Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-07-26

MR CORNELIUS: Lastly, the placing of the ambush was of such a nature that there would be no loss of life with the community, it was a safe area that you had selected between two plantations, is that correct?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius.  Mr Booyens, do you have any questions?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
	Mr de Kock, it doesn't appear from your application or from your evidence, so I would just like to clear one thing up.  Insofar as the Swaziland aspect of the second operation was concerned, you did say that you discussed the second operation with Brig Schoon.  Was the Swaziland aspect to your recollection, also discussed with him, or wasn't it discussed?  I would just like clarity about that.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it emanated from a later discussion with Mr Pienaar and Mr Deetlefs as I recall and as a Commander of C1 and Counter-Insurgency, I could independent decisions.  It was expected of one to take decisions and to assume leadership, that is why one was in that position.  And one would bear all the responsibilities associated with that position,
whether it be success or failure.

MR BOOYENS: And Mr Tait informs me that he was made aware of the fact that the intention of the Swaziland component of the operation was indeed that the people that they were supposed to attack in Swaziland, were indeed responsible for the infiltration of cadres into the country and people who were in fact bent on destruction and murdering people in South Africa, and that was indeed explained to him.  So they were aware who they were supposed to attack in Swaziland.  Would that be correct?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.
	Mr de Kock, what was your rank at that stage?  I'm referring now to both incidents then.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I was a Major, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Regarding the second operation, who was in command?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Well it would have been me, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that one of the important reasons why the persons had to be eliminated in Swaziland, was also specifically to protect the source?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, not exactly, it may have been a peripheral issue.  I know however, that the idea was discussed that if we could kill these two persons there, the source would be able to point out the facilities where the rest of the group waited for infiltration.  Even if not on that night, on a following night we would be able to eliminate them successfully.

MR LAMEY: Is it also your recollection that Mr Nortje was transferred from C1 to C2 after Island Rock?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible that it happened there, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Upon the request of Brig Schoon, or his order?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it your evidence that Brig Schoon, before the second ambush, was informed that it was going to take place and that is enjoyed his approval?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: He knew that there would be a second potential infiltration because I had to tell him why I was remaining behind, because we travelled together from Island Rock to Moolman.  And it was informed to him as such.

MR LAMEY: Was it also your request that the facts afterwards - and I'm also referring specifically to the second incident, that the facts be constructed to created the false impression of a properly set up roadblock, or were you a member to that discussion or that prescription?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, I was part of that discussion.  That was just to avoid the ambush issue because an ambush indicates an intention to kill.  Since 1967 and my first session of training, up to that day, no ambush would be set up with any other intention than to shoot and kill.

MR LAMEY: And did you also have the request that your involvement be removed from the second incident?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Did you make any statement regarding the second incident?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, we went through to Vlakplaas that morning after the shooting.  I wrote a statement, among others that I had been in command and when I wanted to take it through to Piet Retief, I telephoned so that Mr Pienaar could expect me there and he informed me that Deetlefs had already submitted a statement in which he stated that he fired the shots, that he shot the person at the door.
	And later I had to hand in my uzzi at the Piet Retief Security Branch because I think a Mr Klatso, who was retained by the families as their representative, wanted to undertake ballistic tests on the firearm and my gun spent quite some time in the vault at Piet Retief.

MR LAMEY: Regarding the statement which you gave in the light of the Piet Retief incident, was this statement ever used according to your knowledge?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, as far as I know it never became part of the dossier.

MR LAMEY: Do you know why?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I simply assumed in my simplicity, that Deetlefs may be looking to score extra points for himself, a pat on the shoulder.  I may be wrong, but that was my opinion at that stage.  It doesn't mean that I'm right.

MR LAMEY: I assume that you knew that Mr Nortje made a statement and that he basically would have to go along with the idea that it was presented that this had been a roadblock?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I think you touched upon this in your evidence, but the fact that Manzini - that was the member of the Detective Branch, who had to give the signal that the passengers in the minibus were armed, he had to jump out of the vehicle and run around the front side of it and get away from the scene.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, as far as I can recall, upon arrival at the ambush point the indicator lights had to flicker from sharp to dull and that would give us a pre-warning and then he would have to pull away or pull over into the ambush area.  The driver would have to jump out and run around the front of the vehicle.  In other words, in the same direction or line as that in which we had been set up for the ambush.

MR LAMEY: But the fact that he had to jump out and run away would be an important sign to indicate that the passengers were armed?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that would be indicative of the fact that they were armed.

MR LAMEY: Then my instructions from Mr Nortje are that he was diagonally behind you when the person with the AK47 emerged from the door and he confirms what you say, that the person did indeed climb out of the vehicle with an AK47, and he also confirms that he in his mind also expected that this person would open fire any minute and the fact that you also fired was a signal to the other members to open fire, is that correct?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.  I expected that the person who climbed out was going to shot me.  I couldn't get him flat on the ground from such a distance.

MR LAMEY: And then it is also Mr Nortje's recollection that to eliminate your involvement in the incident was requested.  Is that your recollection?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, because my statement was written and typed and I wanted to send it through to Piet Retief.  It wouldn't help to fax it because my original statement had to form part of the file.  And this was not my request.

MR LAMEY: Could you not have requested this from anybody after you had made your statement?