Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-12

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir, you misunderstood what I said.  We would certainly decide and approve, the Co-ordinating Management Committee would approve the broad guidelines as to dealing with developing a comprehensive defensive system.  For example, if you start of with a programme like this your first requirement would be to send somebody out into the world to find out what exists in the world, what are the programmes of other governments in the world and that is exactly what the Project Officer did.
 He went on a world tour, he penetrated many different countries' programmes and came back with that information and he came back with the information that this country concentrates on that particular group of chemical weapons and this one on that and we very soon realised that the old approach of developing lethal agents was gradually falling away and that all countries, particularly the super powers that had vast capabilities were concentrating on incapacitating agents for example.
 But at the same time you must realise that we had to teach our scientists or allow our scientists to develop the skills to deal with these substances under security as well as safety conditions.  We had to allow them to read up on all the documentation and all the intelligence that we had gathered about what other countries were doing.  
 So a very large portion of the initial research went into establishing a data base about what is available in the world, what is being concentrated on, what do we have to protect ourselves against.  Realising that we are looking at a potential threat from forces deployed in Southern Africa, and I'm talking about the surrogate forces of the USSR, namely the Cubans that were here.  That is where we considered our main threat to be coming from.
 And therefore it was important to find out what the philosophy was in the USSR, what substances they were studying and developing and weaponising and creating delivery systems for and what information could we obtain from them.  And I want to say this, it is not so easy to get that type of information, it is not available in the everyday press or in the scientific journals, you have to penetrate those organisations and actually find out what they are working on.
 Now that process took quite some time.  The feedback that was then given to the Co-ordinating Management Committee via the Project Officer who had done this research and who had consulted with some of the scientists in their particular fields, whether it is toxicology or whether it is synthesis or analysis or whatever the case may be.  
 They would come back to us and say: "We believe we should now concentrate on the Organo Phosphates, that is today what is being studied all over the world".  And that kind of guideline clearance would be given, it would be changed into budgetary terms and money would be allocated for it.

DR RANDERA: Thank you General.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I have another question from Miss Sooka for clarifying?

YASMINE SOOKA: General, I'm not a military person and so when you use the word: "penetrate" I would like an explanation of what exactly that means.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well, Miss Sooka, if you want to protect an individual against an agent that he or she could be exposed to, then it is important to know what the penetrating capacity or capability is.   ...[intervention]

YASMINE SOOKA: I'm sorry, I think I'm asking a very direct question, what does penetrate mean?  Does it mean entering someone else's programme without their consent ...[intervention]

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Oh, I beg your pardon.

YASMINE SOOKA: Would that in effect mean spying?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes, I understand what you mean.  I'm sorry, I misunderstood your question.  Penetration also means for an agent to go through the skin or to enter the respiratory system or to get into the bloodstream or whatever, that's what I thought you meant.  But penetrating other systems means spying on them and entering their capabilities under false pretences so that you can obtain information, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just extend that question by asking, did you have for that purpose, an own intelligence capacity or did you rely on the National Intelligence Services?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, we relied on Military Intelligence but  Obviously the Intelligence Services in our country at that time had components in the military environment, in the National Intelligence environment and also within Foreign Affairs and also within the Special Branch of the police.  And any information that was gathered by them that was available within the intelligence community, could be analysed and then could be dealt with by our scientists and by Doctor Basson.

CHAIRPERSON: So the National Intelligence Service was also the source for your intelligence?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes, they may not have been aware of it but they were certainly a source.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I see.

YASMINE SOOKA: Sorry Chair, may I?  When you say they may not have been aware of it, can you clarify that for me please?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.  Miss Sooka, the programme that had been approved by the Minister and then by the decision of the Minister allocated to the Surgeon-General, was with a very strict guideline that no official co-operation was to take place with any other country or with any other organisation.  It was to be done in a clandestine covert fashion.  Do you understand what I'm saying?

CHAIRPERSON: No, I don't think, I certainly do not understand.  I think the question is simple here.  You said, in order for some of the programmes to be done with efficacy - I'm not quoting your direct words, it was necessary to penetrate enemy lines, enemy programmes, in other words meaning spying on them and all that.  Now I said, for that to happen, did you rely on the intelligence gathered by for instance, National Intelligence Service, in other words South African National Intelligence Service?  And then you said: "Military Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, etc., etc., and then you said: "They may not have been aware of it".  And I think Miss Sooka wanted to get a clarification on that.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes.  There was no official representation to National Intelligence to help us gather information with regard to chemical weapons, that is what I'm saying, but there was certainly co-operation at grassroots level to obtain information that had been gathered by National Intelligence, that is certainly true.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words you are saying, it happened except that it was not official?  When a person from NIS came to you and said: "Listen, this is what we gathered", you wouldn't say: "Hey, hey, I don't want to hear this because I'm not supposed to hear it", you would say: "Ja, thank you"?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Of course.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, okay.  And on that intelligent note can we take the lunch break and come back at two.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS