Amnesty Hearings — Bloemfontein — 1998-01-29

MR VISSER: "Granting of amnesty and effect thereof: If the Committee after considering an application for amnesty is satisfied that the application complies with the requirements of the Act,

MR VISSER: (b)	the act, omission or offence to which the application relates is an act associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) and (3)"

MR VISSER: and (2) says this - and, of course, (c) says

MR VISSER: "the applicant has made a full disclosure, it shall grant amnesty".

MR VISSER: (2) says this - and only 2(b) and 2(f) are the ones that are relevant, could possibly be relevant to the present applications. It says:

MR VISSER: "In this 'act', unless the contents otherwise indicates 	an act associated with a political objective means any act or omission which constitutes an offence or a ...[indistinct] which according to the criteria in subsection (3) is associated with a political objective and which was advised, planned, directed, commanded, ordered or committed within or outside the Republic during the period 1st March to the cut-off date."

MR VISSER: (a) deals with:

MR VISSER: "a member or supporter of a publicly known political organisation, a liberal movement",

MR VISSER: and then we come to (b), Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: "Any employee of the state or any former states, or any member of the security forces of the state or any former state, in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her expressed or implied authority directed against the publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in the political struggle against the state or a former state or against any members who support such, etc, etc."

MR VISSER: I am sorry, is this being interpreted? I didn't realise that this is being interpreted. I am sorry.

MR BRINK: Don't worry, we can let her have a copy of the Act.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. I just want to read the last relevant part
"(f) by any person referred to in (b), (c) or (d) who on reasonable grounds believed that he or she was acting within the course or scope of his duties and within the scope of his express and implied authority."
Mr Chairman, we submit that it is quite clear that what the applicants came to you on is the basis: I was a policeman, I was ordered to do certain things and as a foot soldier I carried it out. Now that is perfectly acceptable, and then it depends on whether that is the evidence which you accept at the end of the day. But, Mr Chairman, ass far as Mr Ngo is concerned, my learned friend has this problem. Mr Ngo, we know, becomes a policeman on 10 February 1986. We know on the evidence before you that he was suspended on 2 January 1989. 
	Now without splitting hairs, Mr Chairman, a policeman who is on suspension cannot claim that he then can act in the course and scope of his duty. It is a logical argument. Logic would have it that he can't say that.
	What we say is this, Mr Chairman, and this my learned friend Mr Memani has neglected to do. The applicant, Mr Ngo, would have to convince you on each and everyone of his applications that they fell within that period of time.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: Sorry, but I have a problem. You seem not to distinction between a suspended policeman and a dismissed policeman. I have no problems with your argument if you are saying he had been dismissed, but you say if he was suspended, which is an internal, inter-departmental process. In my mind we have to distinction between somebody who has been suspended, which is an inter-departmental process, and somebody who has actually been dismissed from the police force. To me the situations are not the same.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am not pretending that they are. All that I am saying is that any person who is suspended is prohibited from performing official duties in his employment. I mean, that stands to reason.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: No. Well maybe you will address - because you see, he can be called back any time to come and do the work, even if he is suspended. He can still be paid even if he is suspended. He can still enjoy all the benefits of a policeman. He can still use the medical scheme. His children can still be taken to a doctor, to a hospital, using the medical scheme to which he subscribes.

MR VISSER: But he can't perform official duties because he is under suspension. With all due respect, Mr Chairman, what does it mean when you suspend somebody? You suspend him from performing duties.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: Well vis-a-vis the outside world, I am saying simultaneously disciplinary measures. Vis-a-vis the outside world, if he comes to do work vis-a-vis somebody outside ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I make this submission to you? Objectively, a man who is under suspension cannot perform official duties but if - Mr Chairman, I am not going to split hairs about this. If you feel that at the time when Mr Venter was murdered, in February he was under suspension but he could still fall within the ambit of s 20(2)(b), well then Venter's case falls within that ambit. And then I will say this, then my learned friend had to show you at least that all the incidents for which Mr Ngo applies for amnesty had to be placed within the period of 10 February 1986 until November 1989, because I believe that that was - I am not quite sure - but it does not matter when it was going to be in 1989 - then he has to show that all the acts fell within that period of time.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: I hope that I did not mislead anybody into thinking that I am saying you are wrong. The purpose of oral argument was precisely to debate some of the issues, because we will think about it.

MR VISSER: Absolutely, Mr Chairman. As I have said on record once before, that is one of the few advantages of argument, it causes people to think about things and to debate it. I certainly did not take it in any other way. But the point is ...[intervention]

MRADV DE JAGER: I don't know whether it is convenient because it relates to your first submission that they themselves didn't have a political objective. I don't think that's what the Act requires. The Act requires that the act that they committed should be associated with a political objective. So, my objective could have been whatever it might be, but if I am participating in an act associated with a political objective - the police wanted to arrest persons who acted adversely to the state's interest as they saw it, so they called me to go with them. The act was associated with a political objective. Whatever my opinion is could only be a factor in terms of s 20(3). To ascertain when we investigated whether the act was associated with, my personal motive could be one of the criteria, not a requirement but one of the criteria to see whether the act was in fact associated with a political objective. So they still fall within the criteria of an act associated with a political objective, although, maybe, my own motive might have been something different. Isn't that a ...[intervention]?