Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-08

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes I did.

MR VALLY: From whom?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: From Dr Basson.

MR VALLY: And what was your response?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Who denied that it was outside the programme.

MR VALLY: So he said that acid in whisky and ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Let me just correct that ...(intervention)

MR VALLY: ...anthrax on cigarettes were within the programme?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Let me just correct that.  What I said now was not true.  I had not seen Dr Basson since this document was put to me to examine.  I had not had any contact with Dr Basson whatsoever, so I couldn't ask him that particular question.  But I did, at an earlier date when there was a suggestion, may I refer to the Project Cloud document?

MR VALLY: If you indicate to - I think they've said it was fine.  I believe Advocate Arendse said he got the go-ahead you could use it.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Can we have the basis for having to refer to a document.  What is the - I think General Knobel was just about to say when something happened.  If you could just let us have that we may not even want to talk to that document.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes Mr Chairman I think we can deal with it like that.

CHAIRPERSON: If you can just relate the incident which gave rise, as I understand you are wanting to say, gave rise to your having some queries, there were suggestions that were made.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: If you could just give us the factual ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: There were certain queries.  I will try and deal with it ...(intervention)

YASMINE SOOKA: Sorry General, can I just ask a question.  I am just a little confused because you said in response to Mr Vally's question that you asked Mr Basson and then a few minutes later you said you had not seen ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: ...Mr Basson.  If you could just clear that.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes but I didn't realise this date, you know this was the document that I had seen in '97.  I would like to explain it to you, and this is why I am trying to refer to that other document.
 In September 1994 I gave a full briefing to the National Intelligence Agency with regard to the programme having been given that permission by the Minister of Defence.  From that date onwards we started working together on an investigation into the programme and the role of Dr Basson in it.  Then after that the demarche occurred.  You know what I am referring to.  The document that the two countries involved put on the table contained allegations.  We discussed it with National Intelligence.  National Intelligence gave a briefing to the Minister and myself and in that briefing I became convinced that there were certain things taking place that I was not aware of.  I wrote a comment on the American document which is one of the documents in your bundle here and which you have in front of you, and I made that comment to President de Klerk.  
 But I also confronted Basson at that stage.  You must understand Basson was not in our service any longer.  He was already on pension, but he was still helping us with clarifying certain of the final elements in the Croatia, maybe the Croatia thing I should also not mention, but there were some funds that had to be recovered from Croatia and he was still helping us to do that.  
 And in any case after we spoke to the President about his free moving the President approved that we could take him into our service again, so I had access to him and I could speak to him about it.  Clearly that was when I began to warn, not only President de Klerk but later on President Mandela, about these abuses.
 Now I am saying again, I confronted him, he assured me that all the work that had been done was within the mandate of the programme and that there was no truth in any allegation that they had abused it.  Then I see this document and I admitted to you that I was shocked when I saw it in '97 and we discussed it with National Intelligence at the time and Colonel Steyn and I classified the documents and that classification is available in the document Project Cloud where you can have a look at it where both Colonel Steyn and I queried all of these items as possible abuses.

CHAIRPERSON: Now without getting into details I just want to be able to be happy that I understand what you are saying.  Are you saying between a date in 1994 and 1997, the latter date being the date on which you saw this document for the first time, TRC52, there were developments based on intelligence that was gathered ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Either from this country or from other countries, or from all of these.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: The nature of which gave rise to your feeling uncomfortable about the direction which the programme had taken under Dr Basson.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was of a nature that caused you to want to confront him.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you felt that it had gone, that is you personally ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Felt on the intelligence that you had gathered it had gone beyond the mandate.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You confronted him with your considered opinion that it had exceeded the mandate.  His attitude was that it had not.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It was one of reassurance.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But the position was then made worse when you were confronted with these documents because far from reassuring you it in fact confirmed your earlier discomfort.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Sooka.

YASMINE SOOKA: I just am a little surprised that given the events that took place that you still relied on Dr Basson's reassurance that he had not exceeded his mandate, because surely the events that gave rise to your confrontation should have actually put you in a position to question the validity of what he was telling you?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Ms Sooka can I take you back to the decision by Mr de Klerk to put Dr Basson on early pension.

YASMINE SOOKA: Exactly.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.  That decision was based on the Steyn report.

YASMINE SOOKA: Yes.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: The Steyn report was never brought to my attention.  We never had insight into that report.  As a matter of fact even today I don't know if there was such a written report or not.  What we have in your document is a staff paper which General Steyn used in preparing his report, as far as I gathered.

YASMINE SOOKA: No, no ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No let me please ...(intervention)

YASMINE SOOKA: Sorry just before you carry on.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

YASMINE SOOKA: And I may not repeat it word for word, but the sense of the evidence you gave is that in terms of Intelligence reports furnished to you.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: That was the basis for your confrontation with him.  Now it is true that based on the Steyn report he was relieved of his duties, but you are now beyond that point.  He is helping you to, in fact you take him back on to close up certain projects.  Now you go to the very man about whom there is a question mark and you ask him certain questions.  Based on his answers you are reassured, and the only time you become suspicious is when you are confronted with this other document. Now can you explain to me how a man like yourself, I mean I would expect of you that in your position you would be highly suspicious about irregular activity, you have some example of that, you question him and he assures you he has not exceeded the mandate, and you accept that.  I find that very difficult.