Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — UNKNOWN

JUDGE WILSON: If there was such cooperation with thedefence force would you also have expected the defence force tomake reports to their headquarters?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chair again this would have dependedon the nature of the action.  If it had been an action of sucha scope that one would have expected this, yes.  Taking into account,however, that during this period one sometimes had to work rightthrough the night and that there would have been a number of incidentsin which people were involved under normal circumstances theymight have reported on these events, but in practice this didnot
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occur.  I would agree with you that under the same circumstancesif we were required to make reports yes in a similar way the militarywould have had to report to their superiors.

UNKNOWN: You gave instructions with regard to theZero handgrenades, did you receive a report in this regard?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes I received a report and gavea complete report in this regard to the Minister, the then Ministerof Police.

UNKNOWN: That would have been Mr Le Grange?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes that would have been Mr LeGrange.

UNKNOWN: Do you know whether he reported throughto a higher level or whether it was discussed at the State SecurityCouncil?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: I don't know Mr Chair but I canhardly imagine that a person like Minister Le Grange would nothave taken it to a higher level.  I do not, however, have personalknowledge of his actions.

UNKNOWN: In your case where you gave instructionsyou did report back?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes I did.

UNKNOWN: You would have required the same procedureunder other circumstances?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes where there had been authorisationI would have required that.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: Would there be any incidents in respectof which there would be no report required?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chair I can imagine that theremight have been such incidents.  If there had been a particularincident such as those sketched in the
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applications, the person might have considered it advisable toreport in such a way that the actual action did not appear inthe report.  In other words that it would have been reported asif some other party had been responsible for the particular action,it would then not have been possible to link the particular caseto the particular incident now appearing before you in terms ofreporting.

MR DU PLESSIS: General are you aware, do you have knowledgeof the so-called "San Hedron"? at the security headoffice, could you explain it to us?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: This was generally the heads ofthe various units.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am talking about the "San Hedron".

GEN VAN DER MERWE: This San Hedron it's a term fromJewish religious usage of the past.  These were the heads of theparticular divisions as well as the commanding officer who wouldmeet every morning to discuss the security situation in the countryand to see whether there was urgent attention necessary in particularcases and they also made general planning.

MR DU PLESSIS: General in my research I found an articlewritten by someone called Hansen.  This appeared in a journalPolicing and Law and in this article there was a particular incidentdiscussed which I want to present to you.  This had to do withthe action of the police in terms of emergency regulations.  Hediscussed the case as an unreported case, I don't have the particulardecision at hand State v Verlet in the Cape Province, andread as follows
  "The philosophy of policing in the eighties has shiftedfrom its original roots in total onslaught
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  and total strategy now rests on the notion of revolutionaryonslaught.  Initially this meant that the SAP were trying to perceivecivil conflict as part of a global communist onslaught againstcapitalism.  They now see civil resistance as symptomatic of athird world revolutionary attack.  From this standpoint it hasbecome the duty of the SAP to stave off onslaught in any way possible. In the case of State v Verlet it was shown that the SAPwere ordered to eliminate people that they perceived as beingthe enemy.  It is not unlikely, therefore, that this type of consciousnesshas produced the readiness to kill on the part of the SAP".
This is testimony in a case in the Cape in 1989, roughly in 1989. General if such testimony had been given already at that timewould you be aware of any enquiries or...(Tape ends)

GEN VAN DER MERWE: With regard to the specific incidentI couldn't tell you what steps were taken.  I can hardly imaginethat nothing had been done but I don't know the particular incidentso I can't make comment in this regard at this moment. Where claimswere made with regard to illegitimate actions and where this hadcome under the attention of government, in those cases where Iknew of this there had normally been questions with regard towhat steps were taken.  I don't know of any case where the impressionhad been given from the side of government, and I'm talking interms of gross human rights violations, not other incidents, butwith regard to gross human rights violations where people diedand so on, I gained the impression that
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government would not simply have let such incidents go by withoutinvestigation.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you give us a reference for that articleplease?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I beg your pardon.  It is in Policingand the Law. I am not 100% sure, I think it's the 1989 edition,I will confirm that Mr Chairman tomorrow.  The title of the articleis "Trigger Happy and Evaluation of Fatal Police Shootingsin the Greater Cape Town Area from 1984 to 1986".  It's page118.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: I think it's the 1989 edition, but I willmake 100% sure.

UNKNOWN: Could you check this for us and then onthe document indicate and provide copies for us of the documentation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I will do so.  General I just wantto state it to you that you've given testimony how Brigadier Cronjewould have seen his instructions and this is in effect also whatBrigadier Cronje has brought as testimony.  Thank you then foryour help in this regard.  I must, however, state to you thatBrigadier Cronje, as I have already read to you will bring testimonythat there had been a very great likelihood that these actionshad been sanctioned by government from a higher level, by theState Security Council and that it is likely that the instructionsof Brigadier Victor and Schoon to work with the SADF special forcescame directly from the top.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: I am not aware of any such instructions. I must, however, emphasise it very strongly that I know thatif we talk to our people today that this
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perception had existed amongst many of them because of certaininstitutions such as for instance the counter-revolutionary intelligenceunit known as "TREVITS".  I gave instruction to coordinateand evaluate information with regard to external targets beyondthe national borders and also with regard to particular individualsand organisations inside the borders.  This particular organisation'spurpose had to, because they were external actions and that certainof the targets were handled by TREVITS in such a way that theimpression was gained that TREVITS had been intended to act similarlywithin South Africa under similar circumstances and that thathad been an institution by government to sanction such actions. This is a mistaken perception.  I do, however, find it amongstour people.  If you ask them on what you base your understandinghe cannot give you facts but that he understood it in this waythis is quite the case.

MR DU PLESSIS: A final question General.  Do I understandyou correctly if I say that this perception which existed at thattime that nothing had been done by the superiors of, in particularBrigadier Cronje, to correct this perception?