Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-08

DR KNOBEL: Certainly I had to be briefed and also the Chief of the Defence Force.  The full Coordinating Management Committee met really only for budgetary purposes after '81.  As I indicated here Mr Vally, when I took over as Surgeon-General the first thing that I did with regards to this project was to get a full briefing on it and to find out exactly where we stood with regards to achieving the objectives which had been approved for this particular project.  I then was satisfied that we had achieved most of our objectives.
 Secondly, the threat that existed before and it was perceived to exist within Angola, and particularly within the surrogate forces, the Cuban forces and so on, was diminishing because the Defence Force were involved in the negotiating process which led to the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola.
 Thirdly, the budgetary allocation to the project was being reduced because of general budgetary cuts within the Defence Force.  My attitude was that, as far as I could determine, certainly with regards to the defensive equipment that had been developed, we had satisfied all the objectives.
 However, as I indicated in some other documents and as I indicated to you with regard to the briefing to the State President later on, South Africa was moving towards a negotiating process.  We were involved in - or we were very much aware of mass action and riot control and emergency situations which were declared by the President, and the emphasis then turned to what we called "dual use" chemical agents.  CR was already available as an outstanding anti-riot agent, but also as an alternative to a retaliatory agent which could be used on the battlefield.  The battlefield threat was diminishing, the riot situation was increasing.  That is why the emphasis fell onto the incapacitating agents and the four varieties that were investigated.
 So what I am saying here is, for that purpose the project had to continue, the Coordinating Management Committee overruled my suggestion that we should consider beginning to scale it down and begin with the privatisation and commercialisation process immediately; that we should continue with the incapacitating agents.  When the briefing was given to the President he confirmed that and he also gave the indication that we should continue.
 At the same time you must remember I was the advisor to the Department of Foreign Affairs with regards to what was happening on the international front in terms of the convention.  In 1989, a year after I became Surgeon-General, I accompanied Mr Pik Botha to a conference in Paris where the countries that had signed the original chemical weapons convention, the old 1925 Protocol, and many other countries had decided that that Protocol was redundant, that it was not wide enough, it didn't cover the field properly, and a new chemical convention would have to be designed and signed.  That was in 1989.
 At that time I was given the responsibility, as was my predecessor, to ensure that whatever happens in the project takes place within the parameters of the existing conventions as well as this convention which was going to be signed in the future. So we literally had from 1989 until the actual convention was signed.  The convention, as you know, was signed in 1993 and you know what happened when we were due to sign it and what I reported to the Minister.
 So I am saying the Coordinating Management Committee met on an annual basis to approve the budget but there were other meetings held where it was mainly the Chief of the Defence Force and mainly the Chief of Staff, Finance and the Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and myself that had briefings from the project officer about what progress was made with regard to the project.

MR VALLY: I want to come back to Annexure E which deals with the destruction of documents.  What I need to know - not documents, I beg your pardon, destruction of the substances, ostensibly the substances which were dropped into the ocean.  Can you briefly tell me who was responsible for taking samples out of the drums which were subsequently dropped into the ocean?

DR KNOBEL: No Mr Vally I am not quite sure whether I can ...(intervention)

MR VALLY: Alright ...(intervention)

DR KNOBEL: It was reported to us that the samples were taken in the presence of Commandant de Bruin.  Whether it was taken by Brig Basson himself or not I can't verify.

MR VALLY: So ...(intervention)

DR KNOBEL: In fact I think if we look at the minutes of the Coordinating Management Committee we might be able to get the answer to that.  I have given you all the minutes.

MR VALLY: Because the possibility exists that Brig Basson himself ...(intervention)

DR KNOBEL: No I beg your pardon - sorry Mr Vally.

MR VALLY: Sure.

DR KNOBEL: If you look at the minutes of the meeting of the 29th of January '93, which is in this Annexure here.

MR VALLY: Yes.

DR KNOBEL: If you page to paragraph 6.

MR VALLY: Right.

DR KNOBEL: Brigadier Basson reports
"During the destruction samples were taken by the representative of HDTI for identification if possible".
 In other words he states there that Commandant de Bruin took the samples.

MR VALLY: I am sorry, who is HDTI?

DR KNOBEL: "Hoof direkteur teeninligting", that's a subdivision of Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

MR VALLY: Right.  But this was Brig Basson's report.

DR KNOBEL: This is what he reports at the Coordinating Management ...(intervention)

MR VALLY: Right, and do you have any confirmation of that anywhere?

DR KNOBEL: No Sir, this is the confirmation I have.

MR VALLY: Which is Brig Basson saying yes, we took samples and yes there were these items.

DR KNOBEL: That's correct.

MR VALLY: So if he misled you, you wouldn't know whether the items, and we are talking methaqualone, we are talking ecstasy etc, were in fact destroyed or not?

DR KNOBEL: Yes I suppose so Mr Vally.

YASMINE SOOKA: I think General the question perhaps one should ask is, besides Brig Basson, was there an independent witness to the destruction of these substances?  Apart from Brig Basson of course.

DR KNOBEL: Ms Sooka if you look in the same appendix there were certainly Air Force personnel that flew the aircraft and cabin personnel that had to assist the opening of the hatch so that the containers could be put into the sea.  Furthermore Commandant de Bruin was there on behalf of the Director of Counter-Intelligence, Chief Director of Counter Intelligence of the Chief of Staff Intelligence.  Who else was present I don't know, but I think there were sufficient number of witnesses to the fact that the aircraft flew out, that those drums had been pushed into the sea and that samples had been taken by de Bruin.  Certainly, from my perspective, there was more than sufficient evidence that - I had no reason to doubt that that had in fact taken place.

WENDY ORR: Dr Randera.

DR RANDERA: General just remind me, wasn't this already at a time when there was suspicion in your own mind about Brig Basson's involvement ...(intervention)

DR KNOBEL: Dr Randera no, you are right ...(intervention)

DR RANDERA: So I just - so it's just a yes or no answer, yes there was some suspicion ...(intervention)

DR KNOBEL: Well it's very close.  You see there was suspicion obviously because of the fact that he had been dismissed by the President.

DR RANDERA: Right.

DR KNOBEL: His dismissal was only going to take place two months later though.

DR RANDERA: But yet he is put in charge of going and dumping this - and taking the samples.  Now of course you know you can throw it back at me and say it was all based on trust at the time, but it - you know it does sound a little suspicious that the person who is actually perhaps involved, "perhaps" and I am putting the "perhaps" in, is then put in charge of dumping the stuff as well and taking the samples.