Amnesty Hearings — Durban — UNKNOWN

MR DE JAGER: ---   That's correct, on instructions I did that.  That's why I was entitled to take the second in command on the explosives desk in headquarters, which I couldn't have taken out of my own.  It must have been arranged between the section heads and the approval of General Johan Coetzee.  I was accompanied by him because he would have then prepared all the bombs.  So it was done on instructions, and I was to identify targets and then blow up the places.  That's correct, I planned it.

MR DE JAGER: Now at this stage, the 19th of February, have you already identified targets?

WITNESS:   We have, but it took a long time because the people were very careful, the ANC cadres, when leaving home and going back to home, in shaking off any possible tailing.  But Brigadier Skoon got uneasy about this lapse of time and then called me back, and I had serious reservations about leaving the askaris alone in Swaziland, and I told him exactly just that.

MR DE JAGER: But did they have any explosives with them in order to bomb targets or do anything with explosives?

WITNESS:   No, they did not have explosives with them.  It was left -we first pitched camp at the counter insurgency base at Oshoek, which is about a kilometre away on the mountain, but it was very rainy those days - during those times, so we locked up the explosives in the Oshoek Border Post vault, and Paul van Dyk - at the time in exile when I wrote that report I wasn't sure where Paul van Dyk at the time was, whether he was already at Vlakplaas or still at Oshoek, but he was for sure still at Oshoek.  We locked all the explosives there and then went to Smoky Mountain

MR DE JAGER: /Village,

MR DE JAGER: Village, where I knew the owner quite well, Doug Goldman, and he gave us a bungalow to sleep in free, and that is where the askaris came to meet me twice a day.

MR DE JAGER: And before leaving Oshoek did they report to you that they've identified Pillay?

WITNESS:   Before I left Swaziland ... (intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Going back to Pretoria for the two days?

WITNESS:   I think they did, yes, but I said them to leave it, leave everything until all targets have been identified and a plan was intact.  Not to do anything at all.

MR DE JAGER: And they acted contrary to your instructions.

WITNESS:  Absolutely, Mr Chairman.

MR DE JAGER: Did ever afterwards or before acted contrary to your instructions?

WITNESS:   Well, they weren't the best behaved guys we've had.  They all smoked and all drank heavily, and everyone that smoked smoked - also smoked dagga.

MR DE JAGER: You were not smoking at that stage?

WITNESS:   No, I was not smoking.  But drinking a lot, I was drinking a lot.

MR DE JAGER: Ja.

WITNESS:   And so they were a rough crowd.  Two of them, for instance, Bobby Madiba shot his girlfriend after a quarrel ... (intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Yes, but were they - so in this operation they acted contrary to your instructions in abducting Mr Pillay.

WITNESS:   Absolutely.

MR DE JAGER: What steps were taken against them for acting contrary to orders?

WITNESS:   Nothing at all I did to them.  There was no disciplinary steps taken against them.  We just knew out of the experience that in future not to ever to allow it again, because you have to keep your finger on the pulse with them.  They on several occasions got out of

MR DE JAGER: /hand.

MR DE JAGER: hand.

CHAIRPERSON: May I ask you a question or two?  I get the impression that the identification or identifying of targets was left to askaris in Swaziland.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   That's correct, as far as ANC, because they knew the ANC cadres, they could follow them, they could watch which houses they go into, and then inform us exactly the set up.

CHAIRPERSON: And so you would rely on the information that was given to you by a rough lot of people who smoked dagga, who drank, and lived the way ruffians lived.

WITNESS:   Absolutely.

CHAIRPERSON: And innocent people whom they identified would be targets for murder.

WITNESS:   Well, the possibility that it would have been innocent people would have been very small.  I mean they wouldn't just have come up and identified wrong people, Mr Chairman, but it could happen.

CHAIRPERSON: But how much reliance could you place on rough motley of people like this?

WITNESS:   Well, as much as Vlakplaas allowed us to do in our operations, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because there was no senior person who would make an assessment of the evidence that they would produce and say, "Well, now reliance is placed on this because we've verified facts."

WITNESS:   Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The askaris identify people, they come to you, and they are given the go ahead.

WITNESS:   That's correct.  It could be fairly well verified by Paul van Dyk, who worked Swaziland, and he could assess that quite closely because he had quite a good knowledge of the file-carrying information about the ANC cadres in Swaziland.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  You're not suggesting that in this case that

CHAIRPERSON: /happened.

CHAIRPERSON: happened.

WITNESS:   No, because ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Because here the askaris took it upon themselves to identify target and arrest Pillay.

WITNESS:   We asked them to identify targets.  They reported twice a day.  Paul van Dyk stayed with me, in that flat with me and Paul Hattingh, and they then took it on their after identifying the whereabouts of Joe Pillay.  That is what happened, Mr Chairman.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: Mr Coetzee, maybe we don't understand you, what you mean by identifying targets.  By identifying targets do you mean simply because they would have possibly known them before, and worked with them, they would just point them out and say, "There is the man you are looking for," or are you saying that they would provide the information as to the activities of the individual concerned, and then you would gather the information from the askaris and then make up your mind on the information you gather from the askaris, evaluate that information, and then decide as to whether that person is a proper candidate for elimination?

WITNESS:   No, no.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: You understand what I mean?

WITNESS:   I understand.  Your first assessment is correct, where they had to track down and trace and identify ANC cadres that they worked with and lived with in exile, and then follow them to their place of home - of house where they stayed, and then make sure that is the place that they sleep, how many other ANC cadres lives in that house, comes out and go there.  So it was quite a long period of observation that would have had to take place before a final decision on the blowing of residences or houses could be decided on.

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: But does that mean, Mr Coetzee, that you would be

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: /having the

BERNARD MAKGABO NGOEPE: having the Security Police - maybe at their head office in Pretoria they would be having a file on Mr X, but they don't know who that Mr X is, they just have some information about him, and about his activities and all the things that Mr X does, and then they would then evaluate the reports about Mr X and say, "Well, he's a target for elimination," and then bring in the askaris to say, "We know that person lives in Swaziland.  You go and identify him."