Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR COETZEE: We have not dealt in any detail with all the evidence of the Esikhawini hit squad members due to the fact that the Committee indicated on the 5th of August,

MR COETZEE: /while Dr

MR COETZEE: while Dr Boraine was still present, that the evidence to be given on that date by the Esikhawini operatives did not implicate our clients.

MR COETZEE: I now refer to the evidence of Dr R M Williams. Although Dr Williams, a former MK commander, and as such on the other side so to speak to that of the clients we represent, he came across as an objective and unbiased witness.  It is respectfully submitted that where his evidence differs from that of Mr Varney his evidence must be accepted.  Mr Varney indicated that Dr Williams was available as a witness during the Msani trial, but that Attorney-General McNally refused to call him as a witness.  He is severely critical of McNally in this regard.  The reason why Dr Williams was not called as a State witness is patently obvious.  He supports the version of our clients.

MR COETZEE: Dr Williams explained that the term "offensive/defensive" can be defined at different levels, namely the strategic level, the operation level, and the tactical level.  This is basically the level of a skirmish.  He alluded to the fact that at the tactical level the distinction between offensive and defensive becomes muddled, and I quote.

MR COETZEE: "Going from what the witnesses have said here that is the level that the personnel referred to and trained here were actually deployed was more at a tactical level.  There one can act defensively or offensively, although the nature of tactical deployment is such that offensive and defensive tends to be

MR COETZEE: /quite mixed

MR COETZEE: "quite mixed up at that level."

MR COETZEE: From the above it is clear that the terms offensive and defensive cannot be approached on a strictly compartmentalised basis, as Varney has attempted to do.  He furthermore stated that the training received by the recruits was generic, and that the type of training received in terms of weapons corresponds to basic infantry training or platoon weapons training, and that the further specialised training received by the offensive group corresponds with the type of special forces training, and in this regard I refer to page 200 of the record.

MR COETZEE: Furthermore, he agreed in no unclear terms that it is not the training that a soldier receives that makes one a criminal or a murderer, but only once his military skills are deployed for an unlawful purpose.  In this regard I refer to page 530 of the record.

MR COETZEE: In his evidence he found it strange that the recruits were trained in the use of rocket-launchers and mortars, and he felt that strictly speaking it wasn't necessary, and in this regard I refer to page 204.  However, during cross-examination, when it was explained to him that the protection would take place in a rural environment, and that the experience in South-West was that villages and chieftains' kraals were attacked with mortars, and in those instances the best method to counter such an attack would be through use of mortars.  In this regard I refer to 525 and 526.  Dr Williams accepted this scenario as sketched.

MR COETZEE: He also initially had a problem with the training in house penetration, which he described as a grey area.  However, when the following reasons were explained to him

MR COETZEE: /relating

MR COETZEE: relating to house penetration he immediately agreed with the scenario as sketched.  In this regard I refer to his evidence on page 526, and I quote.

MR COETZEE: "If one gets to house penetration, I assume that the same principle applies.  If you have a situation where the insurgent has gained the upper hand, and he takes control of a particular building, inter alia your charge is in the building in a hostage situation, you must have a means of penetrating that building and undoing the harm.  Would you agree with that?"

MR COETZEE: And the answer,

MR COETZEE: "You certainly could if it was a reaction force trained specifically for the role."

MR COETZEE: He carries on.

MR COETZEE: "Yes.  As I understand the evidence that is particularly what they were trained to do, not so?"

MR COETZEE: Answer,

MR COETZEE: "According to the evidence, yes."

MR COETZEE: Dr Williams had a difficulty in comprehending why it was necessary to train the recruits in explosives.  In this regard the panel is referred to the evidence of, inter alia, General Liebenberg and General Groenewald, where it was stated that it was necessary to train the recruits in explosives for identification purposes.  Say, for example, if Dr Buthelezi was to give a public rally, it would be necessary to determine if there are any

MR COETZEE: /explosives

MR COETZEE: explosives under the stage, and the recruits would have to know what to look for.  This is dealt with in Liebenberg's evidence in the Msani trial on page 3162 and 3163.

MR COETZEE: The panel seems to have a problem with the fact that the recruits were trained with weapons from Soviet origin.  Dr Williams seems to have less of a problem with this aspect, and he was of the opinion that this simply emphasises the covert nature of the project.  In this regard I refer to page 202.  Furthermore the panel is referred to the Msani record, where the reason for the covert nature of the training is fully explained.  It was necessary that the recruits should not be aware that they were being trained by members of the South African Defence Force.  If South African weaponry were to be used it would immediately become apparent that they were being trained by the South African Defence Force.  A further explanation that is also relevant is they also had to be able to identify weapons of Soviet origin.  Also the Directorate of Special Tasks had AK47s readily available for training of these recruits.  One of the reasons why this weaponry was readily available also relates to the assistance given to Unita.

MR COETZEE: Dr Williams further makes the point that no type of weaponry or equipment is inherently offensive or defensive in nature.  It is very much the intention, the doctrine, and the anticipated deployment behind the armed forces that determines whether the training and weaponry is going to be utilised for an offensive or defensive aim.  I refer to page 201 of the record.

MR COETZEE: Dr Williams conceded that because somebody might have received military training it does not make him a

MR COETZEE: /criminal.

MR COETZEE: criminal.  As many as 500 000 South Africans received military training, and this does not make them criminals.  Page 530 of the record is relevant in this regard.

MR COETZEE: Dr Williams was of the opinion that it is not advisable to provide military training to a group of persons and thereafter they are not placed under a command structure.  The panel must, however, take cognisance of the evidence given during the Msani trial, namely that after the trainees had received their training they were to be placed in a formal structure, and that this was the responsibility of the Department of Constitutional Affairs and the KwaZulu Government, and that Military Intelligence only had a liaison function.

MR COETZEE: These trainees were not initially placed in a formal structure due to no fault of the Defence Force and the clients we represent.  It must also be borne in mind that at no stage were these trainees armed by the South African Defence Force on their return to KwaZulu.