bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
On Projecting Grue
Authors: Moreland John
Published: November 2002

This paper attempts to place Goodman's “New Riddle of Induction” within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as ‘grue’ cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples are considered, including cases when ‘grue’ (as opposed to 'green') should be projected, and some remarks are offered on what is meant when it is claimed that a sample is random (in ways relevant to inductive support) and how such randomness is determined. The view presented helps to make clear the relation between such apparently non-projectible predicates as 'grue' and the concept of being examined.
Semantic Components, Meaning, and Use in Ethnosemantics
Authors: Brown Cecil H.
Published: November 2002

The epistemological status of semantic components of ethnosemantics is investigated with reference to Wittgenstein's definition of the meaning of a word as its use in language. Semantic components, like the intension of words in logistic philosophy, constitute the conditions which must pertain to objects in order that they are denoted by particular words. “Componential meaning” is determined to be another form of “unitary meaning” and hence subject to the same critical arguments made by Wittgenstein against the latter's three fundamental types: (1) meanings are objects, (2) meanings are images, and (3) meanings are feelings and mental experiences. A rebuttal to D'Andrade's labeling rule objection to the usage theory of meaning is presented.
The Sui Generis Conventionality of Simultaneity
Authors: Beauregard Laurent A.
Published: November 2002

In this paper, I elucidate the main points involved in the question of the non-triviality of the conventionality of simultaneity within the kinematics of special relativity. I argue that there is an important distinction to be made between the inherited component and the sui generis component of the conventionality of simultaneity. The factual core of the kinematics of special relativity is explored, and it is shown that the Round-Trip Clock Retardation effect obtains if, and only if Winnie's Passage Time Principle holds. Some consequences of this fundamental fact are then explored. In particular, Grünbaum's view that the epistemological conventionality of simultaneity is logically prior to the physical inter-frame relativity of simultaneity is found to be based largely on what I call the inherited component of the former. Finally, a question is raised as to the very self-consistency of the claim, made by Ellis and Bowman, that standard signal synchrony and slow-transport synchrony are logically independent. In some concluding remarks, the author's general agreement with Grünbaum's conception of bridled conventionalism is indicated.
Leibniz's Principle of The Identity of Indiscernibles: A False Principle
Authors: Cortes Alberto
Published: November 2002

In considering the possibility that the fundamental particles of matter might violate Leibniz's Principle, one is confronted with logical proofs that the Principle is a Theorem of Logic. This paper shows that the proof of that theorem is not universal enough to encompass entities that might not be unique, and also strongly suggests that photons, for example, do violate Leibniz's Principle. It also shows that the existence of non-individuals would imply the breakdown of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment.
Carnap's Definition of ‘Analytic Truth’ for Scientific Theories
Authors: Derden J. K.
Published: November 2002

In this paper Rudolf Carnap's definition of ‘analytic truth’ based upon a meaning postulate At, for theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory is subjected to critique. It is argued that this definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Assuming that the preceding is correct, At is subjected to further scrutiny to determine how to interpret it and whether, and under what conditions, it need even be true. It is argued that a given At need not be true as a sentence in a scientific theory and that it must be regarded as a confusedly presented rule for the same. It is then argued that even as a semantical rule for the theory, At cannot provide a guarantee of truth for some meaning postulate similar to At in the theory itself. It is thus argued that Carnap's definition of ‘analytic truth’ for theoretical predicates is unsatisfactory.
Subjunctive Conditionals
Authors: Fumerton R. A.
Published: November 2002

In this paper I shall be concerned primarily with contingent subjunctive conditionals, not to analyze them, but to argue that those who attempt such an analysis employing the concept of law—an approach which I confess seems promising—are at best providing logically sufficient conditions for the truth of contingent subjunctive conditionals and are not providing a correct analysis. My argument will have two parts. I shall first argue that the more plausible attempts to analyze our concept of law without subjunctive conditionals seem to fall prey to counter-examples. Secondly, I shall argue that even if we had an independent understanding of law, it is at least questionable that such an analysis could be employed in explicating conditions which are both logically necessary and sufficient for the truth of a subjunctive conditional.
More than a Marriage of Convenience: On the Inextricability of History and Philosophy of Science
Authors: Burian Richard M.
Published: November 2002

History of science, it has been argued, has benefited philosophers of science primarily by forcing them into greater contact with “real science.” In this paper I argue that additional major benefits arise from the importance of specifically historical considerations within philosophy of science. Loci for specifically historical investigations include: (1) making and evaluating rational reconstructions of particular theories and explanations, (2) estimating the degree of support earned by particular theories and theoretical claims, and (3) evaluating proposed philosophical norms for the evaluation of the degree of support for theories and the worth of explanations. More generally, I argue that theories develop and change structure with time, that (like biological species) they are historical entities. Accordingly, both the identification and the evaluation of theories are essentially historical in character.
Interfield Theories
Authors: Darden Lindley , Maull Nancy
Published: November 2002

This paper analyzes the generation and function of hitherto ignored or misrepresentedinterfield theories, theories which bridge two fields of science. Interfield theories are likely to be generated when two fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same phenomenon and when background knowledge already exists relating the two fields. The interfield theory functions to provide a solution to a characteristic type of theoretical problem: how are the relations between fields to be explained? In solving this problem, the interfield theory may provide answers to questions which arise in one field but cannot be answered within it alone, may focus attention on domain items not previously considered important, and may predict new domain items for one or both fields. Implications of this analysis for the problems of reduction and the unity and progress of science are mentioned.
The Sum Rule is Well-Confirmed
Authors: Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

Simon Kochen and Ernst Specker's well-known argument ([6]) against hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics is also an argument against the possibility of quantum systems having, simultaneously, precise values for all of the dynamical quantities associated with such systems. Devices for defeating the argument were in the literature even before its publication, but recently Arthur Fine has raised a new difficulty ([4]). Fine points out that Kochen and Specker's argument requires the following principles:

Sum Rule: At all times, in all states, the value of the quantity with operator A + B is the sum of the values of the quantity with operator A and the quantity with operator B, provided A, B commute.

Product Rule: At all times, in all states, the value of the quantity with operator AB is the product of the values of the quantities with operators A and B, provided A, B commute.
Conservation, The Sum Rule and Confirmation
Authors: Fine Arthur
Published: November 2002

In 1924, Bohr, Kramers and Slater tried to introduce into microphysics conservation principles that hold only on the average. This attempt was abandoned in the light of the Compton-Simon experiment (and its later refinements). Since that time, except for a moment of doubt in 1936, it has been thought that the classical conservation laws (for energy and momentum) hold in quantum theory for each individual interaction, in a way that yields the classical exchange-and-balance of momentum (or energy) familiar from the laws of elastic collisions. It has been thought, that is, that in each individual “collision” what one part of the total system loses in linear momentum (say) another part gains, so as to maintain the same total amount afterwards as before. To those familiar with discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory, however, it will be apparent that the very concepts needed to express this idea of an elastic collision are generally not admitted in the theory. For one needs the idea that both before and after collision the total system has a well-defined value for the conserved quantity and, moreover, that the various component parts of the system have well-defined values for those quantities out of which the conserved one is composed. But in the case of spin, for example, it is customary to say that although total spin may be conserved in certain interactions one cannot attribute values to the separate components of spin (in various directions) because the associated operators do not commute. (Thus the whole sum is not even the sum of its parts.) Moreover, one does not generally refer to the values of quantities except in eigenstates. Hence, in general, one would not refer to the value of the conserved quantity before and after interaction, except for interactions initiated in eigenstates.
A Critical Examination of The Analysis of Dichotomous Data
Authors: Batchelder William H. , Narens Louis
Published: November 2002

This paper takes a critical look at theory-free, statistical methodologies for processing and interpreting data taken from respondents answering a set of dichotomous (yes-no) questions. The basic issue concerns to what extent theoretical conclusions based on such analyses are invariant under a class of “informationally equivalent” question transformations. First the notion of Boolean equivalence of two question sets is discussed. Then Lazarsfeld's latent structure analysis is considered in detail. It is discovered that the best fitting latent model depends on which one of the many informationally equivalent question sets is used. This fact raises a number of methodological problems and pitfalls with latent structure analysis. Related problems with other methodologies are briefly discussed.
Hempel's Conception of Inductive Inference in Inductive-Statistical Explanation
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

Carl G. Hempel has often stated that inductive-statistical explanations, as he conceives them, are inductive arguments. This discussion note raises the question of whether such arguments are to be understood as (1) arguments of the traditional sort, containing premises and conclusions, governed by some sort of inductive “acceptance rules,” or (2) something more closely akin to Carnap's degree of confirmation statements which occur in an inductive logic which entirely eschews inductive “acceptance rules.” Hempel's writings do not seem unequivocal on this issue. It is suggested that adoption of construal (2) would remove the need for Hempel's high probability requirement on I-S explanations.
Probabilities: Reasonable or True?
Authors: Coffa J. Alberto
Published: November 2002

Hempel's high probability requirement asserts that any rationally acceptable answer to the question ‘Why did event X occur?‘ must offer information which shows that X was to be expected at least with reasonable probability. Salmon rejected this requirement in his S-R model. This led to a series of paradoxical consequences, such as the assertion that an explanation of an event can both lower its probability and make it arbitrarily low, and the assertion that the explanation of an outcome would have qualified as an explanation of its non-occurrence as well.

We argue that if inductive explanations are to be seen as generalizations of the causal-deterministic model, or if they are to be seen as satisfying the requirement—fulfilled by the D-N model—that explanations ought to identify certain features of the universe that are nomically responsible for the explanadum event, then the high probability requirement seems to be unacceptable. If this is so, a realistically inspired theory of inductive explanation will be committed to the paradoxes that follow from Salmon's model.
Indeterminism and Epistemic Relativization
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

Carl G. Hempel's doctrine of essential epistemic relativization of inductive-statistical explanation seems to entail the unintelligibility of the notion of objective homogeneity of reference classes. This discussion note explores the question of whether, as a consequence, essential epistemic relativization also entails the unintelligibility of the doctrine of indeterminism.
Statistical Models of Causal Relations
Authors: Sayre Kenneth M.
Published: November 2002

A model of causation is presented which shares the advantages of Reichenbach's definition in terms of the screening-off relation, but which has the added advantage of distinguishing cause and effect without reference to temporal directionality. This model is defined in terms of the masking relation, which in turn is defined in terms of the equivocation relation of communication theory.
Feyerabend, Brownian Motion, and the Hiddenness of Refuting Facts
Authors: Laymon Ronald
Published: November 2002

In this paper, I will develop a nontrivial interpretation of Feyerabend's concept of a hidden anomalous fact. Feyerabend's claim is that some anomalous facts will remain hidden in the absence of alternatives to the theories to be tested. The case of Brownian motion is given by Feyerabend to support this claim. The essential scientific difficulty in this case was the justification of correct and relevant descriptions of Brownian motion. These descriptions could not be simply determined from the available observational data. An examination, however, of this case shows that no alternative theory is or historically was thought to be necessary in order to justify descriptions of Brownian motion that “directly” refute thermodynamics. While Feyerabend's appraisal of this case therefore is incorrect, a sense is developed in which successful alternatives lend inductive support to the correctness of refuting experimental descriptions. Crucial though to the explanation of this support is the notion of arguments that show the possibilities for improving experimental fit.
Laws of Nature
Authors: Dretske Fred I.
Published: November 2002

It is a traditional empiricist doctrine that natural laws are universal truths. In order to overcome the obvious difficulties with this equation most empiricists qualify it by proposing to equate laws with universal truths that play a certain role, or have a certain function, within the larger scientific enterprise. This view is examined in detail and rejected; it fails to account for a variety of features that laws are acknowledged to have. An alternative view is advanced in which laws are expressed by singular statements of fact describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes.
Programs in the Explanation of Behavior
Authors: Cummins Robert
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this paper is to set forth a sense in which programs can and do explain behavior, and to distinguish from this a number of senses in which they do not. Once we are tolerably clear concerning the sort of explanatory strategy being employed, two rather interesting facts emerge; (1) though it is true that programs are “internally represented,” this fact has no explanatory interest beyond the mere fact that the program is executed; (2) programs which are couched in information processing terms may have an explanatory interest for a given range of behavior which is independent of physiological explanations of the same range of behavior.
Function Statements
Authors: Achinstein Peter
Published: November 2002

An examination of difficulties in three standard accounts of functions leads to the suggestion that sentences of the form “the function of x is to do y” are used to make a variety of different claims, all of which involve a means-end relationship and the idea of design, or use, or benefit. The analysis proposed enables us to see what is right and also wrong with accounts that analyze the meaning of function statements in terms of good consequences, goals, and etiological explanation. It also enables us to show that function sentences can be used in providing various types of explanations, including, in certain cases, noncausal explanations of the presence of the item with the function.
Epistemic Utility and the Evaluation of Experiments
Authors: Levi Isaac
Published: November 2002

William K. Goosens claims to show that my account of epistemic utility runs into serious difficulties when confronted with certain attractive conditions of adequacy for the evaluation of experiments. I show that those conditions of adequacy which are, indeed, acceptable to both of us are satisfied by the procedures for evaluating experiments mandated by combining my theory of epistemic utilities with the approach to evaluating experiments on which Goosens' argument is based. In particular, I demonstrate that my theory does not violate the requirement that an “ideal experiment” be no worse than any alternative experiment.
Three Types of Explanation
Authors: Cupples Brian
Published: November 2002

Several revisions of the Hempel and Oppenheim definition of explanation have been offered in recent years, and none have gone uncriticized in the literature. In the present paper it is argued that the difficulties involved with these attempts are based upon a confusion between three types of explanation, and that Professor David Kaplan's model of S-explanation provides a uniform treatment of all three types.
Atomism in Crisis: An Analysis of the Current High Energy Paradigm
Authors: Shrader-Frechette K.
Published: November 2002

Since the appearance of T. S. Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scholars from various fields have sought to evaluate their disciplines in the light of Kuhnian criteria for scientific change. In this paper I argue that a new paradigm seems needed in high energy physics, and that there is no more reason to say that matter is made of elementary particles, than to say that it is not.

My argument, that high energy physics is approaching a state of crisis, and that a new paradigm is needed, is based on an examination of two events which, according to Kuhn, presage a conceptual revolution: (1) the “old” paradigm of normal science becomes unclear; and (2) this paradigm fails to support normal problem solving research, and scientists begin to use it as if it were merely definitional. After examining the elementary particles paradigm in the light of these two criteria, I conclude that high energy physics is moving from “normal science” to “extraordinary science.” I argue neither that a new paradigm has been found, nor that a return to normal science is imminent; instead I attempt to briefly outline some of the conceptual problems in high energy physics to which Heisenberg, Feynman, and others have alluded, but which so far have not been spelled out in any greatphilosophicaldetail. No attempt is made to argue about what thespecific consequencesof these difficulties might be, but merely to begin to clarify the problems facing scientists dealing with elementary particles.
The Development of Russell's Structural Postulates
Authors: Bradie Michael P.
Published: November 2002

From 1914 on Russell's epistemology was dominated by the attempt to show how we come by our knowledge of the external world. As he gradually became aware of the inadequacies of the “pure empiricist” approach, Russell realized that his program was viable only insofar as certain postulates of inference were allowed. In this paper I trace the development of the structural postulates from Analysis of Matter to Human Knowledge. The basic continuity of Russell's thought is established. Certain confusions implicit in the various formulations of the postulates are brought to light. Finally, it is argued that the viability of Russell's program rests on a larger number of independent postulates than he thought were needed. Some implications of Russell's work for current work in the philosophy of science are briefly sketched.
Particulars, Positional Qualities, and Individuation
Authors: Oaklander L. Nathan
Published: November 2002

In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay—a bare particular—does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay—a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premise that only particulars can ground individuation as deeply as is required, it follows that Bergmann and Hausman have not proved particulars are necessary and that positional qualities are insufficient for individuation.
Moral Autonomy and the Rationality of Science
Authors: Gaa James C.
Published: November 2002

The few extant arguments concerning the autonomy of science in the rational acceptance of hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that science is not morally autonomous, and that the attendant notion of rationality in science decisionmaking is inadequate. A more comprehensive notion of scientific rationality, which encompasses the old one, is proposed as a replacement. The general idea is that scientists qua scientist ought, in their acceptance decisions, to take into account the ethical consequences of acceptance as well as the consequences with regard to the attainment of “purely scientific” or “epistemic” objectives. The result constitutes an argument for a (presumably cooperative) game theoretic treatment of inductive logic.
Health as a Theoretical Concept
Authors: Boorse Christopher
Published: November 2002

This paper argues that the medical conception of health as absence of disease is a value-free theoretical notion. Its main elements are biological function and statistical normality, in contrast to various other ideas prominent in the literature on health. Apart from universal environmental injuries, diseases are internal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels. Health as freedom from disease is then statistical normality of function, i.e., the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at least typical efficiency. This conception of health is as value-free as statements of biological function. The view that health is essentially value-laden, held by most writers on the topic, seems to have one of two sources: an assumption that health judgments must be practical judgments about the treatment of patients, or a commitment to “positive” health beyond the absence of disease. I suggest that the assumption is mistaken, the commitment possibly misdescribed.
Philosophical Issues in Technology Assessment
Authors: Carpenter Stanley R.
Published: November 2002

The current sociotechnical enterprise known as technology assessment (TA) is examined. Applying Skolimowski's analysis of epistemic possibility, the two foci of TA activities, impact analysis and policy analysis are shown to involve different logical and methodological forms. Impact analysis is shown to follow the logic of applied science while policy analysis involves the logic of technological design. Methodological implications of this distinction are isolated. Areas requiring conceptual clarification internal to TA practice are identified and limitations of the overall approach are articulated.
Discussion Review: Justice, Theory, and a Theory of Justice
Authors: Singer Marcus G.
Published: November 2002

John Rawls's A Theory of Justice was published in December 1971 and has already established itself as a landmark. No other philosophical work, in our time or before, has, to my knowledge, excited so much attention in so short a time and in such varied circles. Clearly the book answers to a set of needs that have just recently surfaced, and it was published at just the right time to benefit from changing directions in philosophy and other areas of intellectual life brought on by enormous and accelerating changes in social conditions and concerns, by the disaster of Vietnam, and by the sense that something serious and sufficient must be done to counter the increasing fragmentation of knowledge and the divorce of science from society. Rawls gives one the sense of putting it all together; of seeing things clearly and seeing them whole; of joining together again economics, jurisprudence, and social and moral theory; and of putting philosophy to work once again in the service of society and humanity. In particular, he gives one the sense that there can be a science of justice, of morality, and of values.
Causation in Medicine: The Disease Entity Model
Authors: Whitbeck Caroline
Published: November 2002

This paper examines the way in which causal relations are understood in the dominant model in contemporary medicine. It argues that the causal relation is not definable in terms of the condition relation, but that in general for conditions of an occurrence to be among its causes they must answer instrumental interests in a certain way, and there are further criteria for distinguishing ‘the’ cause of a disease (i.e., its etiological agent) from other causal factors, which are based upon instrumental interests peculiar to medicine. It also argues that diseases are complex processes of which both clinical and underlying patho-physiological manifestations are proper parts (as contrasted with effects).
Karl Popper's Philosophy of Biology
Authors: Ruse Michael
Published: November 2002

In recent years Sir Karl Popper has been turning his attention more and more towards philosophical problems arising from biology, particularly evolutionary biology. Popper suggests that perhaps neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory is better categorized as a metaphysical research program than as a scientific theory. In this paper it is argued that Popper can draw his conclusions only because he is abysmally ignorant of the current status of biological thought and that Popper's criticisms of biology are without force and his suggestions for its improvement are without need. Also it is suggested that Popper's desire to see scientific theory growth as being in some sense evolutionary may have led him astray about biology. And conversely it is suggested that since his claims about biology are not well taken his analysis of theory growth may well bear reexamination.
Dimensionally Invariant Numerical Laws Correspond to Meaningful Qualitative Relations
Authors: Luce R. Duncan
Published: November 2002

In formal theories of measurement meaningfulness is usually formulated in terms of numerical statements that are invariant under admissible transformations of the numerical representation. This is equivalent to qualitative relations that are invariant under automorphisms of the measurement structure. This concept of meaningfulness, appropriately generalized, is studied in spaces constructed from a number of conjoint and extensive structures some of which are suitably interrelated by distribution laws. Such spaces model the dimensional structures of classical physics. It is shown that this qualitative concept corresponds exactly with the numerical concept of dimensionally invariant laws of physics.
Relativista Mechanics and Electrodynamics Without One-Way Velocity Assumptions
Authors: Giannoni Carlo
Published: November 2002

The Conventionality of Simultaneity espoused by Reichenbach, Grünbaum, Edwards, and Winnie is herein extended to mechanics and electrodynamics. The extension is seen to be a special case of a generally covariant formulation of physics, and therefore consistent with Special Relativity as the geometry of flat space-time. Many of the quantities of classical physics, such as mass, charge density, and force, are found to be synchronization dependent in this formulation and, therefore, in Reichenbach's terminology, “metrogenic.” The relationship of these quantities to 4-vectors and their physical significance is discussed.
Traces of Things Past
Authors: Heil John
Published: November 2002

This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known criticisms of the trace theory of memory is discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called “logical” notion of a memory trace.

Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.).
Reduction by Molecular Genetics
Authors: Goosens William K.
Published: November 2002

Taking reduction in the traditional deductive sense, the programmatic claim that most of genetics can be reduced by molecular genetics is defended as feasible and significant. Arguments by Ruse and Hull that either the relationship is replacement or at best a weaker form of reduction are shown to rest on a mixture of historical and logical confusions about the nature of the theories involved.
‘Evolution’
Authors: Brandon Robert N.
Published: November 2002

These days ‘evolution’ is usually defined as any change in the relative frequencies of genes in a population over time. This definition and some obvious alternatives are examined and rejected. The criticism of these definitions points out the need for a more holistic analysis of genotypes. I attempt such analysis by introducing measures of similarity of whole genotypes and then by grouping genotypes into similarity classes. Three sorts of measures of similarity are examined: a measure of structural similarity, a measure of functional similarity and one of relational or historical similarity. The functional approach is shown to be superior and a definition of ‘evolution’ is suggested.
Discovery and Justification
Authors: Kordig Carl R.
Published: November 2002

The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous. This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery. For the debate presupposes the distinction. Real discoveries are well established. What is well established is justified. The proper distinctions are three: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. Logic is not essential to initial thinking. We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis. Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable. Logic is essential, as Hanson noted, to both plausibility and acceptability. An hypothesis needs good supporting reasons to be either plausible or acceptable. Such reasons need not be relative to the particular scientific theory undergoing test at the time. There is no fundamental difference between reasons relevant to plausibility and acceptability. The difference is one of degree. Acceptability requires more than plausibility.
Two Flagpoles are More Paradoxical than One
Authors: Glymour Clark
Published: November 2002

The relation that holds between two singular sentences just if one of them can figure in an acceptable deductive nomological (DN) explanation of the other is not symmetric. As Sylvain Bromberger ([1]) pointed out some years ago, a sentence giving the height of a flagpole can figure in a DN explanation of a sentence specifying the length of the flagpole's shadow, but interchanging the explanans and the explanandum does not result in an explanation even though it may result in a valid argument. Recently Evan Jobe ([2]) has offered an ingenious account of such asymmetries, one which if successful would permit their characterization entirely within the framework of the DN model. The purpose of this note is to show that despite its attractiveness Jobe's idea will not work.
Statistical Dogma and the Logic of Significance Testing
Authors: Spielman Stephen
Published: November 2002

In a recent note ([3]) Roger Carlson presented a rather negative appraisal of my treatment of the logic of Fisherian significance testing in [10]. The main issue between us involves Carlson's thesis that, within the limits set by Fisher, standard significance tests are valuable tools of data analysis as they stand, i.e., without modification of the structure of the reasoning they employ. Call this the adequacy thesis. In my paper I argued that (i) the pattern of reasoning employed by tests of significance needs to be justified in spite of its unquestioned acceptance by most researchers, (ii) The best justification offered to date—by R. A. Fisher—is seriously defective. Therefore (iii) the adequacy thesis is not justified. I proposed some alterations of the pattern of reasoning employed by tests of significance and argued that they guarantee that tests are adequate epistemological tools.
On Explanations in Physics: Sketch of an Alternative to Hempel's Account of the Explanation of Laws.
Authors: Dorling Jon
Published: November 2002

In pursuing philosophical enquiries in the foundations of physics, I have found myself operating with a concept of explanation which has a quite different logical syntax from the concept which Hempel has explicated. I suspect that the concept of explanation I operate with is not especially idiosyncratic, is not fully captured in the existing philosophical literature (though I am open to correction here), and that it may be the more appropriate concept if we are to consider explanation as the goal of physics. I therefore propose to give here a short account of the structure of this alternative concept of explanation.
On the Empirical Significance of Pure Determinism
Authors: Kukla Andy
Published: November 2002

In response to the growing number of paradoxes relating to the hypothesis of universal predictability, Sellars has written:

… conceptual difficulties do arise about universal predictability if we fail to distinguish between what I shall call epistemic predictability and logical predictability. By epistemic predictability, I mean predictability by a predictor in the system. The concept of universal epistemic predictability does seem to be bound up with difficulties of the type explored by Gödel. By logical predictability, on the other hand, is meant that property of the process laws governing a physical system which involves the derivability of a description of the state of the system at a later time from a description of its state at an earlier time, without stipulating that the latter description be obtained by operations within the system. It can be argued, I believe, with considerable force that the latter is a misuse of the term ‘predictability’, but it does seem to me that this is what philosophers concerned with the free will and determinism issue have had in mind, and it simply muddies up the waters to harass these philosophers with Gödel problems about epistemic predictability. ([6], pp. 143–144)
The Universality of Laws
Authors: Earman John
Published: November 2002

Various senses in which laws of nature are supposed to be “universal” are distinguished. Conditions designed to capture the content of the more important of these senses are proposed and the relations among these conditions are examined. The status of universality requirements is briefly discussed.
Strong Scientific Theories
Authors: Harris John Henry
Published: November 2002

Question: What is a (or the) scientific theory V based on a set B of syntactical L -formulas, interpreted according to the intended interpretations of the language L? What probably corresponds to the traditional candidate for V is found to be inadequate for use in deductively explaining experimental facts of a certain form. A second candidate for V, called a strong scientific theory (SST), does not suffer such an inadequacy because it is existentially strong, i.e., it has considerable existential import. It even satisfies the particle physicist's dictum: WHAT IS NOT FORBIDDEN WILL HAPPEN.
Supervenient Bridge Laws
Authors: Horgan Terence E.
Published: November 2002

I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of “bridge laws” in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true.
Theoretical Simplicity and Defeasibility
Authors: Fales Evan
Published: November 2002

Theoretical simplicity is difficult to characterize, and evidently can depend upon a number of distinct factors. One such desirable characteristic is that the laws of a theory have relatively few “counterinstances” whose accommodation requires the invocation of a ceteris paribus condition and ancillary explanation. It is argued that, when one theory is reduced to another, such that the laws of the second govern the behavior of the parts of the entities in the domain of the first, there is a characteristic gain in simplicity of the sort mentioned: while I see no way of quantitatively measuring the “amount” of defeasibility of the laws of a theory, microreduction can be shown to decrease that “amount.”
(C) Instances, the Relevance Criterion, and the Paradoxes of Confirmation
Authors: Rody Phillip J.
Published: November 2002

The Relevance Criterion of confirmation gained prominence as the underlying principle of the class-size approach (CSA) to Hempel's paradoxes of confirmation. The CSA, however, yields counter-intuitive results for (c) instances, and this failing cast serious doubt on the acceptability of the Relevance Criterion. In this paper an attempt is made to rescue the Relevance Criterion from this embarrassment. This is done by incorporating that criterion into a new resolution of the paradoxes, a resolution based on a theory of selective confirmation and a distinction between mere confirmation in principle and evaluative confirmation (E-confirmation).
On Weak Extensive Measurement
Authors: Colonius Hans
Published: November 2002

Extensive measurement is called weak if the axioms allow two objects to have the same scale value without being indifferent with respect to the order. Necessary and/or sufficient conditions for such representations are given. The Archimedean and the non-Archimedean case are dealt with separately.
Is Signal Synchrony Independent of Transport Synchrony?
Authors: Ellis Brian
Published: November 2002

Beauregard ([1], p. 488) claims that Bowman and I were mistaken in saying that “… if the empirical predictions of the Special Theory regarding clock transport are correct, [then] a slow transport definition of simultaneity can be constructed that is logically independent of any signal definition, but is in fact equivalent to the standard signal definition” ([2], p. 131) His objection is not to the empirical concordance of the two criteria, but to the claim that the two are logically independent. His argument is that we fail to take account of Winnie's Passage Time Principle ([4], p. 228), and that if due account is taken of this principle, then “the concordance between the two criteria is logically guaranteed by the synchrony-free factual core of the STR” ([1], p. 488). However, one cannot show that A is not logically independent of B by showing that it is not independent of B and C. Hence, Beauregard's argument fails against the quoted passage.
On a Matter of Principle
Authors: Schlesinger G.
Published: November 2002

In [2] I have presented a sketch of a principle which I suggested was powerful enough to enable us with its aid to solve a number of well known problems in the philosophy of science. James Moor in [1] expresses the opinion that my principle is too strong so as to be destructive and proposes instead a considerably watered down alternative which may be used for constructive purposes only. I shall deal here with his two major objections only and show that on a careful enough analysis it becomes evident that he has not raised any difficulties for my principle.
A Matter of Individuality
Authors: Hull David L.
Published: November 2002

Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, in philosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an “evolutionary” analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single species.
A Note on Jeffrey Conditionalization
Authors: Field Hartry
Published: November 2002

Bayesian decision theory can be viewed as the core of psychological theory for idealized agents. To get a complete psychological theory for such agents, you have to supplement it with input and output laws. On a Bayesian theory that employs strict conditionalization, the input laws are easy to give. On a Bayesian theory that employs Jeffrey conditionalization, there appears to be a considerable problem with giving the input laws. However, Jeffrey conditionalization can be reformulated so that the problem disappears, and in fact the reformulated version is more natural and easier to work with on independent grounds.
The Supervenience of Biological Concepts
Authors: Rosenberg Alexander
Published: November 2002

In this paper the concept of supervenience is employed to explain the relationship between fitness as employed in the theory of natural selection and population biology and the physical, behavioral and ecological properties of organisms that are the subjects of lower level theories in the life sciences. The aim of this analysis is to account simultaneously for the fact that the theory of natural selection is a synthetic body of empirical claims, and for the fact that it continues to be misconstrued, even by biologists, for a tautological system. The notion of supervenience is then employed to provide a new statement of the relation of Mendelian predicates to molecular ones in order to provide for the commensurability and potential reducibility of Mendelian to molecular genetics in a way that circumvents the theoretical complications which appear to stand in the way of such a reduction.
Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman's Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation
Authors: Chao-Tien Lin
Published: November 2002

1. Confirmation Theory One, which we shall construct, when applied to the Raven Hypothesis yields the following results:

(1.1)

Any black raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.

(1.2)

Any black non-raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.

(2)

Any non-black raven disconfirms the Raven Hypothesis.

(3)

Any non-black non-raven is neutral to the Raven Hypothesis.

Theory One consists of two parts: (A) six basic concepts from confirmation theory proper, and (B) the underlying logic.
Dretske on Laws of Nature
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka
Published: November 2002

In a recent article [4], Fred I. Dretske has proposed a new analysis of natural laws. Dretske rejects the more or less standard view which says that laws are universal truths with a special function or status in science. As an alternative account, he suggests that laws are expressed by singular statements describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes: the statement

(1) It is a law that F's are G's3.

is to be analysed as

(2) F-ness ↦ G-ness.

I shall argue, however, that Dretske's reasons for rejecting the standard account are not conclusive. Moreover, his own proposal seems to be either inadequate or reducible to that version of the standard account which takes laws to be nomically necessary generalizations.
Reply to Niiniluoto
Authors: Dretske Fred I.
Published: November 2002

In “Laws of Nature” [1] I argued that natural laws are not universal truths. Laws have properties that enable them to function in a special way. Since universal truths do not have these properties, they cannot be promoted to the status of laws by assigning them this function, by using them in the way laws are typically used. To suppose that we could effect this transformation by the way we used a generalization is like supposing that we could make thumb tacks into garden hoses by using them to water flowers. It will not work. Thumb tacks lack the requisite structure. Hence, they cannot be used in the way garden hoses are normally used. And universal truths lack the properties that would enable them to function, and thereby qualify, as laws of nature.
Quinn on Duhem: An Emendation
Authors: Tuana Nancy
Published: November 2002

In recent years there has been a rebirth of interest in the philosophy of Pierre Duhem. Although I applaud the spirit of this movement, one finds the critics of Duhem frequently lacking in a basic understanding of Duhem's tenets, sometimes to the extent that one doubts a familiarity with the Duhemian text. One of the few papers which is designed to remedy this state of affairs is that of Philip Quinn entitled “What Duhem Really Meant.” Quinn is to be applauded for his meticulous and rigorous exegetical work on the Duhemian text. Unfortunately, Quinn's characterization of the logical relations of two of the central Duhemian theses is erroneous. I shall endeavor to correct these errors in this paper.