Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-02-11

MR ERASMUS: I just want to tell you one thing, one can't describe it in words after everything that had happened, after everything we had gone through is that what we have been trying to do is what is happening today.  We as the security forces and especially the security branch was put - came in-between the political organisations, the National Party was the enemy of the greatest part of the population of this country, on the one side, and we were squeezed into the middle.  What they have tried to achieve to overthrow the government, to put another government in place, we tried, with all our might, to prevent that because we thought that that was the correct thing to do.
	On the other hand the ANC terrorists did exactly the same thing.  They came here and they wanted to overthrow this government, the previous government.  During this process we were squeezed or forced into the middle.  We couldn't get out of this position.  We couldn't get out of this.  We were caught in-between.  It happens everywhere, in Rhodesia, in Ovamboland, everywhere where we acted we killed one-another.  This was not a one-sided process.  There were two groups of people driven by political motives and they were killing one-another.
	From our part the purpose was the create space for the previous government to find a solution to the problem.  We could not find a solution.  The solution had to be a political solution.  It had to be a political solution.  But as it's been shown now you can't solve anything by means of weapons.  If the politicians couldn't find one-another and find a solution it could not have been solved.  That was our position.
	If today, if the situation rises I would cooperate with a legal government and become part of a struggle again.  I feel very sorry for the people and their families and all the relatives who suffered because of this.  But if you become involved in such a struggle people get hurt, people from both sides get hurt.
	You can say I had the power; you can say I make the decision, but at that stage I believed that what I was doing was the right thing.  It was not the legal thing to do, and this is why today, before this Commission, I am applying for amnesty for what had happened.  
	Mostly we would have never landed in this situation if it was not for this political dilemma which was not solved and into which we were forced into a certain position.  We can't say that the present government won't fall into such a dilemma.  It might happen, because there is such a lot of drama and misery entailed in such a dilemma.

MR VISSER: You have said that you feel sorry for yourself and for the relatives and the families, are you referring to the relatives of the victims?

MR ERASMUS: No to all victims, the relatives of all victims. ...(intervention)

ADV GCABASHE: If I might just take you back one step Mr Erasmus, just before the last answer you have given, you spoke about a report from Mr van Rensburg to tell you that the expedition had been successful, the plan had been successful, just before this last bit, yes?

MR ERASMUS: That's  correct, yes.

ADV GCABASHE: In your affidavit this is volume 1 page 31 under 9A.4 the third paragraph
"Later during 1981...."
etc, that's van Rensburg, you've got that bit, volume 1, page 31?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: "He reported in October 1991..."
could you just explain this to me.  Did you receive a report in October or did you receive one immediately after the operation had been successful?

MR ERASMUS: I can't remember about October, probably it's an oversight but I can't remember this date in October.

ADV GCABASHE: You see the reason I ask is because this then would fit in with the September scenario that Dirk Coetzee paints, you know just having read the affidavits that are available to us.  This is why I thought it important just to try and clarify this.

MR ERASMUS: I can't mention a specific date except I only have the documentation relating to the release of Kondile on the 10th of August, that is all I have.  Why I have said October I don't know.  I know after they returned they came and they told me what had happened.

ADV GCABASHE: Hold on, they telephoned you from the Eastern Transvaal.

MR ERASMUS: That's correct.

ADV GCABASHE: They returned and verbally gave you a report as well, is that what you are saying now?

MR ERASMUS: That's correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman I have no further evidence-in-chief, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry Mr Booyens I should have asked you first.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Erasmus just a few aspects.   If a detainee tried to escape, for example jumps through a window, falls on his head, do you think such an attempt would be reported to you?

MR ERASMUS: It would, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Was something like that reported to you?

MR ERASMUS: Not at all.

MR BOOYENS: I want to come back and refer to the broader situation and the background against which this decision was made.  While I am doing this I want to refer you to your later career in the police force.
	At a later stage you were attached to the Intelligence division at headquarters, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Later you were a major general in Johannesburg in the Witwatersrand.

MR ERASMUS: Ja.

MR BOOYENS: Now while you were a senior officer, this whole question of power which by implication was in your hand as a divisional commander, while you were a senior officer did you know about the Simonstown agreement where the security forces among themselves established who would be responsible for what?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This agreement was made during a meeting which, as far as I know it was special forces from national intelligence, the army and the police?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This happened during 1979 and 1980, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: Yes I can remember that.

MR BOOYENS: At the Simon's Town agreement I think all the top hierarchy of these three organisations were involved.

MR ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And to prevent that the certain branches of the security forces infringed on one another certain duties were delegated?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage already was there a kind of attitude of that the enemy had to be combated and that the infrastructure had to be demolished by whatever means, by for example shooting them, attacking them, it could have been done legally and unlawfully.

MR ERASMUS: I can't remember the content of that whole agreement but that was basically what that coordination entailed.

MR BOOYENS: Later on you became a general at head office, is that correct?

MR ERASMUS: No I was not a general at head office.

MR BOOYENS: You were a brigadier?

MR ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: At the Intelligence section?

MR ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: While you were there in that Intelligence section had head office at that stage it was certainly well-known that many people had disappeared, that just disappeared, that political opponents of the government were shot, were murdered, we can think of many, lists are available.  We have handed in lists like that.  While you were at head office were they worried about all the enemies of the State who disappeared or who were killed, or was all this done in execution of a duty?

MR ERASMUS: I don't think they were overly worried about this.  The normal investigations were carried out as far as I know, but I don't think they were very, very concerned about this.

MR BOOYENS: Was it ever indicated that some of these people, and if you look at the people who were killed, and I am specifically referring to the opposition, then people who were not directly involved like the politicians say, and even civilians, would you say that the inference is justifiable for an intelligent person that our security forces are responsible for the deaths on the side of the enemy?

MR ERASMUS: I believe so.