bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Analytic and the Synthetic
Authors: Herburt George Krzywicki
Published: November 2002

This article is devoted to the question: does the Duhemian argument support the position taken by those contemporary philosophers who—like W. V. O. Quine and M. White—reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements? The term “Duhemian argument” is used to refer to the following statement: it is impossible to put to the test one isolated empirical statement; testing empirical statements involves testing a whole group of hypotheses. An analysis of the logical structure of reductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that the Duhemian argument is valid and that it entails the following statements: (1)—experience alone cannot compel us absolutely to the acceptance of any isolated empirical statement whatsoever, independently of our acceptance or rejection of some other statements, and (2)—no isolated empirical statement can be conclusively falsified by experience, independently of our acceptance or rejection of some other statements. The Duhemian argument seems then to establish conclusively the cogency of the claim that, in principle, it is possible to reject or to maintain any particular empirical statement, provided we make appropriate changes in the system of hypotheses which is put to test. The philosophers who reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements—in particular Quine—claim that the same line of reasoning supports their contention. It is alleged that: (1)—the Duhemian argument makes impossible a definition of statement synonymy and, consequently, a definition of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and (2)—that the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science or the total science, and (3)—that it is a folly to seek a boundary between synthetic and analytic statements, because all our statements are equally open to revision. The article tries to show that these conclusions do not follow from the Duhemian argument. In particular it is shown: (1)—that the Duhemian argument does not exclude the definition of statement synonymy, (2)—that this argument does not support the contention that the enigmatic entity called “the whole of science” or the “total science” is involved in each and every testing procedure, (3)—that the principle of fundamental revisability of every statement does not change the fact that in scientific practice the situation is never so hopeless as the Duhemian argument seems to imply, because even inconclusive arguments may differ in their adequacy, and (4)—that the term “revision” is ambiguous and only this ambiguity lends an air of plausibility to Quine's formulations. The conclusion is that the Duhemian line of reasoning does not support the contention of philosophers who reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
A Statement from the President to the Members of the Philosophy of Science Association
Authors: Ducasse C. J.
Published: November 2002

In the fall of 1956, President Margenau appointed a Committee charged to draw up proposals for a reorganization of the Philosophy of Science Association. This Committee eventually prepared a new Constitution and By-Laws, more in line with the present needs and status of the Association than were those under which it had until then been operating. That Constitution and those By-Laws were adopted by the members at the December 1957 election and are published in the January 1959 issue of Philosophy of Science.
Two Approaches to Mathematical and Physical Systems
Authors: Schlesinger G.
Published: November 2002

It is commonly the case that a problem concerning a mathematical or physical system can be solved in two quite different ways—by an internal or an external approach. For example, the area of a triangle can be found by integration or by showing it to be half that of a certain rectangle. In general, the first approach is, to analyse the given system into component parts, and the second approach is to deal with the system as a whole.

It seems that even in cases where solutions to physical problems obtained according to these two approaches are equally valid, and are equally good as explanations, scientists prefer the solution obtained by the internal approach.

The reasons for this preference are examined. And it is suggested that whatever the reasons, this preference may have been partly responsible for the 19th century preference for the Kinetic Theory rather than Thermodynamics.
The Problem of a Logical Theory of Belief Statements
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

It is shown that the logical theory of belief statements must be prepared to take into account relationships among statements which are subtler and more delicate than is requisite in other contexts. It is necessary here to draw distinctions (of a modal and semantical character) which the standard assertory logic can ignore with impunity. This is due to the fact that it is entirely possible to be in ignorance of various logical relationships (eg., entailment, equivalence, etc.) that in fact obtain among believed statements, and so, for example to believe the premisses of a valid deductive argument, and yet disbelieve the conclusion which follows from them. The implications of such difficulties for the logic of belief statements are examined.
Relativity and Electromagnetism: An Epistemological Appraisal
Authors: Dingle Herbert
Published: November 2002

This paper follows up the analysis of relativity theory begun by Margenau and Mould, by including electromagnetic theory which in their treatment was tacitly accepted. It is shown that the experiments on which Margenau and Mould rely to establish the special theory of relativity actually confirm the mutual consistency of the Maxwell-Lorentz electromagnetic theory and the special relativity theory, but throw no light on the validity of the two theories taken jointly. It is further shown that a modification of the rules of correspondence between the mathematical structure of the theories and immediate experience would bring the theories into agreement with an alternative relativity theory based on the Galilean instead of the Lorentz transformation. An experiment is suggested by which the need for such modification can be tested. A proof is then given that the rules of correspondence between the concepts of the special relativity theory (and therefore of current electromagnetic theory) and experience are not self-consistent, so that some modification of current ideas is essential. It is suggested that a generalisation of Maxwell's theory, in terms of Faraday's “ray vibrations” instead of Lorentz's static ether, might provide a satisfactory basis for a relativistic electromagnetic theory.
Pragmatism and the Ideal Language
Authors: Palmieri L. E.
Published: November 2002

Pursuing a line of progression articulated by Prof. Quine, Dr. Pasch (Experience and the Analytic) argues that the analytic-synthetic distinction rests on mere convention. Further, that the use of this distinction by present day empiricists—especially the rational reconstructionists—has caused empiricism to take a departure from traditional empiricism. I observe, in opposition, 1) the natural language firmament is itself an amorphous construct, 2) the natural language might be the language of experience but not of empiricism, 3) the ideal language is tied to experience by primitives for what perceptually appears, and 4) if one claims the primitives must be tested in scientific inquiry, a case should be made for this philosophical position.
Deciding and Predicting
Authors: Richfield Jerome , Copi Irving M.
Published: November 2002

In this note, we wish to remark on some of the relations between deciding one's own action and predicting one's own action. This topic is relevant both to current discussions of the nature of analysis and to the continuing controversy over the nature of scientific explanation.
Note on Professor Leonard's Analysis of Interrogatives, etc.
Authors: Wheatley J. M. O.
Published: November 2002

Professor Leonard proposes that imperative and interrogative sentences be classified, together with declarative ones, as true and false. The interesting analysis he gives in connection with this proposal points out that these three types of utterance have something in common and has the merit of evincing the identity of this common element. Also it may seem to offer attractive possibilities of integrating various types of discourse in its promise of partial assimilation of interrogatives and imperatives to the model of truth-valuable language. Even so, Leonard's account is not altogether satisfactory. I shall not discuss his treatment of imperatives but shall argue that his conception of interrogatives has unacceptable consequences.
On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses
Authors: Barker S. F.
Published: November 2002

The title of this symposium, “Formal Simplicity as a Weight in the Acceptability of Scientific Theories,” to some people might seem to suggest that we are to be making positive proposals about how the concept of simplicity could be defined for formalized languages, defined so as to figure in a formalized theory of confirmation. I must confess at the start that I do not have any such ambitious object in view. I now feel, indeed, that premature formalizations have little power to illuminate the philosophically interesting questions which cluster round the problem of the role of simplicity in scientific thinking. So in this short paper I wish merely to present some elementary considerations, not very novel ones, concerning the role which simplicity seems to me to play in our non-demonstrative reasoning about matters of empirical fact. Although many writers have sought to analyze the logical character of such reasoning, little unanimity has been attained in their over-all views; thus it is that though the considerations which I wish to present are elementary, they are not wholly uncontroversial. But because these matters are elementary in nature, I do feel it appropriate in discussing them to use homely examples of uncomplicated kinds, rather than elaborate examples drawn from the more sophisticated reaches of scientific theory; in doing so, I am taking it for granted that scientific inference as regards its logical character is fundamentally a refinement of everyday thinking, rather than a procedure of some essentially different nature.
On the Vindication of Induction
Authors: Feigl Herbert
Published: November 2002

A practical or pragmatic justification (“vindication”) applies to actions. The action concerned in the case of induction is the making of predictions, and—philosophically of prime importance—the adoption of such rules of procedure as will make the predictions maximally successful. Clearly all ordinary cases of the justification of actions utilize, and in this sense presuppose, inductions. (A prospector looking for gold presupposes that there is gold to be found somewhere in the area of his search. If he had no reason whatever for expecting gold there, we should call his belief irrational, a product of wishful thinking. Inductive evidence for the presence of gold is required.) When philosophers ask for a ground of induction in general the answer cannot be inductive evidence. This would be plainly circular or lead to an infinite regress. Hence we are here dealing with a limiting or degenerate case of justification. It is true that one important component of the meaning of such words as “reasonable” or “rational” is indeed the employment of inductive procedures. Many analytic philosophers rest their case right here and consider the quest for a justification of induction as a pseudo problem because, in their view, this quest comes down to asking “is it reasonable to be reasonable?” But—because of an ambiguity of the term “reasonable”—it is precisely here where the distinction between validation and vindication is helpful and points the way to one more step that can be taken in the overall justification of inductive inference.
Definition and Reduction
Authors: Madden Edward H.
Published: November 2002

While I do not accept any current analysis of theoretical terms I also reject certain criticisms of them. Specifically, I reject the criticism that the paradoxes of material implication and the counterfactual problem eliminate the explicit definition view; and I also reject the criticism that explicitly defined theoretical terms do not refer to anything which “really exists” or do not have “excess meaning.” I do argue, however, that the explicit definition view confuses and conflates the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis. I also defend reduction sentences against the counterfactual difficulty, but show, too, how this view is already logically committed to the network or postulational view of meaning. Finally, I show how the concept of reduction sentences confuses in several ways the concepts of criterion and meaning analysis—although not in quite the same way as explicit definitions do.
Semantic Paradoxes and the Propositional Analysis of Indirect Discourse
Authors: Rescher Nicholas
Published: November 2002

The object of the present discussion is to show that the analysis of indirect discourse obtained when the concept of assertion is construed as a relationship that obtains between the asserting person and the asserted proposition—along the familiar lines proposed by Church [3, 4]—is entirely adequate of itself to circumvent the semantical paradoxes in which indirect discourse is involved.
Peirce, Gambling, and Insurance
Authors: Ullian Joseph S.
Published: November 2002

Peirce writes “It is an indubitable result of the theory of probabilities that every gambler, if he continues long enough, must ultimately be ruined … if he plays long enough he will be sure some time to have such a run against him as to exhaust his entire fortune. … The same thing is true of an insurance company. Let the directors take the utmost pains … according to the doctrine of chances, the time must come, at last, when their losses will bring them to a stop.” This note shows that under the most plausible interpretation of the quoted passage Peirce is committed to a mathematical untruth.
Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology
Authors: Maxwell Grover
Published: November 2002

Utilizing Carnap's notions of “questions [or assertions] within a framework” and “questions [or assertions] about a framework” and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities—in particular, that of theoretical entities—is adumbrated.

In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given.

Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined.
Whewell on Necessity
Authors: Walsh Harold T.
Published: November 2002

It is generally not recognized that Whewell's conception of necessary truth evolved only gradually; his early statements are misleading. For this reason, and because of certain peculiarities in his expository style over his publishing history, he is commonly thought to have used the term “necessary” in the sense of “absolutely necessary”. I argue that, on the contrary, the term is essentially relational in his mature view. This conclusion leads, in turn, to a re-interpretation of his doctrine of “fundamental ideas”. Here I argue that the crux of his position is that cognitive principles which are initially regulative become, through invention, repeated employment, and stipulative definition, constitutive ones.
The Measurement of Simplicity
Authors: Hillman Donald J.
Published: November 2002

Various formulations of the principle of simplicity in science are examined and rejected in favor of Goodman's proposal, the essence of which is to concentrate attention upon the predicates that form the extralogical basis of any given theory and to provide measures for comparing the relative structural simplicity of different sets of such predicates. The postulational basis of Goodman's method is set out and explained, together with some important amendments and additions, and a number of theorems are proved, with whose aid the simplest theory to account for a certain corpus of scientific phenomena is readily determinable.
Science, Computers, and the Complexity of Nature
Authors: Caws Peter
Published: November 2002

The relations between simplicity and economy, and between simplicity and complexity, are briefly discussed, and it is suggested that an appearance of simplicity may arise out of the matching of two complexities, e.g. in the perception of a simple color. Following out this idea, it is shown that scientific activity may be regarded as a matching of theoretical complexity against the complexity of nature, which leads to an expectation of an optimum theoretical complexity for successful scientific work. Some senses of “success” in this context are discussed, and the role of computing machines in helping to achieve it assessed.
The Use of Philosophical Arguments in Quantum Physics
Authors: Losee John
Published: November 2002

Two types of philosophical arguments are employed by the defenders and critics of the Copenhagen Interpretation. One type of argument is a confrontation of an opponent's interpretation with criteria of demarcation and criteria of acceptability. The purpose of such arguments is either to exclude an opponent's interpretation from the range of permissible discourse in quantum physics, or to establish the inadequacy of an opponent's interpretation. A second type of argument is a justification of the value, or utility, of the criteria selected.
Elements of a Theory of Inexact Measurement
Authors: Adams Ernest W.
Published: November 2002

Modifications of current theories of ordinal, interval and extensive measurement are presented, which aim to accomodate the empirical fact that perfectly exact measurement is not possible (which is inconsistent with current theories). The modification consists in dropping the assumption that equality (in measure) is observable, but continuing to assume that inequality (greater or lesser) can be observed. The modifications are formulated mathematically, and the central problems of formal measurement theory—the existence and uniqueness of numerical measures consistent with data—are re-examined. Some results also are given on a problem which does not arise in current theories: namely that of determining limits of accuracy attainable on the basis of observations.
The Probabilistic Argument for a Non-Classical Logic of Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Suppes Patrick
Published: November 2002

The aim of this paper is to state the single most powerful argument for use of a non-classical logic in quantum mechanics. In outline the argument is the following. The working logic of a science is the logic of the events and propositions to which probabilities are assigned. A probability should be assigned to every element of the algebra of events. In the case of quantum mechanics probabilities may be assigned to events but not, without restriction, to the conjunction of two events. The conclusion is that the working logic of quantum mechanics is not classical. The nature of the logic that is appropriate for quantum mechanics is examined.
Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation
Authors: Mischel Theodore
Published: November 2002

How can reasons explain actions? What is the force of “because” in “He did this because...” followed by a statement of the agent's intentions? The answer involves some concept of what can count as explanation, and the history of science indicates that the acceptability of explanations depends, in part, on a scientific community which has decided to pursue its inquiries in one direction rather than another. The first part of this paper examines this pragmatic aspect of explanations; the second part draws on this examination in the hope of elucidating the way reasons explain actions. The possibility of eliminating our ordinary, “purposive,” explanations of actions in favor of some “mechanistic,” neuro-physiological, account is then considered.
A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity
Authors: Rietdijk C. W.
Published: November 2002

A proof is given that there does not exist an event, that is not already in the past for some possible distant observer at the (our) moment that the latter is “now” for us. Such event is as “legally” past for that distant observer as is the moment five minutes ago on the sun for us (irrespective of the circumstance that the light of the sun cannot reach us in a period of five minutes). Only an extreme positivism: “that which cannot yet be observed does not yet exist”, can possibly withstand the conclusion concerned. Therefore, there is determinism, also in micro-physics.
Postulates of Rational Preference
Authors: Michalos Alex C.
Published: November 2002

The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles.
Three Descriptive Models of Social Structure
Authors: Bock Philip K.
Published: November 2002

In this article, three descriptive models are described and compared in an attempt to discover the minimum number of concepts and relations necessary to an abstract description of social structure. It is argued that a “situational model” which uses the concepts of social time, social space and social role together with the relations of internal structure and external distribution is both adequate to the task and superior to the two other models. The advantages and implications of the situational model are discussed.
Discussion: Precision in Theory and in Measurement
Authors: Agassi Joseph
Published: November 2002

An intuitive idea concerning degrees of precision is widely accepted, and it is that we increase precision of theories by paying attention to ever decreasing orders of magnitude of measurements which we incorporate in these theories. We increase precision of measuring or of predicting measurement of length, for instance, if we pay attention not only to centimeters but also to millimeters, microns, angstroms, and so on. And our theories are precise to centimeters, then to millimeters, and so on respectively. The idea is that increased precision is the process of capturing a point within nested intervals, and that this is reflected both in experimental and in theoretical progress. An intuitive analogy may be drawn with series of photos made by a camera which approaches the moon's surface. A corollary from this intuitive idea which has been stated by a number of writers is that observation reports and theories are not overthrown even when superseded by more accurate observation because within the limits of their own precision-range they are still valid. When a law in physics is stated, it is stated usually without such qualifications; but this is a mere matter of convenience, we are told. The idea is that a tacit proviso is understood and the law should be understood to be not the statement “such and such is the case” but the statement “within this and that limit of accuracy such and such is the case”; in such a formulation, the law, once verified, remains unshaken regardless of further progress in the field.
Two Paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Krips H. P.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to resolve two paradoxes, which occur in quantum theory, by using the discussion of the theory of measurement presented in two earlier papers by the author [3], [4], [5]. The two paradoxes discussed will be the Schrödinger cat paradox and the Einstein, Podolski, Rosen paradox [2]. An introductory section will be included which summarizes the relevant results from the author's previous papers. Also a discussion will be made regarding the author's interpretation of the density operator.
Is Any Set Theory True?
Authors: Ullian Joseph S.
Published: November 2002

This paper draws its title from the recent symposium of which it was part; it attempts to respond to the question raised by that title, taking current work in set theory into account. To this end the paper contrasts set theory with number theory, examines a severe brand of set-theoretic realism that is suggested by a passage from Gödel, and sketches a first-order way of looking at the results about competing extensions of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. A formalistic sentiment may be detectable in some portions of the paper.
Correspondence Rules
Authors: Schaffner Kenneth F.
Published: November 2002

The traditional role which correspondence rules, coordinating definitions, or semantical rules, have in a logical analysis of a scientific theory is questioned by providing an alternative analysis. The alternative account suggests that scientific theories are “meaningful” prior to the establishment of correspondence rules, and that correspondence rules are introduced to permit explanation and testing in the “observational” sector. The role of models is briefly assessed in connection with this prior or “antecedent theoretical meaning,” and a causal sequence analysis of a class of correspondence rules is presented which makes explicit the interdependence of scientific theories.
Points of View, Scientific Theories and Econometric Models
Authors: Wolfson Robert J.
Published: November 2002

The relationship between a class of structural forms and a single reduced form econometric model is discussed. These are shown to be empirically equivalent. It is made clear that choice of a particular structural form for estimation, rather than another of the same class, rests on a priori heuristic and computational considerations, not on empirical or logical grounds.

Alternative scientific strategies are discussed briefly.
Remarks on Concept Formation: Theory Building and Theory Testing
Authors: Firestone Joseph M.
Published: November 2002

Concepts originating in the philosophy of science generally are used only ritualistically and in careful isolation from research practice in political science. But philosophical considerations are fundamental to political research, and critically influence its decisions. The question is whether ideas offered by philosophers of science have practical (that is to say, theoretical) significance for political researchers. This essay argues that philosophy of science has extremely relevant ideas to offer. The argument proceeds through an initial presentation of some elementary notions drawn from reconstructions of the nature of concept formation-theory construction. These are then utilized in a critique of the research of quantitative political scientists. Three rather central concerns of this, still very young, discipline are discussed: measurement problems, the use of recursive and structural systems in causal modeling, and the primary logical function of multivariate analysis in political studies. The discussion is viewed as supporting the general point that applied philosophy of science ought to be, not an adjunct, but one of the key critical contributors to political research.
Inductive Logic With Causal Modalities: A Probabilistic Approach
Authors: Uchii Soshichi
Published: November 2002

This paper tries to extend Hintikka's inductive logic so that we can confirm a causally necessary statement. For this purpose, a joint system of inductive logic and logic of causal modalities is constructed. This system can offer a plausible explication of the distinction between nomic and accidental universality, as well as a good formulation of a causal law. And the transition from actuality to causal necessity is construed, in this system, as essentially probabilistic; i.e. no statements about actuality can entail a necessary statement, but certain statements about actuality can single out a most probable causal law.
Reporting, Evaluating, Describing
Authors: Lincicome David
Published: November 2002

Ordinary linguistic practices, as well as such extraordinary ones as are exemplified in scientific accounts, involve reporting, evaluating, and describing. This essay shows how a systematic account of these activities may help to illuminate the study of “ordinary language” and, ultimately, of technical linguistic practices.
Biological Adaptation
Authors: Ruse Michael
Published: November 2002

In successive issues of this journal Ronald Munson [2] and I [4] have made, quite independently, conflicting claims about the relationship between biological adaptation and biological function. I state, admittedly without proof, that “a functional statement in biology draws attention to the fact that what is under consideration is an adaptation or something which confers an ‘adaptive advantage’ on its possessor” ([4], p. 89). This was an identity claim. Munson claims, with proof, that “adaptation and function are not identical” ([2], p. 205). In this discussion note I want to examine the three arguments Munson gives in support of his claim, and I shall try to show that they do not hold.
Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of the Mind
Authors: Armstrong D. M.
Published: November 2002

A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) “higher” sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.
Science and Idealism
Authors: Almeder Robert F.
Published: November 2002

In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue forever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view.

In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science is progressive we must mean either that science progresses by approximating a final goal which, given an infinite process, will be attained, or that science progresses simply in the sense of expanding a body of funded knowledge such that, given an infinite process, the body of funded knowledge expands ad infinitum. That the second member of this disjunct is false and that the first cannot be shown to be false follows largely from a discussion and rejection of all available arguments (five) against the hypothesis proposed in (1). Further, an argument provided by Peirce (and suitably supplemented) provides additional positive evidence for the truth of the first member. No such argument exists for the truth of the second member.

In arguing for claim (2) it is held that evidence in favor of a belief can be purchased by the positive moral value likely to occur as a result of accepting the beliefs, and that there is at least one moral value which accrues to the belief that inquiry will continue forever but which does not accrue to the belief that inquiry will not continue forever. In short, while there is no systematic evidence for or against the view that inquiry will continue forever, we have the right (and duty) to believe that inquiry will continue forever but we do not have the right (and duty) to believe the contrary.
On a Supposed Methodological Difference Between the Natural and Social Sciences
Authors: Vetterling Mary K.
Published: November 2002

Various grounds for methodological differences between the natural and social sciences have been suggested in recent philosophical literature. It is said, for example, that the natural sciences deal with verifiable hypotheses, “exact” findings, measurable phenomena and invariable observations, whereas the social sciences do not. One of the most plausible of all such contentions is the suggestion that the natural sciences produce theories which correctly predict future events, whereas in the social sciences, there are cases in which correct prediction of future events is, in principle, impossible. If such a case is to be found in the social sciences, it must, of course, be further demonstrated that an analogous case is not to be found in the natural sciences. If such a case is not to be found in the social sciences, the contention rests unverified.
Polanyi on the Meno Paradox
Authors: Bradie Michael
Published: November 2002

In [1] Michael Polanyi argues that in order to understand how scientists come to recognize problems as problems, we must invoke a concept of “tacit knowing.” Tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge of which we are aware but which cannot be made explicit. Polanyi argues that a paradox discussed in the Meno cannot be solved without appeal to this notion of tacit knowledge. Here I want to argue, quite simply, that Polanyi's formulation of the “paradox” can be easily subverted without an appeal to tacit knowing. Polanyi puts the paradox thus:

... to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what you are looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything. ([1], p. 22)
On a Problem in Conditional Probability
Authors: Dale A. I.
Published: November 2002

In an article “Countering a Counter-intuitive Probability” [4], Lynn E. Rose discusses a question in conditional probability, claiming that the following problem posed by Copi [1] is usually incorrectly solved:

Remove all cards except aces and kings from a deck, so that only eight cards remain, of which four are aces and four are kings. From this abbreviated deck, deal two cards to a friend. If he looks at his cards and announces (truthfully) that his hand contains an ace, what is the probability that both his cards are aces? If he announces instead that one of his cards is the ace of spades, what is the probability then that both his cards are aces? (These two probabilities are not the same!) ([1], p. 433)
An Argument For The Logical Notion of A Memory Trace
Authors: Rosen Deborah A.
Published: November 2002

During the past decade there has been a very effective campaign against any explanation of remembering whose basic concept is that of a causally mediating trace. This paper attempts to provide such an explanation by presenting an explicit deductive argument for the existence of the memory trace. The conclusion is shown to follow from reasonable, empirical assumptions of which the most interesting is a spatio-temporal contiguity thesis. Set-theoretic techniques are used to provide a framework of analysis and probabilistic definitions of some causal notions, as that of a causal chain, are presented.
Five Duhemian Theses
Authors: Yoshida R. M.
Published: November 2002

In concluding section 2, chapter VI of part II of [6], Duhem claimed:

(I)

... the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses ... ([6], p. 187)

(II)

... when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed'. ([6], p. 187)
Learning to Report One's Introspections
Authors: Falk Arthur E.
Published: November 2002

The author argues for a purely naturalistic underpinning of the linguistic practice of reporting one's introspections. In doing so he avoids any commitments about the ontological status of entities referred to in introspective reports. He also presents evidence of the inadequacy of peripheralistic behaviorism as a naturalistic underpinning of introspective reports. The paper includes (a) a definition of ‘introspection’ and criticism of alternative definitions, (b) a classification scheme that sorts introspections into six different types, and (c) a presentation of evidence that the reporting of certain of these is based on such fundamental psychological phenomena as stimulus generalization, and possibly also conditioning to covert mediating responses.
Prediction, Explanation, and Testability As Criteria For Judging Statistical Theories
Authors: Grier Brown
Published: November 2002

For the case of statistical theories, the criteria of explanation, prediction, and testability can all be viewed as particular instances of a more general evaluation scheme. Using the ideas of a gain matrix and expected gain from statistical decision theory, these three criteria can be compared in terms of the elements in their associated gain matrices. This analysis leads to (1) further understanding of the interrelationship between the current criteria, (2) the proposal of an ordering for the criteria, and (3) the suggestion of a new criterion.
On Mechanical Recognition
Authors: Nelson R. J.
Published: November 2002

In this paper I argue that human pattern recognition can be simulated by automata. In particular, I show that gestalt recognition and recognition of family resemblances are within the capabilities of sufficiently complex Turing machines. The argument rests on elementary facts of automata and computability theory which are used to explicate our preanalytic, informal concepts concerning gestalt patterns and recognition. The central idea is that of a machine which “knows” its own structure. Although the paper thus aims to support mechanism, especially as a framework hypothesis for perception, it contains suggestions for philosophy of science and philosophy of language as well. Some of these suggestions are sketched in the final section.
Explanation, Teleology, and Operant Behaviorism: A Study of the Experimental Analysis of Purposive Behavior
Authors: Ringen Jon D.
Published: November 2002

B. F. Skinner's claim that “operant behavior is essentially the field of purpose” is systematically explored. It is argued that Charles Taylor's illuminating analysis of the explanatory significance of common-sense goal-ascriptions (1) lends some (fairly restricted) support to Skinner's claim, (2) considerably clarifies the conceptual significance of differences between operant and respondent behavior and conditioning, and (3) undercuts influential assertions (e.g., Taylor's) that research programs for behavioristic psychology share a “mechanistic” orientation. A strategy is suggested for assessing the plausibility of Skinner's broader claims about the adequacy of the operant behaviorist program for the analysis of purposive behavior.
The Extensionality of Causation and Causal-Explanatory Contexts
Authors: Levin Michael E.
Published: November 2002

I argue that 'c' occurs extensionally in 'c caused e' and 'D' occurs extensionally in 'c caused e because c is D'. I claim that this has been insufficiently appreciated because the two contexts are often run together and because it has not been clear that the description D of c is among the referents of an explanatory argument. I argue as well that Hume's analysis of causation is consistent with taking causation to be a relation between single events, and that even if events are eliminated as virtual entities, extensionality holds for all terms in the resulting context.
Objective Time Flow
Authors: McCall Storrs
Published: November 2002

A theory of temporal passage is put forward which is “objective” in the sense that time flow characterizes the universe independently of the existence of conscious beings. The theory differs from Grünbaum's “mind-dependence” theory, and is designed to avoid Grünbaum's criticisms of an earlier theory of Reichenbach's. The representation of temporal becoming is accomplished by the introduction of indeterministic universe-models; each model representing the universe at a time. The models depict the past as a single four-dimensional manifold, and the future as a branched structure of such manifolds. Time flow is relativistic in that it manifests itself in a frame-dependent (but not observer-dependent) way. The indeterministic character of the universe-models is mirrored in a “temporal” theory of truth which rejects the principle of bivalence, and suitable semantics are provided for this theory. Finally, an account of physical law is given which defines it in terms of physical possibility, rather than vice versa.
On the Metatheoretical Nature of Carnap's Philosophy
Authors: Norton Bryan G.
Published: November 2002

Rudolf Carnap defended two quite different critiques of traditional philosophy: in addition to the much discussed verifiability criterion, he also proposed a critique based upon “formalizability.” Formalizability rests upon the principle of tolerance plus an acceptance of a linguistic methodology. Standard interpreters of Carnap (e.g., [7] and [8]) assume that the principle of tolerance (and, hence, formalizability) gains its argumentative support from verificationism. Carnap, in fact, kept the two critiques separate and independent. Indeed, verificationism is even, in spirit, inconsistent with tolerance. If the formalizability approach is emphasized, traditional metaphysics is reconstructed, not banished. Philosophical disputes remain rationally decidable, but metatheoretical in nature. Two results follow: Carnap's metaphilosophy cannot be rejected merely on the basis of rejections of verifiability. Second, Carnap's conclusion that all philosophy concerns language provides no reason for despair.
The Sum Rule Has not Been Tested
Authors: Cartwright Nancy
Published: November 2002

The debate between Glymour ([2]) and Fine ([1]) hinges in part on a comparison of the width of the incoming wave packet in momentum space with the angles intercepted by the detectors in the Cross-Ramsey experiment. As Fine argues, it follows from the quantum formalism that the initial dispersion will be conserved in Compton scattering, and he allows that the Sum Rule is constrained by the statistical results of quantum mechanics. The Sum Rule may fail, but it will not fail in any way that violates quantum mechanics. Thus most of the time the individual momentum value does not change more than the width of the initial wave packet: usually the value of Qγe at t must equal the value of Qγ at t′ plus the value of Qe at t′ ± Δp/2, where Δp represents the dispersion in momentum for the initial gamma ray. Thus in order to refute Fine's thesis, the detectors must discriminate finely enough to pick out changeovers of individual values within Δp.
An “At-At” Theory of Causal Influence
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

The propagation of causal influences through space-time seems to play a fundamental role in scientific explanation. Taking as a point of departure a basic distinction between causal interactions (which are localized in space-time) and causal processes (which may extend through vast regions of space-time), this paper attempts an analysis of the concept of causal propagation on the basis of the ability of causal processes to transmit “marks.” The analysis rests upon the “at-at” theory of motion which has figured prominently in the resolution of Zeno's arrow paradox. It is argued that this explication does justice to the concept of the ability of causal processes to transmit causal influence without invoking anti-Humean “powers” or “necessary connections.”
Relative Simultaneity in the Special Relativity
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pargetter Robert
Published: November 2002

In this paper a method is proposed for empirically determining simultaneity at a distance within the special theory of relativity. It is argued that this method is independent of Einstein's signalling method and provides a basis for denying the conventionality of distant simultaneity.
On the Problem of Hidden Variables for Quantum Mechanical Observables with Continuous Spectra
Authors: Teller Paul
Published: November 2002

Existing “no hidden variable proofs” for quantum mechanics deal exclusively with observables with discrete spectra. This note shows that similar results hold for observables with continuous spectra.
A Philosophical Explanation of the Explanatory Functions of Ergodic Theory
Authors: Quay Paul M.
Published: November 2002

The purported failures of ergodic theory (seen in its often proved ineptitude to ground a mechanical explanation of thermodynamics) are shown to arise from misconception of the functions served by scientific explanation. In fact, the predictive failures of ergodic theory are precisely its points of greatest physical utility, where genuinely new knowledge about actual physical systems can be obtained, once the links between explanation and reconstructive estimation are recognized.
A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation
Authors: Railton Peter
Published: November 2002

It has been the dominant view that probabilistic explanations of particular facts must be inductive in character. I argue here that this view is mistaken, and that the aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the explanandum fact was nomically expectable, but to give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it. To this end, a deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation is developed and defended. Such a model has application only when the probabilities occurring in covering laws can be interpreted as measures of objective chance, expressing the strength of physical propensities. Unlike inductive models of probabilistic explanation, this deductive model stands in no need of troublesome requirements of maximal specificity or epistemic relativization.
An Ideal Model for the Growth of Knowledge in Research Programs
Authors: Kantorovich Aharon
Published: November 2002

In this paper a model is presented for the growth of knowledge in a dynamic scientific system. A system which is in some respects an idealization of a Lakatosian research program. The kinematics of the system is described in terms of two probabilistic variables, one of which is related to the evolution of its theoretical component and the other—to the growth of the empirical component. It is shown that when the empirical growth is faster than the theoretical growth the posterior probability of the theoretical component increases. Thus, empirical progressiveness of a research program, as explicated in this model, is accompanied by an increase in the degree of confirmation. In such a case the system grows in a Popperian-like spirit, while learning from experience in a Bayesian manner.
Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation
Authors: Miller Richard W.
Published: November 2002

Past criticisms to the contrary, methodological individualism in the social sciences is neither trivial nor obviously false. In the style of Weber's sociology, it restricts the ultimate explanatory repertoire of social science to agents' reasons for action. Although this restriction is not obviously false, it ought not to be accepted, at present, as a regulative principle. It excludes, as too far-fetched to merit investigation, certain hypotheses concerning the influence of objective interests on large-scale social phenomena. And these hypotheses, in fact, merit empirical consideration. The attractiveness of methodological individualism as a regulative principle depends on two independent confusions, the conflation of an agent's reasons for action with the beliefs, needs, desires, or goals which are the reasons why he acted as he did, and the identification of explaining a phenomenon and describing its causes.