Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1998-04-06

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior, can I just come in here just for further clarity?
	Mr Xundu, I think I heard you attorney saying Mr Mlambo was a member of the military commission, is that correct?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes, the military commission is the one initially I referred to as a revolutionary council.  It was changed in 1978 to be military commission and that was a link between the PAC and the APLA as an armed organisation.  Members of the national leadership of the PAC were part of the military commission.  Members of the high command were members of the military commission, so it was a combination of the two.

ADV SANDI: Just to follow up on that, members of the military commission, would they necessarily play a role in the issuing of orders?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: No, not issuing of orders, what they would do is to formulate broad policies that would, within which APLA have to direct its efforts.

MR PRIOR: Would I be correct in enquiring that during that time, August, September, October of '93, of '92, was there any diversions of opinion between what the PAC were saying and what APLA was saying?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Not to my knowledge.  Not to my knowledge because I think one of the things that bring us here is the question of the armed struggle and 1992, as I have earlier indicated, that the congress of the PAC resolved to intensify the armed struggle.  Now in light of that I don't see any possible contradictions, conflict whatsoever.   There was some sort of political immunism.

MR PRIOR: Alright.  The reference further at page 82 of Exhibit A, I don't think it would be fair to ask you because that evidence is not given in any time frame or any context of that time frame so it could well have been after 1992 but the sense of what is said at page 82, the top of the page, beginning
"I think it is important to - I hope I have answered that question"
That is the 1st paragraph, was that APLA was never told by the PAC that they had either acted in error or that they had not followed the policy of the PAC.  
	If I may just be more specific.  They say:
"This instruction never came to APLA to say you were wrong and therefore reveal all your operations"
	Just to ask you around that, was that - did you ever receive any indication that anyone in the PAC was unhappy with the way APLA was conducting itself, specifically in 1992 and more specifically in respect of King William's Town attack?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: No, not to my knowledge.  What I know is that PAC members that I made contact with were satisfied with the operation.

MR PRIOR: Alright.  Would you agree that an element of proportionality had to occasion or had to be present in your operations?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Proportionality in terms of what?

MR PRIOR: Well between the attack, the effects of the attack and your desired objectives, there had to be a balance as it were.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And was that part of your political training?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: I mean, for example ...[intervention]

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Because we were pushing the programme of the PAC.

MR PRIOR: Yes.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: We therefore could not exceed the boundaries of the mandate given by the PAC.

MR PRIOR: But just to illustrate that, I think it was well illustrated by Brigadier Fitla, I think round about page 90 of that same, or 91 - I'm not too clear Mr Chairman, when he says
"The proportionality was that we couldn't attack creches"
You never had the instructions to attack kindergarten schools and hospitals and old age homes.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay, that's why ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: Do you understand where I'm coming from?  I'm simply saying the element of proportionality was carefully considered, was it not?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: That's why I asked you - you say proportionality with regard to what, because I think if I'm reading, if I have read this correctly, the proportionality that they are referring to is, for instance we had our people, so-called civilians dying every day, then we could proportionally have the white people so-called civilians dying.
	Now my understanding is that if the conflict or ...[indistinct] had gone to the extent that the white security forces or if the white people could hit at lower primary schools where our African children are attending, then we would have to respond in the same way.  That is the understanding that I have about proportionality in this sense.  I don't know whether we are moving on the same frequency.

MR PRIOR: Yes.  And do you agree with what was said at page 82 about, in fact you're bringing your answer as in accordance with what was stated there as a legitimate reprisal, is that what you're embracing in your answer?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: In other words the security forces, if they attacked a black school for example then it would be an attack on a white target or a white civilian target  and in APLA eyes it would be proportional to that attack, it would be justified.  Is that what you're ...[intervention]

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: I think that is the rational.

MR PRIOR: Okay.  And I think it was put here in the delegation by a member of the delegation that APLA considered these to be legitimate reprisals?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: We had an example last week about the North Crest attack in Umtata, did that occur before King William's Town?  I'm not too clear, I'm not too sure.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: I think it was after.

MR PRIOR: Oh, after King William's Town.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: But be that as it may, I mean if we can even then try to dig that proportionality, there are incidents like the Umtata, I mean how many massacres have we talked about since the political history of the country?

MR PRIOR: Yes.  And your mind then, was the identification of a basically civilian target, a white civilian target in a white area, was basically a legitimate target for your APLA operation?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: A white civilian target, what about it?

MR PRIOR: Well, you identified or King William's Town was identified as a legitimate target.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: It was in a white area, the people that were identified to be killed or injured were white civilians predominantly or did you consider them to be white military personnel?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: It could be white military, plain civilians.

MR PRIOR: Okay.  I just want to understand where you're coming from.

UNKNOWN: Paddy, if I might just interject here.  Just to clarify, for me certainly, the question of reprisal.  The King William's Town Golf attack had nothing to do with a specific reprisal, did it?  We are just talking generally, it was a mission that was conceived and executed.  It was not a payback for a particular incident?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Not at all.

UNKNOWN: Thanks.

MR PRIOR: So what - then I just need to ask you this question.  Then where did proportionality come into the King William's Town operation that was predominantly your operation?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: I think the Commissioner who just talked, that we were generalising, we're not talking specifically about the golf club when we talk about proportionality.

MR PRIOR: Alright.  Now I'm asking you specifically, what proportionality was applied or did apply in the golf club operation?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: That was not the paradigm where we ...[indistinct] proportionality.

MR PRIOR: Wasn't that considered at all?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: We were attacking a target.

MR PRIOR: Was it maximum destruction?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Maximum destruction?

MR PRIOR: If you could have killed every living soul on that property, was that your intention?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes, if it was possible.

MR PRIOR: And you set out to achieve that?