Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: There were different variations, once again because it was a broad idea.  So there were many ideas that could come into play with these different courses of action.  It can be noted that the first phases are the same.  That is then the liberation of Charles, the establishment of the resistance movement, getting rid of Lennox Sebe.  That's part of the first phase.  This also underlines the importance of a strong pro-RSA XWB in the Eastern Cape as a prerequisite for permanent stability and normality.  That is the counter-revolutionary front idea.
	13:  And with this plan a condition of permanent normality in the Eastern Cape can be attained.  Now the existing plans are good but it can't guarantee it and therefore this plan is also an extension of this.
	Then paragraph 14:  Lennox Sebe is an embarrassment for the government.  The SP, that's the State President, said it himself, and with the implementation of this plan he will be got rid of.  Now this action is not linked to a specific phase or plan, it could happen now.  That was now before this plan was approved or put into action and it can just facilitate the execution of this or similar kinds of plans.
	Then 15:  The proposed unification of Ciskei and Transkei is possibly the best logical means to satisfy the aspiration of the Xhosas.  One could perhaps just say that all the different aspirations expressed for Xhosa unity was emotionally loaded.  In the unstable instable(?) that we had in the Eastern Cape the fear we had was that there would be execution of Xhosa unity done without proper thinking and it would lead to further instability, so this had to do with ordering the situation.
	Now the feeling in the Eastern Cape was that Xhosa unity had to come.  The question was just how it should come into being and when.  And then the incorporation of the corridor in Xhosaland with upset the whites in the area, especially the right-wing people may try to get some gains out of this.  But there is a common factor which would make this more acceptable for people, and that would of course be the great economic growth that would be possible and the government must be prepared to pay for this incorporation.
	Paragraph 17:  A formidable Xhosa ally would be positive for the RSA and this could then be used to keep the people contained and together Xhosaland can also then fight against this onslaught.   And from a military idea that was the aim, that was in the counter-revolutionary war.

MR KNOETZE: Then in paragraph 18 you start with personalities, could you also just discuss that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson yes, the first one is Charles Sebe.  We saw him as the logical leader of the XWB.  He enjoyed a lot of status, especially among the Security Forces, that's the police and the army of both countries.  He had the background, the ability, the personality, the stature, to activate and lead the XWB, but he was someone that you had to control - I don't know what the Afrikaans word is, he was a maverick.  And we felt that we had to strictly control him in order to let this plan proceed orderly.
	Then page 88.  He projects traditional authority and it can then be expected that the Security Forces and the older generation will support him.  Opposition from the left and the youth and also from Lennox could be expected, but that kind of opposition must be wisely turned around.
	Paragraph 7:  Should Charles for any reason not be able to lead the XWB, then we would have to look at other leaders such as Brigadier Holomisa and Major Sandile who were part of the Transkei Army as other candidates for the leadership role.
	And D:  Charles' physical and psychological health condition must be strengthened after he had been freed.

MR KNOETZE: Right, then paragraph 19, the XWB.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This movement's headquarters I saw that in the command area, probably in Port Elizabeth.  That was just so that control could be exercised so that we don't lose control over them so that a power base can be built up.  And then accommodation facilities should be made available, capital must be provided.
	And then page 89:  Covert Xhosa-speaking troops.  Now with troops it is meant people who had already received training as constables or soldiers so that you don't have to start with training right from the start.  They should be appointed to the XWB so that this movement could have teeth with visible power.  The XWB would then operate under the cover of a front organisation as a counter-revolutionary movement.
	And then just the conclusion.  The course of action or variations is then the cardinal idea to fight the revolution in the Eastern Cape.  2 and 3 are watered-down models and would not have the same effect as action 1. 
	And then in 21 I ask for approval in principle for action 1 or then alternatively for courses 2 and 3.  And then I also ask if such approval is granted, that it is suggested that a team be assembled to give details to this plan, because this plan wasn't written for execution but it was written just to suggest the idea and then I signed the whole plan.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  If we can now return to Annexure A, paragraph 20 on page 21, the top part there.  Now you have already said that you took it to Pretoria and you gave it to your direct superior.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.  What I read now I presented to General Liebenberg.

MR KNOETZE: Could you perhaps just quickly say what his reaction was and what happened after that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well the first presentation, General Liebenberg told me that it's not a bad plan, we won't be able to do everything, but he can see that this plan can assist us in the Eastern Cape with the problems that we were experiencing.  He then, well sometime later, sent Colonel van Wyk to Port Elizabeth to give his input into the plan and Plan 1 that I have just presented was then rewritten and that led to Plan 2.

MR KNOETZE: Who is Colonel van Wyk?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: His first name, that was Ferdie van Wyk.

MR KNOETZE: And the second rendition of this plan is 113 of the bundle, could you just proceed to that?  In whose handwriting is this?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is the handwriting of Colonel Piet Hall.  He was my senior Staff Officer of Operations in Commandment Eastern Cape.  He was assisted in writing this by Colonel Ferdie van Wyk and Commandant Lourens du Plessis.  Colonel van Wyk represented the Chief of the Army and du Plessis was also one of my staff officers.

MR KNOETZE: General would you please just continue and refer the Committee to the differences between the second rendition and the first one.