Human Rights Violation Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-06-11

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I don't know Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Well you are aware that the security forces wanted to rid the place of what they called comrades?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I assume so.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And so it was important for them to isolate the existence of comrades in these areas and get rid of them?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: One can make that inference Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: It is our understanding that you were part of a visit to Mr Ngxobongwana in King Williamstown specifically, just prior to the attack on KTC, is that correct?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: No Ma'am it's incorrect.  In the first instance I have visited Mr Ngxobongwana, together with Mr Graham Lawrence who was also one of our officials and we went to see Mr Ngxobongwana in East London at the Kings Hotel.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: What was the goal of that visit?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: The goal, the aim of the mission was to ask Mr Ngxobongwana to return to Crossroads because matters are out of hand and we are of the opinion that at the time it was necessary for him to be there and to make decisions and to enter into negotiations, which in fact has led to a meeting subsequently with Archbishop Tutu in St Georges Cathedral.
 I must just add that the evening, and it was dusk I remember very well, when Graham Lawrence and I flew over KTC to land at the DF Malan airport at the time that KTC was already burning.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: As leader of the Crossroads factions, let me just say the Witdoeke, Mr Ngxobongwana had a way of disappearing just before an attack, the first time he went to Rustenburg ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Excuse me Ma'am?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Mr Ngxobongwana had a way of disappearing just before an attack.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I have asked him about this because it is not something new to me and his excuse or his reason was always that the people are sending him away.  It is on the request of his community that he leaves.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.  Your information actually confirms what Mr Ndima said yesterday.
 Who arranged the visits to Mr Ngxobongwana?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: It was an idea that came out of discussions between myself and Graham Lawrence and we have approached the JMC, the military authorities to ask to arrange a flight for us.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir would you refer to a document, at the top it says LI916, it's termed Secretariat of the State Security Council and it has "TOP SECRET" on it.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Was this visit a JMC authorised visit?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: A JMC authorised visit?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: H'n.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Why would this request have been sent to the Secretariat of the State Security Council?  May I say one of the highest security bodies of the State.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I wouldn't know Ma'am.  I could only assume that it was because to get authority for a private aircraft but I wouldn't know otherwise.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Does this to you not indicate that the State Security Council secretariat was being kept abreast of developments among the Witdoeke ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Obviously.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Obviously, okay.  Let me go back to the issue of your responsibilities.  Is it correct for me to say that you had a passion for Crossroads?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And that in fact you wanted Crossroads to be developed?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Absolutely.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And that in fact you would not have opposed any actions that might have facilitated your agenda to clear the problem areas around Crossroads to enable you to develop it?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I would not.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: May I say then Sir that your interests, the interests of the security forces and the interests of the Witdoeke verged in a sense?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes, yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And that all three groups would have done anything to make sure that the strategies you engage in facilitated the process.  For you the process would be development.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: One could say that.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: For the security forces their goal would be to clear the area of comrades and for the Witdoeke to get rid of the UDF related allies etc?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: It is therefore not surprising, Sir, or let me raise that, is it therefore not surprising Sir that the reports that have been given that when the Witdoeke in numbers gathered around the Development building that in fact casspirs or security forces were there accompanying the Witdoeke to make sure that they proceed from one area of destruction to another?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: It could probably be Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir are you not curious that in fact the police, security forces and perhaps your department could have prevented these attacks?  Acknowledging that your interests, all of your interests converge around getting rid of these issues that prevent you from developing the area.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Madam we did not go to too much trouble to try and prevent it.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir there is also a particularly interesting strategy that was used in order to ensure that there was cooperation from those communities that have been identified as "not supporting violence", is that correct?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Is that strategy called McEwan Oil Spot Strategy, or are these two different things?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Well the Oil Spot is only one notion within the whole strategy.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: But the McEwan strategy was actually based on the work that was published by an American Marine Colonel, called Colonel John J McEwan and he has made a study of revolutions and counter-revolutions all over the world, and that he has set up theoretical guidelines for a State or a government to handle revolutionary situations.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: As part of that question Sir, did the Development Board provide any support , logistical, financial etc to the Witdoeke or its leadership prior to the attacks?   Now I am not talking about the welfare type things that were referred to in the past.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Madam prior to 1986 I was not aware that there was anything called the Witdoeke.  To me that was something that was born out of the conflict by men fighting each other and one faction identifying itself by wearing white armbands or legbands or headbands against the other opposition which did not have that as a means of identification.
 Prior to the attacks it was my job to provide services to all and everybody in Crossroads, whether they were so-called Witdoeke or whether they were so-called satellite camp leaders, but we had to give to everybody what we could in Crossroads.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir I'd like to refer you to a document, also with a stamp, Secretariat of the State Security Council.  It is WPGBS/22/7/2.  Now I can't speak Afrikaans but ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I can help you.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.  I'd like to refer you to paragraph 9 of the document.  Would you please read that for us please?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Paragraph 9 reads,
"Brigadier de Jager is of the opinion that the older people, the actions of the older people against the comrades necessitates support, although it is on a covert manner.  He will mention this to the Development Board so that they can convey the possibility of support to the Fathers.  COMCOM is also requested to investigate whether the image of the old people could be established".
And then on your right-hand side there is probably an instruction identification, "Mr Land", which I remember was from the Bureau of Information and Mr de Jong who was at (...indistinct) Bezuidenhout's office, Chief Commissioner.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: No Sir I am fully aware that you were not listed on that document, but I'd like to get the benefit of your thinking about what paragraph 9 that you've just read really suggests.