Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-18

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Chairman I am sorry I cannot agree with you that a person in the civil service in my position had the responsibility to decide whether it would affect the election. That might have been considered at governmental level. I certainly didn't consider that as a factor. In fact I agreed that Mr Mandela should be informed as quickly as possible after the election. We knew that the balance of power was going to shift. And we were in, I was eager to get that under the attention of the new government.
 And then Mr Chairman the new government had exactly the same problem.

YASMINE SOOKA: I think that precisely is what concerns us. You see Mr de Klerk in his evidence before this Commission has said: "When this problem came to my notice I dismissed the man. The new government in fact re-hired him." But you are telling us in your evidence that as early as February the old government also had a problem with how they were going to account to other countries on this programme. So you created the monster and you left it for a new government to deal with.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Ms Sooka both of these are my governments. I have acted in the civil service in support of both governments. So I really do not accept saying that it was my government. Both governments were my governments. But let me say this quite categorically when it was brought to our attention in February Mr de Klerk was informed about this. Mr de Klerk was told that in fact the dismissal was not fair, was not based on judicial processes that had been followed and this man was in a position where he could actually sue the government as some of his colleagues have done since then. But the fact is it was then in the political domain. I said this morning the impression I got and I stand by that was that at that point the most important issue was deal with the demarche get that off the table. We can deal with the abuses or possible abuses along a different process.
 And I was satisfied that it was now brought to the attention of everybody that I could possibly bring it to the attention to. Where the Chairman is correct I could have instigated a board of enquiry of my own but that would be far less important than what is taking place at governmental level surely.

YASMINE SOOKA: May I just follow that up with one more question. Would it be fair to say that in reality you or the old government couldn't really afford to have this man placed in the permanent force because in reality he was needed to actually deal with the problems that had arisen. And so never mind the legal technicalities of his dismissal or his pensioning off. The reality is that control of this programme from a technological point of view rested solely with one person, Dr Basson.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is true.

YASMINE SOOKA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally.

MR VALLY: General Knobel we gather from your evidence that OSEO was aware in a letter dated the 8th of December to you, 8th of December 1992 to you that there may be certain financial improprieties regarding Dr Basson's activities?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is correct.

MR VALLY: You weren't aware of it before this date?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir I testified this morning that when I met with National Intelligence at that meeting on the 24 of September 1993 I briefed them also about a number of counter-intelligence reports and investigations that had taken place within the Defence Force.

MR VALLY: No the question is this that before a letter from OSEO - the Office for Serious Economic Offences on the 8th of December 1992 you as project manager for Project Jotta and Dr Basson who fell under you as project officer for Project Jotta, you were not aware of any financial improprieties on his part?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I have just confirmed that I was. I said that at the 24th of September meeting with National Intelligence I referred back to counter-intelligence reports prior to 1992 where he had been investigated by Chief of Staff Finance, by Chief of Staff Intelligence with regard to activities that he was involved in what originally was thought was to be part of the project and it was in fact not part of the project. It referred to the house of Murton, the Murton House position in Pretoria. It referred to the use of aircraft of - I forget now what the name of business was. I think Aeromed Services, words to that effect. Those things had been investigated before 1992 within the Defence Force by the Chief of Staff Intelligence and by the Chief of Staff Finance and they had dismissed it as not being part of the project or not being part of Defence Force. In fact they accepted the explanations that Basson had given them.
 But the answer to your question is yes I was aware that there had been internal investigations in the Defence Force into possible activities by Basson in terms of financial gain.

MR VALLY: You state further, so you were aware already by 1991 there was some concern regarding money and therefore I assume you were more diligent thereafter?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Oh yes Sir.

MR VALLY: You also state in your statement you read out this morning that during February 1994 and I quote you
"It was abundantly clear to both the Minister and myself that there were definite indications that Dr Basson had acted outside the mandate of the project and had probably abused capabilities that had been researched and developed in the project."

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is correct.

MR VALLY: But if you look at TRC 28, 7th of May 1994 a letter from Dr Basson to you and he is still project officer of Jotta on the 7th of May 1994.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I beg your pardon Mr Vally?

MR VALLY: I am sorry, TRC 28.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: You are saying that he was still project officer of Jotta that is not true.

MR VALLY: Well he signs his letter as W Basson, Project Officer Jotta, Brigadier and it is addressed to you, well your name is on the bottom of the letter - D B Knobel, Project Leader Jotta, Lieutenant General.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: He was certainly not the project officer any longer. He may have signed the letter like this and he may have been involved with the finalisation of this particular problem that existed at the time but the project officer from the 1st of March was Colonel Ben Steyn of 1993.

MR VALLY: I see because this letter is headed "Extremely secret. Only copy." It has got "Enquiries; Brigadier W Basson" His address is given as SAMS head office and a private bag in (...indistinct) is set out there. All indications are on the face of this letter that he is still intensively involved in this project. Did you ever refute this? Did you ever write a letter to him saying: "Please refrain from calling yourself the project officer of Operation Jotta"? Did you ever react in that way?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No quite honestly I didn't notice this and I would have reacted if necessary but I think if I see this letter I remember it. It was in answer to part of the investigation that was being carried out about the financial abuses and we wanted an explanation from him and this is the explanation that he had given at that time. I believe if you give me time I will go back to the CMC meetings and I believe it was discussed there. It is incorrect for him to write down here project officer. He was certainly not project officer any longer.

MR VALLY: Well let's go on. I want to go through this letter with you. Firstly the first paragraph. It says
" Final report,
sorry it is in Afrikaans. I will read in Afrikaans to you.
"Finale verslag VSA dollar voorskot."
Can you just briefly tell us what this is all about? Very briefly please?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am afraid Mr Chairman it is not possible. It is a highly complexed story that is being investigated by the OSEO and I would need the help of OSEO to give you the exact explanation of this.

MR VALLY: Alright.