Special Hearings — Political Party Recalls — UNKNOWN

MR GOOSEN: Yes, yes, but that Sir is the point. The point is that there was authorisation for use of a capacity, development of a capacity to deal with unrest situations. There was also authorisation for the development of a capacity to deal with the insurgency and deal with insurgents, the words are effectively, wipe out terrorists, and to deal with underminers by using their own methods. Now would you agree with me, that under the circumstances the State Security Council was in fact authorising and tasking the Ministers of Defence and Police to engage in counter-revolutionary actions which would not mar the image of the visible forces, but would hit back at revolutionary forces using their own methods, terror and fear?

MR DE KLERK: Let me just read, the only place where in your questions, I'm dealing with subject matter here that I've had before me. In question 4 under the heading, Questions on the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: and Other Security Structures, you said,
"In 1986 the SSC established a subcommittee known as the Acronym of GVS, what was the purpose of this subcommittee?
Please furnish all details concerning it's decisions and activities. Please furnish all minutes of this committee. Who chaired the GVS, did this person have any other responsibilities?"
To that part of the question my reply was, 
"The GVS was the Gesaamentlike Veiligheidstaf, was responsible for the coordination of the counter- revolutionary actions. I'm not in possession of its records and suggest that you approach the relevant authorities for the additional information that you require".
Then the next part of the question said, 
"The CCSSC minutes dated 12 May 1986 read as follows
The third force had to be operational in eliminating terrorism.
What is meant by the words uit te wis and please provide a definition of the term teroriste?"
And my reply to that part of the question was, 
"The words uit te wis means to wipe out. In the context in which you quote the phrase it would probably mean the operational neutralisation of terrorist units. I suggest that you consult appropriate dictionaries and political lexicons for a definition of teroriste. The term relates to those who use terror against civilians as a means of promoting their agenda. This often includes the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets and the brutal intimidation and murder of political opponents to promote partisan objectives".
So against that definition, I just reiterate it was never the policy that the government should plant bombs, indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets and in cold blood murdering their political opponents.

MR GOOSEN: You see Mr de Klerk we know that the State Security Council engaged in a debate, got input from various departments, considered various options in regard to the establishment of a third force. And you've indicated and I've indicated at the outset that I accept that no such third force was in fact established, third force in the sense of a uniformed legitimate separate arm of the security forces that can act independently of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: or the SAP and I accept that, and that much is clear from the documents. 
What we do have though is in fact two decisions. Two decisions which are of critical importance which occur at the 12th of May 1986 meeting which bear no relation, no relation whatsoever to legitimate uniformed open policing to deal with unrest situations or crowd control situations which is the framework that is being put up as the explanation for the debate about the third force, and I would highlight those two for you again.
Paragraph E, decision of the State Security Council, 12 May 1986 and it reads Sir
"A well trained capacity to effectively wipe out terrorists, the mobility must be provided by the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: and SAP. It must be prepared to be unpopular and even feared without damaging the image of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: and SAP. It must stand under very strong authority".
And

<UNKNOWN>: "The security forces must work together to bring about the third force..."
here used in a broader context, 
"...so that the underminers are dealt with using their own methods"
"Underminers using their own methods", Sir, wiping out terrorists, terrorists using their own methods, and I'm putting it to you Sir, that there was in fact a decision of the State Security Council to authorise the Ministers of police and defence to engage in counter revolutionary actions which would not mar the image of the visible forces but would hit back at revolutionary forces using their own methods, terror and fear. 
Now at the outset, from this morning and over a number of hours, I put to you a number of specific examples of abuses. They included assassinations, bombings directed at civilian targets, targeted operations to maim and kill, to sow distrust amongst and fear among communities, long range cross border bombings and indiscriminate attacks on civilians. I repeatedly asked you for an explanation as to how very senior members of the police force, ranging from generals through to those immediately below them, as well as persons directly above them, commissioners of police as well as ministers of state, could have authorised and how they could have come to believe that they were authorised to engage in those actions. You could offer no real explanation, with respect, as to how that situation came to exist.
Such actions, I would put it to you, can be described as terrorist actions, terrorist attacks. Now the question is, are these operations are they not instances where members of the security forces engaged in actions in which the methods of terror authorised at the highest level, were applied against the so-called terrorists themselves?

MR DE KLERK: Mr Chairman let me firstly say I have never experienced before that meeting that is referred to, and of which I am referred, or after that meeting in the whole period that I served until I myself became President and thereafter I took charge, I've never experienced it that there was at any stage an acceptance that a policy has been accepted to achieve what Advocate Goosen is suggesting. There was never any reference after that meeting at any time of the two, the third force in any discussion that I can recall, except for this continued discussion on do we establish another overt force or not. There was never any reference that I can recall in any way whatsoever of our policy being using terrorist methods, yes firm action, yes, using and applying extraordinary measures, yes, going underground yes, spying yes, having covert actions, having a state of emergency, putting people in camps without trial. All that yes, but not murdering people, not assassination, it was never part of the policy.
And I have never understood and experienced also in my interaction with ministers, in references, in debates which were not minuted, any sort of feeling that this is our policy as you have now interpreted that and enunciated that.

MR GOOSEN: What we do know though from State Security Council documents is that Minister Vlok was in fact relieved of certain ministerial functions so that he could act full time as head of counter-revolution and take charge of counter-revolutionary actions from the level of the State Security Council.

MR GOOSEN: Well he would be the best man to call then to give you further details.

MR GOOSEN: Sir, you too sat on the State Security Council, in fact in your, in the many years that you served on the State Security Council, you attended more than 91% of all meetings.

MR DE KLERK: I'm a very consciousness man.