Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-09

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman in most cases, maybe I should just raise one point. The commanders, the regional commanders were under enormous pressure and all areas with the main focal points in Joburg, Durban and in the Western Cape, theoretically speaking he fell under the security head office but practically he fell under the divisional commander in that region, but also for the purpose of stabilising an area he was also a representative on the JMS system, and in the third instance he also fell under head office for operational purposes.  There was enormous pressure on him from all these quarters to stabilise the situation.
 So depending on the threat, in practice, below commander level he would have to go to his regional head where the matter would be fully discussed with either that person or his deputy and the situation would be discussed against the threat at that stage and in many cases it was preceded by several acts of terror, maybe five or six in quick succession which then created panic.  
 The threat analysis would have been discussed with the commander and then the options, the possible options would also be discussed.  But when we talk about a threat we also talk not only about what was happening but who was responsible for it, what strategy was being followed, what they still intended to do, what the results might be if there wasn't quick action. These weren't just arbitrary decisions, it's not only that these people had to be eliminated but this matter was discussed.  
 It is also so that the regional commander, there were a number of divisions and each division was responsible for a certain part of the threat. I can't say that I got permission from head office, I got instructions from my regional commander and I was part of intelligence service, the operative on the ground was satisfied that the threat had been analysed, all the options had been discussed and that his commander would take the decision or would have cleared this with head office.

MR GOOSEN: And at all points in the discussion as it were, seen from the point of view of the operative then, who would then ultimately carry out that particular operation, if I understand your evidence correctly, at that period both lawful and unlawful options were available, in other words it was understood, that both lawful and unlawful means could be utilised in the process of dealing with any one particular situation, is that correct?

UNKNOWN: No that's not quite correct, when we talk about legal options the question was, were these able to be executed.  If the situation was such that no witnesses could be produced or that reporters were killed or that policemen would be killed, if the law was rendered inoperative then alternative options would be considered and were also executed.

MR GOOSEN: With reference to, or you use the words yourself, elimineering, uithaal and so on, from your experience and you perspective within the Security Police at the time, how did you understand that terminology, those phrases?

UNKNOWN: It means what it says, to kill that's clear.

MR GOOSEN: Chairman if you'll just bear with me for a second please.  Thank you Mr Chairperson. Brigadier Oosthuizen you yourself assumed an important position.  You were a senior officer in the Security Police at the time, as your rank indicates, and I accept the fact that the first port of call was whether a legal mechanism for dealing with the problem would be evaluated and only in circumstances where that was not deemed to be feasible, if you like, to use that term, would resort be had to illegal mechanisms.  From your experience within the Security Police was that perspective shared by you senior officers and by those officers that worked in close collaboration with you in D Section and other sections of the Security Police?

UNKNOWN: It is difficult to say, the security branch had various components. When we talk about operative level, which was about 32% of the whole, it wasn't a culture or a norm but it was an option which had been discussed, especially in those areas where the threat was severe.

MR GOOSEN: Would you say that the same applied at a leadership level within the Security Police at the time, that perspective?

UNKNOWN: My own assumption was that you must accept he would not easily give an illegal order, not at general level. Therefore in many cases people said, why didn't the generals not issue these orders?  I can speak from personal conviction, I never received an illegal instruction from a general.  What did happen was that a matter would be presented to somebody like a general and his answer would be, you are at the scene, act in the best interest of the community.  But in my whole career I never heard an order saying go and eliminate someone, and I never knew of anybody who got such an order.

MR GOOSEN: And would you say that he would have interpreted that as an implied authorisation to carry out also illegal actions where it was deemed by the operatives who were dealing with the matter to be appropriate to do so and in the best interests of the country? Would that be correct.

UNKNOWN: I wouldn't regard it as an authorisation or an order, I would call it a sanction, that action would be sanctioned.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much.  Mr Chairperson I don't have any further questions for the witness, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson I just wanted to follow up with you Brigadier the issue of words like elimineer, uittewis and so on. You indicated that to your mind of thinking there was only one meaning and that was straightforwardly killing the person. Did I hear you correctly?

UNKNOWN: That is quite correct Chairperson.

MR LAX: Did you ever discuss such meanings with other people or with your fellow officers or, we're just trying to get a sense of, you said it wasn't a culture per se but there was clearly that ambit went further than yourself and one would just like to get a sense of how far, how broad was that understanding in your experience.

UNKNOWN: I just want to make a point.  Now when we talk about eliminate in retrospect the JWS was militarily propelled and this terminology was more common to the defence force.  That word eliminate virtually did not exist in police language, which in police language someone would say we would have to make a plan and then that would be a reference to eliminate.  There are two clear differences. What I will admit is that eliminate as it stands meant to kill, that was part of an option, but when the option was discussed by police the word eliminate would not be used.

MR LAX: You know one is familiar with terms like take out if one uses the English, take somebody out, that was fairly wide usage, it became common parlance even in ordinary everyday language of ordinary vernacular amongst ordinary people. So the point I'm trying to make in a sense is that in many ways white South African society became quite militarised.  Major Williamson made reference to that in his discussion with us and terms like that became common parlance. You would hear of people being taken out, you wouldn't hear of people being killed or murdered.  That was just the way things were and I'm just trying to understand if you're in agreement with that.

UNKNOWN: That's quite correct but I want to expand a bit.  What you say today we are saying retrospectively. At no stage did any operative regard himself as a murderer or a criminal, that's why terms like murder or criminal terms simply did not form parts of the vocabulary. Disappear, take away, disappear, but from a war - seen in a war context that is what happened.

MR LAX: Ja we appreciate that gloss that you put on it and we understand that.