Special Hearings — Political Party Recalls — UNKNOWN

MR DE KLERK: Well firstly I just want to reiterate again that I have in quite a number of instances gained the very clear impression that the alleged knowledge of such people, high-ranking people is based on an allegation by applicants and that they have not been afforded the opportunity to admit or deny that they actually did know and that the orders actually originated from them or not, and that is the route which I sincerely believe the Commission should travel before accepting that they knew. It must be tested.
Having said that let me just say that the policy with regard to security formulated at Cabinet and State Security Council level was caged in general terms. The process, it was a policy there's a revolutionary onslaught. This revolutionary onslaught must be withstood. The goals of the revolutionaries are to overthrow the government, to make the country ungovernable, it needs strong measures. And then it would be operationalised in the sense that then the Minister and the Director General or the Commissioner or the head of the Defence

<UNKNOWN>: orce would, on a specific issue, develop a wider sort-of guidelines to say now this is the framework, we need to start an operation to address a specific problem. This is the framework for such an operation. That would not come to me, that would not come to anybody, that would be between the Minister and the Director General. And to the best of my knowledge the normal process would then be that that framework for an operation would then go to the specific branch or the specific section of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: or the police who, where it should be in terms of their specific line function and they would then, and the senior officer there would then take responsibility to fill in this framework and to now operationalise it into a sort-of an instruction, what's the English word - almost a directive. And then from there on the nearer you come, then somebody will say well to implement this we need eight lorries and we need 50 troops and we need to depart at five o'clock in the morning and we need to be there at six o'clock in the afternoon, that detailed operationalisation takes place then at a much lower level.
No doubt quite often that is where, then, either through over-zealousness or through a mala fide approach, whatever the motivation might be of an individual involved where things get out of hand, where it wasn't foreseen that it should happen, yes the operation was authorised, go and catch the people who are illegally moving from South Africa to be trained by Umkhonto, prevent them from going. So such an order might have been given. 
I'm just using an example which has been used in questions. Then the people who catch them don't only catch them, they don't only prevent them from doing so. That's one possibility. And I think that is the logical possibility.

YASMINE SOOKA: Thank you. Just one more question Archbishop on the question of torture and I think you proffered some explanation that you took measures in fact to contain it, but you also proffered another explanation that often this was the propaganda of the ANC. I simply would like to inform you that in the course of our questioning, through our Section 29 process, very high-ranking officers have informed the Commission that in fact torture was widespread, and that in fact it was so widespread that it was not confined only to the security forces, ordinary policemen, each had their own instrument and their own bag of tricks. I would like to refer you to a matter which was raised this morning where Stanza Bopape in fact died while he was being tortured and there a Commissioner of the Police in fact has applied for amnesty for his part in the cover-up of Stanza's murder.

MR DE KLERK: Well that's terrible, that's terrible and I did say that we were told at times that such propaganda is being spread. I also said that because of the many rumours steps were taken, with hindsight I have no problem in saying maybe it wasn't timeous enough and maybe it wasn't strong enough with the facts now coming to the fore. I'm not saying we were perfect. I am not saying we didn't make mistakes. I am not saying that on such issues, with all these shocking facts coming to the fore, that maybe we should have done more. But what I am saying is, that we didn't just lump everything and close our eyes that there was a process of stepping up measures to prevent that, to give inmates access to outside advice,, to legal advice, to visiting magistrates, to visiting delegations to check on them, to offer them the opportunity to expose it where it continued or where it took place.

YASMINE SOOKA: Sir, I think the point I want to make is you are offering us an explanation that in fact these things were committed by a few individuals and I think in your own submission you talk about a few mavericks, but I think we are faced with insurmountable evidence that it in fact was widespread across the security forces, and I think that's the point that we want to bring home. You have proffered an explanation and we want to test that explanation.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

MR DE KLERK: Can I just react to that by firstly saying, I don't think that when I say that there was a maverick element which was relatively small, which did all these dastardly deeds that I am not then including in that general practices such as hitting a prisoner with fists, slapping him, kicking him around in order to frighten him to get evidence, that is widespread and that has been widespread and it's widespread in all countries, it doesn't make it right, but it's a fact, it's a problem that you have to deal with in each and every police force. But murder and assassination was not, to the best of my experience, something which was widespread. 
With the facts coming to the fore I am not saying that I am shocked by how many people have been implicated. When I drew this in 1996, my first submission, these facts were not on the table. I was as unaware of many of the things which have come to the fore as you have been at that stage, and my expectation at that stage was that the number of gross violations of human rights from the side of the security forces would be much more limited than the evidence which is coming to the fore now. That is why I am blatantly honest with you when I say I am as shocked as you are about these many revelations.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Now Richard you wanted....

MR LYSTER: Yes thank you Mr Chairman, just briefly.

CHAIRPERSON: A brief point, alright, Richard Lyster, yes.

MR LYSTER: Mr de Klerk you've said on a number of occasions that it's human nature for people in their amnesty applications to blame other people. Now many of these amnesty applications that we've heard about today the people don't blame anybody else. They make application on their own behalf. Taking, for example, the 12 executions carried out in KwaZulu Natal, nobody else is blamed, they maintain in their applications that they did this off their own initiative. 
And what makes it problematic for us, or your explanation that this was an aberration or unusual or a handful of operatives is that these were not constables on the beat. These were colonels and a general which makes it very, very difficult for us to accept your explanation that these, like Vlakplaas, were mere aberrations. If that is so there were lots of aberrations taking place all over the country, because we have senior people coming forward and saying, I did this and I'm telling you I did it because I am scared of being prosecuted, not because they've had a change of heart. And that's what is also very clear from these amnesty applications. People are coming forward because they are scared of prosecution. So ...(intervention)