Amnesty Hearings — Umtata — 1998-08-24

MR KNIGHT: As senior officer to Mr Tshabalala, did Mr Tshabalala have room in which to question commands that was given to him by Mr Morse?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No.

MR KNIGHT: Would it have been possible for an Askari in Mr Tshabalala's position, to have had an agenda of his own, let me qualify that by saying it was put in cross-examination that he stood to gain more by having Mr Ndondo killed, than by taking him in for questioning?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR KNIGHT: If the operation or the object were to have been initially to kill Mr Ndondo, would the operation have been different in its format?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, I believe so.  Firstly no queries would have been issued, it wouldn't have been a day operation.  They could have done a grab operation at night, or they could have abducted him, to put it that way.  Therefore that would be my expert opinion that the original objective was not to kill somebody.

MR KNIGHT: I know that you were not present during the operation and I am going to ask you to speculate a little bit but with regard to your own operational experience.
	What would the situation have been from Captain Morse's perspective when the person taken in for questioning, Mr Ndondo, in fact managed to escape from the vehicle?  Why do you think Captain Morse would have at that stage ordered his subordinates to shoot?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe firstly and I believe that he believed that he was dealing with a trained member of the ANC or MK.  There were various categories of these persons who were in a neighbouring States, those who received quick training as well as more advanced training at later stages.
	The situation was that we had to do here with a trained member of the ANC.  When it comes to speculation, it could be that such an escape could have carried broader consequences such as the warning of a possibly operational cell in the area, the destruction of certain documents, shifting or transfer of certain weapons, or any other material.  However, that would be the speculate aspect to your question.

MR KNIGHT: In your experience, what would have become of Shosha, had it become known within the ANC that she was in fact driving in a minibus with tinted windows, with members of the Transkei Security Police as well as other unknown persons?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, all former members of the PAC or the ANC or Askaris as such, lived with the knowledge that they could killed or identified at any time.
	The fact that that person would have escaped or been arrested, would not have been of such importance, because ultimately the Askaris would have testified in court against such a captive member or the ANC or the PAC.
	It is so that reference was made to Mr X in the newspapers, however the ANC and the PAC would have known who Mr X was, because the defence would make that known.

MR KNIGHT: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNIGHT

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.  Mr Dilizo?

MR DILIZO: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Mr De Kock, firstly starting with the misleading of Parliament, was it the matter of practice within the Security Police in South Africa to make sure they mislead Parliament whenever it would be to its benefit as it was in the particular case, concerning Tshabalala in particular?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know.  I only had to do with this specific incident.
	An other incident which is not of relevance at this point, however it appears to be relevant, was a weapons stock piling point, which in co-operation with the CCB was built by Section C1 and C2 near Krugersdorp.   These weapons were found and this led to a light storm action on houses nearby.
	This led to a number of deaths of members of the public, apparently the wrong houses were attacked.  By nature of the situation, Parliament would have to be misled, but I don't know who the Generals were that were specifically involved in that incident.  This is just to give you a broader picture.

MR DILIZO: Yes, with regard to the denial concerning Tshabalala, so that untrue statement was carried through successfully up to Parliament?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR DILIZO: Again with regard to the question of the co-operation between the Transkei and the former RSA Security Police, why was it necessary that you should have some offices or Branches in Queenstown, Aliwal North, Barkly or East London and not in Transkei in particular?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, we couldn't move into Transkei because it was an independent State and if we had to arrest anybody there, we would have to bring that person out to the RSA, to the Republic, and in the court case, it would lead to a conflict of delivery.
	Not all my people were familiar with the Transkei, the environment and the languages spoken here.  The Security Branch in East London would have had the greatest level of interest within the Transkei and what was happening within the Transkei as a result of their border with Lesotho.
	I hope that is a sufficient answer for you.

MR DILIZO: Would you say the policemen who were involved and the Askaris involved in the operations, were informed of the whole purpose of the Security Police with regard to the political activists?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.  If I had to speak for myself, I would say yes, all particulars would be furnished.  I know Warrant Officer Naude and he would have given thorough particulars which would have been of pertinent application to the subject.
	I trust that he did do this, I do not have any doubt about that.

MR DILIZO: Would the people in the rank of Constables, like Dandala and other Askaris be involved in the planning and the formulation of the operations or whether that would be within the level of the seniors, the senior authorities in the Security Police?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I was in Barkly East, I saw that a group that would go and work in Queenstown, would be shown photographs of possible infiltrants or information about these persons, where these people's families were residing, where they might go drinking at shebeens and other bars.  They would be requested to investigate certain car rental or taxi ranks.
	The briefing session would be as thorough as possible, in order to guarantee success.

MR DILIZO: So for instance, let's take the - let me phrase it differently - in the event of a suspect or political activist trying to escape after the arrest from the police, and then the police including the Askaris start shooting that person, would your authorities first of all consider the appropriateness of the actions of shooting, or whether perhaps they would just condone those actions and make a cover up, to use the term?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is very difficult to provide an answer to that question.  What I can say is that given that time and the time level in which we are moving, the Republic was actually burning with activists, internal resistance against the government and if there had been anything which would have placed the South African, Transkei governments and the Security Police at a disadvantage, one would have expected that there would be a certain level of deception.

MR DILIZO: Would you say for instance whether in this case of the killing of Batandwa, whether the authorities had first of all considered whether Tshabalala, Morse and Dandala had acted lawfully in the shooting or not?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I really wouldn't be able to say.  I have studied the documents and it appears that there is a reasonable level of contradiction.
	I wouldn't be able to say how the authorities experienced it right there at the scene of the incident.  I am not trying to be obstructive or obstinate, but I really can't tell you.