Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: What I understand is the following.  While this whole process was going on of unrest in the country Mr P W Botha said he needs a room where all the information can sort of be gathered, in other words all the departments will put in their information - some departments were better geared than other departments - and that if somebody in the top structure walks in there he can get a quick briefing of, say, how many buses were
 /running
running today, how many people were killed, or things like that.  So, that was actually what was meant by a situation room.  It's not an operations room like a - or an operations centre like you'll have in a war situation.  It was to gather information.
Now - sorry, I know it must be a little boring to try and explain all these documents, but we thought it can save you a lot of time, and can assist you to some extent.
Now, I am still busy with the meeting of the 12th of May '86.  Mr Varney was cross-examined on this aspect.  Sorry, I've done that.  Now we go on then at paragraph 23.1.  Option four makes it quite clear that the task to counter terrorism was delegated to the South African Police.  Now, we say that Varney has got all these answers, because what he does - if you look at page 28 of his report he says the following.
"At an SSC meeting on the 20th of June '88 P W Botha queries what happened to the third force which was to free the hands of the SADF and SAP to concentrate on the primary task."
Now this question, according to Varney, was answered on the 8th of May '89 at an SSC meeting by General de Wit, the then Commissioner of the SAP.  He said that the establishment of the Municipal Police, the extension of the SAP Unrest Unit, did away with the need for the creation of another force.  We say Varney has got that evidence, it's in his report, but he's doing it on such a basis to create the impression that there must have been some other superpower that conducted things in this country, and as far as Operation Marion is concerned
 /that's just
that's just not on.  There's no relation between it.  So, all his references to the highest political level is irrelevant, all the links that he's trying to build a relation to Marion does not exist.  Now, I am not for one moment suggesting it might - for purposes of argument it might exist in some other - with other projects, but I am not briefed on that, I am briefed on Operation Marion, and as far as Marion is concerned there's no evidence to link all these things with each other.
May I then go on to a meeting - another document, meeting with the Chief Minister on the 16th of October 1986.  Now, this is the only document - can I refresh your memory?  It's the only document where Colonel John Moore's name appears on.  Now, Moore was important in the sense that he was an accused in the Msani trial, and he was the person in Pretoria, working for Military Intelligence, who was in control of Opperman and Cloete.  In other words he was the sort of direct commander.  Now, it's the only place in this whole documentation where his name appears.  He testified, if I remember correctly, that he was - it was a meeting that was actually conducted between Brigadier van Niekerk and Chief Minister Buthelezi, and he, Moore, only took the notes.  In other words he was only writing down what was said.
In paragraph 3 of this letter it says the following, and I quote in Afrikaans.
"The Chief Minister regards the excellent planning of the group as a positive step in securing his personal safety."
Paragraph 7 of this document refers to Inkatha members who recently took the law into their own hands and conducted
 /offensive
offensive actions, sometimes with weapons, against radical elements.  Now, this reference to offensive actions does not refer to any of the trainees, as the evidence in the KwaMakutha trial proved that all the Inkatha trainees were on leave for the month of October 1986.  The inferences he wishes to draw is therefore once again incorrect.  They finished their training by the end of September '86, then they were all sent on leave, and when - and the point is simply this, there was no trainees who could commit any offences at that stage.  They were all gone.
Then another point that's been made by Mr Varney is the following, paragraph 25.  He says absence of documentation for the period October '86 until January 1988 - you will remember when you read his report he makes something out of it and he says between the time that the ITU went to Military Intelligence offices in Pretoria, and three days later when Cor van Niekerk handed them the documents it could have disappeared, and Cor van Niekerk could have removed it.  Now, the point is simply this.  Why would Cor van Niekerk remove it and hand them all the rest of the incriminating stuff?  The allegation against Brigadier van Niekerk is unsubstantiated, but as far as my clients are concerned, our clients are concerned, we have no idea what happened to these documents.  You will recall that Pitter was transferred the 1st of April '89, so he didn't have any control over these documents.  Geldenhuys was already retired for a couple of years, and no inference can be drawn because certain documents obviously disappeared.
Then I am going on with paragraph 26.  Now, if you study the documents you will find that there were three
 /meetings
meetings - or three documents that relate to meetings being held between the period 21st of January '88 and the 21st of March '88.
Now, I am first going to refer to the first document, the 21st of January '88 document.  According to this document on the 21st of January '88 Admiral Pitter, General van Tonder, Brigadier van Niekerk and Colonel van den Berg met with the Chief Minister and Mr Khumalo.  During this meeting it was decided that a meeting with Brigadier Pretorius, who was then the commander in Natal, was a necessity.  A meeting took part on the 3rd of February 1988 in Durban between van Tonder.. "(onhoorbaar) stafinligting bevelvoerende kommandement" Natal, assisted by their various officers.
The letter dated February '88 has no status at all.  You will see it was never signed, the February document was never signed by Admiral Pitter, and the contents of the February letter was reiterated - is actually contained in the letter dated the 28th of January '88.  It sort of a duplication.  If you read the documents you'll find it. Can I refer you to Exhibit E2, page 107.
Now, the important letter is the letter dated the 28th of January, because everything is contained in that document.  Now, this letter has been prepared by Colonel van den Berg, and was sent by Chief of Staff Intelligence to the Chief of the Defence Force, and it reiterates what was said at the meeting of the 21st of January '88.  Now, after receiving this letter General Geldenhuys made a note on the first page of this document.  Quote in Afrikaans.
"Will discuss with Minister.  HSI must arrange co-ordinating meeting."
 /Now, may
Now, may I explain.  If you look at paragraph 20 - well, let me explain it broadly like this.  The problem was this.  Because of the fact that certain aspects of the Liebenberg report was not put in place, for example a proper security system, there were a lot of communication problems between the Chief Minister on the one hand and the Command in Natal on the other hand, and in order to sort out all these things they suggested that a meeting should be held.  And that's why Geldenhuys then wrote on the top of this letter,
"Saam met Minister bespreek en ...(onhoorbaar).
A meeting was then set up with Brigadier Pretorius of the Natal Command as set out in the letter dated February '88.  The topics discussed are set out in a document titled, "Proposals for Improving SADF Liaison with Chief Minister Buthelezi and Inkatha."  Now, if you've got a bundle of - an exhibit bundle, this document that's been referred to is Exhibit E2, page 64 to 66, and it starts off with the same subheading, and on the last page you will see there's some handwritten notes on it.  Page 66 ends with handwritten notes.  Sorry, I am just referring to it.  I hope you have it.