Amnesty Hearings — Tzaneen — 1999-06-30

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: I think the words you are using,I did not use them.  Initially I said naturally, because we are dealing withhuman beings who would at times, take their own initiative, so I am talkingfrom practical experience, from what happened.  Some of the Units did actuallydo what they were not supposed to do.  We dealt with those cases specificallyaccording to the circumstances under which it happened.  We were strict on thisrule, that is why we separated the Units and I am making this example of theTranskei where I was part and parcel of the team that disciplined the Unit there,but naturally which is what I am saying, we looked at the circumstances.  Beinga soldier myself, if a weapon is laying idle there and I can carry it, I willnot jump it and leave it, because I was not part of the Repossession Unit, soI would take the initiative and take it, as long as I report it back.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, if I can refer you tothe statement of the first applicant, Mr Thobejane.

CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit A?

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, that is Exhibit A,thank you Mr Chairman,  and specifically paragraph 8.2 thereof, I am going toquote it for you, he says, perhaps I should start with yes, 8.2
                "...the bastion and minions of the then erstwhile regime were in terms of the APLAperspective (a) the members of the South African Police and reservists in general,(b) members of the South African Police and reservists in general, (c) ..."

MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Chairperson, just a correctionthere, I think there it was a typographical error, it should be South AfricanDefence Force.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, (b).

MR MBANDAZAYO: It was a repetition, (b), itwas a repetition of paragraph (a).  (b) should be South African Defence Forcebefore it was National Defence Force.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, I don't think I willhave a problem with that amendment, it clearly refers in (b) to members of theSouth African Defence Force and then
                "...(c), the farmers as they belonged to the Commando structures."
        Let's stopthe quotation there.  General, if I get the impression then that APLA had itagainst the regime, the Police, the Defence Force and the white farmers, orthe farmers then, who formed part of the Commando's, the only thing that I canthink of that qualifies these three to be grouped together is because they wereall armed, armed structures, is that not so?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: Partly yes, but our understandingwas that the farmers who formed the first line of defence through the CommandoUnit system and so on.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, and it was general knowledgethat farmers are armed?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: Yes.

MR VAN RENSBERG: So with that knowledge ifI interpret your evidence correctly, you say that it was APLA's policy or instructionsthat in fact, in spite of the fact that they attacked armed farmers, if theycome across guns, they should leave it there and not disarm the farmers becauseit is not part of that Unit's responsibility, is that your evidence?

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Van Rensberg, I understoodit, and correct me if I am wrong please, was that the Offensive Unit's functionwas to attack, not to repossess.  Repossession Unit's function essentially wasto repossess, but if in an attack conducted by an Offensive Unit, they cameacross weapons or money and they could use their discretion and take that money,so long as they reported it to the Operations Director, etc, that was the understandingI took, so in other words and I think in the last answer that the General answered,he said if he was as a soldier doing an attack and came across a gun, he wouldhimself have taken it and then, but report it.  I think that was the understanding,if there wasn't an order "leave guns alone."

MR VAN RENSBERG: It should be totally separate.

CHAIRPERSON: Just rephrase the question.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Perhaps I did misunderstand it, I thought, I also thought that was initiallyhis view, but then that he changed later, perhaps I can put a specific statementto him.

CHAIRPERSON: Before I put that, was I incorrectin what I said?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: You are correct, that is what Isaid.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Okay, then we should notneed to take the matter further.  If you then accept as correct the statementthat the Chairman has made just now, then obviously you have to agree with methat the Court, the criminal Court made the correct ruling in finding them guiltyon attempted robbery, do you agree with that statement?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: Unfortunately I did not see theCourt ruling and I am not too sure if that ruling was based on what, so I wouldn'tcommit myself on that one.

MR VAN RENSBERG: I see.  The Chairman previouslyenlightened us to the fact that on the 16th of January 1994, APLA stopped itsarmed offensive.

CHAIRPERSON: I said I think it was the 16th,I wasn't sure of the date.

SISI KHAMPEPE: That is correct.

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: It is correct, the 16th.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Yes, I just want to confirmthat, is that in fact the correct date that we are talking about, 16th of January1994?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: I am not too sure about the date,but it was in January 1994.

MR VAN RENSBERG: Have you as part, or at leastformer part of APLA's High Command, what steps have you taken to make sure thatyour cadres on the ground today, has received that orders?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: This decision was taken in 1994and I was part of the decision, the reason why the decision was taken firstand foremost is because at that time, if I may give you the background of thePAC, there was some divisions in terms of whether the PAC should become partand parcel of the process that was taking place at the time.  After a lengthydebate a decision eventually was taken in January that the armed struggle hasgot to be stopped and therefore both the PAC and APLA had to be part and parcelof the process that was taking place.  Instructions were issued by the HighCommand, unfortunately we had a long structure in terms of the chain of command,so the instructions from the High Command were directed first and foremost tothe Director of Operations, and the Director of Operations in turn had to giveinstructions to the Regional Commanders and the Regional Commanders in turnhad to give instructions to the District Commanders, down until it reached thelowest levels, and this took a long time.  Not necessarily because it was along chain, but secondly we had to convince our cadres, like I am indicatingthat we had serious divisions in this regard.  Even ourselves before we couldtake that decision as the High Command, we were seriously divided, we had todebate over the issue until finally we had the majority that was for the decision,and amongst the cadres as well, there were those initially who opposed it andthis opposition was also reflected later on when we integrated into the DefenceForce.  Some of the members refused to integrate and we had to persuade themand the last group was only integrated last year, we are still continuing tomake an effort to make sure that even those who have not yet integrated, mustbecome part and parcel of the process.  I can assure you that we have made aneffort since 1994, even to date, if we can get an indication possibly that thereare some APLA members that are thinking differently from what the High Commandthought and the PAC thought initially, we will take it upon ourselves to makesure that they tow the line.

CHAIRPERSON: General, APLA, does it stillexist?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: APLA still exists in as far as integrationis concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: But it doesn't have its formalstructures in place, etc?

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: No, that structure is now part andparcel of the Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MBULELO RAYMOND FIHLA: But within the Defence Force, westill remain an entity to make sure that everything that pertains to APLA isaddressed.