Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: (sworn states)
 Thank Mr Chair, as advocate Maritz has indicated I voluntarily on the 7th of May appeared before the Truth Commission. I made very important points there, important statements, certain questions that were put today to Dr. Barnard were addressed by me in a comprehensive way. I would then like to say that with regards to this submission there's nothing that changed. I still view this as important and what I am going to do today results therefrom. That's the first aspect.
 The second aspect; I think that in the functioning of a state, especially with regards to the Defence Force - and I specifically talk about the Defence Force. There are certain parameters within which planning and certain decisions take place. In other words, the way in which the Defence Force functions in a certain milieu. Some of the Commissioners today asked questions in that regard and it's very clear that they are important questions. They are lacking in knowledge but you sit there with their document before you. That document was submitted by the Defence Force but the Defence Force never discussed that document with you. The document was handed up and General Viljoen and the other people who were there discussed other things and not the document. I am not going to discuss the whole document with you but I'm just going to give you the first part because I think that some of your follow-up questions would be facilitated thereby if you want to put them. 
 It basically concerns the following four aspects. In the first place it's about the security threat. And as Dr. Barnard said there was a yearly forecast, you didn't want to give your documents. I think it's important to discuss that because we had to determine what the circumstances were at that stage. The second one is the national strategy. I do not have documents but there is a document. The only documents I do have are the documents that you have given me. Second one is national strategy. There's referred to the goals and aims of government and it's policy. All departments had to try and realise that goal and aim and policy, that's the questions that you were asking on departmental level. 
 The third one resulting therefrom, concerning the Defence Force. The Defence Force had to fulfil certain tasks. I, Dr. Barnard referred to certain budgets. If a government says that there are certain aims and the departments had to look at them then there are three things important. And then one had to calculate this. And tell the government and say if you want this task to be fulfilled this is what it's going to cost you, this is the manpower needed and the machinery. So there is a logical aspect thereto and then I'll make some remarks on that. 
 The previous time I appeared before the Commission a Commissioner asked me a question, a lady. She asked me what I would think the Defence Force should do today and I also think of the question that was asked to Dr. Barnard earlier. The question concerned checks and balances as well and this is where the checks and balances lie. That is why I would like to make this contribution.
 The first part is on, it was delivered to the Commission on the 8th of October '97. He looks at the, in other words he tells you what this country is facing on security front. Then he comes to revolutionary war and I would like to quote a short part thereof. Which in essence all described it as a conflict which wide ranging and radical change in the political, the social and economic field are brought about through the use of violence.  Basically revolutionary war is the pursuit of a policy of a politically inspired and organised group inside a country. By all means available also with outside support success obtained by the creation of a situation of instability and political intolerability through a war of attrition thus producing a climate of political collapse or acceptance of a negotiated solution. Without necessarily defeating military opponents on the battle field. 
 Then violence, terror, propaganda and intimidation by the revolutionaries are a key ingredient to promote fear, instability and ensure support and to mobilise the masses. As had been the case during world war two the intensive use of psychological operations breeds dislike and hatred or creates sympathy on one or both sides. 
 External support as well as the need for external manoeuvre and freedom of action is of vital importance to the revolutionary movements. The external areas must also be chosen so as to inhibit and paralyse the external freedom of action of the government forces. Compelling them onto the defence. Thus creating scope for the revolutionary military forces and making their opponents commit vast resources on the protection of the population and infrastructure. 
 The next heading is cold war. The cold war. And here I quote a few passages. In areas where direct (...indistinct) was unlikely the super powers were prepared to participate or to support others in their wars on a proxy basis. As part of the cold war the communist powers supported the wars of national liberation which sort to gain independence for the former colonies of the European empires as well as in other areas. And a bit further down; most revolutionary wars were thus not only wars of liberation for people concerned, but also proxy wars for the super powers. 
 The following were among the explicitly declared objectives of Soviet policy in Southern Africa. First to establish and improve relations with the frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Secondly, to support and strengthen the national liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Thirdly; to support progressive programmes adopted by African governments which had embarked on the non-capitalist development. Then the reduction of USA and West European influence. The following one; to obtain the right of bases and reconnaissance in the area. Second last; limiting American and West European access to the mineral resources of the region and lastly; threatening one of the oil supplies routes of the United States and Western Europe. 
 The instruments of Soviet policy  in Africa included economic and military aid, technical assistance, trade, diplomatic relations, assistance in the field of intelligence, security and propaganda and direct military intervention especially in the case of Angola and Ethiopia. Border wars, other conflicts, internal struggles and general instability were avenues for Soviet involvement. The Soviet Union succeeded in establishing socialist orientated states in Congo, Brazzaville, Angola, Mozambique and Madagascar. While Zambia signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union in 1979. Soviet weapons and training assistance were made available to SWAPO, AZAPO and the ANC. The conflict was also part of the cold war and South Africa saw itself allied on the side of the west. 
 The aim was not only to counter the revolution but also to halt the expansion of Soviet domination in the sub-continent. At that stage the RSA's military strategy was mainly based on defensive posture. Because of a commonality in the threat perception between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia as well as the direct  or indirect involvement of SWAPO and the ANC in Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. The South African Defence Force became involved on a limited scale in these countries during the early sixties. This was the first step towards a more outward defence policy. 
 In the turning point, in the direct threat to South West Africa, Namibia and South Africa occurred in April '75 when the Portuguese government in Lisbon was overthrown. Which was followed by a consequent collapse of the ALVOR agreement in Angola which resulted in the purge by the MPLA with Cuban assistance the expulsion of the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda and the ensuing civil war. With the accession of power of FRELIMO in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola the way was now clear for SWAPO and the ANC to move their bases and other facilities further south. These circumstances brought about the first significance change in South Africa's defence strategy when the Vorster government decided to follow the actions of the USA and side with the FNLA and UNITA forces against the Soviet back MPLA. The first South African weapons were delivered to UNITA in October 1974. By that time SWAPO was already establishing itself in the southern areas of Angola.
 Now I, Mr Chairman I carry on with the strategy and the counter strategy. While the SADF was involved in South West Africa, Namibia the ANC was also active in furthering it's plans for actions in the internal struggle in the RSA. The ANC applied a new strategy based on the four pillars of their revolution. Briefly they are: developing underground structures secondly, united mass action, mass mobilisation. Thirdly; armed offensive and lastly; international drive to isolate South Africa.
 From 1976 onwards, Angola had become the main trading centre of the ANC with Lusaka as the main operational centre. After 1978, Mozambique became the pivot for armed action against the RSA. With regional head quarters being established in Botswana, Swaziland, Mozambique and Lesotho. South Africa was slowly being encircled from the north. In the general review of operations, sorry I left something out, I'll just add it in. South Africa and the SADF was however determined not to lose the initiative in the immediate external or tactical area, thereby being forced on the defensive. 
 Then in the general review on operations contained in a white paper on defence and I referred at a previous meeting to study the white papers and I just quote here a small potion of it and I quote: In the present operation situation there is no controlled neutral zone between the RSA and the host countries of it's enemies. The result is that the enemy is able to establish and operate bases, armed depots and logistical routes close to the borders of the RSA and Namibia with the approval of the host country concerned. This means that the enemy can cross the border to lay land mines, kidnap and intimidate. Then within a few hours return to the host country where he is unassailable. No government in the world can afford a situation of this nature.  Consequently when the situation arises the SADF had no other option than to launch pre-emptive operation against the border, across the border in order to destroy enemy bases, depots and logistical routes and in this way to discourage enemy actions from areas adjacent to the RSA border. This was published in parliament so all the politicians knew about it. I'm quite sure that it was also circulated in the SADF. 
 Later a situation was again debated in parliament and I made the following statement. I'm quoting a small portion of it. Let me again remind honourable members of the words of George Schultz, US Secretary of State. And he said: "From a practical standpoint a purely passive defence does not provide enough for a deterrent to terrorism and the states that sponsor it. It is time to think long, hard and seriously about more active means of defence. Defence through appropriate preventive or pre-emptive actions against terrorist groups before they strike." End of his quote. 
 And I quote further on. Consequently to act against the ANC in neighbouring countries and destroy their facilities is a form of self defence for the Republic of South Africa. It is based on a justified principle. In, and I'm quoting from the document again. In applying this dimension of the national strategy the South African Defence Force had two major problems. In the case of SWAPO their bases in southern Angola were so situated as to make maximum use of the protection of the MPLA facilities, infrastructures and units as well as sophisticated Soviet air defence. 
 In the case of the ANC and PAC their cadres were not operating from bush based in isolated rural areas but mainly from houses, camps and similar facilities in or on the outskirts of towns such as Maputo, Gaberone, Maseru and later Harare. These base were mostly small, clandestine facilities which changed regularly. A target base could therefore be active on the one day and gone by the next. Military factors such as accurate intelligence, security, surprise infiltration and infiltration of the attacking forces, etc. were of primary importance. 
 Besides this there was also the danger that such facilities could include civilians. Thus endangering their lives or property. These problems accentuated the need for an effective, covert intelligence capability and the increasing requirement for clandestine and covert special operations. Therefore the SADF's organisation in this regard had to be developed and frequently adapted these requirements. Including the need for a CCV type of unit.  There was a clear correlation between the ANC strategy and the counter revolutionary strategy of the South African government. 
 The first extensive national strategy was approved by the Cabinet in March 1980 and titled; Boek 1, Beluit die RSA se Belange en - the RSA's Interests and goals and aims and policy for orderly government." From these aims and orderly government it was necessary for the departments to with those aims in mind, individually and jointly to formulate their own tasks and from this it is required from the department as I have just said the three M's. That is where it was determined. The manpower of the Defence Force, it's weapons and it's logistical capabilities and monies were then given to it. It occurred from year to year. The Defence Force could put out it's budget for twenty years in the future. 
 The previous occasion when I appeared here I made the remark that what must the Defence Force do now. This is what the Defence Force has done in the past. That is to help the communities who have lapsed behind. We had a community in Kimberley the males alone who had no qualification in the age group 16 to 23, they came voluntarily. We accepted them, we handled them conscripts, we paid them money and we negotiated with the department of manpower and we taught them certain skills. They became technicians, etc, bricklayers and when he obtained a job we released them. If he did not get a job he retained in the military where he developed his expertise regarding his necessary skills. Later he went back to his communities. This can be done at the moment with this analyses I've provided today I would have requested you to ask the present government what is the task of the Defence Force. What are the dangers on the horizon, what are the three M's? It's very important and I've told the Commission because these skills divisions have been created in the new South African Defence Force. There's a general Maloi, he was an MK cadre, he's responsible for this. He's been appointed there, why don't they give him money. He has no money, he can't train the people. Can you see I agree with the question previously asked a certain adjustment should be made. But then it should be done on a scientifically and orderly way to determine what is necessary to appropriate to the Defence Force and how can they help to uplift the disadvantaged. 
 Ek gaan vort. This morning an allegation was made that the Defence Force at a very late stage thought of winning the hearts and minds of people. In the 1970's already I've said that eighty percent of this country's activities should be to win the hearts and minds of people on the political level, economical level, welfare level, constitutional level. That's where the problem is. Politics is only twenty percent of a country's management. 
 The need for co-ordinated action on all above terrains and recognise the eighty, twenty percent requirement of the conflict. That is that the greater accent should be placed on the political and other spheres while the security aspects only made up twenty percent of the solution. Based on the strategy and as a part of it's application the region was subdivided in three areas. An area of responsibility that's South Africa, an area of influence to outside. And an area of interest. And this is very important. Are you buying naval ships to go and fight in India? Is that the government's objective in life? Or are you concerned about your neighbouring states? 
 The reason why I'm discussing these things, we are allocating money. I developed this system and to a very great extent with the help of my colleagues and I doubt whether there's a other way of doing it of allocating priorities by using the government's objective and what he wants to achieve. The strategy emphasised the defence of the RSA for available, a defence of the RSA with all available means within the limits of the law against any form of external aggression or internal revolution, whatever the origin.
 Secondly, the need for a suitable, conventional military capability so as to ensure the defence of the RSA against outside aggression by pro-active action. The need for an effective intelligence network has to provide the required backup for the planning and the support of operations. This included requirement to provide accurate and timeous military intelligence to other authorities within the parameters of the division of responsibilities in the intelligence community. The need to conduct cross-border operations into neighbouring states as a preventative action in self defence. 
 Second lastly. The prevention of a build up of hostile terrorists or conventional forces in neighbouring countries that could constitute a threat to the RSA. And lastly, the need to support the aims and position of anti-Marxist movements in the region so as to form a buffer against Soviet expansion and to promote common anti Communist interests. The document provided the framework for further strategies and for further applications of the strategies, guidelines that emanated from the State Security Council with the approval of Cabinet. And please remember that the State Security Council couldn't prove, it could recommend. Numerous guidelines, directives and new strategies were issued by the Cabinet from 1980 onwards. 
 This all developed at the stage that the ANC was vigorously applying it's new strategy and that was the regional political military committees with their machineries or military task groups were being established in Maputo, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Lusaka and later Zimbabwe. Violence in the country escalated. MK cadres played an important role in testifying the internal onslaught and political and military training of MK members inside the country and in the neighbouring areas was ongoing. MK began to establish military structures and political cells in some of the townships areas which developed into bases or so-called no-go areas. 
 And then a few remarks. From the above it should be obvious that the national and departmental planning process was an ongoing and of a dynamic nature with a constant adaptation according to the actual and perceived threats. It also illustrates the fact that the SADF operated according to a specific mandate. It did not function in a vacuum or of it's own desire. It operated with adequate direction from the government and parliament. Defence strategies followed specific guidelines and directives after continuous and detailed analyses of the threat to the country's security. The proceedings for strategic planning at national, interdepartmental and departmental level was specified in numerous State Security Council directives. 
 The overall planning was also summarised in the white paper on defence and was tabled in parliament on April 1979. The following was stated in regard to defence planning. Within the South African Defence Force the planning is executed as follows; For it's design the SADF strategy are determined by the State Security Council's total national strategy directives and the total national strategies and analysis of the threat as well as of the SADF's capabilities. These strategies are determines inter alia missions and tasks to be executed by the SADF to counter identify threats according to stipulated time scales. 
 The military threat to the country was very real particularly because of aggressive Soviet intervention in Angola. Both in Namibia and the RSA the threat was that of a classical revolutionary war. Simultaneously integrated with the potential of a limited conventional war. There was also the ever increasing threat of violence, terror and intimidation against those who did not support the revolutionary struggle. 
 The SADF was acutely aware of the fact that the solution to the revolutionary struggle was only twenty percent military and eighty percent political. More importantly it was often the SADF itself that warned the political leaders that the solution to the conflict in South Africa was not to be sort through military means but by political restitution.
 At no stage during this time however was it the official policy of the government or the military that the SADF or any other organisation was above the law. Neither did the military see itself as the substitute or caretaker of the government of the day. Neither did the former SADF attempt a so-called silent coup in order to be able to play the predominant role. The members of the former SADF clearly understood that the SADF could only be part of a total solution and not and end in itself.  
 Mr Chairman this is the part which comes from the South African Defence Force. It's very important and you should take note of that. If there is still time left I think that the next aspect as why I'm here refers to the State Security Council and I wish to make a few remarks concerning this.
 For me and my approach based on the study of all the Cabinet and State Security Council decisions which I saw and you've seen more than I have. These are attempts by all the members of those two bodies and it shows that always they supported legitimate actions. Nowhere mention is made of how they acted without the bounds of the law. Read decisions of the Cabinet, SSC. I don't know how many there are, there could be a thousand. I think there are almost ten thousand problems they addressed and in every respect it was lawful methods or lawful actions they addressed. And when no legitimate actions could be taken it was left just like that. 
 And the functioning of that it was State Security Council it was mentioned that there were four committees. Those four committees reported to the Cabinet. It was the social and the economic amongst others. Not one of the others was subordinate to the other. The SSC was a statutory body and because of that it had certain sub-structures and where these sub-structures necessitated it that it was responsible for making security recommendations according to certain specifications. Because of that the strategies derived from security and these Cabinet committees provided their inputs, the secretariat processed it and it was approved according to that and presented to the Cabinet for approval or disapproval. 
 It was not that the one was subordinate to the other. There were no parallel lines of authorities. The various departments were not incorporated here. There were representatives here, the Ministers were represented here but the departments were directly responsible to the Cabinet. 
 The SSC had certain long standing members but they also had co-opted members. While Mr Botha was there, I can't remember about Mr de Klerk, it was always the provincial leader of a province who served on the SSC. And the provincial leader had to have his finger on the pulse of what the feelings of the people were so that he could provide his inputs. Not necessarily that he had specific department to provide input. If there was a certain matter outside the SSC or whether a certain department had to be drawn in, the Minister and also the DJ or the auditor general from that department was called in. The SSC provided advice. 
 And the minutes. Doctor Barnard referred to that. I wish to confirm that. The minutes were cryptic and short. The person who talked the loudest was recorded and the others perhaps not. It was not the various points of view and the various discussions were not recorded. The chairman listened to everything and in the end he gave a summary and he said it feels as if the meeting said we should do this or that and we did that, acted accordingly. 
 There was also always an opportunity for Ministers to object. In a certain instance the Minister said he wanted to object it and after a long discussion he withdrew that. Or he could if he did not agree and left and said I could leave the Cabinet but once that decision was taken by the SSC and the Cabinet approved that everybody carried the political responsibility for that decision. I don't know whether all these decisions were documented. We went through various phases. There were two very important documents regarding the Defence Force's operation. The white document you will find here and the document you've given me it's 1979, August '79. I'm not sure, it's document number A. It's a very important document. It gives an indication of how the checks and balances were functioned once the Defence Force will operate; should he do it or should he not do it. 
 In 1985 a new document was drafted. I think various other documents were drafted afterwards. This was a dynamic management way. What is relevant today may not be relevant the next day because situations changed so drastically. But if a question is asked about that I will try to give your answers regarding those two specific documents. 
 The SSC as you heard, met every two weeks. Special meetings could be arranged and in the Defence Force it was a big problem for me and the same might apply to various other departments. For example in foreign, department of foreign affairs, if now suddenly the British government wanted some reaction for us he couldn't go to the SSC because they want an immediate answer. Then he went to the State President. Or perhaps they could consider bringing in other colleagues or not. If I had to lead certain sensitive operations which had to be done immediately then I consulted the State President. That's where the buck stopped. That is how a government is being ruled. That's not undemocratically because somebody should accept the responsibility. If he had taken a decision and it becomes known, I could just leave the meeting or I could accept co-responsibility. I don't think we should shy away from that. 
 And then lastly I want to refer to political responsibility. Political responsibility was caused by a dilemma in 1977 when I became head of the Defence Force. When I told myself; if we do cross-border operations with a certain group of people, who will carry the responsibility in a neighbouring country? I approached the Minister of Defence Force, I took General Viljoen with me and we approached Minister Vorster. We put the problem to him and he said no the lieutenant or the captain should take the responsibility. And I said no that person should carry the military responsibility but the political responsibility should be carried because if the United Nations had a problem or something you can't blame the lieutenant because that was the political responsibility. 
 And around 1979 documents were compiled, there's another document which I don't think was presented to the members and I wish to say questions which were asked today appear in this document. I handed it in previously and it appears under cross-border operations authorisation of the Defence Force operational cross-border activities, the 21st October 1985. And it specifies whose going to do that, who assumes political and military responsibility and the Cabinet was bound by this. I did that specifically because I was frightened of the situations you are encountering today that this person will say: "You have said this." 
 These are the guidelines, here are the checks and balances. Should he have obtained permission or not? The government if he decided to apply his security operations for example the Defence Force they should act according to certain norms. There were certain prescribed doctrines according to which he had to act. There were delegated capabilities. He was acting on behalf of the state, he's a service organ of the state but the state carries the political responsibility. And the actions will take place according to these norms. 
 Let's divide this into two. Let's take the internal situation. This organisation, the Defence Force has said repeatedly in written form and orally the Defence Force acts according to these guidelines and they are subordinate to the laws of the country. They can't just go and shoot people. There are laws of the country which state that you may not murder and if his action is legitimate the Cabinet carries the responsibility. And if he acts unlawfully it's his own responsibility. That is the division between these responsibilities. In neighbouring countries he uses his delegated competencies and if he acts accordingly the sate carries the political responsibility. But he should act according to a certain doctrine. The (...indistinct) aspect of the state is not there, the legal aspect. This is also a problem you have regarding the granting of amnesty. 
 For cross-border operation the political responsibility is provided by certain guidelines. When a decision is accepted it does not mean that any action is acceptable. I think that this is the problem you are having. The dispensation in South Africa was built on certain norms and according to that he should act. Those norms are the laws of the country. The Defence Force gets an instruction and result of that which comply with the norms, the consequences complying with the norms are the state's responsibility. If it's without or outside the norms of the state, it's not the state's responsibility. Whether it is to achieve a goal, whether it's a goal set by the state. I'm not a legal representative, I'm just trying on a simple way to see how I see this. I just want to add one thing. I want to compliment the ANC and I want to end with that. 
 In my submission I want to read this because I did not try to get it to somebody, released a very important statement a while ago, namely and I quote: "All member of the ANC involved in planning, commanding and carrying out the actual operations fall within the ambit of this submission. The leadership has taken collective political responsibility for the conduct of the combatants in the course of the arms struggle. The political responsibility is accepted for all the cadres even though we know that during the course of the liberation struggle anomalies may have arisen."
 I think this is an excellent example set. Thank you very much Mr Chairman.