Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-25

MR WILLS: Now you were - the body of your evidence has been that you were at great pains, in fact one of your main motivations was to protect the fact or to prevent the fact that Ndaba was an informer from being exposed, is that correct?   And the implications stemming from that, obviously?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR WILLS: Yes and essentially the arrest of Ndaba was an accidental affair, I mean you didn't know that at the time you subsequently found that out and that created a problem for you?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR WILLS: Now why in those circumstances was it necessary for him to keep the appointment that same afternoon or allegedly that same afternoon you were aware that we dispute it was on the same afternoon but you allege that it was on the 7th.  Why was it necessary for Ndaba to keep that appointment and I ask this particularly in the light of the fact that the evidence has been to the effect that there was a fall back position for him to go on the 10th.  Botha's evidence has been that the fall back meeting was on the 10th and I think that's common cause, that's Tuesday the 10th.  So why did you rush something?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson, that was Botha's and Ndaba's decision.

MR WILLS: But don't you think it would have been - I'm asking you from your personal experience as a commissioned officer in the security branch with some years to experience, don't you think it would have been a wiser decision if it was your intention to keep his identity closed, to give yourself a bit more time to see what happened and then for him, he could have just arrived at - he could have had a chance to cool down, you could have seen if anything happened and he could have arrived together with your observation on the 10th of the fall back meeting?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson, as I have already said that was Botha's decision and we went along with it.  I never questioned it or I didn't think that I had a better plan.

MR WILLS: Do you not want to give me your opinion?  I'm asking you for your opinion as an expert in security matters, are you not wanting to give it to me?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: My opinion is that we acted correctly or that Botha's action was correct.

MR WILLS: So in other words you had to rush this thing, you had very little time and you had to rush this thing through, not even give yourself a chance really to breathe and as a result if in effect what happened was the whole operation even got more messed up because in consequence Shabalala was also arrested?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't it equally important to act as quickly as you could before Shabalala got to hear about Ndaba's arrest?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That's possible, I can't think of all the possibilities that Botha took into account, I can't remember them.

MR WILLS: I want to turn now to the arrest of Shabalala.  You've indicated in your evidence so far that give or take a few hours the decision or the realisation that Shabalala was to be killed basically came quite shortly after his arrest?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: The possibility was there.

MR WILLS: Now why didn't you just kill him immediately?  What reason was there for you to keep him for another six days?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson, those were options that Botha considered and the reason why we didn't kill him immediately, we tried to see whether there was another way out.

MR WILLS: But you see, if you wanted to protect Ndaba as an informer, you could have killed Shabalala within a day or so and then let Ndaba go?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR WILLS: You would also then not had any risk of Ndaba being found out, not so?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR WILLS: You would also have no risk of anybody else in the police finding out about your plan because he would have been out of the way immediately?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR WILLS: And then you wouldn't have had to kill Ndaba?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct but that is not what happened.

MR WILLS: We know that, I'm asking why you didn't think of that, you could have saved one person?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson, I think it's proof that we didn't just kill people not just on the spur of the moment.

MR WILLS: What I submit to you, Sir, is that the only probability or the most reasonable probability is that you kept Shabalala for the purposes of gaining information?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That's not the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you try to interrogate Shabalala?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: I didn't interrogate Shabalala.

CHAIRPERSON: Well who was guarding these people?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson we took turns to guard them and C20 members were also involved.

CHAIRPERSON: The four of you were them who took turns or three of you, yourself, Wasserman and Van der Westhuizen?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: And Botha and the four members of C20.

CHAIRPERSON: So there were eight guarding?  And who kept observation on the safe houses?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: It was myself, Wasserman and Van der Westhuizen.

CHAIRPERSON: The three of you?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Some of the C20 members assisted with observation, it was also done in turns.

CHAIRPERSON: I find it difficult to see how you could be guarding the prisoners at a safe house in Verulam and keeping observation on safe houses in Durban?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson, it was only one person who was guarded and often he was tied up in the room so you didn't need a large amount of people to guard, one or two people would have been sufficient at a time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR WILLS: Thanks Chairperson.
	The other thing that I can't understand is if this operation was so secret and you wanted to keep this very, very quiet, why did you take these people to a safe house where there are already another four informers who are being questioned by C20 and I'm referring to Mr Botha's affidavit at page 15 attached to his application, 15 of the bundle?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That was the only place that we had, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: So these four informers obviously would have become aware of at least the fact that two other people had been brought there?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Not necessarily, they were kept apart.

MR WILLS: Did the house have sound proofed walls?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: No Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Are you saying people in another room couldn't hear at all what was happening in another room?  I mean explain the situation to me, I don't know, I haven't seen the house?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Chairperson it was a reasonably big house with lots of rooms and lots of rooms had been built on.  I don't believe that they would have been able to hear.

MR WILLS: Now something that I didn't hear in the previous evidence but maybe I was asleep or not concentrating, is it so that when you took Ndaba for the purposes of pointing out, you didn't just get the addresses from him, you took him and you pointed out certain houses, physically took him and drove him around in the car to point these houses out?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct, he did drive with us and he pointed the places out to us.

MR WILLS: When was this done?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: During the night.

MR WILLS: Obviously we're talking about the period after his arrest?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Do you remember which night?

SIMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: I think it was during the first two nights after his arrest.

MR WILLS: So you took him twice?