Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-19

BONGANI FINCA: Last question Chairperson.  I am moved by your concern for victims and that their welfare must be attended to in order for peace to take root in their own hearts.  I am sorry for this rather personal question, but in your operations as ....(tape ends)

UNKNOWN: ....Mr Chair, and the severance package that was paid to me after the Ciskei Defence Force was closed
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
19 C NEL
down, that is what I have received.

BONGANI FINCA: There is just one severance package?

UNKNOWN: I was paid my pension, I cannot call it a severance package.  Other people who litigated were paid severance packages.  The people who wanted out and wanted out silently and carried on with their lives they were paid another amount, a reduced amount, not even enough to buy a house.

BONGANI FINCA: Thank you.

MR POTGIETER: Dr Ramashala.  I think you were the last one, Reverend Xundu doesn't want to.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Thank you. Colonel Nel do you want to take a sip of water?

UNKNOWN: I am doing that all the time, thank you.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Is it correct that one of the responsibilities, or one of the roles of Military Intelligence is to provide information that will be used in a strategic planning against something?

UNKNOWN: You find two levels of intelligence, three actually.  Strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and then current intelligence, basic intelligence.  If you collect strategic intelligence, strategic intelligence is normally built up over a period of time to form a strategic picture.  Tactical intelligence is something that is for a short period of time valid and then after a while it lapses.  Yes Intelligence communities collect information not to file it and put it somewhere away. It is to be used by strategic planners.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay, in the case of the Bisho Massacre it would be tactical planning?

UNKNOWN: Tactical yes is of a short term nature, it's
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
19 C NEL
an event that is going to be over after that day and the next planning will start the next scenario, yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay then is it correct for me to assume that the magnitude of tactical planning is in direct relationship to the magnitude of the information received?  In other words the less serious the information, the less serious the tactical plan the more serious the information the more profound the tactical plan?

UNKNOWN: Yes if you have serious information you expect your operational commanders to take it seriously and then to make a plan accordingly.  A serious piece of information can be one short line.  It doesn't mean pages and pages of information, but normally no operational planning is conducted unless information is turned into intelligence.  You need intelligence to do operational planning.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.  Then we can assume that since the CDF was carrying live ammunition that the kind of information that was received from you, and when I say from you I mean the Royal 'You', Royal "You - Unit", that the kind of information that was received warranted the carrying of live information?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair I am sure if you study the document that was handed in by Brigadier Gqozo if it's the same document that I paged through during my preparations you will see that there's three different scenarios anticipated from Intelligence point of view, to say that this might happen and this will be the impact and, and, and.....  So what was planned by the operational staff would have been based on the possible scenarios.  The most obvious scenario, the most dangerous scenario, different angles of
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
20 C NEL
possibilities.  In that document you will find information, and if people go back on the record you will find that the night before the march the Ciskei Police came with an urgent application that this march be cancelled because they had information of weapons, large numbers of weapons, and I think it's the Brigadier, maybe Brigadier Ngcobo or somebody who came forward with the information said he had that information under oath, that there was going to be weapons in the crowd, amongst the people on the day of the march.   Remembering that most of the Intelligence agencies in the Eastern Cape concentrated on collecting information on that event and what was building up towards and planning to that effect there were a number of, let's call it rumours, that there will be an armed element, and there was information about a two-pronged approach.  There was information about insurrection, a lot of things going around.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: In fact the rumours that were spread at the time were sort-of anti ANC rumours, in order to take advantage of the fear within the Gqozo government.

UNKNOWN: No Mr Chair, how I classify rumours as pieces of information without any substance that we can link to something.  If a troop comes to me and he says to me and he says to me I am from Izala Village and I have heard in the shebeen last night that the marchers are going to come armed and they are not going to repeat the mistake of the 4th of August, if they are met with resistance they are going to fight their way through, I regard that as a rumour.  And if the next troop comes to me from completely different quarters and he comes to me with evidence that an arms cache is situated there for this specific planning and we go and
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
21 C NEL
have a look at that, that is information.  That is something that can be followed up, something that can be confirmed or denied.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: In fact you played a role in making sure that the CDF are ready for any eventuality on that day.  When I say played a role I mean through information.

UNKNOWN: Our information had to reflect what we have received.  It will be a crime from my side to omit the forwarding of information carried over to me.  If there was an incident where people were killed or shot at and I knew about it prior to that, surely I would be guilty of murder if I kept that information to myself.  So everything that comes in I have to process, I have to make something of it before I send it further.  I cannot send raw information, I have to put it in context to say 50 rumours were received about the possibility of arms being present on that day.  So can we ignore it or can we not.  We have to take it into consideration when we do the planning for the eventualities.  Military planning is normally done on scenarios, what if, what if, what if, be ready for every possible eventuality.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Well one of the sessions is that there was quite a bit of disinformation that was occurring at that time.

UNKNOWN: The possibility Mr Chair of disinformation in the definition of disinformation coming from a lower level saying false information, just forward false information, lies, fabricated by sources and from all my years of experience with handling of sources you get a lot of fabricated information because that guy is normally after money, that's why he's giving you this information.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay.
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
21 C NEL

UNKNOWN: And troops who have to stand in the line wants to make sure that you look after his safety.  He, in his mind, has this possible scenario of being shot at.  He'll come to you, he'll come openly to you and say he's got this information that he's going to be shot at, the arms are there, the people came in the previous night already to bury the arms there, that was one of the rumours, and the marchers are not going to come in without arms, but the arms will already be there, but we do not know where.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Okay with respect to the role you played, there are various levels of perpetrators, you know the term perpetrators?

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Do you consider yourself a perpetrator?