num_pages: 336
description: As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book provides a new perspective on why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline.
language: English
title: Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
titlecomplete: Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)
genres: Economics, Political Science
ratings_count: 8
series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
awards: awardedAt: 1167638400000
name: APSA Luebbert Best Book Award
publisher: Cambridge University Press