Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-09-02

MR WILLS: And then paragraph 51
"... we did then go to her house and told her that she should also come with us to the safehouse where the other comrades were so that she could see where they were.  She then came with us in the vehicle and we also handed her over to Henti Botha's section."
	You see, so she is describing the arrest from another point of view, where he lured her by false pretences in a car, and then delivered her to you at Battery Beach, that is obviously the incident that he is referring to, would you agree?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I see what he wrote in his statement, but that is contradictory to what our instructions were, Chairperson.

MR WILLS: You see, from what we have heard as well from what Mr Mbane's counsel has said, Mr Samuel, is that he also got a specific instruction to pick up the Khubeka woman and hand her over to you?   My question is, there are these four people and coincidentally these four people have signed affidavits at different times to the times your group signed affidavits, which is all between the 13th - sorry the 11th and the 13th of December 1996.  All these other people are sure, absolutely sure that the purpose of that operation was to arrest Khubeka.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My instructions were not to arrest Khubeka.  At my briefing the members of C1 would bring the Commander and possibly other members of the cell with whom Ms Khubeka had been involved with, to the rendezvous point and they would be arrested Chairperson.

MR WILLS: You see the other thing that tends to my mind, which I will argue to support their version as opposed to yours, is that had you been arresting someone who might have been considered dangerous, the probabilities are that like in other incidents that have been testified to, you would have had backup, then you would have had more of a show of force, it wouldn't have been such what can be described as a soft pick-up.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, would you please repeat, I don't understand what your question is.

MR WILLS: What I am suggesting is that you knew on the day that you were going to be picking up a woman.

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is not true Mr Chairperson.

MR WILLS: You knew, and I am inferring that you knew from the fact that from the evidence given so far, it didn't, your operation doesn't appear to the outsider as being an operation where you expected somebody very dangerous to be picked up?  It was just one vehicle, there was no back-up, there was no heavy fire-power in reserve, the plan that you  referred to, I have asked you to describe, wasn't a detailed plan, one would expect that you would have a detailed plan in case firing broke out, particularly in view of the public spot, the spot that was chosen was a public spot where you wouldn't have chosen that spot had you expected there to be a shootout occurring, and that is what my problem is?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Mr Chairperson, I understand Mr Wills' point,  but on many occasions arrests of dangerous persons took place where there was no backup and the specific reason why I think we did not take large amounts of arms with us, was because it was a public place and the point which was decided upon, was a public place.   One could not for example go with an R1 if there was a shootout, and shoot in a public place.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Wills, Mr van der Westhuizen, what you say, you were expecting the leader and the deceased, in fact would you agree that if the deceased, Ms Khubeka was arrested there as she was, it would basically bring an end to the operation regarding the infiltration of MK units because she was the contact point?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Keeping that in mind, can you think of any reason why when that vehicle came to Battery Beach without the leader or any other MK cadre, that and we have heard it from other evidence not from you yet, but we have heard that a signal was given?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you think why the driver of that vehicle would have put on the signal to say I am here with the leader, if in fact he was there with only Ms Khubeka which would result in her being arrested and thereby blowing the whole operation out of the water?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No Mr Chairperson.   I cannot explain that.

MR LAX: Isn't the inference rather that because that happened, that was the intention?  Doesn't that - that is a matter that would be argued obviously, but I am just asking you about it, Mr Wills is arguing that because the signal was given and because for example Radebe and Mbane will say that was the intention, that is why ...

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I hear what Mr Wills is asking.

MR LAX: What I am trying to say is everything is consistent with that version?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I understand what he says, but those were not our instructions on the day.

MR LAX: As far as you knew?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR LAX: You don't know what instructions they were given?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No Chairperson, I was not involved in their briefing.

ADV BOSMAN: May I just ask this one question please Mr Wills, if you don't mind.   Mr van der Westhuizen, is it not so that Mbane placed himself at risk if he had instruction to bring the leader and then give the sign with Khubeka, did he not place himself at risk by doing that?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is possible Mr Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Mr Wills.

MR WILLS: Thank you.  You see, we have heard - I am in the fortunate position of attending the earlier hearing, I know that you haven't testified yet in that, and that is the Shabalala and Ndaba hearing, but it is obvious that people would be at great pains to conceal the fact that this Intelligence gathering operation was under way, not so?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: I mean it was such an important operation that you had people all the way from Pretoria, assisting you or Vlakplaas?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: And it would be a major blow, I mean it must have been a major blow for Mbane to come up with the person who is central to this operation?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR WILLS: By mistake?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: And there has been no evidence so far from any of your colleagues and possibly you can help us as to whether this matter was taken up with Mr Mbane?  It is not in their statements, it is not in their viva voce evidence?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I cannot comment to that, I was not involved in the handling of Mr Mbane.

MR WILLS: Surely you would have expected him to be reprimanded to use a polite phrase?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I wouldn't expect that sir, I wasn't involved with him at all, he was handled by another section.

MR WILLS: You see the section that handled him, his immediate superior was Coetzer, not so?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think Mr Baker was, sir.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not sure because Mr Mbane was part of the C1 unit, perhaps we are going to have to - you can ask about what the structure was with regards the authority over Mr Mbane in those circumstances.

MR WILLS: My understanding was that Coetzer was also from the C1 unit in Pretoria and he basically came to replace Ras.  Is that right?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I don't recall that, I recall Mr Coetzer being involved there in the operation, but I don't know who he replaced.

MR WILLS: Was he from Pretoria?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct sir.

MR WILLS: So we must assume that he wasn't a member of the Durban Security Branch, he was a member of the Vlakplaas contingent?

MR VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.