Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

MR GOOSEN: General Geldenhuys, we could well be here until very late tonight, do you agree with that description of the state of affairs in South Africa at the time, do you agree that that was the position, the policy of the government of the day at the time, do you agree with that, yes or no?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: I can't, Mr Chairman, I can't answer that question as if I had been in the cabinet and knew about it.  If that was General Malan's position in a statement and he was in  a better position, then maybe one should ask him.

CHAIRPERSON: What I think the question seeks to say is you were Chief of the South African Defence Force and quite apart from the fact that General Malan also was the Chief of the South African Defence Force at some stage, he was the Minister of Defence, that is what you recognise to be a statement which he made in his capacity as a politician.
 Now, I think what the question seeks to ask is do you agree with the sentiments of that statement.  Do they ring a bell, do they suggest to you an understanding by yourself of the position to be what it is stated there to be, that the carrier of the land mine, whoever, must be destroyed?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I am not prepared to be asked whether I agree with the Minister.  I accept what he said and if I did not accept it, I would have told him.

MR GOOSEN: In fact, I would be very surprised if you suggested that you don't agree with that at all, because that in fact is quoted by you in your amnesty application made to the Amnesty Committee, is that correct?
 You actually quote General Malan, that precise quote?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: I can't remember if it is in my application.

MR GOOSEN: Okay.  It is.  That precise quote, it is also quoted in the submission made by General Viljoen this morning.

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I agree with the inclusion of this quote of Mr Malan.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you.  And would you say that it adequately reflects the situation faced by the South African Security Forces in the mid-19080's, yes or no?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Before I answer that question, I want to ask, I haven't got the documents, where did General Malan make these statements?

MR GOOSEN: You received a subpoena from the Commission.  Paragraph 3 of that subpoena, it was a standard subpoena issued to all of the people that appeared here, also to the people that appeared yesterday, the people that are appearing tomorrow.
 It is pretty much standard format, because we are following the same format in relation to these proceedings as we followed yesterday and the day after today.  Paragraph 3 says for the purposes of the above enquiry, because we had a  couple of things that we wanted to enquire with you, we stated there for the purposes of the above enquiries, reference may be made to the contents of your amnesty application.
 You instructed an Attorney to file an amnesty application on your behalf.  I presume you would have had access to your own amnesty application.  Now the fact that you may not have read it prior to coming today, is not a matter that you can raise, as an excuse for not answering a very simple question.  Do you agree with the sentiments expressed by General Malan or not?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: I agree that that was the view of the government.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much.  And do you agree that it was in fact the mission of every soldier in the South African Defence Force to ensure the destruction of the terrorists, his base, his capability whether inside the borders of the country or outside the country, before he could commit his atrocities?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Yes, I agree with that.  That is the doctrine everywhere where such a war is being fought.

MR GOOSEN: Now, having that understanding of the situation faced by the Security Forces and having that understanding of what your duty as the Chief of the South African Defence Force was at the time, would you agree that in a period late 1985, early 1986 it was recognised by the South African Defence Force that it would be necessary to employ Special Forces using unconventional methods inside the country in support of the South African Police?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, let me just get that question straight.  Is the question in the Police?

MR GOOSEN: No, that given the situation, given the assessment of the revolutionary onslaught against the country at that time, when you were and when you became Chief of the South African Defence Force was of such a nature that it would necessitate the deployment of SADF Special Forces in support of the South African Police inside the country for using unconventional methods?

MR COETZEE: Sorry, Mr Goosen, as we heard earlier with the previous witness.  Unconventional operations entails a whole range of possibilities.  You need to be a bit more specific in relation to the context of this enquiry.

CHAIRPERSON: thank you.

MR GOOSEN: Perhaps I will skip the unconventional and start with the broader position first.  Would you agree that it was recognised by the South African Defence Force that it was necessary to deploy Special Forces in support of the South African Police in operations inside the country?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I will agree with that, but I must put it very clearly that the whole Defence Force had for years been in support of the South African Police.  We had training about this question of support for the civil authorities from 1950, not just only Special Forces, it is any capacity of which a Defence Force disposes, which can be used to support the Police of a country.
 You will also find that the changes in approach, depending on changing circumstances, are also not new  in the sense that the training manuals in warfare training manuals, are classified according to conventional, unconventional and under unconventional warfare you get various kinds of unconventional warfare and you also get for many years back, manuals dealing with counter-insurgency operations in the countryside and country insurgence in cities.  And these were used to support the Police.  Those elements of the Defence Force which could meet the Police's needs.

MR GOOSEN: General Joubert, the question is really quite simple.  It was stated explicitly and certainly implicit in the submission made by General Viljoen, that in consequence of a shift in strategy by the ANC in late 1985, early 1986, it was accepted that the South African Defence Force would need to adapt its strategy and in consequence of that, it would need to intensify its support for the South African Police inside the country and that that would also involve a deployment of Special Forces or components of the South African Defence Force in operations inside the country, in support of the Police.  Do you accept that that was the position articulated by General Viljoen?
 I am (indistinct), it was a long submission.

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I am not (indistinct) this in the submission, but I assume that it is correct.

MR GOOSEN: Sorry, could you just repeat that please, I was distracted.  I beg your pardon?

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Mr Chairman, I said I didn't control whether this Commission did in fact make the statement as the questioner put it to me, but I assumed that it was put.  The questions are not that the question is complicated, but it is so long that when we get to the end, I have forgotten how it started it out.

MR GOOSEN: I can be nasty and say the same about the answers.

CHAIRPERSON: Please get on Mr Goosen and General Geldenhuys, don't let's start a toe to toe, we need to take General Meiring at half past four and we are having now only 15 minutes left.

JOHANNES JAKOBUS GELDENHUYS: Certainly Mr Chairman.