Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-07-26

ADV GCABASHE: Well your participation, with your members.  You know you talked of control - I beg your pardon, you talked about informing him about it and discussing the matter with him, and the distinction I'd like you to draw for me is seeking authority to participate in this manner as opposed to just generally telling him, not even giving him detail and just assuming that you had that authority, because you were a Major at the time.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: The mandate that we had was against terrorism and not only the area, but the information and the circumstances would indicate which steps can be taken.   And for the person in command on the ground, it is left open for interpretation and what would be the safest and most effective against the enemy.

CHAIRPERSON: What Adv Gcabashe wants to know, in this particular incident, did Schoon give you specific authorisation to participate at Piet Retief and assist Piet Retief?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not say that he said go to Piet Retief and assist them with shooting.  I made it clear to him that Piet Retief has an infiltration and they requested assistance and it had his approval.  So in that sense, one accepts, because you have to report back again and if you don't report back, there would be some enquiries.

ADV GCABASHE: And when you did report back to him on the first incident, you expressed your reservations about what had happened there?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I explained to him that there were no weapons, but that we did sort out the problem.  And the situation was such that if you could not handle it on the ground, one would go to the following person who would be higher and you would request assistance in that manner for the cover up of the situation.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, your last bit finished it off for me, thank you.

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr de Kock, if I understand your evidence correctly you could handle it on the ground because you did cover it up, you did find the weapons.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: If you could repeat please, sorry.

MR MALAN: You said that if you could not handle it on the ground you would have gone up for assistance, but in this instance you could handle it on the ground.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And you did indeed.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, but I told Brig Schoon that is things got out of control or we could not handle it any further, he would be the next person whom I would go to.

MR MALAN: So if there were any weapons you didn't have to tell him because you could handle it on the ground?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because the only difference would be that it was an issue of an ambush and not a roadblock.

MR MALAN: I don't understand when you asked for permission and when you reported.  If I heard your evidence correctly, when you were asked about specific authorisation you said something to the effect that your instruction was against terrorism, not only in the area but also the circumstances would determine and the one on the ground had to interpret it.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, to take it further I would for example not be able to tell Brig Schoon beforehand that I would send a group across the border.  For example, with the second incident after the shooting or before the shooting, I decided to send a group across the border.  I did report back to him that it was a cross-border operation, it did have his approval.

MR MALAN: I will tell you why I ask that, because I get the impression from your evidence that you really understood that you have a general instruction to combat terrorism.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And that you could take the decisions and you had that responsibility.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and then one has to take that responsibility.

MR MALAN: And one bears the consequences.  But in your instance, if you happened upon MK people you could set up an ambush, that would have been part of your general competency?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if that was the best way, then we would have set up an ambush.  ...(transcriber's own translation)

MR MALAN: So you did not need instructions to that effect, that is how you understood your duties.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You understood that it would be within your specific authorisation?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And then you would also not have to report back in general about it?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if terrorists were shot, there would usually be - I would not say it was controversial, but enquiries are made, my report to Brig Schoon would be carried over by Brig Schoon to the Chief of Security and from there it would be taken further.

MR MALAN: Yes, I would accept that circumstances would arise, specifically with the disclosure of the success and the combating of terrorism, but that still does not mean that all illegal actions necessarily had to be communicated upwards.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, in this instance and in other instances it did happen.  I can for example, to shed more light, at Island Rock I did convey the information to Brig Schoon that we obtained an address from one of the persons who were involved with the first shooting incident, it was a postal address and we accepted that it was a DLB for messages, and I asked him if we could send an explosive device and then we did send an explosive device and it did detonate approximately six to seven weeks later, but it did not hit an ANC member.   And I also mention it in my amnesty application.

MR MALAN: I did see that, thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr de Kock, when you informed Schoon about these incidents and that you actually eliminated all these people, what was his reaction?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, as in the other instances it was not a long discussion, it - I have said previously that he was referred to as "quiet Willem".  I cannot recall his words verbatim, but in general he would just nod his head and say it was not a bad shot, it was a good shot.  But we did not discuss these things in depth, it was not a trophy situation.

MS LOCKHAT: But I assume you did inform him that all the members, on the 8th of June and the 12th of June, all died.  I mean, in your report.  We can assume that.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I would have given him the numbers as to how many people were killed, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: And would you be more specific and actually mention to him how they were killed, or would you just give the numbers of the deceased?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I would tell him how they were killed, they were killed by gunfire, I would give him the general circumstances, but one does not go right through, right to the bone of the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you have told him that in the first incident you - when I say you, I mean you instructed that the Makarov and the handgrenades be planted in their luggage?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: It did not state it as such, but I did state that there was a problem with regard to weapons but it was corrected, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just one last question, the flickering of the lights by Mose and Manzini, was that really material in this instance?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it gives us an early warning so that people can arrange their weapons and you do last minute tests, is your magazine in properly, is the weapon cocked, is the safety off.  And on that evening it was either zero degrees Celsius or minus that and I think all the members put their firearms down against trees or branches and had their hands under their arms.  One does not use gloves, well me in any event and not my member use gloves when you shoot.