Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, let me put it to you, on your own document you said that on the 11th February 1986 Groenewald met Du Toit Bosman.  On the 12th February Groenewald went to see Buthelezi to get clarity on his requirements.  Then we have the next bit of documentation.  On the 18th February Groenewald reported about the meeting which he had on the 17th February 1986, and he reported to the Minister.  Is that correct?  Do you remember that now?

WITNESS:   Yes, I'm well aware of the sequence.  It's all in the documentation, but I think, with respect, Mr de Vos, it is really pointless in taking me through what is down here on paper.  I think what you're trying to get at is

MR DE VOS: /how could

MR DE VOS: 5A how could ... (intervention)

MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, please, just answer my question and then we'll be finished quite quickly.  On the 17th February the following happened.  The Minister, Minister Malan, reprimanded General Groenewald about the fact that Groenewald did the Minister's job by actually going to speak to Buthelezi.  Is that correct?  That's what it says in the documentation.

WITNESS:   Make your point.

MR DE VOS: In other words, when Groenewald, on the 12th February, went to speak, they hadn't yet had cognisance of Buthelezi's needs and they hadn't evaluated those yet, so the letter referred to on the 10th February regarding authority on the highest level is clearly in correct, as Groenewald also testified in ... (intervention)

WITNESS:   No, that's a highly simplistic analysis of the documents.  If you read the documents in their natural order and their natural flow, you will see that there were different levels of authorization and different levels of implementation and that first level was the agreement in principle, the authority to get the operation off the ground in the first place.  At that stage they hadn't worked out the nuts and bolts and the little nitty-gritty detail.  That still had to be worked out and the February meetings and the others were part and parcel of that process but the decision in principle to support Buthelezi along the general lines set out in his request, that had been approved but certain of the detail had to be clarified, amongst them matters such as the offensive and para-military support, to name but one.  Clarified.  That's what it amounts to.

MR DE VOS: Mr Varney, all that the State Security Council did

MR DE VOS: /was to say,

MR DE VOS: 5A was to say, "Malan and Heunis, go and speak to Minister Buthelezi, make an evaluation of his needs, find out what he wants".  That's all that was said.  Let me take you a bit further.  I want to put it to you that you haven't given this Commission all the documents handed in at the Msane trial, and specifically here I'm referring to the fact that you didn't give the Commission a signal dated the 8th April 1986, and this signal, if I can just finish, this was a signal sent by the Minister of Defence to HAW2, that's Admiral Putter, in which the following was said, paragraph 4:

MR DE VOS: "Minister of Defence further requested that HSW on behalf of the Minister deals with the covert leg of the organigram."

MR DE VOS: In other words that part which refers to the establishment of a para-military force to Captain Buthelezi.  He must go and sell this idea to Buthelezi.

MR DE VOS: "If successful, it can also serve as authorization for implementing discussion with Khumalo as contemplated in certain documentation."

MR DE VOS: Now, the point I'm trying to make, Mr Varney, if HSI still had to go and discuss matters with Buthelezi to obtain clarification on certain points and the task had been delegated to Minister Malan to first obtain clarity, then up to the 8th April 1986 we know for a fact that there had been no decisions. Discussions still had to take place.  Would you agree with that?

WITNESS:   That's not an entirely correct reading of the documents, Mr de Vos.  Firstly, as regards your assertion that the TRC didn't get these documents, that's a ridiculous assertion.  Do you really

MR DE VOS: /think that

MR DE VOS: 5A think that I would hand over to a body investigating this matter and leave out a documents like that and leave out certain documents.  I'm appalled that you make the intimation that I didn't bring it to the TRC's attention.  If you look - firstly, the TRC got a full set of the documents.  They were also supplied with my report, which you have referred to, and you will see in that report there's a whole paragraph dealing with that particular signal, but that aside if you look carefully at the documents in question and you've got to start with the Liebenberg report itself, it draws up an organigram - a structure - and if you read paragraph 20 of the Liebenberg report it says, "Put this structure to Chief Minister Buthelezi".  It's the structure, the way it's going to be set up - who reports to who and so on - but the essential nature and essence of the support that had already agreed upon.  It was just now the detail that had to be settled, so it now was the structure.  If you look at that signal, it says, "Put the secret part of the structure to Buthelezi", and that is in line with paragraph 20 of the Liebenberg report.  It says, "Daar word aanbeveel dat die volgende oorhoofse veiligheidstruktuur aan die Hoof Minister" ... recommended that the overall security structure be put to the Chief Minister.

MR DE VOS: And the word, "Proposal" means proposal.  There were no final decisions made and that's the point I'm trying to make.  But then those weren't executive actions, as you argued.  You want to link up the entire Defence Force, Groenewald, Liebenberg and everybody, implying that they were busy with executive actions and that they foresaw that people would die.  We argued this in the Msane case.

MR DE VOS: /You know the

MR DE VOS: 5A You know the law as well as I do that a preparation action undertaken by the State can never be unlawful.  Would you agree with that?  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   You are aware, as evident from these documents, and if you read them in chronological order that authority - that overall authority had been granted at the highest level and during February 1986.  My interpretation, which I stand by, because it's quite evident from the documents that the particular detail, the particular nitty-gritty relating not only to the nature of the particular support but also the structure, that was the detail that had to be sorted out and yes, of course, there were proposals and there were recommendations, but it dealt with the detail, not with the overall support.

MR LYSTER: Mr de Vos, you made a suggestion an hour and a half ago that you would like an opportunity to deal with each of these matters in writing and to rebut or dispute what Mr Varney's conclusions are, and we are not in a situation.  It's now 7 o'clock.  It leaves Mr Maritz 20 minutes and I think that's being unfair to him and it's - if you made the suggestion, it would seem an ideal place to make those sort of submissions that you do not agree with his interpretation of documents and you can elaborate at length as to why you do not agree with them and he can respond to those and I would like you to wrap it up now so that Mr Maritz can have a go.

MR DE VOS: May I suggest that at this stage so that Mr Maritz can continue with his and I can then amplify with a submission at a later stage.  Thank you.

MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr de Vos.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DE VOS
/
MR MARITZ
5A

MR MARITZ: Am I on, Mr Chairman?

MR LYSTER: Thank you.

MR MARITZ: Thank you.  Mr Varney, the questions that I have for you are very brief.  I think if we do not argue with one another we can finish in five minutes.  First of all, I'm going to put a few propositions to you.  The first one is this.  Do you concede that Dr Buthelezi at the relevant time was the political foe of the then Government?