Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-03-16

MR WESSELS: So if those files had been made available at that time, what would the files indeed have indicated?

MR VERSTER: It would have confirmed that it happened in that way and what the aim was and that the aim was what I am applying for.  In other words, it could have been very prejudicial to me at that stage and also for the organisation.

MR WESSELS: In other words, would the files then have indicated that the version put before this Committee that there was an attempted murder and that that was the correct version?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WESSELS: Why were these files not destroyed completely?

MR VERSTER: It was precisely to show that it was part of an official structure and that we did not want to do it on our own, that it was part of the working procedures that existed within Special Forces and specifically the CCB, as part of a system.

MR WESSELS: In other words do I understand you correctly that you needed it as evidence that indeed you were a State organisation and that you acted on behalf of the State at that time?

MR VERSTER: That is specifically why we kept it.

MR WESSELS: Were there any suggestions or statements made that the CCB was an unauthorised organisation of which the Minister of Defence had no knowledge at that time?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, that was done.

MR WESSELS: Was there a denial of your contractual relationship with the South African Defence Force?

MR VERSTER: That was the whole attempt that was made, it was directly said to us that we had to forget about it.

MR WESSELS: And you were indeed dismissed as you gave evidence, and you took steps in Court in the face of this.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, there were two occasions where we went to the Supreme Court, where we applied in the Supreme Court that dealt specifically with this.

MR WESSELS: And at the end of the day the State did honour your contracts.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, it was accepted like that afterwards.

MR WESSELS: After what period of time?

MR VERSTER: It was about the middle of '95, so it's approximately after five years from '98, approximately a five year period.

MR WESSELS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wessels.  Mr Martini, do you have any questions arising out of questions that were put by Members of the Panel?  If you can remember that far back.

MR MARTINI: No, Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels, do you have any questions arising out of what we've put?

MR WESSELS: No, I don't.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr P du Plessis?

UNKNOWN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.  Just one aspect arising from the questions put by Mr Lax.
	Mr Verster, Mr Lax asked you questions concerning the proportionality of the steps and the actions, for example in the case of the Early Learning Centre and also concerning the Omar and Evans cases, but due to the nature of these things it is also important for my clients because certain proposals were made by you and they acted on instructions from your side, so I just want to clear up this matter with you.
	The whole situation around the CCB - or let me start like this, Section 6 was first formed in 1988, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: But the CCB structure as such, if I understand it correctly, goes back to a few years before that, in the year '85, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: It is 1986.

UNKNOWN: '86?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: The whole forming of the CCB and the necessity of such a structure, did this flow from the situation in the country at that time?

MR VERSTER: It was directly as a result of the revolutionary climate in the country, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: The decisions that you took in 1989, in the face of the actions of Region 6, did you make these decisions while taking into account the situation in the country at that time?

MR VERSTER: It was based on the intelligence picture in the country at that time and it was related directly to that.

UNKNOWN: I want to propose to you what can be found in Exhibit D and that is the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the President, and then I would like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with what is said, and then I'm going to in the face of this, ask you if this was the paradigm from where you acted and on which you based your decisions.  I will firstly refer you - there aren't any page numbers, but let me say paragraph 140, if you have the document in front of you.  I don't want to read everything into the record, I don't want to waste time, but there are a few important aspects that I think we need to look at.
	If you look at the top, at the top of paragraph 140, there is a heading -
"1985 to 1989 - The War Comes Home"
Do you see that?

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 140, Exhibit D.
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CHAIRPERSON: I wonder, I think Mr Wessels if you could during the next adjournment speak to Ms Coleridge and see that you get the same copy as everyone else has.
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MS COLERIDGE: There's two 140s, it's probably taken out of separate volumes.

UNKNOWN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
	You've found the place.  And then I refer in this regard to paragraph 142, paragraph 140, 141, deals with, especially paragraph 141, with unrest within South Africa.  You've probably seen these paragraphs, do you confirm that this was your perception at that time?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: And paragraph 142, I read the first sentence.
"At its Kabwe Conference in 1985, the ANC formulated the strategic response which it hoped would enable it to capitalise on the popular revolt and turn it into a people's war, possibly even insurrection."
This information, was this available to you during this time, '85 to '89?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: Do you agree with this perception?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: 143, you've gone through that, I will not handle this specifically, but you do take note of it?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And will you also confirm that was your perception?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And then we will continue to 144, and I want to read this to you, a sentence or two
"The military operations of MK in this period, can be categorised as follows:  Firstly, there were bomb attacks on urban targets."
Was that your information?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"The targets selected were meant to be Security Force related, but the reality is that more civilians than Security Force personnel were killed in such explosions."
Was that available to you?

MR VERSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"The reasons included technical incompetence, faulty devices, poor reconnaissance and poor judgement or misunderstanding by operatives."
It refers to the so-called enemy which according to your declared perceptions, was the enemy.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"In addition, there was some deliberate blurring of the lines, which gave operatives the leeway to vent their anger by placing bombs in targets that were not strictly military."
Was that your information?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And without dealing in big detail with what is said there I want to go to the next page, paragraph 164
"In the year after the imposition of the national State of Emergency, the full force of a strategy of counter-revolutionary warfare unfolded domestically."
Was that your perception during 1989 when these events took place, that this amnesty application is about?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, there were direct instructions in this regard.

UNKNOWN: But your instructions were that there was a war situation in South Africa, and in the Commission's Report, as it is put there
"1985 to 1989 - The War Comes Home"

MR VERSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.