Special Hearings — Mandela United Football Club Hearings — 1997-11-24

MR HUGO: A last aspect that worried me personally and you personally as well; is it true that when the affidavit was done which formed the basis of the amnesty application with regard to the Mabota Amnesty application you specifically told me not to make mention of the so-called love relationship that came into play and that on your request you didn't want it to be part of your statement.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairman because if that were the case, it wouldn't have been a gross human rights violation.  Perhaps in the past during the time of the prohibition of mixed marriages act it would have been the case but in the context I said that was during cross-examination by Mr Justice van der Merwe and the Attorney General, but that was during those hearings with regard to questions to you in connection with Mr Chappies Kloppers and his character and his participation in certain misdemeanours.  You didn't mention it there.

MR HUGO: I didn't do so because it wasn't relevant and in fact that you also told me that you were not sure in any way whether there was any substance in that and in fact that could again have been a Stratcom operation from Soweto and you therefore didn't want it in.

MR DE KOCK: If you look at my evidence in front of Mr Justice van der Merwe, in any of the excuses of Mr Mabota, one of the excuses was that he was a sex slave.  I don't believe that, I think the whole story of sex slaves you can't really trust whether it is a high profile person or just a small politician or whoever, the ordinary man, that has nothing to do with the job itself.

MR HUGO: But Mr Potgieter did mention it in his affidavit and he attacked you on the point that you mentioned things that were not relevant and he wanted you to address this whole aspect and you refused to do so.

MR DE KOCK: That unfortunately is true but I think Mr Potgieter was advised by somebody else, not the present advisor, but that is not important here, but I don't want to fight them now.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock then finally can I ask you, you see that some of the family members of the deceased are here and without whipping up emotions, or becoming overly sentimental, how do you feel about what happened and about what you've been involved with at that stage.

MR DE KOCK: Chairman we wasted a number of lives on both sides.  It was unnecessary with hindsight.  The temperatures were running very high in the '70's and '80's.  None of the two sides didn't have prisoners really.  Barbarism was rife on both sides, I don't want to elaborate on that now, it was a waste of good manpower.  At some stage or another we could have been sitting here drinking tea together.  The losses they've had because of the deaths of people and those people who have been messed around physically or emotionally we will never ever be able to repair.  Nobody can say I'm a victim.  Sometimes I do feel like that and that is not out of context, but we're going to have to try to prevent this from happening again, it is not the time to elaborate on it now.  If people want to detain me for that and that could lead to my death, so be it but because a number of people on both sides, the politicians perhaps, couldn't come to terms with each other and one-another, the ordinary man suffered.  It didn't have anything to do with colour and what they told us during that time was acceptable and we accepted that you plant a 5kg bomb and I will plant a bigger one and in that way we kept on destroying and it was escalating and on an escalating level.   So in other words if you didn't experience this yourself, it is difficult for me to, in the limited linguistic skills I have, to really tell you.  I nevertheless am trying my best to do so.  I have nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior.

MR PRIOR: Thank you, Mr de Kock, whilst you were at Vlakplaas did your unit have any relationship or any contact with the Soweto Security Branch?

MR DE KOCK: Yes that is correct Chair.

MR PRIOR: Are you able to give the Commission and idea in general terms of the type of contact that occurred?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chair what happened was that Vlakplaas at C 1 was on a national and international level or outside of the borders, Europe in some occasions.  That's just the background.  The normal procedure would have been that Security Branch or Division might feel that there was a presence of ANC members or operational members in their area, they would then request via head office for a group of askaris and we would look which of the askaris possibly might know some of those terrorists or trained people who might have been trained with them, who might know their family and the moment that they were deployed from Vlakplaas then the commander of the askari group fell under the divisional head of the security branch wherever that is, Durban, Cape Town etc.  From there the commander would go and appoint a member normally a member of the anti-insurgents' unit and say these are the members, task them with specific goals.  Would a Stratcom unit or anybody, should they need an askari, they would go to the commander in charge for order, discipline and their tasking and would say I have these photographs that have to be identified, or can you help me with this interrogation, or whatever.  These are situations on the periphery but the main task was the tracing and arresting of an MK member and especially the confiscation of weapons, ammunition and explosives afterwards because the moment you could do that, you have half an anti insurgent soldier, in other words, his teeth have been extracted.  You haven't done everything but that was a beginning.

MR PRIOR: I'm specifically after, was there any logistical support if I can put it that way, given to the  Soweto security branch by Vlakplaas during this period, 88/89 whilst you were at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chair, we had our own logistics for our own members, machine guns - everything they needed we made available immediately.  I he requested it while he was there, it could have been made to reach him immediately.  As far as Soweto was concerned, they did sometimes fetch landmines, AK47's, ammunition, hand grenades and so forth from me as well as explosives and then exploders as well.   That enabled them to perform possible covert operations, that was basically for what it was.  That's how I see it, there might have been other reasons.

MR PRIOR: So it is correct that Soweto security branch during this relevant period called on Vlakplaas for support whether it be logistical via weapons that they required or ammunition or explosives or other assistance in launching operations.  Do you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chair, it was not a strange concept, there was nothing sinister about it,  We were all in the same boat, we helped each other.  We just had more access to such equipment, it wasn't only Soweto, I am thinking of Eastern Cape, Natal, Cape Town, Eastern Transvaal.  It wasn't an isolated thing, just with Soweto.

MR PRIOR: Before the incident regarding Temba Mabotha, had you had any other contact for example with Mr Potgieter from the Security Branch, Soweto?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I saw him upon occasion I think, if I try to remember but we worked together for a while at Koevoet also in a sensitive line, not everybody moved on that level.  It was an elected group on that level.

MR PRIOR: Once you placed your team of Askari or gave assistance in terms of manpower to the Security Branch at Soweto, would you know the specifics of the operation or would you leave that up to the local commander to give those instructions to your Askaris or your men?