Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1998-02-10

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: At the time when I was a member of APLA, I once, sometimes I got punishment if I did something that was wrong, so I knew that if you do something wrong, you get punished.
	So to defy an order from your Commander, I knew that you would be punished.  In other words to defy means I would be doing counteract to the revolution.

MR PRIOR: My ultimate question refers to paragraph 29 of the statement, the unsigned statement.  You describe how you arrived at the discotheque, you say I got out and found many white people inside.
	I returned and ordered Situlele to stay with the driver and protect him.  Funani was to give us firing cover from behind.  Can I just ask you on that aspect.  You seem to set out what in my mind appears to be a military style operation, you have got the driver being protected and you've got someone in a position to give you firing cover, or covering fire.  Who were you afraid of in that situation?
	The discotheque was closed, there were bars, people were inside the discotheque obviously they couldn't get out in a hurry, who did you fear a counter attack from, if I can put it in that way?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: In South Africa, it is clear that not a single person will claim not to know that white people stay in areas and they are usually armed.
	The areas in which they stay, you always find police around, soldiers around because the white people in South Africa were the people in charge of security of the whole country.
	Therefore you were not protecting the area like that.

MR PRIOR: Would I be correct in assessing from this paragraph that when you started shooting, the people inside the discotheque had no warning, no idea that an attack or shooting was going to occur?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: When you attack, I don't think that your main aim is to make the people aware in order for them to be safe, because we were told that we could die at any time if you ever inform them, therefore that would be counteract to the operation.

MR PRIOR: Can you explain why when you drove away from the scene of the attack, that you shot at a police van driving in the opposite direction?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: The reason why we shot at the police van was it met us when we were approaching a T-junction, they were going to patrol Madadini area and the speed at which it was travelling, it was clear that it was alert, therefore we couldn't wait for the enemy to attack us and act as responders.
	You have to attack first before you get attacked, therefore we had to attack it because we thought we were not safe having met the car at our road.

MR PRIOR: You also encountered a police hippo vehicle.  You say you ordered that it should not be shot at because the gunfire noise would give an indication to other pursuers of which direction in which you had retreated?  Is that correct?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: That is correct.  When you look at a hippo, shooting at a hippo is a waste of ammunition, you cannot affect or get rid of the enemy inside the hippo.
	At the same time, you will be giving direction as to where we were as we were travelling to different directions in the crossroads.
	When you carry out an operation, the most important thing is that you succeed and also to make sure that the people in your company are safe.  It is not one of the aims to challenge the enemy because we know the reinforcements in South Africa, that one of the reasons why we operate in small groups so that as soon as we finish operating, we can disappear as soon as possible, without having been cornered by the reinforcement.
	Because the reinforcement of the apartheid government was powerful at that time.  The police could have followed us, the police were in the police stations.

CHAIRPERSON: ... came to you and say to you that you have substantially answered the question.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Finally, your counsel asked you when you learnt the next day at some later stage, that only one person had died, you said you regarded the operation as a failure.
	Were you disappointed that so few people had died in that attack that had been so carefully planned and executed?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: When following an order to go and attack a place where white people are meeting, if we go and attack and only one person got killed, while our aim was not to kill only one person, it was clear that you will see yourself as a person not having carried out a successful operation.

MR PRIOR: Yes, I was just a bit puzzled at your reply when you said it is not like killing a chicken, a human being, you felt something and I wanted maybe just to explore that.
	What was that something that you felt?  Was it disappointment, was it anger, was it joy, was it happiness or was it sadness?  Are you able to explain to the Committee what you felt when you learnt that at least one person had died?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: I have clearly stated that I know that because I have before involved in operations.  Killing a person is not a nice thing.
	I end up saying that I would ask from the leadership of the PAC to contact the government, the government to arrange a meeting between the PAC with my family and the victims' family to show humanity and also reconciliation.  That is why I answered your question.
	I don't know whether there is anything that shows that I didn't have any pity with regard to the killing of people.

MR PRIOR: Do I understand you correctly, are you saying that it was necessary to kill as part of the instructions that you had, even though it was not pleasant for you to do so?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: It is painful, or it is not a good thing to kill.  Even if you know that that is the case, it doesn't mean that you will be able to defy a Commander's instruction.

MR PRIOR: I don't have any further questions, thank you.

MR PRIOR: .

ADV POTGIETER: Mr Tanda, just one issue.  How many hand grenades were issued for this operation?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: We had two hand grenades on that particular day.  It was a launch grenade which was one.

ADV POTGIETER: The hand grenades, you seem to have been charged with possession of four M26 hand grenades.  Were those the hand grenades that were meant for the operation or what?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: Those which we took to the operation, it was a hand grenade and a launch grenade.

ADV POTGIETER: ... afterwards when it was pointed out?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: That is correct.

ADV POTGIETER: This M26, what kind of hand grenade is that?  Is that a defensive or offensive hand grenade?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: It is offensive.

ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: I would like to ask if I can get a chance to pass water and come back if possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put in re-examination?

NORMAN ARENDSE: Just one aspect Mr Chairman, it shouldn't take more than a minute or so.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you carry one question?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: Okay.

NORMAN ARENDSE: I am in the same desperate situation, don't worry.  Just to try Mr Tanda to help the Committee understand a particular question or a proposition that was put to you by Mr Prior namely that targeting white people, like for example St James, the King William's Town golf club and the disco, just trying to help to understand that, you were an operative in other words you operated as an APLA soldier on the ground, is that correct?

WALTER FALIBONGA TANDA: That is correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Were you anywhere involved or in any way involved in making policy decisions within APLA, in other words did you decide what direction the military wing of the PAC, namely APLA in which way it was going in a particular period of time in a particular year?