Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-06

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, I anticipated some resistance.  I'll give you an example.  If I'd expected to be in a shoot-out, I would have taken extra magazines and so on with me.  I only had one magazine, which was used to threaten people.

ADV PRIOR: And on your intelligence there ought to have been no or few civilian people in the immediate area of the intensive care ward where Gordon Webster had been lodged.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, because it would have been easier to effect the operation with fewer people around.

ADV PRIOR: When you fired the shot in the direction of Const Ngcobo, disarming him and as you indicated, effectively putting his weapon out of action, were there any other persons with weapons that you saw in the immediate vicinity of Const Ngcobo?

MR MCBRIDE: Specifically with a weapon, no, but I believed the deceased' and the people injured with him were police and were armed.

ADV PRIOR: Is that what you believed?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Were they in uniform?

MR MCBRIDE: No, they were not, but they were sitting on the bench that the police used to sit on, which was provided specifically, according to my belief, for the police to use.

ADV PRIOR: And is it your recollection that when they dived to the floor, did they dive under any object, a table, a bench?

MR MCBRIDE: I just out of the corner of my eye, they were further down the passage, saw them move and I immediately fired at them because they moved off the bench where the police normally sat on.  That's the only reason why I fired at them.

ADV PRIOR: Would you say that was an instinctive reaction on your part?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, and also out of fear that I'm going to be shot.

ADV PRIOR: Could you just give us an indication possibly of the distance between yourself and where Mr Khumalo was? - sorry, not Khumalo, Buthelezi.  I beg your pardon.  Just a rough estimate from where you are seated, anywhere in the chamber.

MR MCBRIDE: I can't recall correctly now, but it was some distance down the passage.  The length, it would be the length, half the length of the ward, from the door of the ward to the steps.

ADV PRIOR: Would it be longer than the width of this stage on which we're sitting?

MR MCBRIDE: It could be about from that curtain to the translators, perhaps even more, perhaps even more.

ADV PRIOR: I'd estimate about 30 paces, 35 paces.

CHAIRPERSON: 20 paces.

ADV PRIOR: 20 to 30 paces.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And was it early evening?

MR MCBRIDE: Ja, I think it was half past eight, around half past eight, yes.

ADV PRIOR: I have no questions relating to any of the other events regarding your amnesty application, I think those have been adequately canvassed, other than the Why Not bar and the next few questions will be directed in that respect.
	Mr McBride, after listening to the evidence thusfar, I'm still in some doubt as to why the particular Why Not bar was chosen.  Now is it correct that any area where there was a, within a civilian context, for example the Marine Parade of the CBD area, would have been a legitimate target as a result of the presence of a high concentration of Security Force personnel.  In other words, my question essentially is that what made it a legitimate target in line with the policy after Kabwe, was the fact or the presence of a high concentration of military, Security Force personnel.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And we hear what you said, that pre-Easter and subsequent to you return, your belief was that the Why Not bar was frequented by Security Force personnel.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And I think you made the concession properly when you said that you had no guarantee of knowing on the 14th of June, whether any Security Force personnel were in fact on the premises or not.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes.

ADV PRIOR: If I may just refer you to the criteria which led you to conclude that this bar, Why Not bar, was a legitimate target.  We have the information that you received in passing, general terms at the Allan Taylor residence, we have the report of Gordon Webster that this place was infested with Security personnel, we have the casual comment "May the force be with you" and we have the one evening where you reconnoitred and followed two groups of people, one group not going to the Why Not and the other group going to the Why Not, and you said also, apart from general knowledge.  Were those basically the factors which you took into account in determining, as the Commander of your unit, that the Why Not bar was a legitimate target in line with ANC/MK policy?

MR DEHAL: Sorry, before the question is answered, I think it would be unfair to have to confine it to just those aspects ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He's asking the question.  If not, then Mr McBride can say so.

MR DEHAL: Except that the evidence on record shows otherwise.  I mean, it shows that Mr Gordon Webster had also reconnoitred ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He said ...(intervention)

MR DEHAL: He simply put it on the basis that he had a report from Gordon Webster that it's infested, but the evidence shows that Mr McBride was also ...(indistinct) on a social occasion.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, that is fair.

ADV PRIOR: ...(indistinct) where he heard the comment "May the force be with you".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DEHAL: No, but there was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Dehal is saying is the talk at Allan Taylor's, all the criteria you mentioned plus also that he had done some reconnaissance work in that area with Mr Webster, beside Mr Webster's statement that it was infested with ...(intervention)

MR DEHAL: And apart from Mr Webster's independent recall(?), also on one occasion Mr McBride said he was on a social outing and he happened to pass this place and he had his eye on the Why Not as well.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.  Is that the full extent of your intelligence?

MR MCBRIDE: I can put it this way, all those aspects you mentioned played a part in deciding on the possibility of Why Not as a target.

ADV PRIOR: I also understood when Mr Ismail gave evidence as well as Mr Mnisi and Pule and Dumakude, that it would have been an unacceptable ratio, in other words in the light or against, whether it was a legitimate target to have, on the hypothetical position put by Mr Richard, that it would not have been justifiable if you only had five policemen for example in a crowd of a hundred civilians.

MR MCBRIDE: I did not know that.  And there's also other evidence, I mean one of the people you mentioned ...(intervention)

ADV PRIOR: Sorry, my question is, do you accept that opinion of theirs or do you ...

MR MCBRIDE: Well one person had two opinions on the same thing.  One person said if it's five people going into, who are targets and they go into a place where then other people are not targets and the place becomes a target.  So I mean, it's just opinions we're dealing with at this stage.

ADV PRIOR: But ultimately your objective was to kill as many Security Force personnel as possible and not civilian population.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, yes, that's correct.

ADV PRIOR: Because although Kabwe had changed what the approach would be to some extent, you were still admonished and cautioned and advised, as was the evidence of Mr Pule, that you had to still act within the guidelines and within the policy ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: Sorry, Sir, can you just, when you say "you" meaning me, are you meaning me, "were admonished and advised"?

ADV PRIOR: Well he said that ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: He never gave such evidence that I was admonished on anything.

ADV PRIOR: Before you went or were sent back with the material they were at pains to explain that one couldn't act out of anger.

MR MCBRIDE: He did mention that he was not dealing with me specifically, he was dealing with a hypothetical statement.  I've never been admonished, ever.  I was a disciplined soldier.