Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-18

MR MEYER: According to the information available Reverend to us, because again I must emphasise that not one of the three of us were at that very particular situation on that occasion, but according to the information that is available to us the actual appearance of those that went through the gap led to the starting of the shooting, and it is in that context that this statement has been made.

BONGANI FINCA: Chairperson thank you.  I would like to raise then the question that I had originally prepared before I looked at the statement, and I would think that perhaps I will raise the question and direct it to the three members representing the National Party.  There is a view, and I think it's a very strong view widely held by a number of people in this country and even abroad, that the South African government had the power and had the means to prevent the bloodbath, what they lacked was the will to do so.  We have put this question to Mr Pik Botha when he was here and the answer we received was not satisfactory. I think we would like to re-submit the question to you, that in fact it is not true to fact that the South African Government could not have done anything about that situation.  They had the power, they had the means, they intervened in Ciskean affairs right to the point of appointing Cabinet ministers when they wanted to do so, but in this particular case, and the submission is made to us EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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that because lives which were in danger of being lost were Black lives, and Black lives are cheap, the RSA government did not have the will to act in this particular instance.  I would like to put that view to you and hear what your comment is on it.

MR MEYER: Chairperson thank you very much.  I think this is an important issue that is being raised by Reverend Finca.  I would first of all like to state categorically that a perception or a submission that might have been made to the Commission in that regard, namely that the previous South African government failed in its duty because Black lives were not dear to them, I reject totally that suggestion, that submission or that perception.  That is absolutely incorrect.  I think proof is there as it was submitted here this morning by Premier Kriel and Mr Radue that they were actually sent, a delegation of the South African Government was specifically sent to Bisho on that very day by the then State President Mr de Klerk to ensure that the demonstration can be carried out peacefully.  It was for that reason that Premier Kriel went to see Mr Gqozo and ensured that he allows the demonstration to take place in a peaceful way.  And with all due respect as it is being proved by Mr Radue's fax which was sent just before one o'clock that day, it was actually accepted by all present at that point in time that the demonstration would be carried out peacefully, and that there was actually no reason, at that very moment, to further intervene or interfere.
 The question overall of how we handled the situation as far as the TBVC states are concerned I think is also a relevant one Commissioner.  The point in that regard I would say  is  by  September  of  '92  we had a total break-up of
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negotiations and by the 7th of September of '92, if one just looks back a little bit at the perspective of how matters developed, one must recall that by the 16th of May of that year Codesa II collapsed, so multi-party negotiations came to an end.  In spite of that, however, the work of Working Group 4, which is also indicated in the submission, was confirmed by the parties.  In fact I think one can say that Working Group 4's report was the only one that was actually approved by Codesa II before it collapsed on the work of the other working groups.  In other words although the parties could not reach agreement on the work of the other working groups, including the question of progress with the interim constitution, at least there was agreement between all the parties on the work of Working Group 4, and that included the South African Government, the ANC and all relevant parties.  
 What I am saying by that is that there was confirmation by all parties, including the South African Government, that the TBVC states must be reincorporated into South Africa and it was a question through which means it should take place, and the obvious answer to that was to get agreement on an interim constitution, to ensure the reincorporation.  Now after May of '92 for almost a year there were no multi-party negotiations, in other words progress towards the interim constitution could not take place, but between June and September of '92 the relevant parties, including specifically the South African Government and the ANC, were on a bilateral basis involved in ironing out the stumbling blocks impeding the negotiations as it was then perceived.  And that was the main, or the crux of the whole objective at that stage, to get negotiations back on track so that we can EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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make progress towards an interim constitution.  
 It was therefore, with due respect Chairperson, to my mind not the appropriate moment then to find other ways to deal with the TBVC states, but to get negotiations back on track with a view to come to an agreement, as quickly as possible, also on the question of reincorporation of the TBVC states.  And that applied to all four of them, Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei and that was the view held by the South African Government.  And with all due respect, although Ciskei might have been a pain in the neck, both to the South African Government and to the ANC there was not a reason for any deviation from that agreed policy position, that was the agreement between the South African Government, the ANC and all other relevant parties at that point of time.

BONGANI FINCA: Lastly Chairperson, Mr Meyer you are held in very high respect by a number of South Africans for the role that you have played in the transition of this country, and there is a sense, if the Chairperson find the comment unacceptable, there is a sense in which we expect slightly more from you.  It's really very sad for me to get a sense that you are saying there is not an iota of accountability that should be attributed to the South African Government for this loss of life, when in fact it is common knowledge that very many responsible people in this region in particular, one of those persons is here in this hall, he has just come in, Bishop David Russel, wrote letters of appeal to you, pleading with your government not to continue your support for the dictatorship that was continuing in Ciskei pointing out exactly to what ultimately happened, and how the South African Government decided to nurse an ally in EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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Codesa at the expense of human lives.  Is there no sense 
altogether in your heart that the South African Government had a level of negligence on this matter, given the benefit of hindsight?