Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1996-11-20

WITNESS:   If I could elaborate on that I would like to do that.  You see, it wasn't police policy at all to use these people for these kind of acts, but I think that many of these people went off on their own missions.  And there were many reason for that.  If I tell you that the first 300 special constables which we got, their conditions of service stated that they were entitled to take their firearms home.  On the first day we discharged 16 when they returned, and we then drove around trying to collect their firearms as a result of problems which they caused.  So we threw out - tried to use other methods to control these people.  The main reason why they came to us was to take over guard duties, to guard IFP leaders' homes, and also to man strongpoints.  When they started working with members on shifts, and forming part of the vehicle crew, I can see how Harrington perhaps went astray.  You see, we placed young policemen in positions of power, and in which they exercised control over about, say, 10 special constables.  And I believe that in some cases the special constables could also have constituted a threat for the policemen.  I might also mention that our command structure at the time was pathetic in the unit.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  So do you concede what I've said, that Riot Unit members operating with special constables engaged in very, very serious criminal acts such as the ones I have described during that period?

WITNESS:   I agree with you, but I must say that it wasn't police policy.  We weren't all like that.  I certainly wasn't like that, and I wasn't aware of these things.  But as a result of certain cases for which people were prosecuted I did take note of these things, so I can't deny it.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Of course you can't deny it, and we thank you for making that concession.  Constables Harrington, Erasmus, Madlala were convicted for that very thing.  They were driving around in a Riot Unit vehicle with special constables.  They picked up a passer-by.  They murdered him by strangling him with Constable Harrington or Constable Erasmus' belt, and once he was dead they then ordered a special constable to shoot the body with a shotgun, and then they tried to pretend that it had been an incident of unrest.  So it's impossible to deny that these things happened.

WITNESS:   I agree, Chairperson.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Now, you have tried to portray the role of the South African Police as being impartial, unbiased during the Seven Day War, and working as hard as possible to try and bring the unrest to an end.  That's the picture you've painted to us, or that's the picture that the submission that you read out painted to us.

WITNESS:   That is so, Chairperson.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Why then does the second part of your submission, the answers to Professor Aitchison's questions, why does it say that the South African Police were the subject of intense dislike and mistrust from the residents of the Edendale valley, which the submission refers to as the ANC/COSATU alliance for some reason?  How do you reconcile those two?  You were an impartial, hard-working force, and yet you were the subject of intense dislike and mistrust from one side.

WITNESS:   I don't want to delve in history now, but once again I am a policeman like all policeman, and from our college days we were told about the threat which the ANC constituted, and our training in riot control was focused on the onslaught against us from the ANC side.  That was the biggest threat at the time.  During the period, I think perhaps because the IFP were authorised, the indunas and the Amakhozi, they were legal organisations and institutions.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  (Inaudible) ... so were the ANC.  UDF, ANC, they were all legal organisations at the time of the Seven Day War.

WITNESS:   That is so.  I hear what you say.  The same question which you asked, namely why were the communities at Edendale so opposed to the police, that question I asked myself many times.  Maybe I was stupid, and maybe I was being naive, but, you know, through the years you pick up a lot of what's happening, and even things which I heard at this very Commission are things - I've learnt new things.  It's made it far more clear why the communities hated us so much.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  A couple more questions, Director.  Several witnesses have said that this event, this Seven Day War, so-called Seven Day War, was not a war at all, it was - one witness said it was a cleansing.  Another witness said it was an armed invasion from one side into another side.  Do you agree with that?

WITNESS:   Yes, I agree with that, because all the indictions regarding the attacks from Ashdown to Henley, all these happened on the borders of the UDF areas, although in areas such as Mpumuze, just above Ashdown, in that area Inkatha homes were also attacked.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  So do you agree that the overwhelming - the vast, vast majority of people killed, houses burned, property looted, were from - were non-Inkatha, ie, UDF areas?

WITNESS:  Yes, I agree with that.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Finally, Director, you said that the views that you were expressing here, now, were different from the submission that you made because you were there at the time and you knew what was going on.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Who wrote the submission that you presented?

WITNESS:  It was prepared by a group of people, and people's views differ, and that is why I would like to say that my opinions are my own personal opinions, and I would not like to pass them off as police prescriptions or police policy.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER: Thank you.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Director, I think many questions have been asked which I wanted to ask by my colleagues.  Just to follow up on Richard's question, which you have also conceded that the many places which were attacked and houses burned were the houses belonging to the UDF.  What kind of methodology did you use in dealing with this situation, because according to Mr Harrington's presentation it is said that when there was that situation the people who were always dealt with first were those who were defending themselves, that is UDF.  Would you concede to that?  Did you first deal with the attackers, and if you dealt with the attackers what did you do?  Did you disarm them when they attacked these areas, or you concentrated on the defenders?

WITNESS:   Harrington wasn't even there.  I don't think it was police policy to attack the defenders.  We should also bear in mind that it wasn't only attacks from IFP on UDF.  The police were also a target.  There were specific occasions at which I tried to deal with a group, such as the group walking through Indobo.  Whilst I was trying to defuse the situation I was shot at from behind.  So there are two sides to the story.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Let me ask you the question again.  From these police sources you say that some of the people who made presentations here they were giving the sources from the UDF side, and then from the South African Police sources it is said that the people who were always disarmed were the UDF people.  Did you ever disarm the Inkatha people?  If not, why?

WITNESS:   Yes, we did.  Inkatha persons were arrested - mostly arrested for this.  On one such an occasion we arrested at least 100 people at once.  I am not talking about the Seven Day War, I am talking about a period before that.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  I am concerned about the Seven Day War.  Did you ever during the Seven Day War disarm the Inkatha people?

WITNESS:   No, I didn't.  I don't know whether other policemen did so.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Why did you not do it?