Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-03-15

MR LAX: You see my concern is this, you're applying for amnesty for your role in these activities and we have to evaluate your conduct in the light of the motives and perspectives and all that sort of thing, of your position at that time but in order to understand how you made a particular decision and motivated it, we have to know what considerations you applied in your mind?  In order to do that, we have to understand what information was placed before you upon which you then exercise certain criteria and arrived at a decision.  Now you're continually telling us it wasn't my decision, it wasn't my decision - let me just finish?  And the fact of the matter is that it was your decision at a point because you approved of a plan, you evaluated certain scenarios as you've told us and I'm going to come to that a bit later but at some point you approved and recommended whatever the decision was onto your superiors, for their subsequent recommendation and for me the issue is - and this is really the question, I've just created the context, what were those criteria, how did you evaluate it and it doesn't help you to say "I didn't make the decision" because you're applying for amnesty for your portion of making that decision, that's how I understand it, maybe I'm wrong?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: Yes I think you are wrong.  I repeatedly said that on my level I made the plans, I helped with it, what I am saying that was not my decision was the profile of the individual where information came from ground level or the information came form the higher levels and then there would be a national security management system which on Special Forces level would have an intelligence system with specific intelligence officers who then compiled lists which they denied later who said who were the enemies of the State, what they did, what that person's background was, why it is said, what that person's profile was, what is his family's profile and then outside of my control they would interdepartmentally go to a place like Trevits, they have files, target files, they have photos of the people up against the wall, there was a specific Defence Force policy that we called know your enemy, about who he was and then I received my enemy on my level and then I see who my enemy on the other side was and then we would compare each other and the one would see how they could outdo the other one so if I say that I have access to the enemy then my role and function was to shoot him.  My role and function was not to evaluate his life but I had to confirm that this person, that I received information from above that this is the same person that I would possibly have to go and shoot and for this I accept full responsibility but not for building up the information and the information build up process in the entire intelligence system of the Republic of South Africa because this is a structure that was far above my capacity and above my decision making capacity.

MR LAX: You see, I understand all of that and we've certainly heard lots of evidence about Trevits and other places, some of it quite contradictory but be that as it may what I'd like to know is what exactly are you applying for amnesty for, what specific acts?  Is it your role in this conspiracy, is it the decisions that you made that contributed to the conspiracies?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, I am applying for amnesty for the fact that in terms of the Act I can be classified as a person who had a structure that I exercised management and authority over.  I do not know what the Afrikaans word is where I, in terms of the act committed, gross humans rights violations, I have a problem in terms of whether it was a military operation but in terms of the Act I would accept it as such and further that it was part of a political structure and further that it was not done for own gain and in those terms I had people who worked under me and I sent those people to do things, I gave them guidelines and I am responsible for their actions so sometimes even though I was not on ground level, I accepted responsibility on my level for this.

MR LAX: I'm going to turn briefly to some general stuff about the CCB and to the best of your recollection in global figures, take a year 1989 for example, what was the annual budget of the CCB?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: It is in the region of 30 Million Rand.

MR LAX: And of that 30 Million, how much of it was appropriated to Region 6?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: I have no idea.

MR LAX: Not even a vague percentage?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: I have no idea.

CHAIRPERSON: Would Mr Basson have some sort of knowledge of that, more knowledge than you perhaps seeing that he was the co-ordinator?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: I don't know, he was only the co-ordinator but maybe he can remember it but that is more on the financial side or on the support side.  It can actually be on the formal structure side.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Lax.

MR LAX: It's fine.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Region 6 a cheap region or less expensive to run that regions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: It should have been a lot cheaper because it didn't need to cover such distances and it didn't have expenses outside the country.

MR LAX: There's probably another factor which I could put to you and that is that it hadn't really got off the ground yet, it was still in the - according to your evidence it was being built up?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: That is correct, well actually it was for the whole structure.  I think I did give evidence to this effect that the instructions were from the Chief of the Defence Force's side in building up the system that we in the long term would have to dig ourselves in so this was four, five, eight, ten years ahead and if the relation was always kept between the political developments and that side, I cannot say now but it is the case, it was not really developed.

CHAIRPERSON: If we take two things into account apropos your budget, number one that approximately four real projects got off the ground in Region 6 in relation to something like close to 200.  4 out of 200 is a pretty small percentage, it's nothing more than 2%

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: That is correct, but I think I did give evidence to this effect, yes I did, that it was four operational projects but there were development projects or office projects.

MR LAX: But one can assume that those costs were a lot less than the operational projects?

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: No, it could have been the purchasing of flats or purchasing vehicles but that is so, it is not large amounts.

MR LAX: Even if we say it was 10% of 30 Million which is highly unlikely but ...(intervention)

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: Yes then it would still be small.

MR LAX: Now you indicated and this is within this general context, you indicated that in essence having been given guidelines by the general staff you developed the whole scenario of the CCB yourself, you thought up it's structures, you thought up it's lines of accountability and the broad concept of how it would go on the plans that were with it.  Did I understand that correctly?