Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Thank you. We talk about the issues of the time. Mr Chairman this is a very important question and I'm going down to the, I'm going to refer now to the joint management system where you had various geographical areas. What I did and that was prior to the national joint management system, before that came into working. I went to each and every centre, JMC to see how they operate because they were responsible for the security of people, for the welfare of people and the economic viability of people. And education and things to that effect. To improve it. In other words instead of having a government at the top looking down, it was a question of bringing it down to a lower level. Let's say the grassroot level. I went to most of these JMC's, well I went to everyone. But to some of them I went even five times to improve their functioning, co-ordinated functioning. Because the departments like, let's put it in public welfare department, public works department. And departments like that saw the security matter completely away, not being their responsibility but the so-called security forces. In other words the police and the military to do that.
 I'll give you a very good example. There was an uprising in Queenstown and the chairman of the joint management centre went there to establish what was the problem. And they established that the uprising was because there wasn't running water, sufficient and toilets. So he called in the chap who was the representative of the department, who was responsible for that and he said: "You got to do something about it." And the chap said: "It's not a priority." And he said: "But don't you realise what's happening in this country? You're aggravating the security situation. You're not getting the people to our side. Do something about it," And there he started with that type of example all over the country in getting a combined unit to assist and to improve the situation of the people. 
 I took the State President and some of my colleagues to Port Elizabeth. I took them especially to Soweto by the sea. It's the most filthiest place I've ever been to. Sewerage water running in the streets. We came on a little square there where women folk and children were selling their stuff, a fleamarket type of situation. And the president there addressed the Minister who was responsible for public works and he said: "You'd better erect here roofs and coverage for rain and for the sun. Give then a viable environment." He even went further because according to the law you weren't allowed to do it if you haven't got a licence. And he said: "I couldn't care less about. In this country stop that type of limitation. Let's open it up. Let's get people to help themselves." 
 The reason why I'm explaining this is to give you an idea there was a very sensitivity towards it. Whether it was done enough or too late, that's a different question. I an recall we went to a certain place there where people were housed into, in horse stables. Horse stables that were erected by the British troops in the late 1800's. You can't expect people to live in those conditions.

MS MADIKIZELA: But that is precisely my point General. Thank you very much I appreciate your response. I'm glad you make reference to Queenstown. I know Umlungisi township in Queenstown very well and I know they battle in Queenstown I know. What happened in Queenstown is a microcosm of what was happening in the rest of the country. That people lived under those kinds of conditions which were really quite deplorable as you yourself has pointed out.
 But the point I'm making is if we look back and we review all that happened. The counter insurgency, the death that resulted as result of it, the actions by the ANC, does the notion of the ANC as an enemy or the notion of the supporters or fellow travellers of the ANC as an enemy help us in understanding what happened in the past? Now the point I was making is that for me it seems that it blurs our understanding. Because as you yourself point out people were living under those conditions and I know for example that in Queenstown the issue of toilets and water were very topical and it lead to boycotts of shops in Queenstown and in wars in Queenstown.
 Now it undermines, if we simply say that we were fighting an enemy or the government was fighting an enemy. It undermines some of the fundamental reasons that lead to the conditions of fighting or of the war or it avoids some of those conditions. And I think that's it. I'm not going to belabour the point.
 But another question I want to ask you, make perhaps a comment from you is whether you think that the South African Defence Force in it's counter insurgency crossed the line from being a peace keeping force to one that monopolised violence as a strategy for it's own use?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Mr Chairman if I can refer back to the comment that you made. I agree with you. It's a pity we had a war. Because the problems we had at that stage are still here at present. If we combined our efforts earlier on and did it in a different way, now this is hindsight talking now, it would have been much better. But again we talking about the period and the heart breaking things of a situation in our country where fellow South Africans were fighting each other. It's a pity. And people were killed. I feel very sorry and I apologise it from my side. But I'm coming to the next one with peace keeping against violence.
 If we talk about the, and I'm talking about internally specifically now. If we talk about the situation in South Africa, as a peace keeping versus a violent type of organisation, South Africa was a peace keeping one. We're talking about thousands of troops who committed themselves, who went there and assisted and they knew it was winning the hearts and minds of people.
 I'm going to tell you a story now and I'm referring to Tembisa. And it was a very wicked place, Tembisa. There were very few - I wouldn't say law abiding people. But law and order couldn't be enforced there. It was difficult through various reasons. But when the troops moved in there the first time, my biggest problem was to tell them you'd better take the tea and the biscuits that the ladies are giving you in that township. Drink and eat it to show and to acknowledge their hospitality. I talk about the old South Africa, they were peace keeping troops. And I'm talking about 95 percent plus. You had certain elements who were violent and I'm very sorry about that. But they weren't organised to be violent if I can put it that way. It was mostly individuals that were involved. One day when we talk about the history I'm afraid that the period that we are referring to now is gonna be a bad blob in our history. And I'm talking about a century forward or two centuries. They will always say: "Why couldn't the people of South Africa get together and join hands?"

MS MADIKIZELA: Thank you Chairperson just one last question. Talking about hearts and minds, we are very clear about what that meant in relation to black people in South Africa. What was your strategy to win the hearts and minds of white people in South Africa?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: We never as a military organisation, we never set a goal in winning the hearts and minds of white people as such because we're talking in a sense of haves and haves not. It was the haves not, they were the majority. They were the people who really suffered to a greater extent. They were the group that you had to get on your side if you want to win a revolutionary war.

MS MADIKIZELA: I suppose I mean that in a literal sense. How did you get the white community to be supportive of the strategies used by the Defence Force?