Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, the term "normalisation", that is part of the counter-revolutionary process which deals with the creation of a normal environment and it entails a secure environment, one in which there can be economic development and growth, and one in which the constitutional structures are well based, and one which is also socially orientated, which deals with man's life, his work and his movements.  And in a normal environment you could say that that environment has been normalised.

MR KNOETZE: 7.4
"This essential direction of the South African Defence Force was not in all cases limited to only its own terrain.  The South African Defence Force applied it wherever it could act independently.  Here reference can be made to hundreds of community projects over the length and breadth of Southern Africa."
Do you have any personal knowledge of this principle?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  The Defence Force, and the Army in particular had a programme called Civil Affairs, and some of the conscripts who were professionally qualified were utilised in terms of this Civil Affairs programme.  For instance, doctors, teachers, vets, hydrologists and sports coaches were all utilised in local communities, specifically to aid normalisation in a particular area.  So it amounted to was that during his military service such a qualified person would use his skills and apply it in a particular community.

MR KNOETZE: Can the committee then infer that you were a strong advocate of that policy and that you utilised it to the best of your ability?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  In this programme we had people in the Ciskei and Transkei.  Under this programme we also deployed people in my area of command, and I can only look back and say they did excellent work.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 713, paragraph 8.2
"In times of war and conflict, people's perceptions change and they act differently.  To judge viewpoints and actions in times of conflict from a narrow peacetime is dangerous and negates the reality as experienced in times of conflict."
We have touched on this point, what is your comment on this?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think, Chairperson, you always have to see whether you are judging a situation according to the context or the spirit of the time which reigned at that particular time and what the particular circumstances were at the time.  I think that what it amounts to is that it's very easy to be clever with hindsight, as to what the situation was whereas when you were in that particular situation it was completely different to today.

MR KNOETZE: If we can be more specific in respect of your application serving before the Committee, what is your request to this Committee?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: My request would be that you look at Katzen in the spirit and context of the middle '80's.  That was at the time of the first state of emergency, when the revolutionary onslaught was at its height and where not only South Africa but all the TBVC countries.  And Transkei and Ciskei in my case were also directly affected.

MR KNOETZE: Could I then take you to page 716, paragraph 9.1
"Although it is difficult to appreciate the threat which communism posed to the free world and South Africa in particular, especially after the demise of communism in Eastern Europe during 1989, it is necessary for purposes of a proper analysis of the policies and actions of the South African Government during the 1980's, to have a brief look at the actual position during that time.  I shall endeavour to give a short summary."
Is that once again your view that General Malan's statement here is correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: What was your view at the time in regard to the threat of communism?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well in the middle '80's and just in the years before that Russian expansionism was seen in Africa in particular, and it was called the frontline States in Africa.  In other words, the States surrounding South Africa, all those States to a lesser or greater degree had communist governments or regimes and there was the fear that all those communist States surrounding us, that that would actually spread to South Africa.  And I can recall that at that stage we talked about a two-pronged war, an internal war, it was the revolutionary war, and an external front which spread out to also include the fight against communism.

MR KNOETZE: Do you have any comment regarding the ANC/SACP alliance and their involvement in that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The ANC/SACP alliance was regarded by us as a communist front in South Africa.  We saw it as part of the internal threat.  And to the extent in which it affected the frontline States, it was also regarded as directly affecting South Africa.  The threat therefore was also seen overarchingly as a marxist threat.

MR KNOETZE: Now this view of yours, did that have any effect or influence on for instance your actions which are now known as Plan Katzen?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, Plan Katzen dealt more with the stabilisation and normalisation of the Transkei and the Ciskei, and was not so much aimed against the marxist threat.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 722, 10.4
"The psychological affect of the onslaught became visible in the community.  Homes with walls had steel gates added to them.  Schools were fenced with razor wire.  Security measures in public places were intensified and security personnel exercised access control in buildings and shopping centres."
What was the situation in the Eastern Cape in this period, during which you were commanding officer?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The paragraph of General Malan actually describes the situation very correctly.  Perhaps I can just add that there were not only those measures in place, but there were other measures and this all helped to create a certain psychosis of seige, a seige mentality in South Africa which was greatly strengthened also by our actions such as for instance, road blocks and searching for bombs, patrols, foot patrols or mobile patrols which were carried out, searching of certain areas and people and certain incidents in which we were involved.  Of course all these things were given great publicity.

MR KNOETZE: The paragraph continues
"During this time the government's policy was clear; stop the perpetrator of violence at all costs, the carrier of the car-bomb, land-mine, limpet-mine from the neighbouring States had to be destroyed outside our borders or inside the country, before he could commit his atrocity.  The destruction of the terrorists his base and his capacity was the mission of every soldier in the South African Defence Force and was also the policy of the government of the day.  In this way the killings of innocent civilians could be prevented."
Were you aware at the time of what I've just read to you, that this was the government's policy?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  It was constantly brought home to us, either by statements made by politicians or in documents of the State Security Council and this was brought home to us by reporting also in the media.

MR KNOETZE: And this policy, did that have any influence on your actions?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  Yes, we wanted to win the war, so that which was asked for here, that is what we wanted to do.

MR KNOETZE: So was that also seen in Katzen?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 724, paragraph 10.8
"It is against this background and these circumstances that the members of the South African Defence Force acted, right or wrong.  They saw themselves as the shield between innocent citizens and mutilation or even death."
Would you endorse that view of General Malan's?