Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-06-23

MR COETZEE: Can I ask you, from the government's side, was there an immediate recognition given to your existence?

WOUTER J BASSON: No, there wasn't.

MR COETZEE: There was a systematic attempt to conceal the connection with government official organisations?

WOUTER J BASSON: That's correct, and that's where the story of the rotten apple approach also came into being and was used in that way.

MR COETZEE: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  I think this would be a convenient stage to take the tea adjournment, we'll adjourn for tea.  Thank you.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

WOUTER J BASSON: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, do you have any questions?

GEORGE BIZOS: Mr Kahanovitz.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm sure you know the answer to that.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sure.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Basson, you've already pointed out your administrative name was Christo Britz, now Hendrik Christoffel Nel, Chris Nel, do you know who he is?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, it's this Derek person I referred to.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just for purposes of the record, he was the Intelligence Officer of the CCB?

WOUTER J BASSON: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right.

MR LAX: Just while you're on that, did you say his surname, his assumed name was Derek Louw, or was that someone else?

WOUTER J BASSON: Derek Louw was his administrative name and his real name was Chris Nel.

MR LAX: Thanks.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now Mr Nel gave evidence to the TRC in a Section 29 Inquiry, do you know - you also attended a Section 29 Inquiry, you're aware of what those inquiries are?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, I think so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now Mr Chairman, once again, I'm not - if need be, we can hand in the evidence but I just want to put to the witness certain things that Mr Nel said at that inquiry, for his comment.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now he said that the purpose of using criminals in the unaware outer circle was in the hope whatever job was done would not be able to be traced back to the State, that it wouldn't implicate the State in those acts, you agree with that?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, it's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that this was actually very difficult to achieve and in retrospect he thinks it's the biggest waste of money ever.  He says he estimates that approximately 80% of operations had to be stopped because there were no efficient cut-offs to stop the State from being implicated.

WOUTER J BASSON: Do you want my comment?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, it may be the case, I believe as a result of his employment in the CCB he was more aware of operations.  It is not easy to recruit an indirect member and to trust him completely and to deploy him and his trustability would be of such a nature that he'll say he'll do something and he doesn't do it, or that he tried to find things to compromise you with, so that one day he can fall back on that.  So I agree with that, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You'll obviously agree with me it's very nice in theory to want to believe that someone like Peaches thinks you're working for some international business, but someone like Peaches isn't that stupid.

WOUTER J BASSON: It is true, Chairperson.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now he also worked with you on projects in Zimbabwe, correct?  Region 7.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about Mr Nel now, not Peaches?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, I'm sorry, Mr Nel.

WOUTER J BASSON: I think so, Chairperson.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now he says that Ferdi Barnard was supposed to be working with Lafras Luitingh on Region 7.

WOUTER J BASSON: I don't where he gets that from, he's not supposed to know that Mr Barnard was involved in any way with Lafras Luitingh.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well he's the Intelligence Officer for the whole organisation.

WOUTER J BASSON: I don't know how he knew that, Chairperson.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And he says that one of the problems was that Mr Barnard was, to use his words, prostituting after hours with people in Region 6, because he had friends there.

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I never visited the members of Region 6 at home, I was never part of their social circle, I cannot verify or deny the statement.

MR KAHANOVITZ: By the way, in your evidence-in-chief you said that you didn't know of the existence of Mr Barnard while you were in Region 6.

WOUTER J BASSON: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: On the other hand you said that you were party to the meeting where the question of whether Mr Botha should be given a warning, was discussed.

WOUTER J BASSON: You are correct, I was aware of the name Mr Barnard as a result of that, but I didn't know him personally.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I think what you're really saying is you were aware of his existence and why he posed a problem, but all you're saying is you didn't know what he looked like.  You never personally met him.

WOUTER J BASSON: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now Mr Nel says that, and this by the say is confirmed by your evidence at the Webster Inquest, that in 1989 various regions were called together to do work related to the Namibian elections, correct?

WOUTER J BASSON: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And we'll get to your diary later.  There are various entries there and there's a reference to
"Baptism Day - Region 8"
correct?

WOUTER J BASSON: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He also says that in relation to that project, people were offered bonuses to double up production.  Your superiors were very keen to achieve concrete results, they wanted to motivate people.

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I cannot recall such a promise or such a suggestion.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He also gave evidence about Trevits, the full name is Counter-revolutionary Intelligence Task Team", are you aware of their existence?

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I think I was aware of that when I was working in the Defence Force structure, but as a result of deployment and my status I was never involved in any way with such a thing, but I do not deny that I was aware such a structure.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He also gave evidence about what the purpose of this body was, he says it was established in approximately 1987, in order to co-ordinate activities around the targets for the various State agencies.

WOUTER J BASSON: It's possible, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And for example, you would want to make sure that somebody who was a government spy, wasn't targeted for assassination.  It makes sense to you?

WOUTER J BASSON: It's makes sense, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that the CCB was not directly represented on Trevits, because if they had been they could have been linked to an operation.

WOUTER J BASSON: It probably was like that, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You don't know, but you say it makes sense.

WOUTER J BASSON: I don't know - it makes sense, but I don't know if there was a person who was known.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right.  He says for similar reasons the CCB had to indirectly obtain its intelligence from Headquarters, or to do reconnaissance themselves.  You would be aware of that, correct?

WOUTER J BASSON: That's correct, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That's the effect of some of the evidence that you gave in-chief.  Okay.  Now he says that the CCB itself had a very inferior capability to generate its own intelligence.  In other words the CCB was far more reliant on obtaining intelligence from other pre-existing intelligence structures.

WOUTER J BASSON: That is so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He also says that the professionals in the CCB, the good operators, were very upset with Joe Verster for employing such unprofessional people to work for Region 6 and that their concern was that it was because of their un-professionalism that CCB activities got to be exposed.