Amnesty Hearings — Umtata — 1998-08-24

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, I cannot recall it, however, it would not be incorrect.  There was an official scale of remuneration which was revised every year.  This existed in the Security Police, it was issued by Security Head Office and was reviewed every year.
	On this list of the scale of remuneration, there would be stipulations such as bringing in an AK47, would given an extra R800-00, for a missile, it was R500-00, for ammunition, per 50, would be R50-00.  For the arrest, the wounding or the taking in of an ANC or PAC terrorist an amount of R2 000-00 would be paid out.
	The same system of remuneration existed in Ovamboland, at Koevoet, and annually these scales of remuneration would be adjusted.  I can remember in 1985 and in 1989, the value of an AK47 shifted from R800-00 to R2 000-00 and in 1989, 1990 it moved up to R6 000-00 in order to get it out of the system.
	However, this had a negative effect because people began an industry around this, one could buy it for R50-00 in Maputo and sell it here for R6 000-00.  This is what happened in actuality.

MR HUGO: With regard to the falsification of documents, can you provide us with any details regarding those with who you liaised in order to obtain false identification as well as false documentation and the submission of such false documentation to Internal Affairs?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Firstly it went through Colonel Beukes who worked at the Intelligence Services and then later, or at least he usually handled these aspects.
	Later with the expansion of Vlakplaas, it became necessary to give us permission to handle these aspects.  I cannot recall the specific pattern which I followed, especially with Tshabalala's case in changing his name and all his personal details.  However, I know that it was very effective, because he cannot regain his former name.
	However, I cannot be of any assistance with regard to the precise steps which I followed.  It was very thorough, however.  I am not even sure how I handled the finger prints, because usually one would be able to classify, or according to the finger print classification, one would find the person's original identity, but even those details were removed.
	I am not certain of the exact process which I followed.

MR HUGO: Just two final aspects.  The first one is that there has been evidence that in the minibus there was also a bag with weapons.
	Could you tell the Committee what the arrangement and procedure was with regard to the arming of Askaris when they went on operations?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, usually every member would be issued with his service pistol, a 9 mm in calibre.  Lieutenant Morse was specifically issued with a machine pistol.  Firstly it was an HMK and later it was a Uzi.
	But this was actually issued more for his personal security and his domestic security.  There is nothing sinister about that.
	However, I also issued to every minibus a bag, or a contained with two R1's, two shotguns with a variety of ammunition, as well as two sub-machine rifles.  There were also teargas grenades and M26 hand grenades.
	The reason for this is that because we were looking for terrorists, it didn't mean that we were going to find terrorists.  My people might find themselves in a situation where they would be trapped by a crowd or find themselves in a situation of unrest.  They would then be able to use the teargas.
	They would be able to use the buckshot.  Should they find themselves in an urban or rural situation with military trained terrorists, they would be able to use the Uzi's and the R1's.  The reason for the R1's is that they were suitable for the rural areas and the Uzi's were suitable for the penetration of homes.

MR HUGO: Were any Eastern Block weapons made available to them for these operations?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No.  Where there were cross-border operations or a specific operation internally, I can remember a specific operation in Durban.  Such a weapon would be issued and placed under the control of the group leader of that specific group.
	In other words, it would be used only for the task for which it was needed and then returned.  Internally, the usual practice was to confirm the bona fides.  For example I can refer to the Guguletu 7.
	However, if it was external, it would be for deadly purposes.  If we took weapons over, it would definitely be for the use of such weapons.

MR HUGO: Then finally Mr De Kock, could you please tell the Honourable Committee, which political objectives you wanted to achieve by firstly not disclosing the information that you had that there was an unlawful operation being undertaken in the Transkei, and secondly why you participated in the falsification of documents, and what you thought you would be able to achieve by means of that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it may sound strange to you, but there were some of the Security Branches in this country and Security Policemen at Head Office, who didn't know about Vlakplaas' existence.  I can state this unequivocally.
	By nature, the Unit was an absolutely secret institution.  The continued existence or the survival of this Unit was absolutely necessary for the successful prosecution of ANC and PAC members in the courts.
	It was also established in order to promote the police and State dispensation, to give them the advantage of being one step ahead of the enemy with regard to information and identification and by nature of the situation, it was also a mechanism of protection for these former ANC and PAC members, for their families.  It was a sort of protection umbrella.
	However one would like to put it and I say this with compassion, because not everybody is equally strong, a white Askari or a black Askari, was a traitor to his people or his group, or that which he believed in.  I feel this within myself as well.
	These people's lives were genuinely in danger at that time.

MR HUGO: What do you think, or what was your perception at that stage, with regard to what would happen if the true facts of this incident, were to be disclosed?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Firstly, I have no doubt that there would have been an international objection to this.  That an unlawful system such as ours, could make use of people to maintain it.
	Secondly, we would have the situation that the exposure of such a Unit would have resulted in the ineffectiveness, it would have neutralised the Unit, and then there would have been no more secrecy.  It would have been easier just to label those who had not been involved in the hearings as Askaris, and other similar consequences.

MR HUGO: Would you say that this would have been the last straw for the activities of Vlakplaas and other such institutions?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes.  It would have led not only to the exposure of the Askari system, it would most probably have led to the second agenda, and that was the agenda for covert operations.
	It could have had a domino effect and probably have led to premature exposure of the covert structure for internal and external operations.

MR HUGO: I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO

CHAIRPERSON: In view of the amount of time that we lost this morning, because of the electricity, we intend sitting until 17H30, so I think it will be convenient perhaps at this stage, to take a very short adjournment of about 15 minutes, and come back at about four o'clock, I think it is, at which stage then Mr Knight will commence his cross-examination of Mr De Kock.  Thank you.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (still under oath)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Knight.

MR KNIGHT: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.  Mr De Kock, was Captain Braam Morse, Mr Tshabalala's senior officer?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.