Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-09-09

PIK BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairperson, honourable members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and thank you for the invitation from the right Reverend Finca..  It was actually started by Dr Boraine.  I appreciate the invitation.  As we are moving out of public life, the private life can become lonely at times so I thought it, myself it would be a good thing if I could come here and give my perspective and some information on the tragic events which you are considering.
   May I just warn that I really only have one copy of my submission.  I've been working, Mr  Chairperson, very hard on this the past few days, I had to work through three to four thousand pages of documentation and the copies that I handed over would not be amended, would not be corrected or edited.  I would gladly make afterwards available photocopies if there is time.  The tragic events at Bisho on 7 September 1992 stunned South Africa and the world.
 Time constraints will not allow me to deal fully with the many and varied facets which surround this tragedy.  It happened in the darkness of despair which took hold of the country after the high hopes inspired by the progress made since February 1990, after those high hopes suddenly came to an end in June 1992 with the suspension of bilateral talks between the then South African government and the ANC.
 You will recall how the country rejoiced at the release of Mr Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners on 11 February 1990.  This was followed by the first meeting at Groote Schuur between the government and the ANC on 2, 3 and 4 May 1990, establishing a working group to attend to the immediate obstacles to Constitutional negotiations.  Then followed the Pretoria Minute of 6 August 1990 concluding with the following words which were, in my opinion, striking.  I quote
   'We, that is the ANC and the then South African government, we are convinced that what we have agreed upon today can become a milestone on the road to true peace and prosperity for our country.  In this way we do not pretend to be the only parties involved in the process of shaping the new South Africa.  We know that there are other parties committed to the peaceful process.  All of us can henceforth walk that road in consultation and co-operation with each other.  We call upon all those who have not yet committed themselves to peaceful negotiation to do so now.'
 During the 1991 session of parliament, numerous discriminatory enactment's were repealed including the Lands Act of 1913 and 1936, the Group Areas Act of 1966, the Population Registration Act of 1950 which was, in my opinion, the keystone of apartheid.  That also fell under the axe bringing to an end the era of institutionalised racial discrimination.  As the pillars of apartheid fell one after the other, South Africa was placed on an irreversible course of reform towards becoming a full democracy on the African continent.  
 On 12 February 1991 the so-called D F Malan Accord was concluded in Cape Town comprising the following.  I quote
 'It was agreed that the African National Congress would not allow attacks by means of armaments, firearms, explosives of incinerary devices, infiltration of men and material, creation of underground structures, statements inciting violence, threats of armed action or training inside South Africa.  The democratic process  [this is important]  obliges all political parties and movements to participate in this process peacefully and without resort to the use of force.  The population at large has the right to express its views through peaceful demonstrations.  Violence and intimidation from whatever quarter accompanying mass action should be eliminated.  Peaceful political activities and stability must be promoted.'  
 That's what we agreed with the ANC.  The signing of the National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991 was hailed as another important milestone on South Africa's course of reform.  The National Peace Accord was intended to promote peace and prosperity in violence stricken communities and for South Africa as a whole.  It contained recognition of certain fundamental rights in order to ensure democratic political activity.  These include freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, peaceful assembly, freedom of movement and free participation in political activity.  
 Soon thereafter on 21 December 1991 followed the Declaration of Intent at the convention for a democratic South Africa, the World Trade Centre.  Nineteen organisations and parties met at the World Trade Centre on 20 and 21 December 1992 for a meeting which later became known  [1991 I'm sorry]  as CODESSA 1.  The parties declared their solemn commitment to, I quote
 'Bring about an undivided South Africa with one nation sharing a common citizenship, patriotism and loyalty.  Work to heal the divisions of the past, to secure the advancement of all and to establish a free and open society based on democratic values.  Strive to improve the life of all our people and ensure equal opportunities and social justice for all South Africans.'
 The Declaration of Intent was signed by 17 of the 19 organisations.  The IFP objected to the concept of a unitary government which according to them did not leave enough room for federalism.  The Bophuthatswana government stated that it wished to keep its options open.  All 19 parties including the two non-signatories, however, participated freely in the work of all five working groups.  Much work awaited the various structures created by CODESSA 1.  South Africa was experiencing a decisive period in its history.  A premier meeting of CODESSA took place on 15 and 16 May 1992 to consider the reports of the various working groups.  A crisis struck the proceedings.
 I do not intend to deal with that crisis today.  It almost wrecked the negotiations.  Indeed it suddenly became clear that the more important parties would have to face more severe obstacles than was generally believed up to that point.   And then came Boipatong 17 June 1992.  As could be expected, the massacre unleashed intense emotions and set suspicions on fire which almost crushed all hopes of a peaceful negotiating process to resolve South Africa's Constitutional crisis.  The ANC called off all further bilateral discussions with the government.  I remember this announcement well.  I was acting State President on 21 June 1992 when the announcement was made.
 I called for urgent talks with the ANC to consider all the facts and issues surrounding the Boipatong massacre and reaffirmed the government's commitment to negotiations with the ANC and other parties but the future then looked unstable and dark, and yet I knew from my experience with the negotiations on Namibia's independence that the government and the ANC would have to talk again and I said so publicly repeatedly.  There simply was no alternative.  They did so on 26 September 1992 when a new beginning was agreed to and a record of understanding was agreed to on that day but Mr Chairperson, between June and September 1992 events occurred which kept the country on the brink of disaster.
 The massacre at Bisho on 7 September was such an event.  This tragedy was preceded by an equally explosive event on 4 August.  The ANC had planned a march on Bisho on that day as part of the ANC's mass action campaign.  How did the landscape look at which I found myself as Minister of Foreign Affairs, you may quite rightly ask.
 Negotiating the Komati Accord, Rhodesia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to pave the way for South West Africa's independence, stand out in my life as rewarding work which enriched my life.  Managing relations with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei was the most depressing and distressing experience of my life.  I inherited the nightmare of an impossible dream.
 Independent black states with presidents, prime ministers, parliaments, cabinets and heads of departments like other states, yes, and capitals and airports.  In one case even a snow plough to be operative at the airport after a representative of the country learned from an airport official in Canada that snow ploughs are normal equipment at international airports.  It sounds funny but it isn't.  It is sad, immensely sad.  
 By the time Brigadier Gqozo assumed power in Ciskei after a coup on 4 March 1990 my officials, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and I had already devoted much of our time, too much perhaps, to restore a modicum of order in the financial mess which embroiled the so-called TBVC states.  Sovereignty was the boomerang.  The moment I tried to exert pressure the response was that they were independent states and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had as much authority to interfere with the running of their countries as he had in the case of Britain or any other foreign state.
 The only consolation I have of this part of my career, this depressing part is that I thwarted the independence of a fifth calamity KwaNdabele.  The cabinet was on the point of approving its independence arrangements when I proposed a number of conditions which would have entailed direct control of all the finances of the would-be new state, a prohibition on a casino, no broadcasting structures and a number of other features normally associated with independence.  I knew beforehand that my conditions would not be acceptable for the leaders of KwaNdabele and that ended their dream, or nightmare of becoming independent.
 My first major objective in normalising relations with the Ciskei after the coo was to negotiate an agreement which would give the South African government a say in some of the affairs of Ciskei, only some of them.  Brigadier Gqozo however, on his part had a different opinion.  I made it clear to the new military leader that in future the head of state of Ciskei would no longer have the unfettered authority to appoint his cabinet all by himself.  I insisted that the South African government would designate the encumbrance of certain cabinet posts, just some of them.  
 Brigadier Gqozo however objected.  He said that he should have the right to approve our nominees.  He argued that such a provision was in reality a humiliation and an inroad on his sovereignty.  Why, he asked, should Ciskei suffer this humiliation.  The record of the other three independent states was not better, he said, than Ciskei.  There he had a point.  It was accordingly agreed that South Africa and I quote
 'Shall designate suitably qualified persons who are acceptable to Ciskei to be appointed as ministers in the following portfolios in Ciskei.  
[a]  Economic affairs, finance and state administration, the incumbent of which portfolio should ex officio serve in the legislature.
[b]  Justice.
[c]  Transport and public works.
[d]  Agriculture.'
 Then followed a detailed programme, that was my agreement with him, of commitments and responsibilities which Ciskei undertook to implement as part of the envisaged financial and economic adjustment plan.  The agreement was signed by Brigadier Gqozo and I on 26 February 1991.  For a time I thought it might work but it did not.  I did not at that time foresee how Brigadier Gqozo's stature would grow within the ranks  [I emphasise within the ranks]  of a group which was formed by Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, KwaZulu, the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Volks Unie, shortly after the government and the ANC agreed to the record of understanding on 26 September 1992.
 The group was called The Concerned South Africans Groups, COSAG and was formed out of their opposition to the record of understanding which they rejected.  Brigadier Gqozo became a protected member of COSAG.  Whenever I made the slightest hint that coercive measures could be taken against Ciskei, I was attacked by the leaders of the group expressing solidarity with Brigadier Gqozo.
 Relations became strained and acrimonious.  The secondment of officials who refuse to tow his line were terminated and replaced by inept, inexperienced persons.  At one stage he refused to have any communication with our ambassador here in Bisho.  I spent much time considering ways and means to have him removed as head of state particularly after the killing of Mongwane Onward Gonzana and Charles Zante Sebe, by Ciskei Security Forces.
 My legal advisors told me that there was no constitutional way to do so.  I personally suggested to him on more than one occasion that he should resign.  I can dwell for hours on the distressing relations which existed between us.  I am not here today, however, to pass judgement.  After all, all of us stand to be judged one day and I am painfully aware of my own sins and failures.
 However, the facts concerning our relationship should be made known, that is what this honourable Commission want me to do.  Brigadier Gqozo himself described that relationship in a number of communications.  After a television programme in which I participated on 4 August 1992, the day on which the first ANC march took place, he conveyed the following sentiments to me.  I quote from his letter
 'The Ciskei government wants to lodge a strong protest in connection with the incorrect presentation of events in Ciskei on 4 August 1992 by the Honourable Minister during last night's Agenda programme on SABC TV.  As far as the Ciskei government is concerned the Agenda presentation was a misrepresentation of the actual facts at a time when even the final outcome of the mass action was still in the balance.  The manner in which the situation was portrayed by the Minister negated the restraint and responsible way in which the Ciskei government had handled the situation and gave undeserved credit to the ANC.'
 On 31 August 1992 in reaction to a meeting which my Deputy Minister had with the judge, Judge Claasen, presiding at the inquest into the killings of the late Mr Ganzsana and Charles Sebe, Brigadier Gqozo despatched the following letter to President F W de Klerk.  I quote
 'There can be no doubt in your government's mind that I have been continually supportive and positively committed to the moderate alliance which previously existed between our governments.  It is surprising that all this has been in vain.  I am totally disillusioned by recent occurrences.  I refer particularly to the visit by your Deputy Minister and his  [indistinct]  to me on Friday 28 August.
 I wish to record at some length my dismay and disappointment at the messages he conveyed and particularly the attitude and motive of your government, if correctly reflected in your Deputy Minister's conduct.  Without obtaining facts, your government saw fit to judge the decisions of my cabinet and indeed resolve that you could no longer regard me or the Ciskei as an alley.
 Your government proceeded to advise me that I should act against the advice of four advocates in the trial and give verbal evidence after I had undertaken to file affidavits and submit to interrogatories.  Your officials made contact with the presiding judge and I am left with the impression that your government is interfering in the due process of our courts.  While I have absolute faith in the Ciskei Supreme Court bench, I see no reason why you should go behind my back to Judge Claasen.
 Does this not constitute a mistrial?  What messages were your officials convey, because of the real situation I'm compelled to suspect the modus.  I'm distressed and concerned by the attitude of your Deputy Minister and subordinates which implies that your government was relying on the results of the inquest to remove me from Ciskei.
 If Deputy Minister's attitude is correct, your government is not at all serious about reforms but is simply covering its own interest.  Tricks to use the inquest to get rid of me will not work, he said.  I will be recording to the Supreme Court that I find your contact with the judge to be indefensible.  You could have checked with me or my officials, the normal channels, a route your officials arrogantly disregarded.
 We are not only fighting the ANC SACP because of their despicable policies of intimidation, arrogance, violence and domination but are called upon to defend ourselves against your government practising the same evil against Ciskei when we so desperately need to develop.  Please do not underestimate our determination to resist the ANC SACP tactics.  We would hate to have to resist your government's tactics with the same vehemence.'
 President de Klerk responded inter alia as follows.  
 'I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 31 August and at the outset to express concern at the tone of your letter and in particular at the inferences which you have made and conclusions drawn about my government's motives.  Accordingly I would like to clarify certain fundamental issues.  The South African government scrupulously respects the independence of it judiciary as well as that of Ciskei and other countries.
 There can thus be no question of interference in the judicial process of Ciskei and any inference is totally devoid of any substance.  Regarding your references to discussion with Judge Claasen, the facts have been furnished to me as follows.  In view of the urgency and importance of the matter the Deputy Minister expressed a need to establish first hand before discussing the matter with you, the following
[a] What Mr Justice Claasen's time scale is for the further proceedings of the inquest and
[b] to have access to the exact remarks made by the judge on the question of submission of evidence to the court.
 Mr Justice Claasen furnished the Deputy Minister with the requested information.  The Chief Justice of Ciskei, Mr Justice Pickhard, was present throughout the conversation and can confirm that no other matters were discussed.  Even while the best of relationships are maintained, issues of concern may and do arise from time to time.  When that occurs, the two governments have responsibility to accept each other's motive to resolve differences in open and frank discussions.
 The future of our subcontinent is in the balance at the moment.  I would appeal to you as a leader in an important region to continue to support attempts to bring about the broader democratic dispensation which our common objective.  I am sure you will agree that it is imperative that the volatile situation in the Eastern Cape and surrounding areas should be diffused.  I believe that through close co-operation with the existing peace structures this could be achieved.
 In this manner the possible loss of life in a confrontation which would have incalculable implications for all of us could be avoided.   The point I want to make, Mr Chairperson and Honourable Members, the point I want to make is that Brigadier Gqozo was in fact not a puppet of the South African government.  His government was dependant to a large extent on funds from the South African exchequer that's true but so were Transkei and Venda.  Bophuthatswana to a lesser extent.  He could have done what another military leader did if I exerted too much pressure on him, draining the civil servants' pension fund to pay current expenditure.  It happened in the Transkei.
 My department, in order to achieve discipline in fiscal matters, on occasion delayed transfers of funds to some of the TBVC states with no orderly impact.  The leaders lived like before.  The hundreds of thousands of government employees would have paid the price.  They included police officers and nurses.  They would simply not have received their own salaries.
 If I could use the parallel of a building, I would say that the executive structures in the TBVC states, all of them at that time qualified for demolishing, but if a bulldozer were to be chosen to do the job it could only be done with devastation to the valuable surroundings.  
 In any event as from the beginning of 1992 Working Group 4 of CODESSA 2 had the task to report on all proposals and make recommendations with regard to the relationships between South Africa and the TBVC states and the people of these states under a new South African Constitution.
 From the reports submitted by Working Group 4 that the [indistinct] of CODESSA 2 on May 15 1992, it will be noticed that 18 of the 19 parties including Ciskei, including Ciskei shared the view that re-incorporating of the TBVC states into the new South Africa was desirable.  Only Bophuthatswana reiterated its preference for a non re-incorporating but stated that every option which promised a better future or a future at least as good as its position at that time, would be regarded as a feasible and realistic option for consideration.  Again with the exception of Bophuthatswana all the parties including Ciskei agreed that  [and I quote]
 'The TBVC states will participate in transition arrangements as proposed by Working Group 3 on the understanding that these arrangements shall mutatis mutandis impact on the TVBC governments and territories in the same way as they impact on the South African government and the RSA.'  
 I continue the quotation
 'The people of the TBVC states shall take part fully in the processes of Constitution making and transition arrangements including elections as may be proposed by Working Groups 2 and 3.  Their participation will be arranged in such a way that their votes in the national election shall signify support for or rejection of re-incorporating.  The results of such an election shall constitute a sufficient test of the will of the people.  South African citizenship will be restored to the citizens of all the TBVC states who would have been South African citizens but for the Constitutional independence of the states, immediately after the testing of the will as envisaged.'  
 In addition, consensus was reached on a number of important issues relating to the practical  ... end of Tape 5, side A ... African government persuading those governments to comply with agreements reached in CODESSA as well as in the National Peace Accord became an arduous and exacting task.  This was the case with all four of them, not only Ciskei.  
 Indeed, Mr Chairperson, investigations into irregularities committed in the four states during the two or three years before re-incorporating are still at this moment in process.  We have not yet heard what went wrong.  The countries still wait for the results of what happened in Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Venda.  
 I have often been asked, I, you went to President Mangope one night in March 1994, that's now me, to inform him that he was no longer president of Bophuthatswana.  You deposed him.  Why could you not have done the same with Oupa Gqozo?  It is a fair question.  The answer is that the circumstances were different.  By 1994 the Transition Executive Council was in place.
 In August/September 1992 we had the report of Working Group 4 of CODESSA 2 but no agreed mechanism to deal with the deteriorating situation in Ciskei.  Indeed the opposite was the case.  Bilateral talks between the government and the ANC were suspended, a vacuum, a vacuum filled with bewilderment, fear, uncertainty, suspicion, controversy, bellicosity, provocation and threats.
 Up to 7 September 1992 I firmly believed that agreement between opposing parties anywhere in the world was not impossible on condition that both were brought to realise that conflict would not resolve the dispute.  The events of 7 September 1992 severely damaged that belief particularly after the peaceful outcome of the 4 August march.
 Another important point of difference between President Mangope's retirement in 1994 and Brigadier Gqozo's rule in 1992 is the fact that Brigadier Gqozo at that time, still had the support of his Security Forces and senior personnel.  The ANC was aware of this situation hence a special pamphlet which was distributed shortly before 7 September 1992 in which a direct and earnest call was made by the ANC to all Ciskei civil servants and Security Forces to refuse to carry out Brigadier Gqozo's orders and to join the people in ending his rule.  
 Brigadier Gqozo's rule finally came to an end on 23 March 1994 when he himself called me to say that he had come to the conclusion that he should relinquish power in an attempt to reduce the growing tension.  I immediately agreed and obtained President de Klerk's concurrence to appoint the Right Reverend Bongani Finca and South African ambassador Peter Goosen as joint administrators of Ciskei.  The two gentlemen fulfilled their onerous task in the most exemplary way.  
 The same can be said about Professor Chart van der Walt and Mr Jock Magora who were appointed as joint administrators of Bophuthatswana.  The agreements on these appointments partially restored my faith in the capacity of opposing parties to bridge suspicion and mistrust and in a spirit of give and take, to arrive at realistic solutions in the interest of both.
 I would like to deal now with the 4 August 1992 ANC march because that has never been well documented and I will, in the course of my presentation, for the first time reveal certain facts.  Fearing violence during the march planned for 4 August 1992 I decided to send Deputy Minister Renier Schoeman who was then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Bisho, to assist our ambassador in negotiating an agreement allowing the ANC march under conditions acceptable to Brigadier Gqozo's government and the ANC.
 It was a time when passions were reaching boiling point, aggravated by killings, burning of businesses and homes by both sides.  Brigadier Gqozo refused to allow the march.  The ANC insisted that they had the right to protest peacefully.
 I agreed that the ANC had this right and exert pressure on Brigadier Gqozo to allow the march.  At a meeting between Brigadier Gqozo and Deputy Minister Schoeman at 12h00 on 3 August 1992 Brigadier Gqozo said that his government had given clear reasons why it was not allowing mass action in Ciskei.
 The mass action was a result of the ANC's failure to negotiate at CODESSA he said.  It was aimed at  discrediting President de Klerk, Chief Minister Buthelezi, himself and others.  The ANC was thus not welcome in Ciskei.  The marchers were also not welcome.  
 The ANC had conducted the mock trial of Brigadier Gqozo in South Africa.  They had also done much damage in Ciskei, for example setting vehicles alight.  Brigadier Gqozo added that the UN, the United Nations could not observe marchers in Ciskei because no marches would be allowed to take place.  
 Outsiders were trying to force their will on Ciskei by arranging marches.  The government would use it's Security Forces to stop any marchers and turn them back.  The United Nations observers were not welcome in Ciskei since they would be entering Ciskei with the enemy, it is the marchers.   However they could visit Ciskei on the initiative of the Ciskei government.  The latter would brief them on the situation and let them speak to the victims of violence. Brigadier Gqozo said that whenever he asked for a meeting with the South African government, it took some time to get a response, yet if the SA government had a problem affecting Ciskei it expected Brigadier Gqozo to grant an immediate meeting to discuss the problem.
 In addition his perception was that the South African government was prepared to speak only to the ANC.  Deputy Minister Schoeman responded by pointing out that Brigadier Gqozo as a respected leader, should ensure that he emerges from the present situation in better shape than beforehand.  If there is concrete evidence that the ANC intends to topple his government by way of mass action, he should bring this evidence to the attention of the United Nations Security Council.  There are many more ways to deal with the proposed march than by banning it.
 Brigadier Gqozo had projected himself as a reasonable person at the United Nations.  He should now handle the situation in a manner in which he retains the moral high ground.
 As regards the UN observers, Deputy Minister Schoeman urged him to allow them to observe activities in Ciskei.  This would not preclude him from registering his strongest objections to the activities of the ANC.  He should focus on aspects which place him in a positive light.  That was the advice my Deputy Minister endeavoured to give him.
 Brigadier Gqozo remained unbending.  It was clear that it was, that he was not in a mood for negotiating.  According to Deputy Minister Schoeman his view was that Ciskei would take the responsibility for any repercussions arising out of his halting of the march.  
 Brigadier Gqozo added, Ciskei did not have sufficient security personnel to protect the lives, property and interest of Ciskei citizens.  The only way to do this was to stop the marchers entering Ciskei.  If they were to enter Ciskei they would run amok.  This shortcoming could be blamed on South Africa.  In 1990 when Ciskei wanted to increase its Security Forces, South Africa would not provide the funds.  South Africa said at the time that it was entering a new Constitutional phase and that all matters should be viewed in a regional context.  The South African Security Forces could assist the Ciskei in times of need.
 Ciskei and South Africa also had a non-aggressive pact in terms of which the one country would not allow its territory to be used as a springboard to launch attacks against the other country.  Ciskei would appreciate it if South Africa would deploy its forces at certain key points.  However this would not change Ciskei's attitude concerning the stopping of the march the next day.
 Ciskei had made it quite clear to all citizens that it would not tolerate marches in Ciskei.  It had told its citizens to go about their normal tasks.  Public servants had been told that they faced a dismissal if they did not come to work during the mass action campaign.  The result was that the attendance figure was higher than usual.  To allow marches at this stage would be tantamount to losing face.
 If Ciskei were to permit marches, the Brigadier said, it would involve itself in mass action.  This would not reflect favourably on Ciskei's strength.  Also the ANC would derive favourable publicity from the change in attitude.  The United Nations observers can be told that they should approach the Ciskei government in the first instance, the government will brief them, show them around and show them how it stops marches.
 Deputy Minister Schoeman succeeded, at least succeeded in persuading Brigadier Gqozo to allow the UN monitory team and National Peace Committee to enter Ciskei as long as they were not seen to be part and parcel of the ANC march.  Later that afternoon, that is now 3 August, Mr Chairperson, Brigadier Gqozo telephoned our ambassador and requested that South African troops guard key installations in Ciskei.  His humble attitude the afternoon contrasted sharply with his behaviour earlier that day.
 The South African ambassador then sent the following message to me in Pretoria
 'The Ciskei government recently requested the assistance of South Africa in guarding certain key installations in Ciskei.  The request was repeated today.  Arising from incidents of plundering and arson which had already taken place in Mdantsane today, the embassy supports the request by the Ciskei government for additional troops in Ciskei.  Our department, i.e. Foreign Affairs, should thus recommend that the South African Defence Force should deploy additional troops within Ciskei with the specific task of guarding the factories in the industrial areas.  The same troops will serve as a stand-by to protect strategic key points in King William's Town if necessary.'
 I then requested the ambassador to arrange an urgent meeting with Admiral Burt Bekker [Minister of Finance here in Ciskei],  Mr Jimmy van der Merwe  [Minister of Posts here and of Telecommunications and Public Works],  General Victor [who was Commissioner of Police],  and Brigadier Olche  [Chief of the Ciskei Defence Force.]   I urged our ambassador to ask these persons to persuade Brigadier Gqozo to allow the march planned for the next day.  
 The meeting took place on the evening of 3 August.  During the meeting it became clear that all the arguments put forward earlier that day by Deputy Minister Schoeman were unacceptable politically.  There had been cases of arson that afternoon.  
 The problem was that approval had been given for a rally at Mdantsane but the approval was withdrawn later.  The people went from the site of the rally to the centre of the town.  On the way they started veld fires.  They burnt down the Ciskei Building Society building.  They tried to burn down the telephone exchange.  They destroyed some other buildings.  The Ciskei Security Services had 250 men on the ground who would shoot persons caught in the act of arson.
 The meeting that evening lasted for two and a half hours.  It was the considered opinion of Admiral Bekker and his colleagues that Brigadier Gqozo could not be swayed to change his mind.  He was too deeply compromised.  On the question of South African troop deployment, my staff felt that our troops should be on duty in King William's Town to protect the town and South African interests.
 On the morning of 4 August the situation was thus that two companies comprising 180 policemen had been stationed in King William's Town.  There were only a few people arriving at the stadium in King William's Town early the morning.   Permission for the use of the stadium had been granted until 16h00.   At my request our ambassador sent a note to the Ciskei government again warning them of the serious and negative consequences which would ensue if any harm came to the UN observers.   At about 11h00 there were about 1,000 people at the stadium.  Droves of taxis were on their way to the stadium.  The UN observer and five persons from the Peace Secretariat were meeting with the Ciskei cabinet at my request.  It was reported later to me that an agreement had been reached between the ANC  [represented by Mr Chris Hani], the UN observer Mr Jose Campino, Dr Antonie Geldenhuys  [Chairperson of the National Peace Secretariat]  and the Ciskei government, on the following lines.
 The marchers could hand over the petition at the road-block or they could proceed a few metres into Ciskeian territory and hand over the petition, or a few people could take the petition to the Parliamentary building.  The rest of the marchers would remain where they were.  At least some progress was made at that stage but the march was not over.  At about 1245 the Deputy Town Clerk of King William's Town reported that a portion of the marchers had split away and were taking a different route.
 At about 13h45  Dr Geldenhuys telephoned the ambassador to say that Mr Chris Hani was going to take the marchers through the road-block.  This appeared to be contrary to the agreement reached earlier that day, that only three persons would proceed beyond the road-block and present the petition at the Parliament.  Dr Geldenhuys thought that a blood bath was imminent.
 He requested the Deputy Minister to persuade Mr Chris Hani not to proceed beyond the road-block.  It was a critical moment.   At that moment I was at a meeting in Minister Roelf Meyer's office in Pretoria.  He cleared his office for me.  I relayed a message to Dr Geldenhuys to ask Mr Hani to phone me.  Mr Hani was driven to the Amatola Hotel nearby from where he telephoned me.  He explained his dilemma to me.  He said that the crowd was becoming uncontrollable.
 All they wanted to do was to go peacefully to the Ciskei government building.  He assured me that the march would be peaceful, that they would not enter buildings, would not stage sit-ins in buildings, would not harm anyone.  
 They had the right to protest peacefully.  We had a lengthy conversation.  I agreed with him that they had the right to demonstrate peacefully but emphasised that grave consequences could be expected if they proceeded without a further attempt to come to a mutually acceptable arrangement.  I undertook to speak again to the Ciskei government, to accept the marchers on Ciskei territory.
 Mr Hani showed understanding.  He was not insensible to the potential loss of life but found himself on a knife's edge.  The marchers were getting restless.  They needed guidance.  It was clear that Mr Hani was under severe pressure from his own supporters to go ahead with the march.  I then made an appeal to him to wait at the hotel so that I can first contact Mr Cyril Ramaphosa.
 I was convinced that we could work out something which could prevent a disaster.  He agreed.  I then telephoned Mr Ramaphosa.  I said to him that if the march continued, people are going to die and maybe very, very many of them.  
 We have only one country I said, we will have to share it, we cannot carry on like this.  We cannot sit and talk to one another as I'm now talking to you, I said to Cyril, knowing that in minutes hundreds of people may be shot dead.  We will have to take the blame, you, the ANC, Brigadier Gqozo, the South African government, I, all of us, we're losing the respect to the outside world.  We are creating the impression that we are incapable of controlling this kind of critical situation.
 Mr Ramaphosa reacted by sharing my concern but pointed out that the ANC could not accept Brigadier Gqozo's high hardness in preventing peaceful political expression the way he did.  They owe it to their supporters to uphold that democratic right of peaceful assembly and protest.
 I agreed but again emphasised that there would be time and opportunity to attend to Brigadier Gqozo's attitude and to change things but when people are dead we will faced with the grim reality that nothing here on earth would make them live again.  Human decisions and minds could be changed but not the finality of death.
 Mr Ramaphosa concurred and said he would speak to Mr Hani to see what could be done to save the situation.  I do not know what Mr Ramaphosa told Mr Hani but I remain convinced that that conversation that day, contributed to the eventual peaceful outcome.
 I also again spoke to members of the Ciskei government warning them against the incalculable consequences of shooting any of the marches.  I told them that the world's media representatives were there.  The UN observer was there.  Dr Antonie Geldenhuys was there.  My staff were there.  All of them would be witnesses of the shooting which could be averted.  I also urged Dr Geldenhuys to try once more to persuade the Ciskei government to allow the marchers to gather in the Bisho stadium.
 I also requested Deputy Minister Schoeman to telephone General Bantu Holomisa to speak to Mr Hani.  I do not know whether such a conversation took place.  Shortly before dark the Ciskei government agreed that the marchers could gather in the Bisho stadium.  One condition was that they should enter through the back entrance, they did not but tempers had by then cooled off sufficiently to contain the situation.
 The Commission may wish to have insight in an article.  It is a retrospective consideration of the events written by Professor Raymond Suttner which was published in the 'Daily Despatch' on 20 August 1992.  I believe I should just read a few passages because this gives the other side of the picture and that is what went on in the minds of the marchers.  He says  [i.e. Professor Suttner]
 'Gqozo said we would not be allowed to set one foot into Ciskeian territory.  On the following day at least 80,000  [or 60,000 I'm not quite sure, this Photostat is not so clear]  pairs of feet entered his territory and held a rally in the Bisho national stadium.'  
 Then a little bit later he says  'I knew the South African government couldn't afford a blood bath.  [He is right when he says this]  but when facing guns and when journalists are ordered to move out of the firing line, you place less reliance on theoretical evaluation and concentrate more on which way to dive when they start shooting, looking for a ditch to fall into, pinning out to avoid being trampled by soldiers or hit by rifle butts.
 When the Vaseline came around I grabbed as much as possible preparing for teargas.   Then later we set off 15 in a crowd of 8 to 10,000.  It does not seem big enough.  I wonder about the possibility of a physical confrontation.   We march in blazing heat at a fast pace.  More people up ahead file into the crowd from the sides.
 The marshals are in full control.  After four kilometres we are asked to stop so Chris Hani can speak to a Brigadier Meintjies.  He appeals to Chris in terms of an agreement that we should not proceed further and we hand him our memorandum.  Chris says thank you very much brig. we appreciate your efforts but we are proceeding.
 The brigadier is not happy but we proceed.  We are told by an African officer through a loud hailer that if we go any further they will take action and they look like they mean it.  The Riot Police are Africans but the command, white.  Representatives of this Xhosa Bantu stam seem usually to be called Rossouw or some foreign e.g. Dutch name.  The crowd is ready to push on, move through and deal with the consequences.  Meanwhile we surge forward step by step.
 To our surprise and joy the Casspir retreats 100 metres and the soldiers pull back.  The sense of apprehension returns.  We hear there is deadlock at Stophile hence round Vaseline for the teargas.  A number of people proffer advice on how to breathe and so on.  We also discuss what to do if live ammunition is used.  We discuss whether we should lie flat but the probability is to be trampled when the crowd surges forward.  It's getting colder and we are thirstier.  We have no food and soon it will be dark.
 We had not participated a long drawn out siege.  The negotiators return off and on.  All the time the crowd surges forward bit by bit and the Casspirs retreat again.  Rossouw warns the press to stand behind the Casspir.  Are they trying to set up the atmosphere for us to anticipate shooting while not actually intending it.
 Gradually the atmosphere relaxes again and our people start drinking water from the front of the Casspir.  The discipline of the crowd is consistent.  When asked to sit down, they sit down.  The marshals hold the crowd back with rope.   At one point people surged forward because there is a snake in the grass but they soon reform in a disciplined manner.
 How the people who cannot hear the announcements maintained their discipline is hard to understand.  Later we learned that what was said at the front rippled back.  We're at the final deadlock.  They refuse to allow us to march to the National Assembly in Bisho with the delegation taking the memo further but there is an alternative destination.  Why not go to the stadium in the centre of Bisho and have a rally?   Permission is given for that but they say we must go backwards and around to get there.  We say we will go forward and we'll round in Bisho.  They offer to cut the fence for us to go directly to the stadium but we did not wait, we marched forward, not waiting for an answer.
 This is, in my opinion Mr Chairperson, at least giving some idea of what went on that day from the point of view of one of the marchers - no one less than this very prominent member of the ANC, Professor Suttner and I thought it is of extreme importance that we should try at all times to hear always both sides, all the sides.  It is interesting to hear him describing the diplomacy that we tried to practice.  He says  
 'The crowd is ready to push on, move through and deal with the consequences.  There is a respite.  The United Nations people intervene and there is a message that Pik wants Chris to phone him and this leads to more than four hours of waiting.  Cyril and Holomisa are involved and Geldenhuys is shuttling between the two sides.'
 It gives you, I think Mr President, an honest analysis of the tension that went on that day and when I say this, this stands in very stark contrast, very very stark to the events of 7 September.  The march on 4 August started with hard line positions which, in the morning and until late the afternoon, seemed to offer no hope of escaping from a blood bath.
 Here is the evidence, no hope and yet it did not end in a blood bath but unfortunately the lessons did not take route.  What I feared would happen on 4 August, happened on 7 September.
 The events leading up to the massacre of 7 September 1992 are fully documented.  The Commission is respectfully referred to the documents.   I have made a list and would not like to use your time to read all the documentation.  It contains the reports of the Goldstone Commission, the Picket Commission, letters from Mr de Klerk to Brigadier Gqozo, to President Mandela, President Mandela to President de Klerk and so on and press statements that were made by, media statements, it's all listed here and also a letter which I received from Mr Errol Spring who was of the Border Industrial Council, and my response to him.
 The South African government and I were extremely concerned about the situation which had arisen in the Ciskei border region at the time.  The government had been in constant communication as I indicated, with all the parties involved, in an endeavour to ensure a peaceful resolution.  State President de Klerk had, as I said, exchanged letters with Mr Mandela, with Brigadier Gqozo, with others.  The government had held discussions with Brigadier Gqozo.  It had sent Deputy Ministers, this time Breytenbach and Myburg, to the area to negotiate with a view to the proper management of the situation.
 They had been in constant contact with the Peace Secretariat to ensure that the letter and spirit of the Peace Accord were observed.
 Simultaneously the government had taken steps inter alia through the Declaration of Unrest Areas in order to enable the Security Forces to deal effectively with the volatile situation on the South African side of the border and to ensure that protest actions would be peaceful, lawful and in accordance with the terms of the Peace Accord and the guidelines of the Goldstone Commission as well as the conditions in the magistrate's Court Order.  You will recall the magistrate allowed the march under certain conditions.
 You will notice, with respect, Mr Chairperson, that in  ... end of Tape 5, side B ... and the ANC  SACP  Alliance are severely sanctioned.  In regard to the Ciskei government, the finding of the Goldstone Commission, not mine, the Goldstone Commission was
 'That had the Ciskei authorities acceded to the pleas of the South African government, the SAP (the South African Police) and the NP's  (National Peace  [indistinct]  to allow a peaceful and negotiated mass demonstration to take place, the violence which occurred on 7 September could have been averted.'
 That is as regards the Ciskei government's attitude on the Ciskei Security Forces, the troops.  The judge came to the following conclusion.
 'The manner in which the Ciskei forces fired at the demonstrators can only be condemned in the strongest terms.  Anyone who has watched the videos of the shooting will have experienced a feeling of disbelief that the shooting could have continued till what appeared to be an interminable time.  Indeed it appears clearly that the soldiers in the vicinity of the Yongilanga Crescent continued to fire at the fleeing crowd, virtually until the last of them disappeared from sight.
 The firing was indiscriminate and even if there had been isolated firing from the demonstrators, the reaction of the Ciskei soldiers was completely disproportional.  Not one Ciskei soldier in that area was injured and as already indicated, the high probability is that the one soldier who was injured in the Fort Hare vicinity, was shot by one of his fellow soldiers.  When the crowd in that area turned to flee, on the CDF version, the continued and prolonged firing was quite unjustified and unlawful.
 It must be emphasised that even if the CDF  [Ciskei Defence Force Commander]  and members believed that they were under some kind of attack, even if they believed that the crowd was intent upon overrunning them and going to Bisho, even if they believed that one of their members had been shot by a demonstrator, their indiscriminate and prolonged shooting at innocent demonstrators was morally and legally indefensible and is deserving of the strongest sanction.'
 In regard to the conduct of the Alliance Organisers the Goldstone Commission came to the following conclusion.  At all times the Alliance leaders must have been aware that the Ciskei authorities were in earnest in their refusal to allow the demonstrators into the Ciskei.  That was made absolutely clear in public statements.  It was reinforced by the order obtained from the Ciskei Supreme Court.  It was conveyed in unequivocal terms by the National Peace Secretariat and National Peace Committee.
 It was conveyed by the State President to President of the ANC.  In particular the Alliance created even more confusion by it first seeking an order from the Chief Magistrate, even to the extent of obtaining a mandamus from the Supreme Court.  Having obtained an order, the Alliance chose to ignore it, fully realising that the Ciskei authorities were bound by it.  By all accounts, the notice by the Alliance that they would not follow the terms of the Court Order, was inadequate.
 The threatening statements reportedly made by some Alliance leaders in the days preceding the march could only have been calculated to harden the attitude of the Ciskei authorities.  The threat made by these leaders was that the occupation of Bisho would continue until Brigadier Gqozo gave up his control of the Ciskei.  In these circumstances Judge Goldstone says
 'For the Alliance leaders to have approved of their followers running through the gap in the fence in the direction of Bisho, was irresponsible and deliberately placed such people in imminent danger which resulted in death and injury.  In the present climate of negotiation in South Africa and the policy with regard thereto by all the major political parties, the decision to have risked the lives of their followers by advancing out of the stadium was unfortunate and unjustified.  If their intention was to draw public attention to the policies of the Ciskei authorities, they could have achieved that by more appropriate mass action on the South African side of the border and even in the Bisho stadium.  To have deliberately withheld that intention from the National Peace Secretariat was disingenuous and rendered useless the role which was played by it.'
 Mr Chairperson, it only remains for me to say that this was a tragedy that was feared and predicted.  It happened.  We can never recover time.  You cannot advance it and you cannot recover it.  You cannot bring it back.  There is a famous verse from the prophet which says
 'our love [indistinct]'  [it was a man in the anguish of having lost so much and then he said]  'our love could [indistinct] eye with fate conspire, to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire, would not be shattery to bits and then remould it nearer to the heart's desire.'
 This is one of those instances.  We cannot rebuild it.  We cannot.  We cannot bring back the dead but we can once more in my opinion, extend to their families and friends our condolences, our thoughts and our prayers and in appropriate cases, material assistance and compensation.  I thank you for your patience in giving me this opportunity.