Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-19

UNKNOWN: The head of region 1 was Mr Hyner Muller.

MR POTGIETER: And 4?

UNKNOWN: Corrie Eloffs(?) at one stage and he later died after he left us.

MR POTGIETER: And then who took over?

UNKNOWN: Joe Verster was in charge of region 4, and Hyner Muller to - that was a relief situation because we were not really concentrating on Angola.  We collected information for the Defence Force for special forces in case of them planning operations in that area because of the freedom of movement that we had in that area, but it was a low intensity region.

MR POTGIETER: But just to, I just want to make sure that I understand you.  In region 4, after Corrie Eloffs died you reported to Joe Verster who was the managing director of this CCB?

UNKNOWN: I can put it that my direct head in the period in the CCB I normally worked through Mr Hyner Muller.  He was at one stage the deputy of the CCB.

MR POTGIETER: Now just to round it off and pick up on the point that you've made in response to a question by Reverend Finca, the head of Ciskei Brigadier Gqozo stated in his testimony earlier today that he's got reason to believe that, to quote him, "you were playing cat and mouse with him", in other words you were feeding misinformation to him in order to create a situation or create the impression that there was a major threat, a major threatening invasion by
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the ANC and the alliance to take over the Ciskei by force and in that fashion creating a resistance, a military resistance to the rolling mass action situation that prevailed at that stage, what would your comments be on that?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair thank you for the question.  I heard that accusation made by Mr Gqozo.  Nobody had to convince Mr Gqozo of a threat by the ANC.  He was convinced way beyond any information that we had to our availability because he had high level sources, a company called Multi Media Services which he contracted for a lot of money because he wasn't happy with the information that we provided him, it was too low level.  He was convinced about the threat against him, and I never had to convince him about that.  He wanted me to get better information about that.  He wasn't satisfied with our production, that's why he chased Mr Swanepoel away and it was only integration that saved me.  The thing that made Mr Gqozo unhappy, and I am not ashamed to say it today, I did undermine him in 1993.  I leaked a lot of information to the press and there's a lot of journalists who can testify to that.  Whenever I felt that there were pressures exerted on the Defence Force to do things that were not correct, which were not in step with the democratisation process, you can go and ask Andrew Trench, Patrick Goodenough, even - I can't remember her surname now, Louise Flanagan, I told them about the formation of self-defence units for the ADM. I gave them evidence.  The agreement between us was that they would publish my name in the articles so that I would be protected from being a suspect.  I was then tasked by Brigadier Gqozo to investigate the origin of this leak fortunately.  I later EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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admitted this and there was a newspaper article about this, and I am sure Brigadier Gqozo must hate me for that because I wasn't willing in 1993 to do anything that is not in line with the democratisation process.  
 And he wanted us to establish, the Defence Force to establish something like an Inkatha, or something similar to it.  They wanted to train young boys to protect the headmen because the headmen were being attacked.  Myself and General van der Bank strategised for a long time how to go around this because we know once we train people like that, once we issue them with weapons it's going to become an uncontrollable situation and the fingers are going to be pointing back at us.  Then we agreed to go back to him with a recommendation that we establish Ciskei Defence Force Auxiliary Services, "Hulpdiens", that is a legal system in terms of the Defence Act, you can have such a system, but I was still not happy with the (...indistinct), so before the first people finished their training I called (...indistinct) Patrick Goodenough and Andrew Trench and I told them and they made a big write-up about it.  It's available if you want to do a bit of research.

MR POTGIETER: I just want to finish before I allow Reverend Finca to carry on.  Did you ever allege to anybody that you were working, whilst you were in the Ciskei you were working for the South African authorities and you were manipulating, one of your tasks was to manipulate Brigadier Gqozo?

UNKNOWN: Ja.  I know Mr Chair, I know exactly what you are referring to, it is a test that Jean Ragool failed.  She came to me many times as a peace worker or somebody belonging to Nim collecting information about violence, and
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I assisted her without the knowledge of Brigadier Gqozo because if you mentioned a few names of Brigadier Gqozo he would turn red.  One of them was Andrew Trench, Louise Flanagan, Jean Ragool(?).  We had a very informal chat and what I mentioned to her is that I never broke my old friendships to specific people and what was eventually published in the newspapers were a story, which I believe made her a few rand, it was sensational that I was still connected to the South African Defence Force.  I invite anybody to go and trace any record anywhere and in future this Truth Commission will sit for months, years maybe and the truth will come out.  I was not connected in any way.  I never received a cent of money from the South African Defence Force after I left in 1991.

MR POTGIETER: Thank you Colonel.  Reverend Finca.

BONGANI FINCA: Chairperson I just will raise one question, but before I do so I would like to just find out Mr Nel whether you would be prepared to sit down with the Commission for a longer period of discussions?  We are amazed, not that we were not aware of it, at the amount of wealth of information that you have which is essential for us, which needs to underget this process of reconciliation.  Without that information statements of apologies, no matter how well meaning they may be, as I said to Brigadier Gqozo remain hollow.  We need to go to the roots of this thing, expose it for the world to know so that the victims can have some peace of mind.  I would like to find out if you would be able to afford us a period for an in-depth inquiry with the Commissioners on this matter?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair, Reverend I have no problem, I have no objection.  I am at this stage also involved in the De
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Oliviera Commission, assisting that side, so if there is anything that I can help to clear up, questions that you have, maybe I will have to apply for a witness protection plan after this but.....

BONGANI FINCA: Okay, definitely we will want to grant that.  You testified under the pseudonym Derek Louw in a Commission so you say, can you please just explain what that Commission was?

UNKNOWN: That was the Webster Commission Sir.

BONGANI FINCA: The Webster?

UNKNOWN: The inquiry into the death of Dr David Webster, yes.

BONGANI FINCA: Were you involved in any way in that....

UNKNOWN: I was called Mr Chair to testify in that Commission.  If I can remember correctly it was in 1993 because I was Intelligence Officer and documents that were available to the Webster investigating team indicated a name, David Webster on that, and I admitted that that was a document that I had in my possession while I was a member of the CCB and I went and testified there what the origin of that document was, but unfortunately I have testified in camera because I was also conveying some other information to them, assisting them.  I feel quite proud about my participation.