Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-13

MR VISSER: I can tell you right now Mr Chairman, that Steyn will give the evidence as I put it here today and that is that the order that he gave at the time when he said abduct her, it was already in their minds very clear, that if she could not be, her services could not be elicited, then that there would only be one option.

MR MALAN: Okay, that is fine then.

MR VISSER: We are very aware of the way in which the statement reads Mr Chairman, but we are here to tell you the truth and if it deviates from the statement, well, then so be it.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I am not challenging that, I am saying that the information before us thus far, does not substantiate what you are giving us at the moment, because there was a reference to Steyn's application which is not in that order, and you are telling us that it deviates and you will deal with it when Steyn comes to us, it deviates from what is before us at the moment.
	Let me be very specific because you will have to deal with that, in Steyn's application he says that his consideration of the alternatives, only took place at the safe house, after the abduction and let's not do a summary which is not before us at the moment, please.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with all due respect.

CHAIRPERSON: You can deal with that when you come to Steyn's evidence.

MR VISSER: But Mr Chairman, Botha gave evidence about this, and he made it perfectly clear that at the time when they made the representation, Taylor and himself to Steyn, the consideration of her elimination was already in their minds.
	That was very clear Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: That is indeed so, but he didn't mention Steyn's involvement in that consideration.  He simply talked about the presentation and that the elimination was very clear in their minds, not in Steyn's, because he addressed us on the presentation to Steyn.

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: (still under oath)

MR VISSER: (continued)   That is indeed correct.  All right, Mr Botha, you have listened to the summary which I have given thus far and yesterday you got to the point where you ...

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Where you referred to the date of the 4th of November at the bottom of page 7 of volume 2 and now I am going to page 8 of volume 2.
	You already said that during the afternoon of the 4th of November, you, yourself, Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen by means of information which was given by informers, succeeded to arrest Nxiweni, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: And you took him to a safe house in Verulam where he was interrogated?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also said that in his case, you assaulted him?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That was during the interrogation?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the interrogation dealt with his unit and his own participation in the acts of terror which you referred to when you spoke about Ndwandwe?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you carry on from there please, and inform us about what exactly transpired there during that interrogation of the afternoon of the 4th of November?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the interrogation dealt mainly with the arms which we hadn't found yet, as well as the other members of units under his charge, the identification of them, communication channels to Swaziland, safe houses.  In other words the infrastructure as was used by him and his unit under his command.
	This questioning wasn't continuous because the place where he was detained, also served as my office, and I worked from there covertly.

MR VISSER: Why was it necessary to assault him?

MR BOTHA: He did not always want to respond to the questions asked and it was necessary to put pressure on him, in order to get an answer from him.

MR VISSER: Was it a serious assault?

MR BOTHA: He was hit with both a clenched fist and he was slapped.

MR VISSER: Where on his body?

MR BOTHA: On his body, on his face, he was slapped in his face.

MR VISSER: Now you are making a distinction, you say on the body and he was slapped in the face.

MR BOTHA: He was hit on his body with a clenched fist and he was slapped through his face.

MR VISSER: What was the end of that, did he tell you anything?

MR BOTHA: During this interrogation, information did come forward.

MR VISSER: What was that?

MR BOTHA: He spoke about an explosion the previous night, which was caused by him and members of his unit at the Rosborough railway station.

MR VISSER: Is that an issue which is mentioned in Exhibit A on page 36, the second item under the date 3rd of November 1988?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Which says Rosborough railway station, SBM limpet mine and then below reference CR38/11/84?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What did he tell you about that explosion?

MR BOTHA: He said that he and members of his unit were involved in that explosion.

MR VISSER: We also referred to the KwaMashu unit and you refer in your application to an Allan Taylor unit, are we talking about the same thing here, or are they two different units?

MR BOTHA: They are two different units, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well.  Would you please continue?

MR BOTHA: The interrogation took place during the course of the day, from time to time I interrogated him.
	It was started the evening, and it was continued the next day, and I had to win time, in order to determine if he was at the Kingspark Stadium where it took place, or the fact that his absence in the Allan Taylor unit would cause us problems, and because of that, I had to communicate with an informer of mine.

MR VISSER: Why would his arrest create problems for you?

MR BOTHA: If he was missing, there would have been communication to Swaziland or communication to other units, then it is information that you can use to your own advantage in identifying the unit because usually such a warning would take place if a Commander becomes missing.

MR VISSER: Do you say that when he was arrested, the idea that he would be eliminated was already there?

MR BOTHA: I already had that in mind.  Nxiweni would have been eliminated.

MR VISSER: Very well.  Did you talk to him about the information you obtained from Ndwandwe?

MR BOTHA: That information was confirmed by him, some of the information.  I cannot say what exactly he confirmed, but there was also new information which he gave us.
	Also that that evening of the 4th, they would have been responsible for an act of terror, referring to some of his people.

MR VISSER: That is in Exhibit A, page 36, the third item, the Montclair railway line?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.  Whilst I stayed with Pumeso ...

MR VISSER: Just before you continue, I want to ask you Mr Botha, when you arrested Pumeso and you say to the Committee that you already had it in mind that he would be eliminated, I want to ask you what was your conviction or belief with regards to Pumeso's role in the violence here in Durban at that point in time?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the day of his arrest and two months prior to that, if you go back to Exhibit A and you look at the dates of the events which took place, you will see that 14 acts of terror took place in two months.  There was a lot of pressure on us to find a solution and to stop this wave of terror.
	I had a responsibility to gather the information, or the intelligence.  I have already referred earlier in my evidence to the fact that the situation in Natal drastically changed and no one was playing according to rules any more.  I made a decision by looking at the circumstances and also at his involvement in these acts of terror.
	The fact that he was a Commander who was in charge of other units, would have led to the fact that his elimination would also minimise the violence it might have been stopped by eliminating him.