Amnesty Hearings — Durban — UNKNOWN

EUGENE MARAIS: An AK47.

WILKINSON: Where did you get the AK47?

EUGENE MARAIS: I'll just have to take you back.  In 1988 or thereabouts, I was attending an army camp.  We, in cleaning-up operations in Kempton Park area, we went to a shebeen and while we were raiding the shebeen we came to a squatter camp.  It was pretty well hidden, you couldn't see it from anywhere, it was only when we were on top of it that we noticed it, so I believe that very few people were aware of the place.
The local residents saw us approaching because we were in uniform and in military vehicles and so they fled.  We did a sweeping operation in the squatter camp and we found a number of items, things such as typewriters and various equipment - a tremendous amount of equipment.  At a particular stage I entered a shack.  I was alone.  There was a plastic sheet under the bed on the ground.  I picked it up and under that there was a bag - a plastic bag, and I found inside it an AK47 with magazines and ammunition.
Because I am quite a rifle enthusiast I wanted to keep this weapon to myself and I didn't want to tell anybody about it, and I took the rifle and I hid it in the grass outside, it was quite near the main road.  That afternoon we returned from the camp.  At that stage we could go home every second evening.  I went to my car and went to pick up the AK47 and I took it home.

MR WILKINSON: So that's the firearm that you took to Mr Botha's home that evening?

EUGENE MARAIS: That is correct.  On the 9th of October in the evening I arrived at Mr Botha's house with the firearm.  There I met Mr Smuts and I was introduced to him.  Mr Botha said then, now that the three of us had met, had come together there were enough people present to take the oath of allegiance to the Orde Boerevolk.

MR WILKINSON: What was the oath of allegiance?

EUGENE MARAIS: I don't have it in front of me, I can't quote it but the form has been distributed.

MR WILKINSON: What can you say off the cuff?

EUGENE MARAIS: It says that you are committed to the Orde Boerevolk.  Basically that you declare war against the National Party Government and that you would strive to bring it down.  Furthermore that any organisation or party or person who should stand in the way of the ideals of the Boerevolk should be combated within all one's ability.  It goes on to say that one - we should not inform on one another and that no secrets should be revealed to anybody about the Orde Boerevolk or anything connected with it.

MR WILKINSON: So the purpose of the meeting was to make the existing relationship more formalised?

EUGENE MARAIS: That is correct.  During our meeting at Mr Botha's house it was decided that there should be a reaction to the events of that morning in Durban.  At that stage there wasn't a precise decision on what action we should take.  The feeling, however, was that what had happened in Durban that morning had signs of what we were actually fearing - that the conflict would increase and ...  [intervention]

MR WILKINSON: May I interrupt? Mr Botha was a Kommandant in the AWB?

EUGENE MARAIS: That is correct.

MR WILKINSON: Did you ever dispute his role as a leader in the Orde Boerevolk?

EUGENE MARAIS: As I said, we thought that what we feared and what had been propagated at right-wing meetings of that time namely, that  the day would come when Black on Black violence would - that we are so well acquainted with in this country would move to Black on White violence.  We also saw it as a direct consequence of the National Party Government's decision on the 2nd of February 1990, to unban the so-called liberation movements and to free the present President.
We believed that this would not only lead to the destruction of the Afrikaners, but that it would also cause violence and we would be literally obliterated.  At that stage we thought that what had happened after colonialisation, or after decolonisation in other African countries, Uhuru - that would happen here.  We got into the car and left for Durban.
On the way we decided amongst ourselves that we would have to identify a suitable target.  That sounded like a good plan, that we should attack a minibus taxi.  We arrived in Durban and we saw a taxi and followed it.  We followed it into a residential area, but the circumstances were not conducive to a successful attack, so we abandoned the plan.  
	We turned round.  It was very late and we were about to go back to Richards Bay - we presumed at that stage that we wouldn't find a target because the next day was going to be a public holiday and there wouldn't be anybody left in town.  
We stopped at a petrol station to buy cooldrink, at that point a bus drove past and it seemed to us to be a suitable target.  We followed the bus, and on a quiet road where there were  no other cars, we overtook the bus.  Mr Botha gave the command "Fire" and we shot at the bus. ...  [intervention]

MR WILKINSON: If Mr Botha hadn't given the order "Fire" do you think you Smuts would have fired?

EUGENE MARAIS: No, we would not because we were under his direct command and we were engaged in a military operation, one does not use one's own initiative - one does not do what one feels like on a military operation.  We fired, we passed the bus.  About five hundred meters further up we turned around and we passed the bus again.  We got onto the highway, the freeway N2 North and we returned to Richards Bay and we arrived back at about four in the morning.

MR WILKINSON: Why did you launch such an attack on the same day and in Durban?

EUGENE MARAIS: The entire idea of the operation was - let me put it like this, rather - our operation was entirely a reaction to what we believed was a PAC on Whites that morning.  In other words, what I am trying to say is that we didn't have a party that night and then decide, oh, let's go shoot a few people.  We wouldn't have done it the previous evening or the following morning.  What we did was precisely a reaction to the morning's events.

MR WILKINSON: So the offense was for no other reason than as a reaction?

EUGENE MARAIS: That is correct.

MR WILKINSON: Why didn't you rather demonstrate with posters and placards at the PAC's offices?

EUGENE MARAIS: We believed at that stage, and I want to underline this, that this was the beginning of the onslaught against Whites.  We could see afterwards that there were a number of attacks, and we all know about  this which became worse and worse.  We knew that it wouldn't help to demonstrate.
	At that stage I believed, I truly believed that a peaceful solution was not possible in this country.  And co-operation among the people in this country was not possible and that the Whites -  the Afrikaners, the Boer - that they were all confronted with - with obliteration.

MR WILKINSON: The time of the attack, that was the PAC liberation organisation - were you aware that they had registered as a political party?

EUGENE MARAIS: Yes, I am aware of it.

MR WILKINSON: Can you say about when it happened?

EUGENE MARAIS: Mr Chairman, I can't - in any case it was before 1994 election.  You must understand that at that stage, from 1991 we were in prison so we weren't acquainted with the news.

MR WILKINSON: But in 1990, that obviously was very revolutionary?

EUGENE MARAIS: Yes, we were very fully aware that day of statements.  I'm not just talking about us, the media werefull of this at that time.  A great deal of attention was given to the fact that these people were shouting "Kill the Boer, kill the farmer" and when they finished that, they said "One settler, one bullet" and for us that could only mean one thing.  And at that stage I felt like a settler and we were referring to ourselves at that stage as Boere.

MR WILKINSON: And the Afrikaner community then felt very threatened?

EUGENE MARAIS: That is correct.

MR WILKINSON: Now linking up with my previous question -  why these innocent victims?