Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

JOHAN LODEWYK MEIRING: Chairperson, I can again refer to our submission, page 219, part 4, the function of the National Management System at regional level.  It is contained from page 219 right through to the almost - it continues to in the 40's, it is a very long aspect concerning the - it is  244, sir.  To the bottom, almost the bottom of page 244.
 If there should be additional questions, I will try to answer that.  If I heard the question correctly at this point in time, it seems to me that you ask what sort of actions were taken.  At the time, as far as I could remember and as far as we have done our homework, if there were people that made themselves beyond the law, the normal course of the law took its turn at that point.  I've got nothing further at this point to add.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you General.  Do I take from that that the (indistinct) point did not interview key players involved in the National Security Management System, the State Security Counsel or the Secretariat or study State Security Council documents in order to formulate a coherent response?

JOHAN LODEWYK MEIRING: No, we don't have, we've never have got no access to those documents.  The documents that we have is on a lower level than the State Security Council itself.
 So we have done as far as humanly possible, all the aspects concerning in these number of pages I indicated to you, what our knowledge of that remains, at the moment.

MR GOOSEN: Any in Document C, page 3 dealing with the original submission, where we state that reference is repeatedly made to offensive preemptive actions and the question we asked is, did this apply to both internal and external security strategies, internal to the country and external to the country?
 And to what extent was this position legally enacted and the response to that was as far as could be ascertained, the offensive preemptive position only applied to external strategies and internally, the SADF acted mainly in support of the SAP in the execution of their functions, which included preventative measures.  The decision to follow an offensive/defensive or preemptive/reactive approach, was one of executive policy within the legal framework that existed.
 In the light of certainly the last portion of General Geldenhuys' evidence and I am not sure if you had the benefit of hearing General Joubert's evidence, would you regard that as a complete answer to the question?

JOHAN LODEWYK MEIRING: Chairperson, I can't elaborate on the evidence that I did not hear.  What I can say to you is that again we tried to express ourselves at the knowledge at our disposal on paragraph 3.10, where categories of external operations, and not to my knowledge no reference was ever made to a preemptive strike inside the Republic of South Africa.  It was always done in the context of an external operation.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson, I don't have any further specific issues that I wish to raise.  I am not sure if the panel would want to raise anything with General Meiring, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Richard Lyster?

MR LYSTER: Yes, thank you.  General, I think I just must place on record that I find most of the answers that you have given to be highly unsatisfactorily and rather disingenuous, but be that as it may.
 There are a couple of things that I would certainly want to know more about and one of them is something that I don't think you were asked to prepare on which is operation Endeavour, which you will know was a clandestine support for the Lesotho liberation army, is that something that you are able to speak about at this time?

JOHAN LODEWYK MEIRING: No, I know personally nothing about that.  I have vaguely heard the use of that name.  But I can answer questions if you ask us on that, I have got nothing at my disposal and in my knowledge sphere of reference that I can answer questions on that.

MR LYSTER: Okay, well that is something that we would certainly like to have your response to.  You must know that operation Endeavour was a clandestine directorate of Special Tasks operation, designed to provide military training to the Lesotho liberation army with a view to overthrow the Lesotho government.  It was something that was told to us by a senior military officer during a Section 29 inquiry.  That is something that we would like to receive detailed information about.

JOHAN LODEWYK MEIRING: Chairperson, I hear what you are saying.  I cannot furnish that at the moment in time.  I would appreciate it if the context of the questions for us not to do unnecessary work or supply you with unnecessary information, that we can have that and I will undertake as far as possible, to try and answer this questions as soon as possible.
 Also I would like just to make mention of the fact that I don't know, but this might also have been a subject of the (indistinct) investigation.  I am not sure, but I really know nothing about that.

CHAIRPERSON: General, I just want to ask maybe one question or two and then we should close.  You most certainly do know that this Commission was set up amongst other things to provide for the investigation and the establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights that took place between 1960 and 1994.
 Now, in an investigation you get all sorts of things, and I think you should, or I should request you to bear with us where we sometimes fall short of concrete evidence, but then that is in the nature of Commissions.  We get all sorts of things, rumours, allegations, information, sworn statements, amnesty applications and because we are  a Commission charged with an investigative process, we wouldn't be able to ignore rumours, but what we think we should to is to be fair in our procedures.  To make sure that those who are adversely affected by rumours, information, even by evidence in the form of sworn statements, get a fair opportunity to respond to those.
 Now, it is an opportunities and moments like these that you may find that questions will be put to you, not necessarily because there is hard core evidence, but because an effort is made to establish whether a rumour is a rumour, a fact is a fact or a (indistinct).
 Now, one of the purposes of the Act is to make sure that we have a future, and that is what I am worried about because as you know, we come from a past of strive and division and conflict and this bears on the remarks that you made earlier this day and which you repeated this afternoon that even this Commission is looked at with some suspicion, there is an inherent distrust, that is how you put it by members of the SADF.
 In a submission that had been made by General Viljoen, I don't know whether you have a copy of the small part, that is headed introductory remarks, he states his position very strongly in paragraph 10, where he says we, and I think it takes into account, people like yourselves, where he says we despise such dishonest actions and non-existing rumours.
 Now what I want to ask you and this is an opportunity for me to be able to say General Meiring, under oath, stated his position categorically on this issue, now this Steyn report in so far as in this document by General Viljoen purports to say there were assassinations, the encouragement of IFP violence, train murders, destabilisation, arm smuggling, training of resistance forces without authority, manipulation of the negotiation process, a coup d'etat, right wing violence and general criminal activities, now in so far as these are the allegations that are being made, and I am not stating it at any higher level than that, the first question is during your career in the SADF and in your career now in the SANDF, do you know of any plan that contemplated the things that are referred to in paragraph 10, and  ask that because you are under oath and it is against the background that I have painted.