Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-09-09

UNKNOWN: Thank you Mr Chair.  In fact our investigative unit have been providing background material on this matter and one of the propositions that they have put, and I would like your comment on this, is that at that critical period, 92, the South African government found itself in a dilemma and this is what brought about the dilemma.
 Ciskei was a very valuable ally for the South African government in the negotiations process and therefore its continued existence under a strongly anti- ANC government was crucial because Ciskei was still being used by these strongly anti- ANC government elements as a base for covert operations by conservative SADF elements, who planned to launch an armed attack on the Transkei intending to kill Chris Hani and Bantu Holomisa.
 So that therefore if Gqozo's government collapsed, that operation would have been jeopardised.  That's the one scenario.  
 You need the Ciskei, you need it under an anti- ANC dictatorship.  Elements in the South African Defence Force need that environment for covert operations and Chris Hani and Holomisa being at that time in the Transkei, one of the objectives was to mount this armed attack, take out Chris Hani and Bantu Holomisa.  
 But at the same time Gqozo had become an embarrassment to your government, particularly because of that inquest which you talked about.  You had sent this gentleman, your Deputy Minister on the 26th August and the inquest, this refusal to go to the inquest of Charles Sebe and Onward Gonzana and this refusal to your Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raymond Schoeman, and of course also Mickey Webb and all those people, specifically to discuss, you had sent these men specifically to discuss the refusal to allow the inquest.  
 The support therefore by South Africa was crucial to Gqozo at that time in order to deal with the march.  That's the scenario.  I would like to therefore get your views on this.  You have on the one hand an embarrassment but on the other hand you need to retain him to the extent that there are these other designs.

PIK BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, if I had any wish to get rid of Mr Chris Hani, I would simply not have stopped the events on that day.  I would not have called him to an hotel, pleaded with him and with Cyril.  I cannot speak for other departments.  The fact of the matter is all my documents are either with the UN, contained in speeches, or in files.  The Commission is welcome to call them up.  
 Ciskei was an embarrassment to me.  I cannot see for the life of me how anyone can allege it was an ally.  I just don't see why and how, particularly after we started the negotiations.  I quoted at length here to indicate that full re-incorporating was agreed to.  Full re-incorporating.  There was never any doubt in my mind that the sooner re-incorporating could take place the better.
 I will gladly make available reports by Mr Jimmy van der Merwe I think, and a man called Dr Pretorius  [indistinct]  who was also fired by Brigadier Gqozo.  I'll ask him to give the reports.  
 It was an impossible situation but the same happened in Transkei, the same happened in Venda, to a lesser extent in Bophuthatswana.  I said earlier today that the country has not yet learned what happened to certain hundreds of billions.  People were promoted who should not have been promoted but that is a different matter.  I'm answering the question.   There is not even the slightest possibility that I could have rejoiced in the continued independence of any of these states.  I made public statements which I will give the Commission in which I said all three military dictators must go.  The sooner the better.  All three of them, because there was no way and I invite you now to consult with the Auditor General.
 There was just no way to get any picture of what went on with the finances in these three states.  Just no way and the moment you tried to touch them they said, look you're a white guy from a white government, don't touch us, we're independent and this is a just an old form of baaskap and apartheid.  
 It was a very difficult position to be in, very very difficult indeed.  I just want to assure the Commission.  I know of events but I do not know the truth about those events.  I still don't know exactly what the facts are surrounding the killing of Charles Sebe.  There was an attempt here to invade the Ciskei, remember the late Mr Lenox Sebe asking me to bring President de Klerk here to Cabin.  They showed us weapons and arms here near a government building, which they discovered.
 I was aware that Mr George Matanzima had the Salute Scouts Commander trying to train people, for what, I don't know.  I was Minister of Foreign Affairs having one struggle, that was to try and get the budget's approve of these four states.  That was to try to stop them from going to Austria to buy buses whose doors open on the wrong side of the road.  I, if you, that assurance here today, that was my struggle.  Mr Bantu Holomisa, General Bantu Holomisa once said to me that, he said to me you don't know what's going on in your Security Forces.  Maybe I didn't.
 I can only tell you what the Department of Foreign Affairs' policy was.
 I did my best with the Development Bank of Southern Africa.  Please call in a man called Dr Deon Richter.  He will tell you of the hours we spent together to implement adjustment programmes.  It was clear to me that TBVC states had to be incorporated.  The sooner the better.  I propagated it.  As a matter of fact the ANC said no.  I prepared the Bill, Mr Chairperson, which I wanted to take to Parliament.  It was stopped.  They said Jo don't go, you're not going to deal unilaterally with this, you'll wait for incorporation until the election because the ANC didn't want, at that stage, to get rid of Bantu Holomisa or Rhamashan in Venda.  These are the facts.
 I wanted to get rid of all of them.  I can truthfully say this and I said it publicly.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  Order please!  Just wait.  Thank you very much Mr Botha.  I want to try and find out your schedule because I believe you were supposed to be being picked at 330.

PIK BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, yes I would like to catch a plane in East London at 530 if it's possible.  Now if the Traffic Officers won't prosecute my car driver, I can spend a few more minutes here and there is a date with some media people out there but I'm in your hands.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I, we will appeal to the, the Premiere is here, will you tell your traffic cops not to, maybe they should even escort you.  We will try, just maybe, I'll, I think maybe say five more minutes or so.  Thank you very much.  Boraine?