num_pages: 264
description: "If the revolution in philosophy that Descartes introduced must be set aside... ; if dualism is an irrevocably mysterious metaphysics; and if the idealist epistemology that follows the internalization of all objects of consciousness is inherendy barren, then the roots of Cartesian thinking have to be very much more fully understood than they are understood in current discussions" (23). Thus Collins' rationale for this collection of essays focussing on the metaphysics and epistemology of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Collins is a realist in the two-fold sense of holding that an independent physical world exists and that we perceive that world. He believes that careful study of the history of philosophy should aim at the illumination of this commonsense, realistic metaphysics by, presumably, locating and understanding the mistakes which lead away from this realism. Accordingly, having identified one such mistake in the Cartesian "internalization thesis," Collins devotes some space (17-24) to explaining his provocative charge that contemporary behaviorists and materialists, indeed, even some of their most illustrious opponents (e.g., Saul Kripke) share that thesis with Descartes. In addition, he suggests that one way to avoid dualism (as well as behaviorism and mindbrain materialism) might be to abandon the notion "that believing and desiring are things that are present in men, or go on in men" (55). Now this is indeed a way of avoiding dualism, particularly if the analysis is extended to include perception. But it is worth noting that in this latter case it will also allow Collins to avoid the objectionable consequence of the internalization thesis: If perceivings are not "things that are present in men," then perceptual objects, despite their causal origins, will not be such things either. Ironically, this curious view may be a consequence of Collins' own commitment to the internalization thesis, a commitment so deep that, like Thomas Reid whom he quotes with approval (18), Collins is prevented from seeing any alternative to a representationalist interpretation of Descartes' perceptual idea. What Collins misses is that Arnauld sawjust such an alternative when, arguing that he was the true Cartesian, he advanced an "act" interpretation of Descartes ' perceptual idea in the face of Malebranche's "object" account. Although Malebranche's (and Reid's) reading of Descartes has been the overwhelmingly popular one, the failure to discuss Arnauld's other alternative is a serious omission in Thought and Nature, particularly given recent literature on the issue and the avowals expressed in the passage with which I opened this review. Moreover, given Collins' two-fold realism, it is arguable that the omission is self-defeating: without acts a realistic ontology of perception is impossible. Be this as it may, Collins' aim here is not to reap the benefits of historical analysis but, less ambitiously, to do that analysis. And in this, the results are far more satisfying. The essays on Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are excellent--the Leibniz by itself being worth the price of admission.
language: English
title: Thought and Nature: Studies in Rationalist Philosophy
titlecomplete: Thought and Nature: Studies in Rationalist Philosophy
ratings_count: 1
publisher: Univ of Notre Dame Pr