Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-06-20

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, and they seem to be extremely inefficient, non-effective.  But that only formed a very small part of the entire operation which was under my control, it formed a small part of it.  And they only became operational on the 1st of January and they still had to find their feet and establish themselves and to recruit non-aware members etcetera, to make them truly effective.  As I have tried to explain, it was a protracted process and perhaps in my view at the time they were not that effective because a lot of things still had to be put in place etcetera, before they could act.

MR LAX: Yes, but even eight/nine months later you still weren't getting much production.

EDWARD WEBB: Correct.

MR LAX: One can accept that it will take a few months to get established or you got to develop contacts, but the fact is these weren't people who came in out of the blue, these were people who came in off the ground, they were policemen, that's why you chose them.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, but people who first had to be re-orientated according to our methods, to act according to our methods and not like just ordinary policemen and that's also a big adjustment.

MR LAX: But it's not the method, it's the connections that they had.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, that was an advantage, but you must also be careful with the connections that it's not revealed for whom he is working.  So it was a complicated matter.

MR LAX: But you see that's precisely what they did, because they used the same kind of connections they would have used as policemen.

EDWARD WEBB: Are we talking about Slang van Zyl, yes.

MR LAX: And some of the others, because the others asked for those very same connections.  For example, Gavin Evans in that incident they asked for the very same connections that he had.

MR MARTINI: Sorry, Mr Chairperson, the reason for that was that the other operatives, "bewustelike lede" had not yet recruited their own people, they were - because Mr van Zyl, according to the evidence, had recruited these "onbewustelike lede".

MR LAX: You see I'm aware of that, but the point is that it's the type of people that they wanted to use, not the fact - and that's precisely what you wouldn't have wanted.

EDWARD WEBB: I'm sure Col Verster would also not have wanted it like that.

MR LAX: Ja.  Look, the simple point, and we're getting side-tracked here, is that in terms of what you understood to be your powers and your authorities, the kinds of decision making you would have been required to make would have required of you a very, certainly much more of an extensive knowledge of what was going on than you professed to have had.

EDWARD WEBB: Are you referring to the information which was given to me?

MR LAX: Yes, you see you weren't a conduit as I said earlier, you weren't just a channel for authority, you actually were a person who made the authority, you weren't the rubber stamp.

EDWARD WEBB: That's correct.

MR LAX: And in order to exercise that authority, you were required to have knowledge.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.

MR LAX: But you say you didn't.

EDWARD WEBB: No, I was properly briefed in terms of, for instance the bomb incident in Athlone, how can you tell me that I didn't have information about that?  To be able to make a decision I got the necessary information relating to that.

MR LAX: Well I don't want to intervene in Mr Bizos' cross-examination, there are a hundred questions I would want to ask you about in due course, I'm talking in general terms though, because it's just that incident that you know about.  In one year, only one incident, plus the Tutu one.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.

MR LAX: But in a whole year and a bit more of your being in command you were only consulted twice.  And then yes, you were consulted about Lubowski's monitoring as well.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.  When I had to take certain decisions I made sure that I got proper and correct information relating to that and if monitoring was still being done and so on, then there wasn't the appropriate flow of information to me because at that stage then there couldn't have been a plan.  It's only once a plan had been formulated by Verster, they would submit the plan to me and the information would then be linked with that plan.

MR LAX: Besides the plan and the "voorlegging" which was made to you, what external sources did you yourself use?

EDWARD WEBB: What was available to me as the Commanding General, it was paperwork, documents from Military Intelligence who sent us intelligence reports that I read, plus then the briefings on a daily basis from Special Forces Head Office, their intelligence staff.

MR LAX: So you used Special Forces intelligence.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes.

MR LAX: Anything else?

EDWARD WEBB: I think those were the two primary sources.

MR LAX: What would they know about the Early Learning Centre?

EDWARD WEBB: No, I'm not saying I used them for the Early Learning Centre, you asked me the same question yesterday and I'm saying that in that regard I used only the information which the CCB gave me.  I didn't use information from my own Head Office and their intelligence staff.  Do you understand how the set-up worked, Mr Lax?

MR LAX: No, no, I hear you, I heard you, I'm just trying to put myself in your shoes and to ascertain what kind of questions one would have asked.  Sorry, I've intervened for far too long.  Mr Bizos, perhaps you should carry on.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this would probably be an appropriate time to take the tea adjournment.  We'll take a 20 minute tea adjournment.

MS COLERIDGE: All rise.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

EDWARD WEBB: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Mr Bizos.

GEORGE BIZOS: (cont)
	In answer to a question by the Chairman yesterday you said that the operatives of District 6 were subject to - I'm sorry, Region 6, were subject to military discipline, is that what you said?

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

GEORGE BIZOS: And if they committed any breach of the military code, they were subject to a Court Martial.

EDWARD WEBB: Yes, Chairperson.

GEORGE BIZOS: Well that's - how is that consistent with people whose job was to break every rule in the Military Code?

EDWARD WEBB: They were remunerated by the Defence Force, appointed by the Defence Force and that's why they resorted under the Regimental Disciplinary Code.

GEORGE BIZOS: Everything that they did was contrary to the Military Code.  Does the Military Code authorise anybody in the Army to commit offences?

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

GEORGE BIZOS: Or to commit perjury?

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

GEORGE BIZOS: Or to employ gangsters to do their work?

EDWARD WEBB: No, Chairperson.

GEORGE BIZOS: Well I think I've done enough in relation to that, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe can I just ask a question.  I'm sorry, Mr Bizos.

GEORGE BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR SIBANYONI: If a person would be brought into a Court Martial, would that not expose his activities in the CCB, because I understand their activities were supposed to be secret?

EDWARD WEBB: No, that is so, but you can have a Court Martial in camera.

MR SIBANYONI: Okay, thank you.  Thanks, Mr Bizos.

GEORGE BIZOS: And you would have expected the person that heard this in camera to break their oath of office if they were Judges and Prosecutors, not to report the crimes that were evidenced before them.

EDWARD WEBB: The Regiment of Discipline and Military law, I suppose they didn't have the right really to hear somebody on a charge of murder perhaps.

GEORGE BIZOS: No, I don't think that you are coming to terms with my question, you're dealing with an exception possibly, but have you understood the question in general terms?