Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-18

MR VALLY: Are you still taking advice from Brigadier Basson or Dr Basson?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Of course not. No of course not. He is not a member of that sub-committee.

MR VALLY: So if you have no knowledge or little knowledge of the technical aspects of chemical and biological warfare on what basis are you chairing this sub-committee?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well Mr Vally you would be welcome to take over the chair if you so wish. But I am saying to you those two working groups - the chemical weapons working group and the biological weapons working group consists of representatives of the entire industry in this country that is involved in either chemical or biological research as well as the academics. As well as Colonel Steyn and they are the people with the technical knowledge and the role that I play there is not to be technical but rather to look at the implications of the Convention to the regulations, to the declarations that have to be made. And to advise both foreign affairs and the Non-Proliferation Council on proliferation dangers, etc, etc. And again I make use of the experts I have on those committees and you are welcome to have a look at the members of those committees. They are the top people in this country with regards to those technical aspects.

MR VALLY: Let's go on. Did you know the difference between hard projects and soft projects as been (...intervention)

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I have already answered that question. That was an internal arrangement within the companies and I only discovered that when I saw the documents that came out of the trunks.

MR VALLY: And that was in?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Before that it was never ever discussed even at CMC level.

MR VALLY: And what date was that again?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: The trunks?

MR VALLY: The knowledge of that information?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I think it was in February 1997 that the trunks had been found.

MR VALLY: Well maybe you can take us through some of the projects that you were involved in? Project Jotta?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: It is just a different name for Project Coast. It was an arrangement by Chief of Staff Intelligence that the name Coast was becoming far too familiar and everybody was talking about it, the name of the project had to be changed. It was a security measure.

MR VALLY: Project academic?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Project Academic as far as I recall was the project that was started by the army after we had produced CR in large quantities and it was the process of weaponisation and delivery systems for CR which is a combat service function not a medical service function. Therefore it was handed over to the army.

MR VALLY: Project Black.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Project?

MR VALLY: Black?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am afraid I can't remember what Project Black was about.

MR VALLY: We understood Project Black to be the weaponisation of CR gas.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well I am sorry I was under the impression. You have a document in your folder here which is about Project Academic can we have a look at it?

MR VALLY: We will find it for you and we will come back to you on this issue. Just for interest sake can you tell us what were you purchasing from Croatia?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: In the chronological report that I gave you today in one of the appendices where Dr Basson gives the chronology of events I think he mentions - if we can just look at that quickly. Yes in your appendix G the first document in that series was the document that was produced by Brigadier Basson at the request of the Minister with the meeting that we had with him on the 15th of July. If you refer to page 3 you will see under paragraph 16
"It's been agreed that 500 kg of a substance M would be made available to the project officers under the following conditions."
And substance M.

MR VALLY: M stands for?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I think Methaqualone.

MR VALLY: Which is the active ingredient in Mandrax?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No Sir which is a ground substance that could be used for the development of an incapacitory agent. I don't know if it can be used for Mandrax.

MR VALLY: Well I will tell you it is. It is in fact in the abuse of substances Act it refers to methaqualone there as well.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Thank you Sir.

MR VALLY: So we were importing Mandrax or Methaqualone rather from Croatia?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is correct.

MR VALLY: Why would we be importing Methaqualone from Croatia when General Lothar Neethling was making vast quantities available to Dr Basson? Were you aware of this?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Vally I know that you say it is vast quantities but you argued that whole point with General Lothar Neethling who kept on saying to you that it was in fact not vast quantities.

MR VALLY: Well let's start off firstly; were you aware of this?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That we were obtaining some substances from the police?

MR VALLY: That is right.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes Sir.

MR VALLY: In the quantities that were referred to?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No not at that time.

MR VALLY: Were you aware of whether any documentation had been issued?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No in fact I was under the impression that there was no documentation. I have constantly at the beginning of the OSEO investigation this was one of the questions that was addressed in that very first letter to me that you have in your possession that I gave you this morning. And there Dr Basson said that there was an approval given by the Minister and by the Commissioner of Police and that he had such a document. But we, both the OSEO and I have not been able to get that document at any time. So I haven't seen that document.

MR VALLY: So with your knowledge of his financial improprieties in 1991 and your further knowledge in February 1994 there is no record whatsoever that the 200 000 Mandrax tablets and these were Mandrax tablets put in the boot of Brigadier Basson's car were in fact used as he claimed.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Vally would you repeat that again I am sorry I didn't follow that? You said with my knowledge of his impropriety in 1991?

MR VALLY: Right financial improprieties.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: The financial improprieties came to my attention at the end of 1992 and with the beginning of the OSEO investigation is 1993.

MR VALLY: No you were aware of it before that in 1991. But in 1992 you received a letter. This is what you advised us.

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, no I testified earlier on that I reported to National Intelligence that there was some internal investigations by CSF and CSI about the Murton House and about the Aeromed Services and that was towards the end of 1992. That is what I testified earlier this morning. And the letter of the OSEO that was originated in December 1992 reached me on the 11th of January 1993 and I replied to it and my reply is the 11th of January. But be that as it may could you now complete that question? You say with my knowledge of his impropriety?

MR VALLY: Yes I had understood you saying that there were concerns raised about financial matters regarding Brigadier Basson in 1991 already. And I have put a number of questions to you on that basis already. Are you saying that you only heard about that for the first time in 1992?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No I am not saying that Mr Vally and I don't want to make an issue about 1991 or 1992. I am prepared to accept what you say that I must have been aware of some financial irregularities in 1991. But none of it at that time, internal investigations by the Defence Force had any finding that there were in fact improprieties.

MR VALLY: I see. But by February 1994 you were seriously concerned?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes. Then the investigation of OSEO had been going full-out for almost a year.