description: The average daily death toll over the 100 days of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was three times that of 11 September 2001 in New York, a city with roughly the population of Rwanda. Yet, the response of the outside world, led by the United States, was to minimize its commitments (and costs), even denying the fact of the genocide. Equally disastrous were the sins of commission. Virtually every action that was taken was misguided and contributed to inflaming the situation. Almost alone in emerging from this holocaust with his reputation intact was Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the pitifully inadequate United Nations peacekeeping force. As the scale of the ethnic killing became evident, demands mounted that "something must be done". Yet, little serious thought was paid to what that "something" realistically might be. Meaningful military intervention would have proved problematic. The operational constraints on intervening rapidly and effectively in the middle of Africa, in a country with limited infrastructure, could not be dismissed as insignificant  or insurmountable. This essay explores promising courses of action that, given the necessary political will, would have been militarily feasible and morally justifiable. It assesses realistically their prospects of success in checking the haemorrhage in Rwandan lives and identifies the circumstances and significance of the opportunities missed. Particular attention is paid to the time frame as, with each day's delay, thousands of additional lives were lost.
title: The Pearson Papers, Paper Number 6: Confronting Rwandan Genocide, The Military Options
titlecomplete: The Pearson Papers, Paper Number 6: Confronting Rwandan Genocide, The Military Options