Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

DOUW VERMEULEN: Chairperson I think my interpretation of this document and the instructions which I received from Major Loedolff I could almost say that they were - the one isn't relevant to the other one.  If I as a policeman were to be given this instruction from head office it would have dealt with combatting of unrest situations and I would have filed this under crowd control, in other words where you have to act against a lot of people during a march or something like that, and I would have applied this information or procedures to people taking part in an illegal march from A to B.
So if I could explain it like this.  I would have first used teargas against them after giving the necessary warnings, saying to them you have so many minutes to disperse otherwise we will act against you and if the crowd didn't react to that I would, if I am just going according to the steps here I would then have ordered a charge with sjamboks or batons and if they gathered again I would have used batons or shot ammunition.  So I would have used this procedure here in a totally different situation to what we experienced this day, on this particular day.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: I am sorry that I have to go back to the video.  When we were looking at the video we saw a crowd of people on either side of the road, and according to your own admission you were expecting that these people would be throwing stones, now when that crowd situation, when you are controlling that crowd situation are you suggesting that you would use different measures as you would if you were to go and control a group of marchers who would equally be carrying stones and other things?

DOUW VERMEULEN: Yes I would explain it as follows.  Say for instance the crowd of people that you saw on the video stayed in one position on the corner of St Simons Road and they had a burning obstruction in the road there, and were shouting their usual slogans and throwing stones at the Police etc, if the police vehicle had come to a stop about 20 yards away from this crowd, yes, I would have made use of this procedure.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: You would have applied that procedure?

DOUW VERMEULEN: Yes.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: And in terms of what you told us you were indeed expecting a crowd with stones, you were not expecting what you found, this is what you said earlier?

DOUW VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: In other words, according to your expectations you were expecting a crowd where you would have used those procedures, and what I am wondering about is if then Mr Loedolff instructs you to use even more lethal ammunition how do you, as a professional policeman, allow him to send you on such an operation when you expect something less than what you found?
I mean according to your expectations you did not expect to find, as you describe it, a life threatening situation because you were not expecting such a situation, why then did you not apply the measures that are defined in your own manual, and why did you allow Mr Loedolff to push you into a situation where you had to carry live and lethal ammunition?

DOUW VERMEULEN: Chairperson I find it very difficult to associate myself with the phrase that "Loedolff pushed me" into a situation.  If I look at paragraph 4 it reads,
"In a situation according to evaluation if use must be made of firearms...."
that is what I believed.  I believed that firearms had to be used because an attack had already been launched.  The vehicle was already surrounded by people, stones had already been thrown, the two people in the front were unprotected, had already been attacked, birdshot should first be used,  Other ammunition, heavier ammunition should only be used when there's no other option to protect life or lives or property.
Now I said earlier today that when I was sizing up the situation in the moment before I started shooting I then believed, and I still believe today, that we had reached the point where there was no other way out, that the time had come to protect my own life, the lives of my colleagues and property.  I was passed the stage of thinking that this would be a situation where teargas would be of any assistance or giving orders to disperse or anything of the kind.  At that stage I realised that we had already passed that point and it was my life on the line here and that I had to protect my own life and the lives of my colleagues.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: You see Mr Vermeulen I think I may have made this point in a different context earlier, you are suggesting to us that you had an option, you are suggesting that under the circumstances you had to make a decision whether to use no.3, no.4, I mean whether to use the equipment stated under no.3, in other words less lethal weapons or to use the lethal weapons that Mr Loedolff said you should carry.  This is what you are telling us.  And yet you know, you stated, Mr Loedolff before you stated that all you had in the vehicle was AAA and birdshot.  Now how would you, I mean how did you have a choice?  You did not have the choice, you only carried the lethal weapons.  In other words all that you were prepared to use was lethal machinery.  It's not as if you had a moment to assess and then an option to use other kinds of equipment.  You only used the firearms that were lethal.  There is a contradiction again.

DOUW VERMEULEN: The question as to whether I had an option could be answered like this, if I had stood up from that crate on that day and there was just a normal road blockade there and had there been 10 or 15 youths or adults it doesn't matter, and if they were throwing stones at the vehicle I wouldn't even have thought of using my firearm.  I can promise you we would have been off the truck as quick as a flash and we would have arrested them very, very quickly.
But in the circumstances I realised that we were being attacked, we were under heavy attack, I described it as being in a "rain of stones", stones were actually raining down on us and that's still the way I would describe it.  And that is why if we have to go according to paragraphs and procedures then I realise that it was no longer a question of an option or an alternative. I had no option. I was afraid that I would die that day.

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: I'll say this just one last time actually and maybe we should move on.  You did not have an option, you did not have an option anyway, it is not as if you had other kinds of ammunition, you went there prepared to use AAA.  And let me promise you if you hoped to have arrested a group of 15 agile youths, jumping out of crates on a moving vehicle I doubt if you would have caught them.  So I wonder if in fact the idea was not to use the firearm and the ammunition that you had carried without the option of using anything minimal.
Just one last question and then I will ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Dr Ramashala wants to ask a question.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Yes.  Just a clarification Lt Vermeulen.  A few minutes ago you said, and I quote, "when I was sizing up the situation before shooting", since your head did not show in the crates one should assume that you were either kneeling or squatting, am I correct?   If the crates went as far as your chest, so you men were either kneeling or squatting in the crates?

DOUW VERMEULEN: That's correct.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Could you then explain how you would have been able to size up the situation before shooting, because the video shows you guys coming up and immediately shooting, so how were you able to "size up the situation before shooting"?  Thank you.