Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-06

MR RICHARD: Special Operations you said would be more strategic and amongst other things, more spectacular.  Now when an operation was launched, a target would be chosen, selected.  My question then is, who would select the target?  Would it be somebody from above you or somebody on your level, the field level or would it vary?

MR MCBRIDE: There is no clear rule on that.  I think evidence has been explained about that already.  For example, the attack on the terminal, oil terminal, where oil is pumped, crude oil is pumped in, it was a specific instruction coming from above, which was given to another unit.  On other occasions the instruction is more general, sabotage transformers, power grid, like for example what was given to us.  It depends, it depends on what the leadership thought was necessary what instructions were necessary to give.  That's how I understood it.

MR RICHARD: Now did you ever need clearance from your level, that was as a subordinate to Mr Webster, for an operation?

MR MCBRIDE: Again Sir, the answer is the same as the previous one, it depended on the situation, it depended on the needs.

MR RICHARD: Now within the hierarchy, would you have been classified as a Field Commander?

MR MCBRIDE: I was classified initially as a courier and logistics person, because I moved weapons in and out and because of Naziem not turning up, I became a combatant.  So ja, a Field Commander.  We never used the word Field Commander, but Commander at a later stage yes, I was.

MR RICHARD: So that means, without analysing each of the particular incidents we discussed yesterday, clearly with regard to the various pylons and substations, transformers, that was within the scope of your ordinary mandate, there it was your choice as to how you went about your business?

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct.

MR RICHARD: Now amongst those incidents that you listed yesterday, what incidents were not in that category?

MR MCBRIDE: I'm not sure I understand your question.

MR RICHARD: There were various incidents that you told us about yesterday.  Now I've taken the power grid, water pipes, oil tanks and put them into one basket and I've made the proposition, which I think you've agreed with, with regard to that group of targets, the target selection was yours.

MR MCBRIDE: Is that a question?

MR RICHARD: I'm putting a proposition, do you disagree with it?

MR MCBRIDE: Could you just repeat it please.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: Can you refer to this, it might be helpful.

CHAIRPERSON: What I can understand from the question, correct me if I'm wrong, Mr Richard, you've said that with regard to the explosions at substations and pylons, the selection of the target was within your discretion, that is the unit's discretion.  Now what Mr Richard is asking you is, in respect of - if you take all the incidents for which you are applying for amnesty, that you described to us yesterday, did they all fall within that category?  In other words, the target was in the discretion of the unit or the Commander, or were there any that fell out of that category, where you got an instruction from a different level?

MR MCBRIDE: Just to answer.  There's another angle to the question also.  It's like for example, an instruction was given, car-bomb, military personnel, wherever they may be.  That was different then to the - a completely different one now to the sabotage campaign, it's a different operation.  But reconnoitring or choosing of targets, you'd do your reconnaissance, do your intelligence and you choose it, as per the instructions.

CHAIRPERSON: As per the general instruction as to what the target is?

MR MCBRIDE: And a specific in that case.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

JUDGE PILLAY: Well then if that be the case, Mr McBride, of those offences for which you make application, which of those were targets that were decided upon by the hierarchy and which orders you carried out?

MR MCBRIDE: If I can put it this way, the specific targets and their location, none of them were decided ...(intervention)

JUDGE PILLAY: By the hierarchy?

MR MCBRIDE: By Rashid.  No-one decided it, none of them.

JUDGE PILLAY: Does it then follow that you and/or Webster made those decisions?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, to a large extent, yes.

MR RICHARD: When you say "to a large extent, yes", what's the exception?

MR MCBRIDE: It doesn't necessarily follow, Sir, that it's an exception.  What I'm saying is that it's not a clear case of yes or no.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think for instance, what you told us yesterday, Mr McBride, did you personally have any say in the selection of, let's take the Klein incident target, or the Leaf incident target.

MR MCBRIDE: No, but I could have had.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, but I think that probably answers Mr Richard's question then.

MR MCBRIDE: I could have said to them "Hit Klein".  I could have said, I didn't say it in this case.

MR RICHARD: During the course of the various operations you consumed equipment.  Did you ever have to explain to anyone, whether it was Mr Webster or Mr Ismail, what you had done with the equipment?

MR MCBRIDE: As far as possible we reported and explained what we did with the equipment, yes.

MR RICHARD: Now within what I'm now going to term the Webster/McBride Unit, who was responsible for ensuring that policies were adhered to and practices complied with?

MR MCBRIDE: Because we were volunteers and regard ourselves as patriots, it's expected of us to follow the policies.  We would not have joined the ANC if we did not want to follow its policies.

JUDGE PILLAY: But who would be in a position to discipline any of your ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: The seniors, the Sub-Command or Rashid, the Commander.

JUDGE PILLAY: So those mechanisms existed?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

MR RICHARD: How often did you meet with Mr Ismail during that period?

MR MCBRIDE: I can't remember, about three or four times maybe.

MR RICHARD: What training did he give you?

MR MCBRIDE: I can't remember specifically, but I know - I remember him on occasion giving me further advice being careful, about not being caught.  He was concerned more that we should not be captured.  I can remember he was like a bigger brother to us, concerned about us.  Certain things to do, how to retreat from a place and so on.

MR RICHARD: Now yesterday you referred to a large number of publications.  Did you read them at the time?

MR MCBRIDE: Very much so.

MR RICHARD: What role did these publications play in your instruction?

MR MCBRIDE: In instruction with regard to what?

MR RICHARD: Education.

MR MCBRIDE: In which particular aspects?

MR RICHARD: Policy and philosophy of the ANC, thoughts.

MR MCBRIDE: Well it played a part.  It also played a part in theoretical training.  They would explain to you how to make booby-traps and how out of household material, how to do sabotage from things easily available, would be in some of them.  So it's both.

MR RICHARD: You asked me a little earlier to be specific about referring to the events.  If we take paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15 and 17 of Exhibit G, is there a common denominator in them?

MR MCBRIDE: Sir, you're going a bit too fast.

MR RICHARD: Okay.

MR MCBRIDE: I mean, go slowly on that you know.

MR RICHARD: 1, that's the Fairvale Secondary School.

MR MCBRIDE: Right.

MR RICHARD: 3, that's the Cato Manor substation.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

MR RICHARD: 4, the Wentworth substation.

MR MCBRIDE: Okay.

MR RICHARD: 5, the Huntley Hill substation.  6, the Carrington Heights pylon.  7, the water pipe near the lion park.  8, the second Chamberlain Road, Austerville(?) substation.  And then we skip principle Leafs and Mr Klein's and Edendale ...(intervention)

JUDGE PILLAY: What numbers would those be, Mr Richard?