Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

UNKNOWN: If I have to judge on what is said here, the obstructing of agitators, you must remember this document was also made available to all the Intelligence branches so what we are dealing with here is a kind of counter-performance.  Information had to be gathered so that there was, for instance, a march or any kind of action then information had to be gathered beforehand that we could act against these people within the framework of existing legislation.
 There was no way in which the Police, dealing with riot control could do so or paralyse unrest or hinder a demonstration or whatever without deploying a large amount of people.  That's the only way in which you can deal with a march.  
 Or if we had specific information about a specific area where an attack was planned then we had to patrol that area intensively to try and prevent whatever was supposed to happen.  That is ordinary crime prevention.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes I do accept, it seems to me it is reasonable to accept that this was a period where extraordinary measures had to be taken, for instance where the maintenance of law and order is the function of the Police it was found that it was necessary, at this point in time, to use both the Police and the Railway Police and the South African Defence Force, is that right, precisely because the times were extraordinary, do you agree?

UNKNOWN: I don't think the times were so extraordinary.  I think due to the large numbers of attacks launched against the Police, we, the Police, simply didn't have enough manpower to prevent these attacks.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, which is why then you were using also the support of the South African Defence Force?

UNKNOWN: Yes the Defence Force was specifically asked to supplement our manpower.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now the form in which this particular operation took had never been used in the Western Cape before, in other words using an unmarked vehicle for purposes of going into a community for purposes of arrest, had it been used before?

UNKNOWN: I've already said it had been used on a couple of occasions before.

MR NTSEBEZA: How many times had it been used before, this particular method, sending in a Railway truck with armed policemen into an area so that it should be attacked, when and where had it been used before and how many times, do you remember?

UNKNOWN: I already told you that it was the first time that a Railway truck had been used, but there were similar occurrences beforehand in which we sent unmarked vehicles into an area with concealed policemen in the vehicle and we then performed successful operations.

MR NTSEBEZA: When you say you performed successful operations what do you mean?

UNKNOWN: Many arrests were made.

MR NTSEBEZA: Was it in circumstances where those particular vehicles had been attacked?

UNKNOWN: Yes, also in those circumstances where the vehicles had been attacked.

MR NTSEBEZA: With the same vigour and force as this particular truck had been attacked, in those instances?

UNKNOWN: A similar, a similar modus operandi was followed, yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: And in those instances had there been a Joint Operation Centre meeting before those attacks were launched, similar to the one that you had on the 15th, in those instances?

UNKNOWN: Yes I assume so.  I wasn't involved in the previous one so I can't give you an exact date. But ...(intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: No you talked of instances, you must then have knowledge of those other instances in which unmarked vehicles were sent with some success?

UNKNOWN: That's correct.  I was aware of those operations and I never denied that.  What I said was that I wasn't personally involved in those incidents, in other words I didn't give the orders.

MR NTSEBEZA: What I am asking is had there been meetings of the nature that there was on the 14th and 15th, in respect of those instances where unmarked vehicles were sent into the area and successes were registered by way of arrests?

UNKNOWN: No, no discussions and planning took place on the 14th, they took place on the 15th in this particular instance.

MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, no, no, I am not asking that really.  On the 15th, right.  Okay for the moment, were there in the other instances you've mentioned, meetings such as the one of the 15th before the operations were embarked upon?

UNKNOWN: Yes, I believe that there must have been.

MR NTSEBEZA: Must have been.  Now from what you know of those instances were the orders to those who were involved of the nature that you gave to the people on the 15th?   In other words were the people armed who went into those sort of operations, where you were successful?

UNKNOWN: That is correct, they were armed.

MR NTSEBEZA: And did the police, in those instances which you now mentioned to have taken place with success, did they use their firearms?

UNKNOWN: Yes there were cases when the firearms were used.

MR NTSEBEZA: Did they kill anybody in those instances?

UNKNOWN: I think people were injured.  One or two were killed, yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: Do you know those instances?

UNKNOWN: What exactly do you mean?

MR NTSEBEZA: Do you know who were killed and when as a result of this way of operation?

UNKNOWN: No unfortunately not.

MR NTSEBEZA: Do I understand from your evidence that the so-called Trojan Horse incident was not the first of its kind where you went into an area under false pretences in the sense that you did not show yourselves to the Police, attracting an attack and then retaliating in the event of being attacked in the form of using your weapons resulting in deaths?  Do I understand that this was in fact, on your testimony, not the first incident of this nature?

UNKNOWN: No it was not the first incident of its kind, it was the first incident in which use was made of crates, and I explained why crates were made use of in this particular incident because those were the vehicles normally attacked.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now from what you say it appears that the method that you used, getting into the areas in unmarked vehicles, had been successful.  On your own admission you had been able to make arrests, one or two people died, but that's in the course of things, but you had been able to make successful arrests.
 Now how does that square up with your evidence that you had to resort to this Trojan Horse incident because all attempts to effect arrests previously had failed?  In fact you say now you were very successful, how does that square up with your evidence?   Why use a high - abandon a successful method of arresting people for a method that has been untested and that resulted in the tragedy that we are now talking about, can you explain that?

UNKNOWN: It wasn't a question of abandoning a successful method, we basically used the same method but everything depends on the circumstances ...(intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: No, no, no, no, no Brigadier.  Your evidence-in-chief and under cross-examination was that, and your statement says so, that the normal ways of effecting arrests had failed.  You had sent some other unmarked cars into the areas and arrest in the normal way had failed and you gave that as a justification for using this peculiar method.
 You now say, far from in fact your previous methods of effecting arrest having failed, they were very successful, I ask how does then that square up with your justification for using the method that resulted in the death of these children and an adult?

UNKNOWN: I specifically - when I said that we used earlier methods or normal methods I told you that the normal methods, where we used uniformed men and patrol cars, I never said that we also sent in unmarked cars and therefore had success.  When I explained why we sent in the unmarked vehicles that was the only way to do it, because normal policing methods were unsuccessful.