Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, the State Security Council which got its instructions from President Botha - well we received instructions from the State Security Council  to stabilise by December '87, so I was trying to incorporate that order into this.  The December '86 instruction which we got from the State Security Council was an impossible time-frame for us to comply with.  And here I tried to obtain approval in principle for a plan which would lead to normalisation over a longer period.  I might add that even in terms of counter-revolutionary warfare, something like normalisation in 18 months is actually almost unheard of, it's a very short period of time, but we didn't have a lot of time.

MR KNOETZE: Then the purpose or objective that is in paragraph 4 on page 72, will you read that please? - I beg your pardon "The Ambit"

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 4 on page 72
"The plan was based on Xhosa national unity and pro-RSA resistance movements as it's infrastructure."
And then three possible ways of action are spelt out.

MR KNOETZE: Could you just comment about the implication of the words "three possible ways of action"?  Could one infer from that that you didn't mean to say that everything that you mentioned here as possibilities had to be carried out?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.  It would be impossible to actually carry out everything that was just sketched very broadly in this plan.  I simply gave a broad guideline or overview and that is why I called it an idea and not a plan which would contain real instructions and orders.

MR KNOETZE: On page 73, paragraph 5, you start with the background sketch.  Could you please read or summarise the background for the Committee?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  It deals with the revolutionary struggle and the problem areas as we experienced it here, and the purpose was to address these problem areas.  In paragraph (a) deals with the strong homogeneous population group resident in the Eastern Cape.  It had a long history as a nation, from resistance against the Zulus and the whites and the urge for self-determination was very deeply rooted in the Xhosa nation.  That was actually strengthened by these leadership or leader, leading figures that I referred to.  The black councils which existed at that time actually did not work, they were unsuccessful and that there had to be another structure in the face of that, as an alternative structure.
	We said a breeding ground was created for revolutionary soldiers in the Eastern Cape, and that left a vacuum, there was insufficient self-governance.  And the Xhosa people at that stage, there were simply too many structures of authority.  There was the RSA Central Government, the provincial authority, there were chiefs and there was a third level of authority as well.  And in a way there was also the revolutionary structure of authority which existed.  So there were far too many authorities.

MR KNOETZE: Would you like to comment on page 74, paragraph (d), about the inability to which you refer?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  In paragraph (d) I say that especially in the Ciskei, and the fact that they were not viable as a full independent country, that actually causes a problem for the RSA inasfar as its policy was concerned.  In other words, it was a visible sign that the policy hadn't worked.  In this State there was even more than latent instability, and of course that stimulated the revolution in this area.
	In paragraph (c), there I say that the Ciskei and Transkei are part of the Eastern Province and things were not very sound in the Eastern Province at that stage.  Then I say that in military terms the Eastern Cape should be seen as one theatre of war and should not be seen as three different military fronts.
	Paragraph (d), there I refer to the inability of the government and its instruments, especially at a regional level, to combat the escalating and worsening situation of unrest in the country and in the Eastern Cape.  And that let, in the Eastern Cape especially, to a growing feeling of defeatism, even amongst the whites.
	At the same time, in the mid-80's, there was an economic collapse or decline, Ford and other factories closed down in the Eastern Cape.  And as I've put it here, there as a whole aura of bankruptcy in the area, there was no feeling that there was a future, that there was something permanent here.  There was a lack of confidence, whites moved away, the property market started collapsing.  And I think the people today would be able to remember, the people who lived here at that time will actually remember how bad it was.
	In paragraph (e), what I say is that we tried to activate resistance movements as a front to counter the revolutionary forces and we tried to keep this alive, the resistance movements which we tried to foster amongst the moderate blacks, but it didn't actually work.  They were intimidated and infiltrated by the enemy.  And then, it was really a disturbing thing for us to try and fight this political war in the Eastern Cape, because we didn't have very good dynamic National Party politicians in this area to help us fight this war.  I just felt that I actually wanted to convey this to my chief.  
	So these factors in paragraph 6, well I said that they were eroding the prosperity and progress in the Eastern Cape and that like with an iceberg, it's the portion which is not visible, which is massive and the full extent of that, I don't think that was truly familiar and known to the people who had to make decisions.
	Perhaps optimistically I say the situation is serious but not entirely lost and that things look darker than they actually are.  Then I mention that aspect of the winning recipe and that we were trying to deal with the matter or the issue.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Paragraph 7 on page 75, you start detailing the personalities, namely the people who knew of this or who were partially aware of it.  You've already to that.  Then in 76 you refer to the Transkei and you outline the various personalities.  Do you just want to deal with each of these personalities briefly.