Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-09-26

MR KAHANOVITZ: But I'm unclear as to what it is, what function were you now going to perform in relation to Region 6?

WOUTER J BASSON: I would think that I would have become a Project Manager in Region 6.  In other words, if one looks at the hierarchy I would still have been below Mr Burger, with the other two members below me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What would a Project Manager do?

WOUTER J BASSON: A Project Manager would know of all projects, he would assist the Regional Manager regarding preparations, presentations and so forth.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now I assume that as a member of the CCB's inner core, you knew something of Joe Verster's personality.

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, I must have.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you know something about Gen Webb's personality?

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I did not have much to do with Gen Webb, as a result of my role and my appointment.  Save for the number of occasions upon which I saw him, I cannot really recall any social occasion that I spent with him, but anyone could become aware of another person.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I just want to put something to you that Mr Botes told to Mr Pauw, for your comment, it's at page 178 of Exhibit O.  What he says, this is starting at the second paragraph, you'll see the pencil marking, he says
"Before the transformation of the CCB, the organisation was an integral part of Special Forces."
By the way, you've already given evidence on that, you agree with that.

WOUTER J BASSON: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He goes on to say
"It operated more openly and the Commander of Special Force, Gen Joop Joubert, was directly in charge.  Verster managed the operatives and made an assessment of operations before referring them back to Joubert for final approval.  During the assessment all relevant intelligence information was collected from the various intelligence services."
So far so good, do you agree?

WOUTER J BASSON: It would appear to be correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He goes on to say
"Under its civilian guise, things changed dramatically.  In practice, Verster was now in charge, his men had to work through him.  Even Verster himself was not allowed to go to Special Forces.  Joubert and later Gen Eddie Webb, had to go to him."
Do you agree with that?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, that is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He goes on to say
"When Eddie Webb became Commander of Special Forces and the Chairman of the CCB in January 1989, things became chaotic.  Botes describes Webb as a good conventional soldier, who had little knowledge of the secretive warfare employed by the CCB."
And then he quotes Botes, Botes is saying the following:
"Verster exploited the situation.  He told Webb what he thought Webb should know.  A situation developed where the tail wagged the dog.  Webb had to come and see Verster, who misinformed him on certain projects and operations.  Verster became a primadonna, blinded by his new-found power.
			I was supposed to have a meeting with him every fourteen days.  I had to wait for hours to see him.  I did not see him for two months, because of this Verster lost touch with his operatives in the field.  He gave unauthorised instructions that Webb didn't know about.  Not all operations were referred to Webb for approval."
Do you agree with the general sentiments expressed there?

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I cannot speak on behalf of Mr Botes' sentiment at that point when he spoke to Mr Pauw.  You must understand that Mr Botes was an embittered man, perhaps he was falsely accused by Mr Verster and he wanted to clear up his side of the matter and perhaps he said things that weren't exactly so.
	I don't know anything about operations which Mr Verster launched on his own, I was always under the impression that there was authorisation from Gen Webb.  I was never under the impression that Mr Verster was a primadonna and that he decided to do what he wanted to do.  I never had that impression.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I assume that within the corridors of the inner circle it would be necessary for the purposes of  your work, to do your job properly, to have discussions with other people in the inner circle as to the relationship between Verster and Webb and what was really going on.

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, I think it must also have happened.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I mean if there was a problem, if there was a question mark as to whether authority was being obtained for projects, you'd need to know about that?

WOUTER J BASSON: Well only the project in which I was physically involved.

MR KAHANOVITZ: For instance, you wouldn't want to find yourself in a situation where you were told by Verster that a project had been approved by Webb, but in truth and in fact it hadn't happened?

WOUTER J BASSON: Well Chairperson, I cannot say that Mr Verster is lying if he says that he had authorisation.  It wasn't my place to be present with a presentation to the Chairperson.  If Mr Verster gave the go-ahead after he told us that he was going to consult with the Chairperson about it, then I would accept that he did indeed do so.  I have no proof today that he did so or not.  I have no physical evidence which would confirm that he did so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Where did the real power lie?  I suppose that's what I'm asking you.

WOUTER J BASSON: The Chairperson, who was the General, he was the person who was aware of all plans, projects and presentations and no project could be executed without his approval.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you'll agree that what Botes says is correct in the sense that Webb would rely entirely on what Verster told him about the projects?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, I would assume so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So if Mr Verster wanted to manipulate the situation, he would have been in a position to do so, do you agree with me?

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, I cannot say whether Mr Verster manipulated the situation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm not asking you if he manipulated, I'm asking you, he would have been in a position to do so if he had wanted to, do you agree with me?

WOUTER J BASSON: It is certainly possible.

CHAIRPERSON: And also from Gen Webb's evidence he gave the distinct impression that he spent the vast majority of his time with Special Forces, the other operations of Special Forces, and as far as he was concerned, the CCB was just a component of a far larger operation or ...

WOUTER J BASSON: Chairperson, that is so, General Webb came from a conventional unit, I believe that it was strange to him to view the working method of Special Forces and the CCB, but it is also a fact that Gen Webb was completely informed and on a weekly basis he co-ordinated with Mr Verster at a facility which we called "Skape te Koop".  So it is not the case that Gen Webb was left by himself, there was regular liaison between Webb and Verster.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can I just clarify something.  I got the impression from your diary that one of your functions was to actually set up meetings between Webb and Verster, is that so?  Remember we were asking you questions about the Gavin Evans case and you have a diary entry?

WOUTER J BASSON: Yes, Chairperson, it doesn't mean that I had to consult directly with the Chairperson, I did not telephone him directly, that was not my function, but I should think that its function was to determine or to remind Mr Verster that he would have to arrange for a meeting tomorrow, for example.  It could also be that I had to activate Mr Burger to attend the meeting as well.  But I never had any direct liaison with Gen Webb.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well let's take the Early Learning Centre as an example.  Gen Webb said Verster asked to meet with him on an urgent basis, how would that meeting have been set up?

WOUTER J BASSON: Mr Verster would contact the General directly, he was the person who had direct contact or telephonic contact with the General, and only he would do so.