Special Hearings — Political Party Recalls — UNKNOWN

<UNKNOWN>: ebruary 1990 I appointed the Harms Commission to investigate certain alleged murders".
The Harms Commission, it later came out, was up against a wall. It couldn't get to the truth. It was misled. So that effort did not succeed as I had hoped it would succeed.
"On the 9th of July 1990 the Government announced the final termination of the National Security Management System and also drastically scaled down the role of the State Security Council. The management of covert operations was further reviewed after receipt of the Harms Commission's report. I appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Professor E Kahn to advise on the desirability of all secret projects and to recommend on the phasing out where possible of such projects. Part of his brief was to advise me of the adequacy of existing control measures".
And then I appointed a standing commission, the Goldstone Commission to investigate incidents of public violence. To do exactly what you are doing now. And you can go and read Mr Chairman, and other members of the Commission each and every report and each and every press statement made by Judge Goldstone. He never complained, as a matter of fact he always gave credit that never was a door closed to him, never was a request for additional logistical support refused. That he was given each and every opportunity to get at the truth. 
And then there were some breakthroughs and this resulted in opening up, if there was - inasmuch as there is and was a can of worms with regard to members of the security forces on the State side, things, wrong things being done, that can of worms was originally opened in terms of a commission appointed by me. And your starting point in getting some leads were the very same witnesses, Cronje, Klopper and a few others which came to the fore in terms of the Goldstone Commission's activities.
Then I appointed General Pierre Steyn to investigate allegations, also as a result of something which happened where the Directorate for Covert Operations or something like that was the name, DKE in Afrikaans, was stumbled upon and certain things that they were doing, by the Goldstone Commission. I appointed General Steyn to investigate it, and on the basis of his briefing I took immediate steps to prevent continuation or possible continuation of what was alleged might have been happening there. I have even been criticised by the Commission of over-reacting.
So those are a number of things which were done. And then I deal in my second submission also with guidelines which have been laid down. I have listed the guidelines. And as far as the period under my predecessor is concerned, I accept that you no doubt also addressed these questions to him, he's in a much better position to reply thereto and I set that out in my, not that I'm shirking my duty but that would be best evidence for you and you would get the best information there. 
So I would disagree with the conclusion that I haven't done enough, that I haven't taken reasonable steps. Once again with hindsight, with everything which is coming out, maybe I should have done more. I'm not saying I was perfect, but I, in all friendship, reject the insinuation that I was just sitting on my hands and fooling around while these allegations were made.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr de Klerk (Microphone is not on) ...that we take a break for lunch up to say about 2 o'clock and then we will continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson. Mr de Klerk, to get back to some matters dealt with prior to the lunch adjournment, you indicated that it may be logical to understand that a certain directive, or broad strategy or proposal policy for that matter which was authorised at say the State Security Council level, is conveyed down to the persons who are then responsible for implementing that policy, and as it gets down lower and lower to the level of the operatives who would implement the particular policy, that in those circumstances misinterpretations may occur and at that level certain abberations may then take place based on a misunderstanding of the original policy framework or directive that was formulated at the State Security Council level. You suggested that that might be a logical way of understanding the categorisation of actions or categorisation of responsibilities that you set out in your submission. 
Assuming that that is correct for the moment, where the initial directive, I'm not now suggesting at the State Security Council level, we can come to that in a moment, but where the initial directive, the initial authorisation is illegal in character, and we've had a number of instances of that this morning, where at the higher level it is illegal and we've seen for example commissioners of police, minister of law and order being implicated, implicating themselves in some instances in such illegal directives, how is it possible in your view for such high office bearers to believe that it was right, acceptable, to issue illegal instructions, illegal directives?

MR DE KLERK: It is really not for me to try and interpret why individuals take a certain decision, just sort of on a basis of general assumption. But I think what is important is to see the context within which this conflict took place. I deal with that context fairly extensively from page 17 in my second submission, where I talked about what motivated people.

<UNKNOWN>: irstly, one of the main motivating factors was the determination of many Whites and especially Afrikaners, to defend what they saw as their historic right to self-determination. So that was the political motivation from some. The National Party has moved away from that but it remains to this day the ideal of a significant portion or Afrikaners who support the

<UNKNOWN>: reedom