Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

SALMON PIENAAR: Yes there was joint operations.  For instance, if you had to put down a road block at say, at Thornton, and there was planning to be done between the Army, the Air Force and the Police, the planning broadly affecting all the people was given there, but then I go back to my own people and I give them their orders.
And the South African Defence Force, I told you, it's two different cultures, I do it in writing, I give my orders to my commanders, I brief them fully, I decide who shall receive the orders, if it's a bigger structure junior ranks will go down and give the same detail orderS below.  Yes some cooperated operations have been dealt with in the JOC.

MR NTSEBEZA: Is that in that way then that we must understand your statement which changes the statement which you made shortly after this event - 15th of May 1987 where you say,
"We three commanding officers met and had talks on a daily basis at the JOCS in which we planned the activities and took decisions in connection with matters which required our attention".

SALMON PIENAAR: You must read that in context altogether or separate.  The Trojan Horse wasn't a group-planned operation, that was just mentioned to me and it was said to me that Lt Vermeulen will take command of it and I thought well it's good enough because the aim of it was to arrest people and I was satisfied with it.  And I don't know who went back to Command, you will find that I never reported from my HQ to higher HQ and to Chief of the Army any information about this Trojan Horse incident because there were no troops part of it.  It wasn't an army operation.

MR NTSEBEZA: In fact that's the question I was going to ask next.
Is it your evidence that what happened there was that as part of your daily routine the other commanders of the other structures told you of this plan that they were intending to move into Athlone amongst other things?

SALMON PIENAAR: Correct, correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: Is it your evidence that you were not required to supply any support of whatever nature?

SALMON PIENAAR: Nothing whatsoever, but I can assure you, if they had asked I would have said no, because that's not part of Army operations.

MR NTSEBEZA: In other words you supplied neither human resources nor military resources in the form of weapons for the Trojan Horse operation?

SALMON PIENAAR: Nothing.  I want to confirm to you again.  A soldier never carries a sjambok, never carries a haelgeweer, the only thing he takes with him is his weapon, that's and R4 or R1 or AK47, whatever it may be.  No other weapons.

MR NTSEBEZA: And you were not asked to supply any assistance whatsoever as part of this project?

SALMON PIENAAR: Nothing.  Can I just put it to you this way?. In that way me and my two colleagues, who had a very good relationship, knew the cultures of each organisation and they never asked me because they knew what Defence Force actions would have been.

MR NTSEBEZA: Would your input have mattered in any way to them?
I'm thinking about a person who has got a manual on joint operations centres, for instance on crowd control, on those sort of things, was your opinion solicited at all?

SALMON PIENAAR: I think so, but when you come to the operation itself you will find that - let's take something that was discussed here today, crowd control.  There is a vast difference between the operational method of a soldier, the South African Defence Force, and the operational method of the Police.  I don't say theirs are wrong, what I say to you, we've got different ways of dealing with something like this.

MR NTSEBEZA: So - but what I'm asking is, was your opinion sought as to whether the method that they intended using in effecting these arrests, would not for instance result, as it did, in the loss of life?  In other words was your opinion ever canvassed whatsoever?

SALMON PIENAAR: Yes I think I understand your question.  My honourable answer is I never doubted in the aim that was explained to me.  I never doubted it.  It was explained to me, they wanted to make arrests, they had difficulty in their - say their normal and traditional methods, they wanted to extend to this vehicle, and I saw it, I saw the vehicle, it stood there, I saw the crates.  They told me they'll put people in the crates and they'll try to arrest.  You know examples of that is available all over South Africa.  Normally they put on tackies to run the people in, you see?  But to me it was acceptable.  I never thought that the situation that eventually it resulted in would have happened, because I never knew about the contents of the orders that were given to Lt Vermeulen.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now what do you understand by the term, daadkragitge onrus beheer?

SALMON PIENAAR: Who stated that?

MR NTSEBEZA: No no I'm not saying, but what do you understand by that?

SALMON PIENAAR: Ja I understand it.

MR NTSEBEZA: What do you understand by that as a military man?

SALMON PIENAAR: I can explain to you this way.  Sometimes I must reprimand my child, sometimes I must take him over my lap.  If I take him over my lap that's daadkragtig.  In other words your methods must be strict.  But I say again, and I told you right in the beginning, as far as I understand it, everything that happens in South Africa maintaining law and order must be within the parameters of the law itself.  So if I say daadkragtig, I would understand it as, what can the police do to contain the situation and I haven't got knowledge about that.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now you said, and you have emphasised this, that at the time you, the defence force had to act within the parameters of the legal provisions at the time.  Now you also testified that at the time of this particular incident a state of emergency had been declared.  Now I don't know whether your understanding is the same as mine as far as that goes, that in a state of emergency the Police have got wider powers of arrest than the ordinary ...(intervention)

SALMON PIENAAR: That's correct, I understand it that way.

MR NTSEBEZA: In some instances they do arrest people on suspicion of having committed a crime.

SALMON PIENAAR: That's correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: That would be over and above the detention powers that the security police had in terms the Internal Security Act.

SALMON PIENAAR: That's correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: And in some instances they would have been able to arrest people without necessarily having been able to establish whether they had or had committed a crime.  If they had reason to believe that they are connected or are suspected of committing certain crimes.

SALMON PIENAAR: I agree to that.  You remember the 90 days of Mr Vorster?

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes.

SALMON PIENAAR: That was an Act to give people the opportunity to determine are these people really whatever they may be.  Before the state of emergency we all know that that Act was changed and I think you had to release a person within 14 days.

MR NTSEBEZA: No it was even worse.  In 1985, I can tell you, from personal experience it was worse.  You could be detained for an indefinite period ...(intervention)

SALMON PIENAAR: No I won't disagree with you because I wasn't in the same position.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, but what I'm trying to get at is, I'm trying to get your own sense of whether you are able to agree with Brigadier Loedolff when he says, equipped as they were with powers under the state of emergency, ordinary methods of arrest would not avail them.  How is that possible with the sort of wide powers that the police had in a state of emergency?

SALMON PIENAAR: If I give you an answer on this it's basically a personal opinion off the cuff.

MR NTSEBEZA: Of course.