Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

MR B WILLIAMS: I think, Captain Bellingan, you realise the import of the question that I am asking you and you touch upon it in your own evidence earlier today, when you said that when the shooting started you realised that it is peak hour, there are people in the area and you now want to bring the situation under control, not so?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR B WILLIAMS: Now, as a seasoned policeman, as a seasoned Vlakplaas operative, aware of the fact or, at least, in terms of your evidence, that these people were heavily armed  insurgents, notwithstanding that you did not anticipate that this would be a problem?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, if Jimmy had told them that they should look for another place or another target, if I remember correctly, Jimmy told me that it was not easy to tell them let us do this or that.  If I tried to put them on a decoy it would be much more difficult and we continued as if this operation would be completed.

MR B WILLIAMS: Captain Bellingan, that makes things worse and worse, you see, because now you are saying that your information was so uncertain that you were not sure.  What if it had happened further up in NY1, closer towards the police station and you would have gone ahead, is that what you are saying?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, a week before this incident I saw them, I do not know what happened in those four, five or six days.  We acted according, based on the last information conveyed to us.

MR B WILLIAMS: All Right.  If I can then step off that point.  You had planned to go ahead with this operation.  According to you the only information that you had available was that an attack would take place.  Am I correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: The information we had, according to Jimmy and Eric, was that there will be an attack on a police van.

MR B WILLIAMS: All right and the information ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Did he tell you what vehicle they would be using?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, they said they were going to steal a little van and Liebenberg later found out that it would be a little panel van.  A little panel van was stolen in Guguletu.

MR B WILLIAMS: And you were aware of the fact that it was going to take place approximately in the region of the bridge to the intersection?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  I cannot remember who enquired how the, late the little bus would leave and what route it would follow.  One of the people during the planning session had to do this.

MR B WILLIAMS: What was your communication to Jimmy when he conveyed this, if it was Eric or if it was Jimmy, you are not quite sure?  No?  That you spoke with, that made this information available to you?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I think it was Jimmy.

MR B WILLIAMS: All right and Captain Liebenberg was present at the time that this was said to you?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, Captain Liebenberg was there.

MR B WILLIAMS: And what was your response, would you tell  the Committee?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: We decided to tell the various branches, if we did not do that and something happened the onus was on us, that we did not convey the necessary information.

MR B WILLIAMS: Yes, but the question is, what was your response to Jimmy?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I told Jimmy that he should try to obtain more information, he must contact us.  We still worked by ways of radio contact and if something should happen, he should control the vehicle, if they should steal that, he had to control the weapons so that no shooting should occur.  It was, he, it was a difficult lot of people, it was not easy to control them.  They were well versed in what they wanted to do.

MR B WILLIAMS: Right and that was the sum total of what you could convey to Jimmy at that time?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR B WILLIAMS: And between that time and the time that the incident occurred you had not spoken to Jimmy again?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: As far as I know he did not contact me again.

MR B WILLIAMS: I think you must think very carefully now, Mr Bellingan, because you have said that you did not have a chance to speak to him again.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: He should, he had to make contact with me from his side.  From his side he had to go to a, make contact via telephone.

MR B WILLIAMS: And your evidence is today that that never happened?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: As far as I can remember, it did not happen.

MR B WILLIAMS: Now, can you and you also had no contact with Eric Maluleka?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: He was part of Jimmy's group and they were still inside.  I had no contact with him.

MR B WILLIAMS: And the only further word that you had was a comment from Liebenberg's source on the Sunday, if I remember your evidence correctly?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR B WILLIAMS: And that information was that the plan was going to proceed?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: According to Liebenberg, yes.

MR B WILLIAMS: Right.  Now, will you explain to this Committee when you told Jimmy that he must drive the vehicle up the pavement?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That happened when we saw him the first time before, the week before the incident.  I would have told him try anything possible.  He was not a stupid askari, he was a very intelligent person and I would have told him do anything to try to get him to stop so that we can ...

MR B WILLIAMS: No, no, no, you see, Captain Bellingan, you said earlier that it was a specific instruction that Jimmy Mbane must drive the vehicle up the kerb on that corner, that was your evidence earlier today.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I stand by that, Mr Chairman.

MR B WILLIAMS: Yes, I know you stand by that.  Now, I am asking when did you convey that to him?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That must have been at the last meeting that I had with Jimmy, Mr Chairman.

MR B WILLIAMS: But that cannot have been, Captain Bellingan, with the greatest of respect.  I asked you a few moments ago what was the extent of your information or your instruction to Jimmy and all you said was, if I remember your evidence correctly, was that he should take control of the vehicle and he should try and get, and he should try and keep the weapons out of the way.  Am I correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR B WILLIAMS: There was nothing as specific as an instruction to drive a vehicle up a specific kerb in a specific intersection.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I could have told him just do something to bring the vehicle to a standstill, ride up the kerb, just do something, drive into a pole, that is debatable, I cannot remember all my words specifically.  It might have been that time, Mr Chairman.

MR B WILLIAMS: You see, Captain Bellingan, one gets the impression here, you can tell me if I am right or wrong, that this operation was planned with a lot more precision than you are prepared to recall today.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, as I said to you, if I had all the documents today of all the reports I wrote, I would have had a better idea.  I am only trying to remember things, I am not hiding anything.  Why?  If I had to plan it with more military precision I accept it, I cannot remember every word, every instruction I told Jimmy and Eric.

MR B WILLIAMS: If we look at your involvement in this operation itself, if I understand your evidence correctly, you were driving in a vehicle with Sergeant Grobbelaar, not so?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR B WILLIAMS: Mr Chairperson, I hope the Commission can follow me, plan, and you at some stage had been travelling in a northerly direction down NY1 and then turned right into NY3.  Am I correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: It was after our first planning decision, yes.

MR B WILLIAMS: Right and you say that you passed a group of men on that corner who looked suspicious to you?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: There were people there who looked suspicious.

MR B WILLIAMS: You did not, at that stage, see any of your askaris?