Amnesty Hearings — White River — 2000-05-02

MR BERGER: Then Annexure C is at page 145, it's also an extract from the ANC Submissions.  Annexure D is at page 144, Annexure E is at page 146, F is at 137, G is at 148.  Then you have to go back a bit because Annexure H is at 139, I is at 135, J is at 136, and K is at 142 and Annexure L never found its way into the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: And what is the, what document is that?

MR BERGER: It's an extract from an argument at a previous hearing of the Amnesty Committee and all it, the only relevance of it is a paragraph that Mr Landman, who was then appearing, said - he said the following:  	"Mr Chairman, you also recall that we placed on record that Gen Nyanda, the person who gave the orders, does not intend to contradict any of the evidence which was given and indeed, I'm instructed to inform you that he confirms that that is indeed the correct position, that the orders emanated from himself."
It's not something that relates to the matters under discussion at this amnesty hearing at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the sum total of the annexures?

MR BERGER: Yes, that is so.  Bearing that in mind, if I could then lead General Nyanda?

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.  Thank you Mr Berger, we've noted all of that.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll have to stay with the order as it is now.  Yes.

MR BERGER: General Nyanda, you have made an application for amnesty.  If you would turn to the bundle, pages 4 through to 10, do you confirm that that is a copy of your amnesty application?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I do.

MR BERGER: In addition to that, General, you furnished further particulars to the Amnesty Committee after being requested to do so, those further particulars are contained in a document which runs from page 13 through to 20, page 20 of the bundle, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: And you heard what I said to the Chairperson about pages being in the incorrect order and annexures being found at other places.  Do you confirm that the annexures that I referred to are indeed the annexures to your further particulars?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I confirm.

MR BERGER: Now, General, this amnesty hearing concerns only the landmine campaign which was conducted in the former Eastern Transvaal and to a lesser extent on the Witwatersrand from the end of 1985 onwards.  So I'd like to limit your evidence here to that particular campaign.  in 1985 when the campaign began, where were you stationed?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I was stationed in Swaziland.

MR BERGER: And what was your position there?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well, I'd just been appointed to command a special project called ...(indistinct - ethnic), which was responsible for the landmine campaigning.

MR BERGER: Now "kletshwayo" was a special project that fell under the military head quarters of Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: That's correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: ;   Did it have anything to do with Special Operations or was it distinct in itself from what we know as Special Operations?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well, it was a special operation but it was not part of Special Operations of Umkhonto weSizwe or the ANC, Chairman.

MR BERGER: I forgot at the beginning, General, to get you to give your formal title.  Presently you are the Chief of the South African National Defence Force, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is correct.

MR BERGER: What was the thinking, if you know, in 1985 behind the establishment of "Kletshwayo"?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I think the thinking was that the areas around the borders of the country were used by the South African Defence Force and the South African Police to patrol as well as accost and arrest Cadres of the African National Congress who used these routes to infiltrate into the country.  The areas around the borders were also used by farmers who were part of the network of the Security establishment in the country, to assist the police to patrol and to report all the activities and movements through those areas, so as far as our thinking was concerned, those farmers constituted part of the Security network of the regime of that time, to frustrate our endeavours to intensify our military campaign.  The thinking was then that we should start this campaign in order to try to advance our struggle.

MR BERGER: Would I be correct if I said that it would appear that the motive was twofold in attacking the farmers on that border area?  The one was because they themselves were now part of the military establishment, but secondly also to enable routes to be opened to infiltrate cadres into the country.

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well, we used those routes, but they were there, the routes had been opened by us, but because of the strategy of the regime at that time, to mobilise the farmers as well to try to frustrate our attempts to move either men or material into the country, they became part of the Security, or we regarded them as part of the Security network, these farmers, because they frustrated us from attempts to infiltrate into the country.

MR BERGER: Now, you were the Commander of "Kletshwayo", is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is correct.

MR BERGER: And you had with you a certain Command structure, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: Can you recall the people who were with you on that command structure?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: One of them was Brigadier-General Shoke, another Theopholus ...(indistinct), we used to call him Viva, he is late.  If I recall, another was Molefe, we used to call him Commissar, he is also late.  Those that I can recall immediately, but there may have been more.

MR BERGER: Who was the person on that structure who had contact with the units, the cadres?  For example, did you have contact with the unit?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Some of them yes, but the person who had contact who was in charge of briefing people was Theopholus Dlodlo, the Viva that I mentioned, he was the Operations Chief.

MR BERGER: Can you explain to the Committee how you would go about sanctioning a particular operation?  What was the general modus operandi at the time?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: The modus operandi was that we used mainly people who were familiar with the area in case people who were not familiar with the area, they would be briefed by their Commanders to go and carry out reconnaissance on a specific target, come back, report and then go and carry out the operation, lay the landmine, or landmines, whichever the case might have been.  In most instances we used people who were familiar with the area, who knew the surroundings, who would then go and reconnoitre the area and then lay the landmines, after carrying out the reconnaissance.

MR BERGER: The landmines often get referred to in various documents as the hardware.  Are you familiar with that term?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I am, Chairman.

MR BERGER: Did it happen that the hardware would be infiltrated into the country at the same time that a particular cadre was doing reconnaissance, or was it already there, or was it a mixture of the two?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It was a mixture of the two.  Sometimes it would be ahead of the person so that after carrying out the reconnaissance he would know where to find his hardware which we would have infiltrated before, or it could follow the reconnaissance of the target by the operative.

MR BERGER: What sort of landmines were these?  How could they have been set off?  What sort of weight or pressure would have been required to set them off?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well, at least, I think 850 kilogrammes of weight.  These were Russian-made mines which could be triggered by heavy vehicles, I think over 1000 kilogrammes.

MR BERGER: What I'm really asking is, could these landmines have been triggered by individuals walking over them?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: No, that would not be possible.

MR BERGER: And was there a reason why these particular landmines were used?