Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-20

MR VISSER: Yes, do you agree in principle with the evidence given by Mr Botha, I'm just trying to cut it short here, the evidence given by Mr Botha regarding names etc. and what happened?

J A STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: As a result of this you then went back to Pretoria?

J A STEYN: Yes.  As a result of this Botha and I went back to Pretoria on the 13th of July, to Head Office to explain these arrests and to receive further orders and to do certain planning.

ADV BOSMAN: Chair, if I can just ask some clarification here?  In the previous paragraph you're referring to the clandestine investigation which was conducted meanwhile.  Clandestine, relating to whom?  Could you perhaps elaborate?

J A STEYN: Yes, this was the observation which was being carried out at these safe addresses which we had at our disposal.

ADV BOSMAN: I don't understand your use of the word clandestine.  In what respect was it clandestine?  Who were you hiding it from?

J A STEYN: These were operations, or let me explain it like this.  These were reconnaissance actions which were taking place and we did it in such a way so that we wouldn't expose ourselves.

ADV BOSMAN: So it wasn't clandestine in respect of your seniors?

J A STEYN: No.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, I just wanted to clarify that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes,

MR LAX: Perhaps if I could use the word covert as opposed to overt.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

J A STEYN: Yes, that's right.

CHAIRPERSON: Anyway.

MR VISSER: The point is that if you observe people, you don't actually want them to know that you're doing it.

J A STEYN: That's correct.  On this occasion it was ordered or I received an order that a national investigating team should be put together and that the matter should be investigated thoroughly to be able to reveal everything in respect of this operation, but that in all probability and due to the negotiating process under way between the government and the ANC and other parties, prosecutions would not be instituted.  Upon my return to Durban I put together an investigating team and it comprised various members from across the country.
	On the 14th of July 1990 Col Botha came to see me in my office and told me that problems had arisen for which there were no obvious solutions and here I refer to the fact that we sat with Shabalala and I didn't know what to do with him  and in the light of Shabalala's arrest there was the fear that should he be released, he would be able to compromise the position of Ndaba in the ANC.  apart from this, according to Botha, Shabalala had also started to suspect that Ndaba was collaborating with the South African Police and that that was an even stronger motive as to why he could not be released.  The fact that Ndaba expressed his fears to Botha that the ANC would get to hear of his co-operation with the South African Police and his  expressed intention to go and play open cards with the ANC, made it impossible to release him.
	We thus had a dilemma on hand for which we had no obvious solution.  The only solution would be, was if Botha could compose Ndaba to a certain extent and to change his view to such an extent that it could be trusted not to convey sensitive information to the ANC.  As a background to these facts the following was also relevant in my mind.  The command structure of the South African Police after the negotiating process had commenced, had emphasised it most strongly that everything should be done to strengthen the hand of the National Party and the Government.  The breakthrough made by the Security Branch in respect of Operation Vula gave the National Party a lead in respect of the ANC and the Security Branch received the order from Police Headquarters to do everything possible to try and increase this lead.

MR WILLS: I'm really writing at the speed of light.  I'm using this as my official translation.  I wonder if I could again ask this witness to try and slow down?

J A STEYN: I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: And to give the interpreter a chance.  Yes, please carry on.  Where are we, at paragraph 12?

J A STEYN: 14.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

J A STEYN: It was accordingly for us in the Security Branch and as supporters of the government at that stage and the National Party, it was important that nothing should go wrong, nothing should happen to prejudice the government's position.  As a result of the circumstances and the considerations which I've now mentioned, I on the 14th of July 1990, had reconciled myself with the probability that both Ndaba and Shabalala had to be eliminated unless a drastic change in the circumstances occurred in respect of the intention of Ndaba to go to the ANC and to be frank with them.  In my view Shabalala's fate had already been decided at that stage especially in view of the fact that he was apparently convinced that Ndaba was an informer working for the Security Branch.
	On the 15th of July 1990 during a further meeting at Security Head Office in Pretoria, a previous suggestion that certain persons not be arrested was ratified.  They were inter alia Joe Slovo, Zuma and Hani.  This decision was based on the fact of their participation in the negotiating process and this decision was taken after a briefing to, amongst others, National Intelligence.

MR VISSER: May I perhaps just clarify this?  You're referring here in your evidence to three occasions at which you went to Pretoria.  Is that correct?  It was the 10th and the 13th and then also on the 15th you went to Pretoria on those occasions?

J A STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would it then be correct to say that Col Botha had been present on those first two occasions but not on the last occasion?

J A STEYN: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: You've already said that the national investigating team was put together?

J A STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Continue.

J A STEYN: Due to the extent of Operation Vula a national investigating team was composed but although this national investigating team was put together and further arrests had already followed, it was disappointing that and especially in view of the extent and the objectives of Operation Vula, there'd now been this prohibition which had been placed on the arrests of certain individuals who had played a leading role in Vula.
	Chairperson, the gravity of the case, that is now Operation Vula, was reflected during a bail application made by Nyanda in the Regional Court of Durban and the Regional Magistrate refused it.

MR VISSER: Now for convenience you have here an extract from the Magistrate's judgment.  It's too long for us to read it now and you are asking the Committee to read this extract because this sets out in basic terms what the background was of Operation Vula and what Mr Nyanda was engaged upon.

J A STEYN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Could you then continue on page 6 paragraph 20?