Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

WITNESS:   The - as I have said earlier, your earliest origins were in the

MR MACADAM: /late

MR MACADAM: 2A late 1960s where you find people like General Pops Fraser actually writing manuals on and actually delivering a couple of speeches on the then Springbok Radio on the whole principles and the strategy of counter revolutionary warfare.  You have these exercises in the far Northern Transvaal which are supposed to resemble the Zambezi Valley.  South African Defence Force officers and non-commissioned officers also received some limited exposure at the time in the then Rhodesia, either as staff officers or gaining direct hands on experience by being seconded to the South African Police who up until 1972 were being deployed in Rhodesia.  Experience in Angola, experience in Mozambique, officers being attached there to assist and learn from - from those armed forces.  In 1970s you find that the doctrine of counter insurgency, doctrine and strategy becomes enshrined in the training of the defence force and by the mid, the late 1970s you find that at least as part of your infantry training counter insurgency training are both - are primarily of a rural type, but I mean increasingly of an urban type as well, becomes instituted in the training curriculum and cycles of the Defence Force.  This obviously corresponds to the fact that in Namibia the South African Defence Force takes over responsibility for border protection from the South African Police in 1972 and is involved in quite a protracted counter insurgency campaign and struggle against the SWAPO forces, receives some exposure to that in Rhodesia in the late 1970s when South African personnel are deployed in support of the Rhodesian Army and then obviously on its own doorstep, post 1976 begins to conduct its own counter insurgency campaigns within South Africa

MR MACADAM: /itself

MR MACADAM: 2A itself as MK and to a lesser extent APLA's armed attacks increased.

MR MACADAM: And could we deal briefly with the issue of South West Africa.  How was that dealt with by the South African Defence Force?

WITNESS:   Well, organisationally it's - once again that's quite detailed, but organisationally it was dealt with via the establishment of a territorial command in South West African which was headed by a South African Defence Force officer.  The command itself was divided up into a number of different sectors.  Within these sectors there were different configurations of forces which were used to counter the insurgents, the guerillas.  Some of these - most of these forces were of a counter insurgency nature.  There were a number of different units that were established towards this end.  In addition to counter insurgency units there were special force units and specialist units that were used in that regard.  There was the attempt also - we spoke earlier about the question of unity of effort - there was an attempt in the mid seventies to actually integrate and try and co-ordinate the activities of the different State departments involved in the administration of South West Africa to ensure the unity of this effort.  It's really a very detailed area and ... (intervention)

MR MACADAM: Well, perhaps I can just put to you what I think would be accepted as common knowledge, is that you had this SWAPO which was trying to drive the South Africans out of South West Africa.  They were based in Angola, which was then headed by the MPLA which allowed SWAPO to act from their territory and also were sympathetic to SWAPO's cause and within South West Africa there was a

MR MACADAM: /local

MR MACADAM: 2A local government with the South African Defence Force.  Could you explain to us, just briefly in the concept of counter revolutionary warfare what actually transpired.  How was SWAPO - how was an attempt made to curtail SWAPO and its backers?

WITNESS:   Your key area is, because this is counter revolutionary warfare, was an attempt to organise the population politically and that is why leeway was allowed for such organisations who were regarded as moderate at the time in South West Africa, such as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and a number of smaller organisations to mobilise and organise amongst the population.  Militarily a number of strategies were followed which were consistent with the rural counter insurgency campaign.  The first was there were levels of area protection to protect the local population;  a number of cross-border raids were launched;  there were search and destroy operations in some cases across the border in Angola, but also in Angola there was a concomitant strategy of trying to empower UNITA as what was seen as a moderate option to MPLA via the provision of logistical and financial support so as to enable UNITA to establish both a presence inside Angola and ultimately to possibly constitute a government in Angola which would then advantage the perceived stabilisation of Namibia, South West Africa, both politically and militarily.  I think the point was made once by General Malan that it was - it's pointless trying to occupy a country like Angola militarily, because it would be a Vietnam scenario, it would be an endless war of attrition and that the key thing to stabilise Angola, at least as far as the pursuance of South African Government interest at the time

MR MACADAM: /were

MR MACADAM: 2A were concerned, was to install a government that was moderate;  that had the support of - or was perceived to be moderate by the then political authorities and that had the backing of the population and appropriate levels of legitimacy and that could also act as a buffer against further incursions into North and South West Africa.

MR MACADAM: You talked about South African logistical and financial support to UNITA.  Was there any other form of support which they received?

WITNESS:   Well, direct support and I think this is also known public, direct support was channelled by the Director of Special Tasks, Chief of Staff Intelligence and that really constituted the key support that UNITA required.  UNITA, I think unlike many other rebel movements, did have a basis inside Angola amongst the Avunbundu(?), so it was based to a certain extent amongst the Angolan population, but logistical, financial and material support needed to be channelled to it and was by Ops Disa(?) of Director to Special Tasks.

MR MACADAM: And Director of - which department did it belong?

WITNESS:   That fell under the then Chief of Staff Intelligence.  It no longer exists.

MR MACADAM: And I just take it from these terms that this was a component to the South African Defence Force as opposed to any other State Department?

WITNESS:   Well, Chief of Staff Intelligence was the intelligence division entrusted with the responsibility for providing intelligence to the then South African Defence Force and still is with the South African National Defence Force.

MR MACADAM: And you then also dealt with the issue of, as you've said I think in your own words, when the violence or the correct term, but trouble is coming closer to the South

MR MACADAM: /African

MR MACADAM: 2A African doorstep and the ANC and APLA.  Could you explain what was done there?