Amnesty Hearings — Pietersburg — 1997-07-02

A J G ERWEE: I made no notes at the time of the incident.  These notes I made after I learnt from Brig Ivor Human that he was investigating a case of possible perjury or obstructing the course of justice against me.  I then sat down and made notes as to what had moved me at that stage, to deal with this case docket in a watered-down fashion.
	Chairperson, if I may continue.  At that stage the political opponents were already waging a serious violent struggle against the constitutional dispensation of the time.  With mass mobilisation, establishment of underground structures, alternative structures, et cetera, there was a level of equilibrium which reigned between the constitutional dispensation of the day and the violent political opponents thereof. This manifested itself in intimidation, murders of members of the South African Police, their informers, helpers and agents, and it became extremely difficult for us to maintain an information network or in any way to develop it.  Obviously the intelligence network was the most important structure to provide information to the system in order to make strategic decisions, to undermine the political opponents and murders on SAP members, agents and informers, it would not have been in the interest of the State at that time, in respect of the causal events, to have made this known in any detail.  Leakages could have occurred with the typing of statements.  The administrative process within the Police also exposed it.  The administrative process within the Department of Justice, a formal trial would involve the broader public and this would be supported by the media. It would not be in the interests of the State - it would not have been in the interests of maintaining the status quo to reveal these techniques and methods and a further risk would have been incurred.  
	Firstly, members in the provinces with these international borders, their modus operandi, one of low-border intelligence networks would have been revealed.  This would have had the result that existing networks could have collapsed, and that networks could not be further developed.  Members and their families could possibly become victims of violence and members ran the risk of being arrested in these states or countries and charges of espionage could also become a reality.  
	Even existing agents and informers could possibly be affected by a fierce psychosis, because they were operating very close to a shallow border.  There was a risk of their lives involved and they ran the risk of criminal prosecutions, if they helped South Africa, and more specifically, the security branch with information regarding espionage.
	Thirdly, my decision must also be seen in the broader national context. The modus operandi of cross border or shallow border operations, it is a customary practice to develop and maintain intelligence networks.  So there was much more at stake than just the northern province.  For me it was in the interests of the total national intelligence network.
	As already mentioned, the information network is probably the most important component to shore up the dispensation of the day, vis-a-vis its political opponents.  And I believed, therefore, that I was acting lawfully in the interests of the State and that I was acting within the course and scope of my capacities and competence. In fact, I received no criticism from my seniors or from the Department of Justice saying that I had not handled the inquest properly. 
	The media reports which were released and which indicated that a seventh member had escaped, had stimulated me in my decision to deal with the inquest in the way that I did. 
	For that reason I appointed Swarts to deal with the inquest. He knew the facts exactly and he also would know how to handle the inquest docket, in such a way so that the total causal chain of events would not be revealed and which would thereby to some extent Matthews Sehlwana's cover.

UNKNOWN: Now what you are saying to the Committee is that you gave instructions that the full facts should be concealed?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct, yes.

UNKNOWN: And Swarts was your junior?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And Swarts carried out your instructions as we will also hear from him later?

A J G ERWEE: That is also correct.

UNKNOWN: Did you explain to Swarts why you felt that there was a need to conceal certain facts in the affidavits for the inquest?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct.  In fact, I said it to him and his commanding officer, which was Col Dreyer at the time.

UNKNOWN: Now the affidavit which is now Annexure B before the Commission on page 15, Section C - I think it will take some time, but I want to ask you, would you please read this affidavit.

A J G ERWEE: I don't have it with me.

UNKNOWN: May we ask permission to just put it to Capt Erwee?  Please just remember the interpreters.

A J G ERWEE: Okay.
"Andries Johannes Gerhardus Erwee, declares in Afrikaans.  I am number W49247W, a captain in the South African Police, stationed in Pietersburg, where I am attached to the security branch.
		On 10.07.1986 I was the commanding officer of a group of members of the Force, where we were patrolling the Alldays/Breslau Road."

UNKNOWN: Could you please stop there?  That is not strictly speaking correct?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: It is not correct?

A J G ERWEE: It is not correct.

UNKNOWN: Please continue.

A J G ERWEE: "At approximately nine o'clock in the morning and approximately 14 kilometres from the Botswana border,  I noticed a brown Kombi/micro-bus.  The bus was moving in the direction of Alldays and at that stage I noticed a number of Black people in the bus.  I gave the command to the members under my command to stop the bus and to identify the passengers.  When the members wanted to stop the bus, shots were fired from the bus at these members.  The members and I then immediately responded with R1 fire.  I moved closer to investigate and found six Black men in the bus. They were all fatally wounded."

UNKNOWN: That is also not strictly speaking correct as we now know.  One was perhaps fatally wounded but he didn't die there. The impression is here created that they all died as a result of the fire, the shooting from the members of the Force?

A J G ERWEE: Correct, yes.
"The vehicle was searched and six AK rifles, two hand-arms of Russian origin and various other explosive devices were seized."

UNKNOWN: The list of these explosive devices was made available?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct,yes.
"Upon searching the corpses I found on five of these corpses a passbook, five of these bodies or corpses were identified according to their identity books as Thapelo Ronald Mokobedi, with his identity number;  Andre Mohlele with identity number;  Paul Thapeso Etholeng with his ID number; Louis Pascal Botseme with an ID number and then Raymond Oupa Selepe with an identification number.  I have no doubt that the six deceased were ANC terrorists.  Furthermore, I had no choice but to fire at them because it was clear to me when they started firing at us, that they wouldn't surrender themselves.  If we did not answer their fire the lives of our members would have been in danger."
Then it is just the oath.

UNKNOWN: In other words, what you are actually telling the Committee is that apart from concealing of certain facts could constitute an untruth, there are no real untruths in the statement, but it was just a watered-down statement and you are saying that you did that in order to safeguard the interests, to which you have already referred?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And in so far as that amounted to perjury and/or obstructing the course of justice, you are requesting the Committee in the light of the circumstances reigning at the time, to grant amnesty to you?

A J G ERWEE: Yes, it is in that spirit which I request that.