Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MARITZ: Mr Chairman may I just record another facet of this. This isn't a free for all. The lines have been drawn very clearly in the notices that we have received and in the documentation that we've received. This enquiry relates to the activities as we understand it of the State Security Council. That's what we're here for. It's not a free for all. And I would sound the caution is that we're going to object very strenuously to it being turned into a free for all. If we can direct our attention at the object of this exercise then I'll be happier.

MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson this in fact falls directly within the realm of the responsibilities of the State Security Council. In fact if you looked at the testimony provided by Minister Botha, he indicates that he was shocked to discover that the cross-border raid, a simultaneous cross-border raids in Gaberone, Maseru and Maputo were not discussed or approved by either the State Security Council or Cabinet. And what we are attempting to endeavour is to ascertain, particularly because the State Security Council had laid out very clear guidelines as to the authorisation procedures for cross-border raids. Whether in fact that is 1; the case and 2; whether Minister Malan outside any of those structures did in fact give approval? Is I submit directly relevant.

MARITZ: Mr Chairman with respect, let's get on with it. Let him ask the questions and we'll see how it goes.

MR LYSTER: Okay the question is then; did General Malan know about the cross-border raids into those three towns which have been mentioned, before they took place? And I suppose a follow up question is; did he authorise them and if so with who?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairman. I want to focus your attention on the fact that the names of the towns are wrong. Maputo was not included. I think one should look at this matter historically and I wish to explain it in that spirit because there is no clear cut answer to this matter. Firstly one should look at which circumstances prevailed at that time. I've previously told you that in 1985 the republic was declared an operational area. The Defence Force was activated and this was an indication of the escalation against South Africa. In one of the documents I've read about the increase and with the limited expertise I have and over a period to remember twelve years back, especially when you retired. There was an increase in terrorist activities. If I look at 1982 there was 39, 1983 - 56 and 1984 - 44. 1985 - 136. It's a 300 percent increase. It's an indication that there was a tremendous escalation.
 If you think about the state of emergency. The first one was declared in 1983. It gives you an indication that the escalation has started. The intelligence sources of all the agencies referred to this escalation. If I can remember correctly the president of the ANC, Mr Tambo said in, declared 1986 as the year of Umkhonto weSizwe. I perused these documents you've provided. I just want to find the specific place. And annexure I, we've referred to this previously. I just want to see whether I'm at the correct place. Here you refer to the minutes of the security council and that's regarding certain problem areas in the counter revolutionary warfare. You see there was a deterioration in domestic security. There should be legislation it is mentioned and all this was an indication that certain things were happening. In H of these documents provided to me and I thank you for these. In H there's an indication of ANC terrorists infiltrating. 
 On request of the State President he gathered the various security agencies and says he wanted intelligence or information of what was going on. It was 1986. The Defence Force and the police met, they did certain planning and they identified targets should there be defence mechanism. Cross-border operations essentially influences domestic activities. There will be a decrease in activities in the country because the head quarters are destabilised. The communication lines are destabilised. And therefore after the Defence Force made this joint planning they required that three countries or three targets should simultaneously because of the interdependency, should be attacked. This would have been a bad influence on the ANC. There were certain safe houses, certain parafares(?), there were stores, there were other facilities available. I want to add that these countries had often been warned. These host countries they were warned by the department of foreign affairs that there were ANC members there and they were involved in terror attacks against the republic and they were requested to take the necessary steps against the ANC. And it was spelt out, otherwise the republic would necessarily defend themselves.
 In the 24th of April information was obtained that the ANC had made provision that the republic would attack them. The inference was drawn because of a white paper supplied by the government on the 23rd of April 1986. And if I can remember correctly it was during that time that America attacked Libya. I'm talking under correction. It was the international climate at that time and the ANC read all this very well, they understood it very well.
 The Defence Force's request was that in the second, that this operation should be executed the second half of April. They approached me, I approached the State President. I asked his approval. I explained and he gave his approval. It was an approved operation therefore. Like all sensitive operations, sensitive in the sense that should there be any leakages there would be a loss of human lives, etc. The State President told me to keep quiet about this, this is very sensitive. And at that stage the ANC had already penetrated certain departments, so leakages could take place. 
 However because of all the reasons I've provided and for various other reasons the Defence Force decided that they could not undertake that operation during the second half of April. And then in the middle of May they approached me and asked me whether they could now launch that operation for which approval had been given. I approached the State President again, explained the matter and obtained his approval. You should remember you do not speak about this very light heartedly. There could be loss of lives for example and the second aspect is I can't decide about this all by myself. Because there would be international complications.
 There type of operations had a tremendous, obtained a media coverage internationally. And you can think for yourselves if the head of the Defence Force approved this type of operation, I did not have the competency to do that. But in any case this operation took place on the 19th. The eminence persons group visited South Africa during the same time. I was not aware of their programme, I was not aware of what they were doing here. I've never met them and I only was concerned with the onslaught against South Africa. And on the 19th we launched the attack.
 After that operation no colleague or anybody else came to me and complained about this operation or even mentioned the operation. There was one party in the parliament who locally investigated. They approached the head of the Defence Force and they said they thought it was an overkill. That was the criticism. I'm just glad that the EPG's interpretation was and they stated categorically: That the decision to discontinue the discussions." I answered your question completely now I think.