Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-19

MR MALAN: I have a mandate to put it to you, Mr De Kock, that Mr Nieuwoudt, should it be necessary, would deny that he drew any financial benefit for himself and his men as you put it from this operation?

EUGENE DE KOCK: I cannot speak regarding the second situation with Duli, I am referring to the third incident where I provided weapons to Commandant Nieuwoudt.  There was definitely a financial advantage for him and I will stand by that.

MR MALAN: Very well, I will also stand by that, should it be necessary to elaborate on that at a later stage.  It is not necessary for us to explore this any further, let it just suffice that it has been put to you.  Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MALAN

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, have you got any questions that you would like to put to the applicant?

MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.  Jansen, on behalf of applicant Ras.  Mr De Kock, could you be of assistance to explain the presence of Mr Ras and other members from Vlakplaas in the Eastern Cape, on that day?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, they were not informed surrounding Colonel Duli's actions and also not with regard to the others who were involved in this attempted coup.  Their duty with an enlarged group of former PAC and ANC members, was to monitor activities in the Eastern Cape under a cover.  The actual reason behind that which I kept to myself, was that should this coup be successful, that entire group of askaris and my  members, would have gone into the Transkei and begun with the identification of ANC and PAC members, their arrests and the handing over of those ANC and PAC members to the Duli forces, so that we could identify and trace the weapon stockpiling locations of the ANC and the PAC in the Transkei.  They didn't have the slightest clue of what was really going on, what the left hand was doing and what the right hand was doing.

MR JANSEN: So this was according to the need to know principle or basis, upon which covert operations functioned and therefore, it would not have been strange to foresee a possible role for people without them knowing exactly what the operation as such, was about?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Could you please be more clear regarding that?

MR JANSEN: Perhaps I have stated it a bit clumsily.  Inherent to all covert operations, there was this need to know principle, in other words, specific persons would not necessarily be aware of what other persons' involvement was or what the entire operation was about, the person would simply know what he needed to know at that point?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes.

MR JANSEN: So their presence in the Eastern Cape and their possible involvement in the Transkei at a later stage, was all conditional to the success of the Duli coup?  They didn't have any other role?

EUGENE DE KOCK: No, their actual role in this area in which they were working, was to trace ANC and PAC members, however they couldn't enter the Transkei.  If it had been successful, then yes.

MR JANSEN: Then they would have had access to the Transkei?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: I just want to confirm something which you mentioned in your evidence, it would also not have been strange for a person in the Security Police and more specifically a Vlakplaas member, to be involved in an operation during which there would be a co-operation between the Security Police and the Military Forces?

EUGENE DE KOCK: No, it would however have to be cleared with me as the Commander, especially if the operation was of a serious nature.

MR JANSEN: I don't know if you have had the opportunity to peruse Mr Ras' application, it appears on page 20 and goes until page 28.  Chairperson, I must just mention that if you study that application, between pages 20 and 28, that which should have been pages 2 to 5 of the application, does not appear there, it is simply the usual personal background of the application, it has absolutely nothing to do with the facts of the case, and gradually we will submit those documents when Mr Ras gives evidence, as it is not of cardinal importance at the moment.  It simply has to do with his personal and career background.  Mr Ras' application, if I could put it to you in general terms, has on a peripheral level to do with the Duli matter, but more specifically a plan or a proposal to kill Mr Bantu Holomisa and then there were also certain steps which were taken to identify the target, with regard to Mr Holomisa.  Can you recall anything like that?

EUGENE DE KOCK: After I read his affidavit, I recalled that there was a report from the East London Security Branch which stated that Holomisa upon occasion had a storehouse between Umtata and Queenstown and I don't know if it was me that asked Marthinus Ras or whether he suggested it, but it was agreed that we should investigate the route to see if there was a possible spot for an ambush so that we could attack and eliminate him.  However, I didn't deem it necessary and a week to ten days later, he was in Johannesburg again, he was part of a function which was held near Kempton Park.  He had a flat in the city centre in Johannesburg, so if we wanted Holomisa and by we, I mean Vlakplaas, it wouldn't have been a problem for us.

MR JANSEN: Yes, I assume that there were many operations or ideas which were discussed or from which certain initial work had been performed, but it never went any further than the original suggestion or preparation, that is probably not unusual?

EUGENE DE KOCK: No, I will concede that because one would gather information as one went along.

MR JANSEN: Yes, but I don't want the Committee to be concerned about the fact that you yourself, have not applied for amnesty for this specific matter, but that Mr Ras has indeed.  I would just like clarity so that we can establish that something like this would not have been unusual?

EUGENE DE KOCK: No.

MR JANSEN: And you don't dispute it, it is just that this is probably something which was part of the routine of your work at Vlakplaas?

EUGENE DE KOCK: You see, Vlakplaas was a division of the Security Police and the constitution of that stage managed to keep Vlakplaas going on an unconstitutional basis.   People would gather information over a period of time, which they might use two years later, but it fell within the framework of Vlakplaas/ operations.

MR JANSEN: Aspects which may come to light are things like the fact that in 1990, the ANC had already been unbanned, it was a legal organisation in South Africa after February 1990?

EUGENE DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Could you just inform the Committee to which measure there was still hidden agendas on both sides, we have heard of Operation Vula and there was talk of persons within the South African Defence Force who had so-called contingency plans in the event of the Codesa negotiations being unsuccessful.  Could you provide some information for the Committee about the perception of the Security Policemen and the Policemen on ground level, regarding the fact that on the one hand the ANC had been legalised, and that there were negotiations or at least that the preamble to the negotiations was underway, but on the other hand, there was still this contingency planning taking place.