Amnesty Hearings — Port Elizabeth — 1997-09-08

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I read paragraph seven right at the bottom of the page.
"Each department had a strategic communication component, that is STRATCOM, who can be of assistance in this regard."
Then they also compiled an Aim Plan.  Then I refer you to the second annexure, paragraph three and that is:
"The objective
		To neutralise leaders of the enemy or to eliminate and then also to break down the influence that they have."
Then you look at (b).  That is your specific task, that would be -
"To identify the leaders and to determine the areas of influence."
Then number two, the second column (b) -
"Neutralise or eliminate the leaders of the enemy."
Then I would like to refer you to an annexure;  that is number two.  I think that would be page 37 in your bundle.  The previous one was 36.  Do you see there Strategic Communication, that's STRATCOM.
	This is a document of the police compiled in 1989.  De Klerk was then in power.  All STRATCOM actions had to be re-registered and also submitted to him for approval.  That is why this document was compiled in 1989.
	Then I refer to page 1 of this particular document -
"STRATCOM as instrument of the State."
Then they give a variety of objectives of importance with regard to the question of Mr Mpshe.
	On page three -
"Covert actions also known as STRATCOM, PULWA, active issues of psychological warfare and these include actions which could be executed where that could not be determined and it is also then to achieve a national security policy,  the objectives thereof."
	Then I go to page 14 right at the bottom, those were the guidelines.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Page 49.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes
"STRATCOM is an instrument of the State that has to be used to protect national interest.  It is therefore a political instrument that must be controlled by means of efficient political control and all STRATCOM operations where the SAP would be involved, must be approved by the Minister of Law and Order."
Then on page 18.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Page 53.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Paragraph 50
"It was decided that STRATCOM would be used as an additional instrument to combat the revolutionary attack.  Different departments, also the police, have been given the task to execute STRATCOM."
This was done by the State President.
	Then the next page, page 19 -
"STRATCOM actions are not unfamiliar to the security branch.  Security branch sections are for many years already busy with it on an ad hoc basis.
		The SAP are sometimes accused of being involved by implication by the media."
If you look at for example assassinations, sabotage et cetera.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Nieuwoudt?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, Your Honour.

ADV POTGIETER: What is the relevance of this document that you now shared to us, especially the extract from the State Security Council.  What is the relevance of that?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: The relevance is to point out to you that there was pressure from our side to stabilise the unrest situation.

ADV POTGIETER: According to your version, you assaulted Mr Jack on the 12th of August 1985?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, and this document is 1986.

ADV POTGIETER: So what is the relevance of this document?  What does this have to do with the assault on Mr Jack?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: The relevance of this is that it was continuous - we have pressure from the unrest in 1985.  When we started, that there was pressure on the security branches to stabilise the unrest. That is the reason.  I do not have the documents that refer to 1984 and so forth.

ADV POTGIETER: But these documents in front of us;  where does it give an indication that these references in the document of the State Security Council that certain leaders have to be eliminated. Where does this have anything to do before the 10th of August?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: No, those documents I don't have what was decided beforehand, but that we did have pressure from above.  That's the reason for that.

ADV POTGIETER: But in this document there's no indication that it had to do with the situation before 1986.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That's 1985.  No, the process continues.  The State Security Council was already established in 1978.

ADV POTGIETER: Sorry, Mr Mpshe.  Thank you.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Mr Nieuwoudt, what I think is important at this stage, is a State Security Council document that gave you authorisation to interrogate and assault people the time that you assaulted Mr Jack. Do we have such a document?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: The only document is the emergency regulations, almost 18 that gave me the wide powers.

CHAIRPERSON: What he is trying to say is that the emergency regulations either indemnified or gave them to understand that no matter what they did, they would not be prosecuted.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The emergency regulations did not say that they must now proceed to go around, intimidating and assaulting and terrorising people.	It merely said that if they did it, they will not be prosecuted.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is how I understood it.  Thank you very much.

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Nieuwoudt, but it is implied in your application today that that was not correct, not so? Your interpretation that you attached to these emergency regulations ... (intervention).

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is how I understood it.

ADV POTGIETER: You are now applying for amnesty and you then also, by implication, where you then say that if you have assaulted someone like Mr Jack, it was not really legitimate.  So you then agree that this - these regulations never really gave you the permission to assault people.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Mr Nieuwoudt, on what basis could you conclude that reading the regulations the mandate to you, you could go around doing anything as a security policeman, including assaulting detainees. Would you say that was a reasonable interpretation of those regulations?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: According to me, yes, because it gave me broader powers against prosecution;  should it happen that they would charge me, that I would then have protection against prosecution and civil claims.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we can follow that later on.  Mr Mpshe needs to continue with his questions.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: I'm nearly finished, Mr Chairperson, thank you.
Mr Nieuwoudt you testified that during questioning the detainee stood?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is true.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: For how long did Mr Jack stand when you were busy with him?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: If I have to guess, it was approximately 20 minutes, 20 minutes to half-an-hour.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: And you expected that he had to stand for 20 minutes and at the same time be of assistance to you?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Was it reasonable?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That's not reasonable, but that's the way in which we break down resistance.  So, yes, it's not reasonable.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: As I understand your operations;  if you act against a prisoner or an activist, then it is based on an instruction or command from a senior person?  Is that so?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: The assault on Mr Jack,  was there an instruction given to you?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: No, not a direct instruction to assault him, but that the information had to be obtained to rectify the situation.  There was pressure placed on us.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: In other words, the instruction was indirect>

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: To use assault?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Who gave that instruction?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That was when the emergency regulations were instituted.  We were called together and there were priority given to the leader elements.  It could have been Du Plessis.

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: So you're going back to these broad powers?