num_pages: 426
description: A minutely chronicled analysis of two controversial, historic crises—the Middle East in 1967, Quemoy in in 1958—furnishes a framework for this study of U.S., Soviet, and British policy-making processes in multi-crisis situations. Looming over the scene are the crucial issues of the entire cold war concept of collective security and of U.S. national security policy in a new decade. Jonathan Howe, while acknowledging both benefits and burdens of American global leadership, calls for a critical reassessment of U.S. obligations, tacit and explicit, in the arena of international politics.Since World War II, both Moscow and Washington have actively sought to extend their influence throughout the world, with the consequent gains and losses measured less in real estate than in political and psychological leverage. Mr. Howe sees the United States, however, as an anticolonial force, intervening in local conflicts only when apparent Soviet instigation threatens global reverberations. Russian ambitions and exploitation of national liberation movements and unrest in the Third World increase the number of potential conflicts involving U.S. security.To the frequently leveled charge that the United States is acting as the "world gendarme," Mr. Howe counters with the assertion that America has policed its own zones of influence in a limited peace-keeping role. In response to fears of overcommitment, he allows that the multicrisis phenomenon may expose the United States to greatest jeopardy. Policy choices, in handling both Middle East and Quemoy challenges, were constrained somewhat by the demands of preexisting crises in Vietnam and Lebanon, respectively, but neither involvement appreciably undermined American capability to guard its vital interests. Capability factors bearing upon the decision-making process included estimation of Soviet intentions, military capability and vulnerability, congressional and public opinion, dependence on British support, and economic effects of intervention.Though the United States did not renege on its commitments, two recent divergent trends—Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean and British contraction of forces East of Suez—will undoubtedly increase American military and psychological vulnerability and intensify the difficulties of coping with similar effectiveness in the inevitable clashes of the future.Mr. Howe focuses also on the roles of U.S., Soviet, and British fleets in each situation. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and Seventh Fleet in the Far East were employed as visible symbols of power to prevent Soviet intimidation of unaligned countries. Both crises placed on trial the effectiveness of conventional naval forces as instruments of foreign policy. In an age of nuclear stalemate, Mr. Howe note the renewed significance of surface fleets.An informative oral history, compiled from discussions with upper echelon foreign policy decision makers and appended to this study, supplements extensive and intensive research.
language: English
title: Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Policies in the Missile Age
titlecomplete: Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Policies in the Missile Age
publisher: Mit Pr