Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman, I want to add a small dimension here.  Perhaps to clarify your mind. First of all, I want to say that it must be understood the bottom line in all this discussion, is the fact that whatever action was done, and whatever the circumstances, the basic aim was a political motive to liberate. It was a block, whatever was done, was one block on the wall to climb to liberation. That is the basic line.
 Now on the question which you think there is or you perceive there is a contradiction.  There is no contradiction.  Because I don't have that copy. If you continue with that submission made by the political leadership at the time, it says in spite of all this understanding or whatever it is, the top leadership of the PAC accepts the responsibility.  Because the top leadership of the PAC had this organ which is APLA, which is answerable to the leadership of the PAC.  
 So it is not a fact that APLA was an unguided missile or a law unto themselves. Except the fact that they were faced face-to-face with the concrete conditions of a liberation war.  I thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry to pursue this, but I think this is very important.  We are talking about the 1990s, organisations which had been banned were now legal.  Communication must have been very, very difficult. I accept that entirely, but perhaps a little more improved as a direct result of that.  So let me put the question quite specifically. And I do so against the background of many hearings of many other political parties, where there does seem to be a major problem of political accountability and military operations, security operations.
 Now, let me put it this way.  The very incidence that you refer to on page 3, which I have read out, let's just confine ourselves to those, because they are quite specific; St James Church, King William's Town Golf Club, Heidelberg Tavern.  These were three specific incidence. In this case, was the political leadership at the highest level consulted prior to these attacks and if not, in the aftermath of these, did the political leadership have any objection, or did they condone these incidence, so that in the end APLA and PAC were actually indivisible and one.
 So it is quite specific.  Either they knew or they didn't know. If they didn't know, when they did know, what was their reaction.  Because one of our responsibilities as a Commission is to try to understand the final accountability of any of the events which took place during the conflict, for or against.  Thank you.

BRIG PHITLA: In the first instance, the structure of the Azanian People's Liberation Army ensured that APLA always remained accountable to the political leadership.  We mentioned it in the document, that top - on the structure of the APLA leadership was the military commission.  The members of the military commission were both members of the central committee and members of the high command. The commander of the Azanian People's Liberation Army was also a member of the central committee. Hence, we also gave him the title of being secretary of the defence, to give him a political title.  So that he remains politically accountable.
 Therefore, whenever the political leadership had anything or any bone to chew with the military leadership, it had a structure through which it could do this.
 Hence, also the leader of the party was called commander in chief of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, because he had the responsibility over the Azanian People's Liberation Army. Therefore, we remained accountable. 
 It should be realised also that in the Nineties, the PAC itself had another development as a result of the unbanning. We had parallel structures also in the organisation.  We should take note that there was this internal structure which initially became PERM, and it is this internal structure that later on also mostly became the leadership of the PAC.  So the Nineties were marred by a number of other developments.
 Let me put it on record as well, that the Azanian People's Liberation Army for a very long time was trying to resist to stop with the armed struggle.  But because we remained accountable to the political leadership, when an order was issued that we stopped, we stopped.  Therefore we had a daunting task of ensuring that our fighters accept this order from the political leadership, because we remained accountable.
 I think at this point in time it may be important for us not to say that APLA was law unto itself. Possibly we could say maybe the political leadership suffered from ineptitude, that may be quite a possibility.Now ineptitude has got nothing to do with one being a law unto himself.
 We have also indicated in this document that the high command was appointed by the political leadership.  Therefore, the leadership was at liberty to dismiss the high command if it felt the high command was now not in line in its political aims and objectives.
 So we remain accountable to the political leadership. Never at any stage did we become a law unto itself. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, you haven't answered the question.

UNKNOWN: I just want to add here to the answer.  When these attacks took place, before the attacks took place, the leadership, the political leadership was not informed.  It was only the military people who were aware of these attacks.  When the attacks took place, the people who claim were our publicity department. The political leadership inside the country, Bennie Alexander, for instance, (indistinct) when they were interviewed by the media, they denied this. I don't know whether maybe they are afraid because they are inside the country, if they claim they will be arrested, whatever.  But the military people claimed these attacks.  Thank you.

BRIG PHITLA: Unfortunately I forgot to respond to it.  There was an understanding between the military leadership and the political leadership, that some of the operations could be denied.  We should take note that even the South African Government continued to deny the existence of the South African forces in Angola, and this didn't mean that the South African Defence Force is unaccountable or they were a law unto themselves.  We therefore adopted this tactic ourselves as well. The political leadership, as it deemed fit, because it was going through international platforms, and some of the activities of APLA possibly in those platforms, they couldn't justify them at that time, for fear, maybe of losing, to get money or any other thing, which had nothing to do with policy.  Therefore, they were at liberty to deny those operations.  Even our department of publicity and information, if it meant the safety of our forces, they had the right to deny that operation as well.  There were a lot of other exigencies that intervened.
 So the question of denial of operations had nothing to do with whether APLA was a law unto itself.  
 In my capacity as well as director of military intelligence, it was my responsibility to ensure that there is less communication whenever operations had to be undertaken, because the communication networks were not under our control. Mostly reports that we give in after the operations had taken place, to ensure security of our forces.
 So this question of denial and not reporting prior to an operation being undertaken, should be looked at in terms of these exigencies which existed at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: There is just one part of the question which still is unanswered.  I am very grateful to the answers that you have already given, but let me just put it again.  When these particular incidence took place, the political leadership you have told us, was not informed prior to that. So they had no knowledge of that, but they, of course, like all of us, had knowledge of it afterwards. There must have been discussion.  Were these acts condoned by the political leadership or was there a difference of opinion after the fact?