Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-10-14

ADV GCABASHE: You had not reconnoitred that particular building before you got there, not on that day anyway?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: No I didn't.

ADV GCABASHE: And how long did the drive from Secunda to Pretoria take you?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Mr Chair, I'm not entirely sure how long it took us but it's an hour approximately, I'm not entirely sure exactly how far.

CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon, just give me an idea of the distance, I don't know the road very well from where you were to Vermeulen Street?  Just a rough estimate?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: It's difficult to say, I don't have any clear idea of how far Secunda is from Pretoria and I don't have my own vehicle, I was travelling with other people.  I've never possessed my own vehicle and I honestly don't know how far Pretoria is from Secunda but it's quite a distance.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it more than a hundred kilometres?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes I believe it is more than a hundred kilometres.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Now you left Secunda at about 7 o'clock it would appear.  Can you give me a rough time if that's not right?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Mr Chair, I think it was quite a bit earlier than 7 o'clock.  I wouldn't be able to tell exactly what the time was.

ADV GCABASHE: No but was this day time or evening?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: It wasn't dark yet, it was quite light so it could have been round about 5 o'clock.

ADV GCABASHE: Let's assume it was about 5 o'clock, you got to Pretoria at about 6 o'clock and it still wasn't dark at 6 o'clock?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: So you were going to attack this particular target in broad daylight essentially?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: We would have waited until it was dark, until it would not have been as busy in town.

ADV GCABASHE: But how then did you know that the next shift would not be a two man shift which is what you said you were used to seeing, a two man not a six man shift?  You know, I'm just looking at the planning, that's really the area that I'm looking at right now.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Chairperson, I didn't know when they would change, when the next shift would be there, how many guards there would be, I didn't look at that.

ADV GCABASHE: In your organisation these were not matters that you discussed that if you go out, come back at least with six weapons.  If you go out make sure you operate in this particular manner.  You didn't discuss that type of thing at all?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I don't understand the question?

ADV GCABASHE: I'm going one step backwards from your actions to the planning and any possible discussions you had in the organisation because you were a part of an organisation.  Now when you went out as operatives what modus operandi did your organisation expect from you?  Did they really expect you to come back with two weapons?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I don't think it was very important for them how many weapons I would return with.  I think it was important for them that I would in fact return with weapons, I didn't think the quantity was really that important.  The more the better of course but I think they would have been satisfied if I had only returned with two weapons.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, it just puzzles me a bit that you would put three lives at stake, you go all the way to Pretoria, achieve nothing and drive back to Secunda.  That's really what happened, up to the point you got to Devon, that's really what had happened.  You put three lives at risk and came back empty handed.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, I ask this because again I'm thinking of the planning.  The idea to go to Devon occurred to you when you were now back in the Secunda area essentially, it's not something that had occurred to you when you left Secunda at 5 o'clock, am I right?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: That is correct.  Chairperson, the first idea that I had where to obtain the weapons was the situation in Vermeulen Street, that was my first option, my first choice.  At that stage I didn't really think of Devon.  To tell the truth it was such a long time since I'd passed this base one could almost say that I'd almost forgotten about this base.

ADV GCABASHE: But along with having forgotten about this base when you left Secunda, there was no real urgency either in coming back with one or ten weapons, was there?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes I believe there was urgency to return with weapons.

ADV GCABASHE: But you have said that even if you came back with one weapon, it didn't matter to the organisation and this is why my conclusion and correct me if my conclusion is wrong, my conclusion is then there was no urgency if they would be happy to receive one weapon from three operatives after a mission?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Chairperson, in the first instance my organisation wasn't aware of the fact that I would have approached Mr Holder and Van Zyl to assist with the operation and I believed that each weapon, every weapon would have helped and any weapon that could have been obtained was necessary.  I believed that it mattered whether we in fact returned with weapons.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay, so we get to Secunda and you get the idea that Devon might be the place to go to.  Again, why didn't you go in and reconnoitre first, just find out what was happening?  You hadn't been there in such a long time?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Chairperson, I thought of Devon Base before we arrived at Secunda.  Now Devon is approximately midway between Devon and Secunda so on my way to Secunda I remembered the base and the reason why we first didn't reconnoitre.  Well I don't really know what the reason for that was, at that stage I really believed that it was still a property of the airforce.  I had no idea it had been handed over for example to the South African Police, I had no idea, I did not envisage that.

ADV GCABASHE: You see again, I asked because if indeed Mr Holder's version under oath is going to be that that was his impression, it would sound like a very reasonable impression to have had, but please, you were there, you can correct that best.  Would that not have been a reasonable impression?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I believe that if I had not put it quite clearly of what my objective would have been with the operation, yes then it could have been a reasonable impression.

ADV GCABASHE: Now you get back to Secunda, you get your medical attention.  The one bit that I seem to have missed, the report back, your advocate led you through how you would report back and how you did in fact report back.  Can you just take me through that very briefly?  What I understood you to say was you went to Mr van Rensburg for medical assistance more than to report back to him.  Was that correct, is that why you went to him?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: That is correct, Chairperson, I went to Mr van Rensburg mostly to get assistance, I told him what had happened and at that stage it didn't really occur to me to try and report back.  I was very afraid, I wanted medical attention.  Although I believed that Mr van Rensburg would have discussed this with the leader of the BWB and BRL or whoever had given the instruction would have then ascertained that I would have in fact executed the instruction.

ADV GCABASHE: Now again, this is what puzzles me.  You needed to notify the State against whom you have declared war that you have tackled it's personnel somewhere.  You did not bother to do this.  How would the State know that your organisation was serious about that declaration of war?