Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-12-01

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: It is very difficult to assess, things were done in a very irregular manner in terms of time.  There would be lulls and then there would be very busy periods.
	I think the, if I think in terms of the number of notices or messages and things like that, anything between 25, 30 indications would have come through, but again, I remember very distinctly the pressures, there were times that it was quite frequent, but we weren't ever able to indicate precisely.  The important thing was getting the goodies, not necessarily keeping a record of them.

MR WILLS: You say on page 4 of your amnesty application and I am referring specifically to paragraph 10(b), that all actions were politically motivated aimed to enable communities under attack in kwaZulu Natal to defend themselves.
	Self defence against an armed enemy was a justifiable response as a part of continuing struggle at the time of negotiations in order to secure inter alia free political activity.
	Would you like to expand on that at all?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: Yes.  I think the members of the Committee will know and it is common knowledge that State sponsored counter-revolutionary violence in the South African context in the last couple of years, has undertaken a number of different phases.
	They have all, all those different types of violence, however, have had a particular effect, and that effect and particular purpose, was to deny free political activity to all those organisations which I would argue the ANC was primary, all those organisations that opposed fundamentally, the structures of the apartheid State.
	Now, our experience here from 1983 onwards in the province, had been and it has become clearer over the last couple of months and years as well, but the violence ranged against us at that time, took on the appearance frequently of inter-political violence between organisations or members of organisations, ANC, IFP, etc.
	However, from a very early time in the 1990's, around 1990, 1991, assessment and analysis of the type of violence and the type of activity that was taking place in this province, indicated that there was some other activity going on beneath it, that things were not quite what they appeared to be.
	At that time, I remember distinctly, the ANC and comrades here were aware that the major sources of insecurity to communities, the major sources of attack against communities, were actually fermented and organised and perpetrated by elements from within the Security Forces of the State.
	We would include within those particular definitions of SAP and SADF, particular activities of organised hitsquads.  Nasty individuals and units from within the kwaZulu police who have become implicated in a whole range of activities.
	The reality for communities on the ground, was that structures of authority, whether they were of the kwaZulu government or of the South African government, structures of authority were actually perpetrators of atrocities and violence against many communities.
	What happened and what became clear as evidence of things like Operation Marion or Operation Katson from the Eastern Cape made evident, was that the Pretoria government and instruments of the securocrats, were using other political forces such as the IFP from time to time, for their own particular purposes, and they were doing that in the traditions of counter-insurgency warfare.
	Essentially what that meant in this province, as I think has become evidently clear, is that even in areas which were poverty stricken with scarce resources, it was very easy to foment problems between members of communities, based on political affiliation.
	That was an issue that we had to address and as comrade Jeff has indicated, there were numerous attempts to foment peace structures between the various political organisations which ran hot and cold from time to time, during this particular period.  In essence we found it extremely difficult to establish ANC structures within kwaZulu Natal.
	Southern Natal, we got off comparatively lightly compared to Northern Natal, where it was a clear fact that the ANC had to operate underground.  Even after 1990 in Northern Natal, because of the threats and attacks on organisers, individuals who were identified within communities as being either ANC members or organisers or MK, became targets and became victims very frequently.
	The number of assaults that took place on meetings, constantly we would find that when the ANC as a legal political organisation, wished to have a meeting in a hall, the local authority in charge of that particular area, would refuse permission to have that meeting.
	Funerals were attacked, vigils were attacks, and so on and so forth.  It wasn't only free political activity that was denied.  What increasingly became obvious, that people were not being allowed to live their lives as normal citizens.
	Education was disrupted.  We know of the Pietermaritzburg war for example, the seven day war, which was one of the more dramatic examples of the type of mobile warfare that was going on.  That created a situation in which the province became awash with large number of refugees, displaced people who had nowhere to go, nowhere to live, and in those circumstances, we faced a completely uphill battle as to what to do with this.
	It was clear that the responsible authority, which was the State, was not doing its task, and the ANC at a national level, continually took the issue, even of kwaZulu Natal violence to the then President De Klerk and it is a matter of public record, that the De Klerk government did absolutely nothing to intervene in the particular circumstances of violence here.
	In those circumstances, and it builds dramatically during 1992 and then 1993 at the beginning, those circumstances as comrade Jeff has indicated, created a situation in which a political organisation such as the ANC, had to take the responsibility, not only politically but also in a more active manner to assist communities to defend themselves.
	It was not a decision that was taken lightly.  I was part of the discussions at various conferences about that, and I can testify to the tension and the atmosphere of those meetings, when those resolutions were decided upon.  They were not taken with glee, they were not taken with eagerness, it was taken as a result of serious consideration that this has to be done to prevent the further genocide of people in this particular province.

MR WILLS: You have indicated that you dealt with certain people at MHQ, can you just let us know who those people are?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: Besides the leadership of comrade Chris Hani and comrade Ronnie Kasrils, whom we interacted with regularly, the person I dealt with directly was comrade Calvin Khan who I understand as the Committee or Commission would know, his activities through the name of Riaz Saludi, which is his proper name, but of course I would know other people at MK Headquarters, including Siphiwe Nyanda and others, because of the general interaction, because the point is that SDU activities was one element of many aspects of ANC work that we actually had to encounter.
	There was this constant interaction, so yes, we knew most of the people, but in terms of SDU activity, it would have been comrade Chris primarily and then comrade Calvin at MHQ.

MR WILLS: Further down the line, would you be aware of any of the persons in respect of whom Mr Sithole was interacting?