Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

MR COETZEE: If questions are going to be asked relating to applications submitted at the Amnesty Committee, well then time will be taken to prepare on that document.  That is not on the way we prepared for this hearing.  That is General Geldenhuys' problem and that is what he is highlighting.
 I have no problem if questions are asked relating to all the other issues that have been canvassed in these hearings and the documentation has been made available.  We have not prepared on asking questions relating to any application submitted to the Amnesty Committee.  That is General Geldenhuys' problem, and that is what he is highlighting, and he is not prepared to answer questions on that at this stage.  He hasn't prepared for that in this hearing.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have thought that you would wait Mr Coetzee, until we have heard what Mr Goosen is saying and what General Geldenhuys has said is on the record, we have taken note of it.
 What you have said is on the record, we have taken note of it.  And you are wasting time now with this.  Mr Goosen please, and may I just say now, this is a ruling that you should go ahead and do what you wanted to do.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson.  I will ask the question then in the following way.  Do you agree General Geldenhuys that the revolutionary onslaught against South Africa as you experienced it when you were in the position in which you were as Chief of the South African Defence Force, may be described as following through four phases?
 In the first phase planning, organisation, propaganda and general preparation for the subsequent phases of the revolutionary onslaught that would follow?
 The second phase an increase in strikes, boycotts and various other forms of civil disobedience and civil unrest?
 The third phase far more active reliance on sabotage, arson and armed propaganda if you like, armed protest and intimidation?
 And in the fourth phase, open warfare for purposes of seizing power, would you agree with that characterisation of the progress of the revolutionary onslaught?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I will answer the question.  I just want to ask if the cameraman can just shift the light behind the camera slightly, because it is shining right into my eyes.
 Mr Chairman, I agree with that statement.  There are many models used by different writers for analysing various kinds of revolutionary warfare.  I am aware that there are other models such as those of McEwan and so on.
 This one  to which reference is being made was contained in a handbook  of the military college of the early 1960's.  I found that unless you are analysing a very particular situation, that there could be other and better models, but in general terms, except where there is an immediate take over of power or a coup d'etat, that is to say in all other cases, where the battle had been fought, or the war had been waged over a longer period, the revolutionary war would more or less go through these four phases.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much.  And would you agree that in the period 1985/1986 the assessment of the South African Defence Force was that the revolutionary onslaught in South African had reached, was approximating the stages where phase which could be described as phase 4?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I think I myself can answer that in my opinion, that we were at the beginning stages of phase 4, but I cannot say that this would be the general view inside the Defence Force for the reason that various students and writers use various models to analyze a situation.
 I was recently involved in conferences, discussions where other models were used and such persons may differ from me.

MR GOOSEN: Would you agree that with the submission that was made by General Viljoen this morning where he indicated that in the period late 1985 and then through into 1986, there appeared to be a shift in strategy on the part of the ANC in particular, a shift to deployment of guerilla forces where those forces would utilise the population as a whole as a shield?  They would use the protection of the population as the bush in which they were operating and that that represented a shift on the part of the ANC, would you agree with that?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I think it would be correct to say that there had been a change in the pattern of behaviour and strategy and that this shift from the rural areas to the urban areas of insurgents, was only one of those changes.
 Other changes involved after the Nkomati accord, there was no more insurgency from Mozambique across the Eastern Transvaal border, but that infiltration then happened through Swaziland.  Another shift involved the passive resistance which you described as phase 2.  Civil disobedience, the holding of illegal and riotous meetings, stay away actions, boycotts and so on enjoyed a revival.  You mustn't see these four phases as being divided from each other, because the one may continue while the other one is still in operation - 3 may start while 2 is still under way.  And then you might be in phase 3, as in this case, and then you get a certain upwelling up of the other two phases.

MR GOOSEN: And would you agree that because of the shift in the revolutionary strategy, that necessitated on the side of the Security Forces, also a shift in the strategies employed, or the tactics employed to deal with those revolutionary onslaught?  Do you agree with that?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I agree with General Viljoen's presentation and the wording of it as in the written submission.
 I want to say that concurrent with this, with these changes, the changes among the insurgents from the Defence Force side, there was also insistence on adaptations for the statutory dispensation in this way you will find that in 1985 until 1988, I made a study, I calculated that security regulations had been issued, proclamations in terms of regulations against an average of one every five weeks which went along with the Security Forces' adaptation of the new strategy of MK and others.

MR GOOSEN: In fact if one had to deal with it in a shorthand way, it is quite apparent from the submission made by General Viljoen and it is also apparent from the positions that you yourself have articulated through to the Commission via the Amnesty Committee, that the situation in South Africa in the mid-1980's have become fairly desperate.  You were embroiled in, if you like, a life and death struggle for survival.  Those are not your words, or those of General Viljoen, I am not suggesting that, but that that would describe the situation that the country faced at the time?  Would you agree with that?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: I agree with the General's exposition.

MR GOOSEN: And presumably you would agree then with the statement made by General Malan which is as follows.  I want to quote it to you "During this time the government's policy was clear.  Stop the perpetrator of violence at all costs.  The carrier of the car bomb, land mine, limpet mine from neighbouring States had to be destroyed.  Outside our borders or inside the country, before he could commit his atrocity.  The destruction of the terrorist, his base and his capability was the mission of every soldier in the South African Defence Force and was also the policy of the Government of the day.  In this way the killings of innocent civilians could be prevented."  Do you agree with that statement?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Well, General Malan was a Minister and when he says the government policy was clear, then I can't disagree with him.