Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

MR AVENANT: And Intelligence was what was necessary for the liberation of inter alia, Charles Sebe?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: From whom would this request for information about Charles Sebe have been received?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: From Special Forces, Special Forces of the Defence Force.

MR AVENANT: How was that co-ordinated?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I don't think it was co-ordinated, but I will accept that the normal practice took place, namely that the commanding officer would approach all Intelligence sources and he would have consulted certain people and would have required information from people who for instance, knew about the prison and knew where Charles Sebe was etc.  So I don't think it was a co-ordinated effort, it was a mere request for information which came from the operational commander.

MR AVENANT: So this was not the kind of thing that would be discussed at a meeting?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, it was never discussed at any meeting where I was present.  I don't think that kind of thing would be discussed at a meeting.

MR AVENANT: I think it was the meeting at Mesikaba, where General Griebenauw was not present, he sent Major-General van der Merwe, or Major van der Merwe.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.

MR AVENANT: And that is also - is it correct that the police, just after this meeting, withdrew from the operation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Did you make any enquiries as to why they withdrew?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, this was in the same period where the Chief of the Defence Force told me that we had to scale our involvement in this plan down, so I didn't find it strange at all.

MR AVENANT: You at no stage asked General Griebenauw for instance why they withdrew?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, not as far as I can remember.

MR AVENANT: Were you at any stage approached by the Transkeian role-players to ask why the police were no longer involved?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.

MR AVENANT: At this meeting at Mesikaba - I want to refer to the expression "to take out", in Annexure A, of which you are not the author.  I notice that if you look at Exhibits A and B, A was the statement of van Rooyen.  Namba Sebe - to link up with a question from the Panel, Namba Sebe had to be removed from the scene.  So that was actually to secure him against the Ciskei, or as against the Ciskei?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it was a protective measure.  Actually it was disinformation to say that he was going to a farm or he was going abroad.  It was simply to move him from the public glare.

MR AVENANT: It's my instructions that at that stage there was pressure from the Ciskei Government that Namba be extradited to it.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Because Namba accepted liability and responsibility for the liberation from prison.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Namba said that it was due to his actions that Charles Sebe had been sprung from prison and that there was now pressure on him as a result of that.

MR AVENANT: At what stage did the SADF withdraw permanently from this plan?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I can't recall the exact date, but I think it would have been in December '86, definitely before I was transferred to the Witwatersrand.  I told my successor about the plan because at that stage we from the Army's side played no further role, so I'm not exactly sure what role Colonel Moore played.

MR AVENANT: But there was no question of any supportive functions provided?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it was implied that if the Transkei continued to replace Lennox Sebe and continue with the phase, as I have sketched it in the plan, it was implied that we would support that effort undertaken by the Ciskei and Transkei.

MR AVENANT: In other words the initiative came from the Transkei?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that was my instructions.

MR AVENANT: So Transkei would have had to take the lead?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: So that if Ron Reid-Daly attacks the house of Lennox Sebe and something positive would flow from that he would receive the support of the South African Defence Force?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, although we did not foresee, and certainly didn't want a coup d'etat to take place by means of an attack on a house.  If things had turned out better than foreseen, it would have assisted the plan, or promoted the plan.

MR AVENANT: Your allies in the Transkei, they would have been of the impression that they had foreseen
it would have assisted the plan, promoted the plan,
or that they were still continuing with this course?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes. The termination of Plan Katzen from the South African Defence Force's side, did not mean the termination of Katzen for leaders in Transkei and Ciskei, such as the Lennox Sebe's and the Namba Sebe's, etc.  Those aspirations continued to exist after Katzen.

MR AVENANT: Katzen was the seed that had been planted?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Katzen tried to create a programme of action for a seed that had already been sown, the idea of just Ciskei and Transkei in Unity was already present when I assumed command in 1983, Katzen was simply the formalisation of that and the organisation of that, so that there would be no further instability.

MR AVENANT: Chairperson, I just want to have a look at the original submissions, if you will allow me a moment.
	General, this document written in your own handwriting, I want to refer to that.  There were several phases, for instance page 81 where reference is made to - if you look at 81, paragraph 5, that was course of action 1, and then course of action 2 and course of action 3.  Course of action, you suggested that somebody be removed for instance?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: And course of action 2, it was suggested that somebody be removed from the political life?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: Do these two removals mean exactly the same?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, different interpretations could be attached to that.  I said yesterday that I now realise that it was even possible that a sinister interpretation could be attached to these words.  At that stage our intention was that he be removed from the political scene so that he could no longer play a role there and that he then had to be replaced by a moderate pro-South African ally against this whole revolutionary onslaught.

MR AVENANT: Yes, but course of action 1, there we talk only of remove?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR AVENANT: And then in course of action 2, reference is made to a political scene?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think in context we actually are talking about the same thing.

MR AVENANT: The fact that you say that courses of action 2 and 3 on page 89 are watered down models and they will not have the same degree of success as course of action 1, that should also not be read into that?