Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-02-11

MR JANSEN: Did you contact Brigadier Schoon?

MR ERASMUS: No, I did not.

MR JANSEN: Why not?

MR ERASMUS: I can't explain why not, surely at that stage I did not deem it necessary.

MR JANSEN: But there was evidence that there was a problem of people moving into one anther's areas and that it was causing problems and it would have been the correct thing to follow protocol.

MR ERASMUS: I think the operations are of various natures.  Those were different kinds of operations, this was just a once off move into and move out of an area.

MR JANSEN: And part of this type of criminal clandestine operations, should something go wrong, it could be said with certainty that the investigation would lead nowhere.  In other words this kind of cover-up and there had to be sweepers afterwards, is that right?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR JANSEN: Later on it also entailed co-operation with uniformed policemen or other security policemen?

MR ERASMUS: I was not involved where that was necessary.

MR JANSEN: Was it not a habit to sometime appoint security policemen as in investigative officers in matter such as these?

MR ERASMUS: No, it was not like that, members from the detective branches were appointed to do this.

MR JANSEN: Was anything told to van Rensburg and du Plessis who should know about this operation or who should not know?

MR ERASMUS: I left this operation in Mr van Rensburg and du Plessis' hands.

MR JANSEN: And it did not bother you that a junior officer in Schoon's office was used without Schoon knowing about it?

MR ERASMUS: No, it did not bother me because I was brought under the impression that Mr van Rensburg trusted Mr Coetzee or trusted him to such a degree that he could co-operate in this operation.

UNKNOWN: Mr Jansen, was Mr Coetzee - was he not especially appointed to establish Vlakplaas and did he not establish Vlakplaas from the start?

MR JANSEN: No, with respect Mr Chairman, it's not as simple as that. He was certainly the commander of Vlakplaas but in this respect that apart from the fact that he was situated at head office, he also functioned at the farm but the legal operations had to be executed in co-operation with the senior commanders at the head office and also the area commanders, that as his brief.

UNKNOWN: And the unlawful operations?

MR JANSEN: Well, that is according to Mr Coetzee, that it is general knowledge that Vlakplaas to a certain extent, was a smoke screen under which unlawful activities also took place in such a way that the senior officers knew about those.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I ask Mr Jansen, how does it really matter, how does it affect the situation overall when the time comes to make a decision on the merits of this application as to whether Mr Schoon was consulted or not and if so, why not.  How does it affect the outcome of this application?

MR JANSEN: Well, there is a difference Mr Chairman, I don't want at this stage want to argue to what extent it is material or not but there is that difference that Mr Coetzee's version is that he received the - although there were discussions with van Rensburg generally about them being able to dispose of bodies in this way, the actual Kondile incident - after Mr Coetzee had seen Kondile on the 13th of September, he ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: After Mr Coetzee had?

MR JANSEN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: When he was in the Eastern Cape.  He was thereafter called in by Mr Schoon to contact Mr van Rensburg and to meet up with Flemmington and people in the Eastern Cape so it's a difference which I think ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't catch that, so just put that. I didn't know that is what you were coming up to, I was just under the impression that we were just doing some shadow boxing about whether Coetzee was - Schoon was consulted or not.

MR JANSEN: Yes, no, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

MR JANSEN: You are saying that none of the facts that were presented to you were verified because you trusted the officers?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Don't you think this was only a blind trust or a blind belief in their abilities?

MR ERASMUS: No, it is a trust in them.

MR JANSEN: Mr Erasmus, here is an officer who's just made a very big mistake and he disclosed a secret to a 23 year old student, were you not worried then about the competence of this trusted officer to act as a security officer?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I don't think we understand each other regarding the recruitment of agents etc. Not for one moment I can think which great mistake Mr du Plessis had made.

MR JANSEN: The name of a principle agent was provided to a person who misleading him during the interrogation process.

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, there was no indication of misleading at that stage when that information was presented to him and it's absolutely logical that certain information should be provided to this person, otherwise how would you obtain information from him.

JUDGE PILLAY: Mr Erasmus, the point is, just before you decided to kill this person it appeared that Mr Kondile had misled Mr du Plessis, is that not so? - and this is what the advocate is referring to.

MR ERASMUS: I've already testified that this person was turned.

JUDGE PILLAY: Can we continue from there then?

MR JANSEN: What absolutely surprises me is ...[indistinct] concerning your own operation, you are so strict on the need to know rule but concerning an informer you're trying to recruit, a person who's recently been one of the enemy, there it seems to me you don't work according to the need to know principle or are the requirements not so strict?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, this is something he needed to know otherwise how could he act.

MR JANSEN: I will concede that du Plessis judgement was wrong, it's been proven wrong.

MR ERASMUS: When he recruited him Mr Chairman, this man agreed to act as an informer agent and in order for him to execute his task successfully certain information had to be conveyed to him. There was no other option, no other way of achieving this purpose.

MR JANSEN: Mr Erasmus, you would concede that at all times it was a material danger, then when you tried to recruit somebody as an informer it poses a danger because he could be a double agent.

MR ERASMUS: That is possible, yes.

MR JANSEN: There are other things regarding Kondile's recruitment which on logical grounds appear strange.  For example there was the further danger, did the ANC know how long he had been in detention they would perhaps think he had been recruited as an informer.

MR ERASMUS: That is a possibility, yes.

MR JANSEN: And now there's this story about the informer  Mr du Plessis told you that he wants to send back to Lesotho without knowing whether the ANC would put him in a position to provide information to him.
	If I remember correctly, Mr du Plessis testified that the plan would be developed how he would infiltrate back into Lesotho.

MR ERASMUS: I don't know anything about those facts.

MR JANSEN: Is your evidence that there was nothing wrong with du Plessis judgement?

MR ERASMUS: With the recruitment and the other things? - No.

MR JANSEN: We refer to the Kombi situation, you deny this who situation.

MR ERASMUS: I don't have any knowledge of the Kombi, nobody contacted me regarding the theft of a Kombi.

MR JANSEN: It cannot be that you might have forgotten something like that, that is the type of incident you would remember.  In all fairness I have to refer you to Volume 3, page 202, it's Brigadier's Schoon's version put on record during Mr Coetzee's amnesty application - in Mr Coetzee's amnesty application.  Paragraph 14 refers to this, do you want to comment on this?  That Mr Schoon apparently brings an amount of money which had to be given to - Schoon brings it in connection with this Kombi.

MR ERASMUS: I can't comment on this, I didn't attend that trial either.