Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-10-14

MR MALAN: Chairperson I have less of a problem I think than Yasmin Sooka, but Mr Botha knows that I also come with a bit of a baggage to this Commission.  I left the National Party at the end of '86, beginning of '87, advancing as my primary reason what I perceived to be license to the security establishment.  You did say in your evidence this morning when Cabinet and the State Security Council are not the sinister organisations, you didn't expand on that.   You also expanded fairly at length on the question of power when you referred to the caucus and to congresses and so on, but you ended that statement by saying that "the caucus elected the Head of State", and I am quoting you, "that is where the power was".  Were you saying that the power was at the level of Head of State?  That's question number one.
 Then to sort of kick back adding on to the question of Yasmin, you see I also find it difficult to believe that things happened where people were assassinated, clearly also often in a planned manner or in similar ways and therefore co-ordinated in some way or another, I find it very difficult to believe that it would not have been sanctioned to certain people within the security establishment by at least a member or members of Cabinet.  I find it very difficult to understand that.
 Alternatively that a member or members acted as a shield between whoever was applying this unwritten or implied policy or whatever it was and their being found out.  Now I really implore you to - you did say in your submission, I read it, responsibility lies with Cabinet, none of you can walk away from the position of saying you should not have done more.  You should have questioned which you did not.  And by omission you are responsible.  I think that's how I read your presentation.  
 But there is something more than that.  I mean either there was no nexus with any politician or there was a nexus, either as a shield or commissioning to at least some politicians, if not the whole of Cabinet, and I think I made it clear, I, with my baggage, find it very difficult to accept that the whole of Cabinet would have commissioned and sanctioned and shielded such a policy, something which in any event for yourself you have denied in your presentation.  Please help me also in terms of saying something about the power.

CHAIRPERSON: Please switch on.....

MR R F BOTHA: ...the power of the government derived from the constitution and I think it is obvious if you look at the previous constitution you will find in that constitution that much power, too much in my opinion, was given to the Head of State.  The convention was I remember years ago when we were divided in the Cabinet almost 50/50 on the issue of whether we should attack a place in Angola called Kasinga.  I said no the UN was going to give us a lot of trouble.  The Minister of Defence, who was then Mr P W Botha said it must be done because it had something to do with the movements of the moon because parachute troops had to be dropped.  We were divided 50/50.  And then it was said, I was then a young minister, the Cabinet decision is the Prime Minister's decision and the Prime Minister's decision is the Cabinet's decision.  And I think I am correct in saying this because he who can fire has the power.  If a given minister did not agree when we have sat in Cabinet and I think it's very much the procedure in most of the Anglo-Saxon countries a matter is now on the agenda, you see here of the Security Council, then it goes to the Cabinet in a similar manner and it's discussed, every minister has a right to participate in the discussion, even if it's not your particular portfolio that is affected or your budget that is affected, and then the Chairperson is then the Prime Minister, now the State President, at the end I suppose he looks, listens and he watches all the time, no voting but he watches and he makes up his mind more-or-less well now what is the feeling there.  But you would not always necessarily accept his interpretation of what the majority in the Cabinet feel.  At a given stage the conversation would end, the Chairperson would make a summary and say I've listened to all of you, I've given you each a chance to express your views, I now summarise the Cabinet's decision, but in fact it's his decision.  He culls from, he takes from inputs from the individual ministers, you can also not say a word, it's your right, you can just keep quiet, but he then sums up.  He then sums up and says this is the Cabinet decision.  It is noted like that, and that's it.
 So technically speaking or rather in practice it would depend on very much on the personality of that person who sits in that chair, his style, the way he behaves and his personality and character.  If you have a kind of Chairperson there that wants to listen extensively to his Cabinet Ministers you will have long, prolonged discussions, each one would be listened to and you would have a tendency to postpone the matter until the next Cabinet meeting.  If you have a different kind of personality who takes decisions there and then, wants to see them implemented etc, then you have shorter Cabinet meetings, but it's still within the constitution.

MR MALAN: May I just put a brief follow-up to that, my question really relates to this, if the power vested with the Head of State, as I quoted you, not Cabinet at that level, you didn't quote Cabinet, you said the Head of State, let me phrase it differently, with Cabinet decisions, the President's decision being the Cabinet's decision, ever taken outside of Cabinet meetings?  In other words in your experience were decisions overridden or matters not brought to the Cabinet which was decided at the level of the Head of State?  And do you know whether other people were involved in that?

MR R F BOTHA: I can only speak from experience.  What you might get is for instance that the British Foreign Minister would phone me here at 10 o'clock in the evening and say to me look can we send a British ship on its way to - what are those islands in South America - Maldives, to take in food and fuel?  Now you can't wait for a Cabinet meeting for this kind of thing, I would then phone the President or Head of State, first of all I'll phone the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Transport, I'll check all the Ministers that might have a possible say in a ship that must come into a port, into a harbour etc, and phone all of them, then the President and I'd say look I've consulted colleague A, B, C, D, they have no objection or three of them are alright but D says he's worried about this, so I bring this to your attention.  He will then consider it, give me an answer and we'll take a decision that way.  We will then report to the next Cabinet meeting and say sorry gentlemen, there were not ladies then in the Cabinet, but sorry, time was too short and the decision was taken.  I am really just trying to explain yes, depending on the need to take a decision, you sometimes had to go about executive, you are dealing with executive decisions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Can I get Glen to continue.