Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-06

ADV PRIOR: Did I understand your evidence that the Why Not bar had been, it was in your mind as the target for the car bomb that you were about to construct on your return to Durban from Botswana?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, specifically because I had something to do with the reconnaissance.

ADV PRIOR: By that stage, after you had spoken to Mr Ismail and the others and had received your training in car bomb manufacture, although your evidence is that you did not tell him anything about the identification of the target, at that stage in Botswana you knew that the car bomb would be placed at or near the Why Not bar.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct.  Unless there would have been a police presence that evening, or undue police presence, unusual police presence in the area.

ADV PRIOR: That you couldn't get there.

MR MCBRIDE: Well that I couldn't get there, yes, and that it was ...

ADV PRIOR: Did you at any stage say to Mr Ismail that the target selection had been complete and that an alternative target had been decided upon by yourself, other than the Natal Command objective, because that had fallen away.

MR MCBRIDE: That had happened at an earlier stage.  I mean, I think we went over Natal Command again.  I mean if on the occasion I went out the last time to Botswana and Rashid said look, I want you to fight your way into Natal Command, place the car bomb and retreat, I would have done that.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.  It's just that that stage, Easter, May/June, your overall Commander was still insisting that a purely military target was to be hit.

MR MCBRIDE: No, the difficulties were raised earlier on, before Easter already, as I've said.

ADV PRIOR: If you had already completed the target selection in your own mind - I just have difficulty with the evidence of Mr Ismail on this aspect, paragraph 4 of his affidavit in bundle A1, at page 76, that during that meeting in Botswana you had indicated to him that a number of possible targets frequented by off-duty Security Force members had been identified and you were then instructed to complete reconnaissance with regard to a final selection of target.

MR MCBRIDE: I can't recall the exact circumstances there, but I only had two days in which to purchase the vehicle, put everything together again.  Realistically there was no way I could conduct additional intelligence at that stage, impossible.

ADV PRIOR: My difficulty is, it seems that Mr Ismail certainly was not under the impression from you that a target had been finally selected.  He certainly left us with the impression, or me with the impression from his statement, that when you left Botswana you were to make a final reconnaissance, to complete your reconnaissance in order to finally select your target.

MR MCBRIDE: I think it's fairer to put that question to Rashid, not to me.  I had a few hours in which to put the operation together, almost an impossible task.

ADV PRIOR: Let's accept for the moment Why Not on your intelligence was a legitimate target, but equally so there was an appreciation that many, many civilians could have been killed or injured in that explosion.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, that's why I raised the issue.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.  And as we have heard in other hearings, simple military action always had to be finely tuned with the political objective, is that correct?  In other words, it had to achieve some political purpose or objective and it could not have been seen simply as random violence.  Would you agree with that statement?

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, it's armed propaganda.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.  The very fact that a car bomb would have been placed in the position that you placed it at the Why Not bar, would have had serious repercussions, not only nationally but also internationally.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Vis-a-vis the ANC.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And those were also within your contemplation.

MR MCBRIDE: Well I can only speculate at this stage what the political leadership had decided.  Do you want to hear my speculation?

ADV PRIOR: No, no, no, you've answered for purposes of my next question.
	Is there any reason why you did not raise this with Mr Ismail, that your target was in fact the particular Why Not bar in the Parade Hotel, there was a great chance of substantial civilian casualty and whether in the light of those specifics you still could go ahead?

MR MCBRIDE: No, I - if you read my first statement, if you recall it, that I read out, I did all my anguishing and discussions before I accepted recruitment.  I was asked - I was told that at some stage I'm going to be asked to get involved in operations where people, where the military or otherwise will get killed and that I may also die in the operations.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, I ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: Allow me to finish.  And it was then that all my anguishing and whatever problems I might have had where taking the decision from non-violence to violence was taken.  That's the understanding under which I came into Special Ops.  I cannot whenever it suits me, decide no, I've got some problems with this operation.  I was acting in a military situation.  I'm not suggesting either way that I was forced or undue pressure was put on me, I'm saying that I did all of those discussions about killing with myself before I entered Special Ops.

ADV PRIOR: Mr McBride, I hear you, my question is more specific than that.  On the information before us you joined MK Special Ops round about November 1985 ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: October.

ADV PRIOR: ... October 1985, and by June of 1986 you already had been heavily involved in many operations ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, Sir.

ADV PRIOR: ... which in effect was aimed at the power grid of the country at the time.

MR MCBRIDE: Well at least in two operations people died prior to that.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, but that was ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: And people were injured in the ...(indistinct) incident also.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, but the planting of a car bomb was now a very clear departure from the type of activity that you had been involved in, was it not?

MR MCBRIDE: I think the very nature of a car bomb indicates for itself what it's about.

ADV PRIOR: And also the identification of the target had now changed, to the extent that what had been originally ordered, an attack on Natal Command Headquarters of the Army base, was no longer possible, but an alternative target had been selected by yourself, which you said you'd already decided upon at the time that you were in Botswana, between the 6th and the 11th of June.  Is that correct?

MR MCBRIDE: As one of the possible targets, yes.

ADV PRIOR: My question is simply, bearing in mind that the impact that that particular action or operation would have had, here you had your overall Commander with you in Botswana, during the time that you were being trained to construct the car bomb, I would have thought that it would have been the easiest thing in the world to discuss with him whether the risk of substantial civilian casualty was still acceptable and in line with policy.

MR MCBRIDE: In answer to your question, Sir, I was aware of Kabwe policy before that day, I raised it again myself, what is the policy.  I'm sure ...(intervention)

JUDGE PILLAY: With whom did you raise it?

MR MCBRIDE: With Rashid, Sir.  I also - I'm sure that the political leadership to whom Rashid reported directly were aware of the operation that was going to take place, and who would have considered these consequences you now mention.

ADV PRIOR: Is it your evidence that only the Barn and the Why Not bar were frequented by large concentrations of off-duty Security Force personnel?

CHAIRPERSON: No, the evidence was that those are the two places that they did reconnaissance work on.  I don't think there was suggested that those were the only two places in the whole of Durban which were frequented by members of the Security Force.