Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-10

RONNIE KASRILS: Thanks Chairperson.  I was actually the editor of Dawn in the camps.  That's not my style I daresay, I left the Angolan camps in 1980 and I think you are quoting from a couple of years later, but Dawn had an editorial and it had the articles and I can remember that particular article very well because I came back
to Angola from Lusaka or wherever and I came into one of our residences where Joe Slovo was arguing in a very lively debate with some of our combatants, people who were going through training who were referring to that, that particular issue of Dawn.  And it had given rise to a lively debate.  And most of the young people who had come through from the then Natal, and quite a number from the University, were very much that way inclined.  And Slovo and then others, I joined in as well, in a debate, a hot debate saying that no that is not the way. 
 So Mr Goosen we would correct, through debate, a particular point of view.  And when you say that surely this would be interpreted by combatants in a specific way and we quote from an article, a journal, you are not seeing the kind of debates that were taking place as a result of that article.  One of the most wonderful things about our training camps I very seldom had an experience that can compare was this intense intellectual debate that took place, and it was extremely healthy, and that is one of the ways in which we gave guidance to our combatants.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I just say that I think the point that is being missed is what we - I think what Mr Goosen is really arguing, whether we talk about Dawn or any other publication, or whether we talk about Radio Freedom, for example, what I think we are asking is, was it possible, at least possible that people who were not within
those camps, who were not intellectually motivated and trained as many of your combatants were, but if they were in the struggle on the ground and they heard this and read this, isn't there at least the possibility that they would assume that they could see the IFP as the enemy and therefore that the ANC, to that extent, contributed towards the conflict?

MR GOOSEN: Perhaps Mr Chairperson before Minister Modise, if I can just - Those journals were distributed inside the country.  The question that I asked earlier to Minister Mac Maharaj didn't relate to the interpretation of the generals, I am not asking, as it were, for your interpretation of that and your knowledge of what is intended by this particular publication, it has to do with what the soldier on the ground is interpreting that to mean.  And here I am also not referring to the trained combatant in the camps.  The trained combatant who undergoes significant political education and then is infiltrated into the country, I am talking about the mobilised mass and how they interpreted it.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Chairperson I find the question extremely abstract the way it is posed, as you pose it Chairperson, because it is saying, is it a possible, likely consequence?  Now the real issue is, it was distributed in the country, it was intended for combatants as part of the process of politicising them, as part of them understanding that political decisions are not arrived at by somebody just issuing an
edict.  You need to be politically conscious, you need to debate issues to decide what to do, and you only do that through debate and discussion and democracy.  That we were practising it in our ranks can't make it, by the remote possibility that somebody could have interpreted it that way, to then say that we were wrong to practice that democracy and debate in our ranks; to then say that we were seeking the same sort of culture in the masses who we were seeking to persuade and to understand their oppression so that they stand up and fight.  So in the abstract if I threw this thing onto the floor a whole set of consequences could flow from it.  
 Now if you want to put all the possible consequences that could flow from it I don't know where we are going with that exercise.  Because we are ready to accept responsibility but not in that remote abstract way.  Because our primary duty was to politicise our people about their conditions and to make them understand the need for disciplined struggle.  That's a fundamental obligation we hold.  And if that objective and that democracy that we practised in debate is to be nullified by one possible consequence I find it difficult to accept that that consequences responsibility I must accept.  It must be a reasonable and probable consequence for me to address it, not just a possible one, because otherwise I think that there is difficulty and I think it undercuts a fundamental proposition.  So that's my difficulty.
 I am saying that if you want to put it in the abstract and say this could have been a consequence therefore you accept responsibility, I could say it glibly but we want to say very seriously when we accept responsibility we are accepting it in a very serious way.

CHAIRPERSON: ...my question was abstract, but I accept that it may be interpreted in that way.  Let me rephrase it then - in a moment, I want to clarify my question so that you can answer it.
 Is it not reasonable to assume that people who saw the ANC as their leader, as their liberator, which they did on the ground, and who know nothing or very little about the niceties of having a journal where people can debate issues, but actually read what they see as an authoritative word from the party that they look to, is it not a reasonable assumption that they will take what is there as gospel and not sit back and say well wait a minute, let's not take this too seriously because Kasrils and company are still debating it in the camps?   Let me put it more bluntly then to avoid being abstract, is it not reasonable to assume that people on the ground would read that and not wait for the next instalment but say well this must be what's in the mind of our leadership because these are the people who we look to to guide us?  That's all I am saying.

RONNIE KASRILS: Chair I have considered this a great deal and I must say the TRC process has been invaluable in making one
introspective in terms of the past and responsible in terms of the kind of people who would be applying for amnesty, you've referred to them, and I would agree that there is a great probability or possibility that the kind of person that you are referring to, whether it's from an issue of a journal or heard secondhand from friends in the township, that certainly it's very probable that there are individuals who wanted to follow MK, the ANC, who genuinely felt that we were exhorting them to do A, B or C.  We strove against tremendous odds and bannings and so on, the fact that our information couldn't get across and the document refers to that, we were extremely responsible in attempting, I mean it was our business to relay our policy to our people and our guidance, but obviously we are talking about a massive struggle, many decades, huge country, very unusual times, I would agree and Mac does as well, he's written this to me, certainly in terms of the probability that that could happen.  
 But we mustn't make the mistake of then, in terms of some of the questions asked earlier, the sort of statements of General Viljoen or so, look at that as the reason why the security forces then could see anybody as a target.  I think that's very important.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Kasrils.  Mr Goosen.