Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-24

MR VISSER: Yes, but aren't you forgetting something?  Aren't you forgetting that it was a fact that he was the Commander of the Natal Machinery in Swaziland?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I'm not forgetting that.

MR VISSER: Well, how do you suppress that fact, Mr Maharaj?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Capt Botha referred to it in one instance in his evidence, he said ask Maharaj about the houses at Reservoir Hill and Chatsworth.

MR VISSER: No, no, please can we stay, stick to the question.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, you asked me how?  I don't know how can I explain that's why I said I have difficulty Chairperson in answering this question, except to show instances where files would disappear.  Files would go frozen, files can get lost, files can be misplaced and reappear.

MR VISSER: Can we go to J4 and J5?  You agree that these two telexes deal with detention of Mr Charles Ndaba by the Swazi police?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Yes, I go further to show the detention was as far back as 1987.

MR VISSER: Yes.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: And I show the co-operation therefore between the South African Security Branch and Swazis, you don't have to arrange his deportation left at Charles Ndaba's hands, you just have to do it through your agents in Swaziland Government to make sure he is deported.

MR VISSER: Yes, okay.  The fact of the matter is that J5 refers to 1987.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: J5 refers to 1988.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: J4.

MR VISSER: J4.  Now according to the evidence of Botha, he only recruited Ndaba in 1988 as an informer.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sure.

MR VISSER: So how is J4 relevant then?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: It is relevant to show that the co-operation between the Swazi Security and police in governmental structures and the South African Security police were so close that if you needed to get Charles Ndaba to leave Swaziland as your informer, you wouldn't leave it to him to manipulate it, you would simply inform the Swazis and they would quietly make sure that he's deported.

MR VISSER: I see.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: You don't leave your own man to suffer here and do extra work.

MR VISSER: Yes, the innocent explanation on this document that it is information which the Eastern Transvaal obtained that Charles Ndaba was arrested by the Swazis, didn't occur to you?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, it's very simple.  I don't believe in the innocence of people who were in this conflict.  What I am trying to show is that you had access to the information and contacts and the statements made by Capt Botha that he instructed Charles to find a way to get out of Swaziland and get to Zambia was a very, very peculiar way.  The deportation could have been arranged through your contacts in the Swazi governmental structures.

MR VISSER: Yes.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: That's what I'm showing here.

MR VISSER: To round up, I'm going to argue to this Committee at the appropriate time that your reliance on the whole of Exhibit j takes the matter no further and it does not support the inference which you wish the Committee to draw that Mr Ndaba was not, was never an informer of the Security Branch in Durban.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I think the court has indicated to us at the start of the session after this morning's break that the court will arrive at its view on the documents.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.  Can we go on to the next point please?  You also stated, as a separate consideration, that Mr Ndaba could not have been, well I'm not so sure whether you say that any longer, after what you said this morning, that you were only kicking possibilities and no more, but you did mention the fact that he was screened very thoroughly and that he had military training, intense military training and as I understood your evidence, it was to the effect that such a person would not become an informer, or not probably become an informer.  Did I understand you correctly?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir.

MR VISSER: Well, please tell us what you meant?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sir, I put in the documents, together with other issues, so that the coinciding of all that information puts together the view that the applicants' claim that Charles Ndaba was an informer cannot be sustained by the applicants.  I have never claimed that a senior person can never become an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: I have known senior people, so badly tortured that they have become informers.

MR VISSER: Yes, alright.  So that on itself, that is your evidence now, its not conclusive but you say you must put that in the pot with all the other considerations.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: And when you put them in the pot, the conclusion you arrive at is (a) that the applicants' case that he's an informer cannot be sustained and (b) that the inference is more on the side that he was not an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes, I followed that.  And to be fair to you, Mr Maharaj, the way I understood your evidence, the last aspect which you want to be put into this cooking pot, was that you referred to times being hard in Swaziland for ANC operatives, they were persecuted by the Security Forces, they had a lot of assistance from the Swazi authorities, you refer to the Umkomati Accord, and a subsequent agreement, sorry a prior agreement which made it easier for the Security Forces to make life a misery for ANC or MK operatives in Swaziland, do you remember that?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Yes, life more difficult is a euphemism for being murdered.

MR VISSER: My question to you is would that not have made it more convenient for an MK operative rather than, rather to start working with the enemy who is making his life a misery, rather than to stick it out?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Sir, with due respect, the number of people in the ANC who turned cold, were a very tiny proportion. Most, as things got more difficult, became more determined to come into South Africa and fight face to face with the enemy, so the repression and the harassment had two reactions.  Some weakened, broke and deserted but the majority became stronger, more determined and more committed and wanted and pressured the ANC to say, "We want to get home to fight".

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Maharaj, we're not talking about the majority here, we're talking about one person.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: One person would be assessed in that guess scenario, by saying would he fall more with the majority or would he be the exception and I have reason to believe from my knowledge of Charles Ndaba's background and the way he pursued his objectives, that he would fall in the majority.

MR VISSER: Alight.  Now those are the considerations, did I leave anything out?  The ones that we discussed this morning.  Those were the considerations upon which you asked this Committee to draw the inference that Mr Ndaba was not.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, Sir, those were not the only considerations.  If you listened to my ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well, will you just please tell us what the others are.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Please be patient.  I'm trying to be, this time I went out during tea break and I said  "Stop being arrogant, Mac, be courteous", but now if you become arrogant with me, I'll become arrogant again.  I said that the sequence of arrests, the date of Charles Ndaba's entry into this country which the applicants conveniently are vague about, I've said he entered the country on the first week of February.

MR VISSER: We accept that.