Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 703.  Paragraph 4.2 of the submission reads as follows
"Judging the actions of the South African Defence Force during the conflict, one must keep in mind that it was a service organisation of the State and that it had to act in support of the State and the constitution of the day, just as the South African National Defence Force is obliged to do today."
Do you agree with that statement?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: What is your personal experience of the international security fraternity in relation to this statement?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: All Defence Forces served the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: Did you at any stage discuss this matter with members of other Defence Forces, especially relating to the conduct of the South African Defence Force during this particular period?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Not during the relevant period because I didn't have the opportunity, but in later years, yes.  And as I've already said, all Defence Forces support the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to refer you to page 704, paragraph 4.3.  It reads
"Against this background members of the South Africa Defence Force gave, interpreted and carried out their orders."
What is your view of the matter?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, the background to which reference is made turns on the revolutionary war in South Africa and against that background members of the South African Defence Force carried out orders and also interpreted orders as far as possible.  This was part of the counter-revolutionary war, as part of the contingency planning for that war and for operations.

MR KNOETZE: You refer to interpret, the interpretation of certain orders, can one then infer from that that what you mean is that all instructions given were not 100% clear, they weren't all spelt out completely but it was expected from commanding officers like yourself to sometimes interpret the guidelines and then act accordingly?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.  Most of the instructions which we received were in the form of guidelines, specifically because a revolutionary war is such a fluid situation and it's without precedent.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 705, a portion of paragraph 4.4. reads
"Members of the South African Defence Force and the MK are already working shoulder to shoulder as comrades in arms towards to the success of the South African National Defence Force, the past forgotten."
Can you comment on that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  I think that is not only unique in our situation, you see that in conflict situations in other parts of the world where opposing forces afterwards join hands and work together, they participate in certain structures and participate in trying to obtain peace.  And also in our case in this country that was the situation.

MR KNOETZE: And do you regard yourself as part of the group who after the war was prepared to make peace?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  I also had the privilege, during the preliminary talks with ANC members, to be part of that, participate in that.

MR KNOETZE: I read the last portion of the paragraph
"This I maintain originates solely from battle experience and a mutual understanding of the circumstances during the conflict.  You who were not soldiers can gain such insight only by listening closely and objectively, and by trying to understand what the South African Defence Force and MK explain to you.  Should you not do so, you will fail both to arrive at the truth and to achieve reconciliation."
Do you endorse that view?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to ask you, were you ever personally a target of terror attacks or were you never personally exposed to that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: On two occasions, well the first one was in Uitenhage during the time that I was Commanding Officer in Eastern Province Command and I was trapped on a bridge by a bridge by a crowd of people.  Fortunately nothing happened.
	The second occasion was when I was at headquarters I was the Commanding Officer of Witwatersrand Command and a bomb exploded there and it destroyed the entire headquarters.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, the Committee can accept that if you say you're part of trying to make peace you are not doing so from your easy chair, you're doing so from experience?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 707, paragraph 6.1 reads
"It is of fundamental importance to keep in mind that the South African Defence Force was a creature of statute and as such bound by the provisions of the Defence Act, Act 44 of 1957.  It was also a well disciplined professional organisation and not above the law and apolitical."
Would you like to comment on that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.  I would just like to support that again.

MR KNOETZE: Especially the part about the apolitical nature of it?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.  That is why we said we serve the government of the day.

MR KNOETZE: And 6.2
"The South African Defence Force as an organisation  had a decentralised command structure.  This meant that authority and the responsibility in the execution and functioning of the South African Defence Force was delegated.  This is a universally accepted philosophy of management and applied worldwide by military forces."
Do you endorse that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I do.  As commanding officer I had a certain delegated competence, which was also indicated in my document referred to before.  I had certain authority to act and I had units under my command to be able to take such action.  I was able to make my own evaluations and within the guidelines which I received I could authorise actions accordingly.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 708, 6.3
"The South African Defence Force played an important role in the combatting of the revolutionary onslaught on the Republic of South Africa.  The utilisation of the South African Defence Force in support of the South African Police is a procedure that is not limited to the Republic of South Africa, it is an internationally recognised procedure and principle to utilise a Defence Force in the support of the police in combatting unrest."
Could you please explain that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  Even in modern warfare it is the practice that the police and the Police Service of a particular State is utilised and when the situation becomes so bad that they can't manage, then the Defence Force will be called in support the police, and is exactly what happened in South Africa.

MR KNOETZE: In other words, what you're saying is that the Defence Force was placed in the position that they had to support the South African Police?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Correct.
...(end of tape)

MR KNOETZE: ... portion of paragraph 6.6
"... 1985, the government was forced to initially employ the South African Defence Force in service in addition to the South African Police.  In other words, the territory of the Republic of South Africa was declared an operational area for the South African Defence Force."
That confirms what you've just said?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: I beg your pardon, apparently I misread the word "internally", Mr Chairman.
	Then on page 710, paragraph 7.3:
"The military community thus already realised the necessity for normalising internal relationships and took the lead in creating such a situation within its area of responsibility."
Would you like to comment on that?