Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-09-29

JOHANNES MNISI: I thought I was following you, the way you're questioning me.  You told me that if you put 5 people among innocent 100 people, you ask me...(intervention)

MR RICHARD: Let me go through it again before I push it harder.  You, as an experienced operative, who had been a member of the MK for many years, do a reconnaissance.  As a result of your reconnaissance, which you've done carefully, methodically and rechecked everything that you know, you discover a place where you are going to put a car bomb and from your intelligence gathering exercise, you know that there will be approximately 100 people in that place and I repeat, of that 100 people, which is a hypothetical figure as well, 5% of those might or are Security Force personnel, would you proceed to bomb that target with a car bomb?  It's you who is putting the car bomb, they don't know the car bomb is going to be there.

JOHANNES MNISI: As I've already mentioned that in each and every operation you do your reconnaissance first, in order to identify a target that's what you do, that's the first step.  You try your level best not to injure civilians, that's why any soldier has to do a reconnaissance before the operation.

MR RICHARD: We're not getting anywhere, you're avoiding answering the question.

JOHANNES MNISI: I thought I was answering you, I don't know.

MR RICHARD: You haven't given me an answer even though I believe you've understood the proposition as to whether you would go ahead with the operation or not in the example that I've given you, but now, I'll phrase it slightly differently.  On the hypothetical example that I've given you, and taking into account that you know all about the Kabwe decisions and resolutions and all the rest of it, would that hypothetical situation that I've outlined, when you apply the Kabwe tests and factors, constitute a legitimate target?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, with respect...

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's the same question as before because...Are you saying, Mr Richard, in your first proposition when you said would 5% Security Force Personnel amongst 100 people be a legitimate target, now you've moved on, now you're saying, bringing in the Kabwe principles, you're asking exactly the same question, obviously by using the word legitimate target, you're incorporating the policies that existed at the time, including Kabwe.

MR BERGER: And further, Chairperson, there is no Kabwe test.  Kabwe is just a decision taken by the ANC that now the struggle is going to be intensified and less regard is going to be paid to avoiding civilian injuries, that's what Kabwe decided.  No test.

MR RICHARD: I have here a situation where I think I've put a very, very simple proposition in very plain language to a very experienced operative and I haven't got an answer.  In fact the witness, in my submission, has declined to answer the question.  I think I'll leave it there on the basis that the only inference that can be drawn from the answers that we have received, is that it was not within the ANC's...

CHAIRPERSON: I think that's for argument.

MR RICHARD: The witness has heard my proposition and I put it to you that I'm correct, that that would not have been a legitimate target.

JOHANNES MNISI: I don't know whether you want me to answer you.

MR RICHARD: I would like you to give me either a yes or a no, nothing more complicated.

JOHANNES MNISI: If a place is being frequented by your target, that place it's a target place.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  So we now know that in accordance with your training and expertise and experience as an MK member of many years standing, you would have believed that to kill 95 civilians for the sake of 5 Security Force personnel, was legitimate.

JOHANNES MNISI: I don't know how to answer you.  If I may say it is so very easy for him to say what you're saying to me because you were not affected like I was in those days, we were in war.

MR RICHARD: It is the rules of war that we debate.  No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RICHARD

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Mr Prior, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chair, there are just two areas I'd like some clarification on.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Mnisi, in response to one of Adv Sigodi's questions, Mr Pule, well first the question was, how, as Command structure, were you able to ensure that the guidelines were carried out and that the material supplied was used for legitimate purposes, in other words a legitimate target destruction and so forth and in summary the answer was really there was no way to ensure that it could be done, but the best in the circumstances was to keep reminding the operatives who were going out of Botswana back into the Republic, was to keep reminding them of the political objectives, that there operation should fall within the guidelines set out by the MK Command, is that correct?

JOHANNES MNISI: Yes, that's correct.

ADV PRIOR: And I just want your response to what he added to that.  He said because of the situation in the Republic, or in the country, where the government of the day and he used the word Boers, the type of atrocities that they were committing, he indicated that there was the possibility or there was some indication that the operatives going back could have, for example, placed a limpet mine in a creche and the impression that I gained from Mr Pule is that they didn't want that to happen, so in order to maybe calm things down, they impressed on the operative to operate within the guidelines.  Can you comment on that response of Mr Pule from your own perspective?

JOHANNES MNISI: Yes, people were taught and they were reminded by the guidelines of the ANC and they were told that they mustn't go and do as they pleased, they must do exactly as the guidelines required of them and yes, some people were angry but they were taught and they were told to follow the guidelines of the ANC.

ADV PRIOR: Did it sometimes appear to you in Botswana that the operatives moving back into the country may have been motivated by feelings of anger towards the situation in the country?  In other words, there was a desire to take revenge on one or other group within the country, as a result of what was happening in the country at the time.

JOHANNES MNISI: All the cadres who were coming to South Africa, they were briefed first, they were not allowed to do as they pleased.

ADV PRIOR: It's not quite an answer.  For example, in your inter-relationship with Mr McBride at the time when you were packing these explosives in his vehicle, did you gain the impression that he was particularly angry at the situation in South Africa, the emergency, the various attacks by Security Forces on black civilian populations and so forth, or did you not get that impression?

JOHANNES MNISI: No I didn't get that impression with Mr McBride because what I realised is that he knew, he was briefed and I think even today he knows the guidelines of the ANC.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, one last matter.  Your amnesty application, the application form 1, did someone assist you with that form, in other words to complete the form?

CHAIRPERSON: This is the form that appears on page 97 et seq.

ADV PRIOR: Did someone assist you to fill in the form?  Was it a colleague, or was it an attorney or somebody else?

JOHANNES MNISI: I think my lawyer.

ADV PRIOR: I just want to refer to page 99, paragraph 4 under the heading Car Bomb Blast - Why Not, Magoo's Bar.  If I may Mr Chairman, just read out the brief description and I'll come to the question.
"I was involved in the preparation of materials for the car bomb later used in the bombing of Why Not Magoo's Bar on June 14th 1986.  I assisted in the procurement of the materials and with the packing of the vehicle, which transported the materials into the country from Botswana."
Do you confirm what is there in your application?