Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

UNKNOWN: I told Vermeulen that he had to follow a specific route.  Now if you look at the route, and I'm going to make an assumption to be able to answer your question relating to why the vehicle turned back, if you would allow me Chairperson to do that, to make an assumption then I am prepared to do so.
 If you look at the instruction which I gave Vermeulen and the route, then the route goes from Manenberg in a westerly direction to the Athlone Police Station.  The instruction was to go via Belgravia and Thornton Roads and then he had to go through Lansdowne around Crossroads, go down old Klipfontein Road, through NY108, back to Manenberg, that was the route.  
 Now you want me to make an assumption and if I do that I might say if I remember correctly the vehicle came down Old Klipfontein Road, turned left into Belgravia Road, right again into Thornton Road, came down Thornton in the direction of Old Klipfontein, in other words I will have to assume and say that there was no choice to get back to Lansdowne Road on the southern part he either had to make use of Belgravia again or he had to turn back, that is my assumption to be able to complete his route.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Since Lt Vermeulen was acting on your behalf do you take responsibility for this operation?

UNKNOWN: Of course in the sense that I gave the command for this operation, and it's obvious that if we give joint command then we are both responsible.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Did you then discuss this operation with any higher ranking officers, particularly about the aftermath, the death of three children and the injury of many others and the destruction of property, did you discuss that with anyone higher than you?
 And your discussion, if you had any, did it help you assess how to deal with future operations like this?

UNKNOWN: I am not quite sure.  There have been quite a few questions here.  Could you please just clarify the first question for me?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Did you discuss this with your superiors, whoever your superior was, did you discuss the aftermath of this with your superior?

UNKNOWN: In other words you are referring to after the incident?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Yes.

UNKNOWN: Yes I am sure we did talk about it.  I can't remember exactly what we said, it's too long ago, but yes I believe that we did.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Exactly what did you learn from this operation?

UNKNOWN: In the process of maintaining law and order it happens sometimes, and it's commonly known as a fact, we've had - in the past week we've had many occurrences in the country of robbers robbing a bank and in the process of a shooting incident between police and robbers innocent people were wounded, now that one must accept can happen.  Those are the realities of life.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir three children were killed, several others were injured and you don't remember what you discussed about the operation.  I'll move on.
 Have you ever read or discussed COMPOL memorandum no.43 dated 5 June 1986, written by Major General Wandrag, no. 6, excuse me, memorandum no.6 dated June 5 1986 written by Major General Wandrag of the Joint Security staff?

UNKNOWN: Yes I had seen it.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Did you discuss it with anyone?

UNKNOWN: I can't remember whether I discussed it with anybody.  I think it was only issued in 1986.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And you don't remember what decisions were taken on that memorandum?

UNKNOWN: It's a very long memorandum, I don't know exactly what it deals with.  If you would like to perhaps - or focus my attention on something specific then I could perhaps answer you, but to go through this entire memorandum which was issued 11 years ago that's a bit difficult.  I can't answer you.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: What I will do is ask you one more question, we'll take a tea break and during the tea break I will bring your attention to that.
 How would you categorise AAA and no.1 birdshot ammunition in terms of seriousness and amount of damage, potential damage they would do?

UNKNOWN: AAA ammunition, if it is used directly to fire at a person at a short range it can kill him.  And the same holds true for no.1, but the same could also be done with no.8 and 9 birdshot.  In other words that is the finest type of birdshot, it all depends on the range, it could cause death, yes.  A rubber bullet can also cause death and has done so if used at short distance.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: So you were fully aware when you loaded your equipment with AAA no.1 birdshot that this could result in death, you are fully aware of that?

UNKNOWN: Yes from my experience I was so aware.  I was aware that any kind of shot could lead to death as I have just explained to you.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir may I then put it to you that really the purpose of the operation may not have been to accomplish maximum arrests, but to cause death?

UNKNOWN: If the purpose was to cause death then we could have used far more effective and efficient ammunition.  The purpose of the operation was to perform arrests.  In my mind I had no, but no doubt whatsoever that my instruction was the performing of arrests, that was what we wanted to achieve.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Chairperson could we take a break and I will finish up.

CHAIRPERSON: Dr Ramashala you still want to ask further questions of this witness after tea?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Just two or three more questions after tea and then I will finish.

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody else have any other questions they want to ask?  So it does seem as if there will be more questions.  We will take a tea break.  We would ask people to make it as short as possible, if we can come back in 15 minutes that will be a help to us.  Could I ask the members of the audience to wait until the members who are on the platform have left the room please.
 Mr van Zyl and Mr Brand I wonder whether we could ask, to speed things up later, if we could have the statements of the other people you are representing after the tea break or even now so that they are entered and recorded.  Thank you.
HEARING ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

UNKNOWN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  We will continue with the last few questions to Brigadier Loedolff.  Advocate van Zyl may we have the statements from your other clients?

UNKNOWN: Chairperson we found that in the past, at the previous time we were here, that we give the statements and it gets handed to the Press and it actually gets reported prior to the witness having given evidence and that constitutes a problem to us.  We will make them available immediately when the witness comes forward.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr van Zyl.  I hear somebody's cellphone.  May I repeat our earlier request to have them switched off before we start the proceedings.  Thank you.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Thank you.  Chairperson I just have a few questions and I will stop my - whatever it is I am doing.  Let me review your statement on the ammunition and in fact tell you that Major General Wandrag classified, in his COMPOL memo on page 2, classified the ammunition in the following way.  No.9, no.8, no.7, no.6 as birdshot.  And he classified no.1, AAA, SSG, SG as sharp ammunition capable of being lethal.
 Sir, I have a bit of cognitive dissonance here about your statement that the purpose, specific purpose of the operation was to arrest.

UNKNOWN: That's correct.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Now what were your instructions to Lt Vermeulen in case of an attack?  And how do you define an attack?

UNKNOWN: I told Lt Vermeulen that in case of an attack they had to defend themselves, that's obvious.   We also pointed out to them, as I said in my statement, that they had to just beware that if they should open fire that the men on the left-hand side shouldn't fire to the right and thereby injure their own colleagues.