Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — UNKNOWN

MR DU PLESSIS: You did not say that there were such specificinstructions to act beyond the boundaries of the law but you alsogave testimony in the case of the handgrenade events or incidents,this was the case that there were actions beyond the boundariesof the law.  And you also gave testimony that outside the bordersof South Africa there were actions beyond the scope of the law. Don't you consider it possible that there might have been instructionsof which you might not have been aware, but that there might havebeen instructions that came from the State Security Council orfrom institutions immediately underneath the State Security Councilthrough the joint management system, that police officers underthose circumstances might have been instructed to act in waysbeyond the normal legal system in a pro-active manner?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Mr Chair I don't think it's possibleor at least it is highly unlikely.  South Africa would have beenmuch worse off than it is now.  If it had happened that the ordinarypolice officer would have been
3B under/...
90 GNL VAN DER MERWE
under the impression that he could simply act as he pleased tocounteract the offensive then things would have been far worsethan these cases now at hand.  One must not just try and gaina general impression because in every area circumstances weredifferent.  Every individual acted under specific circumstancesand because of a variety of factors each individual had certainunique perceptions.  One cannot generalise that there was instructionsfrom the State Security Council which gave the instruction thatthe security forces were able to act beyond the limits of thelaw but positions might have been taken, emotional statementsmight have been made or other circumstances might have existedso that the ordinary officer who existed under circumstances wheremurder and violence had to be dealt with everyday that the impressionmight have been gained by the ordinary officer that he could doanything to carry out this task.

MR DU PLESSIS: General then say for instance Mr Cronjereceived the instruction to act beyond the normal limits of thelaw and beyond the emergency regulations, should that person befaced with these circumstances such as you sketched, would youhave considered it reasonable?  Or rather let me state it thisway, what would your view have been if such a person under thesecircumstances such as Brigadier Cronje, if he received such instructionshow would he have interpreted such instructions and how wouldhe have carried out such instructions?  What would you have considereda reasonable response?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: In view of his application, BrigadierCronje's application and his instructions - no I will get to thatjust now or in a moment, this depends on
3B the/..
91 GNL VAN DER MERWE
the specific instructions and circumstances under which the instructionswere received.  Whether I would be able to say that it was ....(Tape3 ends)

MR DU PLESSIS: ....with regard to which he will givespecific testimony said the following which I will read to you,with regard to the actions of the South African Police and theway in which they carried out their instructions Chair I referyou to page 13 of Brigadier Cronje's application.  General I knowyou have seen it but I am going to read. This is then from BrigadierCronje's application on page 13.
  "In view of the preceding there were general instructionsfrom commanding officers to take certain steps to counter certaincircumstances, these were general instructions which did not necessarilyinclude the need for specific instructions in every incident. The power to gain instructions were devolved to a lower levelat the authority structure and a brigadier and other officerswere confronted increasingly with general instructions in termsof which we had to act in a broader manner than under normal circumstances. Such powers were extended and commanding officers could act toa greater extent before gaining the necessary authority".
Would you agree with this General?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes I would agree with this Chair. Let me put it to you in this way.  I can understand that thatis the way in which Brigadier Cronje understood the situation. If one were to analyse clinically every specific incident inthis regard and if one were to weigh the process 3B it/...
92 GNL VAN DER MERWE
it might not appear quite like that, but again under BrigadierCronje's particular circumstances I can well understand that thiswould have been his interpretation of these instructions.  
MR DU PLESSIS
  Of course it was not possible to gain instruction for everyaction for one's subordinates and in certain instances commandingofficers only gained information after actions were taken becauseof the need to act immediately, and because of the practical impossibilityto gain instructions before action".  
This is because of the circumstances of war then reigning, doyou agree with this?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes I agree with this.
MR DU PLESSIS
  "Actions of the South African Police to counter the actionsof the......"

INTERPRETER: I am sorry interpretation is not possiblebecause of the speed of reading and the lack of documentation. Interpretation is not possible of such documentation my apologies.
MR DU PLESSIS
  "Early in 1986 I was contacted by Commander Victor whowas second in command of the Intelligence Unit..."
There appears to have been a spelling mistake, Intelligence Unitwas misspelled here, it was "counter insurgency unit"my apologies.  
  "...due to the structure of the SAP at that time BrigadierVictor my senior,  had to accept
3B instructions/...
93 GNL VAN DER MERWE
  instructions from him".
Do you accept this?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: This is correct.
MR DU PLESSIS
  "He informed me that he called in Captain Jacque Hechterand gave instruction to go with his son, a lieutenant, to bringthe unrest in the Pretoria area under control in any way necessary. He said that Pretoria was burning and that South Africa was burning. He said that every necessary step had to be taken to bring thesituation under control and he said that immediate actions hadto be taken against persons responsible for actions against policepersons and that their house had to be burnt down of such persons. He then said that when striking back it had to be struck backharder in every incident.  The Security Branch had to act activelyagainst terrorists and activists.  His instructions also impliedthat the same procedures had to be taken and that guerilla actionshad to be taken to and against activists of the various liberationmovements.  Before Brigadier Victor's command there was only reactionaryaction from the Security Branch.  Various activists aimed at destabilisationwere dealt with in terms of existing legislation.  When BrigadierVictor gave this instruction it was clear that reactionary actionwas insufficient to counteract destabilisation and violence. It was then, at that point, that full-scale military warfare began".
4A That/...
94 GNL VAN DER MERWE
That is Brigadier Cronje's statement and I will finish readingthere.  Would you be able to give comment on Brigadier Cronje'sstatement with regard to Brigadier Victor?