Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

UNKNOWN: I think it should be appreciated here, that APLA was operating under dire conditions.  Communication was not as perfect as the communication was for the apartheid regime. Because they controlled every territory of the country. They controlled the communication systems.  Now APLA had to operate on two plains, in exile and in the country. Sometimes instructions or communication would take days before it reached its destination.  And then there was also the question of an uneven development. We indicated earlier on that mass mobilisation was part of the people's war. Mass organisation was part of the people's war.  So it is obvious therefore, that in the process of educating and training and mobilisation, there are those people who will benefit more than others in terms of sequence and time.  So that there are those people, therefore, who will be better developed than others.  We do not have training camps in the country.  What training camps that we had in this country, were such that we were running the gauntlet of being observed by the security system. So there are those people, therefore, who were trained not outside in Yugoslavia as the commander has already said, but they were trained inside the country.  So the relayed system of training therefore, had its imperfections.  And it must be appreciated, therefore, that these are the conditions that we had to operate in.  Consequently you will find, therefore, that from time to time there will be people who have enough and adequate information and there will be people who do not have adequate information.  What does this mean therefore?  It simply means that if you have adequate information about any situation, whatsoever, then the likelihood is that you are going to make correct decisions or adequate decisions. But if you have inadequate information about any situation, not only in war, but any situation, even the kitchen, the likelihood is that your decisions are not going to be effective or maybe inadequate, maybe wrong.  So this therefore really puts the whole situation in perspective.
 Let us not assume here that the communication system was so squeaky-clean that communication simply went through without any hitches. And talking about hitches, is actually an understatement.  We had tempestuous times in our communication systems, and there were communication breakdowns and stuff like that.  
 But this does not remove the fact that the intention was to have a squeaky-clean organisational structure.  The intention was that every communication from the political leadership through the political commissar, through to the commander, and the operatives on the ground, the intention was that this communication must reach its final destination as intact as it was when it was originally sent out.
 So that now your questions therefore, must have these assumptions, you must have these assumptions at the back of your mind.  Thank you.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you.  Alex, can you indulge me for a bit longer?

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue, Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much.  I asked the questions precisely for that reason, because in the August submission, 1996, of the PAC leadership, the first presentation of the Truth Commission, at page 7 of that submission and I just want to read a passage of that. I am not sure that you have the copy before you.  Let me read a passage of that and then formulate the question thereafter. It reads
"A new pattern arose in the 1990s where civilians within the White community were attacked. In the nature of guerilla war, which is unlike conventional war, detailed plans could not be made from Dar-es-Salaam.  The actual targets were decided by local commanders.  We also found that internally trained cadres could mount many operations without early detection and arrest.  This advantage had a disadvantage.  In the militarised environment in our country in the 1990s, in the face of Third Force violence against our people in vigils, in places of worship and in trains and taxis, internally based operatives often made errors that APLA had earlier avoided.  There was little political work done, unlike in the camps abroad. These are the causes of the departures in the 1990s, which, we as political leaders who declared war, must and do take responsibility for.  Even if war itself was forced upon us by the aggressor, the upholders of White domination."
Now the point I want to ask you this, I think you have indicated that certainly we are not operating and you were not operating in a perfect environment, where lines of communication were such that you could maintain them without detection and there was no difficulties with that.  We accept that.
 But it is apparent from this passage, PAC leadership submission to the Truth Commission, that the lack of political training, which is understandable in the circumstances, problems with the conduct of operations in a guerilla war, which is understandable in the circumstances, that the operations of the 1990s are described as departures, errors previously avoided, by APLA.
 That, unfortunately, contradicts the position that you adopted in your earlier statement this morning, where you specifically state that attacks like the St James Church attack, the attack on the Heidelberg Tavern and similar attacks which occurred in the 1990s, were specifically ordered and were within the knowledge of the APLA high command.  Is there a contradiction here between this submission and the position that you have put forward this morning?

BRIG MKHWANAZI: I would want to say that there is no necessary contradiction.  In the submission this morning it has been indicated that we were in the process of waging a people's war.  Now a people's war must definitely take into cognisance not only the ideal type of situation, but it must take into cognisance the environment in which the war itself is taking place.  In the August submission it is indicated there that not only the question of the success in internalisation of the struggle, was a factor, but also the increased militarisation that was taking place, even inside the country, where there was a lot of violence, mass violence against our people. Sometimes in their places of worship, I think it is said so in the August submission of 1996. Sometimes in funeral vigils, places of worship,  sometimes at taxis and also buses, their trains, et cetera.
 So now commanders who were the people who took the decisions on the targets, because targets could never have been spelt out, way out from Dar-es-Salaam.  The local commanders themselves did take into consideration some of these factors, and the impact that this would have had.
 Unfortunately I do not have the material right now.  In one of the incidents that occurred in the 1990s, the King William's Town Golf Club incident, you will find a situation wherein if you read the print media of the time, they would actually say that yes, this thing has been severely attacked, in certain parts of the media, but within the oppressed African communities, it was something that was seen to be very, very, very right because it was at the time when there was a lot of violence committed against ordinary people, innocent people, because these people had never undergone any training. They were never a threat to anyone, but they were just being massacred, senselessly.
 So I now want us to be able to integrate that aspect that there are those aspects of the environment of increasing violence, Third Force activities, as mentioned in the 1996 presentation. I think in Brig Mofokeng's presentation he did indicate that some of the activities were both of a - the nature of reprisal and also self-defence.  So I just wanted to bring in those elements.