Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-16

MR VISSER: So you cannot say who was there?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, I see that it is one o'clock.  I don't think I will be able to finish before, within the next half a minute, perhaps we should take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until two o'clock.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: (still under oath)

MR VISSER: (continued)  If I may just interrupt, while it has been brought to my attention, there are two references which I neglected to give you Mr Chairman.
	May I refer you back to volume 2, page 41, that is the application of Steyn, who has completed his evidence.  At the end of the first paragraph from the top Mr Chairman, there is also a reference to JAS2, which I neglected to give you.  That is volume 3, page 424.

CHAIRPERSON: 424?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, and the last one is at page 47 of bundle 2, just before the second last paragraph starts Mr Chairman, there is a reference to JAS6, which is in volume 3, page 419 - 423.  I apologise for the oversight.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Forster, we are now still on the farm there at Elandskop near Pietermaritzburg, and you are saying that it was very clear to you that Ndwandwe could not be turned to become an informer for the Security Branch.  I think that is where we stopped, is that correct?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened then?  Or, if I could just bring you up to date with what was going on, you went to fetch Labuschagne and Verwey and you went back to the farm, and when you arrived there, I think you said that Botha had already left?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.  For how long were Labuschagne and Verwey there?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: As far as I can recall, it was approximately an hour and a half, to two hours.

MR VISSER: Did they interrogate Ms Ndwandwe?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Yes.

MR VISSER: And they then left?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct, yes, they departed.

MR VISSER: Was there any further orders which were issued?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Issued were given by Steyn to me and to Taylor.

MR VISSER: What were the orders?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: The order was that if it was in any way not possible to get her to work as an informer for the Security Branch, we were to eliminate her.

MR VISSER: What was the idea, did you have to attempt again to recruit her or what?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: On the contrary, he gave the order for her to be eliminated.

MR VISSER: Did you and Taylor then go ahead and do this?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: What happened?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Taylor gave the order to Wasserman to carry out the elimination.

MR VISSER: I see in your affidavit, at the bottom of page 98, you say that Du Preez and Wasserman dug a grave outside the house?  Approximately how far from the house?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Chairperson, it was probably if I had to estimate, between 50 - 80 metres away.

MR VISSER: Could this activity be spotted from the house?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: No, it was in a grove of high trees.

MR VISSER: What did you and Taylor do in the meantime while they were away?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Taylor continued to question Ndwandwe in Zulu however, in which I am not proficient.  And I was simply present there.

MR VISSER: Very well, was Ndwandwe assaulted during her detention by you?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: And during a certain stage, Wasserman and Du Preez removed her from the house?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you accompany them?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: no.

MR VISSER: Where were you?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: I remained in the house with Taylor.

MR VISSER: Did Wasserman and Du Preez return later?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you departed?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Forster, this case of Ndwandwe, was this the first case of an abduction out of Swaziland and elimination in which you participated?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: How many incidents of similar nature, did you participate in previously?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: One.

MR VISSER: Which one was that?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That was the case of Deon Cele.

MR VISSER: Cele Mr Chairman.  When did this take place?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: In July 1988 according to my recollection.

MR VISSER: Among others, you have referred in your application with regard to the political background, to an extract in volume 3, page 424 of Heads of argument which were prepared, I trust that this was prepared by my learned friend, Mr Hattingh, is that correct?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes.  You have attached this document mostly as I understand it, as a summary of relevant quotes which were taken from ANC/SACP literature for the information of the Committee?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have nothing further to present.  Mr Forster yes, the evidence of Mr Steyn about the pressure which was experienced "from above", in Pietermaritzburg where you were, was it in any way different?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Pietermaritzburg was also an area which experienced a great deal of hand grenade attacks and as I have testified earlier, there weren't as many explosions, but yes, I would agree with Steyn.

MR VISSER: That you also experienced pressure from the politicians and from within the structures of the security structure?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: Yes, and at that stage I also worked much closer with Steyn's division.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Colonel Forster, from the evidence that we have heard, it seems up until a certain stage, the Security Branch operated within the framework of the law and the rules and regulations relating to your type of work, in combatting terrorism, is that correct?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And then there seems to have been a shift away from that as a policy and I am not suggesting that occurred in each and every case, but there was a change that instead of prosecuting terrorists, one would simply eliminate them?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: That is not correct Chairperson, it was another method which was applied, in order to obtain information and so doing, to recruit MK members or terrorists, because an information network could only function with information.
	It was an attempt - you referred to a policy, it wasn't a policy to eliminate, it was another strategy.

ADV PRIOR: All right, let's call it a strategy.  How did that strategy arise, did it arise or maybe you can answer that, how did it come about that this was considered an option or accepted as an option, given the fact that you had the machinery of the law if I can put it that way, on your side, you could operate, I mean you had draconian powers in terms of the Internal Security Act and other forms of legislation.
	When did you decide, or when was it decided to adopt this strategy?

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: I don't believe that there was any specific date which I can recall upon which an amendment came about regarding the method in which we would continue our work.
	It did however arise from the high tempo of terrorist attacks on the RSA, that we began to realise that we had to act more pro-active fashion.  By pro-active I mean obtaining the information beforehand, and not waiting for an explosion to take place, and only then dealing with it.
	We had to combat the violence and the onslaught.

ADV PRIOR: I am talking specifically about killing as a strategy.