Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-11

WITNESS:   On that particular point, I mean, I can't recall exactly when they were deployed in that role.  I recall that General Liebenberg actually stated that over and above the role they were trained for, according to his report, that was to be an offensive unit.  They could be used as VIP bodyguards but I can't, unfortunately, remember that particular incident, unless you can refresh me with documentation.

MR MARITZ: Well, you see, all I can do is - and I'm not giving evidence - all I can do is refer you to the evidence adduced in the KwaMakutha trial of Peter Msane and several others, where, I think, it was accepted as common cause that the moment those VIP bodyguards arrived back in KwaZulu/Natal they were employed for that very purpose.  Would you accept that?

WITNESS:   Well, not having seen that documentation, I will have to take you at your word.

MR MARITZ: Thank you.

MR LAX: Mr Maritz, if I could just help out there.

MR LAX: /Dr Williams

MR LAX: 1B Dr Williams is getting confused between the two groups.  There's the VIP group and the offensive group.  The evidence in relation to the offensive group in the Liebenberg Report was that the offensive group could double as a VIP unit if necessary, and that's what he's thinking about.

WITNESS:   Oh.

MR LAX: He's not making the clear distinction between that and the people you are talking about.  So just to help out there so that we are talking in the same language.

MR MARITZ: Did you follow that, Doctor?

WITNESS:   Ja, that's correct.  I was assuming you were talking about the offensive.

MR MARITZ: No, I wasn't.  There was a particular group of some 30 people who were specifically trained for the task of VIP ... (intervention)

WITNESS:   Ja, no, I mean they were utilised in that role.

MR MARITZ: Fine, so are we happy with that?  Now, secondly, my instructions are that if you are going to - and let's first talk about a rural situation - if you are going to protect people like chieftains and important dignitaries in a rural situation, you're going to probably need a lot of things.  First of all, to put it in a broad perspective, one would want to create a climate which would be unfriendly to your insurgent.  That is your very broad perspective and that's why you have the contra-mobilisation element, not so?

WITNESS:   Politically, you would, yes.

MR MARITZ: Yes.  And, secondly, one would require intelligence.  In other words, you would have people moving around in your area and picking up signs as to whether there is something out of the ordinary, whether there are strange

MR MARITZ: /people, whether

MR MARITZ: 1B people, whether there are possibly armed insurgents, anything of the kind, but what you need is intelligence to complete your broad picture, to be able to protect.  Would you agree with that?

WITNESS:   Absolutely.  For the purposes of protection, absolutely.

MR MARITZ: Yes.

WITNESS:   And also - I mean, I think, we are speaking about the rural counter-insurgency environment now, where much of a premium is also placed on the ability of the organization to react pro-actively.

MR MARITZ: Yes.

WITNESS:   So, I mean, intelligence would support both your protective and your offensive capabilities.

MR MARITZ: Then one would have a body or agents, whatever you want to call them, who would fulfil the role of listening posts.  One could have geese or dogs or whatever, but they could possibly warn you of an insurgency, but you would have things such as listening posts and you would have people in place to protect, not so?

WITNESS:   You would have people in place to protect installations that you deem to be strategic and persons that you deem to be worthy of protection so to speak.

MR MARITZ: If you take the kraal of a chieftain, one would go about it in that fashion.  You would have actually people on the ground who could protect.

WITNESS:   No, you would.

MR MARITZ: One could also have in reserve a strike force, which, if everything that you've got in place were penetrated and were to that extent neutralised, one could have as an ultimate protection a measure - a strike force - not so?

WITNESS:   You could have a strike force both to ensure that if you were penetrated you were capable of reacting but one of your principles of rural counter-insurgency operations, as I have just said now, is its

MR MARITZ: /pro-active nature.

MR MARITZ: 1B pro-active nature.  That's reflected in the type of military strategies you have in rural counter-insurgencies, such as search and destroy, which go beyond your rural environment, if you're looking for insurgents and you're aware that they're in the area, cross-border operations, preemptive strikes.  So I'd like to qualify that.  I mean, I think it's a cardinal military principle here is that certainly you could use a reaction force, strike force, call it what you will, to protect your defences, but then also in anticipation of the breach of those defences you could use them pro-actively beyond your immediate lines of defence.

MR MARITZ: No, I'm not even talking on that very high level.  I'm talking about a very, very simple situation of ... (END OF TAPE).

MR MARITZ: /(START CASSETTE

MR MARITZ: 2A (START OF CASSETTE NO 2A)

MR MARITZ: ... provide protection at best, what - if one would call it a strike force.  On that simple basis.

WITNESS:  At that simple basis, absolutely.

MR MARITZ: Yes.

WITNESS:   But I would just like to qualify the role of reaction force.  It's not a passive entity.  It acts pro-actively.

MR MARITZ: Yes.

WITNESS:   So if you discovered that, I mean, in a village, however many - so many kilometres away from your base, there were insurgents, you'd react pro-actively.

MR MARITZ: Absolutely, I'm not quarrelling with you.

WITNESS:   Absolutely.  ---  Okay, I just want to - I want to qualify that.

MR MARITZ: No, fine.  No, I'm not quarrelling with you at all.  One could have further permutations.  One could, in regard to the reaction force possibly have, depending on the human material and resources that you have available to you, you could possibly have a situation where you have two chieftains in rather close proximity to one another which are both under protection and you could centre a small reaction force for that matter who could serve the protective role in respect of both these kraals?

WITNESS:   You could.

MR MARITZ: Yes.  Now as far as that is concerned, and I think you referred to that as one of the strange things and at first blush I agree with you, it seems very strange, that if you've talking about protection you're going to train people in mortars, but now if one has the experience as I am instructed was the case in South West Africa, that villages and chieftains and kraals were attacked with

MR MARITZ: /mortars,

MR MARITZ: 2A mortars, the best counter method is to return the attack with mortars?

WITNESS:   You certainly could, absolutely.

MR MARITZ: So you would train these people in the use of mortars.

WITNESS:   (No reply)

MR MARITZ: If one gets to house penetration, I assume that the same principle applies.  If you have a situation where the insurgent has gained the upper hand and he's taken control of a particular building, inter alia your charge is in the building in a hostage situation, you must have a means of penetrating that building and undoing the harm.  Would you agree with that?

WITNESS:   You certainly could if it was a reaction force trained specifically for that role.

MR MARITZ: Yes.  And as I understand the evidence, that is particularly what they were trained to do, not so?

WITNESS:  According to the evidence, yes.