Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

UNKNOWN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
 Whilst we do not intend to engage the TRC in unnecessary political arguments, it suffices to reiterate the legitimacy of our actions as APLA, less we allow those who have chosen to remain oblivious of the truth, and the historical facts to achieve their desire by criminalising our actions.
 Our major goal is to highlight the plight of hundreds of Azanian People's Liberation Army and the PAC members who are still languishing in prison, while their pleas for release fall on deaf ears.
 It is surprising that today the very people who sacrificed their lives and futures in defence of human rights, are criminalised, and are expected to apologise for their role in the overthrow of the apartheid regime.
 We still wish to witness a moment in which the first APLA PAC member will be granted amnesty by the TRC Amnesty Committee.
 It is in this context, therefore, that we make this submission and we are sure that history will vindicate our approach of refusing to apologise for defending ourselves as a nation through armed struggle.
 The historical context.  When the PAC was formed in 1959, no provision was made in its operational structures for the establishment of a military wing.  That situation changed with the massacre of our people at Sharpeville and Langa in the opening days of our positive action campaign launched in March 1960.  
 In September 1961 the foundation for the military wing of the Pan Africanist Congress was laid by Comrade John Ntakubela and Clarence Makwetu.  The presidential council based in Maseru subsequently appointed one of its members as commander to head this military activities.  The reconciliation conference of members of the national executive council committee, held in Moshi in the United Republic of Tanzania in 1967, endorsed the organisation's stand on an armed struggle and set up a revolutionary command in recognition of exigencies of armed struggle; to set up and supervise the strategic and policy task of the armed struggle.
 The revolutionary command took up the political command of the high command, that had already been established.  The hierarchy was reviewed in 1971 and later a military commission as a sub-organ of the central committee, was established to direct the work of the high command.
 In the review of the structures of the party, at the consultative conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in mid-1978, the name military committee was replaced by that of the military commission.  A chairman and two other members of the central committee were designated as members of the military commission which also be responsible for the appointment of members of the high command.
 The military commission subsequently drew up on behalf of the central committee, the directive for APLA, which outlined the operational instructions and military doctrine of the PAC. The military commission was later expanded to accommodate the new military structure.
 Stemming from this historical context, the Azanian People's Liberation Army eventually evolved a competent organisational structure, that was to oversee the effective implementation of armed struggle against the regime.
 The starting point of the armed struggle was to consider a mandate on the basis of concrete situation, between ourselves and the enemy we were fighting or we were facing.  Our mandate was to organise and lead the armed struggle.  The method of what to do was a political leadership responsibility. APLA's responsibility was how to do it.  The key to the matter was whether we were capable of putting our struggle on the correct political line and employing correct methods of struggle.  The crux of the matter was to satisfy ourselves within the limits of our understanding, that we could set our struggle on a correct course of development.  And that was to develop military operations to the level where they served political objectives and achieved the anticipated results.
 The enemy of the liberation movement of South Africa and of its people was always the settler colonial regime of South Africa. Reduced to its simplest form, the apartheid regime meant White domination, not leadership, but control and supremacy.
 This was the desire of the European to continue to protect themselves from the "swart gevaar", the Black danger.  The pillars of apartheid protecting White South Africa from the Black danger, were the military and the process of arming of the entire White South African society. This militarisation, therefore, of necessity made every White citizen a member of the security establishment.
 Whilst uniformed men and women engaged in border and cross-border operations, non-uniformed men and women became the pillar of the so-called area protection.  It will therefore be a fallacy in the context of White South Africa to talk about innocent civilians. Military trained and armed citizens defied the definition of civilians, to ask and attack on a training and armed individuals or individual was a military operation.
 It is in this context, therefore, that the Azanian People's Liberation Army did not have the burden of problem of the so-called soft or hard target.  In all honesty, the term soft or hard target did not exist in our vocabulary and it was a foreign concept.
 All that mattered was the political and psychological benefit that the organisation will derive from such military operations.
 It should be noted that the killing of genuine African civilians had intensified in the course of time.  Africans attending night vigils, commuting to work, et cetera, more especially in the Eighties and Nineties, were brutally massacred whilst the White community lived in harmony and tranquillity. The decision was aimed at carrying out legitimate reprisals in forcing the regime to end the killings of African people, by intensifying the armed struggle.
 This was done both in reprisal and self-defence and must be understood that the war of liberation as envisaged, as seen by the Azanian People's Liberation Army, was a war of self-defence.
 The only requirement was proportionality. It should therefore not surprise anyone that targets like the St James Church, King William's Town Golf Club, Heidelberg Tavern, et cetera, which are more prominent or known by everybody, were selected.  The leadership of the Azanian People's Liberation Army takes responsibility, and full responsibility for that matter for all the operations that were conduced by the cadres and members of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.
 The APLA forces who carried out this operation, followed the directions of their commanders and these directives were from highest echelons of the military leadership, that is both the high command the military commission.
 We do not, therefore, regret that such operations took place, and there is therefore nothing to apologise, because we believe of the justness of our war and the correctness of our struggle.
 Putting the record straight.  From 1978 to 1984, the PAC had an unstable existence,  particularly in Tanzania.  What we used to refer to as crisis.  This is a period in which internal conflicts made a serious dent on the organisation's image and performance. As a result of this internal disputes a consultative conference of the PAC was held in Arusha, Tanzania in 1978. This conference resulted in the expulsion of over 60 members.   The expelled members subsequently formed an organisation called the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party, APRP. Despite these expulsions the organisation continued to be unstable.  Subsequently clear conflicts emerged and namely, the internal leadership squabble or conflicts, conflicts between the leadership and the cadres.  The internal leadership conflicts resulted in the expulsion of the then and the late chairman of the central committee of the PAC, PK Labalo and a few other members who allegedly were his supporters. 
 The conflict between the cadres and the leadership on the other hand, resulted in the death of the members of the PAC triumvirate, David Mamumza Sebeko who was shot and killed by six APLA cadres who were expelled from the military camp in Itumbi, south of Tanzania.  The six APLA cadres were arrested and subsequently sentenced to an effective 15 years in Tanzania, each, by the Tanzanian High Court and therefore cannot be made an issue any more as they were formally charged and sentenced.
 Consequently, the remaining PAC leadership lost total control of the forces at Itumbi camp.  Eventually the Tanzanian Defence Force intervened and in the operation to wrest control of the camp, four APLA cadres were killed by the Tanzanian Defence Force, TDF.
 Meanwhile, dissentions among the APLA cadres in the camp resulted in disappearance of an APLA cadre by the name of Owen Ntuli. Allegations were made that he was murdered at the camp, but these allegations were never confirmed. 
 After the arrival of the late Jonah Dubegela in 1981, after serving his 13 years on Robben island, Dubegela upon his arrival was unanimously elected chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress. His main priority was to reunite the Pan Africanist Congress and eventually a call was made for all PAC members who were either expelled or had left on their own to come back into the fold, and rejoin the organisation.  This call received a positive response and even those members who had formed the new party, APRP and conditionally returned to the ranks of the PAC.
 APLA's human rights record.  Every APLA cadre was entitled to the constitutional rights afforded by the Pan Africanist's constitution and disciplinary codes. However, those rights were tempered with the practical needs of good order and discipline necessary to maintain a military force.  Therefore, APLA faced the dilemma of maintaining military discipline whilst creating a system of justice, where individual APLA members were afforded maximum rights prescribed by the PAC constitution.
 Note should be taken of the fact that APLA members were not employees but volunteers who were prepared to sacrifice their lives without expecting anything.  Their only reward will be that the apartheid regime of the time will eventually be overthrown. Putting it simply, APLA cadres were not just soldiers living on orders but political fighters who had a say in how they should be led and commanded.  
 The rights that were offered APLA cadres can be grouped into three categories.The right to equal treatment, the right of individual APLA members to have open and fair participation in the process of decision-making, that affected their lives and wellbeing.  The right to express opinions, to information, to attend meetings, make contributions and be greatly involved in the political life of the organisation.
 These rights were essential and therefore, they ensured the following: high morale, confidence in the leadership and its decisions, fair selection of the most capable personnel for promotion, additional training, deployment, et cetera, general respect for the organisation and of course, security of the members.
 Whilst we cannot boast of having had the perfect human rights record, we, however, can with pride insist that we did everything we could to protect individuals. 
 As an organisation and institution, we take pride in informing the South African nation that in our entire period of existence, we never had a single detention camp, prison or any form of institution that was employed to violate members' human rights.  No single individual can genuinely claim any experience of systematic torture, abuse or detention in any of our facilities or camps.
 The so-called murders in the PAC camps, that the TRC has chosen to sensationalise and blow out of proportion - that is according to the questionnaires that you sent to us, are acts that APLA will never be ashamed of. While we regret any loss of life as a result of our disciplinary actions, we, however, still remain proud that all the disciplinary actions that were taken, fell within the confines of our disciplinary code and oath of allegiance.
 You must consider the concrete and practical realities of the environment and circumstances that determined the continued existence of our organisation and its ability to carry out these functions as a liberation movement and of liberation movement.  We could not hope to survive and to expound our activities without eliminating or demobilising the forces of destabilisation.  Only one authority could survive or our organisation will have remained in a state of permanent instability and therefore failed to carry out its mandate of liberating the Azanian People.
 We have already alluded to the period of instability that the PAC went through until the arrival of John Nupekela.  The organisation could therefore not tolerate any further forms of destabilisation and subversion, subversion such as those carried out by the individuals concerned.
 Whilst we accept full responsibility for our disciplinary actions, we, however, take great exception when anyone who abused the promotion of national unity and reconciliation, to criminalise our members and therefore distort facts, and spread rumours and lies. 
 It is surprising to us that before we even present our case, the TRC has already talking about murders in our camps.
 If this is not a deliberate attempt to criminalise the Azanian People's Liberation Army, then what is it?  It is shocking to know that such educated and legally qualified men and women can loosely refer to deaths as murders.  Whilst we as laymen, however, know the difference between death and murder.
 It is in this little knowledge that give us the impression that either the entire TRC or some members, therefore, while acknowledging our right to reconcile, have chosen to antagonise us for some political gain, best known to them.
 To make matters worse even, in the TRC's correspondence with us, terms like "trickery, cruelty" are used by and while we do not know.  Be that as it may.  We, however, still believe that the record shall be put straight by the end of our presentation and during the question time.
 It is true that a number of deaths did actually take place, not only in our camps, but in most areas where we had presence as APLA.  These deaths can be categorised into the following; the natural causes, accidents - mostly vehicle accidents - murders, such as those of that individual; and, of course, executions.  
 Briefly the natural causes.  A number of APLA members died as a result of natural illnesses, particularly malaria, as we were living in the tropical areas.  A list can be made available of all the members and wherever possible, the nature of illness members suffered from. The Tanzanian Government and other relevant authorities may be contacted to verify this list.
 Accidents. A number of accidents in the entire period of our existence took place in almost all the countries we operated.  These accidents can be put into different categories, namely vehicle accidents, which were the majority of accidents that even claimed the lives of two APLA commanders - that is General Victor Qweta, that is Sabalo and General Phirin.
 Non-vehicle accidents, eg, members who drowned while trying to cross Zambezi and other rivers, towards home.
 Murders.  A number of murders did actually occur as well.  These are called murders for they had nothing to do with any APLA programmes and discipline. In all these cases the law took its course, as I have already said above. That is the murder of Benedict Zondlo.  
 Those who committed these acts were charged in the courts of law and served their sentences. Among these cases is that of Zondlo, who I have already referred to, who was stabbed to death by a PAC member who was eventually charged and sentenced in a court of law.
 Now executions.  A limited number of Azanian People's Liberation Army members were executed mostly for acts of destabilisation and mutiny.  These members were executed by orders of the APLA commander, who in his own capacity determined the individual who had to perform the task.  We will prefer not to present a list of these members during this presentation, but a copy of all known members will be submitted, as indicated in your questionnaire, as to whether those who were eliminated or killed were executed; whether the next-of-kin had been informed.  That's why we didn't include them here.
 The aim of the categorisation of the above-mentioned cases is twofold.  Firstly, it is to remove the myth that all the members who died were murdered.
 Secondly, it is to put into correct perspective, APLA's human rights record, that is deliberately being tarnished by people whose own agenda could be to criminalise our activities and therefore, deny amnesty to our people or members who are still languishing in South African jails.
 We will go to any extent to satisfactorily answer any questions during the question time, that we may be called upon to answer.  The only request we wish to make is that we should confine ourselves to the truth, for the truth is only what happened, not what we wish to or consider to have happened.
 We are basically going to pour a cold bath of reality in presenting our history.
 We are, therefore, here within the confines of what we know, to tell the truth and not tell what some people may want to hear from us.  
 The nature of our operations.  When we discussed our programme of action above, we endeavoured to define our targets and enemy. Our presentation will, however, be incomplete if we do not correct the sensationalised and maligned acts of repossession.  
 We would like to clarify once and for all that we have never engaged in armed robberies.  It is only criminals that engage in armed robberies.  We have always mentioned that our major source of income was repossession, revolutionary repossession.  
 From its inception, the PAC categorically stated that the land, our land and its resources were usurped through the force of arms.  It was APLA's responsibility to repossess what rightfully belonged to the oppressed and dispossessed Azanian people.
 It is in this context that we proudly and openly mention that banks and other financial institutions were targeted.  We still remain proud and open about these acts, because they fell within the PAC political and ideological perspective.  We therefore do not take kindly to allegations that we were armed robbers.  Robbers are those who steal and defraud and not those who repossess what rightfully belongs to them. 
 I will be very hard, very cold in presenting these documents, these facts, so that we get clarity as to what is this organisation known as APLA, as PAC, and of course, I am here describing the war as envisaged by the Azanian People's Liberation Army.
 APLA's expectation from the TRC.  APLA has viewed with shock and dismay the privileges enjoyed by those who murdered and maimed the African people in the name of apartheid.  More especially, since our people are still languishing and there is no signs that they are being released.  
 People like Dirk Coetzee and Brian Mitchell could receive amnesty.  What is it that can make any APLA member not deserve that amnesty. I think I will have to be very clear on this, because already a number of our people have been refused amnesty. Maybe during the question time and during interaction with the Commission, clarification will be given in that direction.
 We still remain puzzled with regard to the attitude of the TRC in as far as APLA and the PAC members' applications are concerned.  To date, not a single APLA PAC member that has been granted amnesty.  
 However, the trend we see now is that of turning down our applications. It is a major concern to me as a person and to the former members of high command, and of course, to the former members of the Azanian People's Liberation Army. I think it is wise that we present it before you, because the essence here is truth, and of course, the objective is the reconciliation.  It will not work if we start mincing our words without making ourselves very clear to anybody.   The only impression we have at this point is that the TRC's political agenda to criminalise APLA's activities and thereby discrediting any of our achievements. Only history will prove us wrong, because we still have to see anything different, and we still have to be proven otherwise.
 For instance, we are still surprised as to why there has been no inquiries into the deaths of the PAC members that have negative connotation to the PAC and APLA. We have so far not heard of any inquiries concerning the deaths of Jeff Matsemola, Mpula's children in Umtata, John Natikubela, Victor Queta and many others of the PAC and APLA.  The only inquiries are those that have an aim to prove and expose the perceived negative side of human rights violation by the PAC and APLA.
 When we are going to enquire on gross human rights violations against PAC and APLA members, when are we going to do that?  Maybe sooner than later, we do hope.
 I have tried to be as clear as possible, Mr Chairman, because the essence or the name of the game here is to be truthful and nothing else.  If I offended anybody, it is unfortunate, but here we are describing history.  We are describing war as perceived by Poqo, APLA and the PAC.
 So that ends my brief submission and we will be waiting eagerly to respond and answer the questions posed by the Commission.  Thank you.