Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-08

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Ms Sooka the fact that there was another chain of command was well-known for quite a long time.  The position of Dr Basson was the following.  He was, first of all, a physician that was being utilised by not only our own Minister but also other members of Cabinet. He was constantly being called over to see them as patients.  Whenever I enquired about it he said I am sorry it's confidential, it's a patient/doctor relationship situation.
 The second thing that happened was I was informed that he was being made available as a consultant to a whole number of our fellow departments.  I learnt about it, not when I was Surgeon-General, before I was Surgeon-General, as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations.  I discussed it with General Geldenhuys and I said is this right that this man is made available as a consultant without the knowledge of the Surgeon-General, which was General Nieuwoudt at the time.  I was then informed that it has nothing to do with me because I am not in that position.  Two months later I was appointed as Surgeon-General and I had an interview with General Geldenhuys and I said I now want to inform you that I have a problem with a member under my command being utilised by other departments without my knowing what it's about.  I was then informed not to interfere in that and to leave it alone.
 That was the situation that existed at the time.

YASMINE SOOKA: So although he was in your unit and technically responsible to you ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: ...and the Coordinating Committee for this particular project and for the chemical biological warfare programme, it became apparent to you that he didn't report to you directly, and in fact when you canvassed that you were instructed by General Liebenberg to leave it alone.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, by General Geldenhuys.

YASMINE SOOKA: By General Geldenhuys.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

YASMINE SOOKA: I see.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just ask, just following from what you are saying, when you understood that he had also a doctor/patient relationship did you come to know that he was, as the newspapers have been saying, former President P W Botha's personal physician?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Mr Chairman I can't confirm that.

CHAIRPERSON: Or is that ...(intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I think he may have seen Mr Botha on occasion, but to say that he was his personal physician I don't think that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now did you get to know that he was seeing him?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Oh yes I am aware of the fact that he saw him from time-to-time.

CHAIRPERSON: Did it - when you now formulated the conclusion because at some stage you say you formulated a conclusion the essence of which was that you are now more than satisfied that the is more than one line of command.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it your impression that it may well be that these programmes that had given rise to your concerns as having been exceeding the mandate of what the programme should be may well have been authored by Dr Basson at the express instruction of, among others, PW Botha?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I can't confirm that, I am sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no I am asking, I am not saying can you confirm it.  I am asking if when you formulated that conclusion it is clear to me that there are more than - did you have, amongst others Cabinet Ministers, let me put it that way, that he may have been acting on the instructions of Cabinet Ministers or the President whom he was seeing, on his own evidence as a physician but who he failed to disclose the content and the basis of his meeting them except only to say patient/doctor relationship?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Chairman this is a very difficult question but to answer you quite honestly what I thought might have happened was one of two things.  Either that he had, on his own initiative had carried out certain things which he was not informing me about, or ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Which could not have led you to conclude that there were two, more than one line of command.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, no, no, it would lead me to that conclusion.  There could be a second channel of command which started with him.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: But you have already questioned me about the position of 7 Medical Battalion Group and he as the Commanding Officer of 7 Medical Battalion Group and you know that at that stage he was allocated with his Battalion Group to provide medical support to Special Forces and to Parabats and to other police service units, which was another possibility that I certainly contemplated could have been used.  But I was not so bold as to conclude immediately that he was getting information or getting instructions from Cabinet Ministers.  In fact ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think that he might have been getting instructions from General Kat Liebenberg in his capacity as head of Special Forces?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well you made the mention about the toys earlier on and I said to you that came later, and maybe I can confirm at this stage, we haven't got to the evidence that was led by Dr Jan Lourens, but I can confirm what he gave you in his evidence here; that he came to see me in my office and discussed with me the problem that he had with the gadgets, is the best word I can find, that he had made.  And I enquired of him whether he knew where the instructions for those gadgets came from.  And he said, I in fact said to him, I think you should discuss it with the Chief of the Defence Force, and he said but that is my problem because I was asked by him while he was commanding general of Special Forces, "what are you doing with my toys", or "please look carefully after my toys".  I then confirmed with him that did he know that those instructions did not come from me and he said, yes, he knew.  And I think that was basically what he gave in his evidence here.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Vally.

MR VALLY: Dr Knobel, sorry General Knobel, according to the evidence we received Dr Jan Lourens came to you early in 1993 complaining to you that he believed that the project had gone wrong somewhere.  He was asked to make screwdrivers which injected poisons and walking sticks which shot poison pellets.  According to his evidence he came to you early in 1993. ...(intervention)

WENDY ORR: I am sorry Mr Vally before - I assume you are moving off the "verkope lys" now, or are you still on it?

MR VALLY: Well I don't mind if you...

WENDY ORR: I'd just like to place on the record that in fact phencyclidine is not on Table 1 of Chemical Warfare agents and neither are any other psychotropic agents and I think our interchange over this substance highlights for me one of my deepest concerns.  I didn't know whether phencyclidine was on the list, you didn't, we had to call in an expert, but on your Coordinating Committee there were no such experts, and you were taking decisions about substances which to me it seems you were not fully informed about.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am sorry Dr Orr you are not correct.  There was such an expert on the Coordinating Committee and that expert was Dr Basson.

WENDY ORR: I think it has been proven that reliance on such an expert eventually led to severe problems.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Dr Orr at the time there was no concern about the reliance on him.  It is only now, with the wisdom of hindsight, that you can come to that conclusion.  He was a - he had a master's degree in chemistry and all the members of the Coordinating Committee, including those that are now outside the Defence Force and in political positions have confirmed that up to quite recently.