Industrialization and authoritarianism in Republic of Korea, 1963-1983
Authors:   , Kim Taek Kee 
Published: December 2024

This study examines the political consequences of industrial development in South Korea in terms of changes in international economic order and domestic socioeconomic structure. It primarily focuses on the regime's adaptability to maintain its stability in the face of opportunities and constraints imposed from the two different levels -- external and societal. Therefore, this study scrutinizes the linkage between the cause of the authoritarian Yushin regime on the one side and its structural development on the other. The emergence of the growth-oriented Yushin regime in 1972 was associated with the deepening of industrialization, stressing investment on capital-intensive products. The new industrial strategy was an attempt to adjust changing comparative advantage as American textile exports sharply declined in world markets. The Nixon's New Economic Policy, which imposed the barriers against imports in 1971, threatened not only South Korea's upward mobility in the world economy but also the survival of the Park regime itself, since South Korea's main export goods, textiles, had been definitely dependent on the U.S. market. The economic threat to the Park regimes was coincidently aggravated by the uncertain external and internal environments: Sino-American detente, reduction of the U.S. aid as well as troops from South Korea, mounting social disturbances, and bitter intraparty strife within the DRP. However, the most vital factor threatening the ruling elite was the fact that the regime's prime commitment to economic growth would be jeopardized by the U.S. protectionism. It was because the economic achievement in the 1960s not only gave legitimacy to the Park regime but also was the main contribution to the regime's stability. The development of heavy and chemical industry required much more inflow of foreign capital and tight state- corporatist control for market stability and feasibility of the new strategy. Congruent with value of development over democratic principles, the ruling elite sought to construct political order and economic efficiency excluding autonomous associations from political decision-making process. Its political consequence was the preeminence of state corporatism under the authoritarian rule. Because the state was the only organization able to perform a wide range of functions, the impulse for industrialization inevitably came from the center of political power and spread outward into society. The ruling elite froze debate, imposed its will on the society, and thus suppressed discontent and conflict. No group had power enough to compete with the interest of the regime backed by the military. This study employed time series, correlation tests, multiple regression analysis, and the path analysis, to test the empirical validity of the political consequences of industrial development in South Korea for the 21 years from 1963 to 1983. The findings are as follows: Rejection of the social requisite proposition confirms O'Donnell's thesis that political authoritarianism is likely concomitant of higher levels of industrialization in the later developers; the growth-oriented and unequal development policies has strongly influenced economic problems such as increasing inflation and foreign indebtedness; an outgrowth of economic crisis was political disturbances reflected in labor disputes and anti-government demonstrations; and while economic crisis and political conflict have negatively affected the degree of political democracy, political conflict has a noncausal effect on political democracy controlling economic crisis. In all, a major assumption of the findings is that a growth-oriented industrialization sponsored by the state in an later developing country tends to break down democratic performance and impose the rise of an authoritarian regime, at least in the short run, such as during the 21 years this study observed.