bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Moral Luck
Authors: Enoch David
Published: January 2013

If two drivers drive equally negligently, but only one of them causes serious harm or injury (say, because a pedestrian is present in the wrong time and place only in front of one of the drivers' cars), are they equally morally blameworthy? After all, they were equally negligent, and the difference between them was due to a factor that wasn't under their control, it was a matter of luck. Or is the driver who injured a pedestrian more blameworthy? After all, she injured an innocent pedestrian, and the other driver didn't. If two judges are equally willing to take a bribe, but only one takes it because only he was offered a bribe, are they equally morally blameworthy? After all, they were equally willing to act wrongly, and the fact that only one of them was offered a bribe was – as far as they were concerned – a matter of luck. Or is the judge who took a bribe more blameworthy than the one who didn't? After all, the latter did nothing wrong.
Death
Authors: Fischer John Martin
Published: January 2013

Death has inspired much philosophical literature to go along with the existential dread. Indeed, much of the literature has explored the issue of whether the dread is justified; Epicurus and his followers argued that it is not, as they hold that death cannot be bad for the individual who dies (seeStoicism). Although the Epicurean view seems unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, it has its adherents, and many would at least concede that one can learn much from seeking to refute Epicureanism about death.
Motivation, Humean Theory of
Authors: Sobel David
Published: January 2013

The Humean theory of motivation maintains that beliefs by themselves are insufficient to motivate action and that a desire is a necessary component in explaining action. Intuitively the idea is that merely accepting that such and such is the case – say, that the cat is on the mat – in no way by itself provides the agent with a goal which could lead to action. But if we add in a desire – say, a desire that the cat not be on the mat – then this belief/desire pair could motivate one to act to remove the cat from the mat. Of course, one might slip and fall with no desire to do so, but this would not be the sort of intentional action at issue here. The Humean view should, and typically does, recognize that a desire by itself is insufficient to motivate action as action requires not only a goal but some beliefs about what one might do that would help promote that goal.
Quasi‐Realism
Authors: Blackburn Simon
Published: January 2013

Quasi‐realism is the view especially associated with Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard that expressivists in subjects like ethics can explain and justify the forms of thought that have been taken to be inconsistent with their theory (Blackburn 1993, 2010; Gibbard 1990, 2003;seePrescriptivism).
Ricoeur, Paul
Authors: Pellauer David
Published: January 2013

Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) was one of the leading French philosophers of the twentieth century. His writings addressed a wide range of questions and issues in philosophy. His work, which began from phenomenology, moved on to hermeneutics, and then, in the last years of his life, dealt more explicitly with ethics both as theory and in relation to moral and political problems of the day. While he always acknowledged an ethical dimension to his work, the fullest statement of that ethics did not appear until quite late in his career. In his Gifford Lectures, published as
Oneself as Another
, he presents what he calls his “little ethics.” The basis of this ethics is the idea of a good life lived with and for others in just institutions. This is an ethics that necessarily involves three “moments”: a teleological idea of a good life, a deontological moment comprising the normative principles meant to achieve that life, and a practical moment that arises when we have to apply this teleological idea and its normative expression to concrete situations. These may include difficult cases where it will be necessary to bend the rule given the specific circumstances or to negotiate a conflict between possible applicable rules. This latter moment, which Ricoeur speaks of as one that calls for practical wisdom, is in the hardest cases one where the choice is between bad and worse rather than simply between an obvious right and wrong. It is also possible to read this threefold schema backwards in some cases; for example, in the case of a newly discovered disease where a physician must deal with the patient for the first time, but then shares her results with colleagues who go on to develop treatment protocols and learn to refer them back to a broader understanding of the idea of good health.
Motherhood
Authors: Mullin Amy
Published: January 2013

Prior to the twentieth century, philosophers rarely attended to issues relating to motherhood. Plato and Nietzsche made repeated references to pregnancy throughout their work, but both also asserted the considerable superiority of metaphorical pregnancy (in which philosophers give birth to ideas) over the merely physical pregnancy associated with women. Plato briefly discussed physical pregnancy when explaining how to improve the quality of one's progeny, but in doing so he lamented the need even to mention the “distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children” (1961: 502e). While there was some philosophical interest in questions about parental rights and filial obligations (seeParents' Right and Responsibilities), particularly in the early modern period, fathers' rights were emphasized. Neither pregnancy nor mothering was considered of philosophical significance.
Subjectivism, Ethical
Authors: Alm David
Published: January 2013

Within ethics the term “subjectivism” refers to a rather diverse array of positions. Yet it is possible to identify a unifying characteristic, at least to a reasonably good approximation. According to any form of subjectivism, ethical factsdependon mental facts, in the sense that an ethical fact obtains only if some appropriate mental fact obtains.
Luther, Martin
Authors: Anderson Per
Published: January 2013

Martin Luther (1483–1546) was a sixteenth‐century German pastor, theologian, and church reformer who made enduring contributions to Christian understandings of the moral life. In 1520, early in his occasional and pastoral writing on ethics, Luther published
The Freedom of a Christian
.The text articulates the religious bases and structure of his ethical thought. It sets forth the basic norm of a Christian life, which Luther develops in subsequent writings. For Luther, how a person should live begins with an unmerited saving relationship to God through faith. In response to divine giving,a Christian exists to serve the well‐being of others. Luther writes,
Objective Relativism
Authors: Hickman Larry A.
Published: January 2013

The term “objective relativism” was coined by Arthur Murphy in 1927 to characterize a philosophical position embraced by both Alfred North Whitehead and John Dewey (
see
Dewey, John).Although the roots of objective relativism can be found as early as Dewey's 1905 essay “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1977a), Murphy claimed that this “genuinely new philosophy” was “not discernable” until the appearance of Whitehead's
Science and the Modern World
and Dewey's
Experience and Nature
, both published in 1925 (1927: 122).
Heidegger, Martin
Authors: Hatab Lawrence J.
Published: January 2013

The philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was not directly concerned with standard questions in ethics; it was primarily focused on ontology, on the meaning of being as distinct from beings (particular entities and specific areas of inquiry such as history, art, and science). Heidegger insisted on the “ontological difference,” or the radical difference between being and beings, which can be understood in two main senses: (1) rather than to objective descriptions of entities, being refers to the existentialmeaningfulnessof entities in the light of lived interests and purposes; and (2) rather than to positive descriptions, the meaning of being is always related tonegativeconditions that exceed actuality. Because of such negativity, Heidegger claimed that being is “essentially finite” (2008: 108).
Ross, W. D.
Authors: Stratton‐Lake Philip
Published: January 2013

William David Ross (1877–1971) was a leading exponent of early‐twentieth‐century ethical intuitionism (seeIntuitionism, Moral). Intuitionists maintain that basic moral principles are self‐evident, that there are genuine moral properties in the world, that these properties cannot be defined wholly in terms of natural properties (seeNaturalism, Ethical), and (with a few exceptions) that basic moral principles cannot be subsumed under one single grounding principle, as, for example, Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) and consequentialists (seeConsequentialism) claim. Intuitionists, then, are nonnaturalist moral realists, and pluralists. In many ways, Ross draws together the best elements of previous intuitionist philosophers, and defends these views in a lucid and concise manner. However, his most significant contribution to moral philosophy is his concept of aprima facieduty, which A. C. Ewing described as one of the most important discoveries in moral philosophy in the twentieth century (1959: 126).
Dilthey, Wilhelm
Authors: Makkreel Rudolf A.
Published: January 2013

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is mainly known for his philosophical contributions to the human sciences, hermeneutics, and the understanding of history. But his positions in these areas are informed by views on ethics that he developed early in his life. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Schleiermacher's ethics and his inaugural dissertation of 1864 was published as an essay entitled “An Attempt at an Analysis of Moral Consciousness.” In this essay, which inaugurated his university teaching career, Dilthey proposes that the analysis of what is valid in moral consciousness be brought into relation with what actually motivates us to engage ethically with the world. Ultimately, we need an ethics that will have a reformative influence on human life.
Child Abuse and Neglect
Authors: Vopat Mark C.
Published: January 2013

The concepts of both child abuse and child neglect are social constructs that have developed differently in different times and places. Prior to the nineteenth century, very little was written on the subject of child maltreatment. Child abuse and a concern for children generally revolved around issues of the exploitation of children in the workplace. In industrialized countries such as Britain and the United States, this concern was expressed through labor laws. Beginning around 1819, Britain enacted a series of child labor laws meant to protect children (Tuttle 2001). While several states in the US had passed restrictions on child labor in the early 1800s, national regulations would not find their way into law until 1938 (29 USC §203[l] and 29 USC §212). And while these and subsequent laws indicate a growing appreciation for the plight of children in certain parts of the world, they are not indicative of a universal agreement about what constitutes child abuse and neglect. In certain instances, family violence or child abuse is not distinguished from other types of harm, but is covered by charging offenders under the applicable criminal code (e.g., the Canadian Criminal Code). The socially constructed definition of abuse and neglect thus suggests that a fair amount of cultural relativity pervades the issue as not all cultures recognized the same acts or omissions as harmful.
Rauschenbusch, Walter
Authors: Beckley Harlan
Published: January 2013

Walter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918) is widely recognized as the most influential and sophisticated theologian of the Social Gospel movement. Gary Dorrien, among the most prominent writers on American liberal theology, goes a step further. Dorrien (1995: 6) calls Rauschenbusch “the crucial figure” in the making of social Christianity in the United States and “the most instructive precedent for the modern liberationist project” (Dorrien 1990: 17). This essay supports a more modest yet broader claim. Reading Walter Rauschenbusch informs and benefits theological and social ethics whether or not it fits within the liberationist project.
Sentiments, Moral
Authors: Debes Remy
Published: January 2013

Moral sentiments are those emotions, passions, or affective states and dispositions that play a necessary or explanatorily important role in moral judgment, experience, or motivation. In contemporary discussion (especially in the empirical and social sciences) these are often taken to include some combination of guilt, shame, resentment, indignation, contempt, benevolence, sympathy, and perhaps gratitude, esteem, respect, and admiration. However, any such list is necessarily contentious, for it hangs on various assumptions that conceal, even betray, the real complexity of philosophical thinking about “moral sentiments.”
Corruption
Authors: Miller Seumas
Published: January 2013

While there is a vast literature on the topic of corruption (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Hopkin 2002), including its causes and consequences, there is a paucity of developed theoretical accounts of the concept of corruption. This is presumably in part because conceptual analysis tends to be the preserve of philosophy and very few philosophers have focused on corruption. Moreover, many of the available accounts of corruption are really only brief definitions rather than theoretical accounts. As such, they do not offer the kind of illumination provided by an adequate full‐blown theoretical account. Further, many of these are in terms of the abuse of power or authority on the part of public officials motivated by private gain, for example, “Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private gain” (Nye 1967: 417). While definitions in this area are inevitably to some extent stipulative and relative to one's purposes, there are a number of problems with this kind of definition insofar as it purports to be a general definition serviceable in relation to corruption in all its main forms and institutional settings.
Emotion
Authors: Roberts Robert C.
Published: January 2013

The disciplinary diversity of the recent literature on emotions is indicative of the many dimensions of human life that emotions touch. Neuroscientists and other physiologists study them because emotions have rather specific neurological, neurochemical, and other bodily correlates. Anthropologists and historians study them because their character and the popular understanding of them can vary significantly from culture to culture and age to age. Evolutionary psychologists study emotions because at least the most basic ones have defensive and reproductive functions in supporting species survival. Experimental and social psychologists study them, often, with respect to their behavioral outputs, where “behavior” covers a wider class of movements than what philosophers call “actions,” for example emotions’ spontaneous facial expressions. Clinical psychologists study emotions because they impinge on social functioning and psychological well‐being. Legal theorists study them because of their connection to the legal responsibility of defendants and their roles in the judgments of judges and juries. Specialists in religion study emotions because many or all religious experiences have emotional characteristics. Emotions interest philosophers in virtually all of the above connections, and in the ways these interrelate. Each of these disciplinary domains will tend to favor its own kinds of theories about what an emotion is – neuroscientists neurological models, anthropologists social regulation models, evolutionary psychologists biological survival models, etc. – but even theorists sharing the same discipline often offer many competing models. After surveying a few “scientific” models, Ronald de Sousa comments, “It should be clear from this partial sampling that … emotions theory has not unequivocally emerged from the methodological chaos that entitles it to be called philosophy” (2010: 103).
Moral Agency
Authors: Watson Gary
Published: January 2013

The phrase “moral agency” is a term of art, but it designates an utterly familiar concept – the concept of an individual who can, to a significant extent, act effectively and competently in moral matters. This concept shows up in a variety of practical contexts. It is at issue when we worry about the criminal responsibility of 12‐year‐olds, or of psychotically deluded lawbreakers. From a different angle, it figures in our thoughts about whether to comply with the wishes of depressed hospital patients to discontinue life‐support. These contexts exhibit different features of the concept. Moral agents are bothautonomous(in other words, self‐determining or self‐governing;seeAutonomy) andaccountable.
Conscience and Professionals
Authors: Wicclair Mark R.
Published: January 2013

Acts of conscience by professionals can be based on their understanding of the norms and standards of their respective professions (seePROFESSIONAL ETHICS;CODES OF ETHICS). They are aptly designatedprofessional integritypreserving acts of conscience. Cases 1 and 2 exemplify acts of conscience of this type:
Sidgwick, Henry
Authors: Schultz Bart
Published: January 2013

Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) spent his entire collegiate and professional life at Trinity College, Cambridge University, from 1883 as Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy.
Schelling, Friedrich
Authors: Gardner Sebastian
Published: January 2013

Over the course of his long philosophical development, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) neither devoted a single work to moral philosophy, nor attempted to produce a systematic ethical theory of the sort characteristic of Kantian philosophers. In this regard Schelling contrasts with Kant and his fellow German Idealists, Fichte and Hegel, for whom the construction of a system of practical norms is an essential part of the task of philosophy as
Wissenschaft
(
see
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Kant, Immanuel). Schelling's discussions of topics in practical philosophy, furthermore, remain comparatively fragmentary, insofar as they occur principally in contexts devoted to other issues and display changes of standpoint between writings of different periods. The absence of a systematically elaborated ethics from his work does not mean, however, that Schelling lacked a substantive and original conception of morality, nor that his work fails to pursue the systematic implications of Kantian ideas for practical philosophy. The former is contained in Schelling's metaphysical foundation of morality, the latter in his theory of right and the state (
see
Rights). Schelling's systematic and historical importance lies in the originality of his attempt to base morality on a metaphysics of monistic idealism, and in the distinctive challenge which he poses to better‐known and more historically influential forms of post‐Kantian ethics.
Climate Change
Authors: Gardiner Stephen M.
Published: January 2013

For some time, and especially over the last two decades, scientists have been warning that humanity is carrying out a giant geophysical experiment by pumping large volumes of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as byproducts of fossil fuel use and deforestation (Weart 2003). Such activity is already affecting the world's climate, and if current trends continue, looks likely to do so increasingly in the future, potentially leading to catastrophic impacts on human and natural systems (IPCC 2007). As a result, scientists have been calling for cuts in anthropogenic emissions in carbon dioxide, the main culprit, of between 50 and 80 percent in coming decades. However, despite this, both global emissions and those of most major countries have been increasing. From 1990 to 2005, global emissions rose by almost 30 percent, and US emissions by just over 20 percent (Marland et al. 2008). Moreover, prior to the global financial crisis, the rate of growth had been accelerating in a way previously unanticipated, from an average of 1.5–2 percent per annum in the late 1990s to nearly 3 percent in 2007. As theWashington Postput it late in 2008, “The rise in global carbon dioxide emissions last year outpaced international researchers’most dire projections” (Eilperin 2008).
Divine Command
Authors: Hare John E.
Published: January 2013

Within the domain of theological ethics as this has been understood within the Christian tradition (
see
Early Christian Ethics), there have been two main accounts of the basis of morality. We can call them natural law theory (
see
Natural Law) and divine command theory, though the labels are to some extent misleading. Two very similar alternatives can be found within the theological understanding of ethics within Judaism (
see
Rabbinic Ethics) and Islam (
see
Islamic Ethics). Outside the Abrahamic faiths the notion of divine command gets less salient. In Plato and Aristotle, for example, there is nothing like a divine command theory (
see
Plato; Aristotle). The divine functions in Plato and Aristotle as a magnet, drawing the cosmos toward itself, but not by command. In the
Eudemian Ethics
(VIII.3, 1249b15), Aristotle says “God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands.”
Organic Unities
Authors: Heathwood Chris
Published: January 2013

A day can go better or worse for a person, as can a whole life. One's whole life evidently comprises all of the days of one's life. What is the relation between how well each of a person's days goes and how well her whole life goes? The simplest answer is
summation
: just as a life is nothing more than the days that make it up, the value of a life is nothing more than the sum of the values of those days. But, G. E. Moore (1903: 28) warns in full italics that “
The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts
,” thus inaugurating a subject of inquiry mostly missed in the history of ethics before him (
see
Moore, G.E.; for earlier discussions, see especially the work of Franz Brentano [
see
Brentano, Franz], as expounded in Chisholm 1986: 69–90).
Intuitions, Moral
Authors: Tramel Peter
Published: January 2013

Appeals to moral intuitions are common in moral philosophy. Clarification and defense of such appeals are relatively rare and occur most often in discussions of moral intuitionism (seeIntuitionism, Moral).
Von Wright, G. H.
Authors: Toppinen Teemu
Published: January 2013

Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) was a Finnish philosopher whose work covered a variety of topics from induction to modal logic and from value theory to philosophy of action. He is also widely known for his succeeding Wittgenstein as professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1948, and as one of Wittgenstein's literary executors. Von Wright never developed a detailed ethical theory, but he made some significant attempts at providing what he believed to be parts of the crucial conceptual groundwork for moral philosophy. I shall here focus on (1) his account of the notion of
the good of man
in
The Varieties of Goodness
(“
The Varieties
” or “
VG
,” from this point on), (2) the analyses of moral concepts in terms of this notion, (3) von Wright's metaethics, and (4) his pioneering work in deontic logic.
Discourse Ethics
Authors: McMahon Christopher
Published: January 2013

Discourse ethics is a program in moral philosophy that is associated most closely with the work of Jürgen Habermas (1990). The program is meant as a response to the problem that under modern conditions, reason no longer seems able to put us into epistemic contact with a set of timeless and universal moral truths. Thus many writers on ethics have been attracted by subjectivist and emotivist accounts of moral thinking (seeEmotivism). Discourse ethics, by contrast, is a cognitivist program which seeks to make a place for correct answers to moral questions by extracting moral normativity from the normativity associated with the use of language (seeCognitivism; Normativity). To the extent that reason can be identified with the normative framework governing our use of language, the success of the program would provide morality with a foundation in reason.
Direction of Fit
Authors: Schueler G. F.
Published: January 2013

The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind‐to‐world for beliefs and world‐to‐mind for desires (
see
Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” belief, e.g., about what is best or right to do, can ever by itself be enough to motivate action. A desire or desire‐like state is always required (
see
Reason and Passion; Hume, David). This issue will be discussed below.
Organ Transplantation
Authors: Taylor James Stacey
Published: January 2013

The first successful transplant of an organ into a person whose original organ was failing to function properly was performed in 1954, with the transplant of a human kidney. This was followed in 1966 with the first simultaneous kidney–pancreas transplant, and then in 1969 with the first successful pancreas transplant. These successes were followed in 1983 with the first successful single‐lung transplant, and in 1986 with the first successful double‐lung transplant; the first successful intestine transplant was performed in 1987. More recently, the first successful womb transplant was performed in 2000, and in 2005 the first successful transplant of islet cells was performed.
Risk
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove
Published: January 2013

Public debates on risk often center around ethical issues, such as: When is it justified to expose others to a risk? Does an exposed person's consent justify a risk imposition? What is required for the social distribution of risks to be fair? A careful analysis of questions like these should be an important part of socially responsible risk management. In addition, many risk assessments contain inherent moral values that need to be identified and explicitly stated. Therefore, moral philosophy has important tasks in the risk decision process.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb
Authors: Moyar Dean
Published: January 2013

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) is one of the founders of the philosophical movement known as German idealism. He is most often discussed as a transitional figure between Immanuel Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) and G. W. F. Hegel (seeHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich), but he deserves to stand in his own right as one of the greatest innovators in modern ethical philosophy. He was an uncompromising advocate of human freedom and a relentless systematizer who inaugurated a new method of philosophical idealism. Elevated by a wealthy benefactor from a working‐class background to an education with Saxony's elite at the famous Pforta school in Leipzig, the school attended later by Friedrich Nietzsche (seeNietzsche, Friedrich), Fichte struggled to establish his own intellectual and professional position until his reading of Kant's critical philosophy in 1790 (especially theCritique of Practical Reason) inspired him to develop his own philosophy of freedom. In 1792 he burst onto the philosophical scene as a result of his first work,Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, which was published anonymously and widely mistaken, initially, as authored by Kant himself. Fichte would go on to have an enormously influential stint as a professor at the University of Jena (1794–9); this period came to an end with his dismissal for alleged atheism. He continued to teach and write in Berlin, and he would eventually become the first elected rector of the newly founded university in Berlin (later the Humboldt University). Fichte's philosophical system, which he called theWissenschaftslehre(the “Doctrine of Science”), continued to evolve throughout his career, but it had its most lasting influence in the versions taught and published while he was in Jena (see La Vopa 2001 for a good account of Fichte's development and Jena career). The following discussion focuses on the Jena period writings, and in particular on hisSystem of Ethicsof 1798.
Metaethics
Authors: Olson Jonas
Published: January 2013

Moral philosophers often ask whether abortion is morally permissible, whether the suffering of nonhuman animals is on a par morally with human suffering, and whether an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness. Political philosophers often ask whether persons have inviolable rights to their bodies and whether distributive inequality that benefits the worst off is morally acceptable. These are all examples offirst‐ordermoral questions. But such questions are not the business of moral and political philosophers only. First‐order moral questions pervade everyday thinking and acting: Is it wrong to eat meat? Ought one to donate more to charities? Is there reason to vote in elections?
Naturalism, Ethical
Authors: Dowell J. L.
Published: January 2013

On its most common characterization, ethical naturalism is the thesis that ethical properties exist and are natural. This makes the thesis metaphysical and realist. (Roughly,ethical realismis the thesis that genuinely ethical properties exist;seeRealism, Moral; Non‐Cognitivism; Prescriptivism; Projectivism.) Importantly different ethical views have been categorized by their champions as naturalist, however. Some see ethical naturalism as primarily involving a metaphysical commitment (e.g., Gibbard 1990; Brink 1989; Boyd 1988), others as involving methodological commitments (e.g., Copp 2003). Some see ethical naturalism as requiring commitment to the existence of ethical properties (e.g., Brink 1989; Boyd 1988), others don't (e.g., Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1988).
Preventive and Preemptive War
Authors: Lee Steven P.
Published: January 2013

Preventive wars and preemptive wars are wars fought for an ostensibly defensive purpose but which involve a first use of force (
see
War). These wars are like wars of aggression in that they involve a first use of force, but, unlike paradigm forms of aggression, they have an ostensible defensive justification. Preventive and preemptive wars are fought by a state against an opponent in an attempt to prevent an expected future aggression by the opponent. Preventive war is an anticipatory response to aggression expected at some indefinite time in the future, while preemptive war is an anticipatory response to aggression expected to begin in the immediate future. The question is whether one or both sorts of war may be morally justified.
Harrington, James
Authors: Karstadt Elliott
Published: January 2013

James Harrington (1611–77) is not primarily remembered as a writer on ethics. Historians tend to focus instead on his political writings and on their importance in relation to understanding the English Civil Wars. But it is also crucial to see Harrington as working within a particular tradition of moral philosophy. In particular, he is responsible for marrying a Platonic ethical ontology with a Machiavellian political morality to produce a novel philosophy of virtue (
see
Machiavelli, Niccolò; Plato).
Reciprocity
Authors: Mackenzie Catriona
Published: January 2013

If someone bestows a good or benefit on us we often (and ought to) feel gratitude (seeGratitude), but we typically also feel a strong sense of obligation to reciprocate; to repay our benefactor in some way, even if the benefit is one we did not ask for and may in fact not want. We also expect others to feel similarly obliged and may blame, feel resentful towards, or desire to punish another person who fails to reciprocate.
Internalism, Motivational
Authors: van Roojen Mark
Published: January 2013

The term “internalism” is a label for a number of distinct philosophical positions. We shall be concerned with metaethics (seeMetaethics), where it is a term used to label positions that posit a conceptual or necessary connection between moral judgments, moral truths, or reasons on the one hand, and motivation or reasons on the other. Restricting ourselves to specifically motivational internalism, our concern would be with whether there is a necessary or conceptual connection between either moral judgments, moral truths, or reasons and motivation. For example, a motivational internalist concerned with morality might think that a sincere moral judgment must necessarily be such as to motivate a person who accepts that judgment to act as the judgment suggests. Or a motivational internalist about reasons may think that reasons necessarily depend on elements in an agent's existing motivational system such as desires (Williams 1981;seeWilliams, Bernard). These examples should give a rough sense of the sorts of claims internalists make. We'll consider other sorts besides these.
Properties, Moral
Authors: Strandberg Caj
Published: January 2013

A central topic in metaethics (seeMetaethics) concerns the existence and nature of moral properties: Are there any moral properties and, if there are, what are they like? The answers to these questions bear on a number of fundamental issues in moral philosophy, such as the nature of moral judgments (seeMoral Judgment), whether there are any moral truths (seeTruth in Ethics), and the possibility of moral knowledge.
Suffering
Authors: Radden Jennifer
Published: January 2013

“Suffering,” “pain,” “hurt,” “distress,” “agony,” and like terms point to a category of profound moral significance. It encompasses in every casestates of consciousness, when these are the product of afflictions both somatic and psychological. We suffer when we are subject to painful ailments and injuries; we also suffer from bad luck and all the misery to which our relationships and situations make us prey. Our physical suffering is sometimes object as well as target of our suffering – not merely suffering the pain itself, we suffer over the presence of pain and its sequelae. Our nonsensory, emotional distress also effects, and affects, physical suffering.
Good and Better
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove
Published: January 2013

Morality is concerned with evaluating and recommending. Therefore, among the key terms of moral discourse we find evaluating words like “good,” “bad, ” and “better, ” and we also find words expressing norms or recommendations, such as “ought, ” “forbidden, ” and “permitted. ” This essay is concerned with the evaluative terms. (On the normative terms,seeDeontic Logic.)
Computer Ethics
Authors: Weckert John
Published: January 2013

Computer ethics (or what is now often called the ethics of information and communication technology) is concerned with ethical issues that arise around the use of computers; more specifically, around activities that are enabled by computers. Whether or not it is a distinct field of applied ethics has been debated, but what is more important is that there is a cluster of issues centered on computer technology that demand ethical examination. (For a history of computer ethics, see Bynum 1999.) Problems in computer ethics are not different or new in the sense that they are different in kind from other ethical problems. Moral philosophy has been studied systematically at least from the time of the ancient Greeks and the ethical issues in computing are part of this tradition. For the most part they also arise in other applied ethics (seeApplied Ethics) contexts and overlaps exist between computer ethics and other applied fields, for example bioethics (seeBioethics) and business ethics (seeBusiness Ethics) (Weckert and Henschke 2010). Many of the problems, however, become more urgent because of computer technology or occur in new and perhaps even novel ways (Johnson 2001). Intellectual property is a good example. The ease of copying, together with the fact that in most cases the copy is as good as the original, has made the ethical problems (as well as the legal ones) more urgent. Some of the problems are also novel. Computer programs are a bit like text that is normally subject to copyright and a bit like machines, where intellectual property is usually protected by patents.
Civil Disobedience
Authors: Brand Jeffrey
Published: January 2013

Civil disobedience is a form of civil resistance involving deliberate lawbreaking under special conditions. Defining “civil disobedience” has proven controversial, although there are widely recognized paradigm cases (see below). Civil disobedience raises many philosophical questions. This essay addresses two. First, what is it? Second, under what conditions, if any, is it morally justified?
Foot, Philippa
Authors: Hursthouse Rosalind
Published: January 2013

Philippa Foot (1920–2010) is widely regarded as one of the foremost Anglo‐American moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Her published work, spanning 50 years, consisted entirely of essays until its culmination in her only monograph,Natural Goodness(2001). Although her work forms, by and large, a coherent whole, subsets of the essays relate to different areas of ethics, in each of which she made a substantial contribution. Inapplied ethics, most of the essays are on abortion (1967, 1970, 1985). In the first one she famously introduced the trolley problem, one of many examples employed in a subtle discussion of the moral relevance of foreseen consequences involving the death of the innocent. The discussion involves the distinction between killing and letting die – a key feature in all the abortion essays, and also in “Euthanasia” (Foot 1977).
Value Pluralism
Authors: Mason Elinor
Published: January 2013

We talk as if there are lots of different values, like friendship, love, knowledge, and honesty, but that could be misleading. Perhaps these apparently different values are all reducible to one super value. Value monists like Jeremy Bentham argue that there is only fundamental value – for Bentham, famously, the value is pleasure, and all the other objects we think valuable are valuable only because they contribute to pleasure. Pluralists, by contrast, argue that there are several distinct values, and that they are not reducible to a super value.
Late Modern British Ethics
Authors: Schultz Bart
Published: January 2013

Covering the period from the end of the Scottish Enlightenment to the early twentieth century, late modern British ethics was a cosmopolitan affair, a virtual European Union of the marketplace of ideas. But it was also largely a debate over utilitarianism, the view that the ultimate normative standard is the greatest happiness (
see
Utilitarianism).
Experimental Ethics
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Timmons Mark
Published: January 2013

The experimental study of ethical judgment has blossomed into a thriving research area. Philosophers, psychologists, and scientists from other experimental fields have investigated a wide range of phenomena associated with human morality. Some of this work has focused on metaethical questions concerning the character and psychological nature of moral judgment itself. Other work has explored issues connected with normative ethics. The philosophical implications of the empirical work remain controversial, of course. But the field continues to grow in volume and sophistication. This essay will begin with a review of experimental approaches to issues in metaethics, followed by a review of experimental work that attempts to address issues in normative ethics. It should be noted at the outset that this discussion of the philosophical issues and experimental work is necessarily selective; it does not attempt to canvass the large and growing field of experimental ethics.
Virtue Ethics
Authors: Driver Julia
Published: January 2013

Virtue ethics is an approach to normative ethical theory that builds upon the notion that virtue evaluation isprimary. For this reason it is useful to distinguish virtue ethics itself from the broader category of virtue theory. Virtue theory is compatible with other normative ethical theories such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, both of which offer distinctive accounts of virtue (seeKant, Immanuel; Utilitarianism). However, on those theories, virtue evaluation is understood in terms of more basic normative notions. Virtue ethics is distinctive in treating virtue itself as basic. Different approaches to virtue ethics have developed this idea differently. Some hold that virtue evaluation replaces deontic action evaluation. Instead of “that was morally right” or “that is what he morally ought to do” we get evaluations of the sort “that was a kind act” or “what a kind person.” However, the more common view is that action evaluation must be understood in terms of virtue evaluation rather than the other way around.
Bad Faith and the Unconscious
Authors: Webber Jonathan
Published: January 2013

Self‐deception is a complicated and puzzling phenomenon. How is it possible to actively hide something from yourself? Philosophers find this question interesting for two main reasons. One is that the answer promises to be informative about the mind more generally, or at least it seems that any theory of the nature and structure of the mind that cannot account for self‐deception must be wrong. The other is that the ethical concern with how one should live and the more specific moral concern with right and wrong actions seem to require us to evaluate our own lives and those of others in an honest and unprejudiced way, a requirement we would be better equipped to fulfill if we had a clear idea of the ways in which self‐deception about these things can occur. There have thus been major philosophical discussions of the nature of self‐deception in both the anglophone and the European traditions of philosophy over the past century. However, these two traditions of thought have taken crucially different examples as their paradigms of self‐deception.
Continental Feminist Ethics
Authors: Murphy Ann
Published: January 2013

“Continental feminist ethics” refers to a field of philosophical inquiry and a group of thinkers that is notably diverse. Included in this category would be not only Continental feminist thinkers from France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany, but also feminist thinkers in the United States, the UK, and Australia who use concepts and strategies inherited from the canonical thinkers in nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century European philosophy. Despite the breadth and even vagueness of this category, it is possible to trace a line of inheritance in Continental feminist ethics that begins with the thought of French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, who is popularly regarded as the seminal figure in this philosophical tradition (seeBeauvoir, Simone De).
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Authors: Lloyd S. A.
Published: January 2013

Niccolò di Bernardo Machiavelli (1469–1527) spent the earlier part of his life as a diplomat and government officer of the Florentine Republic. When the Medici family took over the government of Florence, Machiavelli found himself out of work and took to his study to write two of the works he is known for today,
The Prince
and his
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy
. These books are full of historical anecdotes and character studies from his experience as a diplomat, and they lack the systematic character students generally expect in a work of great moral or political philosophy. However, Machiavelli does develop two original and important ideas of significance to ethics. He articulates the theory that there exist no outcome‐independent virtues or vices. Traits of character traditionally lauded as virtues may operate as vices in some contexts; and character traits traditionally derided as vicious may actually operate for good in some cases. Virtue of character, then, lies in practical judgment about how to achieve good ends in the specific circumstances (
see
Character; Practical Virtue Ethics).
Political Ethics
Authors: Thompson Dennis F.
Published: January 2013

Political ethics (sometimes called political morality or public ethics) is the practice of making moral judgments about political action, and the study of that practice. As a field of study, it is divided into two branches, each with distinctive problems and with different though overlapping literatures. One branch, the ethics of process (or the ethics of office), focuses on public officials and the methods they use. The other branch, the ethics of policy (or ethics and public policy), concentrates on judgments about policies and laws. Both draw on moral and political philosophy, democratic theory, and political science. But political ethics constitutes a free‐standing subject in its own right. Most writers on the subject do not try to apply foundational moral theories but rather work with mid‐level concepts and principles that more closely reflect the considerations that political agents could take into account in making decisions and policies.
Disabilities, People with
Authors: Wasserman David , Asch Adrienne
Published: January 2013

People with disabilities are present everywhere, and increasingly visible in many spheres of public life. Yet there is much debate about what counts as a disability, and what difference disability makes in various contexts. This essay briefly reviews these questions to set the stage for discussing some of the main ethical issues concerning people with disabilities: the impact of disability on well‐being; the relevance of disability for decisions about creating and extending lives, allocating scarce resources, and undertaking medical and surgical interventions; and the obligations of a just society to people with disabilities. Often, these issues involve conflicts between the perspectives of bioethics and disability scholarship.
Race
Authors: Spencer Quayshawn
Published: January 2013

The nature and reality of race is one of the most controversial and fascinating issues that philosophy has ever tackled. The topic also has more direct relevance outside of philosophy than most metaphysical debates. In ordinary life, and even in other realms of academia, we typically assume that race is real. For example, pollsters take the reality of race for granted when they record voting behavior by race, sociologists and psychologists take the reality of race for granted when they study institutional, aversive, and other subtle forms of racism (seeRacism), and even medical researchers take the reality of race for granted when they measure disease risk or drug metabolizing efficacy as a function of race. However, a small group of philosophers, who we can call “philosophers of race,” have questioned both the reality and nature of race since at least 1775 when Immanuel Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) became the first philosopher to ask, “What is a race?”
Cyrenaics
Authors: Keefe Tim O'
Published: January 2013

The Cyrenaics were one of the “minor Socratic” schools, founded by Aristippus (fourth century
BCE
), a follower of Socrates, although its theory was largely formulated by Aristippus' grandson, confusingly named Aristippus too. The Cyrenaics were hedonists (
see
Hedonism)and egoists (
see
Egoism well outside the mainstream of Greek ethics (
see
Ancient Ethics). Later Cyrenaics argued against the more moderate hedonism of Epicurus and modified the Cyrenaic ethical doctrines. The school died out around the middle of the third century
BCE
.
Environment and Ecology in Religions
Authors: McKim Robert
Published: January 2013

Do some or all of the religious traditions have anything unique to contribute to understanding, and to solving, our global environmental problems? Or are some or all of them obstacles to doing so? We will have trouble answering these questions about all religions, even all major religions, both because there are so many such religions and because environmental problems are so numerous and so various. To make this topic, which is the subject of a vast contemporary literature, more manageable, I introduce a two‐part environmental goal that is part of any adequate environmental ethic – though I cannot defend that judgment here. I then explore ways in which religions may encourage or be consonant with, or for that matter inhibit, pursuit of this goal.