Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Plan Katzen addressed all the power bases in Transkei/Ciskei and the adjacent areas.  It wasn't a standard and normal conventional Defence Force plan, it actually went far beyond the conventional Defence Force planning in order to establish a total normalisation of these areas.  It was dynamic in the sense that it was a revolutionary situation which required a revolutionary plan, and there was no precedent for that.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Page 139, paragraph 68
"The SADF was acutely aware of the fact that the solution to the revolutionary struggle was only 20% military and 80% political.  More importantly, it was often the SADF itself that warned the political leaders that the solution to the conflict in South Africa was not to be sought through military means, but by political restitution."
You have referred to this before, do you confirm it again?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And was that also embodied in Katzen?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  Not only in Katzen but also in another plan which I wrote in the previous year, Plan Strelitzia.  I think it was embodied in all the civil affairs programmes which we applied and ...(intervention)

MR KNOETZE: Please just stop there.  What civilian affairs programmes were you personally involved in?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well as I said, the placing of doctors and vets and teachers and other professional conscripts which we had, especially in the Ciskei and the Transkei and also in other areas.  So that those people could use their skills and share their skills to the advantage of the local community.  Once again, to be able to establish a normal local community.

MR KNOETZE: Could you then also refer the Committee to the regional Development Advice Committee?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the Regional Development Advice Committee (SOAK) was, these were organs - this was Region D and probably still is Region D, this body had to look at the coordinating of the regional development.  The Eastern Province was under the Chairmanship of Mr Louis Koch from the Department of Constitutional Affairs, and I also served on that Committee.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Page 140, paragraph 70
"Because of the lack of urgency of the 80% component and the sterility in regard to meaningful political solutions, the SADF applied itself in areas that were beyond its normal functions, and in the process infringed on the tasks and terrain of others, but not without government authorization."
Would you like to just explain that to us?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well, I can link that to the Eastern Province Command in this way:  We were not a social welfare department, we were a security department but as a result of the very specific composition we had a lot of social welfare sources and capacity, and I utilised these sources and capacity in respect of the  80% part of the war.  I tried, along with the Social Welfare Departments, to try and achieve normalisation on those areas.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 71
The military also made use of unconventional methods as part of its strategy.  Those were not normal times, and the conflict in the RSA was not an isolated bush war.  On the contrary, the ANC's position in this regard was clear:  We do not have forests in South Africa, the military machine would smash us if we tried to send an army from outlying areas.  Our masses have to serve as our bush.  The black community is our bush."
Is that the way you saw it at the time?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  That is typical of revolutionary warfare, the population is the actual bush, the terrain, and we also moved on that terrain, we had to.  And plans such as Strelitzia and Katzen may be regarded as non-standard, unusual or unconventional plans.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 161, paragraph 48
"The State Security Council (SSC) as the main focus of the National Security Management System, was instituted by parliament in 1972, Act 64 of 1972, as a result of the need to formulate national security policy and to create an active national security system.  The SSC was preceded by the State Security Advisory Board ..."
...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze, we don't have page 162.  We've got page 161, but not page 162.

MR KNOETZE: Is it only the one page that the Committee does not have?  I'm sending mine up, Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: There are some, I think about two other pages but you did not refer to them.  I'm not sure if it is necessary to get them.  I think that was - according to my note here, that was 148, 152 and 154.
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, could Advocate Sandi just please repeat the pages that he does not have.

ADV SANDI: That would be 148, 152 and 154.

MR MAPOMA: And 164.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Knoetze, you can proceed.

MR KNOETZE: General, we've already referred to this system, can you just once again confirm that in effect it had quite a material influence on your task at the time.  In other words, you constantly had to juggle these three hats, you couldn't only be the Commanding Officer of the Eastern Province Command and do the easy thing and attack the terrorists or rig up roadblocks etc.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  I must say the military part of it was far simpler than the non-military part, and the Welfare Departments and programmes actually took up a lot of my time.  I was personally involved in those things, that is the 80% part of the war.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 193, paragraph 7.  It says
"The legal base for the SADF's involvement in internal and external operations stems from the following
(a)	The SADF was the official instrument of the RSA Government, created in terms of the RSA Constitution with the object of protecting the sovereignty of the State, its territorial integrity and its people.
	(b)	The State President as Head of the State, was also the supreme commander of the SADF in terms of the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and had the authority to employ the SADF for service in terms of the provisions of the Defence Act 1957."
And then (c) on page 194:
"Employment of the SADF:  The State President with the approval of parliament, employed the SADF for service in defence of the RSA in prevention of suppression of communism and for the prevention or suppression of internal unrest within the Republic of South Africa."
...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Knoetze, we don't have page 194.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I must say we find all this very surprising.  I don't want to pass the blame but the copying of the documents done in your possession was not done by us.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm not blaming anybody, I'm just saying we haven't got it.

MR KNOETZE: General, you just once again request the Committee to be aware of that and to take note of that situation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And then 195, paragraph 9.  That paragraph once again outlines the different responsibilities of the South African Defence Force, and are you asking the Committee to bear that in mind as well?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.