bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Population Migration and Its Influence in the Period of the Eastern Jin, the Sixteen States, and the Northern and Southern Dynasties
Authors: Hu Axiang
Published: November 2010

During the period of the Eastern Jin, the Sixteen States, the Southern dynasties, and the Northern dynasties, population movement caused the conflicts both between the Han and minorities in the north and immigrants and natives in the south. The traditional method of estimating the immigrants was based on the households of migration prefectures, subprefectures and counties recorded in local gazetteers, which is actually different between the actual distribution of immigrants and those registered in local gazetteers. Thus, the migration population and their descendents need to be recalculated. In fact, migrations in the Sixteen States were largely for military and agriculture purposes, while in the Northern dynasties, particularly the Northern Wei, population movements were mostly to fill the capitals, the boundary and inland areas, both were enforced by the governments. Population migration often determined government policies, enriched cultural contents, promoted economic developments, and changed the intellectual trends and social structure in certain dynasties, especially in the Eastern Jin and the Southern dynasties.
Beckwith-Wiedemann-Syndrom
Authors: Prawitt D. , Enklaar T. , Zabel B.
Published: November 2010

Das Beckwith-Wiedemann-Syndrom (BWS) ist ein pädiatrisches Überwuchssyndrom mit variablem klinischem Erscheinungsbild. Obwohl die betroffenen Kinder mit zunehmendem Alter immer normaler aussehen, ist es wichtig, die Diagnose BWS zu stellen. Gründe sind mögliche syndromspezifische Komplikationen, insbesondere ein 400-fach erhöhtes Risiko der Patienten, an bestimmten embryonalen Tumoren – Nephroblastome (Wilms-Tumoren), Hepatoblastome u. a. – innerhalb der ersten Lebensjahre zu erkranken. Klinisch überlappt das BWS mit anderen Krankheitsentitäten, sodass eine eindeutige molekulargenetische Diagnostik zur Risikoabschätzung und adäquaten Therapie wünschenswert ist. Molekular ist das BWS mit der Chromosomenregion 11p15.5 assoziiert, einer Region in der es 2 Cluster von Genen gibt, die dem genomischen Imprinting unterliegen. Bei den Patienten lassen sich Sequenzabweichungen in bestimmten Genen finden, die Mehrzahl weisen aber DNA-Methylierungsveränderungen auf, welche die Gendosis der funktionell zur Verfügung stehenden, monoallelisch aktiven 11p15.5-Gene pathogen beeinflussen. Zurzeit existiert nur eine sehr unvollständige Genotyp-Phänotyp-Korrelation. Aktuelle Forschungsarbeiten liefern Ansätze, die Ätiopathogenese des Syndroms molekular besser zu verstehen. So werden beispielsweise Interaktionspartner identifiziert, die das Imprinting der 11p15.5-Gene modifizieren und epigenetisch regulieren.
One Currency, Several Degrees of Competitiveness
Authors: Riela Stefano
Published: November 2010

Unless economic recovery occurs, there is a high possibility that a currency war will be instigated. The euro is considered to be a fundamental contributor to the export success of sixteen Member States. Change in currency value is only one of the two factors affecting the price of exports; the other factor, and arguably the one that affects export prices in a more overarching manner, is the cost of production. However, to maintain a competitive advantage against the growing competition of Asian countries, Europe must find a way to facilitate innovation and thus produce high-tech products for the export market.
Techniques de contrôle de l’éjaculation dans l’ancienne Chine
Authors: Karamanou M. , Demetriou T. , Liappas I. , Androutsos G.
Published: November 2010

La littérature sexuelle de la Chine ancienne constitue une source inépuisable d’informations sur les méthodes de contrôle de l’éjaculation, qui restent en vigueur à l’heure actuelle et sont à l’origine des techniques préconisées par les sexologues contemporains.
Maidens, fillies and the death of Medusa on a seventh-century pithos
Authors: Topper Kathryn
Published: November 2010

A well-known relief pithos in the Louvre (CA 795) shows Perseus confronting a Gorgon whose human torso terminates in the body of a horse. Her equine features have proven difficult to explain, and earlier discussions of the scene have appealed to lost narratives, seventh-century artistic conventions and broad symbolic associations between Gorgons and horses. Focusing on her combination of equine and maidenly characteristics, this article interprets Medusa's unusual form with reference to a series of ancient Greek metaphors connecting maidens, horses and Gorgons. It argues that recognizing the metaphorical logic of the image allows us to understand Medusa's form as a sympathetic comment upon her death, which has parallels in the sacrifices of maidens in Greek art and literature.
Framing the fox: Callimachus' secondIamband its predecessors
Authors: Steiner Deborah
Published: November 2010

This article treats the figure of the fox that appears as one of the members of the embassy sent by the animals to Zeus in Callimachus' secondIamb. By exploring previous appearances of the fox in the poetic repertoire, I identify a series of Archaic and early Classical works that Callimachus uses by way of ‘intertexts’, and argue that the Hellenistic author draws on the animal's place within the interconnected iambic and fable traditions that inform his poem. Already visible in these earlier texts, and anticipating Callimachus, is a concern with literary as well as ethical polemics.
Unreasonable Care: the establishment of selfhood
Authors: Newson Elizabeth
Published: November 2010

Out of my normal context, and separated from my usual reference groups, perhaps I need first of all to explain the background from which I speak. As a developmental psychologist whose main research interests are to do with child rearing in the various social environments in which it takes place, I have been particularly concerned with the long-term dialogues (verbal and non-verbal) that go on between parents and children, in the course of which they commonly come to certain understandings about their mutual tolerances and intolerances, and learn to live together with some regard to these limits. I stress the intersubjective nature of these understandings because I take it as axiomatic that children bring up their parents in the course of parents bringing up their children, even though parents are more powerful in physical terms and marginally more powerful in psychological terms. Secondly, as a child psychologist working clinically with parents and handicapped or problem children, I am also interested in another kind of dialogue: that which takes place between parents and professionals with the child as focus. I am concerned to find ways of making this dialogue as effective as possible, in particular by recognising the differences that inform parental and professional approaches to our common focus, and then using these differences to enable a complementary partnership that builds upon the advantages of each.
Conjugal Faithfulness
Authors: Hutchings P. Æ.
Published: November 2010

‘Faithfulness’ is defined in The Oxford English Dictionary of 1901 in a way that leaves out what one might take as a central paradigm. The OED entry reads, in part

Faithfulness … the quality of being faithful.

A. Fidelity, loyalty (to a superior or friend) …

B. Strict adherence to one's pledged word; honesty, sincerity. …

The feudal system, the army, and the rest of such things are provided for in (A) ‘loyalty to a superior …’, and so are friends – after superiors. In (B), commercial interests are satisfactorily covered: ‘strict adherence to one's pledged word, honesty. …’ It is a nice piece of social history: from William the Conqueror to the latter phases of the Industrial Revolution, in two definitions. But a very odd piece of social history, in that conjugal faithfulness, the most existential one that there is, does not rate a mention.
Truth and Fiction
Authors: Mitchell Julian
Published: November 2010

As I'm a writer, I'll begin with a story. It's not, I'm sorry to say, one of my own – I wish it were – but it is very philosophical. It's by the great blind Argentinian, Jorge Luis Borges, and it's called ‘Funes the Memorious’. Somewhere in a marshy province of Uruguay, Borges comes across a young man called Funes who has gone into an extraordinary mental state after a crippling fall from a horse. He is quite unable to forget anything that has ever happened to him in his physical or mental life. He ‘not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every wood, but even every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it’ – and with exceptional vividness. In an attempt to manage this colossal burden, Funes thinks about classifying and reducing his memories to some practical order. But ‘two considerations dissuaded him: the thought that the task was interminable, and the thought that it was useless. He knew that at the hour of his death he would scarcely have finished classifying even all the memories of his childhood.’
Art/Nature
Authors: Forge Andrew
Published: November 2010

Eighteenth-century country gentlemen would carry small amber-coloured reducing lenses on their evening walks, and with their help they would transport themselves from Derbyshire or Kent into the Roman campagna or into the ideal campagna they had learnt from the paintings of Claude or Gaspard Poussin.
Hume and Wittgenstein
Authors: Hanfling Oswald
Published: November 2010

It is well known that Wittgenstein's reading of the philosophical classics was patchy. He left unread a large part of the literature which most philosophers would regard as essential to a knowledge of their subject. Wittgenstein gave an interesting reason for his non-reading of Hume. He said that he could not sit down and read Hume, because he knew far too much about the subject of Hume's writings to find this anything but a torture. In a recent commentary, Peter Hacker has taken this to show that ‘Wittgenstein seems to have despised Hume’. Hume, he adds, ‘made almost every epistemological and metaphysical mistake Wittgenstein could think of.
Agreement, Objectivity and the Sentiment of Humanity in Morals
Authors: Cherry Christopher
Published: November 2010

Fairly recently, I came upon the following passage in a review of a book by Colin M. Turnbull, called The Mountain People:

A child dumped on the ground is seized and eaten by a leopard. The mother is delighted; for not only does she no longer have to carry the child about and feed it, but it follows that there is likely to be a gorged leopard near by, a sleepy animal which can easily be killed and eaten. An old woman who has been abandoned falls down the mountainside because she is blind, so a crowd gathers to laugh at the spectacle of her distress. A man about to die of gunshot wounds makes a last request for tea. As he feebly raises it to his lips, it is snatched from him by his sister, who runs away delighted. A child develops intestinal obstruction; so his father calls in the neighbours to enjoy the joke of his distended belly.
Schopenhauer on the Principle of Sufficient Reason
Authors: Hamlyn D. W.
Published: November 2010

‘The Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the sole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is posited. Accordingly every necessity is conditioned; absolute, i.e. unconditioned, necessity therefore is a contradicto in adjecto. For to be necessary can never mean anything but to result from a given reason.’ These words are taken from the beginning of section 49 of Schopenhauer's The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. They express sentiments with which I am to some extent in agreement, and it therefore seemed to me worth while to explore in some kind of detail Schopenhauer's treatment of the issues. It might, however, be asked why the view expressed by Schopenhauer should be of philosophical interest, what, if anything, turns on the rejection of the notion of absolute necessity. To this I can reply by saying only that apart from the intrinsic interest of the notion of necessity itself, an issue on which a philosopher ought to make himself clear, Schopenhauer himself points to some of the consequences of his doctrine - the impossiblity, for example, of an absolutely necessary being, and the similar impossibility of ontological or cosmological arguments
Humour, irony and sarcasm in severe Alzheimer's dementia – a corrective to retrogenesis?
Authors: MOOS INGER
Published: November 2010

Retrogenesis is claimed to be the process by which degenerating mechanisms in the brain, as found in Alzheimer's disease (AD), reverse the order of acquisition of functions, including language, in normal child development. In FAST (Functional Assessment Staging of Alzheimer's disease) stages of AD are translated into corresponding developmental ages. Humour, irony and sarcasm are communicative strategies linked to meta-linguistic abilities developed late in childhood. If found in the conversation of people with moderately severe AD according to FAST, this could be an indication of problems in the FAST scale and subsequently in the concept of retrogenesis concerning speech and language abilities. Comprehensive, open-ended, naturalistic conversations between three nursing home residents with moderately severe AD according to FAST and their professional care-givers were analysed with concepts developed in linguistics as to the occurrence of humour, irony and sarcasm. Although the data material was limited, the findings indicate an unexpected communicative competence of the three participants. This is a corrective to retrogenesis and a caveat for poor expectations of intelligible conversations with demented people for professionals and the people they advise. Implications for research strategies and for the general knowledge of communicative competence in AD are addressed in the discussion section, and possible ways of elucidating deterioration of speech and language abilities in AD are suggested.
Hospitalization rates associated with hepatitis B and HIV co-infection, age and sex in a population-based cohort of people diagnosed with hepatitis C
Authors: GIDDING H. F. , AMIN J. , DORE G. J. , LAW M. G.
Published: November 2010

To determine the extent age, sex and co-infection affect morbidity in people infected with hepatitis C virus (HCV), we performed a population-based study linking HCV notifications in New South Wales, Australia with their hospital (July 2000 to June 2006), hepatitis B virus (HBV) and HIV notification, and death records. Poisson models were used to calculate hospitalization rate ratios (RRs) for all-cause, illicit drug and liver-related admissions. Co-infection RRs were used to estimate attributable risk (AR). The 86 501 people notified with HCV contributed 422 761 person-years of observation; 0·8% had HIV, 3·7% HBV, and 0·04% had both. RRs for males were equal to or lower than for females in younger ages, but higher in older ages (Pfor interaction ⩽0·013). HBV/HIV co-infection resulted in ARs of over 70% for liver disease and 30–60% otherwise. However, at the cohort level the impact was minimal (population ARs 1·3–8·7%). Our findings highlight the importance and success of public health measures, such as needle and syringe exchange programmes, which have helped to minimize the prevalence of co-infection in Australia. The findings also suggest that the age of study participants needs to be considered whenever the burden of HCV-related morbidity is reported by sex. The results are likely to be representative of patterns in hospital-related morbidity for the entire HCV-infected population in Australia and the ARs generalizable to other developed countries.
A calculus for hardware description
Authors: PARK SUNGWOO , IM HYEONSEUNG
Published: November 2010

In efforts to overcome the complexity of the syntax and the lack of formal semantics of conventional hardware description languages, a number of functional hardware description languages have been developed. Like conventional hardware description languages, however, functional hardware description languages eventually convert all source programs into netlists, which describe wire connections in hardware circuits at the lowest level and conceal all high-level descriptions written into source programs. We develop a calculus, calledlλ (linear lambda), which may serve as an intermediate functional language just above netlists in the hierarchy of hardware description languages. In order to support higher-order functions,lλ uses a linear type system, which enforces the linear use of variables of function type. The translation oflλ into structural descriptions of hardware circuits is sound and complete in the sense that it maps expressions only to realizable hardware circuits, and that every realizable hardware circuit has a corresponding expression inlλ. To illustrate the use oflλ as a practical intermediate language for hardware description, we design a simple hardware description language that extendslλ with polymorphism, and use it to implement a fast Fourier transform circuit and a bitonic sorting network.
Objectivity and Social Anthropology
Authors: Beattie J. H. M.
Published: November 2010

This lecture is divided, roughly, into three parts. First, there is a general and perhaps rather simple-minded discussion of what are the ‘facts’ that social anthropologists study; is there anything special about these ‘facts’ which makes them different from other kinds of facts? It will be useful to start with the common-sense distinction between two kinds or, better, aspects of social facts; first—though neither is analytically prior to the other—and putting it very crudely, ‘what people do’, the aspect of social interaction, and second, ‘what—and how—people think’, the conceptual, classifying, cognitive component of human culture. Now in reality, of course (and perhaps not so ‘of course’; people do tend to think of them as separate ‘things’), these two aspects are inextricably intertwined. But it is essential to distinguish them analytically, because each aspect gives rise to quite different kinds of problems of understanding for the social anthropologist. We shall see that the problem of how to be ‘objective’, and so to avoid ethnographic error, arises in both contexts, but in rather different forms in each.
Scientific Method: Realism, Reference and Theory
Authors: Harré Rom
Published: November 2010

The claim of this paper is that only by adopting an approach to the analysis of theorizing based on the highlighting of analogy relations, that is on an analysis of the content of theories, can a defensible form of realism be found.
Is Free Will Incompatible with Something or Other?
Authors: Griffiths A. Phillips
Published: November 2010

Professor Vesey poses the following question:

…philosophers talk of ‘free will’ with a view to justifying our engaging in the practice of treating people as responsible for what they do. But why do we feel the need for a justification? It is because they want, also, to engage in the practice of looking for (motor) causes of everything that happens, and feel that the two practices are somehow incompatible? If so, then it is very paradoxical that they should turn to Descartes, and his theory of willing. Descartes' answer to the question ‘What does a person do immediately?’, namely ‘He performs an act of will’, has what I call ‘the incompatibility feature’, whereas Aristotle's answer has not. Why are they not content to say, with Aristotle, that the two practices are compatible, and hence there is no need for a justification?
Liberalism and Liberty: the Fragility of a Tradition
Authors: Graham Keith
Published: November 2010

My discussion in this lecture is structured as follows. In section 1 I consider the nature of philosophical enquiry and its affinity to liberalism. In section 2 I lay out some of the basic components of liberal theory and explore their interrelations. In section 3 I discuss two challenges to liberalism: one concerning the conception of liberty which it involves and one concerning the way in which it introduces the idea of legitimate political authority. In section 4 I suggest that these problems, to do with the values of liberalism, arise on the basis of a prior conception of individuals which is in need of modification. In a brief concluding section 5 I indicate the need for a post-liberal political theory.
Cardiovascular medication and falls
Authors: Darowski Adam , Whiting Robert
Published: November 2010

There are inadequate data to formulate evidence-based guidelines on cardiovascular medication and falls. A critical systematic review of medication as a risk factor for falls concluded that there was a weak association between drugs that reduce blood pressure and falls. The population studies reviewed, looking for an association between cardiovascular drug usage and falls, consisted of subjects who were much younger and who had a much lower drug burden when compared with the older clinic population. The magnitude of the effect of cardiovascular medications on falls may therefore have been underestimated in these studies.

Two observational studies in falls clinics showed significant reductions in falls and syncope following withdrawal of cardiovascular medication, with improvements in symptoms, in tilt-table parameters predictive of syncope, and in measures of gait and balance.

There are no randomized controlled trials of the effect of cardiovascular drug withdrawal on falls. An expert audience of 200 members attending the 2009 British Geriatrics Society Falls Section Conference held the unanimous opinion that cardiovascular medications were a significant cause of falls in older people.
Philosophical Plumbing
Authors: Midgley Mary
Published: November 2010

Is philosophy like plumbing? I have made this comparison a number of times when I have wanted to stress that philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult, but is also needed. It is not optional. The idea has caused mild surprise, and has sometimes been thought rather undignified. The question of dignity is a very interesting one, and I shall come back to it at the end of this article. But first, I would like to work the comparison out a bit more fully.
Is Philosophy a ‘Theory of Everything’?
Authors: Hunt G. M. K.
Published: November 2010

When Wittgenstein moved from Manchester to Cambridge he was following a path from the study of the natural sciences to the study of philosophy which was then not unusual, and has since become increasingly common. Russell had preceded him in that intellectual emigration and many more were to follow. Of the three philosophy departments I have been in, two were headed by natural scientists (and the third by an historian). Both my research supervisors in philosophy were natural scientists (as I was myself). Less surprising, but still significant, a considerable proportion of Presidents of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science were originally trained as natural scientists. Yet it is a subject still unrecognized by the Royal Society. The editors of both the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and the journal Analysis were both originally natural scientists. Eminent scientists seem to feel impelled to discuss there own subjects in a wider context of philosophy. Bohr, Schrodinger, Kilmister, Hoyle, Hawking and Penrose, are but a few from a long list.
Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness
Authors: Tye Michael
Published: November 2010

One standard objection to the view that phenomenal experience is functionally determined is based upon what has come to be called ‘The Absent Qualia Hypothesis’, the idea that there could be a person or a machine that was functionally exactly like us but that felt or consciously experienced nothing at all (see Block, 1980; Block and Fodor, 1980; Campbell, 1980; Nagel, 1980). Advocates of this hypothesis typically maintain that we can easily imagine possible systems that meet the appropriate functional specifications but that intuitively lack any phenomenal consciousness. Ned Block (1980), for example, asks us to suppose that a billion Chinese people are each given a two-way radio with which to communicate with one another and with an artificial (brainless) body. The movements of the body are controlled by the radio signals, and the signals themselves are made in accordance with instructions the Chinese people receive from a vast display in the sky which is visible to all of them. The instructions are such that the participating Chinese people together realize whatever programs the functionalist supposes underlie human phenomenal experience.
Wittgenstein and Connectionism: a Significant Complementarity?
Authors: Mills Stephen
Published: November 2010

Between the later views of Wittgenstein and those of connectionism1 on the subject of the mastery of language there is an impressively large number of similarities. The task of establishing this claim is carried out in the second section of this paper (with arguments in the fourth section lending further support).
Conclusion
Authors: Phillips-Griffiths A.
Published: November 2010

A rough and tumble, we have had; though one quite lacking in impoliteness. I hope I do not go too far in supplying that deficiency.

Disagreement is endemic on political questions, both between and within ourselves. We do however come to conclusions, often strongly held. It may often be in doing so we are wholly irrational; but in so far as we are not, the philosopher should surely have something to contribute?

Our conclusions, so far as they are at all rational conclusions, will be based on some considerations or other: our premises. So, it may be thought, so far as we are rational we should be clear about what our premises are, how if at all they may be justified, and that our conclusions logically follow from them. Only if this is so are our conclusions justified.
Wittgenstein: Whose Philosopher?
Authors: Anscombe G. E. M.
Published: November 2010

One of the ways of dividing all philosophers into two kinds is by saying of each whether he is an ordinary man's philosopher or a philosophers' philosopher. Thus Plato is a philosophers' philosopher and Aristotle an ordinary man's philosopher. This does not depend on being easy to understand: a lot of Aristotle's Metaphysics is immensely difficult. Nor does being a philosophers' philosopher imply that an ordinary man cannot enjoy the writings, or many of them. Plato invented and exhausted a form: no one else has written such dialogues. So someone with no philosophical bent, or who has left his philosophical curiosity far behind may still enjoy reading some of them.
Language and Conversation: Wittgenstein's Builders
Authors: Gaita Raimond
Published: November 2010

We may reflect on language in different ways. There is the way familiar to analytical philosophers. That may take different forms, but most of them are strikingly different from the way of someone like Elias Canetti or F. R. Leavis, whose thought is shaped by their concern with literature. In the latter case language appears as an essentially human phenomenon, not because it is limited to the species Homo sapiens, but because it is essentially connected with the culture and histories of peoples, whose plurality is underdetermined by any elaboration on the nature and environmental conditions of Homo sapiens. It is rare to find analytical philosophers of language for whom that is important or who have tried even to sketch the kind of importance it may have. That is because they assume that it is not important to language as such (to what makes something language) but only to the sophisticated use of language in poetry or literature. They have tended to misunderstand the sense in which a language such as English is a natural language.
Psychoanalysis: A Form of Life?
Authors: Brearley Michael
Published: November 2010

My aim in this paper is to consider the suggestion, made in an unpublished paper by Peter Hobson, a psychoanalytic colleague, that psychoanalysis is a form of life. Hobson is impressed by the peculiarity of psychoanalytic thinking, by its specialness, by the fact that its concepts are embedded in a system of practices and beliefs such that an outsider to all this may be unable to understand what the analyst says, whether to his patient or to another analyst. Hobson uses Wittgenstein's notion of a form of life to refer to this system of practices and beliefs, but he does not criticize or examine the notion itself.
Wittgenstein on Freud's ‘abominable mess’
Authors: Cioffi Frank
Published: November 2010

The ‘abominable mess’ of which Wittgenstein complains is that of confounding reasons and causes. What does Wittgenstein mean to call attention to by this contrast and why does he think himself entitled to hold that Freud confounded them? Sometimes by reasons he means just what someone says on being asked why he did what he did or reacted as he reacted, and sometimes what an experience meant to a subject on further reflection upon it—its ‘further description’.
Wittgenstein and Social Science
Authors: Trigg Roger
Published: November 2010

The work of the later Wittgenstein has had a vast influence in the field of social science. This is hardly surprising as the effect of that philosophy has been an emphasis on the priority of the social. Empiricist philosophy started with the private experience of the individual and from there built up an inter-subjective picture of the world. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, began with the rule-governed practices of a community. Both the nature of private experience, and of an objective world, was deemed to depend on concepts all could share. Society is the source of such concepts and thus becomes the key notion in our understanding of ourselves and our relation to the world.
Popper, Science and Rationality
Authors: Newton-Smith W. H.
Published: November 2010

We all think that science is special. Its products—its technological spin-off—dominate our lives which are thereby sometimes enriched and sometimes impoverished but always affected. Even the most outlandish critics of science such as Feyerabend implicitly recognize its success. Feyerabend told us that science was a congame. Scientists had so successfully hood-winked us into adopting its ideology that other equally legitimate forms of activity—alchemy, witchcraft and magic—lost out. He conjured up a vision of much enriched lives if only we could free ourselves from the domination of the ‘one true ideology’ of science just as our ancestors freed us from the domination of the Church. But he told us these things in Switzerland and in California happily commuting between them in that most ubiquitous product of science—the aeroplane.
Popper on Determinism
Authors: Clark Peter
Published: November 2010

There is no doubt at all that the issue of determinism versus indeterminism was a central, dominating theme of Popper's thought. By his own account he saw his criticism of the thesis of determinism as crucial to his defence not only of the reality of human freedom, moral responsibility and creativity but also as equally fundamental to his account of human rationality and to his theory of the content and growth of science as an objective, rational and most importantly demonstrably rational enterprise. Consequently a great deal of his writings discussing both the content and methodology of the natural and the social sciences alternately bear upon and presuppose his defence of indeterminism.
The Uses of Karl Popper
Authors: Wächtershäuser Günter
Published: November 2010

Karl Popper's work is of great diversity. It touches on virtually every intellectual activity. But he himself considered his philosophy of science one of his most important achievements. And indeed his achievement here is revolutionary. It destroyed the philosophy of inductivism which held sway over science for hundreds of years.
Popper and the Scepticisms of Evolutionary Epistemology, or, What Were Human Beings Made For?
Authors: Smithurst Michael
Published: November 2010

There is a sort of scepticism, or, at least, epistemological pessimism, that is generated by appealing to Darwin's theory of evolution. The argument is that nature, that is the selective pressures of evolution, has clearly fitted us for certain sorts of learning and mundane understanding, directly beneficial in point of individual survival and chances for reproduction. Very likely then, it is argued, nature has not fitted us for arcane intellectual accomplishments remote from, or quite disconnected from, those ends. So, it is suggested, perhaps we cannot understand, perhaps never will understand, because we are not made to understand, such matters as consciousness, its nature and causes, the origins of life, the beginning of the universe, or astro-physics in its more finalist pretensions. Sometimes, taken with the claim that manifestly we do understand some of these things, the argument becomes a reductio, and its exponents claim that consequently Darwinism must be false, or of only limited application. More commonly, however, in ‘naturalized epistemology’, it is made the vehicle of a claim about the limits of science, limits imposed by the evolutionarily derived frailty of human understanding. Popper, the late Popper, is one of the progenitors of naturalized epistemology. I want to ask what Popper's response would be, or ought to be, to this epistemological nihilism (to purloin a phrase of Quine's) conjured out of Darwinism.
Pluralism, Realism and Truth
Authors: McKnight C. J.
Published: November 2010

Recent interest in ethical pluralism derives from Isaiah Berlin's reflections on the writings of Vico and Herder and their opposition to the views of the Enlightenment. I begin with two quotations from Berlin:

It (pluralism) is not relativism. Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand … the values, the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society, even those remote in time or space. They may find these values unacceptable, but if they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, and at the same time live in the light of values widely different from one's own, but which nevertheless one can see to be values, ends of life, by the realisation of which men could be fulfilled. (Berlin, 1991, p. 10)
Coping with the Many-Coloured Dome: Pluralism and Practical Reason
Authors: Graham Keith
Published: November 2010

The One remains, the many change and pass;

Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly;

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,

Stains the white radiance of Eternity,

Until Death tramples it to fragments.

(Shelley)

At its widest, ‘pluralism’ signifies simply the variety of life, the teeming multitude of forms and entities, the many different properties that living beings manifest. Life is not everywhere the same but impressively differentiated, and without it eternity would be all of a piece, uniform. That is enough for life to stain the white radiance of eternity. But within the multiplicity of specifically human life there are not merely differences. There are tensions, oppositions, conflicts. In contemporary philosophical debate ‘pluralism’ then comes to signify one problematic aspect of this. Groups of people have perhaps always subscribed to very different values, and in consequence favoured very different forms of behaviour from one another, at least on a global scale. But the groups are no longer geographically separated: we live in distinct but overlapping cultures, and get in one another's way to a far greater extent than previously. Shelley's ordered image of the dome may then seem inappropriate, and it may seem unnecessary for death to trample it to fragments. Life is already fragmented, and the practical problem facing us as living creatures is to go beyond the fragments, to achieve at least a modus vivendi in the light of all our differences and incompatibilities even if not the orderliness and cohesion of a dome. Somehow, we have to live together. That is a practical problem which confronts us at every level, as members of families, neighbourhoods, departments, countries and increasingly simply as members of a world-wide human race.
‘Race’ in Britain and the Politics of Difference
Authors: Modood Tariq
Published: November 2010

It was only a few years ago that the central topic of academic political philosophy, at least in the English-speaking world, was distributive justice. The focus was very much on economic or material goods; the question being whether people were entitled to have what they had, or did justice require that someone else should have some of it. That the arguments about justice led to investigating the conceptions of self, rationality and community that underpinned them meant that the debate was far from governed by economics and welfare, and was capable of moving in many directions and far from its starting-point. Yet that many of the leading participants in the ‘liberalism v. communitarianism’ debate should now have come to place diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism at the centre of their theorising, with the emphasis being on the justness of cultural rather than economic transactions, is surely not just a product of ‘following the argument to where it leads’. The change in philosophical focus is also determined by changes in the political world; by the challenges of feminism, the growing recognition that most Western societies are, partly because of movements of populations, increasingly multi-ethnic and multi-racial, and the growing questioning of whether the pursuit of a universal theory of justice may not itself be an example of a Western cultural imperialism. The politics I am pointing to is various and by no means harmonious, but a common feature perhaps is the insistence that there are forms of inequality and domination beyond those of economics and material distributions.
‘Two Cultures’ Revisited
Authors: O'Hear Anthony
Published: November 2010

Vanity of Science Knowledge of physical science will not console me for ignorance of morality in time of affliction, but knowledge of morality will always console me for ignorance of physical science.

(Pascal, Pensées, No. 23)
Rational and Other Animals
Authors: Haldane John
Published: November 2010

The soul has two cognitive powers. One is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of power called the intellect. Though natures only exist in individual matter, the intellectual power knows them not as individualised, but as they are abstracted from matter by the intellect's attention and reflection. Thus, through the intellect we can understand natures in a universal manner; and this is beyond the power of sense. (St Thomas Aquinas,Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 12, a. 4;responsio.)
Three Major Originators of the Concept of Verstehen: Vico, Herder, Schleiermacher
Authors: Hausheer Roger
Published: November 2010

It is generally agreed by historians of modern thought that, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, philosophers in the German-speaking world identified and defined a type or species of knowledge whose peculiar independent status had hitherto been largely overlooked. It was developed, clarified, and, with a sharpened awareness of its unique possibilities, made to work in practice above all by Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert and their numerous followers; and, to a degree, also by Max Weber. The general name by which it was, and is, most often referred to is ‘Verstehen’—understanding. It has to be admitted that it was from the first, and remains to this day, a highly problematic and hotly disputed concept. Positivists, materialists, behaviourists and monists of all kinds—all those whose ideal is a single structure of organized systematic knowledge—have tended to view it with deep suspicion, and even to deny its existence altogether, claiming that it is wholly illusory and doomed to disappear before the inevitable advance of positive scientific method. However that may be, it will not be my purpose in this paper to enter into these difficult controversies. It may indeed be that no watertight definition of it is possible; that its putative boundaries with other forms or types of knowledge are vague and shifting; and even that there is no ultimate discontinuity in principle between it and the knowledge we gain from other spheres of research and investigation.
Weber's Ideal Types as Models in the Social Sciences
Authors: Weinert Friedel
Published: November 2010

There has recently been a great interest in models in the natural sciences. Models are used mainly for their representational functions: they help to concretize certain relationships between parameters in studying physical systems. For instance, we might be interested in representing how the planets orbit around the sun—a scale model of the solar system is an ideal tool for achieving this end. We are free to leave out one or two planets or ignore the moons which many of the planets have. Alternatively, we might be interested in studying the relationship between two particular parameters—how one may be dependent on the other. Then we construct a functional model and determine the functional relationship between them. For instance, the orbital period of a planet is functionally dependent on the average distance of the planet from the sun.1 Models are rather widespread in the social sciences, especially in economics where functional models are used to study relationships between, say, supply and demand. Economics, however, also uses a different kind of model which is also used in the natural sciences: the hypothetical or as if model. Economists employ as if constructions when they assume economic agents to be perfectly rational beings who always seek to maximize their utilities. It is common knowledge that economic agents are not perfectly rational and that the assumptions of perfect rationality and optimal information are at best idealizations which do not, strictly speaking, correspond to the economic reality of how economic agents behave in the market-place.
The Meaning of the Hermeneutic Tradition in Contemporary Philosophy
Authors: Bowie Andrew
Published: November 2010

In hisNotes on Philosophy, which he began writing in 1796, Friedrich Schlegel asserts that ‘The fact that one person understands the other is philosophically incomprehensible, but it is certainly magical.’ In the interim a large amount of philosophical effort has been expended on trying to refute Schlegel's first claim. The fact is, though, that what Michael Dummett calls a ‘fullblooded theory of meaning’ is now looking less and less like a really feasible philosophical enterprise, so Schlegel may have actually been right. Dummett maintains that a ‘full-blooded theory of meaning’ ‘must give an explicit account, not only of what anyone must know in order to know the meaning of any given expression, but of what constitutes having such knowledge’. However, as I shall try to show via aspects of the hermeneutic tradition, it is precisely this way of talking about meaning and understanding that renders them incomprehensible. The differences between approaching the issue of understanding from the hermeneutic tradition and approaching it from the analytical tradition can, I want to suggest, tell us something important about the state of philosophy today. My aim is eventually to suggest that we need to understand the analytical version of the ‘linguistic turn’ in modern philosophy as a perhaps rather questionable aspect of a much more important ‘hermeneutic turn’, whose implications are now becoming apparent in more and more diverse areas of contemporary philosophy.
Data and Theory in Aesthetics: Philosophical Understanding and Misunderstanding
Authors: Hepburn Ronald
Published: November 2010

This paper has a twofold structure: both parts concern philosophy's understanding (or misunderstanding) of its data—in the area of aesthetics. The first part (I) considers aesthetics as philosophy of art: the second part (II) considers aesthetics as concerned also with the appreciation of nature.
Anti-Meaning as Ideology: The Case of Deconstruction
Authors: Grant Robert
Published: November 2010

Don't look for the meaning; look for the use. (Wittgenstein)

A few years back the Yale deconstructionist Paul de Man wasposthumously discovered to have written repeatedly for a Belgiancollaborationist journal during the Nazi occupation. So far as I amaware, de Man in his American period espoused no particular politics. Indeed, the Left frequently regarded this as a cause for complaint, since most of them (to some extent rightly, as we shall see) thought of de Man and deconstruction as being their natural allies.
Global Religion
Authors: Clark Stephen R. L.
Published: November 2010

The social and environmental problems that we face at this tail end of twentieth-century progress require us to identify some cause, some spirit that transcends the petty limits of our time and place. It is easy to believe (or to pretend to ourselves that we believe) that there is no crisis. We have been told too often that the oceans will soon die, the air be poisonous, our energy reserves run dry; that the world will grow warmer, coastlands be flooded and the climate change; that plague, famine and war will be the necessary checks on population growth. But here we are: sufficiently healthy and well-fed, connoisseurs of far-off catastrophe and horror movies, confident that something will turn up or that the prophecies of doom were only dreams. We are the descendants, after all, of creatures who did not despair, who hoped against hope that there would still be life tomorrow. We no more believe in the world's end than we believe that soldiers could break down the door and drag us off to torture and to death: we don't believe that they could even when we know that, somewhere altogether elsewhere, they did. Even if we can force ourselves to remember other ages, other lands or other classes, we are content enough.
The Idea of the Environment
Authors: Dower Nigel
Published: November 2010

This is in part a reflection on issues raised by David Cooper in his paper entitled ‘The Idea of Environment’ (Cooper, 1992), a paper that I have an ambiguous attitude towards. On the one hand it has opened my eyes to a way of thinking about the environment, namely as a field of significance, but on the other hand it seems to be unfortunate in its tone of negative criticism of much of the thinking of deep environmentalists, and wrong in its dismissal of the idea that the environment as a whole should be a field of significance.
Chaos and Order, Environment and Anarchy
Authors: Belsey Andrew
Published: November 2010

The distinction between chaos and order has been central to western philosophy, both in metaphysics and politics. At the beginning, it was intrinsic to presocratic natural philosophy, and shortly after that to the cosmology and social philosophy of Plato. Even in the pre-presocratic period there were important intimations of it. Thus Hesiod tells us that ‘first of all did Chaos come into being’ (Theogony, line 116, in Kirk et al., 1983, p. 35)—although exactly what is meant by ‘chaos’ in this context is not clear. (It could be some sort of undifferentiated, primordial mass, or just the separation (the gap) between earth and sky (Kirk et al., 1983, pp. 38–41). Nor does Hesiod concern himself with what Chaos came from (Barnes, 1987, p. 57).) The myth of origin in the Theogony, though, can be seen in contrast to the underlying theme of Works and Days, namely, Zeus's eternal rule over the world in accordance with Justice or Order (Kirk et al., 1983, pp. 34, 72). This point will become centrally important in what follows.
Natural Capital
Authors: Holland Alan
Published: November 2010

Interest in the concept of natural capital stems from the key role which this concept plays in certain attempts to elucidate the goal of sustainable development—a goal which currently preoccupies environmental policy-makers. My purpose in this paper is to examine the viability of what, adapting an expression of Bryan Norton's, may be termed the ‘social scientific approach’ to natural capital (Norton, 1992, p. 97). This approach largely determines the way in which environmental concern is currently being represented in the environmental policy community.