Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, de Vos.  I will continue on page 42 of our submission under the heading Operation Marion in the documents.  What we've tried to do, we tried to give an explanation as to each and every document that pertains to our clients which were handed in during the Malan trial.
The disclosure - the background of the whole Operation Marion is the following.  The disclosure of Operation Marion followed upon the leak of information to the media during 1990.  The Goldstone Commission thereafter conducted an investigation into the training of the 200 Inkatha trainees, whereupon various persons, including Generals Geldenhuys, Liebenberg, Groenewald and Pitter was charged with murder and conspiracy during 1995.
The beginning of Operation Marion.  The request received from Chief Minister Buthelezi.  Operation Marion resulted as a direct result of the fear expressed by Chief Minister Buthelezi for his own safety, as well as the safety of various other prominent leaders of Inkatha, during a briefing given by General Groenewald to Chief Minister Buthelezi on the 25th of November 1985, which was a task fulfilled by General Groenewald on behalf of the Department of Constitutional Development.  And I must stress this, he didn't appear there as a member of Military Intelligence, he went there as somebody who appears or represents the Department of Constitutional Affairs.  Now, at that meeting the Chief Minister said that he is aware of the fact that, I quote in Afrikaans,
 /"The ANC
"The ANC wanted to eliminate him personally."
Further references are, inter alia, 
"(a) the ANC mission in exile are being sent to destroy Inkatha and to assassinate me."
Now, at this point I just want to refer the Commission to one aspect pertaining to the documents that we received from the TRC.  A telex dated - or No 135, dated the 9th of December 1985 does not form part of the documents that we received.  It was, however, handed in at the Msani trial as part of Exhibit E2, page 1-10, and it was attached to this letter dated the 25th of November 1985.  Now, in this telex - let me explain it.  This telex was a telex - Chief Minister Buthelezi wrote a letter to Mr Hans Meyer, who was then the Commissioner-General for KwaZulu-Natal, and after Mr Hans - Hans Meyer or Hans Muller received this letter, he sent a copy of that telex or letter through to General Groenewald.  Now, that was after the 9th of December.  Why it's important, it gives a broad background of the feelings and emotions expressed by Chief Buthelezi in that period.  Now, in that telex it says the following.
"(b)  The ANC has declared war on me and Inkatha.  My supporters are having their homes destroyed, and they are witness to schools, offices and vital KwaZulu installations being burned down."
Further reference to the telex,
"(c)  A military threat from the ANC has been directed specifically against me, KwaZulu and Inkatha.
 /(d)  Now
(d)  Now that KwaZulu has become the target number one of those who are unleashing violence against us ..."
I am referring now to another occasion.  That was a remark made during a meeting between the Chief Minister Buthelezi with Ministers Malan, Heunis and Le Grange dated the 9th of January 1986, and this document was also not given to us as part of the TRC's documentation, but it was handed in in the Malan trial as Exhibit E6.  And then,
"(e)  We in Inkatha are burying our dead.  The ANC mission in exile has declared war on Inkatha and they have ordered my assassination."
I refer to the telex again.
"(f)  Does the SA Government really think that I can watch as my people die, because they are defenceless against the mounting onslaught against us."
I refer again to the telex.  And,
"(g)  I have frequently called for the development of a paramilitary task force in KwaZulu.  Ordinary people feel the need for protection."
Now, we submit that these requests as set out in this document of the 9th of December 1985 corresponds with the contents of a memorandum prepared by General Groenewald dated the 27th of November 1985, and spells out what is requested by Chief Minister Buthelezi, namely - and I am now summing up in military terms what he requested - (a)  Personal protection;  (b) the ability to gain information, in other words information training; 
 /(c)  the
(c) the establishment of his own defence force;  and (d) the creation of a KwaZulu security management system.
Now, after receiving these document Colonel Cor van Niekerk received instructions to make an appraisal, and it is important to note it is only an appraisal, of Chief Minister Buthelezi's needs, as well as the needs of Bishop Lekanyane.  Lekanyane was then in the Northern Transvaal, and he had similar problems at that stage.  Now, Brigadier van Niekerk prepared an appraisal dated 19th of December 1985, and he used as his source documents the letter prepared by Groenewald dated the 27th of November '85, that refers to the meeting on the 25th of November '85 between Groenewald and Buthelezi, as well as the telex that was sent by Mr Buthelezi to Mr Hans Muller.
In paragraph 3 of this document dated the 19th of December van Niekerk states the following.  I am quoting in Afrikaans from the document.
"The intensity of actions against Inkatha has compelled the latter, through Chief Minister Buthelezi himself, to direct a request at the RSA authorities that military assistance be given to him in order to protect Inkatha against the actions of the charterists."
The aim of this staff report is set out in paragraph 7.  I am quoting the Afrikaans again.
"The purpose of this staff report is to determine the nature, the extent and the modus operandi of the SADF support to Minister Buthelezi and to Bishop Lekanyane in order to make
 /recommendations
recommendations for approval in principle to the Minister of Defence."
Under the heading, "Requirements" - "Behoeftesteling," he says - I quote in Afrikaans again from the document.
"A cogent appreciation and plan can only be drawn up once the detail of what Chief Minister Buthelezi had in mind exactly had been discussed with them."
The document then sets out the needs of Chief Minister Buthelezi as envisaged by Brigadier van Niekerk.  In paragraph 15 he states - I quote from the Afrikaans again.
"The two leaders' requests cannot at all be considered by the SADF without considering the following legal aspects."
And then I quote again from the document.
"The legal competence of political, cultural or church organisations to conduct their own security services."
I then refer to paragraph 17 of this document, and the heading is the following, "Immunity Against Prosecution for Unconstitutional Paramilitary Actions."  He states,
"The three organisations under discussion have a total membership of at least seven million.  It would be practically impossible to guarantee immunity against prosecution for actions against the ANC and UDF to such a large group.  There is only one possible option regarding this need for immunity, especially as expressed by Bishop Lekanyane, and this
 /is by way
"is by way of legal adaptations, and that is to give recognition to the Makoko as protectors of the ZCC and its members.  For example, as is done for security companies, in terms of which they can perform limited policing actions."
It is important, we submit, that Chief Buthelezi did not request indemnity for the actions to be taken by Inkatha members.  This in itself is a very strong indication that his need throughout the deliberations was based on a protective capability for Inkatha.
Paragraphs 26 and 27 of this document refer to the protection element and the offensive element, but does not have any sinister connotations because it's a military document being set up by Brigadier van Niekerk, and with reference to what his instructions were.  This is the usual type of thing that a military man will do when you get that kind of information.
Paragraphs 17, 25, 34 and 45 of this same document all refer to legal aspects that should be addressed by the relevant State departments to ensure the creation of a paramilitary force was legal.  The covert nature of the training - see paragraph 21 - was to ensure that Chief Minister Buthelezi would not be regarded as a puppet of the government.  Paragraph - it's been referred to also in paragraph 20.  In paragraph 51 it is stated, and I quote from the Afrikaans,
"The elements to be trained must be equipped with their own recognisable basic uniforms, and at least pistols which cannot be traced back to the
 /military."
military."
Close the Afrikaans quote.  This clearly ... (intervention)