Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-11

MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"Because the South African Police had no statutory powers to act in an independent neighbouring country, it meant that actions in Swaziland would be illegal.
		However, an agreement was made with the Swaziland authorities two years before the Umkomati Accord, which made provision for actions in Swaziland prima facie."

MR VISSER: I see that we did not add this. The Umkomati Accord was signed in 1984?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that means that the Swazi Accord would have been in 1982?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the agreement with the Swaziland Government?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: 1982?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"It was the knowledge of the members of the Security Branch that intermittently from Mozambique through and in Swaziland, an active role was fulfilled by high profile MK members in the planning and execution of violent actions in the RSA.  That weapons of war were smuggled by and through Swaziland to the RSA.  That a great deal of terrorists had left the RSA and after they had completed their military training, had returned to the RSA via Swaziland.  That there was an extensive network of safehouses and other facilities with which terrorists were supported.  That financial and logistical support was provided to such persons in Swaziland.
		Due to the geographical proximity of Natal to Swaziland, the activities of the liberation movements in Swaziland became known to Natal.  The Security Branch Eastern Transvaal was naturally also affected by this.  Due to their intelligence capacity, the Security Branch was kept up to date very well with activities and personalities and their activities in Swaziland.  
		The Security Branch was up to date regarding who the ANC operatives were and what their intentions were.  By means of well-placed informers they regularly received information regarding the terrorists and weaponry that would enter the RSA, as well as the routes along which they would travel, as well as the situation of the DLBs and safehouses.  The DLBs actually refer to weapon stockpiling location and not necessarily points of information.  They also had knowledge about safehouses, contact persons and so forth, which placed them in a capacity to act in future.
		Swaziland also played an important role in the execution of the ANC/SACP alliance's Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula.  In Swaziland certain structures had been established by the ANC/SACP alliance and had been operated as such.  There was an RPMC, a Regional Politico Military Committee under which the so-called political committee and a military committee functioned."

MR VISSER: Yes, and for the convenience of the Committee two quotes have been taken from the Further Submissions of the ANC to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 12th of May 1997.  The first deals with the period from 1983 to 1985, and that refers to page 48 and 49 of that document.  And the second refers to the period from 1985 to 1990, and that is from page 53 of that document.  And that basically deals with the committees and the personalities involved in those activities.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now with Natal itself, could you submit to the Committee from page 25, paragraph 79.  Chairperson, I'm going a bit quickly ...

CHAIRPERSON: That's quite alright.

MR VISSER: I suppose you understand what I'm referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I'm referring to the Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of 12 May 1997.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please do stop me if ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, you carry on.

MR VISSER: Thank you.
	Please continue, paragraph 79 from Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA
"Chairperson, with regard to the province of Natal and with the exception of somewhat uncoordinated commission of violence which was experienced across the country, Natal suffered the consequences of two highly organised structures of the ANC/SACP alliance, namely Operations Butterfly and then Operation Vula.
		Operation Vula which was established in the final phases of 1985 and went to 1990, but which was actually aimed at lasting much longer ..."
...(intervention)

MR VISSER: It was a five year plan, isn't that so?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.  And it had to lead to the unleashing of a civil war.
"During the five years an infrastructure would be established within the country and weapons would be stockpiled within the country.  And according to the plan the masses would be politicised to such an extent that they would spontaneously rise up if there would be a spark to the so-called flame.
		By these means the Vula operatives did not commit violence ..."
...(intervention)

MR VISSER: They were busy with preparations.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we will hear later what the spark or one of the sparks at least were.

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"Operation Butterfly was a structure of MK.  In other words it was a purely military structure within the ANC, or at least a purely military operation within the ANC.
		While those members shared very much the same objectives as Operation Vula, they were more violently oriented and committed acts of violence.  Operation Vula in contrast was an operation of the SACP.
		Initially, during the '80s, Natal was into three security divisions within the SAP, namely Division Natal with the head office in Pietermaritzburg, Division Port Natal, with the head office being Durban and Division Northern Natal, with the headquarters being Newcastle.  
		It is important to mention this due to the fact that over the period of the 1980s, initiatives were brought in from the three divisions which later became one, Division Natal."

MR VISSER: And in which year did this take place, can you recall?

H J P BOTHA: I cannot recall the precise year, but I would think that it was in 1988 or '89.

MR VISSER: Very well.  That is when there was only one Division Natal.

H J P BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.  In the following paragraph, 83, you have given a background of how your staff was numbered, with specific reference to Durban.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have also given the position of Col Andy Taylor.  And if we look at the bottom of page 26, where Mr Botha gives evidence, you say - and you refer here to the evidence that you gave in the Ndwandwe amnesty application.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You say
"Mainly in command was Col Andy Taylor with an investigation unit directly under his command."
Now his unit was actually a unit that dealt with research regarding terrorism.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, it was a terrorist unit.

MR VISSER: It was a terrorist unit.  And furthermore you say in your evidence before Judge Wilson and the Committee Members
"And there was an MK Intelligence Unit, which was under my command."
That is below you.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then we speak of manpower and you say
"Chairperson, in total at the Security Branch (and you refer to Durban) we were about 200 members."
Does that refer only to Durban?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that refers only to Durban.
MR VISSER
"C-Section as our unit was known, under the command of Taylor existed out of 18 persons in total."