Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1996-11-20

<UNKNOWN>: "of SADF members available, and these members were deployed along the main Edendale road according to the joint planning for the day.  It is easy with hindsight to say ... (incomplete ... end of Side A, Tape 5) ... need to be understood within the context of what was taking place throughout the province at the time, where there were several areas of conflict.  At national level similar situations prevailed in various provinces, and the National Riot Unit 19 had already provided 50 men some time prior to the outbreak of the Seven Day War.

<UNKNOWN>: 14.  We have already referred to the limited SADF personnel available and the operational planning provided for their deployment along the main route through Edendale, which provided access to the Edendale Hospital for the many injured persons, and to keep the route open due to several road barricades erected by the residents.  It is not correct to state that the SADF was not requested by the SAP to assist, since joint planning took place with them on a daily basis.

<UNKNOWN>: 15.  The police were engaged in several areas at that time, trying to prevent attacks or to separate attacking groups.  We have already pointed out that there was no manpower available for surveillance of the groups moving in various directions, and this was no doubt also the position with regard to the

<UNKNOWN>: /"group

<UNKNOWN>: "group moving over the bridge to KwaShange.  By the time the police became aware of this group they were already launching attacks in the KwaShange area, and several huts were already burning.  The only policemen in the area at the time were the Riot Investigation Unit, who had gone to retrieve the body of Poswa, which is referred to in paragraph 3.3 of our submission.

<UNKNOWN>: 16.  The police had no prior warning that an attack was to be launched on KwaMnyandu, and were still concentrating their efforts on various of the flash-point areas of the previous day, where violence had subsided, but could have broken out at any time.  The KwaMnyandu area does not have a proper infrastructure and there are few access roads.  It is situated on a hillside and access by vehicles is difficult under normal circumstances, let alone the muddy conditions which prevailed due to the heavy rains at the time.

<UNKNOWN>: Day Five.  While it is correct that action was taken to disperse the protesting women it is emphatically denied that the police adopted a soft-line approach to the impis, and this fact is supported by several newspaper reports.  Given the prevailing situation in the area the potential for violence by any group remained a serious threat, and the dispersal of the women was aimed at averting

<UNKNOWN>: /"a possible

<UNKNOWN>: "a possible attack on these protestors.  It was also the women's refusal to disperse at the request of the police which compelled the police to warn them of the use of force if necessary.  We also wish to point out that the attack in KwaMnyandu took place during the early morning, whilst the protest march occurred much later in the day.  As regards to allegations that repeated attempts to deploy members of the SADF were frustrated by the police, this department wishes to place on record that it is totally unaware of, and denies, that it frustrated the SADF in any way from deploying in Imbali.  We also question the accuracy of Professor Aitchison's statement that a 10-platoon convoy of SADF members were deployed outside Huletts Aluminium.  One platoon consists of 30 men and three vehicles, and it is the recollection of the department that the entire contingent of SADF members available at the time in Pietermaritzburg area did not exceed four platoons and a total of approximately six vehicles.  The SAPS wish to record that we find these allegations extremely strange since no complaints of this nature were ever recorded at the meetings of ... (inaudible) ... on the Friday the 30th of March, at which the SADF was represented, and at which incidents of this nature would be raised.  Furthermore it needs to be pointed out that

<UNKNOWN>: /"the SADF

<UNKNOWN>: "the SADF did not fall under the command of the SAP, but operated under their own command structures in support of the SAP.  This allegation is also starkly contradicted by the testimony of Mr Radley Keys, according to whom SADF reinforcements only arrived on the 10th of April.

<UNKNOWN>: Day Seven.  Although official police records are not available the SAP members have no recollection whatsoever of having shot three people at Mpophomeni.  Whilst opposing groups were attacking each other in the area the police arrived and were immediately shot at themselves.  The police responded with tear gas grenades and shotguns and the groups were dispersed.  The bodies of two males were found at a private dwelling which was not in the vicinity or the direction in which the police had fired.  It is assumed that these persons were killed during skirmishes between the opposing groups.  As far as the allegation relating to the wounding of 35 people at Table Mountain is concerned, the SAP emphatically denies that they were ever involved in a skirmish in which they wounded 35 people in Table Mountain area.  We have previously pointed out that the SADF acted in support of the police, and it is inconceivable that the police would be involved in fomenting the violence and handing out firearms and ammunition in Imbali as alleged, and

<UNKNOWN>: /"thereafter

<UNKNOWN>: "thereafter call in the SADF in order to quell the violence which the police themselves were allegedly involved in.  If one has regard to the previous allegations of Professor Aitchison, which are in any event denied, then it would seem that the SADF would never move into an area unless requested to do so by the SA Police.  We are referring to the allegations relating to the 10 platoons waiting fruitlessly outside Huletts Aluminium.  It cannot therefore be contended that the SADF vehicles which allegedly later moved into the Imbali area did so of their own accord.

<UNKNOWN>: 18.  It is true that informal inquests were held in respect of the victims of the Seven Day War.  It must, however, be pointed out that the authority and the prerogative to decide whether a formal or informal inquest is to be held vests in the Attorney-General, and the SA Police are not in a position to dictate or to influence the Attorney-General in this regard.  It needs to also be pointed out that the SAP received very little, if any co-operation at all from the affected communities in their investigations in this regard.  The Riot Investigation Unit, under command of Senior Superintendent Upton, even approached attorney firms such as Cheadle Thompson & Haysom and others to request their assistance in persuading members of the community for whom they were acting to provide

<UNKNOWN>: /"the police

<UNKNOWN>: "the police with sworn statements identifying culprits.  Requests were also directed to leading political figures such as Mr Radley Keys to assist in this regard, and despite this very little information was provided to the police.  The investigation team also published details of property recovered from looters in the local media in an effort to identify owners to ensure successful prosecution against offenders, and even this report met with no success.