Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

WITNESS:   If you are referring to the National Defence Force, we were not in a position to make logistical preparations.  As I said, when this started to happen, and you will realise or remember back that all the main political people were involved, like President Mandela, Mr de Klerk, and it was really a situation of this community asking for Government to assist.  Once the Defence Force were given the resources we had to sort out the logistics, which even today is not favourable, in the sense that we had to - that we had to accommodate our troops in a place like Mayor's Walk.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, what I am trying to understand is this, and you must remember that I myself was in the SADF as a national serviceman.  I understand how it works, I understand the lines of command, I understand all that stuff.  And you must also remember that I've worked with policemen for years as an attorney.  I understand how their lines of communication work.

WITNESS:   Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  I have also represented clients on the receiving end of, for example, the security process, and I've sat through trials listening how decisions get made.  And what I can't understand is that when it suited the State it could act with immense speed and power.  When certain areas came under threat that the State really wanted to protect they did so effectively and quickly, and you'll concede that.

WITNESS:   Sir, let me say to you that I cannot talk on behalf of the State.  I ... (intervention)

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Well, in your experience - sorry, I'll allow you to continue.  I beg your pardon.

WITNESS:   You must remember that I was part of this organisation on a group headquarters level, and obviously as a thinking person the authorities of that period had their factors to appreciate, and they had reasons for doing things.  So I cannot answer on behalf of the State, Sir.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Who sat with you on that joint planning committee?

WITNESS:   Initially at the early stages of '89 and early parts of '90 it was essentially a low level planning thing between the company commander and - the Stability Police, I believe they were called then.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Yes.  Who were those individuals?  We just want to know that.

WITNESS:   Well, you know, I can't recall all those names.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL: Order please.  Order please.  (Pause)   This is serious.  We are not in the circus, we are about business.  Please, give us the time.  Okay.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Thank you.  Sorry, Brigadier, for that interruption.  As commander of Group Nine you would have been part of the joint management structure.

WITNESS:   Yes, I was.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  And that joint management structure was primarily responsible for waging what was called the total strategy.  Correct?

WITNESS:   Well, I don't know what you mean by that.  /Are you

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL: Are you referring to our own here in Pietermaritzburg?

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  I am referring to a national policy, in terms of top secret documentation that's been made available to this Commission, and that has been confirmed, both in terms of the de Kock trial, the Malan trial, and a number of amnesty applications before this Commission.  So you don't have to be afraid to tell us about it.  You're not breaching the Official Secrets Act or anything like that.

WITNESS:   Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  It's in the public terrain.

WITNESS:   Yes.  Sir, you know, if one looks at the management structure you're talking about then one must realise that the structure of that time in Pietermaritzburg was the police - I think about three or four brigadiers in this area - and myself, and we had some subcommittees looking at the social economic side of things, and the matters we dealt with was the maintenance of law and order in this area.  In the process, of course, plans were made and executed throughout Natal.  And that I know about as the commander of Group Nine.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, Brigadier, we're quite familiar with this whole structure.  It's not a secret any longer.

WITNESS:  Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  And it was that structure and its substructures which, for example, authorised what later happened in Trust Feeds.  And what we want to know from you is what did that structure do about what was clearly a dangerous situation developing in the Edendale Valley?  And, you know, from what you're saying, you're saying the SADF could do nothing, it was up to the police to organise it, you didn't have the resources.  Is that correct?   Is that impression we're getting, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Well, Sir, you have to look at the Natal situation of the time, and essentially yes, in this area the Defence Force, due to other factors outside our control, simply didn't have the resources ... (incomplete - end of Side B, Tape 2) ... and in fact it happened, but it happened for different reasons.  And even today the part-time forces are being called up to deal with specific things in the Natal Midlands.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  I have one question which is a follow-up to Mr Lax.  When I listened to Mr Mkhize yesterday, when I listened to Mr Keys, and when I listened to Father Smith today, their response was to a crisis situation.  I almost heard there was a sense of panic in the way they responded.  I am not getting the sense of panic from you when you received the first call, which told you that people were killing, were looting, and they were fighting.  Mr Mkhize specifically told us that he panicked, he phoned the police, he phoned the Justice Department, the Minister of Law and Order, the Riot Unit, almost all the resources that could be mobilised.  I do understand that you were in a position of power.  Can you just help us briefly to tell us how was your response to this crisis which would indicate to us that you panicked about events?

WITNESS:   Madam, I must first say that it was an extremely sad period, and in my role as the military commander of this area I did what I could, namely the authorities in the military line of command, who are really the people with the power, were  informed about this situation on a minute-to-minute basis.  We of course had the same sense of urgency in a professional way, in the sense that we started to organise, and we assisted a lot of people with limited resources at our disposal.  To mobilise a Defence Force, or even parts of the Defence Force, is not and was not within my power.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  One more question.  These three other people actually went - they went to the places where there was this fighting.  Did you go there?  Where did you go?

WITNESS:  Madam, the police were in full command of this operation.  According to the plan the troops that we had were involved in that thing - in a limited way, as was described.  I myself went out to the area to see for myself what was happening.   And because of my observation there, and having visited these refugee camps, having visited the people that were going to all these places, I again went back and I said to the authorities, "This is a situation that needs intervention on a senior level."  Secondly we also then extended an invitation to the authorities of this area in saying that we can mobilise doctors, medical personnel if they need us to do so.  And at the time Edendale Hospital said, "Thank you, but we can cope with the situation."  So, Madam, that was my reaction.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL: Thank you.