Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-12

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is Mr Wasserman.  You will find his statement of his evidence at page 45 of the additional bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have that.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, you gave evidence earlier in this week before this Committee, is that correct?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you wish to incorporate the evidence you gave previously in your present application?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, at page 93 of the original Tekere bundle where you dealt with the Tekere application, you stated that the nature and particulars of this incident are not immediately recalled to mind and you said that you would do the necessary research etc in an attempt to provide a full and detailed statement which would be provided at a later stage.  What did you mean by that?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I needed to consult and recall the particulars with other parties that might have been involved in the same incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a bit louder, I can't hear.  You needed to recall?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: I needed to recall some facts, some salient points, from other parties which would have been involved, in order to make a decent, full statement.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: You were involved in more than one incident, we already know, is that so?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's so.

MR VISSER: Was your problem the same as that of Maj du Preez, that he could not recall at that stage which incidents referred to which personalities?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you please take the Committee through your statement at page 46, that is page 2 before you?  You referred to the evidence of Mr du Preez and you find yourself in agreement with his testimony, you stated there.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: We will see that there are some slight differences which you will point out in a moment.  Will you continue from paragraph 2?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.  My memory is rather poor relating to this incident.  I do recall that I did proceed with du Preez one evening to a farm in Pietermaritzburg,  although I am uncertain when the instruction first came. I know that the farm was in the Elandskop area, which Col Vorster used as a safe-house.

MR VISSER: According to your recollection, is it a fact that you were in fact on that farm once before the Tekere matter took place, not so?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That is so, Sir.

MR VISSER: Were you able to find your own way to the farm?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Consequently du Preez and I met Mr Vorster in Pietermaritzburg and we followed him to that farm.  On arrival at the farm, we found Col Andy Taylor with a black gentleman present.  Col Taylor then briefed us in regard to this man.  He informed us that it was MK Tekere and that he was an S O U, he was a Special Operations member and that he was totally non-co-operative.  He also said that Tekere had been arrested by askaris and that he would be able to convey to the ANC the identity of those askaris.  He further told us that Tekere had been arrested and that he was on his way to plant bombs in the Durban area.
	What made Tekere particularly dangerous was underscored by the fact that he was a member of the elite Special Operations unit of the ANC and some of the biggest and most spectacular attacks during the conflict of the past, were attributed to Special Ops, such as the explosions in Durban on the Victoria embankment and the Mobil Oil Refinery.  I am also informed that this list includes the Church Street bomb, Krugersdorp Magistrates Court bomb and the attacks on Sasol 1 and 2.

CHAIRPERSON: These are the activities of the Special Operations Unit?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Of  S O U, yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Not necessarily Tekere?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: I was further informed that attempts made to solicit his services as an informer were unsuccessful, so briefly we were told that Tekere could neither be prosecuted or released.  He couldn't be prosecuted due to the lack of evidence against him and he couldn't be released as he would continue with his terrorist activities and consequently Taylor decided that he should be eliminated.

MR VISSER: What was your experience of Col Taylor at the time?  How did you regard his judgment in matters dealing with your work?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: I regarded his judgment and opinions and conclusions as pretty professional.

MR VISSER: According to your own knowledge, was Taylor instrumental in the arrest of other so-called terrorists during the time that you knew him?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Can you give any indication of numbers with which Taylor would have been involved?  Arrests.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: It would be numerous, I can't recall how many.

MR VISSER: Yes.  Would you say tens, or hundreds or what?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Scores.

MR VISSER: Scores.  Alright.  And according to your knowledge, were all those persons that Taylor had arrested before or had taken into custody, been killed, or what was the position?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Not at all, Mr Chairman, many were processed through the legal channels that were in existence.

MR VISSER: Tried in court and found guilty or not guilty, etc?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Alright.  Will you continue at page 3 please, page 47 in your bundle, Mr Chairman.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, as a result of the information passed on to me by Mr Taylor, it was clear to me that Tekere had been unlawfully abducted and detained.

MR VISSER: That's an inference you drew?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: That's the inference I drew, yes.

MR VISSER: Alright.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: And by my subsequent actions and conduct, I associated myself therewith.
	Col Vorster took us to a spot in a plantation, which he identified as a good spot to bury Tekere.  Mr du Preez and I then proceeded to dig a grave and when finished, we went back to the house.  Tekere was informed that he was to be taken to another location and he was blindfolded.

MR VISSER: Can you recall whether his hands were cuffed?

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: He was cuffed behind his back, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Right.

LAWRENCE G WASSERMAN: We led him down the garage driveway and just before reaching the plantation where the grave had been dug, I hit him with a police baton, which rendered him unconscious and caused him to fall to the ground.  He was on his back and I shot him in the head with a silenced Makarov pistol, which was given to me by Col Taylor, for that purpose.  I thereafter shot him a second time in the chest.  The second shot was to make absolutely certain of death.  We then took off all his clothes and buried Tekere.  The clothes were then taken up to the farmhouse and were burned there.  We then all left the scene.

MR VISSER: How do you view your position in what you did?  Can you explain that to the Committee?