Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-05-06

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Despite the long lines of communication and sometimes poor lines of communications, we got cadres to report back from time to time, that came back to the font line areas to talk to the commanders periodically,  we also got couriers to take messages to the cadres inside the country.
	In all I would say the control was good, it could have been better but it was good, that where there were problems these were communicated to the cadres, where we felt - and it has been explained, when the ANC felt for instance that there may have been a misunderstanding of the whole call to take that struggle into the white areas, then we were in a position to go to front line countries and we also encouraged senior members to go into the country.
	Operation Vula itself was an attempt to build the structures inside of the country, to build a greater and more dynamic contact between the commanding structures, between the leadership and the cadres on the ground and I would say, to a large extent it was good. 
	If one looks at the 1990 period with the end or the suspension of armed hostilities, you found no operations taking place.  Immediately we were able to get the message across, the cadres themselves were highly political, they listened the messages all the time etc.,  and we found that within a very short period of time we were able to communicate to everybody to say: "Stand down, maintain your positions and we will communicate with you".  This is despite the fact that we had long lines of communications.  
	The communications took place telephonically often with code words etc., etc., and sometimes all we were able to do is to send a message to people and say: "Come to a certain point" or "Come outside of the country, come and receive the instructions and orders etc.".  But given the circumstances I would say it was good.

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Ismail can you maybe if possible, maybe just describe shortly, how did the process work prior to an attack on a specific target?  How did you go about identifying a target, getting the information, identifying the MK, getting - exactly how did the process work?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, again here one has got to differentiate between the targets planned from outside and those of units inside the country.  For targets outside the country, initially we would have perhaps documentary information which we would pick up on - do some studies around it.  For instance if one took the whole question of the power grid etc., a lot of the initial information was gained from documentation, the entire pylon grid was gleaned from documentation.
	On the basis of that we would then send initial reconnaissance to determine whether the information that we had gleaned from documents was accurate, reasonably accurate and on the basis of that we would get those reports, we would then draw up initial plans, we would then send units to say: "We are thinking of tackling the following targets, go inside and carry detailed reconnaissance on these".
	  The units would then go to the actual targets, determine what they were able to do and at the same time they would find areas where they could base in, they would begin to look at drawing up a plan of action as to what they were going to do at every point.  And each time the cadres then came back to headquarters and reported on what was happening and what they were able to do, we then talked to them about what happens in this case or another case, you know: "Will you be in a position to survive should you face various contingencies"?  
	Of course we couldn't plan for all the contingencies but we tried to look at an allround plan.  We would then go into a situation or drawing up a proper plan, we would then infiltrate material that we thought appropriate for that operation, get it into the country, we would then have that information brought back, hand it over to unit commander.  
	We didn't always give that information to all the members of the unit but to the unit commander or perhaps two of them, and then people would be sent into the country with the resources that they required, money, the weapons.  And in some cases we even infiltrated units into the country without weapons because we thought that if they were travelling by public transport, with the searches and things that were going on, they would able to survive in that way because sometimes they necessarily be identified but they would face searches and if they carried a pistol or something they would be arrested so we urged cadres not to carry weapons with them.
	Many of the cadres survived despite the searches and things, they would then get to their operational areas.  Prior to the time they would then check out the area that they were going to operate in, get to the base areas, establish that, if they needed any additional support they would establish that themselves.  They would then go and draw the material from the caches, check the equipment, clean it if it required that and prepare themselves for the operation.
	They would then carry out final a final reconnaissance prior to the operation and finally carry out the operation.  They would then also withdraw and also trying to ensure that there was an alternative that existed at most times.

MR STEENKAMP: Can you tell me, how did the section special operations link with the SDU's as it then existed?  What was the relation between the SDU's and the section or department of special operations?  Exactly how did ...[intervention]

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: There was no link between the SDU's and special operations at all.  The earliest SDU's came about in about '86, '86, '87 with the violence in Natal, that was very much a community based operation where the communities started organising themselves, occasionally with units on the ground.
	The special operations units were not always in those areas.  If there may have been some that were internal, they would have assisted the local SDU's but by and large the units didn't necessarily reveal, except to the people that supported them, that they were in fact MK combatants etc. 	So there was no direct link between the SDU's and the special operations unit.

MR STEENKAMP: So then had control over the SDU's, was there any measure of control?	 What was the policy regarding that?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: With the SDU's, those were large community based structures and even in the post 1990 period they continued to be community structures.  The role of MK generally was where they were found and many of the MK cadres, when they came into the country after the unbanning of the ANC, went to their communities and often communities would say to them: "What kind of soldiers are you, you know, if you can't provide us with weapons, if you can't protect us" etc.
	Those people then integrated into those SDU's and the documents explains all of that and says that those SDU's were assisted by MK cadres but the military headquarters deliberately took a decision that they would not get directly involved in the SDU's but that certain members of headquarters and members of MK were told: "Do what you have to do amongst the communities".

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Ismail, as far as you know, to your knowledge, was anybody every hired from outside or any specific individuals ever hired to do certain or carry out certain of these attacks or was it only people from inside your own structures that was used, attacking targets and infiltrating the country or did you hire?  I mean hiring, there was an allegation at one stage, was it Mr Mastic, that one of the persons who died in the   Pretoria bombing had certain money on him, do you know if - did you at any stage hire anybody?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No.

MR STEENKAMP: No, nothing.