Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-09-29

MR WESSELS: You also always thought that you would use your own weapon.

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Well why didn't you then use one of your own weapons to go and practice?  It would then be better to practice with the weapon that you are going to use at the end of the day, is that not true Sir?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes it is so, but what I did was that after I returned with that weapon I chopped it, or modified that shotgun in the way in which I wanted it.  I did not have one ready.  I went to come and do this when I returned and I thought this is the right weapon to use.

MR WESSELS: What did you do to this weapon, this weapon that you used in the end?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Mr Chairperson I shortened the barrel with about six inches.  I took off the butt and put a Pachmayer pistol grip on it.  It's very simple.  It's not difficult.

MR WESSELS: Then it's like a hand gun with a very long barrel?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: It is quite different from a rifle with a butt.

FERDINAND BARNARD: It is a little bit different, yes.

MR WESSELS: Yes it's not a little different, it is a rifle with a butt you press against your shoulder ...(intervention)

FERDINAND BARNARD: This one you cannot shoot from the shoulder, correct, ja.

MR WESSELS: This one you cannot shoot from the shoulder, no, this is a hand weapon.

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: You did not go and practice with this weapon.

FERDINAND BARNARD: With which weapon?

MR WESSELS: This one that you modified, the murder weapon.

FERDINAND BARNARD: No I didn't.

MR WESSELS: So what was the purpose of practising with Mitchell's shotgun?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Sir, it was short.  It is about hiding a weapon and then leaning out of a window and using it.  If it is a very long weapon like a Winchester, or Smith & Wesson then it is this high from the ground.  That weapon from Mitchell is this long, and the one that I chopped was the same length when I was finished with it.

MR WESSELS: What type of shotgun was this?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I cannot recall.

MR WESSELS: Was it a double-barrel or single-barrel?

FERDINAND BARNARD: A double-barrel.

MR WESSELS: Double-barrel, the traditional cock-action shotgun.

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Barnard the George Mitchell shotgun, was it a sawn-off shotgun or was it a manufactured short shotgun?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No Sir it was shortened by somebody.  I do not think you can buy it like that.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say you didn't practice at all with your modified one?

FERDINAND BARNARD: With the one that I chopped, no, no I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: So you didn't know what sort of kick to expect or anything like that before you fired it?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, I did not know.

MR WESSELS: With this you did not think to practice with this shotgun in the light of the fact that a shotgun has got a lot of kick-back or backfire and usually you can feel it against your shoulder but now you have to hold it in your hand and it can influence the accuracy of the weapon.

FERDINAND BARNARD: It can influence the accuracy of the weapon.  It depends on the distance of the shot.  I did not do it, I did not practice with it.  I came back from the South Coast where I went to that farm and when I returned I modified the weapon in the way in which I wanted it and not long after that the incident took place.  I did not go and practice with it.

MR WESSELS: But was this now after the second meeting or before the second meeting?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Shortly after the second meeting.

MR WESSELS: You say that you were told that this was an urgent target?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct, it was a priority target.

MR WESSELS: A priority target, yes.

FERDINAND BARNARD: There was also an urgency involved, yes.

MR WESSELS: Did they make use of the word "urgent"?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, not as far as I can recall but I created the impression and if I think back to it I think there was an urgency, yes.

MR WESSELS: They just told you that this is a priority target?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: They did not tell you that you have to kill the person at a certain date?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, nobody told me.

MR WESSELS: You could do what you thought would be good in the circumstances.

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, Sir, I think my evidence-in-chief stated very clearly that there was an urgency that I picked up from the discussions.  They did not want Dr Webster to make known certain information.  Nobody told me that on the 21st he is going to address the United Nations, there is going to be a report.  They did not tell me to take my time.  I got the impression that I mustn't worry about Jay Naidoo, that this is the priority.  I have to work on this thing and leave the rest.

MR WESSELS: And you did not think to ask how much time you had because that certainly had an influence on how you do your monitoring, how thorough you would be, how thorough the planning would be?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No Sir, I did no such enquiries.

MR WESSELS: Was it not important to you to find out how much time you can spend on monitoring and to arrange for security measures for yourself, escape route etc?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Sir, if persons said there was a cut-off date they would have told me.  I went out and immediately started working on it, on the addresses that I received.  Over those few days while I was busy with that if I went there 17 times a day I could and I did.

MR WESSELS: Did they tell you if this was an authorised project that came from the higher ranks?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Sir, General Webb did not exist for me.  For me it was a situation where Joe Verster was the CCB.  If I received an instruction from General Webb I would first clear it with Joe Verster and that's how I felt about it.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think Mr Barnard what Mr Wessels is asking you is, did either Verster or Luitingh tell you that it was an authorised project?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, the fact that it was an authorised project I accepted that, but nobody told me that it was authorised from a higher level.

MR WESSELS: I am just asking this because I noticed in the newspapers, I think it is the Cape Times, mentioned that this operation was authorised from the highest ranks.

FERDINAND BARNARD: Is this also my fault?

MR WESSELS: No Mr Barnard.  I did not, that I have not put before you yet.  Mr Barnard what information did you have about Webster?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Mr Chairperson I will not say one or two but I would say two or three articles there was a photograph, an A4 photograph, a black and white photograph of Dr Webster.  There were two addresses, Dunbar Street and Eleanor Street.  There were a few notes made.  I cannot really recall the details thereof but it wasn't really important but the information that I received on questions that I put to them was that Mr Webster was a very prominent figure in the SACP's underground systems.  That he worked on the Wits University radical student organisations on campus and then as well as the story concerning - that was discovered in Kosi Bay and he was a manager or a chairperson of various organisations that opposed the government of the day.

MR WESSELS: And you then decided to involved Calla Botha in this incident?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: When did you make that decision?

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairperson I said that yesterday or the day before yesterday that I foresaw that I had to involve somebody and for me the logical option was Calla Botha.  I then formed this option when I left there that I will approach Calla Botha.  I started with the observation and I cannot specifically say when I approached him but we probably went there four, five times to Dr Webster's residence before the killing took place.

MR WESSELS: And did you decide to approach Calla Botha after the first or second meeting?