Special Hearings — Children's Hearings — 1997-06-12

DR RANDERA: Max, my last question.  In the 18 months that we have been taking statements and listening to stories, of course we've had a number of people coming forward who were victims of either people's courts or what is commonly come to be known as necklacing in South Africa, as Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee at the time, can you tell us whether the Committee actually took a position on this issue, was there a debate around this issue, if you can highlight that please for us?

DR COLEMAN: Well, certainly, I mean this was a practice which no right thinking person can do anything but condemn and one may attempt to understand it, one may attempt to understand how extraordinary atrocities which have occurred around the world and that these would occur in conditions of extreme conflict, but as a practice it is totally unacceptable and we said so all the way through.
 But it is one of the by-products of the struggle which I think is extremely unfortunate.

DR RANDERA: Thank you Chairperson, I have no other questions.

MS MKHIZE: Thank you very much.  I will ask other fellow Commissioners to ask you a few questions.  Wynand Malan?

MR MALAN: Thank you Chairperson.  Dr Coleman, I really have two questions, but they are in a sense big questions which I hope you can answer in a small way or in a big way, in a brief period.

DR COLEMAN: I will try.

MR MALAN: The first really relates to, or let me just preface the question with saying that personally I have the highest respect for you, I think you have that experience in our relationship, you did make an earlier submission at our offices, there were some questioning, which I think you dealt with brilliantly and clearly, honestly, I have very much appreciation for that.
 Secondly, I do sense that in terms of your call it charter or your res non deberet, that the focus was on the State whereas we are looking at a broader conflict so to speak and on that I have one question really.  In describing the activity of the youth, on the first page already of your submission, you talk about the footsoldiers, I think those were more or less your opening remarks and what they were doing, but you don't refer to any active role of aggression on the side of the youth, whereas in all our hearings around the country, we have fast evidence of youth or youths or groups also acting against what you indeed refer to later, the undesirable structures or support structures of the apartheid State, councillors, homeland governments and so on.
 I really would want to ask you whether you wouldn't maybe not now, but maybe give us something, let your experience roll with you and give us something in writing as to your understanding of the nature of that conflict and not only in terms of the human rights violations which indeed I think you have covered well here.
 That is the first, it is a request, you can respond to both.  The second is relating to the distinction between the periods one leading up to 1989 and the second then 1990 to 1994, in your opening remarks  I think it starts more or less on page 13, you make it clear that there was now a switch, a change in the nature.  You refer to it as the mother of all covert operations, I enjoy some of your language, it is very descriptive, but you do say there was a broadening, a kind of added dimension, if not then also a change in approach with the addition of vigilante groups and elements within the Security Forces, in addition to what you call the State itself.
 Again then, would you not also just reflect on the reasons as to why specifically the vigilante groups joined into this.  The difficulty in a presentation or in receiving a presentation as you have it focusing on the violations against the youngsters only, could be read as that all of them were totally not guilty or not culpable in terms of the broader conflict and struggle.
 Those are really my questions.  The same question but relating to two different periods.

DR COLEMAN: Yes.  Thank you.  Yes, they are very broad questions and would really to do them justice, would take a long time, but just very briefly, one must agree that our work has been definitely focused on the human rights violations of the apartheid State.
 And in that sense you might say is one-sided, unbalanced, yes, that is true.  But within our mandate, as a human rights body to observe human rights violations, we have tried to record these violations as faithfully as possible.
 And that really leads on to the second part, that obviously in a liberation struggle, there is always going to be a reaction to a particular action.  And it is the reaction to actions that we are still living with today unfortunately in KwaZulu Natal in particular.
 Certainly you can't have the scenario of on one side a bunch of saints and on the other side a bunch of sinners, it is not like that at all.
 And there are sinners within the saints ranks and there are even saints within the sinners ranks, let's put it that way.  And that distinction can become blurred over the time, but certainly our mandate was to observe and record the actions of the apartheid State and that is what our previous submission is exactly.
 If it is reflected in this particular submission, you know, it is not surprising really.  On the second part in terms of the switch from what we call total strategy to destabilisation strategy, that too really is a whole debate and you know, I really would welcome some kind of specific let's say hearing on the part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on that whole aspect, because we did believe from all our recording and all our information, that it is a clear case for saying that the destabilisation strategy was cold-blooded, calculated, deliberate, it is not something that just happened, it wasn't haphazard and that from that critical month of August 1990 when the Pretoria Minute was signed and when the ANC suspended the arms struggle, from that moment there was just this huge explosion.
 In that month alone 700 people died.  That is just too big a coincidence, what was it all about.  What we say it was about was a collusion between various elements who had an interest in maintaining the status quo or at least retaining the power which they had from the apartheid system or had inherited.
 All the actors within that destabilisation, the aggressive actors within that destabilisation all had some kind of stake in the continuation of apartheid and you might say that is what the third force was all about, and yes, perhaps the third force was a collection of the beneficiaries of apartheid.

MR MALAN: May I indulge on the Chair and just ask another question, really flowing from your response which was this action precipitating reaction, cause and effect thing, that to me specifically, but I think generally within the Commission, there is a major concern also when we look at the future, spiralling, the negative spiralling of violence generally speaking.
 Do you have any ideas of how it could be possible to cut into such a spiral and get it sort of down spiralling?  If we should see similar things in the future, it won't be on apartheid, but it could be some other kind of mobilisation, cause and effect type thing, is there anything one can really do?  How does one see it, how does the society move in against such a development?