Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-10

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Mr Chairman, I do believe that whoever it was, senior people of the Force, government, whoever, believed that it suited or the means justified the ends that there would have been a blind eye turned.

MR VISSER: Mr Adrian Vlok, on more than one occasion gave evidence, particularly in the COSATU House and the Khotso House amnesty application, that with hindsight he considers himself guilty of exerting pressure by making use of certain phrases and certain language whereby the impression could have been created with members of the Police, that they were expected to act illegally.
	Is that really what you were referring to at this particular stage?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I would say so, because being exhorted to hunt the enemy, drive them out, whatever.  To our mind at that stage there wasn't a lot of ways or many ways in which to interpret that.

MR VISSER: Yes, and also as far as the awarding of medals were concerned, where it now appears quite frequently, that medals were rewarded where in fact the actions that were taken, were in fact illegal and which again, would have instilled a bona fide belief with the members, did it not, that there was condonation of what they were doing, although it was illegal?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I believe so Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes.  And Gen Van der Merwe gave evidence, perhaps you can just tell the Committee what he said and whether you agree with that.

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: My understanding is that Gen Van der Merwe said that we were practically being in a war situation, it was understandable that members of the Security Branch, that the distinction between what is legal and illegal, could become a very grey area, and he could understand our members who were involved in this political war, could well believe or have bona fide belief that if they did something illegal for the government, it fell within the parameters of our duties, because we were doing what was expected of us.

MR VISSER: Did you have that same ...

MR MALAN: Sorry, where - this quote, do you have a reference to that?  I didn't find that specific quote in his statement.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, yes, I am afraid, we didn't want to burden the record with adding the record of the COSATU House/Khotso House, it comes from that amnesty application.
	If you wish, we  could make a printout of that page and give it to you.

MR MALAN: I will appreciate it if it is available.

MR VISSER: Yes certainly Mr chairman, we will do that.
	I must say that there is a reference to the grey area also in the papers now before us, my Attorney is just looking for it, if he finds it, I will draw your attention to that reference Mr Chairman.
	In paragraph 10(a) and (b) of your written application, at page 27 - 30 of the Bhila volume, you briefly stated general aspects of the political objective in regard to the particular act for which you apply for amnesty for.
	Do you confirm the contents thereof?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I do Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: In point of fact, before I forget, do you confirm the whole of your written application form, apart from those issues relating to the facts of this incident, which we will address later, and which you will attempt to give an explanation for certain divergent evidence, which appears.
	Apart from that, do you confirm the correctness of the balance of your affidavit?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I do Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am going to interrupt the leading of the evidence, because this is important.  We are referring to page 165 of the Zandile bundle 1.  In paragraph 26, you will find a paragraph in the statement by the Generals, so here it is not particularly Gen Van der Merwe speaking, but the contents of this, I would gladly read to you Mr Chairman, it says the nature of this conflict and violence, blurred the traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants, between legitimate and illegitimate targets and more importantly, between acceptable and unacceptable methods.
	They often occurred in a grey area between legitimate orders given, the interpretation of such orders in circumstances where secrecy and other factors made proper communication difficult or impossible.  The requests which were not always properly expressed or formulated and a mixing of cultures of the various Security departments through the National Management System, which negatively effected the normal day to day functioning of the South African Police.
	But we will find the other and let you have it Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: If I could just point out that this does not refer to illegal acts being their duties, which was what I referred to previously.

MR VISSER: Yes, I take your point Mr Chairman.  Would you care to elaborate on the question of political objectives to what you have already stated in your application, at pages 27 - 30 Mr Rosslee?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I can only speak from my viewpoint and from what I have heard and seen from friends and colleagues of mine in the SAP.
	I would like to say in the case, many of us served on the South African borders and outside the South African borders and South West Africa or Namibia and Angola, and I in particular, I think did seven tours of duty in the bush.  I was subjected to counter-insurgency training, advanced training and also served and was subjected to or underwent further counter-insurgency training in South West Africa with the Koevoet Unit.
	What it boils down to is myself and a lot of members in those days, were trained to think and act like soldiers.

MR VISSER: You have told us that when returning to Civvy Street as it were, you had certain problems to adapt.  After you became transferred to ...

MR MALAN: Sorry Mr Visser, may I just get some indication from the applicant, what does he mean by trained and act like soldiers.  Could you just describe that for us?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Mr Chairman, to my way of thinking when I became a policeman, I wasn't going to be hunting terrorists on a daily basis where they were using explosives, automatic weapons and that sort of thing against us.
	My mind, when I became a policeman was, we are going to catch criminals, take them to courts of law, and they were going to be incarcerated.  In this case, we were fighting a war.

MR MALAN: Was your understanding that you would fight it, indeed like is expected of a member of the Defence Force, like a soldier in other words, within a discipline and hierarchy and structure, that indeed rules existed, or are you using this in a metaphorical way, different to what is expected of a soldier?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Sorry Mr Chairman, I am not quite with the question there.

MR MALAN: Were you to act basically as a member of the Defence Force or are you saying more than that?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I believe that Mr Chairman, that we probably did more than that, because we were a specialised unit, and more was expected of us.

MR MALAN: What more?  Could you please describe that.  I am not sure how I should understand your evidence.  If you say we were trained to act like soldiers, soldiers are also subject to rules, discipline, order.

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I agree with you.

MR MALAN: What are you saying, are you saying only that?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Sir, I agree that yes, we had the discipline, we had the training, there were structures, etc, but the line between being a soldier and a war situation and being a policeman, are very different things in my mind.

MR MALAN: That I fully understand, I want to understand what you mean by being a soldier, that is effectively like any other member of the Defence Force or any special Task Unit, subject to their rules, subject to the discipline, subject to orders of higher officers?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I agree to that.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand, you are talking about soldiers in a war situation, not soldiers in peace?