Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-10-14

MR R F BOTHA: Thank you.  I thank you Mr President.  On the subject of analysing and construing State Security Council resolutions and documents it should be mentioned that we were relentlessly inundated with working documents, proposals, guidelines, assessments, predictions and memoranda drafted by a labyrinth of committees, subcommittees, joint management centres, assessment centres, working committee, task groups ad infinitum.  In interpreting SSC minutes it should be kept in mind that the minutes as well as the documentation do not reflect the atmosphere in which a debate took place.  They do not contain the differences between Ministers expressed in the discussion. A considerable number of the proposals and recommendations formulated as decisions were vague and of a general nature and some were naive and ingenuous and simply not capable of implementation in the light of the existing realities or the shortage of funds.
 In annexure 2 to the document discussed under item 7 of the State Security Council meeting of 14 April 1986 a multitude of plans are set out to stem the deteriorating security situation. An analysis of the plans and the funds earmarked for the implementation will illustrate how unrealistic and naive some of the plans were.  For instance under the heading Restoration of Law and Order the first objective is to dominate Duncan Village and Ndantsane,  The tasks to achieve this are according to the document, I quote, roadblocks, patrols and reaction unit.  The actions to be implemented are, day and night roadblocks, maintaining mobile reaction units similar to the South African Municipal Police system.  This task is then to be done by 228 members of the Ciskei Police and Ciskei Defence Force.  
 Dominate, Mr Chairperson, may have a variety of meanings but all of them amount to the following - control, rule over, command, dictate, call the shots, lay down the law, be in the saddle, wear the crown, etc.  In 1986 the situation in Ndantsane simply did not lend itself to be put in any of these categories by 228 members of the Ciskei Police Force and Defence Force.   In German there is an expression "Traum Wirklichkeit", "dream and reality", which can be applied to many of the plans and tasks contained in the document under reference.  At first sight the plans look impressive, I admit, on analysis they become words expressing a wish to do something to curb a deteriorating security situation.  Then I give in the document which will be made available to you, some other examples of the objectives to be pursued.
 The important one is the question put to me by the TRC and that concerns the words, to neutralise/ eliminate enemy leaders and the influence which they exercised.  I have been asked to explain this and the meaning of this.
 To achieve this objective in the document the following actions are proposed.  I quote -
"Deceptive operations; payment for information       R10 000.
 Exploiting differences among the enemy; harassment actions; smash and grab actions; turn actions..."
I don't know what that is,
"...legal steps; arrests and prosecutions.  Identifying the weak points and vulnerabilities of enemy leaders; banning and detention without trial".
These tasks are then entrusted to the South African Police, the South African Defence Force and the Department of Justice.  
 Under the heading Special remarks or guidelines it is stated-
"Linkage with the Security Forces is to be avoided; isolation in respect of contact with society is essential; judicial authority for South African Police and Minister for detention without trial is required; respectively 90 days and 180 days is requested urgently.  (Amendments of the Public Safety Act".
 It is fairly obvious Sir, Mr Chairperson, that the neutralisation/elimination of enemy leaders is to be brought about by detention without trial because the means to achieve this objective is clearly spelt out, namely the need to amend the Public Safety Act, to give the South African Police and Minister the power to detain persons without trial for 90 or 180 days.
 I realise that the TRC is confronted by a dilemma in having to interpret the meaning or import of various words and phrases used in decisions of the Security Council dealing with action against terrorists.  A variety of words were used, "elimineer" - eliminate; "neutraliseer" - neutralise; "uitwis" - obliterate or wipe out; "vernietig" - destroy; "opspoor en vernietig" - track down and destroy; "hou vas, breek" - break their grip; "bekamp" - fight against, curb, control; "stuit" -arrest, stem; "uit die saamelewing verwyder" - remove from society; "permanent uit die saamelewing verwyder" -remove permanently from society.  
 The context in which these words or phrases were used is important to determine the meaning.  If the words neutralise, eliminate were used in reference to hot-pursuit, cross-border action or terrorist bases in neighbouring countries then obviously neutralise, eliminate would include the killing of the terrorists.
 If the phrase neutralise, eliminate was used in respect of actions inside the country then neutralisation, elimination can indeed mean detention without trial.  Removing from a person permanently from society can indeed mean detaining that person indefinitely.
 The Deputy Attorney-General of Gauteng is reported to have said in the High Court on 6 October 1997, that's a few days ago, that the convicted murderer, Ben du Toit, should be permanently removed from society.  As the death penalty does not apply in South Africa the Attorney General must have had in mind a prison sentence of long duration.
 These words and phrases were part of the vocabulary commonly used throughout South Africa over many years, since the first murders and bomb attacks by terrorists commenced.  The sentiments expressed in these words, and far more militant language were used in debates in Parliament, at public meetings, business lunches, Party conferences, social functions and in media reporting and editorial comment.  
 These words and phrases reflected the general reaction amongst the majority of white South Africans whenever a murder or bomb explosion by terrorists was announced.  It was reasonable, therefore, that members of the security forces would have interpreted a phrase like wipe out the terrorists to include killing them, and unless the senior command structures of the security forces made sure that all ranks understood the distinction between a person who is directly engaged in the planning and execution of acts of violence threatening the lives of civilians on the one hand, and political opponents belonging to the same organisations as the terrorists on the other hand, lower ranks would probably not have made that distinction on their own.   General Johan Coetzee, a former Commissioner of the South African Police, is reported to have said at a hearing of the TRC on 9 October that he had never sanctioned illegal Police activities.  To plan and execute the killing of a political opponent of the government would certainly constitute an illegal activity.  What is of importance in General Coetzee's statement is that he did not interpret any State Security Council decisions as a licence to kill political opponents, because if he did not issue such instructions he could not have got them from the - or rather it is indicative that he did not get them from the State Security Council.
 A number of ex-members of the South African Police have, however, testified at other hearings that they received clearance for killing political opponents from their seniors.  They said that they sincerely believed that such orders had come from the top, or that the top must have been aware of their actions, or at least acquiesced in their actions.  The top included the Chief of Police, in certain cases the Minister of Police, and in some cases even the State Security Council and the Cabinet.  I would, myself, be interested to receive a clarification of this concept from the top.
 When I visited Mr Piet du Plessis in prison in Pretoria Mr Eugene de Kock's cell was opposite Mr du Plessis' cell and he used to make tea for us, and I had the opportunity to have lengthy discussions with him, and in the presence of Mr du Plessis he said to me that he once had an order to plant false dollar notes and diamonds on Mr du Plessis when he was still a minister.  I then asked him, who gave you that order?  And he said from the top.  Neither Mr du Plessis or I have succeeded in finding out what that top means.  We would very, very much like to know that.
 I was on the hit list of both the Conservative Party, or members of the Conservative Party, and members of the ANC according to evidence given in the courts of this country.  I think I would also like to know who gave those orders.  But let us leave that aside for the moment.
 I have to point out that the State Security Council, although it was established by an Act of Parliament only had an advisory function.  The Prime Minister, and later the State President submitted all the more important proposals and decisions to the Cabinet meeting which followed the relevant State Security Council meeting.  I am not aware of any State Security Council decision of substance which was not submitted to the Cabinet for approval and discussion.  In my opinion the State Security Council could not take illegal decisions because as a body it was not entrusted with executive powers.  
 Specific tasks were allocated to specific ministers or general tasks were allocated to all the ministers, but always subject to the applicable legislative powers exercised by individual ministers and/or heads of their departments.  If an individual minister felt that he was given an assignment in contravention of the provisions of any Act of Parliament, then it was the responsibility of that minister to raise the matter in the Cabinet or to take it up with the State President.   In terms of the Republic of South African Constitution Act no.110 of 1983 the State President and all Cabinet ministers were required to make and subscribe an oath of office to respect and uphold the Constitution and all other laws of the Republic of South Africa.  
 I can assure the TRC that I did not approve and would not have approved of any action which authorised the killing of political opponents of the government. Quite apart from the moral aspect of such a decision the Department of Foreign Affairs and I had to bear the brunt of international reaction to the death of persons like Steve Biko and all the others.  Four of the five Directors General of Foreign Affairs who served under me are still alive, they were also members of the State Security Council, they attended more meetings of the Council than I did due to my frequent visits abroad, they will certainly be willing to testify before the TRC on the stand they and I took in respect of actions and events which stirred up world reaction against South Africa.
 But I will go further today and say, that all my colleagues in the State Security Council, and in the Cabinet and in Parliament, and there are records of Parliament, are equally acquainted with the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and myself, on events which damaged our image abroad.  
 I say this here today to pay tribute to the officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs who fought a lonely battle out in the corners of the world to curb our growing isolation and to avert the imposition of economic sanctions.  They never received medals in grand parades, they just suffered quietly and endlessly, their story remains to be told. 
 The State Security Council, as well as the Cabinet and for that matter Parliament, operated in an atmosphere of tension and global isolation.  It was believed that the ANC, the PAC and later the UDF would not be satisfied with any constitutional arrangements which did not unequivocally ensure universal suffrage.  Universal suffrage was anathema not only to the National Party, but to the vast majority of the white voters and their institutions and even to a sizeable number of brown South Africans and citizens of Indian origin.   Without expressing myself on the merits of the causes of the two sides it was a fact that the leaders on both sides were precluded from meeting and discussing a peaceful way out of the deadlock because each side rejected the political stand of the other out-of-hand and in principle.  Each side believed it had the power and the means to sustain the struggle.  On the part of the government the resolve to halt the enemy was real.  In Angola where the enemy was identifiable successes were achieved.  In South Africa we were fighting a losing battle, but no-one in government would admit it.  I was certainly not lauded when I said at that international conference in Cape Town, that South Africa would have a black president. 
 The point I want to emphasise Mr President, is that neither the State Security Council, nor the Cabinet was a sinister structure, divorced from the sentiments of the voters and the institutions which the government represented.  I want to emphasise the words divorced from the sentiments of the voters and the institutions which the government represented.  
 I cannot describe the state of affairs more aptly than Dr Nico Horan, a well-known church leader of Windhoek.  In the column "Godsdiens aktueel" - religion topical, in Beeld of 2 October 1997, he described the relationship between the Afrikaans churches and the government as follows.  I now quote Dr Horan -
"It is like someone who has been caught with his neighbour's wife, he does not confess his adultery but he does admit I got too close to her".
 Dr Horan suggests that the churches ought to confess that they believed in apartheid from early times, long before the State made it a policy, apartheid had been practised in the churches.  When the NP came to power the churches enthusiastically co-operated.  The churches directed the coloured people to take their seats in the back of the church.  Later they were driven out of the church.  The churches assisted eagerly in the passing of apartheid legislation to deprive people of their vote.  I agree with Dr Horan.  
 I have noticed that the Western and Southern Cape Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church decided recently to submit a presentation to the TRC in which the church will acknowledged inter alia the wrongs of the past.  I appeal to the other synods of the church, as well as to the other Afrikaans churches to do the same.  Confessing a sin and experiencing remorse for wrongs which one committed have a salutary healing effect on the individual and on a people.  This is essentially a mental and spiritual venture.  Entering into it cannot be made conditional on others doing the same.  It does not work on the basis of a quid pro quo, it loses its efficacy the moment we say, yes, we confess, we know that we sinned but the ANC and the PAC and others also committed hideous transgressions, we will confess if they confess.  In the realm of confession there is no room for negotiations or striking deals.  It is a lonely cleansing process of the heart and the mind, and that is what Dr Nico Horan would wish us to do.
 Mr Chairperson, although I warned the whites of this country many years ago that they should change; although I urged the NP Government in 1970 to subscribe to the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights; although I stated in 1974 at the United Nations that I could not defend apartheid; although I said in 1986 that South Africa would have a black president and that I would be willing to serve under him; although all this I realised that I could have done more to turn the tide of apartheid earlier.  
 I acknowledge that I could have done more in the State Security Council, in the Cabinet and in Parliament to ensure that political opponents were not killed or tortured by government institutions.  I could have and should have done more to find out whether the accusations that government institutions were killing and torturing political opponents were true. Not one of us in the former government can say today that there were no suspicions on our part that members of the South African Police were engaged in irregular activities.   The decisive question is not whether we as a Cabinet approved the killing of a specific political opponent, we did not do so.  The question is whether we should have done more to ensure that it did not happen.  I deeply regret this omission.  May God forgive me.  
 In my public career I said many controversial things, I did not do it simply to be different.  I had been a career diplomat for 18 years when I entered politics in 1970.  I was a member of our legal team at the World Court where for more than five years we fought the world unremittingly.  There I experienced that you gain nothing by winning the legal battle if you lose the moral battle.  We could not win the political struggle, not against the world and not against the ANC because the policy of the National Party had no moral basis.
 The whites of our country can now, for the first time, make their contribution without feelings of guilt.  President Mandela made it clear that he welcomes and appreciates the contributions of the whites.  Of course the levels of crime and violence are horrific.  Of course things are said by individual members of the ANC that are distressing, but then it is the duty of all, black and white, brown and Asian, to enter into debate with each other and analyse our clashing standpoints within the framework of free speech and association and that we can now do today without the contamination of racial prejudices.  We can debate on policy and premises that are no longer race or colour bound.  
 And we, the whites, should not lose perspective.  There was a time when an NP minister said in public that Steve Biko's gruesome death left him cold.  There was a time when it was seriously considered in the inner circles of the Party, that's the National Party, to clamp down on the so-called Oppenheimer Empire, when the Senate was packed to make the law stripping coloureds of their right to vote; when people of colour were reclassified in the most disgusting way to strip them of their fundamental rights; when a white man and a coloured or black woman that had sexual intercourse were sent to jail like criminals while a white man could cheat his wife every evening with another white woman without the law laying a single finger on them; when a black man went to the cafe around the corner without his pass to buy cigarettes for his "baas" was arrested, locked up and punished in court like a criminal; when a black professor of a university near the Limpopo river was travelling to Cape Town could not overnight in any hotel along the long way he had to travel; when a coloured person who had a doctorate, who spoke and wrote poetry in Afrikaans and was a member of the Dutch Reformed Church could not dine in a restaurant with fellow Afrikaners; when Indians were deprived of their property in cities and towns and were moved to the outskirts; when as a member of Parliament I had to battle for six months to a year to get a telephone for a voter when a voter who wanted to open a cafe had to obtain approval from 26 official institutions; when no farmer could sell his goods along the roadside - I do not want to create the impression that whites have to reproach themselves endlessly and condemn themselves to sit in sackcloth and ashes until Doomsday, we the whites, including the Afrikaner, in particular the Afrikaner, now have a more important role to play than ever before.  Genuine remorse about the repressive past which we sustained and supported, will liberate us to play that role.  
 The country's gross domestic product, this country's, is equal to that of the 42 countries south of the Sahara.  We have at our disposal modern institutions in almost every sphere of life.  General Obasanja, to whom I've referred earlier, told me after his first visit to South Africa, and that was before the EPG visit, he said to me, I am suffering from shock, I did not know that there exists on our continent such a paradise.  Africa can be proud of you.  There is no other place on this continent like this one.  We must preserve this country as a model for Africa.  You are our hope for survival.  
 The whites and also the Afrikaner are necessary, together with all the other communities to ensure that this country survives and prospers.  We have to get the past behind us.  Deputy President Thabo Mbeki is right when he says a new Great Trek awaits us.  I have hope for this country.  I believe that new political movements will come into being where skin colour will play no role and where South Africans will be bound together by the principles which they support, only then will the liberation process of this country be completed.
 Mr Chairperson I want to thank you and your fellow Commissioners for your patience and for the time given me to deliver this presentation.