Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-11

MR VISSER: Yes, and here you refer to Chapter 17, which is Exhibit B, isn't that so?  Mr Chairman, if you could perhaps turn to paragraph 6 you will find what the witness is now referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Just hold on.

MR VISSER: It's at page 112.  We should have re-paginated it.  But dealing with the page numbers as they appear now, page 112 paragraph 6.  And there reference is made to the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about paragraph 6 of Exhibit D?

MR VISSER: No, no, of Exhibit B for bravo.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Chairperson.  B for bravo.

CHAIRPERSON: Hold it.

MR VISSER: And it's paragraph 6, that is at page 112.  And we're not going to read it, but that is what the witness is referring to, the zones and areas and zonal and area commanders etc., Chairperson.  So that should just be noted alongside paragraph 105 of Exhibit A.
	Very well, please proceed.
MR BOTHA
"Their activities included the recruitment of agents in the Security Forces, the pressure and circulation of political literature in order to politicise persons regarding problems or problematic issues within the country, as well as the mass import of weaponry from abroad into stockpiling points in the RSA."

MR VISSER: Before you proceed.  Chairperson, I hope I'm not confusing you, I'm just trying to be helpful to give you the cross-references.  If at page - at paragraph 105, at the end of that, you can refer again to Exhibit C, page 2 of Exhibit C, the third paragraph.  And I will read it to you.  Exhibit C says this: - if you have it before you, Chairperson, that's the Gail Wannenberg document.
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were ..."
...(intervention)

MS THABETHE: Sorry, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MS THABETHE: Can my learned friend please repeat the page numbers.

CHAIRPERSON: This is page 2 ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Of Exhibit C.

CHAIRPERSON: ... of Exhibit C, paragraph 3.

MR VISSER: It's the third paragraph from the top.  They're not numbered.

CHAIRPERSON: They're not numbered, yes.

MR VISSER: Has Ms Thabethe found it?

MS THABETHE: Yes, thanks.

MR VISSER: I read it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were to relocate senior and middle-level leaders from the ANC external leadership into South Africa to create a nation-wide underground network to co-ordinate and support a general insurrection against the apartheid State and to penetrate the South African governmental and security structures for the purposes of intelligence collection and covert disruption.  	But for Vula to succeed it had to create an underground organisation far more sophisticated, secure and secretive than the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe had been able to achieve to that point in the armed struggle.  In addition, it had to create or obtain a secure means of real time communication between the external leadership at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia) and the Vula operational command inside the country.
			Its existing communications system with internal underground operatives, consisted of a combination of one-time inscription pads, air flight couriers, cross-border smuggling messages etc."
Now Mr Chairman, if you will allow me to confuse you even a little further, from the Internet there is a document available, which can be down-loaded.  It is called "Talking to Vula" and it is by a Mr Tim Jenkin.  He was a gentleman who lived in England and who developed and perfected this one-time encryptic pads and the communication system which evolved through telephone modems talking to computers, which allowed instant same time access, both from South African, Lusaka and England.
	Now it's an instructive document to show how it evolved.  And if you are at all interested, Chairperson, it is available on the Internet as I stated, under the heading "Talking to Vula".  We have a copy thereof, which again we can make available to you.  We don't believe it really is more than of interest value to you, but of course it is available if you want it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks very much.  I mean these are technical developments that speed up communication.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well we don't have to be educated on that.

MR VISSER: I think you don't need to know anything beyond that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: For present purposes.  Yes, do carry on.

MR VISSER: Very well, would you proceed.

H J P BOTHA: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA
"Role players in Operation Vula included Oliver Tambo, as already mentioned, Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils, Archie Abrahams, Siphiwe Nyanda, Raymond Lala, Jeanette Love, Pravine Gordon, Ivan Pillay and others.
		Sometimes Vula also co-opted MK operatives who were successful to the Vula structure.  And here is an example of Paul Gotesemang.  Within the Vula structures he was known as Rexal, R-E-X-A-L and he was the brother of Mbuso Shabalala."

MR VISSER: And that is the subject of the amnesty application which is served before this Amnesty Committee?

H J P BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed with paragraph 108.
MR BOTHA
"Maharaj, Kasrils and Nyanda were sent in first to the RSA, in order to establish Operation Vula and their mission was to create an infrastructure.  By June 1990, after two years of the establishment of the infrastructures, there were already three established infrastructures, namely in Natal itself, the PWV area and Cape Town.
		As I have already said, Natal was divided into a so-called central, southern, northern and western zones and districts.  When the first official negotiations began between the SA Government and the liberation movements, Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo ..."
And here I just want to qualify.  Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo is incorrect here ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Joe Slovo was not in the country?

H J P BOTHA: That is correct.  The other three that I have mentioned were already in the country.

MR VISSER: So you are saying that Joe Slovo must be replaced by Siphiwe Nyanda?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.  So they were already in the country.  What year are we referring to?

H J P BOTHA: We are referring from 1988 to approximately 1990.
"At times they had to leave the country in order to participate in the ANC's negotiations team, then they would re-enter the country and conduct negotiations after which they would again leave the country legally and then re-enter illegally to continue with Operation Vula."

MR VISSER: Now this legal and illegal, this has to do with the legislation which at that stage came to the statute which gave indemnity or exemption from prosecution in order to grant the leaders of the ANC and the SACP and other liberation movements the opportunity to enter the country and participate in the negotiations.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"During February 1990, Mr Nelson Mandela was released.  Documents indicate that during the remaining two years of the five year plan of Operation Vula, Mr Nelson Mandela's death was identified as the trigger of the insurrection, the spark which would ignite the civil war."

MR VISSER: Yes.  Mr Chairman, if we may refer you to Exhibit B for bravo, at the page which is marked 117, paragraph 10.

CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it.