bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Communication by Ramsey-Sentence Clause
Authors: Bohnert Herbert G.
Published: November 2002

F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single “monolithic” sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential formula closed except for a special kind of variable. Understanding such clauses requires incorporating them within the scope of one's own Ramsey sentence. Many concepts of deductive and inductive logic carry over without great change. But the concepts of truth and designation are extendible to clauses only in the sense that assertions involving them must, to be understood, in turn be construed as clauses and incorporated into the Ramsey sentence. The behavior of these extended concepts of truth and designation suggests an explication of coherence truth within a correspondence-truth framework.
Extensive Measurement in Semiorders
Authors: Krantz David H.
Published: November 2002

In both axiomatic theories and the practice of extensive measurement, it is assumed that a series of replicas of any given object can be found. The replicas give rise to a standard series, the “multiples” of the given object. The numerical value assigned to any object is determined, approximately, by comparisons with members of a suitable standard series.

This prescription introduces unspecified errors, if the comparison process is somewhat insensitive, so that “replicas” are not really equivalent. In this paper, it is assumed that the comparison process leads only to a semiorder, which allows for such insensitivity. It is shown that, nevertheless, extensive measurement can be carried out, provided that a certain set of (plausible) axioms is valid. Approximate measures, and their limits of error, can be derived from finite sets of semiorder observations. These approximate measures converge to ratio-scale exact measurement.
Some Recent Work on the Problem of Law
Authors: Jobe Evan K.
Published: November 2002

It is widely agreed that ‘scientific law’ (or ‘law of nature’) is one of the key scientific terms which any adequate philosophy of science must attempt to clarify or define. The importance of the concept ‘law’ is made evident by the fact that the distinctive functions of science—explanation and prediction—are usually analyzed with reference to laws. Thus events are explained by showing that descriptions of them are deducible from laws (conjoined with suitable statements of “initial conditions”), and laws are utilized in deducing descriptions of unknown future events, thereby permitting their prediction. Moreover, it has recently become clear that the concept ‘law’ is relevant to the analysis of counterfactual conditionals, disposition terms, and the physical modalities. An adequate explication of ‘law’, then, will further the analysis of these important concepts.
On Biological Analogs of Newtonian Paradigms
Authors: Hall Thomas S.
Published: November 2002

To what extent is the scientist's endeavorquascientist influenced by his philosophic image of himself? A preliminary and partial answer to this question is suggested by a study of eight physiological thinkers of the second half of the eighteenth century, a period during which biology was much influenced by the scientific and philosophical ideas of Isaac Newton. At this time, physiologists invoked certain “principles,” “properties,” and “powers” which were deemed useful as explanatory devices, even though they could not themselves be explained. The use of these devices in physiology was often defended in terms of their supposed similarity to devices used in mathematics and Newtonian physics. The results of this practice are considered critically, partly in the light of current studies of scientific explanation.
An Explication of ‘Explication’
Authors: Hanna Joseph F.
Published: November 2002

It is generally agreed that the method of explication consists in replacing a vague, presystematic notion (the explicandum) with a precise notion (the explicatum) formulated in a systematic context. However, Carnap and others who have used this and related terms appear to hold inconsistent views as to what constitutes an adequate explication. The central feature of the present explication of ‘explication’ is the correspondence condition: permitting the explicandum to deviate from some established “ordinary-language” conventions but, at the same time, requiring that the explicatum correspond (via an effective translation) to the chosen “definitive intension” of the explicandum. (In effect, the first stages of an explication provide an informal characterization of a vague and possibly inconsistent language convention.) The present account of explication contrasts sharply with that sketched by Quine in Word and Object (although Quine accepts a correspondence condition of a sort). The terms ‘explication1’ and ‘explication2’ are used to indicate these quite different senses of the term. In Kaplan's terminology, explication1 is intended to remedy “external vagueness” while explication2 is intended to remedy “internal vagueness.”
Mental Terms, Theoretical Terms, and Materialism
Authors: Cornman James W.
Published: November 2002

Some materialists argue that we can eliminate mental entities such as sensations because, like electrons, they are theoretical entities postulated as parts of scientific explanations, but, unlike electrons, they are unnecessary for such explanations. As Quine says, any explanatory role of mental entities can be played by “correlative physiological states and events instead.” But sensations are not postulated theoretical entities. This is shown by proposing definitions of the related terms, ‘observation term,’ and ‘theoretical term,’ and then classifying the term ‘sensation.’ The result is that although ‘sensation’ is a theoretical term, it is also a reporting term because it is used to refer to phenomena we are aware of. Consequently sensations are not postulated and cannot be eliminated merely because they are unnecessary for explanation.
Discussion: On Bergmann's Ontology
Authors: Körner S.
Published: November 2002

Professor Bergmann is an original thinker who has for many years wrestled with some of the most important and difficult problems of philosophy. Although at first mainly interested in epistemology, he has gradually come to the conclusion that the fundamental questions of philosophy are ontological and that even epistemology is in the last analysis “the ontology of the knowing process.” He holds that by neglecting the explicit formulation of his ontology, a philosopher courts intellectual disaster because the inadequacies of the ontological foundation are likely to affect all philosophical superstructures built on it. In his last book [1], Bergmann explains some of the main features of his ontology in systematic form and criticizes competing systems, especially those of Brentano and Meinong, by comparing them with his own. In the critical parts of his work he tries to show that the competing ontologies are not adequate to the tasks for which they are intended and why this is so. The constructive and the critical parts supplement each other very well, since Brentano's and Meinong's questions and emphases are similar to Bergmann's. Broadly speaking, he regards his own ontology as a phase in a development of ontological insight which consists, at least negatively, in the gradual elimination of three major errors: nominalism, reism, and representationalism.
Logic, Probability, and Quantum Theory
Authors: Fine Arthur I.
Published: November 2002

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a probabilistic framework that is adequate for the formulation of quantum theory and faithful to its applications. Contrary to claims, which are examined and rebutted, that quantum theory employs a nonclassical probability theory based on a nonclassical “logic,” the probabilistic framework set out here is entirely classical and the “logic” used is Boolean. The framework consists of a set of states and a set of quantities that are interrelated in a specified manner. Each state induces a classical probability space on the values of each quantity. The quantities, so considered, become statistical variables (not random variables). Such variables need not have a “joint distribution.” For the quantum theoretic application, there is a uniform procedure that defines and determines the existence of such “joint distributions” for statistical variables. A general rule is provided and it is shown to lead to the usual compatibility-commutivity requirements of quantum theory. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of interference and the misunderstandings that are involved in the false move from interference to nonclassical probability.
Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation
Authors: Hempel Carl G.
Published: November 2002

The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding “ambiguity” in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical generalizations invoked in probabilistic explanations must be lawlike, and by arguing that predicates fit for occurrence in lawlike statistical probability statements must meet two conditions, at least one of which is violated in each of the counterexamples adduced in the objections. These considerations suggest the conception that probabilistic-statistical laws concern the long-run frequency of some characteristic within a reference class as characterized by some particular “description” or predicate expression, and that replacement of such a description by a coextensive one may turn a statement that is lawlike into another that is not. Finally, to repair a defect noted by Grandy, the author's earlier formulation of RMS is replaced by a modified version.
New Dimensions of Confirmation Theory
Authors: Rozeboom William W.
Published: November 2002

When Hempel's “paradox of confirmation” is developed within the confines of conditional probability theory, it becomes apparent that two seemingly equivalent generalities (“laws”) can have exactly the same class of observational refuters even when their respective classes of confirming observations are importantly distinct. Generalities which have the inductive supports we commonsensically construe them to have, however, must incorporate quasi-logical operators or connectives which cannot be defined truth-functionally. The origins and applications of these “modalic” concepts appear to be intimately linked with a number of basic conundrums in the philosophy of science, such as causation and the nature of explanation.
Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind
Authors: Webb Judson
Published: November 2002

The metamathematical theorems of Gödel and Church are frequently applied to the philosophy of mind, typically as rational evidence against mechanism. Using methods of Post and Smullyan, these results are presented as purely mathematical theorems and various such applications are discussed critically. In particular, J. Lucas's use of Gödel's theorem to distinguish between conscious and unconscious beings is refuted, while more generally, attempts to extract philosophy from metamathematics are shown to involve only dramatizations of the constructivity problem in foundations. More specifically, philosophical extrapolations from metamathematics are shown to involve premature extensions of Church's thesis.
Phonons—The Quantization of Sound (and Kant's Second Antinomy)
Authors: Berenda C. W.
Published: November 2002

The recent extension of quantum theory to sound waves in solids is briefly outlined and then discussed from a specific philosophic (Kantian) perspective.
An Alternative “Fundamental” Axiomatization of Multiplicative Power Relations Among Three Variables
Authors: Marley A. A. J.
Published: November 2002

Suppose that the axioms of conjoint measurement hold for quantities having two independent components and that the axioms of extensive measurement hold for each of these components separately. In a recent paper, Luce shows that if a certain axiom relates the two measurement systems, then the conjoint measure on each component is a power function of the extensive measure on that component. Luce supposes that each component set contains all “rational fractions” of each element in that set; in this note we present an alternative form of the axiom relating the measurement systems that enables us to prove Luce's result without requiring that such “rational fractions” exist.
Quantum Theoretical Concepts of Measurement: Part I
Authors: Park James L.
Published: November 2002

The overall purpose of this paper is to clarify the physical meaning and epistemological status of the term ‘measurement’ as used in quantum theory. After a review of the essential logical structure of quantum physics. Part I presents interpretive discussions contrasting the quantal concepts observable and ensemble with their classical ancestors along the lines of Margenau's latency theory. Against this background various popular ideas concerning the nature of quantum measurement are critically surveyed. The analysis reveals that, in addition to internal mathematical difficulties, all the so-called quantum theories of measurement are grounded in unjustifiable, classical presuppositions.
Goodman, ‘Grue’ and Hempel
Authors: Hooker C. A.
Published: November 2002

It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate “grue” presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these “difficulties” has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that “grue” raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intuitive appeal offered. However “grue” is shown to raise an informal, “over-arching” difficulty of great magnitude for all theories of confirmation, including Hempel's theory.
The Strategy Sense of ‘Methodology‘
Authors: Petrie Hugh G.
Published: November 2002

In this paper I attempt to elucidate the nature of that sense of ‘methodology’ which is concerned with the strategics, techniques, and procedures of scientific experimentation. It is claimed that methodology in this sense is at bottom a set of logical relations between sentences expressing pervasive facts of the subject matter and sentences describing experimental behavior. In particular a successful methodology is one in which the set of these sentences is logically consistent. I then turn to the problems involved in teaching and learning an explicit methodology. Finally, I argue that this analysis throws fresh light on the distinction between knowing a fact and possessing a skill or competence.
The Logic of the Situation
Authors: Leach James J.
Published: November 2002

Controversy over the adequacy of the regularity or covering law theory of explanation when applied to historical actions continues to rage. A detailed analysis is here made of Professor A. Donagan's recent attack on this theory, as representative of many others. His alternative model of deductive non-law explanation, based on Popper's notion of the “logic of the situation,” is then shown to be invalid and generally defective. Finally, four sources of the difficulty are elicited which, when resolved, provide support for the regularity theory in its probabilistic version. We suggest that this theory, despite recent criticism, can be fruitfully extended to historical explanation by uncovering and codifying a major difference between history and science, the rational actions of historical agents, without distorting it.
Discussion: On a Claim By Skyrms Concerning Lawlikeness and Confirmation
Authors: Hempel Carl G.
Published: November 2002

In his article [5], Brian Skyrms adduces (on p. 233) some generalizations which, he claims, receive no confirmatory support from their positive instances even though all the predicates they contain are well entrenched in Goodman's sense. Invoking the principle that “a generalization is lawlike if it is capable of receiving confirmatory support from its positive instances” (p. 232; actually, the converse is needed and, I will assume, intended by him), he claims that his examples “provide striking demonstration of the fact that the lawlikeness of a hypothesis is not a simple function of the projectibility of its constituent predicates.” I think the claim is of great interest; but I will try to show that Skyrms's argument fails to establish it because it presupposes an unwarranted assumption which raises a problem of general importance for confirmation theory.
Discussion: Deductive Predictions
Authors: Coffa José A.
Published: November 2002

According to Hempel, all scientific explanations and predictions which are produced exclusively with deterministic laws must be deductive, in the sense that the explanandum or the prediction must be a logical consequence of the laws and the initial (and boundary) conditions in the explanans. This deducibility thesis (DT) has been attacked from several quarters. Some time ago Canfield and Lehrer presented a “refutation” of DT as applied to predictions, in which they tried to prove that “if the deductive reconstruction [DT for predictions] were an adequate reconstruction, then scientific prediction would be impossible” ([2], p. 204). Their argument seems to have been uncontested except for an inconclusive rejoinder by Beard (cf. [1]). Moreover, Stegmüller has recently argued that “it may turn out that all or at least most of the so-called deductive-nomological explanations are in truth inductive and not deductive arguments, in view of the difficulty which has been pointed out by Canfield and Lehrer” ([3], p. 7). It seems it would be worth investigating whether Canfield and Lehrer's argument is, indeed, correct.
Discussion: On Falling Short of Strict Coherence
Authors: Hacking Ian
Published: November 2002

Abner Shimony called it coherence; John Kemeny called it strict fairness; today many people speak of strict coherence. According to Shimony's definition, a set of betting rates on a series of propositions hi and ei is strictly incoherent, when “there exists a choice of stakes Si such that, if X accepts the series of bets at these stakes, then no matter what the actual truth values of hi, and ei may be, X can at best lose nothing, and in at least one possible eventuality he will suffer a positive loss” ([3], p. 9).
On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part I
Authors: Feyerabend Paul K.
Published: November 2002

Discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory are at present obstructed by (1) the increasing axiomania in physics and philosophy which replaces fundamental problems by problems of formulation within a certain preconceived calculus, and (2) the decreasing (since 1927) philosophical interest and sophistication both of professional physicists and of professional philosophers which results in the replacement of subtle positions by crude ones and of dialectical arguments by dogmatic ones. More especially, such discussions are obstructed by the ignorance of both opponents, and also defenders of the Copenhagen point of view, as regards the arguments which once were used in its defence. The publication of Bunge's Quantum Theory and Reality and especially of Popper's contribution to it are taken as an occasion for the restatement of Bohr's position and for the refutation of some quite popular, but surprisingly naive and uninformed objections against it. Bohr's position is distinguished both from the position of Heisenberg and from the vulgarized versions which have become part of the so-called “Copenhagen Interpretation” and whose inarticulateness has been a boon for all those critics who prefer easy victories to a rational debate. Einstein's main counterargument is discussed, and Bohr's refutation restated. The philosophical background and earlier forms of Bohr's views are stated also. Considering that these views are more detailed, better adapted to the facts of the microdomain than any existing alternative it follows that fundamental discussion must first return to them. Their uniqueness is not asserted, however. Here the author still maintains that a hundred shabby flowers are preferable to a single blossom, however exquisite. But a hundred shabby flowers plus an exquisite blossom are more desirable still.
The Causal Theory of Time: A Critique of Grünbaum's Version
Authors: Lacey Hugh M.
Published: November 2002

After precisely specifying the thesis of the causal theory of time, Grünbaum's program developed to support this thesis is examined. Four objections to his definition of temporal order in terms of a more primitive causal relation are put and held to be conclusive. Finally, the philosophical arguments that Grünbaum has proposed supporting the desirability of establishing a causal theory of time are shown to be either invalid or inconclusive.
Physical Time: The Objective and Relational Theory
Authors: Bunge Mario
Published: November 2002

An objective and relational theory of local time is expounded and its philosophical implications are discussed in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 certain physical and metaphysical questions concerning time are taken up in the light of that theory.
Quantum Theoretical Concepts of Measurement: Part II
Authors: Park James L.
Published: November 2002

This portion of the essay concludes a two-part paper, Part I of which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal. Part II begins with a careful study of the quantum description of real experiments in order to motivate a proposal that two distinct quantum theoretical measurement constructs should be recognized, both of which must be distinguished from the concept of preparation. The different epistemological roles of these concepts are compared and explained. It is then concluded that the only possible type of “quantum measurement theory” is one of little metaphysical interest and that quantum measurement seems problematical only when viewed from an overly narrow classical perspective.
Discussion: Professor Nagel on the Cognitive Status of Scientific Theories
Authors: Byerly Henry C.
Published: November 2002

1. Introduction. Professor Nagel's account of the “cognitive status” of scientific theories has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend [5] and M. B. Hesse [8] in terms of his alledgedly misguided distinction between experimental laws and theories. The difficulty lies, these critics agree, in Nagel's attempt to find a stable basis for scientific theories in an observational basis of experimental laws. Both Feyerabend and Hesse note the vacillation in Nagel's account of the stability of the meaning of experimental terms and in his discussion of the status of observational as opposed to theoretical terms. They find Nagel too “positivistic” and see as a first step toward a more adequate account of scientific theories the abandonment of the theoretical-observational dichotomy as having more than a pragmatic significance. Nagel's discussion of the theoretical-observational dichotomy is, I agree, inadequate in certain respects. I shall, however, suggest a quite different remedy from those of Feyerabend and Hesse, one that depends neither on a phenomenalistic reduction of theoretical entities nor on a blurring of the theoretical-observational dichotomy.
Simultaneity by Slow Clock Transport in the Special Theory of Relativity
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf
Published: November 2002

Ellis and Bowman's account of nonstandard signal synchronizations is examined as a prolegomenon to this paper. Attention is called to some consequences of an important ambiguity in their account of the transitivity of nonstandard synchrony. Then an analysis is given of the principle of relativity (first postulate of the STR) to assess E & B's claim that this principle either restricts nonstandard signal synchronisms or rules them out altogether. It is argued that the latitude for choices of nonstandard synchronisms is not circumscribed by the factual content of the principle of relativity; instead, the exclusion of such synchronisms by this principle depends on a tacit appeal to the particular conventions implicit in certain formulations of the principle. Hence E & B's claim is rejected as an argument against the factual tenability of nonstandard synchronisms.
The Conventionality of Simultaneity
Authors: Salmon Wesley C.
Published: November 2002

After describing a new method of synchronizing spatially separated clocks by means of clock transport, this paper discusses the philosophical import of the existence of such methods, including those of Ellis and Bowman and of Bridgman, with special reference to the Ellis-Bowman claim that “the thesis of the coventionality of distant simultaneity ... is thus either trivialized or refuted.” I argue that the physical facts do not support this philosophical conclusion, and that a substantial part of their argument against Reichenbach, in particular, is misdirected. Finally, I suggest that Ellis and Bowman employ seriously unclear notions of triviality and “good physical reasons” that tend to obscure rather than clarify the basic philosophical issues. An objective criterion of nontriviality of conventions is advanced.
Conventionality in the Axiomatic Foundations of the Special Theory of Relativity
Authors: van Fraassen Bas C.
Published: November 2002

In this paper we examine Ellis and Bowman's argument, that simultaneity in inertial frames of reference is not conventional, from the axiomatic point of view. In Part I we examine the role of conventions in an axiomatic physical theory, and in Part II the relation of simultaneity in Reichenbach's axiomatization of the space-time theory of special relativity.
Synchronism by Slow Transport of Clocks in Noninertial Frames of Reference
Authors: Janis Allen I.
Published: November 2002

The demonstration that slow transport of clocks can be used to define simultaneity in inertial frames of reference leads to the question of whether clock transport can similarly be used in noninertial frames. It is shown that there are certain types of reference frames in which the clock-transport method cannot be used in a self-consistent manner. It is also shown that there are other types of noninertial frames in which the clock-transport method will succeed. The discussion includes noninertial frames in flat space-time as well as the case of curved space-times.
On a Recent Critique of Complementarity: Part II
Authors: Feyerabend Paul K.
Published: November 2002

“Bohr was primarily a philosopher, not a physicist, but he understood that natural philosophy ... carries weight only if its every detail can be subjected to the ... test of experiment” (Heisenberg in [59], p. 95). As a result his approach differed from that of theschool-philosopherswhom he regarded with a somewhat “sceptical attitude, to say the least” ([59], p. 129) and whose lack of interest in “the important viewpoint which had emerged during the development of atomic physics” he noticed with regret ([59], p. 183).But it also differed, and to a considerable degree, from the spirit of what Professor T. S. Kuhn has called a “normal science.” Looking at Bohr's method of research we see that technical problems, however remote, are always related to a philosophical point of view; they are never treated as “tiny puzzles” whose solution is valuable in itself, even if one has not the faintest idea what it means, and where it leads: “For me” Bohr writes to Sommerfeld in 1922 ([59], p. 71) “[the quantum theory] is not a matter for petty didactic details, but a serious attempt to reach ... an inner coherence.” Emphasis is put on matters of principle ([59], p. 36) and minor discrepancies, or “puzzles” in the sense of Kuhn, instead of being deemphasized, and assimilated to the older paradigm,are turned into fundamental difficultiesby looking at them from a new direction, and by testing their background “in its furthest consequences by exaggeration” ([59], p. 329). A noteworthy example of Bohr's “non-normal” and rather metaphysical approach to physics is his scepticism in the face of the success of his own atomic model.
Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference
Authors: Schick Frederic
Published: November 2002

This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous.
Three Logical Theories
Authors: Corcoran John
Published: November 2002

This study concerns logical systems considered as theories. By searching for the problems which the traditionally given systems may reasonably be intended to solve, we clarify the rationales for the adequacy criteria commonly applied to logical systems. From this point of view there appear to be three basic types of logical systems: those concerned with logical truth; those concerned with logical truth and with logical consequence; and those concerned with deduction per se as well as with logical truth and logical consequence. Adequacy criteria for systems of the first two types include: effectiveness, soundness, completeness, Post completeness, “strong soundness” and strong completeness. Consideration of a logical system as a theory of deduction leads us to attempt to formulate two adequacy criteria for systems of proofs. The first deals with the concept of rigor or “gaplessness” in proofs. The second is a completeness condition for a system of proofs. An historical note at the end of the paper suggests a remarkable parallel between the above hierarchy of systems and the actual historical development of this area of logic.
Entropy of Knowledge
Authors: Kelley Hillary Jay
Published: November 2002

Entropy is proposed as a concept which in its broader scope can contribute to the study of the General Information System. This paper attempts to identify a few fundamental subconcepts and lemmas which will serve to facilitate further study of system order. The paper discusses: partitioning order into logical and arbitrary kinds; the relationship of order to pattern; and suggested approaches to evaluating and improving the General Information System.
Footnotes on the Philosophy of Biology
Authors: Mayr Ernst
Published: November 2002

No other branch of the philosophy of science is as backward as the philosophy of biology. When physicists or philosophers “explain biology,” they not only tend to use wrong terminologies but they usually throw away that which is typically biological. This error is second only to the even worse one of adopting vitalistic interpretations. Vitalism is now dead, as far as biologists are concerned (it seems to survive in the minds of a few philosophers), and a biologist can now talk about the differences between the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology without being suspected of being a concealed vitalist.
Parameter Estimation vs. Hypothesis Testing
Authors: Woodson M. I. Charles E.
Published: November 2002

Professor Meehl [2] has pointed out a very significant problem in the methodology of psychological research, indicating that statistical tests of psychological hypotheses against a null hypothesis are loaded in favor of eventual success at rejecting the null hypothesis. In my opinion this is not, however, a contrast between physics and psychology, but rather between the method of parameter estimation and that of the null hypothesis in the tradition of Fisher. A physicist could use the null hypothesis method as well as the psychologist. The fact that he doesn't is probably related to the more advanced state of his measurement techniques and theoretical constructs.
A Strategy for Planning Basic Research
Authors: Gordon T. J. , Raffensperger M. J.
Published: November 2002

Scientific tradition holds that it is essential to permit individual researchers almost complete freedom in their selection of research projects. As a result, structured research planning has not played a major role in determining the course of the sciences. By “structural research planning” we mean the methodical establishment of goals, and the identification of research routines which apparently accord priority to highest value goals, while minimizing the cost and time of their attainment. With increasing competition for limited fiscal and intellectual resources this kind of planning may become more necessary. Let us cite three specific examples: First, the individual researcher is often faced with the question of how best to spend his time in pursuing a particular line of investigation. He must allocate his personal resources of time and talent to work which appears to hold the promise of highest pay-off. Second, on a larger scale, the competition for resources also raises the question of priority among alternative government-sponsored research projects. Individuals proposing equally alluring projects sometimes seek the same funds; government planners need some sort of objective criteria (hopefully based on a rational strategy) in order to judge the proposals. Furthermore, government planners face the problem of justifying their request for “big science” resources; a planning strategy which defines the use and expected output of the requested resources can help in the design and promotion of their concept. Finally, there is a growing sentiment that at least some research should be directed toward the solution of current and anticipated societal problems, to find means of circumventing or minimizing the impact of potentially dangerous problems of civilization. These needs : the choice of individual research, allocation of national resources among competing projects, and selecting research of societal importance, suggest that structured research planning might be valuable.
Force and “Natural Motion”
Authors: Hunt I. E. , Suchting W. A.
Published: November 2002

Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of “conventional,” and finally that he has not established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw.
Derived Measurement, Dimensions, and Dimensional Analysis
Authors: Causey Robert L.
Published: November 2002

This paper presents a representational theory of derived physical measurements. The theory proceeds from a formal definition of aclass of similar systems.It is shown that such a class of systems possesses a natural proportionality structure. Aderived measureof a class of systems is defined to be a proportionality-preserving representation whose values aren-tuples of positive real numbers. Therefore, the derived measures are measures of entire physical systems. The theory provides an interpretation of the dimensional parameters in a large class of physical laws, and it accounts for the monomial dimensions of these parameters. It is also shown that a class of similar systems obeys a dimensionally invariant law, which one may safely subject to a dimensional analysis.
Explanation in Aristotle, Newton, and Toulmin
Authors: Wilson Fred
Published: November 2002

The claim that scientific explanation is deductive has been attacked on both systematic and historical grounds. This paper briefly defends the claim against the systematic attack. Essential to this defence is a distinction between perfect and imperfect explanation. This distinction is then used to illuminate the differences and similarities between Aristotelian (anthropomorphic) explanations of certain facts and those of classical mechanics. In particular, it is argued that when one attempts to fit classical mechanics into the Aristotelian framework the latter becomes structurally incoherent. It is suggested that this, together with the fact that classical mechanics embodied the first piece of perfect knowledge, accounts, in part at least, for the historical fact of the rapid demise of the Aristotelian patterns as the new science developed. On the basis of this discussion, the inadequacies of the attack on the deductive model on historical grounds by Toulmin come to be seen.
Goodman's Paradox and Rules of Acceptance
Authors: Williams Peter M.
Published: November 2002

The purpose of this note is to examine the claim made by Howard Smokler that “Goodman's paradox should be considered as an independent argument against a conception of inductive logic which makes use of rules of acceptance” ([4], p. 76).

Smokler's claim arises from his treatment of Goodman's paradox in the form given it by Israel Scheffler ([2]). Schefflerhas discussed this paradox primarily in the context of a methodology of induction which views inductive rules as rules of acceptance permitting one to assert detached conclusions. The inductive rule considered by Scheffler is described as follows:

What leads us to make one particular prediction rather than its opposite is not its deducibility froIII evidence but rather its congruence with a generalization thoroughly in accord with all such evidence, and the correlative disconfirmation of the contrary generalization by the same evidence. (I shall refer to this hereafter as the “generalization formula”) ([2], p. 177).
Games and Paradox
Authors: Suits Bernard
Published: November 2002

In his recent address to the Aristotelian Society, Aurel Kolnai suggests that games exhibit what he calls a “genuine paradoxy.” I do not believe that he has shown this to be the case, even on the most permissive interpretation of what it means to be a paradox. Kolnai has, however, called attention to an aspect of games which invites further investigation, and I should like to advance the following considerations not so much as a criticism of Kolnai as an attempt to take the investigation along a path which Kolnai has indicated, but which he has not himself, in my opinion, followed. It is not that Kolnai does not say many interesting, indeed penetrating, things about games, for he does. That Kolnai's inquiry is an important contribution to the philosophy of games is not in question. What is questionable is whether paradox has very much to do with that contribution.
Teleological Explanations in Evolutionary Biology
Authors: Ayala Francisco J.
Published: November 2002

The ultimate source of explanation in biology is the principle of natural selection. Natural selection means differential reproduction of genes and gene combinations. It is a mechanistic process which accounts for the existence in living organisms of end-directed structures and processes. It is argued that teleological explanations in biology are not only acceptable but indeed indispensable. There are at least three categories of biological phenomena where teleological explanations are appropriate.
The Axiomatization of Physical Theories
Authors: Simon Herbert A.
Published: November 2002

The task of axiomatizing physical theories has attracted, in recent years, some interest among both empirical scientists and logicians. However, the axiomatizations produced by either one of these two groups seldom appear satisfactory to the members of the other. It is the purpose of this paper to develop an approach that will satisfy the criteria of both, hence permit us to construct axiomatizations that will meet simultaneously the standards and needs of logicians and of empirical scientists.
If-Iculties
Authors: Stevenson Charles L.
Published: November 2002

The discrepancy between English if's and the horseshoe is far from being negligible. That is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe, which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean ; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse. But it is a reason for distrusting the current logical pedagogy that leads students to take the two as being intertranslatable. So if symbolic logic is to help us in our English arguments (and that should surely be one of its functions) it needs to be supplemented: it needs to be provided with additional symbols (presumably with the introduction of one or more primitive concepts) that will preserve the meaning of our various if's with greater accuracy. In the present paper I shall point in the direction of such a logic. I cannot undertake to develop it in a complete postulational form; but I can at least call attention to certain English locutions by which the required postulates should be guided. And I can venture to state some of the postulates using appropriate symbols.
Theories and the Transitivity of Confirmation
Authors: Hesse Mary
Published: November 2002

Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary “convergence of opinion” in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation.
Probability and Conditionals
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C.
Published: November 2002

The aim of the paper is to draw a connection between a semantical theory of conditional statements and the theory of conditional probability. First, the probability calculus is interpreted as a semantics for truth functional logic. Absolute probabilities are treated as degrees of rational belief. Conditional probabilities are explicitly defined in terms of absolute probabilities in the familiar way. Second, the probability calculus is extended in order to provide an interpretation for counter-factual probabilities—conditional probabilities where the condition has zero probability. Third, conditional propositions are introduced as propositions whose absolute probability is equal to the conditional probability of the consequent on the antecedent. An axiom system for this conditional connective is recovered from the probabilistic definition. Finally, the primary semantics for this axiom system, presented elsewhere, is related to the probabilistic interpretation.
Special Relativity without One-Way Velocity Assumptions: Part I
Authors: Winnie John A.
Published: November 2002

The Reichenbach-Grünbaum thesis of the conventionality of simultaneity is clarified and defended by developing the consequences of the Special Theory when assumptions are not made concerning the one-way speed of light. It is first shown that the conventionality of simultaneity leads immediately to the conventionality of all relative speeds. From this result, the general-length-contraction and time-dilation relations are then derived. Next, the place of time-dilation and length-contraction effects within the Special Theory is examined in the light of the conventionality thesis. The slow-transport method of synchrony is then examined in the light of these results and is shown not to provide an adequate method of uniquely determining the one-way speed of light. Finally, the general ∊-Lorentz transformations for events along the x-axis are derived from three principles: the round-trip light principle, the principle of equal passage times, and the linearity principle. These principles are shown to be independent of one-way velocity assumptions, and thus may form the basis of a Special Theory of Relativity without distant simultaneity assumptions.
Some Problems of Perception
Authors: Lewis Douglas
Published: November 2002

Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of ‘dependent’ which play a role in this view. Finally, I show that a causal dependence of secondary qualities upon the perceiver will not lead to the conclusion that secondary qualities are private unless the philosophical thesis that they are particular is already assumed.
Four Philosophical Problems of Psycholinguists
Authors: Miller George A.
Published: November 2002

Four philosophical problems—predication, speech acts, rules, and innate ideas— are discussed in the light of their implications for psychological and linguistic research. The discussion of predication concerns both form and use. With respect to form, it is argued that our lexical memory is organized according to a predicate-argument formula that underlies the subject-predicate form of our sentences. With respect to use, it is argued that the illocutionary force of the sentence as a speech act must be taken into account. Both the formation and the use of such verbal constructions are normally characterized by systems of rules, but there is no clear account of what a rule is or how it might operate to control behavior, and this problem is especially difficult when, as in language, the person's knowledge of the rules is implicit. The innate basis for our human ability to acquire linguistic rules is considered and the problem of innateness is redefined around the conjecture that there are innate, language-specific mechanisms unique to human beings. The problem of investigating such language-specific mechanisms psychologically, however, is quite difficult at the present time.
Intentionality and Physical Systems
Authors: Boden Margaret A.
Published: November 2002

Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort will show the characteristic features of intentionality. Psychological subjects are, under an alternative description, purely physical systems of a certain sort. The intentional description and the physical description are logically distinct, and are not intertranslatable. Nevertheless, the features of intentionality may be explained by a purely causal account, in the sense that they may be shown to be totally dependent upon physical processes.