Amnesty Hearings — Pretoria — UNKNOWN

JEREMY CRONIN: No, no, that's a false conclusion, he was a dedicated communist and he wanted to see a socialist dispensation in our country but he was certainly not so undemocratic that he was not prepared to work with and to perceive huge advances in dispensations and societies which were not necessarily socialist.
	He was not a dogmatist and was someone who was prepared to live and let live and I mean that not just in an individual sense but politically.  He'd lived in exile, he had a wide experience of a variety of political dispensations and saw many civilised societies outside there - outside of South Africa, so it was not that he was intolerant of alternative views but he believed that - given the kinds of poverty, the kinds of problems that we've got in South Africa, that the best system for South Africa would be a democratic communist dispensation, yes but he was not intolerant of alternatives.

MR PRINSLOO: Now Mr Cronin, I refer you to page 44.
	At the bottom of the page Mr Chairman:
"John Robby - Again in the interest of saying a civil war"
...[intervention]

JEREMY CRONIN: Saving.
MR PRINSLOO
"We had - Doctor Korne Mulder on Friday, sounded like a very nice reasonable educated Afrikaner man talking about Afrikaner nationalism, talking about this deep-seated desire to have their own country and yet every time we speak to someone from the ANC and we mention the possibility of a Boerestaat - immediately no, is that something that you would be prepared to negotiate at any circumstances Chris?
The reply:
"Well, I think we should discuss it but it is something that I would never support, I think that those who are hankering after a Boerestaat should come to CODESA and place that issue before the players at CODESA.  Let me discuss the merits of it but let me elaborate what would be the cost of a Boerestaat in this country, where would it be situated, where in the country did you get an Afrikaner majority?  The implications of a Boerestaat would mean the removal of people in their millions"
And so it carries on.  So, it's clear that Mr Hani was directly opposed to anything with regard to a Boerestaat.

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, but what you are leaving out in your question - if that was a question, is that he was opposed - he politically thought it was absolutely unworkable and it was an irrational proposal.  But what he's very clearly saying is: "But let's discuss it for heaven's sake, let's not fight a war about it, come to CODESA, place your concerns on the table and let's discuss them.
	I, for one - he is saying, don't believe it's workable but let's hear, maybe there's a rational argument for it, maybe there's some workability in it".   So, that's his position, he's not saying: "I'm declaring war on those who imagine that there should be a Volkstaat, they me deluded - they are deluded, but let's discuss the matter" - that's his position.

MR PRINSLOO: But what is clear Mr Cronin, is that Mr Hani would not agree to a Boerestaat - should they negotiate for a Boerestaat, they wouldn't agree to that - and this what ...[inaudible]?

JEREMY CRONIN: I think it's highly unlikely that he would - or any rational South African, would agree to a Boerestaat because I think it's an irrational idea but he was certainly prepared and willing - as he is saying here, to discuss it - he's not saying: "Over my dead body" ...[End of tape 3A, day 7 - no follow-on sound]  certainly not saying that.

MR PRINSLOO: Now, Mr Cronin, Mr Hani - you've heard what Doctor Ferdie Hartzenberg said about him today as to how the Conservative Party viewed him, what about the Vula incident that was publicised widely in the country? - and there's evidence that Mr Hani was involved in Vula.

JEREMY CRONIN: What about the Vula incident, you ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, that is what I'm asking you, what about Vula - that's what the people believe - that Vula had in mind insurrection in the country, was that correct or not?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, it was completely incorrect, Vula was an underground structure established in the late 1980's by the ANC, not the SACP.  On the eve of the December 1991 conference - no, no, sorry, on the eve of the July 1990 rally of the SACP at which the SACP announced it's interim leadership group, there was a flurry of disinformation propaganda from the National Party regime trying to connect Vula to the South African Communist Party and trying to suggest in 1990 that Vula was a communist plot - which was denied by Joe Slovo at the time - he was the General Secretary at that point, it was denied by Chris Hani and it was denied by all of as it still is today.
	It was an underground structure along with other underground structures of the ANC and people like Joe Slovo were involved in that along with Oliver Tambo and other non-communists but under the discipline and instructions of the ANC, so that's Vula.

MR PRINSLOO: But why was it an underground structure Mr Cronin?

JEREMY CRONIN: Because the organisations were banned, it was launched in the late 1980's - the Communist Party you will remember, had been banned in 1950, so in order to operate inside South Africa, we had to operate in the underground.
	The ANC as you will remember, was banned in 1960 - it had two choices, it either could disappear or it had to operate illegally and that meant operating in the underground, so Vula was one of many endeavours to set up underground - in this case, political structures - there were underground military structures, Vula was essentially a political structure.

MR PRINSLOO: What happened to Vula after 1990 when the ANC and the SACP was disbanned?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, Vula began to emerge - just as with the process of Umkhonto weSizwe, we weren't sure in February 1990, that the unbanning was for real and again we had good reason and so, as we were beginning to emerge leaders from the underground - we were testing the waters, we didn't know what to expect, we immediately had a cease-fire - we took it that seriously, but we weren't sure if we could show - surface all of our leadership, those that had been in underground, those that we still in exile - we had to be careful, we had to be cautious.
	There were also lunatics roaming in South Africa, who were aiming to take pot-shots at leaders - as happened in April 1993 in the case of Chris Hani, so we were quite cautious about revealing exactly - precisely in 1990, who was our leadership.  As we became more assured that it was till dangerous to operate but the chances of an effect negotiated settlement were on - so those disappeared, so by 1991/1992 and certainly by April 1993, there were no longer any underground structures.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, at the time of the arrest of certain of the Vula members, were they still underground at that stage?

JEREMY CRONIN: One or two of them were in underground, others were prominent political figures like Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Casserells - some of whom were not arrested but who had been involved in the Vula structures and who were not underground, so there'd been a partial surfacing of some but others were still - as it were, uncertain as to whether - awaiting orders from the ANC, as to whether they should fully surface or not but I stress again that this was not a military operation, it was a political structure.

MR PRINSLOO: Why were they uncertain Mr Cronin?