Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

MR AVENANT: Chairperson, perhaps at this stage I should mention that there is a further, or there are further actions for which amnesty is applied for by this applicant, but which are not contained in this bundle and apparently are also not on the roll for hearing.  I just want to place on record that these acts were not contained in a separate application, it was contained in an amendment to the document currently before the Committee.  Now whether that has gone missing somewhere, I really don't know, we'll have to find out.  But it seems to me that these acts are things which can be dealt with administratively.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  I've got no idea of there being further applications by the applicant, Mr Avenant, all I know is what is in front of us in the documentation.  But maybe during the lunch adjournment, which will be very shortly, I see it's 1 o'clock now, you can perhaps discuss this matter with Mr Mapoma.  When you say that it could be dealt with administratively, are you meaning the nature of the incidents don't involve gross human rights violations, or that there'd have to be another hearing to be held?

MR AVENANT: No, I don't think that it would constitute any gross violations.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps then this would be a convenient time to take the lunch adjournment, and if you can discuss this issue with Mr Mapoma to see if it can be resolved here.  If it can be, so much the better.  Is three quarters of an hour convenient?  Anyway, as close to a quarter to two as possible.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: General, I just remind you that you are still under your former oath.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Avenant, you may continue.

MR AVENANT: Thank you, Chair.  Chairperson, just before we had lunch it was concerning the acts not included.  Now at this stage we're not going to pursue it further, we're going to leave it there and then probably we will be informed whenever there will be a formal hearing for that, which I doubt.
	If I can then continue, General.  Page 176 10(a).  The question is asked, what was the political aim that you wanted to achieve.  What was the aim here with regard to the politics?  Now this refers to the planning of the whole Operation Katzen and General van der Westhuizen gave an exposition.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: Yes, but to summarise, I identify with everything that he had said.  That is basically what it boils down to, and that is that a power base should be established, the Xhosa land that should be established as a counter-revolutionary measure, and then also a pro-RSA Government.  That would then assist us to normalise the situation in the Eastern Cape.

MR AVENANT: Now if you can just continue to Annexure C, page 188.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: Chairperson, it was common cause that the revolutionary war was raging at that time between the government of the day, the National Party, and the revolutionary powers controlled by the ANC/SACP and PAC.  Now this fact is confirmed by various statements by the Ministers of the then government, and Ministers of the current government.
	Now on instruction of the government of the day, the Security Forces of the RSA fought a war and then also on instruction of the leaders of the revolutionary forces they also then had a struggle.  That was MK and APLA soldiers.  Both sides made use of covert and unconventional methods.  And there was one aim and that was to achieve the political aims of the specific political leaders, and political leaders could not find a political solution whilst the Security Forces, MK and APLA actions then caused death and devastation.
	I would now like to link to what General van der Westhuizen said and that there was then also a measure of force or pressure from the political leaders on the Security Forces, and we told them that we cannot govern the country by the means of the barrel of gun and there should be a political solution.  And that is - I find it strange when I read President de Klerk's book where he said that after he thought about this, he realised they were on the wrong route and that there should be a political solution, but I think that change came from the upper side.  
	I was also part of the official State organ, the JMC, which had as aim to realise the aims of the government and in that capacity then I also carried out my official tasks.

MR AVENANT: General, anything with regard to which was a result of your function.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: While I was in service in Cape Town we were on patrol and our whole group was following a suspected terrorist and a hand-grenade was thrown at us and some of the policemen were injured.  Nothing happened to me.
	And then eventually when I was Commissioner of Police in KwaNdebele, the report concerning the exposure concerning Katzen and Holomisa.  And immediately after that the KwaNdebele Government then objected against the further presence in KwaNdebele.  And also perhaps as a result of that report or article, a group of MK members who were in KwaNdebele at that stage, there was a conspiracy to kill me and then for the security of myself and my family I had to end my services.  In that regard I was also a victim.

MR AVENANT: That is the testimony of the applicant.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR AVENANT

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, General Griebenauw.  Mr Knoetze, do you have any questions to ask the applicant?

MR KNOETZE: I do, Mr Chairman.
	General, could I take you to page 181 of the bundle, where you refer to this meeting under chairmanship of Joubert.  On behalf of General van der Westhuizen I want to put it to you that he cannot remember this meeting.  He does accept that such a meeting could have taken place.  Are you convinced that he was present at the meeting?

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: Yes, I am.

MR KNOETZE: If I can then refer you to paragraph 9 on page 182.  On behalf of Brigadier Schoon I want to put it to you that it is his version and how he recollects it, that he did not have the instruction from the Commissioner of Police that the plan or what was discussed there, that the police would have joined in or participated.  He had the instruction to attend the meeting, the same with you.  The instruction was to attend the meeting and nothing more at that stage.  I also put it to you on behalf of the then "KOMOP", General Coetzee and the then Chief of the Security Division, General Johan van der Merwe.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: On the 28th of August 1986 - that was as a result of the meeting that I attended, I wrote a letter to the Commanding Officer Security Branch in Pretoria and that was for the attention of Brigadier Schoon.  I referred him to a telephone conversation on the same day.  I gave an exposition of the information that he required and also the information ...(indistinct) the meeting gave me the instruction to obtain.  It's quite a long report.  The point that I would like to mention is that I would not have given a report to Brigadier Schoon personally if I did not have that instruction.

MR KNOETZE: No, General, you don't understand me.  I don't say that you didn't have the instruction to give the report or to obtain the information, what I'm saying is that when you and Schoon attended the meeting you did not know precisely what the meeting would be about.  So there wasn't an instruction to participate in that what was to be discussed, you had to go and hear what was going to be discussed and after that a decision would be taken whether the police would participate.  And then in confirmation thereof, I put it to you on behalf of Brigadier Schoon, that he went back to Pretoria and reported that it was a political issue and that it would deal with political involvement and the police would not be involved.