Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

MAPULE RAMASHALA: I want to put it to you that in fact this operation was pre-planned long before the 15th of October as you say.  If you refer to the memorandum from Lt General Stevens at April 1985, and again since I am at a disadvantage I am just going to ask to read my understanding of the gist of this.  Point 3 it says,
"3. Come with pro-active actions.  Think about ways and means to confuse the plans of agitators and to paralyse them before they even begin.
 4.3 We need timely deployment of seasoned men to frighten off agitators".
On page 2 with regard to the information gathering process it says once again, 
"It is once again emphasised that there should be absolute cooperation between the South African Defence Force, the Railway Police and the National Intelligence Agency".
This suggests very sophisticated pre-planning, and when we consider that and the modus operandi used we can't but help concluding that this was a premeditated operation.
 But what I want you to consider for a minute, how high were the crates by the way, I mean taking your height Sir, how far did the crates go, your chest, your neck?  Could you give us an indication of how high the crates were?

UNKNOWN: If I remember correctly, it's difficult to say in metres, but approximately chest height for a reasonably small person.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: I consider myself a reasonably small person with respect to height, so would that be chest height for me?

UNKNOWN: I unfortunately didn't quite see how tall you were.  Yes, approximately.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir, how then could it have been possible for the officers to jump out, ammunition and all, to jump out of the crates and make arrests?  Because by your own admission, the purpose of the mission was to make arrests, how would it have been possible to jump out on a truck, to jump out of the crates and the truck and make arrests in the crowd?

UNKNOWN: It shouldn't have been a problem if you bear in mind that the Police, and especially in the areas in which we worked, we sometimes had to scale six foot walls, it's about 1,8 metres, and that's much higher than you are, and we sometimes had to scale these walls to apprehend people, so that wouldn't have been a problem.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: I'm going to conclude by saying Sir, that in fact - there were two per crate, umph - I am going to conclude by saying, in fact taking into consideration Major General Wandrag's classification, that you sent your men there deliberately with AAA and no.1 birdshot to make sure that they accomplish the maximum damage, and that is to shoot to kill.

UNKNOWN: Well that is your inference that you are drawing.  I have already told you what the instructions were, that we specifically were going to perform arrests and I would like to add that all these people were trained to shoot rifles or shotguns.  It was not the first time that they were issued with shotguns and told you have to use this thing.  These people were trained, they knew how to operate shotguns.
 If you look at Thornton Road, specifically at the area where this incident took place, you will see that the road is quite narrow and I've already said, if a person was fired at directly with any kind of shot he would die.  If you take into account the fact that there were 35 shots fired, that's how I understand it, if 35 shots are fired at a crowd, a crowd of between 115 to 100 people and the intention was to shoot to kill, then many, many more than three people would have died.  
 If you bear in mind, I am sure you have seen the video regarding the so-called Trojan Horse incident shown by the Media, if you look at the way in which the people were standing in the crates and they were about 2.5 to 3 metres above the ground and you look at the general direction in which they were aiming you will notice that they weren't actually firing at the crowd.  Even if warning shots had been fired in the sense of firing at the ground, with the bullets ricocheting then there would have been many more deaths.  But I am convinced, and I am really as honest as it is for a person to be, I am convinced in my heart that if the instruction was to shoot to kill and these people had performed this instruction to shoot to kill then there would have been a tragedy on that day.  
 This was a specific instruction to arrest people and in the process of performing arrests an attack was averted.  If you still then want to draw the inference that the instruction was to shoot to kill then that is your personal conclusion and inference, but from our side that was not the instruction.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: By your own admission these were very experienced sharpshooters.  They indeed were successful in killing a 10 year-old and two 16 year-olds and a 21 year-old.  Thank you.

UNKNOWN: You were talking about sharpshooters, I want to object to that, I never mentioned sharpshooters.  I said the people were properly trained in the use of shotguns.  There is a difference between a person trained in the use of a shotgun and a sharpshooter.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Dr Ramashala.  Thank you Mr Loedolff, we note your distinction.  Any further questions?

MR NTSEBEZA: Brigadier Loedolff I just want to make sure that I understand your evidence.  We are talking about an operation that was planned by you and others from the South African Defence Force and the South African Police in the context of an unrest situation in the Western Cape, is that right?

UNKNOWN: That is correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: And it was an unrest situation that had enveloped the entire country, would you agree?

UNKNOWN: It's very difficult to answer that because these things happened 12 years ago.  I know what took place in the Cape, I don't know what happened elsewhere in the rest of the country.

MR NTSEBEZA: Oh well it was an unrest situation that was prevalent in the Western Cape, would you agree?

UNKNOWN: Correct, yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: In fact in your evidence you indicated that the areas were Nyanga and Athlone and other areas, areas traditionally occupied by other than White people, is that correct?

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: And from the document that was indicated to you, dated the 22nd of April 1985, would it be your assessment that as early as April of that year instructions were being issued from Pretoria as to how you should contain unrest situations, would you agree?

UNKNOWN: Yes, according to this document.

MR NTSEBEZA: And is it a document that you had sight of?

UNKNOWN: I can't tell you whether I had personally seen the document, I am aware of the contents of the documents.

MR NTSEBEZA: You are prepared to then say you were aware of the contents.  Now do I take it to mean that as early as April of 1985 there was a structured plan at Headquarters in COMPOL in Pretoria communicated to you in the Western Cape as to how you should deal with an unrest situation?

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: And one of the methods was to, I think that's an English translation, or to put it in the way in which it is in free,
"You must think of ways and means to obstruct the agitators or to paralyse them even before they could start".

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now I don't understand military language, now when you say "you must paralyse" something before it even begins or - what was sought to be conveyed in your view since you knew the contents of this document?