Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-11

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes absolutely, terror whether it was directed at Government institutions, individuals or police officers, it was something that happened every day and it was quite a new experience for me in terms of the liberation movements, that is the ANC and the PAC and other surrogate organisations of these liberation groups.
	In 1983/84 there was a great increase in terror in Durban specifically and Durban, which was the head centre of the division for Port Natal, was the target of such acts of terror.

MR VISSER: Can you just please tell the Committee and give them an outline of the structures which was valid here in Port Natal?   We know that Mr Steyn, the then Brigadier, was the Division Commander.  I'm jumping ahead now, but if we can just get to the relevant facts, we can return to '83/'84 later on if you want to, but in '87 what was the structures then?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: In 1987 Colonel Steyn, the later Brigadier was the Commander of the security branch.

MR VISSER: And he is also one of the applicants in this case?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the terrorist unit, how were they constituted?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: In 1983 when I arrived in Durban the terrorist unit was under the command of Captain Andy Taylor?

MR VISSER: Was he Captain then already?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes he was a Captain then already and was mainly directed at the investigation of terrorism, under the Act of Terrorism.

MR VISSER: The Act of Terrorism only really came to light later.  When was it promulgated?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: In 1973.

MR VISSER: Then I'm making a mistake, sorry.  Please continue.

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: And later the same unit, as there was a bit of a shift in the approach as to when it comes to stopping the terrorism and fighting it, this unit as an investigation unit divided into two units or sub-units if I can call it that, Chairperson.  Mainly in command was Colonel Andy Taylor with an investigation unit directly under his command and there was an MK intelligence unit which was under my command.

MR VISSER: Can you as far as 1987 is concerned tell us what was the extent as far as manpower was concerned within the terrorist unit and then also the investigation part and also the intelligence part?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Chairperson in total at the security branch we were about 200 members.  C Section, as our unit was known under the command of Taylor, existed out of 18 persons in total.  It was an investigation component, administrative one and the intelligence component.  The investigators, I'd estimate there were about six to eight of them.  The administrative component, there were two members and the balance was made up by the intelligence component itself.

MR VISSER: So it was in the vicinity of eight people who worked at intelligence unit in 1987?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.  Some of the members in the intelligence component, who are also applicants in this case was Major du Preez, Warrant Officer Wasserman and Sergeant van der Westhuizen.

MR VISSER: Did you support a specific or political party?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Chairperson, since I was a child I grew up in a National Party house and as I grew older and the National Party was the governing party, I've always been a supporter, yes.

MR VISSER: And we now that the National Party had a policy of separate development and they adhered to this and they also promulgated this and it later became known as the policy of Apartheid?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you, in your younger years, experience any impulses in your milieu, the one you grew up in which makes you realise that this policy was wrong?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the situation then, who were the people you got into contact with since you were young?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: The impressions I got as a child and that's also in my younger years I thought that the policy was implemented by the government of the day I thought it was correct and later in my police career I thought that we had to maintain this policy at all costs.

MR VISSER: And specifically the security branch, not true?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: Because we know the security branch and we've heard quite often they got involved in a political struggle with the liberation movements?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it's also so that since 1948, it's a question of history, the National Party was also the government of the country?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We also heard from other witnesses that within the security branch the members had to study literature of liberation movements etc., was it also in your case the same?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes it's correct, except for the fact that during my training at the security branch and also the courses I completed I was exposed to the literature of the ANC and the PAC and we had to study it in order to stop the revolutionary onslaught and also to understand it and because of the nature of my work, I often saw this kind of documentation so that we keep ourselves up to date.

MR VISSER: And these documents, especially those of the ANC/SACP Alliance was directed at encouraging the black population of South Africa to revolt in the country, is that not true, in order to take over the political power by means of violence?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the consequence of that?
	Mr Chairman, may I just ask the interpreters to give an indication as to whether we're going at the correct speed?  Yes thank you, it seems that we are.  
	Sorry, where was I?  You referred to literature and you also referred to the extent thereof and you spoke in general terms.  What was the consequence of this inciting political literature with regards to what was happening in the country, Mr Botha?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Chairperson, in order to stop the revolutionary onslaught in South Africa and also to understand it and the way we experienced it here in Durban, there were two dimensions to it, these were politics and the military part of it.  The documents which were distributed was for the politicizing of the masses.  Together with that, we found the infiltration of trained terrorists from abroad, with specific instructions and tasks and they committed acts of terror.

MR VISSER: And later on, maybe it's appropriate to say it now, the training started happening more and more internally?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.  As there was an improvement in strategy, if I can call it an improvement, it shifted from external training to local training with an internal command structure.

MR VISSER: Yes and to which specific occurrences are you referring to when you speak about this internal component?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Here I specifically refer to operation butterfly which is the code name of an ANC operation

MR VISSER: Yes and we'll get to that.  The component which you referred to, the military one that is, the one which caused these acts of terror, what influence did this have on your average member and also on yourself within the security branch?  We're talking about these explosions, murders, etc?