Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Yes, before opening for the members to respond I would like, Mr Chairman, to introduce the added members of the delegation who arrived late this afternoon.  It is Colonel Willy Nkunene, Director of Training and Manpower Development of Apla, Colonel Barney Glajawo, the Chief of Staff of Apla, Lieutenant-Colonel Andile Tabena, a Director of Personnel and Sergeant David Phillips, a Director of Recruitment.
 I will open the question for the members to respond on that.

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Yes, proportionality is as the name or rather the word suggests.  You attack in proportion to the offensive that you receive.  In other words, to put it very, very, to put as my grandmother would have put it, you do not attack an elephant with a needle nor do you attack an ant with a hammer.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier.

MR GOOSEN: Do I take it ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier Fichler.

MR GOOSEN: I beg your pardon.  Do I take it then from that, that in determining which target to attack, in the words that are set out in the third paragraph, at the end of the third paragraph on page three, that all that matters then is the political and psychological benefit that the organisation would derive from such military operation.  Is that correct?

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Not really.  I would remove the phrase "all that matters".  I would remove that phrase, because then you are excluding every, in your other things.  This is just one of the objectives, a psychological victory.

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier Fichler.

BRIG FICHLER: I think here the problem is that as our struggle developed, there are certain operations that we undertook, which operations would not have happened if certain activities on the part of the South African Government and its security forces have not happened.  That is where, now, the element of proportionality came in.  Some of the operations we had to undertake were a result of what had happened before.  Like we alluded in the document that the environment at that time was such that there were massacres in the trains, like in the Boipatong situation as well and we were under pressure, as well, from our people asking us where are you, because the problem now was that only one side was suffering.
 This is why, now, we talk about political benefits as well, because as a political organisation we had, at that same time, make sure that we maintain the support that we enjoyed from the people.  If we could not do certain things that our people wanted us to do and then also we would have lost political support.  So, that is the political benefit, also, we are talking about and when we talk about proportionality here, we could have easily gone for much easier targets than the adults.  We could have gone for creches, we could have gone for institutions for the disabled, but we had to look at proportionality.  Some of the things that we could also, politically, justify and defend.  
 If we had gone for children in a nursery school, we would not be in a position to stand on this platform today and proudly speak about those activities.  So, therefore, we looked at our operations on two levels as well.  First, the political benefits that would be derived by those activities in terms of also the support that both Apla and the PAC would enjoy.  Also, when we talk about the psychological effect here, also we wanted also to put pressure on the White community as well.  It served to be politically involved and put pressure on its Government to, that we are also suffering now so that the whole political process should not be as a result of the Black community only talking about suffering.  Also the White community should also talk about the Whites suffering and if you look at the history itself, Apla became so widely publicised now, because the farmers and other sectors of the community were now feeling some of the problems and that is the psychological impact that was also derived.  So, that is basically what we are trying to mean in the document.

MR GOOSEN: So, whilst you would recognise that there would be some limits to, which would determine the actions initiated by Apla, the limitations that you would impose in launching those actions would, obviously, be determined from moment to moment on the basis of the psychological and political benefit which the organisation would derive from those actions.  Is that correct?

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Most likely, because those were not the only determinant factors, but most likely that would have been the case.

MR GOOSEN: Could I ask then what principles, what limiting principles applied in the determination of targets selected by the Apla command?

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Can you repeat your question and explain it much further?

MR GOOSEN: The question is what limiting principles applied.  In other words, what factors would the Apla command take into account and regard as serving to limit the negative impact of a particular targeted action, of a particular attack, for example.  On what principles would you determine, would you apply a limit?

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Thanks Comrade Chairman.  The first one would be political motivation.  Whenever an operation is not politically motivated, that operation falls outside our ambit of our definition of a target.  That is one of the main things, but I need to put more emphasis on the fact that Apla, as we have put it before, had no problem of identifying other hard or soft targets.  What actually happened here is that hard, the so-called hard military targets, as we said the security police were our primary target, the security arrangements of, and the army of the oppressor were.  It was just a matter of putting more emphasis on what actually, what actual targets we need, primarily, to target.
 It does not mean that at a certain point in time when we felt that the situation has changed to the extent that we needed to extend our targets to include the so-called White civilians. We could not do that, we could still do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel Glajawo.

BARNEY GLAJAWO: My addition to the question is ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do so, can I swear you in?  In fact, if the new arrivals, any of them is going to be participating in testifying, maybe Brigadier Mofokeng should read all their names into the record and I will swear all of them simultaneously.

UNKNOWN: Colonel Willy Nkunene, Colonel Barney Glajawo, Lieutenant-Colonel Andile Tabena, Staff Sergeant David Phillips and Major Kundu.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, all of you.

WILLY NKUNENE: (Duly sworn in, states).

BARNEY GLAJAWO: (Duly sworn in, states).

ANDILE TABENA: (Duly sworn in, states).

DAVID PHILLIPS: (Duly sworn in, states).

CHAIRPERSON: Sworn in.  Mr Glajawo, you were about to give a reply.

BARNEY GLAJAWO: Yes, what I wanted to add is the limiting factor of anything that would constitute a target to Apla would be it must fall within the mandate and that adds to what he said, it should contribute to a programme which is pre-determined by the Apla leadership, it should conform with what the parties directives are and also that there should be involvement of those that are going to carry it and there should be serious commitment on their part.  So, in short what I am saying the limitation would be the mandate itself.

MR GOOSEN: Would the Apla high command have regarded the operation of international humanitarian law as a limiting factor at all in determining whether or not to embark on an operation?

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Repeat the question.

MR GOOSEN: Would the Apla high command have considered the operation of international law, humanitarian law and the law, in particular, relating to the conduct of armed operations?  As a limiting factor in determining whether or not to launch a particular operation?