Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-08

WENDY ORR: If you were setting up such a coordinating committee now, with hindsight, would you not think it advisable to have additional independent people who could advise you about these issues, rather than relying on a single person?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I find it difficult that you cannot understand ...(intervention)

WENDY ORR: I do understand.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, that you cannot understand that a person in a commanding officer's position, if he has an expert available, and he relies on him and the rest of the Committee relies on him, that that is sufficient.  Are you saying that I should have been an expert myself to be able to make that decision?

WENDY ORR: No I am not saying you should have been an expert yourself.  My concern, and this goes to the fact that the Truth Commission has to make recommendations as to how to prevent future violations and abuses, is how could we structure coordinating, managing, controlling bodies in order to ensure that this kind of thing does not happen again?  If my suggestion is invalid or impractical I would appreciate your suggestions about this.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Now you are asking me a question as how would I reconstruct such a committee today.  I would probably go and approach somebody like Professor Peter Folb to serve on such a committee as my project officer and I would rely totally and completely on the integrity of a man like Professor Folb.

CHAIRPERSON: And if he turned out to be a Dr Wouter Basson down the line, that is on the assumption that all the allegations about Dr Basson are true ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not making a judgment.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question that is being asked here, isn't it safer to have a committee rather than a single consultant?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No indeed I don't think so Mr Chairman.  My feeling is that a committee - if you are saying a specialist committee which advises the coordinating committee then I would go along with you.  It would have been safer with the wisdom of hindsight to have several experts.
 But that is in fact what started happening at a later stage.  Out of the programme came a number of experts and those experts, which are few and far between, that have sufficient knowledge about the field of chemical and biological weapons, have been very quickly taken away from us.  I am talking about Dr Brian Davey, I am talking about Dr Philip Coleman; I am talking about Colonel Ben Steyn who was here with us.  They are the sort of people who are immediately picked to support the OPCW in the Hague; to begin to work in a private company like Protechnic and to serve on the Chemical Weapons Committee for South Africa in support of Foreign Affairs.  We've developed such experts.
 But the problem is, Mr Chairman, in South Africa you simply don't get an expert that is an expert on chemical and biological weapons.  Professor Folb can confirm this to me.  If I were to select a committee today in South Africa there simply aren't such people that have that kind of knowledge and insight and understanding.
 Dr Orr made mention that she doesn't find phencyclidine on this list ...(intervention)

WENDY ORR: No Professor Folb did not find phencyclidine.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Right, but I accept that fully.  But we'd also heard the evidence of General Neethling yesterday that phencyclidine would be an ideal substance to investigate as a possible incapacitating agent.  Remember this list is not the ultimate list.  In the Convention at the present time our representative, namely Colonel Steyn, sits on an organisation in the Hague called the Friend of the Chair and one of their functions is to advise the OPCW on revisions of this list, and this will depend on what new technology.  Did Iraq, for example, develop any substances outside this list which should now be included in the future.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Sooka.

YASMINE SOOKA: You see all - what really troubles me about this issue is that it seems to me that even if you asked him the question as to whether or not he exceeded his mandate, technically there was no way of you really knowing that because he was the expert and that then I think covers why everybody else still keeps on employing him, because even now he seems to be one of the few experts.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes....

YASMINE SOOKA: Would you agree that technically you had no way of determining ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: ...whether or not he exceeded his mandate?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, it's not absolutely true.  Technically you are correct when you say I couldn't determine technically.  Who do I consult about this?  I could certainly consider consulting some of the international experts and we did.  We did have discussions with the international experts.  But what I did do was to refer this to National Intelligence and to help them and said to them would you please question this man and find out.  And maybe you should get the evidence of what happened when they questioned him.

YASMINE SOOKA: No, no, but what I was trying to establish that you're within the parameters of this particular programme because there was so much reliance placed on him ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's true.

YASMINE SOOKA: This chemical expert.  But even when you questioned him about excesses in terms of this programme you had no way of establishing, except for his word, as to whether or not he had exceeded that.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally.

MR VALLY: General Knobel I find it very strange that you say you only got concerned for the very first time in 1994 and then really realised things had gone badly wrong in 1997 when you saw this "verkope lys".  I'll tell you why I find this strange.
 Dr Koekemoer came to see you late eighties, early nineties, I can give you the date, wondering about the production of ecstasy ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No he didn't come and see me, I am sorry.  I have never seen Dr Koekemoer.

MR VALLY: I beg your pardon, he went to see General Neethling.  I am so sorry.
 Well Dr van Rensburg came to see you in the late eighties complaining about scientific and managerial irregularities at RRL.  Dr Lourens came to see you early in 1993 saying that some aspects of the programme were going wrong.  He told you about screwdrivers which were used to inject poison into people.  He told you about walking sticks which were being used to shoot poisoned pellets into people.  He probably in fact told you about his trip he made to Britain to deliver ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Vally would you please just start again because you are going too fast.

MR VALLY: Sure.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: What did you say about Dr van Rensburg.

MR VALLY: Alright let me put it in context.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, but I want to know what you said about Dr van Rensburg.

MR VALLY: Fine.  I will give you all the people who I believe approached you who give evidence ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Who gave evidence to that effect.

MR VALLY: In terms of evidence presented to this hearing, because the context is, you said in 1994, after the demarche by the Americans and the British, that you got concerned.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

MR VALLY: And by the way, and I don't think this is proliferation, but that demarche wasn't to say this is a terrible immoral thing you people are doing, this demarche was to say hey, make sure that the ANC don't get their hands on these items.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct, that's exactly the information I gave Mr Mandela.

MR VALLY: Fine.

CHAIRPERSON: Of course then the ANC got into power....

MR VALLY: I am telling you that before 1994 there were queries which set alarm bells ringing.