Special Hearings — Mandela United Football Club Hearings — 1998-01-28

LODEWYK DE JAGER: I would not dispute that sir, but I would not be aware of that as Fanie was not in my team and neither was Louis Watermeyer.
 What actually happened, I was in my office that afternoon and we, I always had a two way radio on, and I heard Colonel Claassen reporting to Colonel Coetzee that in fact a firefight had taken place and that Fanie had passed on, and then I went up to General Coetzee's office and from there we managed the process as far as the admin was concerned, the writing of the telex, etc.
 That is as far as my knowledge of that goes.

MR RICHARDS: From the transcript, you have no doubt heard that the thesis of what was happening during that period was that you had Mrs Madikizela-Mandela's house with this variable number of people attached to it and there was to put it in one way, a paranoia about informers, leaks, impimpi's with the result that, well my client, according to his evidence, concedes that he killed four and attempted to murder one other on the basis that they were informers and he had so been instructed to do so by Mrs Mandela.
 Now wouldn't that sort of information have been of great interest to the Security Establishment?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: If we had known about it timeously yes, but I really cannot comment on this particular remark that you have made.  It would have been of importance yes, if we knew timeously that the man was supposed to be killed, but I might just mention Mr Chairman, that during those days as the gentleman there rightly said, there was a paranoia about informers and I think this Commission has in all probability heard the evidence how informers were dealt with.
 And I think it was a known fact that in order to get rid of a person, or to discredit him or whatever, you merely had to whisper that a person could possibly be an informer.  The only informer that I know about in my personal capacity and I learnt about it that afternoon, is the matter of the gentleman that has been mentioned.

MR RICHARDS: Thank you, you have answered my next question, but then to proceed.  From the evidence earlier today, we have the information that there were approximately 30 dockets in the process of preparation, investigation regarding Mrs Mandela and her household and her doings.
 Who in fact made the decisions as to what would happen in those matters, was it the Investigating Officer?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: If I might describe the procedure as I would see it.  I think an instruction would have come say from the Divisional Commander that on the basis of the information being received, that one should now look at this person with the intent of going to court and then a person would be appointed to start building a docket.
 That person would get the relevant information reports, whatever it might be, and start actually building a docket.  I think that instruction was given to Colonel Potgieter, if I am not mistaken.  What exactly went in there, how it was handled, when it went to the Attorney General, I really would bear no knowledge of that sir.

MR RICHARDS: There was some rather surprising evidence that when it came to investigation decisions and all the rest of the practical steps that were taken, difference was made and instructions were taken from the Attorney General at the time, Claus van Lierres, is that correct?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Sir, I bear not any knowledge of the investigative process and what went on with that.  I was involved in the intelligence gathering.
 All that I know is that during the many years in the Security Branch is that very seldom was any prosecution done without the specific instructions of the Attorney General, who then obviously would appoint a Prosecutor etc, etc.

MR RICHARDS: So that then follows that it is correct that even to the detail of whether to classify a particular investigation as political or common law, the Attorney General was referred to and his guidance sought?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: I really cannot comment in total on that, but I would presume and as I said, my experience is that the Attorney General most of the times, had a say as to who should be prosecuted for what.

MR RICHARDS: In other words, the conclusion is correct that the Attorney General of the time was indeed part and parcel of the Security Establishment of the time?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: No, with all due respect, I think Mr von Lierres would not feel kindly about the remark, as such.  He was a person with an office in his own right, and I think he was fiercely independent too not to have anybody interfere with him or prescribe to him, sir.
 That is my experience of Mr von Lierres on the one or two occasions that I did meet the gentleman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Richards, where are you taking us?

MR RICHARDS: No further questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Are there any other questions?

MR DU TOIT: Mr du Toit, on behalf of the Pretorius family.

CHAIRPERSON: Please go ahead.

MR DU TOIT: Mr de Jager, I didn't hear clearly.  Could you explain to us again the task of Louis Watermeyer?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: In broad terms he was a section head of a certain section which among others included Fanie Pretorius as part of his direct personnel.
 Fanie was an informant handler who would report to Mr Watermeyer with regard to the information gathered in whatever sense.

MR DU TOIT: I think that you used the term that his section was involved with the Mandela household, is that so?  In broad terms, I understand that part of his sections were among others to look at what went on at the Mandela household.

LODEWYK DE JAGER: We had a reasonably broad distribution of personnel who dealt with things like the PAC, SYCO etc, and part of Fanie's duties may have been to see to what was going on in Mrs Mandela's house.

MR DU TOIT: What was the duties of a handler when he got information?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: If one bears in mind that the opposition of that time had disinformation campaigns, then one didn't immediately react to a certain single person's information.
 Depending again of course on circumstances.  In the investigation into organisations and people who lived in the townships at that stage, overt investigations, you could, but information in connection with trained cadres and so forth, we reacted at the first moment that we got the information, that is also why we lay traps for them as it were.  In this case I think that Fanie would have let his handler know.

MR DU TOIT: Is it your information that it was indeed Pretorius who reported to his handler?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: No sir, in broad terms again, that was not my field.  Each informer also had a co-handler and the real handler in case the real handler was not available.  So, maybe it was the co-handler and not ...

MR DU TOIT: Was there a James  Radebe on your staff at that stage?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes sir, I certainly remember that name.

MR DU TOIT: Were you ever involved in action with the Riot Unit in Soweto to have a look at the situation of taking out cadres?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes, I imagine so.  There were many actions be that in terms of the emergency regulations or in terms of riots.  I think I know what you are aiming at, it was practice for most of us who had certain forms of training at that stage to call in the Riot Unit and sometimes we did the house penetrations ourselves, because we had had training in the Riot Unit.
 Some of the other people had done the same training.

MR DU TOIT: Was there any standard drills or prescriptions as to when the Riot Units would go with the Security Branch?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes, if they called us we preferred them to do the house penetrations because they had the best bullet vests available, and the vests they had was what we called chopper jackets.  They were the only jackets that could stop an AK bullet at that stage.

MR DU TOIT: To put it clearly the Riot Units had better jackets?