Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

WITNESS:   He also pointed out that the force would not be subject to command and control.  While the foresight of the offensive force engaging in life-taking actions was obvious and I think obvious to anybody.  I don't think you need to be an expert in any way to see that.  But Barnard's statement confirms that this specific concern was the subject of the debate at the IDC meeting and had to be debated as well at the meeting of the State

MR LYSTER: /Security

MR LYSTER: 3A Security Council on the 3rd of February 1986.  So indeed the recommendation goes to the SSC and on the 3rd of February 1986 they confirm that recommendation and Malan and Heunis were then tasked with contacting Buthelezi in order to conduct an evaluation of his needs and requirements with regard to the paramilitary element and the ... [break in recording]

MR LYSTER: (END OF CASSETTE NO 3A)

MR LYSTER: (START OF CASSETTE NO 3B)

MR LYSTER: 3B

WITNESS:   ... been supplied at the highest level.  Needless to say, Chairperson, if they were simply authorising innocuous mundane protective lawful measures, there would have been no need to refer this matter to the highest level.  So SSC was then seized with this particular matter and although the SSC deferred the decision elsewhere, they anticipated that such support would result in Inkatha's offensive unit carrying out attacks on its opponents.  The available minutes do not indicate any opposition or dissent or an endeavour to stop the operation.  Nobody present at that meeting has to date distanced themselves from the decisions made at that meeting and I would argue that if such details had been disclosed at an early stage an unquantifiable number of lives could have been saved, particularly in the early 1990s when the full offensive force of the Caprivi trainees was unleashed and it is my submission then that those involved in those deliberations are not able to wash their hands from what flowed from the project.  They are indeed accountable.  Moving to the next sub-paragraph under the heading, "Offensive as pre-emptive".  With overall approval now granted with support to be supplied to Inkatha and KwaZulu, the military set

MR LYSTER: /about

MR LYSTER: 3B about to work on the detail in consultation with Buthelezi and how in fact to carry out the project.  Following a meeting held between Groenewald and Buthelezi on 11th February 1986, a memo was drawn up and a description of the offensive capacity referred to by Buthelezi in that particular meeting is contained here and we have to deal with this description in some detail, because those representing the military have argued and will argue and will rely on this particular description to claim that the offensive capacity was in reality nothing more than a purely lawful protective capacity and it is my considered view that that interpretation cannot be sustained.  The description reads as follows -

MR LYSTER: "An offensive (or a protective capacity) whereby the UDF/ANC/SACP can be prevented from breaking up Inkatha meetings, destroying property and terrorising, murdering and injuring Inkatha members".

MR LYSTER: Now it is my submission that what is being referred to there is the capacity to take initiatives to prevent or pre-empt those groups from attacking Inkatha members and supporters.  Indeed the author of that document, Groenewald, was asked during the Malan matter what "offensive" meant and he stated that it meant "primarily to take the initiative" -

MR LYSTER: "Reactive steps are normally taken in reaction to what the enemy does, while pro-active involves the taking of pre-emptive measures before the time.  You take the initiative.  And you must

MR LYSTER: /"especially

MR LYSTER: 3B      "especially see offensive in the terms of taking the initiative".

MR LYSTER: Now these actions, offensive actions, you take the initiative even if aimed at preventing possible later attack are unlawful in terms of South African Law and as much has been made of this passage by the military in an endeavour to paint the offensive capacity with an innocent tint, I intend to revisit it very shortly at a later stage.  Suffice to say that at this stage, given that we are aware that there are more forthright reference to what offensive capacity is all about, if one interprets that particular passage in its pre-emptive sense, then the document flow and they make sense.  They are reconcilable.  But if they are interpreted innocently, then the documents make no sense at all.  They simply don't flow and they cannot be understood.  I'm moving now to the Liebenberg report.  I'll try to deal with it as briefly as I can.  This report was drawn up following an instruction by General Malan to the then Head of the SADF, General Geldenhuys, to draw up a report which would include a detailed implementation plan together with an organogram and Geldenhuys Liebenberg to do so and hence we have the Liebenberg Report.  In the report it's set out that Buthelezi request had already been settled with him, confirmed with him and these included a number of things, personal protection, that of VIPs and so on.  He further required a contra-mobilisation unit for political mobilisation, defensive element and offensive element, intelligence capacity, etcetera.  Under his request the offensive element was described as a small full-time offensive element that could covertly be used against the

MR LYSTER: /UDF/ANC

MR LYSTER: 3B UDF/ANC (about 30).  Other requirements of his included the expansion of the KwaZulu Police by an additional 500 men, a security management system and so on.  The organogram in that particular report, if one refers to it at paragraph 20 of that report, it demarcates the support to the KwaZulu Police and the government on the left side of the structure and the support to Inkatha on the right side and it's a neat distinction between the secret and covert support to Inkatha and the more overt support to the governmental structures.  Funnily enough or interestingly enough, it places the offensive element outside of the paramilitary unit, but this was no coincidence, because the original proposals in fact said that as well and one can refer to the 19th of December 1985 document to see that.  Buthelezi was listed in the organogram as the link person, the only link person between the clandestine support, Inkatha's armed wing and the overt support to the KwaZulu Government structures.  M Z Khumalo was listed as the commander of the paramilitary and offensive groups.  A bit further on in the report it dealt with the activities of the paramilitary unit and if one looks briefly at the Leadership Corp, which is also referred to as a defensive group (militia), their training was to include, proposed to include military procedures and the breaking up of meetings and again, one must just pause.  Why are they being trained to break up meetings?  That is hardly a lawful exercise.  Under offensive activities, the following activities were set out and I quote -

MR LYSTER: "The purpose was to provide a small group of well trained troops for Inkatha which

MR LYSTER: /"could

MR LYSTER: 3B      "could be used offensively against the ANC, UDF and related groups.  Further the group could also be used as personal bodyguards for Buthelezi in his capacity as President of Inkatha".