Amnesty Hearings — Benoni — 1997-06-23

UNKNOWN: I then want to refer you to the next.  He says;
"There was a recommendation on the 15th of March 1985 which brought about the founding of the National Coordinating Committee.  The National Coordinating Committee was responsible for coordinating.....
 (the Interpreter must unfortunately cease to interpret the reading is too rapid and there is no document available) ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Will you just read it slowly because the Interpreter is having difficulty interpreting it.

UNKNOWN: Oh I beg your pardon Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You are reading too fast, please.

UNKNOWN: I am trying to save time.  I beg your pardon I will read slower.
"The National Coordinating Committee was responsible for coordinating efforts on the regional level to combat the revolutionary onslaught and to achieve other national purposes.  The function of this body was to take into account departmental planning; to counter the revolutionary onslaught and to initiate actions; to coordinate executive actions and to monitor such actions, and to report to the working and Cabinet committees with regard to these activities".
He then continues to say,
"TREVITS was then founded....."
and he mentions that,
"During 1986 the Security Forces and departments were tasked to formulate their own counter-revolutionary strategies and to execute these actions".
Do you bear any knowledge with regard to this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair I've already mentioned that at the Joint Management Councils the various departments were represented.  You would then have heard what every department attempted to achieve .......

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Mr Chairman I requested that we wait a little bit until the shuttling shall have stopped.
SHORT BREAK

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, will you proceed.

UNKNOWN: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Can you recall that the departments and the Security Forces were tasked to develop their own counter-revolutionary strategies, can you recall this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: As I have already mentioned at the Joint Management Councils every department indicated what they did in order to counter the revolution.

UNKNOWN: He then continues to say that,
"For instance the Counter-Insurgency Unit of the South African Police had a very important role with regard to handling unrest in the Black areas of the then South Africa".

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: That is correct.  The Unrest Unit or Riot Units were involved in controlling unrest, particularly in Black areas.

UNKNOWN: General if we agree on this could you then agree with this statement that the actions of your unit and the actions of the Security Branch aimed at countering unrest and preventing terrorism would have been part of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the government of that day, would you agree with that statement?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I could agree with that statement, and that is what was involved, to control unrest and if possible Chair, to prevent it.

UNKNOWN: Good.  General that which Brigadier Cronje and Mr Hechter and them, the testimony they gave with regard to pro-active efforts with regard to the counter-revolutionary strategy that is exactly what you now have confirmed.  Pro-active actions were actions intended to prevent insurgency and to prevent unrest.  Is there any reason you might have to deny this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair I do not believe it is so, I said to the Committee here what my suggestion had been both to the members in my office as well as to Brigadier Cronje.  Chair I could not agree with the statement that what they want to ask amnesty for would be within the ambit of the prevention of unrest and counter-insurgency.

UNKNOWN: We will get to the discussion that you had.  General van der Merwe says then on page 71, from line 8 on,
"It is undoubtedly so that militaristic and political inspired speeches often made it difficult for the security forces becoming more and more emotionally involved, to be able to distinguish between that which was normally justifiable in terms of the law and that which was not.  This status quo led to members of the Security Branch, who had to deal with the most horrendous manifestations of violence on a day-to-day basis, ultimately becoming equally disillusioned and negatively influenced regarding these matters".
Could you agree with this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair personally I have never paid much attention to political speeches.  I have never once in my life voted for any political party and I have never been a member of any political party.  I would, however, agree that political propaganda did have a negative influence on the security forces.

UNKNOWN: Good.  General, in the presentation of the previous Commissioners of Police which General van der Merwe read into the record, particularly paragraph 5 where he says, and this is on page 5, paragraph 13, my apologies, he refers to the fact that the "struggle had become more intense, or the conflict had become more intense", and at the top of page 5 he says,
"This turn of events was to lead to the South African Police entering the shadowy world of guerilla warfare and counter-insurgency operations, while in other respects the members concerned were at the height of confrontations also exposed to countering the normal strategies of a conventional military struggle".
Would you agree with him or differ?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Could I read the paragraph myself Chair, if you will allow me.

INTERPRETER: The Interpreters would appreciate a mention again to Mr du Plessis to just keep his reading speed down somewhat.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you are required to keep your speed down a little bit to enable the Interpreters to do their bit.

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Is the statement that this is what in fact occurred?

UNKNOWN: This is what all four of the previous Commissioners of Police the situation had been.  I want to ask you whether you agree with this or not.

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I do agree with this.

UNKNOWN: Then on page 8, paragraph 25 General van der Merwe reads as follows, and he's also given testimony that the other Commissioners......
"It is well known that violence begets violence and as has occurred in conflict and violence all over the world serious and reprehensible abuses occurred on all sides of the multi-faceted struggle in South Africa.  Members of the South African Police and their families were murdered and maimed, in some cases in most gruesome ways and were further isolated and rejected by certain communities as a result of the actions by the ANC/SACP alliance and the PAC".
Would you agree with this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: That is correct, that is what in fact occurred.

UNKNOWN: Then paragraph 26,
"The nature of this conflict and violence lured the traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants, between legitimate and illegitimate targets and more importantly between acceptable and unacceptable methods.  They often occurred in the grey area between legitimate orders given, the interpretation of such orders in circumstances where secrecy and other factors made proper communication difficult or impossible, requests which were not always properly expressed or formulated and a mixing of cultures of the various security departments through the National Management System".
Would you agree with this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: That is what the General said, this is not what I would say.

UNKNOWN: What then would you say?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: If I understand correctly why you are reading this to me this would involve the lack of clarity with regard to requests and commands and how this would then be brought in to bear on my suggestion to the members and Brigadier Cronje.  I would not be able to speak on behalf of General van der Merwe, that is his view which he had stated on that occasion.