Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-05-06

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: If I may refer you Mr Chairperson to the second submission, 2.1 on page 65, and I will read the sections on page 65 from the third paragraph onwards.  "In an interview with Oliver Tambo published on the 6th of July 1983 in the Guardian the issue of civilian casualties was dealt with".
and I quote -
"When we blew up the Sasol tanks where thousands of people were working the attack was carried out in such a way that no-one was injured.  Yet on the other hand our people were being captured, tortured and mercilessly interrogated.  We have fought back when attacked and there have been many clashes with the Police, and only the Police.  Lately the regime has become almost desperate. There have been assassinations of our people.
		In 1979 they tried to kill hundreds of our people at a military school in Angola".
	Referring to the Matola raid, the Maseru raid and the South African Air Force bombing of Maputo Oliver Tambo added -
"This means the conflict is escalating.  We always thought it was going to be a bitter, brutal, viscous struggle, almost as a necessary precondition for the liberation of South Africa.  We have to go through that.  The conflict is reaching new levels.  There is to be much destruction, much suffering and a lot of bloodshed which will not be confined to South Africa.
		In 1980 we signed the Geneva Protocols and said that if we captured any enemy soldiers we would treat them as prisoners of war.  The fact is we are not against civilians.  We do not include them in our definition of the enemy.  The ANC was non-violent for a whole decade in the face of violence against African civilians.  What do we mean by civilians?  It really means "white" civilians.  No-one refers to Africans as civilians and they have been victims of shootings all the time, even children.  They have not been killed in the hundreds."

CHAIRPERSON: "have been killed"

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Sorry
"They have been killed in their hundreds, yet the word has not been used in all these years.  Now it is being used especially after the Pretoria South African Air Force bomb.
		But implicit in the practice of the South African regime is that when you shoot an African you are not killing a civilian.  We don't want to kill civilians but some will be hit, quite incidentally and regrettably.  I am sure we are going to lose many civilians and many innocent people as happens in any violent situation".
	I quote -
"We do not boast about it in the way the South African regime boasts about its killings.  I think South Africa is going to be a very happy country one day and we will avoid all avoidable loss of life but harsh as this sounds we cannot allow the system to persist for the sake of saving a few lives.  It is not so harsh when one considers how many lives apartheid has destroyed."
	Chairperson those are the words of our President Tambo at the time, and that was policy.

MR VISSER: The Church Street bomb was in 1983 on the 20th of May, the quote that you just read to us at page 65 was of an interview with O R Tambo which was published on the 6th of August which is after the Church Street bomb.  Is there any significance in the fact that where Tambo deals with civilian casualties he refers to the Sasol tanks but he doesn't refer to the Church Street bomb?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson President Tambo here is talking clearly about the justification for the Air Force Headquarters attack.

MR VISSER: Where does that appear from?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Perhaps I should read the sections again.

MR VISSER: No, no, no please don't.  Just show us where that appears from, where is the Church Street bomb mentioned here?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: In the middle of the top of page 65 on the right-hand column.

CHAIRPERSON: It's referred to as SAAF/HQ Bomb, Pretoria(SAAF/HQ Bomb).  That must be the Church Street bomb.

MR VISSER: Yes indeed.  I withdraw that question Mr Chairman.
	You gave evidence to say that, and please stop me if I am wrong, you and Mr Joe Slovo I think it was, in December 1982 discussed an attack on enemy personnel, that's the question.  Is there an answer?

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, did you and Joe Slovo during 1982 discuss attacking enemy personnel?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: In or around that time, yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Yes.  Was this discussed with anyone else?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson I had also stated yesterday or the day before that Mr Joe Slovo had also reported to the President and that the President had given his explicit authority for this operation to go ahead.

MR VISSER: I remember that evidence.  I just wanted to know now whether apart from yourself and Mr Joe Slovo the people who discussed this issue, whether there were other people involved, but I take your answer to be no.  Only there was later a discussion with the President and he gave a mandate.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes but there were discussions later with the people that worked with me in terms of carrying out that operation.

MR VISSER: Referring to whom?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well firstly to Mr Mnisi when we were discussing how to carry out the operation.  And also where the operatives will carry out the operation.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes.  Whose decision was it to target that particular building in Church Street?

MR VISSER: Finally mine.

MR VISSER: Yours.  Was it also your suggestion in the first place?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No that came out of various reconnaissance.  Mr Shongwe and Mr Maseko were tasked to check out such targets.  They came back and reported that that was a possible target.  That was then taken back to Mr Slovo and then it was agreed upon that we should go ahead.

MR VISSER: You gave evidence to the effect that the ANC was very set upon proper reconnaissance and to attempt not to endanger civilian lives and you gave us the example of the Mobil Oil refinery which you in fact yourself reconnoitred.  Was that done in the case of the Church Street bomb?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes.  As I had indicated in my earlier evidence that it indicated that there was an overwhelmingly large number of military personnel outside the Air Force Headquarters at the time from 4:15 onwards they began assembling, waiting for busses and that that was a suitable time to attack.

MR VISSER: Did you, from the reports that you received, were you able to judge or did you know from your own knowledge, that in virtually the centre of town at that time of the afternoon there would be many civilians - in fact you've already said so.  You accepted that it was inevitable that civilians would be affected.
	Perhaps I should ask you this.  Did the reports that you received tell you that there were shops etc on the ground floor of that building?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes they did, but the report indicated that it was a military target and Air Force Headquarters.  It also indicated that the overwhelming number of people that were there, or would be there around that time would be military personnel waiting for their buses.

MR VISSER: Yes.  And just on that point the fact that this was an administrative office of the Air Force that made no difference to your perception that it was a military target?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, any target that was military, any target that was a government installation which was part of the State infrastructure were deemed legitimate targets.

MR VISSER: The fact that by and large the personnel who would be affected, who worked for the Air Force in that building were administrative personnel made no difference to your decision that it was a military target?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson an Air Force Headquarters carries senior military personnel.  Those people there were all part of the military machine.  A soldier is a soldier.  The soldiers were there to protect that apartheid state.  All soldiers were part of the target.