Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-06-19

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well I'm not referring to specific projects, but you were informed as to what the line of command would be, for instance in the case where you wanted to launch actions against Umkhonto weSizwe.  Now did you from time to time have briefing sessions with these Commanding Generals for instance, the Chief of the Army? - in general.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, I think once or twice I spoke to these Generals.

MR P DU PLESSIS: During these discussions between yourself and your superiors, was it discussed that you had these powers which Gen Joubert told you you had?

EDWARD WEBB: No, the only briefing which I received, which I got regarding my powers and non-powers, came from Gen Joubert.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I understand that, but let's refer to your discussions with your superior officers.  Did it in those discussions with your superior officers, also become clear that these people were also aware of your powers and functions as Commanding General Special Forces?  Specifically relating to internal affairs?

EDWARD WEBB: No, no, it was just not an issue.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was your information which you got from Gen Joubert that your superior Generals, to refer to them in that way, that they were aware of your job description and powers and functions?

EDWARD WEBB: He never told it to me in those words but I accepted that my higher authorities knew what my powers were.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you assumed that to be the case?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just for the record I want to touch on something very briefly and that is the situation within the Republic during '88, specifically '89.  What was the situation relating to the onslaught by the enemies of the State against the State, in 1989, according to your perception?

EDWARD WEBB: The onslaught was very severe and that one can infer from the fact that a State of Emergency was in existence countrywide.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You're talking about a State of Emergency, that of course was within the borders of the Republic of South Africa at that stage?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: General, you are on record and if necessary I can refer to it, as that you referred to the internal situation as a situation of war.

EDWARD WEBB: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was not officially declared a war in the normal sense of the word.

EDWARD WEBB: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This view of the war within the borders of the country in 1989 as being a situation of war, was that conveyed to the people under your command?

EDWARD WEBB: I would say yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this view of the domestic situation also conveyed by your superior officers to yourself?  I'm talking for instance of the Chief of the Army, was that perception also the perception of the Head of the Army or Defence Force?  Namely that we were dealing with a war situation.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, of course that was the perception.  It was not a case of anyone calling you and telling you that, because we grew up in the war, we had been soldiers for a long time and this war just grew and grew and grew.  So it really wasn't necessary for anybody to tell me, look this is an internal problem, we knew that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you - what I'm referring to is whether specific talks, even informal talks, were held in which the situation was described as such?  ...(transcriber's interpretation)

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, informally.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Between yourself and your superior officers and Generals?

EDWARD WEBB: I can't remember specific places, but normally you would talk about the war and the counter-measures when you talk to your superiors.

MR P DU PLESSIS: May I just have a moment, Mr Chairman.  Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR P DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis.  Mr Martini, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

MR MARTINI: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few questions.
	General Verster - sorry, General Webb, as a member of the South African Defence Force, the Special Forces Unit, the other members, cell members, the other applicants here, Mr van Zyl for example, as my client, were also employed by the South African Defence Force, is that correct?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: And as members, would you fall - as General, would you know this knowledge as a General, would you all fall within the scope of the Defence Force Act?

EDWARD WEBB: For me, yes.

MR MARTINI: Now General Webb, just a few further questions on the issue of the authority.  Would you accept, from my understanding of the evidence, is that the CCB's function was the total disruption of the enemy, is that correct?  Enemies of the State.

EDWARD WEBB: Not totally, maximally.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Martini, just before I forget, you've moved onto another point ...
	You say that everybody fell under the ambit of the Defence Force Act?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So for instance if there was a disciplinary problem involving, let's say Mr van Zyl or any of the other applicants, would that lead to a court martial?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And they were treated as soldiers?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.  Mr Martini.
	Sorry General Webb.  So it was the maximum disruption of the enemy of the State, was the principle that the CCB used to operate under?

EDWARD WEBB: That was their order, yes.

MR MARTINI: Now Mr van Zyl gave evidence that they attended an "opleidings kursus" and there they were told that one of the functions in this "maksimale" disruption of the State was anything from the breaking of a window to the elimination of a person, would you accept that?

EDWARD WEBB: I was not present at this meeting but according to the evidence it's possible.

MR MARTINI: Well would you dispute that one of their duties or part of their duties and functions included breaking of a window, up to the elimination of a person?

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: You will not dispute that.

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: You heard the evidence that according to Mr van Zyl, their knowledge of the procedures, an instruction was given to Mr van Zyl, for example, to come up with a plan to eliminate Dullah Omar, thereafter we heard that there was to be an "in-huis" involved in this plan, does that accord with your knowledge of the procedures of the CCB?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chair.

MR MARTINI: And we also heard from Mr van Zyl's understanding of the procedures, thereafter the Managing Director, Verster was to then have a "tweede in-huis" further up with yourself.  Is that correct?

EDWARD WEBB: Whether it was a second in-house or a third in-house, but Col Verster and myself did discuss the operation.

MR MARTINI: Did you discuss the Omar operation?

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

MR MARTINI: So am I misunderstanding you, what you're saying is you accept that there would be a "tweede in-huis" between Verster and yourself on a particular project, in general?

EDWARD WEBB: Call it a second in-house, yes, what the name is actually doesn't matter, but between Verster and myself we would have to sit down and discuss the matter.

MR MARTINI: And a decision would then be taken and would you then accept that the Managing Director, Mr Verster, would then convey that decision down the line to - the Regional Manager would then go on to, let's call them the footsoldiers, Mr van Zyl ...(intervention)

GEORGE BIZOS: Have we now moved from the specific of the Omar incident to the general procedure, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think because ...(intervention)

GEORGE BIZOS: Well as long as we understand that we've moved from the specific ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That was my understanding, Mr Bizos, because the witness said that there wasn't an in-house relating to the Omar incident.

GEORGE BIZOS: Thank you, I'm sorry for interrupting.