Amnesty Hearings — Umtata — 1998-08-24

MR DILIZO: When looking at the subsequent conduct by authorities, including you, with regard to this matter, my impression is that the authorities did not look at the appropriateness of the conduct of these three, that is Morse, Tshabalala and Dandala, but on your side you proceeded with the question of the verification of his document and that according to the evidence of Dandala and Tshabalala, Tshabalala appeared once or twice in court, and thereafter never appeared and that it was Dandala who appeared alone and again the case did not proceed any further, up to now?
	The impression I am having is that it would appear that the authorities had condoned those actions without having considered whether these three had initially acted lawfully or not in the killing.  I don't know whether you get my point?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, I will concede to that.  I will refer to the later Harms Commission in 1989 which was a cover up of Olympic standards.

MR DILIZO: So, would this subsequent conduct by the authorities, not mislead a person in the position like Dandala a Constable, that his actions whether they acted excessively or wrongfully, they were condoned in the circumstances?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Under the circumstances of that time, both internally and in the independent home lands, actions against terrorism if I may put it that way, were not frowned upon.
	There was also the mentality that this would take place at whatever cost.  I believe that Morse, Tshabalala and Dandala would have believed that although according to the law and departmental stipulations, the law was not entirely met with, it would still enjoy the approval of the government.

MR DILIZO: So, that would be the case even if they had acted excessively in the shooting or not, the authorities would not more strictly concern themselves with the appropriateness of the actions?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I must just qualify that a trained member of MK or APLA was seen in a completely different light than a burglar or a car thief.   The psyche among the members of the Security Police and the Counter-Insurgency community was that a terrorist had received military training and was dangerous.
	He couldn't just be your equal, he could be even more skilled than you, and to be the second one to shoot, would lead you to your grave.  If you shot first, you would win.  If you shot second, you would die.
	That was a mental state of the operators and the workers, especially on ground level where most of the injuries were received, that was the mentality of the members.
	That which would appear to be excessive, would not be excessive for the operative on ground level.

MR DILIZO: Which could therefore also mean that when dealing with a trained so-called terrorist then, one would not have been expected a person like Dandala, Morse or Tshabalala to have given a warning shot before actually shooting, because it was a question of either you dying, or him dying?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes.  In this case they were not fired upon and one wouldn't know exactly what their thoughts were at that moment in time.
	I think it is a myth which has existed for quite a number of years, during my training there were departmental orders that there was no such thing as a warning shot.
	A warning shot would land somewhere and it could hit somebody innocent.  I have never in my life, fired a warning shot because to whom, or at what am I shooting?  I must just mention this in passing.

MR DILIZO: So, in which case therefore you would also not regard the conduct of either Dandala, Morse or Tshabalala as reprehensive in that one of them shot at the Batandwa Ndondo without first giving a warning shot?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No Chairperson.  In counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism training, one would shoot at one's target immediately.  In counter-insurgency there would be no warning, you would shoot first.

MR DILIZO: I also take it that the same would apply to the so-called excessiveness in the shooting, that is the number of shots, would not matter in those circumstances?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I wouldn't be able to agree with that.  The number of shots are too many, but from the experience which I had in Namibia, I found that while a man was running, you would shoot.  That would be the basis psyche.
	I have seen people running with five or six shots, I have seen people running with leg wounds.  I have seen someone running with a wound in his chest and people would carry on shooting and only later on would one discover that this person has five or six shots on his body.
	We are talking about heavy calibre fire.  People continue shooting, because they believe that they are missing.  That is the experience which I had.  I can't speak for others.
	However, the number of shots is a lot, and I would say that it is excessive.  However, I don't want to eliminate the possibility that while he continued running, they continued shooting, that is a possibility.

MR DILIZO: The reason why I am asking this question is the impression I am having is that, if one in the insurgency situation would shoot to kill, therefore the number of subsequent shots would be immaterial, even if you were successful with the first shot.  That is the picture I am having in my mind in the consideration of your answers?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, if the first shot was a hard shot, I don't believe that there would have been any other shot, however I am speculating.
	If he had stopped running, they might not have continued shooting.  However, that is speculation.

MR DILIZO: So would it be possible more specific in the insurgency situation for a person to shoot to kill, because if he doesn't, his opponent will shoot to kill him?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I have never fired any shot other than to kill in counter-insurgency.  I would shoot to kill, that would be it.

MR DILIZO: So, coming to the question of the Askaris, so I take it that the Askaris were such people that, whose identity had to be concealed from the members of the public, and more in particular, from the members of the MK or the APLA?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: From the public yes.  From MK and APLA, we would not be able to conceal it, because they were already familiar to MK and APLA.  What MK and APLA did not know was whether these people were working for the Security Police or not.
	The lack of such knowledge of whether or not they were working for the Security Police, would be a lack of intelligence gathering on the behalf of MK or APLA, possibly weak information or communication channels.

MR DILIZO: Which would therefore mean for instance in this particular case, that the knowing of Shosha and Tshabalala by the members of the ANC, would be detrimental to the functioning of the Security duties?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes.  However, it would not have been such a great obstruction, because Shosha did testify regarding certain ANC matters, Tshabalala also testified in ANC matters and I have no doubt that the ANC would have known that these two persons were working for the Security Police, they testified against some of their own people, who were ultimately convicted.
	It wouldn't have been familiar to those in the camps.  There is reference in "The Fog of War" by Van Klausowitz that communication and intelligence systems are insufficient and can give the wrong information to the wrong people, and lead to the wrong decisions as a result.

MR DILIZO: Would you say it was highly incumbent upon Dandala, Morse and Tshabalala to do their utmost best to see to it that Batandwa did not escape, more in particular after he had identified Shosha?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I wouldn't say that.