Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, Plan Strelitzia was a plan that came from the National Management System, almost with not a security component, non-military.  Now the military advantage would have arisen from the processes in Strelitzia.  Now in departmental regard it wasn't necessary for me to put on my military hat to go to my chief with Strelitzia.  Now as opposed to that, Katzen, especially the initial parts, is a security plan, it's more of a departmental plan.  The members that we referred to earlier were also ex facie members of the Security Council of the State Security Council and therefore the State Security Council could then  by means of those members be cognisant of the plan.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knoetze.

MR KNOETZE: Could I just refer you back to page 119, paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.  Was that discussed, that particular part of the phase?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't remember whether paragraph 6 was discussed.  As far as I know we thought that that would follow later after the party had been established.  One could not involve them at an early stage.  Then the replacement of Lennox was discussed and it was written here it had to be done by a means of a coup d'etat.  I would accept because the plan was available, I can't think that we discussed it in any detail.  And then also a conclusion of a security alliance, I don't think that was discussed.

MR KNOETZE: Now if we get to the execution of what had been approved, could you perhaps just address that.  Could I perhaps refer you to paragraph 30 on page 30.  Now before we get to that, the last part of paragraph 28 on page 29 says that Brigadier Moore, part of Military Intelligence, Directorate Special Assignments, as then appointed as officer for Katzen and the management or control for the execution of this part.  Could you perhaps just explain to us what is meant by control over the execution?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now the plan fell outside of the ambit of the Defence Force and the plan was presented to the Chief of the Army and the other Generals were also present there, Geldenhuys etc., and the command went to the Head of Intelligence.  Colonel John Moore was an officer at Intelligence ...(indistinct) and then he was appointed as the officer in charge.  Perhaps I should just explain, that is now referring to the Chief of the Army, so that referred to the Army Headquarters level.  So John Moore took over command of the execution from the Army side, the Defence Force side for the execution of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Now who was Colonel John Moore's chief, his superior, the Head of Military Intelligence?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That was Admiral Putter.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 29 refers to a meeting that was held in Cape Town and the people involved there are mentioned, you weren't present?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I received an invitation for the meeting in Cape Town but I could not attend it.  The meeting had in fact taken place, according to my information.

MR KNOETZE: Then we go back to paragraph 30, page 30.  Could you just tell us what is referred to in this paragraph and to what extent you were involved here.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it was in July after we returned from Pretoria.  It was myself and Commandant du Plessis.  We went to the Transkei where we spoke with George Matanzima, Lent Makoba, Namba Sebe and Ben Namoi, and the plan then was sketched, presented to them in general terms.  General Matanzima said that it was urgent, the Ciskei were prepared to take the initiative with the implication, they were all in agreement that Lennox Sebe had to be replaced or removed and Namba Sebe indicated that he would lead the XWB.  That was before Charles Sebe had been liberated from prison.

MR KNOETZE: Right, paragraph 31 please.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The XWB was established, well the idea was established under the name Ciskei Ilizalomsa Movement, the eye of the nation and Namba Sebe and Lent Makoma would then have their headquarters on a farm in Elliot.  The movement would be extended by distributing pamphlets.  Funds were urgently needed and on the 31st of July R10 000 was handed over Lent Makoma and R5 000 to Namba Sebe.

MR KNOETZE: Who gave this money, whose money was it?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I remember correctly, the money was handed by Commandant du Plessis who attended the meeting with me.  I think he also received receipts for that.  I'm not quite sure where the money came from.  Well it could just have been from two sources, that could have been the Chief of the Army and if it had gone over to Intelligence, it would have come from there.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 32, do you have any knowledge of what is referred to there?  Paragraph 32.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can try to recollect it, it could have been at that meeting we attended with Matanzima where we referred to the liberation of Sebe, that he had to be freed on the 25th or the 26th and that the guards at that time of night perhaps are not awake.  It was recommended that Kwani Sebe, Lennox's sons also had to be removed with Charles' liberation.  He was the head of the elite unit.  Aerial photos of the prison where Charles Sebe was being kept was taken on the 1st of August by a pilot.  I wasn't aware of that, I only got to know about this later on.

MR KNOETZE: On page 32, do you have any knowledge of what is referred to in paragraph 33?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, no.  Now we recommended the liberation of Charles Sebe.  While he was not liberated by people under my command, it was done by soldiers from a special unit.  I was not aware of the liberation, I also heard of it the following day. Perhaps I can just add it's not strange, the liberation of Charles Sebe was a covert operation and the Special Forces were involved.  At that stage they weren't even under the command of the Chief of the Army, so it wasn't a Defence Force issue.  Brigadier Moore supplied the funds for this exercise.

MR KNOETZE: Did you have any knowledge of what happened in paragraph 34?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I did not have any knowledge about this.

MR KNOETZE: Do you mean that you didn't know that it was being planned and when it would be executed, but afterwards you heard of it?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  No, I didn't know that they were kidnapped that night.

MR KNOETZE: Right, paragraph 35 there was an indication given of the repercussions.  This doesn't have anything to do with the execution.  And if we then go to paragraph 36, page 33, there it is said that because of the increasing fear that Katzen would be made known in any way, it was decided that the Defence Force's involvement there would be scaled down and just to continue with it in a low profile manner.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, that is what General Liebenberg also told me when we discussed this.  So the idea was then that from our side and from the Defence Force side, that the establishment of the XWB, that we should assist with that with the liberation of Charles Sebe and that the Transkei would then take the lead assisted by the Ciskei leaders in exile and then behind the scenes in a low profile we would then assist the Transkei to continue with the rest of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 37 says that on the 22nd of October '86, Colonel Hall and van Rooyen visited Major General Ron Reid-Daly and then discussed certain actions with him to discredit Lennox Sebe among the people.  Did you know of this?