Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — UNKNOWN

MR BOOYENS: You then proceeded - let's return to the operation in Cape Town.
	When was the idea mooted for the first time about attacking this police kombi. We know this incident took place on a Monday.  When was the idea mooted that you should attack this police kombi?

JIMMY MBANE: It might have been four to five days before.

MR BOOYENS: About Wednesday/Thursday, Tuesday / Wednesday or Thursday.  The previous week.

JIMMY MBANE: It's possible that it might have been four to five days before.  As to precisely which day, I don't know but you can do the counting and come up with the right day.

MR BOOYENS: And once this idea was raised, did you immediately report to your superiors.

JIMMY MBANE: Yes, I told them the following day, but I did that after we had done our recognising.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, and what was the reaction of the Vlakplaas people when you told them they were going to attack a police vehicle?

JIMMY MBANE: They told me I must try and stop them.  They told me in that same week that they had to go and attack those police.  I tried to stop them.
	But when I realised that I could not stop them, I suggested that we must recognise the area and I went there first with Chris and we reported back to the crowd again.
	The following day, I instructed Chris to go and do the recognising, him and Maluleki, and in the meantime I went to report to my seniors to say the aim of this group.

MR BOOYENS: So that must have been two days before the actual...one day...

JIMMY MBANE: I do not recall these days, as this happened ten to eleven years ago.  I cannot recall exactly the days.  Please get me clearly on that matter.
	If you can ask me exactly about the days, I cannot help you because I don't remember clearly, but I can just tell you more or less how many days it was.

MR BOOYENS: Well, that's what I am asking you to do.  It was about five days beforehand when they planned the operation.  You reported the next day.  You were told to try and stop them.  That makes it the day before or maximum two days before the planned attack that you informed Vlakplaas that the attack was proceeding.  Is that correct?

JIMMY MBANE: Please repeat your question.

MR BOOYENS: If the plan was mooted about five or six days before the attack, four to five days before the attack and two days went by while you were, they were still doing reconnaissance, then it seems to me that it was one or two days before the actual attack when you told Vlakplaas that they were proceeding with the attack. Is that correct?

JIMMY MBANE: We discussed this at night, and the following day we went to do the reconnaissance, me and Rasta.  Therefrom we rested, but the following day I asked Maluleka and Rasta to go and do the reconnaissance and whilst they were away I went to check contact and they sent me to Seapoint where I got a room and in that room I found Belletjies and Liebenberg and explained to them what was happening.

MR BOOYENS: What steps did you take to try and stop this attack?

JIMMY MBANE: I suggested to them that we should start doing reconnaissance because we are not amateurs.  So as to not land in a clumsy situation.  And in that way, I was trying to stop them.

MR BOOYENS: You were trying to stop them by planning the operation better. Is that what you are saying?
	Because you went to do a recon -  said to them, you are not amateurs, is that how you tried to stop the attack on the police kombi?

JIMMY MBANE: Yes, that is the means I used.

MR BOOYENS: Now how does one stop an attack by actually getting yourself involved in the planning?

JIMMY MBANE: Let me tell the Commission, I want to be given the opportunity by this Commission to explain exactly what happened, because you are asking me questions randomly.  But I would like to tell you step by step the events as they happened.
	I am kindly requesting this Commission to give me that opportunity.

MR BOOYENS: I think you must just answer my questions and you can make your speeches afterwards.
	How does it, by in going to do a recon, how do you actually try and stop an attack, because that is what you said you wanted to do?

JIMMY MBANE: If I should not have done this reconnaissance, this would have not stopped the attack the following day, because our intention was to do the shooting the following day immediately after taking the decision.  We discussed this thing overnight and their intentions to go and shoot the following day.

MR BOOYENS: Oh, I see.  Are you now talking about the group.  Your group discussed it the previous night and they said they were going to attack the police the following day? And you stopped it in that way.  Is that right?

JIMMY MBANE: Yes,  I stopped it that way.

MR BOOYENS: Is the following what happened then.
	You stopped it that day, by saying to them we must first go and do a recon.  Is that what you are saying?

JIMMY MBANE: Yes, that's how I stopped them on that day.

MR BOOYENS: And then the next day you went to do the recon and the day afterwards you sent Maluleka and the other man and you made contact with Vlakplaas in Seapoint.  Is that right?

JIMMY MBANE: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you then reported to Vlakplaas that you had stopped the attack, the planned attack?

JIMMY MBANE: I told Liebenberg and Belletjies.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, you told them that these people planned to attack the police vehicle and you had stopped them by suggesting you must first do a recon.  Is that what you are trying to tell us?

JIMMY MBANE: After Shakes and Rasta left, I went to make the telephone call and we arranged a meeting place at the hotel, and that's where I told them that I attempted to stop this, but this won't last for a long time.

MR BOOYENS: Yes.  And then, what was their reaction?

JIMMY MBANE: They said I should just attempt to stop it, because they needed a chance to go and see the place as well.

MR BOOYENS: Well, what attempts subsequent to that did you take to stop the attack?

JIMMY MBANE: On the third day, I sent two more boys to go and do the reconnaissance.

MR BOOYENS: That's not stopping the attack, that's delaying the attack.  What steps did you take to stop the attack?  If any.

JIMMY MBANE: Then it means I was delaying the attack.

MR BOOYENS: Now, this helicopter that you also told us about all of a sudden in your evidence in chief, and this sitting on the roof with a white cap and a newspapers and so on.  When did that flight take place?

JIMMY MBANE: It happened long before the planning of this operation.

MR BOOYENS: Oh, so they didn't - this was a long time ago.  While you were still busy training the people?

JIMMY MBANE: Yes, I was still training them.

MR BOOYENS: Where was this place when you were sitting on the roof.  In which township or squatter camp or wherever?

JIMMY MBANE: I used to call it Khayelitsha, but it's in the squatter camp areas.

MR BOOYENS: But after Khayelitsha, you moved your place to Guguletu.  Not so?

JIMMY MBANE: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And your group was then based in Guguletu. Correct?

JIMMY MBANE: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And did you again sit on the roof with a white cap reading a newspaper so that they could recognise the place from a helicopter once you were in Guguletu?

JIMMY MBANE: No, I never did that again.

MR BOOYENS: You were not requested to do that either?

JIMMY MBANE: No, I was never instructed to do that.

MR BOOYENS: So in fact the knowledge that they had earlier on about where this group might be would have served no purpose whatsoever in them trying to trace the group once the group had decided to attack the police.   Is that correct?

JIMMY MBANE: Please repeat your question.

MR BOOYENS: Well, you gave this evidence obviously with the intention of suggesting to the court that the police, that now specifically Bellingan and Liebenberg, knew where the group was based.  It was right at the end of your evidence in chief. Do you remember that?

JIMMY MBANE: Yes, they knew.