Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

WITNESS:   I haven't heard extensive evidence on that, I mean, I've read the evidence on that.  It's difficult to work out what the precise motive for that was, although there is allowance made and, as I say, this is not a rule in counter revolution strategy, but there is allowance made in counter revolutionary thinking at least and it's a very small allowance, that under certain circumstances when the political and legal constraints of a situation prohibits you from engaging more robustly with your opponent, that

MR MACADAM: /certain

MR MACADAM: 2B certain acts of, I suppose one would call it counter terror, could be permitted, but it's very qualified.

MR MACADAM: And two of the witnesses also mentioned the fact that they were told that they had to hide from the police.  There's evidence given that when the attack on the house took place a sock would have to be placed over the ejector of the firearm to prevent the cartridge cases ejecting and landing on the ground.  One person said as well how to escape from police custody.  How would that fit in?

WITNESS:  Well, once again going back to the two previous comments that I made and that you referred to, I mean, that once again confirms the covert nature of this deployment and the desire to hide the origins and the nature of the units and the personnel being used in these attacks, I think self-evidently.

MR MACADAM: And if we look at the initial objectives, the prevention of the assassinations of political leaders, defence(?) of property, disruption of rallies, now I think this is also common knowledge that the South African Defence Force was employed in the mid eighties specifically to bring to an end the violence that had taken over in KwaZulu-Natal.  Are you able to describe just briefly what that was response was, how that response or need was catered?

WITNESS:   Well, the former South African Defence Force and the present South African National Defence Force, when it described urban counter - the involvement of the army or the defence force in urban counter insurgency warfare, is very emphatic about the use of the defence force, not using the defence force in police supportive roles and it derives its definition from the reading of the Defence Act in 1957 and it says the

MR MACADAM: /only

MR MACADAM: 2B only military task which army can do in which they're not in support of the police, are things like protection of natural key points, protection of certain government buildings and certain forms of reconnaissance, for instance, observation posts, it says otherwise if it acts in support of the police, it always acts subordinate to the police;  it will not use police weapons;  it will adhere to the principle of minimum force and the principle of minimum force will be reflected in rules of engagement;  it will respect the local population - this is doctrinally at least - it will maintain its image throughout.  So the principle is very much in urban counter insurgency operations, unlike other urban counter insurgency principles elsewhere in the world, of acting in support of the police.  So its role is very limited and its role is almost exclusively defensive in that role.  In a rural counter insurgency role.  In a conventional role, it's allowed to assume an offensive capability, but in an urban coign environment it acts strictly in support of the police and that was the principles in the 1980s and those are the principles now.

MR MACADAM: And in that context would you expect then the SADF to have been deployed with mortars, RPG7s and Soviet Block weaponry?

WITNESS:   Not at the time.  Not in an urban coign environment, not in an urban counter insurgency environment.  That would be deployed with armoured personnel carriers, Casspirs, Buffels, small calibre weapons, teargas canisters which can only be fired on authorisation of the police - obviously your officers would carry pistols and then obviously your support equipment.

MR MACADAM: /And

MR MACADAM: 2B And you've heard certain of the witnesses have sketched how they operated once they had returned and received that training in the Hammarsdale and the Pietermaritzburg areas.  Are you able to furnish any comments or opinions to the type of activities they claim they were involved in, how they operated?

WITNESS:   Well, that - I mean, the training they received in - that appears to be the type of training that was provided by Special Forces, obviously it's difficult to confirm that now, but the range of training they received seem to be of a more of a special operations, possibly a special forces type training.  One can only surmise that the reason this was done was that because of the existing political and legal constraints which limited your defence force to the type of roles that I've outlined now, that if one was going to engage more proactively in the type of counter revolutionary strategy that was envisaged in this area, then one would have to utilise a different approach, a different type of training and possibly a different calibre of personnel.

MR MACADAM: Can you draw any links at all between training received and what these persons claim they actually did once they got back?

WITNESS:   Well, it appears to be consistent.  I mean they were quite capable of using the weapons that they were trained in, be it hand grenades, you know, be it light calibre weapons.  What they used was what they were trained in.

MR MACADAM: And you've had - I don't know if you've had an opportunity to go through the documents which were handed in as an exhibits in the trial in the Durban Supreme Court last year where, for example, you have the Liebenberg

MR MACADAM: /Report,

MR MACADAM: 2B Report, a report prior to the Liebenberg Report where, for example, a definition is given of "offensiveness", which is then in brackets described as, "of beskermings-komponent".

MR MACADAM: MS   (?): Protection component.

MR MACADAM: The documents and this was also commented on by the Court at the time that these documents were incomplete.  There wasn't a complete set of documents.  Furthermore, there were documents going up to various meetings and discussion groups, without any indication of what discussion took place, what policy decisions were taken after those discussions.  The Court also remarked there were variances between what was contained in the Liebenberg Report as to what the categories of trainees would be, the type of training and in fact what was given in the Caprivi.  Bearing in mind all these difficulties with the documents, do you see any factors or issues which are relevant in those documents which could assist this Commission in making its findings?

WITNESS:   In light of what you've said, I've read the documents last week.  I mean, I think there is a consistent theme that flows through the documents and that refers to the type of capabilities required and the type of structures required to accomplish them.  Not every capability is reflected in the structure.  Sometimes a number of capabilities are reflected in a particular structure.  The only inconsistency I see in the document is the document I think just prior to the Liebenberg Report where the offensive capability is equated with the protection element.  In all other documents those two are actually separated out.  The protection capability - the defensive

MR MACADAM: /capability