Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

WITNESS:   I shall try where I can, Chairperson.  According to secret documents and announcements made by Inkatha leaders, during the mid 1980s Inkatha wished to establish its own military type force and it is further evident that it was willing to employ force to achieve its objectives.  If one looks at a speech made during May 1984 by Chief Minister Buthelezi in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, he referred to the need for a paramilitary wing to carry out protective and offensive actions and I quote

MR LYSTER: "... In fact I believe that we must prepare ourselves not only to defend property and life, but to go beyond that and prepare ourselves to hit back with

MR LYSTER: /"devastating

MR LYSTER: 3A      "devastating force at those who destroy and kill ...".

MR LYSTER: So I think it is evident that he was looking at two capacities here.  Protecting property and life, but more than that.  The going beyond and preparing to hit back with devastating force, clearly an offensive capacity.  According to a top secret State Security document produced in March 1989, which looked at the causes of the Natal violence, Inkatha took a decision to turn the whole of KwaZulu-Natal into a "no go area" and this was apparently an unrecorded resolution taken in 1985 and I quote -

MR LYSTER: "During 1985 the expressed mutual hostility and mistrust between Inkatha and the UDF became a visible reality when Inkatha realised that the UDF represented a threat to its power monopoly in KwaZulu and decided at a Central Committee meeting of Inkatha that the whole of KwaZulu and Natal be turned into a so-called 'no go area' for the UDF, regardless of the consequences".

MR LYSTER: I may add that the same document referred to the UDF and ANC's policy of making the townships ungovernable as an equal cause to the violence.  Not surprisingly there was no reference to the State's own endeavours in fomenting violence.  Moving to the process of authorisation.  It is evident from State Security and military documentation that clandestine operations, internally and externally, were authorised at the highest levels.  Now I'm going to skip 6.1, because that's a document my learned friends

MR LYSTER: /haven't

MR LYSTER: 3A haven't got, save to say that that document sets out what I have just said, dealing with foreign operations, which had to be cleared at the highest level, clandestine foreign operations.  Now that was further refined in November 1986 when the SSC decided that large scale planned offensive operations had to be cleared with the chairman of the SSC, that was P W Botha, the State President and small scale offensive operations had to be cleared with the Minister of Defence where necessary in consultation with the chairperson of the SSC.  Now the Operation Marion documents read in conjunction with the Security Council meeting of 3rd February 1986 refers to another clandestine operation, but this time an internal operation, that of supply offensive paramilitary support to Inkatha and that also had to be cleared at the highest level and I suspect that it is the same highest level that was involved in the authorisation of clandestine operations externally and internally.  Another example is Katzen and if you look at those documents, you will see on the first page of the Katzen ... (intervention)

MR VISSER: (?)   Mr Chairman, I formally object to any evidence led on Katzen.  At the beginning of these proceedings I explain that there's various documentation that has been requested relating to Katzen that has not been provided.  There are also certain people that are implicated in Katzen that have not received notice, Section 30 notices.  Inter alia, I spoke to J(?) Van der Westhuizen's attorney, who is implicated in Katzen in various respects and he has not received any notice, so I respectfully request that no evidence be led on Katzen.

WITNESS:   May I suggest, Chairperson, that with regard to

MR VISSER: /Katzen,

MR VISSER: 3A Katzen, I simply don't refer to names, but the operation generally.

MR LYSTER: I think considering that we're dealing here with Operation Marion, there is a certain amount of information that's publicly available about Operation Katzen.  If you just refer to it in passing as another operation of the Directorate for Special Tasks, which is what it was, as I understand it.

WITNESS:   Yes.  Chairperson, I also will, during my submission, look in brief at Katzen and other military operations such as the CCB in an endeavour to show the modus operandi of specialist units of the SADF at that time and I believe to complete the picture, that is absolutely necessary, but I will refrain from referring to names.

MR VISSER: (?)   Mr Chairman, time is limited and I don't want to unnecessary labour the proceedings.  These proceedings relate to Marion.  All the - people who have been implicated in Katzen have not received notices and the same relates to CCB.  This hearing is about Operation Marion.  Mr Varney says he was investigation Marion.  That's the evidence that should be heard, otherwise there is going to be severe prejudice to lots of people that aren't here today.  No documentation on these matters have been supplied to us.

WITNESS:   With the greatest respect, Chairperson, all the documents that I am referring to were supplied to my learned friends, that is simply incorrect.  If the documents I refer to which were included in the Section 30 notices, they were supplied.

MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, I think we are here to concentrate on Operation Marion.  You may refer to Operation Katzen in passing as another operation of the DST.  Please don't

MR LYSTER: /mention

MR LYSTER: 3A mention any names and don't go into any detail whatsoever as to the nature of Operation Marion - Operation Katzen.

WITNESS:   As the Chairperson pleases.  Now the authorisation of such operations from the highest levels which included defensive actions, involving acts of terror and elimination, is in line with Fraser's recommendation which I referred to earlier, that the use of terrorism by government forces must be decided upon at the highest level.  I now turn to Operation Marion itself and as this constitutes the bulk of the submission, I will endeavour to just simply draw from the most relevant documents and concentrate on the most salient points.  Under the heading, "The request for an offensive paramilitary unit".  During November 1985 according to a document produced at that time, Chief Minister Buthelezi, who I am going to refer to as Buthelezi, set out his need for certain support which included an offensive paramilitary support and this was set out in a memorandum and according to Major-General Tienie Groenewald who authored the document in question, Buthelezi commented that although he was a supporter of peaceful resolution and I quote here -

MR LYSTER: "... the ANC must realise that if it uses violence against KwaZulu, the Zulus are also in a position to take violent steps against the ANC.  He himself would like to take the struggle to the ANC in Lusaka, although at present he does not have the capacity".

MR LYSTER: According to a handwritten note that particular document, unsurprisingly, had to be destroyed after reading and in my view that passage is an expression of a desire for an

MR LYSTER: /offensive