Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-18

GEN STEYN: No, the way it worked was like this.  During Van Sittert's information to me as regards the presence of the armed terrorists, it was discussed with the reaction unit and the person in charge there was Lt Breytenbach that should any action arise out of this incident, the intercepting or arrest of the people whatever, that it would be Lt Breytenbach who would be in charge as far as that part of the operation was concerned.

MR VISSER: Alright, so that necessarily meant that the people from the security branch would then have to report to him or would they still be under your command, your command as overall commander?

GEN STEYN: They would still be under my command.

MR VISSER: But they would carry out Breytenbach's orders?

GEN STEYN: Yes, if circumstances demanded it.

MR VISSER: And what was the plan?  What was the idea to have security branch members there?  What were they supposed to do?

GEN STEYN: The security branch had to give back up and give us the necessary information so that should it become necessary at a later stage that the task force would be able to act.

MR VISSER: And by support that would mean that they would also have to help you to do that?

GEN STEYN: Correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 16?

GEN STEYN: The planning was to the effect that we would wait for the suspects to leave, their vehicle had already been described to us and the reaction unit would then try to intercept these people after having left the house.  The purpose was to arrest them but we were not to endanger our lives.

MR VISSER: Now the question was put during cross-examination whether - it was put to Botha, whether you hadn't discussed beforehand and decided that come what may we are going to kill these people?

GEN STEYN: No, there was no such decision.

MR VISSER: But should you have taken such a decision, would that have been the way in which you would have gone about it?

GEN STEYN: No.  Then we could have done it in a different way and more conveniently so we wouldn't have wanted to go about it in this way on the N2 freeway.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I notice it's 1 o'clock, I won't get through, perhaps it would be convenient to take the break now?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will take the adjournment now, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: May we resume at quarter to 2? Mr Webster?

MR WEBSTER: I'm comfortable with that arrangement, thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn and resume at quarter to 2.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

GEN STEYN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, before I do so, may I ask an indulgence that we might discard such articles of clothing as is not compatible with the temperature in the hall, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: You may do so, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Could I apply that direction too, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you.

MR VISSER: (continues)
	General Steyn, we had proceeded up to page 4, I beg your pardon to page 3.  15 and 16 and 17, Chairperson, we're now on to 18 I believe?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: May you continue with paragraph 18?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, by dusk that evening a radio message came from W/O Shabalala that the suspects had left the house and had departed with that vehicle.  We immediately departed with various vehicles in different directions in order to cover all escape routes.  I drove with Maj Botha, or Director Botha in his vehicle.  Mr Wasserman drove in a mini-bus with two other members.  Taylor drove with his vehicle and the reaction unit with their vehicles.
	The suspects, Chairperson, drove on the N2 from North to South.  There was much traffic and it was difficult to catch up to the vehicle.  In our attempt to catch up with the vehicle, Maj Botha and I observed the vehicle at some stage.  We moved in to the left side of the vehicle and Mr Botha continually shouted "Police, stop".  The vehicle would not stop and attempted to push our vehicle off the road by swerving in our direction.  There was however no contact with our vehicle.  This took place twice.  
	Mr Wasserman was behind us in a kombi with two Black members, Lembede and Mduli.  I observed at some stage that they moved in on the right hand side of the vehicle.  The suspects vehicle collided with the kombi at some stage if I recall correctly.  Shots were fired.

MR VISSER: Can you just say according to your recollection who first fired shots?

GEN STEYN: My recollection, Chairperson, is that Director Botha shot first.

MR VISSER: And what happened afterwards?

GEN STEYN: Directly thereafter several shots were fired.

MR VISSER: From which direction or are you not able to say?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, shots were fired from the kombi which was driven by Mr Wasserman and I don't know how many shots Director Botha fired but he definitely fired a few shots.

MR VISSER: Continue?

GEN STEYN: At the same time from diagonally behind us shots were also fired and shooting ensued from all directions.

MR VISSER: Diagonally behind you?  Was this on the right or on the left?

GEN STEYN: On the right hand side.

MR VISSER: Did you look about to see exactly where the vehicles were, in which the police were, at that stage?

GEN STEYN: No Chairperson, it was all chaos and it was not easy to say that this vehicle was there and the other vehicle was there except for the fact that I knew we were.

MR VISSER: When you observed the vehicle, General Steyn, did you in some or other manner try to inform the other people that you had observed the vehicle on the N2?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.  I did not follow radio procedures as one would do on the normal circumstances but I just shouted that the vehicle had been observed and it moved in this direction.

MR VISSER: And you pursued them?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You say shots were fired from the kombi and from the right hand side behind you and Botha fired shots?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: When this shooting took place what did you think would be the consequence of the shooting that you had heard there with regards to the occupants of the vehicle?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I accepted that the people in that vehicle would either be injured or killed.

MR VISSER: Very well, did you associate yourself therewith and did you then try to stop people?

GEN STEYN: No I did not try to stop anyone and I associated myself therewith.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 23?

GEN STEYN: Because of this shooting and the fact that at this stage this suspects vehicle had been hit several times, this vehicle collided into the back of the kombi which was driven by Wasserman and it stopped.

MR VISSER: You say driven by Wasserman, is that what you recall?

GEN STEYN: That's a mistake, the kombi in which Wasserman was an occupant.

MR VISSER: And the vehicle collided with it from behind and they came to a stop?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And was there any further shooting?

GEN STEYN: I think shots were still fired for a few seconds after which it ceased.  Director Botha Parked our vehicle to the left behind their vehicle and in that process while the shooting was still underway it came to an end.

MR VISSER: What is the inference that you draw, who shot from behind, to the right, behind of the vehicle, who was that?

GEN STEYN: That was the task force.

MR VISSER: And does this concur with your observations after the action had ceased?

GEN STEYN: Yes that is correct, I surmised that the reaction unit members did fire shots.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your question?

MR VISSER: The question was, Chairperson, whether his thought that it was the reaction unit that had shot from the right hand side from behind their vehicle was confirmed by what he observed after the incident was over and he said it did.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Yes, do carry on?