Amnesty Hearings — Boksburg — 1998-09-15

CHAIRPERSON: As far as I know history there is always a general or someone who was in contact with grassroots level to see that everything was going according to plan or a change of plan or whatever, and you say that as far as your knowledge goes in this war there was not such a person.

MR PRINSLOO: No, what I meant by that was that the general who was in charge of his area had to, in consultation with his commanders, ensure that the instructions of the generals in staff are executed.  For example, in Koesterfontein, according to my discretion, Mr Barnard, Cliff Barnard would have been in control.  A that specific moment or the period when Mr de Wet arrived there, I say that I assume that Mr Barnard would take the lead or command or then inform him or school him into as to what he must do.

MR MOTLAUNG: Tell me, these bomb explosions, were they planned for execution only from the Western Transvaal or countrywide?

MR PRINSLOO: Countrywide.

MR MOTLAUNG: Did any take place?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, there were explosions in the Free State, in Natal and members were arrested who were on a mission to plant a bomb in the Eastern Cape.

MR MOTLAUNG: And as far as the generale staf members who visited you after the Germiston, not the Germiston, the Johannesburg bomb went off, why were they specifically there, why did they visit?

MR PRINSLOO: Because I did not have communication with the other areas.

MR MOTLAUNG: Didn't they visit you so that they could say whether they support what happened in Johannesburg or they don't?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, amongst others but I sent a message through that I do not receive any communication and my communication was cut down with the other areas.  At that stage I realised that they had communication with each other and that is why I had to drive to and fro in order to get messages and I left a message telling them that they must come and see me.

MR MOTLAUNG: You see because it's a bit strange for me.  If it was part of the plan to the knowledge of the general staf, that bomb would go off like the one in Johannesburg, why would they have to say whether they agree with what happened or they don't?

MR PRINSLOO: Well the generals in staff operated in that fashion.

MR MOTLAUNG: Okay. And as far as the Johannesburg bomb, you were specifically told by General Ackerman to go and plant that one?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: The Germiston one, were you specifically told by anyone to do that?

MR PRINSLOO: No, it was explained in our briefings with our different commanders that a bomb had to go out but not specifically a trailer bomb.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they say where that bomb had to be planted?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it was in Germiston but it was not specifically said but they said it had to be a soft target.

CHAIRPERSON: Who made the decision that the bomb had to be planted in Germiston close to or in a taxi rank?

MR PRINSLOO: It was done, the decisions were made by the generals in staff.

CHAIRPERSON: No, the generals in staff did not say that it had to go to a taxi rank, who decided that?

MR PRINSLOO: It was explained that soft targets had to be targeted, amongst others, taxi ranks, restaurants, everywhere where large groups of people would be gathered.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there a restaurant that was blown up?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MR PRINSLOO: That was in Pretoria.

MR MOTLAUNG: And lastly, tell me ...[intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, Mr Motlaung, just to follow up on that point.
	I understood the question to relate to orders or discussions at general staff level about all the other bombs, not the first bomb, the Johannesburg bomb.  And this is probably where I have a difficulty because I don't quite understand your answer.  
	Your answer says you discussed the Germiston bomb with your commanders, now am I correct to think that your commanders were your chaps who were on the farm with you, is that right?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Right.  Now let's go back above those commanders, yourself and those commanders, to the general staff.  My difficulty remains, the discussion on all the other bombs that went off, because I understood you to say in your evidence in chief, that  you were instructed by Ackerman to prepare one bomb that was going to go off in Johannesburg, where the instruction or the discussion on all the other bombs fits into the general staff's general ideas to what was going to happen, I'm not too sure.  Can you help me there?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: You seem to have operated on your own, this is why I'd like clarity, viz-a-viz all the other bombs barr the Bree Street bomb, am I wrong?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, you are wrong.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.  Help me with that.

MR PRINSLOO: The specific area for which we were responsible was indicated to us as well as to all the other generals in staff.  My area of operation would be the PWV area.  We had to create chaos and a psychosis of fear in this area.
	Concerning the Germiston bomb, we had to get one person from the members or a volunteer who knew the area and who would then go and plant this bomb and detonate it.
	There was not specifically discussed in generals in staff meetings that it had to go to Germiston in this street at the taxi rank.  I was just said that it had to be in the East Rand/West Rand areas.

ADV GCABASHE: When did they say this, the generals in staff?

MR PRINSLOO: That was before I left for the game farm, in that period, that week or so, it could have been a week or two weeks.  We always had long discussions, we always discussed this at the staff meetings, in this period that went before the elections.

ADV GCABASHE: Why then did Ackerman have to specifically talk to you about the Johannesburg bomb if nobody else specifically talked to you about all the other bombings and these were decisions that had been taken at that general staff level?  Just help me on that.

MR PRINSLOO: That had to be the trigger to everything else, this one big bomb that had to go off first.  That is how I see it.

ADV GCABASHE: But that doesn't answer my question about the distinction between that one bomb and all the others, because you were given a specific instruction on one particular bomb, why not with all the others?  Why didn't you then wait for somebody to come and say: "Right, let's go with the rest"?  I don't quite understand why they singled out the Johannesburg bomb and gave you a specific instruction and didn't single out all the other incidents with similar specific instructions.

MR PRINSLOO: You see like I said earlier on, we had our area.  This Johannesburg bomb had to be the trigger which started everything off.  The people who were sent out - I had my instructions that the West Rand and East Rand areas had to be attacked, what towns had to be chosen we discussed, myself and the commanders and we agreed that a person had to be sent to, for example Germiston or Pretoria.
	During the visits of the generals in staff, it always had their approval as well as my reports at Ventersdorp.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, the last point.  Can you tell me, did you want the citizens of this country and the international community to know that it was you people, particularly from the AWB, who were busy with these bombs and why you were busy with these bombs?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at that stage we felt that we are acting on behalf of all other right-wing whites in South Africa because we also had the support of them.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did you never after the bombs make public statements, taking responsibility for them?