Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I've said, this is the result of the contributions made by several people.  And maybe this remark was made towards somebody else.
MR AVENANT
"Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen emphasised or his duties were further emphasised by personal instructions which the then Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan and PW Botha had given to him."
So that creates the impression that it was given personally.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, but what was involved here are my duties.  I can remember that visit, quite a lot of pressure was placed on us by both Malan and Botha, to address the situation in the Eastern Cape.  What was involved was the actual situation of unrest.  In the first sentence reference is made to my aforementioned duties.  So these duties which not only I had, but the Eastern Province Command as a whole.  There were many such visits, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Avenant, if I could just ask a question.
	You've said that the then State President issued this instruction, that the area, and the Eastern Cape in particular, had to be stabilised or normalised by December 1987, initially I think it was 1986 for the whole of South Africa, December 1987, isn't it contradictory, would there be a setback in that regard with your having been transferred on the 1st of January 1987?  After all you were in charge of the Army in the Eastern Cape and then six months after being given this fairly heavy instruction, difficult to carry out, the Army then transfers you out of the area to Witwatersrand Command.  Would that have had an impact on the adherence to that directive given by the State President, namely to stabilise the area by the end of '87?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Chairperson, you are entirely correct.  I was not very pleased with my transfer, but it was thought that the Witwatersrand should perhaps enjoy a higher priority, and as a result of my experience in the Eastern Cape, it was decided that I should be transferred to the Witwatersrand.  I might just add that my staff and my commanding officers who worked with me stayed behind and they would be able to assist the new commanding officer to just take over and continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Thank you, Chair.

MR AVENANT: General, just to get back to this instruction.  This would not be something which somebody would just fabricate and lie about, that Charles Sebe should be liberated from prison?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.  As I indicated yesterday, the imprisonment of Charles Sebe in Middledrift Prison enjoyed a high level of interest, media interest etc., everybody talked about it.  I don't think it would be too far-reaching to say that even President Botha would have known about it and talked about it.  But I can't personally say - well, President Botha didn't tell me personally to liberate Charles Sebe from prison.

MR AVENANT: Thank you.  But that then actually became part of the plan, the liberation of Charles Sebe?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, whether PW Botha said so or not, we all thought that that was necessary, and for that I accept responsibility.  I felt that he should be liberated from prison.

MR AVENANT: Would you be able to link this instruction or the idea with President Botha's visit to the Eastern Cape?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It was in August '85 when President Botha visited the area.  I can remember it very well, especially as a result of the pressure which was placed on us during that visit.  There were also other visits, but I can't remember the dates, but I can remember the August '85 visit.  And we also visited East London in August '85.

MR AVENANT: But it was as a result of this pressure exerted on you that Plan Strelitzia was developed?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.  Plan Strelitzia was conceived even before this visit, in May/June of '85.  Plan Strelitzia had a long genesis and months before the presentation, in June '85 I think, we got together and started compiling Strelitzia.  So that was part of my ongoing duties.

MR AVENANT: On page 28, the meeting of July '86, the 9th of July '86, the version of Katzen was conveyed to General van der Westhuizen or General Liebenberg.  There you also refer to the fact that General Griebenauw attended this meeting in Pretoria.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think that is correct.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are that he was not present at that meeting.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I will accept that.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are that his first getting to know of the plan was in East London, or I beg your pardon, in Port Elizabeth in August.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I will accept that too.

MR AVENANT: It is possible that you're perhaps confusing him with Brigadier Schoon who was at that stage in Pretoria.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: What you're saying is correct, it's possible that I'm getting him confused with somebody in Pretoria, a police officer, because there was somebody from the police present there but I can't recall who.  It's possible that it could have been somebody other than Colonel Griebenauw.  This meeting, if I remember correctly, took place in General Geldenhuys' office.

MR AVENANT: I'm accepting that you were assuming that you were personally involved in the Port Elizabeth meeting, but there were so many of them.  The first meeting which took place in Port Elizabeth where General Griebenauw was present, we think took place the end of July, beginning of August, but we don't have a specific date for it.  It was at this meeting that the plan was discussed in broad terms, in Port Elizabeth.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think that is the meeting where General Joubert was present, yes.

MR AVENANT: And is it correct that this plan was not discussed in its full extent, but only in broad outline?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Is it correct that General Griebenauw voiced his concerns and objections to his participation in this plan, he did not want to take instructions from the Defence Force?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That I can't remember pertinently.  I know that there were certain objections to the plan from the police side and also from the Intelligence side, but I can't remember the details.

MR AVENANT: My instructions are ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, by that then I gather you won't deny that there was that opposition expressed?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I will accept that.

MR AVENANT: At that same meeting, Brigadier Schoon told Griebenauw that it was an instruction from the Commissioner of Police, do you remember that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't recall it but I will accept it, especially in view of the fact that South African Police knew of this plan, and Colonel Griebenauw was their representative in the Eastern Cape.  So by virtue of his office he would have been familiar with it, he would have known of it.

MR AVENANT: What was the police's function, the Security Branch in particular, what was their function in relation to this operation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: From the Eastern Province Command side there was no need for us, for the South African Police to fulfil any function other than what we would normally require, namely our co-operation inasfar as Intelligence and the operational side of things were concerned.  I can't recall, given the fact that I had written Plan Katzen, that I had in that document expressed any desire for the SAP to assist us.

MR AVENANT: Is it correct that the South African Police's primary task, well the Security Police, was to gather Intelligence?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.