Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-11

WITNESS:   My answer to that would be in two points.  I'd say that first of all if one was actually dealing with conventional operations, then the environment is pretty straightforward, the armed forces are there for the protection of the sovereignty of the government in question, whether they engage themselves externally or internally.  When it comes to Coin Ops, the tendency is counter insurgency operations.  The tendency is for it to become much more blurred.  In terms of classic counter insurgency theory, whether it's rural or urban, the military forces that one utilises and whatever counter mobilisation measures one adopts, is there to ensure the integrity of the sovereignty and legitimacy of the government of the day.  Where it does appear to be blurred in this case, is firstly the fact that these forces were used in support of a particular political party, which undermines the supposedly non-partisan and apolitical role which armed forces should play.  I mean that should be

MR WILLS: /there

MR WILLS: 2A there at the disposal of the government, whether they're in a conventional or counter insurgency capacity.  I think the second point which you raised is the question of command and control, because one must bear in mind at the end of the day that this was a very volatile climate within military forces were being employed.  There were also other forces available and I think that the one was mentioned earlier on by the legal counsel there, that could have played the role of protection.  It could have been 121 Battalion, it could have been the police, it could have been the standard SADF citizen force unit, but a necessity was felt to create a force over and above that and that is why I have stressed one has to look at the political and military objectives of this force in relationship to those other agencies one had at one's disposal, before one can actually can - can really comment on it, so I would say it's very difficult - certainly the principles of counter revolution, counter insurgency warfare perpetually argue for unity of effort for the legitimacy of the operation and creating a force in which the command and control is shaky and vague at best, does become problematic, particularly when it is in support of a partisan objective.

MR WILLS: Yes, thank you.  Now another aspect of control that concerns me is that we've heard the evidence of a couple of the so-called hit squad operatives and a number of their hits were directed not against guerillas per se, or not against what my learned friend, Mr Maritz, referred to as insurgents, but against people who occupied positions in civil society, for example, trade union leaders.  Now is that - does that correlate with the theories as we've

MR WILLS: /discussed?

MR WILLS: 2A discussed?

WITNESS:   It doesn't, bar some counter insurgency theories have made allowance for a small area of, I suppose one can call it discretion, in which beyond the law you could actually utilise it, but generally your principles of counter insurgency and counter revolutionary warfare and I think it has been spelt out in the principles that were enunciated from Pops Fraser, states quite emphatically that support of the population, the legitimacy of the operation and a good image of the armed forces amongst our local population is essential and that you do not engage in those type of activities.

MR WILLS: Now should the system have gone wrong and I'm emphasising on the control aspect.  Let me paint a scenario here, is that if taking for granted these people were trained and they were under the command and control of the persons who trained them, like in the SANDF, for argument's sake, should they - should the individual operatives veer from the tasks given to them by the higher command let's take out civilian leaders, would there not a be an obligation on the part of the hierarchy to investigate those instances in order to prevent the reoccurrence?

WITNESS:   To investigate and where necessary punished through appropriate mechanisms, like the Military Disciplinary Code, regimental disciplinary measures, it would be.

MR WILLS: And obviously this - these processes are set in motion specifically to keep the individuals who are acting - acting in a disciplined and military manner, not so?

WITNESS:   It's to ensure the legitimacy and integrity of command, yes.

MR WILLS: Now at the time and I think we're talking about a

MR WILLS: /period

MR WILLS: 2A period roughly between let's say the end of 1986 and up until 1993 and we're talking about KwaZulu-Natal, do you have any information as regards the extent of the deployment of liberation insurgents in the area at that time?  Was it rife with insurgents or was it more - was it a military - was it military stage or were we still at a political stage, if one looks at the principles of guerilla warfare?

WITNESS:   It was most probably and, I mean this is generally the reading that comes out and if one looks at the events that were taking place, it was most probably at a stage where Stage 1, the classic Stage 1 of political mobilisation was maturing and elements of armed actions, what's normally called armed propaganda, hitting strategic installations, for instance for political value, were being pursued.  There had been a number of skirmishes report and more particularly in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal of a military nature, but from the reading of the situation and from the available evidence, we don't know what evidence is not available, it certainly wasn't a fully blown military confrontation, which would correspond to Stages 3 and 4 of classis counter insurgency warfare.

MR WILLS: Thank you.  A final point concerns the issue which you have indicated before is a, to use my word, a contentious issue in counter insurgency warfare and that concerns the issue of keeping within the law and to avoid actual, what can be described as terror attacks is, I mean, very loosely, is it not so and I speak here as a layman, that in fact that is in fact often very problematical in scenarios like this.  I think that what have been described by the previous witnesses are - can

MR WILLS: /only

MR WILLS: 2A only be described as without the law and also as being effectively terror attacks?

WITNESS:   I think many of your counter insurgency strategists acknowledge the danger of going beyond the wall precisely because once you actually transgress the law, you can land up in a spiralling situation and which is very difficult to control, both the process and the forces at your disposal.

MR WILLS: Yes.  Sorry, this is the last question.  Another part of the evidence which has come out over the last few days is that there was on the one hand an instruction given to the trainees to avoid the police and to keep the - their training covert.  There's also been a limited amount of evidence which suggests that the - there were active measures taken by various authorities to cover up the operations that had already been executed.  Now surely this would impact upon the discipline of the operatives themselves and essentially allow them to operate out of any form of control and outside the scope of what could be considered any lawful engagement?

WITNESS:   It certainly would give any military person considerable licence and latitude if you don't have that type of oversight.

MR WILLS: Thank you.  No further questions.

MR WILLS: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS

MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, De Jager on record.  We're not going to plough the same land as Mr Maritz.  We associate ourselves with the cross-examination of Mr Maritz and in order not to hand this microphone manually from man to man and woman to woman, may I also put on record that that is the general attitude of us all.