Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1996-11-20

MR LYSTER: We, as a Commission, have not had time to analyse the evidence and to draw conclusions or to make findings, and all I will do here is to briefly summarise the evidence and to look at some of the trends and the patterns that the evidence points to.
 We've been looking at the week from 26th March to 4th April 1990, and I think that it can safely be said that this week was not a good week for the people of the Edendale valley.  We have heard evidence in vivid detail from both victims and perpetrators that the people of this valley were subjected to an armed invasion by thousands of heavily armed men, resulting in 200 residents of that valley being murdered, hundreds of houses being looted and destroyed, stock driven off, and 30 000 refugees being created, many of whom are still homeless today.
 For the people of places like Ashdown, Xaluza, Mpumuza, Gezabuso, KwaShange, KwaMnyandu, it was undoubtedly the most terrifying experience that they had ever and will ever undergo.  Several witnesses said that this was not a war, because a war implies a battle of equals.  One witness said it was a political cleansing, while another said it was an armed invasion.
 Just as that week was a bad week for the people of the Edendale valley, so also was this week a bad week for three organisations, the Defence Force, the SAP, South African Police, and the Inkatha Freedom Party.  Many witnesses who have testified over the past four days, people who were both victims and perpetrators, pointed fingers at these three organisations, and I will look briefly at each one of them.
 With regard to the Defence Force, Brigadier Swanepoel said that the role that he was given by the police to play in the Seven Day War was to ensure that the Edendale Road was kept open, so that Edendale or Vulindlela residents could get to work without being stoned.  He confirmed that at no stage were his troops deployed in the upper valley, where the destruction was taking place.  He confirmed that if his troops had been stationed there they could have prevented loss of life and destruction of property.  Residents of these areas, journalists and violence monitors pleaded with the Defence Force to deploy what forces they had in the areas where the attacks were taking place, but the SADF did not respond. The reason that Brigadier Swanepoel gave was that the plan that had been worked out by the Joint Management Centre did not provide for the deployment of troops in the unrest area.  This may appear to many of us to be unbelievable, but I believe that that is what in fact happened.  The Joint Operations Centre decided that the army should only be deployed to keep open the Edendale road.  There is no doubt that vehicles were being stoned on that road before the Seven Day War, but there has been no evidence that any political party was responsible for the stoning, and it seems that it was probably young people who had been driven away from their homes at Elandskop and Vulindlela.  
 Brigadier Swanepoel and Director Meyer of the police contradicted themselves as to whether the Defence Force was sufficiently resourced to enable it to enter the upper reaches of the valley where the real trouble was taking place.  Brigadier Swanepoel said that the Defence Force was hopelessly understaffed, whereas Director Meyer said the SADF resources were quite adequate.  One thing is certain, is that if the six armoured vehicles and the 100 soldiers which the army did have had been deployed in the valley there seems to be no doubt that a substantial proportion of the death and destruction could have been averted, and Brigadier Swanepoel agreed to this.  Another thing is certain, if army reinforcements had been called in immediately the Seven Day War could have been averted altogether.
 This brings us to the role of the police.  Director Meyer presented the official version of the South African Police, and he portrayed the police as being completely impartial and unbiased, and as having done everything possible to prevent loss of life and damage to property.  On the other hand the version from Special Constables Shabangu and Madlala, and a Riot Unit Constable Harrington, was one of open complicity on the part of the police with the IFP forces.  
 Shabangu said that he drove a Riot Unit vehicle to pick up special constables;  that he met up with a large Inkatha crowd, including Mr David Ntombela;  that he went with this group to the outskirts of KwaShange, and there he watched with other members of his Riot Unit as the special constables attacked, burned and looted houses at KwaShange, and returned with stolen property, which they loaded onto a police vehicle, which was then driven to Mr Ntombela's home, along with cattle which had been stolen from the residents of KwaShange.  
 Mr Radley Keys and Mr Pierre Cronje, then of the Democratic Party, testified that they had watched a 3 000 strong IFP group prepare for an attack on Xalusa.  They said that the police, under Brigadier Viljoen, sat in their armoured vehicles and silently watched while that saga unfolded before their eyes.  They said that only after very strenuous argument on their part did the police very reluctantly begin to intervene to ward off that impi.   Other witnesses testified to watching in disbelief as police provided buckets of ammunition to Inkatha combatants.
 During the course of his evidence Director Meyer did make some significant concessions.  He said that it was probable that some special constables had participated in the violence, but that if they did so it was contrary to the instructions of senior officers.  He said that it was possible that arms and ammunition had been given by the police to IFP combatants, but that if they did so it was contrary to the instructions of senior officers.  He said that he could not account for the participation of the KwaZulu Police in the Seven Day War on the side of the IFP, and said that the KwaZulu Police were part of a different command structure.  
 When he was asked why no legal action had been taken against IFP leaders like Mr Ntombela, and many others who were alleged to have been involved in violence, he said that prosecutions may well have been instituted against them had there not been intimidation of witnesses.  He said that he could not deny the evidence of Constable Harrington, who said that as a member of the Riot Unit he had participated in many serious crimes, including murder, the sale of weapons to the IFP, torture, assaults, and the use of police vehicles to transport IFP members to attack UDF areas.  He also conceded that the creation and the deployment of the special constables was one of the most fundamental mistakes which the South African Police had made.
 With regard to the role of the special constables generally, I do not believe that Director Meyer was frank with the Commission.  Evidence has been given before this Commission by several other people, not only witnesses at this hearing, but other witnesses, that the special constables were specifically recruited, trained and deployed to act against the UDF/ANC and to support Inkatha.  I have no reason to disbelieve Constable Madlala, Shabangu and Harrington when they say this, and I also have no reason to disbelieve ex-police Captain Brian Mitchell, who has given evidence under oath to this Commission, when he says that special constables were in fact the so-called third force during that time in the entire Midlands area, and that the sole purpose of the special constables was for them to be deployed offensively against members of the UDF, and to support and assist the IFP.  
 Constable Harrington told the Commission that while he and some special constables were braai-ing meat and drinking beer in the Table Mountain area with an IFP group another IFP group launched an attack on a nearby ANC settlement.  Instead of intervening and stopping the attack, or investigating the attack, or even observing the attack, Harrington and the Riot Unit and the special constables continued to eat and drink, after having been assured by their IFP hosts that it was merely an attack by IFP on UDF people.  He said that that attitude and that behaviour was typical of the work of the Riot Unit and the special constables during that time.  He said that he routinely assaulted and tortured people, threw people from the back of police vehicles, used his police vehicle to transport IFP people to UDF areas to carry out attacks, confiscated weapons from UDF areas, and gave them or sold them to IFP members.  He said that this was commonplace behaviour in the Riot Unit, and that it was done by many of the Riot Unit members.
 I accept that after the death of Major Terblanche the official attitude towards the ... (inaudible - end of Side A, Tape 5) ... Erasmus and Madlala to have taken place.  However, I cannot believe that the police hierarchy in the Midlands did not have a full appreciation of what the special constables actually were, and what they were to be used for.
 With regard to the investigations into the deaths caused by the Seven Day War, we have heard the evidence of Inspector Bongani Nxumalo this afternoon, and it is clear that those investigations were completely inadequate.  
 Finally we look at the role of the IFP.  Almost
every witness who has appeared before this Commission,  other than the SAP and the SADF, laid the blame for this terrible event at the feet of IFP members.  The IFP have not given us an official account of its involvement in the Seven Day War.  As I said earlier on a letter was sent to the Premier, Mr Mdlalose - sorry, Dr Mdlalose, and to Mr Jiyani - Dr Jiyani, sorry, inviting them to send someone to give an official account of the IFP to this Commission, and a reply was received from Mr van der Merwe saying that the IFP had made its submission in Cape Town some months ago to the Commission, and that it did not intend making any further submission.  Now, I was present in Cape Town when the IFP made its submission, and in the several hundred pages of submissions that it made to the Truth Commission it did not make mention of the Seven Day War, or of any incident or event which took place during that period, and that is the route that the IFP has chosen.
 Mr Ntombela was invited to give evidence before this Commission.  The Commission had originally agreed to subpoena Mr Ntombela to come to this Commission in the same way that it subpoenaed many other witnesses, but we decided that we should rather first invite Mr Ntombela out of respect for his public office.  He initially accepted the invitation, but on the day that he was due to appear he refused to give evidence, and instead he called for the dismissal of the entire panel as it was constituted for this hearing.
 I should also place on record that a couple of weeks before the hearing a senior IFP member went onto the Zulu language radio and said that if Mr Ntombela was subpoenaed
to appear at this hearing that the city of  Pietermaritzburg would be plunged into darkness.  Mr Ntombela has requested that we make available to him copies of the witnesses' statements in order to allow him to formulate his response to the allegations made against him, and he is entitled to those documents.  And he has told us that he will be responding to those documents, and until such time as he has done so I will not make further comment on his role, except to say that he has been implicated by many witnesses in this terrible tragedy.
 In conclusion I want to look at a hypothetical scenario.  Let us imagine for some bizarre reason that the black residents of Imbali swept out in a huge group of 3 000 people and attacked the white suburban residents of Pietermaritzburg, killing them, burning their houses, stealing their property.   We would not have seen a few police Casspirs driving around negotiating with the Imbali residents, escorting them back to Imbali.  We would not have seen the South African Defence Force confined to its base, or deployed to keep a road open, and we would not have seen members of the Riot Unit sunning themselves in the gardens of Imbali leaders.  What we would have seen if this had happened was the mass deployment of thousands and thousands of policemen and soldiers.  We would have seen hundred of armoured vehicles in the streets and helicopters in the sky.  We would have seen a mobilisation of resources as never before seen in this country, and we would have seen hundreds of people arrested and tried and convicted for murder, theft, armed robbery, arson, and other serious crimes.  
 And this is what should have happened in the
Edendale valley.  This is what the residents of the  Edendale valley were entitled to expect from the police, but because they were poor, and because they were black, and because they represented what Director Meyer called the UDF/COSATU alliance, they did not get that help.  And we hope that those days have passed.
 Finally I just want to thank all the various people who have worked hard during this past week to make this hearing proceed as it did.  I want to thank the witnesses, because without them we would not have had a hearing.  We want to thank them for their courage and bravery in coming forward.  We want to thank the special Truth Commission task team which worked so hard to pull all these witnesses together, and the other TRC staff members who also worked very hard.  We want to thank the police for protecting this building, the interpreters who interpreted for us, the press, and the many other voluntary people who worked so hard to make this hearing a success.  Also thanks to the media in general for their coverage and their hard work.
 Please, as you leave the hall please do so with respect and dignity that this occasion demands.  We thank you very much for your attendance.
 Before we part please let's not forget that each time we gather we don't part before singing a cultural song or traditional song.  We came together in this fashion, talking about those who've left us, who died, and simply depart easily like that.  Let's stand up so we can sing a traditional song or some kind of a song.
/TRANSCRIBER'S