Amnesty Hearings — Port Elizabeth — 1997-09-25

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: What still emerges in paragraph 6 if you take the second sentence, I suggest to you indicates once again that even this document had in mind lawful action on the part of the police.  In other words, the Government had to give more authority to the police, not that they should act in their own way.  You may disagree with me but please read the second sentence and perhaps for the benefit of everybody, read aloud.
"The State could not"
Go on from there please.
MR NIEUWOUDT
"The State could not afford to call out a state of emergency"

MR PHOSA: Read on please.
MR NIEUWOUDT
"The State could not afford I  ...[inaudible] to call out a state of emergency.  And legislation which would give broader powers to the safety and security community was essential in order to prevent the Republic of South Africa from being forced to take much more drastic measures soon"

MR PHOSA: Can you stop there?  Do you accept that the idea there is that legislation must be made use of,  this meeting was saying: "Let us create legislation to deal with the problem".

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR PHOSA: Read the next sentence, that last one.
MR NIEUWOUDT
"An element that stands out in the legislation is the competence or ability to remove the revolutionary elements from the community through unrestricted detention where Judges, Magistrates, physicians and senior police officials would have access to them".

MR PHOSA: So even as late as 1986, the Government was saying: "Let's find lawful means of removing these people" and it suggests how, can you see that?  The emphasis is on whilst there is a certainty that there has to be something done it is still within lawful means, it's got to be done through parliament, isn't that so?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, not in one of these paragraphs do we have the word eliminate.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: There's reference to removing the people from the community and suggestions are also made like unlimited detention.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And this - I'll just repeat that.  The term that is used a lot in the next document - Stratcom, is mentioned in paragraph 7 and they describe it in the bottom lines there - you can see that because it features a lot that side.  I want you to move the secrecy about the term - it's explained here, the strategic communication component.  It's not something sinister that each department will have it's own, isn't it?  I'm assuming that you've read this.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR PHOSA: And nothing sinister in the summary that appears on page 61, paragraph 9 can be read that suggests that people must be killed - from my reading of that paragraph, nothing suggests killing.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And then the strategy communication from page 6 ...[inaudible], just explain to me what you understand or what is meant in the third paragraph on page 65.  Just read it and explain to me how you understand it.
MR NIEUWOUDT
"Every Government has the purpose and objective of protecting national values against enemies and to build them out to the benefit of the nation or the group"
Is that the paragraph you're referring to?

MR PHOSA: Yes, that's the paragraph.  Now, that obviously is not dealing with people like Mr Mthimkhulu?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It is so, that paragraph does not refer to that kind of person.

MR PHOSA: Anyway just before I forget, you see this particular document as I see it, emphasises quite a lot of action being done by the Government - even there it says: "the Government", my general reading of it - you have read it, is that all these things are supposed to be done at a Government level.  Did you get a different impression - not this paragraph but generally?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson.

MR PHOSA: And what I - I don't want to spend more time on this, what I'm suggesting to you is this Mr Nieuwoudt, even in - as 1986 the Government of the country had not given up on legal means of turning round the situation.  Mind you this was 1989, this document was in - it talks about 1989, do you remember that?  So even as late as 1989, the Government was still trying to do things that way.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It is so Mr Chairperson, but I would like to explain that certain objectives were set in the appendix which we have already dealt with, in which the Government set out certain guidelines and which were carried into effect, so they suggested policy on national level but this policy was carried out on ground level.

MR PHOSA: Yes, it may just be my difficulty with Afrikaans, can you indicate to me - I couldn't pick up the interpretation that you give, where do you find this that the Government was obviously suggesting that.  Can you show me?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, could you give me a moment please?  Mr Chairperson, page 63 spells out very clearly the State Security Council - the objectives that should be implemented and that is type of thing that I referred to with regard to page 6 which I'd already read, that this was proposed on national level and then it was escalated down to ground level.

MR PHOSA: Are you saying that those - I'll repeat that, are you saying that the words that you find on page 63 must be read without taking the context of what appears in the main document - in the documents?  For instance what appears in the second - in the strategic one where it says: "the emphasis should be to win the heart and soul of the people"?  You mean that must be read differently from that?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: No, what I'm saying is it should be read in context because it is part of that document of mine of my Appendix 1, all of these are objectives that are spelt out.

MR PHOSA: Let me save time Sir, because I can argue this later when you are no longer talking.  What I'm putting to you in this, what appears on page 80 for instance - 80, paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 really sums up what was intended, even at these strategic meetings namely the need to give political power to the police in the sense of allowing them sorry, - giving the Government political power, allowing it to politicise the people and winning their hearts and minds, as it says at 47.  That is what appears to me to be the fundamental message being sent here including the need to act secretly, do you interpret it differently?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I interpret this differently, there are other steps that should be taken into consideration because this is psychological warfare forming part of it -  there is a further step to be taken.

MR PHOSA: Just finally on that, from these documents it appears quite clearly that each department - each branch of the Government, the police, the army what have you, has it's role to play in this whole affair.  In other words, there are certain things that were to be done by the army and not by the police.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: As far as strategic communication is concerned, yes that is correct.

MR PHOSA: Now to come back to the present story, the incident - I don't know why I suddenly have difficulty with this after three days.  Now this thallium poison that's mentioned, do you know what it is?  Do you know what thallium poison is?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I know now after I had spoken to my legal counsel before the matter because I had them explain to me.  And I know when they warned me in the warning statement, they used the term thallium but I'm not a chemist and I won't be able to tell what the components are.