bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025 huggingface dataset:
Determinants of Revenue‐Reporting Practices for Internet Firms*
Authors: Bowen Robert M. , Davis Angela K. , Rajgopal Shivaram
Published: November 2003

The financial press and accounting regulators (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Accounting Standards Board) have expressed concern about pressures on Internet firms to report high levels of revenue. This study verifies the association between market capitalization and revenue, and examines economic factors that potentially influence Internet company managers' decisions to adopt allegedly aggressive revenue‐recognition policies. Specifically, we examine factors hypothesized to influence the reporting of advertising barter revenue and grossed‐up sales levels. We begin by providing descriptive evidence on the use of barter and grossed‐up revenue across Internet sectors. Although common in some sectors, we find that the use of these accounting policies is not pervasive overall. We limit our empirical analyses to Internet companies that have the opportunity to report grossed‐up or advertising barter revenue. Our cross‐sectional predictions are based on both external and internal incentives to maximize revenues as well as constraints that may limit management's discretion. We predict that the following factors increase the likelihood that a firm will report grossed‐up and/or barter revenue: shorter time before needing additional external financing, more active individual investor interest in the firm's stock, more active pursuit of growth via acquisitions, and greater use of stock options in employee compensation. We also posit that barter transactions might be an inexpensive way for firms to evaluate the viability of future marketing or content alliances with potential partners. Finally, we predict that constraints on management discretion are related to the reputation/quality of the firm's auditor and underwriter and the extent of management ownership. We find that firms with greater cash burn rates and higher levels of activity on Motley Fool message boards are consistently associated with barter and grossed‐up revenue reporting.
Corporate Governance and the Audit Process*
Authors: Cohen Jeffrey , Krishnamoorthy Ganesh , Wright Arnold M.
Published: November 2003

There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.
Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?*
Authors: LANG MARK H. , LUNDHOLM RUSSELL J.
Published: November 2003

We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward‐looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law.

Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.
A Laboratory Investigation of Verification and Reputation Formation in a Repeated Joint Investment Setting*
Authors: Schwartz Steven T. , Young Richard A.
Published: November 2003

This paper describes an experiment in which subjects, acting as division managers, exchanged privately held information before making intrafirm investment decisions. Social efficiency required that managers honestly disclose their private information, but managers had individual incentives to send biased messages. These features of the model created an important role for ex post verification, the main manipulation in the experiment. The matching protocol was also manipulated, using both random and continuous matching of subjects. This second manipulation was intended to examine whether an important institutional attribute — the frequency of interaction — would affect the usefulness of verification. The results of the experiment indicate that verification significantly increased the relative frequency of honest messages and the level of social efficiency. However, the improvements from verification were greater in settings where subjects did not interact repeatedly. The data also indicate that, in the continuous matching treatments, responses depended on the history of behavior of the message sender. However, this behavior was not observed in the random matching treatments. Thus, both the efficacy of verification and the extent of reputation formation depended on the institutional setting.
Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*
Authors: Burgstahler David C. , Eames Michael J.
Published: November 2003

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.
Board Characteristics and Audit Fees*
Authors: Carcello Joseph V. , Hermanson Dana R. , Neal Terry L. , Riley Richard A.
Published: November 2003

This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee “quality” are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees.
Undetected Deviations in Tests of Controls: Experimental Evidence of Nonsampling Risk*
Authors: JOHNSTON HEATHER , LINDSAY W. DARYL , PHILLIPS FRED
Published: November 2003

The objective of the study was to examine the effects of three independent variables ‐ accountability, audit workpaper structure, and type of control deviations ‐ on auditors' detection failure rates during control tests in a purchases, payables, and payments cycle. The experimental design used a between‐subjects manipulation of accountability and workpaper structure, and a within‐subjects manipulation of deviation type. Consistent with prior research, we observed an alarmingly high detection failure rate of 42.3 percent. This failure rate was not affected by levels of accountability or workpaper structure, although postexperiment evidence suggests that these variables were successfully manipulated. Failure rates did depend on the type of seeded control deviation, with nonmonetary deviations being overlooked most frequently. In addition to replicating prior research, our study makes two further contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence that supports Hirst's (1992) speculation that successful manipulations of accountability may not affect auditor performance because auditors may self‐induce levels of accountability that create a ceiling effect on auditor performance. Second, we observe that although auditors perceived that highly structured workpapers allowed them to be more effective and efficient when performing tests of controls, their actual audit performance was not more effective and, on average, was less efficient.
The Influence of Affect on Managers' Capital‐Budgeting Decisions*
Authors: Kida Thomas E. , Moreno Kimberly K. , Smith James F.
Published: November 2003

In this paper, we propose that affective reactions are integral to accounting decision contexts like capital budgeting, and that researchers must jointly consider affect and cognition to better understand accounting decision makers' behavior. We argue that interpersonal relationships are characteristic of many capital‐budgeting contexts, and that these relationships can lead to emotional affective reactions. For example, reactions such as frustration and anger may result if a manager is treated unfairly by another individual involved in a capital project. Drawing on relevant work in neurobiology and psychology, we then predict that these affective reactions can influence managers' capital‐budgeting decisions. We report on four experimental scenarios that demonstrate the impact of affective reactions on capital‐budgeting decisions. Consistent with our predictions, the results indicate that managers consider both financial data and affective reactions when evaluating the utility of an investment alternative. Our results suggest that researchers should consider both affect and cognition to more fully understand decision making in accounting contexts.
Audit Strategies and Multiple Fraud Opportunities of Misreporting and Defalcation*
Authors: Patterson Evelyn , Noel James
Published: November 2003

We examine how an auditor assesses the risk of fraud and formulates an audit plan when the auditee has the opportunity to commit various types of fraud. Unlike previous studies, the audi‐tee can misappropriate assets (defalcation), misreport financial information (fraudulent financial reporting), or misreport financial information in combination with defalcation. Our results identify four possible equilibria whose characteristics depend on the auditee's relative rewards and penalties from the various types of fraud, the cost of audit effort, and expectations about the auditee‐firm's performance. When the cost of audit effort is sufficiently small, fraud risk assessment depends on the auditee's rewards and penalties associated with each type of fraud, but not on the auditor's beliefs about firm performance. The auditor develops an audit plan that focuses on the type of fraud the auditee is most motivated to commit, and in turn, the audit plan deters all other types of fraud.
The Impact of Financial and Tax Reporting Incentives on Option Grants to Canadian CEOs*
Authors: KLASSEN KENNETH J. , MAWANI AMIN
Published: November 2003

This study explores the effects of financial and tax reporting incentives on options granted to chief executive officers in Canada. Extant studies with a similar objective (Yermack 1995; Matsunaga 1995) explore predominantly nonqualified U.S. option grants that are deductible to the extent that the options are in the money at the time of exercise. In contrast, Canadian firms do not get a tax deduction for their stock option grants at any time. In both countries, no expense is recorded for financial reporting purposes. As a result, the financial reporting and tax reporting trade‐off is more pronounced in the Canadian setting of this study compared with the U.S. setting. We measure option granting behavior as the ratio of the Black‐Scholes value of stock option grants to the sum of cash compensation and the value of stock option grants. Using a sample of 806 firm‐year observations during the period 1993‐95, we find that observed option grants are significantly correlated with proxies for short‐run financial reporting incentives. We also find evidence that option granting behavior is correlated with proxies for tax incentives.
Improving Jurors' Evaluations of Auditors in Negligence Cases*
Authors: Kadous Kathryn
Published: November 2003

Prior research indicates that individuals acting as jurors experience outcome effects in audit negligence litigation. That is, jurors evaluate auditors more harshly in light of negative outcomes, even when audit quality is constant. I posit that outcome effects in this setting are caused by jurors using their negative affect (i.e., feelings) resulting from learning about negative audit outcomes as information relevant to auditor blameworthiness. I tested this hypothesis in an experiment in which I manipulated audit quality, outcome information, and provision of an attribution instruction. The attribution instruction was designed to discredit negative affect as a cue to auditor blameworthiness. Consistent with expectations, attribution participants' evaluations of auditors exhibited less reliance on outcome information and more reliance on audit quality information than did evaluations made by control participants. In fact, outcome effects were eliminated for attribution participants. Courts may be able to improve the quality of jurors' decisions in such cases by employing an attribution instruction.
The Effects of Labour on Accounting Choice in Canada
Authors: CULLINAN CHARLES P. , BLINE DENNIS M.
Published: November 2003

This study examines the effects of labour considerations on accounting choice in Canada. Two potential labour‐related incentives are considered: ability to pay and employee attraction and retention. Measures of these incentives are developed based on Canadian data: unionization for ability‐to‐pay incentives, and labour intensity and the percentage of white‐collar employees for the attract and retain incentives. Our results indicate that ability‐to‐pay incentives, measured by unionization, are not associated with depreciation policies in Canada. In contrast, the findings provide mixed support for the attract‐and‐retain perspective, because labour intensity was significantly correlated with these choices, while the percentage of white‐collar employees was marginally significant.
Auditor Conservatism, Asymmetric Monitoring, and Earnings Management*
Authors: Kim Jeong‐Bon , Chung Richard , Firth Michael
Published: November 2003

In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.
Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*
Authors: Bushee Brian J.
Published: November 2003

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.
Productivity in “Top‐Ten” Academic Accounting Journals by Researchers at Canadian Universities*
Authors: MATHIEU ROBERT , McCONOMY BRUCE J.
Published: November 2003

We examine the research productivity of academic accountants at Canadian universities for the 11‐year period 1990‐2000. Our analysis is based on the “top‐ten” ranked refereed journals in accounting, auditing, and taxation, as documented by Brown and Huefner (1994). We first provide an overview of the importance of publishing in highly ranked accounting journals for individual academics, departments, and business faculties. We then provide details of the proportion of articles published in each of these journals by academics from Canadian universities; the type of research published in each journal (auditing, financial accounting, managerial accounting, and taxation); and details of editorial board service. Our results indicate that even at the most productive Canadian university (in terms of “top‐ten” publications), faculty members publish (on average) approximately one article every seven years. Six Canadian universities have faculty members with, on average, more than one article in “top‐ten” journals every 10 years. We also provide results of analyses that rank each Canadian university, after controlling for the relative quality of each journal, using impact factors published by the Social Science Citation Index. In addition, statistics are provided with regard to the 15 most productive researchers, in terms of “top‐ten” publications, in the 11‐year period. Finally, in conjunction with the 25th anniversary of the Canadian Academic Accounting Association, we examine the productivity of academic accountants at Canadian universities over the past 25 years by combining our results with those reported by Richardson and Williams (1990).
Competition and Big 6 Brand Name Reputation: Evidence from the Ontario Municipal Audit Market*
Authors: BANDYOPADHYAY SATI P. , KAO JENNIFER L.
Published: November 2003

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre‐amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non‐Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.
Impact of Competition and Taxes on Responsibility Center Organization and Transfer Prices*
Authors: NARAYANAN V. G. , SMITH MICHAEL
Published: November 2003

We show that a firm can use its decentralized organizational structure and transfer price as commitment devices to obtain strategic advantage in the product market only when there are nonstrategic reasons to decentralize and to distort transfer prices away from marginal costs, such as the sales office's local knowledge about market conditions and the presence of tax rate differentials across the two tax jurisdictions. Surprisingly, an increase in the sales office's tax rates may help a firm increase overall profits. An increase in the sales office's tax rates causes the firm to increase its transfer price, which in turn dampens the sales office's competition and may more than offset the effect of increased tax rates on the firm's overall profits.
Inferring Transactions from Financial Statements*
Authors: ARYA ANIL , FELLINGHAM JOHN C. , GLOVER JONATHAN C. , SCHROEDER DOUGLAS A. , STRANG GILBERT
Published: November 2003

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.
Competition and Cost Accounting: Adapting to Changing Markets*
Authors: Krishnan Ranjani , Luft Joan L. , Shields Michael D.
Published: November 2003

The relation of competition and cost accounting has been the subject of conflicting prescriptions, theories, and empirical evidence. Practitioner literature and textbooks argue that higher competition generally requires more accurate product costing. Theoretical economic analysis, in contrast, predicts that the optimal level of product‐costing accuracy is sometimes higher at lower levels of competition. Results of survey research are inconsistent, suggesting a need for further identification of conditions under which higher competition leads to more accurate product costing. This study shows experimentally that individuals' choices of the level of product‐costing accuracy depend not only on the current level of competition but also on the previous level of competition — that is, on an interaction between market structure (monopoly, duopoly, and four‐firm competition) and market history (increasing versus decreasing competition). In the experiment, subjects decide on the quantity of data to collect at a pre‐set price per datum to support more accurate product‐cost estimates. Subjects collect the most cost data (i.e., choose the most accurate product costing) in monopoly, collect the least in duopoly, and an intermediate amount in the four‐firm market, consistent with the pattern of optimal cost‐data collection in Hansen's 1998 model. The process of convergence to the optimum differs significantly across market types and market histories, however. Subjects who begin in four‐firm competition adapt more successfully to change than those who begin in monopoly. The lowest levels of decision performance occur when ex‐monopolists face their first competitor: they overreact to this first encounter with competition and overspend on cost data.
Audit‐Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports*
Authors: Johnson E. , Khurana Inder K. , Reynolds J. Kenneth
Published: November 2003

This study examines whether the length of the relationship between a company and an audit firm (audit‐firm tenure) is associated with financial‐reporting quality. Using two proxies for financial‐reporting quality and a sample of Big 6 clients matched on industry and size, we find that relative to medium audit‐firm tenures of four to eight years, short audit‐firm tenures of two to three years are associated with lower‐quality financial reports. In contrast, we find no evidence of reduced financial‐reporting quality for longer audit‐firm tenures of nine or more years. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence pertinent to the recurring debate regarding mandatory audit‐firm rotation — a debate that has, to date, relied on anecdotal evidence and isolated cases.
Why Do Large Firms' Prices Anticipate Earnings Earlier than Small Firms' Prices?*
Authors: AYERS BENJAMIN C. , FREEMAN ROBERT N.
Published: November 2003

This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.
A Discussion of “Audit Review: Managers' Interpersonal Expectations and Conduct of the Review”
Authors: Peecher Mark E.
Published: November 2003

Gibbins and Trotman's study both explores reviewer attributes that auditors judge to influence review quality and replicates earlier, largely experimental findings about preparer and reviewer decision behavior. Such exploration and intra‐method replication create opportunities to refine theory and better design future experimental and nonexperimental studies. Naturally, as with any study, the opportunities that this study creates are not without bounds. To help in thinking about these bounded opportunities, this discussion raises four topics that I have entitled “retro‐spective biases”, “stylization perceptions”, “manager styles”, and “real‐time review complexities”. After discussing these topics in turn, I end with a short summary.
Are Fundamentals Priced in the Bond Market?*
Authors: Khurana Inder K. , Raman K. K.
Published: November 2003

To date, the discussion of the Lev and Thiagarajan 1993 fundamentals in the prior literature has been exclusively in the context of the stock market. Our study is the first to examine the value‐relevance of these fundamentals for default risk. By focusing on the market for new bond issues, we examine the value‐relevance of the fundamental score using expected rather than realized returns. Also, by focusing on the bond market we provide a different perspective than that brought by prior studies relying solely on stock prices. We find the fundamentals to be priced in the market for new bond issues as indicators of expected future earnings and to be value‐relevant in enabling the market to discern differences in bond credit quality over and above the published bond ratings.
The Relation between Aggregate Earnings and Security Returns over Long Intervals*
Authors: Shroff Pervin K.
Published: November 2003

This paper provides a theoretical explanation and consistent empirical evidence for the increase in the contemporaneous correlation between returns and aggregate earnings as the return interval is lengthened. Consistent with intuition and with Easton, Harris, and Ohlson 1992, the analysis shows that aggregation over time renders the lag in accounting recognition relatively less important and thus improves the returns‐earnings R2. Interestingly, the analysis also reveals that aggregating earnings over longer periods increases the positive covariance between aggregate earnings and the accounting lag, which may further increase the R2. This positive covariance can lead to an earnings coefficient greater than one over some range of aggregation, which is consistent with the findings of Easton et al. that over the 10‐year interval the returns‐earnings regression slope coefficient is greater than one (1.7). The empirical results highlight the fact that the slope coefficient, which is greater than one and increasing with the interval, accounts for much of the increment to the returns‐earnings R2. In fact, constraining the slope coefficient to be one results in an R2 of 11 percent for the 10‐year interval, which is considerably lower than the R2 of 47 percent when the regression is unconstrained. Hence, the positive covariance between current earnings and the accounting lag, rather than the diminishing effect of the accounting lag, appears to be the dominant explanation for the observed high R2 over long intervals.
An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Online Trading on Stock Price and Trading Volume Reactions to Earnings Announcements*
Authors: Ahmed Anwer S. , Schneible Richard A. , Stevens Douglas E.
Published: November 2003

This study provides evidence regarding the effects of online trading on stock price and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online trading (1996‐99) and a period without online trading (1992‐95). We conjecture that online trading has increased the proportion of naive investors in the market. We predict that this will result in (1) a decrease in the average precision of investor information prior to earnings announcements leading to higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs), (2) an increase in differential interpretation of earnings leading to higher trading volume reactions that are unrelated to price change, and (3) a decrease in differential prior precision leading to a decrease in the association between trading volume and absolute price change. We find evidence consistent with all three predictions. Our findings are relevant for assessing the validity of concerns about online trading expressed by regulators and the validity of theoretical models of trade with asymmetrically informed investors.
Private Information Production, Public Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital: Theory and Implications*
Authors: Zhang Guochang
Published: November 2003

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.
Do Investors Overrely on Old Elements of the Earnings Time Series?*
Authors: Bloomfield Robert J. , Libby Robert , Nelson Mark W.
Published: November 2003

This paper reports an experiment demonstrating that MBA students overrely on old earnings performance when predicting future earnings performance in a laboratory setting. In the experiment, MBA students relied too heavily on old annual ROE information to predict future annual ROE. The experiment shows how a common cognitive error (overreliance on unreliable information) interacts with the structure of the earnings time series to create particular patterns of prediction errors. The results also suggest directions for research on two well‐known anomalies, long‐run overreactions (De Bondt and Thaler 1985, 1987) and post‐earnings‐announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 1990).
The Interaction between Internal Control Assessment and Substantive Testing in Audits for Fraud*
Authors: SMITH J. REED , TIRAS SAMUEL L. , VICHITLEKARN SANSAKRIT S.
Published: November 2003

We examine the interaction between internal control assessments and substantive testing in a model of fraud detection. The purpose of our study is to examine a two‐stage model of the auditor‐manager interaction in which the auditor assesses the “likelihood” or possibility of fraud in the first stage and conducts substantive tests in the second stage. We examine the allocation of audit resources across these two distinct facets of the audit. We find that, regardless of the auditor's allocation, the probability of undetected fraud remains the same, but the allocation of some audit resources to internal control assessment may provide cost savings for the auditor.
Commentary: Accounting Schism or Synthesis? A Challenge for the Conditional‐Normative Approach*
Authors: MATTESSICH RICHARD V.
Published: November 2003

This paper explains the conditional‐normative accounting methodology (CoNAM) and its origin, offering a comparison of the normative, positive, and conditional‐normative approaches. It also discusses the difference between the pragmatic versus a more scientific treatment of CoNAM. However, the main thrust of the paper is directed toward the schism in academic accounting between the positive accounting theory (PAT) and the critical interpretive view (CIV). To better understand CIV, the paper attempts to explain the philosophic roots that reach from Husserl and some Marxist writers to Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard. This schism seems to call for a new synthesis that avoids extreme positions but draws upon insights from both camps. In this search, CoNAM might be helpful by exploring means‐end relations and connecting value judgements to accounting theory in a fairly “objective” way.
Inferring Accounting Information from Corporate Financing Choices: An Examination of Security Issuances in the Banking Industry*
Authors: Bishop Marguerite L. , Lys Thomas Z.
Published: November 2003

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance.

We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.
Auditor Quality and the Accuracy of Management Earnings Forecasts*
Authors: CLARKSON PETER M.
Published: November 2003

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus.

The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.
Income Smoothing and Discretionary R&D Expenditures of Japanese Firms*
Authors: MANDE VIVEK , FILE RICHARD G. , KWAK WIKIL
Published: November 2003

During the recent recession (1991 to present), Japanese firms decreased their spending on R&D for the first time since World War II. The decreases have raised concerns that Japanese managers may be making suboptimal allocations to R&D. We test whether Japanese managers adjust R&D based on short‐term performance. Our results show that Japanese firms in several industries adjust their R&D budgets to smooth profits. Interestingly, adjustments to R&D are larger in expansion years. These results, similar to those documented with U.S. managers, point to myopic decision making by Japanese managers.
The Relationship between Board Characteristics and Voluntary Improvements in Audit Committee Composition and Experience*
Authors: Beasley Mark S. , Salterio Steven E.
Published: November 2003

This study empirically examines the relation between certain board of director characteristics and the extent that audit committee composition voluntarily exceeds minimum mandated levels and includes outside directors with financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience. This study focuses on board characteristics because the board directly controls audit committee membership. Such staffing decisions can directly affect the ability of the audit committee to monitor management's financial reporting process on behalf of the board. Results suggest that Canadian firms that voluntarily include more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum have larger boards with more outsiders serving on those boards and are more likely to segregate the board chairperson position from the CEO/president positions. Additionally, firms that voluntarily create audit committees composed of outsider members with a breadth of relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience have boards that are larger, have more outside members, and are less likely to be chaired by the CEO/president. Implications of these findings for auditors, institutional investors, regulators, and other interested parties are discussed.
The Association between Auditor Choice, Ownership Retained, and Earnings Disclosure by Firms Making Initial Public Offerings*
Authors: Copley Paul A. , Douthett Edward B.
Published: November 2003

Using a system of three simultaneous equations, we test the predictions of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes 1991 and Hughes 1986 between auditor choice, earnings disclosures, and retained ownership in U.S. firms making initial public offerings of securities. Using a sample of initial public offerings between 1990 and 1997, we find that the demand for high‐quality auditors increases with firm risk. Additionally, we find that auditor choice, earnings disclosure, and risk are determinants of retained ownership, which is consistent with the predictions of Datar et al. and Hughes that auditor choice and direct disclosure are substitute signals for ownership retention. Further, our results suggest that the signals chosen (i.e., retained ownership, auditor choice, and disclosure) are related through their cost structures and are chosen jointly to minimize the overall cost to the entrepreneur.
The Disposition of Audit‐Detected Misstatements: An Examination of Risk and Reward Factors and Aggregation Effects*
Authors: BRAUN KAREN WILKEN
Published: November 2003

While professional standards indicate that auditors have the responsibility to both detect and report material errors, empirical evidence shows that auditors waive approximately 50 percent of material errors (Wright and Wright 1997). Unlike prior research that has examined factors that may affect auditors' decisions to waive single material misstatements, the current study examines auditors' propensity to waive proposed adjusting journal entries (henceforth PAJEs) that exceed materiality, either individually or in aggregate, under several different aggregation contexts. These contexts are represented in the form of different cases that vary in terms of the materiality and income direction of the individual and aggregate PAJEs. The current paper posits that auditors will be more likely to waive PAJEs in excess of materiality (i.e., make a “non‐GAAS” decision) when there is potential reward for doing so or when there is little litigation risk from doing so. The case decisions of 155 audit partners and managers indicate that they are not affected by potential reward (Client's Relative Fees), but are affected by potential risk (the Client's Financial Health, the PAJE's Subjectivity, and the PAJEs' Aggregate Directional Effect on Income). However, these factors are not equally influential across all aggregation contexts. Additionally, auditors are more likely to make non‐GAAS decisions when they are evaluating immaterial PAJEs that aggregate to a material level than when they are evaluating a single material PAJE.
Are Reviewers' Judgements Influenced by Memo Structure and Conclusions Documented in Audit Workpapers?*
Authors: Tan Hun‐Tong , Yip‐Ow Jackson
Published: November 2003

This paper investigates how the initial conclusion reached by the preparer of audit workpapers and the manner with which the preparer structures the associated evidence can influence the reviewer's judgement in an audit setting. We conducted an experiment in which auditors reviewed the work of a preparer who had concluded that the account of the client's major customer was either collectible or not collectible. The preparer's memo was structured in a neutral manner or stylized to emphasize (de‐emphasize) evidence consistent (inconsistent) with the preparer's conclusion. Results showed that reviewers placed less reliance on the conclusions reached by the preparer when the preparer's memo was stylized than when the memo was structured in a neutral manner. These results suggest that reviewers are sensitive to stylization attempts by preparers. Implications of the paper are discussed.
The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*
Authors: Duru Augustine , Iyengar Raghavan J. , Thevaranjan Alex
Published: November 2003

This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.