Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 2000-09-04

CHAIRPERSON: I'm inviting all of you to comment now.  Say how much time you think you need for the adjournment?

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have a very few questions and I understand that the applicant would like to leave early.  I have a few questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, let's see if we can go ahead.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you Chairperson.
	Sir, the applicant Raymond Lalla, he's known to you?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And is it correct that he was doing the launching of Operation Butterfly, part of military or head of Military Intelligence in Swaziland?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: I don't know what his exact function was but he was in the command cadre of Swaziland which was the next layer above us.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes and did you personally meet with him in Swaziland?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes I did.  The actual dates escape my memory but I have met with him in Swaziland, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And what was discussed in relation to types of targets if anything with Mr Lalla?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Mr Lalla being involved in guerrilla warfare himself would not know the finer details of the operational activities in which we were engaged in.  His was largely to receive information about the activities of the apartheid Security Forces to advise us on the general nature of Umkhonto weSizwe operations that needed to be conducted to determine for us theoretical priorities in terms of the range of operations that should be engaged in the near and medium future and to assist in the logistical supply.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Meaning to be part of that command cadre which was headed by Tami Zulu for the purpose for the period in which we're applying for amnesty.  He was part of that command cadre, he was not in the command line.  The direct commander was Tami Zulu and as I understand it, the instructions or whatever instructions came, which were not all given to me.  Mind you, I was part of the command cadre but I played a role and it was also on a need to know.  If it was decided that I didn't need to know about certain things, these were not - information was not divulged to me.  It was not as if we sat down and had a meeting and took minutes about who said what, etc.  But what I can say is that in my discussions with Raymond Lalla, one on one and with at one stage, I think it was with Sihle and Tami Zulu.  The discussions were general, they were not specific.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.  Then during your evidence you said the immediate head internally was Sibusiso Mbongwa.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you know who was the immediate head or the internal head prior to?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: The internal head prior to that was Belgium Nduduz Sithole.  Belgium was his MK name.  His was replaced by Sihle Mbongwa and Sihle Mbongwa was the appointed commander of Operation Butterfly.  Now Operation Butterfly froze from the development of activities during period under which Belgium was in command as well.  But Belgium was not a commander of Operation Butterfly per se, as I understand it.

MS CAMBANIS: And if I can refer to it as a launching of Operation Butterfly in the Natal area, about what period did the planning for this ...(indistinct)?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: I think it's post Kabwe Conference.  So I don't know the actual date of the conference but it's post Kabwe Conference.

MS CAMBANIS: 1985.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Mid 1985.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much.  Chairperson, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS CAMBANIS

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Any questions?

MS MOHAMED: No Mr Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS MOHAMED

MR MTHIYANE: No questions Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR MTHIYANE

MR MAPOMA: Just one question.
	So you say for the Chatsworth bombing it was intended to last when there were no people present there?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Which of the bombings?

MR MAPOMA: The Chatsworth Magistrate's Court bombing?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MR MAPOMA: Why?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: One tends to, one tries to be as ethical as possible in the context of war but the Americans in the bombings of Hiroshima, if you compare that sort of situation to say the Chatsworth bombing and the issue of ethics arises and out of the ethical issue the policy of Umkhonto weSizwe was to limit damage to property and person as far as possible, qualified by the understanding that in a war situation, in a situation of civil war it is practicably impossible not to have unintended consequences.  In the Chatsworth operations of what is the Chatsworth Magistrate's is one, the previous one there as well, it was possible within the political objective to select targets in which we, being military persons, could carefully control the nature of the operation and to maximise the political message.  There was no need to injure persons or buildings.  We were part of the armed propaganda, the African National Congress, and we conducted an operation so as to heighten the efficacy of that message.  There was no need to damage beyond that which is required to state the political message.  This was a general principle.  It is possible that that principle may have been transgressed like somebody other principles in the context of war.  War is not a cold clinical business, one cannot predict outcomes.  You try within a certain concept to attain your purpose with a minimum damage.  This is standard military approach.

MR MAPOMA: Then what is your comment about those operations where civilians got injured?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Chairperson, in order to give justice or to answer that question fully would require something like five days on my side because the question itself is very general, extremely general.  What about those operations in which civilians were?  I would like to know which operations these were and we can debate the ethical side of the issue and the policy side of the issue once we've given the specific details of that particular operation.  I unfortunately can only talk about the ones in which I have been involved in and the ones for which I have applied for amnesty.

MR MAPOMA: Mr Ramlakan, I was asking you this question because you were a commander of MK and there are some operations which you took overall command over and in some operations under the umbrella of Operation Butterfly.  There are bomb blasts which took place?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MR MAPOMA: At places where civilians got injured.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: Yes.

MR MAPOMA: And now what I want to find out from you in particular is whether those operations can be described as operations which took place in line with the policy of MK.

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: I cannot speak on behalf of MK overall but what I can refer you to are the statements of Comrade Oliver Tambo, our commander-in-chief, Comrade Chris Hani, these are contained in bundle 2 in terms of the judgement and I think they accurately, I think they are around pages 100 or so.  They accurately reflect the approach of MK overall and the approach of the ANC to these operations.  Butterfly was not an ANC operation of a special type.  It followed the similar format of all the operations around that period and must be viewed from that perspective, I feel.  So what I'm saying is, in short, without wanting to appear to be evading the question, is that I bowed to higher headquarters as a military person.  They have explained the issue around that period of time and I think they have done a job of explaining it fully.  I cannot not offer anything in addition.

MR MAPOMA: Thank you.  Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  You indicated, I think, that you would ask this applicant be excused, that he had some reason why he was required urgently elsewhere?

VEJANAND INDIJI RAMLAKAN: I would appreciate that, Chairperson.