Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — UNKNOWN

GEN VAN DER MERWE: As far as official policy wasconcerned it entailed nothing more than that, but if you see thematter in perspective you would have to bear in mind that therewere views, statements, perceptions etc created
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amongst our members which gives the whole issue a slightly differentcomplexion.  I have said it before, and I will state it again,that irrespective of what the perceptions might have been overa long period of time there was never a policy which amountedto members of the security police acting in an unlawful manneras far as gross violation of human rights was concerned, therewas never such a policy.  But if you analyse the situation carefullyand you look at individual cases in which people held certainviews then the situation might be judged differently.  I can'tgive you particular incidents to say that upon such an occasionsuch and such a person made this statement and interpreted itin this way, but I can say that if you talk with your people nowit seems that the perception did exist that it was expected ofthem to do a lot more than that which could be done within theparameters of the legal system.

MR DU PLESSIS: General you have also now referred tothe fact that instructions were received or given, now from whomwere these instructions received?  Who did you receive your instructionsfrom?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Apart from our duties in termsof the Police Act and Regulations our instructions normally camefrom the State Security Council.  What I would like to emphasisethat in respect of all instructions coming from the State SecurityCouncil all these instructions fell within the ambit of the law. Instructions from the State Security Council, as far as I amaware, were never extra-legal by nature.  But if you go and lookat the system this is a bit difficult to explain.  At the timethere were a lot of statements made and speeches made.  Peoplebecame emotionally excited about circumstances prevailing at the
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time and views and statements were aired and we actually can'tremember them all that clearly today, but if you look at the generalperception at the time the impression was created that the enemyhad to be halted at all costs.

MR DU PLESSIS: General you say that the instructionsfrom the State Security Council were not instructions relatingto any unlawful conduct, were there any enquiries from the StateSecurity Council relating to any alleged actions which took placeoutside the boundaries of the law?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That Chairperson is difficultto explain.  It's hard to say why it would be expected of theState Security Council to make such enquiries if one bears inmind that during 1984, 1985 there were about 48,000 incidentsof violence or terrorism and sabotage and annually about 15,000persons are killed in this country on average.  So it would havebeen very difficult for the State Security Council to enquireabout any particular incident if there is nothing which one cancall to mind very specifically.

MR DU PLESSIS: As far as the incident of the handgrenadesare concerned and the use of handgrenades and the zero ignitionmechanism so that the handgrenade would explode in the hands ofthe person actually pulling out the pin of the grenade, as I understandyour evidence that instruction came directly from Minister LouisLe Grange?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct.  It was actuallya matter of approval after we made a submission to him.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes but was Minister Louis Le Grange -did he serve on the State Security Council at the time?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes he was indeed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now you were not a member of the StateSecurity Council but would you regard it as a possibility
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that this Council knew of that particular incident?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: It is a possibility, yes, butI don't have any facts at my disposal about that so I can't testifyto that.  What I can say with certainty, the way I knew Mr LeGrange, is that he would never have taken such a decision withoutat least consulting the President, or the Minister.  He wouldnot have lightly taken such a decision.

MR DU PLESSIS: General I am also going to put it to youthat the evidence of Brigadier Cronje and Colonel Venter relatingto this event will be to the effect that they were told duringa meeting when you discussed this instruction with them, thatthe instruction had come from PW Botha via Minister Louis Le Grange.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is possible.  I would sayyes that that is possible.  I don't remember it like that butI can't dispute that, it happened too long ago, but that is possibleyes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And General this was an action which felloutside the normal legal boundaries even considering the factthat there was a state of emergency at the time?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes.  I think in the circumstancesprevailing at the time when we made this decision I think I mightbe bold enough to say that the Attorney General might have saidthat it was an act of necessity.  But I will concede, if you takeeverything into consideration, that perhaps one could see it differently.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was a decision ever taken, do you knowof any decision, policy which provided that the South AfricanPolice would not only act in a reactionary way against terroristsbut also pro-actively to prevent these acts?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Are you speaking generally now?
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MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Apart from action abroad wherethe general view was that because we didn't have the various rightsand competencies which we had internally other actions were consideredlegitimate in order to level the playing fields in combating theenemy.  In many cases operations undertaken outside the bordersof the country were authorised by the former government but therewere also cases where, especially as far as our neighbouring states,actions were taken without them being authorised explicitly Butwhere actions were taken at a local level as a result of the factthat the opportunity presented itself to act against somebodyidentified as a member of the enemy.

MR DU PLESSIS: On page 10 of the Commissioner's submissionthe following is said
 "... in which all parties became more and more desperateand various political leaders on both sides of the political spectrumexerted their forces to greater heights and pressurised them toachieve further successes in carrying out their respective tasks. The individual forces were thus required to adopt all the methodsand techniques which are normally employed in conventional warfareso as to function as effectively as possible".
General if we look at what you said there, or the Generals saythere, I think you will agree with me that this means not onlyreactionary conduct but also active, proactive conduct to preventterrorists from accomplishing certain acts of terrorism?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: What we meant by saying that was,and also seeing the context of the document as a whole, that 3Bas/...
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as a result of the way in which the South African Police wereutilised in Zimbabwe and Namibia where they were actually usedas ordinary soldiers, they hunted people and tried to kill themand eliminate them.  Then these members of the South African Policecame back to the Republic and were then expected to act withinthe law.  So taking all other factors into consideration, in themind of the ordinary man-in-the-street there was much confusionregarding the ordinary guidelines applicable and these becamevery vague and we tried to give an impression of what the ordinaryman-in-the-street how he would have seen the issue at the time.