Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

MR DU TOIT: Just briefly, although again it's not in my view relevant in detail, what is the - in paragraph 100 you just mention it.  Briefly what was your function as stratkom officer for this division, the Pietermaritzburg division?

WITNESS:   Okay, it's the strategy that was recently revealed by Paul Erasmus from the Security Branch.  It dealt with strategies that were sent down from head office, normally the Security Branch.  They weren't allowed to be sent out to our districts, the various districts in their entirety.  They had to be reworked and

MR DU TOIT: /reworded

MR DU TOIT: reworded before they were sent out for implementing.  They were usually between top secret and secret documents.

MR DU TOIT: Generally speaking what were the thoughts at this time within those circles on dealing with unrest?  You make three points by way of summary in your notes in paragraph 104.

WITNESS:   It boiled down to undeclared civil war between Inkatha/Government Security Forces and the ANC backed by the UDF.  I was taught to ... (incomplete - end of Side A, Tape 3)

MR DU TOIT: Now, in 104 you've also made notes in respect of certain thoughts.

WITNESS:   Yes, there were certain thoughts at the time with the unrest, was that not an inch of Natal was to go to the UDF/ANC irrespective of the costs;  that the creation of no-go areas provided a safe haven for Inkatha, and they then only had to protect themselves from attacks from outside the area.

MR DU TOIT: Is that the so-called clear and retain strategy that was born from Rhodesia?

WITNESS:   That is similar, yes.

MR DU TOIT: And then please proceed.

MR DU TOIT: "As a counter measure to the black solidarity that most of us learned to fear the violence was kept within the confines of Inkatha and the UDF.  The Security Forces sided with Inkatha, and this kept the focus away from the whites.  The violence would appear to be black on black."

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR DU TOIT: "The violence was suddenly pushed up in any given area.  In the case of the Trust Feeds the attacks by Inkatha on

MR DU TOIT: /"the fateful

MR DU TOIT: "the fateful night.  The effect was to weaken the opposition so that they gave way and the area was left in the hands of pro-Security Forces and pro-Inkatha or pro-Government people.  Houses of activists were set alight and attacked.  Here the special constables, as a third or auxiliary force, played an important role.  I refer to now, "Everyone is afraid, the changing face of policing in South Africa," a research document of the Catholic Institute for International Relations published in London in 1988.  A copy is annexure G."

MR DU TOIT: Now, what you are referring here, just to be brief, because the document is before the gentlemen, is that it would appear that the special constables were involved in violent incidents all over the country according to this document.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: At so-called flash points.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: The research document also refers to a clampdown on news.  Was it your experience that in the mid-80s there was indeed such a clampdown on news?

WITNESS:  Yes, there was.

MR DU TOIT: Would you share your views which you have set out in paragraph 108 with us please?

MR DU TOIT: "One must also look now at how disinformation and the clampdown on the media were used.  The average white South African male was sitting at home on a Saturday afternoon drinking beer and watching rugby, while the townships

MR DU TOIT: /"were ablaze

MR DU TOIT: "were ablaze with violence and unrest.  We were ordered to stop such unrest at all costs."

MR DU TOIT: The unrest situation was limited basically to the township areas, is that what you are saying, news-wise?

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Now, in paragraph 112, although I am not going to take you through the whole of the paragraph, at the trial you were questioned by Mr Justice Wilson on certain aspects, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, I was.

MR DU TOIT: Now, then you ended that discussion during your cross-examination by stating that,

MR DU TOIT: "The riots shattered the foundations of many families of the police."

MR DU TOIT: That's at the bottom of page 27.

MR DU TOIT: "It shattered the foundations of the South African Police as a whole."

MR DU TOIT: What do you mean by that, that the foundations were shattered as a whole?

WITNESS:   It ended up that many policemen lost their homes, lost their families, and it ended up that some of us ended up as arsonists and murderers.

MR DU TOIT: You're referring to the moral foundations of the force as an institution ... (intervention)

WITNESS:   Yes.

MR DU TOIT: ... now with hindsight.

WITNESS:   Yes, I am.

MR DU TOIT: And is it correct that you say that you then became prepared, as you saw it, to fight fire with fire?

WITNESS:   Yes, I was.

MR DU TOIT: And there would now be terror on the terrorists, as you see it?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: By the authorities.  That you say in paragraph 114.

MR DU TOIT: /---   Yes,

MR DU TOIT: ---   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: You have also studied the documents contained in annexure B, is that correct?

WITNESS:   I have.

MR DU TOIT: I do not intend dealing in detail with the whole document, but will, as requested by you, draw attention to certain of the important aspects.  Can I ask you to page to page 339 of annexure B.  This would be the manual or the notes, lectures also, available at the Divisional Headquarters.  That's a covering letter from head office addressed to senior people within all the sections of South Africa on a national basis, is that correct?

WITNESS:  Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: The document is described as secret.

WITNESS:   Yes, it is.

MR DU TOIT: And on page 344 the document is called, "Counter Measures Overflow of Violence into White Areas."  Is that correct?  On page 344.

WITNESS:   Yes, I've got it.

MR DU TOIT: Can I draw your attention more specifically to the next document on page 346, the translation would be a quelling or preventing of riots in a small rural black township.

WITNESS:   Yes, that's correct.

MR DU TOIT: May I ask you also to then page to the next page 347, and paragraph 4.  Now, I am translating.  It says, "The fact that members of a force are well known complicates clandestine operations."

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR DU TOIT: "Because all members of a force are well known on or in small places, and even their first names are known in many instances, it is usually necessary to make use of members from elsewhere to operate secretly in the area."  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that's correct.

MR DU TOIT: /"It again

MR DU TOIT: "It again has its drawbacks in that a stranger is immediately viewed with suspicion."

WITNESS:   That is right.

MR DU TOIT: Now, just to draw it through to your situation, in what vehicle did the special constables arrive in Trust Feed?

WITNESS:   They came with an unmarked kombi.

MR DU TOIT: What clothing were they wearing?

WITNESS:   They were dressed in civilian clothes.

MR DU TOIT: Were they known in the area?

WITNESS:   No, they were not.

MR DU TOIT: And where were they put in order not to arouse suspicion?

WITNESS:   They were posted at Mr Gabela's house, the Inkatha leader of the area.

MR DU TOIT: Now, from page 19, your typed 19, but 28 of Volume I, you go back to Trust Feed, is that correct?  You will see from paragraph 118.

WITNESS:   Yes, that's correct.

MR DU TOIT: You describe firstly the special constables as an auxiliary or third force.  You say that policing acquired a black face, and that black offensive power was added to the Riot Units, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: So when you came to Trust Feed you became the Chairperson of the Local Management Centre.

WITNESS:   Yes, I did.