Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: I am then moving on to the organogram contained in the Liebenberg report.  Varney alleges that
 /something
something sinister should be read into the fact that the offensive group was not placed on the same line as the rest of the paramilitary group.  See paragraph 18 of his document - of the Liebenberg report.  Paragraph 24 of this report, of the Liebenberg report, however makes it absolutely clear that the offensive group was part of the paramilitary force.  General Liebenberg made it clear in his evidence that the offensive group forms part of the paramilitary force.  Due to a mistake made by the secretary of the task force, Colonel D C Bernadi - one must remember - can I just stop there?  When these senior military people gets together they don't sit there and write out everything, they've got a secretary, and he finishes the document the next day.  He takes notes and then he goes and writes the whole thing, and they afterwards read it and they sign the document.  So it's not a question of sitting there one evening writing it out, dictating it like we lawyers do it.  They do it on another basis.  And it's common cause, according to the evidence, that due to a mistake made by the secretary of the task group, Colonel B C Bernadi, who drew up the organogram, the offensive group was not showed to be part and parcel of the paramilitary force, it was showed sort of separately.  Having, however, regard to the written portion of the document - compare paragraph 26 of the Liebenberg report - it is clear that it was in fact regarded as part and parcel of the paramilitary force.  It wasn't a separate force.  General Geldenhuys testified that it is standard practice that scarce resources are often kept separate, and allocated and utilised when and where necessary.
 /Now, Dr Williams
Now, Dr Williams agreed with this principle as stated above.  In other words what it boils down to, if you've got a force consisting out of infantry, artillery, etcetera, etcetera, and you also need air support in the form of helicopter support, you will keep your air support separate.  It's your offensive group, but you will use it as and when it is needed.  You're not going to send each small group - you're not going to give each and every group its own helicopter.  It's a scarce resource, and that's - if one looks at the offensive group, they consisted out of 30 people.  You've got three shifts per day.  People can't work for 24 hours around the clock, so what have at the most, you've got 10 people at the time on duty.  Now, we submit it is clear from the above explanation that no sinister inference can be drawn.
General Liebenberg also explained in the KwaMakutha trial how an offensive group can and is being used as a reactionary force to provide protection.  I am not going to deal with all that evidence again.
It is also proposed in this document that the support for Inkatha/KwaZulu Government would be conducted by the Directorate of Military Intelligence with the support of other Defence Force elements where necessary.  The reason why the Director of Military Intelligence was earmarked to handle this project was that it was geared for sensitive liaison and had the necessary facilities and funds available.  
It was also proposed that there should be a full-time project commander.
In terms of this report the following paramilitary activities were envisaged.  A full-time - firstly, a full
 /time leaders
time leaders corps of about 200 members should be trained for the defensive element.  It was proposed that they would be trained in military procedures, convoy, roadblocks, house-to-house search, political meetings and related procedures, dispersing of gatherings, and small calibre weapon training.  A this point in itself, with all due respect, if one compares to what transpired later it shows clearly that the way of thinking of Groenewald and Liebenberg at that stage was that the defensive group would be trained to control people, nothing more.  Small calibre weapon training, etcetera, all those type of things.
Secondly, it was proposed that an offensive element be established, and I quote from the Afrikaans again.
"The purpose of this group was to create a small group of well-trained troops for Inkatha, which could be used offensively against the ANC/UDF and allied organisations.  The group would also be used as bodyguards for Chief Minister Buthelezi.  The group had to be trained covertly by Special Forces in offensive action, sniper tasks, bomb disposal and VIP protection."
It was furthermore suggested that contra-mobilisation planning should take place in co-operation with Ultra It(?) - that was a separate company - and further it was specifically recommended that bodyguards be trained for Chief Minister Buthelezi.  And that was the whole Operation Marion plan when it left Liebenberg's table.
Now, it's important to note that the Liebenberg
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report does not contain recommendations as to how this force should be deployed, the reason being that various other State departments had various tasks to complete before finality could be obtained as to their deployment.  No unlawful inference can also be drawn from this report as it was specifically pointed out by the task group that it was foreseen that certain statutory amendments were required. 
Many of the details contained in the Liebenberg report were, however, never implemented.  For instance paragraphs 21 to - and I note there paragraph 21, paragraph 22, paragraph 23, paragraph 24, paragraph 28 (d), paragraph 29, and see record, pages 3175 to 3178.  So what it boils down to, they prepared a plan, they made certain recommendations, people could accept certain of these recommendations or they couldn't.  In this case some were accepted and others weren't.  Some of the plans were never implemented and - but it doesn't take the matter against the military any further.  It's just an ordinary military plan.
It is clear from letter dated the 16th of April 1986, Exhibit E2, page 99, and more specifically paragraph 8 thereof, that during the final discussions held between Chief Minister Buthelezi and Admiral Pitter that the Chief Minister differed with the impression created in the organogram, and insisted that all members of the paramilitary task group, including the offensive group, be trained as a unit.  We say that is the end of any sinister meaning of the offensive training given by Varney to the Liebenberg report, because on the 16th of April, when the Chief Minister saw this document - and probably it's been
 /discussed
discussed with him - he said, "No, but they must be trained as one group."  Where's the sinister impression now about each one?  It falls away.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just to interrupt there, Mr de Vos.  You led to understand some minutes ago, or about half an hour ago, that final authority for this project was granted on the 17th of April.  Now, the document of the 16th of April specifically says that training should start  on that very day, which means recruitment would have taken place, infrastructure would have been in place, the decision clearly would have been taken to ensure that these people were in Caprivi, ready to start training.  Now, how does the ... (intervention)