Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-20

MARTINUS RAS: No Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And you were unaware of the fact that the coup would take place at that stage?

MARTINUS RAS: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Initially you were sent down by Mr De Kock, or by Colonel De Kock, in what you believed would be your routine work?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: At which stage did you realise that your presence in the Eastern Cape, could be related to the Duli coup or to a coup in the Transkei?

MARTINUS RAS: Chairperson, I didn't realise on the first day, we booked into a holiday resort and the following morning, I saw Snyman and Vermeulen's vehicles and it was rather strange to me because I did not expect them there at that stage.  I walked over and I saw that there were things that they had put in the bakkie, and these things were wrapped in black bags, they were rather surprise to see me there, and I didn't ask them anything about what was in the bakkie.  We had a short discussion and the following day, they had left, they had booked out of the place.  I then bumped into Mr Nortje in the city and he told me that they had brought weapons for the coup in Transkei.

MR JANSEN: Very well, and what was your role or what was the objective of your presence in the Eastern Cape in so far as it was related to a possible successful coup in the Eastern Cape?

MARTINUS RAS: Chairperson, on the day of the coup which was the following day, Mr De Kock called us together at a safe house of the Security Police, where we gathered with former ANC and PAC members.  We followed the proceedings on the radio with regard to the coup.  If the coup had been successful, we would have entered Transkei with the ANC and PAC members to assist with the identification of ANC and PAC persons who resided in Transkei and worked from there, with the exclusive purpose of arresting them and handing them over to the Transkei Security Police at that stage.

MR JANSEN: Very well, so even those activities didn't really have anything to do with the so-called achievement of a successful coup?

MARTINUS RAS: No, the case was that we would have had a more favourable inclination from the Transkei Security Police, we would have been able to move around freely in Transkei.  At that stage we were already working in Bophuthatswana and assisting Bophuthatswana with the arrest of ANC and PAC members.

MR JANSEN: I just want the Committee to understand the context of your purpose there, so in other words, before or at the stage when Gen Holomisa was in charge, the Security Police didn't have the same access to the areas in Transkei as what it had in Bophuthatswana for example?

MARTINUS RAS: No Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Very well, so there was no actual deed which you performed which made you a member of attempted coup or the delivery of the weapons?

MARTINUS RAS: No.

MR JANSEN: At the very most you became aware at a certain stage of your colleagues and your Commander's involvement in this incident and you remained silent about it, or you didn't do anything about it?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Yes, and within the culture and the milieu of the Security Police, it was logical for you not to say anything about the other work which came to your knowledge, this covert work of your colleagues?

MARTINUS RAS: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: And your legal representatives have also explained to you that in so far as you may require amnesty in this regard, at the very most, it would be upon the basis that there was the legal obligation on you to do something about the illegal acts or dealings of your colleagues, but that this is a question of argument in your mind?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Then I would like to come to the final aspect of your application, which would be the so-called conspiracy or attempt to murder Gen Holomisa.   Could you inform the Committee about the context of that action of yours?

MARTINUS RAS: Chairperson, at that stage Holomisa was favourably inclined towards the ANC, it was a general fact that he criticised the South African government and there was information that he had permitted ANC members to have in transit houses in Transkei and as a result of the planned coup, with the objective of toppling him, the proposal arose to kill Gen Holomisa.

MR JANSEN: Could we just return to your introductory paragraph, was your summary for one of the reasons for the failure of the coup, that it did not begin by means of an assassination of Holomisa, is that part of the way you saw it?

MARTINUS RAS: Chairperson, there are various important aspects in a successful coup, but according to my opinion it would have helped to achieve a better position in the Transkeian government.

MR JANSEN: You heard the evidence of Colonel De Kock yesterday with regard to the political situation in 1990, in other words, after February 1990, you listened to that evidence, is that correct?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Are you in agreement with his evidence in that regard?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: What I would just like to clear up here with regard to the incidents, is that in the working manner of people at Vlakplaas, would it have been contradictory to the work policy of a person in a more junior position, such as yourself, to make an initial proposal about an operation?

MARTINUS RAS: No.

MR JANSEN: If you made such an initial proposal and made initial preparations and gathered information, under which circumstances would you go over to the actual execution of an operation?

MARTINUS RAS: Chairperson, I wouldn't have gone ahead with the operation without the approval of Mr De Kock, and in this case, I believe that even Mr De Kock, would not have given his permission if this matter had not been cleared on a high level as a result of the political implications which the elimination of Gen Holomisa may have held.

MR JANSEN: But these steps which you took for such a possible operation, were not only theoretical or academic exercises, with which you were occupied, you were earnestly busy with work on a project which may have been executed in the future?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And when you told Mr De Kock that you wanted to determine whether or not something like this would be viable, you were serious when you said that?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: And also with regard to this aspect, you didn't have any personal malice or problems with Mr Holomisa, you simply knew of him as a political figure?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes, except for the fact that at that stage he was allowing ANC and PAC members to reside in Transkei.

MR JANSEN: And you believed that your actions in this regard were part of your more general scope of work as a Policeman in your action against the political enemies of the State of that time?

MARTINUS RAS: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just ask one question, did you actually physically do anything to investigate the possibility of an assassination, did you go and drive the Queenstown/Umtata Road and looked for spots to ambush or whatever, I think it was referred to yesterday, that you, did you take any actual steps?

MARTINUS RAS: Yes Chairperson, at that stage we had flight lists of persons who were entering the country, people from the ANC who committed crimes within the RSA and we knew that Holomisa had flown from Jan Smuts to East London, from East London, he drove to Umtata in a vehicle and to eliminate Holomisa would not have taken place in the RSA, it would have taken place as soon as he had crossed the border into Transkei territory.

MR JANSEN: Might I just add, did you identify places where the assassination as such would take place?