Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well that was the building up of his image.  Then in the third paragraph, bottom of the page
"And simultaneously the psycho subtle denigration of Lennox Sebe had to take place, Lennox Sebe and/or his hangers-on.  Also his power base had to be eroded, excluding the Security Forces."

MR KNOETZE: What did you mean by the attack to which you refer, that his power base had to be attacked?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well I meant it in the counter-mobilisation sense of the word, in the sense that he had to be discredited and the alleged corruption which he'd committed had to be exposed and publicised by means of pamphlets and reports in the media.  There had to be reports etc., that he was not a good leader and Head of State and that his people didn't trust him, that he got rid of good Ministers.  So what it amounted to was a psychological attack on President Lennox Sebe's person and his reputation, and also the power bases which he still controlled, excluding the Security Forces.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then on page 79, paragraph 4.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 4 deals with the resistance movement.  There I say that it should be established and developed and should take place chiefly among urban blacks, and when Charles Sebe was freed it should be led by him, and there should be leadership given by the South African forces of this party, but it should be covertly done, and that this revolutionary movement or resistance movement should be similar to Inkatha - perhaps that was a little bit optimistic, and that it should form a joint power base together with us, against the revolutionary forces.
	Paragraph 5 dealt with the existing but struggle Eastern Cape resistance movements, especially in the Cookhouse area.  We reckoned that this resistance movement could join up with the XWB.  It was the Reverend Mokoena's Black Crisis Centre, and there was the Action for Peace and Prosperity, Sport Resistance organisation etc.  And the whole idea was that all these groups should be joined together into one unified front.
	Paragraph 6 deals with the Ciskei and the Transkei Security Forces and bringing them closer to each other.  I can remember that we had sport days, we arranged rugby days etc., so that these two security forces could see other as friends and not enemies, and that they could work together with us as an alliance to form a front against the ANC/SACP alliance.
	Paragraph 7.  We said that the XWB could probably be elevated in status to become the safety wing of Makoma's CPRPP, depending on the party's successes so that one could actually parade these groupings.  As far as the XWB was concerned, there was also the thought of protection, protection for the Ciskeian leaders as bodyguards.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then phase 2 on page 79, paragraph (b), please read that objective.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The objective was to, before June '87, unify, constitutionally unify Ciskei and Transkei before June '87.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 2, page 80, the execution in broad outlines.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that had to be aligned with phase 1.  And paragraph 2
"XWB plays the major role in the unification of the Ciskei and the Transkei Security Forces and also co-operates with the RSA Security Forces, to achieve overall stabilisation of the Eastern Cape front."
Here the Eastern Cape Treaty Organisation is mentioned, this should be established.  And the RSA, Ciskei and Transkei would become one formally, as far as security matters were concerned, so that there would be one unified force that could act jointly.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 3.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph 3.  The idea of Xhosa unity must be promoted.  There's very little motivation for this, especially as far as the Matanzimas were concerned.  The Ciskeian leaders that had been in exile actually supported the Matanzimas and it would create a political future for themselves, whereas at that stage they had been deprived of their political positions.
	Paragraph 4.  We say that we should give covert support for Chief Makoma's party and that this party would represent the moderate Ciskeian person and represent such a person.  And this party would not be limited to the Ciskei and could along with the XWB play a major role in achieving Xhosa unity for the people, the Xhosa people, but that it should be noted that the successful implementation of this phase was not dependant on the success of that party, that is the CPRPP.  
	Then paragraph 5.  I say that the major stumbling block was Lennox Sebe and that he should be eliminated by means of the following methods, or a combination of the following methods:  Chief Makoma should defeat him in an election, or if Charles was liberated he could remove him, the Matanzimas could get rid of him, the RSA Security Forces could act in a covert way against him, or the RSA could place him on pension.

CHAIRPERSON: So by that, General, the idea was to get rid Lennox Sebe anyway.  Would one these, particularly (c) or (d), include the possibility of an assassination? - The Matanzimas get rid of him, or RSA Security Forces by means of covert action?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: At the time that this document was written it wasn't my intention that Lennox Sebe should be killed.  Afterwards, and with great uncertainty in my mind, I realised that words such as "remove, get rid of, covert action etc.", could be interpreted, especially by persons who had not walked this road with me, other people who had seen the plan. It could be interpreted by such people as referring to President Lennox Sebe being killed, but that was never my intention when I wrote this plan.  I want to repeat that.  I realise now with hindsight that those words could be interpreted to mean that he should be killed.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but General, if you look at the option of Lent Makoma defeating Mr Sebe in an election, as far as I can remember Ciskei was a so-called one party State at the time, how possible was that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Later in the plan we say that there should be a complete full national election, and this was regarded as one of the methods by which we could get rid of Lennox Sebe, that would remove him from the political terrain if a person with the stature of Chief Makoma could defeat him in a democratic election.  When that would take place was not a foregone conclusion at this stage, it was simply put forward as a possibility.  It was one of the methods whereby he could be got rid of, and the sooner the better, in the context of this plan.

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.

MR SIBANYONI: May I just ask one question.  Why is the word "remove" put in brackets, does it not mean people should not give it its ordinary meaning but a different meaning?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think it appears more than once in the plan.  In paragraph (e) I also say that he could be placed on "pension".  That is because there could be other methods, and the method or way in which it was to be done had to be well considered.  For instance, there were other methods such as discrediting him or by means of bribing him and then revealing such bribery.  All those ways could be used to perhaps get rid of him.  So "remove" is the overarching term, which could have several meanings depending on the context.   We wanted to get rid of him as President of the Ciskei.  I think that emphasises that surrounding the word "get rid of" or the phrase "get rid of", there should be quite a lot of consultation as to exactly how it should be done.
	You will see - I don't know whether it's in this plan or later, we also suggest a coup d'etat as a method of getting rid of him.