Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: The Chairperson, Gen Joubert, very briefly sketched the Plan, Plan Katzen.  I didn't know what the name was, it didn't have a name at the time, I don't think.
	It dealt with the Eastern Cape and to stabilise and to normalise the Eastern Cape.  As I said, there were no documents, no documents were handed out, it was only much later that I would learn that it was actually called Project Katzen.
	During the meeting, the Chairperson explained that the plan was to establish a unified Xhosa State and the way in which this would be done, was to liberate Charles Sebe from the Middeldrift prison in Ciskei and he would then be used to dethrone the then President of the Ciskei, Charles Sebe.  President Sebe was seen as a stumbling block in the way of a unified Xhosa nation or state.
	The Chairperson then also explained that the South African Police, in the person of myself, would be responsible for providing information relating to the liberation of Charles Sebe.  I objected and said that South African Police had very good operation of the Transkei and Ciskei and that this would be to the detriment of that kind of cooperation.  It wasn't possible to foresee how Charles Sebe would react after such a long period in detention.
	My objection was made light of and it was said it was an instruction from the Commissioner of the South African Police, that Brigadier Schoon, represented the Commissioner and that he would confirm this instruction, which Brigadier Schoon in fact did.
	I was given the task to collect information to facilitate the implementation of the plan by other components of the Security Forces.  After the meeting and during August 1986, I directed a document, I wrote a letter rather to the Security Headquarters in which I once again voiced my concerns and my objections, but I received no written reaction.
	The reason why I objected apart from the fact that it infringed on the very good cooperation there was between our side and the Ciskei and Transkei Police, was this, I was privileged to have people under me, who actually went to school in the Transkei and Ciskei and my history and knowledge of the area, told me that the Plan was not feasible and I also believed that if you gave States their independence with (indistinct) things like salaries and government cars, you couldn't take it away without causing conflict.  That is in brief, what my objections were based on.
	I dealt with the progress made with the planning.  Obviously I gave various members under my control, orders relating to the gathering of specific information, but I never made known the specific reason for which it was needed.  In respect of liberating Charles Sebe from prison, I requested members under my command to obtain information about the specific cell where he was detained, and we arranged that photographs be taken of the Maximum Security Prison at Middeldrift where he was being detained.
	I gave these instructions to then Warrant Officer Hattingh and Fouche.  He has since died.  If I remember correctly, they brought me a sketch, Warrant Officer Fouche brought me a sketch and said this is the cell where he is being detained and from Mr Hattingh, I also received the photographs.
	I then also had talks with Joe Verster from Special Forces, South African Defence Force and I conveyed -

MR AVENANT: Please just before you continue, how did it come about that you had direct contact with Joe Verster?

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: My Head Office contacted me and told me that the person from Special Forces, I think it was Schoon who phoned me, he told me that a person from Special Forces would contact me, and that he would be the Operator.
	He then arrived at some later stage, and introduced himself and I knew he was the right person.  I also had talks with Joe Verster from Special Forces and I conveyed the relevant information to him.
	Without having knowledge of the then correspondence and without having talks with individuals who were involved at the time, I unfortunately can't give you any more specific details.
	On the 25th/26th September 1986 ...

MR AVENANT: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, that is a mistake which must be corrected in the document, it is indicated as the 21st in the document.

JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW: Charles Sebe was liberated from the prison at Middeldrift.  After this, Joe Verster told me telephonically that the task had been carried out successfully.
	Gen Schutte assisted the Ciskei Police with the investigation into the liberation of Charles Sebe and this function was later taken over by Captain Landman.
	As a part of the plan of action, it was decided that Kwane Sebe, the son of President Lennox Sebe, will be abducted to place pressure on President Sebe.
	The SADF component made arrangements for a meeting with Kwane Sebe which took place at the AmaTola Sun as I later learnt.  As was the custom, Kwane Sebe was accompanied by Major General Ngwenya.  From the AmaTola Sun the group then moved to the Holiday Inn in East London where Kwane Sebe and Ngwenya were abducted by masked men.  This I also learnt later.
	I made arrangements because of the information which I had to collect was related to a safe route to the Transkei, unguarded routes, border posts, etc, and I gave instructions to certain Policemen, I can't remember their names, to take up position in certain areas and we had certain codes, using flickering lights, etc.  
	In such a way they had to lead the person right to the border post.  This was all to do with the abducted people to safety.
	The liberation and the abduction was prominently reported in the press and I also reported this to Head Office.  Brigadier Schoon and or Gen Van der Merwe were constantly kept up to date with what was happening.  Brigadier Schoon was personally kept informed and I think if I remember correctly, Gen Van der Merwe was the Security Chief and Gen Coetzee, the Commissioner of Police.
	At no stage did I take part in any of the actions physically, but I accept full responsibility in so far as I was involved in the planning of the Operation and the orders which I issued to members in this regard.
	As a result of the fact that I didn't inform members about the purpose for which they had to collect information, I also accept full responsibility for their actions, in so far as it took place within the framework of my orders.
	After Charles Sebe's liberation and after Sebe and Ngwenya were abducted, once again I attended various meetings of which SADF was the convenor.
	There were various requests for cooperation in the form of information, the provision of information, but I didn't have enough knowledge of the total plan and I took in a very passive attitude and I also felt that the plan was risky and also not feasible.
	I upon occasion then voiced my objections and concerns to Gen Van der Merwe, and he agreed that we, that is the Security Branch, would have a very low profile, maintain a very low profile.

MR AVENANT: Part of the plan was the training of terrorist organisations?