Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 2000-01-17

MR VISSER: Absolutely, quite correct, Chairperson, quite correct, but both Wasserman and Botha readily conceded that they may have hit some of those people and may - in fact Wasserman must have hit some of them if you look at Exhibit E.

CHAIRPERSON: Well he went to the car to do that.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes that was the intention at that stage, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Only to find that they'd already been killed.

MR VISSER: Correct, Chairperson, yes.  Chairperson, then there was a point made that and the Chair also mentioned this this morning, that the applicants were disentitled to accept on hearsay as it were, that the victims had attacked Mrs Sabelo.  Well, of course, the way in which wars are fought and in which the Security Forces acted, as well as the ANC and the other liberation movements, Chairperson, was on intelligence.  It's hardly logical or reasonable to suggest that an officer who received information from an informer, should go into the field and go and establish whether that information is correct for himself.  They had checks and balances of course, Chairperson, and you've heard evidence about that in the past.  They have had checks and balances, but what they acted on was information Chairperson and with great respect, the rule of hearsay evidence finds no application in the present situation.
	Chairperson, if I may go back somewhat, before the adjournment certain matters were raised and certain responses were given by myself and I just wish to elaborate somewhat or amend perhaps on some of the issues that were raised.  The first was the question of whether there was evidence that the other members, apart from Brian Mamela, had received training inside the country, you will recall.  Well Chairperson, we have found that passage on the record, it's at page 637, but I was wrong to say that it was Botha who gave the evidence, it was in fact Steyn and you will find that in the middle of the page where Steyn says:
"But that was the information, that Brian Mamela was a trained person and the group who was with him were locally trained, in other words they were terrorists, that was our viewpoint at that stage."
And then it goes on, but the rest isn't that important Chairperson, so that's the one point. 
	Chairperson, the other point is that Commissioner Lax, on the issue of the communication channels and the radio, put to me that his reading of the record, the evidence of Gen Steyn, was that there was an open communication, as I understand the point, between the radio in his vehicle, in Botha's vehicle in which he was and the Task Force and I think Chairperson that the reference that Commissioner Lax had in mind was at page 649, if I'm not mistaken, because that's the only reference that we could find that comes close to what was put to me.  Now 649, two thirds down the page, may I read it to you?
"

MR WEBSTER: What was that radio for? (Referring to the radio in the car.)
		GEN STEYN:  On occasion I said on the radio, without using radio terms, I simply said:  'We are driving in the direction and we notice a vehicle.'

MR WEBSTER: Why didn't you get confirmation of the whereabouts of the people who were supposed to execute the dangerous duty?"
Page 650 and I think this is the passage,
"I can't remember whether they were communicating with me, that I told them where we were.  Things happened - and it says carefully it should read quickly, I submit.  At that stage everybody is talking on the radio at that stage and we were dealing with an operation where we wanted to arrest suspect terrorists and we wanted to get hold of them some or other way"
and on reading this passage, Chairperson, I must concede that one interpretation which cannot be faulted is that Steyn was in fact in radio communication with the Task Force.  I must be honest with you, I didn't understand his evidence to mean that, because the way I understood it to be is that on the radio there were people talking, I didn't believe he was referring to the Task Force, but I readily concede that it might be, but the submission which I made in this regard Chairperson, still holds water.  It couldn't be expected of Steyn at that stage to say:  "Let's wait for the Task Force, or Breytenbach, please give me authority to act."
	Chairperson then ...

MR LAX: Mr Visser, it's hardly likely that a person who was a Lieutenant Colonel at the time, would have asked a Lieutenant for instructions.

MR VISSER: Yes, there is that obvious point as well, yes.  Chairperson and then I understand that I made a mistake this morning by saying that van Sittert was Breytenbach's Commander.  That was a clear mistake, if I said that.  van Sittert of course was a Security Branch member and he was under Steyn, not in the Task Force and I do apologise for making that mistake.
	Chairperson, it remains, in my respectful submission, only for me to address you on one other point and that's the issue of proportionality required by Section 20, sub-section 3.  Chairperson as you said yourself, this was not a frozen situation.  There was a hectic car chase.  There were members of the public present.  For some reason or other it became very important to Botha to stop the car as soon as he could.  He may have picked a bad spot to do so.  As it turned out, it was a blessing that members of the public were not injured or killed, but the fact of the matter is that is how life works, that is the reality, that's what happened, according to their evidence.  Botha says that he was convinced that he was under fire.  The irony is that, as it was pointed out by Commissioner Bosman to him, that he was really the one that started the whole thing by shooting at the rear wheel because that, in its turn, created the impression with Lembede and Wasserman that they were under fire and they thought they were under fire from the occupants of the car, so things went horribly wrong indeed and in the process...

CHAIRPERSON: In other words we can't ...(indistinct - mike not on) when he says he was convinced that he was under fire?

MR VISSER: Well, Chairperson, with respect, it makes perfect sense.  He says that he fired to stop the vehicle and he says then there was firing and he explained to you that he thought that the firing came from the car, but the kombi was directly on the other side of the Cressida from where he was, so it's perfectly acceptable that he could have thought that there was firing from the vehicle, from the Cressida, on him.  Yes, Chairperson, I don't submit that at all, that he can't be believed.  In fact the submission is that due to the confluence of circumstances, that's exactly what he thought and that's exactly what he would have thought.  The kombi is on that side of the Cressida, the Cressida is in the middle, he's on the left-hand side as he explained to you, firing comes from that direction, what is the logical inference he draws?  The logical inference he draws is it's coming from the Cressida.  Of course he was wrong and Wasserman was wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, to say he was under fire is different from saying he heard firing.

MR VISSER: Well, I can't remember ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The kombi, you understand, quite clearly he was under no firing.

MR VISSER: No sure, clearly, we know that as a fact.  I don't know what the words were ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When he says he was convinced he was under fire, if I were to look at that sentence, then I must come to the conclusion that there was no reason for him to be convinced that he was under fire.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I must apologise, those are my words.  I'm not sure what the words were that Botha used.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAX: What he in fact said, and this is my recollection and I can check it for you again, what convinced him was he saw the flashes of the firearms.

MR VISSER: Yes, on the right-hand side.