bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Futures Contracts and Futures Markets
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J.
Published: October 2003

This is the first of two chapters dealing with futures contracts, and it concentrates on the defining characteristics of a futures contract, on ways in which it can be settled, on types of commodities and financial instruments in which futures trading is likely to be successful, and on measures of the importance of futures markets; the discussion is with respect to the USA. The exchanges on which futures contracts are traded are also explored: the history of organized markets, the role of the clearinghouses, the form of quotations, and the main market participants – hedgers, speculators, arbitrageurs and floor traders. The following chapter examines some of the theory and empirical evidence on the pricing of futures contracts, paralleling the discussion of stock and options prices in earlier chapters; it should be noted that some of the finer points in Ch. 9 may not be fully clear without the analysis of futures prices presented in Chapter 10. The first section of Ch. 9 looks at forward contracts, and the rest of the chapter is devoted to futures contracts (which are a highly standardized forwards contract) per se – with sections on the origin of futures trading, basic elements of futures contracts and the organization of futures markets. An appendix discusses the Euromarkets and the swap market.
Futures Prices
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J.
Published: October 2003

The previous chapter outlined the nature of futures contracts and some of the institutional aspects of the markets in which they are traded; this chapter analyzes the forces that determine the prices of different futures contracts, their relationship to the current market price (known as the spot price), and derives a satisfactory theory of futures prices. Different determinants are explored of the prices of both commodity futures (contracts based on a tangible commodity) and financial futures (those based on another financial instrument or index). After looking at the role of futures in ‘programme trading’ and the realities of so‐called portfolio insurance through the use of futures and options – a concept that was put to the test by the ‘Black Monday’ crash of 1987 – the chapter concludes by discussing futures as an investment. The five sections of the chapter (which is a discussion with respect to the USA) are as follows: Profits and losses on various transactions; Relations among spot and futures prices; Hedgers, speculators, and market equilibrium; The role of expectations; and Futures and portfolio management.
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Harm to Others is the first volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that addresses the question, What acts may the state rightly make criminal? Feinberg identifies four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles, each of which is the subject of a volume of his book. In the first volume, Feinberg looks at the principle of harm to others – or the harm principle – which John Stuart Mill identified as the only liberty‐limiting principle. The other principles that Feinberg considers in subsequent volumes are (1) the offense principle: it is necessary to prevent hurt or offense (as opposed to harm) to others; (2) legal paternalism: it is necessary to prevent harm to the actor herself; and (3) legal moralism: it is necessary to prevent immoral conduct whether or not it harms anyone. As a thinker who favors liberalism, Feinberg rejects legal paternalism and legal moralism, maintaining that the harm principle and the offense principle exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions. Feinberg's examination of the harm principle begins with an account of the concept of harm and its relation to other concepts like interests, wants, hurts, offenses, rights, and consent. After addressing difficult examples such as moral harm, vicious harm, prenatal harm, and posthumous harm, Feinberg considers both the moral status of a failure to prevent harm and the problems related to assessing, comparing, and imputing harms.
General Introduction
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Specifies the parameters of Feinberg's inquiry: he is concerned with the limits of the legitimate power of the state to impose criminal prohibitions on “primary” crimes. Put differently, his concern is the moral limits of individual liberty (understood as an absence of legal coercion). Criminal law regulates one's liberty by imposing duties, extending liberties, and conferring rights. Coercion‐legitimizing or liberty‐limiting principles provide moral considerations that weigh against the presumptive case for liberty. As a proponent of liberalism, Feinberg aims to limit the number of liberty‐limiting principles to the harm principle and the offense principle.
Harming as Wronging
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Considers features of harmful acts arising from their character as violations of others’ rights. A person violates another's rights when she acts in a manner that is defective and morally indefensible, given both the risks it generates for the other person and the setbacks it causes to that person's interests either intentionally or negligently. Harming that meets these conditions is morally indefensible, as it lacks an adequate justification or excuse. The consent of the person harmed provides some justification for harming, according to the classical Volenti maxim that “to one who has consented, no wrong is done.” Feinberg goes on to examine the concept of a victim, which he defines as one who suffers any kind of unconsented‐to harm to one's interests. Feinberg concludes by considering the causation of harming.
The Philosophy of Leibniz
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

This book offers a critical account of the fundamental elements of Leibniz's philosophy, as they manifest themselves in his metaphysics and philosophy of language. Emphasis is placed upon his hitherto neglected doctrine of nominalism, which states that only concrete individuals exist and that there are no such things as abstract entities – no numbers, geometrical figures or other mathematical objects, nor any abstractions such as space, time, heat, light, justice, goodness, or beauty. Using this doctrine as a basis, the book considers the core of Leibniz's metaphysics and philosophy of language, including the well‐known principles of Contradiction, Sufficient Reason, Continuity and Individuation, and the concepts of Possible World, Individual Substance, Truth, and Necessity.
Life and Works
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

A summary account of Leibniz's life, with special attention to the aspects and episodes that throw light upon his intellectual qualities and the difficult circumstances in which he had to work. Although he is known principally as a philosopher (“this is the best of all possible worlds”) and as a mathematician (coinventor of the differential and integral calculus), the remarkable scope of his intellectual activity and attainments amply justifies his characterization as a polymath, polyhistor, or universal genius.
Truth
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

Leibniz has a very special, and philosophically notorious, way of understanding what it means to say that a proposition is true. His best known and most important dictum on the subject is “a proposition is true if its predicate is included in its subject.” The present chapter consists largely of an explication, elaboration, and critique of this idea.
Necessary and Contingent Truths
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

To reconcile his account of truth with his acceptance of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths, Leibniz introduces a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. It turns out that for him a proposition P is hypothetically necessary if the proposition ‘If the actual world exists, then P’ is absolutely necessary; or, what comes to the same thing, the conjunction ‘The actual world exists and not P’ is absolutely impossible.
Cross‐World Identity
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

This chapter takes up the question of what it can mean, for Leibniz, to say that an element of one possible world is identical with an element of another. It turns out that for him, such an identity is impossible. Thus, e.g., Adam would not have been the same person if Eve had not existed, i.e., he would have lacked the attribute “coexistent with Eve”; in other words, the very concept of Adam includes the attribute, “coexistent with Eve”; in still other words, nobody who was not coexistent with Eve could even possibly be Adam. In general, possible worlds are completely disjoint.
Relations and Denominations
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

In the so‐called region of ideas, the counterparts of declarative sentences are propositions or thoughts; correspondingly, the counterparts of definite or indefinite descriptions are so‐called “denominations”. The content of Leibniz's principle “there are no purely extrinsic denominations,” in its connections with the rest of his philosophy, especially his theory of relations, is explicated. A number of texts are given in which Leibniz endeavors to make clear his view that there really is no such thing as a relations.
Space and Time
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

This chapter sets forth and discusses critically Leibniz's controversy with Newton about the existence of absolute space. It also discusses the significance of the so‐called analysis situs, in which Leibniz defines a number of geometrical concepts – e.g., sphere, straight line, circle, plane – in terms of a single quaternary relation, R (a, ba, c, d), with the intuitive meaning “a is as far from b as c is from d,” and then, on the basis of these definitions, proves such theorems as “ the intersection of a sphere and a plane is a circle.”
Concluding Thoughts
Authors: Mates Benson
Published: October 2003

This chapter is largely concerned with what has been called “Leibniz's doctrine of superessentialism,” the doctrine that every attribute of an individual is absolutely essential to the existence of that individual, i.e., that no attribute is accidental.
Pride, Faith and Fear
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick
Published: October 2003

Islam is spreading rapidly in sub‐Saharan Africa, home of more than 150 million Muslims. African Islam is local Islam, responsive to local histories in cultures as diverse as the countries considered in this study – Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, Kenya, and South Africa. Islam provides a source of communal identity to those experiencing rapid change, populations affected by secularization, unemployment, corrupt and ineffectual governments, and the intrusions of global media. The spread of Islam ascends as respect for the state declines. Ironically, the same Muslim believers who rail against Western materialism are keen on adopting the most modern technologies to communicate with members, and to find access to employment and economic opportunities in the West. As for Islamic fundamentalists (Islamists) the danger is that given Africa's porous borders and weak state structures, such groups can move about easily, feeding on popular discontent. Often more political than theological in aspirations, there is no certainty that the Islamist position will advance in Africa. Opposition includes central governments, many of them with Muslims in key positions, and numerous traditional Islamic rulers and brotherhoods, more moderate in outlook. The extent to which imposition of Sharia, traditional Islamic law, is introduced in a country can be a barometer of the extent of Islamic influence. This timely study is based on extensive field research, including oral interviews, the study of contemporary local sources, and historical research by two scholars with long familiarity with the subject.
Islam in the Sudan
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick
Published: October 2003

Sudan, at the crossroads between Africa and the Arab world, is an oil‐rich, largely barren country with a Muslim North, home to numerous factions and brotherhoods, and a Christian South, with many ethnic and linguistic groups represented. Under Turco‐Egyptian suzerainty during much of the nineteenth century, the most important Islamic figure to emerge in that era was the Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad ibn ’Adballah. During the postindependence period, Sudan has suffered from destructive competition among sectarian groups, including Islamic groups and their political parties that paralyzed the decision‐making process during rare periods of civilian rule. Imposition of a sweeping version of Sharia has become the symbol of Muslim–Christian conflict in Africa. With the ideologue Hasan al‐Turabi sidelined, there are indications that the government led by General Umar Hasan al‐Bashir is moving toward a more pragmatic direction by both opening up the electoral process and discussing the ending of one of the world's longest standing civil wars.
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 4: Harmless Wrongdoing
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Harmless Wrongdoing is the final volume in a four‐volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law that examines the kinds of harm that a state legitimately may make criminal. Of the four liberty‐limiting, or coercion‐legitimizing, principles that Feinberg examines, he accepts only the harm principle and the offense principle as morally relevant reasons for establishing criminal prohibitions. In this fourth volume, Feinberg considers and opposes the principle of legal moralism , according to which legal coercion is legitimate to prevent immoral conduct whether or not that conduct harms anyone. Feinberg examines various forms of legal moralism: including: (1) moral conservatism, which endorses legal coercion that may prevent drastic change to a group's way of life; (2) strict moralism, which supports legal coercion against nongrievance evils that are inherently immoral; (3) the exploitative principle, which recommends criminal prohibitions against substantial, unjustly exploitive, free‐floating evils; and (4) legal perfectionism, which combines moralism with paternalism in approving legal coercion that benefits an individual's character. In his defense of liberalism, Feinberg makes some concessions to legal moralism, but maintains that only harm to others and offense to others have sufficient weight to legitimize legal coercion.
Moral Conservatism: Preserving a Way of Life
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

Feinberg analyses a variety of pure legal moralism, which he calls “moral conservatism,” according to which legal coercion is legitimate when likely to prevent drastic change to a group's way of life. The moral conservative view of social change does not regard any one way of life as superior to others, but rather regards any substantial change in a traditional culture as evil per se. Feinberg outlines, first, the arguments for impure moral conservatism based on fairness and on harm to interests, and second, the arguments for pure moral conservatism based on the need to prevent free‐floating social‐change evils. He maintains that to impose legal coercion to prevent free‐floating evils, evils like false beliefs or evil thoughts that cannot ground personal grievance, would be to impose suffering and injury for the sake of no other person's good.
Exploitation With and Without Harm
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, Feinberg considers the concept of exploitation (which he defines as a way of using someone for one's own ends), distinguishing between exploitation that causes harm and exploitation that does not. On rare occasions, exploitation of a morally unsavory nature can occur although it is free‐floating and thus does not harm the interests of the exploitee. If this nongrievance exploitation were a moral evil, then the liberty‐limiting principle legitimizing its prohibition (the exploitative principle) would be a variety of strict legal moralism. Feinberg assesses this principle in Ch. 32. Here, he considers the key elements of exploitation: (1) the ways that other people can be used, (2) the kinds of potentially exploitable traits and circumstances, and (3) the redistribution of gains and loses.
The Exploitation Principle: Preventing Wrongful Gain
Authors: Feinberg Joel
Published: October 2003

What role should the law play in preventing or punishing nongrievance or even free‐floating exploitation? According to the exploitative principle, which Feinberg regards as the last best hope for legal moralism, certain types of unjust exploitation are free‐floating evils substantial enough to warrant criminal prohibitions. To this defense of legal moralism, Feinberg offers several replies: (1) some acts of apparently free‐floating exploitation like insider‐trading, which generate unjust gain for the exploiter, actually involve rights‐violating harm; (2) limited forms of certain types of exploitation should be decriminalized, like fortune‐telling for entertainment, or isolated instances of ticket‐scalping. Combining these two replies, Feinberg responds to the legal moralist on the issue of blackmail (a crime that involves threatening to do what one has a legal right to do anyway unless some demand, which one has a legal right to make, is granted by the victim). Taking a radical view, Feinberg argues for the decriminalization of a variety of informational blackmail on the grounds that no criminal code based on liberal principles could prevent people from offering, in exchange for consideration, not to do what they have a perfect legal right to do (i.e., carry out their threat).
Conclusion
Authors: Harrington Watt David
Published: October 2003

Fieldwork conducted in the early 1990s at Oak Grove Church, Oak Grove Christian Academy, the Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, and the Philadelphia Church of Christ produced a great deal of data that suggest that in the early 1990s Bible‐carrying Christian churches tended to naturalize (to various degrees) the authority of heterosexuals and of men. The data also suggested that under certain (relatively rare) circumstances, Bible‐carrying Christian churches denaturalized the authority of ministers, corporations, and nation‐states.
In Search of an American Catholicism
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

Catholics have struggled to reconcile two sets of values, those as Americans and those as Catholics, for more than 200 years, and in this book, Jay Dolan explores how Catholics have met these challenges as New World followers of an Old World faith. He argues that the ideals of democracy – and American culture in general – have deeply shaped Catholicism in the U.S.A., even as far back as 1789, when the nation's first bishop was elected by the clergy (and the pope accepted their choice). Dolan follows the tension between American democratic values and the Catholic doctrine, from the conservative reaction after the fall of Napoleon, to the modernist movement of the late nineteenth century, to the impact of the Second Vatican Council. He explores several issues: grassroots devotional life; the struggle against successive waves of nativism, from nineteenth‐century “Know Nothings” to the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s; the impact – and often collision – of different immigrant groups and their traditions; and the disputed issue of gender. He shows throughout that influences have flowed in both directions; belief and church traditions have shaped the Catholic sense of citizenship, community, and public advocacy. The tensions remain in contemporary America, as signs are seen of both a resurgent traditionalism in the church in response to the liberalizing trend launched by John XXIII, and a resistance to the conservatism of John Paul II.
Introduction
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

Explains the origin of the book as resulting from a desire to explore the historical relationship and interactions between the two very diverse traditions of Catholicism and Americanism, and more specifically, from a need to explore how American culture (defined as those values and beliefs that a group or society uses to identify itself) has shaped American Catholicism. It discusses change in the Catholic church, and the tensions and conflicts that have arisen resulting from this, and from the clash between the American republican model of Catholicism and the traditional European monarchical model. Finally, an outline of the ground covered by the five chapters of the book is given.
Catholicism in an Age of Democracy
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

Examines American Catholicism in an age of democracy – the period from 1780–1820. The American Revolution ushered in a new age, and henceforth, democracy became a defining element of American culture. How this concept influenced Catholicism makes up a major portion of this chapter. This period was also a time when certain seals of the Enlightenment took hold among Catholics. Such ideals shaped the way Catholics thought about their religion in this age of reason and started the development of a distinctive American version of Catholicism.
In Search of an American Catholicism
Authors: Dolan Jay P.
Published: October 2003

Examines the period from 1880–1920, when Catholicism's relationship with American culture intensified. There are five themes: (1) The study of the interaction between Catholicism and American culture is expanded, while continuing to focus on democracy and how this core American value influenced the Catholic community; (2) An examination is also made of the European devotional style of Catholicism that flourished at that time and how it shaped Catholicism; (3) The issue of American national identity is also addressed in relation to Catholicism – this became a major topic of debate in the 1880s and 1890s; (4) The Americanization of Catholic doctrine started as the American cultural traditions of democracy and religious freedom persuaded some Catholics to reexamine Catholic teaching on church and state and religious freedom – as a result, American Catholicism began to take on a distinctiveness that would set it apart from its counterparts in such countries as Italy and France; (5) The final theme examined is that of gender – with the emergence of the American ideal of gender equality, an awakening clearly began to take place among Catholics, which sought to modify the traditional understanding of the role of women in society. These five themes are examined in more detail in the next two chapters.
Philosophical Interpretations
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

The essays in this volume are, with some exceptions, efforts to make sense out of difficult or problematic philosophical texts. Some of these readings depart, sometimes radically, from standard readings. Yet the principles of interpretation that underlie these essays are not themselves radical. The interpretations are governed by a semantic principle of charity, namely, that there is a very strong presumption in favor of holding that philosophers meant to say precisely what they did say, and that what they did say means precisely what it seems to mean. This approach encourages close reading of the text.

Six of these essays exhibit this “close reading” approach: “Three Platonic Analogies,” “A Reading of Aquinas's Five Ways,” “Hume and Berkeley on the Proofs of Infinite Divisibility,” “Hume on the Missing Shade of Blue,” “Hume's Worries about Personal Identity,” and, “Wittgenstein on Identity.”

Though driven by the same principle of interpretation, other essays have a broader scope: “The Tendency of Hume's Skepticism,” and “Wittgenstein and Classical Skepticism.” Only two of these essays are technical: “Hamilton's Quantification of the Predicate” and “[Wittgenstein on] Negative Elementary Proposition.”
A Reading of Aquinas's Five Ways
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Aquinas's so‐called Five Ways are usually read as proofs – or at least as sketches of proofs – of God's existence. This chapter suggests that they can profitably be read as a series of responses to one of the objections that precedes them: namely, that there is no need to posit the existence of God, because natural effects can be explained by natural causes and contrived effects by human reasoning and will. On this reading, the first three (cosmological) ways are aimed at the claim that science can explain all natural causes. The Fifth (teleological) Way is a response to the claim that all purposes in the world can be explained as human contrivance. The Fourth (degrees of perfection) Way points to a dimension of reality completely outside the scientific worldview.
Hume and Berkeley on the Proofs of Infinite Divisibility
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Berkeley, and Hume following him, rejected the doctrine that lines, e.g., are infinitely divisible. They both thought that the notion of infinite divisibility lead to paradoxical results. To avoid these paradoxes, they adopted the view that a line is composed of finitely many minimal parts. In addition, Berkeley argued, successfully it seems, that all the standard geometrical proofs for infinite divisibility are, in fact, question‐begging.
Hume and the Missing Shade of Blue
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Hume declares that the doctrine that every simple idea must arise from a simple impression is a “first principle” in the science of human nature. Then, in both The Treatise of Human Nature and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he presents what he takes to be a decisive counterexample to this first principle: Presented with a spectrum of colors with one shade missing, we can form an idea of this missing shade even if we have never had a prior impression of it. The suggestion here is that, for Hume, simple ideas can resemble each other in various degrees without compromising their simplicity. Because of this, the system of colors forms a space in which gaps can be recognized and, if not too small, can be filled in.
What Hume Actually Said About Miracles
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Since this article was reprinted in this volume, I have come to think that it is fundamentally in error. I take a very different approach to this topic in A Defense of Hume on Miracles, Princeton University Press (2003).
The Tendency of Hume's Skepticism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This essay provides a survey of the central role of various radically skeptical arguments in David Hume's philosophy. The discussion relies upon a distinction between theoretical skepticism and prescriptive skepticism. A theoretical skepticism calls into question the grounds or the warrant for some important class of beliefs, e.g., our inductive beliefs about the future and our beliefs about the external world. A prescriptive skepticism recommends the suspension of belief for some class of beliefs. This essay is an attempt to show that Hume was an unmitigated theoretical skeptic over a wide range of areas, but for the most part he was a moderate or mitigated prescriptive skeptic.
Richard Price on Promising: A Limited Defense
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

This essay presents an exposition and limited defense of Richard Price's claim that the “fidelity to promises is properly a branch or instance of veracity,” i.e., the obligation to keep a promise is, for Price, an instance of our obligation to tell the truth. His general idea is this: When one makes an assertion, one is under an obligation to have one's words fit the facts. When one makes an assertion about one's own future actions (rather than simply expressing an intention concerning them), one falls under an obligation to make what one said true by acting in the stated way. Though not without difficulties, Price's account of promising is presented as a viable alternative to accounts given by H. A. Prichard and J. L. Austin.
Hamilton's Quantification of the Predicate
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

These essays offer an exposition and defense of William Hamilton's theory that categorical propositions implicitly involve quantification over the predicate term; e.g., for Hamilton, “All S is P” is more accurately rendered as, “All S is some P.” This makes good sense if we treat this proposition as an embedded identity statement, i.e., “If anything is an S then there is some P it is identical with.” This approach yields a coherent theory of the distribution of terms that can be used for evaluating the validity of both immediate inferences and categorical syllogism. It also captures a fragment of the identity theory.
Negative Elementary Propositions
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Contrary to explicit statements in the text of the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, this essay argues that the notion of a negative elementary proposition makes sense within the Tractarian system. The suggestion depends upon separating two strains in Wittgenstein's account of propositional meaning: the picture theory of meaning, and the truth‐functional account of meaning. A proposition could be considered elementary if it contained only one elementary proposition or one elementary picture. In this approach, if p is an elementary proposition, then so is not‐p. Though this change would involve substantial revisions of the Tractatus, it squares with Wittgenstein's fundamental view that logical constants are not representatives.
Wittgenstein and Classical Scepticism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Throughout his long, complex, and changing career – from the Tractatus to On Certainty – Wittgenstein leveled essentially the same charge against skepticism: The skeptic's questions may be dismissed because they lack meaning. This critique of skepticism, however, has to be understood in the context of Wittgenstein's general critique of philosophizing. Read this way, Wittgenstein is best understood as someone who rediscovered ancient skepticism, in particular Pyrrhonian skepticism, and gave it its most powerful statement.
Thinking and Doing
Authors: Fogelin Robert J.
Published: October 2003

Taking some remarks by Aristotle on the practical syllogism as the starting point, this essay offers an account of how thought can be connected with action and how this connection between thought and action can be adverbially modified. The key idea is that a practical syllogism is composed of a factual premise, a premise that is a conditional imperative, and a conclusion that is an unconditional imperative. The practical reasoner reasons as follows: Wanting drink, a person accepts the conditional imperative “If this is drink, drink it!” and then, because he believes this is drink, he accepts the unconditional imperative “Drink it!” Adverbs of excuse of the kind that J. L. Austin studied can then be explained by noting the ways in which the connection between thought and action can be defective.
Asia's Next Giant
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

South Korea has been quietly growing into a major economic force that is even challenging some Japanese industries. This book examines South Korean economic growth as an example of “late industrialization,” a process in which a nation's industries learn from earlier innovator nations rather than innovate themselves. Discussing state intervention, shop‐floor management, and big business groups, the reasons are explored for South Korea's phenomenal growth, paying special attention to the principle of reciprocity in which the government imposes strict performance standards on those industries and companies that it aids. It is shown thereby how South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan were able to grow faster than other emerging nations such as Brazil, Turkey, India, and Mexico. The book is arranged in three main parts: Part 1 surveys South Korean history and the origins of state policies that led to the successes of its late industrialization; Part 2 examines the ways in which the South Korean management and workforce were transformed into major factors in the growth of its industry; and Part 3 discusses the creation of comparative advantage in several industries and the reasons why only one kept pace with expansion while the others drove it.
The ABCS of Japanese and Korean Accumulation
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This chapter is concerned with how acceleration in South Korean investments and exports was activated from the beginning of the 1960s, largely by exploiting its low‐wage advantage. The main emphasis of the chapter is on the details of the competitive advantage of Korea over Japan with regard to the cotton textile industry. The various aspects covered are the emergence of an international division of labor, the model of accumulation pasted together by the Korean military regime in the early 1960s, Korean trade policies (import restrictions, export dependence and incentives, the tariff structure), and Korean investment policy.
The Spiraling of Market Power
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This chapter starts with a discussion of the development of the highly diversified business/industrial groups that have grown in late‐industrializing countries – as exemplified by the zaibatsu in Japan, and the chaebol in South Korea. Such big businesses raise various issues, including economic performance, and their social effects, but this chapter is mainly concerned with two further issues: the magnitude and causes of concentration, of which there has been no systematic study; and the support of, and the discipline by, the government. These issues are discussed under the headings of market concentration, corporate strategy towards diversification, and the discipline of monopoly power.
The World's Largest Shipbuilder
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

This chapter, within the context of the shipbuilding industry in the acutely competitive decade of the 1970s, examines the hypothesis that the diversified business (industrial) group provides a multitude of capabilities and a protective cover to latecomers wishing to enter world trade. The whole chapter is devoted to Hyundai Heavy Industries of South Korea, a subsidiary of the Hyundai Group, which began building its first ship (a very large crude carrier) in March 1973. Aspects discussed are the competitive challenge, government assistance, foreign technical assistance, the acquisition of design capability, investment in the formation of the Hyundai Engine and Heavy Machinery Manufacturing Company, intermarginal changes (quality, and time and motion studies and cost control), and organization (chaebol membership).
From Learner to Teacher
Authors: Amsden Alice H.
Published: October 2003

Late‐industrializing countries such as Japan and South Korea appear to challenge existing economic powers such as the U.S.A. precisely in those areas in which the challengers excel by virtue of their recent histories as learners. Consequently, the book concludes with the major lessons that the learning paradigm of late industrializing offers to countries wishing to reindustrialize. In addition to illuminating the path of late industrializers, the paradigm's reflection also suggests where innovators might change their rules of behavior to compete in a world that now includes a generation of latecomers reared on the learning tradition.
Post‐Classical Chisholmian Internalism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Some of Roderick Chisholm's more recent work has displayed a conception of warrant (which conception I refer to with the phrase “postclassical Chisholmian internalism”), which differs substantially from his earlier conception of warrant (classical Chisholmian internalism). In this chapter, I explain postclassical Chisholmian internalism and then offer four critical observations about it. First, it is relatively uninformative (telling us little about what warrant is); second, it remains internalist, but loses the principal philosophical motivation for internalism by moving away from deontology. Third, it is not the case (contrary to the postclassical Chisholm) that for a given belief B, there is a set S of evidence bases such that, necessarily, B has warrant for me if and only if it occurs in conjunction with a member of that set S. And, fourth, it is a mistake to suppose that the warrant a belief enjoys for S can be understood as a function solely of the psychological properties S exemplifies.
Bayesian Coherentism and Rationality
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

Rationality, although distinct from warrant, is a notion both interesting in its own right and important for a solid understanding of warrant. In this chapter, I first disambiguate at least five different forms of rationality, and, second, examine the relationship between Bayesianism and rationality (in its different forms or senses). Bayesians often claim that conformity to Bayesian constraints (such as coherence, changing belief by conditionalization or probability kinematics, or van Fraassen's Reflection) is necessary for rationality. Against this view, I argue that (1) none of the forms of rationality I distinguished requires coherence, and some of them in fact require incoherence, and that (2) changing belief by conditionalization (or by probability kinematics) is neither a sensible ideal for human cognizers nor a requirement for rationality. Finally, after a somewhat extended look at Reflection, I argue that (3) while van Fraassen surely has important and probably true things to say about what rational integrity requires with respect to one's commitments and intentions about belief change, it is nonetheless the case that rationality does not require that I conform to Reflection.
Pollockian Quasi‐Internalism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I examine John Pollock's conception of warrant, as developed in his article “Epistemic Norms” and his book Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. I argue that his official view of warrant is deeply flawed, foundering as it does on the possibilities of cognitive malfunction. As Pollock uses the phrase, an epistemic norm is a rule describing the circumstances under which it is epistemically permissible to hold beliefs. Central to Pollock's account are several claims about epistemic norms, which I take pains to dispute. After considering several problems with Pollock's conception of warrant, I proceed to argue that, while Pollock describes his theory of knowledge as an internalist view, it is in fact internalist in name only, being not a species of internalism, but a sort of transitional stage to a more satisfactory view of warrant.
Reliabilism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground. Recent epistemology has seen a flurry of interest in reliabilism, a particular species of externalism, and in this chapter, I examine three externalist and reliabilist accounts of warrant: those offered or suggested by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. After introducing the notion of Alstonian justification, I point out that Alstonian justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant (largely due to the possibility of cognitive malfunction). I then briefly outline Dretske's account of knowledge, Goldman's earlier version of reliabilism, and (giving a somewhat more lengthy treatment) Goldman's later version of reliabilism. I conclude that the views of both Dretske and Goldman suffer because they fail to pay explicit attention to the notion of the proper function of our cognitive equipment.
Prospect and Retrospect
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I take stock of the arguments and conclusions of the previous nine chapters, noting that the idea of proper function figures prominently in the difficulties from which the main current views of warrant suffer. This fact suggests that the notion of proper function is much more deeply involved in our idea of warrant than is currently recognized. In Warrant and Proper Function, I shall examine this suggestion in detail; in this chapter, (the final chapter of Warrant: The Current Debate), I give an outline of the content of Warrant and Proper Function. In so doing, I introduce the claim that the paradigmatic cases of a belief's having warrant are cases such that (1) the belief is produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly (i.e., functioning in accord with the cognizer's design plan), (2) the cognitive environment in which the belief is produced is one sufficiently similar to the environment for which the relevant cognitive faculty or faculties were designed, (3) the belief is such that the purpose of the module of the faculties producing the belief is to produce true beliefs, and (4) the design plan in question is a good one.
Warrant and Proper Function
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Warrant: a First Approximation
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In Warrant: The Current Debate, I canvassed contemporary accounts of warrant (that quantity enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and found them inadequate. In this chapter, I begin to develop my own account of warrant. After introducing the notions of proper function, a cognitive environment, and a design plan, I arrive at the following first approximation of warrant: a belief B has warrant for an agent S if and only if the relevant segments of S's cognitive design plan (the segments involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment, sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed, and the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true. (I add, moreover, that in these conditions the degree of firmness with which S holds B is proportional to the degree of warrant B has for S).
Warrant: Objections and Refinements
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplicity, the distinction between purpose and design, trade‐offs and compromises, and defeaters and overriders. In connection to the notion of trade‐offs and compromises in our cognitive design plan, I take up the subject of Gettier problems, trying to understand what really underlies Gettier situations and then seeing how these situations look from the vantage point of my conception of warrant. While Gettier problems do not in fact plague my account of warrant (as I try to point out), considering them nonetheless enables us to deepen our analysis of warrant. I close the chapter with a brief argument for the conclusion that my account of warrant qualifies as an example of naturalized epistemology (or naturalistic epistemology).
Perception
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I point out a few salient features of my account of warrant as it applies to perception and perceptual warrant. On my account, a perceptual judgment of mine (or yours) constitutes knowledge if and only if (roughly speaking) that judgment is true, sufficiently strong, and produced by cognitive faculties that are successfully aimed at truth and functioning properly in an epistemic environment that is right for human perceptual powers. After a brief discussion of perceptual experience, I argue that ordinary perceptual beliefs are basic: they are not formed on the evidential basis of other beliefs I hold (e.g., beliefs about my experience). While perceptual judgments are not formed on the basis of beliefs about my experience, they are, nonetheless, formed on the basis of experience, and so I take a quick look at that claim. In the final section of the chapter, I briefly take up questions about learning to perceive, and entertain the position that many perceptual judgments are only partially basic: not formed solely on the evidential basis of other beliefs, but formed partly on the basis of present perception and partly on the basis of beliefs about what things (say, trees, or automobiles, or whatever it is that one is perceiving) look like.
A Priori Knowledge
Authors: Plantinga Alvin
Published: October 2003

In this chapter, I examine a priori knowledge from the perspective of my account of warrant. According to the epistemological tradition, what is known a priori is known, somehow, prior to or independently of experience; in the first section of this chapter, I attempt to clarify this claim and describe some of the general features of a priori belief and knowledge. In the second section I argue, among other things, that a priori warrant (more precisely, intuitive warrant) is fallible and comes in degrees. I go on to consider an objection to the existence of a priori knowledge based on what has been called the causal requirement (roughly, the claim that any objects of which we have knowledge must be such that we stand in an appropriate causal relation with them). I argue that there is no plausible form of the causal requirement that constitutes a good objection to the existence of a priori knowledge; along the way, I offer an argument for the conclusion that propositions cannot be concrete objects of any sort, and point out that it is quite possible to think of abstract objects as capable of standing in causal relations with us.