Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Perhaps I could just say, Chairperson, the essence of Plan 1 and 2 do not differ, they are in essence the same.  There are certain differences which do not really affect the aim.  I will work through them.  Now the first difference is the date is 9 July, approximately a month later, after the plan was presented in Pretoria.
	Now this plan does have annexures that the other plan did not contain.  Now here you will see that we here refer to Operation Katzen.  That is why there is OP given there, it's Operation and it had a name, Katzen.  We referred to it yesterday.  Paragraph 1 and 2 on 113 is new.  That gives an introduction and it refers to the order that we received from the State President - that is in paragraph 1 - that the situation had to be normalised by December, not only in the Eastern Cape but in the whole country.  I yesterday already said that it was an impossible time-frame, so it imply that the situation had to be stabilised by the end of October, which is even more impossible for us because the stabilisation bases that we had to create had come into operation.
	Now 2 is also new and it is very clear that the current unrest situation cannot be normalised against the background of the state of emergency.  Should I just refer to the differences, Chairperson?

MR KNOETZE: Yes, please.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: And then on page 114 the aim was formulated differently and that is to develop the Eastern Cape into an independent power block against the ANC and the UDF by December '87.
	Paragraphs 5 and 6:  The plan must have minimal political risk for us.  And in 6, it should not be traced back to the RSA because of the sensitive political nature and also concerning the whites and their reactions.
	7 to 10 is also new.  That is the Xhosa aspiration for unity.  It's not new, it's also in 1.  Traditional leaders must be used maximally.  The present Ciskei Government must be replaced with a pro-RSA government.  Perhaps I should just add, because of the friction between the RSA and the Ciskei Government at that time, this Ciskei was not seen really as anti-RSA but they weren't pro, so this perception was strengthened by what Lennox Sebe said during his public statements that he made.
	Paragraph 10:  Elements of the execution of the plan did not have to be dependant on one another.  
	11:  And then the scope.  That's also new except for the first sentence that is the resistance movements.  Then you have four phases and the first plan only had three phases.  And then the different phases are then given in terms of priority and they could also be done independently.
	Then page 116, that's the same.  Also 117, nothing new there.  118, there are a few aspects where there are differences.  On 118 you will see that it only says method.  It's not only an idea, the plan has been strengthened, it's not necessary to give different courses of action.  The method or the course of action given here with the four phases now contain what I expressed on 1, with three courses of action.  So it's now proceeding more in the direction of a plan, whereas the first one was more an idea.  
	And then the execution is done in four phases.  That is up to the date of December '87.  Now phase 1, it's difficult to say exactly which phase is new but I would say that phase 1 would be the newest of those included, and the aim is to stabilise the Eastern Cape and the Ciskei, November '86.  That's on the security terrain.  
	And then the execution ...(indistinct) of a climate at Namba Sebe and then also the establishment of the XWB and then the Transkei leader's acceptance thereof.  Now that at that stage had already been in existence, it had been achieved.
	Paragraph 2 on that page, the establishment of the XWB and the expansion thereof.  And then also the Ciskei People's Rights Protection Party had to be extended and then also involving smaller moderate groups.  And then 4, climate creation for the Xhosa nation with all the different groups, Transkei, Ciskei and Eastern Cape.  And 5, the liberation of the Sebe group.  I think it was two of his sons, two children. 	Chairperson, I can't remember but I think Namba Sebe's son was also involved, and then the appointment of Charles Sebe as leader of the XWB.
	Paragraph 6:  Then the training and organisation of smaller moderate groups for the take-over of third-tier authorities.  Those are the local authorities.
	And then 7:  The coup d'etat.  I don't think that appeared as a concept in the first plan, where Lennox Sebe is then replaced by moderate people, pro-RSA such as Lent Makoma, Namba Sebe and Charles Sebe.
8 is the same, that is the security alliance.
	Chairperson, I'm going to continue with the differences, is that in order?  Then phase 2, the aim was to establish an Eastern Cape confederation of States before January '87.  That refers back to Strelitzia.  There's nothing new there.  Also not on page 120, also not on page 121, 122 also not, 123 also not.  Then the implications on 123, the same, 124 is the same, 125, 126.  127, there is a small technical difference.  In paragraph 22(a) I said the XWB headquarters would probably be in Port Elizabeth and here we say that it should be in the Transkei area.  128 is also the same, I also ask for approval in principle and I also signed it.

MR KNOETZE: Could I then refer you to Annexure A, page 28, paragraph 28.  Do you have that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do.

MR KNOETZE: Is it correct as it is stated here, that on the 9th of July 1986, you presented this second version to General Jannie Geldenhuys?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: And on this page the people are indicated who were present there, General Johan Coetzee, Colonel Jan Griebenauw and a Mr Hall of National Intelligence.  Do you confirm this?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I can recollect, I can recollect that Liebenberg was also present.

MR KNOETZE: What was the decision taken at that meeting concerning this plan?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I can remember correctly it was decided that we can start with parts of phase 1, to get that into operation and depending on how that proceeds, a decision will then be taken concerning the rest, executing the rest of the plan.

MR KNOETZE: Now in this regard, can I take you to page 118.  That is phase 1 of the second version of the plan.
Could you just indicate to the Committee what was approved.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On page 118, that was the creation of the climate for Namba Sebe.  Now that already existed spontaneously.  Then the establishment of the XWB, we could proceed with that.  The strengthening of the Ciskei People's Rights Protection Party, the involvement of the groups there, we could continue with that, climate creation by using pamphlets.  In regard of Xhosa nation unity, that could proceed.  It was also mentioned that the Sebe group, especially Charles Sebe, that he should be freed as part of this phase and that attention should be given to the substitution of Lennox Sebe, by people such Lent Makoma.  Those are  the only aspects that we had authorisation for.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, could I just the General a question while we are on this point.  When you were talking about Operation Strelitzia, you said that you approached the State Security Council for authorisation or approval thereof, with this Operation Katzen, you've now spoken about now going to meet with certain high-ranking Generals, General Liebenberg, Geldenhuys, why was this not presented to the State Security Council as had been Operation Strelitzia?  Were they being short-circuited or what was the position?