Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1999-02-16

MR RICHARD: I'm putting the proposition to him.
	I'm putting it to you that during that period from January until some time after the Ellis Park bomb when you were in Lusaka, there was no line of communication, no line of command between you and the rest of the world.  Is that true or not? - seven months.

MR DUBE: Not that I could not communicate with them.  I could communicate with them using the same means that we've employed in the past, but such report one will have to make time to sit down and elaborate and give explanation fully.

MR RICHARD: Tommy Masinga.  Where was he in July in relation to you?

MR DUBE: In July Tommy Masinga was with me here.

MR RICHARD: Now, what was Tommy's position in the hierarchy?

MR DUBE: He was the overall commander of the special ops.

MR RICHARD: And you and he were together in South Africa at the time.  Did you tell him about the incident, before going to Lusaka?

MR DUBE: I did not.

MR RICHARD: Why not?

MR DUBE: There was something we were busy with, some mission that ended up to the one of Ellis Park.

MR RICHARD: But it would have taken you ten minutes to have sat down and told him about this.  We're not now talking of a report that had to be set out fully, you could have told him.  Why didn't you?

MR DUBE: Earlier on I already said that we followed a certain chain of command, so I couldn't report to him at the time.  That's why I did not bother to tell him about this.

MR RICHARD: In the Ellis Park incident wasn't Tommy Masinga  also known as Dumakude, the commander of the operation?

MR DUBE: If I may ask, you had already asked me about Dumakude, why I didn't report to him.  Now I don't understand why you're going back to the Ellis Park and you want me to furnish answers in relation to that.

MR RICHARD: You said that you were responsible to people above you.  As I understand your evidence, Tommy Masinga, which is Dumakude, was your commanding official above you in Johannesburg.  It's under his direction and command that the Ellis Park bomb incident was committed.  So isn't he the person to whom you should have reported the matter?

MR DUBE: Military-wise there's something called chain of command.  And that's exactly what I employed at the time.  This is why I did not report to him.

MR RICHARD: Instead you waited for seven months until, as you say here, at paragraph 6 page 11
"...I then reported the matter to the then immediate commander of special operations, i.e. Tommy Aquino."
You're contradicting yourself unmercifully.

MR DUBE: I did explain this morning with regards to this matter, that I made mention of this in such a way that Aquino told me that he will tell the commander who will give the report to him as Dube was the overall commander.  I did explain to this effect in the morning.

MR RICHARD: Right, the next thing is, you've said that according to the structures around you, that's whether it be Aquino or Tommy or yourself, that this was a legitimate killing.  Correct?  Now would you please explain to us then if it was a legitimate incident, why it was not on the ANC's lists of incidents for which they've taken responsibility as submitted to the TRC?

MR DUBE: I don't know.  I don't have an answer to that.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Richard.  Mr Dube, let's put it this way.  Are you aware that the ANC made a submission to the TRC in which amongst the other things they gave a list of incidents which are known to them, incidents or operations which were carried out in pursuit of the ANC policy.  Do you know, are you aware of that?

MR DUBE: Yes I am aware.

ADV SANDI: Have you seen the list counsel is talking about?

MR DUBE: Not the whole list, because there were submissions were divided into parts, like part one, part two, but I did not get to see the entire document.

ADV SANDI: Did you at any stage become interested whether this particular incident which was carried out by you, whether it did appear in that list?

MR DUBE: Yes, I was interested.  But I told myself that maybe it will come to the surface, or it will be brought to the attention.

MR RICHARD: Now, if you take responsibility for the Witbank incident, can you give us a reason as to why in the same list it's put in as one that might or might not be the responsibility of the ANC?

MR DUBE: Please repeat, what about Witbank?

MR RICHARD: The Witbank incident is listed in the schedule as an event for which the ANC is uncertain as to whether it should or shouldn't or is or isn't responsible.  My question then to you is, if you take responsibility for the incident, as you do, why is there that qualification to the Witbank incident?

INTERPRETER: Please repeat the last part of your question.

MR RICHARD: What is the translation of what the ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: I'd ask the counsel to repeat the very last part of his question.

MR RICHARD: No, my question is why is the schedule conditional about the status of the Witbank incident?  If Mr Dube takes responsibility for it and is a member of the ANC, why doesn't the ANC come out straight and say it's one of those for which we take responsibility?

MR DUBE: I do ...(indistinct) I don't know.

MR RICHARD: Well, we make much mention of the word special operations.  Would you please tell me what the special operations division of the MK operation was.  What is special operations?

MR DUBE: Special ops is the unit that was formed so to have certain targets, military installations of the enemy, so that operations such as Sasol could be executed.  And again people were elected or appointed to this kind of unit, special ops, who would have been experience people with high expertise.  I don't know if you are with me or you get me.

MR RICHARD: Well, what I understand is how this special ops division differed from other MKU's.  In other words, they were specialised highly trained units.  Is that correct?

MR DUBE: It was different in terms of targets.  Its targets will not be the same as the other wings target, as I've already made an example to the effect of Sasol target.

MR RICHARD: What's special about Sasol?

MR DUBE: No I was only giving you an example.

MR RICHARD: What I'm trying to understand is, is your answer that special operations had special types of targets against which acts of, attacks should be committed, such as strategic plants, engineering, mining, police, military?

MR DUBE: I will go back and state that there was a need even with regards to the case we are talking about and the special ops which I was a member of.

MR RICHARD: So when we deal with special ops did you have a mandate to select your own targets?

MR DUBE: I had the mandate.

MR RICHARD: How did you select ...(intervention)

MR DUBE: But I only got the mandate after I acquired experience about the operations ...(indistinct) outside the country, as well as to mention that the mandate I had, part of the mandate I had, was enabling me to train and recruit and train people, in that order.

MR RICHARD: So, who decided, to take an example, that the Witbank bomb should happen or not happen?

MR DUBE: I would request not to answer that question because I already submitted the application with regards to the Witbank bomb blast and I'm not here for it.

MR RICHARD: Did you make the decision?

MR KOOPEDI: The witness has ...(intervention)

MR RICHARD: When it comes to your own mandate, where and when were you told what your mandate was, as to what to do?  Was it while you were in South Africa, or while you were in Lusaka?

MR DUBE: What I said was we had various ways of communicating with the commanders, my commanders that is, we would do DLB's for instance and I will be able to go and gather my message from that DLB.

MR RICHARD: Were you ever taught the MK military code?

MR DUBE: I did not hear the question.

MR RICHARD: Were you ever taught what the MK military code is and what it says?  I have a copy of it here, would you like to see it?  ...(intervention)