Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-09-01

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, unaware of that.

MR WILLS: Were you - are you able to say when the Vlakplaas operatives were drawn out of the house, or sorry - excuse me Mr Chairperson - were withdrawn from the operation, how many days afterwards?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I'm not aware of their activities after this.  I can't recall.  They were there for a day or two, but what Mr Botha did with them or redirected, I wouldn't know.

MR WILLS: Yes, but your recollection is that they weren't there for long after that.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR WILLS: It might have been the very next day?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Or even the day after that, Mr Chairman, I cannot recall that at all.

MR WILLS: You were obviously in close contact with the C1 people or not?  Did you ever speak to them?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Are you referring to this operation, Sir?

MR WILLS: Yes.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, not ideally.  We would discuss peripheral things but the details of the operation were Botha's details, not mine.

MR WILLS: Yes, look I realise that Botha would have discussed this in the main, but you were living together, not so?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: That's correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: So I mean the chances are you didn't have a hell of a lot in common, except the sort of work that you were doing?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: That's correct, Sir.

MR WILLS: So the probabilities are that you would have discussed work more than anything else?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Not necessarily, Sir.

MR WILLS: You can't remember discussing the details of operations, of what was happening in their lives, or their infiltration with them at any stage?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR WILLS: You can't remember for example being informed by them that Ms Khubeka was getting suspicious of the fact that she's being watched, or just getting generally suspicious of what was going on?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, I was never informed of that fact by anyone.

MR WILLS: Now, in a situation where somebody in her position, and let's just look at that position just very briefly, where she is an ANC operative, you have infiltrated with a couple of your askaris and assuming that she was suspicious, what action would you have expected to be taken?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I don't quite get the point of the question Sir, please repeat.

MR WILLS: If she's suspicious of the fact that, if she thinks that the Security Branch is on to her and that was communicated to you and you know that you've got your operatives working there, you know that her suspicions are indeed true, so in other words she's got some information concerning the fact that she's the subject of a Security Branch operation and you have your two informers there and communicating with her on an ongoing basis, what would happen to her in a situation like that, I mean, surely you wouldn't just let it carry on normally?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: But Mr Chairman, I wasn't aware of that situation.

MR WILLS: No, no I'm asking hypothetically.  I've accepted your answer that you weren't aware of that.  Hypothetically, you'd have to protect the operation, the integrity of the operation surely?  Have to take some action to make sure that her suspicion didn't lead to investigations, which didn't lead to her uncovering the fact that this was a big Security Branch ploy?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman, there would have been some action taken by the operation handlers.

MR WILLS: Yes.  And what sort of action would you expect them to take?  I think Mr Lax summed it up by saying that at least one of two things would have been considered.  One would have been to withdraw the operatives and, sorry the informers, the askaris, and the other would be to arrest Khubeka.  Would those be contemplated in the situation? Again we're speaking hypothetically.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes, those two could have been contemplated and as well as the normal informers that were in position could have continued as well and the whole thing could have been aborted as well.

MR WILLS: Yes.  But if you specifically wanted information from her that you believed she was holding, for example she knew the whereabouts of freedom fighters infiltrating from Zambia, the chances are you would have, the dice would have fell on the option to pick her up and find out what's going on?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I personally wouldn't have picked her up, Mr Chairman, I would have continued long distance surveillance and an operation on her.  I personally would not have picked her up had I been in charge of that, in that scenario.

MR WILLS: Why not?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I would let the operation continue and eventually the sources would have come up with ...(intervention.

MR WILLS: But we've heard evidence that the sources weren't coming up with the goods.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Maybe that's on this particular case but they would have come up sooner or later, Mr Chair.

MR WILLS: Yes, but on the assumption that your sources weren't coming up with the goods, surely then you wouldn't have let this valuable source of information escape you and you would have decided then to pick her up?  Because I can't see, or unless you can advise me, I can't see any other way of getting that information out of her head into your domain?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I think it's a matter of personal methods between personal Security Branch policemen.  If you're asking me hypothetically, I would not have picked her up, but she was picked up seemingly by evidence led here because she was brought by Mr Mbane.

MR WILLS: Yes and would you expect that that would be an organised arrest?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: From what I gather it was not due to happen like that, Sir.

MR WILLS: Okay thank you Mr Chairman.  No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTION BY MR WILLS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Wills.  Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, in inches what is the equivalent to a 9 mm bullet?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: In inches it would be .38.

MR VISSER: And a 7.65 mm what would that relate to in, or translate to in inches?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: That would be .32.

MR VISSER: 32?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.  No, I'm sorry, the firearm which you said you had there that evening, was that your own personal firearm?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, it was my personal issue SAP weapon.

MR VISSER: It was a police issue?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Police issue weapon yes.

MR VISSER: What police issue were the other members of the Security Branch issued with?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: We were all issued with 9 mm.

MR VISSER: 9 mm, .38s?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Bosman, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Chairperson.  Mr Wasserman did you remove the blindfold from the body?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you dispose of the body with the blindfold on it?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I beg your pardon, at the scene of the disposal?

ADV BOSMAN: Yes.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No the blindfold was off her then?

ADV BOSMAN: What became of the blindfold?  What did you do with it?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I can't recall, Mr Chairman.  Maybe, I would imagine we would have destroyed it.

ADV BOSMAN: And I asked your colleague whether he didn't find it strange that a sjambok was being used for this assault and he thought it was rather unusual.  What are your views on it?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, even I, it's rather strange that a sjambok was there.  However, it was there and it was used.