Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-10

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct, that is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Just to elaborate perhaps on that Mr Rosslee, South West, the northern part of South West Africa, at the time of the operations of Koevoet, was it declared operational area, isn't that correct?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And that would have been under the control of the Military?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were required and ordered to work together with the Military in South West Africa, while you were a member of Koevoet?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: There was a lot of cooperation, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I am not suggesting for a moment that your duties were to perform operations together with the Army all the time, but it did happen?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: It most definitely did.

MR VISSER: Yes, and those operations were basically or sometimes at least, seek and destroy operations?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Yes.  There would be attacks and you would follow or track the perpetrators down and if there was a fight, there would be people killed?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Is that what you are referring to when you talk about acting as a soldier?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Definitely.

MR VISSER: It is not as if you walked with your briefcase with a docket under your arm, into the bush?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Most definitely not.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, and thank you to the panel.

CHAIRPERSON: As I gather from other evidence we have heard about Koevoet operations, you fought against them, but one of your main objectives was to try to capture the terrorists to endeavour to turn them, so that you could use them later?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you to you Mr Chairman.  All right, you now are in the Security Branch Mr Rosslee, and you have already told the Committee, that you became more and more subjected to the political perspectives, which you were required to deal with, is that correct?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You came into contact with different ideologies and different points of view of organisations and groupings?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is right Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you have to, were you required to make studies of these different organisations and groupings and different ideologies?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Mr Chairman, yes, within the Security Branch we went on courses where we were educated with regard to different political ideologies, etc.

MR VISSER: Well, I might be forgiven perhaps to say that you were brainwashed in a sense.  You were given one perspective and one perspective only, from one angle, isn't that so?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Most certainly.

MR VISSER: Yes.  And did you accept that as being a true and correct perspective?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I did.

MR VISSER: Yes.  Please continue.

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: The exposure to dangers from supporters, cadres of the liberation movements, attacks, assassinations, attempts on policemen, attacks on policemen, murders of policemen, etc, had a very profound effect on me.  They were colleagues of mine that were killed in the townships, while on duty, etc, while they were performing their duties.

MR VISSER: Yes, and I think you have dealt with your experiences, I am not going to revisit that Mr Rosslee.
	All along, during the exercise and execution of your duties, was there also another sense of responsibility which dominated you?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I would say the overriding sense of responsibility would have been to the community or the citizens of the country at that stage, to protect them from as it became know, the "Red Danger" and what was happening in the country.

MR VISSER: Was it your realisation, your experience that you were able to do so effectively?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I believed that yes, we could fight the war.

MR VISSER: To protect the public effectively from attacks?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: The worse it got, I think the more disillusioned we got about how effective we were in countering.

MR VISSER: Yes.  Not to make bones about it, the police were just not able to adequately protect the public.

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Correct.

MR VISSER: We saw bomb attacks, especially in the area Natal, not so, the Amanzimtoti bomb attack, etc, where people were killed and injured?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What effect did that have on you?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I would say it made me personally a lot more determined to do more, to be more effective in countering the threat.

MR VISSER: Yes.  I think enough of that Mr Rosslee.  If you are asked in cross-examination about anything, you are quite willing to delve deeper into the political background, etc.  Perhaps we can come to the merits, to the facts of this particular case.
	We know it took place some ten, eleven years ago and normally one's memory would fail.  In your case, you have told the Committee that you have pointedly attempted to forget, but let's see how much you can remember.
	We also know that there are certain, there is a certain divergence of evidence and we will try to deal with it as we go along.  Can you from your own memory state what you remember, about the Bhila incident, starting with where it was first, it first came to be spoken about?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Right, I was at Vlakplaas at that stage, and we were busy with routine duties down in Durban, Port Natal.  McCarter and myself were with Major Andy Taylor, when he asked us to eliminate Bhila.

MR VISSER: In your application, Mr Rosslee, as was pointed out yesterday by the Honourable Chairman, to me, the last paragraph at page 24 of the Bhila volume 1, your application stated in Durban, we were met by Mr L. Wasserman of the local Security Branch.  He told us that two of the accused in the Amanzimtoti bomb blast criminal trial, had been acquitted, but was still continuing their subversive actions and that our task was to "arrest" them for purposes of elimination.
	Then you go on that you assume that the orders came from higher up.  Is that statement, well, is that paragraph entirely correct?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: It is not Mr Chairman.  Mr Wasserman was our normal liaison when we came down to Port Natal, and in normal matters, everyday matters, he would have briefed us on the situation in Port Natal, but that is obviously incorrect.

MR VISSER: Yes, but when you signed this affidavit, believing at the time that it was Mr Wasserman that gave the order, is that the reason why you assumed that the orders have come from higher up?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: It would have been one of the reasons yes.

MR VISSER: And what would have been the reason for assuming that the order came from higher than Mr Wasserman?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: Well, I find it difficult that someone like Mr Wasserman could make that decision in the light of the seriousness of the act that we were asked to commit.

MR VISSER: Yes.  All right, now application also refers to the elimination of people who were involved in the Amanzimtoti bomb blast criminal trial.  Do you remember that?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I remember that Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Then I must immediately interrupt your line of thinking, by taking you to Exhibit B.  Exhibit B, purports to be an affidavit, signed by you, do you agree?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: I agree Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And it was in fact signed by you?

ADRIAN STEVEN ROSSLEE: That is right.

MR VISSER: Will you please tell the Committee first of all how it came about in April 1996, that you signed this.  Mr Chairman, the date appears on the last page, page 7 of Annexure B, 12th of April, so it seems.  Yes, it appears on two places Mr Chairman, 12th of April 1996.
	How did it come about that you signed this affidavit?