Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

MR DU TOIT: I think that the strategy document there makes it clear that the idea is to use black people within the black community, tragic as this may be, as a physical wedge.  The strategy was exactly to remove the white police face from the community, as I understand the strategy, and as my - I think my client understood it at that point in time, so that he saw the special constables as this wedge, this physical force which will be used in
	/order to
order to prevent further land from becoming UDF or ANC dominated.  And it is on that basis that he approached it. I think that there was the added advantage, as my learned junior points out, that such violence as will come to the fore will be black on black and not white policemen on black.  I think that is also clear from the approach which is found in this strategy document.
What needs to be pointed out is that within this subculture, within this subculture of, one can say, a civil war in this area during those years, the foundations of the police force were shattered, as my client testified.  The moral foundations of the police force were shattered, and what my client has been testifying about, for example, the sweeping of an area in order to render it vulnerable, is not something which was heard here only.  A day or two ago in the Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg another special constable testified to exactly the same effect, namely that areas - according to a newspaper report that I read - would be used - their unit would be used to sweep the area and to ready the area for certain overt action.  Also from the one document it is clear that clandestine operations took place, that strange or foreign policemen - that is to that particular area - would be brought in to operate secretly within that area.
It is within that framework that one does observe certain overt moments, certain overt elements in the covert plan.  On this factual basis one cannot approach what was done from the armchair and from the viewpoint of a normal police force operating within a normal society, because both those two elements were missing at that point in time.
/MR DE JAGER

MR DE JAGER: Mr du Toit, there was a cover-up.  I think that's common cause.

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR DE JAGER: Isn't that an indication that if it wasn't ordered it was at least approved by superiors?

MR DU TOIT: Well, not only that.  My client was promoted to a captain thereafter, and I must say that that he acted vicariously was also accepted, for example, through the settlement of most of the claims on the basis that what he did was done in the scope of his duty.  But certainly there was no reaction.  The senior officer who came from Pretoria discussed the matter with the investigating officer and the matter was left there.  It was only some years after that - I must also point out that - and I think WILSON J will remember this, the special constables were allowed to leave with a group of 80 from the South African Police Force and went en masse after this incident to the KwaZulu Police, where the four specials were hidden.  They went to a kraal where they were looking after somebody.  And it is striking that 80 special constables actually were allowed to leave the South African Police Force and they were allowed to join the KwaZulu Police Force shortly after this incident.

WILSON J: Well, what I do remember is that at the time it was alleged they were looking for the special constables the special constables were still being paid their salaries, and that when they joined the KwaZulu Police the KwaZulu Police wrote to the South African Police asking for references, and were supplied with references by the South African Police.

MR DU TOIT: And not only references, but rather
	/outstanding
outstanding references.  At least the stamp of approval, at the worst for my client, was put on this after the incident.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: But, Mr du Toit, whether or not this was authorised it would have embarrassed the police anyway.

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: Isn't that so?

MR DU TOIT: Absolutely.  I must ... (intervention)

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: And the fact that there was a cover-up does not necessarily mean that there was prior authority.  It was just going - whether authorised or not it was going to embarrass the police.

MR DU TOIT: I think that what eventually happened embarrassed them more, and I think what obviously would have happened if there was this atrocity committed by a policeman outside of what was considered to be acceptable there would have been action, he would have been arrested and he would have been brought before Court, as eventually happened when an independent policeman brought his discretion and decision to bear on the facts.  But I think the subsequent events also demonstrate that there was the stamp of approval.
But let me say immediately that if one looks at the criteria there is no stamp of approval necessary.  Major Terblanche sent the constables there and instructed him to place them at Gabela's because they were going to be used.  My client received an instruction, and what happened afterwards in my view, at worst for my client, tends to confirm that this situation was not totally unacceptable to the authorities at that point in time.  Knowing this, 
	/because
because the senior officer from the head office, the
brigadier, knew about it.  Knowing that my client was promoted to captain in 1991.  It is therefore clear that what happened was not even held against him on the basis that there should not be promotion.
I must also point out that the promotion did not follow the event, so that I don't think one can argue that, objectively seen, there was a seeking of a more senior position, and that he was, let us say, rewarded for what happened.  That certainly is not the position, no.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: May I just ask you something?  The revelation on the part of your client that he had received instructions from Major Terblanche, did it come out while Terblanche was still alive?