopaths? Are there psychophysiological protective factors for antisocial behavior that have clinical implications? Does a disinhibited temperament and low arousal predispose to primary psychopathy? Would primary or secondary psychopaths be most characterized by prefrontal dysfunction?
Primary sociopathy (psychopathy) is a type, secondary is not
Authors: Mealey Linda
Published: February 2010

Recent studies lend support to the two-pathway model of the evolution of sociopathy with evidence that: 1) psychopathy (primary sociopathy) is a discrete type and 2) in general, sociopaths have relatively high levels of reproductive success. Hare's Psychopathy Checklist may provide a start for the revision of terminology that will be necessary to distinguish between primary and secondary trajectories.
Arguments in favour of a psycho-psychophysics
Authors: Müller Friedrich
Published: February 2010

In contrast to Lockhead's view it is argued that psychology as a genuine science must not be based on other sciences and that psychological measurements have to be validated inside psychology. It is pointed out that psychological scalings, unaffected by judgment contexts, can be obtained if the experimental setting is compatible with everyday situations.
The ontology of aspectual shape
Authors: Kurthen Martin , Linke Detlef B.
Published: February 2010

Searle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the “ontology” of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of “ontology,” namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
Where the adventure is
Authors: Bienenstock Elie , Geman Stuart
Published: February 2010

Interpreting the Miyashita et al. experiments in terms of a cellassembly representation does not adequately explain the performance of Miyashita's monkeys on novel stimuli. We will argue that the latter observations point to acompositionalrepresentation and suggest a dynamics involving rapid and reversible binding of distinct activity patterns.
Reverberation reconsidered: On the path to cognitive theory
Authors: Chown Eric
Published: February 2010

Amit's work addresses a critical issue in cognitive science: the structure of neural representations. The use of Hebbian cell assemblies is a positive step, and we now need to consider its role in a larger cognitive theory. When considering the dynamics of a system built out of attractors, a more limited version of reverberation becomes necessary.
What's in a cell assembly?
Authors: Dalenoort G. J. , de Vries P. H.
Published: February 2010

The cell assembly as a simple attractor cannot explain many cognitive phenomena. It must be a highly structured network that can sustain highly structured excitation patterns. Moreover, a cell assembly must be more widely distributed in space than on a square millimeter.
Mathematics of Hebbian attractors
Authors: Hirsch Morris W.
Published: February 2010

The concept of an attractor in a mathematical dynamical system is reviewed. Emphasis is placed on the distinction between a cell assembly, the corresponding attractor, and the attractor dynamics. The biological significance of these entities is discussed, especially the question of whether the representation of the stimulus requires the full attractor dynamics, or merely the cell assembly as a set of reverberating neurons. Comparison is made to Freeman's study of dynamic patterns in olfaction.
Distributed cell assemblies and detailed cell models
Authors: Lansner Anders , Fransén Erik
Published: February 2010

Hebbian cell-assembly theory and attractor networks are good starting points for modeling cortical processing. Detailed cell models can be useful in understanding the dynamics of attractor networks. Cell assemblies are likely to be distributed, with the cortical column as the local processing unit. Synaptic memory may be dominant in all but the first couple of seconds.
How do local reverberations achieve global integration?
Authors: Wright J. J.
Published: February 2010

Amit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.
Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia
Authors: Crider Andrew
Published: February 2010

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.
Overworking the hippocampus
Authors: Dennett Daniel C.
Published: February 2010

The postulated hippocampal comparator, like any other subsystem, must rely on “syntactic” patterns in its “input,” and hence could not have the extraordinary powers Gray supposes. It may play a more modest role, but it is not the place “where it all comes together” for consciousness.
Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?
Authors: Díaz José-Luis
Published: February 2010

Robust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.
On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness
Authors: Foss Jeffrey
Published: February 2010

Because consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.
Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience
Authors: Hemsley David R.
Published: February 2010

It is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.
Mind – your head!
Authors: Ingvaldsen R. P. , Whiting H. T. A.
Published: February 2010

Gray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own model – ending up dealing with the unknowable.
The control of consciousness via a neuropsychological feedback loop
Authors: Nelson Todd D.
Published: February 2010

Gray's neuropsychological model of consciousness uses a hierarchical feedback loop framework that has been extensively discussed by many others in psychology. This commentary therefore urges Gray to integrate with, or at least acknowledge previous models. It also points out flaws in his feedback model and suggests directions for further theoretical work.
The elusive quale
Authors: Rachlin Howard
Published: February 2010

If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements (qualia) within the brain or as internal products of the brain.
Prospects for a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness
Authors: Revonsuo Antti
Published: February 2010

In this commentary, I point out some weaknesses in Gray's target article and, in the light of that discussion, I attempt to delineate the kinds of problem a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness faces on its way to a scientific understanding of subjective experience.
The homunculus at home
Authors: Smith J. David
Published: February 2010

In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator (needing problem resolution) and matches (during appetitive approach) have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty (i.e., information-processing mismatches) especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.
Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”
Authors: Swerdlow Neal R.
Published: February 2010

Gray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
On giving a more active and selective role to consciousness
Authors: Toates Frederick
Published: February 2010

An active role for conscious processes in the production of behaviour is proposed, involving top level controls in a hierarchy of behavioural control. It is suggested that by inhibiting or sensitizing lower levels in the hierarchy conscious processes can play a role in the organization of ongoing behaviour. Conscious control can be more or less evident, according to prevailing circumstances.
A few reasons why psychologlsts can adhere to Feldman and Levin's model
Authors: Bonnard Mireille , Pailhous Jean
Published: February 2010

We emphasize the relevance to cognitive psychology of Feldman and Levin's theoretical position. Traditional views of motor control have failed to clearly separate “production control” at the level of motor command, based on task-independent CV (control variables), from intentional “product control” based on task-dependent parameters. Because F&L's approach concentrates on the first process (trajectory formation), it can distinguish the product control stage.
Conservative or nonconservative control schemes
Authors: Corcos Daniel M. , Pfann Kerstin
Published: February 2010

The conservative strategy proposed by the authors suggests a solution of the degrees-of-freedom problem of the controller. However, several simple motor control tasks cannot be explained by this strategy. A nonconservative strategy, in which more parameters of the control signal vary, can account for these simple motor tasks. However, the simplicity that distinguishes the proposed model from many others is lost.
Reciprocal and coactivation commands are not sufficient to describe muscle activation patterns
Authors: Gielen C. C. A. M. , van Bolhuis B.
Published: February 2010

Recent results have shown that the relative activation of muscles is different for isometric contractions and for movements. These results exclude an explanation of muscle activation patterns by a combination ofreciprocal and coactivation commands. These results also indicate that joint stiffness is not uniquely determined and that it may be different for isometric contractions and movements.
Inverse kinematic problem: Solutions by pseudoinversion, inversion and no-inversion
Authors: Goodman Simon R.
Published: February 2010

Kinematic properties of reaching movements reflect constraints imposed on the joint angles. Contemporary models present solutions to the redundancy problem by a pseudoinverse procedure (Whitney 1969) or without any inversion (Berkenblit et al. 1986). Feldman & Levin suggest a procedure based on a regular inversion. These procedures are considered as an outcome of a more general approach.
Frames of reference interact and are task-dependent
Authors: Kay Bruce A.
Published: February 2010

The problem for the CNS in any particular movement task is to coordinate the various frames of reference appropriate to the task. Control variables are determined by this coordination. The coordination problem varies greatly from task to task, and so no single set of control variables is likely to account for a broad range of movement tasks.
Equilibrium-point control? Yes! Deterministic mechanisms of control? No!
Authors: Latash Mark L.
Published: February 2010

The equilibrium-point hypothesis (the λ-model) is superior to all other models of single-joint control and provides deep insights into the mechanisms of control of multi-joint movements. Attempts at associating control variables with neurophysiological variables look confusing rather than promising. Probabilistic mechanisms may play an important role in movement generation in redundant systems.
What does body configuration in microgravity tell us about the contribution of intra- and extrapersonal frames of reference for motor control?
Authors: Lestienne F. , Ghafouri M. , Thullier F.
Published: February 2010

The authors report that the reorganization of body configuration during weightlessness is based on an intrapersonal frame of reference such as the configuration of the support surface and the position of the body's center of gravity. These results stress the importance of “knowledge” of the state of internal geometric structures, which cannot be directly signalled by specific receptors responsible for direct dialogue with the physical external world.
Command invariants and the frame of reference for human movement
Authors: Ostry David J. , Laboissière Rafael , Gribble Paul L.
Published: February 2010

We describe a solution to the redundancy problem related to that proposed in Feldman & Levin's target article. We suggest that the system may use a fixed mapping between commands organized at the level of degrees of freedom and commands to individual muscles. This proposal eliminates the need to maintain an explicit representation of musculoskeletalgeometry in planning movements.
Interneurons as backseat drivers and the elusive control variable
Authors: Nichols T. Richard
Published: February 2010

It is proposed here that the spinal network of proprioceptive feedback from length and force receptors constitutes the mechanism underlying the coordination of activation thresholds for muscles acting about the same and neighboring joints. For the most part, these circuits come between motoneurons and supraspinal signals, invalidating the idea that the activation thresholds constitute control variables for the motor system.
Two joints are more than twice one joint
Authors: Smeets Jeroen B. J.
Published: February 2010

An alternative multi-joint extension to the lambda model is proposed. According to this extension, the activity of a muscle depends not only on the difference between lambda and length of that muscle, but also on the difference between lambda and length of other muscles. This 2-D extension can describe more neurophysiological experiments than the extension proposed in the target article.
Control parameters, equilibria, and coordination dynamics
Authors: Sternad Dagmar , Turvey M. T.
Published: February 2010

Important similarities exist between the dynamical concepts implicit in Feldman & Levin's extended λ model and those basic to a dynamical systems approach. We argue that careful application of the key concepts of control and order parameters, equilibria, and stability, can relate known facts of neuromuscular processes to the observables of functional, task-specific behavior.
Origins of origins of motor control
Authors: Thelen Esther
Published: February 2010

Examination of infant spontaneous and goal-directed arm movements supports Feldman and Levin's hypothesis of a functional hierarchy. Early infant movements are dominated by biomechanical and dynamic factors without external frames of reference. Development involves not only learning to generate these frames of reference, but also protecting the higher-level goal of the movement from internal and external perturbations.
Biological variability and control of movements via δλ
Authors: Wright Charles E. , States Rebecca A.
Published: February 2010

Three issues related to Feldman and Levin's treatment of biological variability are discussed. We question the usefulness of the indirect component of δλ. We suggest that trade-offs between speed and accuracy in aimed movements support identification of δλ, rather than λ, as a control variable. We take issue with the authors' proposal for resolving redundancy in multi-joint movements, given recent data.
The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges
Authors: Koehler Jonathan J.
Published: February 2010

We have been oversold on the base rate fallacy in probabilistic judgment from an empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint. At the empirical level, a thorough examination of the base rate literature (including the famous lawyer–engineer problem) does not support the conventional wisdom that people routinely ignore base rates. Quite the contrary, the literature shows that base rates are almost always used and that their degree of use depends on task structure and representation. Specifically, base rates play a relatively larger role in tasks where base rates are implicitly learned or can be represented in frequentist terms. Base rates are also used more when they are reliable and relatively more diagnostic than available individuating information. At the normative level, the base rate fallacy should be rejected because few tasks map unambiguously into the narrow framework that is held up as the standard of good decision making. Mechanical applications of Bayes's theorem to identify performance errors are inappropriate when (1) key assumptions of the model are either unchecked or grossly violated, and (2) no attempt is made to identify the decision maker's goals, values, and task assumptions. Methodologically, the current approach is criticized for its failure to consider how the ambiguous, unreliable, and unstable base rates of the real world are and should be used. Where decision makers' assumptions and goals vary, and where performance criteria are complex, the traditional Bayesian standard is insufficient. Even where predictive accuracy is the goal in commonly defined problems, there may be situations (e.g., informationally redundant environments) in which base rates can be ignored with impunity. A more ecologically valid research program is called for. This program should emphasize the development of prescriptive theory in rich, realistic decision environments.
The implications of Koehler's approach for fact finding
Authors: Callen Craig R.
Published: February 2010

Koehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.
Are base rates a natural category of information?
Authors: Connolly Terry
Published: February 2010

The base rate fallacy is directly dependent on a particular judgment paradigm in which information may be unambiguously designated as either “base rate” or “individuating,” and in which subjects make two-stage sequential judgments. The paradigm may be a poor match for real world settings, and the fallacy may thus be undefined for natural ecologies of judgment.
Physicians neglect base rates, and it matters
Authors: Hamm Robert M.
Published: February 2010

A recent study showed physicians' reasoning about a realistic case to be ignorant of base rate. It also showed physicians interpreting information pertinent to base rate differently, depending on whether it was presented early or late in the case. Although these adult reasoners might do better if given hints through talk of relative frequencies, this would not prove that they had no problem of base rate neglect.
Probabilistic fallacies
Authors: Kyburg Henry E.
Published: February 2010

Two distinct issues are sometimes confused in the base rate literature: Why do people make logical mistakes in the assessment of probabilities? and why do subjects not use base rates the way experimenters do? The latter problem may often reflect differences in an implicit reference class rather than a disinclination to update a base rate by Bayes' theorem. Also important are considerations concerning the interaction of several potentially relevant base rates.
Fallacy and controversy about base rates
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: February 2010

Koehler's target article attempts a balanced view of the relevance of knowledge of base rates to judgments of subjective or credal probability, but he is not sensitive enough to the difference between requiring and permitting the equation of probability judgments with base rates, the interaction between precision of base rate and reference class information, and the possibility of indeterminate probability judgment.
Nuancing should not imply neglecting
Authors: Margolis Howard
Published: February 2010

Koehler is right to argue for more nuanced interpretation of base rate anomalies. These anomalies are best understood in relation to a broader class of cognitive anomalies, which are important for theory and practice. Recognizing a need for more nuanced analysis should not be taken as a license for treating the effects as “explained away.”
Which reference class is evoked?
Authors: McKenzie Craig R. M. , Soll Jack B.
Published: February 2010

Any instance (i.e., event, behavior, trait) belongs to infinitely many reference classes, hence there are infinitely many base rates from which to choose. People clearly do not entertain all possible reference classes, however, so something must be limiting the search space. We suggest some possible mechanisms that determine which reference class is evoked for the purpose of judgment and decision.
How are base rates used? Interactive and group effects
Authors: McLeod Peter J. , Watt Margo
Published: February 2010

Koehler is right that base rate information is used, to various degrees, both in laboratory tasks and in everyday life. However, it is not time to turn our backs on laboratory tasks and focus solely on ecologically valid decision making. Tightly controlled experimental data are still needed to understandhowbase rate information is used, and how this varies among groups.
Conservatism revisited: Base rates, prior probabilities, and averaging strategies
Authors: Melone Nancy Paule , McGuire Timothy W.
Published: February 2010

Consistent with Koehler's position, we propose a generalization of the base rate fallacy and earlier conservatism literatures. In studies using both traditional tasks and new tasks based on ecologically valid base rates, our subjects typically underweight individuating information at least as much as they underweight base rates. The implications of cue consistency for averaging heuristics are discussed.
Improving decision accuracy where base rates matter: The prediction of violent recidivism
Authors: Quinsey Vernon L.
Published: February 2010

Base rates are vital in predicting violent criminal recidivism. However, both lay people given simulated prediction tasks and professionals milking real life predictions appear insensitive to variations in the base rate of violent recidivism. Although there are techniques to help decision makers attend to base rates, increased decision accuracy is better sought in improved actuarial models as opposed to improved clinicians.
Where do you stand on the base rate issue?
Authors: Stalker Douglas
Published: February 2010

This commentary presents a self-assessment inventory that will allow readers to determine their own attitude toward the base rate fallacy and its literature. The inventory is scientifically valid but not Medicare/Medicaid reimbursable.
The perils of reconstructive remembering and the value of representative design
Authors: Vicente Kim J.
Published: February 2010

(1) The miscitations of seminal experiments in the base rate literature adds to the existing database of systematic miscitations of wellknown psychological experiments. These miscitations may be caused by a process of reconstructive remembering. (2) Representative design should be the methodological core of Koehler's call for ecologically valid research. This approach can benefit both basic and applied research.
Base rates do not constrain nonprobability judgments
Authors: Windschitl Paul D. , Wells Gary L.
Published: February 2010

Base rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.
“Abnormal” movements: What are they reflections of?
Authors: Gielen C. C. A. M.
Published: February 2010

We agree with Latash & Anson that therapeutic approaches should be directed toward solving the underlying problem, not toward adapting the abnormal to normal behaviour. The fundamental obstacle, however, is that doing so requires a solution of the “equivalence problem” in movement control.
The goal of treatment for motor impairment is not to “normalize” but to “functionalize” through facilitative modulation and enabling context
Authors: Goldberg Gary , Mayer Nathaniel H.
Published: February 2010

Adaptations occurring in the central nervous system (CNS) in the presence of pathology arenotuniformly “good” for the organism when viewed in a functional context. A functional reordering of CNS priorities can be produced by allowing restructuring of the external context or through modification of neuromuscular physiology or anatomy designed to reduce the inherent restriction of functional movement in upper motor neuron syndrome. In fact, volitional control can often be “unmasked” through such interventions. Therapeutic interventions should not be directed toward “normalization” of motor patterns but should permit a functional reordering of CNS priorities that would otherwise not be possible.
Thought is action
Authors: Gurd Jennifer M.
Published: February 2010

It is difficult to chart “normal movements” in atypical populations, such as those with Parkinson's disease, because there is great variability in the pattern of motor changes, both within and between patients. However, the potential clinical implications of Latash & Anson's theme are positive and powerful.
Should stereotypic movement synergies in hemiparetic patients be considered adaptive?
Authors: Levin Mindy F.
Published: February 2010

The motor deficits observed in patients following some lesions of the central nervous system may be viewed as falling at one extreme of the continuum of possible motor behaviours. They are usually associated with an impaired ability to select and control specific movements from the available repertoire. Such movements may not be viewed as abnormal. However, it is unlikely that the primary motor deficits can all be considered adaptive.
What is the appropriate criterion for therapeutic intervention in the motor domain?
Authors: Sparrow W. A.
Published: February 2010

Observations are made on Latash & Anson's theme that changed motor patterns should not be viewed as pathological. Normality in motor control might be characterised in terms of qualitative differences in control mechanisms rather than differences in movement patterns. Understanding of the concepts implicit in instructions to subjects should be confirmed. Principles of energy expenditure in atypical movements are outlined. If restoration of normality is not adopted as a criterion for therapeutic intervention, what might be proposed as an alternative?
On optimality and movement disorders: A dynamic systems perspective
Authors: van Emmerik R. E. A. , Wagenaar R. C.
Published: February 2010

The argument that disordered or changed motor patterns can be adaptive or optimal given the constraints imposed is supported. Two major points of criticism are made, concerning the perceived superstates of the primary disorder and the absence of a systematic approach to identifying this adaptivity and optimality. We have tried to give the general outlines of such an approach to disordered movements from a dynamic systems perspective.
Optimal search strategies for optimal motor solutions: Self-determination or informed guidance?
Authors: Walter C. B. , Kamm K.
Published: February 2010

Impoverished resources may direct the pathologic central nervous system toward local solutions during ontogeny. The resultant motor behavior can be systemically optimal without being functionally optimal. Therapeutic intervention should focus on facilitating function (rather than “normalcy”) by encouraging behavioral exploration through appropriate combinations of task and environmental variations with respect to individual capabilities. Some health professions have already adopted this philosophy.
Intentional relations and social understanding
Authors: Barresi John , Moore Chris
Published: February 2010

Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third person information). However, through the integration of these two sources of information, it is possible to generate representations of intentional relations that are uniformly applicable to the activities of both self and other. The four levels of the framework differ in the extent to which such integration occurs and in the degree to which imagination is involved in generating these representations. Most animals exist at the lowest level, at which integration of first and third person sources of information does not occur. Of nonhuman species, only great apes exhibit social understanding at intermediate levels, at which integration of these sources of information provides uniform representations of intentional relations. Only humans attain the highest level, at which it is possible to represent intentional relations with mental objects. We propose that with the development of the imagination, children progress through three stages, equivalent to the later three levels of the framework. The abnormalities in social understanding of autistic individuals are hypothesized to result from a failure to develop integrated representations of intentional relations.
Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please
Authors: Allen Colin
Published: February 2010

Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular
Authors: Dwyer Susan
Published: February 2010

Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching
Authors: Mitchell Robert W.
Published: February 2010

The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind
Authors: Premack David , Premack Ann James
Published: February 2010

Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
Did courtship drive the evolution of mind?
Authors: Baum Eric B.
Published: February 2010

The driving force in the evolution of language and the human mind was the advantage gained in courtship by efficient communicators. Ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny may offer an alternative to Donald's picture of the relative origins of language and mimesis. Very recent evidence is pertinent to dating the origin of language.
Memory metaphors and the real-life/laboratory controversy: Correspondence versus storehouse conceptions of memory
Authors: Koriat Asher , Goldsmith Morris
Published: February 2010

The study of memory is witnessing a spirited clash between proponents of traditional laboratory research and those advocating a more naturalistic approach to the study of “real-life” or “everyday” memory. The debate has generally centered on the “what” (content), “where” (context), and “how” (methods) of memory research. In this target article, we argue that the controversy discloses a further, more fundamental breach between two underlying memory metaphors, each having distinct implications for memory theory and assessment: Whereas traditional memory research has been dominated by thestorehousemetaphor, leading to a focus on thenumberof items remaining in store and accessible to memory, the recent wave of everyday memory research has shifted toward acorrespondencemetaphor, focusing on theaccuracyof memory in representing past events. The correspondence metaphor calls for a research approach that differs from the traditional one in important respects: in emphasizing the intentional –representational function of memory, in addressing the wholistic and graded aspects of memory correspondence, in taking an output-bound assessment perspective, and in allowing more room for the operation of subject-controlled metamemory processes and motivational factors. This analysis can help tie together soine of the what, where, and how aspects of the “real-life/laboratory” controversy. More important, however, by explicating the unique metatheoretical foundation of the accuracy-oriented approach to memory we aim to promote a more effective exploitation of the correspondence metaphor inbothnaturalistic and laboratory research contexts.
Memory, metamemory, and conditional statistics
Authors: Bjork Robert A. , Wickens Thomas D.
Published: February 2010

Koriat & Goldsmith's distinction between encoding processes and metamnemonic decision processes is theoretically and practically important, as is their methodology for separating the two. However, their accuracy measure is a conditional statistic, subject to the unfathomable selection effects that have hindered analogous measures in the past. We also find their arguments concerning basic and applied research mostly beside the point.
Omissions relevant to gender-linked mathematical abilities
Authors: Epstein Herman T.
Published: February 2010

Analyses of bodies of data usually omit some relevant studies. Geary omits (1) some studies looking at functional correlates of basic biological data, (2) studies of developmental implications for functioning, and (3) the recent achievement of acceleration of cognitive development.