Amnesty Hearings — Richards Bay — 1998-04-14

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.  He was a Special Constable Mbandwa.  That is Lucky Mbandwa.  He originally came from kwaMakutha, he was a very staunch IFP member.
	It might as well be now that I am explaining, I might have forgotten about him, but he was present as well.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Now, what I want to know is were any IFP members of Policemen closely associated with the IFP, free to participate in such covert operations?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: What I can say is that as I have already explained the formation of the hit squad, there was a time where I was given permission to recruit people who were not necessarily Caprivians.  In fact I am the one who suggested that I use people who were not Caprivians.  There were people who were within the Police Force, who were not Caprivians and who had not been members of the hit squad on its formation, but who joined this formation later, people like Victor Buthelezi who was a Constable at the Police.  He was not trained for anything else except for the Police Force.
	People like Constable Lucky Mbandwa, people such as those were not Caprivians, but we did not form the hit squad around them.  As time went on, they joined in resulting from necessity and the need for manpower.
	We trusted such people on realising on how committed they were to fighting rather for the movement and this was necessitated by the tension and the fight that was going on between the ANC and the IFP and these was growing on a daily basis, where people were dying and houses were set alight.
	There was therefore a need for a greater manpower to come and help out.  Therefore I agree that there were members who ended up joining the operations resulting from their honesty and trustworthiness.  But I cannot lie here and say I also took them like Romeo, to introduce them to our authorities because they did not demand that I do that.
	Romeo is a special case, because he is the one who insisted to be introduced to the authorities, he wanted guarantee as to his security.  I therefore concluded that these people stayed with Bebebeyela, the Mayor on a daily basis and he must have known him.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Mr Mkhize, let me ask you a short question and hopefully you will give me a short answer.  When he participated in this operation, was he a member of your hit squad, had he been recruited by you?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Are you referring to Victor Buthelezi?

SISI KHAMPEPE: No, I am referring to this Constable or Special Constable Lucky Mbandwa.

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: It is very difficult to explain this Chairperson, because Lucky was recruited at the Mayor's place.

SISI KHAMPEPE: I am going to interrupt you.  I want to know at the time of the commission of this murder, was he a member of your hit squad?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: No, he was not a member of the hit squad, he had just come in that day.  Maybe he will be implicated in later operations, but he was not necessarily a member of the hit squad at the time.
	Maybe there is one or two incidents where he will be later implicated.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Thank you Mr Mkhize, I only wanted to ascertain that fact, and that fact only.  Thank you.

MR WILLS: Mr Mkhize, you report on page 104 of the record, paragraph 59 about some attacks on ANC areas.   You have indicated in your testimony that eSikhawini was in fact divided up into areas, certain areas supported the IFP and certain areas supported the ANC.
	Now, can you just expand and let the Committee members know which these areas are.  For example, if you can tell us the areas of eSikhawini, the various sections, which political parties were those areas generally, which supporters lived in those areas, the supporters of which political party lived in the specific areas.

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Mr Chairperson, I would not refer to section to section because in one particular section, you would not necessarily find the whole ANC or IFP.  One section would for example be divided by a stream and people on this side of the stream would belong to the ANC, people on the other side, belonging to another movement.
	For example eMalahleni, which is H2 section, it is so big and it moves on, proceeding to D2 and covers the area towards the garage, proceeding towards Gundani.  That is still H2, but it is not necessarily the whole area that was dominated by the ANC, there would be specific areas.
	There would be demarcations where we knew the ANC is strong, not necessarily the entire section.

MR WILLS: The short of your evidence is that the township was divided up into geographical areas, and certain geographical areas were ANC strongholds, and other geographical areas were IFP strongholds.  It wasn't like I think, in other areas of South Africa where members of differing political persuasions, live altogether in one area.  Is my understanding correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: There were times when such a situation prevailed at eSikhawini but as time went on, as the war proceeded or the fighting went on, houses were burnt down.
	For example in J2, there were initially ANC members in that area, but houses were burnt down and they were resultantly driven out.    They left and Inkatha remained behind.
	The few who remained, realised that they too had to leave.  It ended up being clean, that is the area and by so saying, this is suggestive of the fact that only one organisation was now remaining behind in the area, so that at the end of the day you would have only one organisation remaining behind.  This is how it happened.

MR WILLS: So when, and now I am referring to paragraph 59, when Mr Xele from Dlanguba Reserve arrived with the white Husky, the ZG Husky, with ammunition and you attacked certain areas, you were aware at that stage that these areas were in fact dominated by ANC persons, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct, we attacked places about which we knew, belonged to the ANC.

MR WILLS: Did, I want you to go through this incident which is detailed in paragraph 60 of your affidavit, page 104 of the record, where you went to Msilgwenya school.  Am I correct in assuming that that school was indeed in an ANC area?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: I am sorry Mr Chairperson, I am getting rather a lot of distortion through my headphones, I will try and proceed, I think it is the rain.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, mine seems to be not too bad at the moment, but if it becomes too much of a problem, Mr Wills, just let me know and we can see if it can be improved.

MR WILLS: All right, I will try and proceed.  I think I am just going to take you through this evidence very quickly, and you can confirm what you have said in the report.
	You basically drove in this Husky to the school, and on the way you identified two males, who were in the vicinity of the school, and you gave Mr Hlongwane the instruction to shoot these two males, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: And you later shouted out to Mr Hlongwane that another person who you had seen coming from the school, that that person should take the first bus, is that correct?  And that person was indeed killed by Mr Hlongwane, is that correct?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WILLS: Why did you do this?

BRIAN QUNA MKHIZE: I have already explained Mr Chairperson.  We knew that this was the ANC area.  Nobody would have thought that there were Inkatha people here, driving in the Husky that was brought to us by Xele, being sent by M.Z. Khumalo.
	And therefore we were in that mission as I have already explained, our aim was to attack ANC strongholds so that the ANC should come to realise that they are not the strongest in the area.  That is why I am explaining that we had to attack these areas, so that the ANC can come to realise that they are not the strongest, we were basically the same strategy as the ANC.