Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-08

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well I trying to give you more background so that you can understand better what my feelings were.
 After the dismissal or the early pensioning of Dr Basson I became concerned.  I was seeing yellow and red lights and the lights were not only about criminal activities with regard to these substances but also with regard to fraudulent activities.  I was involved in the Office of Serious Economic Offences investigation as from the beginning of '93.  And I have been cooperating with them very closely, but I was alarmed at the fact that they were certain that there were fraudulent activities.  
 The Minister of Defence, Mr Coetzee, who had just become Minister was then briefed about the programme and we discussed these alarms that we had.  I insisted that he allow me to make direct contact with National Intelligence which he approved and we met on the 24th of September '94.  One of the reasons I did that was to make Dr Basson or to persuade Dr Basson to make himself available to National Intelligence for cooperation with them and this can be verified by National Intelligence, by Mr Kennedy.  After they had access to him and had long discussions with him they gave a briefing to myself and Minister Coetzee.  I then drew up my comment which indicated clearly, and you've got the document on your files, and my words are "it has become evident that there are more than one channel of command", because I knew that I hadn't given any of these commands or had approved any of this, and I realised that either it was at his own initiative or he had been receiving orders from somebody else.  
 Now you may criticise me for not realising it earlier but I want to just add one additional point.  Even in the briefing that we had from National Intelligence Minister Coetzee and myself, it was pointed out to us that there were several persons with the name of Basson and that it might have been some of the other Bassons.  There are in fact four Bassons, at that stage, if I remember correctly, that could possibly - it is true, that is a fact.  However, I was then very concerned and I made my concern known to Mr de Klerk and I made my concern known later on also to Mr Mandela.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the accusation here, if I may be bold to say it, is that there seems to have been a fairly non-urgent approach to this thing.  I mean if your intelligence was of such a nature that suggested that here was a person at that level who was either abusing or potentially abusing an otherwise legitimate programme, and we are talking here national security.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Your approach was very cavalier.  I mean for any structure at your level, and I say nothing about National Intelligence Service, to refrain from taking appropriate action on the basis that there are four Bassons is very, very, - I mean it hasn't taken any length of time for an invigorating approach to isolate which Basson is which Basson.  And that's why we are here.  I think that is the accusation.  There is a sense in which you know there was this sort-of all boys club approach to a matter that, as it stands now, and I don't know what your intelligence was before 1997, but if it was given the sort of red lights that the evidence has shown, even about fraud, for prevarication to be made as to whether this is this Basson, or this Basson or that other Basson and for a consequence to arise where Wouter Basson is dismissed, reemployed, and we find the situation where you do not know whether he is there or he is not there.  I think that is the accusation.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well I would like to defend that Mr Chairman.  The position with regards to the Steyn report, all that happened after the so-called Steyn report was given to the State President is that I was informed that Dr Basson had to be put on early pension.  I was absolutely astounded because he was very much involved in the finalisation of the project and the final privatisation process of the two companies.  It was extremely difficult to deal with that process without his help.
 I therefore immediately asked for an interview with the Minister of Defence, which at that time was Mr Louw.  I went to see him and I said could I please be informed what is the reason for his being dismissed.  He tried to get me an appointment with the State President.  He spoke to him personally in his office, and he said I have General Knobel standing here, he would like to have an interview with you and find out what it's all about. The State President refused to see me.  I tried it for a second time.
 I then went to see General Liebenberg, who was the Chief of the Defence Force, who was on holiday.  I was actually at that stage the acting Chief of the Defence Force, and I had to deal with the administrative process of putting all those members that were dismissed or put on pension, I had to deal with that administrative process.  I went to see General Liebenberg at his holiday home, and I said what is the problem with Basson?  His reply to me was, don't worry it's being investigated by the D'Oliveira Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't tell you, I am sure, about the "speelgoed wat hy wil terug..." which he wanted to have back?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Not at that stage, no, no, no, no Mr Chairman, that came a lot later.  That came when Jan Lourens came to see me.  That was a lot later I am sorry.
 But anyway the fact of the matter is I was then satisfied that it was being investigated.  That is what my orders were, it is being investigated.  I was, however, not satisfied.  I then informed Mr Louw about the programme and later on, because we were changing over from one Minister to the other very rapidly, then Mr Coetzee very shortly afterwards in April, and I've already explained to you that in September when I met up with National Intelligence, having urged Mr Coetzee to allow me to link up with National Intelligence, I then discussed it with National Intelligence and then began to find the evidence or the indications that I was concerned about.
 I agree with you, looking back now, it may seem to you as if it was a - you said a very lackadaisical approach, but I tell you the fact of the matter was there was some doubt as to the identity of Basson and the other Bassons.  That doubt was confirmed by National Intelligence as late as the next year in February.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Sooka.

YASMINE SOOKA: You, sometime as you related it, you talked about the fact that it was quite clear that there was another chain of command.  Now in your confrontation with him did you ask him that question?