Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: Now, this document - the covering letter was handed in as Exhibit E2, page 17, and it is part of paragraph 11 of the TRC's documents supplied to my clients.  As I have said earlier this document, the covering letter itself, if one looks at it, was prepared by Colonel van Niekerk for the signatures of both the Chief of Staff Intelligence, Admiral Pitter, and the Chief of the South African Defence Force, General Geldenhuys.  Paragraph 1 of this letter reads as follows.  In Afrikaans I quote.
 /"On 19th
"On 19th December 1986 a submission under the reference SD/311/7/7 was made by General-Major Groenewald to the Minister of Defence concerning SADF assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi and Bishop Lekanyane.  This submission is attached hereto as background.  Since then assistance to Minister Buthelezi at the highest level has been approved, but no decision as been attained regarding assistance to Bishop Lekanyane."
Now, Groenewald testified in the Msani trial that he made a statement to the police before his arrest.  What actually happened, before he was notified that he will be arrested two or three of the members of the ITU appeared in his offices in Cape Town, gave him about 10 documents, if I remember correctly, and asked him to make a statement.  Now, he made a statement.  He admitted in this statement that he used van Niekerk's 19th of December document to brief the Minister.  That's what he said in his police statement.  The briefing took place shortly before the State Security Council meeting of the 20th of December '85.  
He testified in court that he made a mistake in this regard.  The reason for making such a mistake was that not all the relevant documentation pertaining to the Operation Marion was showed to him by the Investigating Task Unit.  It was only after his arrest, and after he was supplied with all the relevant documentation, that he realised that he personally had nothing to do with Bishop Lekanyane, and therefore did not brief the Minister with the document of
 /the 19th
the 19th of December at hand.  What he in fact used was the document dated the 25th of December '85, in other words the first letter that he wrote, reporting what Chief Minister Buthelezi said to him, as well as the telex dated the 9th of December 1985 - that's the letter written by Mr Buthelezi to Mr Hans Meyer - to inform the Minister.  Van Niekerk's incorrect assumption, as set out in the covering letter, was the reason for the misunderstanding, because in the first paragraph of that covering letter van Niekerk states that Groenewald used his document dated the 19th of December to brief the Minister, but that's an assumption made by van Niekerk, and that assumption was carried through when Groenewald gave his statement to the police.  One must remember that was approximately 10 years after the incident occurred.  It's a long time, and if anybody says to me there's a letter confirming in '86, or whatever the case - or '86, early '86, saying I made a recommendation to somebody on the basis of another document, I will accept it.  But if I start preparing the matter, and I find out exactly I didn't have anything to do with Lekanyane, I will rectify it.  And Groenewald came along and he testified and he said this to the Court.  I mean there's no reason to disbelieve him.  
Now, the point U am trying to make is Varney makes a huge point out of this.  Varney makes an issue out of the fact that it is stated in this covering letter - now I quote in Afrikaans,
"Since then assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi has been approved at the highest level."
Now, as it is apparent from the previous paragraphs, the
 /SSC referred
SSC referred the matter to Ministers Heunis and Malan to investigate and to determine the aims and the needs of Buthelezi.  If the aims and needs were already determined, and if assistance has been granted to Buthelezi, there was no need for General Groenewald and other members of the Defence Force to visit Mr Buthelezi on the 12th of February 1986, an aspect that we will discuss in the next paragraph.  Now, the only point we're making is that all those assumptions made by van Niekerk in that first paragraph of the covering letter are incorrect.
Then we go on.  General Geldenhuys testified that he received this letter, together with the 19th of December '85 document, the van Niekerk document attached thereto, on the 10th of February '86.  Geldenhuys explained in the Msani trial that after reading this document - that's now the van Niekerk document - he wrote certain instructions as it appears on page 5 of the 19 December document.  See for instance the note next to paragraph 3 of the covering letter.  If you look at the covering letter you will see on the right-hand side there's a small note, "See page 5."  If you have the covering letter in front of you you will see it.  Ja, it says there in Afrikaans,
"Yes, see note, page 5,"
and, 
"Liaise with SAP and NI."
The note on page 5 reads - quote in Afrikaans,
"This section only deals with the principle.  There should be a security plan issued in the shape of a security order or instructions to ensure security."
 /Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3 of the covering letter makes it quite clear that the only mandate that was required by the Chief of Staff Intelligence was a mandate to make contact with the SSC.  The reference in the first paragraph to Chief Minister Buthelezi is totally irrelevant for purposes of the authority requested in this letter from Geldenhuys.  Varney, however, tries to link this 19th of December document and the instructions written by Geldenhuys to a handwritten note by Pitter dated the 5th of March 1986, Exhibit E2, page 80.
Now, according to what he said there - I quote from what Varney says,
"Pitter gave instructions for the direction of Geldenhuys to be carried out, and that liaison in this regard should take place with HDMI and DTI.  He also called for close co-operation with the SAP.  This document was stapled in a bundle between 10 February '86 memo, E2, page 17, and the 19th of December '85, E2, page 9, documents.  It is not known what Geldenhuys' instruction was.  Compare page 72 of the Varney report."
Now, footnote 172 of the Varney report reads as follows.
"Groenewald was HDMI.  This reference casts doubt on his claim that he had no further connection to Operation Marion following the Liebenberg report.  Compare also page 92 of Varney's report."
 /Now, we
Now, we submit that to say it is not known what Geldenhuys' instructions was is purposely projecting false ignorance.   Geldenhuys explained, as set out above, and in accordance with the court record in the Msani trial, that he received the 10th of February 1986 document with the 19th of December '85 document attached to it.  Varney now refers to a handwritten note in between these two documents.  Geldenhuys' instructions was clear as it appears on the cover letter dated the 10th of February 1986.  All this was testified in court under oath.  The question is why does Varney pretend not to know?  It creates impressions to the detriment of General Geldenhuys.  
A similar distortion appears in footnote 172 in regards to Groenewald.  HDMI is a name of a position.  At about this time Groenewald relinquished his post.  He was transferred to another post in other words.  This is well documented and confirmed under oath and cross-examination.  See, for example, the document dated the 18th of February 1986, Exhibit E2, page 39 and page 40, paragraph 3, where he specifically requested to be released from this whole assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi. 
I am now moving to another document.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask one small clarification, rather than having to go back later and then bring it up?  Do I understand you correctly that your client's instructions are that this document that we've been referring to of 19 December has no bearing on KwaZulu whatsoever?