Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — UNKNOWN

MR DE JAGER: I will read the second sentence that is in my document, and I ask yesterday that we assure that we have the correct pieces in front of us.
"Captain du Plessis informed us further that this attempt to recruit Kondile was successful and that they continued to inform him with regard to the execution of his task".

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am sorry, I don't know whether I now read the wrong sentence but I understood what this man meant was that I should read paragraph 1 page 5.  I my humble opinion it starts ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Oh you read the second paragraph and not the second sentence. I understood that you had to read the second sentence.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I understood that I had to read the first sentence of the second paragraph.

MR MOOSA: Ah let me confess to be the one doing this damage.  It is the sentence beginning "Kapt du Plessis", that's at the bottom of page 5.  I apologise if there was ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Both sentences being with "Kapt du Plessis".

MR MOOSA: "Kapt du Plessis het sy vrees uitgespreek..."
"Captain du Plessis expressed his fear..."
that's the one.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's the one that I read.

MR MOOSA: And if I understand your evidence just before lunch correctly, what you are telling us is that what Mr Kondile knew was the name of the principal agent and this is what would have caused this damage, am I right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: I also put it to you that it seems to me that you have now begun to accept certain aspects of the evidence of Mr Coetzee which goes back some way around about 1989 when he made these allegations about Mr Kondile's case for the first time, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't follow you now.

MR MOOSA: Well for one thing we now know that the car which Mr Coetzee says he saw and the description of the car is basically correct, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.  I cannot say anything about the colour of the car but what Mr Coetzee says that it was a Datsun car that's correct, yes.

MR MOOSA: Also that, and this emerged for the first time yesterday, that Mr Kondile was held in White single quarters in Jeffrey's Bay.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: For a period of time, yes.

MR MOOSA: And that he was guarded and we now know that he was guarded by Ginotry Danster.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes amongst others.

MR MOOSA: Which others?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: According to what I understood, this is what I was told, Mr Raath also guarded the man.

MR MOOSA: I see.  Were you told who interrogated the man?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I was not informed who interrogated him, I accepted that Mr du Plessis was doing the interrogation.

MR MOOSA: From your evidence-in-chief I gather that you knew at this stage Mr Coetzee very well?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes I did know him very well.

MR MOOSA: Now Mr Coetzee stated that he came to the Eastern Cape and saw you and this is how he gathered this information, in fact he was taken with you to these white single quarters in Jeffrey's Bay.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is not correct.

MR MOOSA: Is Mr Coetzee lying to us about that aspect?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know if he has his facts wrong or whether he is telling a lie, I don't know.

MR MOOSA: To get it clear there was never a time that he went with you to the white single quarters and saw Mr Kondile?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, never.

MR MOOSA: He also says that there was a discussion with you where you said that this threatened to be a second Biko case because this young man Mr Kondile had sustained serious brain injuries?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's not true.

MR MOOSA: And that it was then that it was decided that this young man had to be eliminated and Mr Coetzee would be of some assistance in this.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Nothing of the kind was ever discussed at that stage.  We did not speak to him about the man at that stage, in the case that you are sketching for us.

MR MOOSA: But certainly when you had to think of someone to be of assistance it was Mr Coetzee that you contacted?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: And it was pre-arranged that this would be at Komatipoort, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: From all the statements before us in these applications it was felt that you, Mr Erasmus and Mr du Plessis were acting in this matter pro-actively, in relation to Mr Kondile in the situation before you, is that correct?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not quite understand what you mean by pro-actively.

MR MOOSA: Well please look at your statement, at page 6, it's both page 6 of your statement and page 6 of the bundle which has Volume 1.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR MOOSA: Read out to us in the statement, in the first paragraph, first sentence in the paragraph right at the bottom and I am going to be clear about it this time, "ons het besluit om hierdie...." "we decided in this case...."

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Right, now I understand what you asked, yes that's true, to act pro-actively.

MR MOOSA: Now it's your statement, tell us what you mean by "pro-actively" here?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To act pro-actively is to prevent, to act in such a way that you prevent this person become a traitor and betraying us and destroying our network in this way and that is why we decided to act proactively in order to prevent this from happening.

MR MOOSA: So you acted pro-actively actually in reaction to the situation you were faced with but to prevent further dangers, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that's correct.

MR MOOSA: And from what I gather there were a number of meetings and discussions of what alternatives you had.  This was together with Mr Erasmus and Mr du Plessis.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Tell us what were the alternatives?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The alternatives which were mentioned were, did we have to or could we detain him longer in isolation, in other words in terms of Section 6 of the detention of that time; or could we de-activate the agent, principal agent - those were basically the two options that we had.

MR MOOSA: And it was felt that it was not feasible to deactivate the principal agent, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that's correct.

MR MOOSA: Tell us why?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well for the same reason that would have destroyed our network in any case.

MR MOOSA: Once the decision was taken - sorry, you had a number of meetings, can you tell us how many these were?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot be precise, perhaps we met on three occasions.

MR MOOSA: And these were on different days or on the same day?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think on one day we met in the morning and then the afternoon late again.  I recall that Mr Erasmus said that afternoon that we left that we should think very seriously about this, about these options that we were faced with.

MR MOOSA: Now once it was determined that the option was to eliminate Mr Kondile I noticed that your instruction was that you also had to be present when this was done, is that right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That's correct.

MR MOOSA: And what was the reason for that?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not know exactly, I cannot recall the exact reason for that whether Mr Erasmus felt that he wanted a senior man to be in control of the operation, I think that that was the reason but I am not sure.

MR MOOSA: But in any event you were in control of the operation?