Amnesty Hearings — Durban — UNKNOWN

MR JANSEN: Now, in the incidents - more particularly the Mxenge matter - that fell between August and December 1981, in those instances did you at all times operate in conjunction with the regions where the incidents took place?

WITNESS:   I don't understand the question.  Can you just please repeat it?

MR JANSEN: The incidents which we will be testifying about here, more particularly those which happened during this time that Vlakplaas was operational, from August to December 1981, did all of those incidents take place in conjunction with the various regional or branch offices?

WITNESS:   100%, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Now, your unit at Vlakplaas, was it part of your work to do the gathering of intelligence information on

MR JANSEN: /any particular

MR JANSEN: any particular individuals?

WITNESS:   Not at all.  We didn't carry any personnel files or collect any information, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Was it part of your work to assess the severity or not of a specific individual's security threat, in other words the extent to which an individual posed a security threat to the State?

WITNESS:   Not at all, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Who did this work?

WITNESS:   This was usually on regional level, with headquarters sectional, and the Security Police level.  In my specific cases I couldn't place any specific incident higher than General Johan Coetzee.

MR JANSEN: Now, the typical kind of command that you would receive, would the content of that command be made known to you in the presence of, for instance, the other policemen or askaris that were working with you?

WITNESS:   No, not at all.  As less as possible people present.  Usually on a one to one basis, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Why was this?

WITNESS:   As a result of the need-to-know chain, which is there to protect the command structure and the information structure, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And I take it these commands were not in writing?

WITNESS:   I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that the commands were not in writing?

WITNESS:   No, no, not at all in writing.  No, Sir.

MR JANSEN: Now, before you left the Security Police did you have any aspirations of progressing higher up in Security Police ranks?

WITNESS:   I think it's every policeman's desire, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Would it have helped for you to have questioned any of these activities?

WITNESS:   If it was according to our

MR JANSEN: /security

MR JANSEN: security work a legal instruction, and you've questioned it, you wouldn't have been in that position that you were, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand what that answer means.

MR JANSEN: Can you just repeat it?  With somebody who had questioned any of the activities, or showed a reluctance to participate or do what he was told, would such a person have progressed in the Security Police?

WITNESS:   Oh, sorry, not at all, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Now these, for instance, incidents where people were killed, did you regard the orders in that regard as being justified at the time?

WITNESS:   Absolutely, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Did you regard it was lawful within the Security Police culture?  I am not talking about strictly legal.

WITNESS:   Yes, Mr Chairman.  The short answer to it is yes, I did.

MR JANSEN: Did you regard it as necessary for the protection of the State?

WITNESS:   Absolutely, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Now, why did you regard such serious transgressions of the ordinary laws of the country as being justified?

WITNESS:   Mr Chairman, because the normal, common law of the country, according to our Security Police, was not sufficient to deal effectively with the revolutionary total onslaught, and in a quote - I don't think I can put it better than a quote from Mr Williamson, who was seen as our expert on terrorist matters, when he said that, on page 22 of my manuscript, paragraph 4.3.2.1,

MR JANSEN: "Law enforcement officers, such as members of the SAP and other organs of the Security Forces understand that the RSA is faced with a revolutionary

MR JANSEN: /"onslaught

MR JANSEN: "onslaught which, if it is ever allowed to succeed, will plunge the southern tip of Africa into chaos."

MR JANSEN: A quote from Captain Williamson in the October 1981 issue of the police magazine, SAPAMAS, in an article with the title, "Why Spy?"  If you would allow me to would just like to mention another quote from this article where he says, in the second - next paragraph,

MR JANSEN: "Therefore the only real answer is secret operations against the enemy using many of the secret operational methods devised by the communist revolutionaries themselves."

MR DE JAGER: Could you kindly repeat the page?

CHAIRPERSON: Page 22.

MR DE JAGER: Page 22, thank you.

WITNESS:   Page 22.

MR JANSEN: Were orders ever given in a literal or a direct manner, in other words were orders given in the form an instruction to kill this or that person?

WITNESS:   No, not explicitly used that words, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: In what kind of way was it put?

WITNESS:   You would hear - rather hear the drift that, "Make a plan with so and so," or a nod of the head, even a sort of go - if a certain person was discussed you would get a nod of the head, and it was a problematic area and so you would get that nod, wink, wink kind of attitude.

MR JANSEN: If you could turn to ... (intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Was that even on a one to one basis?

WITNESS:  Yes.  Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR DE JAGER: Why then only a nod of the head if it's on a one to one basis?

WITNESS:   Well, I can only again put it in the

MR DE JAGER: /words of

MR DE JAGER: words of the famous Craig Williamson, or notorious Craig Williamson, when he says this type of conversation - he says it is - he was explaining to a chairman presiding at my departmental trial exactly this dubious way of talking.  He says,

MR DE JAGER: "It is a very devious way of talking.  It is something that security people will understand, and also I think for people in the profession, people who speak deviously to each other, and who have a very intimate rapport with each other, understand intimately, understand very well what is going on in this type of conversation."

MR DE JAGER: And it is a quote from Craig Williamson in my internal trial, 10 June 1985, Volume 6, page 292 and 293.  So what I would actually mean is the whole drift of the conversation would be in the end - it could even be as pulling up of the shoulders and, "Make a plan with him."

UNKNOWN: May I just find out, is this quotation referring to the manner in which orders were given by superiors to people of your calibre?

WITNESS:   Yes, in a way.  Yes, our way of talking in general, Mr Chairman, where - for instance, in Mr Mxenge's case I was asked to make a plan with him, which clearly meant to me that we must kill him.

UNKNOWN: What I want to understand is whether it referred to the manner in which instructions were issued?

WITNESS:   Ja, it was in the same manner, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: If we can turn to the Mxenge matter.  I think it's a matter of public knowledge that Mr Griffiths Mxenge

MR JANSEN: /was killed

MR JANSEN: was killed on the 19th of November 1981, is that correct?

WITNESS:   That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Now, were you involved in his murder?

WITNESS:   I was involved in the murder, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, if you could just bear with me.  Prior to November 1981 did you know Mr Mxenge?

WITNESS:   Not at all.  The name didn't mean anything to me and I didn't even know the existence of such a name, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Can you relate to the Committee your involvement in this Mxenge matter?  I think if you'd start with your presence in Durban at the time.