Amnesty Hearings — Richards Bay — 1998-04-14

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: It is Mr Dalaqolo Luthuli, he actually promised that he was going to bring me another group of people with whom I was going to work, and he brought me people like Zweli Dhlamini and Israel Hlongwane.
	They finally arrived to come and assist in the operation.  I knew them and I knew Dhlamini because we had been trained together at Caprivi and at the time when I was at Hammersdale, we were in the same IFP movement.  Israel Hlongwane himself, I knew him even though he was still younger, but one person whom I knew very well, was Zweli Dhlamini.
	Israel Hlongwane was in the IFP Youth at the time at Mpumalanga.  I just knew him as a person who was holding a position in the IFP Youth at Mpumalanga.
	So I knew him to be in charge of the Youth.  And also, Israel Hlongwane at the time when I was at Koeberg, he was actually one of the people who were trained by the SAP there, but he did not come from the Caprivians group.  There were actually two groups.
	Some people were recruited randomly and there were people who were trained with the intention of posting them to infiltrate certain movements.  There were actually people who knew nothing, they just joined the Police Force to be Special Constables and I was trained with him at Koeberg.

MR WILLS: Now, you have indicated in your affidavit that certain members of the Police, the KwaZulu Police I refer to, were aware of the existence of this operation, this hit squad operation, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Not that they knew, they are the ones that formed this group.

MR WILLS: Can you expand a bit on that, which Policemen are you referring to?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Would you please repeat your question, I am confused as to which Policemen you are talking about here?

MR WILLS: I will rephrase the question.  As I understand it, you were at the time of doing these operations and we will be shortly getting into the operations that you conducted, you were also a member of the KwaZulu Police and so was Mr Mbambo a member of the KwaZulu Police.
	Now, it may seem strange to some persons that you were able to continue with these operations, whilst you were still an ordinary member of the KwaZulu Police.  Can you explain how that could happen?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Now I understand your question.  This was possible because there was Brigadier Mzimela was District Commandant at eSikhawini and we, let me just put it this way, Brigadier Mzimela was used to communicate with the local leadership of the IFP at eSikhawini, people like Bebebeyela, etc.
	He knew about this as I have already explained.   He is the one who was covering us up so that we do not land ... (tape ends) ... He placed us in a position where we would be able to carry out our duties.  Mbambo for example was deployed to the Investigative Branch and he was not doing this as a part time job, but he was on a full time basis, also manipulating his full time duties.
	He is the one among the Detectives, who would actually go out and do something, cover something up so that the case disappears and the investigation is discontinued.  
	I was in the Reaction Unit for the reason that I would be able to know where Mbambo and others were going to attack, so that I can stop the Police from going there, I am talking about the patrolling Reaction Police.
	Even after an attack has been carried out, we would, I would arrive there first, pick up the cartridges so that no trace or any trace of evidence can be left behind.  This enabled us to proceed as we did.

MR WILLS: Thank you.  Just to summarise and to finalise the issue of the formation of this hit squad and how the structure actually worked.  As I understand it, there was a - you were in fact the person who were in charge of the eSikhawini hit squad and there were certain people that you gave orders to and those persons are amongst others, Mr Mbambo, Mr Hlongwane, Mr Dhlamini, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: Now, on top of you there were persons, your direct Commander as I understand your evidence was Captain Langeni.  Is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Is it the same Mr Wills as Major Langeni?

MR WILLS: Yes, thank you Ms Committee member, in the affidavit at the time this was drafted, he was in fact a Major, but at the time that this hit squad was formed, the witness has corrected me, he was in fact a Captain.  It is the same person.  Thank you.
	But Major Langeni was part of what I understand a Committee which comprised of M.Z. Khumalo, Mr Luthuli and Prince Gideon Zulu.  This Committee had a broader ambit and they organised operations in other areas of the province, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: Now, in regard to the information on the targets.  This emanated from the local leadership at eSikhawini and the persons that you have mentioned in that regard, were mainly Mrs Mbuyasi and Mayor Bebebeyela.  Is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: I would like to explain here with the permission of the Chairperson.  I would like to explain so that this is well understood.

MR WILLS: Yes, go ahead.

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Our operation was such that the direct instruction that there should be an operation, came from Captain Langeni and I would go to Ulundi and he would also telephone me and I would also call him.  We contacted each other now and then.
	Yes, he was giving me instructions.  Some instructions I knew and I expected him of course to give me those instructions because these instructions had already come from the local leadership at eSikhawini.  That is the cooperation between the leadership at eSikhawini and those at Ulundi was such that it looked like a wheel.
	If a person was problematic at eSikhawini it would not be Captain Langeni who would know that he is problematic.  It would be the local leadership that would know first that such a person is troublesome and that if such a person died, would the movement or organisation benefit from his death, and therefore the local leadership would be the one who would contact Ulundi and I would in turn receive the instruction direct from Captain Langeni from Ulundi.  That is how we used to operate.
	But, these will be instructions that I would know already because I would engage in conversations with the local leadership, there were good cooperation.  Sometimes these were the things that I already knew and expected.

MR WILLS: Yes.  There was a significant event which occurred in February 1992, when the IFP held a rally in eSikhawini and that rally was attacked by ANC members, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: Can you tell us what the consequences of this was as regards the instructions you were given after that rally?