Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

MR KNOETZE: The background portion of it reads as follows
"The Eastern Cape was traditionally the cradle of black radicalism.  Certain areas in the Eastern Cape, namely East London, Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, Queenstown and Cradock, were known since the '50's for a radical and even violent political actions.  Certain families who traditionally had an important influence in the region, used revolutionary methods to achieve their political goals and played a major role in the revolutionary climate in the region, and the Calata family was particularly prominent in this respect.  The church leader, Canon Calata was one of the founder members of the ANC, and during the '50's and the early '60's was actively involved in mobilising actions in the Eastern Cape.  His son, Mr Fort Calata, in the '80's became actively involved in revolutionary activities in the Eastern Cape.
	In the early '80's, the internal situation in both the former Ciskei and the former Transkei deteriorated very quickly due to bad administration as well as the pursuing of personal aims by the leaders of those countries.  On the 23rd of May '84, a state of emergency was announced in the Transkei, which state of emergency was further extended for a further year on the 9th of July 1985.
	George ..."
...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Knoetze, are you going to read all the 40 pages now, because we've read this document.

MR KNOETZE: Under those circumstances I won't read it, Mr Chairman.
	General, you're already said that you've looked at this, do you confirm that this background is a correct version of how the situation was in the Eastern Cape?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, insofar as my involvement and knowledge is concerned, it is correct.  There are portions which relate to times or periods when I wasn't involved or I had already left, but as far as I am concerned, it is a correct version of Operation Katzen, or Plan Katzen and the circumstances surrounding it.

MR KNOETZE: If we can then go to page 16 of that document, "The Idea".   You've already indicated how it arose, now just to summarise, the idea originated with you?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That's not entirely correct, the idea surrounding Katzen was broadly known in the Eastern Cape and was discussed in the Eastern Cape.  It was definitely known to the Xhosa leaders that I referred to earlier, the basic idea of a Xhosa unity, unity as a nation. So it wasn't my original idea.  Even white leaders also made statements to this effect.  Most probably these statements were made in a slightly negative sense towards the Ciskei, which was not regarded as having the same viability as the Transkei.  And also, from my own personal point of view it was regarded as two countries but one nation, just divided by a thin strip in the middle and neither of those two were viable as separate entities.  It was only if they were joined together and upon inclusion of the portion in the middle, that they could perhaps survive as a unified Xhosa nation.  That was the basic idea.

MR KNOETZE: Well the plan as such is described on, or in this document as from paragraph 20 on page 20, and it deals with the various phases and the objectives.  Could we then turn to page 71.  What is this document that appears on that page?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It's in my handwriting, Chairperson.  It's a submission which I wrote, dated 13th of June, and it's in connection with Plan Katzen.  I presented this to General Liebenberg in Pretoria.

MR KNOETZE: Why is the document written in your handwriting and why isn't it typed?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The presentation as it stands here was regarded as highly confidential by myself because it spanned other departments as well, and didn't only relate to the military function which I had.  I saw it as a politically sensitive document.  Our government had created the Ciskei and this plan actually suggested that that creation or the creation of those two states be made null and void, that it be made one country, so it was politically very sensitive.  I didn't actually trust a typist to type the plan, and it would have been counter-productive if the information or the proposals in this plan had to leak out.  I wanted to clear with matter out personally with my direct superior, and I only consulted two staff officers in compiling this plan, in order to improve the confidentiality aspect of the whole plan.

MR KNOETZE: Is that also the reason why at the top in the right-hand corner it says: "Copy number 2 of two copies"?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct?  I made one copy and kept that one for myself, and one copy was made for General Liebenberg and I handed to him personally in his office.

MR KNOETZE: Now the discussion between yourself and General Liebenberg, did that lead to something else in turn?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I present the plan as it's spelt out here, to General Liebenberg and he thought it wasn't a bad plan.  He then instructed one of his staff officers, Captain Paddy van Wyk, to go to Port Elizabeth to convey certain amendments and supplements in the plan, and that is what then gave rise to the second plan.

MR KNOETZE: Alright.  We will in time get to the differences between plan 1 and plan 2, but maybe for the time being you can take the Committee through this plan step by step.  For instance "The Perspective", on page 71, what was that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Normally in military planning there is a formal structure or format in terms of which a plan is written, but this plan does not comply with any standard military plan structure, it's rather a letter from myself to my direct superior.  That is why I started by outlining the perspective by saying that it was not a written evaluation and it was not a detailed military plan, but it was an idea, and that I wanted to submit this idea to him.  If he found the idea acceptable, then experts had to be appointed to look at all the various aspects of the idea, they had to analyse the plan, evaluate it.  And I said that the plan, due to its political implication, would have to be taken up with people at the highest political level, and by that I meant Minister Malan.
	It also had to be in alignment with the other plans which had been drafted and which had already been carried out.  And then, the plan was not written for the man in the street, it was not written for the person who actually had to carry it out, it was written to enable the person in a position of authority, to give that person a structured idea as to a possible solution for the problems in the Eastern Cape.  That is what I tried to convey by a perspective, it was not a military plan.  And to make it possible to carry it out, those four aspects, (a), (b), (c) and (d) first had to take place.

MR KNOETZE: Now paragraph 2, "The Emphasis", what did you actually try to emphasise?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I wanted to emphasise that we were striving for permanent normalisation of the Eastern Cape situation.  So, we were aiming to win the revolution and it could only be won by normalisation.

MR KNOETZE: Then "The Objective", as reflected in paragraph 3 on page 72?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The purpose of this submission is to obtain approval in principle for a plan to permanently normalise the Eastern Cape by December '87.  In other words it gave us 18 months time to achieve that objective.  ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: How was that date determined, General, or was that just your date?