Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-18

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am not aware.

MR VALLY: I am referring to sheets of explosives?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Not aware of that.

MR VALLY: I am referring to Omo boxes which were bobby trapped to explode?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Vally I have said to you already the minute he started talking about gadgets I indicated to him that I don't want to have this type of detail. He did not give me that type of detail.

MR VALLY: But he did tell you he told General Liebenberg about it?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: He did tell me. When I said that I don't know about this he indicated to me that he knew that I didn't know about it and he also knew where the instruction originated from. He said: "I was at a social function where General Liebenberg approached me and asked me 'Are you looking well after my toys?' Or: 'Are you hiding them?'" Words to that effect as I testified this morning.

MR VALLY: And General Liebenberg was head of Defence Force at the time?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir at that time I think he was the Commanding Officer of Special Forces. He was certainly the head of the Defence Force when I got the information. But he was referring to General Liebenberg as the Commanding Officer of Special Forces where he was working at that time.

MR VALLY: At the time when you got the information and you raised it with General Liebenberg he was head of the Defence Force?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is correct.

MR VALLY: So as far as you are aware up to the top most structure in the Defence Force knew about these killing instruments that he was manufacturing?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Vally (...intervention)

MR VALLY: As far as you are aware? Your impressions?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I don't even agree with that statement.

MR VALLY: Fine.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: All that I had was that Dr Lourens indicated to me that General Liebenberg knew about this. When I tested the water with General Liebenberg he ignored it totally and said: "Man don't pay any attention to that nonsense it has being dealt with by the d'Oliviera Commission in the past and they have not prosecuted anybody." And that was that. So I can't say that I was aware that at the level of the chief of Defence Force he had known about it. I only had the story that Dr Jan Lourens told me.

MR VALLY: Well let's go on.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me Mr Vally. There are questions from the panel just to clarify issues.

YASMINE SOOKA: General what was your impression about what Dr Lourens actually wanted from you by telling you this story?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: At the time I think he was concerned about his own personal position and he was uncertain as to whether he should take it any further. In that regard in my opinion I reassured him by saying there are authorities that you can go to with this and my advice to you is to take it to those authorities. At that time I was aware of the fact. In fact I was reminded of it constantly by General Liebenberg that there had been commissions appointed by the President of which the latest one after the Steyn Report was the d'Oliviera Commission. When he gave me this information I thought to myself that is the type of thing that obviously would resort under the d'Oliviera investigation. And that is why I said to him my opinion is that you should take it there.

YASMINE SOOKA: You see I think we are having some difficulty with the fact that in October you already know of the cloud of suspicion that lies in the realm of what Dr Basson's activities related to. Here comes somebody to you who tells you that he is involved in making instruments responsible for killing. And you keep on affirming before us that you have acted correctly. And my inclination would be that you would actually go yourself to the Attorney General concerned and make a report to him of the conversation that takes place between you and Dr Lourens. I certainly would have done that. And so I find it even stranger that in your position, a man responsible for Dr Basson because he reports to you functionally, I think that is what you say in the report. And Dr Lourens is actually complaining to you about an instruction he receives from Dr Basson, some one under your care and supervision. And all you say to him is: "Go to see the Attorney General." But you yourself don't do anything more other than reporting to this committee.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am sorry Ms Sooka I am sorry I did not do nothing. I confronted General Liebenberg. I thereafter informed General Meiring. That is my direct line of command. You may be right. If I look back now it might have been wiser for me to go directly to the Attorney General's office. But if you consider the position that you have in a state department like that it is not the normal channel of command and control that any officer in a defence force would follow. The right channel of command would be to go to the commanding officer. Now the fact that General Liebenberg had been mentioned that concerned me certainly. As I said to you I tried to find out how he would react to it. I told you how he reacted. But thereafter when General Meiring took over as chief of the Defence Force I did inform him about that. But it wasn't until and I say that again, that is the truth whether it was unwise of me or not may be so. But that is the truth. It wasn't until we had the briefing from National Intelligence in February that we really realised that this was in fact proudly related to the project or around the project. And that is where the idea emerged of two channels of command and control which I have then shared with National Intelligence, with Chief of Defence Force, with the Minister of Defence and with the President.

CHAIRPERSON: What could have happened General if for instance you had called Basson and said: "Listen," and confront him and say, "now listen this is what I hear. Here is Lourens, this is what he says to me about you. What have you got to say? I don't believe it but I need to make sure at this stage that I have a clean house in which I am dealing."

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I understand your question Mr Chairman. I confronted Basson on many occasions before. Mainly about the financial abuse.

CHAIRPERSON: No I am asking about this particular thing. What could have been wrong if you had confronted him about this issue? I know that you testified earlier to say you know it was the sort of thing that you had no confirmation on and I think that is what you are implying also by saying it is only when in February you had sufficient briefing from NIS that you felt something was really amiss.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But here is a, I mean you see part of the questions that I always ask is we are at a stage where we are dealing with a negotiations process. In fact in 1993 we had signed a Constitution which has got a charter of human rights and we are heralding in a society that was going to be premised on notions of democracy and human rights and whatever. And here you get told at that critical juncture that your people are manufacturing maiming and killing weapons and all you are telling us is that you couldn't confront the person who was being alleged to be behind that programme. All I want to ask at that time taking into account everything else what would have gone wrong if you had called Basson and confronted him?