Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-19

MR VISSER: And you also testified that Shabalala, by virtue of what had happened there at the vehicle, could have made the inference that Ndaba was not being arrested?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, correct.

JOHN WILLS: Chairperson, I must object, that's a leading - giving an answer in a crucial aspect of the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you are putting ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: That was his evidence, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That's putting thoughts into the mind of the witness, isn't it?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, I just say that he has already given that evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, he hasn't.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, he has given that evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: No the evidence he's given is as far as my notes go, is that he feared that Shabalala would tell the ANC if he were released that he had been with Ndaba.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, earlier he said that he didn't think - his evidence was that Shabalala could have thought that Ndaba was not arrested at the same time.  That was his clear evidence, Mr Chairman.  But may I continue?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.

H J P BOTHA: I realised that Shabalala's arrest had the potential to compromise our Intelligence operation.  As I said should he be released and should he report to the ANC that Ndaba had been arrested with him, that would place the spot light on Ndaba in that he would then have to explain why he was released.

MR VISSER: Yes, I think that is a repetition.  You have already said that there would also then be a suspicion that he had led the police to Shabalala.  Continue.

H J P BOTHA: In these circumstances, I thought that it was too risky to release Shabalala and to place Ndaba back into the Intelligence operation.  At that stage...

CHAIRPERSON: Now what was decided, what you thought was proper to do with Ndaba?

H J P BOTHA: At that stage the thought did arise in my mind that Shabalala should possibly be eliminated.  Chairperson, at that stage in 1990, we had already performed many similar operations and depending on the circumstances you could anticipate what the consequences of a particular action would be and the thought of the possible elimination of Shabalala was there in my mind.  At the safe-house I continued to speak to Ndaba to try to make a plan to place him back in the operation safely.  His suggestion was that he should stay with me in the safe-house until Tuesday the 10th of July 1990.  On that day, he arranged for a fall back date with Shabalala, should one of them not attend the meeting of the Saturday the 7th of July 1990.  This arrangement, this pre-existing arrangement suited me.  I agreed with the suggestion because it would give us time to perhaps monitor the situation an to try and ascertain whether there were any danger signals for Ndaba as a result of the arrest of Shabalala and his own arrest on that Saturday morning.  The plan which we formulated was that Ndaba after that Tuesday would report to the ANC that Shabalala had not attended either of the meetings and that he suspected that there could possibly be problems.  In my view that would take the focus away from him and in the meantime he would have the opportunity to ascertain whether he was safe or not.  The plan presupposed that Shabalala should not be released, in other words that we would have to detain him for an unlimited period or to eliminate him.
	I once again informed Gen Steyn of the latest developments and he supported the proposition or the proposal.

MR VISSER: You can continue a little bit faster.

H J P BOTHA: It should be noted that certain members of Unit C 20 of the Security Branch Head Office were at that stage coincidentally busy doing certain photograph identifications and interrogation of 4 other informers at the safe-house in Verulam.  Chairperson, just for your information, the C20 Unit, their specific task was to travel throughout the country and they went to terrorists and got them to identify certain things by means of photographs and we used them specifically in Natal.

CHAIRPERSON: What were they taking photographs of?

H J P BOTHA: No, photographs, these photographs came from the photograph albums and they were of terrorists who had left the country for military training and they then identified these people.  We used them in Natal from time to time when we'd arrested a terrorist in a grab action or in a recruitment drive and they came over to our side and they worked for us and we would then do that identification with them.

MR VISSER: Continue.

H J P BOTHA: On Sunday the 8th July 1990, I gave permission to the members of C 20 to question and talk to Ndaba and to question him relating to their research.

MR VISSER: You're talking of Mr Ndaba.  What was the position as far as Shabalala was concerned?

H J P BOTHA: I think they also spoke to Shabalala the next day after having spoken to Ndaba.

MR VISSER: I interrupted you, we are on Sunday the 8th of July, why did you give permission for them to speak to him?

H J P BOTHA: As a result of his high profile which he had in the MK structures, it would be advantageous for their research to also get certain background information from him.  However, I want to make it clear that at no stage did they have any knowledge of any unlawfulness which had been committed by members of the Durban Security Branch or any unlawful acts which would have been committed relating to either Ndaba or Shabalala and the members of C 20 to whom I'm referring, were W/O van der Berg, Lt Frank McCarter, M-C-C-A-R-T-E-R.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 35 at the bottom of it, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much.

H J P BOTHA: Capt van Dyk and W/O Roeland.  It's important to realise that whilst the ANC were busy in a negotiations process with the National Party, who were the governing party of the day, the ANC still propagated the armed struggle and violence and they also acted on it.  For convenience the following extracts are quoted from Seshaba the ANC's mouthpiece, Seshaba of March 1990, Armed Struggle
"White South Africa must accept the plain fact that the ANC will not suspend to say nothing of abandoning the armed struggle until the Government shows it's willingness to surrender the monopoly of political power and to negotiate directly and in good faith with the acknowledged black leaders.  The renunciation of violence by either the government on the ANC should not be a precondition to, but the result of, negotiation."
And I quote from Seshaba April 1990:
"The issue of negotiations as far as the ANC is concerned, is not to be isolated from the mainstream struggle to destroy apartheid.  It is but another terrain of a number of interrelated terrains of our struggle, namely the activities of the ANC underground inside South Africa, mass protest action, mobilisation of the international community against the apartheid regime and the armed struggle.  Negotiations do not replace any of these and must, until otherwise decided in the course of negotiations, go simultaneously with all these other areas of struggle."
Statistics that I believe are correct, indicate the following in respect of armed attacks by the ANC SACP Alliance in the Port Natal area.  During 1990 there were 26 such incidents and in 1991 there were 31, 1992 there were 50 and in 1993 there were 39 incidents.

MR VISSER: So the point is that it didn't decrease as a result of negotiations?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Could we please return to Mr Ndaba?