Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well I was actually extremely curious and I was very interested in seeing Charles Sebe because I knew him well before he was imprisoned.  Apart from the fact that I wanted to see him, I wanted to also satisfy myself as to the fact that he was strong enough to continue with the resistance movement.  His half-brother, Namba was with him and I think that explains Namba's presence.  Major van der Merwe from the Security Police represented Colonel Griebenauw at the time and then it was myself and my staff officer.

MR KNOETZE: Alright, if we can then return to Annexure A in the bundle.  On page 35 there is a portion which reads
"It was made clear that the RSA would co-operate, but that the taking out would be done by the Transkei itself."

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's entirely correct.  We'd already been given the instruction to keep a lower profile and that further actions should actually be performed by the Transkei and the Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 41, could you explain that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, at this stage I think there were 11 members, it was a small team who had been recruited in the Ciskei.  Once again, if I remember correctly, there were members of the Ciskei Defence Force and/or police and they were trained at Port St Johns.
	The Transkei had a military base at Transkei, or at Port St Johns where they did Special Forces training, and this team received their training there.  I think it was only the one small team which had been trained there for a very short period.

MR KNOETZE: Could you just pertinently tell us, what was it intended that this team would do after having been trained?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: They would form the initial phase of the resistance movement and later it would be strengthened, stepped up, and in the initial phases they would look at the protection of Charles and Namba Sebe and also Chief Lent Makoma, but in the end it never really progressed much further than this.  It never developed into a counter-revolutionary front.  And I may add, the idea was that they should form a military wing for Chief Makoma's party, but nothing came of that either.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Paragraph 42, page 36 says
"The actions, the influenced actions to try and discredit Lennox Sebe continued."
How were you involved in these actions to discredit?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well we assisted by for instance the printing of pamphlets which discredited Lennox Sebe and reports in the media were placed at our initiative, reporting about the corruption in the Ciskei.  There were also radio reports about that.
	Later on we noticed that this type of discrediting action should no longer take place at my headquarters but should be moved to the Transkei. - pamphlets were also dropped from planes.  A private plan was hired for this purpose so that it couldn't be traced back to the Defence Force.

MR KNOETZE: So this was done by your subordinates with your knowledge, and you take responsibility for that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then paragraph 43.  That explains what happened then, that
"President Lennox Sebe became aware of these actions against him and he then took certain steps to bolster his own position."
Then let us go to paragraph 44 on page 37.  It says that:
"About November/December '86, General Liebenberg gave Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen oral instruction that the Command Eastern Province should no longer be involved in the carrying out of Operation Katzen.  The further involvement of Lieutenant-General van der Westhuizen and his staff officers was in a JMB context or as assistance to Brigadier Moore.  Lieutenant-General Kritzinger, who succeeded General van der Westhuizen as Commander of the Command Eastern Province, repeated this instruction shortly afterwards, although no member of the Eastern Province Command was at that stage still involved in that."
Is it true that General Liebenberg told you orally that the Eastern Province Command should no longer be involved?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then in paragraph 45 there is a reference to an abortive incursion into the Ciskei by the TDF forces, that is the Transkei Defence Force, TDF.  It says that the SADF's involvement in Katzen ended, but the financial assistance to the liberated Charles Sebe was continued.  You were not involved in this financial aid?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, the funds were dealt with and managed by Lieutenant Moore.

MR KNOETZE: Then it continues
"The idea to try and topple Lennox Sebe by means of pressure of a resistance movement was hampered by the attack on Lennox Sebe.  Katzen died a natural death."
Is that correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.  The attack to which paragraph 45 refers, I think is what also is referred to in paragraph 46.
MR KNOETZE
"On the 19th of February a group of 23 armed men, consisting of members of the Transkei Defence Force, including ex-Rhodesians, launched an attack on the house of President Lennox Sebe.  One member was killed, one was seriously wounded, two were arrested and the attack was averted.  The SADF was not involved in the attack and it was also not part of Katzen."
Can you comment on that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, as I've already said, in December I was transferred to the Witwatersrand and at that stage, according to the instruction which I got from General Liebenberg, we had to withdraw from Plan Katzen and only assist and monitor where necessary.  The attack on the 19th of February therefore took place after the instruction to end involvement which I received, so I don't have detailed knowledge of that attack.  But it was my observation or my perception that the Defence Force was not involved in that and that it was also not a part of Katzen.
	I might just add that the only reason why it could be seen as a continuance of Plan Katzen, was that I had recommended it in my plan.  Not an attack per se, but I recommended a coup d'etat and the TDF could have launched the attack as a continuation of that which I'd recommended in my plan.  
	I might add that whilst I was in Johannesburg, I received a call from General Reid-Daly in which complained that he was alone, in that we didn't assist him.  I told him that we'd terminated our participation in the project and that he should liaise with General Gleeson if he has any further problems.  That was before this attack took place.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Paragraph 47
"The attack on President Lennox Sebe led to a revolt in the Transkeian Defence Force, in which those who were rebelling under the leadership of Major-General Holomisa, got the upperhand and took over the Government of the Transkei.  The new Government of the Transkei committed breach of contract vis a vis, the former ex-Rhodesians and evicted them from the country.  At that stage the Transkei Government owed the ex-Rhodesians approximately R6-million.
Paragraph 48:  It says that the relationship between the Ciskei and Transkei kept worsening and as a result of that the then Minister of Defence on the 7th of October 1982, authorised R2-million to conclude Katzen, to terminate it.  General Coetzee after this, paid out R2.225.030-million to the ex-Rhodesians, which money was provided by the Department of Military Information or Intelligence, and was paid for out of the Scraper Fund.  You were not involved here, so you don't have any knowledge of what is mentioned here?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No.