Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-19

H J P BOTHA: This included planning, military planning as well as strategic planning and the creation of structures, military training of supporters and the establishment of a sophisticated communication network and Intelligence network.
	Ndaba's function was to write a programme about amongst other things military training, provision of weapons, etc.  Basically the how and where and the wherewithal aspects in preparation for the popular revolt.  This function of Ndaba's was generally known as military combat work.
	Ndaba told me that there were certain leading figures in the RSA such as Siphiwe Nyanda, Ronnie Casrills and Mac Maharaj and he further gave me the addresses of a whole number of safe houses of the ANC in the Durban area.  The information regarding the presence of these people, mentioned people in the country was news for me.  Nobody in the Security Branch knew that.
	Ndaba also gave me the names of other people who were involved in the operation.  Some of these had been trained, military trained abroad and others were well-known activists within the borders of the country, such as Pravien Gordhan and Dipak Patel.  Their involvement in the operation was also news to us.  
	It is necessary to try and explain my own framework, interpretation framework, relating to information which was received in that period.  On one hand the South African Government had made a serious start with negotiation process with, amongst others the ANC SACP Alliance and Mr Nelson Mandela was released and certain agreements had already been achieved regarding certain matters such as the Groote Schuur Minute and serious negotiations with a view to negotiations was the order of the day and a suspension of the struggle was viewed as a future possibility.
	This suspension of the arms struggle by the ANC SACP Alliance was announced by them during August of 1990.

MR VISSER: This follows after the incident, but you're just placing it in context for us?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that was according to the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

H J P BOTHA: I'm mentioning this fact to show that during 1990 there was a movement towards the suspension of all the military aggression of the government and the liberation movements.
	During 1990 there was a significant decrease in explosions in public places, but the military struggle manifested itself in the attacks on certain person, especially in the struggle between the supporters of the ANC and the IFP.  Accordingly the members of the Security Branch of Port Natal could not simply assume that the arms struggle had been ended. 
	As a result of the above, my focus was still very much on information which could help with preventative actions against political violence.  The fact of the negotiating process did not play a major role to my thinking to the analysis of information which I received.  It's possibly for these reasons that, as appears later, I didn't have a complete understanding of the extent and the importance of the information which Ndaba gave me.  2 or possibly 3 further meetings took place between myself and Ndaba during which he gave me information with the same basic import.  On Saturday the 7th July 1990...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Chairperson, I'm battling with the speed.  If we could also remind the witness to slow down a bit.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you've got Exhibit D in front of you.

MR LAX: I realise that Mr Chairperson, my Afrikaans isn't very good.  Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Take it easy, thank you.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, I'm taking my cue from the interpreter.  On Saturday the 7th July 1990 I received a phone call from du Preez at home.

MR VISSER: Who is this du Preez?

H J P BOTHA: He was a Lt du Preez at that stage and he was one of my colleagues who worked with me in the ANC  the MK component.

MR VISSER: Was he under your command?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, he was under my command.

MR VISSER: And he's also an applicant for amnesty in this matter?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.  During this phone call he told me that an ANC MK terrorist which later appeared to be Charles Ndaba, had been arrested and detained at C R Swart Square.
	Upon my arrival there, I met du Preez and accompanied him to the Security Branch offices where I saw a member of Col Andy Taylor's askari unit, namely Vusi Ninela.  At that stage I was du Preez's commanding officer and Col Taylor was the Commander of the terrorist unit.  Now it needs to be mentioned that at that stage Durban had about 9 askaris to assist me, tracking, identification, arrest and the questioning of terrorists.  In the office a person was sitting on a chair and I immediately recognised him.  Ninela was very excited and told me that he by himself, had arrested this person and he identified him to me as Charles Ndaba, MK Zwelake.  
	It was only much later that I heard that Ninela had not been alone when Ndaba had been arrested, but that Goodwill Sikhakane, he was also an askari, had taken part in that.  I first learned of Goodwill Sikhakane's involvement in the arrest when Adv Ackerman, in December of 1995, warned me that I was a suspect in the death of Goodwill Sikhakane.  I was, however, not involved in the death of Goodwill Sikhakane.
	At C R Swart Square I represented Col Andy Taylor, W/O Wasserman, Maj du Preez and Sers van der Westhuizen, well I met them there.  I took them to a different office and I told them that Charles Ndaba was in fact a registered informer of the Security Branch and that he was being handled by me.  At that stage, it was just myself and Gen Steyn aware of the fact that Ndaba was an informer and that he was in the country.  Col Taylor was upset about the fact that he had not been informed of that and after that he withdrew along with Vusi Ninela.

MR VISSER: If I may interrupt you here?  Mr Botha, yesterday the Evidence Leader of the Commission gave us certain documents, amongst others we were given statements.  Mr Chairman, these have not been marked as exhibits.  I'm not sure whether Ms Thabethe has any particular order in mind to deal with these exhibits.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what document you are talking about.

MR VISSER: We are talking about, Mr Chairman, HLV statements and investigative unit reports, Mr Chairman.  Now the investigative unit reports are marked in the bundle which was provided to us yesterday by Ms Thabethe as pages 1 to 9 of that bundle and HLV statements were marked pages 10 to 27.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I believe that copies have been prepared for you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have them.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may suggest that that bundle might be referred to as Exhibit E then?

CHAIRPERSON: The bundle as a whole?

MR VISSER: The bundle as a whole, Mr Chairman.  It contains both investigative unit reports from page 1 to 9 and HLV statements from page 10 to 27.

CHAIRPERSON: Just let me get one thing clear.  Mrs Thabethe, who is this - who compiled the document we are going to deal with as Exhibit E?

MS THABETHE: I did, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: This bundle of documents will now be referred to as Exhibit E.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, not - so that you don't become confused, there is also another bundle.  I'm not referring to that bundle at all at this stage.  I merely refer to this bundle, Exhibit E for reason of the fact that I want to refer you page 4, Mr Chairman.  No that, well Mr Chairman, I'm not sure whether I'm not confused here because the statements run on.  This might be the second bundle Mr Chairman which starts with, in handwriting, Statements from the docket by Eugene de Kock, page 1 to 3, Andrew Taylor page 4 to 6, have you got that in front of you?  Perhaps it should be better to mark that F, Mr Chairman, otherwise we're going to get confused.

CHAIRPERSON: To mark what document as Exhibit F?