Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

MR GOOSEN: So far as the APLA high command is concerned, the actions against White civilians as described in the August 1996 submission, those were not departures from policy. Those were not a, as it were, a new pattern which arose, because of the difficulties with either political education or lines of command or the difficulty of commanding guerilla operations.  Those were in fact strategically determined targets, targeted by the APLA high command?

MR MKHWANAZI: What I am actually emphasising here, is that to carry the people along with you in a people's war, you might have emphasised certain things at a particular time.  And you have to take cognisance of the changing situation, changing environment.  That's what I was particulary emphasising.

MR GOOSEN: But not a departure, as described in the August 1996 submission, it talked about it as being departures; departures from previous policy, a different and earlier strategy, not departures, but merely an adaptation of strategy in the changing circumstances of the 1990s. That's the position of the APLA high command.

MR MKHWANAZI: I think that is correct to say that because of a developing situation, what we have actually stated in the 1996 presentation, that is we are the political leadership, and I was part and parcel of that presentation before this august body, but on a further discussion with the high command, this point was emphasised, that no, this thing we had to take cognisance, even of those elements that are mentioned in that very presentation, that we had to adapt to the changing situation and carry the people along with us, who were the main constituency supporting us.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I just take that - do you want to ...

BRIG PHITLA: Yes. Just to add there one perspective to this question.  It is a fact that in the Nineties we had the pressure of lack of the commissars.  This was a result of the fact that the rate of recruitment was higher than ever before in our organisation.  It is therefore a fact that the level of education that could be given to the recruits, was not as it was externally.  Because the difference here is that in the camps, when people woke up in the morning, they ate, worked and dreamt politics and nothing else.  And therefore, people had ample time at their disposal to discuss and do everything that was political.  Whilst in the internal environment, this was different.  We should realise that some of the people were recruited had other occupations somewhere else.  They might have been students, they might have been employed somewhere else, and therefore political education had limited time. So that is a fact.
 Secondly, I don't think there is a problem here in terms of talking about possible errors.  Because we have not identified the possible errors.  What we have referred to in our document, is specific operations that we are talking about. It is not possible errors.  We are not denying the fact that there could have been possible errors.  The document only indicates that the operations that were undertaken were not errors themselves, but possible errors might have been there.  So there is no question of departure as such.

CHAIRPERSON: Could I take this just a little further, because I think we are on a very, very important point here. I think that what we are trying to ascertain, as a Commission, is where does the buck stop.  Who accepts final accountability for any action, of any organisation, not just APLA or PAC.  What I am finding a little difficult to understand is - and let me put it quite bluntly, what I hear you are saying in effect, and I may be mishearing, and you will correct me, is that APLA was really a law unto itself.  That within APLA there was considerable political debate and education, but there does seem to me, from what you have said thus far, a difference between PAC and APLA at certain stages, and I think it is reflected in the earlier report, which was given to us by the political leadership.  And now we are talking directly to the APLA operatives and commanders and the chain of command.
 Let me demonstrate what I am trying to say, by referring to page 3 of your presentation of today.  And I refer to the third or fourth paragraph which begins with "it should be noted".  
 Here you state in your submission that it should come as no surprise that targets like St James Church, King William's Town Golf Club, Heidelberg Tavern were selected and that the APLA leadership of APLA takes full responsibility for these operations, that there is no regret expressed and nothing to apologise for.
 Now that doesn't seem to square with what we hear from the leadership of the PAC. So I am just trying to discover now, is APLA then accountable finally to the political leadership, not merely to the political commissar, but the ultimate political leadership or is it an organisation which is, as I stated, a law unto itself.
 I find, it is difficult for me to understand that on the one hand there seems to be this commitment to reconciliation and on the other, a total lack of any acceptance of responsibility, other than it was a normal target such as St James Church, King William's Town Golf Club, Heidelberg Tavern, et cetera.  Is there a contradiction here because I am not getting the full picture.

MR MKHWANAZI: Ja, Mr Chairman, there is no contradiction in that regard.  Maybe to clarify the misunderstanding.  PAC was or is the leadership of APLA and Mr (indistinct) will draw the PAC and it is the structure.  Earlier on we defined what war is, how did we perceive our war of liberation. Of course, we even went to the extent of quoting clauses that war is just the continuation of politics.  Basically it must not be expected but in the fighting situation we behave like politicians, et cetera. It is a bloody situation, it is a bloody mess on the battlefield. I think you have to be very clear in this regard.
 This, I must say, it is a normal or usual propaganda or perception, more especially of the media industry, that APLA was a law unto itself. But that is not the case.  That's why we always reiterate that.  But if the Commission or the South African people do not understand that war means blood-shed, means killing, means death, then I do not understand how are we to clarify that. 
 We were at pains, to be even political, to sound political in our submission, to show how the politics is linked with the war itself. So in that regard I think it is very clear, and the decisions, unless - maybe I don't understand you well, Mr Chairman, that you expected that in every decision that we take - it is an organisation. APLA is an organisation with the principles and the rules and regulations.  We perfected and developed it as an organisation that is subordinate to the Pan Africanist Congress. It has the power, the authority, the command, to execute the armed struggle as it perceive it, correct.  Thus, every decision could not be referred to the leader or to the central committee of the time, because that will make the central committee, which is the political body, the actual execution or the implementing or the military organ of the organisation. So I think my colleagues will add on that, that there is a difference in terms of the operation. But basically it is the carrying and the promotion of the political objectives of the PAC.
 So I don't know whether it is understood?