bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Denying the Antecedent as a Legitimate Argumentative Strategy: A Dialectical Model
Authors: Godden David
Published: March 2017

The standard account of denying the antecedent (DA) is that it is a deductively invalid form of argument, and that, in a conditional argument, to argue from the falsity of the antecedent to the falsity of the consequent is always fallacious. In this paper, we argue that DA is not always a fallacious argumentative strategy. Instead, there is a legitimate usage ofDA according to which it is a defeasible argument against the acceptability of a claim. The dialectical effect of denying the antecedent is to shift the burden of proof back to the original proponent of a claim. We provide a model of this non-fallacious usage which is built upon pragmatic models of argumentation.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements
Authors: Fogelin Robert
Published: March 2017

The Logic of Deep Disagreements
Deep Disagreement, Rational Resolutions, and Critical Thinking
Authors: Feldman Richard
Published: March 2017

According to Robert Fogelin, deep disagreements are disagreements about fundamental principles. He argues that deep disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. In this paper I argue against this thesis. A key part of the response depends upon the claim that disagreements can be rationally resolved not only by one participant rationally coming around to the other's point of view, but also by both of them rationally suspending judgment about the disputed proposition. I also claim that suspension of judgment may be the rational response in the examples Fogelin characterizes as deep disagreements. I deny that this result has any troubling implications for critical thinking.
Assessing the Cogency of Arguments: lbree Kinds of Merits
Authors: Rehg William
Published: March 2017

This article proposes a way of connecting two levels at which scholars have studied discursive practices from a normative perspective: on the one hand, local transactions-face-to-face arguments or dialogues-and broadly dispersed public debates on the other. To help focus my analysis, I select two representatives of work at these two levels: the pragmadialectical model of critical discussion and Habermas's discourse theory of politicallegal deliberation. The two models confront complementary challenges that arise from gaps between their prescriptions and contexts of actual discourse. In response, I propose a theory of argument cogency that distinguishes three kinds of merit: content, transactional, and public. Normative links between the two levels arise through the ways argument contents spread across multiple transactions in a social space whose structure and composition favor collective reasonableness.
The Epistemological Theory of Argument--How and Why?
Authors: Lumer Christoph
Published: March 2017

The article outlines a general epistemological theory of argument: a theory that regards providingjustified belief as the
principal aim of argumentation, and defends it instrumentalistically. After introducing some central terms of such a theory (2), answers to its central questions are
proposed: the primary object and structure of the theory (3), the function of arguments, which is to lead to justified belief (4), the way such arguments function, which is to
guide the addressee's cognizing (5), objective versus subjective aspects of argumentation (6), designing different types of argument (7). Then the notion of '(argumentatively)
valid argument' is defined and criteria for the adequate use of such arguments are introduced (8). Finally, this conception is justified as, among others, leading to more
true beliefs than competing conceptions (9).
Useful Argumentation: A Critique of the Epistemological Approach
Authors: Huss Brian
Published: March 2017

The main rationale for adopting the epistemological approach to argumentation seems to take the form of a criticism
of the consensus theory. This criticism says that some instances of clearly bad argumentation count as acceptable instances of argumentation on the consensus theory.
Supposedly, the epistemological approach does not have this problem. I suggest that the kind of normativity argumentation theorists should be concerned with is the normativity
associated with giving real-world advice on how to partake in a critical discussion. I try to show that when we understand the normativity of argumentative standards in this
way, the main criticism of the consensus theory falls short, and the epistemological approach does not really have the advantages over the consensus theory that it is purported
to have. If I am right, then the main reason offered for adopting the epistemological approach fails, and we should stick with the consensus theory.
A Normative Theory of Argument Strength
Authors: Hahn Ulrike , Oaksford Mike
Published: March 2017

In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.
Argument Strength, the Toulmin Model, and Ampliative Probability
Authors: Freeman James B.
Published: March 2017

We argue that Cohen’s concept of inductive or ampliative probability facilitates proper explication of sufficient strength for non-demonstrative arguments conforming to the Toulmin model. The data and claims of such arguments are singular statements. We may epistemically classify the warrants of such arguments as empirical (either physical or personal), institutional, or evaluative. Backing evidence and rebutting considerations vary with the epistemic type of warrant, but in each case the notion of ampliative probability for arguments with warrants of that type can be characterized. We may then use ampliative probability to define sufficient strength and related notions for Toulmin arguments.
A Bibliography of Douglas Walton’s Published Works, 1971-2007
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

A Bibliography of Douglas Walton’s Published Works, 1971-20
Natural Normativity: Argumentation Theory as an Engaged Discipline
Authors: Gilbert Michael A.
Published: March 2017

Natural normativity describes the means whereby social and cultural controls are placed on argumentative behaviour. The three main components of this are Goals, Context, and Ethos, which combine to form a dynamic and situational framework. Natural normativity is explained in light of Pragma-dialectics, Informal Logic, and Rhetoric. Finally, the theory is applied to the Biro-Siegel challenge.
The Arguers
Authors: Hample Dale
Published: March 2017

I wish to argue in favor of a particular orientation, one expressed in

Brockriede’s remark that “aruments are not in statements but in people.” While much has been gained from textual analyses, even

more will accrue by additional attention to the arguers. I consider that textual materials are really only the artifacts of arguments. The actual arguing is done exclusively by people, either the argument producers or receivers, and never by words on a page. In

fact, most of our textua l interpretations are quietly founded on the assumption that the artifact is fully informative about what people think.
Dialectical Obligations in Political Debate
Authors: Kock Christian
Published: March 2017

Political debate is a distinctive domain in argumentation, characterized by these features: it is about proposals for action, not about propositions that may have a truth value; there may be good arguments on both sides; neither the proposal nor its rejection follows by necessity or inference; the pros and the cons generally cannot, being multidimensional and hence incommen- surable, be aggregated in an objective way; each audience member must subjectively compare and balance arguments on the two sides; eventual consensus between the debaters is not a reasonable requirement. From all this follows a view of the rhetor’s special obligation in democratic, deliberative rhetoric on which it becomes crucial, in the interest of the audience, that political debaters acknowledge good arguments on the opposite side and explain why, on balance, they deem the arguments favoring their own side to be stronger.
On the Contrary: Inferential Analysis and Ontological Assumptions of the A Contrario Argument
Authors: Canale Damiano , Tuzet Giovanni
Published: March 2017

We remark that the A Contrario Argument is an ambiguous technique of justification of judicial decisions. We distinguish two uses and versions of it, strong and weak, taking as example the normative sentence “Underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit”. According to the strong version, only underprivileged citizens are permitted to apply for State benefit, so stateless persons are not. According to the weak, the law does not regulate the position of underprivileged stateless persons in this respect. We propose an inferential analysis of the two uses along the lines of the scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom, and try to point out what are the ontological assumptions of the two. We conclude that the strong version is justified if and only if there is a relevant incompatibility between the regulated subject and the present case.
In view of an express regulation: Considering the scope and soundness of a contrario reasoning
Authors: Jansen Henrike
Published: March 2017

A contrario reasoning (or ‘a contrario argument’ or ‘argument a contrario’) is traditionally understood as an appeal to the deliberate silence of the legislator: because a legal rule does not mention case X specifically, the rule is not applicable to it. Modern perspectives on legal reasoning often apply this label to a broader concept of reasoning, namely the reasoning by which a legal rule is not applied because of the differences between the case at hand and the one(s) mentioned in the legal rule. This article first explains how the broader concept could have come into being, and then argues that from an argumentation theoretical point of view the modern concept makes no sense as a category of argumentation. Furthermore it is shown under which conditions the traditional concept can be sound.
Topics in Contemporary Legal Argumentation: Some Remarks on the Topical Nature of Legal Argumentation in the Continental Law Tradition
Authors: Kreuzbauer Guenther
Published: March 2017

The article discusses topics in the context of contemporary legal argumentation. It starts with a sketch of the development of topics from ancient times until the present day. Here the author focuses on the theory of the German legal philosopher Theodor Viehweg, which was most influential to legal argumentation in the 20th century. Then a modern concept of topics is introduced and finally the author discusses the role of topics in contemporary legal argumentation. In this part the distinction between topoi in the weak sense (practically all argumentation schemes) and in the strong sense (specific legal topoi as listed by Gerhard Struck in 1971 is introduced. The author argues that Viehweg’s claim that topics plays an important role in legal argumentation is problematic, because topoi in the weak sense are certainly of high importance, but this is almost trivial. Topoi in the strong sense on the other hand are only of minor importance for legal practice. What characterises legal discourse much more is a set specific pragmatic discourse rules, discussed at the end of the paper.
Dialectical Relevance and Dialogical Context in Walton’s Pragmatic Theory
Authors: Macagno Fabrizio
Published: March 2017

The notions of types of dialogue and dialectical relevance are central themes in Walton’s work and the grounds for a dialectical approach to many fallacies. After outlining the dialogue models constituting the background of Walton’s account, this article presents the concepts of dialectical relevance and dialogue shifts in their application to biased argumentation, fallacious moves, and illicit argumentative strategies. Showing the different dialectical proposals Walton advanced in several studies on argumentation as a development of a dialogical system, it has proved possible to highlight the fundamental aspects of his theory in a comprehensive model of communication and interaction.
Arguing from Definition to Verbal Classification: The Case of Redefining 'Planet' to Exclude Pluto
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

The recent redefinition of 'planet' that excludes Pluto as a planet led to controversy that provides a case study of how competing scientific definitions can be supported by characteristic types of evidence. An argumentation scheme from Hastings is used to analyze argument from verbal classification as a form of inference used in rational argumentation. The Toulmin-style format is compared to more recently developed ways of modeling such cases that stem from advances in argumentation technology in artificial intelligence. Usingthese tools, it is shown how argumentation schemes, in particularargument from verbal classification and argument from definition to verbal classification, apply to cases of scientific argumentation.
In Defense of Analogical Reasoning
Authors: Gamboa Steven
Published: March 2017

I offer a defense of ana-logical accounts of scientific models by meeting certain logical objections to the legitimacy of analogical reasoning. I examine an argument by Joseph Agassi that purports to show that all putative cases of analogical inference succumb to the following dilemma: either (1) the reasoning remains hopelessly vague and thus establishes no conclusion, or (2) can be analyzed into a logically preferable non-analogical form. In rebuttal, I offer a class of scientific models for which (a) there is no satisfactory non-analogical analysis, and (b) we can gain sufficient clarity for the legitimacy of the inference to be assessed. This result constitutes an existence proof for a class of analogical models that escape Agassi’s dilemma.
Mathematical Proof and Discovery Reductio ad Absurdum
Authors: Jacquette Dale
Published: March 2017

The uses and interpretation of reductio ad absurdum argumentation in mathematical proof and discovery are examined, illustrated with elementary and progressively sophisticated examples, and explained. Against Arthur Schopenhauer’s objections, reductio reasoning is defended as a method of uncovering new mathematical truths, and not merely of confirming independently grasped mathematical intuitions. The application of reductio argument is contrasted with purely mechanical brute algorithmic inferences as an art requiring skill and intelligent intervention in the choice of hypotheses and attribution of contradictions deduced to a particular assumption in a contradiction’s derivation base within a reductio proof structure.
Implicit dialogical premises, explanation as argument: A corpus-based reconstruction
Authors: O'Halloran Kieran
Published: March 2017

This paper focuses on an explanation in a newspaper article: why new European Union citizens will come to the UK from Eastern Europe (e.g., because of available jobs). Using a corpus-based method of analysis, I show how regular target readers have been positioned to generate premises in dialogue with the explanation propositions, and thus into an understanding of the explanation as an argument, one which contains a biased conclusion not apparent in the text. Employing this method, and in particular ‘corpus comparative statistical keywords’, I show how two issues can be freshly looked at: implicit premise recovery; the argument/explanation distinction.
Dialectical Shifts Underlying Arguments from Consequences
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

Eight structural criteria are developed as part of a dialogical method bytesting them against seven examples of arguments from negative consequences. The aim is to provide a method for evaluating thearguments in the examples as fallacious or not. It is shown that any method that can be satisfactorily used to evaluate such examplesneeds to be based on two techniques. The first is careful application of argumentation underlying shifts from one type of dialog to another schemes. The second is consideration of contextual factors concerning.
Jumping to a Conclusion: Fallacies and Standards of Proof
Authors: Walton Douglas , Gordon Thomas F.
Published: March 2017

Five errors that fit under the category of jumping to a conclusion are identified: (1) arguing from premises that are insufficient asevidence to prove a conclusion (2) fallacious argument from ignorance, (3) arguing to a wrong conclusion, (4) using defeasible reasoning without being open to exceptions, and (5) overlooking/suppressing evidence. It is shown that jumping to a conclusion is best seen not as a fallacy itself, but as a more general category of faulty argumentation pattern underlying these errors and some related fallacies.
Argumentation in Discourse: A Socio-discursive Approach to Arguments
Authors: Amossy Ruth
Published: March 2017

Rather than the art of putting forward logically valid arguments leading to Truth, argumentation is here viewed as the use of verbal means ensuring an agreement on what can be considered reasonable by a given group, on a more or less controversial matter. What is acceptable and plausible is always coconstructed by subjects engaging in verbal interaction. It is the dynamism of this exchange, realized not only in natural language, but also in a specific cultural framework, that has to be accounted for. From this perspective, it is not enough to reconstruct patterns of reasoning. As logos is by definition both Reason and Language, abstract schemata have to be examined in their verbal realization in a given situation of discourse. Such an approach toarguments allows for a “thick” description taking into account their discursive and communicational aspects, as well as argumentation’s constitutive dialogism and its inscription in a set of common representations, opinions and beliefs (a doxa).This approach, exemplified by the analysis of a short text on stock options borrowed from the French newspaper Libération, is an attempt at establishing a dialogue between disciplines like argumentation theories, rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis.
Pragmatic Considerations in the Interpretation of Denying the Antecedent
Authors: Moldovan Andrei
Published: March 2017

In this paper I am concerned with the analysis of fragments of a discourse or text that express arguments suspected of being denials of the antecedent. I first argue that one needs to distinguish between two senses of ‘the argument expressed’. Second, I show that, with respect to one of these senses, given a Gricean account of the pragmatics of conditionals, some such fragments systematically express arguments that are valid.
"What Type of Argument is an Ad Verecundiam?"
Authors: Woods John
Published: March 2017

"What Type of Argument is an Ad Verecundiam?"
Why Fallacies Appear to be Better Arguments Than They Are
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

This paper offers a solution to the problem of understanding how a fallacious argument can be deceptive by “seeming to be valid”, or (better) appearing to be a better argument of its kind than it really is. The explanation of how fallacies are deceptive is based on heuristics and paraschemes. Heuristics are fast and frugal shortcuts to a solution to a problem that sometimes jump to a conclusion that is not justified. In fallacious instances, according to the theory proposed, this jump overlooks prerequisites of the defeasible argumentation scheme for the type of argument in question. Three informal fallacies, argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam and fear appeal argument, are used to illustrate and explain the theory.
A pragma-dialectical response to objectivist epistemic challenges
Authors: Garssen Bart , Laar Jan Albert Van
Published: March 2017

The epistemologists Biro and Siegel have raised two objections against the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. According to the first objection the pragma-dialectical theory is not genuinely normative. According to the second objection the rejection of justificationism by pragma-dialecticians is unwarranted: they reject justificationism prematurely and they are not consistent in accepting some arguments (‘justifications’) as sound. The first objection is based on what we regard as the misconception that the goal of resolving differences of opinion cannot provide a normative approach. In response to the second objection we argue that in pragma-dialectics, the notion of argument, and related notions, are defined in a non-justificatory manner.
Introduction: Reasoning for Change
Authors: Rooney Phyllis , Hundleby Catherine E.
Published: March 2017

This special issue of Informal Logic brings together two important areas of philosophy that have shown significant development in the last three decades: informal logic and feminist philosophy. A significant innovation they both share is new thinking about practices of argumentation and related practices of reasoning. Feminist theorizing supporting social and political change foregrounds “reasoning for change” in a way that draws attention to the contextual and rhetorical dimensions of argument and thus connects with significant developments in informal logic.
Argumentative Injustice
Authors: Bondy Patrick
Published: March 2017

The aim of this paper is to adapt Miranda Fricker’s concept of testimonial injustice to cases of what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too much or little credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to adopt a stance of “metadistrust”—we ought to dis-trust our inclinations to trust or dis-trust members of stereotyped groups.
The Authority of the Fallacies Approach to Argument Evaluation
Authors: Hundleby Catherine
Published: March 2017

Popular textbook treatments of the fallacies approach to argument evaluation employ the Adversary Method identified by Janice Moulton (1983) that takes the goal of argumentation to be the defeat of other arguments and that narrows the terms of discourse in order to facilitate such defeat. My analysis of the textbooks shows that the Adversary Method operates as a Kuhnian paradigm in philosophy, and demonstrates that the popular fallacies pedagogy is authoritarian in being unresponsive to the scholarly developments in informal logic and argumentation theory. A progressive evolution for the fallacies approach is offered as an authoritative alternative.
Take My Advice—I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority
Authors: Mizrahi Moti
Published: March 2017

In this paper, I argue that ad hominem arguments are not always fallacious. More explicitly, in certain cases of practical reasoning, the circumstances of a person are relevant to whether or not the conclusion should be accepted. This occurs, I suggest, when a person gives advice to others or prescribes certain courses of action but fails to follow her own advice or act in accordance with her own prescriptions. This is not an instance of a fallacious tu quoque provided that such circumstantial ad hominem arguments are construed as rebuttals to appeals to (administrative) authority (of expertise), or so I argue.
Quotations and Presumptions: Dialogical Effects of Misquotations
Authors: Walton Douglas , Macagno Fabrizio
Published: March 2017

Manipulation of quotation, shown to be a common tactic of argumentation in this paper, is associated with fallacies like wrenching from context, hasty generalization, equivocation, accent, the straw man fallacy, and ad hominem arguments. Several examples are presented from everyday speech, legislative debates and trials. Analysis using dialog models explains the critical defects of argumentation illustrated in each of the examples. In the formal dialog system CB, a proponent and respondent take turns in making moves in an orderly goal-directed sequence of argumentation in which the proponent tries to persuade the respondent to become committed to a conclusion by asking questions and offering arguments. Analyzing quotation by using the notion of commitment in dialog, it is shown (a) how an arguer’s previous assertions can be brought to light in the course of a dialog to deal with problems arising from misquotation, (b) how the profile of dialog model allows a critic to analyse the fundamental effects misquotation brings about in a dialog, and (c) how the critic can use such an analysis to correct the problem.
Do Squirrels Eat Hamburgers?: Intellectual Empathy as a Remedy for Residual Prejudice
Authors: Linker Maureen
Published: March 2017

In her 2007 book "Epistemic Injustice" Miranda Fricker argues that "the silent by products of residual prejudice in a liberal society" are often the most difficult biases to eradicate. In this essay, I provide several examples of the kind of residual prejudice Fricker describes. I then propose a principle of "intellectual empathy" (with four component elements) as a methodological remedy for eradicating this kind of bias in good critical thinking.
What Hamblin’s Book Fallacies was About
Authors: Mackenzie Jim
Published: March 2017

I finished my undergraduate degree at Monash University and joined Charles Hamblin’s seminar at the University of NSW in March, 1968. Phil Staines from the University of Newcastle joined at the same time, and Vic Dudman was an established member. Hamblin’s book Fallacies would be published in 1970, but the seminar discussions rarely concerned fallacies. This may have been because Hamblin had been working for so long and so closely with those ideas that he was now ready to turn elsewhere. But I shall argue that the book was only part of a much broader program, other parts of which occupied us in the seminars. Hamblin never explicitly discussed the writing of Fallacies with me, and what follows is an attempt to explain how the book fitted into his overall project as a logician, drawn from his published works and from what I remember of his contributions to the seminar.
Scaring the Public: Fear Appeal Arguments in Public Health Reasoning
Authors: Cummings Louise
Published: March 2017

The study of threat and fear appeal arguments has given rise to a sizeable literature. Even within a public health context, much is now known about how these arguments work to gain the public’s compliance with health recommendations. Notwithstanding this level of interest in, and examination of, these arguments, there is one aspect of these arguments that still remains unexplored. That aspect concerns the heuristic function of these arguments within our thinking about public health problems. Specifically, it is argued that threat and fear appeal arguments serve as valuable shortcuts in our reasoning, particularly when that reasoning is subject to biases that are likely to diminish the effectiveness of public health messages. To this extent, they are rationally warranted argument forms rather than fallacies, as has been their dominant characterization in logic.
A Unitary Schema for Arguments by Analogy
Authors: Bermejo-Luque Lilian
Published: March 2017

Following a Toulmian account of argument analysis and evaluation, I offer a general unitary schema for, so called, deductive and inductive types of analogical arguments. This schema is able to explain why certain analogical arguments can be said to be deductive, and yet, also defeasible.
The Epistemic Inferiority of Pragma-Dialectics – Reply to Botting
Authors: Lumer Christoph
Published: March 2017

In a recent paper in this journal, David Botting defended pragma-dialectics against epistemological criticisms by exponents of the epistemological approach to argumentation, i.e. Harvey Siegel, John Biro and me. In particular, Botting tries to justify with new arguments a Functional Claim, that the function of argumentation is to resolve disputes, and a Normative Claim, that standpoints that have the unqualified consensus of all participants in a dispute will generally be epistemically sound. In this reply it is shown that Botting’s arguments are fallacious, that the two Claims are false and that the epistemological approach to argumentation, of course, outclasses pragma-dialectics epistemically and is at least as good as it in other respects.
Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies
Authors: Santibáñez Yáñez Cristián
Published: March 2017

Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, and 2011d) have presented a stimulating and provocative new theory of reasoning: the argumentative theory of reasoning. They maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss the perspective of the authors in which they conceive this competence as the natural scenario of reflective reasoning.
Story Similarity in Arguments from Analogy
Authors: Walton Douglas
Published: March 2017

In this paper a hybrid model of argument from analogy is presented that combines argumentation schemes and story schemes. One premise of the argumentation scheme for argument from analogy in the model claims that one case is similar to another. Story schemes are abstract representations of stories (narratives, explanations) based on common knowledge about how sequences of actions and events we are familiar with can normally be expected to unfold. Story schemes are used (a) to model similarity between two cases, and (2) as the basis of evidence to support the similarity premise of an argument from analogy. Four examples of argument from analogy are used to test the theory.
The Ethics of Argumentation
Authors: Correia Vasco
Published: March 2017

Normative theories of argumentation tend to assume that logical and dialectical rules suffice to ensure the rationality of argumentative discourse. Yet, in everyday debates people use arguments that seem valid in light of such rules but nonetheless biased and tendentious. This article seeks to show that the rationality of argumentation can only be fully promoted if we take into account its ethical dimension. To substantiate this claim, I review some of the empirical evidence indicating that people’s inferential reasoning is systematically affected by a variety of biases and heuristics. Insofar as these cognitive illusions are typically unintentional, it appears that arguers may be biased despite their well-intended efforts to follow the rules of critical argumentation. Nevertheless, I argue that people remain responsible for the rationality of their arguments, given that there are a number of measures that they can (and ought to) take to avoid such distortions. I highlight the importance of argumentational virtues and critical thinking to rational debates, and describe a set of indirect strategies of “argumentative self-control”.
Some Clarifications about the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning. A Reply to Santibáñez Yañez (2012).
Authors: Mercier Hugo
Published: March 2017

In “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies” (2012) Santibáñez Yañez offers constructive comments and criticisms of the argumentative theory of reasoning. The purpose of this reply is twofold. First, it seeks to clarify two points broached by Yanez: (1) the relation between reasoning (in this specific theory) and dual process accounts in general and (2) the benefits that can be derived from reasoning and argumentation (again, in this specific theory). Second, it suggests one domain—the categorization of arguments—in which argumentation studies and the argumentative theory of reasoning could usefully complement each other to yield a better understanding of the processes of argumentation.
Moral Hybrids, Moral Relevance and Moral Particularism
Authors: Vorobej Mark
Published: March 2017

Some of Jonathan Dancy's strongest arguments in support of moral particularism depend crucially upon the distinction he draws between three different kinds of relevance relations -- favourers, intensifiers and enablers. In this paper I generalize certain features of Dancy's account of the different roles that premises can play in moral argumentation. Most significantly, I argue that both intensifiers and enablers play parallel roles within different kinds of (more primitive) supplementation relations. This matters since it is common for people to accept Dancy's account of intensifiers while remaining suspicious of his notion of enablers. But this asymmetrical response, I argue, cannot be justified. This account also generates a simpler and more elegant argument in support of moral particularism.
Review of Giving Reasons
Authors: Xie Yun
Published: March 2017

Book Review

Giving Reasons: A Linguistic-Pragmatic Approach to Argumentation Theory

Lilian Bermejo-Luque

Springer, Argumentation Library Vol. 20, 2011, Pp. xvi, 1-209

ISBN 978-94-007-1760-2 (Hardcover) 106.95 €

e-ISBN 978-94-007-1761-9 (eBook) 99.99 €
Reason in the Balance
Authors: Blair J. Anthony
Published: March 2017

Book Review

Reason in the Balance

by Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby

Whitby, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2010. Pp. xiv, 1-349.

Softcover ISBN-13: 978-007-007341-8, ISBN-10: 007007341-4

CDN$ 97.95
Aggression, Politeness, and Abstract Adversaries
Authors: Hundleby Catherine
Published: March 2017

Trudy Govier argues in The Philosophy of Argument that adversariality in argumentation can be kept to a necessary minimum. On her ac-count, politeness can limit the ancillary adversariality of hostile culture but a degree of logical opposition will remain part of argumentation, and perhaps all reasoning. Argumentation cannot be purified by politeness in the way she hopes, nor does reasoning even in the discursive context of argumentation demand opposition. Such hopes assume an idealized politeness free from gender, and reasoners with inhuman or at least highly privileged capabilities and no need to learn from others or share understanding.
The Abuses of Argument: Understanding Fallacies on Toulmin’s Layout of Argument
Authors: Pineau Andrew
Published: March 2017

This paper provides a preliminary account of fallacies on Toulmin’s model of argument, one that improves upon previous attempts to understand fallacies on this argument scheme. To do this Johnson and Blair’s (1983) taxonomy of three basic fallacies (irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion and problematic premise) is examined using Toulmin’s layout.
The Virtues of Argumentation from an Amoral Analyst’s Perspective
Authors: Doury Marianne
Published: March 2017

Many French-speaking approaches to argumentation are deeply rooted in a linguistic background. Hence, they “naturally” tend to adopt a descriptive stance on argumentation. This is why the issue of “the virtues of argumentation”—and, specifically, the question of what makes an argument virtuous—is not central to them. The argumentative norms issue nevertheless can-not be discarded, as it obviously is crucial to arguers themselves: the latter often behave as if they were invested with some kind of argumentative policing duty when involved in dissensual exchanges. We describe several researches developing a descriptive approach to such ordinary argumentative policing: we claim that the virtues of argumentation may be an issue even for an amoral analyst. We will connect this issue with linguistic remarks on the lexicon of refutation in English and in French.
The Virtues of Reason and the Problem of Other Minds: Reflections on Argumentation in a New Century
Authors: Goodnight G. Thomas
Published: March 2017

From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by Aristotle’s virtue ethics in the polis. Moral hazard is identified as a threat to modern argument communities.
Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is
Authors: Goddu G.C.
Published: March 2017

In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is”, Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.
In Defence of Virtue: The Legitimacy of Agent-Based Argument Appraisal
Authors: Aberdein Andrew
Published: March 2017

Several authors have recently begun to apply virtue theory to argumentation. Critics of this programme have suggested that no such theory can avoid committing an ad hominem fallacy. This criticism is shown to trade unsuccessfully on an ambiguity in the definition of ad hominem. The ambiguity is resolved and a virtue-theoretic account of ad hominem reasoning is defended.
Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning
Authors: Godden David
Published: March 2017

This paper explicates an account of argumentative rationality by articulating the common, basic idea of its nature, and then identifying a collection of assumptions inherent in it. Argumentative rationality is then contrasted with dual-process theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. It is argued that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This result challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms derives if they derive at all from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive capacities. In response, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning which retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying that activity.
Inference, Circularity, and Begging the Question
Authors: Mckeon Matthew William
Published: March 2017

I develop a syntactic concept of circularity, which I call propositional circularity. With respect to a given use of an argument advanced as a statement of inference for the benefit of a reasoner R, if the direct and indirect premises R would have to accept in order to accept the conclusion includes the conclusion, then the collection of premises is propositionally circular. The argument fails to display a type of inference that R can perform. Appealing to propositional circularity, I articulate a sufficient condition for a use of an argument to beg the question, highlighting why question-begging is a defect.
Formalizing Informal Logic
Authors: Walton Douglas , Gordon Thomas F.
Published: March 2017

This paper presents a formalization of informal logic using the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS), a formal, computational model of argument that consists of a formal model of argument graphs and audiences. Conflicts between pro and con arguments are resolved using proof standards, such as preponderance of the evidence. CAS also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes can be used to check whether a given argument instantiates the types of argument deemed normatively appropriate for the type of dialogue.
Mizrahi and Seidel: Experts in Confusion.
Authors: Hinton Martin David
Published: March 2017

In this paper I describe the apparent differences between the views of Mizrahi (2013) and Seidel (2014) on the strength of arguments from expert opinion. I show that most of Seidel's objections rely on an understanding of the words 'expert' and 'opinion' different from those which Mizrahi employs. I also discuss certain inconsistencies found in both papers over the use of these key terms. The paper concludes by noting that Mizrahi is right to suggest that evidence shows expert predictions to be unreliable, but Seidel is correct to observe that this finding should not be used to claim that expert opinion in general is not to be trusted.
Denying the Antecedent: The Fallacy That Never Was, or Sometimes Isn’t?
Authors: Duarte d’Almeida Luis , MacDonald Euan
Published: March 2017

Abstract: In this paper we examine two challenges to the orthodox understanding of the fallacy of denying the antecedent. One challenge is to say that passages thought to express the fallacy can usually be given an interpretation on which they express valid arguments, entitling us to query whether the fallacy is commonly, if ever, committed at all. We discuss this claim in Section 1. The second challenge comes from those who think that there are legitimate uses of denying the antecedent that have traditionally been overlooked. In Section 2 we propose a general test for claims of this sort, and assess three versions of this view.
In Memoriam: Richard Paul
Authors: Blair J. Anthony , Johnson Ralph H.
Published: March 2017

In Memoriam: Richard Paul (1937-2015)
Considering Carneades as a Framework for Informal Logic: A Reply to Walton and Gordon
Authors: Selinger Marcin , Koszowy Marcin
Published: March 2017

The paper offers a critical analysis of the research program for formalizing informal logic proposed by Douglas Walton and Thomas Gordon (forthcoming). Since their proposal is based on employing the Carneades Argumentation System (CAS), this paper aims at answering two questions: what are main benefits of applying CAS as means for formalizing informal logic, and what are possible extensions of Walton and Gordon’s research program and modifications in employing CAS?
Preface: Methodologies for Research on Legal Argumentation
Authors: Araszkiewicz Michał , Zurek Thomasz
Published: March 2017

Preface
Defining Marriage: Classification, Interpretation, and Definitional Disputes
Authors: Macagno Fabrizio
Published: March 2017

The classification of a state of affairs under a legal category can be considered as a kind of con- densed decision that can be made explicit, analyzed, and assessed us- ing argumentation schemes. In this paper, the controversial conflict of opinions concerning the nature of “marriage” in Obergefell v. Hodges is analyzed pointing out the dialecti- cal strategies used for addressing the interpretive doubts. The dispute about the same-sex couples’ right to marry hides a much deeper disa- greement not only about what mar- riage is, but more importantly about the dialectical rules for defining it.
Teaching Critical Thinking in the "Strong" Sense: A Focus On Self-Deception, World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis
Authors: Paul Richard
Published: March 2017

Teaching Critical Thinking in the "Strong" Sense: A Focus On Self-Deception, World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis
Charitable Reconstruction and Logical Neutrality
Authors: Fogelin Robert
Published: March 2017

Charitable Reconstruction and Logical Neutrality
Fact from Opinion
Authors: Weddle Perry , Tindale Christopher W.
Published: March 2017

Fact from Opinion
Teaching Argumentation Analysis and Critical Thinking in the Netherlands
Authors: Van Eemeren Frans H. , Grootendorst R.
Published: March 2017

Teaching Argumentation Analysis and Critical Thinking in the Netherlands
Alternatives, Writing, and the Formulation of a Thesis
Authors: Adler Jonathan E.
Published: March 2017

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Residuos piscícolas a ensilaje biológico: Evaluación Fisicoquímica
Authors: Ortega Toro Rodrigo , Hoyos Concha José Luis
Published: March 2017

Una alternativa para estabilizar los subproductos provenientes de piscifactorías es el ensilaje de los residuos y vísceras, los cuales servirán como base para la alimentación de otras especies. Este proceso es amigable con el medio ambiente, seguro, simple tecnológicamente y económico. El objetivo del presente trabajo fue evaluar parámetros fisicoquímicos de residuos de tilapia durante el proceso de fermentación ácido láctica. Se fermentaron matrices de residuos de tilapia roja (Oreochromis spp.) inoculadas con bacterias ácido lácticas (BAL) de yogur y Lactobacillus plantarum B2. Se usó un diseño factorial de 22 en el que los factores por evaluar fueron la matriz y el inóculo, cada uno con dos niveles. Se evaluaron, así mismo, parámetros fisicoquímicos como, pH, acidez titulable, consumo de azúcares totales y análisis proximal. Se encontró que el proceso fermentativo de ensilado inoculado con L. plantarum B2 presentó mejor comportamiento en cuanto a reducción de pH y producción de acidez titulable. En cuanto al ensilaje obtenido mediante la fermentación con yogur, presenta parámetros de calidad aceptables siendo este inóculo una alternativa viable para llevar a cabo el proceso de fermentación.
Determinación de la Huella Hídrica
Authors: Díaz Fonseca Oscar D. , Lizarazo Ariza Juan A. , Torres Ortega Jesús A.
Published: March 2017

La huella hídrica es un indicador en el ámbito mundial por ser la principal herramienta para identificar de manera cuantitativa la relación del hombre con el agua, y sus posibles impactos sobre el recurso hídrico. Esta investigación se desarrolló con el objetivo de determinar la huella hídrica del cultivo de algodón en un predio del municipio de Natagaima localizado en el departamento de Tolima. Se optó por una metodología cualitativa y cuantitativa, seccionada en tres fases, con el fin de determinar la presión ejercida sobre el recurso hídrico debido a la actividad agrícola del cultivo de algodón. La primera fase consistió en el diagnóstico de los ciclos de consumo de agua en el proceso productivo del cultivo de algodón. En la segunda fase, mediante la simu- lación del programa CropWat 8.0, se calculó la huella hídrica total (azul, verde y gris) del cultivo de algodón teniendo en cuenta los datos de la estación meteorológica Anchique, facilitados por el IDEAM. Y, por último, en la fase 3, se realizaron los respectivos análisis, para así reconocer los procesos antrópicos que afectan en cada tipo de huella las actividades agrarias para un cultivo de algodón. Se propuso la implementación del sistema de riego para la compensación hídrica del cultivo de algodón en las épocas más críticas, recomen- dando el sistema de riego por goteo por tener este un mayor rendimiento y ser más eficiente en la distribución del agua con mínimos costos de inversión, lo que genera mayor cobertura al campo de cultivo de algodón.
Projected Performance of Sub-10 nm GaN-based Double Gate MOSFETs
Authors: Faisal Md. Saud Al , Hasan Md. Rokib , Hossain Marwan , Islam Mohammad Saiful
Published: March 2017

GaN-based double gate metal-oxide semiconductor field-effect transistors (DG-MOSFETs) in sub-10 nm regime have been designed for the next generation logic applications. To rigorously evaluate the device performance, non-equilibrium Green’s function formalism are performed using SILVACO ATLAS. The device is turn on at gate voltage, VGS =1 V while it is going to off at VGS = 0 V. The ON-state and OFF-state drain currents are found as 12 mA/μm and ~10-8 A/μm, respectively at the drain voltage, VDS = 0.75 V. The sub-threshold slope (SS) and drain induced barrier lowering (DIBL) are ~69 mV/decade and ~43 mV/V, which are very compatible with the CMOS technology. To improve the figure of merits of the proposed device, source to gate (S-G) and gate to drain (G-D) distances are varied which is mentioned as underlap. The lengths are maintained equal for both sides of the gate. The SS and DIBL are decreased with increasing the underlap length (LUN). Though the source to drain resistance is increased for enhancing the channel length, the underlap architectures exhibit better performance due to reduced capacitive coupling between the contacts (S-G and G-D) which minimize the short channel effects. Therefore, the proposed GaN-based DG-MOSFETs as one of the excellent promising candidates to substitute currently used MOSFETs for future high speed applications.