Amnesty Hearings — Port Elizabeth — 1997-09-25

MR BOOYENS: Okay.  Now let's deal with Mr Mthimkhulu, he was detained, released, he got sick, he was hospitalised and this is a matter of public record today.  Before he returned, allegations were made that he had been poisoned and this appeared in the press.  When he returned to Port Elizabeth - and this is also apparent from the press cuttings, a large group waited for him at the Port Elizabeth airport.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so.

MR BOOYENS: Was the security police present?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: What happened to Mr Mthimkhulu's stature after his return?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairperson, his stature increased markedly after his return.  During all the meetings - and perhaps I should just mention this, at that stage the following action with regard to the 70th anniversary of the ANC was taking place and that played a great role in the politicisation of the masses and in organising the masses, mobilising the masses. And a number of meetings were held in this hall where the masses were conditioned and that enmity towards the White regime or the apartheid Government featured very prominently.

MR BOOYENS: What role if any, did Mr Madaka play at these meetings?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Mr Madaka at this stage acted very covertly because it is a consequence of these resistance actions that were taking place and this created fertile ground for the initiation of the people's war.  If you would allow me a moment to explain this please.  From 1978 onwards the executive management of the ANC outside the country inter alia the late Oliver Tambo visited Vietnam where they encountered the strategy of the people's war and where it originated.
	And during 1980, the fertile ground for the initiation of the people's war was created by mobilising the masses, by politicising the masses and by arming the masses.  That is where Madaka had a role in that structure in particular because the fertile ground had been created, the concept of revolutionary action had been created internally in the country, the masses have been indoctrinated, the have been politicised and they have been mobilised.  That is the spectrum  at which we are looking on the left from the freedom movements to topple the apartheid Government at the time and to effect this.  And these are the two poles that we have to look at and the spectrum that existed.  
	It's exactly what happened, that is where the late Mr Madaka played a role and that is the conflict which arose between the security police of the time and the liberation ideology at this stage.  The masses had been armed inside the country and that is why we had the series of attacks on - which took the form of bomb attacks, deeds of terror which were the order of the day at the time.  We have to look at it from this subjective point of view and analyse the situation.

MR BOOYENS: That which you told the Commission now, is this also confirmed by Tom Lodge's book "Black Politics in South Africa" on pages 95 and 96 of the Appendices to your application?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is that bundle A?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And more specifically dealing with the '80's, on page 96 the second paragraph, left hand page, in contrast to the first Umkhonto campaign etc., - that section there, where reference is made also to the Sasol bomb attack, the power stations in Eastern Transvaal, Voortrekker Hoogte police stations, inter alias New Briton, Chatsworth, Booysens, Soekmekaar.  At the bottom of the page he refers to: "With the exception of the assassination of informers and other people regarded as collaborators, African Security policemen for example, the campaign strategy has been guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided".  Was that the situation at the time?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: At the same, in the middle of the page "Setting up Arms Caches etc., as well as forming a cellular organisational structure in the main townships", Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: I'm sorry, can I ask - Mr Nieuwoudt are you still talking about 1980 when you talk about: "Acts of terror, violence, widespread turmoil", are you still talking about 1982?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I am sketching the scenario from 1980 onwards which continued up to 1982.

ADV SANDI: You are at 1982 now?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It continues right through but what I referred to now was 1981 Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: You referred to page 96, is that correct?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Could just indicate again, I couldn't follow exactly which paragraph you were referring to?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chair, through you - sorry, two pages had been copied.  On the left hand side, the second paragraph which starts with: "In contrast to the first Umkhonto campaign" and more or less in the middle of the same paragraph there is a reference to: "Setting up arms caches as well as forming a cellular organisation structure in the main townships".

ADV SANDI: Sorry, this book by Tom Lodge, when was it published?

MR BOOYENS: First impression 1983, second impression '85 - can I hand it to you Mr Chairman?

ADV SANDI: You can carry on.  That is after Mr Mthimkhulu and Mr Madaka had been eliminated?

MR BOOYENS: ...[inaudible]

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so Mr Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: With respect yes, the book was published after the death of Mr Mthimkhulu but it deals with the period from 1945 Mr Chairman.
	I beg your pardon Mr Chair, I'm still dealing with Mr de Jager's question to me.  Still on page 96 at the bottom of the page, last line: "With the exception of the assassination etc.,", those are the sections we wish to quote.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the problem was - which my learned colleague also experience, when these dates - when these deeds that are referred to took place but I see on the pages that you have referred to, the latter section with that quotation: "With the exception of the assassination of informers and people regarded as collaborators, African security policemen for example, the campaign's strategy has been guided by the principle that civilian casualties should be avoided" etc., as quoted and then in August 1981 however, "Oliver Tambo announced".

ADV DE JAGER: So I think he's in fact dealing with the period '80/'81 when he relates, whether it's correct or not I wouldn't know.

MR BOOYENS: That is so Mr Chairperson, we just quoted this as confirmation of the statement made by the witness regarding the situation.
	You have dealt now with Mr Madaka's position, let us return to the position after the return of Mr Mthimkhulu.  You said that his stature increased, what was his practical role on the ground?  What did he do there, did he address meetings?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: He addressed meetings and the youth specifically at that time and one has to keep in mind that the schools boycott continued until the beginning of more or less March '82 and then gradually the pupils started returning to school.  So there was throughout a process of politicisation and mobilisation that was taking place and this was done by Mr Mthimkhulu and with the stature that had increased.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon Mr Nieuwoudt, but I just wish to determine whether these facts given in the book are approximately correct and you have to assist me to tell me whether these are so or not.  On page 96 we have the statement that in August 1981 Oliver Tambo made a certain announcement -  "Before the Tambo statement  appeared in a foreign press, it was not reported inside South Africa, a bomb exploded in the main shopping centre of Port Elizabeth.  Unlike earlier inner city explosions, this one took place during working hours".

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct Mr Chairperson, the facts are correct.