Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-06-21

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR LAX: The thing that I just wanted to follow up was, I didn't hear you clearly and I didn't hear the translation that clearly, I just want to clarify, you said that Verster spoke to the Chairman and then you said that he suggested that the place be blown up with a limpet mine.  I wasn't clear in my own mind whether you were referring to the Chairman who suggested that, or whether it was Verster's suggestion?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: It was Mr Verster's suggestion to blow up the place.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well, please continue.  What was the rest of the procedure, you say that at one point Mr Verster told you that the project had been approved by the Chairman and then things had to happen very quickly in view of the meeting that was going to take place.

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: Yes.  In this time, I knew the Co-ordinator and myself, Mr Wouter Basson, we were at Mr Verster and Mr Verster told him that he had to get a limpet mine.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That was Mr Basson?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: That was Mr Basson.  And afterwards, the Co-ordinator told us that we must get together for the execution of the task, and the training of the members to show them how the limpet had to be activated and handled.
	As far as I know, Mr van Zyl and Mr Maree and myself, we had no knowledge about explosives, we are no experts on explosives and we have no experience in that regard.  We had a meeting at the Protea Garden Hotel in Berea where myself and Mr van Zyl were present.
	Mr Basson came and that Nick person was also there, as far as I can remember, but I cannot remember, between the two of them, who came with the box with the limpet mine, but I think it was the Co-ordinator, Mr Basson, because that was the order of Mr Verster.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was Mr Verster also present?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No, I cannot remember.  Then Mr Basson explained to Mr van Zyl, how the mechanisms work, how he had to detonate with a remote control and how to explain that to his infrastructure, so that they would not harm themselves.
	I want to mention that Mr Verster's order around the blowing up of the property was coupled with the order that there had to be no loss of life and that as far as possible, it had to be prevented that innocent people would die, meaning not only the Kewtown Movement who had to leave the premises without any loss of life, but also other individuals.
	At that stage at the hotel with the explanation of the mechanisms, Mr van Zyl told us quite clearly that he was uncomfortable and he didn't feel capable to handle this thing with the explosives.  I contacted the Chairman, sorry the Managing Director, Mr Verster,  and I told him that my suggestion to him was to involve Mr Calla Botha, because Mr Botha had reasonable knowledge, and he was more at ease with the handling of explosives.
	In this way I contacted Mr Botha and asked him to come to our premises at the Protea Gardens.  Mr Botha joined us and the procedure was explained to him very briefly.  He had to convey this to Gakkie, and explain to him how the mechanism worked and how to detonate it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this the first meeting where Botha was present?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: This is the first time, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I hear the evidence and you said that things moved very quickly because the Kewtown Youth Movement had a meeting on the 31st of August, what was the relevance of the meeting towards the blow up of the building?  Why was it linked, why couldn't it happen at another point?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: The relevance was that we, as soon as the meeting adjourned, and the building was considered empty, to detonate the bomb as soon as possible after the meeting, so that the impact of this explosion, the effect would carry over the correct meaning.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The physical effect or the emotional effect?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No, the emotional effect, the effect of confusion amongst themselves, the different ideas that might come from their own managing members, because it was an unknown explosive, it was used to create the impression not only with the police, but also among themselves that it could be one of their own systems that detonated through bad control, bad management, bad handling, to mislead the police investigating the premises afterwards and to make them aware of these members and what their motives were and what, the influence that such an explosion would have on the community.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It seems from the ex post facto that there was some confusion?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: I learnt that Mr Williams told somebody that there was kind of division in the community.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We can come back to that later, let's continue with the physical execution.  Botha and van Zyl left with the detonation mechanism, they went to the Cape to execute the project?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You heard how the execution took place practically, on ground-level.  It doesn't sound to me as if it happened according to plan, in that the two members were personally involved in the detonation?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: Chairperson, the guidelines of the CCB as covert organisation were, especially from Mr Verster, were very clear and very pertinent, and he is still like that, even today, that there had to be cut off points, in that you could, nothing could be traced back to you, there must not even be the idea that you might be directly involved, in other words everything had to be done indirectly so that you and the organisation and his connections with the South African Defence Force and the National Party, would not be revealed.
	Unfortunately in this case, Mr van Zyl was not trained with explosives, Mr Botha went with him as observer to see that Gakkie handled the thing correctly.  In the sense of the execution of orders, I would say that Mr van Zyl, he contravened the rule, but not in the sense of blow up the place and the main target of the disruption action of this project. 
	There he executed the order.  The only problem I have with it, is that they executed it themselves, but on the ground, in any organisation, even in a covert organisation, there are exceptions that arise where the member as far as I believe, his order was very clear,  "you make sure there is no loss of life".
	If Mr Verster would have said, "and if there is another bomb that explode, you are responsible", I don't know.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But in the light of that,  the project still happened, but he contravened the discipline.  Later it was reported back to you that the project was successful?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that the operatives on the ground were remunerated accordingly?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We heard that Mr van Zyl's Section 29 statement, that contained the fact that you took R5 000-00 of that money for yourself, that you stole it, you appropriated it for yourself and that he repeated that here in his evidence, is that correct?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you appropriate any of those funds for yourself?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you reserve R5 000-00 for yourself?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps on this point, we can link up with the Omar project where Mr van Zyl's evidence was that he, in respect of the funds to be utilised for the project, paid some of it over to Mr Barnard for expenses which he had incurred.  Did you hear that evidence?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it ever discussed with you?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you in any way aware of the utilisation of the funds in that way?

DANIEL F DU TOIT BURGER: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Burger, did you actually, just on this point being dealt with by Mr du Plessis, did you actually hand over to Mr van Zyl?