Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR COETZEE: The next heading relating to the evidence is the following.  The proposed deployment of these trainees was lawful.  The initial deployment was lawful.  It was only at a far later stage, as alleged by the Esikhawini hit squad members, that they were deployed by Luthuli for an unlawful purpose.  In Luthuli's evidence it is clear that the initial deployment was lawful, in lines with the aims envisaged by the Defence Force.  The VIP protection unit was immediately taken up in the KwaZulu Police, the contra-mobilisation group was utilised throughout KwaZulu at IFP offices in order to mobilise the masses.  Certain trainees were deployed at chieftain's kraals to provide protection.  In this regard I refer to 451, 452 and 453 up to 455 of the record.

MR COETZEE: It was only at a far later stage that Luthuli alleges that he deployed certain Caprivi trainees as a hit squad in the Esikhawini area.  This seems to have transpired subsequent to 1990 or 1991.  This deployment seems to have arisen because certain IFP politicians wished to utilise the military skills of these Caprivi trainees to form a hit squad to unlawfully attack the ANC.  In this regard I refer to page 456 of the evidence.

MR COETZEE: It is also apparent that the Esikhawini hit squad never wanted the Defence Force to be aware of their unlawful activities.  Mr Dlamini even entered into a skirmish with members of the Defence Force.  See in this regard page 166.  Mr Luthuli also testified that he did not want the Defence Force to know what they were up to, and I quote.

MR COETZEE: "Thank you.  Now, Mr Luthuli, when I read your statement which you made to the ITU

MR COETZEE: /I gained

MR COETZEE: I gained the impression that you were very wary of the South African armed forces, comprising the Defence Force and the South African Police.  Is this impression correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct."

MR COETZEE: This is on page 458.

MR COETZEE: I now refer to the evidence of Mkhize.  In evaluating his evidence it is important to refer to his understanding and interpretation of the terms, "offensive training" and "protection."  In this regard it is noteworthy to refer to the evidence which was given on page 56, line 25-27, where he testified as follows, referring to the Caprivi trainees.

MR COETZEE: "From the beginning of the training it was always insisted that we would protect the government of the time."

MR COETZEE: On page 61 of the record Mr Mkhize in his evidence puts emphasis on offensive training.  He refers to various weapons on lines 3-7, page 61, and makes the inference that because they were trained in these weapons their training concentrated on an offensive capability.  This inference is betrayed by Mkhize's own evidence on page 64, where he refers specifically to the RPG7 rocket launcher, and explains on line 20 to line 31, and on page 65, lines 1-3, why it was important to be able to recognise and know the RPG7 weapon extensively, in order to able to defend oneself, which is clearly an indication of an emphasis on the defensive nature of this training.  What is more important to underline here is that the RPG7 is probably the most powerful weapon the Caprivi trainees were trained

MR COETZEE: /with, and

MR COETZEE: with, and Mr Mkhize goes at length to explain the protective and/or defensive role the training entailed relating to this weapon.  I respectfully submit that this is clearly in contrast with the evidence that was given by Mr Mkhize on page 69, lines 5-11, where he testifies that they only had one aim, and that was to kill.

MR COETZEE: I further submit that Mr Mkhize makes one cardinal error in his evidence.  It is so that any firearm used by a soldier in combat has the ability to kill.  This does not necessarily imply that the fact that the weapon is able to kill that such soldier is trained or entitled to kill or commit acts of murder indiscriminately.

MR COETZEE: The protective nature of the training was also emphasised ... (inaudible - end of Side B, Tape 1) ... to lines, 21-27, where he testified as follows.

MR COETZEE: "It was done to equip these people with the necessary knowledge so that they could be able to counteract certain situations they found themselves in, so that they could be able to defend themselves and fight and protect themselves, as well as other members of that group, if they were needed to do that."

MR COETZEE: That is defensive.  On page 393, line 3-6 Mkhize testifies that he is not in a position to testify as to the offensive training as he was training on contra-mobilisation.  On line 29 of the same page it is of interest to note that his evidence was that it was a minimum amount of Caprivi trainees who involved themselves in hit squad activities.  This in itself, Mr Chairman, we

MR COETZEE: /respectfully

MR COETZEE: respectfully submit, should be a clear indication to the Committee that there was never an intention or foresight on the part of our clients that the training could lead to hit squad activities.  As a member of the contra-mobilisation group it was never foreseen that a member of such group would be deployed in a manner outside the area of contra-mobilisation.

MR COETZEE: On page 71 of the record Mr Mkhize alluded to infiltration techniques, which coincides with acquiring information and/or intelligence.  On page 78 of the record, lines 30 and 31, and in the first two lines on page 79, he testified as to the protective and defensive element of their training.  The inference drawn by Mr Mkhize on lines 1-20 on page 78 of the record is clearly incorrect.  He draws the inference that because one is trained with certain weaponry that it can only be used in an attacking role and not a protective capacity.

MR COETZEE: We further submit that the chronological sequence of events is of vital importance.  The Caprivi training took place during 1986.  During 1989 Mkhize was trained as a KwaZulu Policeman, after he had been trained as a special constable by the South African Police, and only after these further periods of training Mr Mkhize was then, during 1991, called upon by Mr Luthuli and others to commit murders, the murders he testified about.  There is simply no correlation between the fact that Mr Mkhize was trained in 1986, and thereafter underwent two courses of police training, and five years after his training in the Caprivi, during which period he never committed any crime, was called upon to engage himself in hit squad activities.

MR COETZEE: A further indication of this is found on page 351,

MR COETZEE: /lines 20-22,

MR COETZEE: lines 20-22, where Mkhize testified that he elected not to work with his co-Caprivi trainees, but indeed elected people with other characteristics, with whom he felt comfortable, to associate himself with in committing these murders.

MR COETZEE: Mr Mkhize was trained in contra-mobilisation, and he testified that this was exactly the capacity in which he was initially deployed after completing his training.  In this regard I refer to page 400 and 402, lines 25-28, and I quote.

MR COETZEE: "Namely do go and do contra-mobilisation, not some other job.  Not murdering people, but to go and do contra-mobilisation."

MR COETZEE: And the answer is,

MR COETZEE: "That is true."

MR COETZEE: If any conclusion is to be drawn from the evidence of Mr Mkhize it is that he does not blame the training in the Caprivi for the predicament he now finds himself in.  He clearly feels that he was misused.  In this regard I refer to page 411 of his evidence, lines 12-14, and 417, line 30, and page 418, line 9.

MR COETZEE: We respectfully submit that, due to General Liebenberg and Geldenhuys and Admiral Pitter's limited involvement in the training of these Caprivi trainees, they could not possibly have foreseen that the KwaZulu Police and Inkatha politicians would utilise certain Caprivians on the basis alleged by Luthuli.