Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-18

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Thank you.  If the Commission looks at the briefing to the State President, I am not going to read the entire briefing, you have it available if you wish to do so at your leisure.  I want to refer to page 3, paragraph 10, in which a discussion was held with the State President with regards to the nature and the effect of chemical and biological weapons and the explanation that is given here is -that in the Western world there was a change taking place.  It reads as follows
"It was moved away from research and development regarding weapons of destruction and two new approaches were taken
A. The development of chemical weapons which are not non-destructive that can impair the brain function of the target groups that they cannot function properly and can easily be attacked by conventional weapons".
 Then I want to refer you further on, after we discussed with the President the aims and objectives of the project and the way that it has been run up to then, page 4, paragraph 18 under the heading "Threat to the South African Defence Force".  I want to draw your attention to the second half of that paragraph which reads -
"We, however, in 1986 found certain bomb shrapnel after a supposed attack on Unita and we tested that for chemical agents, namely with the code name DM. This agent is an incapacitating agent which causes irritation of the eye and throat, disorientation, nausea, vomiting and depression".
 A discussion then follows about the developments after that finding, and on page 5 I wish to draw your attention to paragraph 23.  This is with reference to the chemical company that had been established and what it was working on -
"This plant concentrates on research in and the production of incapacitating and irritating agents.  These agents are built into weapon systems together with Armscor.  A new type of teargas was developed which could be used effectively".
 Finally if you would allow me with regards to the biological research and development, page 6, paragraph 27 -
"Our biological plant, this is RRL, is responsible to keep up to date with all potential threats, and to do this it is continuously producing new organisms so that the threat can be updated and that preventative and treatment methods can be updated".
 In essence that document refers then to what we put in front of President de Klerk and what he approved.  His approval was that we could continue with the incapacitating agents and with the irritating agents as had been presented to him; that we should stop all further research on any deadly agents.
 The next document, if I can take you back to my statement where I refer to the second document, namely the minutes of a mini-DCC, that's what you have in front of you in that same Appendix, and you will see it's a thick document.  You will see that it reads:
"These mini-DCC, Defence Command Council meeting held on the 25th of October".
You will also see, by the way, that General Steyn attended that meeting.  And here I want to just very briefly take one or two paragraphs on page 1, paragraph 2:
"The purpose of this meeting was
 1 - to provide background regarding the status of development of chemical weapons in the Project Coast.
 2 - the decision regarding the research should be re-established based on the present directive and the State President's instruction regarding the establishment of technology".
 Why I am showing you this, Mr Chairman, is to show you that the decision of the State President was carried through to the Defence Command Council and from there obviously to the Co-ordinating Management Committee.
 And then on page 2, paragraph 5(B):
"The State President provided authority for research into chemical weapons and not into the production of deadly chemical weapons".
and let me explain what that means.  It means incapacitating agents or irritating agents.
 I want you then to turn to the appendix to that document which was a document to the same mini-DCC with the proposed new philosophy for chemical and biological warfare. Again you will notice that the person who drew up the document is Brigadier Basson.  He will, if I take you to the relevant paragraphs, if you look at page 3, paragraph 10A, that the decision that was given to us or the direction that was given to us through our State President is reflected here:
"The development of chemical weapons which are not deadly but which can impair the brain functions of target groups so that they cannot function in an orderly fashion, and they could be approached easier than with conventional weapon".
 It also deals on page 4 with the implications - "the implications of the chemical threat for the South African Defence Force", a discussion of that.    I am not going to read it all Mr Chairman.
 And then I refer you to page A6, the main conclusions of:
The chemical warfare and the conclusions and what was decided then during this Council.  Paragraph 32.
"To avoid this threat the Defence Force has to do the following
 Keep up-to-date about the research regarding the offensive threat;
 keep up-to-date regarding research regarding the latest technology to protect against chemical weapons and a system of training of chemical warfare and to maintain that as if the physical threat could be fought against and,
 to develop a command structure which can take proper decisions".
On the next page -
"The technology in South Africa establishes and provides protective clothing according to the new standards and to improve this ability and to establish the technology in South Africa, not to produce chemical weapons of mass destruction.  And to develop operational activities in which the above five points can be incorporated, rationalisation of functions will take place and central co-ordination is also important".
 And further on that same page under the heading "Offensive chemical warfare philosophy".
"It is proposed that the South African Defence Force develop a research capability regarding limited production of non-deadly chemical weapons and maintain that".
 And regarding the defensive policy, page A8, paragraph 35, 
"It is also recommended that the Defence Force should develop an offensive capability which should entail protection".
 Finally if you look at page A12 -
"Establishment of the production technology for non-deadly weapons".
Paragraph 59 deals with the steps that will be followed in achieving that.
And then finally paragraph 60, the first sentence -"In this regard Project Coast has already developed one chemical warfare agent, namely the so-called NGTR, a new generation teargas".
As you will see later on that refers directly to the CR that was developed in the programme. I use these two documents to illustrate to you that the guidance that was given to us by the President were followed through into the Defence Command Council and were applied exactly in that fashion and was carried through into the Co-ordinating Management Committee and into the project.
 If I can now take you back to where we were on my statement. 
"During December 1992 President de Klerk announced the early retirement/retrenchment and/or dismissal of some 23 military officers after General Pierre Steyn had submitted his report on the alleged activities of the South African Defence Force to the Cabinet on the 18th of December 1992.
 Brigadier Doctor Wouter Basson of the South African Medical Service was one of these officers.  At the time I was in London on the way back to the Republic of South Africa, having attended the AMSES Congress in the USA and visiting the Boots Pharmaceutical Plant in Nottingham in the United Kingdom.
 The Chief of the South African Defence Force, General Liebenberg, phoned me in London to inform me about Mr de Klerk's decision and to enquire whether I would be available to be appointed as Acting Chief of the South African Defence Force over the Xmas holiday period, with the responsibility to deal with the administrative process required to carry out the instruction of President de Klerk.  I indicated that I would be available.
 On my return to the Republic of South Africa, I immediately enquired as to the circumstances that led up to this decision with specific reference to the position of Doctor Basson and was simply told that it could not be discussed in detail with me but that the President had appointed the Steyn Commission in additional to the Harms 1990, Goldstone 1991 and Hiemstra 1991 Commissions, to conduct and investigation into the Intelligence Services of the South African Defence Force and the South African Police, with special reference to their role in possible third force activities.
 In addition I was informed that all findings would be handed over to Mr d'Oliveira of the Attorney General's office for possible criminal proceedings against individuals found to be involved in such activities.  
 Not satisfied with what I was told and quite alarmed about the position of Doctor Basson who was playing a critical role in the privatisation of the front of Project Coast, and I'm referring here specifically to DG Scientific and R&L, as well as to recovering some funds and closing accounts which were still in existence in Europe.  I tried in vain on two occasions to arrange to see Mr de Klerk personally through the office of the Minister of Defence which was then Mr Louw.  
 I also had telephonic discussions with General Liebenberg in this regard and was eventually asked by him to visit him at his holiday home near George and to bring Doctor Basson with me.  At this meeting I was asked to allow him to speak to Doctor Basson alone and thereafter informed that he had explained to Doctor Basson why it was found necessary to put him on early pension, but that it would be appreciated if he could still be available to the Surgeon General after the 31st of March 1993, in a voluntary capacity in the Citizen Force Reserve, to finalise outstanding issues within the project.
 I was again assured that the d'Oliveira investigation would undoubtedly deal with any so-called third force activities.  Somewhat reassured I proceeded to deal with the documentation of the 23 officers involved, with the help of the Chief of Staff Personnel of the Defence Headquarters and with a rather serious negative reaction with the Defence Command Council with respect to the role played by General Steyn in what seemed to them to be an unfair dismissal of senior officers in the South African Defence Force, without any visible application of the rules of natural justice including the audi alteram partem principle.
 In this regard I had several discussions with General Pierre Steyn, who was clearly also disturbed by the animosity of his fellow members of the Defence Command Council.
 Important to note was the fact that General Pierre Steyn indicated at the time that he was not at liberty to disclose what he had reported to President de Klerk and that we should leave the matter in the hands of the d'Oliveira investigation.
 In this regard the contents of the so-called Steyn Report was not revealed to me in any way until I received a translated copy of the staff paper used by General Steyn, from Mr Mike Kennedy in February '97"
And you have this document in front of you as Appendix B.  This document was as far as I can judge, a translation of the TRC document number 111 in the bundle of documents for this hearing.
 On the 7th of January 1993 - I beg your pardon Mr Chairman, if I can just refer to that document.  I'm not going to discuss the contents.  You will see at the bottom right-hand corner where it was handed over to me by Mr Mike Kennedy on the 25th of February 1997.
"On the 7th of January 1993, the new Minister of Defence, Mr Louw, was briefed about the state of the project and what the implication of the pending signing of the New Chemical Weapons Convention by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, due to take place on the 14th of January '93, would be.
 The full briefing plus confirmatory notes of the briefing drawn up on the 8th of January '93 and signed by the Minister are included in Appendix C"
May I please refer you to that document?  Again Mr Chairman, I am not going to read the entire document but I'm simply going to point out to you that in this document the entire project as it was mandated and initiated initially by General Malan, with its aims and objectives, with the phases that it went through, is described in some detail.  Particularly I want to refer to page 4, paragraph B, Heading: 
"Phase 2: The Commercialisation Phase"
where it reads as follows:
"Continuation of research and identification of research objectives for production owing to guidelines given by the State President after briefing given to him in 1994"
And then the next paragraph C:
"Phase 3"
paragraph (iv):
"A submission to the Parliamentary Committee regarding sensitive matters being investigated by the State.  This Committee consisted of various Ministers and during this the contents of the project was made clear to them"
The rest of the document deals with, in some detail, with these different phases to bring the Minister totally up to date.  I would like to refer you to page 7, paragraph 27:
"Offensive Equipment Obtaining and Research.  According to the guidelines by the present State President in 1990, only irritants and incapacitating measures were made which can be used in counter insurgence.   These are a CR derivative, an irritant B, which is a BZ variety incapacitating, C, a methaqualone derivative which is incapacitating, D, dimethyl amphetamine which is incapacitating"
 We then proceeded to discuss with the Minister what the implications of these substances were with regards to the pending CWC Convention and this is what is reads on page or rather paragraph 28 on page 7:
"The BZ variant leaves us with the least problems.  We produced 1000 kilogram's for weapons which would take place in 1993. This substance was on the list: "Prohibited Agents" and we were compelled to announce this or destroy it.  The last option will be the preferable one"
And the next paragraph, 29:
"The NGT provides fewer problems"
Now Mr Chairman, I can deal with this in great detail but basically what it says there is that CR as an irritating agent is not prohibited by the New Chemical Weapons Convention.  You do have to declare that you have it in your possession but no other requirements are necessary.  We therefore indicated to the Minister that we could carry on with the CR although we were going to sign the Convention within a week.
 And then on page 9, the confirmation again with regard to the incapacitating agents, sub-paragraph 37:
"Incapacitating agents as previously described, the Defence Force has two incapacitating agents"
Mr Chairman, that refers to the BZ variant that I've already dealt with and the second was the dimethyl "ketoon amfetamien derigaat"(?) ...[no English translation] which will come forward again later on in the hearing.  And then finally under recommendations on page 10:
"It should be continued with the defensive projects under Armscor"
What is meant there is the production of masks, filters, clothing, detection apparatus, decontamination.  42:
"That the SADF will not declare that it has this agent and will go ahead with the production of this in the form foam until its been completed.  This work should be done covertly to be able to be protective"
Mr Chairman, I would like to explain in this regard.  Signing the Convention means that South Africa becomes a State party to that Convention, however the Convention must then be ratified and the number of countries that have to ratify it in this case were 65 and after 65 countries ratified it, then it enters into force 6 months after ratification.  
 So what we said to the Minister here is: "We can carry on, we don't have to declare it now.  When the Convention one day is ratified and enters into force 6 months later, that is when we will have to declare that we are in possession of CR.
 And third recommendation 43:
"That all work in connection with other the two incapacitants should be ceased and that all raw materials should be destroyed in the presence of a member of the South African Police so that a certificate of destruction be supplied"
Because I realised that this was an important meeting and these were important decisions taken by the Minister, I had the secretary of this meeting, which was Colonel Steyn, draw up confirmatory notes immediately. That is the second part of this documents.  You will see:
"...[no English translation] George on 7 January, the date here is 8 January"
And I only want to refer you to the final decision by the Minister, page 3: Decisions, paragraph 13:
"The Minister accepts all the above three recommendations as described here"
As I read it to you from the original meeting.  And 14:
"The Minister gives instructions that all technical and scientific documentation regarding this programme should be put in a safe place so that the programme can reactivated if necessary.  The Defence Force should not limit the capability to prevent anarchy and they should not leave these capabilities"
You'll see my note there in my own handwriting, the instruction to Brigadier Basson with regard to recommendations, paragraph 12:
"To have negotiations with SAFCOL"
In other words to go ahead with the process of destruction and obtaining a certificate to this effect from the police.  And you can also see right at the bottom in the handwriting of the Minister what he said about: "NGT".  I have difficulty in reading it but I'll try:
"Because NGT is not a listed agent regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention and because its regarded to be used in the control of riots.  I approve it, but before this agent is used it should first be cleared out with the Minister or the State President"
That deals with this Appendix Mr Chairman.  If I can go back to my statement.
"After this briefing I also privately brought the Minister up to date with the position of Doctor Basson, as outlined above"
Mr Chairman, if I may just explain this.  I'd already told you that I'd seen General Liebenberg at his holiday house and discussed the position of Basson and what he had said to me at the time.  This is what I have related to the Minister then.  
"I also informed the Minister that I had received a letter from the Offices of Serious Economic Offences, the date of it, the 8th of December 1992, informing me that they were conducting an investigation in accordance with Section 5 of the Act on the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences, 117 of 1991 in Armscor, with special reference to Brigadier Basson.  This letter and my reply to it dated the 11th of January 1993 is of importance because it contains a lot of information about Project Coast and how it was managed and in particular it mentions the fact that I had experienced some difficulties with the control over Brigadier Basson with respect to operational use of products with the project and how I tried unsuccessfully to rectify it.
 A copy of the letter from the Offices of Serious Economic Offences and my reply to it, which was also made available to the Minister of Defence, is included here, Appendix D"
If I may refer to Appendix D and again Mr Chairman, I will not deal with the entire document but only the relevant paragraphs.  First of all at the back of the document is the letter that I received, dated the 8th of December, with a whole number of questions.  I refer specifically to paragraph 12 which reads as follows:
"Under whose control did he work and who authorised his activities"?
and in my answer, I want to refer you to the answer to that question, page 13, question 12:
"Under whose control did he work and who authorised his activities"?
And I will read that to you.
"Brigadier Basson was after his appointment in the Defence Force, under the control of the Surgeon General and he is responsible for medical and other activities responsible to the Surgeon General.  Brigadier Basson was under operational control of the Commanding Officer Special Forces and the Defence Force as from March 1981 and all his military activities were controlled by this instance.  Since the 1st of March 1988 I personally controlled him and it was confirmed by his appointment as Director of Research and Development in my headquarters.  Regarding the project under discussion, Brigadier Basson was responsible for the Co-ordinating Committee for the management of this project.  This includes research, development and production and his activities were authorised by this body.  The situation regarding the operational application of the products delivered by this project was different.  In this regard Brigadier Basson was tasked by the user or the person who gave the instructions.  These people who gave instructions were the Minister of the Defence Force, the Minister of Defence, the Head of the Defence Force, the Commanding Officer Special Forces, the Head of Staff Information, the Commissioner of the South African Police, the Commanding General of the South African Police and the Director General National Intelligence Service.  The above state of affairs was not acceptable for me and I objected to this to General Geldenhuys, the Head of the Defence Force.  He took note of my objection but the practice continued.  In the cases where Brigadier Basson was tasked operationally by the abovementioned people, the Management Committee of Project Coast only knew about that after the operational need had been satisfied"
I would like to explain this.  The main product at that stage was the CR that had been produced and we had in our possession and was being utilised by all of these instances that I'm mentioning here.  And let me just make it clear Mr Chairman, the Medical Service is not a combat arm of service.  The Medical Service cannot apply any of these substances, it can only be done by Combat Services and that is why these individuals that are mentioned here are all in charge of combat or operational forces.
 Perhaps I should refer to page 16 where I repeat to the Offices of Serious Economic Offences what I have said to the Mini Defence Command Council in paragraph 63:
"Furthermore I want to indicate that the present State President on the 26th of March 1990 in the presence of Malan, Geldenhuys, Liebenberg and myself was informed by Basson regarding the status and scope of Project Coast.  The State President provided approval that the project could be continued regarding the offensive research objectives and that attention should be given to the irritants and incapacitants.  This instruction was followed to the letter and in a cabinet meeting regarding sensitive projects consisting of du Plessis, de Villiers, Coetzee and Viljoen, Brigadier Basson on the 20th of September brought these people up to date with the present state of affairs"
Mr Chairman, obviously this letter is to the Office of Serious Economic Offences, they are looking at financial abuses and that is why the answer is directed more towards the financial side in which they had an interest in at the time.  I add to this that during this briefing I was not present because of other responsibilities.
 Then Mr Chairman, simply to show you that the process that had been followed by myself was one of, in my opinion, responsibility to ensure that the guidelines given by the State President is conveyed to everybody that had to know it and that the circumstances around it was explained in every case.
 Now I go to my statement:
"On the 14th of January 1993, Mr Pik Botha signed the New Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris.  I was part of the delegation that accompanied him as an advisor and in this regard I confirm that I had briefed him before the time about the fact that we had a Defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme but that its mandate was within the provisions of the original Geneva Protocol of 1925 as well as with the Biological Weapons Convention of 1975 and would remain so with respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, also after ratification and entry into force.
 During February 1993, Brigadier Basson reported to General Liebenberg and myself that a transaction that had taken place in Croatia on the 6th of November 1992 had resulted in a loss of project funds because of the arrest of the agent he used to facilitate the transaction.
 As it was believed that these funds could be recovered quickly, General Liebenberg approved personally that Brigadier Basson could return to Croatia to attempt to rectify the situation.  This ultimately resulted in Brigadier Basson himself being detained in Switzerland together with the agent on charges of fraud in June 1993.  These happenings obviously impacted directly on the Office of Serious Economic Offences and Auditor General's investigations.
 Along with these events, my and Colonel Ben Steyn's activities were directed to carrying out the instructions of the Minister of Defence as given the briefing of the 7th of January 1993 and reporting the relevant facts to the Co-ordinating Management Committee at its meetings on the 29th of January 1993 and the 31st of March 1993. 
 In particular the procedure followed to terminate all work on the incapacitating agents and to destroy all ground substances and existing agents and to obtain a certificate to this effect, were confirmed and were documented.  All of these and other relevant documents are included in Appendix E"
And please, I write an NB here, these documents should be read with what I dealt with in Appendix C.  Mr Chairman, if I can take you through that very quickly.  The first document in this bundle is a quotation that was received from Medchem Technologies for a substance called DNA Dimethyl Phenathelimine, code name Baxil and it is dated the 30th of July 1992.  And I then sign an order directed to Doctor Philip Mijburgh of Medchem Technologies, dated the 7th of August 1992 and I say, I refer to the substance DNA Dimethyl Phenathelimine, Baxil and I then place an order for the production of 1000 kilogram's of this product.   I want to draw your attention to what I add in my letter:
"Regarding your request for protection against prosecution, I want to inform you that it is just within our ability to protect you regarding the provision of raw materials and the production of the products.  Any irregularities which occurred during the production and the illegal provision to other people will be the full responsibility of the management"
Mr Chairman, that substance that is ordered there is the second incapacitating agent that I referred to in my briefing to the Minister, that had developed and that had received.  In other words on the 7th of January the next year we had received it and that we were ready to weaponise it.  However, in view of the State President's decision, he would have to decide whether we could go ahead.  That refers to the briefing to the Minister.
 The next document in that bundle is dated the 9th of November, it says:
"Confirmation of the receipt of products received from Project Coast injuta"
I want to take you specifically to the last paragraph, paragraph 4:
"At the moment the following agents are available which we would be translated into certain products:  1000 kilogram's product  B"
That is the BZ product that I referred to before when I briefed the Minister later on.
"And 500 kilogram's product M"
That is the Methaqualone on which we briefed the
Minister.
"30 kilogram's product C"
That was a cocaine derivative substance that we also included at that stage.  
 Now what I want to point out is, this was on November.  I believe that Doctor Koekemoer in his evidence here indicated to you that the delivery of the Baxil took place early in January, that is why it is not reflected on this document.  However, if you refer back to my briefing to the Minister on the 7th of January, you will see that I say that we have in our possession two incapacitating agents and I indicate 1000 kilogram's of each.
 The instruction of the Minister that these products had to be destroyed is contained in the next document, the document dated the 30th of March:
"Certification regarding the destruction of chemical products on the 27th of January 1993"
I refer you to paragraph 2:
"The load consisted of the following: 18 blue plastic drums, weight so and so, product M.  73 metal drums, product BX.  C: white metal drums, D: small plastic containers, F: green metal drums"
My copy is a bit unclear, it looks like:
"21 green metal drums, B: four papers drums and two cartons"
Mr Chairman, these products refer to the products which were given to the Minister in his briefing:
"M being Methaqualone, BX being Baxil, C being Cocaine and B being BZ"