Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-19

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, upon various occasions, Mr Mbotoli flew up to Pretoria, we covered the costs of his travel and his accommodation.  On a regular basis, he provided information and it appeared from this information that he received very good feedback from the Transkei and on a certain day, I can't recall the exact date, he informed me, that is Mr Mbotoli, that a Colonel Duli wanted to speak to me urgently.  Previously I had heard of this Colonel Duli, however, I had never met him.  Nonetheless I agreed to meet with him and this meeting was arranged at the Jan Smuts Holiday Inn where Colonel Duli and another coloured man was introduced to me by Mr Mbotoli.  At the same time approximately, I contacted Commandant Nieuwoudt and made enquiries about Colonel Duli and Mr Nieuwoudt, who was involved in the Transkei at that stage, I asked him about Colonel Duli and he told me that Duli was on our side and this on our side, indicates in that language that he was favourably inclined towards the government and governmental forces and that it was safe to negotiate with him and that is what I did.  When I saw Colonel Duli during this meeting, there was a coloured man with him as his bodyguard.  Colonel Duli told me that he had a shopping list and a shopping list within that context, military speaking, would be a list of weaponry or military equipment which would be required for some or other task, and he told me that he required military weapons for a coup d'etat in the Transkei.  The purpose of this coup d'etat was once again to topple Gen Holomisa and then to appoint Kaiser Matanzima.  This shopping list or list included assault weapons, handgrenades, machine guns, gun grenades, ammunition for all these weapons, 60 mm mortars, 82 mm mortars and mortar bombs of various calibre, anti-tank weapons with launchers and missiles, demolition chargers and radio contact equipment.  I would just like to say that initially he did not have the radio equipment on his list and I made enquiries as to whether or not he would require it and he said that it would be acceptable if I could obtain this equipment.  This weaponry and equipment was obtained in December 1992, I see that the date has been indicated as 1990, but I can't recall with certainty what the exact date was.

MR HATTINGH: So you provided the weapons.  Where did you obtain the weapons?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Chairperson, these weapons came from the weapons which Vlakplaas had at its disposal, which were held at Meken, where we had two shipping containers.  The weapons came from the members' own arsenals which were in their possession and I also fetched some of Vlakplaas' weapons at the Police College which was under the control of Major Beneke.

MR HATTINGH: Would this indicate the weapons which came from Namibia originally to Vlakplaas and then found their way to the Police College?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You then delivered the weapons?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, I provided these weapons to Duli at a small town not far from the Transkeian border, I think it was Maclear, I am not quite certain about that.  During my first meeting with Colonel Duli at the Holiday Inn, I asked him on whose behalf he was acting and in this regard, I wanted to know specifically whether he was acting on behalf of the SAP Intelligence Services or the SA Defence Force.  He told me that he had the support of both Intelligence Services, and before my departure to the Eastern Cape, I told Gen Engelbrecht that Mbotoli had introduced me to Duli and that Duli and I would provide weaponry with the objective of a prospective coup d'etat.  However, he told me that I should be very cautious not to be caught.  Gen Engelbrecht, however, said that it was high time that a coup d'etat be executed on Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: How did you interpret that statement of his?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Chairperson, in all regards was he not only in support of it, he even advised me on it, and I had his unequivocal support in this attempt.

MR HATTINGH: Please continue.

EUGENE DE KOCK: Warrant Officer Nortje, Warrant Officer Snyman and Warrant Officer Vermeulen and I left for East London after that, where I met Colonel Duli.  Gradually I also introduced the other members to him.  Upon my arrival here in East London, he immediately requested four AK47 assault rifles with magazines and 16 handgrenades from me.

MR HATTINGH: Where did this meeting take place, can you recall?

EUGENE DE KOCK: It took at the Osner Hotel where Colonel Duli had rooms from where he launched his operation.

MR HATTINGH: Did you provide the weapons, ammunition and handgrenades?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, I did.  It did cause certain problems because all these weapons had been sealed, to be watertight and we had to remove the vehicle from which we retrieved it and break the seals and that meant that we could be spotted by the Police or the public.  I understood later from Nieuwoudt that these four AK47 rifles, magazines and handgrenades had been given to four of his agents who would take it to Umtata.  These four agents were actively involved, according to him, and they were kept as a sort of a surprise for whichever purpose he required.  Whether they were there as contingency agents should something go wrong, or whether he had something else in mind for them, is unknown to me.  Later that day, after the delivery of the arms, we heard by means of news reports that the coup d'etat had not been successful, and that Colonel Duli and various other members of the group who had participated, had been killed during this attempted coup.

MR HATTINGH: Where were you when you received this information?

EUGENE DE KOCK: I was still here in East London.  However, we used the news media and especially the radio in order to follow the events.

MR HATTINGH: When you heard about this, what happened next?

EUGENE DE KOCK: From my side, not much happened.  There wasn't anything else that I could do.  Warrant Officer Nortje, Snyman and Henk Vermeulen and I later during that afternoon, had a beer at the Osner Hotel and while we were there, Colonel Anton Nieuwoudt and Clive Brink arrived there coincidentally, and it was a coincidental meeting.  Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt was quite dejected and disappointed that the operation was not successful.  I then told Nieuwoudt that I had provided the weapons for this operation.

MR HATTINGH: As far as you knew, at that stage, was he aware that you had provided the weapons?

EUGENE DE KOCK: No  Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, so you were informing him about this at that stage?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes.  He then in turn told me that this coup attempt could not be seen as a failure, that it was not futile, that there were still four people with guns, magazines and grenades who would make a further attempt to topple the government of Holomisa.  The weaponry that he referred to was apparently the same weaponry that we have retrieved earlier that day for Duli.  Commandant Nieuwoudt mentioned this to me.

MR HATTINGH: After that, did you have any further contact with Nieuwoudt?