bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Cosmogonic Myth and ‘Sacred History’
Authors: Eliade Mircea
Published: October 2008

It is not without fear and trembling that a historian of religion approaches the problem of myth. This is not only because of that preliminary embarrassing question: what is intended by myth? It is also because the answers given depend for the most part on the documents selected by the scholar. From Plato and Fontenelle to Schelling and Bultmann, philosophers and theologians have proposed innumerable definitions of myth. But all of these have one thing in common: they are based on the analysis of Greek mythology. Now, for a historian of religions this choice is not a very happy one. It is true that only in Greece did myth inspire and guide epic poetry, tragedy and comedy, as well as the plastic arts; but it is no less true that it is especially in Greek culture that myth was submitted to a long and penetrating analysis, from which it emerged radically ‘de-mythicised’. If in every European language the word ‘myth’ denotes a ‘fiction’, it is because the Greeks proclaimed it to be such twenty-five centuries ago. What is even more serious for an historian of religion: we do not know a single Greek myth within its ritual context. Of course this is not the case with the paleo-Oriental and Asiatic religions; it is especially not the case with the so-called ‘primitive’ religions. As is well known, a living myth is always connected with a cult, inspiring and justifying a religious behaviour. None of this of course means that Greek myth should not figure in an investigation of the mythical phenomenon. But it would seem unwise to begin our kind of inquiry by the study of Greek documents, and even more so to restrict it to such documents. The mythology which informs Homer, Hesiod and the tragic poets represents already a selection and an interpretation of archaic materials, some of which had become almost unintelligible. In short, our best chance of understanding the structure of mythical thought is to study cultures where myth is a ‘living thing’, where it constitutes the very ground of the religious life; in other words, where myth, far from indicating a fiction, is considered to reveal the truth par excellence.
An Approach to the Emergence of Heterodoxy in Mediaeval Islām
Authors: Taylor John
Published: October 2008

Self-righteousness and censoriousness are strong emotions. They exist in the claims of ‘orthodoxy’ as much as in the protests of ‘heterodoxy’. They lie behind claims of tolerance as often as behind displays of intolerance. These emotions should be disentangled in the motives of the men who make history, of those who write history, and of those who read history. The very designation ‘heterodox’ is both etymologically and conceptually structured in antithesis to ‘orthodox’. It is a word not only of doctrinal description, but also of inherent condemnation. The structure and the intention of words such as Shī‘a, comprising the whole sweep from bid‘a to ghulūww, direct the attention back to an opposite concept which originates, defines and prejudges these words. One corollary of this is that the movements and doctrines defined as ‘heterodox’ are fundamentally related to the ‘orthodox’ and cannot be understood in isolation. Another is that this relationship, by its very definition in terms of vindication and repudiation, is one of tension.
The presuppositions of inter-religious communication—a philosophical approach
Authors: Chatterjee Margaret
Published: October 2008

Religion has in the past, it may be truefully admitted, done more than its share of fostering the spirit of ‘we’ over against ‘they’. Economic and political factors have unfortunately, throughout history, clogged the channels of communication between men of one faith and those of another. The most unhappy aspect of the relation between religion and society has been the way in which the former has fostered the distinction between the insider and the outsider. Typical of this is the fact that most religious communities have a word which describes the religious outsider and the word is never a flattering one. That there should be religious diversity in the first place should occasion no surprise. Diversification is the order of things in the biological realm and we would not expect to find a sudden departure from this, that is, a move towards convergence, in the sphere of religion. But unless diversification is matched with understanding and with communication we face the future at our peril. It is for this reason that the question of inter-religious communication, the ground of its possibility, can be regarded not only as the most pressing of problems for the student of comparative religion (for unless there is prior understanding and communication where indeed are the data to be compared?) but as a matter of pressing urgency for all.
Existence, Transcendence and God
Authors: Ward J. S. K.
Published: October 2008

Is the existence of God a question of fact? To the majority of theists, both now and in the past, I think it has seemed clear that, if the phrase ‘God exists’ is to be meaningful, then it is a fact, either that God exists or that he does not. This assertion may even seem trivially true; and yet it has evidently been denied, in recent years, by many theologians. The reasons for such a denial are, in part, to be found in the general reaction against metaphysical philosophy, which was characteristic of the early years of this century, and which is, in Britain, epitomised by A. J. Ayer's stipulation that no proposition can be factually significant unless it is verifiable; unless, in principle at least, some series of observations could conceivably show it to be true. By restricting ‘observation’ to the senses of the physical body, and by emphasising the fact that God, as transcendent by definition, was not a possible object of the senses, some philosophically sensitive theologians were startled into denying that ‘God’ was, even in principle, verifiable; and consequently into denying that propositions purporting to assert his existence were factual.
Existence as a Perfection: A Reconsideration of the Ontological Argument
Authors: Howe Leroy T.
Published: October 2008

Anselm's two ‘ontological’ arguments rest upon three fundamental assertions:

(1) The idea of God is the idea of a being than which nothing more perfect is conceivable.

(2) Whatever exists in the understanding and outside the understanding is more perfect than whatever exists in the understanding alone. (Prosologion 2)

(3) Whatever cannot be conceived not to exist is more perfect than whatever can be conceived not to exist. (Proslogion 3)
The Presence of Evil and the Falsification of Theistic Assertions
Authors: Wainwright William J.
Published: October 2008

The falsifiability of theistic assertions no longer appears to be the burning issue it once was, and perhaps this is all to the good. For one thing, it was never entirely clear just what demand was being made of the theist. In this paper I shall not discuss the nature or legitimacy of the falsification requirement as applied to theistic assertions. Instead I shall argue that some of the reasons which have been offered to show that these assertions are not falsifiable are by no means conclusive. Since the most plausible bit of anti-theistic evidence is the existence of evil, it would seem to be legitimate for us to devote our attention to arguments which are designed to show that the theist does not allow the presence of evil to count against his claims.
The Christian Wager
Authors: Swinburne R. G.
Published: October 2008

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity.
Faith and Evidence
Authors: Matthysse Steven
Published: October 2008

As traditionally understood, faith rests on an interior illumination which makes the believer certain that the doctrine proposed for belief is true. St Thomas calls this illumination ‘the light of faith’, and Calvin, ‘the interior testimony of the Holy Spirit.’ The claim of certainty encounters some serious difficulties, however, and it seems tome we have to accept an interpretation of the ‘light of faith’ in which some doubts are left unresolved. Faith turns out not to be a simple state at all, but is composed of three distinct elements. The first element is an intuition that what is proposed for belief is true, which is accompanied by hesitation and fear of error. The second element is the infusion of a doubt-free state, in which doubts, while not resolved, are removed to the periphery of consciousness, and lose their power to cause anxiety. The third element is an intuition which makes the believer certain that he is morally required to allow this state to continue. Although many of the sources I will be discussing use ‘faith’ in an exclusively Christiansense, I believe my conclusions will hold for theistic faith in general.
Science and Religion: Their Logical Similarity
Authors: Miller John F.
Published: October 2008

In his “Theology and Falsification” Professor Antony Flew challenges the sophisticated religious believer to state under what conceivable occurrences he would concede that there really is no God Who loves mankind:

‘Just what would have to happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but also, logically and rightly, to entitle us to say “God does not love us” or even “God does not exist”? I therefore put…the simple central questions, “What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God”?’
Fact and Value in Theological Ethics
Authors: Galloway A. D.
Published: October 2008

Lady Oppenheimer has shown the need to preserve the richness of religious language and the language of vision if we are to talk about the reality of Christian ethics rather than some skeletal caricature of it. The problem is how to preserve such richness in the face of the astringent effect of the fact/value dichotomy in logic and the principle of the ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Therefore, rather than attempt to develop or comment directly upon Lady Oppenheimer's sensitive and perceptive exposition of the richness of some Christian ethico-theological concepts I am inclined to relate it to some of the earlier papers and to make some suggestions about the kind of prolegomenon I would like to write for it.
Eliade's Progressional View of Hierophanies
Authors: Reno Stephen J.
Published: October 2008

The purpose of this essay is to present a brief description and evaluation of Mircea Eliade's interpretation of religious symbols with an eye to certain methodological difficulties. Professor Eliade characterises the procedure of the historian of religions as being uniquely preoccupied with religious symbols, that is, with those symbols which are involved in both the experience of homo religiosus and in his conception of the cosmos. As an historian of religions Eliade's own approach has consistently been to study religious symbols from a position that is not reductionist. Although admitting the influence of cultural and environmental factors upon the formulation of religious symbols, he has been primarily concerned to discern the typical structures or types of religious experience and expression by a consideration of religious phenomena. In his own words, he has attempted to study ‘the conceptions of being and reality that can be read from the behaviour of man of the premodern societies’.
The New Testament and the Incarnation: A Study in Doctrinal Development
Authors: Owen H. P.
Published: October 2008

Christianity affirms, with Judaism and Islam, that God is the omnipotent Creator of all things. But it diverges from them in also affirming that the Creator assumed a human nature in one figure of history, Jesus of Nazareth. Christ thus differs from other men in kind, not merely in degree; he is absolutely, not just relatively, unique. Admittedly many Christian theologians have held that the difference between Christ and other men is only one of degree. Yet the Church's traditional claim, as expressed in the Chalcedonian Definition, is that Jesus was both creature and Creator, both fully man and fully God.
Gastwirth's ‘Concepts of God’
Authors: Slater Peter
Published: October 2008

Paul Gastwirth seems to me generally correct concerning our concepts of God (Religious Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 1972, pp. 147–52). But there are at least two points at which he needs to take his analysis further if he is to help us to think through the topic. In the first place, he must do more than invoke the Wittgensteinian image of family resemblances if he is to exorcise the quest for defining characteristics. And, in the second place, he needs to consider in some detail the use of ‘God’ as a name.
Miracles
Authors: Diamond Malcolm L.
Published: October 2008

The status of religion in the modern world is intimately related to the rise of science. The clearest way of getting at this relation is to consider the issue of miracle. Given the success of scientists in predicting and controlling natural phenomena, many of the leading theologians of the modern era abandoned the understanding of miracle as a supernatural violation of natural regularities. They conceded the capacity of scientists to offer natural explanations of phenomena that are naturally observable and shifted their theological focus from the observable patterns of nature to morality, religious experience, and history. Although many liberal and existentialistic theologians affirmed the miraculous, especially with regard to the Resurrection, they avoided a head on collision with science.
Is the Justification of Religious Belief a Possible Enterprise?
Authors: Durrant Michael
Published: October 2008

In a recent article Professor Phillips has argued against Mascall's contention that the role of philosophy in relation to religious belief is to justify that belief by seeking ‘rational grounds for asserting the existence of God’. In this paper I shall investigate the case Phillips presents and the argument he utilises from Winch to establish the conclusion that it is a fundamental misunderstanding to think that one could justify religious belief and I shall further point out a serious dilemma in Phillips's position on the question of religious truth. It is my claim that Phillips does not establish that Mascall's enterprise is an impossible one and that his own position in criticising Mascall leads him into the dilemma I have alluded to.
Professor N. H. G. Robinson and Natural Theology
Authors: Trethowan Illtyd
Published: October 2008

In a recent article ‘The Problem of Natural Theology’, Professor N. H. G. Robinson has considered the requirements of a ‘genuinely empirical natural theology’. For the first section of it, a very clear sorting-out of recent debates on the ontological argument, I have nothing but admiration. It ends with the question: ‘Granted that if we think of God we must think of him as necessarily existing, why must we think of God at all?’, followed by the comment: ‘We seem thrown, without any prospect of rest, between apriorism and [Barthian] empiricism’. Robinson is rightly dissatisfied with that situation, and in his second section he raises the question whether there cannot be an approach to God which the debates on the ontological arguments (as so far described) have overlooked and which may be properly called an ‘empirical’ one, free from Barthian presuppositions. He finds what seems to be such an approach in Professor E. L. Mascall's Existence and Analogy but concludes that it is in fact after all a form of ‘rationalism’. In the third section he criticises Professor T. F. Torrance's defence of Barth's position in a way which seems to me most satisfactory, and in the fourth he makes his own positive proposals. With these I am in substantial agreement. It is only his account of Mascall's position, in particular at the end of his second section, which seems to call for critical comment.
Faith and Belief
Authors: Evans Donald
Published: October 2008

The next contrast, like that between grammatical beliefs and non-grammatical beliefs, has to do with what is believed. My labels for the contrast may be misleading, but I have not found better ones. Some beliefs are ‘existential’, others are ‘non-existential’. You will be misled if the labels suggest my earlier contrasts between intentional and non-intentional or attitudinal and non-attitudinal, or the contrast often made between what exists and what is non-existent. The existential/non-existential contrast is a contrast made in terms of conditions of understanding. By an ‘existential’ belief I mean a belief where what is believed can only be understood to the extent that one has fulfilled certain existential conditions—that is, conditions which existentialist philosophers emphasise, conditions having to do with the personal depth and authenticity of one's commitments, attitudes and general life-experience. A non-existential belief is one which has no such conditions for understanding (though it is often a belief concerning what exists).
A New Disproof of the Compatibility of Foreknowledge and Free Choice
Authors: Lackey Douglas P.
Published: October 2008

Old philosophical problems never die, but they can be reinterpreted. In this paper, I offer a reinterpretation of the problem of reconciling divine omniscience and human free will. Classical discussions of this problem concentrate on the nature of God and the concept of free will. The present discussion will focus attention on the concept of knowledge, drawing on developments in epistemology that resulted from the posing of a certain problem by Edmund Gettier in 1963.
Christian Response Within Hinduism
Authors: Gosling David L.
Published: October 2008

The purpose of this paper is to describe and to discuss the implications of some features of Hinduism which seem to be of universal significance for Christian thinking. The title ‘Christian Response Within Hinduism’ refers to aspects of Hindu spirituality which a reasonably detached observer might find hard to distinguish from Christian spirituality in its better moments, but which, if only on account of the absence of the institutional Church, is likely to be classified as Hindu rather than Christian.
Understanding Understanding Religious Belief
Authors: Cherry Christopher
Published: October 2008

I try in this article to shed some light on what it is and what it is not to understand certain kinds of beliefs, of which religious belief is the most prominent instance. Much has been written on the subject, and I make no apologies either for taking for granted a context for discussion, or for disregarding a number of familiar issues. I try, in particular, to explain why a rather curious thesis about understanding religious belief has found wide acceptance when, on the face of it, it cannot possibly be correct. I begin with one or two points about belief; I then take what I hope is a fresh look at two theses about understanding religious belief; and finally I draw some tentative conclusions about puzzlement, understanding and understandability.
A Russian View of Immortality
Authors: Harvie J. A.
Published: October 2008

It is arguable that without a decline in the credibility of life after death, Western civilisation, with its frenetic attempts to manipulate man's physical environment, could hardly have developed as it did. As long as human life is regarded sub specie aeternitatis, changes in the conditions under which it is lived can hardly be thought of as being of supreme importance. Conversely, current indications of a renewal of interest in the great theme of personal immortality may owe something to the eclipse of our science-based culture and the increasingly precarious nature of life in this world. It is still far too soon to be sure. In the circumstances it may be of interest to look at a work written almost 200 years ago by a man who has often been hailed as the first Russian revolutionary. Though it has never been translated, it is generally known in English as the Treatise on Immortality. Highly literate and articulate, the author affirmed his belief in the indestructibility of the human spirit in face of imminent bodily dissolution. The arguments he deploys are not essentially dissimilar to the terms of the immortality debate today. First, however, a minimum of information about the writer is necessary if his views are not to be presented in a vacuum.
The Problem of the Divine Eternity
Authors: Sturch R. L.
Published: October 2008

The ‘traditional’ view among philosophical (and many other) theologians, that God is eternal not merely in the sense of being everlasting but in the sense of being outside time altogether, has come under sharp criticism in recent years, both from biblical theologians and from philosophers. It is against the latter form of attack, particularly as represented by the detailed criticisms of Professor Nelson Pike, that I wish to try and defend the notion of a divine timelessness.
On the Alleged Inseparability of Morality and Religion
Authors: Klemke E. D.
Published: October 2008

In his Morality and Religion, W. W. Bartley III states that ‘the chief aim of this study is to get clearer about the extent to which morality and religion may be interdependent’ (p. i). After stating various possible alternatives, in terms of the logical relationships of derivability and compatibility, which are relevant to this issue, Prof. Bartley in fact devotes his book to a consid eration of four views:

(1) Morality is reducible to religion.

(2) Religion is reducible to morality.

(3) Morality and religion are in conflict (partly, not wholly).

(4) Morality and religion are inseparable.
The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil
Authors: kane G. Stanley
Published: October 2008

Traditional theism maintains the view that the world is created by a God who is at once omnipotent and perfectly good. One of the most persistent challenges to this view is that known as the problem of evil. The challenge consists in the allegation that the manifest imperfections of the world are incompatible with its having been created by a God who is both perfectly good and has the power to carry out his will. In the face of this challenge some theists have sought to defend theism by drawing a sharp distinction between human goodness and divine goodness and claiming that the goodness of God is different from human goodness not merely in degree but in kind, and that God's goodness cannot be understood by men. As a consequence of this, they contend, the created world can be judged to be imperfect only if it is measured against the inferior standards of human goodness, which because they are inferior are inappropriate for judging the works of the almighty and infinitely perfect God. The sharp distinction between God's goodness and man's thus allows the theist to maintain that God is perfectly good even while recognising that there is (according to human standards of goodness and evil) a great deal of evil in the world. Hence, if the distinction can be successfully defended, it provides a neat way of getting out of the problem of evil.
The Knowledge of God According to Two Process Theologians: A Twentieth-Century Gnosticism
Authors: Gunton Colin
Published: October 2008

Knowledge of God, in the sense of acquaintance with him, is an unavoidable part of our experience as human beings. God is presented to us along with the other data of our experience. That is the heart of the understanding of the knowledge of God according to the doctrines of the two Process theologians who are the subjects of this paper. Quite how it is so will, I hope, follow from an exposition of the views of Schubert M. Ogden and Charles Hartshorne, who represent different aspects of the situation. Hartshorne is the philosopher, who has devoted all his intellectual life to preaching and refining his metaphysical system, while Ogden has taken up Hartshorne's discoveries for apologetic and theological reasons. A brief look at Ogden's intellectual history will set the scene.
Is Necessity Necessary?
Authors: Martin J. A.
Published: October 2008

Q: If necessity is the mother of invention, whence necessity?

A. (Thesis): The matrix of necessity in God-talk is religious experience, philosophically interpreted. The interpreters, theists and non-thesists, have indeed been inventive.
The Cosmological Argument
Authors: Wadia Pheroze S.
Published: October 2008

I. Professor William L. Rowe begins an interesting paper on the Cosmological Argument by stating that his ‘purpose …is not to resurrect it’ but ‘to uncover, clarify, and examine some of the philosophical concepts and theses essential to the reasoning exhibited in the argument’. (49) However, in the concluding pages of his paper, Rowe is at some pains to show that his discussion does at least demonstrate that the Cosmological Argument is beyond the reach of criticisms levelled against it in the works of its classical critics, Hume and Kant and their modern-day counterparts. To quote his concluding remark: ‘Like most important philosophical arguments, it appears that the Cosmological Argument is neither as good as its supporters have claimed it to be nor as bad as its critics have believed.’ (61) Now I have long suspected that some such estimate of the Cosmological Argument was correct; however I do not think that Rowe's discussions in his paper establish his contention that the reports of the death of the Cosmological Argument have been premature. Nevertheless, Rowe's uncovering of the reasoning that lies behind the argument does have the merit of laying bare the precise point from which, as well as the direction in which, the defence of the argument should proceed if we are to truly make some headway on this hoary topic. In what follows, I will first try to show why I think Rowe's discussion fails to establish his conclusion and thereafter try to give the outline of a more successful strategy for arriving at the same conclusion.
Informative Discourse and Theology
Authors: Power William L.
Published: October 2008

It is a fact that human beings attempt to discourse about God. The question is: can they? In this paper I want to discuss the problem of man's endeavour to speak and write meaningfully about God. In the first part of the paper, I will discuss the informative function of language and the conditions under which one can use language intelligibly to communicate information about a particular concrete individual or object. In the second part of the paper, I will attempt to apply my remarks to the problem of discourse about God and to show how God can be understood as a concrete individual by employing the metaphysical categories of C. S. Peirce.
What a Miracle Really is
Authors: Landrum George
Published: October 2008

Although an immense amount has been written about miracles by philosophers – and theologicans of a philosophical turn of mind – to the point where no one wants to read any more on the subject, there are still two very good reasons for writing about miracles: (1) the concept of a miracle commonly employed simply will not do, so that most of the talk of discovering whether or not some event is miraculous is beside the point; (2) the proper way of looking at what a miracle is involves one in clarifying the very perplexing notions of agency and explanation, and both of these notions are interesting in their own right.
The Achievement of Clement of Alexandria
Authors: Ferguson John
Published: October 2008

In his masterly book Christ and Culture H. Richard Niebuhr identified five main attitudes which Christians have taken towards secular culture. The first emphasizes the opposition between Christ and culture. In the New Testament it is best seen in Revelation (where it is complicated by a situation of persecution) and in the First Epistle of John. But it appears in its most radical form in Tertullian, though even he is not wholly consistent. Men are under illusions from their very culture (Apol. 21). Graeco-Roman society was shot through and through with what Tertullian regarded as superstition and idolatry, as well as immorality. So Tertullian repudiated political life, military service, many aspects of commerce, philosophy and the arts (apart from the amount of literary training needed for expression).
The Fabric of Self-Suffering: A Study in Gandhi
Authors: Saxena S. K.
Published: October 2008

This essay seeks to clarify Gandhi's logic of self-suffering. Its inner accents have not received the attention they deserve. So I propose to emphasize them, though the context of such suffering and its impact on men too must be given due regard.
Basava's Spiritual Struggle
Authors: Samartha M. P.
Published: October 2008

The purpose of this essay is to investigate and critically analyse some of the formative factors which led to the spiritual maturation of a leading Vīraśaiva saint, Basava (1106–68). This inquiry focuses on a single event in the life of this great reformer of medieval times, i.e. his spiritual conflict leading to his rejection of theupanayana(investiture of the sacred thread) ceremony. The study will proceed through an investigation of the earliest and subsequent sources which veil the personality of Basava. The traditional view will be challenged as one-sided. By critically comparing the sources, a more comprehensive and plausible account will be suggested.
Mysticism and Drugs
Authors: Kellenberger J.
Published: October 2008

In recent years the issue of whether mysticism can be induced by drugs has been pursued by both scholars of mystical literature and psychological researchers. R. C. Zaehner is perhaps the best known among the scholars of religious literature who have addressed the issues of drug-induced mysticism. While on the side of empirical psychology investigators such as Walter N. Pahnke, R. E. L. Masters, and Jean Houston have pursued some of the same issues using the techniques of laboratory experimentation. Zaehner, who was familiar with both Eastern and Western mysticism, argued that drug-induced experiences are not the same as religious mystical experiences of the theistic variety. It was farcical, he argued, for Aldous Huxley to posit a connection between his preternatural feeling of oneness with his chair and the Beatific Vision. The issue between Zaehner and Huxley was not over the veridicality of Huxley's mystical experience. It was over the significance of Huxley's experience: Was it or was it not a drug-induced mystical experience of the sort attained by mystics after heroic struggles of self-discipline? This was the issue again when Zaehner came to address himself to the claims of Timothy Leary, a chief proponent of ‘the LSD experience’, and, in general terms, this has been the central issue pursued by the psychological researchers.
The Role of the Anugītā in the Understanding of the Bhagavadgītā
Authors: Sharma Arvind
Published: October 2008

Sometime after the famous fratricidal battle among the Bharatas known as the Mahābhārata war was over (on the eve of which the Bhagavadgītā had been revealed to Arjuna by Krŗşņa), Arjuna

requested Krŗşņa… to repeat the instruction which had already been conveyed to him on ‘the holy field of Kurukşetra’ but which had gone out of his ‘degenerate mind’. Kŗşņa thereupon protests that he is not equal to a verbatim recapitulation of the Bhagavadgītā but agrees in lieu of that to impart to Arjuna the same instruction in other words, through the medium of a certain ancient story – or purātana itihāsa. And the instruction thus conveyed constitutes what is called the Anugītā, a name which is in itself an embodiment of this anecdote.
Towards a Reconciliation of Mysticism and Dualism
Authors: Betty L.Stafford
Published: October 2008

At a time when mysticism is at last emerging as a respectable field of study for philosophers and religious phenomenologists, we find this new field in considerable disarray. We see, for example, Eliot Deutsch defending as philosophically intelligible and as significant śankara's non-dualistic interpretation of the mystic's experience.1 There is R. C. Zaehner, on the other hand, labelling śankara's mysticism ‘profane’ and sharply distinguishing it from the fuller, or ‘sacred’, mysticism of the theist.2 A third modern-day interpreter, W. T. Stace, finds both the ‘monism’ of śankara and the dualism of the theist inadequate and proposes ‘pantheism’ as the most plausible interpretation of the mystic's experience.3 Still another interpreter, Ben-Ami Scharfstein, rejects, as did Bertrand Russell much earlier,4 every metaphysical claim put forward by the mystic; any such claim, be it monist, pantheist, or dualist, is but an ‘ontological fairy tale’.5
God and Whatever Comes to Pass
Authors: Helm Paul
Published: October 2008

In thinking about God's relation to the world philosophical theologians have taken two lines of thought. In some cases (e.g. Aquinas) these two views have been held side by side, in others separately.

The first has been to conceive of God as existing timelessly, or outside time, and as contemplating the world in one timeless creative gaze. (Convenient documentation can be found in God and Timelessness by Nelson Pike.)1 As has often been pointed out, this view is subject to the difficulty of making sense of a temporal order of events in a tenseless mode. God may know (timelessly) that e is earlier than f. But A. N. Prior has forcefully argued that if God's knowledge is outside time this restricts what God knows to those truths that are themselves timeless. The idea of something's being over, or going to happen, or happening now cannot fall within the knowledge of God if he exists timelessly. To replace the indexical words such as ‘now’ and ‘then’ with dates and definite descriptions of places will not suffice because (for example) what we know when we know that e is over but f is not is not simply that e is before f.2
Professor Pike on Part III of Hume's Dialogues
Authors: Wadia Pheroze S.
Published: October 2008

My attention in this paper will be focused almost exclusively on the interpretation of Part III of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion suggested by Professor Nelson Pike at the very close of his excellent recent commentary on that enduring classic.1 As I will show briefly in Section II below, Pike's interpretation of Part III emerges from the wider context of his quarrel with Kemp Smith in regard to the final outcome of these Dialogues. I find much in Pike's commentary to applaud and to agree with, especially in its earlier sections, but on this whole question of Hume's final position in the Dialogues, I find his views less than convincing. But in this paper I will confine myself to showing what I think is wrong with his reading of Part III, and no more.2 In particular, I will make no effort to challenge Pike's disagreement with Kemp Smith in regard to the final dialogue. Though Pike himself regards Part III as crucial, I am well aware that to make anything like a successful case against the kind of interpretation he favours of the upshot of the Dialogues much more would have to be done than I attempt in this paper. I submit this attempt, then, in partial fulfillment of a larger task to be completed at some future time.
The epistemology of omnipotence
Authors: Lackey Douglas
Published: October 2008

Traditional theology asserts that God is omnipotent. I wi11 argue that there is no way that a person could be justified in believing that God is omnipotent. It follows that one cannot know that God is omnipotent, since knowledge requires justified belief.
Nichiren and his nationalistic eschatology
Authors: Kodera Takashi James
Published: October 2008

A noticeable number of contemporary Japanese intellectuals have associated Nichiren (1222–82) with intolerant nationalism and henceforth have viewed him with an air of aloofness, if not of contempt. For these intellectuals, who have come to denounce nationalism and patriotism as a dangerous ideology that led Japan to the tragedy of World War II, Nichiren's passion for Japan runs counter to their decided preference for a man more cosmopolitan in taste, even a man critical of Japan. It is true that the followers of Nichiren attempted to promote Nichiren as a patriotic Buddhist when ultra-nationalistic fervour was steadily advancing Japan as a formidable power in the world through her victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War a decade later.1 The image of Nichiren presented by his ultra-nationalistic followers in early modern Japan and by contemporary intellectuals continues to obscure Nichiren's own teaching. The present paper probes Nichiren's attitude toward Japan in the context of his messianic view of history, which constitutes one of the most salient features of Nichiren's teaching of seven centuries ago.
The ‘radically empiricist’ interpretation of early Buddhist Nirvāṇa
Authors: Doore Gary
Published: October 2008

In a recent book on the historical development of Buddhist thought, the author, David J. Kalupahana, has presented the thesis that early Buddhist philosophy, as found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, is radically different from that of later Buddhism, and supports his claim by tracing the historical divergence of the later schools from original Buddhism as he reconstructs it. He then goes on to assert that not only does early Buddhism differ philosophically from the later schools, but also that even the spiritual goal of nirvāna was fundamentally different, i.e., that the experience or condition denoted by the term ‘nirvāna’ in early Buddhism is quite different from that state which the same term came to denote later – a theory which is perhaps the most controversial feature ofhis overall interpretation of Buddhism.
Comments on Professor Løgstrup's paper
Authors: Helm Paul
Published: October 2008

I find myself in serious difficulties over Professor Løgstrup's paper. There are many points on which I am far from confident that I have understood him, and on the points where I am confident I have understood him that confidence may well prove to be misplaced. What I shall try to do in these comments is to provide in my own words an account of what I think is the argument of Professor Løgstrup's paper; then I shall try to say why I think that that argument is unconvincing. Finally I shall try to say something about the kind of programme that Professor Løgstrup sets himself, and the sort of programme that is in my view incumbent on a Christian philosopher of religion.
Price, Hick, and Disembodied Existence
Authors: Reichenbach Bruce R.
Published: October 2008

In an attempt to make the idea of surviving one's own death in a disembodied state intelligible, H. H. Price has presented a possible description of what the afterlife might be like for a disembodied self or consciousness. Price suggests that the world of the disembodied self might be a kind of dream or image world. In it he would replace his present sense-perception by activating his image-producing powers, which are now inhibited by their continuous bombardment by sensory stimuli, to produce mental images. Though he would be cut off from any new supply of sensory material, he might be able to draw upon his memory of his previous physical existence to create an entire environment of images. A nexus of perspectively inter-related images would constitute an object; this would serve as a substitute for the material objects which he perceived in his past life. The entire environment of the disembodied individual would be composed of such families of mental images and would serve to constitute his world. It need not, however, be a solipsistic world, for by means of telepathy the discarnate individual could communicate with other disembodied selves and in this way acquire new information. Price notes that since this world would be as real to the discarnate self as our present world is to our embodied self, in the afterlife the disembodied self in effect would create for itself a real world, though of course if it took it to be anything other than an image world it would be deceiving itself.
Some reflections on predestination, providence and divine foreknowledge
Authors: Hebblethwaite B. L.
Published: October 2008

It might appear to be beyond question, for Christian theism, both that God is omniscient and that omniscience includes knowledge of future truth. For it seems obvious that if P is true, then an omniscient being knows that P. P, in this propositional function, is entirely general, and must therefore include propositions of the form: ‘it will be the case that X’. If, truly, it will be the case that X, then God knows that truth.
Foreknowledge: Nelson Pike and Newcomb's problem
Authors: Ahern Dennis M.
Published: October 2008

The problem of foreknowledge and freedom presents a challenge to the defender of traditional Western theism. Nelson Pike has argued that the existence of an essentially omniscient God who possesses foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. Pike's opponents in this matter, among whom is Alvin Plantinga, argue that no incompatibility has yet been shown. I shall develop the view that neither Pike nor his opponents have conclusively settled the question whether foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. Furthermore there is a reason why the issue has not been, and may never be, conclusively settled: it is an inherently paradoxical issue. To aid in demonstrating this point I shall discuss a modified version of a paradox that has come to be known as Newcomb's Problem.
Perfect Happiness and the Resurrection of the Body
Authors: Morreall John
Published: October 2008

Although not a great deal has been said about heaven in the Christian tradition, it is part of the traditional notion of heaven that the blessed are in a condition of perfect happiness. In this life we can be happy to a certain degree, but mixed with earthly happiness is disappointment, frustration, and even sorrow. In heaven, by contrast, there is no sadness, nothing is lacking, happiness is complete. The usual way of explaining this perfect happiness is in terms of the ‘beatific vision’ – the face to face relationship of knowing and loving God which the blessed enjoy. On earth we experience only finite objects; nothing that we come to know ever completely satisfies our desire to know, and nothing that we love ever completely satisfies our will. But in the beatific vision we shall be in a direct relationship with the infinite God, who in his boundless perfection will completely ‘fill up’ our capacities to know and love. As the completely adequate object of these capacities, God will make us perfectly happy. As Aquinas puts it, ‘…But if God alone were seen, who is the fount and source of all being and of all truth, he would so fill the natural desire for knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely happy.’
Religious Experience in Lonergan and Whitehead
Authors: Fischer Kathleen
Published: October 2008

This comparison of some aspects of the treatment of religious experience in the writings of Bernard Lonergan and Alfred North Whitehead is intended to be a contribution to the continuing dialogue between process thought and classical theism, especially as the latter is represented in proponents of a newer or renewed Thomism. Continued exchange will hopefully be fruitful for the common theistic task, as well as a source of insight on the problems and limitations faced by each approach.
Polanyi's Notion of Hierarchy
Authors: Olding A.
Published: October 2008

Professor Gill's recent defence of the notion of ‘reasons of the heart’ in religion1 depends upon Polanyi's view that through ‘tacit knowledge’ of lower levels of reality we can come to know something of higher levels - even, I take it, of God, himself, as the highest level of all. Unfortunately, Polanyi's argument for such a hierarchy of being is confused and depends for its apparent strength on an illicit mixing together of ontological and what may be loosely called methodological claims. Because of this and other confusions, the argument is difficult to state concisely. For convenience I will first use Marjorie Grene's formulation.
The Argument From Design: Some Better Reasons for Agreeing with Hume
Authors: Doore Gary
Published: October 2008

I. The argument from design or ‘teleological argument’ purports to be an inductive proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the evidence of the order exhibited by natural phenomena to the probable conclusion of a rational agent responsible for producing that order. The argument was severely criticized by David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and it was widely conceded that Hume's objections had cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the teleological argument, if not destroyed its credibility entirely. However, there has been a recent reappraisal of this claim by R. G. Swinburne, who maintains that none of Hume's criticisms have any validity against a ‘carefully articulated version of the argument’. Using an analogical argument based on temporal regularities rather than on spatial regularities (or arrangement of parts), Swinburne claims to have shown that the teleological argument is a legitimate inference to the best explanation whose force depends only on the strength of the analogy and on the degree to which the resulting theory makes explanation of empirical matters simpler and more coherent. Moreover, he claims to have shown that the argument provides support for the Christian monotheistic hypothesis and not merely for the weak claim that the universe was designed (somehow). This is an important claim since it has long been thought that Hume's most devastating blow was dealt when he showed that the teleological argument (if it is admitted to have any force at all) provides just as much support for the negation of certain propositions considered essential to Christian monotheism as it does for their affirmation.
Reinterpreting the Proofs of The Existence of God
Authors: Bench-Capon T. J. M.
Published: October 2008

In this century the major insight in the field of moral philosophy has been that moral arguments need not proceed by way of the deduction of moral conclusions from non-moral premises. This realisation sprang from a recognition that the purpose of moral argument was not just to get one party to a moral disagreement to assent to a proposition that at the outset of the discussion he denied. If a moral argument was to be able to be considered successful it was insufficient for someone to recognise that an action he had previously considered right was wrong; it was essential that this recognition have an influence on his subsequent conduct. The change in belief was important only in so far as it led to a change in action. And although this insight led people to over diminish the importance of belief and propose various types of non-cognitive theories of ethics, it is none the less true that the acceptance of a proposition of the form ‘action X is wrong’ must have an impact of some kind on the behaviour of those who accept it.
Miracles and Credibility
Authors: Young Robert
Published: October 2008

Tan Tei Wei in ‘Mr Young on Miracles’ (Religious Studies, X (1974), 333–7) takes me to task over certain contentions of mine regarding the best understanding of ‘the miraculous’. I claim that the notion of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature by a particular interposition of a god, founders on the difficulty of rendering such a notion coherent. I offer instead the following account which is not subject to such a difficulty. Namely, that a miraculous event would be one brought about by God acting as a factor in the causally operative set of factors (out of the perhaps several possible sets sufficient for the event in question's occurrence), such that his activity alters the outcome from what it perhaps would have been if, contrary to fact, he had not been actively involved. It is open to a theist employing this account to say as well that had God not thus actively involved himself as a (specifically rather than just generally) active agent-factor, the (miraculous) effect would not have come about.