Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-12-04

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: (sworn states)
DR BARNARD
"I the undersigned Lucas Daniel Barnard declares  as follows. I am the Director General of the Provincial Administration of the Province of the Western Cape.
On the 14th of July 1979 I appeared before a Special Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  The statement I made at the decision is attached as annexure LB.1.  To avoid duplication I refer to paragraph 2 in which my terms as Director of the National Intelligence Service and the Department of Constitutional Development and the circumstances of why I left this department are detailed.  
I make this statement against the following background:
On the 17th of September 1997 I was served with a written notice according to Section 29 to appear on the 16th of October before the Commission in Johannesburg.  According to this notice my evidence was required for the purposes of promoting the motives and the perspectives of key figures serving on the State Security Council.  The Commission required specific information regarding abuse of these people, regarding the conflicts of the past and the roles they've played in this regard.  This appears from paragraphs 1a and b from the first notice, which was served on me.
More specifically the Commission wants to know whether any discussions of the State Security Council authorised illegal activities or whether it could be regarded as authorising illegal activities. 
For the purpose of the evidence required from me, I'm referring to the first set of documents, it is impossible to give a complete perspective with only referring to the documents applied to me.  
I want to emphasise as I've done previously, that there are many documents containing information, which support all the perspectives.  My legal representatives told me that requests for the Commission to obtain these documents were of no avail.  This hampered the preparation of this statement and I had to rely on my memory.  
Before I refer to the specific incidences required, I want to emphasise the following.  
On the 14th of July 1997, I accepted responsibility for the actions of the people of National Intelligence while I was head and I'm also doing it regarding the activities of the people of the State Security Council.  
There are certain organisations and individuals which is not in my favour because of their own political agendas and they said that while I was member of National Intelligence that I was involved in illegal activities.  This is why I want to refute these allegations.  
While I was in Durban, I assumed that this was not the Commission's view.  You are not able to make an informed evaluation regarding the work of National Intelligence without referring to all the documents, which were generated by all the parties party to this conflict.  You should keep in mind that the NI documentation was the result of consultation and administrative processes. For the purposes of  formulating  an informed perspective, the Commission should also refer to these documents.  
I wish to refer to specific incidences for which my evidence is required.  
During that period under discussion as Head of National Intelligence and also Head of the Department of Constitutional Development I made certain inputs at the State Security Council.  I cannot comment on subjective matters such as the motives or perspectives of other individual role-players in the State Security Council and I'm withholding these views then.  
My own views are as follows.  To put my evidence in the following context I will use the following details.  My views regarding the strategic role of the State Security Council, the various structures and also the role and task of the NI during this period;  furthermore, actions of the Government of the day in regarding the security situation with reference to actions in neighbouring States or other States; actions regarding internal opposition groups or liberation movements, and the role of National Intelligence in negotiation politics.  
Firstly then, the strategic security situation in the period under discussion.   
This statement is concerned with a period, the beginning of 1980 to April 1994.  The conflict which South Africa experienced during those times was not a new phenomenon. Before the colonial times there was also violent conflict in South Africa.  It was not exclusively related to South Africa.  The struggle for political power was underlying this conflict.  The conflict and the way it was solved here, and elsewhere moved away from the conventional forces, which waged war in a conventional way, and in this time the difference between the soldier and the civil person disappeared.  
In South Africa the conflict was a result of the fact that various population groups were excluded from political decision-making - "who" decided "who" should govern the country, and how it should be done.  
This conflict had a long historical beginning and this was because the so-called Coloureds, were excluded from the Convention in 1908 to 1910, and the establishment of the ANC in 1912.  The initial peaceful protest developed into conflict where violence was used to realise certain purposes, and that was in the 1960's.  
In the 1980's the position was that the White minority ruled the country while other population groups were not part of the political process. During that time the ANC, SACP alliance and other revolutionary groups were on all terrains involved in a struggle against the Central Government.  There is a lot of documented evidence from that time to the effect that these groups, that it wanted to change the dispensation in South Africa and would use all various efforts to establish a new political order.  Attempt to do this should be -  because this struggle moved to all terrains of life and the idea of total onslaught developed, otherwise it was not a legend but it was a hard reality with which all South Africans were confronted.  These people who did not participate in the political processes, wanted to bring about the fall of the Government, by using a Total Onslaught through undermining, by violence, mobilisation of the masses to make the country ungovernable, international isolation to bring South Africa, especially on an economic way on its knees, and the development of alternative structures, internally and overseas. to establish an alternative Government.  
The application of this brought a tragic framework, nothing was left out of consideration.  
On the military area, people who had to bring the Government to a fall, were trained world-wide.  
Intelligence structures were developed which had to gather security information.  
On economic terrain, boycotts and sanctions were orchestrated against South Africa.  
On a social level and especially in the way of churches and in schools mobilisation was enforced, and said that no education was possible before political liberation.
The previous Government to use all possible methods, should be seen against the background of this total onslaught to get all the power.  For each and every offensive assault a defence mechanism had to be found. This required planning, strategies etc in order to curb these onslaughts.  Except for the factors that I have referred to, the following cardinal and very important factors have to be taken into account in the judging of the Government's counter-revolutionary strategy.  
The realisation that the use of weapons was impossible, brought about strategic concepts of Total Onslaught and total counter-strategy.  This included that other areas, other terrains of life also had to be included.  
The SSC was motivated by the concern that a revolutionary war would also be successful in South Africa as in other countries, including in South Africa's neighbouring States.  At that stage the concept of revolutionary war had the flavour of being unconquerable.  
The conflicts in Southern Africa were not without blood-pouring and the concern of many of the members of the SSC at that stage, my own as well, was that such a development in South Africa had to be prevented.  At that stage there was terror in the cities, there were motor bombings and bombs planted, without any concern as to who were blown up like in Northern Ireland and in Latin America.  
At that stage also planes were also hijacked and it was general knowledge that ..(indistinct) in the city was creating panic in citizens.  There were also other factors that the SSC had to take into account.  
It was throughout, my point of view that the conflict would not be able to be countered and could not be ended if there was continued violence or political  (en die ekonomiese aanwend)
The co-ordination and economic use of manpower and the security structures as well as the welfare departments were necessary.  
There were great discrepancies between people with regards to the use of the Security Forces on the one hand, and the attempt to uplift people socially and economically, especially the military and the police, initially, pleaded for a renewed attempt in that direction.  While welfare departments wanted more socio-economic upliftment attempts, the SSC came to the conclusion that in a revolutionary conflict the battle for the hearts and minds of people was more important than the physical battle on the security front.  It is clear from the policy documents, that the Commission made available to me. 
In the late eighties members of the SSC spent more and more time in developing more effective methods to curb the political conflict in South Africa and the possibility of seeking process was very important.  The members of the SSC were throughout convinced that such a political settlement cannot be sought in chaos, but that the actions of the security forces had to bring about stability so that a political settlement process can be guaranteed that it will be in a peaceful way.  The members of the SSC were kept up to date by Intelligence publications and National Intelligence assessments as well as other documents that were given to them during these information meetings with regards to revolutionary organisations. The evaluation of such information from time to time took place.  
It was clear in these discussions that giving over was never an option and that the South African Government with the power at its command, had to protect the physical integrity of the State and its citizens, the structures of the Security Management System, and their tasks.  
The planning of the State's ability during this period to maintain security and stability in this period was the responsibility of the SSC and its sub structures.  
In paragraph 6.4 in my previous statement, referred to as annexure LDB.1, I discussed the background to the establishment of the SSC. As indicated there the existence of such a body was not unique in South Africa, and not only States, and also revolutionary movements also have these types of institutions.  I refer in this regard to the ANC's political Military Council and the National Working Committee.  
The SSC was under the political power of the Government of the day.  Possibly as a result of the fact, that, because of the Total Onslaught policy, the idea of National Security was an all encompassing concept, and the strategy, and the constitutional, economic, social, also entailed the security terrains, and it was suggested that the SSC was actually the Government of the day.  
On the 30th January 1984 the Prime Minister reacted as follows in Parliament, and I quote -
"When the SSC now takes certain decisions, the Chairman takes it personally to the Cabinet and presents it to the Cabinet.  The Cabinet still has the right to discuss any decision of the SSC and to disregard it."
In a press statement, which was supplied by the Secretary of the SSC on the 21st September 1983 it was said that a decision taken by the SSC had to be finally approved by the Cabinet. To the best of my knowledge and as far as I can remember the SSC functioned as follows: 
It gathered twice per week under the chairmanship of the State President.  If necessary, special meetings were held.  I remember that every year, one week before Christmas such special meetings were held in order to discuss the security of the country during the Christmas season.  Special meetings were also held to discuss the security actions, which was regarded as important for the security and the management of the State.  The institution and the relief of States of emergency was also decided on special meetings.  Meetings of the SSC were also attended by the permanent members as determined by statute.  Additional members were co-opted.  
It was also used to use other officials or to invite them from time to time to attend various meetings and to inform the SSC to the best of their ability and to use experts.  Matters which were discussed on a specific State and which were regarded as relevant to security were contained on these agendas.
This was divided into the following categories: the necessity of physically security action to avoid threats to the Government from overseas and internally, furthermore, general relationships between States and the consequent security implications for South Africa.  In this regard the situation in the previous South West Africa during those years, took a lot of time from the SSC.  
Furthermore, the increasing international isolation of South Africa on diplomatic, economic, cultural, academic and sport terrains and specifically the role of economic sanctions and boycotts, as well as the strategies to circumvent this.  
Other matters such as the supplying of passports and various transport matters to people were regarded as politically sensitive people, as the supply of visas to opponents of the Government.  
In my opinion the discussions in the SSC were held on a professional and high level.  The agendas and the minutes of these meetings are available and give enough information in this regard.   
The administrative support of the SSC was provided by a body called the Secretariat of the SSC, and this Secretariat's functions entailed the following: It served as a gathering point of all departmental inputs from about 15 inter-departmental committees, from the Working Committee to which is referred in paragraph 9.6.  The processing of information to enable the SSC to handle accordingly.  And also keeping SSC minutes and conveying decisions of the SSC to the people who had to execute these orders or decisions.  The administrative activities of the SSC was done by the Working Committee of the SSC.  The meetings of this Committee was important for the SSC and sometimes ad hoc meetings were held to discuss crises and to provide advice to the SSC.  
The members of this Working Committee were those officials to which are referred in Section 4 of the Act on Security Information and the State Security Council number 64 of 72, as well as other Heads of departments, which according to the circumstances were necessary for the preparatory administrative work of the SSC.  
As in the case of the SSC itself, many middle level managers and other experts were invited from time to time, to inform the members of the SSC regarding certain matters.  There was also an extensive system of inter departmental sub committees of the Working Committee.  
Certain State Departments were grouped according to line function activities to give expert advice to the Working Committee.  For example, there was an inter-departmental Committee regarding the control of aliens, and this provided advice regarding matters pertaining to the supply of passports and visas, and the illegal stay of aliens in South Africa.  The contents of the preparatory documentation which served as input at these committees is of great importance for the development of an informed and balanced historical perspective regarding this specific period and the views of various role players, regarding events in South Africa.  
I had no access to that.  If that means that the Commission does not intend to refer to that, important information will not be taken into consideration for their report. 
The co-ordination of the Intelligence activities of the South African information community was co-ordinated by a body that was known as the Co-ordinating  Intelligence Committee in short, CIC.  In paragraph 10.1.6 and 10.1.10, I deal with this in more detail.  
After the proclamation of the General State of Emergency on the 12th June 1986, the security management of the country was bettered by the National Security Management System in order to make it more effective. The existence of this management system must be placed in the following historical perspective.  
During the mid-eighties, the South African police did not have the necessary manpower, funds and sometimes expertise, as well as training and management in order to counter the internal revolutionary onslaught successfully.  The South African Defence Force, however, did have the necessary manpower, the equipment and an officer corps who had management skills but they were primarily responsible for the defence of the State's territory.  In order to counter this dilemma a thought was mentioned to create a new force also called a Neutral or an In-between Force between the Police and the Defence Force.  Such forces do exist in States like, France, Spain and Italy.  I recall that there were even discussion documents at the Working Committee regarding the possible development of such a force in which it was referred to as a Third Force.  
For practical purposes, I was at all times against the implementation of such a force and I was of the opinion that the South African police had to be made stronger rather.  Addendum K to the bundle of documents that the Commission made available to me, reflects this.  
Even though there was never such a decision to bring about such a force, many people continued in their attempts to put the bringing about of such a force in front of the SSC's door.  During the mid-eighties it was clear that this conflict could not be alleviated by means of the use of the Security Forces and that the other departments, the Welfare Departments were better co-ordinated or had to be better co-ordinated to better the social economic circumstances of all South Africans.  
In the terminology of the revolutionary conflict this entailed that the battle for the hearts and the minds of the people had to be won.  
Various departments with critically important welfare functions, however, had a shortage of funds and skills.  Accordingly a better co-ordinated management mechanism had to be developed in order to use funds and skills optimally.  Against the background of the above two considerations, a Vice Ministy of Law and Order and Defence was created who was responsible to make sure that on security terrain the Defence Force as well as the Police co-ordinated in a harmonious way, and that the security forces and the welfare departments could be managed in a co-ordinated way in order to counter the revolutionary onslaught in an effective way. This system required a network of Management Committees in various functional areas and on various hierarchy levels.  Certain committees functioning on National level were backed by committees on Provincial and/or Regional levels and sometimes even on Local level.  This system initially encountered some resistance. 
Departments and Administrations regarded this as an interference in their responsibilities and others were of the opinion that it was an attempt to militarise the State.  The Management Committee was a well-meant attempt to gain an integrated use of manpower, funds and skills against the revolutionary onslaught to make this possible.  It was not sinister and is definitely not unique.  
Experts on revolutionary warfare agree with each other that a management mechanism of all the State's forces was and is, a very important aspect of successful counter-revolutionary action.
Next, the role and task of the National Intelligence in this
time.  During this time that is concerned in this report, I was Head of NI and my contribution to the SSC was in that perspective.  My view regarding the Central Intelligence Services like NI was throughout that it is in main in contrast to other departmental Intelligence organs, and like for example Military Intelligence Services or Police Intelligence Services.  It had to deal with a universal Intelligence task which is to gather Intelligence regarding happenings and events that related to undermining the State power.  Intelligence, Security Intelligence is only useful if it can be weighed up in an expert way and if it can be given to the political decision-makers in time.  It is fundamentally important that such information must be given to the political decision makers in time and one of the problems of Intelligence Services world-wide is to give these political decision makers the information in time and to help them to understand the importance thereof.  The evaluation of Security.  The evaluation of this information, it could not be coloured by personal ideas, it would be very short sighted.  No Government or Intelligence Service can in the long run use the security information for political or ideological point scoring.  Intelligence Services are responsible for giving Intelligence and information to other State Departments which can be an embarrassment to the State departments and which sometimes has nothing to do with the political role plays ideological  convict.  Because of their unique manpower and capabilities of the Intelligence services they are sometimes used for secondary Intelligence responsibilities.  Intelligence services should thus be act in the fullest confidence and have the ability to covert diplomacy, confidential discussions, the handling of security in the State dispensation and other forms of clandestine activities on military, economic, constitutional, social and other terrains and to handle all this.
 The coordination of the information or the Intelligence communities activities during this at time to which  I'm referring  is done by the CIC which met bi-weekly under my chairmanship.
 The various roles of the National Intelligence and the Military Intelligence division of the South African Army, the Security Force of the South African Police and the Department of Foreign Affairs was determined during an occasion known as the Simon's Town meeting.  Members of the Intelligence Community kept to their various areas of works and they agreed not to spy on one another.  
 The CIC, like Intelligence Services world-wide, worked on a "had to know basis", according to which individuals were only concerned with the information they required to execute their various tasks.  This compartmentalisation principle was for security reasons so when certain sources and information could not be harmed and if a member from one information service would become a member of a hostile information service.  
 Activities of the CIC was supported by a system of sub-committees which did the necessary preparatory work.  These sub-committees were amongst others, firstly, Covert Information Gathering, then Open Information Gathering, then Technical sub- committees, then Evaluation sub-committees which was later known as the Branch National Interpretation, then, Counter Espionage sub-committee and lastly, Intelligence Security sub-committee.  
 Although CIC did it's utmost best to allow the Intelligence community of South Africa to co-operate in a co-ordinated way, there were certain overlappings in activities and there were strong differences of opinion regarding security Intelligence in general.  Difference in opinions serve a purpose because this sometimes lead to new improved insights and consequently the CIC presented the participants the ability to give inputs regarding various critical matters.  But political decision makers required consensus opinions and sometimes we had the dilemma that forced consensus, sometimes required that it didn't refect the standpoint of anybody at all.  
 During my previous appearance I've already said, and today again, and I've referred to the annual National Intelligence Evaluations. There is little, if any, documentation in South Africa available, which gives such a complete and balanced picture of what happened during the specific time on the security terrain.  I want to reiterate that the objectives of the Commission and the openness or transparency which should be part of a democratic society would not be served or would be served by a continued denial or negligence to provide those Intelligence evaluation for public discussion or evaluation.  The fact that I could not get access to that for the purposes of preparing this statement is a pity.  More important is that the Commission would not do what it has to do if for the purposes of this report did not supply or present those documents to Parliament.  The contents of those documents proves above all doubt that the Intelligence community and the SSC's structures were not an evil organisation, as said by some.  
 Taking the Commission's objectives into consideration, it will not be unreasonable not to investigate or report on a subject which is important today to refer selectively only to smaller parts of the large amount of available documentation, especially if those documents are not made available.  
 I am further of the opinion that the formation of a balanced perspective regarding the security events of the 1980's is only possible if the differences between the departments  which were involved in the security process are taken into consideration.  I refer here to the NI, the South African Army, the South African Police, the Department of Foreign Affairs and to a lesser degree the Department of Justice, Finance and Internal Affairs and the other State Departments which are known as the Welfare Departments.  
 National Intelligence which had no executive powers, the main task was the gathering, the processing and communication of National Security Intelligence.  A study of all security documentation of NI from the beginning of the 1980s to the beginning of 1992 shows that one fundamental Intelligence fact was consequently emphasised by NI, that was namely that the call of South Africa's security problematics was political of nature and could only be solved through a constitutional negotiated process.  Based on this point of departure, the standpoint was maintained that the security forces could maintain order and stability on security area to provide the basis for a political solution.  
 In the case of the South African Defence Force in general and the division Military Intelligence specifically, the emphasis was placed on the military street from our neighbouring and other States.  There was a way of thinking in the Defence Forces emphasising the standpoint of a foremost defence strategy.  This strategy according to the classical theory of international politics and strategy was based on the supposition that buffer zones between opposing States or even groups of States had to be developed to serve as a basis for inter-State power basis.  
 Against this background the Defence Force was militarily involved and worried about Angola and Mozambique and sometimes also Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.  In depth debate about the main focus of the budgets of those years was not strange and the differences in opinion of the preferences which military matters had above the social, economic and development of the whole population often occurred.  Because of the expertise of the Defence Force to which I've already referred, it had often happened that the Defence Force moved outside the typically military terrain and was often asked to undertake these type of activities.  This position sometimes led to tension between the Security Department and sometimes between the Defence Force and the Welfare Departments.  As the conflict grew internally the Defence Force was used more often and consequently it led to intensification of various differences.  
 The South African police was responsible for maintaining law and order in South Africa.  By the end of the 1980's they had this task, unenviable task, to try and keep this country stable, while most of the citizens did not accept the political dispensation, and the revolutionary movements tried to destroy it in any possible way.  Taken into consideration also that the police had a serious shortage in manpower and funds and sometimes also modern managerial abilities. the extent of this dilemma becomes very clear.
 The Department of Foreign Affairs had against a strong attack to isolate South Africa had to maintain diplomatic relationships.  This department was thus involved or worried about the influence which cross-border operations and economic actions against South Africa, by our neighbouring States would have on inter-State relationships.  Members of this department had the standpoint that security activities in South Africa  should be of such a nature that it would not lead to further isolation or economic boycotts.  In this way the department contributed to it, that the voice of international thought, morality and influence could still be heard and was taken into consideration in the SSC and other security structures.  
 Late in the 1980's the welfare departments played an increasingly important role.  It was especially when the thought was developed and became acceptable that a political negotiation was the only way out, and that could happen in a stable, social, economic environment.  
 You must take into consideration that the security management system, in the 1980's was well informed and was effective, and it was this system which laid the foundation for the peaceful transition to a democratic political dispensation.  You must not allow that atrocities by individual members of the security forces which because of that gruesome nature, had an influence on all.  This must not influence your evaluation of the bigger picture.  
 You cannot make a rule of the exception.  These exceptions are very important and it must be emphasised and the perception exists that it's not true to reality.  You have to be true to what you should do and you should put this right.
World-wide it had happened that some departments, sometimes acted in subjective line function.  It often happened that departments interpreted decisions to give themselves the advantage of an interpretation which would enforce their own position and their control over forces and manpower.  This leaves scope for individuals to promote their own careers or because of other considerations to manipulate instructions or decisions for their own benefit.  
 It is also true that  in large bureaucratic institutions such as the public sector in a State where hundreds and thousands of people work in the public sector, that  there is a danger that decisions and instructions are not formulated, conveyed or interpreted in a correct way.  And also a degenerating security situation associated with attempts to undermine the power of the State and this leads to a greater pressure in the work situation and there can be certain misunderstandings. 
 Actions of the Government of the day, in the first place, actions in neighbouring States and other countries.  I accept that my input is required regarding the emphasised parts of the documents presented to me as Annexures A to L .  Before I do this, I give my viewpoints regarding activities in neighbouring States.  
 You would like to know according to me, in this context, you would like to know as far as I think whether the SSC authorised illegal cross border activities, held discussions or made decisions which could be interpreted as it had authorised these illegal cross-border activities.  Before the 1980's, but especially during that time, the revolutionary resistance organisations of South Africa's neighbouring States was used as a basis for logistical support; training for revolutionary fighters which had to infiltrate South Africa or to source these people, and it was also used as a safe haven for revolutionary people.  The correctness of this statement leaves no space for dispute.  
 Revolutionary movements, cross-border activities against civil and other targets in South Africa became a threat for the security of the State and the citizens.  These States which allowed that the revolutionary movements which became part of these activities and which operated from their countries also became part of the contravention of International Law.  Included in the state of these States to respect the sovereignty of the other States it is also their duty not to allow or to promote terrorist activities from their soil and to do all steps which might be necessary to prevent that.
 In this regard I would like to point out that States who were members, or in which members of revolutionary organisations were, were in any case warned repeatedly not to allow their territory to be used for those purposes.  Nevertheless, the members of the revolutionary organisations co-ordinated violent cross-border actions from these neighbouring states, and it was necessary for the State to defend itself in certain actions and to act against these people in neighbouring states.  In terms of International Law as I understand it, self-defence actions against such members of revolutionary organisations who were present  in neighbouring states is allowed.  I cannot recall any decision or discussion of the SSC in terms of which an unlawful cross-border operation was authorised or which could reasonably be interpreted as being a decision to allow unlawful operations.   NI and myself also was of the opinion that cross-border actions were authorised by International Law and was in principle not against it.  It was sometimes expected from NI to give its opinion on intended cross-border security actions.  This was not in all cases done.  The fact that during some of these operations certain so-called non-combatants died, it was an unfortunate occurrence due to the vagueness of the border between soldiers and citizens.  
 I have to emphasise though, that members of the security forces, never aimed their actions against innocent civilians.  To summarise I would like to reiterate that cross- border self defence actions is a natural and a necessary result of revolutionary conflict and is authorised by International Law.  From a strategic point of view it would be extremely naive to allow armed terror groups in neighbouring States and to allow them to go on with their revolutionary work and their blood letting.
 In addendum A  of the bundle of documents which was included in the first notice, my commentary was required with regards to paragraph 8 thereof.  My commentary is as follows:  After the conclusion of the Lancaster house accord people were sent to report on the events in Zimbabwe, Mr Neil van Heerden from Foreign Affairs and Admiral W.N. Du Plessis of Division Military Intelligence and a member of NI were also there.  After they came back, they reported to a committee, of which I was the Head, they reported on what they heard and I informed the SSC with regards to their reports as is clear from the addendum.  
 One of the various aspects that was mentioned was that there was an attempt on the life or an planned attempt on the life of Mr Mugabe of the then Rhodesian security forces.  If I recall correctly part of the suggestion that was discussed by the SSC was that if such an attempt, if it was successful would have very bad consequences and would be very negative.  I gathered that my comment is necessary on this document because somebody is of the opinion that paragraph 7.8 thereof indicates that the SSC is involved in an assassination attempt on Mr Mugabe.  This paragraph and the background facts as explained above shows that such an inference is completely unfounded.  
 Actions with regards to internal liberation movements, revolutionary groupings and resistance movements.  In addendum G and J in the bundle of documents of the first notice, there is a reference to strategy number two, named Strategy to the countering of the African National Congress and strategy number 44, National strategy against revolutionary war in South Africa.  This is about the planning of the safety structures against the revolutionary onslaught.  The two documents offer a proper general view of thoughts on internal resistance groups of the security structures at that stage.  There's no doubt that revolutionary resistance movements, especially since the mid '80's planned each and every plan and executed these plans with a view to make the State ungovernable, and in that way to lay a foundation for a process of revolutionary taking over of power.  Examples of this are - an attempt of rolling mass action, to muster resistance in each and every sector of civil life; attempts by labour unions to destabilise the work force and to disable the economy and to make the country ungovernable.  Furthermore the stabilisation of existing Government structures in mainly traditional black areas; furthermore, attacks on members of the security forces mainly in traditional black areas and also on their families; furthermore, the planning and execution of rent boycotts, the non-payment of lease and service charges which would make social economic development impossible and would in many cases neutralise it.  The organisation of the use of consumer boycotts and the often brutal intimidation of the people who would not take part.  The intimidation of Government structures in Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuhatswana as well as structures of the then three house parliament.  
 Furthermore, the use of the liberation theology in churches; furthermore the creation of non-government organisations which would in each and every terrain of life put up resistance and orchestrate financial help from foreign goverments, welfare organisations, banks, church, universities, city councils etc.  In this comprehensive organisation of internal resistance climate, the UDF and later also the MDM and various other organisations like the PAC, AZAPO, and the SACP and others had a very important planning and co-ordinating role.  Against the background of this comprehensive internal and foreign revolutionary onslaught against the then Government, various security and welfare steps were taken to counter this onslaught.  
 The exercise of main responsibility of any Government which is to maintain an effective Government and administration of the country to guarantee the security of the inhabitants.  As a perusal of the documents will indicate the strategy that was developed by the SSC in the '80's, caused a security management system to be placed or to be developed that would prevent South Africa to fall into the clutches of a war.  
 The minutes of the SSC in the late 1980's and early 1990's shows unequivocally that the SSC during those years were full time involved on a full time basis with discussion of methods to change the social economic circumstances of all South Africans, and to prevent the possibility of a bloody revolution.  
 Secondly the planning and implementation of a political agreement process in a milieu of optimal security stability to ensure a peaceful transition.  This process was not without problems.  
 It is well known that reactionary members of the security forces and the welfare departments sometimes acted without, outside their mandates in the execution of these strategies. It is also true that instructions and mandates were sometimes vague and were communicated cruelly.  It can  also not be denied that members of the public sector had deeply seated and subjected personal convictions and sometimes that led to very serious activities which have been brought under the Commission's attention.  Such deeds, atrocities which had been done on both sides cannot be ignored, but you must not allow that, that should be the norm.
 And the full truth of the 1980's should be presented.  The truth is not that the South African history's course was determined by those on both sides who were involved in various atrocities on both sides.  The peaceful transition to a democratic system was possible because of the concerted attempts of those people who wanted a peaceful negotiated process.  The truth, as I've tried to indicate, was that the SSC and their sub-structures played an incisive role to make the present democracy in South Africa possible.  
 This, I as a previous statutory member of the SSC, unequivocally say and I'm going to attempt to illustrate it shortly with referring to NI activities in the realisation of what I regarded as the strategy of the SSC.  Then the role of the NI in discussions with ANC leaders and also the development of management mechanisms for politics in South Africa.  
 What I'm presenting in this regard must not be seen against a background as certain attempts to refer to the negotiated politics of the 1980's.  What I've seen about this is superficial and it contains many wrong facts and interpretations and assumptions.  I am not going to try to give a complete discussion of those moments in the political process, or in this political settlement process in which NI and I myself were involved.  I still refer to main historical notes regarding my own actions during that time to provide the required perspective regarding my views during that specific period in the search for and the eventual achievement of a political settlement in South Africa.  
 NI during the 1980's in the security structures and elsewhere was of the opinion that South Africa's problems would only be solved successfully through political negotiation and settlement.  South Africa's core problem was according to NI political of nature.  No military action would result in a continued settlement in South Africa.  In the security community of those years this was not a popular view. To make a political settlement in South Africa possible, according to me, the true political leaders of the revolutionary resistance movements in South Africa had to be negotiated with and the question, was the question, who were those leaders?    And in which way during this revolutionary climate in South Africa, how could these discussions be held?   Because of the political implications of such discussions, it was necessary that it had to be held very confidentially.  Because of  NI's unique ability to have these discussions on a confidential level and also the degree of confidentiality which we had with the State president P.W. Botha, NI during the initial reconnaissance phase could undertake these type of discussions. There was nothing sinister about that, that I and other NI members were part of the negotiating process.  Also Mr Mandela and the ANC wanted to keep these discussions confidential.  
 And I during the start of this process of settlement politics and they took the standpoint that only the State and its organs in the final instance would have to undertake these negotiations, and the execution of this process.  And we took a standpoint against the attempts of economic leaders, academics, church leaders, cultural leaders to act as facilitators.    This point of view was that such persons did not have political responsibilities and this could not bear the brunt of the political results of the discussions.  
 Very early during these discussions with Mr Mandela, we reached the agreement that the political settlement process in South Africa between the South African goverment and the liberation movements had to be negotiated and that facilitators from overseas would not be used in a manipulating role.  
 During discussions with Mr Mandela in May 1988 in the Pollsmoor prison in Cape Town, after we had been planning that for a whole year. I remember that in the next year, next years, approximately 48 discussions took place and some of them took 8 to 9 hours.  The discussions with Mr  Mandela led to the widely published meeting between Botha and Mandela in Tynhuis, and  this led to it that a process could be institutioned to enable the further planning of a negotiating process.  
 Concurrent with this and when Mr De Klerk became head of the government and his important February debate in Parliament for clandestine meetings with the external wing of the ANC under the leadership of Mbeki took place in Europe.  In such a way planning was done to manage the political settlement process in South Africa.  The rest of what happened afterwards is not important regarding the purposes of the perspectives, which are required from me.  
 I want to say, that if the real facts regarding, the political settlement process in South Africa, had to be recorded as true and as objectively as possible and to show that it was historically and correct to show that the SSC and its sub structures, and the individuals which had leadership roles in those structures, possibly played the most incisive role to make the political settlement process in South Africa a reality.  
 Lastly, encompassing perspective.  According to me a balance and equitable evaluation of the role of the security structures specifically, and events in South Africa in general during the 1980's and early 1990's should take the following points into consideration:  
 Firstly, there was an intense struggle on the one hand to maintain and, on the other hand to obtain political power, which was total in extent planning and the potential for conflict.   Furthermore, there was a total onslaught, which required extensive counter-measures that is undeniable.  During this conflict the various parties sometimes used unconventional and unorthodox methods to achieve their objectives.  
 Furthermore, the activities of the revolutionary movements which was sanctioned, presumably on the highest political level was, however, if you look at it from which point of view, they were illegal.  I refer specifically to attacks on innocent civil targets, which led to bloodshed and death.                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Although the State Security Council, to the best of my knowledge, never authorised any legal activities it has now become known that some members of security forces became part of the most gruesome atrocities possible.  This was the tragic result which came after the intensification of the conflict. 
 Please allow me to suggest that you should not against the background of the knowledge which you have now that people when they were involved in the struggle and things were at its worst that they did not know about these things.  
 I also want to suggest that you should take into consideration that the thousands of people who only did their duties according to their own insights and they have been humiliated because of these things which they now know about.  To brand them now, as that they were part of this, even to make it so difficult for them to still believe in their own human values, this would be a bad day for the national reconciliation  process.  
 Furthermore, in the "stormingdrang" of this revolutionary conflict representatives of all parties often neglected instructions, took the law into their own hands and sometimes they disregarded the boundaries of human activities. Such actions is not only part of the time of conflict in our country but it still remains a tragedy.  What we cannot deny, however, is that the security structures were used to  maintain a relatively stable community structure which made it possible to initiate the politically negotiation settlement process.  In a state of total anarchy it would not have been possible, and I want to reiterate my standpoint.  The SSC and its structures established the base for the new South Africa and the establishment of a structure, a climate and ability to make possible the activities of this Commission.