Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-12-04

MR MCADAM: Are you aware of the fact that these vigilantes were people who took the law into their own hands?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes the possiblity was there that they took the law into their own hands. The National Intelligence service did not manage them.  Our task was to gather Intelligence regarding all that and to provide to the authorities.

MR MCADAM: That Intelligence that you have gathered for example  would you have indicated that this vigilante group, although they were against the ANC, that they intended attacking squatters and that the military and the police should come in and by way of blockades or whatever should stop this violence?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: That would be the NI's contribution.  I can't remember this document specifically, it was 1985, 12 years ago.  This document, the information contained here it would be an inter-departmental committee in which the other departments with executive capabilities they took responsibility.

MR MCADAM: Would it be applicable that people participating in violence would be appointed as law enforcement officers?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: I think you are referring to page 10 paragraph 10.  In order to establish law they should be tried to recruit these people as law enforcement officers. I just want to say regarding the status of this document.  This is not a document with any official status.  I just want to repeat it's a very important point. I've said this previously.  You selectively chose a few documents from many many documents .  This is only an information document and as I can see that it reflects no permanent decisions.  With that I want to say this document was compiled by officials who were working on a concept strategy how you could counter the revolution and what you see there is the standpoint of various officials.  If you wanted to establish law and order which it was a possible by the compilers of this document, is that those people should be looked after and then they could also help in enforcing law in their own communities, this is how I see it.  There was a hearing earlier this year where an expert gave evidence regarding the revolutionary war and they said the South African Government used counter-guerilla groups that was where the ANC was active and that is why they established groups to neutralise them it started outside but it also spread to various groups.  Do you know of that policy?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes I know of such allegations I don't know of any decision in this regard to execute this matter.

MR MCADAM: So according to your view that was wrong role interpretation of the real profession?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: I don't have the complete picture of what you are referring to I don't know what his complete testimony was and it's unfair of you to expect from me to the state of counter revolutionary warfare.  Certain allegations were made regarding that internally and externally.  The structures of the State I'm aware of, namely the State Security Council and the Security Council never authorised the establishment of such groups.

MR MCADAM: : And lastly while listening to your evidence NI with the illegal abduction of people from overseas?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: No.

MR MCADAM: I just want to hear whether there are other questions, then we'll finish off.  I have finished.   Thank you very much, Dr Barnard.

MR MCADAM: : Thanks,  Dr Barnard you can correct me if I'm wrong but I heard you say that you were not aware of any formation and then use of such middle groups for a refer to in counter revolutionary period.  Middle groups in other words you were saying that to the best of your knowledge you know of no instance where,  particularly internally middle groups were created by the State, but the thrust of my question is subtly different.  Were existing organisations internally used as middle groups by the State as far as you are aware?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: I think my standpoint is not that I did not know of such groups.  There were such groups.  But my standpoint was that the NI did not give any legal authorisation to these structures and that remains my answer regarding that question.

MR MCADAM: I just want to go back to the Seychelles incident just for a moment and that was you said that your department had knowledge of it and you explained how you came to have that knowledge and so on. The question is what did you do about that knowledge?  What steps did you take to prevent that thing from happening when you were aware that it was on the go?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: After I had become aware of that and after I had  returned to Pretoria from Durban I and a senior member of NI who were present with the discussion with Mike Ward.  We made an appointment with PW Botha I informed him regarding these possibilities and  I also told him there was a possibility of military involvement in this matter.  After I told him that, he told me that he wanted to discuss this matter on a political level wiith his colleague.  He asked me to address this matter with the Head of the Defence Force because this could have negative results for South Africa. That was the last thing I heard about this Seychelles incident.

MR MCADAM: I want to just look at, in more general terms and I understand your reticence to answer questions dealing with specifics where you have not been given the documents, and one accepts  that .  there is a general thrust that we have become aware of if you like an argument that certainly some people are putting forward that says the State was involved in a counter-revolutionary struggle and that everybody below a certain level operated consistently in terms of that strategy, and yet the people at the very top level are saying, yes we are aware there was such a strategy but the instructions we gave weren't intended to mean what the people at the bottom did.
 How do you explain this disjuncture?  We have two totally different realities here.   I must tell you that I was in the Defence Force myself as a troop, later as a two stripe non-commissioned officer round about 1975 when our people went into Angola for the first time, and the evidence that we've been hearing and the insinuations that the people have been making are utterly consistent.  With my recollection of  the milieu of that time.  I am speaking of my own personal experience of that time so I don't see  - for me the consistency is even greater then because what we understood as young conscripts of that day is absolutely consistent with counter- revolutionary warfare theory and yet people at the top are saying, that's not how we meant it to be.  It's not what we intended people to understand.  Can you explain that for us maybe?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Before I answer your question what specifically are you asking?  Are you asking between the executive actions on grassroots level and the evidence of the people in the top echelons, is there a discrepancy?