Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-18

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir I did not. At that time I was satisfied that Basson was persuaded and I explained to you this morning that I had some difficulty in persuading him to cooperate with National Intelligence. And I was assured in myself that they would now reveal or unravel whatever other activities he may have been involved in. But I have to admit to you that maybe I should have acted more strongly at the time and it certainly looks like it with the wisdom of hindsight. But I am giving you the facts as they happened. I was at a loss as to how to deal more. If you say that I could have gone to d'Oliviera myself certainly I could have done that. I think it is not the type of thing that a person in the military environment does. The person goes to his direct commander, which I did. To make it clear to him that I was aware. I was becoming aware of something. Whether it was true or not I had no proof of what Dr Jan Lourens said to me. I had only the story that he told me. I was alarmed by the story. I told it to the Chief of Defence Force and immediately thereafter to his successor.

DR RANDERA: General what was the time period between informing General Liebenberg and then going to General Meiring?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: It was about a week later. I said this morning that after Dr Jan Lourens saw me General Liebenberg retired at the end of October. So it was within that period of two or three weeks that General Liebenberg retired. Immediately thereafter General Meiring took over. I explained to you this morning that I didn't have to tell General Meiring anything about the project. He was part of the CMC, he knew exactly what the broad guidelines were and the mandate was, etc, etc. And I informed him of this information that I had got from Lourens. So I was under the impression I had done as much as I could do at that stage. I agree with you that it would have been wiser now looking back to insist that there should be a board of enquiry as I explained right at the beginning of my testimony. All members in the medical service are not only under the disciplinary code but also under the professional code of conduct of the medical or other professions that they are registered with. You are right that would have been proudly wiser at the time. But we got caught up and when I say we, not only myself the whole Defence Force, the whole government got caught up in the demarche situation. In which this man played a key role. He was being offered to the American, the British I understood to expose to them exactly what our programmed was about so as to reassure the government about the legitimacy of the programme. They certainly commented otherwise on the programme but by that time, that was after February I was far more informed than I had been in October. By that time we shared that information with government and we said what have we have to do with Basson. If we get the testimony of National Intelligence they will confirm to you that one of the issues that was discussed was what do we do with this man. It was an issue that was carried over to Mr Mandela also, what should he do with the man. You know exactly what happened afterwards when Mr Mandela approved that he be re-appointed there was an outcry in the country about the re-appointment. But it shows you in what difficulties the government was as to what to do with this man with the information that he has, with the background that he has.

DR RANDERA: General just one last question. Are you now saying that a decision is taken to dismiss Brigadier Basson by the President no lest and within the forces, Intelligence Services, Military Services, you were contravening an order?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir I don't (...intervention)

DR RANDERA: Because we not, in terms of the events that took place December 1992, these concerns that you expressing are post the decision. A decision has been taken already to dismiss the man.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir you are not correct there. He was dismissed as a member of the permanent force. He was placed on the citizen reserve which happens to everybody who is pensioned earlier. He was not actually dismissed, he was put on pension. But what is a fact is we discussed when I say we, Mr Mike Kennedy and I discussed with Mr de Klerk personally the fact that he was actually illegally or unlawfully dismissed or unlawfully put on pension. He was never charged with anything. He was never given a chance to give any account of the reasons or whatever. And the fact is when we discussed it with Mr de Klerk by the time the demarche took place we indicated to him this man is going to create a problem for us. We need to take him under control again. And Mr de Klerk did not want to do that and he said I will leave that for the new President to decide about and that is exactly what happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Sooka. Sorry Mr Vally.

YASMINE SOOKA: General is it possible that one of the reasons you didn't actually do anything about Mr Basson at the time Lourens came to see you is perhaps the suspicion that you already had that possibly what Basson was doing had been authorised by another chain of command other than yourself?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Ms Sooka I think that realisation of what you are saying now that took place in February. What you are saying now is what I realised in February. That was when we had the briefing from National Intelligence along with the Minister of Defence.

YASMINE SOOKA: Sorry just to, I mean I have heard what you have said but did it ever occur to you I mean the name of a general is mentioned, General Liebenberg you have discussed, you have informed us before that you confronted him but you didn't actually mention that it was about him. Why was that? Why did you not say to General Liebenberg; "This man has come to me to tell me that on your instructions he is manufacturing this stuff and that he is being instructed to do it by Wouter Basson"?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes I am trying to be quite honest with you I can't explain that to you but I simply say to you that at a very short date thereafter I said so to General Meiring that, that was the information I have.

CHAIRPERSON: But Meiring had not given an instruction to Wouter Basson?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I know that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: See that is exactly why we are having a difficulty you know. You allow a person to - well you don't allow him but you know at a time when you could have effectively dealt with the thing by raising it with him you don't and you raise it with somebody else who can easily take the attitude; "Oh well it has nothing to do with me. I never gave that person an instruction." In fact if Meiring never did anything about it who can blame him.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Chairman I think that I may have made a misjudgement there but I was of the opinion that if there was any truth in it that General Liebenberg would have come out with it. He did not. He dismissed it. He ignored it. He reacted in such a way that I had some uncertainty in my mind whether it was true or not.

CHAIRPERSON: What would a cynic say? What would you say if a cynic say well you just took the attitude that: "Well it is clear now we are heading for an election and it may well be that the ANC are going to come in. Let that be their problem. We don't care."