Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: /"speculation

MR LYSTER: 3A      "speculation that hit squads are one of the factors, which contribute to the violence in this country, and more specifically KwaZulu Natal, as experienced during the last few years ... ... All attempts ... to restore peace have been unsuccessful.  ... People who exploit the unrest and disorder reigning in our province, be it common criminals or supporters of political causes, however noble the cause might seem to them and their leaders, must be told in no uncertain terms that a civilised society shall not tolerate the assassination of political opponents by members of a police force, who are duty bound to serve and protect the citizens of that society, irrespective of their political persuasions".

MR LYSTER: He called further for a -

MR LYSTER: "... full investigation into the alleged involvement of those persons identified by the accused as the masterminds and puppet masters behind the Esikaweni Hit Squad ..."

MR LYSTER: If I may pause just briefly here and stress the inability of the cause referred to by the Judge in his finding here.  It may be argued and I believe cogently that those in Inkatha, the leaders of that organisation and in the State did believe that they were in fact ultimately protecting

MR LYSTER: /their

MR LYSTER: 3A their supporters and protecting the status quo.  It is simply the means that I believe is the subject matter of this particular debate and it is the means I would argue have been objectionable.  Central to the hit squad actions in Esikaweni, Mpumalanga and elsewhere were the Caprivi trainees.  For this reason it is necessary to examine the source of this group in the mid 1980s.  It is my submission that those who gave birth to the Caprivi trainees are ultimately accountable for the actions taken by that group.  The training and deployment of the Caprivi trainees fell squarely within the strategies adopted by the South African State in the mid 1980s.  The State perceived itself to be facing an onslaught of total revolutionary war from within and outside South Africa.  To combat this threat the State employed counter revolutionary strategies which involved the taking of a wide range of actions.  These included political, psychological, economic and security or forceful measures.  By the mid 1980s political and violent actions executed by anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC and allied organisations had reached unprecedented levels.  The State adopted equally drastic measures to counter these threats and these measures included acts of terrorism and guerilla warfare.  They were carried out by specific security organs and "middle" or counter revolutionary groups within and outside South Africa.  The IFP's SADF trained offensive element was a case in point of such operation carried out within South Africa.  The operation was codenamed "Marion" and was executed by Intelligence Operations Directorate of Special Tasks, DST.  DST's support of groups such as Renamo in Mozambique and Unita

MR LYSTER: /in

MR LYSTER: 3A in Angola are examples of such operations carried outside South Africa.  Operation Marion was naturally accompanied by a programme of deception and cover-ups and I would argue they still continue today.  As I have mentioned, the originals of all the documents I am about to quote are held at the State Archives or are authenticated exhibits in court trials and inquests and it goes without saying that the documents I am going to be quoting are classified "Secret" or "Top Secret".  In fact most of them are classified "Top Secret".  Under the sub-heading, "Provision of an offensive paramilitary capacity to Inkatha", the Operation Marion documents point unambiguously to the offensive or attacking nature of the offensive element supplied to Inkatha.  While there are but two reference that can attract debate if considered alone in isolation, the offensive theme which runs through the documents is set out in blunt and obvious terms.  Examples include direct references to "offensive steps", meaning "hit squads" and the ability to take out undesirable members.  The duty sheet of the liaison officer appointed to support the operations on the ground set out the nature of offensive actions in paragraph 15 of his duty sheet and I quote -

MR LYSTER: "OFFENSIVE ACTIONS:  Must only carried out by trained cells under strict control,  Authority must be granted by DST-2 beforehand.  Targets must be approved by REEVA, SAP(Security) and SADF.  Criminal prosecution of participants must always be taken into account ..."

MR LYSTER: /It

MR LYSTER: 3A It is little wonder that another document referred to the deep concern that because "offensive actions were part of Marion's tasks", the Chief of Staff Intelligence and other senior officers involved in the planning of Operation Marion may be charged with crimes carrying the death penalty.  I think I am going to emphasise that.  Here we are talking about or the document refers to those involved in the planning of Operation Marion may be charged with offences carrying the death penalty because offensive actions were part of Marion's tasks.  I think the Commission will have little difficulty in comprehending and understanding the meaning of such passages.  The documents speak for themselves.  To extract an innocent interpretation requires in my view the taking of an adventure into the absurd.  If the Commission declines to engage in such theatrics it must consider whether the conduct was confined to the parties actually implicated in the documents, that is the military command structure, or whether there was a connection that led to higher levels.  Put another way, did those in the organising structures at the highest political levels approve of an entirely laudable project which the military and Inkatha behind their backs subverted into something unlawful and monstrous?  There is nothing in my view to support this proposition.  This submission will endeavour to show that there was an unbreakable connection between the authorisation by the highest political structures of offensive support to Inkatha and the passages that I have just referred to.  The offensive capacity requested by Chief Minister Buthelezi, as he then was in 1985, and approved of by the South African Government, is the same

MR LYSTER: /offensive