Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-09-11

COL SHOBESBERGER: I'm Colonel Schobersberger, I'm the former chief of staff operations Ciskei Defence Force and, Honourable Chairman, I appreciate very much that I'm given the opportunity together with my colleagues to answer question and also to bring forward points to clarify certain issues, detail issues in respect of the Bisho massacre.
 But before I do so, I want to express the disappointment of the members of the Ciskei Defence Force that their Head of State at the time, Brigadier Gqozo is not present, that he is taking cover, that with the soldiers who on the 7th September put our heads on the block for him, are again putting our heads on the block for him and he is running away from it.  We must make it very clear we expect and we ask the Commission to ensure that he appears in front of this Commission because he must stand, he must say - I am responsible.   This is a point I would like to make very clear and I appeal to the Commission to ensure that he appears in front of this Commission because we, the soldiers had to safeguard him and when it is time for him now to stand in, in front of us he is taking cover which we cannot accept.  
 During Monday, accusation or statements were made by political leaders in respect of that we, the Ciskei Defence Force lured the marchers into a trap.  This old theory of ambush, setting up an ambush I would like to clarify with your permission and I want to answer it in this way and to clarify it in the following ways.  First, our original deployment before 11 o'clock in the morning of the 7th was that we had one company of soldiers which are about 120 soldiers positioned in the stadium.
 Their task was to prevent the marchers occupying the stadium because at this stage we did not know that permission was given to go to the stadium.  So the fence around the stadium had no meaning for our own soldiers because they occupied the stadium.  
 Only at 11 o'clock we were instructed to remove from the stadium, to change our position because permission was given to the marchers to go to the stadium.  So the fence at this stage had no meaning to us.  Then when we moved again this company from the stadium to Fort Hare, the issue of the fence did not come up.  Why?
 Our task was not to confine the marchers in the stadium.  Our task was to prevent the marchers marching and occupying Bisho.  If the marcher would have milled around the embankment of the stadium, including outside of the fence, it would have not made any difference to us.  Only the effect it had when the marchers charged against our position at Jongilanga Crescent, then we acted, leading to this terrible event.  But if the marchers would have moved around the stadium, outside, inside it would have means nothing to us which brings me to the second point and that is 
 We were asked why did we not use crowd control measure as standard practice.  If the marchers would have moved as a crowd, singing, toyi-toying, chanting, towards our lines, we would have been able to stick to proper crowd control measure but that was not the case.  When our soldiers, my soldiers, saw that the crowd was charging towards them there was panic, there was fear to be overrun and killed.  That was the effect this charge against our lines had.  
Furthermore if the Commission, I'm quite sure you received a detailed briefing on the deployment and events, remember that the moment the marchers charged from the stadium towards our lines, still one group of soldiers, namely one platoon from Bravo company  [which are about 30 soldiers]  were running from their original positions which was to Combana House brought up by trucks to their position at Jongilanga Crescent.
 So for me I must of course believe a man's word if he says he could not see our soldiers in their position at Jongilanga Crescent but half of the soldiers deployed there were still running to their positions.  So the leader of this group must have seen it.  Furthermore, the accusation of - we took cover, we were hiding and waiting for the marchers to run and shoot.  The first line of defence as laid down in all the groups between police and the Ciskei Defence Force was that the police will be the first line of defence.
 The second line of defence will be again the police and when everything has failed because we received information that MK will be with the march, MK will stage an armed attack.  Then only if police cannot handle this with their non-lethal means like teargas, rubber bullets etc. then the soldiers as a last resort will have to resort to live ammunition.  So the soldiers being positioned there at Jongilanga Crescent, they did not stand like the ones at Fort Hare, in riot position because they did not expect this charge coming to them.
 Some of them were standing, some of them were sitting, some of them were lying, not for any purpose because when we also rehearsed on the previous Sunday, or was it the day before, our message the soldiers wanted to put across to two role players  [the one was the Alliance and the second one was the South African Defence Force based at King William's Town]  that the soldiers will obey the orders of their political leaders and when it comes to the tragic event it came, they will have to open fire.  So they were at no stage, at no stage at doubt on this.  
 I could accuse now to say Intelligence, MK and ANC failed to pick up this, I could say so but I don't want to use excuses.  The fact was we rehearsed and we used blank ammunition during rehearsal to get the message across to say please do not do something which could lead to this tragic event.  But I, as I have explained, must really strongly, strongly reject from deep from my heart that this issue was a set-up ambush because that means that we, not only the soldiers sitting here, all soldiers, were from your community who are related to you, who are part of this region are just happy killers who waited for the kill to destroy, and that is wrong.  That is wrong.  
 We were forced in a position by our political leaders to stop the marchers.  As soldiers we knew what it means.  We prepared a document as stated by the General, warning the politician, we gave three scenarios in this document and one of them was what we call the worse case scenario which we say if we have to open fire, that will be the consequences and we exactly expressed what actually happened and it was up to the politicians now to make a decision if they can take this risk or not.  We soldiers of the former Ciskei Defence Force had no hidden agenda, we had an order which we followed leading to these tragic events.
 So I must say as I explained, never ever did we intend to set up an ambush.  I could even go into smaller details.  If you look to the ground and the passage through the tunnel leading towards the soldiers deployed at Jongilanga Crescent, there is a ditch.  When they prepared the embankment from the stadium they took out the soil to put it up to this embankment.  Fortunately there was a ditch because without this ditch more people would have died.  We would not have sat at an ambush for two reasons.  One because we are not sick people, we are not mad people, we are not killers.  
 We followed orders and we regret it deeply but also from a military point of view, if a group of soldiers wanted to kill it doesn't need to be at Jongilanga Crescent to wait for the marchers to come.  So there was never any intention to create the situation.  In August when this march was diffused, we soldiers were very happy about this and we hoped it will happen also on the 7th September.  So from my point of view the Commission will probably ask me questions but let me use the opportunity as I did already in September 94 over radio Ciskei.  
 From my point of view and for the soldiers of the Ciskei Defence Force I can speak.  I say we are sorry.  I say the burden of the Bisho massacre will be on our shoulders for the rest of our lives.  We cannot wish it away, it happened but please I ask specific the victims not to forget, I cannot ask this, but to forgive us, to get the soldiers back into the community, to accept them fully, to try to understand also under the pressure they were then.  This is all I can do.  I'm sorry, this I can say and I'm sorry and I speak I think on behalf of the Ciskei Defence Force soldiers who are now deployed all over South Africa, who are not only any more here in this area.  Who are already putting down separatist movement in KwaZulu Natal, who are patrolling other areas to establish crime free zones etc.  Who are fully integrated now into the new South African National Defence Force.
 That is my plea to you, through the Commission, sorry that I always spoke to things but it is through the Commission and as I say, I request the Commission I think on behalf of the soldier of the Ciskei Defence Force that Brigadier Gqozo will stand here and answer for what he has ordered on the 7th September.  I am, I can answer any question.  Thank you very much.