Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-24

MR VISSER: I want to put it to you Mr Maharaj that you are purposely playing it down and that in fact that this was the basis of the whole of Operation Vula and I'll tell you why I say so, that is the reason why you came into the country, to create structures, that is why you imported these masses of arms, all of that was directed at one purpose and that was at some point in time, there would be a spark to start a veld fire which would be the insurrection.  I put it to you.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I put it to you, Sir, in response that if you have a closed mind and do not understand democratic functioning and debate,

MR VISSER: You can be derogatory to me, Mr Maharaj, it runs off my back like duck's water.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I'm used to that.  I'm used to that.  Close minds always have water running off their backs.  I am making the point that the ANC Conference Decisions and Resolutions are there for the record.  Why single out one article and make it the view point and official line of the movement?  I'm saying the mandate of Vula was written in 1986 against the Conference decisions at Kabwe, this is a viewpoint being put for discussion and I would read to you, I think we need a copy of the African Communist to see what it says.  After saying it is a journal of the South African Communist Party, it says it is a journal for discussion issues.  That is why people write in the African Communist.  They don't write in the African Communist on what is the official policy of the ANC and Vula was an ANC operation.  This article is being used from the writings of Kibusa to extrapolate and make it the official mission of Vula.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, was it never the policy and strategy of the ANC to topple the South African Government through a people's war, which would lead to a people's insurrection?  Was that never the policy?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: The policy I'm saying adopted at Kabwe was a people's war.  Two issues of a strategic nature were still issues to be thrashed out by events.  Would it be an armed confrontation leading to the conquest of power involving the masses or would it be the form of an uprising?  On the uprising questions, two issues arose, would it be a general strike or would it be an uprising of the people with arms in hand.  Debates in the African Communist even had a viewpoint once that the task of the ANC was just to distribute arms to the masses.  That discussion defeated that viewpoint.  So this is an evolving thing, but I'm saying that the official Kabwe resolution, was a resolution supporting the strategy that we would be heading for a people's war.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Maharaj, I understood you to say, to tell this Committee yesterday, that this was a secret movement, that it was, it came from the President Tambo himself, that a very few people knew about this, that you were actually the architect, putting all of this together and even the National Executive Committee knew nothing about this.  I'm talking about Operation Vula.  Now you're taking it back to Kabwe as if the ANC would have known, or would have prescribed to what you were doing in Operation Vula.  Please.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir, I'm saying that I was a member of the ANC Operation Vula would be conducted and its strategy would derive from the Conference Resolutions, we would not put a strategy differing with Conference resolution.  Operation Vula, we had weapons, you say, lots, we were training people.  Why we were training?  We should have been just sitting waiting for the spark.

MR VISSER: You were waiting for the spark.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No way.  I say we were training people, not just waiting for a spark.

MR VISSER: I see.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: We were conducting operations here.

MR VISSER: Alright, alright.  I put it to you simply that a people's insurrection in this country was always the policy and strategy of the ANC.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: When you say always, how many years you using?

MR VISSER: It was towards the end, if you wish to restrict it, but it was at one time, if you want to put it that way, it was official ANC policy.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: After the unbanning of the ANC there was even a debate that went on in the African Communist in 1991 whether we should go for a Leipzig option or not a Leipzig option.  Now, I don't know whether counsel really has read the history of struggle as a historical process or whether he's just picking things from Col Stadler who was Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Mr Maharaj, on a simple issue we have now spent probably 5 minutes, with respect.  Can I ask you just to answer this one question?  Are you saying that a people's insurrection was never part of the ANC struggle?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I have said that the issue policy decision was people's war, what form, whether insurrection would be part of that process was a matter also of debate and that even in the insurrection there were two strategic issues.

MR VISSER: Yes.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Yes, but if you heard me clearly, you wouldn't be putting the question.

MR VISSER: What I hear from you is that a people's insurrection was never a part of the ANC policy.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, you're forcing things down my throat.

MR VISSER: You don't want to answer, Mr Maharaj.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Because you don't want to look at the Conference Resolutions.

MR VISSER: Alright, can we go on?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: I want to refer you to the contents of paragraph 10 and this is this Stadler now speaking, which you have just referred to
"A particular aspect which is of the most significance, importance, is the content of a particular paragraph which appeared in an encoded message sent from Mac Maharaj in Johannesburg to Siphiwe Nyanda in Durban on 24 June 1990"
and it says:
"A mere 13 days before the arrest of the Vula Operatives commenced".
The said paragraph reads as follows, gives a reference:
"In the meantime we have had word from Cleo, codename for London, that Donald, codename for Chris Dlamini, will be coming into the country around the end of June, 1990.  Besides the equipment you already have, it appears that Ntaba's  (N-T-A-B-A) Outfit, codename for Jacob Zuma, also member of the NEC"
That's the comment of Stadler
"...is currently required to store two pieces"
		comment, codename for firearms,
		"...which were in the hands of the enemy group"
he doesn't know what that stands for,
"...planning Madiba's assassination"
You can explain just in a moment.
"From the description that Ntaba gave me, one of the pieces seems to have an optical sight and given the internessant..."
comment, probably meant to be internecine, 
"...struggle within the enemy camp, I am attracted to
borrowing one of those pieces if it is suitable for use 
by us, even if on a temporary basis.  It will be good 
to know how you feel about that aspect of the project 
and whether our information is being updated re those 
potential targets.  We will have to keep Donald under 
a tight reign if he is to be productive."
Alright, are there preliminary comments which you wish to make?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: That's an invitation.

MR VISSER: You want to leave at 2 o'clock, Mr Maharaj.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Please don't stop me when I'm making the comments.

MR VISSER: You're the one that wants to leave on the plane at 2 o'clock.