Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-19

EUGENE DE KOCK: From there there was a request from Gen Dreyer, who had the returned from Ovamboland with regard to the breaking up of a Koevoet Unit, they wanted some of the ammunition and explosives.  A large quantity of these weapons, approximately two five ton trucks full was delivered at the South African Police College in Pretoria at their weapons stores, but nonetheless a large quantity remained behind for the purposes of Vlakplaas and its activities, and it was stored at places such as Meken at Paardefontein, which was a facility of the Defence Force or Denel and members were also issued with weapons which they as individuals had to guard for operational purposes for our functions.

MR HATTINGH: So what you are saying is that individual members of Vlakplaas had their own arsenals of arms and ammunition?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is what it boiled down to.

MR HATTINGH: Very well Mr De Kock, that brings us to the incident which is of relevance for these proceedings.   You have applied for three incidents with regard to which you delivered weapons which would be used in prospective coup d'etats?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Your legal representatives have recommended that with regard to you, these matters can be settled in chambers, however it was decided that one of the three would be publicly heard, and that is the one that we are dealing with today?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I am going to lead you very briefly with regard to the two other incidents, because they do have a measure of relevance for what the Committee is dealing with today.  Could you briefly tell the Committee how it occurred that you provided weapons for the very first time for the purposes of a coup d'etat in the Transkei?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was approached by Commandant Anton Nieuwoudt, who was a senior Staff Officer of DCC, the Directorate of Covert Collections in Pretoria and he served under the command of Colonel At Nel and Brigadier Tolletjie Botha.  He approached me for a quantity of weapons, ammunition and handgrenades for a coup d'etat in the Transkei.  I provided the quantity that he had requested.  He fetched it at Vlakplaas and I understood that the weapons were delivered at Bloemfontein to a person who was involved in the attempt at this first coup d'etat, during which a group of men had settled on a farm near Queenstown and they were arrested there and the Queenstown Security Branch investigated the case further from there.

MR HATTINGH: So you supplied the weapons and apparently nothing came of this prospective coup d'etat?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then we will come to the relevant incident.  The Duli incident, will you tell the Committee what happened there?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Chairperson, Gen Krappies Engelbrecht approached me in 1990 after he had visited the Eastern Cape and he informed me that he had held negotiations with a well-known Eastern Cape businessman by the name of Mr Chris van Rensburg who was also involved with the company, JALC.  I don't know what the acronym stands for, but I understood that it was a military front or a front for Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: We were told, we had a hearing last week and we were told that JALC is the beginning, the first letters of the first names of four partners or Directors in the company, JALC.

EUGENE DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not entirely certain, but I will accept that.

MR HATTINGH: Might I ask you, what was Gen Engelbrecht's position in the South African Police at that stage?

EUGENE DE KOCK: At that stage, he was the head of the Investigative Unit which dealt with related complaints and cases which were to be submitted to the Harms Commission, and he had already been earmarked as the next Commander for Vlakplaas or Section C1.

MR HATTINGH: C1?  Continue, what happened then?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Gen Engelbrecht informed me that this businessman, this Chris van Rensburg had given proof to him of the fact that in the Eastern Cape and especially in East London and adjoining areas, there was an economic slump as a result of actions by Gen Holomisa in the Transkei, among others that the Transkei was being used as a safe haven for members of the ANC and the PAC, that it was also a safe haven from where organisations such as Trade Unions were against the government and would go over to active terrorism if it be necessary.

MR HATTINGH: Apart from what Engelbrecht told you in this regard, did you have any information from your informers or your askaris which confirmed this information?

EUGENE DE KOCK: I didn't work with the Transkei myself, and at that stage I didn't have any sources within the Transkei.  However, I did have three members of the Transkei Security Police who had fled away from Gen Holomisa and I had accommodated them at Vlakplaas for their own safety.  However, this didn't indicate that we were working on Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have any knowledge at that stage with regard to the information that the Transkei was being used as a safe haven for the ANC?

EUGENE DE KOCK: It was general knowledge at Security Head Office, there were various reports with regard to this.  I had liaison with Colonel Ras from the Intelligence Unit of the Pretoria Security Branch, who had managed  a very sensitive source, a serving MK member, who provided information to him on a 24 hour basis with regard to where members of the ANC and the PAC were receiving training in the Transkei, where they were accommodated, where they had settled and that they were receiving assistance directly from Gen Holomisa.

MR HATTINGH: If any, what was the instruction which Gen Engelbrecht have to you?

EUGENE DE KOCK: At that stage, he didn't give me any orders, what he did tell me however, was that he wanted to introduce me to a Transkeian businessman, who held interests within the Transkei and approximately a week later, Gen Engelbrecht took me to a house in Sandton where he introduced me to a Mr Vuli Mbotoli.  He introduced me to this gentleman and Gen Engelbrecht requested me to act from there as the handler of Mr Mbotoli with regard to information which would be supplied from the Transkei, via friends and acquaintances of this Mr Mbotoli and that this information would involve with special reference to Gen Holomisa's share in the armed conflict and his assistance to members of the ANC and the PAC who had settled in the Transkei.  I accepted this order, but I did find it strange because this arrangement was against the existing principle of the Security Police that a person or an informer who was supplying information, especially if it was such sensitive information, should be handled within the area where the local Security Branch or Security Division was situated and held jurisdiction.

MR HATTINGH: Did you begin to manage this Mr Mbotoli as you referred to it, in the Security Police?

EUGENE DE KOCK: Yes, I met him and we began to make arrangements for him with regard to the payment of a salary.  We also appointed him as a source under a false name as a head of a source and if my memory serves me correctly, I obtained two passports for him, of which one had a false name, the other one was issued in his real name.  I think that we also provided ID books, or documents for him, South African ID documents in those names, the same names that the passports had been issued in.  Me and Sergeant Chait who was at C1, were involved in managing Mbotoli, he reported directly to me and I reported to Engelbrecht.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information from this Mr Mbotoli?