Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-07

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: (sworn states)

MR RICHARD: Thank you Chair.  Thank you, Mr Ismail.  We've heard that there were a number of discussions between you and Mr McBride during 1986.  Do you have any memory of how many discussions there were?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, I have no specific recall of the number of discussions we had.  Whenever it was possible and when I was in Botswana, I would meet with operatives and in this case, I would have met with Mr McBride whenever I was there and whenever he would have been there.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ismail, during 1986 these discussions, were they all face to face discussions?  You didn't have telephonic communication or anything like that?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: I did not deal telephonically with Mr McBride.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  Now when was the first discussion concerning a car bomb?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: The first discussion concerning a car bomb was actually held with Gordon Webster and this would have been earlier in the year, it could have been as early as March, April and I had, at that time, said to Gordon Webster to reconnoitre the Natal Command with a view to using a car bomb at the Natal Command, where there would be high concentrations of Security personnel.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  Now, when was your first discussion with Mr McBride concerning a car bomb?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, the discussions were always held with Gordon Webster regarding this and when he had reported back about this, there may have been some time when Mr McBride was present.  I don't recall exact dates and times when I was there etc and at that time I had said to them to do further reconnaissance but specifically I was directing myself at Gordon Webster as the Commander of the unit at the time, to say to him to do further reconnaissance on the possibility of using a car bomb against Security Force personnel.

MR RICHARD: So, what was the first report you got  back from either Mr Webster or Mr McBride as to the viability of your idea of a car bomb attack on Natal Command?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: The report that they gave to me was or rather, that Gordon gave to me was that they could not carry out such an attack against Natal Command where there would be a high concentration, because all of that area had been marked as places where no cars could be parked and here we're talking specifically around the front, where the soldiers would enter and exit from the base, or where they may hang around in large numbers.

MR RICHARD: Now was it then that an alternative target was discussed?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No.  At that time we did not discuss any alternative targets, I had said to Gordon and Robert who may have been present, that they should do further reconnaissance and look for other suitable targets.

MR RICHARD: When you said other suitable targets, did you mean targets of the same nature and description as Natal Commands?  In other words, a military police establishment?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No, I'm talking about large concentrations of Security Force personnel, I did not specify where they had to be.  I basically had instructed, wherever they occurred.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  Now when did the idea of placing a car bomb in a hotel first become a topic for conversation?  Was it weeks or months before June 1986?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: There was no specific discussion about any hotel, because my instruction was, find Security Force concentrations.  It was not reported to me that there is a concentration at a hotel.

MR RICHARD: So if I understand your answer correctly and correct me if I'm wrong, you never had a discussion with either Mr McBride or Mr Webster, concerning the placing of a car bomb outside a hotel?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No.

MR RICHARD: Then, in your mind, what did you mean by a high concentration of Security personnel?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Security Force personnel congregate at various points.  In the case of the Church Street, they were concentrated outside of the Air Force Headquarters, there was a bus rank there, they were there in their hundreds.  I'm talking of that kind of a concentration, where they would occur, wherever they would occur, but to my mind, wherever they would occur, if they were off duty and they were sitting in a pub or whatever, that would still be a concentration of Security Force personnel.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  From what I understand your answer to imply is, as in the Church Street situation where there was transport to take Security personnel home, where people would be standing in a bus, there might also be other people in that area, but there would be a bus line of Security personnel, or a concentrated number of them, am I understanding you correctly?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, and I also added that if they were there sitting in a pub drinking, then that would also form a concentration of Security Force personnel.

MR RICHARD: How many would constitute a concentration?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well it depends, it could be 20, it could be 100, it could be 200.

MR RICHARD: Less than 20?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, that could also be a concentration, yes.

MR RICHARD: Now, Mr McBride has given evidence that he raised the question of what now has become termed collateral civilian casualties.  Do you recall him raising that issue?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes and I did testify to that and I said he had raised it and I had said to him about Kabwe.

MR RICHARD: On how many occasions did he raise that topic?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That would have occurred more than once, however, the last time when I met him, it was just before the incident we are dealing with, it was raised again and it was reiterated.

MR RICHARD: Now, on that occasion, other than outlining the nature and import of the Kabwe Conference's decisions, was there any contextual discussion about how they would apply in a practical planned operation that they were about to go on?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, we did not discuss contextual discussions because that would depend on specifics.

MR RICHARD: Did you ever discuss the Kabwe principles in relation to a specific planned attack?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No.

MR RICHARD: Did you discuss those principles in the context of a car bomb attack?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes.

MR RICHARD: What was the content of that discussion?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, basically it was what happens if there are civilians around, the possibility of civilian casualties and the discussion was, there's a high concentration of Security Force personnel, the movement's decision was that we were no longer to be that concerned about the possibility of civilian casualties, that that could or would be allowed and therefore we could go ahead with that.

JUDGE PILLAY: What was meant, or how would the words "high concentration" be defined?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Judge, a high concentration can be, it's a relative term.  You could see it as a small unit, it could be a very large unit and it depended on that.  It's a question of inside of an entire context.  If there are large numbers, the overwhelming number has to be Security Force personnel relative to other people around there.  That is the issue.

JUDGE PILLAY: You see, why I raise that issue with you now, your last answer says, or said that the Kabwe decision was that where there was a high concentration of Security Forces, there would be a reduction of the duty of care in respect of civilians and the trend of cross-examination was how at one stage it dealt with percentages, I don't know what the relevance thereof is at the moment, but I think it then necessary, if you use the words "high concentration" in respect of the reduction of the duty of care, then we should define it somewhat, as far as we can.