Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — UNKNOWN

MR TIPP: In 1988 you then went to the Soviet Union where you underwent further training.  Is that correct?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: That is correct.

MR TIPP: Could you tell the Committee what that training comprised of?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: I went for training in intelligence on the main.

MR TIPP: Since then is it correct that you have been primarily involved in intelligence work?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: Yes it is correct.  When I left for Soviet Union I was going for a more advanced and specialised course because I was given, when I was in Angola, I was a member of the Department of Intelligence and Security.

MR TIPP: From 1988 until 1991 you operated in the frontline states and in 1991 you finally returned to South Africa.  Is that correct?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: That is correct.

MR TIPP: From then until 1994 or 1995 in fact, you worked for the ANC's Department of Intelligence and Security and in 1995 you transferred to the National Intelligence Agency.  Is that correct.

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: That is correct.

MR TIPP: Mr Beea could you tell the Committee about information that you had received prior to the 28th of March 1994 which had a bearing on the events of 28 March 1994?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: As Deputy Head of Intelligence in Gauteng in the Department of Intelligence and Security in the ANC one was tasked, or my primary task was to gather intelligence information and it is true and it is a fact that before 1994 one had sources in different political organisations, and as I say, my primary role was to gather information.  The sources from time to time would supply me with information to the effect that the African National Congress and Shell House, as was perceived by other political parties, as the attacked and this is information that was gathered over a period of time.

MR TIPP: Was there any conclusion as far as this information was concerned about what these groups were intent on doing?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: From 1993 onwards the information was very broad and as we - as time progressed and we were getting closer to the 1994 elections, our focus as an organ within DIS was more to - was to find information around what might happen.  What is it that other parties were planning to do as a way of trying to stop or disturb the process of election?

MR TIPP: Did the information ever become more specific?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: Yes, in 1994 I handled quite a few sources and one of these sources was strategically placed in a Committee that was central, in my mind, in planning if I may say so, as to how best could they disturb the elections in 1994.

MR TIPP: Yes, and were you told how best that could be done?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: The plan was not like a plan that was put down on paper.  The source would sketch a number of scenarios and we ourselves sketched a number of scenarios and a number of possibilities.  One information was that there was a possibility of people were looking at driving into Shell House at the underground, park their cars or trucks or whatever with explosives and at that critical time, through remotes, trigger that.  It was one of the ways in which it was broadly said that it was a possibility.  We were looking at the possibility of drive by shootings, just to shoot at - because people would stand outside Shell House, it was normal and those people, cars we thought would pass and they would just shoot at the entrance of Shell House just to scatter people or to - the mindset, just to deal with the set-up of the people.  The other possibilities were rockets, grenades all those things in total were scenarios that were sketched, but the source could not specifically say they were going to do this on this specific day, it wasn't said that way.

MR TIPP: All those scenarios were focused on one or other way of attacking Shell House, is that what you're saying?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: That's correct.

MR TIPP: And according to your source, who was going to be responsible.  No the specific people, but who was going to be responsible for this attack on Shell House?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: There was collaboration as far as we knew between right wing organisations and the Inkatha Freedom Party and at some point - it's just that I can't remember and put dates into perspective today - at some point information that we had, that I had was that one of the extreme right wing organisations took upon themselves to deal with the acts of violence, the bombings and all that and some other political parties took it upon themselves to spread disinformation so - and if I may be specific, the IFP's role then, as I was told, was to through disruptions in the townships, was to set the mood in the country and they would use the marches mainly to disrupt whatever process, to - they were targeting the polling stations.  They would go to the - simply because it was known, even in the townships, every time you saw a group of marchers with these traditional weapons, you would not know what it is that they're going to do, nobody would dare go an pass next to them, you'd run away and that was a known fact.  They were going to use that element to just create chaos and scatter people around so those are kinds of tactics that was agreed upon then.

MR TIPP: Mr Beea I want to be specific and go to the days preceding the 28th of March.  Can you tell the Committee briefly what information you received in those very few days before the march?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: The weekend before the 28th March I spoke to sources in the Alexandra hostels specifically and these sources had said that they were addressed by two key people in the IFP then, (indistinct) and the source made mention that although a plan was not clearly mapped out, the message then to the residents of the hostels was that the IFP must show the country, the world and the ANC in particular, that they are a force to be reckoned with.  As to what that specific, what that man specifically - I tried to source it out from the source, it was difficult, that's what the address - that's how they addressed residents in the hostel.

MR TIPP: You say in paragraph 3 of your Affidavit at page 88 that you conveyed certain information to the leadership of the ANC.

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: Sorry, what paragraph is that?

MR TIPP: Paragraph 3 on page 88, 88 your Affidavit.

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: That's correct.

MR TIPP: What information did you convey and to whom did you convey it?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: My immediate superior then was Faruk Timol(?).  I conveyed this information to him that there's a possibility of an attack on Shell House on the 28th of March because that information was gathered that there was going to be a march, but that march was going to be used by the IFP as a way of attacking Shell House and that is what I  had conveyed that there was that big possibility that Shell House could be under attack.

MR TIPP: Mr Beea I now want to move to the 28th of March 1994.  You detail in your Affidavit moving through from Alex, through Hillbrow, eventually coming to Shell House.  Can you briefly describe to the Committee the groups of IFP marchers that you referred to in paragraph 7 of your Affidavit, page 89, round about what time was this and what did you observe the groups doing?

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: Paragraph 7 you said?

MR TIPP: Yes.

COLSON TEBOGO BEEA: The groups that I'm referring to are groups that were passing in front of Shell House and every time they were opposite the entrance of Shell House they would stop for a bit and do some dances and do mock attacks, so they would run forward and just stop before they could put their foot on the platform, on the pavement of where Shell House starts and then they would go back and do that and go back and do that and go back and then pass on and then another group would come and do the same and another group would come and do the same, that type of - that's what I'm trying to explain.