Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-24

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: It did not feature in the strategic objectives of Vula.

MR VISSER: Let's not play with words.  I'm asking you not at all?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, hold on.  I'm talking as a military Commander.  You say in the orders, paragraph 1, mission description, paragraph 2, strategic objectives, paragraph 3 the tactical space that you have to fulfil it.  I'm saying in the objectives of Vula.

MR VISSER: Let's go to paragraph 4, political objectives.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Paragraph?

MR VISSER: You're talking about a paragraph 1 and a 2 and a 3, didn't you consider the political realities in regard to Operation Vula?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: The strategic objectives of Vula were both military and political.

MR VISSER: Alright.  Was that a five year plan?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, it didn't have 5 years.  We had given up that communist terminology.

MR VISSER: Was it never the intention that there would be a general revolt of the people, an uprising by which the South African Government and the Security Forces could be toppled and democracy established?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: There was, the strategic objective of the ANC as spelled out at the Kabwe Conference, which was a people's war, not a people's uprising.  The matter was being debated.  Different people have different views, but the Conference decision was a people's war, not a 'Volks opstand".

MR VISSER: There was an article written by Mr Siphiwe Nyanda, perhaps you have knowledge of it.  Let me just find it.  It's part of Exhibit G.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Yes, it appeared in the African Communist.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'm actually, I'm really referring to Exhibit B for Bravo, paragraph 10 which is at page 117.  I'm sorry, page 116 and perhaps I must ask you this first of all.

MR WILLS: Sorry, what page was that?

MR VISSER: 116.

MR LAX: B starts on 110 and then it moves on from there.  It's headed Chapter 17, sub-paragraph Operation Vula.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Chapter 17, Operation Vula, yes.

MR LAX: Then page 116, paragraph 914 (b) is what you're being referred to.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sure, thank you.

MR VISSER: Sorry, before we get to that, were you here on Friday when, in the afternoon, Mr Steyn's evidence in chief was just concluded?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: You weren't.  Did your counsel, I'm not certain, one or both of your legal representatives or the legal representatives draw your attention to the fact that I specifically drew the attention of the legal representatives to Exhibit B at that time.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: With a view of your evidence, which was then anticipated.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir, they did not mention that at all to me.

MR VISSER: They never mentioned that to you.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: What was faxed to me was his evidence in chief.

MR VISSER: Unbelievable.  Because you see I specifically, Mr Maharaj, drew the attention of Ms Poswa, if we can confine it to her then, to page 116 to 118 with the comment that if Mr Maharaj is going to give evidence, this is going to be relevant.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: But it doesn't matter, I'm ready to answer.

MR VISSER: No, no, I know but that was not, never conveyed to you?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No.

MS POSWA: Mr Chair, can I just interject?  I really don't remember that bit, can you remind me, was it said?

MR LAX: My recollection and I speak subject to, because I didn't make a huge note of it, but you asked specifically that that evidence be incorporated in Gen Steyn's evidence.  Whether you indicated that it was of particular relevance to Mr Maharaj's testimony or not, I honestly have no recollection, but my fundamental recollection was that we wanted to avoid wasting time reading that into the record and it was incorporated by reference into the evidence of Gen Steyn.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: That is what my note from Adv Poswa says, that in the fax that I received it had an N.B. at the bottom, it says
"Incorporate page 116 and 118 of Exhibit B into the statement"
but I did not have these files with me in Jo'burg.

MR VISSER: And Mr Chairman, Commissioner Lax is of course absolutely correct but what I also added was because Mr Wills and Ms Poswa had not been here during Deon Cele that we wanted to draw their attention specifically to that document in view of the fact that Mr Maharaj was going to give evidence about Operation Vula, but be that as it may.  Now at page 116 of Exhibit B there's a reference to Siphiwe Nyanda, alias Kibusa, alias Carl and there's a reference to an article entitled "A Single Spark can start a Veld Fire - the perspectives of the armed seizure of power."  Do you know of that article?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I don't recall the specific article at the moment, but certainly I would expect that there would be an article like that in the debates and discussions going on.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, did you say that you would have become aware of it?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I say, I would expect such an article to appear in the debates and discussions going on in the columns of the African Communist.

MR VISSER: Yes, this was published, according to page 117 in the African Communist Journal of South African Communist Party Number 12, first quarter 1990, page 35 to 43.  You would accept that?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Yes.  I would accept that there's an article like that.

MR VISSER: Yes, that's all I'm asking you.  And at the foot of page 116, would you accept that in that article there's a quotation which reads
"A spark can start a veld fire - insurrection in order to take place, relies on a stimulus.  The objective conditions can be present, but this is no guarantee that an uprising will take place."
It goes on, talks about the sufferings etc and then it says:
"The stimulus or spark can come in many forms.  It can arise out of some high-handed action by some official, sparking protest which  spread, the killing of a child, a massacre, unpopular legislation, rent evictions etc.  It can even arise out of the most unexpected circumstances like a train accident"
and then I want to refer you to the words underlined further down,
"The stimulus can also come from the revolutionary movement, making a call, the response which triggers a chain of events, leading to insurrection or a direct call to the masses to rise."
My question to you is, was this something just in the mind of Mr Siphiwe Nyanda, or was this in fact part and parcel of the strategy and planning of Operation Vula?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sir, Operation Vula commenced in 1986, it's strategic objectives would be defined by the Conference decision and National Executive decisions of the ANC.  In the context of that, as developments went on, individual comrades in the ANC would have different views about the way forward.  Siphiwe Nyanda, who was my Deputy Commander, had the view which he developed as events unfolded, that the great possibility was an insurrection.  That was a view that he published in the African Communist for debate so that others could participate, agree, disagree and challenge his view.  It was a public journal available on bookshelves around the world and with the unbanning of the Communist party on February the 2nd it would be available in the bookshops in South Africa, so that people could read and debate.  it was a viewpoint he was advancing as his individual viewpoint here.  Nothing in these quotations say this is the policy of the movement and that is how ideas grow, that is how correct tactics and strategies emerge.