Human Rights Violation Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-06-11

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: Mr Chairman in 1976 we were trained in handling riots.  The instructors showed us how you should handle riot situations, how to put up road blockades, patrols and when there were big matters how to use teargas depending on the circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me I prefer to be referred to as Miss Chairperson or otherwise Madam Chair, not Mr Chairman, thank you.

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That's good.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ntsebeza.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes.  You were still describing the sort of orders or instructions that you were being given with regard to handling these unrest situations in general.

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is right Madam Chair.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now the JMC structures in the Western Cape did you feature in that at all anywhere, the Western Cape JMC, the Western Province JMC?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: I was not part of the Western Province JMC.  Sometimes when my commanding officer could not be there I went to these meetings.  No I never went to the Western Province JMC but sometimes I did attend meetings of the S-JMC when the commanding officer was not available.

MR NTSEBEZA: And the meetings of the Western Province JMC itself did you ever attend any or some of them?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: It could have been that I attended some of those.  I attended meetings of the S-JMC when my commanding officer was not there.

MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, yes I heard that.  But what I was actually asking whether you also were able to attend meetings of the Western Province JMC?  In other words a level at which Schelhase was operating according to the previous witness?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: No I never went to the Castle to attend these meetings.

MR NTSEBEZA: VEIKOM, did you ever attend ...(intervention)

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: Yes I did attend VEIKOM meetings when my commanding officer was not available.

MR NTSEBEZA: Would that also be at the S-JMC level or at the level of the Western Province?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is correct Madam Chair.

MR NTSEBEZA: And you never attended VEIKOM meetings at the Western Province level, the WP-JMC?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: No never.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now you  heard Trevor Vermeulen testifying that he was secretary to the Western Province, in other words the Peninsula S-JMC, now did you ever attend meetings at which he was secretary?  Yes you did, there was one ...(intervention)

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: Ja, yes I have, these are in the documents ...(intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: Ja okay.  And one of them being the one that I put to the - I am going to put that thing to you just in a moment.  Now at these meetings of GOS, who did GOS report to?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: The JOC meetings?

MR NTSEBEZA: H'n.  Now what came out of those meetings, where did they get to?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: During these JOC meetings information was obtained from the Security Police.  Du Toit was there, they told us about possible incidents, perhaps in the whole Cape Peninsula and we planned what to do.

MR NTSEBEZA: Ja, and did JOC always inform the S-JMC when it would embark on operations like for instance the Guguletu 7, would that have been something, if it was decided at GOS, would that be something that would then be reported to the S-JMC?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: No, that operation was not discussed at the JOC.

MR NTSEBEZA: At S-JMC.  It was not even discussed at GOS?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: No.

MR NTSEBEZA: Oh I see.  Would there be an instance at which instances where something that was discussed at GOS would not be reported to the S-JMC?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is correct.  General discussions should have taken place and we can't send all the minutes through every day, it could have been possible.

MR NTSEBEZA: But operations, where for instance an operation was like - let's take an operation which I think did serve before GOS, the Trojan Horse, would that sort of operation be reported to the S-JMC?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is correct.  Madam Chair the same if you went on a foot patrol in KTC or Old Crossroads or the satellite establishment you put it on record and the operational person in Manenberg receives it and he writes a report and that is faxed through to Colonel Vermeulen in the region.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now can you look at that document on counter-mobilisation, I think you have the reference, the one that (...indistinct) - now according to the previous witness you were present when there was a discussion on that document?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: And I am keen to get your own impressions, what did this notion of counter-mobilisation mean to you?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: Point 11, is that what you are referring to?

MR NTSEBEZA: I am referring to.  What did you understand the ...(intervention)

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: There should be attempted to motivate the people from the Black residential areas to rise up against the revolutionaries.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now wouldn't you in the context of Crossroads and KTC wouldn't you, in your own mind, when you read that document or when the thing was discussed, who did you identify as revolutionaries in the context of what was happening there?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: The Comrades were revolutionaries, the Makabanas as they were called.

MR NTSEBEZA: Will you please be quiet.  And what did counter-mobilisation mean to you vis a vis those groups of people, what did you understand it to be?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: Which point is that?

MR NTSEBEZA: Ja we are still dealing with 11.

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: 11.

MR NTSEBEZA: You see no.11 on that document deals extensively with counter-mobilisation.  And for instance it seems to suggest that structures must be identified which are favourably disposed towards the counter-mobilisation strategy, did you as yourselves, I am talking now about the Riot Unit, or as yourself in the context of that particular meeting, did you have a view as to what structures you identified?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: No, no.

MR NTSEBEZA: What did you regard as, in the context of Crossroads and KTC as positive resistance movements, what did you identify?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: I do not understand the question.

MR NTSEBEZA: You see you have said in the context of Crossroads and KTC at that time your own view was that the revolutionaries were Comrades.

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: That is correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now I am asking are you able to tell us in a similar fashion what in the context of Crossroads and KTC in that period would be positive resistance movements?

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: I would think this refers to the Witdoeke.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now we now know that there was a discussion of that document at a meeting at which you were and there is a document which I think you have which Colonel Vermeulen has designated as a memo, that flowed from those sort of discussions.  Now do you have a sense of what was your thinking about methods that ought to have been employed to discredit the revolutionary leaders?  You see where he talks about "the clandestine operations should be launched".  We are reading paragraph 5 on page 2 of that document, "Propaganda Operations", 5C.

CORNELIUS ADOLF JANSE ODENDAL: This is a committee which should be established, a fixed committee of clandestine operations should be established, this is what I understand by that.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes.  And if we look at 7 what are your comments with regard to that, the very first portion, where it appears that the recommendation was that this was a specialised operation of a clandestine committee in relation to which when the climate is right should go into operation, or a climate could be created, could you give us your impressions about what that memo was saying?