Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-06

MR RICHARD: The next question was
"With your superiors?"
And your answer was -
"With my superiors and political seniors.  I've never been censured for this operation."
Is that correct?

MR MCBRIDE: Which line is this now?

MR RICHARD: It's immediately after
"I had millions of discussions about it"

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

MR RICHARD: The next proposition put to you was
"With your superiors?"

MR MCBRIDE: That's right, I have that.

MR RICHARD: Then your answer was, and I ask you whether this is correct
"With my superiors and political seniors."

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD
"I've never been censured for this operation."

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.
MR RICHARD
"That is correct."
Now when you say -
"With my superiors and political seniors"
... who precisely did you discuss it with?

MR MCBRIDE: Well most in people in the NEC of the ANC, a different times, people I worked with, I can't remember specifically. I've discussed it with Rashid.

MR RICHARD: And your political seniors?

MR MCBRIDE: I'm talking about the NEC, that's what I'm talking about.  I'm talking about people who were with me in the Provincial Executive Committee of Gauteng, where I served as an executive member, people in parliament who were with me when I was a legislator.

MR RICHARD: Right.  Now it carries on, so I won't - I think it becomes repetitive.  You have indicated earlier that you haven't read either the African National Congress's statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, dated August 1996, or the sequel thereto, the Further Submissions.  Now as at 12th of May 1997, from our last answers about discussing it with millions of people or millions of times, is it correct for me to assume that whoever wrote the further submissions would have heard whatever you had to say?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know who wrote the Further Submissions?

MR MCBRIDE: No, Sir.

MR RICHARD: And again with Internet, I have no idea which page it's going to be on.  It's the paragraph which starts
"Gathering tactical intelligence was the responsibility of the units on the ground"

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any paragraph number or any other ...?

MR RICHARD: It's immediately above the paragraph heading which is entitled "Operational and Technical Difficulties Leading to Unintended Consequences?

JUDGE PILLAY: Is there a number there, Mr Richard?

MR RICHARD: Page 14.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it's on page 14 on the right-hand column in the middle.

MR RICHARD: I'm sorry, Chair, I don't have one with columns.

CHAIRPERSON: I've just mentioned that for other people to ...

MR RICHARD: The paragraph reads, and I'll read it slowly
"Gathering tactical intelligence was the responsibility of units on the ground.  This was exceptionally difficult, given the conditions in the country.  At times attacks which appear to be aimed at civilian targets were nothing of the sort.  The cadre may have had information to the effect that an SADF or SAP group would be present at a particular railway station or hotel or restaurant at a particular time, but due to a range of difficulties ranging from faulty intelligence to devices which malfunctioned and go off at the wrong time, an explosion occurs, apparently senselessly in a civilian area.  Then particularly, the Magoo's bar attack falls into this category, as indicated in our first submission to the TRC."
Are you aware of that paragraph, that quote?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, I've read it now.

MR RICHARD: Do you believe it's correct?

MR MCBRIDE: Do I believe it's correct?  Insofar as it wishes to offer an explanation why the effects of the legitimate, attacking a legitimate target, were not as, would have been preferred or desired.  It's correct in that sense in giving that explanation.  It doesn't comment, it tries to give an explanation why it happened.  It doesn't comment on the legitimacy of the operation of otherwise.

MR RICHARD: It places the Magoo's bar attack in a category where what was apparently a senseless attacks occurred or explosions occurred in a civilian area due to a number of factors such as faulty information, intelligence.  We know that your device did work and did go off at the right time.  Now do you believe that the Magoo's bomb attack fairly and correctly is categorised by the ANC in its report that I've just read out, into such a category?

MR MCBRIDE: Based on the information that they had at that time, it would be correct that perhaps at the time when the bomb went off, there weren't as many Security personnel in the bar as had been previously reconnoitred.  Insofar as that is concerned, yes, it's correct.

MR RICHARD: This report was published in May 1997.  So you accept that in fact the Magoo's bar fell into a category of its own, where it was apparently a senseless attack on a civilian area as a result of ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: I don't agree with that, it depends apparent to who.  Who is apparent to?  It's not apparent to me that that is the case.

MR RICHARD: Well it's clearly apparent to your own Party.  They wrote it, this is their official statement on the incident.

MR MCBRIDE: I think since you were looking at the dictionary for meanings of words we should look at what apparent means.  Because you've just read out another one to me previously, from the earlier submission, which says this attack was in line with the ANC's attempt to take the struggle out of black ghettos and into white areas.  The Why Not was targeted precisely because it was frequented by off-duty members of the Security Forces.

MR RICHARD: Yes, but now what ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: Page 60, the first submission of the ANC.

MR RICHARD: Yes, but now what had happened in-between whiles is very pertinent, the Section 29 inquiry had taken place.

MR MCBRIDE: The Section 29 inquiry was held in camera and was secret.

MR RICHARD: So do you believe that the ANC might review its attitude on reading the Section 29 record?

MR MCBRIDE: It hasn't reviewed its attitude, it says clearly its attitude on page 60.  In fact the President of the ANC in the submissions has no problem whatsoever with the operation.

MR RICHARD: You have read from a report which was published in August of the year before, this was published some months later, in response to questions by the TRC.
	Now however we then proceed to the next point.  From what I understood, both the import of that that I've just read and Mr Ismail's evidence, he accepted your recommendation and opinion about what should be done, without question and without query, is that correct?

MR MCBRIDE: In the light of all the information supplied to him.

MR RICHARD: Now you've added on that you gave him the information that you fully anticipated civilian casualties would be sustained.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes.

MR RICHARD: And you expressed your reservations about a car bomb not being specific and being imprecise in targeting what it's intended.

MR MCBRIDE: I did not say that.  The instruction given and the material given was a car bomb.

MR RICHARD: However, from the quotes in the Section 29 hearing that I've just read out, you said a car bomb is.  Is that one of the factors that you communicated to your Commander, Mr Ismail?

MR MCBRIDE: I can't remember specifically if I used those words, but that generally the affects of a car bomb were discussed.

MR RICHARD: Now I further dissect it.  He did not ask you for the name of the pub but he did fully understand the nature and exigency and description of what sort of pub it might be that would be attacked.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes.

MR RICHARD: And in his evidence earlier this week and last week he says he accepts political responsibility for what you did and supports your application for amnesty. That is correct?

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes, we all heard that.