Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-09-08

ANDILE SHICEKA: You say APLA didn't knowledge prior.  Let me explain this to you.  If you are given an order and you are told what type of targets are to be attacked, and then what will happen thereafter, I won't say before an attack today, I won't tell people that I'm going to attack people before that could take place.  What if that information will land to the wrong hands, will land to the enemies before the attack.
	APLA has given me a target.  What I'm supposed to do is to execute the orders and report after the operation.  They know very well everything about my whereabouts, they know very well that I'm involved in an operation.  Even if I hid this or that, they know very well that the order was given but I can't tell people beforehand.  I can't tell Mzala, what if Mzala has changed his mind and now he's collaborating with the enemy and we would be killed during the operation?  That means that I'll never tell before the attack, I will never tell the people before the attack.

MR WARNER: Okay.  So then do we have to understand it was within your authority to decide on what kind of target to hit?

ANDILE SHICEKA: As I've already mentioned what type of targets were described to us, no matter what I do it has to fall under that category, I mustn't do my own thing.

CHAIRPERSON: I think there were general instructions and the commander of a unit then selects the target.  The entire organisation of APLA doesn't select specific targets and say go and hit this target or the other, they are given general instructions and the commander then picks the target.  That is how I understand the evidence to be.

MR WARNER: Can it then be said Sir, that the commander had a discretion in picking the target?

CHAIRPERSON: Obviously he selects the target.

MR WARNER: Thank you, thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: That's how I understand his evidence.
	Mr Arendse, am I wrong?

NORMAN ARENDSE: No, Mr Chairman, that's correct.

MR WARNER: I want to ask you also, this attack on the restaurant, is it not true that this was your first attack on a civilian or so-called soft target?  Your attacks prior to that had all been on military installations, is that not correct?

ANDILE SHICEKA: You see APLA was formed long ago in 1960 ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] your first soft target, not APLA.  It's the first soft target in which you were involved, that's the question.

ANDILE SHICEKA: That was my first attack.

CHAIRPERSON: That's the answer.

MR WARNER: Did you not therefore feel that you were entering unfamiliar territory?  Did it not strike you as something you were not used to doing?

CHAIRPERSON: He's now got to express to you how he felt about it?  Mr Warner, what is it that you're really after?

MR WARNER: I would like him to tell me whether or not he felt this was a different operation from his previous operations, or was it just the same as all of the rest.

CHAIRPERSON: Well the differences are so obvious, even to me.

MR WARNER: Sir, he made a comment earlier on that there was no difference whatsoever between a soft target and a military target.

CHAIRPERSON: No, what they mean is that they don't draw a distinction.

MR WARNER: What I'm trying to establish Sir, is that there is indeed a distinction there and that he must have been aware of that distinction.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, they said that they don't draw a distinction.  In other words, as far as APLA is concerned, they don't say: "We will only attack hard targets, military targets, we will not attack soft targets".  They don't draw that distinction.  They're not saying that there is no distinction, they don't draw that distinction.  That is as I understand it.

MR WARNER: So can I understand that it follows from that, that as an APLA soldier, he himself did not feel that this was, there was any significance whatsoever in that this was his first soft target?  Is that how we should understand it?

CHAIRPERSON: That there was no significance?

MR WARNER: No significance, it wasn't a moment for him, it wasn't a special time for him where he'd crossed over the line from soft targets, from hard targets to soft targets?

CHAIRPERSON: Listen carefully please.  You attacked police stations, you attacked policemen at railway stations, with a view to getting their arms, that's one kind of activity.  Now you are attacking a restaurant, not to get guns from the people but just to attack the people.  In your mind, counsel wants to know, did you not have any difficulty in drawing a distinction that you're attacking unarmed people in a restaurant, as distinct from attacking policemen and soldiers?

ANDILE SHICEKA: No.

MR WARNER: I put it to you finally that the target that you attacked was not a legitimate target, what is your comment?

ANDILE SHICEKA: You say that was not a legitimate target, the one that we attacked?  Is that what you are saying?

MR WARNER: That is correct yes, the restaurant.

ANDILE SHICEKA: To me it was a legitimate target.

MR WARNER: Thank you Sir, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WARNER

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any questions?

MR MAPOMA: Thank you Chairperson, no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any re-examination Mr Arendse?

NORMAN ARENDSE: Just one Mr Chairperson.
	In your written statement, Andile, you say in paragraph 6.1, just referring to your orders, in paragraph 6.1 you say the order was for you to come to Cape Town:
"to carry out operations in which I was to attack members of the then racist South African Police, SANDF and other white people.  The purpose was to take the war to white areas and steel by force weapons from the police and members of the Defence Force"
Now in your written application on page 20 of the bundle you also say that comrade, and I'm referring to paragraph 11(b), there's a question: "If so, state particulars of such an order and the persons who gave you the order".  You say:
"Comrade Mzala issued the order to take the war to the white areas and to destroy the state machinery"
Now, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Arendse, what page are you reading from?

NORMAN ARENDSE: Page 20 of the bundle, paragraph 11(b).

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Is that the same thing that you were saying in paragraph 6.1 of your written statement?

ANDILE SHICEKA: Yes.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Thank you, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ARENDSE

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much, you can stand down.
WITNESS EXCUSED

NORMAN ARENDSE: Chairperson, we've got no other witnesses, that is the case for the applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Arendse, do you know whether the people who were his companions have applied for amnesty, people whose names have been mentioned here?

NORMAN ARENDSE: No, Chairperson, they definitely haven't applied for amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: They haven't?

NORMAN ARENDSE: They haven't.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you proposing to call any witnesses?

MR WARNER: No, Sir, I have no witnesses.

MR MAPOMA: No, Chairperson, no witnesses.

CHAIRPERSON: Where in Claremont is this restaurant, or is it no longer there?

MR WARNER: Sir, it is no longer there.  Apparently the owner went bankrupt as a result of crippling medical expenses following the act.  There is another restaurant in its place.  This is on the corner of Landsdowne Road and Belvedere Road.  I have a map if the Commission would like to have sight of such.

CHAIRPERSON: No, this is sufficient.  And under what name was this restaurant at that time?

MR WARNER: It was called: "Stakes": S-T-A-K-E-S.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much.
	Mr Arendse, will you address us now, or do you want a little time until tomorrow morning to do so?

NORMAN ARENDSE: Can we have some time until tomorrow morning Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Some time, meaning early in the morning?

NORMAN ARENDSE: First thing in the morning.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Yes.