Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-19

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Thank you, I have it here.

MS PATEL: May I proceed?  May I proceed?
	Would this have been the first time that this information would have gone through to Vlakplaas, to the best of your recollection?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I cannot say with certainty, but I think and I think we should ask the TRC, during my Section 29 statement, encoded message was shown to me and it was promised that I would receive that.  I have never received that.  In that message I used the word "elimination", but I have never received a copy and I think you are referring to that encoded message.  I think before the third of March there was an encoded message in which I referred to the specific people who were killed that morning and sketching their backgrounds and the crimes they were involved in.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Sir.  You cannot remember offhand, without having insight to that, how long before you had this information?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, I cannot say with any certainty.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you.
	Just to move onto another point, you stated quite clearly that you accept responsibility for Mr Mbelo's conduct on the scene for the impression with which he was left with after the meeting that was held on the morning of the third.  Could you please explain more fully what you mean by accepting responsibility?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I think because I was the group leader at that stage, I was a senior on that scene, part of the group, the command structure came down from de Kock through me to the people on the ground.  In the circumstances we were in today where we want to achieve reconciliation and incorporating all the lies and the mud-slinging, I would say I accept the full responsibility what my staff and,  I think, de Kock assumes responsibility for the whole farm and to lighten his load and not to run away, therefore, I also assume full responsibility what happened there, whether I knew about that, whether senior people were on the scene are saying they do not know what happened there, I am asking, on behalf of reconciliation, to accept full responsibility.

MS PATEL: By extension, then, Captain, would you then also accept responsibility for the conduct of the askaris on the scene?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If the askaris worked within the instructions, with the frame of the instructions I have given them, if they did not do something unresponsible, which they did not convey to me, I would accept responsibility for their conduct.

MS PATEL: Thank you.  Captain Bellingan, not wishing to flog a dead horse here, could you, perhaps, just briefly, once again, confirm the instructions that were given to your askaris regarding this specific operation?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, together with Ms, with Liebenberg I gave them the necessary instructions.  I told them this is what they had to do in the Western Cape, here were certain addresses. Our primary purposes was, purpose was tracing the so-called liberation fighters.  He, they had to identify them, to establish their network, it was not something which could be done in a short time.  I told them to gather information, we compiled reports, I kept copies of these reports.  Our task was to gather information.  These two people had possession of AK47's or one AK47 and a Tokarev and they had a covert vehicle.  That was a way of living out a legend.
	You cannot live a legend amongst the liberation fighters and if they ask, could I also use this weapon, you could say, no, you cannot, because my group leader has said so, you should also allow him to shoot at targets, but the instruction was clear, do not leave these weapons out of your sight, even if you sleep on them, do not do something which can get you into trouble later on.  
	One evening I told them, I mentioned it in the Section 29, to develop a legend, for example, one evening three or four of them in the Kombi, to live out your legend, when you see a police Caspar, the Riot Squad at that time was very stressed at that time, shoot at the Caspar, just shoot a few shots so that the liberation fighters who were with you could see and believe in your legend and that you were serious about things.  This happened and they got stuck in the sand.  The police confiscated the Kombi, I and Liebenberg later took this Kombi from the store, although Liebenberg said he cannot remember that, and then we had to develop a different legend.
	We found an AK47 magazine in that Kombi and they thought that there were terrorists in that Kombi.  That was my instruction, do not do anything without clearing it out with me.  Should you do something wrong, come and tell me so that I can manage that, because these instructions were not a free for all, they were reasonable.  Do not just shoot randomly or burn houses.  It was not like that.

MS PATEL: I thank you.  When you started the operation what specific information did you have at hand?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: As I have said previously, I took an operation over from other members.  There was limited information available.  I cannot say immediately what that was, but we had information that here were liberation fighters who were trained overseas.  After an onslaught in Lesotho there were certain networks which were still here.  There were, the information was vague, but there was information.

MS PATEL: Were there any photographs available of (...indistinct).

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If I remember correctly, the Research Desk, C2 there, would provide us photographs of infiltrators in the Western or in the Eastern Cape.  In many cases it happened that the liberation fighters from Oudtshoorn were hiding in the Western Cape or vice versa.  You would show them photographs of possible terrorists.

MS PATEL: Would you have double checked that with Mr Liebenberg down here?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Definitely.

MS PATEL: Were any of these photographs shown to the askaris before they infiltrated?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That was normal practice.  What we also did, those same photographs were shown to other branches of the police, like the Detective Branch.  I think that was also the case in this instance.

MS PATEL: Can you, perhaps, recall how many photographs there were available of the group that was eventually infiltrated?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I do not think there were only photographs available of all these people.  I am speaking under correction.  You had a national photo album kept at headquarters which contained photographs from all over the country.  Then you had a local photo album.  It is like any good security agent, he compiled his own photo album for all the suspects he got involved with.  So, I cannot say with any certainty.

MS PATEL: Would you concede, though, that some photographs may have been available or not?  You do not recall?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I cannot remember that.

MS PATEL: No, that is fine, that is fine.  When Mr Mbelo was sent in to infiltrate, was the information that you had available then the same information that was then given subsequently to the two askaris that were sent in?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Because I do not have access to all the records any more and I have listened to Mr Mbelo's application, it could be that the two networks were the same, but I think it could have been like that.

MS PATEL: Okay.  Would you have debriefed Mr Mbelo after he came in from the evening that he spent with that particular group?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, I and Liebenberg, we saw him sitting in front of the office that same morning and we debriefed him then.

MS PATEL: Okay.  Would Mr Mbelo have been involved in the initial instructions to your two askaris before they went in, would he have supplied some information to the askaris?