Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-10-14

MR KOTZE: Would you agree that in the run up to the elections of 1994 there was a strong political awareness that developed in Secunda?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Very strong, yes.

MR KOTZE: And it reached it's height immediately preceding the 27 April 1994 elections?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes that is correct.

MR KOTZE: Are you also aware that there was a system of so-called safe houses that was developed by the AWB in Secunda?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes I am aware of that.

MR KOTZE: And the idea behind the safe houses was that on election day as many as 70 000 persons from the neighbouring townships would stream into Secunda and that a civil war would then develop?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well I wasn't aware of the figure of 70 000 but I was aware of the uprisings that would come.

MR KOTZE: And were you of the opinion that a large influx would take place into Secunda and that people would cause havoc in the white neighbourhoods of Secunda?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes that is correct.

MR KOTZE: And the AWB organised quite widely identified houses and prepared emergency plans?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well I don't know about their plans and the houses identified but I was aware that they were planning.

MR KOTZE: And the idea was that should attacks take place on houses where women and children would be, the relevant safe houses had to be defended meaningfully?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes that is correct.

MR KOTZE: And the idea was that hand held weapons would not be proper defence against automatic attack weapons which at that stage was believed to be under control of the people who were expected to make the attacks?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes that is correct.

MR KOTZE: Is it also correct that according to your knowledge the City Council of Secunda as a matter of fact also issued emergency notices also contained in the bundle, which you had seen I assume, in which if I could possibly refer to it, is contained a list of emergency provisions for families or couples of people that had to be held for various periods of time contained on page 57 to 59 of the bundle?  Page 57 to 59.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I never received such a list myself so I wasn't aware of it.

MR KOTZE: My instructions were that this document was comprehensively distributed throughout Secunda.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: It is possible but as I said I never received one of these lists.

MR KOTZE: But would it be correct that you were aware that shortly before the elections there was a feeling of let's call it panic and of danger, comprehensive danger that existed and that wide plans had been made to resist an emergency situation?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes definitely.

MR KOTZE: On the 23rd April 1994, the day of this incident, the circumstances were that after you had received the telephone call you and Mr van Schalkwyk, the other applicant's commander went to Mr van Zyl - no first to Mr Holder's house, you didn't find him there and then you went to Mr van Zyl's house where you found Mr Holder as well, is that correct?
Let me make it easier, you went to look for them with Van Schalkwyk?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I can't remember accurately but yes I had, I went to look for them.

MR KOTZE: And what happened was you found Mr Holder at Mr van Zyl's house but Mr van Zyl wasn't there at the stage and you conveyed the instruction you had received to Mr Holder, is that correct?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes, it is.

MR KOTZE: My instructions were also that you and Mr van Schalkwyk at that stage told Mr Holder, who conveyed the message again to Mr van Zyl at a later stage, created the impression that firearms had to be found at some dump or an arsenal where according to Mr Holder's understanding it would be illegal arms which were in possession of freedom fighters, they believed, and that it would be a case of going to a specific place, the guards would be drunk and that the arms could be taken in a method that didn't hold a high risk.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well I don't know whether Mr van Schalkwyk told Messrs Holder and van Zyl this but I definitely did not say so.

MR KOTZE: From the beginning...[inaudible] Mr Holder and Van Zyl that guards themselves were the target?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes at that stage they very clearly understood this.

MR KOTZE: My question was whether you yourself had conveyed this to them?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: I can't remember whether I conveyed this to them myself or to Mr van Schalkwyk but that was clearly my objective.

MR KOTZE: With regard to what Mr van Schalkwyk had conveyed to Mr Holder, you can't express an opinion obviously?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: No I can't.

MR KOTZE: Mr Holder said that he had believed that a number of automatic firearms would be obtained and that hand held firearms would not be the objective of the operation because effective firearms had to be obtained?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well, the guards were armed with R4 rifles as well as with pistols in some cases and at the army base of Devon.  That ...(intervention)

MR KOTZE: I'm sorry, I'm referring to Vermeulen Street.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: At Devon Army Base or Airforce Base they had R5 firearms and 9 mm pistols.

MR KOTZE: At the stage when you arrived in Vermeulen Street Pretoria Messrs Holder and Van Zyl say that for the first time you indicated that you considered attacking the guards of the relevant Defence Force installation?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well at that stage and I still don't know  what building it was, my purpose was to rob the firearms of the guards, whether Mr van Schalkwyk had stated this to them I'm not aware but if that was the first time they became aware of this then they had gone blind into a situation they didn't know anything about.

MR KOTZE: My instructions were that at that stage they realised that you would not hesitate to attack persons and that that was actually not the purpose of their actions.

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well, I would have done anything in my ability to carry out my instruction correctly.

MR KOTZE: Would it be a correct word to say that at that stage you were fanatical?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: No I wouldn't think so.

MR KOTZE: You wouldn't think that it was wrong to describe it as such?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: No, I wouldn't think that I had been fanatical.

MR KOTZE: Messrs Holder and Van Zyl said that in Vermeulen Street at one stage you said that the guards had to be eliminated for propaganda purposes and that they had made it very clear to you that they were not prepared to go along with that kind of action?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: No, that is not correct, it's not true.

MR KOTZE: For what reason did you say that the guards in Pretoria were not attacked for their R5 attack rifles?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Well normally two guards guarded the building but that particular night there were approximately six guards and that is the reason why we decided against this.

MR KOTZE: If you say we decided, it was actually your decision, wasn't it?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: One could say that.

MR KOTZE: And that was after Mr Holder and Van Zyl had said that they believed that it would be much too risky for their liking?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes, it would have been at a great risk to me as well.

MR KOTZE: You then decided not to continue with the Vermeulen Street target and the decision was taken to return with Mr van Zyl's vehicle to Secunda?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: That is correct.

MR KOTZE: And on your way back did you remark to Messrs Holder and Van Zyl that previously you had undergone service training at Devon army base or airforce base which was well known to you?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes, that is correct.

MR KOTZE: You once again selected the target if one could state it as such?

OCHERT ANTONIE DE MEILLON: Yes.