Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

MR DU TOIT: Would you look at the bottom of page 248, and then over to 249.  The question is what should be the name of such a force.  That's the very first paragraph, Mr Chairperson, on page 249.  Secondly whether that new force should be attached to the South African Police - to the South African Police Force or to the Municipal Police, or thirdly, whether it should be a third force on its own.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: The pros and the cons are discussed on the same page, and there is then a suggestion that it should be attached as an auxiliary force to the South African Police Force.

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: Could we also draw your attention, Mr Chairperson and Commissioners, to page 255, the third new paragraph. Is it correct that at this stage there were a few special constables already employed?  You'll see the middle paragraph, which  will roughly translate.

MR DU TOIT: "Through the special constables the South African Police have, within a few

MR DU TOIT: /"months,

MR DU TOIT: "months, already freed the black townships inch by inch from the grip of the alternative structures."

MR DU TOIT: Do you see that?

WITNESS:   Yes, that's correct.  That was before they were deployed her in Natal.

MR DU TOIT: And the idea is now to - or the suggestion is made to employ thousands of the special constables and attach them as an auxiliary force to the South African Police Force.

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: This is then what you knew of special constables when you were employed at the Divisional Headquarters and when you went to Trust Feed as station commander.

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Now, in the document - just to complete the picture, is it correct that in the research document of the Catholic Institute for International Relations it is shown that a number - that would be annexure G, Volume III, on page 691, if I could ask you to just go to that.  691, the middle paragraph starting with, "This situation," and the second line.

MR DU TOIT: "An additional 16 000 "kits konstabels" ..."

MR DU TOIT: special constables,

MR DU TOIT: "... and Municipal Policemen were added to the police force."

MR DU TOIT: This is on page 691, I am sorry.

MR DU TOIT: "Many known members of the vigilante groupings were drawn into the new forces, and the strength of the entire South African Police is only 48 000 at that time.  The deployment of an

MR DU TOIT: /"additional

MR DU TOIT: "additional 16 000 new policemen meant that the numerical strength of the SAP was increased by a third."

MR DU TOIT: It would appear then that about 16 000 special constables, Municipal Constables, were then in fact attached - employed and attached to the South African Police Force, is that correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: I think you have said this morning that they were then deployed countrywide, and they were attached to the various Riot Units, just to complete the picture.

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: And to further complete the picture as far as Pietermaritzburg is concerned, could I ask you to go to page 789 of the research document, annexure G.  Page 789.  Do you see the heading there, "Pietermaritzburg Gets Kits Konstabels"?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Would you just read out the first two paragraphs, ending with the last paragraph on the next page please.  Just read that, thank you.

MR DU TOIT: "On the 1st of March 1988 Adriaan Vlok, Minister of Police, announced that special police might be sent to Pietermaritzburg if they were needed for the maintenance of law and order.  The next day it was revealed that 300 special constables had started duty there the previous night.  The political affiliations of these ... "

MR DU TOIT: (intervention)

MR DU TOIT: Of those.

MR DU TOIT: "... of those who were trained had not

MR DU TOIT: /"been screened

MR DU TOIT: "been screened prior to their recruitment.  Brigadier Millet, Vlok's press secretary, said that the constables understood that they must not take sides.  He went on to explain that the police were not allowed to take part in any extremist organisations like the UDF or the AWB, but could be part of an organisation like Inkatha."

MR DU TOIT: And the next paragraph.

MR DU TOIT: "The "kits konstabels" had all been recruited from the Pietermaritzburg area, and had been armed with shotguns.  Their role was to reinforce the South African Police."

MR DU TOIT: And the next paragraph on the next page please.

WITNESS:   		     "Despite alarm expressed by the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness and the PFP that the training of the constables was inadequate Brigadier Millet said that the special police were extremely popular with the local people in various parts of South Africa."

MR DU TOIT: And the next first line - sentence.

MR DU TOIT: "A week and a half later at least five "kits konstabels" were dismissed on account of alleged involvement in crimes."

MR DU TOIT: Now, if it is correct that 300 special constables came to Pietermaritzburg on the 1st of March of 1988 what, 	/according

MR DU TOIT: according to you, would have happened to them?  Where

MR DU TOIT: would they have been deployed?

WITNESS:   They were deployed in the flash points or the unrest areas where the violence was.

MR DU TOIT: And to what would they have been attached?  What unit or what section, the special constables?

WITNESS:   To the Riot Unit.

MR DU TOIT: Now, it is common cause that a couple of months later, on the 2nd/3rd December 1998, the same year, a couple of months after the "kits konstabels" or the special constables came to 'Maritzburg, you employed and used these special constables in the Trust Feed area.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: And they were brought there on the instruction of the officer commanding of Riot Unit 8, Major Terblanche.

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: How did you see that as against the strategy which you have drawn the attention of the Committee to, Mr Mitchell?

WITNESS:   I saw it falling within the strategy.

MR DU TOIT: Although it is not necessary in my humble view to deal with the matters in detail, and it will be dealt with else where I would imagine, the counter measures also include measures directed at the use of the media, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Counter measures in the church sphere.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Would that include certain personalities such as the Reverend Allan Boesak?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Dr Beyers Naude?

WITNESS:   That's correct.

MR DU TOIT: And Archbishop Desmond Tutu?

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: /Is it

MR DU TOIT: Is it your view that the strategy was indeed implemented?

WITNESS:   Sorry, say that again.

MR DU TOIT: Is it your view which the strategy which is set out in annexure A, the strategy document, was indeed implemented in practice?

WITNESS:   Yes, it was.

MR DU TOIT: Can we now go back to your affidavit on page 24, paragraph 97.  Page 24 of Volume I in paragraph 97.  You have now set out the strategy, and it would appear that indeed thousands of special constables were attached to the police force.  What was the general attitude within the circles that you moved as far as this province, Natal, is concerned?

WITNESS:   It was said that - and repeatedly said, that not a further inch of Natal was to be lost to the UDF/ANC.

MR DU TOIT: And what was the stance in respect of Inkatha in this total strategy?

WITNESS:   The police sided with Inkatha, and they also instructed them on counter tactics against the Comrades, who were armed and trained to fight against the police, SADF and Inkatha.

MR DU TOIT: You were also appointed as the stratkom officer for the division, is that correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct.