Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-19

JOHN WILLS: Yes.  what my question is that plan B would have been to arrest those people.  You're dealing with seriously experienced Security personnel including yourself and your colleagues I've seen, they've been in the Security Branch for some time as well.  Now obviously if you wanted to arrest them, you would do it in such a way that there wouldn't be this risk that Shabalala would get the hint, the slightest hint that he was the only person being arrested and that's what my query is.  Why did that occur?

H J P BOTHA: No, I think you're misunderstanding.  When the danger signal is given, then it means that the informer's life is in danger and you don't then continue placing him back in an operation thereafter, you secure him.   How you do it is not relevant then because both of those people are then detained thereafter, the one lawfully, the other one unlawfully, or whatever the case may be, but the first step is to secure your informer.

JOHN WILLS: Yes, I understand that, if I can just butt in here.  I understand that that your first step is to secure the informer, but I also cannot believe, with respect, Mr Botha, that experienced persons like you would not have been able to do that and have planned to do that and at the same time make sure that Shabalala did not get a hint of the fact that Ndaba was an informer.  In other words you had four people there.  It would have been quite easy for, not only you to ram a pistol in the stomach of Shabalala, it would have been quite easy for Wasserman to do the same for Ndaba.  What was to stop you doing that?

H J P BOTHA: Well, it wasn't done.  The first thing was to secure the informer.  van der Westhuizen pulled him out of the car.

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage the signal conveyed to them that Ndaba was in danger.

JOHN WILLS: Yes, I understand that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now really, where does it get us one way or the other.  Had they not done it, what difference does it make?  Unless there is some criticism that you are seeking to make which is fundamental, what is that?  The fact of the matter is that these chaps were arrested, rather Shabalala was arrested, Ndaba was their reliable informer, he wasn't arrested at that time.

JOHN WILLS: What I'm suggesting with respect, Mr Chairperson, that this arrest process is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It could have been better.

JOHN WILLS: No, it is an example of the fact that the plan to put Ndaba back into the network afterwards is just something that has been made up post facto for the purposes of this amnesty application and I'm saying that for the reason, which obviously I'll argue, is that these are experienced people and they, the evidence has been to the effect that they planned for this arrest and that that's the purpose of my question.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, Mr Botha, even at that stage, when Shabalala was arrested, you knew that you were going to eliminate not only Shabalala but Ndaba as well, at that stage?

H J P BOTHA: Chair, if that had been my plan then I could have drafted a much simpler amnesty application.  Why would I give such a story and such a version if that's not what actually happened?

JOHN WILLS: Mr Both, I'll move on.  You then went to Pretoria together with Mr Steyn on the 10th.

H J P BOTHA: That's correct.

JOHN WILLS: What time in the morning did you leave on the 10th?

H J P BOTHA: I think we flew.

JOHN WILLS: Now between the 7th and the 10th were you in almost continuous contact with the two detainees?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, constantly.

JOHN WILLS: Were you living at that safe-house yourself?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: And what about Mr Steyn, where was he?

H J P BOTHA: At his office or at his home.

JOHN WILLS: Did he at any stage come to the safe-house in Verulam?

H J P BOTHA: No, at no stage.

JOHN WILLS: So your evidence is to the effect that you reported this to him soon after the arrests which I trust would have been on the 7th?

H J P BOTHA: Telephonically yes.

JOHN WILLS: You then discussed this development with senior people in Pretoria and it's regarded as so sensitive that you have to personally brief the Commissioner, or the then person in charge of the police the next day, General van der Merwe?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: And you do that?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: Now Gen van der Merwe obviously indicates to you that it is a very sensitive position, not so?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: You knew that.  It's not often when somebody is detained that embassies have to be advised and the Foreign Intelligence have to be advised beforehand.

H J P BOTHA: But it was not the detention of people that was the issue here.

JOHN WILLS: Sorry, I don't understand, please.

H J P BOTHA: The point that you made was that the briefing was regarding the detention of two people, but that's not what it was about.  It was about the intelligence as it deployed in terms of Operation Vula.

JOHN WILLS: It was a whole operation, I accept that, the whole operation and the two detainees were part of that?

H J P BOTHA: No.

JOHN WILLS: Did you not discuss the detainees?

H J P BOTHA: No, because it wasn't necessary.  What it was about was intelligence and information.

JOHN WILLS: Didn't he ask where you got the intelligence from?

H J P BOTHA: From an informer.

JOHN WILLS: Didn't you tell him that the informer was detained?

H J P BOTHA: No, because it wasn't necessary.

JOHN WILLS: Surely it would be something that would come up in conversation?

H J P BOTHA: No, it wasn't necessary.

JOHN WILLS: But then the subject of arrests was discussed at that meeting, not so?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: It was decided in fact, could I interpret your evidence as to the effect that you received a direct order from van der Merwe that these arrests must not take place before the 16th?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: So you were ordered to ensure that I think the other people involved are Mr Gordhan, Mr Maharaj and a number of other people that you had information on at that stage.

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: Now the - but the point is that it was stressed by Gen van der Merwe giving that order, you must yourself have realised that this is serious information, this is a particularly sensitive position and we must make sure that we play this according to the instructions given to us by Gen van der Merwe.

H J P BOTHA: That's correct.

JOHN WILLS: How did it happen that all of these people were arrested on the 12th?

H J P BOTHA: Let me give you the background again.  I've already testified about it.  Before the message was given to du Preez, Wasserman and van der Westhuizen, before it could be given to them, the message that there  was to be no arrest before we get the order from Head Office, a situation developed here locally in terms of which Wasserman and du Preez who were responsible for the observation of Siphiwe Nyanda, followed him and he became aware of the fact that he was being followed and that made it necessary to arrest him.

JOHN WILLS: Was this not discussed with you beforehand?

H J P BOTHA: No, it wasn't discussed.  It wasn't a planned arrest and on the contrary they weren't even aware of Gen van der Merwe's order that there should be no arrests before there was an order from head office and that is why Gen Steyn went back to head office the next day to inform them of the latest developments.

JOHN WILLS: Now it would seem to me that you knew the significance of the persons whom you were potentially going to arrest, and by that, I've got the list of certain names, but let's look at Mr Nyanda first of all.  Did you know his importance in the MK structures at that stage?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

JOHN WILLS: You knew that he was a very senior official in MK?

H J P BOTHA: Correct, just as well as I knew of Mr Maharaj and the other people who were in senior positions.