Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: With the greatest of respect, Mr Maritz, I won't allow that question.  Really, it's pointless.  Mr Varney has been allowed to testify.  We will decide what evidenciary value to put on his evidence.  Really, to put it to him, with respect, is a bit of a harassment.  It's absolutely unnecessary.

MR MARITZ: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm being interrupted by
 /an attorney.
5A an attorney, just give me a moment.  No, Mr Varney, it's very pertinent.  We will argue the matter if it arises, but I want to merely put it to you that our standpoint is that your opinions, not being an expert, are totally valueless in this regard.  Will you bear with me one moment, Mr Chairman?  Mr Chairman, as for the rest of the submissions it is a matter of argument and we will address our arguments or submissions in due course.  Thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ

MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Maritz.  Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I hope that I will also be short - brief.  Mr Varney, may I preface the few questions that I want to put to you on behalf of the persons that I appear for and I hope you remember who they are, by telling you that they have applied for amnesty so, my purpose to be here is not to conceal any truth or to run away from it.  Please view my questions in that light.  Just to sketch the parameter within which I am going to contain myself, I am simply going to direct questions to you on the basis - and I'd like you to bear it in mind - as to whether any conduct which appears from your allegations based upon documentation which you have provided, not all of which to us, I may add, on whether that conduct was an act or an omission which also an offence.  Do you understand my line of questioning, because that way I can go quickly?  May I start with Mr Vlok?  Would it be fair to say that your implication of him, by way of deduction or inference, is his association with, membership of, presence at certain State Security meetings?  The mere fact that he was there.  Would you answer?

WITNESS:   Correct.

MR VISSER: /Yes, and

MR VISSER: 5A Yes, and perhaps to take it further, in fairness to you, the fact that he made some, "Voorlegging", some presentation about this whole issue of a third force - you will remember that was the meeting of - I don't have it at my fingertips.

WITNESS:   12th May 1986.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Varney, the 12th May, correct.  One would add that to the basis for your inferences?  I am not going to repeat what my learned friend, Mr Maritz has asked you, but on the basis of evidenciary value - that's as far as it goes.  Thank you, Mr - the rest we will argue, Mr Varney.  Now, coming then to General Coetzee, am I correct - I think you mentioned that your page 14, paragraph 5, that the way you see him being implicated is that he supported the establishment of a para-military strike element, call it what you will, at the time, which was in January 1986 - in the early part of 1986 for Inkatha, that that would be the basis, or is there something which I have missed?

WITNESS:   No, I think you have it in a nutshell.  He was part of the sub-committee that recommended the establishment of an offensive para-military unit, but I think it does go a little further than that, because he was the Commissioner of Police.  I'm not sure when his tenure ended, but he would have obviously been kept informed of general developments.

MR VISSER: I accept your answer.  In that regard, may I put to you, Mr Varney, that whatever it was that was discussed at that particular meeting, and I don't think we really have the details of that from the documentation, may I put to you that by the 19th December 1985, which was a little bit before that, what was considered as being help for Minister Buthelezi is what we find in the document

MR VISSER: /entitled, "SA

MR VISSER: 5A entitled, "SAW hulpverlening aan Hoofminister Buthelezi en Biskop Lekganyane", dated the 19th December 1985, at page 3 thereof.  Would that be a fair statement to make?  Perhaps you can just look at the document, because I'd be interested to see whether you agree with that.

WITNESS:   What paragraph, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: It's at page 3, paragraph 10.  It's under the heading, "Hoofminister Buthelezi" and there are (a) to (f).

INTERPRETER: Chief Minister Buthelezi.

MR VISSER: "Hoofminister Buthelezi".  I am sorry, you were interpreting.  I am terribly sorry.  I thought she was correcting me.  Mr Varney, the supposition I'm making is simply this.  I'm going to say and I'm going to argue later, and that's why I'm putting it up for your comment, that during January 1986, if Coetzee supported anything, by and large he must have had what is in paragraph 10 at page 3 of that document in mind and I will concede immediately that, in addition thereto, whatever he may have considered to be an offensive unit that must obviously be added to that, in fairness, but isn't this essentially what he had in mind?

WITNESS:   Well, it's impossible for me to say whether it was confined to this, whether, in fact, there was much more.  We don't have the minutes of the discussions at that particular meeting, but certainly this document and presumably the one before, the November 1985 document, 27th November, would have fed into the deliberations at that sub-committee meeting in which your client sat.

MR VISSER: Yes, now, and I certainly don't want to start an argument, but is it fair, do you think, to accept that if

MR VISSER: /he says, "Look

MR VISSER: 5A he says, "Look here, whatever I supported, I'll tell you now, it wasn't to support people to act unlawfully and kill each other", are you prepared, on the documentation as it stands and as you know them better than I do, that that's a possible explanation or an acceptable explanation?  Or are you aware of evidence which says that could never have been so, "General Coetzee, you knew"?

WITNESS:   He would have argue, of course, that the offensive capacity as he dealt with at that stage was an entirely innocent and laudable affair.  Presumably those are your instructions.  He would also have to argue that the offensive capacity they discussed here was something entirely different from the offensive capacity I referred to later, where pretty blunt and straight-forward descriptions were given, and I would find that an extremely difficult argument to accept.  In fact, I couldn't accept it.

MR VISSER: I'm quite happy with your answer, Mr Varney.  I think it's a fair answer.  That would be for him to show and if he can't show that, well then either he succeeds with his application for amnesty or he doesn't, but that's another matter.

WITNESS:   Yes.

MR VISSER: In general - well, let's first get to the last particular person which I think has featured in your evidence and on the documentation specifically, and that is General Johan van der Merwe.  Johan Velde van der Merwe ... [end of tape] ... [break in recording] ... criminal sense results or flows from the discussions which were held at the Liberty Life Building on the 8th November 1988, where Generals van der Merwe and Smit were apparently, according to the note which we have here,

MR VISSER: /present.  Now,

MR VISSER: 5B present.  Now, you dealt with that, Mr Varney, and if you'll allow me to refer you to page 27, your paragraph 22.  I believe this is where you refer to that meeting, where you say,

MR VISSER: "It is evident that by November 1988 the military regarded continued SADF support for the taking of offensive actions as an unacceptably high security risk.  Attempts to secure greater police intervention ..."

MR VISSER: And then, may I suggest to you, with respect, this is an inference as we go on now,

MR VISSER: "... in the cover-up of crimes committed by Caprivi Trainees were not successful."

MR VISSER: Well, we certainly agree with the result which you come to.  They weren't successful and we know why.  We've read that document.