Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MS MADIKIZELA: Thank you Chairperson. I'm just wondering if this idea of the needs to know basis, if it is possible at all that part of the reason for this was perhaps to avoid not in an actively conscious way but in a kind of subtle way to avoid confronting the problems on the ground by delegating them to other to do the job in a way. While you as a Minister or the people in charge sat in the background and watched the results and not got involved in the process. Do you think that part of the function that, that serves was to remove you from direct accountability so that you're not directly involved on the grounds but you know, others are doing it? Do you think that is possible?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: No. Sorry if I talk about need to know I'm talking about need to know about certain specific things. Horizontally as well as vertically. For instance the nuclear bomb I doubt whether there was more than five people in the Defence Force who knew about it. That's a need to know basis, that's what I'm. And I'm not trying to avoid accountability or responsibility. That's the reason why when we spoke here yesterday I came out and I said this is political responsibility. And I've got to carry it. Now if the CCB did certain things in South Africa that was unlawful it's their responsibility but otherwise it's my responsibility, political responsibility.
 But basically where I would have met them, met in the sense of it might have been discussed was I had a, as a Minister I insisted on getting all the various arms at the air force, army and navy and all the staffs that's the personnel, the operations and so forth, get them around a table. And I'm talking about maybe 50, maybe 60 people once a year. It took at least about three days to work out the budget and it could have happened that in the budget people will say well we need for special forces a 100 million or 10 million or what the case may be. And I'll say well are you sure that's enough or should we give them more? Debating between the people who are subjectively involved and I should be objectively in the sense of keeping it back. And keeping and that's what I tried to do yesterday, explain yesterday that's the forecast of operations that will take place for the next year, for the next five years or the next twenty years, etc. But otherwise no, need to know basis wasn't keeping the Minister out of the picture because there was delegations. And I must say something else too. I doubt whether there's any other department in South Africa that had a policy of management by objectives and decentralised control and command written. And this is the way business world work and it's a scientific way. We did it. But need to know didn't play a role there.
 I'm not quite sure but I have an idea that somewhere you fed us with a need to know definition or something. I picked it up in studying and preparing myself to appear here. But it wasn't keeping the Minister away and let's do the dirty tricks here under the table. No.

MR LYSTER: General just before we broke for lunch you talked about the raids at the time of the EPG mission. And you said that essentially that decision was taken or was it needed to be taken in circumstances of great sensitivity by yourself, essentially by yourself and the State President. Obviously on the advise from the head of the army whoever it was in the army. Now was that something which took place on a regular basis? Where if it was of a sensitive nature or if it was of such a nature that a decision had to be made quickly that decisions were made by the State President and the Minister responsible? And I'm talking really about yourself and the Minister of law and order and perhaps one of the other Ministers within the security arena?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Well Mr Chairman this was a question of sensitivity of not so much time-wise because we had leakages previously and failure in operations because of that. And because it could have been postponed again. I always went to the State President for any operations across border. To keep him informed because the implications, the international implications were so great. I couldn't take those decisions on my own. But in this specific case he said fine in the middle of May. But unfortunately then I was out of circulation for approximately a month. So what happened after his approval to the operation and coming back into the folds of the government I wouldn't know. That's why I said I'll take responsibility but it was the government's decision there.
 Except if you followed the golden rule that I explained in parliament today where I said those words. Nobody said you are advocating murder now. Nobody said it but they should have done it there. If somebody was against it then he should have gone to the State President because he saw it on the 19th. He could have done it personally or he could have waited for the State Security Council or say: "I'm sorry I disagree with it." And the golden rule, leave government if you disagree with government. I mean that's the way it functions.

MR LYSTER: Ja. I was really asking a more general question as to whether these sorts of decisions were taken by Ministers in consultation with the State President? Not cross-border raids but other decisions which may have had national and international repercussions? Was that how the, was that the milieu in which you operated at the time? That the State President made decisions in consultation with a Minister or perhaps two Ministers?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: He could have done it that way or he could have done it in isolation. It depended on various factors. There wasn't a golden rule to say he had a group in. I saw him in certain situations that he got a group in, depending on the situation. It wasn't operations. I mean when they caught those chaps in France they say smuggling arms and ammunition for South Africa, he called in a couple of people like people who were involved in it. Involved in a sense of relationship with France, etc., etc. So you could play it any way. My problem is the international implications and national and therefore I went to him and then he decided what to do. In this specific case I advised we should do it and he decided to do it. I'm not sure whether he spoke to the other chaps or he didn't speak to them. I went out of the normal routine there.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman can I just record General Malan has referred to the fact that in that time slot he was out of circulation. I just wish to record that I think from somewhere in May to about July 1986 General Malan was incapacitated because he underwent heart surgery. A heart bye-pass was done which is a very large operation and I just wish to record it so that you can take it in account (...indistinct) Thank you.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. Just for the record Ilan Lax speaking. General one of the things that struck me when we heard the evidence from your colleagues, your Cabinet colleagues in Johannesburg was all of them said that the tenor, the tone of the Botha government and the Botha Cabinet in particular was such that you just didn't ask questions. You didn't question decisions because he just didn't tolerate that sort of thing much. That's how they put it across.