Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

UNKNOWN: Perhaps I should explain that the JOCS in Manenberg was established on the instructions of (Interpreter did not hear the word) in Cape Town, VAKOM was an extension of this JOC system, and in Manenberg we were the people on the ground who on a daily basis had to plan to evaluate the situation and - in other words we had to do the work on the ground as a result of the planning and evaluation taking place.  My immediate superior, on the Railway Police side, was in those years Brigadier Malan, but he had nothing to do with the planning and the work of JOCS in Manenberg, and he couldn't give us orders, because our orders, our JOC orders came via VAKOM and we were ordered via VAKOM to establish JOCS.  The commanding officer of JOCS was Piet van Rensburg.  He was a representative of the South African Police.
 If you look at this particular document now in front of you, you will see that each and every entity, whether the South African Police or the Defence Force or the Railway Police were commanded, were under their own command.  In other words, for a particular operation to take place it was only the commanding officer of that particular unit who could give orders to his own people.
 To make it a little bit easier to do our work in practice planning was done at this Joint Operational Command Centre at Manenberg and orders were there given as to what should happen.  When a joint operation was to take place the senior man was then in charge, whether it was from the South African Police side or the Railway Police side.  
 So to answer your question briefly, yes, I had to answer to Colonel Piet van Rensburg who was the head of the South African Riot Unit at that time.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Can you Sir, give a clear account of the deliberations by members of the Command structure at the Joint Operational Centre on October 15 1985?

UNKNOWN: Unfortunately I can't give you a complete picture, I can't give you all the information because I can't remember it, it's 12 years ago now.  If we are talking about this specific operation, yes, I can talk about that if that is what you want.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Let me be specific Sir, did you know about or attend the meeting of the Sub-Joint Management Centre, JOMC, held at 10 o'clock in the morning at the Thomas Boydell building on the 14th of October 1985?

UNKNOWN: It's possible.  I will have to look at documentation and we will have to see whether my name appears on the list of those present.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: I refer you to Annexure 30, I believe, that meeting was called by Adrian Vlok.

UNKNOWN: Chairperson we don't seem to have that document referred to.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Do have Annexure 31?

UNKNOWN: We have a 32.  We don't have anything marked 31 that I can see, no.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: If you would bear with us. This is an invitation to the Regional Commissioner, and since I am at a disadvantage, it's written in Afrikaans, I'm at a disadvantage I will ask our staff to read that in Afrikaans.
"Regional Commissioner South African Railway Police
 P O Box 3181
CAPE T0WN 8000
MEETING- SUB JBS 1985 AT 10H13 THOMAS BOYDELL BUILDING CAPE TOWN.
1. You are hereby notified that the abovementioned meeting will take place on the 14th of October 1985 at 10H30 in the morning at the conference room at the Thomas Boydell in Beraad Street in Cape Town, and you are requested to send a delegate.
 It must be mentioned that this meeting has been convened on the instructions of the Secretary of the State Security Council and it would therefore be appreciated if you would send a senior representative if you can't attend the meeting personally".
Sir, the question is did you attend that meeting?

UNKNOWN: I can't remember.  No I did not attend the meeting.  I can't remember anything about this meeting.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.  Can you then give a clear account of the discussions by members of the command structure at the JOC centre on October 15 1985?

UNKNOWN: I can give you an explanation in this sense that we spoke that morning, that's what we would normally do. I can't tell you exactly what we said apart form the discussion surrounding the operation itself, but what is normally done is that we look at the incidents which have taken place over the past 24 hours, we determined our priorities for action, we planned and then we would issue instructions of what was to happen and in which areas we were to work.   Are you satisfied with that?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Well let me move on, perhaps the next questions will clarify this.  When exactly did you discuss the use of the "ghost vehicle" and I'm translating that, "ghost vehicle", do you remember the term "ghost vehicle"?   When exactly - and who was there when you discussed the use of the ghost vehicle?

UNKNOWN: It was discussed that morning that the only alternative, because we were not succeeding in making arrests and arresting the people throwing stones and that there was no decrease in the number of incidents, it was discussed that morning that we had no alternative and that the only way in which to operate was to use an unmarked vehicle.  It was discussed that morning, yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Exactly what were the motivating factors for using - I am not satisfied that it was just discussed, I mean what were the reasons, particularly putting the crates in the back of the truck and having the two officers dressed in non-uniform attire, what were your reasons for specifically using crates in the back of the truck and deciding that the officers would hide inside the truck?

UNKNOWN: We found in this period that if we sent in a police vehicle that as soon as the vehicle would enter the area the people would run away and then nothing would happen, and then as soon as the police withdrew the unrest and stone-throwing and petrol bomb incidents etc would just start up again.  There was no way in 1985 for us to use the community in that area where the trouble spots were.
 What I am trying to say to you that in normal circumstances, to be able to apprehend the culprits you would expect that you could place policemen in that area in houses who would be able to observe what was happening.  The situation, at that stage, was such that the police weren't welcome anywhere in that area.  On the contrary, in certain areas in Athlone, I was refused a cool drink, I couldn't even buy a cool drink and the shopkeeper told me Sir, I am sorry if I sell you this cold drink I will have trouble in my shop this evening.  The result of this was that we couldn't place policemen in an area to monitor the area and to observe and then to facilitate our planning.
 Secondly, I have already told you that we could not send in marked vehicles and people in uniform because nothing would happen and then as soon as you withdrew the attacks would just start afresh.  In other words our only option was to send in an unmarked vehicle.  Now to send in such an unmarked vehicle and to place uniformed policemen in this unmarked vehicle would also serve no purpose, you'd have the same result, that you would enter such a situation the people would run away and once again you would not have a successful peacekeeping operation and you would not be able to apprehend culprits.
 So we were forced to send in this vehicle in some way, clearly marked with a South African Police number, because at that stage it was the delivery trucks and vehicles that were being attacked, so we had no other choice but to send in this vehicle and to make it look as close as possible, to make it look like a delivery truck, and then to use the trucks and to conceal the policemen in the crates because that was the whole purpose of the operation, to get the policemen to the culprits to be able to arrest them. And that is why we gave the driver and his passenger khaki coats to put on over their uniforms.