Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-09-29

MR RICHARD: Was it not also important at that time, and we are now talking about the middle 1980's to the end of the 1980's, to obtain support from those countries, America and Britain.

CHAIRPERSON: Where are we going Mr Richard for the purposes of us making a finding here?

MR RICHARD: The point that I am making is quite simple, that in due course we will hear evidence as to why Mr McBride was prepared to accept that his acts were his own acts, not those of the organisation and it was so as to protect his organisation.  The point I am making in relation to this particular paragraph is quite simple, what he said at his trial is quite consistent with a man who understood that he should protect his organisation from the brand of terrorism.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, if my learned friend is going to quote from a document, in fairness the document should be placed before Mr Ismail for his comment, if indeed it is permissible to do so.  I suggest that perhaps, if there is any cross-examination of this sort, and if it is relevant at all, it should be directed to Mr McBride to explain why he said certain things at certain times in his life, under certain circumstances.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: And if I may appeal Mr Chairperson, I am not sure whether Mr Richard is making a statement or he is asking a question.  I was still waiting for the question that followed upon what he said.

MR RICHARD: My question was straight forward and simple.  From the import of the paragraph I read, is it not correct yes or no, that an operative would commit acts only consistent with the objectives of the ANC at the time?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, and the objectives of the ANC at the time were to strike at Security Force personnel, that is what we sought to do, that is what Mr McBride sought to do.

ADV SIGODI: Mr Richard, is it your instruction that the Magoos bar was never patronised by the Security personnel?  Is it in dispute that it was ever patronised by Security personnel?

MR RICHARD: My instructions are that on that day, there were no Security personnel amongst the injured.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, I accept that, but is it in dispute that it was ever patronised by Security personnel on a regular basis?

MR RICHARD: Chairperson, with respect, it is elementary straight and crooked thinking, for me to make the proposition that the Parade Hotel was never patronised by members of the Security, would be far too wide.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, but what the applicant is putting is that we had information from Mr McBride that this place was a place which was regularly patronised by Security personnel and if the victims are disputing that, then put that to him, is it the victims' case that this place was never patronised by Security personnel, thus making it an illegitimate target or we can hear that on that particular day, the victims are saying that there were no Security personnel, we can accept that.  But is it disputed that it was ever patronised, that the applicant or at least Mr McBride had no reasonable basis for putting the bomb there on that day?

MR RICHARD: To answer the question specifically, it is denied and disputed that Mr McBride made any honest or diligent effort to conduct a meaningful reconnaissance of the place.  It is alleged that he did what he did without heed for the consequences of innocent civilians in the pub or pubs at the time, and without applying his mind to what in fact he was doing, in other words his allegation that he did a reconnaissance upon which he could make the statement that he does, is disputed and he will be put to the proof thereof.

ADV SIGODI: Yes, but shouldn't that be put to Mr McBride then as the person who did the reconnaissance, how far can we take this matter in so far as the present applicant is concerned?

MR RICHARD: This particular witness and applicant is the one who was the Commander of the unit in which Mr McBride served, and it is he who accepted Mr McBride's say so, that it was a legitimate target.   Now, if Mr McBride had a thorough understanding of the political objectives of the armed struggle, and was compliant and supported thereof, and had applied his mind to it, the consequences of bombing a civilian target, must have been well know, that is the purpose and relevance of this line of questioning.  Does this witness accept that or not and having said that, I may ask the question, do you accept what I have just said as a summary?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, basically the information that was before Mr McBride was that that was frequented by Security Force personnel.  It was in line with the objectives of the ANC.  The political objectives of the ANC were to strike at Security Force personnel, wherever and whenever and as far as I am concerned, the ANC accepts political responsibility for it.

MR RICHARD: We will discover from Mr McBride what he did to inform himself of the situation, we have discovered from you that you knew nothing as to what he did to base his opinions.  Let's proceed.  Lower down on the page
" ...we have described the conditions under which the Kabwe Conference was held in our First Submission."
	I believe we have covered the point, but it is correct that the effect of the Kabwe Conference as stated in this document, is less emphasis was placed on avoiding civilian casualties at all costs, and I emphasise ...

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, could you - before you just dive on, indicate to us where exactly you are reading from.

CHAIRPERSON: It is the last paragraph on page 15, on the left hand side of the page, it begins "we have described the conditions..."

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: I have that, thank you.

MR RICHARD: My question is very shortly, what is the relevance of the word "less" in that paragraph, less emphasis was placed?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That means that we needn't always pay heed to avoiding civilian casualties if we were striking at Security personnel.

MR RICHARD: But emphasis was still placed on avoiding civilian casualties?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, it says "less emphasis".

MR RICHARD: In other words the factor of civilian casualties was still a factor to take into account?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, perhaps I should refer Mr Richard to the quote by the President of the ANC at the time, comrade O.R. Tambo and as he put it, I will summarise and I quote
"... I will summarise the position taken by the Conference in these terms, that the struggle must be intensified at all costs.  Over the past nine to ten months at least, at the very least, there have been many soft targets hit by the enemy, nearly 500 people have now died in that period, massacred, shot down, killed secretly.  All these were very, very soft targets, they belonged to the sphere of the intensification of the struggle.  What we have seen in places like the Eastern Cape is what escalation means for everybody.  The distinction between hard and soft targets, is going to disappear in an intensified conflict in an escalating conflict."
	That is what we are talking about.  We are talking about atrocities committed by the regime and the ANC's position that they were going to strike back.

MR RICHARD: What you have just said, did not flow from any question I asked, but I would understand you to mean that ...

MR BERGER: Chairperson, with respect, my learned friend asked a specific question about soft targets, Mr Ismail answered that question directly.

MR RICHARD: My question in reply to what you have just said to me, does that imply it was justified for the ANC to hit civilian soft targets?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: The ANC accepted that there would be civilian casualties as it struck against the racist Forces of the apartheid regime.

MR RICHARD: And yesterday to remind you, we went through various hypothetical situations, do we need to go through it again?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Not in the way you put them, I don't see what the relevance of it was.