Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-05-11

GEORGE BIZOS: I'm merely saying Mr Chairman, the reason - we're characterising the nature of the evidence that we'll be able to give but we will go through the evidence at the end together with -  now the other matter Mr Chairman, that we want to deal with is this, that the issue of what information there was available to the leadership of the ANC and the guards from the evening of Sunday the 27th right up to shortly before the attack took place at 11h13 at Shell House.
	In bundle A you will find from page 13, a summary of what appears and a detailed index of what appears on SAP channel 27.  That only starts at 07h38 on the morning of the 28th.  However, information as to what might or was likely to happen was available to the ANC leadership from the night before.  A number of affidavits were filed at the inquest proceedings including the affidavit of Mr Tokyo Sexwale in bundle B, pages 68 - 74 - there was more than one affidavit, Mr Chairman, from which it appears in point 2.1 that he had information that the ANC and PWB Regional Office in Shell House would come under attack.  In paragraph 4 at page 69 he communicated this to General Calitz because there was a query Mr Chairman - you will recall that paragraph 2 says what his information was and what the people were going to do,
"There was a query during the inquest proceedings as to whether I immediately telephoned General Koos Calitz at his home late in the afternoon to inform him of the above that that did not refer to paragraph 2."
We submit that it is a wrong interpretation of paragraph 4 but wanting to make it clear that that is what he meant.  On page 73 - 74 you will find a supplementary affidavit in which he spells out what he clearly meant.  He considers that he had clearly said in the previous affidavit but in any event the supplementary affidavit puts it beyond any doubt.
	There is also on page 75 an affidavit by Nagede Matthews Phosa, who states that he had information which he conveyed to the then President of the ANC, Mr Nelson Mandela.  Mr Mandela's affidavit on page 47 to page 54 deals with the information that he received from Mr Phosa and others and that the steps that he took in order to prevent the widespread violence that the information indicated there was, and the steps that he took.  He phoned the then President of South Africa, Mr de Klerk, the Commissioner of Police, Mr van der Merwe. And Mr van der Merwe's statement is also in bundle B, pages 42 - 46.  There is a statement of Mr Joe Mtlandla on page 55 - 57, a statement from Mr Maduna on page 58 -62 and a supplementary statement from page 63 - 67.
	Mr Chairman, Mr Mandela's statement we will also refer to in due course under another heading because we submit that the picture that he paints in his affidavit informs the Committee of what we may say is recent, if not present history, to the effect that the issue at the time was whether or not there would be a free and fair election or not, and - but we will refer to that.  I'm sure that every member of the Committee has lived through that history, it may not even be necessary to have evidence before it but it is there.  
	Now, that there was going to be difficulty Mr Chairman, that there were going to be difficulties, that is the information in the possession of the ANC, is also evidenced by a confidential report appearing on page 1 of bundle B.  The origin of that is from the files of the police, Mr Chairman, which was handed in into the inquest proceedings.  Firstly, Mr Chairman, we will draw attention to the fact in the first paragraph, that the information then available was that the IFP Transvaal, would organise originally a march for the 25th but the information then - there will be evidence that there was this information, but then it was changed to the 28th, paragraph 3, 
"That the march is intended"
I'm translating to the best of my ability, Mr Chairman, paragraph 3: 
"that the march is aimed of bringing about disruption in the city."
	The other matter, Mr Chairman, is what happened during the morning from 07h38 on.  For this we refer you to page 13 of bundle A to page 76, Mr Chairman.  I do not intend reading this out Mr Chairman.  May I explain what the document is.  The police have a central radio facility to which policemen out in the field report.  A particular channel is indicated for particular events, channel 27 was chosen for this.  As I indicated earlier it was only disclosed in July when the inquest had been going on for a few months, and what you will see is the time and the report that is made and is recorded on a tape at the centre.  This is a summary.

CHAIRPERSON: This is not a transcript of the tape?