Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-09

MR NTSEBEZA: And you are saying no information was shared with you by the special forces?

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: No, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson thank you very much.  There are a few other matters but given where we are and where we have reached I am not intending to canvass those.

CHAIRPERSON: Any other member of the panel?  Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Just one last thing General, just to follow-up on Mr Ntsebeza's last question to you and your reply to that, we're a little puzzled that in essence SADF people are saying that they did these operations in support of your people, in support of the police, I am not saying during your time or any other time, in general terms that's what they are saying, and the impression we are getting is that the police say no, that didn't happen.  It certainly wasn't with our cooperation or for our support.  Can you explain this?

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: Yes I can to some extent Mr Chairperson.  I think the position was very clear as far as riot control was concerned in South Africa.  That was that the South African Defence Force was deployed in support of the South African Police.  I've said it in another occasion also.  So we had standing instructions about that, the deployment in riot control situations throughout the length and breadth of the country of the South African Defence Force in support of the South African Police.  So to do that they had operational centres, they had joint command structures and so on and so on.  So this may have stemmed from that situation.  That is a separate situation.  In one of my affidavits I've described it and said this is the situation.
 So whether it then overlapped into another situation and some thought but now we are also in support of the police or they've analysed it that way that may be their problem, but the standing instructions-  Now I've heard yesterday, I must be quite frank, say that there was a new order of some kind to the South African Defence Force about their operational situation, I'm not aware of that.  That may stem from that also, but I am just indulging in conjecture here.  And I am saying that as far as riot control in South Africa was concerned over a long period, just like in time of war the South African Police was by our law, it was dictated that we should go and support the army in the war, so the reverse position was the situation.

MR LAX: You see General ...(intervention)

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: It may originate there.

MR LAX: General the issue really is subtly different in this sense.  We acknowledge that in conventional terms and even in unconventional activities, and we use those terms as you would understand them as a member of the security forces, that was the case. What we are talking about are what they referred to as irregular or extraordinary measures, what they refer to as revolutionary measures when we were speaking about yesterday to them, and they were quite clear, absolutely clear that for example targets would be selected by your people and they would act in support.  That's the language they used and so there seems to be this total lack of congruity between the two positions and that's what I am trying to understand.

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: No I understand what you say Sir.  The position is as I have said, the instruction was for a long period, for a long period since about 1980 as far as I am concerned, that the South African Police should make available all the information that they have to the other members of what we termed the security establishment.  We should give it to the South African Defence Force, we should give it to the National Intelligence, we should give it to the Prison Services and that's that.  We should give it.  We did it, we had conferences Sir about every week in which these people has sent representatives to sit down and listen to our briefing.  So they knew exactly what the position was.  I said what their attitude was that - so they were entitled, they were entitled as of right to get any information from the South African Police that they thought they needed to act within their doctrines.
 What I object to Sir from that evidence is that it's said that they, it's unbeknown to me and I've said it, that there was a deployment of special forces which I, as far as my experience goes, was utilised outside the country,  that they were deployed or there was a decision to deploy them in support of the police, I am quite unaware of that.  It never came to my notice.  Yesterday was the first day that I heard it.

CHAIRPERSON: General Coetzee that concludes the questions we have for you and we are grateful to you for being here and for assisting us in the way you have.  You may now retire from the podium and do whatever you want to do.

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.  We are changing the order just a little to assist us in following a ....(no recording)

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: Chairperson, I have a document here which I would like to hand to him which is entitled "Alternative structure as a factor in the revolutionary structure against South Africa". ...(intervention)

MR GOOSEN: I never realised that I had antagonised him that much.

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: ...assistance to him.

CHAIRPERSON: I'd be grateful if you would give that to him.  I am quite sure he is always ready to improve on his knowledge.  (Talking in the background).... ja, but just get the word right though.

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: Ja, ja, thank you I am very sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no.  Thank you General.

MR GOOSEN: General thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: We would like to call Major Craig Williamson now to the stand please.  Major Williamson let me welcome you to the Commission and I will ask my colleague Mr Ntsebeza to offer the oath.   Thank you.

UNKNOWN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, thank you Major Williamson.  I understand that you have an opening statement that you would like to read, if that is so would you please proceed.