bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Only if ‘Acrobatic Logic’ is Non-Boolean
Authors: Bugajski Slawomir
Published: January 2016

The purpose of this paper is to defend ‘quantum logic’ against a vigorous attack of J.H. McGrath (1978). The case is serious, as he allegedly discredits quantum propositional logic showing it unmotivated and useless. The object of his criticism is the procedure of “taking a well-known theory and distilling its logic” (Finkelstein 1969), or “reading off quantum logic from quantum mechanics” (McGrath 1978). This procedure is indeed the corner stone of the quantum logic philosophy, so if it were be “discredited in a most general way” and shown to be “fundamentally misconceived” (McGrath 1978) then the idea of quantum logic has broken down. I am going to show, on the contrary, that McGrath's account of the ‘reading off’ procedure is not sufficiently precise resulting in the failure of his ‘acrobatic’ counterexample.
The Hunt for Scientific Reason
Authors: Hesse Mary
Published: January 2016

The Duhem-Quine concept of the underdetermination of theory by evidence has perhaps been the most crucial influence on philosophy of science during recent decades. It is a concept that has brought together metaphysical and epistemological issues that had been sundered into a mass of non-communicating specialisms in the decline of positivism. It has given birth to a new spectrum of comprehensive theories about the nature of science, ranging from scepticism and historicism, to a near-Aristotelian revival of realism, essentialism and necessitarianism. By way of its implications for the indeterminacy of truth-values, it has revived discussion of theories of truth, meaning and realism in relation to science, and philosophers of science have gone back to the pre-positivist authors - Frege, Peirce, Mach, Poincare, Duhem – for their pioneering arguments on sense and reference, correspondence and consensus, realism, instrumentalism and conventionalism.
The Herd as a Means
Authors: Hull David L.
Published: January 2016

In 1886 Friedrich Nietzsche noted the following basic error in the philosophies of his day, ”…to place the goal in the herd and not in single individuals! The herd is a means, no more! But now one is attempting to understand the herd as an individual and to ascribe to it a higher rank than to the individual—profound misunderstanding!!! Also to characterize that which makes herdlike, sympathy, as the more valuable side to our nature!” (Nietzsche 1901, p. 403).

The recent flap over sociobiology has stemmed largely from the fear that biology is being used to justify a Nietzschean view of human societies, as if the chief good in human relations must be basically selfish, as if apparently altruistic behavior is fundamentally hypocritical. From Darwin to the present, biologists have blithely attributed the presence and persistence of all sorts of traits, including behavioral traits, to the “good of the species”.
Means/Ends and the Nature of Engineering
Authors: Hodges Michael
Published: January 2016

One of the most interesting and influential views in Aristotle's work is his distinction between the practical life and the contemplative life. The division is based on two important claims. The first is a philosophical psychology which involves a hierarchy of human faculties, the highest of which is the intellect. The second is a distinction between two kinds of human doing. One sort of doing is essentially aimed at ends for the sake of which it is undertaken and the other is a doing pursued for its own sake, merely as an exercise of appropriate faculties, skills, or capacities. The hierarchy of faculties and division of human doings grounds Aristotle's view that the exercise of intellect, what he calls “contemplation”, is the highest form of human activity.
Curried Lakatos or, How Not to Spice up the Norm-Ladenness Thesis
Authors: Wykstra Stephen J.
Published: January 2016

Though Imre Lakatos's ideas have been of first importance to recent History and Philosophy of Science, one of his central theses has been ill-received by philosophers and historians alike. I refer to his thesis that historiography of science is (and should be) so laden with normative philosophical doctrines about scientific rationality that “history of science without philosophy of science is blind.” (1971, p.91). In defending this ‘norm-ladenness thesis’ (as I shall call it), Lakatos employs a notion of “rational reconstruction” and “internal history” that has been indicted by Thomas Kuhn as “not history at all but philosophy fabricating examples.” (1971, p. 143). Kuhn's charge, echoed in varying degrees by Holton (1974, p. 68), Laudan (1977, p. 170), McMullin (1970, p.33), Suppe (1977, p. 669), and others, has such wide currency that I shall call it ‘the Received Critique’ of Lakatos's norm-ladenness thesis.
The Generalization of de Finetti's Representation Theorem to Stationary Probabilities
Authors: Plato Jan von
Published: January 2016

According to de Finetti's representation theorem, probabilities of exchangeable sequences of events are unique mixtures of Bernoullian probabilities. The exchangeable probability P(E) of the sequence E equals an integral of the form , where Px(E) is for each x (0≦x≦1) a Bernoullian measure with the probability x for ‘success’ and independence between consecutive events, and F a uniquely determined distribution of the parameter x. P(E) equals the expected value of Px(E). If F has a derivative f, Probabilities can be calculated under the integral sign as if events were independent and had a constant success probability. Therefore there cannot be anything one can do with Bernoullian probabilities, but could not do with the exchangeable ones, de Finetti thinks that he has, because of the unique correspondence between exchangeable measures and distributions over a parameter each value of which gives a Bernoullian probability, shown the unnecessity of the latter.
A Bayesian Argument in Favor of Randomization
Authors: Swijtink Zeno G.
Published: January 2016

The theory of personal probability must be explored with circumspection and imagination. For example, applying the theory naively one quickly comes to the conclusion that randomization is without value to statistics. This conclusion does not sound right; and it is not right.

L. J. Savage (1961, p. 585).

Randomization is a generally accepted principle of sound experimental design and common practice among working scientists. But many philosophers and some theoretical statisticians have rejected it. Bayesians have most often stated their opposition to randomization in terms of a decision theoretic argument. Not all Bayesians, however, could go along with that argument, as the above quotation by Leonard Savage testifies.

In this paper I will examine the Bayesian decision theoretic argument against randomization and show why it fails. By means of an example I will then give a partial justification of randomization in Bayesian terms.
How to Commit the Gambler's Fallacy and Get Away with It
Authors: Baird Davis , Otte Richard E.
Published: January 2016

The gambler's fallacy runs like this: We know

1) the bias for heads of a certain coin and flipping device is 1/2, and

2) flips of the coin with the flipping device are independent.

Given these facts we can easily compute the probability of 4 heads or fewer turning up in 20 flips, P(h≤4), to be

Suppose we flip the coin 15 times and get—improbably enough—all tails. If the coin lands tails up once more in the next 5 flips the improbable event of 4 or fewer heads in 20 flips, h≤4, will have occurred. Since P(h≤4) is so small we might be tempted to infer that all of the next five flips will be heads.
Truthlikeness for Quantitative Statements
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka
Published: January 2016

In A History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability (1865), I. Todhunter tells that among the “learned conversations” of the Florentine gentlemen the following question was once proposed: “A horse is really worth a hundred crowns, one person estimated it at ten crowns and another at a thousand; which of the two made the more extravagant estimate?” When consulted on this matter, Galileo pronounced the two estimates to be equally extravagant, “because the ratio of a thousand to a hundred is the same as the ratio of a hundred to ten”. A priest named Nozzolini thought that the higher estimate is more mistaken, since “the excess of a thousand above a hundred is greater than that of a hundred above ten.” (p. 5).

Todhunter's comment on this issue is interesting: it does not appear to him that “the discussion is of any scientific interest or value”.
The Apparent Inconsistency of Moulines' Treatment of Equilibrium Thermodynamics
Authors: Harris John H.
Published: January 2016

One of the main advantages that has been claimed for the Sneedian “structuralist” approach is that with it one can actually represent real scientific theories. (I consider a “structuralist” approach to be one in which the objects of study are structures in the modeltheoretic sense, with at least some such structures thought of as representing physical situations or processes.) Using just Suppes’ structuralist approach, one can already give a reasonable representation of many features of scientific theories. Examples of such are the representations of classical particle mechanics (CPM) in McKinsey, Sugar & Suppes (1953), relativistic particle mechanics in Rubin & Suppes (1954), and rigid body mechanics in Adams (1959). Then with Sneed's (1971) modifications of Suppes’ approach, in particular with Sneed's introduction of the notion of a constraint between structures, the representational strength of a structuralist approach seems to increase dramatically.
Quantification, Regulation, and Risk Assessment
Authors: MacLean Douglas
Published: January 2016

One of the roles of government is to regulate new technologies and control the risks to life and health that they impose. This will be true according to any plausible theory of government or politics. There are many reasons for centralizing the control of technological risk. First, the problem can elude individual or decentralized solutions because the transaction costs for bargaining to take place are too high, either because many different actors each impose slight risks which are intolerable only in their aggregate, or else because one actor imposes significant risks which are distributed thinly over very many individuals. A second reason is that technological risks are often invisible, delayed, and exceptionally complex, so the costs of gathering enough information to make reasonable decisions can be so prohibitively high that they are incapable of being borne except at the most centralized levels of government where resources can be pooled.
The Differences That make a Difference: A Comment on Richard Bernstein
Authors: McCarthy Thomas
Published: January 2016

With his usual deftness and sensitivity to the spirit of our times, Richard Bernstein has brought us to the center of current philosophical debates concerning modernity and postmodernity. He has sought to identify the common ground shared by three of the principals in these debates, in contradistinction to the usual stress placed on the differences separating them. He finds this common ground in the vision of a “non-foundational” or “anti-foundational pragmatic humanism” which is said to inspire all three, and next to which the usually perceived differences — which he does not’ deny — fade to differences of emphasis.

One job of a commentator is to set a discussion in motion, and the easiest way to do that here is obviously to recall the familiar differences, to argue that they are basic, and to suggest that next to them the alleged common ground shades to philosophical insignificance.
Direct Inference and Randomization
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: January 2016

R.A. Fisher began defending the use of randomized assignments of treatments to plots in agricultural field experiments in 1926 (Fisher 1926). His claims on behalf of randomization were challenged by many other statisticians including his friend and colleague W.S. Gosset, the celebrated “Student” (Gosset 1937). After Gosset's death, Fisher's insistence upon the critical importance of randomization to good experimental design became a cornerstone of methodological orthodoxy, a status it has continued to enjoy until recent years. Even so, an undercurrent of resistance to some of the more excessive claims on behalf of randomization has continued to influence thoughtful statisticians and methodologists.

Fisher's rationale for. randomization was grounded on the need to control or eliminate systematic error or bias. For example, the average yield of wheat on plots treated with one kind of fertilizer may be compared with the average yield of wheat of the same variety on plots treated with another kind of fertilizer.
How Technology Aids and Impedes the Growth of Science
Authors: Agassi Joseph
Published: January 2016

Allow me to begin by thanking Professor Nickles for his organizing the session on “Technology and Scientific change” in order, as he wrote me in his kind letter of invitation to participate in this session, to explore ways in which technological developments have stimulated or obstructed scientific change. I take it there is no established list of ways in which technological progress stimulates scientific progress, yet some ways are all too obvious. The simplest, perhaps, are the cases of the technological progress which facilitate the life of the scientist, the technological progress which makes more free time available, some of which is used for scientific education and research, the innumerable technological advances which raise the standard of living in myriads of ways, and which help science grow in all sorts of manners. I suppose these are the indirect ways.
The Sure Thing Principle
Authors: Jeffrey Richard
Published: January 2016

Here is the example that L. J. Savage (1954, p. 21) uses to adumbrate the principle:

A businessman contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of the next presidential election relevant to the attractiveness of the purchase. So, to clarify the matter for himself, he asks whether he would buy it if he knew that the, Republican candidate were going to win, and decides that he would do so. Similarly, he considers whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate were going to win, and again finds that he would do so. Seeing that t he would buy in either, event, he decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event obtains, or will obtain, as we would ordinarily say.
Inductive Analogy in Carnapian Spirit
Authors: Kuipers Theo A.F.
Published: January 2016

A number of evaluations of the general prospects of Carnap's program of inductive logic have been presented on different occasions (e.g., Adler 1980, Jeffrey 1973, Kuipers 1984a, Lakatos 1968, Niiniluoto 1982). Niiniluoto's and my own account are the most positive about the internal strength of the program, provided one includes open systems of inductive probability, i.e., systems with non-zero probabilities for contingent universal generalizations. As is well-known, this was done for the first time by Hintikka.

This paper will not add a new evaluation to the list. Instead, I will show that the internal heuristic of Carnap's restricted program is already strong enough to solve one of its major problems, i.e., the problem of integrating analogy influences in systems of inductive probability.

Carnap has given considerable attention to the problem of analogy; to be precise, to what he called analogy by similarity, or analogy influences based on a distance function between the predicates.
Observability
Authors: Rynasiewicz Robert
Published: January 2016

Among objects and events in the world some have been or eventually will be observed. Others never have been and never will be. Current wisdom has it that among these latter are those that are nonetheless observable. Furthermore, the class of observable, not just observed, phenomena determines the empirical import of science. As van Fraassen tells us, a theory is empirically adequate if “what the theory says about what is observable (by us) it true.” (1980, p. 18). If there are quibbles with this picture, they are with the feasibility of a nonarbitrary or a theory-neutral distinction between the observable and the unobservable, but not with the idea that there are observable yet forever unobserved objects and events.

This, however, is precisely my quibble. Concrete items of the world—events and objects—are either observed or unobserved but, I urge, are not in addition observable or unobservable. This is not because I deny that a nonarbitrary or theory-neutral distinction can be drawn.
Two Concepts of Cause
Authors: Sober Elliot
Published: January 2016

Hume contributed two ideas to our understanding of causality. First, he held that when one event causes another, the physical ontology of this situation contains two items, not three. There is the causing event and its resulting effect; but there is not, in addition, a third physical entity consisting of their causal relation. Causality, Hume believed, is a relation like that of one individual's being taller than another. Sam and Aaron are terms of this relation. Platonists may think that there is a third term here — an abstract object known as the Tal].er Ihan relation. But in the world of physical objects, Sam and Aaron are not joined by a third physical object that connects them in the Taller Than relation.
Primatology is Politics by Other Means
Authors: Haraway Donna J
Published: January 2016

Adam and Eve, Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday, Tarzan and Jane: these are the figures who tell white western people about the origins and foundations of sociality. The stories make claims about “human” nature, “human” society. Western stories take the high ground from which man — impregnable, potent, and endowed with a keen vision of the whole — can survey the field. The sightings generate the aesthetic-political dialectic of contemplation/exploitation, the distorting mirror twins so deeply embedded in the history of science. But the moment of origins in these western stories is solitary. Adam was alone, Robinson was alone, Tarzan was alone; they lacked human company. But each couple, each solution to the illogical insufficiency of a rational autonomous self, was fraught with the contradictions of domination that have provided the narrative materials of “the West's” accounts of its devastating collective history.
Doing Science
Authors: Addelson Kathryn Pyn
Published: January 2016

It is not easy to ask serious questions about sex and gender in the construction of science. Science is so constructed that the questions keep being transformed into something else. Sometimes into “external” questions about social context. Or into historical questions about bad science in the past (now corrected). Or into questions about suspect sciences like anthropology or primatology, but not real sciences like physics. Or into political questions about equal opportunity. Or perhaps into the ravings of Marxists and Feminists. It is particularly difficult to ask serious questions about sex and gender in philosophy of science, because of the ways in which its scholars have reconstructed science.

In “Primatology Is Politics by Other Means”, Donna Haraway talks about sex and gender so as to reformulate the way we talk about science. As I read her paper, there are two main investigatory concepts she uses. One is “social organization”.
The Kantian Foundations of Modern Science
Authors: Brittan Gordon G
Published: January 2016

One way of putting our Interpretive problem, as Professor Butts, does in his very interesting paper, is to characterize the relation(s) between Kant's transcendental and metaphysical principles, on the one hand, and between these principles and the presumptive laws of empirical science, on the other. Another way of putting the problem is to distinguish between Kant's merely illustrative use of the science of his day, his appropriation, generalization, and redeployment of contemporary, often chemical, concepts, his commitment to certain features of classical physics, in particular, as constitutive of any adequate conception of experience, and his identification of the deep presuppositions of any science worthy of the name.

In fact, I do not think that there is any general and precise way in which transcendental and metaphysical principles and the laws of empirical science are related. At best there are analogies.
Churchland on Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection
Authors: Shoemaker Sydne
Published: January 2016

Churchland (1985) is much struck with the possibility that we might learn to make introspective reports in “the conceptual framework of a matured neuroscience”. He thinks that this would yield “a quantum leap in self-apprehension”. And he apparently thinks that the possibility of this strengthens the case for reductionism. I will not question the claim that we might learn to make in a quasi-introspective way the sorts of reports Churchland envisages, about dopamine levels in the limbic system, spiking frequencies in neural pathways, and so forth; nor will I question that this might have a beneficial effect on our aesthetic appreciation, our emotional self-understanding, and the like. I will question whether the awareness Churchland envisages would be genuine introspective awareness, although in some sense it would involve it.
The Problem of Irreversibility
Authors: Earman John
Published: January 2016

The nature and basis of irreversibility has been intensively investigated over the last 100 years by physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers. But if progress is measured by convergence of opinion among the “experts” then it is hard to detect; in fact the field is a virtual Tower of Babel. J.L. Lebowitz, one of the leading mathematical physicists in the field put it this way:

I do not know if anyone is making bets on the eventual resolution of the apparent paradoxes relating to the coexistence, in the description of the same phenomena, of both determinism and randomness, reversibility and time asymmetry, and so on. If there are people betting, however, I would be very happy to be the banker and keep the money until everyone has agreed on the answer. (Lebowitz 1983, p. 4)
Schlick’s Critique of Positivism
Authors: Lewis Joia
Published: January 2016

It is not well known that Moritz Schlick, whose name is inseparable from the development of logical positivism, was extremely critical of positivism prior to the 1920’s. The positivism Schlick found fault with was associated with the physicist Ernst Mach. Schlick went to considerable lengths to criticize Machian positivism on both epistemological and ontological grounds. He also objected to the positivist claim to be able to account for relativity theory within its framework.

Schlick’s views before his move to Vienna in 1922 have been labeled a “critical empiricist realism” (see Feigl 1938, p. xx) or a “structural realism” (Friedman 1983, p. 501). His exposure to the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is generally held up as the crucial factor in turning him away from his early realist views towards positivism. There is general acknowledgment of a major change in Schlick’s philosophical thinking in the early 20’s; disagreement exists, however, over both the extent of the change and whether it was a positive or negative one.
Marr’s Theory of Vision and the Argument From Success
Authors: Morton Peter A.
Published: January 2016

A central aspect of the computational theory of vision developed by Marr and his coworkers is the use made of contingent regularities in the physical environment to explain how the visual system determines the shape and location of objects in the world on the basis of the spatial organization of the retinal image. Marr (1982) refers to these environmental regularities as “natural constraints” and “physical assumptions.” In this paper I am concerned with recent arguments concerning the implications of this feature of Marr’s theory for understanding psychological explanation. Burge (1986) claims that Marr’s use of natural constraints shows the theory to be nonindividualistic, in the sense that the individuation of psychological states depends essentially on the objects and conditions of the world external to the subject. While it does capture an important aspect of Marr’s theory, Burge’s account is misleadingly incomplete. To see this it is useful to compare the issue of individualism with the question whether the theory is compatible with methodological solipsism as a research strategy.
Explanation in the Semantic Conception of Theory Structure
Authors: Thompson Paul
Published: January 2016

The semantic conception of theories has a relatively short history the beginnings of which Frederick Suppe has traced to von Neumann (Suppe 1988). Two other early initiators and advocates were Evert Beth in 1948-49 (Beth 1948, 1949; see also 1961) and Patrick Suppes in 1957 in his Introduction to Logic (Suppes, 1957). Beth advanced what has become known as a state space approach while Suppes advanced a set-theoretical predicate approach.

Suppes suggested that scientific theories are more appropriately formalized as set-theoretical predicates. Shortly thereafter in 1961 Robert Stoll in his Set Theory and Logic (Stoll, 1961) made a similar claim about the formalization of informal theories of which scientific theories are instances. Suppes wrote a number of papers during the 1960's in which he indicated the features of theories that were better represented on a set-theoretical predicate conception of theories (see, for example Suppes, 1962).
Backward Induction without Common Knowledge
Authors: Bicchieri Cristina
Published: January 2016

Game theory studies the behavior of rational players in interactive situations and its possible outcomes. For such an investigation, the notion of players’ rationality is crucial. While notions of rationality have been extensively discussed in game theory, the epistemic conditions under which a game is played — though implicitly presumed — have seldom been explicitly analyzed and formalized. These conditions involve the players’ reasoning processes and capabilities, as well as their knowledge of the game situation. Game theory treats some aspects of information about chance moves and other players’ moves by means of information partitions in extensive form games. But a player's knowledge of the structure, for example, of information partitions themselves is different from his information about chance moves and other players’ moves. The informational aspects captured by the extensive form games have nothing to do with a player's knowledge of the structure of the game.
Sets and Point-Sets: Five Grades of Set-Theoretic Involvement in Geometry
Authors: Burgess John P.
Published: January 2016

Cantor was the founder of not one but two theories: an earlier theory of point-sets and a later theory of sets. How are they related? How much more about points and sets of points can be proved with the assumption of sets of sets of points, sets of sets of sets of points, and so on, than without? The present paper is a semi-popular (nontechnical except for presupposing some familiarity with first-order logic) survey of partial answers obtained by logicians during the last decades.

Tarski (1959) has shown how classical geometry (of any number of dimensions, say for definiteness three) can be formalized in a first-order language, here to be called L0, as a first-order theory, here to be called G0. L0 has variables x,y,z, and so on for points, and predicates for a couple of geometric relations among points. G0 has a dozen axioms and one scheme.
Taming the Dimensions-Visualizations in Science
Authors: Wimsatt William C.
Published: January 2016

The role of pictures and visual modes of presentation of data in science is a topic of increasing interest to workers in artificial intelligence, the psychology of problem solving, and increasing numbers of scientists in all fields who must deal with problems of how to represent large quantities of complex multidimensional data in an intelligible fashion. The use of pictures is marvelously illustrated by but not limited to the biological sciences, so I will use examples from elsewhere as appropriate. With the development of our visual technology—television, videotape, and the computer, the uses (and misuses) of visualization has properly become a matter not only of theoretical but also of practical concern. I will start with a practical story because it has multiple morals, both practical and theoretical—most of which lead elsewhere than I wish to go here.
Paradigms and Barriers
Authors: Margolis Howard
Published: January 2016

Having for thirty years believed and taught the doctrine of phlogiston… I for a long time felt inimical to the new system, which represented as absurd that which I hitherto regarded as sound doctrine; but this enmity… springs only from force of habit… [Black to Lavoisier, 1791]

This paper is abstracted from a forthcoming book which defends a particular answer to the question of just what it is that shifts when a paradigm shifts. The claim is that what shifts are habits of mind. And in particular the claim is that the most striking cases of paradigm shift will characteristically turn on a shift in some single, uniquely critical, habit of mind: the barrier. An account of a radical discovery — discovery that prompts the Kuhnian symptoms of incommensurability, so that intuitions that seem irresistible to some seem perverse to their rivals — then characteristically turns on how some individual got past the barrier (escaped the critical habit of mind), while at least for a while others could not do so.
Darcy’s Law and Structural Explanation in Hydrology
Authors: Hofmann James R. , Hofmann Paul A.
Published: January 2016

According to a recent argument, models play two essential roles in the argumentative structure of solid state physics and chemistry (Hofmann 1990). On the one hand, models are the culmination of phenomenological description. That is, models are idealized representations of the molecular structures thought to be causally responsible for the processes experimentally monitored and measured. Secondly, dieoretical physicists and chemists require that models ultimately be cast in a mathematical form appropriate for the application of the Schroedinger equation. In this respect models become the means through which the Schroedinger equation gives a theoretical unity to what would otherwise be a disparate set of empirical phenomenological laws and descriptions with limited scope. That is, it is an important theoretical goal to show that experimentally generated phenomenological laws can be approximately derived through an application of the Schroedinger equation to a necessarily idealized and simplified mathematical description of the relevant system. The two functions of models are not incompatible, but they do reflect two distinct theoretical orientations toward the interpretation of data.
Another Day for an Old Dogma
Authors: Levy Robert J.
Published: January 2016

In Theory and Evidence, Clark Glymour asserts that many philosophers are convinced that “evidence can only bear on the entire body of our beliefs, and cannot be parceled out here and there“(1980,p.5). Attributing this view to Quine, Glymour says:

No working scientist acts as though the entire sweep of scientific theory faces the tribunal of experience as a single, undifferentiated whole; nor, I think, does any working person act so with regard to his beliefs. On the contrary, much of the scientist’s business is to construct arguments that aim to show that a particular piece of experiment or observation bears on a particular piece of theory, and such arguments are among the most celebrated accomplishments in the history of our sciences (1980,p.3).

Some philosophers might counter that Glymour’s criticisms apply properly to a view Quine had significantly modified two decades before the publication of Theory and Evidence.
Additivity and the Units of Selection
Authors: Godfrey-Smith Peter
Published: January 2016

Variation is the fuel of evolution, but as is well known, not all variation will drive Darwin’s engine along. Within population genetics, “additivity” is one concept used to characterize the salient type of variation. The characterization of variation (variance) in terms of additivity originates with R.A. Fisher (1918), and Fisher’s “fundamental theorem of natural selection” (1930) states that the rate of evolutionary change is proportional to the additive variance in fitness in the population at that time. Evolution proceeds until the additive variance is exhausted.

It would not be surprising if a concept so important in the mathematical structure of evolutionary theory had philosophical significance. In two important works, William Wimsatt (1981) and Elisabeth Lloyd (1988) have claimed that additivity can be used to give a criterion for deciding the “unit of selection” in an evolutionary process.
Reversibility and the Interpretation of Mixtures in Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Pessoa Osvaldo
Published: January 2016

The term “experimental philosophy” has been used to refer to the solution of what were considered philosophical problems by means of laboratory experiments. A recent example of this was the experimental violation of the Bell inequality, which ruled out certain philosophically appealing “realist local” theories as alternatives to quantum mechanics (QM).

Following the spirit of such experimental philosophy, this paper proposes a feasible test between two different interpretations concerning the nature of “mixtures” in QM. The use of delayed coincidence techniques seems to show that the process of mixing beams of light in different polarizations is reversible, favoring a weak version of the so-called “ignorance interpretation” over the “instrumentalist” view.
A New Look at Simultaneity
Authors: Peacock Kent A.
Published: January 2016

In recent years there has been renewed discussion of the problem of temporal becoming (Maxwell 1985,1988; Dieks 1988; Stein 1991). The theme of this paper is that these discussions, timely and interesting as they are, do not go deeply enough into the question. I would like to suggest that a certain way of thinking about simultaneity, which as far as I know was first sketched in a science fiction novel by Robert A. Heinlein (1956), opens up a set of possibilities that deserve serious consideration.

More precisely, I will address the following question: is there anything in the formal structure of Minkowski spacetime which corresponds to our intuitive albeit imprecise notion of a global “present”? It is generally assumed that because of the relativity of optical simultaneity the answer to this question is, resoundingly, no.
The Selection of Alleles and the Additivity of Variance
Authors: Sarkar Sahotra
Published: January 2016

Since the mid-1970s, when philosophical scrutiny of biology began to be
focused on evolutionary theory, the center of philosophical attention in
that field has been what is called the “units of selection” controversy. In
particular, two problems have attracted philosophical and, on occasion,
biological attention: (i) should natural selection be regarded as capable of
operating on groups of individuals as distinct units, or should such a
process only be regarded as a special type of selection on the constituent
individuals of such groups even when every member of the group, by virtue of
its membership of that group, is affected by selection in an identical
manner?; and (ii) similarly, should selection be regarded as “ultimately”
operating only on individual alleles since, even when the genotype seems to
feel the action of selection more directly, any change in the genotypic
composition of a population also consists of a change in its allelic
composition?
Scientific Explanation: From Covering Law to Covering Theory
Authors: Rohrlich Fritz
Published: January 2016

The premise of the present paper is the primacy of understanding over
explanation. The question “is the act of explaining a goal in itself, or is
it a means to an end?” is here answered by “explaining is a pragmatic
concept and serves the purpose of responding credibly to a request for
understanding.” Explaining is secondary, understanding is primary.

Given this view of scientific explanation, one is faced with the
received view and the recent literature based on it. Models of explanation
cast into the covering law format do not necessarily ensure understanding,
nor do they necessarily provide sufficient information for
credibility.

After explicating this dissatisfaction (Section 2) I shall first clarify
what I mean by scientific theory, law, and model (Section 3) since these
concepts are crucial for the covering theory
model proposed in Section 4.
In Search of a Pointless Decision Principle
Authors: Bandyopadhayay Prasanta S.
Published: January 2016

“Maximizing expected utility (MEU)” is one assumption of (strict)
Bayesian decision theory [Savage 1972]. According to the principle of MEU,
in a given decision situation, the decision maker should choose one of the
alternatives with maximal expected utility [For an excellent discussion of
decision theory, see Jeffrey 1990]. However, MEU as the foundation of
Bayesian decision theory has been under attack. One counterexample that
seems to dispute MEU as a rationality principle is offered by Daniel
Ellsberg[Ellsberg 1961]. While discussing what has been dubbed as the
Ellsberg paradox, I will consider briefly three decision principles, each of
which is different from the MEU principle.
Simplicity, Cognition and Adaptation: Some Remarks on Marr's Theory of
Vision
Authors: Gilman Daniel
Published: January 2016

David Marr's theory of vision has been a source of both fascination and
confusion for many in cognitive science. There has, of course, been
substantial technical interest in the particulars of Marr's model. But
beyond this we have seen his work cited in debates about the nature of
mental representation and computation, the structure of cognition, the role
of theoretical knowledge in perception, how and indeed whether one ought to
apply results from cognitive science to antecedent questions in
epistemology. Marr's theory is cited in such debates because it is widely
seen as a successful, rigorous account of a large scale cognitive/perceptual
process (if not as the successful such account).
But it has been suggested that Marr's theory might be mistaken as a whole;
that Marr might have been wrong not just about one or several of the
sub-mechanisms of vision, and not just in offering an incomplete account,
but wrong in his basic approach to the study of vision.
Newton's Opticks as Classic: On Teaching the Texture of Science
Authors: Sepper Dennis L.
Published: January 2016

The opening paragraphs of Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions noted that different kinds of scientific writings have peculiar roles (Kuhn 1962). A textbook written for pedagogical purposes in a well-established scientific field gives a view of the field quite different from the actual history—an actual history that for the most part has to be reconstructed from the writings that originated the field. The originating writings correspond to the period of founding, to revolutionary science, whereas conventionalized textbooks belong to normal science.

This is almost too well known to be rehearsed again. Certain works found a science, like Newton's Opticks or Watson and Crick's original papers on the double-helical structure of DNA; others come in their wake, not just textbooks used for beginners but all the future texts that contribute to the paradigm project embodied in the originals.
Scientific Classics and Their Fates
Authors: McMullin Ernan
Published: January 2016

The term ‘classic’ runs a risk that all our terms of approbation face in these inflationary times, the risk, that is, of losing its ability to mark off singular works of human achievement. A “classic” today might be anything from a horse-race to a hairstyle. But it was not always so. There is some debate about the origins of the term (“of the highest class”? “books for class use”?), but it long ago came to designate those works of Greek and Latin literature that for centuries shaped the education of young Western Europeans. These books were held up not only as models of literary accomplishment but also as sources of moral and social wisdom. Though they were composed in ages long past, their resonance was still felt in the present. And so the broader sense developed of a significant literary work of the past that still in one way or another speaks to us today.
Discourse, Practice, Context: From HPS to Interdisciplinary Science Studies
Authors: Wylie Alison
Published: January 2016

One of the most widely debated and influential implications of the “demise” of positivism was the realization, now a commonplace, that philosophy of science must be firmly grounded in an understanding of the history of science, and/or of contemporary scientific practice. While the nature of this alliance is still a matter of uneasy negotiation, the principle that philosophical analysis must engage “real” science has transformed philosophical practice in innumerable ways. For one thing, it has led to a systematic questioning, indeed, in the view of many, the dismantling, of “unity” theses and the presumption that the sciences embody a common rational core that philosophers can reasonably expect to “reconstruct.” As HPS practitioners have scrutinized particular sciences, their diversity has come more clearly into focus and this has generated, in turn, vigorous programs of research that take an increasingly wide range of “special” sciences—including various life sciences, earth sciences, and social sciences—as a legitimate primary focus of concern.
Meaning in a Material Medium
Authors: Baird Davis
Published: January 2016

On September 3 and 4, 1821 Michael Faraday, age 30, performed a series of experiments which ultimately produced what were called “electromagnetic rotations.” Faraday showed how an appropriately organized combination of electric and magnetic elements would produce rotary motion. He invented the first electric motor.

Faraday's work resulted in several “products.” He published several papers describing his discovery (Faraday 1821; 1821-2; 1822c). He wrote letters to many scientific colleagues (Faraday 1812-48, pp. 122-39). He built, or had built, several copies of an apparatus which, requiring no experimental knowledge or dexterity on the part of its user, would display the notable rotations (Faraday 1822a; 1822b). He shipped these to his scientific colleagues (Faraday 1812-48, pp. 128-9). It is this material product which I would like to focus on.

For the presentation of this talk in New Orleans, I intended to have my own version of Faraday's first electric motor.
Inhibition of the histone demethylase Kdm5b promotes neurogenesis and derepresses Reln (reelin) in neural stem cells from the adult subventricular zone of mice
Authors: Zhou Qiong , Obana Edwin A. , Radomski Kryslaine L. , Sukumar Gauthaman , Wynder Christopher , Dalgard Clifton L. , Doughty Martin L.
Published: January 2016

The role of epigenetic regulators in the control of adult neurogenesis is largely undefined. We show that the histone demethylase enzyme Kdm5b (Jarid1b) negatively regulates neurogenesis from adult subventricular zone (SVZ) neural stem cells (NSCs) in culture. shRNA-mediated depletion of Kdm5b in proliferating adult NSCs decreased proliferation rates and reduced neurosphere formation in culture. When transferred to differentiation culture conditions, Kdm5b-depleted adult NSCs migrated from neurospheres with increased velocity. Whole-genome expression screening revealed widespread transcriptional changes with Kdm5b depletion, notably the up-regulation of reelin ( Reln), the inhibition of steroid biosynthetic pathway component genes and the activation of genes with intracellular transport functions in cultured adult NSCs. Kdm5b depletion increased extracellular reelin concentration in the culture medium and increased phosphorylation of the downstream reelin signaling target Disabled-1 (Dab1). Sequestration of extracellular reelin with CR-50 reelin-blocking antibodies suppressed the increase in migratory velocity of Kdm5b-depleted adult NSCs. Chromatin immunoprecipitation revealed that Kdm5b is present at the proximal promoter of Reln, and H3K4me3 methylation was increased at this locus with Kdm5b depletion in differentiating adult NSCs. Combined the data suggest Kdm5b negatively regulates neurogenesis and represses Reln in neural stem cells from the adult SVZ.
Individual variation in whole-animal hypoxia tolerance is associated with cardiac hypoxia tolerance in a marine teleost
Authors: Joyce William , Ozolina Karlina , Mauduit Florian , Ollivier Hélène , Claireaux Guy , Shiels Holly A.
Published: January 2016

Hypoxia is a pervasive problem in coastal environments and is predicted to have enduring impacts on aquatic ecosystems. Intraspecific variation in hypoxia tolerance is well documented in fish; however, the factors underlying this variation remain unknown. Here, we investigate the role of the heart in individual hypoxia tolerance of the European sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax). We found individual whole-animal hypoxia tolerance is a stable trait in sea bass for more than 18 months (duration of study). We next examinedin vitrocardiac performance and found myocardial muscle from hypoxia-tolerant individuals generated greater force, with higher rates of contraction and relaxation, than hypoxic-sensitive individuals during hypoxic exposure. Thus, whole-animal hypoxia tolerance is associated with cardiac hypoxia tolerance. As the occurrence of aquatic hypoxia is expected to increase in marine ecosystems, our experimental data suggest that cardiac performance may influence fish survival and distribution.
Heterozygosity increases microsatellite mutation rate
Authors: Amos William
Published: January 2016

Whole genome sequencing of families of
Arabidopsis
has recently lent strong support to the heterozygote instability (HI) hypothesis that heterozygosity locally increases mutation rate. However, there is an important theoretical difference between the impact on base substitutions, where mutation rate increases in regions surrounding a heterozygous site, and the impact of HI on sequences such as microsatellites, where mutations are likely to occur at the heterozygous site itself. At microsatellite loci, HI should create a positive feedback loop, with heterozygosity and mutation rate mutually increasing each other. Direct support for HI acting on microsatellites is limited and contradictory. I therefore analysed AC microsatellites in 1163 genome sequences from the 1000 genomes project. I used the presence of rare alleles, which are likely to be very recent in origin, as a surrogate measure of mutation rate. I show that rare alleles are more likely to occur at locus-population combinations with higher heterozygosity even when all populations carry exactly the same number of alleles.