Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-09-28

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, he told me that McQuillan, that the liaison with McQuillan was known, he did not specifically say that I was involved.  He did not give me the details about what exactly leaked out and where it leaked out.
	At a later stage he said that they received information that McQuillan and George Mitchell was both connected to Zimbabwe as well as ties with Military Intelligence.

MR WESSELS: But he blamed you for that?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Well, he tried to place the blame in front of me, but we had words about that.  I felt that I did everything according to the book, the leak did not occur with me.  The way in which I met McQuillan and Mitchell's connection, I conveyed all of that to Lafras Luitingh.  I was not allowed to go around and make enquiries about where this person fits in.  That was not part of the organisation.

MR WESSELS: What was Luitingh's allegations against you, where would you then have acted in the wrong?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Sir, he told me that the whole world knew about McQuillan and the money and that I had to lay low and to suspend the operation.
	I argued with him and I said that from my side, nobody could have heard about it.  Mr Luitingh just told me "this is the story, this is the instruction, you have to withdraw".

MR WESSELS: Did he suggest that you spoke about this project to somebody?

FERDINAND BARNARD: He did not necessarily suggest it, but somebody made a mistake that led to the fact that McQuillan's contact with the Intelligence system, or our system, was blown up and that the money was made public.

MR WESSELS: Mr Luitingh thought that you were responsible for it?

FERDINAND BARNARD: He might have suggested it, yes, but he did not say it directly, it would have been ridiculous.

MR WESSELS: The Basie Smit incident to which you have referred in your Section 29 statement, is that true?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, it is not true.  I never worked on Basie Smit.  I just put it in there, it is one of the things that I did under the pressure of the Section 29 statement, to keep the police busy and to put the ball in their court.  At the same time, I wanted to give them something, because you cannot give them anything, if you do not give them something, you will never get out.
	I made many false allegations.

MR WESSELS: The following that happened was that McQuillan was arrested, is that correct?

WITNESS: I do not know if he was arrested sir, he was pulled in for interrogation.  If you look at it again, it could be that he was arrested yes, but nobody told me that he was arrested.  He was pulled in by Viktor of the Security Branch, it was March of 1989.  It was after the second excursion with the Alvaro Figarero.

MR WESSELS: Then you went and you spoke to Brig Viktor and you got McQuillan out, you felt sorry for him and you tried to assist him, is that correct?

FERDINAND BARNARD: yes.

MR WESSELS: And in the process, you compromised the organisation?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes, I did.

MR WESSELS: And Mr Luitingh accepted, was very upset about it?

FERDINAND BARNARD: In my Section 29 statement, I disclose that they found out about it in some way.  That is not true, I reported it, the whole issue around McQuillan.  He told me that I had to leave McQuillan alone, which I then did.

MR WESSELS: Did you speak to Mr Verster concerning that, at that time, about McQuillan?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, I did not.

MR WESSELS: In other words you just spoke to Luitingh?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes, as far as I can recall, only Luitingh.

MR WESSELS: And did Luitingh not tell you that Verster was upset about your actions and the fact that you compromised the organisation?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes, he did.

MR WESSELS: And that Verster was very angry about it?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes, he said there is, he is not very happy that I admitted that it could have been Special Forces.    I made a mistake there.

MR WESSELS: Yes.  And your instructions were that now you have to lay low?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did they tell you for what period of time you have to lay low?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No sir.  It happened often that if I was involved in something and they told me to lay low.

MR WESSELS: At that stage that was now the first time that you had to lay low, you were now part of the CCB?

FERDINAND BARNARD: No, I don't think it was very long, it was for a very short period of time.

MR WESSELS: Did they give you a period of time during which you had to lay low, or did they just tell you "lay low"?

FERDINAND BARNARD: They just told me to lay low.  They did not specify the time.

MR WESSELS: That was in April 1989?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I cannot recall if it was March or April or when in March or April, I cannot specify the specific time.

MR WESSELS: When were you again approached by Mr Verster or Mr Luitingh?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Sir, if it was in March, I keep on thinking it was in March, I was contacted by Mr Luitingh.  It happened that he addressed me and he mentioned to me that Mr Verster wanted to see me, and that was then the run up to the Webster incident.

MR WESSELS: Did you then see Verster and Luitingh together?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Was this in March?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I assume it was in March or April, I cannot specifically say, sir.  It is difficult to recall all the dates.

MR WESSELS: If it was early April, otherwise late March?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I cannot say that, I cannot recall.

MR WESSELS: There you then met the two together, can you tell us exactly what you can recall what happened?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I was alone with Lafras Luitingh first of all.

MR WESSELS: Where was that?

FERDINAND BARNARD: It was in Ponti, it was very high up, I think it was probably the 50th or 52nd floor.   I had a flat that myself and Lafras Luitingh used on the 35th floor, the 36th floor, that I myself rented, but I was given an instruction to go to another facility in Ponti.
	When I arrived there Lafras Luitingh was already there.  We sat down and spoke and it was there that he told me that I was going to be dealt with in a different way, that I will be applied possibly abroad, in foreign countries.

MR WESSELS: Excuse me?

FERDINAND BARNARD: That I had to be applied abroad or I was going to be applied abroad and that I will get my salary on a three-monthly basis.  While we were sitting there, Joe Verster arrived and I was then addressed concerning David Webster and Mr Jay Naidoo and that Webster was a priority target.
	It was Johannesburg, it was my region, because I knew the area very well, they were complimenting me at that stage.  Mr Luitingh didn't do a lot of the talking, Joe Verster was talking the most, and I then undertook to gather as much information as possible about them,  but on more than one opportunity Mr Verster emphasised that Mr Webster is the priority target.

MR WESSELS: What do you mean when you say priority target?

FERDINAND BARNARD: He was a priority, I had to do everything possible to get to know what his movements are and what he was doing.

MR WESSELS: Did he at that stage tell you that this person was going to fall?

FERDINAND BARNARD: I cannot recall if it was then or the second time that I met him afterwards, but I got the impression that they were very serious about him.

MR WESSELS: Let us first talk about the first meeting in the flat.  Jay Naidoo's name was mentioned and Webster's name was mentioned as people who you had to gather information on?

FERDINAND BARNARD: Yes, but they were interested in specialised information about their movements, it was specifically their movements.  For me, I experienced it as definitely information geared to their specific movements and I already had the idea about what was going to happen to them, because why would you need that type of information, you are there for the maximum disruption.

MR WESSELS: And at that first opportunity did you realise that Dr Webster had to be killed?