Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-10-14

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.  I have to take some time to get my breath back because the last part of your presentation is a deeply moving one.  Thank you very much.  I am sure my colleagues and I will be wanting to say a great deal more than this in response to a contribution that I hope will reverberate in our country for the purpose of the healing of this country.  I just want to say in a preliminary way thank you very, very much indeed for having made this contribution.  Thank you for what you have done in the past for our country.   Now I hand you over to - I don't know what they are saying, I mean they are sort-of sending secret signals which are a little - Glen Goosen please.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson thank you very much.  Mr Botha from the side of the group who have been preparing some questions, some additional questions to direct to you, and I think possibly following on from the Chairperson's remarks, our appreciation for the detail with which you answered the questions that were originally sent to you.  It certainly makes our task a bit easier.
 I obviously do have the difficulty, given the statements that you have just made in the concluding part of your address to unfortunately bring you back to some of the earlier parts and deal in a sense with more mundane questions in relation to that, and you will forgive me for that.
 The impression one gets in reading through the initial part of your submission and listening to it is that certainly in respect of actions which impacted upon the activities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and your Ministry in particular, that crucial decisions were being taken, policy decisions, or that policies were being implemented by the security forces without your knowledge, without you being consulted and without any regard to the consequences that such actions would have on the efforts made by the Department of Foreign Affairs in your Ministry in that regard.  
 And there is a sense when reading your submission that you, despite the fact that you were a senior member of Cabinet, that you were not a player in regard to those issues, and I don't mean that in a disparaging way at all, but that there were other Cabinet Ministers who were taking decisions without reference to you whatsoever.  Would that be an accurate reflection of the dilemma that you faced?

MR R F BOTHA: It is not all that simple.  First of all the TRC quoted that passage to me where it was policy that Foreign Affairs and other departments, as I indicated in my response, should as far as possible be consulted.  Then there's a proviso, except when immediate action was required.  In other words, when immediate action was required then the security forces need not, need not consult.
 The fact of the matter is that there is a Defence Act, there's a Police Act, which gives certain powers, I don't know the Acts so well myself, but they do give powers to the Chief of the Defence Force; the Constitution gives certain powers to the Head of State when it comes to defence matters, and as I also indicated, in all fairness to the Defence Force they saw it as their task to guard the borders, the territorial integrity of the country, while Foreign Affairs had a different style, culture and objective.  
 And I do not - yes you're right, I believe that not only the Defence Force, but a vast number of South Africans, due to this country's relative isolation, never really appreciated the implications of full-scale sanctions.  I did.  And that's why I made it my business, I knew that in the case of the former Rhodesia/Zimbabwe after the donor conferences and when the flags were lowered and the euphoria was over the markets that that country lost under Ian Smith were never regained, never.  And the promises which the donors made were not fulfilled.  And I saw clearly that if this country was going to be crippled economically it would be extremely difficult for us to revive any sort of economic growth because in a dramatic monumental change such as the one that we went through, and had to go through, you need a strong economic base to support it.  That's why the, I think the Chinese of the People's Republic of China is doing it differently from the Soviet Union.  In the Soviet Union you had a dramatic constitutional change, but a very thin economic basis.  In the People's Republic of China they first built up their economy and maybe then will change their constitution into a more democratic system.  
 But be that as it may I think we must keep in mind here that the Defence Force also had the rule, and for that matter the Police, but mostly the Defence Force, it was said in Afrikaans "moet weet", in other words certain actions were regarded of such a sensitive nature that only those few who are required to implement the action "moet weet daarvan", must be informed of it.  And that is also not something you know restricted to our Defence Force.  There is quite a brotherhood across the world amongst police forces and amongst defence forces, it's extremely interesting how after a war erstwhile enemies dine and wine together, but that's a different matter.  
 The point I want to make in response to your question, I think it would be unfair to imply that they did not want to consult with us.  The fact of the matter it is true that I think my department and I were generally considered to be obstructionists, that we might try to block a given activity because of our fear for the outside world.  I was called once by one of my colleagues, yes you are indeed the Foreign Minister, meaning I am the Minister for foreigners.  But be that as it may, you see the Foreign Minister of South Africa in those days if he had any ambition to become the Prime Minister or President then he should have resigned his Foreign Minister portfolio immediately because you could not follow the two, you could not pursue the two.  You could not try to become popular in terms of the caucus and at the same time do your job as Foreign Minister, that is clear.  
 But I want to really again, if I may Mr Chairperson, emphasise as I have done here with respect to the use of those phrases and words, I am not saying this in a critical sense but those were the phrases used at every National Party conference.  A National Party conference had an agenda, we can dig it up for you.  Far worse things were demanded of the government at these conferences.  What I am trying to say there will never be an end to trying to find the root of this thing.  
 It was - I attended a business lunch in Johannesburg where I suggested many years ago to a number of well-to-do companies, I said, I asked them how many blacks have you got on your boards and not one of them had any.  And then I didn't dictate, I didn't prescribe, I just said gentlemen with a view to the future don't you think it might be a good thing to start recruiting some black people to serve on your boards so that they can get training, training in business, in business management etc?  And then one stood up and said to me, look you in the government will not be allowed to come and dictate to us in this country, this is the private sector not your government, we will appoint the people we consider to be necessary to make profits in our.... 
 I am trying to answer your question really as best as I can, but at the same time want to warn that to take some of these lines and inscriptions, why not publish all of it, publish the lot so that the public, the newspapers, everyone can see the Cabinet minutes, the - why not, secrecy is now being created and I want to say to my friends in the TRC be careful not to lift a sentence out of context because you were not there, you were not at that meeting.