Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-23

MR WILLS: Now you also had a discussion, I think some time towards the end of 1990, with Eugene de Kock concerning the elimination of I think Mr Sekakane, it might be part of another application of yours, I'm not sure.  I'm referring here to page 1 of Exhibit F, the affidavit of Mr de Kock.  I don't know, has this document been shown to you.

J A STEYN: I cannot remember, I'll first have to look at it Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Can you just look through it?

J A STEYN: Are there specific paragraphs Chairperson that I have to look at?

MR WILLS: It's a relatively short affidavit, but basically my question is, were you aware or do you agree that you had a meeting with de Kock as he indicates in this affidavit, which basically centres around the elimination of an askari, which was later carried out by de Kock's unit and I think that the person they refer to here is Sekakane.

J A STEYN: Chairperson, I did not speak to de Kock about the elimination of Sekakane.

MR WILLS: So you dispute the contents of this application, of this affidavit?

J A STEYN: With regard to that specific question, yes Chairperson.

MR WILLS: Well you see, because in paragraph 3.2 of this affidavit, de Kock indicates that you had this discussion with him about Sekakane who was about to tell what happened to an ANC operator who was involved with Operation Vula.  You deny that that discussion ever took place?

J A STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Because de Kock's recollection of this incident implies that at that stage which was late in 1990, you were of the view that Vula, sorry Ndaba was an ANC operative not an informer.

J A STEYN: No, Chairperson, I did not discuss this matter with de Kock.

MR WILLS: Now let's get back to the information or the meetings that you had, or the information you got from your subordinate, Mr Botha, prior to the arrest of Ndaba on the 7th of July.  We have the evidence that you were a person who was a hands-on Commander, that you worked closely with your subordinates.  Now we know that Ndaba, or it's a alleged that Ndaba met with Mr Botha three or four times in the 6 weeks prior to his arrest and it seems from your affidavit that you were aware of the fact that this was going on.

J A STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Now I want to know what information was given to you as a result of those communications.

J A STEYN: Chairperson, Col Botha told me that according to the information that he had received, structures were being built up by leading figures of the ANC SACP and he referred to these structures or whatever one could call it at that stage as the President's Committee.  That this was a Committee or a structure that was busy with building structures including weaponry, networks, communication networks and so forth.

MR WILLS: Is that all, to the best of your knowledge obviously?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, there could have been more.  I will think about it.  Yes, there were the presence of possible senior ANC members that were mentioned.  Members that were possibly in the country at that stage.

MR WILLS: Can you remember the names of those persons?

J A STEYN: I think it was Mr Kasrils, Mr Maharaj, I forget the other names for the instant.

MR WILLS: You obviously, at that time, knew that these were very senior persons as far as the ANC's military struggle was concerned?

J A STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: Now what did you do with this information when it came to your knowledge?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, I reported to Col Botha.  Due to this information that was news to us, I told him to continue to monitor this situation so that we could see what flows out of this.

MR WILLS: Did you not tell anybody about this information?  Particularly your seniors, possibly General - was it Gen Basie Smit at that stage?

J A STEYN: I cannot specifically remember if I reported it to Headquarters.  The news, or the information was news for us and if I can remember correctly the thought was that we first had to let this thing take it's run and then see where we ended up.  If something constructive came out, if something positive came out that could give more confirmation to this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: But surely it was of vital importance to those senior to you who had connections with the politicians who were negotiating the future of the country, to let them know that this organisation had been set up?

J A STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.  I think that the information and the value of that information we probably did not appreciate to its full value.

MR WILLS: I put it to you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's not we, it's you, isn't it?  You didn't discuss it you say with anyone else, you just took the decision to sit on it.  Is that what you're asking us or telling us?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, if I can just say, I think that I, at that stage, along with Botha, did not realise  the seriousness of the situation.

MR WILLS: I put it to you, Mr Steyn that had you become aware of knowledge that these senior persons Kasrils and Maharaj were in the country, these "terroriste" as you refer to them as, were in the country, you would have immediately brought that to the attention of your seniors in order that this information could have been followed up immediately with the utmost seriousness.

J A STEYN: Chairperson, I already answered how I handled the matter at that stage and how I saw the matter at that stage.

MR WILLS: So essentially you handled it like a routine bit of information, it could have been information about anyone, just get more information?

J A STEYN: No, it is a case of what I told Botha.  "Investigate and continue and see what we can get hold of", something more that would confirm.

MR WILLS: You didn't put other resources into this operation to assist?

J A STEYN: Probably Botha would have done this and he would have probably continued with this and I accept that he did continue with this.

MR WILLS: Did the information include the establishment of safe-houses for these senior operatives that you received before the 7th of July?

J A STEYN: I cannot remember precisely, but it might be the case, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: I mean surely at the least you would have ordered that these places be observed so you could trap these people you'd been looking for, for so long?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, at that stage we had already had some places under observation, different places, but at that stage we did not connect this with this specific organisation.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but if you were told, this is how I understand the question, that this particular organisation had established safe-houses, it would have been important to find out where they were and to have kept them under observation.

J A STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you make any attempt to do so?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, I said that Botha had to monitor the situation and this would then include all investigations that he would deem necessary at that stage to gain further information in this regard.

MR LAX: You see, General, my difficulty with what you're saying is, it's already been established that you were a hands-on man, you weren't someone who just left it to your subordinates to just do their own thing.  They had to report to you regularly, personally.  As Botha has already said, you were the only one who knew about Ndaba.  Now Ndaba wasn't just a small fish, he was a big fish and he suddenly pops up back in the country.  And not only does he pop up back in the country but he pops up with information about very, very senior military operatives, I mean Kasrils, Mr Maharaj, these are very senior people within the ANC's military structure at that time.  People you would dearly have loved to have got your hands on if you had the opportunity to.

J A STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: And yet you just say "Go ahead, this is - just keep it under observation", that's the maximum that you do?