Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MR GOOSEN: So in respect of say the support for the Witdoeke in KTC June 
of 1986 in Cape Town, support rendered by members of the Security forces, 
attempts by the Joint Management Centre in the Western Cape to secure even 
financial support from the Secretariat of the State Security Council in order to 
support certain activities of the Witdoeke that that would all be, fall into the 
realm of an unreasonable misinterpretation of what was envisaged in respect 
of counter mobilisation of contra mobilisation policies as approved by the 
State Security Council.   Is that correct?

MR MEYER: I think so, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And presumably on that basis you would say that then no 
political responsibility could ever attach in respect of the actions by the 
Security force members and all the participants in the meetings of the Joint 
Management Centre in respect of that covert support to the Witdoeke?

MR MEYER: . . . but think so, we must just remember that this strategy 44 
came into being on the 1st December 1986 according to the document whilst 
those alleged activities if I remember correctly what you said this morning 
took place at an earlier stage so one would not necessarily bring it in line with 
what is stated here in this strategy because the one came after the other.

CHAIRPERSON: But presumably if it wasn't authorised at the point 
November 1986 when this comprehensive plan is put in place, there was no 
policy prior to that to provide that support from the, level of the State 
Security Council.

MR MEYER: I won't know from my own knowledge, one would have to go 
through the documentation and maybe you and I will be proved incorrect, but 
as far as my own knowledge is concerned, I won't know.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Meyer, thank you very much, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Are there any questions from the panel? Yasmin.

YASMINE SOOKA: Mr Meyer at Page 2, I think paragraph 4 of your own submission, 
you say the fact the term regarding deficiencies in the system in use at the 
time, the fact that so many transgressions took place over a lengthy period is 
an indication in itself that more vigilant actions was called for and with 
hindsight and looking at the embarrassing facts now emerging one can argue 
that more stringent steps should have been taken to curb the possibilities of 
transgressions taking place and of you go on to take responsibility, but I think 
the question does face us here is, given the policy of the counter revolutionary 
strategy the fact that the security establishment was so powerful, how was it, 
given what so many politicians have come forward to us to say that they didn't 
actually know or else they would have taken steps to curb that. How was it 
possible for the kind of things that did happen to take place and where do we 
actually say "Where is this gap" I think that is my question, I have heard from 
the politicians and I am sorry to be asking so many questions in one. But the 
real difficulty that faces us is where would one say the blame actually lies, 
you have got the politicians on the top, you have got the State Security 
Council, you have got the Generals, but somewhere in-between, something 
went wrong, and I think we would like your view on what it is that did go 
wrong, because we actually go, you fall short here of taking criminal 
responsibility or and I think one could actually question that, the whole 
concept of criteria, the liability of putting in to place things like Vlakplaas, 
the CCB where you must have a sense that things can go horribly wrong. 
 Now, I think that is what we would like to get an answer on.

MR MEYER: I guess nobody had the answer, maybe, and let me try to put 
forward this, from one's own view in that regard. Maybe it is just a question 
that things have developed over a period of time in such a way that in the end 
we were all part of a frame of mind, politicians, officials, people in minor 
positions even that believed that there was an enemy that had to be wiped out, 
the belief that there was not a just cause on the side of the majority of South 
Africans and the belief that for protection of the minority that was the right 
thing and the only thing to do. Maybe it was, it was in the end fear that 
dictated, that is why I refer to my submission to the fact that one had to look 
at the total spectrum both dimensions of the conflict because that in itself 
tells something about the demands and the fears that had developed at the time 
and in that context, it is probably not possible to even put at a specific point 
or a specific place the blame, it was just overall, that is the feeling that one 
had today if you look back at it. So during this period, let us say the mid-'80's 
in general, we probably have reached a stage when in any event the climate 
was of such a nature that it was not sort of the in thing to raise questions. I 
listened to the questions this morning and I was surprised in that regard, but it 
was, it was not the in thing to ask questions, if you hear on a daily basis, 
especially within government circles that people are being killed as a result of 
an act of terrorism or necklacing is taking place on a daily basis, that bombs 
are going off and things like that, you fall into a frame of mind that you stop 
asking questions because it is not the right sort of thing to do at that moment 
and I think that is the context that one has to put yourself back into for the 
sake of creating an understanding. 
 Looking back now, it is easy to make judgement and say "How the hell 
could this happen" but then it was different and I am not trying to excuse 
ourselves, I am trying to find out myself why, why could we let this happen, 
some amongst us were bold and did take the necessary action, some were as 
bold as to break out of the mould at that stage because they were driven to do 
so. All that we can say is fortunately we all, we all arrived at a point 
fortunately, we gained better insight.

YASMINE SOOKA: And I think we maybe, one needs to say that we are not sitting 
in judgement but we want to understand and for the same . . .(indistinct) the 
answer.