Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-24

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: At the safe-house we locked Shabalala into one of the bedrooms.  In view of the fact that Ndaba was already a Security Branch informer and given his status in MK, he was previously acting Commander of MK Natal Machinery in Swaziland, I was given to understand that we might not be interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us, nor were we told we had to attempt to recruit him as an informer.  He was simply detained and as far as I know not seriously questioned.  Neither Ndaba nor Shabalala were assaulted or ill-treated in any way throughout the period in which they were kept at the safe-house.

MR VISSER: Did you have conversations with Mr Shabalala?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Periodic conversations, yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: But not any attempt at interrogation or recruitment, as you said.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: None at all, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright.  Go on.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I was aware of a dilemma which was coming about as this arrest of Shabalala.  We did not know whether Shabalala might not become suspicious that Ndaba had led us to him.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Visser, can I just come in here?  Mr Wasserman I would like you just to clarify paragraph 10, where you state that,
"he was simply detained and as far as I know not seriously questioned."
Are you aware of the members of C20 who questioned him?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I'm aware of the presence of C20 at that place but I didn't participate with them in any questioning.

ADV BOSMAN: Do you know whether they questioned him?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: They did talk with him.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you to Commissioner Bosman.  Would you please continue then?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: The problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in fact suspected Ndaba of working with the police.  I remember him saying as much an I might add that Shabalala was robust and aggressive throughout.  During the period 7 to 14 July, du Preez, van der Westhuizen and myself guarded Shabalala and Ndaba in turn.  At some point during the weekend, Col Botha briefed us that he had obtained information from Ndaba which pointed to a massive operation run by the ANC SACP to incite a people's revolt.  It was clear that the information was of fundamental importance and that it would probably materially affect the negotiation process which was under way at the time.
	On the 12th of July 1990, as far as I can remember, Maj du Preez and myself were conducting an observation.

MR VISSER: Now, perhaps you could just fill us in a little bit.  Tell us about this observation.  Where was it?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we were observing a place called the Knoll.

MR VISSER: K-N-O-L-L?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Yes.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: And we were observing the movements of persons entering the premises and leaving them.

MR VISSER: Alright.  And just continue then.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman at the time of conducting an observation, at the time Mr Siphiwe Nyanda became aware of our observation and this necessitated his arrest for fear that he might warn others of the police, that the police were onto them and for fear that he might go into hiding.

MR VISSER: What, how did you arrive at the conclusion that your cover was blown, so to speak?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we followed Mr Nyanda from the Knoll quite a long distance into town.

MR VISSER: Was he walking and you walking, or what was the position?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, he was in a Toyota Cressida.  He was alone.

MR VISSER: And you followed him with what?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Du Preez and I were in a Nissan, Nissan Sedan.

MR VISSER: Yes.  And what happened then as far as the arrest was concerned?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we anticipated that Mr Nyanda had cottoned on to our surveillance and we then moved in, blocked his vehicle.

MR VISSER: Did you call other, did you call for assistance on the radio?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there was a second vehicle accompanying us on the surveillance.

MR VISSER: Alright.  You blocked him in.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: We blocked him in on the road and du Preez and I alighted from our vehicle and he was formerly arrested and placed into our motor vehicle.

MR VISSER: What happened to his motor vehicle?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: One of the members in the second vehicle of ours then commenced to drive that vehicle.

MR VISSER: And where did you go?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: We proceeded directly to C R Swart Square.

MR VISSER: Now, just continue with what is stated in your statement.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Carrying on from the statement it states.

MR VISSER: He was arrested with?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir, he was arrested with certain weapons in his possession, photographs of which appear in The Other Side of the Story at the last page.

MR VISSER: Now, perhaps that does not set out the position accurately as it could have.  When you say he was in possession of these weapons would you just explain to the Chairman how it came about that they were found and when they were found and where they were found.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.  And upon arrest, we transported Mr Nyanda in our vehicle to C R Swart and another member drove Mr Nyanda's car to C R Swart Square and the vehicle was cursory searched and gone through by myself, but no weapons were found in the vehicle during the cursory search.  It was at a later stage that a thorough search was done on the vehicle and then the weapon was recovered and that is the one that appears on the last page of The Other Side of the Story.

MR VISSER: What kind of weapon is that?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I'm not sure of the weapon.  No, I see it, I have heard, it's got a silencer on it and it's a 45 calibre, but the actual make, I don't recall.

MR VISSER: Is it not a common weapon that you were used to?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: That you're accustomed to.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, it's not a common one carried by liberation forces.

MR VISSER: Alright.  So in fact the weapons, to put it accurately, the weapon was discovered later not at the same time as the arrest, but it was discovered in Mr Nyanda's car?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Were you present at all when the weapons were taken out of that car?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I was not, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you wouldn't know what exactly was found there?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: I would not, Sir.

MR VISSER: Alright.  Now there was evidence by Mr Botha and Mr Steyn that Head Office had given instructions, I believe it was on the 11th that there should preferably be no arrests before the 16th of July which was later on so that there could be time to notify various institutions, intelligence organisations, embassies etc.  At the time when Mr Nyanda was arrested, had that instruction been conveyed to you?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Now, let us assume for a moment that you had an instruction, that you had received an instruction, that you should not go ahead with arrests.  Given the circumstances as you experience them and as you've told the Committee now, what would you have done in regard to the arrest of Mr Nyanda?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we would have gone ahead with the arrest of Mr Nyanda.

MR VISSER: Why?

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: Due to the fact that he had detected, his counter surveillance had proved positive, he had detected us and he would have warned other parties and they would have gone into hiding.

MR VISSER: They would have gone into hiding.  Yes.  Alright.  Please continue.