Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MR MEYER: No, that is never how I understood it, in terms of this 
particular context. I think what one can deduct from what is stated here under 
for instance 8.2 Paragraph 8.2 is that it was very much in the frame of 
thinking of the constitutional solution at that stage that we needed a 
democratic solution based on Group Rights and that was all in that framework. 
If you look at the original statement, Objectives as defined in the introduction 
to the document. I can't find it exactly now, but I can recall reading through 
it, it was stated there that the purpose is to develop - oh, here it is, can I read 
it Mr Chairperson, it is Paragraph 9 of the main document Page 5.
 To neutralise the revolutionary war against the republics of the 
democratic dispensation can be developed here in which all the groupings of 
the population can take part in the government of the country without 
threatening each other's rights, because it was quite clearly the overall 
intention with the stated goal. That was part of the Constitutional thinking at 
the time that a democratic solution should be arrived on a basis of group or 
ethnic rights and I think that one should see that therefore also in Paragraph 
8.2 later on in a context of what was intended there, but I can't recall any 
experience where this was a specific intention to play of one group against 
another on the basis of putting them to a fight.

MR GOOSEN: Then can I refer you to the other document which was 
provided to you which was tabled at the GVS Werkgroup on the 24th January 
1987 Strategic considerations in respect of the initiation of the counter 
mobilisation in South Africa and I refer you to Page 11 of that document 
where it says at the top the Following measures may be considered, 
encouraged, distrust ethic and tribal defences and all other divisive factors 
amongst the enemy, discredit them and their helpers internally and outside the 
country and as individuals under these organisations. How does that maatreel 
fit in with the notion that you have just explained in regard to the . . .

MR MEYER: I also noted that and can I make a general observation whilst 
the first document that you have referred to is clearly something that reached 
the level of the State Security Council, sort of neatly packaged and made 
sense in terms of what the Councillor have approved by then and what let us 
say these apparatus were busy with.
 The second document which to my mind and I have read through it, I 
came to no other conclusion that it was drafted by an individual and probably 
didn't go beyond the first level of discussions if it did, because there are so 
many contradictions in that document itself, that one can only come to the 
conclusion as the person himself said in the very last part of the paragraph of 
that document, Paragraph 20. "Many more loose ideas may be proposed" and I 
think that describes the whole document. It is a document of loose ideas and I 
can't imagine that that was every approved, I can't recall this document quite 
frankly and I can't remember that I have ever seen it and I can't recall that it 
was every discussed in my presence. I tried to find out what might have been 
the status of that document but it seems nobody know. It was apparently 
referred to a Working Group for discussion in January 1987. The point that I 
am concluding on is to say that for instance in Paragraph D that you have just 
read out, does not fall, what is intended there is, what is put forward there as 
a loose thought, definitely did not fall in the ambit of what we were busy with 
in the Joint Management Centre at that stage. I can't recall any specific 
occasion where something like that was executed or planned by the 
Management Centre.

MR GOOSEN: So I take it from that that you would say in respect of the 
first document that the Over arching conduct and actions and objectives would 
not be susceptible of an interpretation that ethnic conflict divisions in a 
community should be manipulated and utilised in order to organise active 
resistance against enemy organisations I include in enemy organisations the 
UDF. It is not susceptible of that interpretation.

MR MEYER: It might have been but I am saying that it was not part of what 
I was involved in or know about as far as the official operations of the Joint 
Management Centre is concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Now, I accepted that you are saying on the basis of the 
document that that was not authorised, I accept that but you are saying, is it 
conceivable that in the implementation of this the contra-mobilisation efforts 
as set out here in this document, the first document referred to, could have 
been interpreted to mean something closer to the Paragraph D that I refer to in 
the second document?

MR MEYER: I would say that, Paragraph 8 in the original, the first 
document, I would say definitely had not as far as the official operations is 
concerned, if that is the right word, have been considered or applied. Let me 
take you to one specific example which relates to the point thereunder 8.4 
which you have also referred to of the first document. There it is stated under 
Remarks "Contaminated youth or youthful military elements must be removed 
from society and must be rehabilitated according to acceptable practices" in 
that regard by the then Department of Education and Training, they 
established some training institutions for that purpose where rehabilitation 
could take place, I think whether they were successful or not, that is not the 
point but that was how it was done and operated, but I can't recall any 
successful or even an attempt of operation under 8.2.

MR GOOSEN: So it was never policy for example, that members of the 
Security Forces would provide with overt or covert support to anti-
revolutionary groupings as were defined, anti-revolutionary groupings inside 
the country in accordance with this policy. That was never policy.

MR MEYER: I can't say that there were no covert activities of that kind, I 
can't say that because I won't know and I can't say that it was impossible as 
far as that is.

CHAIRPERSON: Where such coverts support was in fact rendered it was 
outside of the ambit of approved policy guidelines from that the level of the 
State Security Council, not so?

MR MEYER: No, all that I can say is that it could be interpreted in such a 
way by a specific line function department. I won't know, but that is not 
impossible.

CHAIRPERSON: I accept that you wouldn't know, but it would be a 
misinterpretation by that line function department to render that sort of 
support because that is not what was envisaged.

MR MEYER: I don't think that was envisaged, no.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not a question of whether you don't think it was 
envisaged, from what you have indicated that was not envisaged so therefore 
if a line function department engaged in such kind of action it would be a 
misinterpretation, correct?

MR MEYER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you say that it would be a reasonable 
misinterpretation or not?

MR MEYER: I said to you what I understand of A2 was and how it was 
interpreted to my mind by the both the State Security Council and all its 
subsidiaries and I think one can say within the overall policy framework at 
that stage it would have been an unreasonable interpretation.