Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-11

MR MARITZ: "Conservatism or text-book wisdom is fatal whether in battle, civil administration, psychological operations or political direction.  Initiative and ingenuity are vital."

MR MARITZ: ---   Correct.

MR MARITZ: "27. A government must not allow any signs of a developing pattern of revolution or spontaneous uprising to pass unheeded."

MR MARITZ: ---   Correct.

MR MARITZ: "28. The danger of complacency (i.e. refusal to recognise the true situation) before

MR MARITZ: /and during

MR MARITZ: 1B and during revolutionary war must be avoided."

MR MARITZ: ---   Correct.

MR MARITZ: And 29.,

MR MARITZ: "It is essential to identify the enemy exactly and then isolate him from the population."

MR MARITZ: ---   Correct.

MR MARITZ: Then 30. he says,

MR MARITZ: "The law must be adapted to each stage of the threat."

MR MARITZ: And this is very important.  To me, as a layman, he is saying here that to become attractive to your population, you must strive at all times to act within the law.  Do you agree with my interpretation as a layman?

WITNESS:   There are many different interpretations of that point and it harks back to the question of using violence as a long-term policy and I think that's why it's actually qualified.  So I think the point you're making now can be interpreted in different senses.  That at a certain stage of the counter-revolutionary struggle the legal provisions that you normally make available in a democracy will not be pertinent to the type of methods that you're actually adopting in what becomes a rather bitter and internecine struggle.  The law can be adapted in a much more coercive and authoritarian manner to enable your security forces to act effect against the insurgents they proceed and classic examples in this regard are state of emergency, extension of emergency powers to your security forces.  So the law is being adapted.  I think that's the key issue there.

MR MARITZ: Absolutely, and while I am about it, from what I can

MR MARITZ: /remember, having

MR MARITZ: 1B remember, having read of Thompson - you refer to Thompson on the Malaysian Wars.

WITNESS:   That's correct.

MR MARITZ: He expounds exactly the same principles.  He says even if you have to use draconian measures do it within the law, otherwise you're running a grave risk of defeating the whole purpose of the exercise.  So I agree with you on that score.  Do you agree with that?

WITNESS:   I agree.  I mean, I agree with the principle as it's enunciated there.

MR MARITZ: Yes.  And then he says in 31.,

MR MARITZ: "The government must be ready to conscript, direct and control labour."

MR MARITZ: And in 32. he says,

MR MARITZ: "In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces, preferably by previous international arrangements.  Internal boundaries within the country, administrative, police and armed forces must coincide."

MR MARITZ: Now, what he describes here, as I understand it, once again as a layman, is, inter alia, your references to the situation in Angola and Mozambique and to a lesser extent Lesotho, where this principle was, in fact, carried into practice.

WITNESS:   Just as a point of clarity, the principle being the recognition of the flexibility of borders.

MR MARITZ: Yes, he says,

MR MARITZ: "In the fight against insurgents territorial borders must be possible of being disregarded by government forces,

MR MARITZ: /preferably by

MR MARITZ: 1B preferably by previous international arrangements."

MR MARITZ: So that would coincide with what you have told the panel already on the strategies in regard to Angola and Mozambique more specifically.

WITNESS:   That's correct.  Just one point of clarity there though.  There's possibly and actually are many clashes with the interpretation of that principle in the international law, so one can read that principle theoretically, certainly, but in terms of legal arrangements, particularly international law, the right to preempt a strike for instance, it can admit to very, very different interpretations.  It's a somewhat glowing reference to the principle, I think, the way the phrase expounds it.

MR MARITZ: No, I appreciate that.  I think that any government would have to take cognisance of principles of international law and sail those waters to the best of its ability.  I appreciate that.  I have no quarrel with that at all.  Now, Doctor, having said all that, I want to just sketch a scenario, and that is this.  You've referred in your evidence to the liberation struggle in the erstwhile South West Africa, which then became Namibia.  Now, I'm going to give you a bit of background and possibly you know all this - hopefully you do.  You see, General Kat Liebenberg and, I think, to an extent, maybe I should put them on the same footing, General Geldenhuys as well, were both involved in the South African effort in the erstwhile South West Africa.  You are well aware of that?

WITNESS:   Yes, absolutely, in the 'seventies.

MR MARITZ: One of the difficulties they had is that, be it as part of the terrorist tactics, be it because chieftains

MR MARITZ: /were hostile

MR MARITZ: 1B were hostile to the insurgent and more friendly to the forces in place, that many of them became targets and many of them were indeed killed during that struggle.  You are aware of that?

WITNESS:   A number of figureheads were targeted.

MR MARITZ: Now, what they did then was to devise a strategy and they implemented it, whereby they also trained indigenous people to render protection to chieftains who were actually under threat, or who perceived themselves to be under threat.  Are you aware of that?

WITNESS:   Yes, it started with the Ovambo Home Guard.

MR MARITZ: That's right.  Now, when this request came to the then South African Government in regard to KwaZulu, it is no accident that General Malan, the then Minister, called upon General Kat Liebenberg to evaluate the situation and to propose a remedy, because of the experience gained in South West Africa.  Well, obviously you wouldn't know that or possibly you do know it, but you could accept it?

WITNESS:  It's consistent with their previous system.

MR MARITZ: Yes, now, getting to this problem that we have here and may I make two remarks?  For the purposes of this debate let us assume that there was a threat.  Let us assume that Dr Buthelezi was genuine or, can I use the word, bona fide in his belief that he was under threat.  That Dr Buthelezi was bona fide in his request for assistance and that the South African Government regarded it in that light.  If we make those assumptions for purposes of the debate.  Now, first of all, if one looks at the 200 Caprivi trainees, a component, some 30 of them, were trained at VIP bodyguards.  Now this is a force or training which is universally practised.  I think one sees

MR MARITZ: /it on television

MR MARITZ: 1B it on television.  High dignitaries are virtually shielded by humans in their public appearances.  There's nothing new about this.  Would you concede that?

WITNESS:   Certainly within the scenario you are painting I would, but there are many scenarios, but we can proceed with this scenario, certainly, with the scenario you are painting.

MR MARITZ: Yes.  And my instructions are, and this has always been my perception I must tell you, that the bodyguards that were trained as part of the 200 were, in fact, employed immediately when they got to KwaZulu/Natal for that purpose and primarily to protect the person of Dr Buthelezi, so they were the human shield concept which was employed here.  Would you agree with that so far?