Amnesty Hearings — Pietersburg — 1997-07-02

A J G ERWEE: Mr Chairperson, I am not quite familiar with the area there, so I would have to estimate. It might be wrong, but I think from Alldays to the place where the incident took place, is about 50, 60 kilometres. Perhaps I am not exaggerating too much.  I was there much on the particular day of the incident and I never went back to that area.

UNKNOWN: You were busy mentioning the whistle and whilst you were talking about the role of the Defence Force, what were the underlying motives for the presence of the Defence Force there?

A J G ERWEE: They were supporting us and the South African Police had certain needs which could not be met by the South African Police, so the Defence Force helped us there.  The Defence Force who were used to moving around in the area, the presence of the Defence Force there would mean that suspicion would not be aroused as much as people would be used to seeing them in the area.  They also boosted our presence in the sense that we would be able to stage a show of force, upon confronting these insurgents.  Because a Defence Force patrol consisted of many more components than just an ordinary police patrol with three or four members.  The Defence Force vehicles and Defence Force uniforms, we believed, would make a greater impact on these insurgents to convince them that they should surrender.

UNKNOWN: In other words, to discourage them from resisting arrest upon seeing this great overwhelming show of force?

A J G ERWEE: Yes, I believed it would be a dynamic deterrent to prevent them from turning violent.

UNKNOWN: And how would the Defence Force officers be dressed, or the troops?

A J G ERWEE: All the Defence Force members were instructed to wear their uniforms and that is what in fact happened.  In fact, I can mention that the security force members, which included myself, I wore civilian dress. I think one or two of the security branch people wore camouflage uniform, but that was not part of the planning.

UNKNOWN: Now you are entirely certain that on the day of the 9th you did not do any rehearsal of this incident, for the reasons you have already mentioned.

A J G ERWEE: Correct, yes.  And then also, I knew from experience, that to stage such a rehearsal days and weeks beforehand, actually was not always that effective, because you lacked the adrenalin that was present on the day itself.  That's why we decided to have the rehearsal on the day of the event itself, so that everything was fresh in the minds of the members involved, so that nothing should go wrong and that we could perform the arrests with a minimum of violence.

UNKNOWN: Now what about Mr Matthews Sehlwana?  Now as far as you are concerned, did you assume that somebody else had told Matthews Sehlwana or did you tell him yourself?  How was he made aware of all these planning issues, in which he was involved?

A J G ERWEE: Chairperson, Matthews Sehlwana was the key figure, according to me, in this whole incident.  Matthews was the most important figure at that stage, because at that stage I knew that it was no longer a calculated risk, but a real and major risk.
	That is why on the night or the evening of the 9th I informed Sehlwana and I told him that there were enough people present and that should he develop a psychosis of fear during that night, or early the next morning, that he would be able to be reassured by the presence of his colleagues and that we were there to support him.  So on the night of the 9th he was informed that he should not be worried, that he should pick up the people and start moving, that he shouldn't worry and that there were people placed all along the route and there were people to help him should something go wrong.  He was told that the window had been removed.  We first planned to make the window so that it couldn't close, but eventually we decided to just remove it altogether. I can't remember exactly who removed that window, but I remember that it was removed.

UNKNOWN: Did you tell him why that was being done?

A J G ERWEE: He knew. He knew that we would throw a teargas-grenade through that window to cause confusion, to give him some time to escape and to reduce the risk of him being kept hostage or any other kind of danger, for him. I think that, I trusted that Sehlwana had enough confidence in his colleagues and knew that we wouldn't leave him in the lurch.

UNKNOWN: Now we now have arrived at the morning of the 10th of July 1986.  You just said when it started becoming light, you arrived at the place already determined beforehand?

A J G ERWEE: No. No, it was before daybreak, it was still dark and we lay in the bushes for about an hour, waiting for the sun to rise, so that we could familiarise ourselves with the scene, because most of us had never been there before.  It was our first time there.  Now as soon as day broke, Capt Bourne and myself walked down to the low-water bridge and the low-water bridge is then from the Botswana side which ... (intervention).

UNKNOWN: Can I show you a copy of Exhibit C?  You might find it easier to identify certain points, on the basis of Exhibit C.  Is there one in front of you?  It is a sketch which looks like this.  According to the sketch there is an arrow which indicates the movement of the Kombi, more or less from west to east and you will see the other two points of the compass north and south on your right side.  Now we are not going to enter into a dispute as to where exactly where south, north and east are, but as general plan you can refer to this little map, to indicate directions.

A J G ERWEE: Thank you, Chairperson. I have the map here and I am satisfied with the crossing and the direction Capt Bourne and myself ... (intervention).

UNKNOWN: You will see it is a little low-water bridge and there is a cement, piece of cement there, the surface, and there is a sharp dip and then a very sharp incline again on the other side.  But we then measured the distance from the bridge, more or less from where the Casspir would have to be standing on the road, on the north.
	Thereafter we got into the bus.  Capt Bourne drove from west to east along the route and applied the brakes very sharply right on this cement surface already mentioned and we made a note of the fact where the bus came to a stop.

UNKNOWN: Did he get out and run from the bus?

A J G ERWEE: No, not at that stage.  After we had taken note of exactly where the bus had stopped, we measured out a further 10 to 15 paces where the Casspir would have to be standing on the ... (intervention).

UNKNOWN: Is this to the east where the bus would come to a halt?