Amnesty Hearings — Pietersburg — 1997-07-02

A J G ERWEE: Yes, that is correct.  There was to be a helicopter on standby. I will still get to that point, as to the reasons why we needed a helicopter.  We needed the helicopter should there be any arrests or wounded people or whatever and then the helicopter could have given us the ability to deal with those incidents speedily.
	We adjourned with the request to Capt Bourne to go to the Alldays area on the 9th, where he was to find a suitable place along the road for us.  The reason why we sent him on ahead by himself, and the reason I didn't go along, was that we didn't want to draw too much attention to movements of strange vehicles and strange people in the area.  It would increase the risk for Matthews Sehlwana, as well as for the other members involved in observation points on the Botswana side of the border.  There is always the risk that the insurgents became aware of any strange movements.

UNKNOWN: Mr Erwee, I want to take you back a couple of steps.  What was the planning, on the day that you became involved, what was it aimed at?

A J G ERWEE: It was put to us very clearly by our divisional commander, Col Willem van der Merwe, that the total operation which took the form of a road-block, that we should use everything in our power to arrest these people. The information was important at that stage.  It was important whatever we could extract from these people.
	Firstly, to be able to identify the underground structures or whatever belonging to MK in the northern region, as well as elsewhere in the country.  And that is why Col Willem van der Merwe told us that our primary aim would be to effect arrests. But he also told me that I should not endanger my life or the lives of the other members, should we fired at or the risk become too great.

UNKNOWN: Please continue.

A J G ERWEE: Mr Chairperson, late the afternoon of the 9th I went to Alldays and more particularly, the police station.
I may perhaps mention at this stage, that at that stage Brig Coetsee had already told me that he requested reinforcements from the police in Messina, Louis Trichardt.  The reinforcements had been sent to Alldays and that they would wait there for further instructions and developments, and that everybody should not arrive there at the same time and that they should use as few as possible vehicles, because it might start to look suspicious.

UNKNOWN: To take you one step back. Just to finalise the planning stage. Col Willem van der Merwe gave you all the instructions. Would you have regarded that planning as the final planning down to the last finest detail or was the situation different?

A J G ERWEE: No, that only laid down the broad guidelines from top management.

UNKNOWN: Where would the final detailed planning take place?

A J G ERWEE: The final detail would have been worked out at the Alldays police station by myself and my supporting officer from 5 Reconnaissance, Mike Bourne.

UNKNOWN: Was the idea that you would just enter into this operation cold or that it would be rehearsed?

A J G ERWEE: During planning at Alldays, myself and Capt Mike Bourne told ourselves that the rehearsal would take place on the morning of the 10th, because if we went to the scene with all the necessary personnel, that the presence of personnel and the sound of the vehicles, all of which were unusual in that area, would evoke suspicion and once again, this would decrease the risk for Sehlwana and Van den Berg. It could also hamper our attempts to arrest these people.  That is why we decided we would perform the rehearsals the next day, early on the morning of the 10th.
	Now at Alldays I met the members there.  I am talking about the security force members not the observation point members.  I found Capt Mike Bourne and one or two Defence Force members there.  We went into a room, where Capt Mike Bourne showed me where the best place would be to actually stage the road block.  
	It was also put to me that the initial point which he chose for the road block, had been amended.  As a result of information from Col Strydom, which indicated that the place originally chosen, held a measure of risk, in that there were residential homes close-by.
	I must just inform the Committee that I am not familiar with the area and I allowed myself to be led by Col Strydom and Capt Mike Bourne, who was in charge of reconnaissance.  
	After we agreed on the actual point - I forgot to mention to the Chairperson, Capt Bourne was also told that he had to go from Alldays to the crossing point, and to determine exactly how long it would take him to drive there.  So that we would know exactly what time to leave on the morning of the 10th, because it was important for us to know that because it was dark, we wanted to know exactly how many kilometres we had to cover with our lights on and how many we needed to drive with our lights switched off.
	So we decided on a time, that is now the time of departure for the morning. We would have left from a different place, not the police station.  It would have been somewhere along the road. I can't remember the exact place now.
	A Defence Force Casspir was to transport us and we were also to be conveyed in this bus.  That is the way it actually happened.

UNKNOWN: Now whilst we are dealing with the vehicles, you have already explained to us very nicely that you were careful not to arouse suspicion by having too many vehicles and so on in the area and that you wanted to keep the movements of vehicles to a minimum.  You also said that you were to be transported from Alldays to the scene in a Casspir and a mini-bus which Matthews Sehlwana would then later use to transport the six people.
	Were there any other vehicles accompanying you and if so, how many other vehicles went along with you to the scene on the 10th?

A J G ERWEE: It was the Casspir, the bus, and if I recall correctly, there were one or two other vehicles involved as well. There would have been bakkies and I would not be able to give you the exact number.

UNKNOWN: But the idea was that on the 10th upon arresting the people, that they would be conveyed back to Alldays in these vehicles, including the Kombi?

A J G ERWEE: Yes, we would have moved back in the Kombi, in the Casspir and the bakkies, one or two, I can't remember.

UNKNOWN: You said that you had discussions previously with Bourne so that he could determine exactly what the distances involved were.

A J G ERWEE: Yes, we also determined that the helicopter which was on standby at Alldays base, would become air-borne as soon as we had received the message that the insurgents had infiltrated the RSA. It was so planned that the helicopter wouldn't go to the scene but should already be air-borne, but not within earshot, in order to give us support, should we need it.
	We also decided that commands would be given at the scene by means of blowing a whistle.

UNKNOWN: Who would have blown the whistle?

A J G ERWEE: Capt Mike Bourne would have blown the whistle.  There were various reasons why he would have blown the whistle, because there were certain actions to be carried out.  But the number of times that he would blow the whistle was actually only determined once we got to the scene.  Now I haven't yet described that. It would have been unheard of to shout commands at personnel about 30, 40 metres apart from each other.  It would have caused chaos.
	We started that morning. For the first while we had our lights on.  Thereafter we switched them off and we moved at a snail's pace.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you please tell us, how far is Alldays from the place where the incident took place, that is where the border was crossed?