Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-10-14

MR R F BOTHA: I tested myself and it takes me two and a half minutes to read one page, that means 39 times two and a half will keep us here perhaps for too long, but then with respect Chairperson, it was the TRC who submitted the questions to me and I wanted to do justice in my replies to those questions.
 The first question that they put to me, or series of questions, not just one question, they have a subject and then a series of questions, that is added as Annexure A.  I made that available also to the staff of the TRC yesterday so that if the media are interested then they have the advantage of those questions and they have the advantage now of my first document, the 39 pages.
 Now I did not repeat the questions in my document because that would have been repetitive of the five pages, but the first series of questions centred around the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group.  
 This group, as you know, was established in terms of a Commonwealth heads of government decision the previous year in 1985, and the co-chairpersons of the EPG, I will refer to the Eminent Persons Group as the EPG, were General Obasanja, a former Head of State of Nigeria and Mr Malcolm Fraser, a former Prime Minister of Australia.
 Looking back, Mr Chairperson, 1985 stands out as a dark year in our history.  The South West Africa issue was far from being resolved.  South African troops were fighting in Angola.  The high hopes raised by the 1984 Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South Africa had dissipated.  
 In August 1985 President PW Botha had delivered what has become known as his Rubicon Speech in Durban.  The world had been waiting for good news, important announcements on dismantling apartheid and releasing Mr Nelson Mandela.  I myself drafted that part of the speech in which the phrase "today we have crossed the Rubicon" appeared.  President Botha, however, retained the sentence but removed what had preceded it, namely the release of Nelson Mandela and the government's intention to dismantle apartheid. The effect of the speech on the world, and on many South Africans, was that of a bucket of iced water in the face.
 Relations with our neighbouring states were characterised by animosity, suspicion, resentment and mistrust and there were acrimonious exchanges and cross-border military operations.  Within South Africa bombs were exploding.  Pressure for Mr Nelson Mandela's release mounted inexorably.  Against the gloomy background of South Africa's situation in 1985 the Commonwealth took the initiative at a meeting of heads of government at Nassau in October of that year to appoint a group of eminent persons to see whether they could help us break out of this impasse, this looming threat of escalating conflict, not only internally in South Africa but also in the region as a whole.  It was certainly a formidable task.
 I will, because it is in my document, not burden you with the technical details, but I think it is essential that the Commission have that on record, so I will skip a number of pages.  
 The ANC leadership told the EPG that their immediate reaction to the setting-up of the group had been one of disappointment.  According to the EPG report the hopes of the ANC had been raised by the debate in Nassau and the prospect of increased international pressure on the government through sanctions, instead the group had been established and in their view it would assist in relieving the pressures on the South African government which had been building up in the period before Nassau.
 The EPG was nevertheless warmly welcomed as the ANC had a keen interest in hearing what the group felt it might be able to do.  The ANC expressed great interest in the South African government's response to the EPG's mandate because only then would it be able to make it's own contribution.  If the government was prepared to shift its ground and indicate its readiness for fundamental change this would impact on the ANC view.  Their assessment was, however, that nothing had changed and nothing would change.  If that proved to be the case then the conditions for negotiation did not exist.  
 The ANC placed much emphasis on the release of Mr Nelson Mandela, a crucial step which recognised that it was not possible for negotiations to take place in the absence of the peoples' authentic leaders.  A prerequisite for talking to the government was that it should be through the peoples recognised leaders, not through the ones the government chose to identify.  Without this essential first step the conflict would continue.
 Allow me also to say here today Mr Chairperson, Dennis Worrall, our ambassador in London at the time, played a major role in preparing the EPG for their visit to South Africa.  Both of us saw in the visit a real chance to make progress in ending the turmoil in our country.
 I mention these matters because of their relevance to the EPG mission.  General Obasanja and Mr Fraser arrived in South Africa on a preliminary visit a few days after I made a remark at an international press conference in Cape Town on 6 February 1986 to the effect that South Africa would have a black president and that I would be willing to serve under that president. General Obasanja arrived here on 17 February when the media of South Africa were still reporting on my black president remark.  These two gentlemen had a meeting with me on the date they arrived, 17 February.  Had it not been for my black president remark I would probably have been in a stronger position to influence the discussions more positively.  As things turned out my room to manoeuvre was restricted as I hope you can imagine.
 I could, however, give advice to General Obasanja on the sensitivities on both sides.  He understood my position.  A strong personal bond of friendship began to grow between us.  We could say to each other whatever was in our minds, openly and without inhibition.  During February until 13 March 1986 the EPG held meetings with South African leaders across the full spectrum of opinion, the government, the ANC and all other political parties, church leaders, business leaders, academics, women's organisations, even governments of South Africa's neighbouring states.  
 By 13 March the EPG had developed its possible negotiating concept which evolved out of their consultations and their judgement of what might be possible. 
 I will now skip parts of the report of the EPG.  I have inserted it in the document for the sake of completion of the record.  What is important is at that time I urged General Obasanja to explain to his colleagues that the South African position at that stage represented progress, maybe not enough but it did represent progress.  After all I was not fired after my remark on 6 February.  
 What we needed was to start talks with the ANC.  I negotiated the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1983/84 which involved equally intractable obstacles in an atmosphere of severe suspicion and animosity.  Written positions only changed, Mr Chairperson with respect, when you sit down with your opponent and ask him face-to-face what his words mean.  General Obasanja agreed with me but said that he had difficulties with some members of the group.  He reminded me that obduracy was not confined to certain members of the South African government.  
 The EPG, Mr Chairperson, this is very important, the EPG came closer to success than most people realise or at least suspected at the time.  I saw in the EPG a real chance of achieving a breakthrough.  This was a smaller and less emotional forum than the United Nations.  It was able to draw closer to the protagonists.  Also General Obasanja was not only an African leader but a realist.  He had gone through severe and troubled times in his own country and he had been a witness of the havoc conflict brings.  In my discussions with General Obasanja he displayed a ready willingness to understand the government's difficulties without surrendering the objectives of achieving a solution based on a full democracy which in effect meant one person one vote at the end of the day.  He knew our history and had a deep understanding of the position of the Afrikaner.  He accepted the Afrikaner's anti-colonial stands.  He used to say, and I quote him -
"The Afrikaner is an inherent part of Africa.  Consequently....."
he would continue...
"... other Africans should acknowledge this to a greater extent and by doing so diminish the Afrikaner's fear of being overwhelmed".
He has said, for instance -
"The Afrikaner mentally is reported to thrive in isolation and be prone to rigidity under pressure, yet my limited contact with the Afrikaner does not suggest that he is suicidal".
 In the EPG report itself, I think this is important that I read this so that the country can also take note of this and also the Afrikaners, this is coming from the EPG report.
"Clearly a number of Afrikaners, including some who trace their roots back over 300 years to the original Dutch colony feel their whole future threatened and see no country which might match up to their fatherland.  Some of them are turning to the misguided notion that their power to subdue blacks by using the full  power of the security forces renders them sufficiently strong to resist fundamental change.  They close their eyes to the simple fact, acknowledged by government and business alike, that both whites and blacks separately have it within their power to destroy the country.
 In recent months the country has witnessed the emergence of growing and increasingly assertive extreme right-wing as Afrikanerdom begins to fragment under the cumulative weight of the pressures we have described.  The phenomenon is not altogether surprising for two generations whites in South Africa have lived as beneficiaries of apartheid, in a system engineered by a political party which constantly asserted white supremacy.  When they witness an apparent change in government theology with the rhetoric of total white control giving way of talk to power sharing a backlash of some description is inevitable, but just as the far right is a creation of the National Party, so too it must accept responsibility for dealing with it.  The need for courageous leadership has never been greater.  Certainly whatever the threat from the extreme right the government can still rely on carrying the majority of the white community if it takes bold decisions to bring peace and prosperity to the country as a whole.
 We recognise, (that's the EPG), the huge difficulties of adjustment facing the white community.  As the editor of one leading English daily put it recently, it will not be easy for many whites to settle down to what is their inevitable destiny in a multiracial country where the population is three-quarters black.  Many whites genuinely entertain fears about their future in any new dispensation.  We found a keen awareness of this among responsible black leaders, together with an acknowledgement of a need to allay them".
 Mr Chairperson I would skip a number of pages now because I would like to get to the EPG's negotiating concept which was handed to me Minister J C Heunis, who was then Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning and he was the Chairperson of the Constitutional Committee, not me, at that time, and General Obasanja handed that to us on 12 March 1986.  He explained in that document first of all to us their motives for drafting it, and then this is important, their concept in fact read as follows, it's not long but it's very important, because Mr Chairperson four years later this is what happened, four years later when the ANC and the National Party started their discussions they started it on the basis of this negotiating concept of General Obasanja.  And this is how it read -
"The South African government has declared its commitment to dismantling the system of apartheid, to ending racial discrimination and to broad-based negotiations leading to new constitutional arrangements for power-sharing by all the people of South Africa.  In the light of preliminary and as yet incomplete discussions with representatives of various organisations and groups within and outside South Africa we believe that in the context of specific and meaningful steps being taken towards ending apartheid the following additional action might ensure negotiations and a break in the cycle of violence".
And then they have, in the part of the government four requirements, no three, only three -
"A. Removal of the military from the townships.
 Providing for freedom of assembly and discussion, and
 suspension of detention without trial".
That was (A).  
"B. The release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and detainees.
 C. The unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and the permitting of normal political activities".
 On the part of the ANC and others the requirement was that they should enter into negotiations and suspend violence.  
 And then they added, the EPG in their negotiating concept -
"It is our view that simultaneous announcements incorporating these ideas might be negotiated if the government were to be interested in pursuing this broad approach".
 And then they say -
"In the light of the government's indication to us that it (that's the government)
1. is not in principle against the release of Nelson Mandela and similar prisoners;
 2. is not opposed in principle to the unbanning of any organisations;
 3. is prepared to enter into negotiations with the acknowledged leaders of the people of South Africa;
 4. is committed to the removal of discrimination, not only from the statute books but also from South African society as a whole;
 5. is committed to the ending of white domination;
 6. will not prescribe who may represent black communities in negotiations on a new constitution for South Africa;
 7. is prepared to negotiate on an open agenda the South African government may wish to give serious consideration to the approach outlined in this note".
 I drafted these points 1 to 7.  I was naturally pleased it was used prominently in the concept.  On our side eyebrows were lifted, but luckily I was not shot down.  I explained to my colleagues in the Cabinet that I could substantiate each of these points from statements made by some of them over the past year, even if they have been made in a different context, they still made the statements.
 The possible negotiating concept of the EPG, Mr Chairperson, will in my opinion come to be regarded as one of the most remarkable documents to emerge from the seemingly interminable negotiating processes.  Our discussions with the EPG floundered on the issue as to whether the ANC should merely suspend violence or instead terminate it.  There were also a few other questions of concern to us but the main problem was that if suspending violence meant only discontinuing violence for as long as negotiations continued, then the threat of a resumption of violence would become a bargaining counter, in other words, we were afraid that the ANC would say keep talking or else violence again.   Significantly this same issue again formed the major stumbling block in getting the negotiations going four years later.  It was only eventually resolved at the end of 1990.  The irony is that today few South Africans would even know what the fuss was about in such a way it is that history moves us past some of our most earnest issues.  
 On 19 May 1986 I formally responded to the EPG negotiating concept in a letter to General Obasanja and Mr Fraser.  It was the culmination of intense debate and argumentation amongst my colleagues and myself.  It was the best I could do.  I expressed the government's concerns on the issues of violence and three other points, but I ended by saying -
"The South African government would welcome further discussions which could accommodate the government's concerns.
 I would like to thank you and your colleagues for the spirit in which we have been able to conduct our discussions".
 On 5 June 1986 the co-chairman responded.  They did not agree with the South African government's points of concern and reiterated their belief that their negotiating concept would assist in achieving negotiations in a non-violent atmosphere.
 They concluded saying that in the absence both of movement on the part of government on the major points and a positive response to the concept as a whole they were unable to see merit in further discussions.  
 They came to this conclusion, that there was no prospect of setting in motion a dialogue with a view to establishing a non-racial and representative government.
 I like to believe that General Obasanja himself did not share this view.  He was the kingpin in the driveshaft but also a member of a team.  One day I shall ask him what he really thought at that time and I know that he will tell me.  But that, Mr Chairperson, is not the only reason why I conveyed a personal message in 1995 to the President of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, appealing for clemency for my friend and his fellow Nigerians.  
 Or perhaps he will tell me one day, yes he had still thought there was a good prospect of getting talks off the ground. But Mr Chairperson, in the early morning of 19 May 1986 the South African security forces launched attacks on Harare, Lusaka and Gaberone.  Each was a Commonwealth capital which the EPG had recently visited in the course of their search for a South African solution.   Maybe General Obasanja will tell me it was just one provocation too much, if so, I will understand him.  I felt very much the same.  
 On the other hand the EPG stated categorically, on their departure, that the raids were not the reason for the decision to discontinue the discussions.
 Now how did it happen?  Why did it happen?  The ANC suspected that the government's design to get them to agree to the termination of all violence on their part was to gain time to consolidate its position internally and externally.  The government, this is us, could then enter into protracted negotiations producing proposals which might seem reasonable and acceptable to the outside world but which robbed the ANC of a strong bargaining counter in exacting concessions from the government.  In short the ANC believed that the government would not voluntarily relinquish power come what may.
 The government in turn believed that the ANC's willingness to suspend violence was their strategy to get the talks going with total world support and then to make demands under the threat of a resumption of violence if their demands were not met.  They would then exploit anti-apartheid world opinion to support a resumption of violence.
 What I had in mind in making my ultimate appeal on 19 May to the EPG for further discussions on the issue of violence was to explore the feasibility of international or Commonwealth guarantee or pledge to the effect that the international community would expect both parties to implement their commitments in good faith and would monitor the process.  I often attempted to do this on the issue of Namibia, on the issue of South Africa but the National Party was not ripe for the idea to get outsiders into this country to give that kind of guarantee because we had an over-exaggerated fear of interference in our internal affairs ever since Jan van Riebeeck landed at Cape Town.
 "We couldn't cut the Gordian knot", as we say in Afrikaans, that "we couldn't cut the Gordian knot" was the greatest disappointment in my 17 year career as Minister of Foreign Affairs.  So many hopes were raised by this mission, it could and would have saved South Africa a lot of pain, a lot of wounds, a lot of agony, nevertheless it was an important trial-run for the breakthrough that was to come four years later.
 Against this broad background Mr Chairperson I will now proceed to reply to the more specific questions.
 The raids on Harare, Gaberone and Lusaka on 19 May '86 were not discussed at any meeting where I was present.  In the light of the importance the Department of Foreign Affairs and I attached to the EPG discussions, and the tremendous amount of work we invested in the effort we would certainly have opposed raids most strongly.
 As regards the guidelines for cross-border activities approved by the Security Council on 21 October 1985 I should point out that these were guidelines.  Where it is stated in the introduction that in all cases there should be the closest co-operation between the defence force and the Department of Foreign Affairs as well as other affected departments it meant no more than what is said.  And this guideline was in any event subject to the proviso except in instances where immediate action was considered essential.
 May I also point out that it was clearly stated that the responsibility for the military implementation of operations vested exclusively in the Chief of the Defence Force.  The security forces considered the raids essential to prevent ANC activists from initiating and pursuing armed incursions into the country.  They claimed that they had reliable and confirmed information that operatives would be staging murderous activities from places which were attacked by the security forces.  The security forces believed that they were acting within the framework of the Defence Act and other relevant legislation mandating them to take the action which they took.  From a legal and technical point of view my department and I could not assail or ward off the argument on the basis of illegal activities.  The Department of Foreign Affairs and I in principle assessed a given cross-border action in the light of the predictable international consequences.  In these matters, Mr Chairperson, a clear and consistent divergence of views existed between the security forces and Foreign Affairs.  
 The security establishment saw it as their prime objective to trace and stop dangerous operatives from pursuing sabotage and violence in the country.  Foreign Affairs, although in principle opposed to violent pursuits by the ANC, the PAC and others, weighed the consequences of reprisals or pre-emptive strikes against the international consequences for the government.  
 In the few instances where Foreign Affairs acquiesced in cross-border raids it did so on the strength of convincing evidence produced by the security establishment to the effect that a pre-emptive strike was essential to save the lives of innocent South African citizens.  
 Cross-border activities against terrorists who cut the throats of elderly couples on farms, or who set off a bomb like the Pretoria bomb were generally supported by the vast majority of white voters including opposition parties and the media, but this support was limited to activities against proven targets.  In some cases facts or circumstances surfaced after an attack which contradicted the claims made by the South African security forces.