Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-09

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.  I think this is a good time to adjourn for lunch and we will resume for questions directed to you, Major Williamson, at quarter to two.  Thank you very much.  This is now adjourned.
HEARING ADJOURNS AT 12H55
ON RESUMPTION AT 13H45

CHAIRPERSON: Right could we come to order please.  One of my colleagues has just asked my permission to take his jacket off.  It's not usual that they ask me for permission, I am just so overwhelmed I thought I'd say if you would like to take your jackets off feel free.

MR LEVIN: Mr Chairman, subject to the gravamen of the remarks I made in opening Mr Williamson will address any questions put by my learned friend Mr Goosen, by your good self Sir and by members of your panel.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.  Mr van der Hoven you asked if you could say a few words.

MR VAN DER HOVEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.  I hold a watching brief for today, I just want to record that my clients and obviously other members of the SADF do not necessarily agree with all the evidence that was tendered this morning, and specifically my clients would just like to reserve their rights in this regard.  That's all I want to say.  Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say this morning, are you referring to the entire morning or to someone in particular?

MR VAN DER HOVEN: Well the entire morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, thank you for that.

MR VAN DER HOVEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson thank you very much.  Major Williamson the document that you presented sets out as it were a framework for understanding some of the actions in which members of the security forces were engaged in the period in which you were a member of the security forces.  And it appears that it is in many respects consonant with some of the views expressed during the course of evidence that we heard earlier today also from General van der Merwe.
 You indicate that, and it's really a portion that is extracted from your presentation, that you had no doubt that secret violent and other actions against the revolutionary enemy were an accepted and approved procedure in our overall arsenal of counter-insurgency weapons, and you've really motivated that in the way in which you have in your presentation.  You indicate that that's on the basis of - from documents, from presentations made, from courses and so on, as well as aspects of your own experience.  
 That view in many respects flies in the face of the essence of the submission made on behalf of the National Party by the former State President, Mr F W de Klerk, in that he indicates that it was never government policy to authorise gross violations of human rights, and anybody who did so was acting without authorisation, was either misinterpreting stated policy or was acting male fide.  Would you indicate whether you, in your interpretation, are misinterpreting the precepts of State policy at the time or not?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman I unfortunately only got from the media what Mr de Klerk said, but from what I gleaned from the media and from what has been said here now by yourself and what was said earlier this morning, all I can say is that if he believes what he says then his eyes were closed.  And perhaps I am willing in his case to be very careful what I say because he was never, I think, until 1989, 1990 really involved in a key way in the counter-insurgency struggle, to my knowledge.  And perhaps he misinterprets the counter-insurgency tenets which were used by the State during the time that he was certainly a Cabinet minister, because as I have said in my evidence there was an attempt, quite a large attempt in fact, to preserve an image of legality, and that the actions taken in the South African context were not something that were dreamt up by the South African security forces.  This is not new tactics to the world's counter-intelligence or counter-insurgency warfare manuals, these are things that have been done in all counter-insurgency fights.
 So all I can comment is that from my involvement, and that includes my involvement as a politician, a National Party politician, a member of the President's Council, somebody who, because of my previous security force rank and role was an expert in the National Party in Parliament on these matters, you know that my view differs radically from his view.

MR GOOSEN: And those would have been the comments made specifically in regard to perhaps the interpretation or views of former President F W de Klerk, would you be able to comment, from your understanding of the matter, what you would regard as the views perhaps of Mr P W Botha and his perspective in regard to this framework?

UNKNOWN: I can't comment, I mean I never discussed the matter personally with the previous President Botha, but obviously I was far more closely involved with Mr P W Botha's administration than I was with Mr de Klerk's administration, and at that time even as a member of the President's Council I could talk to President Botha's closest aides and that was a time when I was serving on the National Party caucus, standing committee on defence where we went on border trips.  Our job was to educate other members of Parliament from other parties, from the other houses, also the media, in our counter-revolutionary strategy.  And at that time, as I indicated in my evidence-in-chief, the situation in South Africa had become extremely militarised, and the military influence and effect, even on political level at that time was extremely high.  And the theories of counter-insurgency were coming from military sources to politicians rather than the other way round.

MR GOOSEN: So in your experience in particularly the period when you would have interacted then very closely with senior politicians, both in government and those who may not have necessarily been in government but associated with government, would you say that at that period that from your experience that politicians, those that you interacted with, would have come to understand and appreciate the implications of the counter-revolutionary strategy that was being prosecuted by the security forces at that stage?

UNKNOWN: I would imagine so Mr Chairman, and also I can go further and say that every serving high level politician, now I am talking about a politician in an executive position, a cabinet minister, most of the deputy ministers, chairmen of committees, had the advantage of receiving on a daily basis Intelligence summaries, Insums, which summarised everything that had happened the day before, the week before, projected what perhaps would happen tomorrow and the coming week, and which reported incidents, all incidents.
 And I would have thought that if there was a mysterious element in the country's counter-insurgency warfare effort, which was that there were things happening that nobody knew who had done, some politician would have asked their Intelligence chiefs to determine who was responsible for these activities, and ask why when with monotonous regularity the ANC cadres in one or other neighbouring states start their cars the cars explode.  But these questions weren't asked.  There was a tacit acceptance and understanding that this had something to do with South Africa's counter-insurgency programme, and that's the only answer I can give to that.