Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-19

UNKNOWN: Thank you.  Mr Chairman I thought his Grace would be here, Commissioners, Ladies and Gentlemen.  It is a pleasure to be invited before this Truth and Reconciliation Commission to make my presentation regarding the unfortunate incident commonly  EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
O GQOZO
referred to as the Bisho Massacre.  
 At the outset I would like to thank this Commission for reconvening this second hearing relating to this matter in an endeavour to afford me an opportunity to make my submissions.  I apologise for any inconvenience that I might have caused due to my incapacity when the previous hearing in this regard convened.
 To address this Commission simply on the Bisho Massacre would be a futile exercise as it is essential that the political and ancillary matters thereto be addressed.  Accordingly I ask you to bear with me whilst I sketch the scenario to yourselves.
 Whether we condoned it or not the TBVC states were a creation of the National Party's apartheid era.  These states were, for all intents and purposes, autonomous little countries where Black man was to rule Black man.  
 In the Ciskei the reigns were initially held by the late Lennox Sebe.  The people in Ciskei became increasingly dissatisfied with the reign of Sebe.  He was regarded as an instrument of apartheid.  Sebe and his Kwane were allegedly using strong-arm tactics against persons who did not support the Sebe regime.  At that juncture I was Chief of Intelligence in the Ciskei and can thus attest to the accuracy of this aforegoing situation.
 Consequently the morale of the people of Ciskei, more particularly the military, was at an all time low and a coup was imminent.  On the 4th of March 1990 whilst Sebe was in Hong Kong a bloodless coup took place in the Ciskei.  It was not orchestrated by myself and neither was I personally responsible for the aforementioned coup.  I was requested by the soldiers to come to Bisho in the early hours of that morning of the 4th of March 1990 to take control.  Henceforth I became known as the military ruler of the Ciskei.
 At this stage I find it necessary to place the following on record.  As I saw it the coup was not a political coup per se.  It was not of political origin per se.  It found its roots in the dissatisfaction of the people and the soldiers towards the Sebe regime.  Consequently my capacity as military ruler I held no allegiance to either the African National Congress or the National Party.
 After assuming power in Ciskei my government introduced reforms, including a new constitution and Bill of Rights, the abolition of the death penalty and the unbanning of political organisations.  I brought to your attention that Ciskei functioned as any other country did with inter alia a government, security forces, a judiciary and laws to be obeyed. 
 As head of the Council of State of Ciskei I was committed to negotiations and my government accordingly actively participated in CODESA.  We formed part of the Freedom Alliance who entertained the stance that all matters and principles be decided prior to the 1994 general elections, and that the principles accordingly be laid down for the new South African government.  I was in favour of federalism, the delimitation of borders and the dismantling of the Homelands.  I was also in favour of reincorporation of the TBVC states but wanted to know what the position of inter alia the civil servants, the security forces and industrialists would be.
 As far as my personal situation was concerned I was prepared to leave that to the electorate.  I established my own political party which became known as the African Democratic Movement.  I at all times intended to participate in the general elections with this political party.  I was in favour of a negotiated settlement and strongly opposed violence.  Consequently the ANC's decision to abandon CODESA II in favour of launching a mass action campaign on the 3rd of May 1992 some three weeks before the collapse of CODESA II, did not find favour or support with myself or my government.  The mass action campaign was a multi-faceted campaign aimed at transferring power to the ANC. 
 The ANC's mass action campaign against the Homelands.  One of the aspects of this campaign was directed at those Homelands that did not support the ANC.  The ANC/SACP and COSATU, which collectively became known as the Tripartite Alliance embarked on a policy of mass action in the Ciskei.  Violence increased in Ciskei and people began to live in fear.  As illustration hereof I annex a press report published in the Eastern Province Herald on the 3rd of September 1992 as Annexure A.
 As the then head of the Ciskei government I has to assure the greater population of Ciskei that they would be protected.  I could not understand the alliance's attitude as there was no apartheid in Ciskei and I had unbanned political parties in my early days.   I felt that as head of government at the time I could not simply sit back and allow mass action to terrorise persons in the name of democracy or the struggle.  In my view, however, there was no need for a struggle as everything was already subject to negotiations.  Consequently I condemned the mass action of the alliance.  I refer in this regard to two extracts from the Umtombo newspaper, volume 1, no.3 of 1992 annexed hereto, marked as Annexures B and C.
 I am convinced that Ciskei was targeted as it was because it was probably regarded as the weakest of the Homelands that were not sympathetic to the ANC and hence where such a campaign was likely to succeed.  There seemed no doubt that the ANC alliance hoped that by targeting Ciskei a domino effect would result causing the other Homelands who were not sympathetic to them to fall and ultimately the then South African government, without further negotiation.

MR POTGIETER: Brigadier can I just come in here.  You are referring to a number of annexures.

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR POTGIETER: Are you going to take us through those annexures?  Are you going to refer to them at all in regard to the content of those annexures or have you thought that you will simply leave it to us to read or what?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman I thought that I would leave them to you as it would be too long to read through.  But if would also depend on the view of the Commission.

MR POTGIETER: Alright.  It might be of some assistance if there are some of them that are of particular importance that you would like us to focus on, that you could perhaps refer to those ones and perhaps just tell us briefly what it's about and so on.  Because obviously it's going to be very difficult for us to, in the time at our disposal now, to work through all of those annexures and so on.  So if there is something that's really relevant that you feel that we should actually consider, perhaps you can just attract our attention.

UNKNOWN: I am sorry to take your time.  Commissioner I am given good advice here that it would be the view of my advisor that instead of delving through some of these whilst some of the audience haven't got these might take more time than necessary.  Perhaps in your spare time after this you would go through them at your own pace.

MR POTGIETER: Ja that's fine, but then as I say, if there's something in particular, I know you have just been referring to some of the media releases and so on, we might have seen them already, but if there is anything that is particularly important, I see there is correspondence, you might when you come to that just perhaps highlight the importance of some of these.  You don't need to go through them but perhaps just....

UNKNOWN: Okay, alright, thank you.

MR POTGIETER: Thank you very much.  You may proceed.