Amnesty Hearings — Pretoria — UNKNOWN

JEREMY CRONIN: They were - the alliance - so it was not just the ANC, the South African Communist Party also accepted full responsibility and involvement in helping communities to set up self-defence units.  Our approach was that they must not be partisan structures, they were there to defend the community, they were not there to attack alternative political formations - people with different political views, they were there to defend communities in the face of attack.
	But we felt - being an alliance, that we believed - and as the elections were to prove later, being a movement that represented an overwhelming majority of Black people, that we had a responsibility to facilitate the development of those self-defence units and also in the framework of the National Peace Accord, to legitimate that formation.  
	So within the National Peace Accord - if you take the trouble to read it, you will see that there was an agreement that communities should have the right to - there was an understanding within the National Peace Agreement agreed upon by a range of Political Parties - I forget if the Conservative Party was there or not, that the right to self-defence was part and parcel of bringing peace to South Africa.  
	So it was within that National Peace Accord framework, that we - as the South African Communist Party and the ANC, helped to facilitate self-defence units.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, what you told the Committee - that Mr Hani said - in order to defend the low-intensity warfare which prevailed at the time, would rather engage in negotiations as opposed to reacting by violence, is that correct?  Will that be correct - as what you said?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, he said it would be wrong to go - what he was saying was that it would be wrong to go over into offensive violence, to deploy violence for strategic purposes - that we did in 1961 without - openly, with no fudging and confusion as to whether there was a subjective view or whether there were three different views as to whether we were involved in armed violence or not.
	We were involved in armed struggle from 1961, we deployed armed struggle for political purposes, it was a strategic political option we took and from 1990 we stopped that, there was no strategic deployment violence for political ends.  But that people had the right to self-defence is in any case as I understand - I'm not a lawyer, but it is a common-law right that people have and therefore it was - yes, people had the right to defend ...[indistinct]

MR PRINSLOO: In as far as the targets were concerned - what the people believed, the perception of the public, the White public of South Africa, that the targets at the time was indiscriminate - whether it was soft targets or hard targets.

JEREMY CRONIN: The targets of whom?

MR PRINSLOO: Of the ANC, they targeted soft as well as hard targets.

JEREMY CRONIN: Again this public that you're talking about?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes.

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, let's clarify that.

MR PRINSLOO: The public in South Africa - the White public.

JEREMY CRONIN: Okay, that's not the public Mr Prinsloo.

MR PRINSLOO: And a lot of the Black public as well.  I can give you an examples where people were killed in land mines, for instance an incident near Davel in the Eastern Transvaal.

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, okay.

MR PRINSLOO: There was a land mine placed and there were people killed - Black people, only Black people.

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: They were travelling in a car.

JEREMY CRONIN: In the course of the armed struggle which as I say lasted from 1961 to 1990, the ANC moved through a variety of strategies - it was the ANC with Umkhonto weSizwe operating under the political guidance of the ANC.
	The original targets of the ANC - when it launched it's armed struggle in 1961, were purely buildings, facilities - unoccupied buildings, unoccupied facilities and pylons.  So the original wave of sabotage action launched in 1961, was directed at those targets and there were strict instructions not to injure or hurt anyone including security forces - the belief at that time was that there was a possibility still of a negotiated settlement in the early 1960's.
	Through the period of the 1970 and '80's strategies changed, they were always publicly announced and cadres were always carefully instructed in those changing tactics and strategies.   By the - in the course of the 1980's the ANC, Umkhonto weSizwe, used - amongst other things, land mines which by their nature can be indiscriminate - the idea was to prevent military and security organisation on White farms particularly on the border are, that was the strategic and political objective and that had ceased by 1990.

MR PRINSLOO: But Mr Cronin, in Davel in the Eastern Transvaal - which is very far from the border, where the St Danie family members were killed - that's very far from the border?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, it's in a border - I mean, it's the route - it was along an infiltration route but - the ANC has in it's amnesty application and it's submissions, has said that: "We're involved in armed struggle, we chose that in all political seriousness and not easily, it took us many, many decades to come to that conclusion  that we should launch armed struggle.
	In the course of prosecuting that armed struggle people lost their lives, it was not only our own people that lost their lives but other people lost their lives as well and we regret that - I would certainly have no difficulty in reasserting that, one deeply regrets the loss of life.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, during that time - in the '80's, Mr Hani was an Executive Member of MK, correct?

JEREMY CRONIN: He was Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe in the later half of the 1980's, correct.

MR PRINSLOO: So, the soldiers would have operated under his command at that stage?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, he would have been responsible for the actions of his soldiers in his command?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, yes and unlike certain other political leaders he would assume full responsibility, he would have had no - he did not delight in warfare, he did not delight in violence but as a leader he assumed full political responsibility for actions carried out under his command and would done his best to ensure that they had a political objective at all times.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, in order for you to say that Mr Hani accepted full responsibility, is that what he told you?

JEREMY CRONIN: Did he tell me?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, of course - I mean, we all - as a collective leadership, we accepted responsibility for what we're doing and that is why we treated the matter of peace and of violence very, very seriously, unlike some political leaders who feel that rhetoric is the order of the day and that you can cover up responsibility and lines of command through suggestiveness and rhetoric and creating illusions in people's minds.  We assumed responsibility for what we were doing and therefore selected our words as carefully as possible at all times.

MR PRINSLOO: Just a moment please Mr Chairman.  Mr Chairman, could I ask the Committee's indulgence at this stage as it's nearly 4 o'clock - a certain - there's just certain documents I'd like to get hold of Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I'll give you a short adjournment to look for those documents but we are going to carry on.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I would like to get these documents - I haven't got them here, that's the only problem - unless my colleague Ms van der Walt can then commence here cross-examination and I can then take over from her tomorrow on that basis.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we'd like to finish with this witness Mr Prinsloo, we'd like to sit - we've been losing a lot of time and I'd like us to carry on and see how much we can get done.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, I don't want to be obstructive but we've been co-operating, I didn't waste any time today at all Mr Chairman.