Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1996-11-20

<UNKNOWN>: "... on these days, but it was virtually impossible to determine beforehand where such incidents would occur.  Apart from the main route referred to incidents of stone-throwing also occurred on the route to Gezabuso to Sweetwaters, especially in the KwaShange and Nxamalala area, which stretches over 10 kilometres.  At times when stone-throwing was anticipated the police did their best to escort vehicles through these areas given the limited manpower and logistical resources.

<UNKNOWN>: 3.  It was the practice of the SA Police under chairmanship of the commander of the Riot Unit to meet on a daily basis with other role players, namely the Security Branch and the

<UNKNOWN>: /"SADF

<UNKNOWN>: " SADF, for the purpose of sharing information and planning operations.  Obviously the planning depended on the nature of the information received and the reliability thereof.  Naturally the police did anticipate the possibility of further mobilisation of people during this period as it was clear from intelligence reports that tensions remained extremely high in the areas concerned.  Regular police patrols were mounted in identified flash point areas, and it is naturally impossible to say what effect these patrols had in preventing further mobilisation, but we are convinced that these patrols played a vital part in containing many outbreaks of violence.  With particular reference to the situation immediately prior to the outbreak of the Seven Day War, the police did anticipate that buses could be stoned en route to the IFP rally in Durban, and this is dealt with in paragraph three of our submission.

<UNKNOWN>: 5.  The members involved in the present submissions to the Commission have no personal knowledge of the Security Police in this matter and cannot respond to this question.

<UNKNOWN>: 6.  The Commission is referred to paragraph three of our submission.  There were allegations by both parties that the other party launched attacks on them first.

<UNKNOWN>: 7.  This aspect is also dealt with in

<UNKNOWN>: /"paragraph

<UNKNOWN>: "paragraph three of our submission in detail.  The police, however, find it amazing that there should be a suggestion that they, with the awesome firepower at their disposal, should contemplate shooting at attackers of the buses when it is a well known fact that security forces pursue a police of minimum force.  At all times the police endeavour to avoid armed confrontation with groups by negotiations and mediation.

<UNKNOWN>: Day three, 27th March 1990.  In regard to the allegations of involvement with people dressed in "kits konstabel" uniforms, we wish to draw the following aspects to the attention of the Commission.  The uniform worn by special constables was blue overalls, which was commonly available in many shops and also worn by many workers at various places of employment in the city.  In addition many of the special constables had been discharged from the SA Police, inter alia for desertion, and many had not returned their uniforms.  The SAPS, however, do not discount the possibility that several of these special constables may have become embroiled in the violence since they also resided in the areas wrecked by violence.  If they did so, however, they were embarking on a mission of their own and did not have the sanction of the SA Police.  The Commission is respectfully referred to paragraph 5 (1) and 5 (2) of our submission.

<UNKNOWN>: /"These

<UNKNOWN>: "These newspaper reports directly contradict the allegations that police did not halt attacks, and this is in any event disputed most strongly by this department.  We maintain that we did everything in our power to stop the attacks.

<UNKNOWN>: 8.  If some policemen on various occasions supplied Inkatha forces with weapons and ammunition this was most certainly not done with the knowledge and/or collusion of the officers in charge of the operations at the time.  Such actions would never have been tolerated, and, given the strict control over the use of ammunition and firearms, could hardly have gone undetected.  We therefore express serious reservations as to the accuracy of such allegations.

<UNKNOWN>: 9.  Fourth day.  In paragraph 3 (4) of our submissions we have pointed out that several attacks in at least six areas already occurred early in the morning prior to daybreak, and all available personnel were despatched to these various areas to attend.  It was specifically because of the magnitude of the violence that additional security forces were brought in from Durban during the course of the day.  The attacks were spread over an extremely wide area, and it was impossible to mount police surveillance teams everywhere to monitor the movements of groups of people.  The four SAP vehicles deployed in Taylor's

<UNKNOWN>: /"Halt

<UNKNOWN>: "Halt were the only available vehicles to despatch to that area.  The SA Police is unaware of the role or the reasons for the presence of the two KwaZulu Police vehicles.

<UNKNOWN>: 10.  The SA Police are not aware of the transporting of warriors from Cato Ridge in KwaZulu Government trucks.  We are also unaware of any conspiracy with regard to the planning of the attacks.  There are conflicting versions before the Commission as to the origin of these trucks.  Some say Eshowe, which is Taylor's Halt area, and others refer to KwaMnyavu in the Camperdown area.  The aerial survey referred to would very likely have observed 25 police vehicles since the police were deployed all over the larger Edendale area.  The police emphatically deny the allegations that they ignored the Inkatha attackers and only took actions when the youth defended their homes.  I once again respectfully refer the Commission to the newspaper reports referred to in our submission, which contradicts this allegation.  It should not be lost sight of that the police themselves were frequently the targets of attacks where firearms were used and had to defend themselves, whilst at the same time trying to contain the situation.  It is no secret that the SA Police were the subject of intense distrust and animosity from the UDF/ANC alignment, and mostly came under

<UNKNOWN>: /"attack

<UNKNOWN>: "attack when operating in these areas.  On the other hand the tribal structures in Amakhozi were the legitimate structures of the day, and tended to co-operate more willingly with the security forces.  In most circumstances it is little wonder that there was a common perception of collusion between the security forces and the IFP.

<UNKNOWN>: 11.  We have already endeavoured to outline the magnitude of the violence occurring on that day.  Whilst the groups were advancing from Taylor's Halt an extremely serious confrontation was taking place in Ashdown and all the other areas mentioned in paragraph three of our submission, which warranted the attention of the bulk of the security forces deployed on that day.  It was simply impossible to concentrate on all the areas at the same time.

<UNKNOWN>: 12.  We have already responded to the special constables, but cannot answer the KwaZulu Police, who fell under separate command structures at the time.

<UNKNOWN>: 13.  The magnitude of the attacks only became apparent on Wednesday morning, at which time reinforcements were urgently requested from Durban.  Due to the unavailability of police records regarding manpower deployments we cannot give accurate figures of the numbers of reinforcements.  We have already referred to the fact that there were only a limited number

<UNKNOWN>: /"of SADF