Special Hearings — Political Party Recalls — UNKNOWN

MR DE KLERK: Mr Chairman, I was against allowing amnesty for this type of action. I was drawn, forced almost kicking in order to ensure that we get a political settlement into changing my decision on that. With the Record of Understanding I was not in favour of changing the law which would allow cold-blooded murderers to apply for amnesty. That is where I stand on this issue. 
And it was under pressure from the ANC in order to get people who committed necklace murders, in order to get people who were found guilty of planting the bomb in Magoos Bar etc, etc, released from jail and getting them amnesty, where they made it an absolute pre-condition that unless we did it we could not have continued negotiations. So I made the concession. If I had what I wanted to do then the Norgard(?) Principles would have been applied on these issues. That is where I stand. And on that basis I am saying that whoever did that within the framework of my whole experience was not executing government policy and was not implementing a reasonable interpretation of what government policy was.

MR GOOSEN: It's conceivable then, Sir, that the political motivation, the ostensible political motivation of the persons who would be applying for amnesty in these matters would then be called into question by you and your party?

MR DE KLERK: No, that doesn't flow from that. Can I here underline something which I have made abundantly clear in my submissions. There is this concept that everybody working in the civil service and everybody in the security forces were actually National Party supporters, whereas it is simply not true. A vast percentage of them never voted for the National Party. Many of them might have supported parties to the right, others have supported parties to the left of the National Party. We had a de-politicised defence force and police force and civil service. 
And in that sense of the word, the political motivation of individuals is a very complex issue. It's not just party political, it's a political motivation for a person if that person believes that against the type of revolutionary onslaught certain things would be allowable because of the seriousness, because of the threat which that person believes such a revolutionary onslaught holds. 
Likewise one can ask whether, what was the political motivation of for instance, ANC applicants who killed I

<UNKNOWN>: P supporters? The I

<UNKNOWN>: P was against apartheid. They never accepted apartheid. Where fellow Blacks have been killed who were as opposed to apartheid as those who killed them, what was the political motivation? It wasn't apartheid, it wasn't the fight against apartheid which gave rise to those killings. So it's a complex issue. And I think that the political motivation of people in general who fought on all the many sides who fought each other, is really almost a given, because the whole conflict centred around political motivation; centred around how individuals saw the future, saw constitutional dispensations, saw what was good for the country, what was bad for the country. It wasn't about money. It was about politics and all those who participated in it, almost per definition had a political viewpoint and were in the final analysis also motivated by that political viewpoint. 
So I would urge that political motivation shouldn't be made a sort-of a controversial issue, to draw a line of fine distinction of deviating, of deviating from the norms which were applied in previous amnesties and releases which were agreed upon. 
You will recall Mr Chairman that on this issue in my very first submission I asked for absolute even-handedness and with all due respect I am not imputing motives to the questioner, I think there is a risk in the underlying line of thinking to that question, that suddenly new norms might be applied in deciding or analysing whether there was political motivation or not.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much. Mr de Klerk I'd like to move on to slightly different, though similar, we are dealing with the same thing, I have some documentation, a bundle of documents which I will from time-to-time refer to in further questions ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me, I beg your pardon, I gather you are moving now to a different category?

MR GOOSEN: Strictly speaking Mr Chairperson it's not a different category, it's just not an example in the same form that I've presented examples previously, and would want to carry on. It deals with the same subjects.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you. I have made available to you Mr de Klerk certain documentation which I would refer to from time-to-time and the documents are also available for members of the panel.
An SAD

<UNKNOWN>: document dated 28 April 1987 and which appears at page 1 of the bundle entitled "Aanbieding BSB on HSAV Chief of the South African Defence

<UNKNOWN>: orce - HSAV se Komentaar" was submitted at the Goniwe inquest, it was labelled Exhibit G33. The authenticity of the document is not disputed by the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: at the inquest and was confirmed in an affidavit which was made by General Joubert, officer commanding special forces, a copy of which is attached, which appears at pages 3 and 4 of the bundle. The document deals with a number of discussion points raised for clarity with the chief of the South African Defence

<UNKNOWN>: orce, General Jannie Geldenhuys at the time relating to actions of the CCB.It's apparent that CCB operatives were concerned about their liability for actions aimed at the elimination of targets and whether such actions could be seen as murder.
Under paragraph 7 which reads,
"Methods used the BSB does not regard that as murder and defines it as possible an assault on an enemy bases was not a standard issuing of weapons in an unconventional way not to harm. Under Chapter 9 internal activities elimination of specific targets. A channel of handling these aspects are being established. This channel will be discussed on the 12th May and a certain person will be present".
And then if you look at paragraph 10.2 on page 2.
"BSB will make certain recommendations for targets but it should be referred along that channel to a certain person. To HSAW".
In your view of the remarks of the then SAD

<UNKNOWN>: , Chief of the South African Defence

<UNKNOWN>: orce General Geldenhuys constitute an aberration?

MR DE KLERK: Mr Chairperson I must object to once again this question and I think we must have clarity on this.

<UNKNOWN>: irstly I don't know whether this document is an authentic document.

MR GOOSEN: There's an affidavit attached to it.

<UNKNOWN>: ine but an affidavit doesn't make something the truth. Many people lie under oath. We know that every day in court magistrates and judges find that under oath the most terrible lies have been told. I would like to know has this question been put to who was then Chief of the Defence

<UNKNOWN>: orce? That would be, Mr Chairman, to my opinion, the way of treating people who are drawn into things, fairly. Not to ask other witnesses to comment on a document with regard to which the authenticity might still be in question. 
And I would urge you, that on this type of situation, especially also in the light of the ruling of the Appellate Division with regard to the court case as to procedures which should be followed, that the best available evidence should first be followed up and should be tested in terms of the whole ethos of our judicial system, before this type of exercise is undertaken. 
Just looking at this document I haven't had the advantage of checking it, of looking at it in context, but just looking at it, it appears to me from lines here as if it might be a document which might have been tampered with. I know General Geldenhuys, if he said that he will admit it. Ask him.