Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-03-16

UNKNOWN: And that it was an internal war, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: Not exclusively, but it was also internally definitely.

UNKNOWN: I'm not speaking about exclusively, but we're looking at internal actions here.

MR VERSTER: That's correct.

UNKNOWN: That inside South Africa there was an undeclared war, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: And then if one goes to paragraph 163
"Finally, the above took place in the context of a nation-wide State of Emergency that effectively remained in place from June 1986 to mid-1990."

MR VERSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: A crisis emergency situation.

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And it is in this time that the CCB was formed, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: Concerning proportionality, it would also be accompanied by - and I'm not saying that this is the perception that Mr Lax tried to create, but the perception might exist that you were on a picnic of your own in this case and that you decided how people could be damaged and it was your decision solely and that officers higher up in the Defence Force were not involved with it.  I want to refer you to paragraph 382 of the same Report.  If you can please look at that.  Do you have it?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: A person by the name of Gen AJM Joop Joubert is mentioned there, is this the person that you referred to as your Commanding Officer before Gen Webb took over?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: It is written there, with reference to the aforegoing that I, amongst others, referred to
"The above details are corroborated in the amnesty application of the GOC Special Forces, November 1985 to January 1989, Gen AJM Joop Joubert."
	Just by the way, this same Gen Joubert during 1988 he - my clients Burger and Maree and also Mr Slang van Zyl and Kalla Botha were welcomed in the CCB by him, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That's correct.

UNKNOWN: And he also gave them some information.

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: In your presence?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: He says there
"In the mid to late '80s, one of the major goals of national security policy and strategy was to bring the revolutionary organisation and mobilisation by the liberation movements, particularly the ANC, to a halt.  By this time it was also clear that the ANC was not going to be stopped by normal conventional methods and that the revolutionary methods would have to be used.
		As the institution for external operations, Special Forces would also have to intensify its external operations, since the necessity for unconventional and revolutionary action was already clear.  It was also clear that clandestine and covert operations would have to take place internally, for which Special Forces members would be used."
Is that the correct situation?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"It was more-or-less then that the name CCB was adopted as a replacement for D40 or Barnacle."
Is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"The revolutionary and covert nature of the plan amongst other things, involved
(a)	That ANC leaders and people who substantially contributed to the struggle, would be eliminated."
Were those your instructions, Sir, from officers like Gen Joubert?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, that was part of the priorities as I have mentioned them.

UNKNOWN: One now has to look, he says
"ANC leaders and people who substantially contributed to the struggle."
So it would then have been collaborators with the ANC that were not necessarily ANC, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"(b)	That ANC facilities and support services would be destroyed."

MR VERSTER: That's correct.
MR P DU PLESSIS
"(c)	Activists, sympathisers, fighters and people who supported them would also be eliminated."
Was that the higher officers' instructions to you, amongst others?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: In the next paragraph the CCB is amongst others described in the last sentence as a
"civilian strike force."
Would you agree that that was amongst others, one of the aims?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And then the next significant finding by this Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission says
"... which neither the government nor the SADF would acknowledge publicly."
Was that your perception?

MR VERSTER: That's correct.

UNKNOWN: And this was to the definition of covert action and this was also, isn't it correct Sir, the attitude of these people after the CCB was made public, that they did not want to admit to the nature of the CCB?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And amongst others, my clients and also Mr van Zyl and Mr Botha who did want to make public this information, they were discouraged from doing it, is this correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: And at that stage, and I'm talking about the Harms Commission, and I see this was the 16th of May 1990, a day after the first Indemnity Act was approved by the President, and at that stage there was a lot of uncertainty about the protection that you would receive, if any.  Is this correct?

MR VERSTER: This is correct, there was a lot of uncertainty regarding that.

UNKNOWN: I just want to look at 384
"Thus the CCB represented a new method of State directed warfare in a South African context part of Special Forces but structured and functioning in a way intended to make it seem it was not."
If one goes back to the sentence, do you agree with the whole sentence?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: Do you agree with the description that it was
"... State directed warfare"

MR VERSTER: It was always, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: It was as it was told to you and as you gave it to my clients, Mr Basson, Mr Maree and Mr Burger, amongst others.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: And that is the impression under which those people were at all times, that they were busy with "State directed warfare" against the enemies of the State, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: If one then returns to the proportionality of what had happened and the decisions that were taken around Messrs Omar and Evans and also the Early Learning Centre, was your decision - when it dealt with the bomb explosion at the Early Learning Centre, was your decision based upon the circumstances in the country at that time and upon the instruction as put out by Gen Joubert?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, that was within the total plan.

UNKNOWN: And would you agree with me that my clients' participation, Mr Burger, Maree and Mr Wouter Basson, was also within this policy?

GEORGE BIZOS: Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect, where there is an identity of interest between a group of people, it is an elementary rule of our practice that leading questions are to be avoided if any serious effort is going to be made to rely on the answers.  I ...(inaudible) because ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It is a form of cross-examination in the sense which is ...(intervention)

GEORGE BIZOS: Yes, but where there is an identity of interest, then it doesn't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know, I take that point.

GEORGE BIZOS: But Mr Chairman, the last question has a - and this is why I object to this one, that it has actually - this witness is being asked to express an opinion about the state of mind of other applicants and I don't think that ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I don't think it's going to get us any further, Mr du Plessis.

UNKNOWN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I take the point, I will cast it differently but I had to address it shortly.  I just don't want to waste any time, that's why I referred to the findings of this Commission, it's not something which I got somewhere in a storybook.