Special Hearings — Mandela United Football Club Hearings — 1997-11-24

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman I would like to qualify.  Col Grobelaar did not participate at all although he was there.  The person with me, I don't remember that he participated in any way and I would also like to say two members from Marble Hall, because it was their premises, they didn't participate in any way.  It was me and the Soweto members of whom I knew only one member.  He has died so I would not name him and the rest.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock you say in the next statement that you then went back to Pretoria and later you were phoned by Col Potgieter of the Security Police, what did Mr Potgieter say to you then?

MR DE KOCK: It was very short and there were many euphemisms such as a plan had to be made with this man and the general tone was that he could not be released again. Which gave me the indication that this man had to be killed.  It was not a misunderstanding.  I qualify this by saying that Col Potgieter and I have a good understanding, we've always had it and it was a service rendered, we served together at Koevoet where he was in charge of previous SWAPO terrorists and their interrogation and the analysis thereof.  He is a very good analyst of information.

MR HUGO: What did Mr Potgieter say to you why should Mr Mabota be killed?

MR DE KOCK: Because Mabota was involved with the shooting of two policemen and that it would happen again and that it had to be prevented.

MR HUGO: Can you tell us what exactly happened on the day of his release?

MR DE KOCK: Can I go on?  There was a short conversation between me and Jan Potgieter.  I wouldn't say who called whom because I can't remember, but I know the area very poorly but if one travels towards the police station from de Deur in an eastern direction, you see a crossroads, one goes north and one goes south there.  We moved from north to south first, past the turn-off for de Deur, we met him along the road and discussed the strategy and then from them myself and Wouter Mentz in a vehicle and Col Potgieter in his, because he had to go and get the person cleared out at the police station.  A second vehicle was driven by Louw van Niekerk and Dawid Britz.  When Col Potgieter left the police station, they would move from the turn-off road of de Deur in a western direction and make a U-turn at a reasonable distance where they would stop, Col Potgieter would then give Mabota, hand him over to Louw van Niekerk and to Dawid Britz.  They were both big and strong with the excuse that he was going to Vlakplaas.  This handing over took place at that distance so that identification by the police at de Deur would not have been possible.
 As a result of the plan that had to be made with Mabota, there were already two explosive experts to secure the place.  They had to make sure that there were no herd boys or hunters or anybody.  A second vehicle waited at the Bapsfontein highway, a land cruiser.  Mabota went with van Niekerk and Britz to that point.  He was transferred to the land cruiser and some of those then went to I think a certain mine.   We waited at the western side of the police station as a cut-off point if there would have been a fight at the handing over of Mabota and we first went to Vlakplaas.  I do not know why but it was quit that we went and from there I went to the Penge Mine and just before the entrance to the mine we collided with a big rotweiler dog and damaged my vehicle.  Maybe some people will remember that.  
 On the other side of Penge Mine I found Mabota, his were tied behind his back, he had not been assaulted, he was not asked any more questions.  I asked him where the weapons were, whether they had been taken out and he said he knew of nothing.  I said that's good and we took him down to the groove of the mine where there was already a block with 25 kg of plastic explosives.  
 When Mabota turned around I shot him two shots into his heart after each other.  Then his clothing was removed, his hands were untied and he was placed on top of the explosives.  I then walked off because exploding bodies was not in my line.  I actually buried people in the Republic and in Angola because one has to go on with the fight but we buried them later, so I can later explain to you why we made use of the explosives.  There were enquiries into this, it was strange to me as well but it was not quite unknown.

MR HUGO: After this you returned to Pretoria and in terms of what you said in your statement you then reported to your commander.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairman, I told Brigadier Schoon that the problem that we had and the problem that we had to help with was removed.  We never went into detail and at the same time I reported the damage to the vehicle and I told him it will be reported that on the Ben Schoeman Highway I damaged my vehicle, it was an official vehicle even though it was a secret vehicle and I explained that to him. He is a man of not many words and usually he nodded or when he wanted to elaborate he was a kind man but sort of rather short.  He was a good officer, he was - it is uncomfortable, it is not easy, thank you Chairman.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, I would like you to return to page 9 of your statement which is October 13 and in that you state that in that time we are dealing with now we had rumours about Mrs Mandela's activities and that there were rumours that she could be involved in a number of crimes.  Do you refer to that or do you accept that you accept those rumours?

MR DE KOCK: I had information that I have received from an intelligence member and I didn't see this rumour but that is open for discussion.
   Your perception nevertheless rightly or wrongly that Mrs Mandela spearheaded the freedom movement fight at that stage against the regime, I would like to qualify there are a number of people who today say especially in Parliament and those people who have political forecasts that there was a broad revolutionary front against us the security forces and the anti freedom terrorists, but she really spearheaded that with a courage that was worrying senior politicians.  She did stand on her legs, she really exposed herself, I'm not trying to plead for her, there should be no uncertainty about that.  However she really was a thorn in the flesh of most of the security.  
 The general summary and I'm not an expert, I'm a layman but in security terms in the security and in the army, whenever her name came up, there people were really worried.  The impression I had was that they couldn't really touch her because of her profile and the reason for that was that it wouldn't only have international repercussions but also economic repercussions because the internal safety situation  would be stabilized with the entire grass roots level on her side.  She is a very strong person, let us make no mistake, a friend of mine and perhaps in a lighter vein I could say this that one could throw from a height of 30,000 ft from an aeroplane and nothing would happen to her.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock you conclude paragraph 14 and I would like you to just read out a few sentences of that paragraph.

MR DE KOCK: It rather seems now that I look at in retrospect that many rumours that were spread about Mrs Mandela could perhaps make out a part of operations of the S A Police in an effort to work up the emotions of the public against Mrs Mandela and also to motivate the members of the police, including myself, to take all sorts of steps against her and her supporters, supporters being not only the United Mandela Football Club on grassroots level as they say, I am not very exposed to language but I am now, my apologies but that was phenomenal and somebody who wants to dispute that has to have a good argument.