Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I think that those weapons in the blanket, which was referred to at the Section 29, were the weapons which were confiscated by Brits.  The Tokarev which I obtained, was that one evening it was lost, it got lost and a few months afterwards it was found in an armed robbery in the Peninsula and according to their procedure they handled that weapon.  I cannot, I think it was sent to the Quartermaster where the other branches sent their weapons to.

MR HUGO: But from the side of Captain Drury, did he ask when those weapons would be returned?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If he had a request regarding these weapons, I would have written a letter to him and said there are, were outstanding weapons and it were, they were handed over to Murder and Robbery.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock says in his statement that these weapons could not have been issued by the arsenal at headquarters without Willem Schoon giving approval for that.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: In this case Schoon did give the approval for that.  I spoke to him at his house and he agreed that that was the procedure.  He could not remember the specific incident, but he did give instructions for that.

MR HUGO: Then, shortly, I want to refer to the Volkswagen Kombi.  What happened to this Kombi after this operation?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, that Kombi was white, was painted white and it had false panels.  One evening it was involved in a shooting, shoot-out with the police.  There were AK magazines in the Kombi and it was resprayed from funds from the secret fund.  We put in some windows and it was used again in Guguletu.  After this operation it was painted dark blue and it was taken back to Vlakplaas.

MR HUGO: Regarding the structures in place for calling Vlakplaas members to assist in operations countrywide, I want to put it to you that Mr de Kock said that it happened in a very structured way and that the commanding officer, for example in this specific incident, was the Commanding Officer of the Western Cape Branch, would contact Brigadier Schoon in Pretoria and ask for permission to use members from Vlakplaas in his specific region.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And Brigadier Schoon from his side would contact Colonel de Kock, put his need and then Colonel de Kock would liaise with the Commanding Officer in the Western Cape and then it would happen that the Commanding Officer in the Western Cape would tell Mr, Colonel de Kock who was the officer who expressed the need and then Mr de Kock would contact that person?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And Mr de Kock, as soon as he had obtained this information, would contact you and would inform you with whom you had to liaise in the Western Cape?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Colonel de Kock would then continue, that the control and the authority over your group would fall under the officer to which you will be reporting when you arrive in Cape Town?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  I would not do anything after I have cleared it out with the local security police and the person to whom I was responsible and in this case it was Liebenberg, on a daily or even hourly basis I would report back to him.

MR HUGO: One aspect which I have neglected to address, when a need is expressed from, for example, the Western Cape, Mr de Kock says that such a need would, had to be confirmed with Brigadier Schoon via a telex.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That administrative arrangement was established when Colonel de Kock took over at Vlakplaas.  We said that everything should be written on paper and there should be clear guidelines.  That is correct then.

MR HUGO: While you were in the Western Cape and involved in this operation and in this infiltration process, did you contact Mr de Kock from time to time?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  I did contact him regularly to tell him that everything was going well.  That was just good manners and once or twice he visited us.  He visited various members countrywide to see whether everything was still in order.

MR HUGO: In his statement he says that that information given to him and the discussions he had with you were of a general nature and he never received detailed information from you or anybody in the Western Cape?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock says, Mr Bellingan, that about three or four days before this incident, this is the incident which happened on the third of March, you, and he cannot remember very well, or somebody else from the Western Cape contacted him and told him that a certain attack on a police station was being planned.  Can you remember something like that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: It is difficult to say, but under normal circumstances I would have contacted him to tell him that things are going well and we hope that our mission will be successful.

MR HUGO: And then after this incident various telexes and encoded messages were sent to headquarters and some of them were addressed to Mr de Kock.  Is it so that you wrote those telexes?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  Either I or Liebenberg or both of us wrote those telexes.

MR HUGO: Why did you address them to Mr de Kock?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Because at the Terrorist Desk everything resorted under Colonel de Kock, everything had to go there, he was my Commanding Officer.  There were questions in Parliament, there were various reasons why we had to do that.

MR HUGO: While we are busy with questions in Parliament, are you aware that Tiaan van der Merwe, a previous member of Parliament, for the previous Progressive Party, asked questions regarding this incident?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And Mr de Kock says that the nature and the detail of those questions were never brought under his attention or nobody ever asked him for any input?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  From the Western Cape we would send these telexes at the Research Desk with Colonel Boegner, I think, would go to him.  He would compile all the questions and documents, asked for the signature and take it back to the Commissioner and would be given to the Minister's office and the answer returned to Cape Town.  It could have been that these telexes did not pass him.

MR HUGO: You also, regarding the aspect of the so-called head-money, which has been referred to here, you have also said that the askaris received an amount of R7 000,00 and that was a normal procedure.  Could you tell us how this process worked from the administrative point of view?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If I can remember correctly, he would come back after a successful mission and a claim was instituted for these askaris either under their names or fictitious names and it was processed to Schoon and then to the administrative section who paid out the money.

MR HUGO: The report compiled afterwards, was that presented to de Kock and he had to approve that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I think if he was there I would have given it to him or second in charge.  It was normal practice, it had to go to de Kock.

MR HUGO: Is it correct to say that there was nothing sinister about the payment of these amounts?  There were formalities which had to be followed and certain procedures were established for that purpose?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is 100% correct.  We went so far as after payment, we took these members to the bank to avoid mishandling of the money.  We opened bank accounts for them, we were busy with the rehabilitation process.  It was not just to capture people and to shoot people, we were there for rehabilitation.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO