Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: The reason why I had contact with the other units, special units and the police, was that we were purely a terrorist detection and tracking unit and the feeling in Cape Town was that the security police had no information and the people who patrol the streets for 24 hours a day were Murder and Robbery, Riot Squad, the Narcotics Bureau, Detective Branch of Guguletu, so I shared my information with them and shared my photographs, my photograph albums with them so that we would, between the whole group of us, the whole lot of us, we would be able to track down terrorists in a better way, in a more co-ordinated.  So, these people would have been the people who would have picked up my Black members if they were moving around in vehicles at night and these other units worked on the ground very, very regularly, so it would have, actually, caused my operation to miscarry if I did not share information with them.  I went to Brigadier Ronnie van der Westhuizen ... (intervention).

MR BOOYENS: Who was he?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: He was the Divisional Detective Commander.  I have introduced myself to him, I said I am from the Counter-Terrorist Unit and I am working with the security police in Cape Town, may I please also work with your units?  He said, well, you go and have contact with the different units, just go and introduce yourself, tell them what kinds of vehicles you are using, because we can do whatever we like, but if the detectives pick up these people, then the whole thing will miscarry.  That was the reason why we had to have contact with the other branches.

MR BOOYENS: Page 27, paragraph 13, there you deal with how you moved into KTC and the situation as you found it on the ground?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In your view it was clear that normal policing, at that stage, was no longer possible?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, that I observed from my own observations and also as a result of the information which I got from the various branches.  I realised that you could simply not enter into these areas with your unarmed vehicle, if I can use the English term, it was a free for all situation.  You had to be accompanied by several other men if you entered KTC or Crossroads, you had to move in in small groups, late at night, because they picked up our presence there, they used whistles to stay in contact with each other and they shot at us.  So, it was a crisis in Cape Town at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: You also say that you had to enter Crossroads on foot, because ... (intervention).

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, it was a squatter settlement, so there were a limited number of roads in and out of Crossroads, there were heavy rains and the roads actually were, we could not use these roads.  So, the Commissioner of Police, in those days, did not want to allow unarmed vehicles in that area at that time.  That is why we decided to enter the area on foot and in small groups to try and arrest suspects.

MR BOOYENS: How successful were you?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: We supported the Guguletu Detective Branch quite a lot and we helped them, achieved quite a bit of success in arresting people.

MR BOOYENS: Paragraph 14, you mention that you never identified yourself as a member of Vlakplaas when you contacted the other units, but that you simply told them that you were in command of a Counter-Terrorist Unit from head office.  What is the reason for that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, that stage Vlakplaas was a very, very sensitive operation.  We used the word "The Farm" and we did not actually mention the name Vlakplaas.  I was involved right from the establishment in 1981 and it was a very, very sensitive operation which was operated by means of secret funds.  So, we actually just referred to "Die Plaas" or "The Farm" and not Vlakplaas, but I am sure many of these policemen knew that it was the farm outside Pretoria called Vlakplaas.

MR BOOYENS: Nou, u handel dan op bladsy 29 uit, gee jy net 'n opsomming van die samesprekings met Luitenant Liebenberg.  Nou, net kortliks, wie was Luitenant Liebenberg en hoekom het jy met hom gepraat?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Luitenant Liebenberg was die Bevelvoerder van die Teenterroriste Lessenaar by die veiligheidspolisie hier in Kaapstad.  Hy was toe nog 'n jong man uit Offisierkursus uit en hy is die taak gegee om 'n Teenterroriste Lessenaar en netwerke te begin vestig om sodoende inligting in te samel rondom terroriste opspoorting, mnr die Voorsitter.

MR BOOYENS: En u meld ook spesifiek ... (intervention).

SISI KHAMPEPE: Sorry, I think there is a, there seems to be something wrong with the translation.  What ... (intervention).

INTERPRETER: If ...

SISI KHAMPEPE: ... the witness has just said was not translated.

INTERPRETER: If the witness would please repeat what he said, it will be interpreted.

MR BOOYENS: Please just repeat.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Lieutenant Liebenberg was a young officer and he was the Commanding Officer of a Counter Terrorist Desk in Cape Town in the security branch and he was placed there to establish a network of intelligence regarding terrorists, but I do not think they were particularly successful at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: In paragraph 15 you mention certain information which was obtained from informers.  Are these the informers that you infiltrated?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, also informers from Murder and Robbery, from the Detective Branch, Riot Squad and they gave us information as to what the situation was like and I did not have direct contact with those informers.  From time to time, however, I spoke to their handlers and they told me what the situation was like in KTC.

MR BOOYENS: Was the information also obtained in the way which you mention in paragraph 15?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: You also mention in paragraph 16 something which you already referred to, namely the prohibition on unarmed vehicles entering those areas and you also elaborate on the situation there.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: In paragraph 17 you mention the objective of your operation and that there was the aim to make the area ungovernable by the liberation movements?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Paragraph 18, page 30, towards the end of February you received information from the one man whom you had infiltrated at the group, that is Jimmy Mbane, and the information was to the effect that the group was busy planning to either attack a police station or to attack a police van or minibus.  Is that correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: This police bus, just to get some clarity on that, did this police bus transfer staff who lived outside of Guguletu, did it pick up these staff on a daily basis and then drive through a particular route and this particular crossing where the incident later took place on the way to Guguletu Police Station?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct, it was a little van belonging to the administrative staff and this bus used the same route at the same time every morning.  It came from a northerly direction to the Guguletu Police Station.

MR BOOYENS: Was the vehicle easily identifiable as a police vehicle?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: It was a yellow police mini-bus.

MR BOOYENS: Typical of the type of police vehicles used at the time?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: On page 21, page 31, paragraph 21 you mention that about a week before the taking place of the incident, Jimmy Mbane made arrangements to meet Liebenberg and myself at the Holiday Inn.  Could you perhaps elaborate on that, what happened there?