THE UK RESPONSE TO THE NAPOLI INCIDENT
Authors: Stone TOBY 
Published: January 2013

Incident Overview

During severe weather conditions on the morning of 18 January 2007, the MSC NAPOLI, a UK-registered vessel, suffered flooding in her engine room in French Territorial Waters. The MSC NAPOLTs Master took the decision that the danger to the vessel was sufficient to order the crew to abandon the ship. All the crew were successfully rescued by UK helicopter from Royal Naval Air Station Culdrose. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch has instigated a full investigation into the causes of the incident.

The English Channel is a zone of joint responsibility between France and the UK with regards to maritime pollution incidents under the auspices of the multi lateral Bonn Agreement. There is an Anglo-French joint maritime contingency plan, which is referred to as the Mancheplan. The French and English authorities were faced with a large container ship known to be carrying a cargo that included potentially hazardous materials and to have more than 3,000 tonnes of fuel oil on board. Particular account was taken of the strong advice from environmental experts that the ship's cargo and oil would need to be recovered and should not be left to sink in deep water. The effects of sinking in deep water would have been serious long-term environmental damage. In the first instance, there would be the strong possibility of a large release of oil and spreading of the cargo, with the very real consequences of navigational hazard in the Channel. In any case, the oil would have escaped and found its way onto many beaches on both sides of the English Channel for many years, whereas in shallow waters the hydrocarbons and other pollutants could be recovered much more easily and as soon as possible.

In line with the Mancheplan, French authorities led the initial response to the incident, liaising closely throughout with the UK Secretary of State'S Representative for maritime salvage and intervention–commonly known as SOSREP. French tugs arrived on the scene promptly. A French Government intervention team went on board the vessel. Having made an on-scene assessment of its condition, experts concluded that its state was such that it was unlikely to survive prolonged exposure to severe weather conditions. To prevent a serious marine pollution incident, the French and UK Governments recognised that the vessel must be towed to a place of refuge where she could be dealt with in a controlled manner. The need for a place of refuge and its location are always driven by the circumstances of an incident, including the weather, the size and condition of the vessel and the potential threat posed by the vessel and its cargo. Taking all those factors into account, the French authorities were unable to identify a suitable place of refuge on the French coast within about 200 miles.

All other options were on the UK south coast from Falmouth to Portland. A full risk assessment was carried out to determine a location providing best shelter and chance of survival to offload oil and hazardous cargo. None of the main ports, including Plymouth, had sufficient depth of water to accommodate the vessel. The Falmouth Harbour-Master reported that the vessel could have anchored outside the harbour, but that Falmouth could not handle or store containers. Moreover, transit to Falmouth, because of the direction of travel and the state of the sea, would have exposed the casualty to severe stress. There was no safe option to enter any south coast port.

An anchorage with good shelter from south-west winds was needed. The most suitable option was Portland because it affords shelter combined with good access to port facilities and, later, the potential for moving the ship into the inner harbour. It also meant that the vessel could be towed in a direction that minimised the stress on its hull. A tow was attached on the evening of 18 January. However, in the early hours of 20 January, the cracks on both sides of the ship worsened and the stern of the ship started settling lower in the water. It became clear that the MSC NAPOLI would not reach Portland. The priority became keeping the vessel intact, as there was real concern that it might start to break up, and therefore looking to beaching it in the shallowest water possible.

Initially the Port of Portland was the preferred place of refuge in which to take the vessel, however as the condition of the vessel deteriorated it was decided to take her into Lyme Bay - originally in order to stabilise her before continuing to port. When it was understood that the condition of the vessel was such that to tow the vessel to port was not possible - beaching her became the only practical alternative. From the beginning of the incident all decisions had to be made against the presumption that the casualty could, and probably would, sink at any time.

Concern was urgent and a decision had to be taken without any delay whatsoever. In accordance with the UK'S National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations (NCP), environmental bodies and local authorities were consulted. Moreover, through forward planning, which is an integral part of the UK system, SOSREP already had knowledge about the suitability of locations as possible places of refuge for this vessel. SOSREP decided that the only viable option was to beach the ship in shallow water, where there was a greater chance of successful salvage, and decided to turn the vessel towards an identified beaching site in the shelter of Lyme Bay. During the passage the vessel was under tow which broke on several occasions.