Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-10

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Deal with the question of the Anglo-American example, because I think General Ismail has made the point very clear that even where we were involved such acts would have been more of a symbolic nature rather than directed at the personnel.  In the case of Anglo-American I don't know whether it falls into the grey area list or the list that we say, yes we carried it out, but there was a problem, there was a problem.  And we said this, we stated this problem at the Pafuwe meeting where business, including Gavin Relly came over to Zambia.  We reminded Gavin Relly that just before his visit to us in the Pafuwe they had fired 14,500 workers in the platinum mines in the Rustenburg area.  But we said you are solving your industrial relations problem using the most vicious apartheid laws.  That the phenomena that had become common in industrial relations in South Africa was workers legitimately with
their grievances on working conditions and salary, wages, would find any action that they took ringed by the security forces and the security forces would often beat them and shoot them, and we said this is a problem.  We understand that you are business, operating in South Africa, fine, but when you start using those laws and you call in the security forces for a normal industrial problem where anywhere else in the world in a democracy those mechanisms would not be used.  It's causing us real problems.
 Now, with the recognition that the mass of the people in this country, the black people, were oppressed and exploited, needed a way to even improve their daily lives through industrial struggle and the State's repressive forces were brought in on the side of the employers by the employers, how would we support and send the message to business what we expressed to Gavin Relly, verbally face-to-face at Mafuwe?  So I would say whether it falls in the grey area or not if we carried out that action I could understand why such an action would be carried out in support of the struggle of the workers to improve their daily lives even while apartheid existed.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to follow up or not?

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson.  Just to clarify portion of an earlier answer, at the previous hearing the ANC claimed that party politicians or members of political formations were not targets for attack.  I am not sure that I
understood whether, when I asked the question about the attacks on the National Party offices whether that was the position that you were articulating now, or whether you had drawn a distinction between that and the facilities.  I understood that the position that was articulated was that the National Party, qua National Party was in fact a target.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No Sir, let me amplify that.  Again I'd need to look at the operation of the National Party offices but I am almost certain that that operation would have been at night, not intended to kill people inside the National Party offices but an attack on the National Party offices as a symbol, and as a message.
 Now this happened also from the start of MK.  We attacked Pass offices, but we tried to attack them when the people were not there.  We even have in Durban, in the trial of the first comrades in 1963, I think it is Ebrahim Ismail, Ronnie was part of that group of terrorists - (laughter) - where in that trial it comes out very clear that they went out to bomb a certain target, a building ...(intervention)

RONNIE KASRILS: National Party office.

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: ...National Party offices and a newspaper office, something happened there, there was surveillance, they were disturbed, they couldn't carry it out and Ebrahim took the train late at night and that's how that bomb was left on the train.  But again very clear he says it was an empty train but he didn't know what to do with this bomb - (laughter).
 So I am saying that the National Party offices, if they were attacked, the policy remained it was the party in power, we needed to send a message, we attacked its buildings, but the policy that was articulated and the balance of decisions that we had to make as illustrated over the Republic Day, I think it is, where we could have hit a major portion of the Cabinet, including the State President, we said no, that would send the wrong message, however dramatic it may be. So I think the policy stood.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you.  Just one further follow-up.  The clarity then is party politicians in government were not targets specifically so, did that include party politicians in Homeland structures and the like?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: Chairperson again, that does not mean that particular persons could not become targets, it does not mean.  Secondly, that takes us to the whole question of issues such as councillors, Bantustan leaders, particular individuals.  I must say from my point of view, understanding ANC policy, if I had a chance, if I may use the word that has become part of the need for debates yesterday where dictionaries have been produced, if I had the opportunity to eliminate Magnus Malan in 1988 inside the country I would have eliminated him, because although he was a party politician, clearly identified Minister of Defence, if I had the opportunity I would have done it.
 Now, but the problem about the actions is what was happening spontaneously on the ground.  We were teaching people, we were fighting a system.  Now you know you can't throw stones at a system, it's got to be at something, and the people were saying to us in our political lessons, no I hear you, I agree with you, but who do I shoot?  On the ground the people would look, police, councillors etc, how are they behaving towards them. So the lesson that that institution was bad would be translated by them in spontaneous action, and it was that that was happening even before we had addressed the question.
 So we didn't turn around and say now that's not a legitimate target.  What's his name in the Eastern Cape, Linde, Tamsanga Linde, okay, councillor, next thing what do we find he is the leader of vigilantes and when the people acted against him they were not asking the fine distinction is he a councillor and therefore not a legitimate target, or the leader of vigilantes and therefore a legitimate target.  So these were the problems that arose.
 What I am saying is that in relation to the case that you have raised of the National Party, it did not mean that we would not hit a leader of the National Party and in government.  Even a leader not in government depending on the role that that individual was identified with in the public mind, so that's where it would stand from our point of view.

CHAIRPERSON: You want to continue do you?

MR GOOSEN: No sorry, it's just that I had in fact specifically asked about Homeland structures, whether the same principle applies in respect of people in Homeland structures or not?

SATHYANDRANATH RAGUNANAN MAC MAHARAJ: No, I think the Deputy President Mbeki Chairperson was very, very frank at the last hearing when he dealt with the question of Mr Buthelezi, and he showed how a unit was planning to kill him.  He showed how the moment we heard about it we took steps to ensure that that idea is not even entertained.
 Now just being Homeland did not make you a target, but we know that in particular situations at particular moments particular Homeland leaders played a very, very vicious role.  And people reacted to them and saw the need to act against them.    
 So those situations arose but there was no carte blanche position because you're a Homeland leader you must be killed.  Individuals could become legitimate targets by their own actions.

MR GOOSEN: I think you have indicated that you might want to break at this point.