Amnesty Hearings — Pietersburg — 1997-07-01

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes at some stage in June if I remember correctly, I think it was towards the end of June, I received information via Koos van den Berg that the three people were ready to enter the country and that we should help them with transport.
	Arising from that, Koos van den Berg and I along with Colonel van der Merwe undertook a planning session to monitor these people on their journey into the RSA.  What it amounted to was that we would place certain people from the Security Branch on certain strategic points along the route from Alldays as far as Pietersburg to do the monitoring.
	On this specific day for which the infiltration was planned these people were deployed but there was in fact no infiltration.

ADV VISSER: Just by the way, on this particular day was the Defence Force involved and was the ABS involved and if so, in what capacity?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Chairperson the Defence Force was involved in the sense that they would provide a plane to help with the monitoring function, the ABS was involved also in helping to monitor at a specific point and they would later be utilised if there was a need for arrests to be made.

ADV VISSER: Yes I apologise Mr Chairperson, ABS is the Division of Internal Stability, that is the ABS.
	Now I think that Lourens Pretorius was placed at the exit of the farm Eendvogelpan on the Breslau-Alldays road and Lourens Kruger was placed at Dendron.

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Joggie Kruger it was Joggie Kruger?

ADV VISSER: It was Joggie Kruger, correct.  And then Fuchs was placed on the showgrounds about a kilometre from the Seshego turn-off ...(intervention)

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Thata's right.

ADV VISSER: And Koos van den Berg was on the farm Kruitfontein.   I'm going to do it through your evidence even though you don't have personal knowledge of it.  Reference has been made to a farm Alldays, it's actually a reference to Kruitfontein, the place where the people infiltrated was actually the farm Kruitfontein, is that how you understand it?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Kruitfontein is on the Republic side, on the point where the infiltration took place.

ADV VISSER: And from Kruitfontein you had to drive through the farm Eendvogelpan to get the Breslau-Alldays road?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Now you said, you mentioned the placing of these people. Nothing actually happened on that day.  The next day they were deployed again and once again nothing happened.  Now we come to the last event before the incident itself, can you recall what happened?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: There was a third occasion on which there would have been three people who were intending to infiltrate. At the beginning of July, I think it was round about the 6th of July, that incident once again did not materialise and during that incident this vehicle, the Toyota Sedan which I referred to, became defective in some way, had to be towed away, I think from the Alldays side.
	Shortly afterwards we received information via Koos van den Berg that there were now six people who were planning to infiltrate and they would be armed.
	Obviously we then realised that the vehicle was now no longer operational and that we'd have to provide another vehicle to convey these people and arrangements were then made to make available a police combi for transporting these people.

ADV VISSER: Did that make any difference to your planning Mr Coetsee?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes if I recall correctly we at that stage already made use of Defence Force personnel in the sense that they could relay radio messages and conversations for us because we were experiencing problems in radio communications with each other.  When we received the information that there were now six people, six armed people planning to infiltrate, we went back to the Defence Force and they promised us reinforcements.

ADV VISSER: As far as the initial plan was concerned that the people would be allowed to be transported to wherever they wanted to go what actually happened to that plan, did it change and if so what?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes because the number had now grown to six armed people, the planning changed and we wanted to arrest them as close as possible to the crossing point.

ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee, as far as the specific planning was concerned, inasfar as it was to do specific planning beforehand, could you say something about that, how was this done and what was the thinking behind the planning?  What was the Defence Force supposed to do?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: In brief, what it amounted to was that Sehlwana would still be the driver of the vehicle that the Defence Force would be assisting our members at certain observation points that a casspir of the Defence Force would be made available to be used at the road blockade.

ADV VISSER: Members of the Defence Force, which Commando Unit were they from?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Five Reconnaissance Command from Phalaborwa.

ADV VISSER: On this occasion did you meet an officer from Five Reconnaissance?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes, if I remember correctly it was Mike Bourne, Captain Mike Bourne.

ADV VISSER: According to your planning what would have been his function?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: His function would have been as follows
	Where these people entered the roadblock he was then to say to them, "Look you are surrounded, you must surrender"

ADV VISSER: Yes.  Was there any discussion as to how he should be dressed?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes, if I remember correctly, it was specifically said that he should be dressed in Army uniform.

ADV VISSER: The previous witness testified that the idea was to intimidate these people by a show of force and to discourage them from putting up a fight and turn violent.

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: That is correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Do you agree with that?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: What was the purpose of the planning at this stage?  Mr Coetsee, what do you intend to do with these six people?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: We wanted to arrest them.

ADV VISSER: And what would have been the purpose of arresting them, apart from the fact that as policemen you were obliged to arrest them? What would have been the purpose of arresting them?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: To question them after arrest and thereby extracting information from them about infiltration routes, planning etc inside the Republic of South Africa.

ADV VISSER: It is also correct that part of the final planning also entailed the involvement of members from other security branches and offices to come and assist with the operation, correct?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee what do you know about the specific preparation relating to the vehicle itself and what was supposed to happen on the scene to ensure that no loss of life took place?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: During discussions where Colonel Willem van der Merwe, myself, Colonel Erwee and Captain Mike Bourne were present and involved we tried to establish broad guidelines as to how the operation should take place. It was, amongst other things, decided that the right rear window of the combi would be removed, that one of the Defence Force men would then throw a gas grenade into the combi at the point where it was brought to a halt. This was aimed at dazing the occupants of the combi and also to give Sehlwana the opportunity to jump out of the combi and to escape.

ADV VISSER: Did your prior planning also include an escape route for Matthew Sehlwana?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes that's right.

ADV VISSER: Were you involved in the incident of the 10th of July?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: No.

ADV VISSER: Was a report made to you as to what happened there?

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV VISSER: Could you tell us what reports you received?