Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

MR KNOETZE: 196, paragraph 11
"Both the revolutionary movements and the SADF realised the importance of the areas of tactical influence, i.e. the areas in neighbouring territories adjacent to the RSA, for operational and strategical reasons as explained in Chapter 1.  Since the SADF was not allowed to permanently occupy these areas, tactics and capabilities had to be developed to conduct the operations efficiently into these areas from secure bases in the RSA or South West Africa/Namibia.  Although external operations were directed against the armed elements of revolutionary movements, provision had to be made for possible intervention by armed forces of neighbouring countries.  Being a landward threat, the Army, i.e. land forces, was the primary role-player in these tactical operations, supported by other arms of the service."
Would you like to comment on that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the paragraph deals with actions and spheres of influence, a sphere of influence which adjoins your area of responsibility.  In my case the Ciskei and Transkei were my areas of influence, and I had a tactical interest in stability in those two countries.
	There were two organs, namely the Transkei Joint Management System and the Ciskei Joint Management Council or System, which we used as the co-ordinating platform for promoting stability in these two countries.

MR KNOETZE: Can the Committee then accept that the mere fact that Plan Strelitzia and Plan Katzen involved those countries is not at all strange, but in the light of this fell within the broader guidelines of what was expected of you?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.  That is also spelt out in my command, letter of command.  It was said that I was responsible for the stability in those countries.

MR KNOETZE: I then read paragraph 12 on that page
"Targets were however also identified in the so-called area of interest, i.e. areas beyond the reach of the SADF tactical capabilities, which were referred to as the enemy arrear areas.  These targets were mainly targets for reconnaissance or interdiction activities and were typical Special Forces or Intelligence gathering assignments."
Is that also correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  The area of interest is actually, well what it says is the area of interest, which in my case was in fact the rest of South Africa where I didn't actually act, in the context of paragraph 12, the areas of interest were countries as far as central Africa.  That is what is referred to here.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I note that it is 1 o'clock.  It is convenient to adjourn at this stage if it is the time that you're intending to adjourn.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll take the lunch adjournment now for three quarters of an hour and start again at a quarter to two.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Knoetze, you may proceed.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Chairperson.  Chairperson, it seems as if there might be a problem with the concepts normalisation and stabilisation.  Could we perhaps just interrupt for a moment and go to page 870 in the second part of Annexure C.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think there - was there a problem?  In what way?  I think the General defined both concepts fairly succinctly.

MR KNOETZE: Alright.  Perhaps everybody's understanding isn't as good as yours, Mr Chairman.  May I briefly?  It won't take long to page 870.
	General, would you briefly just refer to 870 and just explain what you've written down there and what it refers to?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, that is a schematic diagram of the essence of revolutionary warfare and the target area in this war are the elements of the State's power bases, which appears in the middle of that page, and those components of the power base we referred to as security, psychological, constitutional, economic and the welfare aspect.  Those last three form a so-called welfare aspect of revolutionary warfare and the security component or the power base has an operational and information component.  Overarchingly the security component was managed by what was known as the "FYKOM" or the Security Committee.  	Then there was a joint operational centre for operations, meaning the joint operations of the South African Police and the South African Defence Force or joint operations between the Defence Forces of the Transkei, Ciskei and the Republic of South Africa.  In the same say there was a Joint Information Centre, the JIC, where information was collected and co-ordinated.
	The psychological component of the power base.  That typically, according to revolutionary warfare, had three components, namely the protection of the own forces, also of the population as a whole, and then the attack of the enemy's moral.  This psychological component was mostly waged by means of discrediting actions and pamphlets, communication actions etc.
	Then the 80/20% principle.  The 80% was the welfare area of this war and the 20% was the security aspect of it.
	Then the management of the power bases.  That was what was important.  The State or the public section tried in co-operation with other parties, tried to stabilise the security component and the psychological component, to prepare the populists to defend themselves, and on the welfare section, to normalise.   And the enemy on the other hand, in this case the ANC/SACP alliance primarily, by means of violent actions and non-violent actions tried to destabilise the security component and tried to create an abnormal situation as far as welfare is concerned and also to undermine our moral psychologically.  I think that is in the broad lines the revolutionary warfare aspect.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 196, paragraph 13 there
"Although the SADF was employed for service in defence of the RSA and in prevention of suppression of terrorism, no external operation could be conducted without government (political) approval."
Do you confirm that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.  Once again the reference here is to the national context and to actions outside our national borders.  In the Eastern Cape I was responsible for actions in the Ciskei and Transkei, I had to co-ordinate that from my headquarters and I had to obtain approval and authorization for any plans, or actions to be launched in those areas.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, was that also embodied in Plan Katzen?  Is that a plan for which you needed this kind of approval?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  And for that reason I directed Plan Katzen personally at the Chief of the Defence Force.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 203, paragraph 24
"In SA Defence Force context the SA Army had the primary responsibility for the conduct of landward operations, which included counter-revolutionary operations, whilst the other three arms of the service played a mainly supportive role."
Do you confirm that as well?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.  It was my responsibility to wage the counter-revolutionary war in the Eastern Province.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 210, paragraph (f).  That gives an outline of the development of the unrest in the RSA.  And are you requesting the Committee to also bear that in mind, to take note of that"

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.