Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

GEN VILJOEN: Thank you very much.  And it did happen exactly this way and when we through this out without firing a single shot we avoided a rather big fight.  So the point I'm making is, this kind of special forces had some very, very valuable and good applications provided it would be handled at the top level.
 Now regarding the CCB, I will deal with the CCB and the functions.  Firstly, the CCB operated externally and internally.  There was an increasing requirement for clandestine and covert operations of a new kind in 1986.  A small group known as D40 was originally organised for this purpose.  D40 developed into Barnacle which later was transformed in the CCB.  The CCB was a covert military organisation managed by a managing director under supervision of a senior officer special forces.
 The function were - and that's very important, infiltration, in other words deep infiltration within the enemy itself and penetration of the enemy.  Penetration also in the areas - the deep areas where the enemy operated and secondly, the disruption of the enemy.  The CCB was organised into 10 regions, of which 7 of the 8 regions were operational regions.  Each region was responsible for the collection of it's own intelligence including region 6 which was the internal region where they collected military intelligence internally.
 Although this was a private structure for the purposes as I said before - in order to be able to handle with the situation after 1986 when the graphs changed, the Government - the military structure still had to be authorised by the Government and the military structure had to follow within our defence force, certain military procedures for authority.
 General Malan's remarks in this regard - I just want to mention two points that's on 2.10:
"In times of warring conflict people's perceptions change and they act differently to just viewpoints and actions in times of conflict from a narrow peacetime perspective is dangerous and negates the reality of experience in times of conflict".
Then also he said later on:
"During this time the Government's policy was clear - stop the perpetrator of violence at all costs.  The carrier of the car bomb, landmine, limpet-mine from the neighbouring States had to be destroyed outside the borders or inside the country before he could commit his atrocity.  The destruction of the terrorist is based and his capability was the mission of every soldier"
 I'm referring this to you before you cut me - no, I still have some time.  I would  like to say that we developed some special strategies around about this time and now I want to have the transparency on the strategy please because at that stage we were looking for strategies and ever since 1980, we thought as to how to handle the change in attitude and the change in strategy by our enemy.  And this then gave us the defence strategy.
 Defence of South Africa with all available means within the law, against external aggression or internal revolution.  
 Secondly, suitable conventional capability to defend the RSA against the outside aggression pro-actively.  I'm referring to situations such as the Cuban involvement in Angola.
 Thirdly, effective intelligence network to support operations.  That for example included the CCB action.  Cross-border operations into neighbouring States has a preventative action in self-defence.  Many, many cross-border operations were coupled to this.
 Prevent a build-up of hostile terrorists or conventional forces outside the South Africa situation and support of anti-Marxist movements in Southern Africa to buffer Soviet expansion.
 Chairperson, I specifically mentioned this here because this was our mandate.  This was the political instruction as a defence force and it is around this strategy that we carried on after 1980 and especially in the very crucial stage of 1986, some important decisions had to be made in this regard.   Chairperson, from 1984 onwards - can I have the next transparency please, the conflict started to really enter into it's worst and most uncompromising phase.  
 I'm just going to mention in the transparency what happened in the period September '84 to August '90, the destruction of so many homes 7187, 1779 schools, 1265 shops and factories, 81 offices, 66 post offices, 49 churches, 29 clinics, 12.188 delivery vehicles, over 10.000 buses, over 4.000 SAP vehicles, 152 trains - all damaged and destroyed.  The financial loss from '85 to '86 - 90 million rand in this regard.  Necklaces and burning - you have already seen the graph, but it was 399 necklaced and 372 burnt to death.
 Chairperson, this was a crucial challenge to us, how do you deal with a situation such as this.  It was our responsibility to protect the people.  We were not involved with the internal situation of taking the war to the people, we had to protect the people inside.  That was our mandate and that is the reason why we went on.  
 And I now want to emphasis to you that within the RSA, the police were still the primary responsible organisation and we had to quickly find ways and means of co-ordinating between the police and the defence force because accountability wise, the South African defence force co-operated - and I'm reading on 3.37, the South African defence force co-operated with all departments and other role players in joint planning and joint execution of operations and accepted full responsibility for the execution of allotted operations or tasks.
 The South African defence force could not accept accountability for determining tasks or decisions to undertake an operation or activity because of legal restrictions.  The police remained the accountable insistence internally throughout for all security force deployment but we co-operated with the police.  In the national management context, each department acted in accordance with it's mandate and it's budget within each line department.  
 The South African defence force observed this principle and never infringed on the terrain in this respect but I must say it was difficult.  We were suddenly confronted with a situation where complete in strategy by the enemy and we were rubbing shoulders with the police.  We were very close to each other and it was not always easy to exactly discriminate between the tasks of the police and the other people.  I'm referring to the issue of accountability and the importance of close co-operation between us and the police.

CHAIRPERSON: Could we use that as a very good moment to stop?  Thank you very much for your co-operation and for your contribution thus far, this is not the end of it, it will continue in the afternoon.  We will adjourn now for tea and we will return here for those who wish to but those who have to at 20 past 11 and for those on the panel, those you are giving evidence today, if you'll use that door over there please and go down to the 7th floor where tea will be made available for you as well.  Thank you very much - 20 past 11.

MR CILLIERS: Mr Chairman, may I just say something briefly before we take the short adjournment.  This is not ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: For the record will you tell us your name please?

MR CILLIERS: Cilliers.   I'm appearing for General Viljoen.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.