Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-11

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.  If I may, I will call Vorster to give evidence.  He will also give his evidence in Afrikaans, and I believe he also has no objection to taking the oath.  We have prepared a document for him summarising his evidence, which we would beg leave to hand in as Exhibit E.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

J A VORSTER: (sworn states)

MR VISSER: Mr Vorster, you are an applicant in this matter which is in regard with the abduction, detention and elimination of Mr Dion Cele.  Am I correct?

J A VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And your amnesty application is to be found from pages 35 to 59 in the Cele bundle, and you deal with this specific incident from page 39 to 44.  Do you have - have you studied Exhibit A?

J A VORSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Are there any parts thereof which you would have no knowledge of, which you would like to exclude?

J A VORSTER: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm according to your knowledge, the correctness of Exhibit A?

J A VORSTER: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Col Botha, with regard to the circumstances which reigned in Swaziland and in Natal.

J A VORSTER: Yes, I have, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you accord with his evidence about that?

J A VORSTER: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you also request that the evidence orally and written to which reference is made in Exhibit A, be incorporated into your amnesty application.

J A VORSTER: I do so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have previously given evidence before the Amnesty Committee, with regard to Ms Ndwandwe.

J A VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: On page 2, would you please tell us what your knowledge is about this incident.

MR LAX: Just he does that, Mr Visser, should we not just give this an exhibit number?

MR VISSER: I thought I asked for that to be E.  If I didn't, I apologise.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.  This will be recorded as Exhibit E.

MR VISSER: Yes.  I'm sorry if I neglected to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we were busy trying to swear him in at that time when you were talking.

MR VISSER: Well then I'm doubly sorry, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR VISSER: Mr Vorster, you should possibly sketch your position in Pietermaritzburg.  What was your position there?

J A VORSTER: I was in command of the Terrorist Desk in Pietermaritzburg, the Midlands as it was known.

MR VISSER: Would you please continue at paragraph 1.

J A VORSTER: I do so, Chairperson.
MR VISSER
"During July of 1988, if I recall correctly, Col Taylor, Col Botha - I visited Col Taylor and Col Botha to share information with them which I received from an informant.  And this informant was Goodwill Sikhakane, known as MK Neville.  That a certain MK terrorist attached to the Natal Machinery in Swaziland, one Dion Cele, MK Charles, indicated his willingness to Sikhakane to also co-operate with the Security Branch as Sikhakane has done."

MR VISSER: And Ms Thabethe asked Mr Botha on which grounds the inference was drawn that he, that is Cele, would be willing to co-operate with the Security Branch as an informer.  On that question, according to the information which you received from Sikhakane, did you ask him about it or what is the position?

J A VORSTER: Chairperson, I did so.  Sikhakane's conveyance to me was that Dion Cele at that stage had experienced some problems with the ANC in Swaziland and he indicated his willingness to Sikhakane that he would like to work with the RSA, in the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: In other words, was it expressly said by him?

J A VORSTER: Yes, it was, Chairperson.  And on those grounds I approached Taylor and Botha for assistance.

MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR VORSTER
"Cele was an ANC/MK terrorist who was in Manzini in Swaziland and he was attached to the Natal machinery.  His activities - he was attached to border work as it was known to us, which included assistance to insurgence of MK trained terrorists to the RSA, specifically to Natal because he was attached to Natal machinery, and the smuggling of arms and weaponry into the RSA for the commission of acts of terror, as well as the recruitment of ANC persons for internal and external training.
		During this period we found several large weapons cache locations in Port Natal, Midlands, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which were found.  And on the basis of above-mentioned knowledge, that Cele would be willing to co-operate with us.  The purpose of the planning was to recruit Cele as an informant and to place him back into Swaziland as quickly as possible for his use.  It was a method with which we had much success in the past.  And that is the reason why we refer to the weapons caches which were found previously."

ADV BOSMAN: Chairperson, may I just intervene here?  I note that Neville Sikhakane's name was MK Neville, was he also an ANC/MK terrorist who was recruited?  Is he an example of this success which you refer to?

J A VORSTER: I may answer you in the following.  He also indicated that he wanted to work with the RSA and I was part of the group who recruited him to bring Neville out of Swaziland and place him back for further use in Swaziland.  I was consequently also his handler in this instance.
"This method was applied to combat the onslaught of the ANC in Natal.  And in this regard the Committee is referred to the submission of Gen van der Merwe, J V van der Merwe, of the 21st of October 1996, in his amnesty application."

MR VISSER: Yes, we have already made reference to that.  Please continue.
MR VORSTER
"The members who I can recall who were part of the operation were, after the discussion with Col Taylor and Col Botha, Col Taylor - I think they were a Sergeant and Lieutenant, I cannot recall, Labuschagne and Verwey from Middelburg contacted these two by telephone to assist us with the execution of this operation seeing that they were familiar with the area.  W/O Wasserman of the Security Branch Durban and then Sgt Brooks from the Security Branch at that stage Pietermaritzburg who served under my command, they all participated in the operation."

MR VISSER: Before we arrive at paragraph 7, was there a meeting?  Did you convene at Amsterdam?

J A VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you then go into Swaziland and if indeed so, in which manner?
MR VORSTER
"Col Botha and I, the evening before the abduction of Dion Cele, had crossed the Swaziland border legally and we met with Goodwill Sikhakane.  I introduced Goodwill to Col Botha because Col Botha did not know him.  He knew of him, but he did not know him.  We observed - we staked out a place for observation close to the college where Cele attended classes and from where we would plan when to grab him and to abduct him.
		And the other reason why we entered Swaziland the previous evening was to ensure that Goodwill Sikhakane would be available and that Cele would indeed be present the following evening, because no specific date and day was established for the execution of this operation and to ensure whether Cele was still willing to assist us. After the observation we left Sikhakane in Swaziland and ..." ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: And you went back to the RSA?

J A VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What happened then, the following day?
MR VORSTER
"The following day, it was late, we legally crossed the Swaziland border.  I was in a vehicle with Labuschagne.  Botha was in a vehicle with Wasserman, in a minibus and Verwey was in a third vehicle.  I cannot recall whether Verwey or Labuschagne was with me, but ..."
...(intervention)

MR VISSER: One of the two.

J A VORSTER: That's how I recall it.

MR VISSER: And where was Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks?

J A VORSTER: The two of them waited a predetermined point at the border on the RSA's side.