Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-05-06

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: ...[indistinct] straight.  With regards to Mr Mastic, that the money was given to them was in the event of them needing money to leave the country etc., as an emergency fund.  They were not paid, they were willing to operate for the freedom of the people and had stated as such.

MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTION BY MR STEENKAMP

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Trengove, do you have any re-examination?

MR TRENGOVE: May I raise one topic, really two related topics Mr Ishmail, the one is the issue that formed the focus of my learned friend's cross-examination namely the ANC policy with regard to civilian targets on the one hand and the second and related topic is the one touched on by my learned friend Mr Steenkamp about the control exercise by military headquarters over the operatives within the country.
	In that context could you please turn to the initial submission, Exhibit A1.  Firstly at page 46 you will see that that is a chapter in the submissions that deals with the stages of the struggle and its policy foundations from 1960 through to 1994, do you see that?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That is in the middle of the ...[intervention]

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm referring to whole ...[intervention]

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Oh, the whole chapter, yes?

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, that's what the chapter deals with.  Within that chapter towards the end at page 52, there is in the second column reference to the pamphlet that was published by the ANC in 1985 entitled: "Take the Struggle to the White Areas", do you see that?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, I do.

MR TRENGOVE: Could you read that paragraph on that initiative and comment on it, particularly with regard to the concern expressed by my learned friend Mr Steenkamp, that is might have meant that white civilians were to be indiscriminately targeted.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Okay, thank you.  It's in the middle of page 52 on the righthand column and I read
"By the end of 1985 an official ANC pamphlet titled: 'Take the Struggle to the White Areas' was distributed inside the country.  Targets were identified as: "The racist army, police, death squads, agents and stooges in our midst".  The call to: "Take the war to the white areas" is defined as follows:  Firstly, strengthening our workers organisations and engaging in united action in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs.
		2.  Second, spreading the consumer boycott to all areas of the country.
		3.  Organised and well planned demonstrations in the white suburbs and central business districts.
		4.  Forming underground units and combat groups in our places of work and taking such actions as sabotage in factories, mines, farms and suburbs and disrupting the enemies oil, energy, transport, communications and other vital systems.
		5.  Systematic attacks against the army and the police and the so-called area defence units in the white areas.
		6.  Well planned raids on the armouries and dumps of the army, police, farmers and so to secure arms for our units"

MR TRENGOVE: Do did the initiative imply indiscriminate attacks targeted on innocent civilians?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Absolutely not.  There is nothing in there that suggests that at all.  If anything, at point 5, it says
"Systematic attacks against the army and the police and the so-called area defence units in the white areas"

MR STEENKAMP: You spoke with some pride about the control exercised over the operatives within the country.  In that context I would like you to refer to the opposite page, that is 53 in the second column from the second paragraph.  Could you read it and comment on it please?
MR ISMAIL
"When attacks did not accord with ANC policy started to become a trend in the late 1987 MK commanders were instructed by O R Tambo and the NEC to go to all forward areas and as far as possible also to meet with units operating inside the country to reassert ANC policy with regard to the avoidance of purely civilian targets.  Failure to comply with these orders would be considered as violations of policy and action would be taken against offenders"

MR TRENGOVE: Was there in fact such an initiative?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, there was.

MR TRENGOVE: How do you know about it?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, I was part of that initiative.  And in fact in this document or other documents it is stated as to who exactly, which of the commanders from military headquarters were dispatched to the different frontiers and where commanders were then instructed to call units.  We personally met with units from inside the country. 	Whether they had been involved in infringements of policy or not, they were called up and they were told: "remember this is the policy of the ANC and this is what you are expected to do, this is what you can and cannot do".

MR TRENGOVE: I think in your evidence in chief you described an initiative which took you to Maputo and to Botswana to meet with front line operatives.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That is so.

MR TRENGOVE: Commanders.  Is that the initiative that you're referring to here?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, I am Mr Chairperson.

MR TRENGOVE: Could you continue please?
MR ISMAIL
"In August 1998 the NEC issued a statement specifically on the conduct of armed struggle in the country: "The NEC further reaffirmed the centrality of the armed struggle in the national democratic revolution and the need to further escalate armed actions and transform our offensive into a generalised people's war".
		However, the NEC also expressed concern at the recent spate of attacks on civilian targets.  Some of these attacks have been carried out by cadres of the people's army Umkhonto weSizwe inspired by anger at the regime's campaign of terror against the oppressed and democratic forces both within and outside of South Africa.
		In certain instances operational circumstances resulted in unintended casualties.  Yet has come to our notice that agents of the Pretoria regime have been detailed to carry out a number of bomb attacks deliberately to sow confusion amongst the people of South Africa and the international community and to discredit the African National Congress.
		Further, the ANC hereby underscores that it is contrary to our policy to select targets whose soul objective is to strike at civilians.  Our morality as revolutionaries dictates that we respect the values underpinning the main conduct of war.  Any other course of action would also play into the hands of the enemy".

MR TRENGOVE: Is it correct that the ANC policy was never to select targets whose soul objective was to strike at civilians?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, that is correct.

MR TRENGOVE: Is it also correct that when cadres departed from ANC policy as did happen, the ANC acted to reassert control?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That is so, especially with reference to what Advocate Visser had talked of with the Wimpey Bars or whatever, that at that point when the NEC felt that it was going in the wrong direction they immediately instructed all of the military headquarters to go out immediately and deal with the matter.

MR TRENGOVE: Thank you Sir.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR TRENGOVE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, I'm just going to ask the members of the panel if they have any questions?
	Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no questions from me.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Motata?

UNKNOWN: Just two Mr Chairman.
	Mr Ismail, we would look at the policy formulated as late back as 1969 and here I'm having to the Morogoro(?) conference and if we look at the thread it was always to go at the apartheid systems which were in place then.  
	Then round about 1985 there was shift now: "Take this struggle to the whites", would you say in that regard, when you targeted the SAAF headquarters in Church Street, was that in line with that policy as formulated?  '83 rather, sorry.