bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
The Mispricing of Abnormal Accruals
Authors: Xie Hong
Published: March 2008

This paper examines the market pricing of Jones (1991) modelestimated abnormal accruals (often termed “discretionary accruals” in the prior literature) to test whether stock prices rationally reflect the one-year-ahead earnings implications of these accruals. Using the Mishkin (1983) and hedge-portfolio test methods Sloan (1996) employs, I find that the market overestimates the persistence, or one-year-ahead earnings implications, of abnormal accruals, and consequently overprices these accruals. These results extend Subramanyam (1996) by demonstrating that the market not only prices, but also overprices abnormal accruals. They also suggest that the overpricing of total accruals that Sloan (1996) documents is due largely to abnormal accruals. The results are robust to five alternative measures of abnormal accruals, and still hold when I estimate abnormal accruals after controlling for major unusual but largely nondiscretionary accruals. The latter finding is consistent with the notion that the market overprices the portion of abnormal accruals stemming from managerial discretion.
The Effects of Domain Experience and Task Presentation Format on Accountants' Information Relevance Assurance
Authors: Vera-Mun˜oz Sandra C. , Kinney William R. , Bonner Sarah E.
Published: March 2008

Information relevance advisory services offer growth opportunities for accountants in CPA firms, but we know little about the types of knowledge needed to provide high-quality advice. In a two-stage experiment, accountants with different management and public accounting experiences (that we suggest lead to different types of knowledge) receive task information in alternative formats, and develop relevant information for a client's decision. We find that participants are more likely to choose an appropriate problem representation when they receive an appropriate task format or when they have more management or public accounting experience (stage one). Also, when participants choose an appropriate problem representation, more management accounting experience improves their development of relevant information, but more public accounting experience does not (stage two). Our results suggest that tailored task presentation and domain experience that facilitates acquisition of multiple knowledge types improve accountants' information relevance advice.
Securities Price Consequences of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events
Authors: Ali Ashiq , Kallapur Sanjay
Published: March 2008

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) increases restrictions on private litigation for securities fraud. We examine stock price reactions on legislative-event-related days of firms in four high-litigation-risk industries. Two other studies on this issue, Spiess and Tkac (1997) (ST) and Johnson et al. (2000) (JKN), conclude that shareholders considered PSLRA beneficial. While we find largely similar daily abnormal returns for event-related days that they examine, we present evidence that the timing of multiple confounding events makes the interpretation of these daily returns ambiguous. Results from additional analyses beyond those conducted by ST and JKN (market price reversal tests, analysis of additional legislative-event-related days, cumulative abnormal returns over the legislative period, and analysis of other events affecting investors' ability to bring securities-related lawsuits), are largely inconsistent with their interpretation, suggesting instead that shareholders in the four high-litigation-risk industries react negatively on average to PSLRA's restrictions on their ability to bring securities-related lawsuits.
Honesty in Managerial Reporting
Authors: Evans John H. , Hannan R. Lynn , Krishnan Ranjani , Moser Donald V.
Published: March 2008

This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We also find less honesty under a contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the manager than under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how the surplus is divided between the manager and the firm. The optimal agency contract yields more firm profit than a contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. However, a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of subjects' preferences for honest reporting, yields the highest firm profit. These results suggest that firms may be able to design more profitable employment contracts than those identified by conventional economic analysis.
Delayed Security Price Adjustments to Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Annual Earnings
Authors: Elgers Pieter T. , Lo May H. , Pfeiffer Ray J.
Published: March 2008

This paper documents that the weighting of analysts' annual earnings forecasts implicit in security prices is lower than the historical relation between financial analysts' forecasts and realized earnings. Short positions in securities in the bottom decile and long positions in the top decile of the crosssectional distribution of analysts' early-in-the-year earnings forecasts generate significant hedge-portfolio returns in the year after portfolio formation. This delayed price response is more pronounced for firms with relatively low analyst coverage, consistent with the premise that low financial analyst coverage is associated with a variety of factors that impede the information efficiency of the security market. The hedge-portfolio returns concentrate in the months of subsequent quarterly earnings announcements, suggesting that the delayed security price adjustments reflect the market's failure to incorporate information in analysts' forecasts about future earnings, rather than deficiencies in our conditional expectations of security returns.
The Relation among Disclosure, Returns, and Trading Volume Information
Authors: Kim Oliver , Verrecchia Robert E.
Published: March 2008

This paper introduces a model in which the firm's returns depend on trading volume when the firm defers disclosure, because market makers use volume to draw inferences about better-informed investors' private information on firm value. In addition, we show that a firm's commitment to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes dampens the slope coefficient on volume in a Taylor expansion of the log of the absolute value of returns on volume. The reason for this is that when a firm commits to a policy of timely disclosure of a broader range of outcomes, the deferral of a report indicates that the outcome is extreme. This heightens adverse selection. In turn, this makes informed trade more costly and hence less likely, thereby rendering returns less dependent on trading volume as a source of information about firm value. This result predicts that firms committing to more disclosure should experience a smaller slope coefficient on trading volume. Thus, the slope coefficient offers a potential tool for measuring the economic consequences of shifts in disclosure regimes.
Taxes as a Determinant of Managerial Compensation in Privately Held Insurance Companies
Authors: Ke Bin
Published: March 2008

This study empirically investigates how taxes affect managerial compensation for a sample of privately held insurers whose managers own a large percentage of the firm's stock (I refer to these as management-owned insurers) during 1989–1996. Shareholder/managers receive two types of income from the firm they own: compensation income as employees, and investment income as shareholders. Although compensation income is taxable to employees and deductible by employers, investment income is subject to double taxation. Thus, the mix of the two is an important tax-planning decision for management-owned insurers. I predict and find that as individual tax rates increased relative to corporate tax rates from 1989–1992 to 1993–1996, shareholder/managers paid themselves less tax-deductible compensation relative to a control sample of nonmanagement-owned insurers (i.e., privately held insurers with no managerial ownership). The study's results expand our understanding of management-owned, privately held firms' tax-planning strategies, and have implications for the efficiency of the federal income tax system.
Hyperlinking Unaudited Information to Audited Financial Statements: Effects on Investor Judgments
Authors: Hodge Frank D.
Published: March 2008

This study provides evidence that hyperlinking a firm's audited financial statements to unaudited information in a web-based environment leads investors to blend the unaudited information with the audited statements. I obtain evidence of this blending effect using an experiment where investors assessed a firm's earnings potential by evaluating the firm's audited financial statements and a subsequent optimistic unaudited letter to shareholders from the firm's management. Investors who viewed hyperlinked materials on the Web misclassified more unaudited information as audited and assessed the credibility of the unaudited information as higher than did investors who viewed hardcopy materials. Those investors who assessed the unaudited information as more credible also judged the firm's earnings potential to be higher. Notifying users with an “AUDITED/NOT AUDITED” label attenuated these effects. This evidence suggests that firms can influence financial report users' perceptions by hyperlinking unaudited information to information in their audited financial statements, and that a simple disclosure rule reduces this influence.
Further Evidence on the Extent and Origins of JIT's Profitability Effects
Authors: Kinney Michael R. , Wempe William F.
Published: March 2008

Empirical research provides scant evidence that just-in-time (JIT) adopters outperform their non-adopting industry peers. Using a sample of 201 JIT adopters and matched non-adopters, we examine the relation between financial performance and JIT. Our sample-wide results indicate that JIT adopters improve financial performance relative to non-adopters, and that profit margin, rather than asset turnover, is the primary source of such improvement. However, results of additional analyses suggest that JIT adopters below a firm-size threshold do not improve financial performance, a finding that reconciles our study to Balakrishnan et al. (1996), which examined a JIT adopter sample that included a greater proportion of small firms.
The Effect of Legal Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets
Authors: Baginski Stephen P. , Hassell John M. , Kimbrough Michael D.
Published: March 2008

Citing fear of legal liability as a partial explanation, prior research documents (1) managers' reluctance to voluntarily disclose management earnings forecasts, and (2) greater forecast disclosure frequencies in periods of bad news. We provide evidence on how management earnings forecast disclosure differs between the United States (U.S.) and Canada, two otherwise similar business environments with different legal regimes. Canadian securities laws and judicial interpretations create a far less litigious environment than exists in the U.S. We find a greater frequency of management earnings forecast disclosure in Canada relative to the U.S. Further, although U.S. managers are relatively more likely to issue forecasts during interim periods in which earnings decrease, Canadian managers do not exhibit that tendency. Instead, Canadian managers issue more forecasts when earnings are increasing, and their forecasts are of annual rather than interim earnings. Also consistent with a less litigious environment, Canadian managers issue more precise and longer-term forecasts. These findings hold after controlling for other determinants of management earnings forecast disclosure that might differ between the two countries—firm size, earnings volatility, information asymmetry, growth, capitalization rates, and membership in high-technology and regulated industries.
Predecisional Distortion of Evidence as a Consequence of Real-Time Audit Review
Authors: Wilks T. Jeffrey
Published: March 2008

With the current shift toward real-time audit review, subordinates become aware of supervisors' views earlier in the audit process. I use an experiment to examine whether earlier knowledge of supervisors' views increases subordinates' tendencies to agree with those views because subordinates predecisionally distort evidence. In a going-concern task, I find that auditors who learn the partner's view before evaluating evidence (1) evaluate individual evidence items as more consistent with the partner's view, and (2) make going-concern judgments that are more consistent with the partner's view, than do auditors who learn the same partner's view after evaluating evidence. In a second experiment, I examine whether auditors anticipate the distortion's effect on subordinates' judgments. I find that auditors expect subordinates to make judgments that agree with supervisors' views, but auditors do not expect subordinates to agree even more with those views when subordinates learn those views earlier in the audit process.
Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises
Authors: Matsumoto Dawn A.
Published: March 2008

Recent reports in the business press allege that managers take actions to avoid negative earnings surprises. I hypothesize that certain firm characteristics are associated with greater incentives to avoid negative surprises. I find that firms with higher transient institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders, and higher value-relevance of earnings are more likely to meet or exceed expectations at the earnings announcement.

I also examine whether firms manage earnings upward or guide analysts' forecasts downward to avoid missing expectations at the earnings announcement. I examine the relation between firm characteristics and the probability (conditional on meeting analysts' expectations) of having (1) positive abnormal accruals, and (2) forecasts that are lower than expected (using a model of prior earnings changes). Overall, the results suggest that both mechanisms play a role in avoiding negative earnings surprises.
Expanded Disclosures and the Increased Usefulness of Earnings Announcements
Authors: Francis Jennifer , Schipper Katherine , Vincent Linda
Published: March 2008

We investigate three explanations for prior studies' finding that the usefulness of earnings announcements, as measured by their absolute market responses, has increased over time. We confirm this increase for a sample of 426 relatively large, stable firms over 1980–1999. We find no evidence that this over-time increase in the magnitude of the market reaction to our sample firms' earnings announcements is attributable to increases in the absolute amount of unexpected earnings conveyed in the announcements or to increases in the intensity of investors' average reaction to unexpected earnings. To test the third explanation—an over-time expansion in the amount of concurrent (with bottom line earnings) information in earnings announcement press releases—we analyze and code the contents of 2,190 earnings announcement press releases made by 30 of our sample firms over 1980–1999. Concurrent disclosures increased significantly over this period and we find that these concurrent disclosures, especially the inclusion of detailed income statements, explain increases in the absolute market reactions to earnings announcements for our sample firms.
Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Declines across Publicly and Privately Held Banks
Authors: Beatty Anne L. , Ke Bin , Petroni Kathy R.
Published: March 2008

This study compares samples of publicly and privately held bank holding companies to examine whether the high frequency of small earnings increases relative to small earnings decreases reported by public firms is attributable to earnings management. We expect public banks' shareholders to be more likely than private banks' shareholders to rely on simple earnings-based heuristics in evaluating firm performance, so we expect public banks to have more incentives to report steadily increasing earnings. Consistent with this expectation, we find that relative to private banks, public banks: (1) report fewer small earnings declines, (2) are more likely to use the loan loss provision and security gain realizations to eliminate small earnings decreases, and (3) report longer strings of consecutive earnings increases. These results suggest that the asymmetric pattern of more small earnings increases than decreases, first documented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), is attributable to earnings management and is not simply a reflection of the underlying distribution of earnings changes.
Negotiated Transfer Pricing: Is Fairness Easier Said than Done?
Authors: Kachelmeier Steven J. , Towry Kristy L.
Published: March 2008

Questionnaire responses reported by Luft and Libby (1997) reveal that transfer price negotiators expect fairness-based price concessions that moderate the influence of an outside market price when the outside market price strongly favors one of the parties. We examine whether these expectations of fairness extend to the actual prices that result from real-cash negotiations. Findings indicate that expectations of fairness-based price concessions do not survive actual negotiations when participants negotiate over a computer network with no communication other than bids, asks, and acceptances. Conversely, both expectations and actual negotiated outcomes reflect fairness-based price concessions when participants negotiate in a face-to-face setting with unrestricted communication. Together, these results imply that the extent to which questionnaire-based judgments of social behavior generalize to actual behavior depends on the whether the competitive environment suppresses or reinforces the social presence necessary to sustain phenomena such as preferences for fairness.
The Effect of Information Precision and Information Reliability on Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships
Authors: Kulp Susan Cohen
Published: March 2008

This study investigates the extent to which a retailer's willingness to share internal (sales and inventory) information with a manufacturer and the reliability of the information transmission between the retailer and the manufacturer affect the total supply-chain profits resulting from two alternative inventory management systems. I present analytical models of a traditional system and a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) system. The VMI system is a supply-chain management technique in which the retailer delegates its inventory decisions to, and shares its internal accounting information with, the manufacturer. With VMI, the parties aim to reduce inventory-related costs and increase supply-chain profits. The theoretical analysis indicates that the system that produces higher supply-chain profits depends on the extent to which the retailer reveals its internal accounting information to the manufacturer and the ability of the manufacturer to accurately receive and use this information in its decisions. Survey data corroborate the model's prediction that manufacturers are more likely to select VMI when retailers provide more precise sales and inventory (i.e., demand) information and when the manufacturers' systems ensure reliable transmission and receipt of this information. The study's results suggest that managerial accountants should consider the retailer's willingness to share sales and inventory information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer's ability to reliably transmit this information before implementing VMI systems.
Insider Trading, Earnings Quality, and Accrual Mispricing
Authors: Beneish Messod D. , Vargus Mark E.
Published: March 2008

This paper investigates whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality and the valuation implications of accruals. We show that (1) the one-year-ahead persistence of income-increasing accruals is significantly lower when accompanied by abnormal insider selling and greater when accompanied by abnormal insider buying; (2) the accrual mispricing phenomenon observed in previous work (e.g., Sloan 1996) is due to the mispricing of income-increasing accruals; (3) one-year-ahead hedge returns to trading strategies based on the direction of accruals and insider trading significantly exceed those based on accruals alone; and (4) the lower persistence of income-increasing accruals accompanied by abnormal insider selling appears to be at least partly attributable to opportunistic earnings management. Our evidence suggests that market participants and researchers can use managers' contemporaneous trading in ex ante assessing the likelihood that the firms' accruals are of high or low quality, and in assessing the likelihood of earnings management. Our evidence suggesting that insiders trade on their knowledge of factors associated with accrual persistence is also relevant to policymakers charged with regulating insider trading.
Executive Target Bonuses and What They Imply about Performance Standards
Authors: Indjejikian Raffi J. , Nanda Dhananjay (DJ)
Published: March 2008

We provide evidence that CEOs' and lower-level business unit executives' target bonuses are negatively associated with a proxy for measurement noise in accounting-based performance measures, and positively associated with proxies for firms' growth opportunities and the extent of executives' decision-making authority. Non-CEO executives' target bonuses are also positively associated with their CEO's target bonus.

In addition, we compare executives' actual and target bonuses over two consecutive periods to draw inferences about how firms revise executives' performance standards. If firms adjust performance standards to fully reflect executives' past performance, then we expect an executive's chances of earning an above-target bonus to be independent of his past performance. We find evidence to the contrary; an executive is more likely to receive an above-target bonus if he received an above-target bonus in the prior year than if he did not. This suggests that firms do not adjust standards to fully reflect executives' past performance, consistent with agency-theoretic arguments that a firm can better motivate its executives if it discounts executives' past performance in setting their future compensation.
Changes in Analysts' Information around Earnings Announcements
Authors: Barron Orie E. , Byard Donal , Kim Oliver
Published: March 2008

In this study we examine changes in the precision and the commonality of information contained in individual analysts' earnings forecasts, focusing on changes around earnings announcements. Using the empirical proxies suggested by the Barron et al. (1998) model that are based on the across-analyst correlation in forecast errors, we conclude that the commonality of information among active analysts decreases around earnings announcements. We also conclude that the idiosyncratic information contained in these individual analysts' forecasts increases immediately after earnings announcements, and that this increase is more significant as more analysts revise their forecasts. These results are consistent with theories positing that an important role of accounting disclosures is to trigger the generation of idiosyncratic information by elite information processors such as financial analysts (Kim and Verrecchia 1994, 1997).
The Valuation Implications of Employee Stock Option Accounting for Profitable Computer Software Firms
Authors: Bell Timothy B. , Landsman Wayne R. , Miller Bruce L. , Yeh Shu
Published: March 2008

We use the Ohlson (1995, 1999) and Feltham and Ohlson (1999) valuation models to investigate the market's perception of the economic effect of employee stock options (ESOs) on firm value for a sample of 85 profitable computer software companies. Our results suggest that the market appears to value these firms' ESO expense not as an expense but as an intangible asset (even after controlling for the endogeneity bias arising from the mechanical relation between ESOs and the underlying stock prices). However, we also find a conflict between: (1) the positive manner in which investors appear to value ESO expense, and (2) the negative relation between current ESO expense and future abnormal earnings. This conflict not only could be an artifact of the restrictiveness of the abnormal earnings forecasting equation we estimate, but it also calls into question whether investors assess correctly the effect of ESOs on profitable software firm value.
The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint
Authors: Barton Jan , Simko Paul J.
Published: March 2008

The balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous accounting choices, so the level of net assets partly reflects the extent of previous earnings management. We predict that managers' ability to optimistically bias earnings decreases with the extent to which the balance sheet overstates net assets relative to a neutral application of GAAP. To test this prediction, we examine the likelihood of reporting various earnings surprises for 3,649 firms during 1993–1999. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the likelihood of reporting larger positive or smaller negative earnings surprises decreases with our proxy for overstated net asset values.
Evidence from Auditors about Managers' and Auditors' Earnings Management Decisions
Authors: Nelson Mark W. , Elliott John A. , Tarpley Robin L.
Published: March 2008

This paper reports analyses of data obtained using a field-based questionnaire in which 253 auditors from one Big 5 firm recalled and described 515 specific experiences they had with clients who they believe were attempting to manage earnings. This approach enables us to analyze separately managers' decisions about how to attempt earnings management and auditors' decisions about whether to prevent earnings management by requiring adjustment of the financial statements. Our results indicate that managers are more likely to attempt earnings management, and auditors are less likely to adjust earnings management attempts, which are structured (not structured) with respect to precise (imprecise) standards. We also find that managers are more likely to make attempts that increase current-year income, but auditors are more likely to require that those attempts be adjusted, that managers are more likely to make attempts that decrease current-year income with unstructured transactions and/or when standards are imprecise, and that auditors are more likely to require adjustment of attempts that they identify as material or that are attempted by small clients.
Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment: Early Evidence
Authors: Heflin Frank , Subramanyam K. R. , Zhang Yuan
Published: March 2008

On October 23, 2000, the SEC implemented Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), which prohibits firms from privately disclosing value-relevant information to select securities markets professionals without simultaneously disclosing the same information to the public. We examine whether Regulation FD's prohibition of selective disclosure impairs the flow of financial information to the capital markets prior to earnings announcements. After implementation of FD, we find (1) improved informational efficiency of stock prices prior to earnings announcements, as evidenced by smaller deviations between pre-and post-announcement stock prices; (2) no reliable evidence of change in analysts' earnings forecast errors or dispersion; and (3) a substantial increase in the volume of firms' voluntary, forward-looking, earnings-related disclosures. Overall, we find no evidence Regulation FD impaired the information available to investors prior to earnings announcements, and some of our evidence is consistent with improvement.
Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements
Authors: Boschen John F. , Duru Augustine , Gordon Lawrence A. , Smith Kimberly J.
Published: March 2008

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.
Restructuring Charges and CEO Cash Compensation: A Reexamination
Authors: Adut Davit , Cready William H. , Lopez Thomas J.
Published: March 2008

Prior research generally concludes that compensation committees completely shield executive compensation from the effect of restructuring charges on earnings. In contrast, we find that after controlling for the growth in annual inflation-adjusted CEO cash compensation, compensation committees only partially shield CEO compensation from the adverse effect of restructuring charges on earnings, on average. In further analyses, we identify factors associated with cross-sectional differences in the extent of shielding. Specifically, we find that compensation committees appear to: (1) completely shield initial and subsequent restructuring charges for CEOs with long tenure, provided that the firm had not recorded a charge in the two immediately prior years; (2) provide no shielding of subsequent restructuring charges taken by short-tenured CEOs if the firm reported a prior restructuring charge within two years of the current charge; (3) and partially shield the other categories of restructuring charges. Overall, this study provides evidence that compensation committees evaluate the context of each restructuring in determining the extent to which they will intervene to shield executive compensation from the effect of these charges.
Do Investors Respond to Analysts' Forecast Revisions as if Forecast Accuracy Is All That Matters?
Authors: Clement Michael B. , Tse Senyo Y.
Published: March 2008

Prior research suggests that investors' response to analyst forecast revisions increases with the analyst's forecast accuracy. We extend this research by examining whether investors appear to extract all of the information that analyst characteristics provide about forecast accuracy. We find that only some of the analyst characteristics that are associated with future forecast accuracy are also associated with return responses to forecast revisions. This suggests that investors fail to extract some of the information that analyst characteristics can provide about future forecast accuracy. In addition, forecast properties other than expected accuracy appear to be value-relevant. For example, investors respond more strongly to forecasts released earlier in the year and to forecasts by analysts employed by large brokerages than appears warranted by the ability of forecast timeliness and broker size to predict forecast accuracy. We conclude that investors respond to analysts' forecast revisions as if forecast accuracy is not all that matters.
Residual Income Risk, Intrinsic Values, and Share Prices
Authors: Baginski Stephen P. , Wahlen James M.
Published: March 2008

Empirical accounting research provides surprisingly little evidence on whether accounting earnings numbers capture cross-sectional differences in risk that are associated with cross-sectional differences in share prices. We address two questions regarding the risk-relevance of accounting numbers: (1) Are accounting-related risk measures (i.e., the systematic risk and total volatility in a firm's time-series of residual return on equity) associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk? (2) If so, then are these accounting-related risk measures incrementally associated with the market's assessment and pricing of equity risk beyond other observable factors, such as those in the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model?

We develop an accounting-fundamentals-based measure of the market's pricing of risk—the difference between actual share price and a residual income valuation model estimate of share value using risk-free rates of return. Our results show that both systematic risk and total volatility in residual return on equity partially explain this pricing differential, and that the explanatory power of total volatility is incremental to the Fama and French (1992) factors—market beta, firm size, and the market-to-book ratio.
Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals following “New” Going-Concern Reports
Authors: Carcello Joseph V. , Neal Terry L.
Published: March 2008

One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports that Big 6 firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern reports. In addition, we find that the relation between audit committee independence and auditor protection from dismissal has grown stronger over time. Finally, independent audit committee members experience a significant increase in turnover rate after auditor dismissals. These findings, coupled with those from Carcello and Neal (2000), suggest that when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, management often can (1) pressure its auditor to issue an unmodified report despite going-concern issues, and (2) dismiss its auditor if the auditor refuses to issue an unmodified report.
The Effects of Firm-Wide and Office-Level Industry Expertise on Audit Pricing
Authors: Ferguson Andrew , Francis Jere R. , Stokes Donald J.
Published: March 2008

This study examines the role of auditor industry expertise in the pricing of Big 5 audits in Australia. We test if the audit market prices an auditor's firm-wide industry expertise, or alternatively if the audit market only prices office-level expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. We document that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with industry expertise when the auditor is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the top two firms nationally in the industry. However, the top two firms nationally do not earn a premium in cities where they are not city leaders. We further document that national leadership rankings are, in fact, driven by the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. Thus, the overall evidence supports that the market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia is primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets.
Earnings Management: New Evidence Based on Deferred Tax Expense
Authors: Phillips John , Pincus Morton , Rego Sonja Olhoft
Published: March 2008

We assess the usefulness of deferred tax expense in detecting earnings management. Assuming greater discretion under GAAP than under tax rules, and assuming managers exploit such discretion to manage income upward primarily in ways that do not affect current taxable income, then such earnings management will generate book-tax differences that increase deferred tax expense.

Our results provide evidence consistent with deferred tax expense generally being incrementally useful beyond total accruals and abnormal accruals derived from two Jones-type models in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and to avoid a loss. Only total accruals is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to meet analysts' earnings forecasts. Deferred tax expense is more accurate than the accrual measures in classifying firm-years as successfully avoiding a loss, whereas no one measure is more accurate in classifying firm-years as avoiding an earnings decline or meeting analysts' forecasts.
Risk Management in Client Acceptance Decisions
Authors: Johnstone Karla M. , Bedard Jean C.
Published: March 2008

This paper examines whether risk-management strategies (specifically, the use of specialist personnel and higher billing rates) moderate the effect of risk on client acceptance decisions, thereby assisting auditors in bringing prospective client relationships to acceptable risk/return levels. We propose a conceptual model of the client acceptance decision process, and use archival data on one firm's actual client acceptance decisions to test the model. Our results demonstrate the selective use of risk-management strategies in the client acceptance decision, based on the nature of the risks present for each particular client. Specifically, plans to charge a higher billing rate are associated with a reduction in the negative relationship between client acceptance likelihood and both going-concern risk and public trading status, and plans to assign specialist personnel are associated with a reduction in the negative relationship between client acceptance likelihood and both fraud risk and error risk. Therefore, we provide evidence that while risky clients are less likely to be accepted overall, the application of particular risk-management strategies to particular risks increases the likelihood of accepting such clients.
Delegated Investment Decisions and Private Benefits of Control
Authors: Baldenius Tim
Published: March 2008

This paper studies the capital budgeting process in a setting where a manager is privately informed about the profitability of an investment project and enjoys nonpecuniary benefits of control (“empire benefits”). I characterize the optimal required rate of return and show that a delegation scheme with residual income-based compensation can replicate the benchmark performance achieved under centralization. The main result of the paper is that the optimal capital charge rate for computing residual income always exceeds the required rate of return as a result of empire benefits. This highlights the necessity for future empirical studies on capital budgeting to distinguish between alternative forms of hurdle rates. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I further show that if compensation contracts are derived endogenously, then the shareholders will ultimately benefit from the manager's empire benefits even under asymmetric information.
The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets Recognized by U.K. Firms
Authors: Kallapur Sanjay , Kwan Sabrina Y. S.
Published: March 2008

We examine the value relevance and reliability of brand assets recognized by 33 U.K. firms, and the stock price reaction to the announcement of brand capitalization. We find that brand assets are value relevant, i.e., associated with market values. However, the market capitalization rates of brands of firms with low contracting incentives are higher than those of firms with high contracting incentives to capitalize and overstate brand values. Thus, there could be substantial differences in the extent of bias or error in brand valuations of firms with different levels of contracting incentives, i.e., brand asset measures might not be reliable. The stock price reaction during the 21 days surrounding the first announcement of brand recognition is significantly positively associated with the recognized brand amount. However, the brand coefficient is only a small fraction of what would be expected if markets did not impute any value to brands before firms recognized them. Few previous value-relevance studies have examined intangible assets recognized in financial statements, and none have examined the effects of contracting incentives on the reliability of the reported values of intangible assets.
Discipline with Common Agency: The Case of Audit and Nonaudit Services
Authors: Kornish Laura J. , Levine Carolyn B.
Published: March 2008

Using a common agency model, we investigate the interactions of a utility-maximizing auditor (the agent) with managers (who hire the agent for nonaudit services) and shareholders (who hire the agent for conducting an audit) of the same firm. In a single-period model, managerial discretion over consulting and other nonaudit service fees can influence auditors to issue unqualified opinions on reports that are more favorable than warranted. Shareholders, represented by an audit committee, cannot recover truth-telling. Removing the current restriction on contingent audit fees allows audit committees to offset the incentives provided by management and instead provide the auditor incentives to accept only truthful reports. Extending the model to a multiperiod framework, the audit committee can motivate truth-telling by making retention decisions that are contingent on outcome. Auditors will consider the impact of overreporting on their ability to generate future audit fees from the same client.
How Do Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock Recommendations?
Authors: Bradshaw Mark T.
Published: March 2008

This paper examines whether valuation estimates based on analysts' earnings forecasts are consistent with their stock recommendations. Because earnings forecasts are linked to value and recommendations reflect analysts' opinions of value relative to current price, earnings forecasts and stock recommendations should be linked in a predictable manner. I consider four possible valuation models of how earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are linked. These models include two specifications of the residual income model, a price-earnings-to-growth (PEG) model, and analysts' projections of long-term earnings growth. The results provide little evidence that analysts' recommendations are explained by either residual income model specification. However, both the PEG model and analysts' projections of long-term earnings growth explain analysts' stock recommendations. The relation between the valuation models and future returns is also examined. Analysts' projections of long-term earnings growth have the greatest explanatory power for stock recommendations, but investment strategies based on these projections have the least association with future excess returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that analysts' recommendations are more correlated with heuristic valuation models than with present value models, and buy-and-hold investors would earn higher returns relying on present value models that incorporate analysts' earnings forecasts than on analysts' recommendations.
R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation
Authors: Cheng Shijun
Published: March 2008

This study investigates whether compensation committees seek to prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D expenditures. I hypothesize that changes in R&D spending are more strongly positively associated with changes in CEO compensation in two situations: (1) when the CEO approaches retirement, and (2) when the firm faces a small earnings decline or a small loss. Consistent with these hypotheses, the results indicate that the association between changes in R&D spending and changes in the value of CEO annual option grants is significantly positive in the above two situations, and insignificant otherwise. Similar results hold for changes in CEO annual total compensation. The results also show that neither situation is associated with reduced R&D spending. Overall, these findings suggest that compensation committees respond to, and effectively mitigate, potential opportunistic reductions in R&D spending.
The Market Valuation of Environmental Capital Expenditures by Pulp and Paper Companies
Authors: Clarkson Peter M. , Li Yue , Richardson Gordon D.
Published: March 2008

The objective of this study is to examine the market valuation of environmental capital expenditure investment related to pollution abatement in the pulp and paper industry. The total environmental capital expenditure of $8.7 billion by our sample firms during 1989–2000 supports the focus on this industry. In order to be capitalized, an asset should be associated with future economic benefits. The existing environmental literature suggests that investors condition their evaluation of the future economic benefits arising from environmental capital expenditure on an assessment of the firms' environmental performance. This literature predicts the emergence of two environmental stereotypes: low-polluting firms that overcomply with existing environmental regulations, and high-polluting firms that just meet minimal environmental requirements. Our valuation evidence indicates that there are incremental economic benefits associated with environmental capital expenditure investment by low-polluting firms but not high-polluting firms. We also find that investors use environmental performance information to assess unbooked environmental liabilities, which we interpret to represent the future abatement spending obligations of high-polluting firms in the pulp and paper industry. We estimate average unbooked liabilities of $560 million for high-polluting firms, or 16.6 percent of market capitalization.
Fair Values, Income Measurement, and Bank Analysts' Risk and Valuation Judgments
Authors: Hirst D. Eric , Hopkins Patrick E. , Wahlen James M.
Published: March 2008

We examine how fair-value-income measurement affects commercial bank equity analysts' risk and value judgments. Normatively, holding information and other underlying economics constant, bank analysts' risk and valuation assessments should distinguish between banks with different risks, but should not depend on how banks measure income. In our experiment, we vary income measurement—full-fair-value (all fair-value changes recognized in income) versus piecemeal-fair-value (some fair-value changes recognized in income, others disclosed in the notes). We also vary interest-rate-risk exposure (exposed versus hedged). We find that bank analysts' risk and value judgments distinguish banks' exposure to interest-rate risk only under full-fair-value-income measurement. Our evidence contributes to research concerned with financial performance reporting, risk, and fair-value accounting by demonstrating that differences in income measurement affect fundamental judgments of specialist analysts. Our findings are striking because they: (1) point toward an important role for measurement and recognition of fair-value gains and losses in income, and (2) suggest that note disclosure is not a substitute for financial-statement recognition (even for professional analysts specializing in banks and working in a context that involves assessment of core operations of a bank). These results should be of interest to accounting standard setters as they evaluate whether to require full-fair-value-income measurement.
Determinants of Control System Design in Divisionalized Firms
Authors: Abernethy Margaret A. , Bouwens Jan , van Lent Laurence
Published: March 2008

We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.