Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I once again refer to Cosatu House and so on, before the, before an election the politicians would notify headquarters and headquarters would notify de Kock that we would have to make a plan with some of the trade unions and their offices and that is what I am referring to.  That is the type of counter-terrorism acts.  Then it would have been a specific reason, because the allegation would have been that these buildings would have been used by the terrorists groups to plan attacks in South Africa and then there would have been a proper analysis by the Trevats or Stratcom units and then the instruction would have been given further to task units such as ourselves.

MR P WILLIAMS: And also later on you say that,
"Legal action ...",
that is in the second paragraph,
"Legal action had no positive effect anymore.".

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: At that stage several States of Emergencies had been declared and there was also talk of marshall law, that that would have been brought in under Botha and in certain areas there was total lawlessness.  Total lawlessness was the order of the day and normal policing methods simply had no effect any longer.

MR P WILLIAMS: Now, if the, if lawful operations on the side of the police have no effect, then what type of operations would have, would be effective in your view?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That would depend on the circumstances, what the nature of the problem was.

MR P WILLIAMS: But are you not saying, by implication, that the police or the force had to resort to unlawful means?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is what I mean and I have referred to several instances.  General Johan van der Merwe's amnesty application, for instance, where there was the zero hand grenade incident where the hand grenades were actually tampered with and then handed to activists.  That is the kind of method I am referring to.  The blowing up of Cosatu House, the cross-border operations, any conceivable method to simply stabilise matters and bring it to an end.

MR P WILLIAMS: Now, if I understand you correctly, the milieu that you were operating in at that stage lawful operations by the police was not effective and would you say that means that were less lawful or that were illegal was the order of the day on the side of the security forces?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, it was not a, simply a matter of a free for all that we could whatever we wanted to.  There was some measure of control and there was proper planning.  I was involved in several instances where terrorist networks were exposed in the Cape and they were all arrested, the people involved.  So, it was not a, simply a matter of doing what we wanted to and a free for all, it was a very closely controlled situation.

MR P WILLIAMS: Somewhere else, I think it is page 73, you also mention, if I understand you correctly, that some of the selection criteria for allowing people to work at Vlakplaas were White members who were involved in the bush war on the Namibian border.  Is that correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR P WILLIAMS: Would that be members who were previously involved in Koevoet Operations?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, there were members who had been in the Defence Force, there were members who had been with Koevoet or with the local security branches in South West Africa.  It was only members who had already had experience of counter-terrorism methods, because there was no point in taking a totally inexperienced person and putting him in Vlakplaas.  We need people who had already shown that they were excellent group leaders, disciplined people.

MR P WILLIAMS: So that would include members who were previously operative within Koevoet?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, there was nothing wrong with Koevoet and members were also recruited from there.

MR P WILLIAMS: If I turn to page 135 you concede that there were a pattern from Vlakplaas, which had its or which said that,
"... must trace down the terrorists and kill them."
Page to 135, do you have that?

SISI KHAMPEPE: Can you give us the page again, Mr Williams?

CHAIRPERSON: One three five.

MR P WILLIAMS: The second paragraph, it is a question by Adv ... (intervention).

MR BOOYENS: Mike.

MR P WILLIAMS: ... Ntzebeza.

MR HUGO: Mike.

JUDGE MILLER: The mike Mr Williams.

MR P WILLIAMS: Yes, sorry Mr Chairman.
	That somewhere Adv Ntzebeza says that that was intended to be followed was that which Vlakplaas use to follow, trace down the terrorists, kill them and he also says that the spirit in which things were done in Koevoet were being imported into the operations of Vlakplaas and lower down, the second sentence into your answer you say, you confirm there was, indeed, such a pattern at Vlakplaas.  Would you confirm that now?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: What I meant there was that Colonel de Kock had come from South West Africa as a Commanding Officer of Koevoet, he taught us how to go about counter-terrorism units and he taught us discipline and so he was not the only person to teach us those things.  We had already learnt that before and we knew that a person in any encounter with a terrorist, it was the person who shot first who survived.  So, it had already been established by de Kock's predecessors.

MR P WILLIAMS: The person who shoots first, he is the person who survives?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, if somebody aims a gun at you, you certainly would not try and show your certificate of appointment where we can see what is happening in our country today.

MR P WILLIAMS: Would you try other means to arrest the person, for example, shooting him in the legs or in the arm or whatever or ...

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Of course you would try and apprehend a person alive.

MR P WILLIAMS: At some stage you also say that whilst you were in South West Africa you were visited on regular occasions by politicians.  Can you remember what politicians visited you there?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Those were the Ministers of Defence, Ministers of Police, it could have been Minister le Grange and Vlok.  Vlok, Mr Vlok also refers in the document he sent to me on Friday.  He there says that he takes full responsibility for certain statements by him during his motivational visits.  We were in a state of conflict at the time.

MR P WILLIAMS: And in your application you also, you say that,
"When suspects were interrogated we did not really whether they died or not."
I take it that also refers to the stage when you were based in South West Africa.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: When we had information that that particular suspect possessed certain information that there would be a motor bomb explosion in a particular place, we would have used all methods at our disposal to extract that information from him.  For instance, Tony Yengeni was arrested at eight o' clock at night and half past eight he pointed out to the security police where all his other cadres were.  So, all conceivable methods were to be used.

MR P WILLIAMS: So, you did not care whether the suspect die or not?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, I was responsible.  I would not just walk into the office and beat him to death with a chair.  It was a responsible decision when you were interrogating somebody.

MR P WILLIAMS: But it is your statement, you say that,
"We did not care whether they died."

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: In South West Africa it was a different situation.

MR P WILLIAMS: And somewhere you also confirm that that pattern was imported here into South Africa or into Vlakplaas.  Is that not so?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: It was not incorporated 100%.  As I said, if we had information that somebody was, had planted a motor car bomb or there was a bomb that would explode at a particular time, we would have used all possible methods, yes.

MR P WILLIAMS: Mr Bellingan, if we come to this actual incident, let us go to the planning stage early in the morning at Wingfield.  What was the instruction that were given to your members with regard to arrests or eliminate?