bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach
Authors: de Mesquita Bruce Bueno
Published: May 2006

A model of war costs is presented that is based on the utility nations expect to derive from the war as well as on the technological gap between adversaries and the short-term tactical tit-for-tat calculations that must occur on the battlefield. This model explains nearly three-quarters of the variance in battle deaths per million population per month of war experienced by war initiators. Approximately one-quarter of the variance in war costs is accounted for by considering the position of the initiator's opponent. A second model, based on marginal changes in expected utility, technological differences, and tit-for-tat, is shown to account for more than one-third the variance, regardless of whether war costs are viewed by the initiator or an opponent in a war. This study, therefore, provides a useful explanation of war intensity and contributes to the cumulative, lawlike implications of the expected-utility approach on which it is based.
Words and Deeds in Soviet Foreign Policy: The Case of Soviet Military Expenditures
Authors: Zimmerman William , Palmer Glenn
Published: May 2006

This article describes several techniques for predicting Soviet military expenditures on the basis of an analysis of the annual budget speech by the Minister of Finance. Using the Shishko-Nincic series as an indicator of actual ruble increments in the Soviet defense budget, more than four-fifths of the variance in the change in Soviet ruble expenditures for defense can be explained by an interactive model that combines a) the Finance Minister's changing characterizations of the United States and imperialism, b) his depiction of Soviet military intentions, and c) the planning cycle. This finding suggests that even in a relatively low information system such as the Soviet Union, its leadership believes it must depict the broad contours of the budget even with respect to military expenditures. The result is that the Soviet Union provides more information about important matters than Western analysts have hitherto realized.
The City and Political Psychology
Authors: Fischer Claude S.
Published: May 2006

Alternative theories—“social mobilization” and “urban anomie”— predict different relationships between urbanism and political involvement, i.e., that urbanism stimulates, or that urbanism alienates individuals. (Dahl has predicted a curvilinear association.) This study examines these theories using the 1968 Michigan S.R.C. election survey. Three methodological tools are employed— formulating a causal model among political psychological variables, distinguishing size of polity from size of urban area, and using path analysis—to answer three questions: the effect of urbanism, the effect of polity size, and the effect of their interaction. Overall, the results show little independent association be-tween the urban variables and involvement. Trends indicate that largeness may have slight mobilizing effects even though it also slightly reduces sense of political efficacy, and that the mobilization is a shift in involvement from local to national politics. A partial replication is obtained in the Almond and Verba data.
Comment on Burnham's “Theory and Voting Research”
Authors: Converse Philip E.
Published: May 2006

I am very grateful to Dean Burnham for his labor in checking out a number of “plausible rival hypotheses” that I proposed some years ago might account for the bundle of changes in American voting statistics he had first described in his seminal 1965 paper. I had pointed out these possibilities with some vigor, since if they could be shown to have empirical merit, they would seem to put a rather different light on those historical changes, relative to the interpretations Burnham originally provided.

I now read the current paper as indicating that for the areas covered, changes in registration practices do appear to have affected turnout adversely, following one of our original rival hypotheses. It also suggests, however, that this registration change does not begin to account for all of the decline in turnout that occurred around 1900, particularly in states like Pennsylvania. It goes on to imply that some other familiar factors affecting turnout, such as party competition, also contributed to that change. In effect, the turnout decline not accounted for by structural change seems greatest where the realignment of 1896 moved states from competitive to rather noncompetitive status (the more frequent case); but states moved by the same events from noncompetitive into competitive status, like Missouri and, in fact, numerous other upper midwestern states, do not show the same pattern as Pennsylvania.

All this is well and good, particularly as Burnham in his penultimate paragraph sets aside the 1965 conspiratorial interpretation of the change that had originally prompted our own brief inquiries as to probable causes.
Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy
Authors: Hill Larry B.
Published: May 2006

This article proposes an authority based conception of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Whereas most social science writing on the subject focuses either upon the organization's internal structural integration (such criteria as well-boundedness, universalism, complexity, and coherence often are employed) or upon its ability to cope with environmental challenges (the concepts of adaptability and autonomy have been suggested), I propose that an organization'soffensive capabilitiesvis à vis environmental actors be viewed as a measurement of its institutionalization.

Principally based upon fieldwork in New Zealand bolstered by additional research in Scandinavia, Britain, and Hawaii, this study focuses upon the institutionalization of the ombudsman—an increasingly popular bureaucratic control mechanism. A sociometric analysis of ombudsman-bureaucratic interaction is undertaken, and four questions are investigated: How extensive is the interaction? How consequential is the threat posed by complaints? What demands does the ombudsman make? How cooperative is the agency in responding? The investigation provides answers which are indicative of the ombudsman's successful institutionalization. That is, the office performs its mission and has established itself with the environmental actors as an authority figure.
Thucydides' View of Athenian Imperialism
Authors: Bruell Christopher
Published: May 2006

The paper attempts, through an examination of Thucydides' treatment of a significant problem, to illustrate the character of an older approach to the understanding of politics and to argue, implicitly, for the validity of that approach. The approach in question is shaped by the thoughts that the barriers standing in the way of a “scientific” approach to politics are much greater than today is sometimes assumed and that there is no more direct path to the removal of those barriers than the painstaking elaboration and subsequent refinement of the assumptions which shape and frame our view of the issues of politics. Thucydides' “history” is seen as intended to facilitate such an elaboration and refinement; his treatment of Athenian imperialism is accordingly presented in various stages, which first appeal to the prejudices with which the reader is likely to approach the work and then lead him gradually, through an examination of these, to Thucydides' own understanding, which is much more heterodox than is ordinarily supposed.
Changing the Rules Changes the Game: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention
Authors: Cavala William
Published: May 2006

Rules changes in the Democratic party have substantially altered one of the fundamental institutions of American politics. This article is an effort to assess some of the effects of the new rules on the selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention on the strategic environment faced by presidential candidates. The article outlines the basic aspects of those rule changes, describes the problems involved in the implementation of the rules, and attempts to evaluate some of the consequences faced by the presidential campaign of Senator George McGovern in the context of the California primary of 1972.
Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893–1969
Authors: Ray David
Published: May 2006

It is often asserted that state legislatures are characterized by low membership stability, attributed to low career commitment on the part of individual legislators. Such assertions are usually based on the high proportion of first-term members in most legislatures, even though the available data on this subject are limited and contradictory. Two better measures of career commitment and membership stability are: (a) the number of incumbents seeking reelection, and (b) average prior legislative service. Data for these variables are presented for 20 sessions of the Connecticut, Michigan, and Wisconsin legislatures. The data show a gradual but substantial decline in the number of first-term legislators and a gradual but substantial increase in membership stability. The computation of such data is an essential first step in documenting the causes and consequences of membership stability.
The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning
Authors: Brams Steven J. , Davis Morton D.
Published: May 2006

The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of “one man, one vote.”
The Future of Community Control
Authors: Fainstein Norman I. , Fainstein Susan S.
Published: May 2006

The nature of community control ideology, its relation to more general political consciousness, and its social correlates are explored. The primary data are drawn from two main sources: a survey of the attitudes of 362 civic and political leaders in seven districts of New York City conducted in 1972 using a combination of structural and reputational indicators to identify the sample; and intensive participant observation in three of these districts during 1973–74, along with 175 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with individuals in district-level voluntary organizations, interest groups, political parties, poverty boards and agencies, and “street-level” bureaucratic roles.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the great majority of leaders subscribes to a democratic rather than a race-conflict rationale for community control, but that there is a strong independent relationship between minority group status and operational support for community control. Possible explanations for this finding include the present interests of minority groups in American cities, the functional inadequacies of the political party structure, and the developmental history of the civil rights movement and its ideology. The relationship between race and community control may fade, however, if community control ceases to be a useful vehicle for advancing the interests of minority groups. One crucial determinant will be the identifications and beliefs of minority group members who are recruited into urban bureaucracies. Another is whether experience with decentralized city agencies indicates that movement toward increased community involvement in government leads, in fact, to enhanced power and patronage for minorities. The data point to a continuing attachment to the community control ideology but also a recasting of it in a more qualifiéd and complex form.
Models of Statistical Relationship
Authors: Weisberg Herbert F.
Published: May 2006

The choice among measures of relationship has increasingly become a matter of the interpretation of their intermediate values. Interpretations are important, but a prior question is the statistic's implicit model of a relationship—what it considers a perfect relationship, and what it considers a null relationship. A family of models based on combinations of certain maximum- and null-value conditions is analyzed in this paper. The distinction between the models can be used to shed light on the stakes involved in the choice among dichotomous variable measures as well as that among familiar ordinal statistics.

The models are ordered in terms of their leniency, and the coefficients based on each model are specified. An empirical analysis shows that the different measures are positively correlated, but those measures based on different models can differ sharply from one another. Statistics based on the same model covary regardless of differences in their interpretations. Since different models are intended to measure different concepts, multiple coefficients can allow investigators to examine their data in greater detail. Several political examples of the use of multiple models are provided.
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Authors: Riker William H.
Published: May 2006

While contemporary political science (as, for example, in such subjects as political socialization, studies of public opinion, etc.) tends to emphasize the study of values and tastes (because of an assumption that political outcomes–like market outcomes–are determined by the amalgamation of individual preferences), the older tradition of political science emphasized the study of institutions. The line of research in political theory followed during the last generation has involved seeking an equilibrium of tastes; but it has revealed that such an equilibrium exists only rarely, if at all. The inference then is that prudence in research directs the science of politics toward the investigation of empirical regularities in institutions, which, though congealed tastes, are “unstable constants” amenable to scientific investigation.
Voting Outcomes in the 1984 Democratic Party Primaries and Caucuses
Authors: Parent T. Wayne , Jillson Calvin C. , Weber Ronald E.
Published: May 2006

Scholarly inquiry concerning influences on electoral outcomes in the presidential nomination process, though extensive, has been conducted almost exclusively with data collected at the individual level of analysis. The Michigan model of normal vote analysis suggests that long-term influences measured at the aggregate level, such as the sociodemographic, economic, and ideological characteristics of the states, are also important in determining electoral outcomes. We present an aggregate-level analysis of state characteristics that affected the Hart, Jackson, and Mondale vote proportions in the 1984 Democratic caucuses and primaries. Our primary election models explain between 65% and 83% of the variance in candidate vote shares, with sociodemographic and economic factors as the leading indicators. In the caucuses, we find that campaign spending and sociodemographic influences are dominant in models that explain between 38% and 81% of the variance. We conclude with a brief discussion of what our findings mean for future Democratic candidates.
Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making
Authors: Hall Richard L.
Published: May 2006

Participation in committee decision making is an important form of legislative behavior but one we know little about. I develop a model of committee participation and test it using data drawn from staff interviews and records of the House Committee on Education and Labor. The analysis confirms that congressmen are purposive actors, but it also shows that different interests incite participation on different issues and that motivational effects vary in predictable ways across legislative contexts. If members are purposive, however, they also face a variable set of opportunities and constraints that structure their ability to act. Members and especially leaders of the reporting subcommittee, for instance, enjoy advantages in terms of information, staff, and lines of political communication. At the same time, freshman status entails behavioral constraints despite the reputed demise of apprenticeship in legislative life. Understanding such patterns of interest and ability, I conclude, should permit us to illuminate several larger questions regarding decision making and representation in a decentralized Congress.
Dewey and Marx: On Partisanship and the Reconstruction of Society
Authors: Damico Alfonso J.
Published: May 2006

There are many similarities between Dewey and Marx, particularly the claim by each to have united theory and practice. But this article argues that the distance between the two remains great. Dewey denies what Marx affirms; namely, that partisanship performs a variety of positive functions in the movement towards a more morally adequate society and in the moral transformation of man. Against Marx, Dewey argues that the “rivalry of parties” must come under the control of the norms of critical inquiry which, Dewey believes, can also serve as the site of a more comprehensive and nonpartisan social interest. The article concludes that both Dewey and Marx are correct in what they have to say about partisanship, but in a more limited way than either would acknowledge. If partisanship is functional in the reconstruction of society, as Marx holds, and dysfunctional to the moral growth of the individual, as Dewey holds, then the controversy between liberal amelioration and radical politics is likely to persist.
The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice
Authors: Riker William H.
Published: May 2006

One contemporary method of reconciling the conflict in methodology between determinism and indeterminism is the notion of rational choice, which allows for both regularities in behavior and artistic creation. A detailed explanation of artistry within the rational choice context has not yet been developed, so this essay offers such an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or the dynamic manipulation of the conditions of choice. The running example used throughout is the decision on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the method of selecting the president.
Changing National Images: International Public Relations and Media Agenda Setting
Authors: Manheim Jarol B. , Albritton Robert B.
Published: May 2006

Research within the agenda-setting framework has generally ignored the potential influence of purposive efforts by external actors (those outside the political system) to manipulate media coverage related to their interests. The present study uses interrupted time-series analysis to examine one such set of manipulative efforts, those undertaken by professional public relations consultants to influence the images of foreign nations as portrayed in the United States press. Data representNew York Timescoverage of six nations that signed public relations contracts with American firms during the period from 1974 to 1978, and one nation that expressly rejected such a contract. The analysis identifies consistent patterns of improvement along two primary dimensions of national image, visibility and valence, which are associated in time with the public relations contracts.
Ordinal Preference Games: An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility
Authors: Koehler David H.
Published: May 2006

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Riker's size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility.

This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.
Political Capacity and the Decline of Fertility in India
Authors: Rouyer Alwyn R.
Published: May 2006

With data from 15 Indian states, in this study I demonstrate that political capacity, defined as the ability of government to penetrate society and extract resources, has a more significant—though indirect—effect on fertility behavior than does level of economic development. A path-analysis model with six variables—crude birth rate (the dependent variable), family-planning-program effort, mean female age at marriage, physical-quality-of-life index (PQLI), income per capita, and political capacity—showed a strong indirect effect by the political-capacity measure on fertility decline through both the PQLI and family-planning effort. Within the model, income per capita had little effect on birth rate or any of the intervening variables. The conclusion drawn is that under conditions of economic backwardness as exist in India, it is politics, not economics, that is the primary determinant of fertility patterns.
Floor Behavior in the U.S. Congress: Committee Power Under the Open Rule
Authors: Weingast Barry R.
Published: May 2006

The open rule in the House is a complex set of restrictions, limiting, for example, the number of motions and the order of recognition. By incorporating constraints based on the actual set of rules into a model, I show that legislative outcomes appear more predictable than was previously thought. These rules nearly always allow the proponents of legislation to respond to an opponent's amendment, mitigating the potential damage of the latter. An advantage of the approach is that it provides a new interpretation of the changes in floor activity observed in the postreform period.
The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis
Authors: Sullivan John L. , Marcus George E. , Feldman Stanley , Piereson James E.
Published: May 2006

Over the past 25 years a number of conclusions concerning the development of political tolerance have come to be well accepted in the literature on political behavior. There are, however, two persisting problems with the studies that have generated these findings: they have relied on a content-biased measure of tolerance, and have failed to examine well specified models of the factors leading to tolerance. In this article we report the results of an analysis of the determinants of political tolerance using a content-controlled measure of tolerance and a more fully specified multivariate model. The parameters of the model are estimated from a national sample of the U.S. The results indicate the explanatory power of two political variables, the level of perceived threat and the commitment to general norms, and psychological sources of political tolerance. Social and demographic factors are found to have no direct effect and little indirect influence on the development of political tolerance.
The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue
Authors: Alker Hayward R.
Published: May 2006

If the realist tradition has underappreciated the formalizable quality of Thucydides' scientific investigations, neorealist teachers and writers have generally failed to see the normative and dramatical features of Thucydides' political science, each an expression of his dialectical epistemology and ontology. Nicholas Rescher's partial formalization of dialectics as a controversy-oriented approach to knowledge cumulation and Kenneth Burkes dramaturgical approach to textual understanding are both shown to fit Thucydides' argumentation in the Melian dialogue. Thus argumentation produces new knowledge about the inner determinants of Athenian imperialism; simultaneously it dramatically reveals the constituting practical rationale of Athenian actions to be unjust. Once Thucydides' determining essences of power politics are properly uncovered, their false “eternal, mathematical necessity” can be appropriately criticized. A case is thus suggested for a “neoclassical polimetrics” more fundamentally grounded in “political argumentation” about practical choices in particular contexts than in ahistorical laws, inductive statistics or deductive mathematics.
Can Liberals Punish?
Authors: Brubaker Stanley C.
Published: May 2006

Liberalism doubts that a sound theory of politics can be built from a theory of the human good. In pursuit of its authorized ends, the liberal state can establish incentives and disincentives, it can require reparations, and it can restrain dangerous persons. But can liberals punish? By distinguishing punishment from related phenomena and comparing its presuppositions with central tenets of liberalism, I tentatively conclude that they cannot. An analysis of efforts by leading liberal theorists to come to terms with punishment confirms that suspicion: their theories do not authorize punishment or do so at the expense of their more fundamental principles. I conclude that the ability to punish criminal is part of a larger moral experience and capacity that is lost with liberalism's expulsion of the human good from politics, and further, that without reference to the human good, liberalism's central concepts of liberty and equality are left weak and empty.
The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy
Authors: Williams John T.
Published: May 2006

Conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political, as well as economic, forces. Using vector autoregression analysis, I test three models of monetary policy determination for the United States, 1953–1984: the electoral cycle model (that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle), the party differences model (that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations), and the referendum model (that changes in presidential approval create, in effect, a continuing referendum, allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary). Analysis shows that monetary policies, as measured by the monetary base and short-term interest rates, respond to the election cycle and presidential approval (although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous). Party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables.
Redeeming American Political Theory
Authors: Shklar Judith N.
Published: May 2006

American political theory has been accused of being uniformly liberal; but its history is diverse and is worth studying to understand the development of political science and the institutions it reflects (representative government, federalism, judicial review, and slavery). While modern social science expresses a slow democratization of values, it has been compatible with many ideologies. This can be seen in Jefferson's anthropology, Madison's theory of collective rationality, and Hamilton's empirical political economy. Jacksonian democracy encouraged social history, while its opponents devised an elitist political sociology. Southern defenders of slavery were the earliest to develop a deterministic and authoritarian sociology, but after the Civil War Northern thinkers emulated them with Social Darwinism and quests for causal laws to grasp constant change in industrial society. Though social critics abounded, democratic empirical theory emerged in the universities only in the generation of Merriam and Dewey, who founded contemporary political science.
A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies
Authors: Geddes Barbara
Published: May 2006

In this article I develop a simple game-theoretic model of administrative reform in Latin American democracies. The model, which is based on the incentives facing the politicians who must initiate reforms if any are to occur, yields two predictions: (1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable. Attention to the incentives facing legislators and party leaders also results in the expectation that certain political institutions, such as open list proportional representation and electoral rules that minimize party control over candidate lists, reduce the probability of reform. I test these predictions and expectations on a set of Latin American democracies and find them consistent with historical events.
Bargaining With the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence
Authors: Sullivan Terry
Published: May 2006

I employ a simple game to suggest the effects of information and expectations on bargaining strategies and responses. I make use of members' predispositions in order to identify actors likely to be bargaining. Using administration headcounts, I show that while very few members misrepresent their preferences during the coalition-building process, those who do represent a large proportion of the administration's core supporters, make their misrepresentations unsystematic to avoid a costly reputation, and convert more readily than those who are not. Strategic considerations drive conversion among bluffing members, while identification with the administration determines conversion among other members. Compromise generates few conversions. A conservative estimate of bluffing suggests that the conversion of bluffers decided more than half the administration's critical votes. I speculate about a model to account for the observed bluffing.
Stability in Anarchic International Systems
Authors: Niou Emerson M. S. , Ordeshook Peter C.
Published: May 2006

Can stability emerge solely from the competition and self-interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of anarchy, or does stability depend on restraints from the complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and its associated institutions? We suppose some infinitely divisible resource, that all nation-states are endowed with and maximize and that enables them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict. We offer a noncooperative, extensive-form model of international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions balance of power and collective security ensure the sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems. We conclude that there exists at least one world—albeit an abstract one—in which anarchy yields stability.
The Political Performance of Third World Governments and the Debt Crisis
Authors: Snider Lewis W.
Published: May 2006

The developing countries' suspension of payments on their external debt is as much a consequence of the political weakness of their governments and the excessive politicization of their economic policies as it is a result of unfavorable structural changes in the international economy. Differences in debtor governments' political performances are treated as an explicit variable rather than as residuals to an economic explanation in estimating the probability of developing countries' suspending their external debt service payments. Using a logit model, I analyze fifty-eight developing countries for the years 1970–1984. The results show that political capacity can be decisive in corrrectly predicting the probability of a government's suspending its external debt service payments. The model predicts 96% of the total outcomes correctly and 80% of the debt payment suspension cases correctly.
Should Market Forces Control Educational Decision Making?
Authors: Tweedie Jack , Riley Dennis D. , Chubb John E. , Moe Terry M.
Published: May 2006

In the December 1988 issue of thisReview, John Chubb and Terry Moe presented data comparing public and private schools, and made an argument concerning “politics, markets, and the organization of schools.” Chubb and Moe argue that private schools outperform public schools because they are more autonomous, advantaged by market forces rather than democratic political control. Jack Tweedie takes vigorous exception to this conclusion, arguing that the evidence does not support Chubb and Moe's conclusions about the efficacy of market forces. Dennis Riley directly attacks the virtues of market control of institutional choices in educational policy making. Chubb and Moe find their critics unconvincing.
Sequential Voting with Endogenous Voter Forecasts
Authors: Epple Dennis , Kadane Joseph B.
Published: May 2006

We investigate a sequential voting model in which voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined endogenously. Voters are assumed to make decisions in an environment in which future outcomes are uncertain. The uncertainty arises from two possible sources. Voters may be uncertain of other voters' preferences. In addition, events that occur before future issues are decided may affect voters' preferences on future votes. Information available to voters at each point in time is characterized. An equilibrium to the voting problem, if one exists, is one for which the outcome on the issue currently being decided and voters' forecasts of outcomes on future issues are determined simultaneously. We show that an equilibrium exists under a particular voting institution and characterize voters' forecasts for this equilibrium.
Asymmetric Information and The Coherence of Legislation: A Correction
Authors: Austen-Smith David , Riker William H.
Published: May 2006

In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.
Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the “S” Word in Political Psychology
Authors: Nagler Jonathan
Published: May 2006

I show that restrictive registration laws do not dissuade individuals with lower levels of education from voting any more than individuals with higher levels of education. This finding contradicts the result reported in Wolfinger and Rosenstone's classic analysis of turnout. I show that their conclusion was actually an artifact of the methodology they employed. Examining predicted probabilities generated by a nonlinear model such as probit or logit may produce spurious results when used to determine interactive effects between two independent variables. By respecifying the model of turnout to explicitly include terms to test interactive hypotheses and reanalyzing the data from the 1972 Current Population Survey (as well as data from the 1984 survey), I show that in fact, no such substantive interactive effect between registration laws and individuals' level of education exists at the micro level.
Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964–1988: The Voters Remain the Same
Authors: Leighley Jan E. , Nagler Jonathan
Published: May 2006

We address the question of whether class bias in the American electorate has increased since 1964. We analyze the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey and the National Election Studies for seven consecutive presidential elections, 1964–88. Our results show that conclusions regarding changes in class bias are sensitive to which measure of socioeconomic class is used—income, education, or occupation. We argue that income is the appropriate measure since government policies that discriminate based on socioeconomic class are most likely to do so based on income and there are measurement problems associated with using either education or occupation over time. Our analysis shows that there has been almost no change in class bias in the electorate since 1964.
Rethinking Allison's Models
Authors: Bendor Jonathan , Hammond Thomas H.
Published: May 2006

The ideas in Graham Allison'sEssence of Decision(1971) have had an enormous impact on the study and teaching of bureaucracy and foreign policy making. While Allison's work has received considerable critical attention, there has been surprisingly little examination of the content and internal logic of his models. We subject each of Allison's three models to a systematic critical analysis. Our conclusion is that the models require substantial reformulation.
Question Wording and Macropartisanship
Authors: MacKuen Michael B. , Erikson Robert S. , Stimson James A. , Abramson Paul R. , Ostrom Charles W.
Published: May 2006

MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson used quarterly Gallup poll data to show in this Review in 1989 that changing levels of macropartisanship, the two-party division of partisans, responded to presidential approval ratings and perceptions of the economy and predicted national election results. In a 1991 Review research note Abramson and Ostrom argued that the NES and GSS questions more commonly used by scholars generated macropartisanship measures less sensitive to short term factors and less predictive of election outcomes. In this Controversy, Erikson and Stimson respond to the challenge and present new data from CBS News and New York Times telephone surveys to buttress their earlier analyses, arguing against substantial effects of the different question wordings. Abramson and Ostrom explain their continuing reservations.
Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresidential Voting
Authors: Beck Paul Allen , Baum Lawrence , Clausen Aage R. , Smith Charles E.
Published: May 2006

The primary source of divided government in the United States is voters who split their ballots between the parties. Yet there has been little comprehensive examination of either patterns or sources of ticket splitting in recent years. Instead, divergent lines of research have emerged, emphasizing such things as voter partisanship, incumbency, and a “new” (young, well-educated, even partisan) kind of ticket splitter; and their focus has been too often restricted to the atypical president–Congress pair. We seek to unify these research traditions in a comprehensive model of split-ticket voting and to test this model across the partisan ballot in a typical election setting-here, the contests for five Ohio state-wide offices in 1990. The model incorporates partisan strength, candidate visibility, and the individual characteristics that distinguish the “new ticket splitters”. The results support our partisan strength and candidate visibility explanations but provide little support for the emergence of a new type of ticket splitter.
Seniority in Legislatures
Authors: McKelvey Richard D. , Riezman Raymond
Published: May 2006

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.
Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term
Authors: Murphy Walter F.
Published: May 2006

Judged by any standards the 1963 term of the United States Supreme Court was one of momentous importance to the future of the American political system. Most immediately, the Justices once again found themselves embroiled in political controversy, their decisions attacked by the Republican party platform, by the Republican presidential candidate and by many members of Congress.

Among the more notable deeds of the 1963 term were decisions writing into the margins of the Constitution the formula “one man, one vote” as the proper rule for apportioning electoral districts for the House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. The Court also invalidated two acts of Congress, and in the field of criminal justice introduced several new principles while overturning supposedly settled law. In addition the Court again struck down officially sanctioned prayers in public schools.

For its part, Congress seriously considered constitutional amendments to reverse the school prayer decisions of this and previous terms, and to modify the doctrine of the reapportionment cases. The House went so far as to pass a bill to remove from federal courts jurisdiction to hear apportionment suits.
Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation
Authors: Brady Henry E. , Verba Sidney , Schlozman Kay Lehman
Published: May 2006

This paper develops a resource model of political participation. The resources considered are time, money, and civic skills—those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to political activity. These skills are not only acquired early in life but developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life: the workplace, organizations, and churches and synagogues. These resources are distributed differentially among groups defined by socioeconomic status. A two-stage least squares analysis shows these resources have powerful effects on overall political activity, thus explaining why socioeconomic status has traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation. We disaggregate overall activity into three kinds of acts: those that involve giving time, those that entail donating money, and voting. Each requires a different configuration of resources resulting in different patterns of stratification across various political acts.
Liberty, Equality, Receptive Generosity: Neo-Nietzschean Reflections on the Ethics and Politics of Coalition
Authors: Coles Romand
Published: May 2006

Recently there has been a movement to embrace coalition politics both as an historically fundamental mode of action and as ethically desirable. Yet, as Bernice Johnson Reagon illustrates, coalition politics presents many profound difficulties, both in terms of its possible directions and the type of self capable of engaging in such activity. Laclau and Mouffe, embracing an open-ended development of equality and liberty, expand and clarify the possibilities that a radically democratic liberalism has available for envisioning and sustaining coalition politics. Yet, they illustrate the limits of such a project insofar as they are unable to address adequately the problems posed by Reagon. I argue that only by supplementing (and transfiguring) equality and liberty with an ethic of receptive generosity, suggested by an idiosyncratic reading of Nietzsche's gift-giving virtue, would coalition politics likely be sustainable and ethically desirable. The gift-giving virtue allows us to formulate a vision of the possible grandness of plurality that is ethically more compelling than the logics of identity and difference offered by Laclau and Mouffe.
Economic and Referendum Voting: A Comparison of Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections
Authors: Atkeson Lonna Rae , Partin Randall W.
Published: May 2006

We compare vote choice in senate and gubernatorial elections from 1986 and 1990 with two retrospective voting hypotheses: the national referendum hypothesis and an economic retrospective hypothesis. Despite the similarities between the office of U.S. senator and governor (same constituency, high levels of campaign spending, highly visible candidates, etc.), we find that different types of retrospective evaluations are used with respect to vote choice. As members of the national legislative branch, senators' fortunes are linked to the success or failures of the president. In contrast, governors, as state executives, are held accountable for perceived state economic conditions, while senators escape unscathed from the same general economic evaluations. These findings shed some light on the nature of vote choice in a political system complicated by federalism and separation of powers.
On the consistency of Quine's New foundations for mathematical logic
Authors: Rosser Barkley
Published: May 2006

In the present paper, the various means used by the author in attempting to find a contradiction in Quine's New foundations are sketched, and the reason why each method failed is indicated. It was not Quine's system itself which was tested, but a stronger one obtained by adding a rule of Kleene's type to Quine's system. Reasons are presented why a contradiction in the stronger system should be as damning to Quine's system as a contradiction in Quine's system itself. Two other features of the system are worthy of note. One is the fact that only two symbols are used in building up the formulas of the system. Other systems have been built using only two symbols, but the particular method used in this paper is very flexible and simple, and is peculiarly adapted to the use of the Gödel technique. It was suggested by the consideration that the formulas of any system can be written by the use of only two symbols by first assigning Gödel numbers to the formulas and then writing those numbers in the binary scale of notation. The second feature is that ι (to be used in ιxp, meaning “the x such that p”) is an explicit and integral part of the system, and the axioms and rules governing its use are such as to make it very simple to handle. By a process similar to “Die Eliminierbarkeit der ι-Symbole” of Hilbert-Bernays, it is shown that the system involving the ι can be reduced to one not involving it. The points of difference with the Hilbert-Bernays technique make possible an especially unhampered use of ι.
A logical measure function
Authors: Kemeny John G.
Published: May 2006

By a logical measure (for a given language) we mean a syntactically defined function which associates some value with each well-formed formula of the language. Various such logical measures have played a fundamental role in the development of Logic and the Philosophy of Science. The purpose of this paper is to define a logical measure which has much wider applications than measures so far studied.

The new measure has two fundamental advantages, which will be referred to throughout the paper. First of all it can be applied to more (and richer) languages than the older measures. Most of the measures now in use are restricted to the first-order functional calculus, and frequently even to a first-order calculus with one-place predicates only. The measure to be defined will be applicable to richer languages as well, e.g., to functional calculi of all finite orders. But even as far as the first-order functional calculus is concerned, the new measure has a great advantage: We do not have to require that the atomic sentences of the calculus be independent. The previous measures depended in their construction on the requirement that “the basic statements of the language express independent facts.”

By an atomic sentence we mean a well-formed formula formed by applying an h-place primitive predicate to h individuals (a well-formed formula no part of which is well-formed); by a permissible conjunction we mean a conjunction of atomic sentences and negations of other atomic sentences; and the requirement of independence is that an atomic sentence (or its negation) is logically implied by a permissible conjunction only if it (its negation) is one of the components of the conjunction.