Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 2000-09-04

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think you have but he has been mentioned in other applications and I raise the question now as to whether he has been given notice as an implicated party.  At page 33 he is given as person who gave an order, Raymond Metheraj, at page 36.  He is given as the commander of the unit who gave the order.  At page 42 he is also referred to as the commander of the unit?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes I related directly to him for those operations and he would have passed those orders on to his - sorry, he would have executed those orders together with his unit and in the process would have then given his orders to the people who were working with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know where he is now?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: He is sitting in this hall in person.

CHAIRPERSON: Well perhaps someone can inform him when we adjourn as to his rights as an implicated party?

MR MOERANE: While speaking about Mr Metheraj Saclou, did he give evidence in your trial?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes he did, he was a State witness.

MR MOERANE: And he was offered and he received indemnity?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: I am led to believe that is so.

MR MOERANE: I see.  Yes, now during and after the trial you got to know the other persons who are involved in the attack on Mr Rajbansi's house and the attack on the Chatsworth Magistrate's Court building?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MR MOERANE: And who were those other persons?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: The other persons who were in the unit commanded by Raymond Metheraj Saclou, were firstly Lenny Naidoo ...(intervention)

MR MOERANE: Lenny Naidoo is now deceased?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Deceased.  He was killed at the border.

MR MOERANE: At Piet Retief?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes, Piet Retief.

MR MOERANE: Yes.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: That has been part of a TRC hearing a time ago.

MR MOERANE: Yes.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Derek Naidoo.

MR MOERANE: Applicant?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Applicant.  Richard Vallihu.

MR MOERANE: Also an applicant in this.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: And applicant David Madurai.

MR MOERANE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Can something be done about that noise?

MR MOERANE: Now can you please tell the learned Committee about operation Butterfly?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Operation Butterfly was an operation conceived by Umkhonto weSizwe and it was conceived as a result of the long lines of command and logistics that existed in the early '80s where because of the need to work from the headquarters, forward headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia through the front-line, front areas, and in our particular case, Swaziland.  There were numerous difficulties in communication and in ensuring a degree of control as well as accelerating the goal and the number of operations by Umkhonto weSizwe against the apartheid forces.
	It was conceived and used, in present day terminology, there was a flattening of structures with a short term communication between commanders and units on the ground.  What happened was that the need to then have a highly developed infrastructure in the areas surrounding South Africa would be dispensed with and we would be able to concentrate using high technology communication directly with the headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia and other areas designated for that purpose.  People in the Front Line States in the command position would be moved ahead into the Republic of South Africa so that they could be in closer contact and accelerate and minimise the time for decision meeting on operational issues.  Overall, that is the operational concept of Operation Butterfly.
	It also involved another important element.  A direct and closer link with the political underground of the ANC during that period.  Our operations, as Umkhonto weSizwe, were subject to the primacy of the political objective to the primacy of the political struggle.  Although there were four pillars of the struggle, armed struggle was the pivot around which the struggle against apartheid moved.  But although it was the pivot, it was subject to political objective which was to ensure the end of apartheid and freedom for the oppressed.
	As a result of that operation, people, Sihle Mbongwa, was sent into the country to take over command and to be involved in the general direction at the highest level of Operation Butterfly.  We fell under his command and reported directly to him.  All this, however, is within the context of guerrilla warfare.  With the need to know secrecy, operational readiness, operational development, all being primary to our relationship to him as a cadre.  So unlike a conventional force where there would be a parade of troops who were all genuine and authentic members of Operation Butterfly, ourselves as a command cadre had minimal contact except through the actual commanders who reported to us.
	So what also was primary to Operation Butterfly was the need to form larger operations directed against the apartheid regime.  Therefore, operations would be conducted with the combination of units working together who would meet for the purposes of the operation and they would then, once the operation was complete, then resort to the normal guerrilla warfare mode of existence. 
	Operation Butterfly used the terminology the Area Political Military Committee, the APMC, and identified that as a critical component of the need to advance the activities of the armed struggle and as a part of this, development of the Area Political Military Committee, people were sent into the country to take over political command from the underground political structures of the ANC and one was involved in the transport of these people.  I actually served also as a liaison between the political and the military arms of the Political Military Committee.  If aspects are not clear I'm prepared to give information on that.

MR MOERANE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well could I ask a few questions now?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand, I may have misunderstood you completely, that you for example would have a unit of four people under you.  You would issue instructions to those four people.  They in turn might have, each one of them might have a unit of four under them, but they would not know one another, there would be a need to know principle.  You would only know the four under you, you would not necessarily know all sixteen?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Chairperson, that is accurately expressed.  One can understand the reasoning behind this.  If there was a break in the structure at any one point there would be a limit to the amount of damage that any one particular individual could due to the structure overall if he was say for instance interrogated and then after identify the persons that he'd been working with.  He's knowledge would be limited to just simply the people that he worked with and that is a classical principle of guerrilla warfare.

CHAIRPERSON: And you as the liaison officer would have a contact with the political units?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But they wouldn't - their contact would be limited to you?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: So again if there was something - unfortunate happened, there would be a limitation to how far and what people would know?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that mean that people in the political sphere would not know what was going on in the military, if I can call it that?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: They would know what was happening because there would be - most of the activities would be visible but they would not know the operational details, they would not know the persons involved and that and they would not know the methodology of the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: No, ...(indistinct), they would know that there had been explosions?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.