Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Thank you, Brigadier Swanepoel.  We will put some questions to you.  Just to start with a question.  From what you've said is it correct that the first time that Defence Force vehicles were deployed in the area was on the 2nd of April?

WITNESS:   No.  No, Sir.  One company of Defence Force troops were assisting the police in various areas since 1989 up to March of 1990.  The reinforcements, however, arrived only, as far as I remember, round about the 6th of April.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  So prior to the 6th of April, during the period commonly known as the Seven Day War, which was from 27 March to about the 4th of April, where were Defence Force vehicles deployed, and in what numbers were they deployed?  You've said that they were deployed along the Edendale Road.

WITNESS:   Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Now, you don't need to repeat that.  Where else were they deployed?

WITNESS:   The troop levels at that stage, as I said, consisted out of about a maximum of six military vehicles, and I would say about roughly 100 soldiers.  I can't remember the names of places, but I would say the first troops were deployed along the route at the robot just before you get to the Edendale Hospital, and as far as I remember we didn't go much past the hospital.  Does that answer you, Chairman?

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Brigadier, there is something which is very interesting which you have just said here, which was always a puzzle to some of us when at certain times we felt that the Defence Force was not effective.  But you have just said here today that when the Defence Force was called upon there were certain restrictions applied.  Can you just try and tell us about those restrictions?  What type of restrictions were those, and who was giving the command that those restrictions must be observed?  I think that is going to help the picture about the Defence Force.

WITNESS:   Thank you, Reverend.  First of all, the restrictions I was referring to refers to the type of training a soldier gets.  A soldier, Sir, is not trained to arrest people.  They are even not trained to investigate and to deal with crime-related activities.  So the restrictions is firstly one of that you cannot use a soldier in the role of a policeman.  But what one can do, Sir, is you can assist the police by means of patrols, roadblocks, and other type of actions, but the police, according to the law, must be - must remain the main role-player in any criminal type of activity.  And for that reason, although the Defence Force were always under their own commanders, the police remained the persons by law to deal with things like arrests and related things.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Could you move in in a situation to help with a conflicting situation without getting the approval of the commander of the police?  That is question number one.  And question number two, since you were working together with the police, helping them, was there any situation where you could meet with the police and sort of discuss the situation and how you think you should be acting together?

WITNESS:   Reverend, on your first question, on agreement by the Security Committee of that time, a police member had to be with Defence Force elements at all times.  Even if we had a group of 30 soldiers working in a specific area our agreement was that at least one police member must be with the soldiers in order to deal with crime-related actions.  On your second question, the police and the soldiers have been working together for a long time on, I would say, two levels, the first level being the management level, and the second level being the grass roots level.  And yes, Sir, in both situations discussions can take place and did take place.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  The last one now, that's this last.  You know very well that there's a general perception that the police worked with the other organisation.  As you people were very close to the police would you say that that is a false assumption or is there some truth in that, because even here you heard yesterday the police working with the organisation, and you say that you have been working close with the police?  Can you say something about that?

WITNESS:  Reverend, it is extremely difficult for me to make assumptions, or even comment on something like that.  I, as an individual, having been involved on planning level with the police, never got the impression that we are sitting here with the support of security forces to one particular faction in society.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  So finally, in other words, you say that there was nothing like a third force in the conflict between the two groups?  You say that there was no third force.  We have heard a lot about the third force, and are you saying that there was no third force?

WITNESS:   Sir, with respect, you know, I also through the media heard a lot about those things which you have mentioned.  In my time in this area we tried to have an honest and direct approach to trying to create peace.  I want to use one example just to - and the people of that area can maybe come forward and - take, for instance, the role that the police played in Mpumalanga.  That role they played resulted in peace in that area.  That of course is my own perception, but after a while, through the involvement and assistance of those people, we achieved what we were there for, and that is to create peace and stability in a very difficult situation. Brigadier, your - did your unit, as Group Nine, have its own intelligence gathering operation?   ---   Group Nine had its own intelligence section.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  And was that section involved in gathering intelligence about the potential build up that was taking place, as we've heard, in the Edendale Valley?

WITNESS:   Sir, I would venture to say that the intelligence community as a whole was sort of assessing the situation, not only in Natal, but also in relation to the rest of the country at that time.  As I said, the more serious situation prevailed in the Rand prior to March 1990.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, we've heard evidence so far over the last two days that indicates that by the 27th, and even before the 25th in fact, there were already clear signs that Inkatha was massing forces, that - for example we heard yesterday about the meeting between the chiefs at Ulundi, and the King, where people were encouraged to clean up their areas.  Your people were aware of that, is that correct?  You're nodding your head at me, so I am assuming that that's correct.

WITNESS:   No, I will answer.  Of course we knew about the rallies taking place in Durban.  We were aware of the fact that in KwaZulu Natal as a whole, and in South Africa maybe as a whole, some political people were saying things, and I must admit that at the time we said that this stirring of emotions, and this talks that we hear on the rallies, can only result in a problem.  So my answer to your question is yes, holistically we of course knew and realised that things were starting to develop.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Now I want to take you on in this process, because some of the evidence we've heard is that elements in the police and Brigadier Buchner, as he was at that time, together with one of his officers, Mr Meyer, actually stopped a group a day before the violence really started, a huge group of people, several thousand strong.

WITNESS:   Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Now, surely at that time it must have been evident to yourselves, and to them, because you had a joint planning group.

WITNESS:   Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  It must have been evident to you that the potential for these people to mobilise quickly and efficiently was very, very strong, and what I want to know is what logistical preparations did you make to meet that strong potential?