Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-17

MR VISSER: For how long were they informants of the Security Branch before this incident?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is difficult to say, but I can guess it could have been a year, I am not sure of the time span.

MR VISSER: Were they askaris?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: No, negative.

MR VISSER: Were they applied and did you receive information from them in other cases apart from that of Ndwandwe?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You then heard as you have just said, what the purpose of this operation was, and you then accompanied them?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: We know who the people were who went with, we do not have to cover that again.

MR MALAN: Before you continue Mr Visser, the purpose of the operation was the abduction, but you said that you discussed further details with Botha, or he discussed it with you.  Did he tell you what the purpose of the abduction was?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: The purpose of the abduction was then to recruit her as an informant.

MR MALAN: Did he talk to you or discuss with you about the possibility of success to recruit her as an informant?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: It was discussed Mr Chairperson.  I cannot remember the finer details.

MR MALAN: Did you think that the chances are good that she will be able to be recruited as an informant for the police?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, I thought that it was possible.

MR MALAN: No I am asking you if you think that it would be good, not impossible?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, I thought the chances were good.

MR MALAN: In other words the chances were better that she would be recruited?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Did Botha tell you this?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: I think that was my own opinion.

MR MALAN: At no stage he told you that it would be difficult to recruit her?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: I do not think in a percentage, I thought that the chances would be good to recruit her.

MR MALAN: You have heard his evidence, and if I can summarise it correctly, he said that in his mind she must be abducted, that she will be eliminated, except if she could be recruited.  Didn't he put it to you like that?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that possibility was there.

MR MALAN: No sir, it is not a possibility.  That is the framework in which Botha began this operation.  That is what he said to us.
	Not that it is possible that she will be eliminated, but that it would be a possibility and that she could - I think he used the expression, that she could save her own life by becoming an informant.

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, I knew that if she will not cooperate as an informant, she will be eliminated.

MR MALAN: But the probability was not shared with you, is that correct?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Not that I can remember of.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Your personal view was that it would be worthwhile to abduct her from Swaziland, because there is a possibility that she could have been recruited as an informant?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If you did not foresee that possibility and you just wanted to eliminate her, what would you have done then?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Then we would have eliminated her in Swaziland.

MR MALAN: Can I just ask you on what basis did you make this conclusion, was there something specific?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Before this incident, various other people or persons were recruited in this manner.

MR MALAN: But there was nothing specific in Ms Ndwandwe's actions that made you think that there is a chance now to recruit her, it was just because of other operations?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: If she had been eliminated in Swaziland, wouldn't there be a danger of a political scandal?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Mr Chairperson, not necessarily.  The ANC eliminated many of their own members in Swaziland, so if she were to be eliminated in Swaziland, fingers could be pointed to the ANC themselves.

CHAIRPERSON: But fingers may well be pointed at the South African Security Forces, might they not?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Certainly so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Particularly if a fairly large group in three different vehicles had crossed the Swazi border that morning?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: If it was about the elimination, we would not have used so many personnel or vehicles.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.  It is also true, is it not, and we know this from the facts, that Ndwandwe during the Ramlakan case, did indeed under Section 29 detention, apparently offer her cooperation?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct, she also made a Section 29 statement.

MR VISSER: In either event, as history has taught us, your feeling about this was incorrect, but let us first move into Swaziland.  Is it correct that you moved in three vehicles, Taylor's Nissan, the kombi and a bakkie?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence which was given by Wasserman and he has stated that you and him were basically together.

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with his breakdown of how it happened, where you went, first to Onverwacht, then up to Manzini, that you made observation in front of the bakkie, after you had given the bakkie to the two informers on the way to Manzini and that Ndwandwe climbed into the bakkie and that the bakkie moved behind you, you moved ahead.  The vehicle of Taylor, with Taylor, Botha and Forster inside, was driving behind the bakkie, is that correct?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that outside Manzini, Ms Ndwandwe was transferred from the bakkie to the kombi?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you then travelled in the direction of Culel?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that you turned then on the Hluti road?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you stopped after you had travelled that road for a short while, and Botha and Ndwandwe took shelter at the back of the bakkie, under a piece of canvass?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you and Wasserman were in front of the bakkie?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall that it rained on that evening, as we have heard?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.  We drove the bakkie in fourth wheel drive.

MR VISSER: It was a 4 x 4?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: When you were in Manzini, can you remember what time you were there, what time of the day?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: We were in Manzini at dusk.

MR VISSER: In October that would have been approximately what time?  Was it October?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Approximately 6 o'clock, half past six.

MR VISSER: Yes.  We know that the minibus was driven by Forster away from the border post, and the bakkie was driven out...

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: No, Wasserman and I drove the bakkie.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, I meant that Botha and Taylor were in Taylor's vehicle and that is how they moved out at the Culel border post?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also your recollection of the facts, that the two informers were dropped off and that they crossed the fence illegally to the other side?

SALMON JOHANNES GERHARDUS DU PREEZ: Yes, I assume that that is how it happened.