Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

WITNESS:   I understand the question.  It is difficult - it is impossible for me to answer that because I didn't make that plan.  I was aware of the planning, and we were aware of the bus incidents that took place when the buses through Edendale Valley, and sitting thinking here I think the buses and the incidents on the Edendale Road were concentrated on in that specific plan.  So what the police have planned for the rest of the area I cannot answer, Sir, I am afraid. Okay.  Are you aware that the rally that these people were going to was in fact paid for by the Government in essence?   ---   Are you referring to the Durban rally, Sir?

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Correct.

WITNESS:   No, I wasn't aware of that.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, we in this Commission are hearing evidence on a regular basis of the fact that the security forces and your ... (incomplete - end of Side A, Tape 3) ... the security branch.  And that's why we know to the last cent how much was paid - some R152 000,00 odd.  That rally was arranged by the police for Inkatha.  So it should not come as a surprise then that in your planning your elements would have known that the rally was being paid for, because you guys paid for it.

WITNESS:   Sir, I must react on what you have just said.  I, as a group commander, at the time and even today, didn't know that information.  We didn't pay for that.  So you may be right, Sir, I must - you may be right, but what I want to place on record is that the knowledge of whoever organised that or paid for it, that was definitely not visible on my level.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, what I am attempting to give you an insight into is that you may have been a military commander doing your duty as you saw fit, but there were other role- players you were working with that had another agenda completely, and those would have been people like Brigadier Buchner that you would have worked with.  So it doesn't surprise us, seeing the big picture, to see that you were relegated to a duty of keeping the road open, while the rest of the main offensive was happening up in the valley.  Do you see what I am saying to you?

WITNESS:   Well, I hear what you're saying to me.  Of course, you know, I cannot respond to that.  I am, and was, a military commander of this area, doing things according to our military rules and regulations, so I cannot comment on the rest of the possibilities that could have existed at the time.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Let me put it to you this way.  You're a senior Defence Force officer.  I can see you're a highly intelligent man.  As an officer, if you were to assess the facts I've just put to you, what conclusion could you possibly come to, being absolutely honest about the facts?

WITNESS:   I think it is maybe, if I may say so, a little bit unfair question to pose to me, because I may be a senior officer now, but we must please keep in mind that at the time of these things that we are discussing today that this area was my world, and my frame of reference comes from whatever happened in this area.  So I cannot, based on anything, come to specific conclusions about things.  I think that would be irresponsible of me to do so, and I think maybe I should say that no, Sir, I cannot comment on that specific part.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  You see, what I am really asking you to do is to, with the benefit of hindsight, look back, and today say if you knew what you knew today what conclusions would you come to?  That's really what I am asking you to do.  But you don't have to answer the question, I can see you're unwilling to.

WITNESS:   Yes.  Yes.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  But that's okay.

WITNESS:   I must put on record I am unwilling to do so, because we are judging a local situation here, and I cannot for the life of me extend that thing into speculating and so on.  I think I will not be able to comment on that. That's fine.  Unfortunately it's my job to judge the situation.   ---   Thank you.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Before Dlamini goes on, because he has not had a chance, I want to put it just nicely to make it easier for you, Brigadier.  I am following what my brother has been saying.  So much has been said here, and you seem not to be knowing some of the things which have been happening.  Are you embarrassed by what you are hearing here?  That is very easy.

WITNESS:   Reverend, it is easy and straightforward.  In listening to the previous speaker, and sitting here after six years, I am not embarrassed, I am really very sad to hear all these things that happened in the area.  But from a military point of view the planning that was done, the way it was executed, it happened in that way.  If it proved to be not that effective so be it, but I am not embarrassed, Reverend, really I am not.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL: You must be very hard.  Thank you.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Thank you, Mr Chairman.  In fact all the questions have been asked that were quibbling me.  It's just one thing to note.  I am equally concerned about the amount of joint operations planning that took place.  I am trying to relate that to what other witnesses said, especially analysts like Professor Aitchison, Mr Keys, and others, that this incident was not by accident, it was strategically planned.  But my question.  Brigadier, you have understandably explained to us that the resources were very limited at your disposal, that with adequate resources you would have done some of the things which did not take place on that day.  But the question that I have is, don't you think that with proper and adequate joint operation planning you would have had adequate resources to make sure that people were safe and secure?

WITNESS:   I think that is a fair question.  I want to refer back to what I said about the national situation reigning in South Africa at that time.  I cannot speak on behalf of the Government or the State, but obviously in assessing the national situation resources at that time were not made available, or were not available to this area, but the reasons for that I cannot comment on.  I, as a commander, was given a specific force level, which of course, as you know, was drastically upgraded after this sad incident in Edendale.  So essentially, yes, you are correct, but we simply didn't have the resources then.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Sorry, Brigadier, just two last questions.  The first aspect - or the two last aspects, should I say.  As a person involved in support services and so on, and logistics - we've had evidence of literally 20, 40 trucks, KwaZulu Government vehicles, that were used to ferry these combatants from the gathering places to the areas where the attacks took place.  What I find unbelievable is that your intelligence didn't know about this.  You know, to have 20 or 40 trucks moving around an area is a pretty obvious thing to see.  These are big, white, Toyota Government trucks.  I am sure you've seen the like of them before.  Just a comment on that.

WITNESS:   Do you want me to comment?

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  Ja.

WITNESS:   It may be like that, but a report to that nature was never placed on my table in Group Nine.   So it may have happened, but I didn't know of those

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL: things.

JOHANN MATHYS ADAM SWANEPOEL:  The second part of that aspect goes like this.  The evidence we've heard is that these many thousands of people that were involved in these attacks spent the nights camped in the vicinity of the two chiefs' homesteads.  So we're talking about large camps of people.  Surely as a commander of forces - I am asking your opinion if you were in charge - wouldn't the most simple thing to have been is simply surrounded those groups and removed them from the area - disarmed them, removed them from the area?