Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: And Brigadier Van Niekerk of DST who attended the meeting made the following entry in his diary -

MR LYSTER: "Must we rather not go for lower level targets that make less waves"

MR LYSTER: or less ripples and at the same meeting it was stated that Marion members should only talk to Security Branch members and again one must ask if they were simply engaged in bona fide protective actions, why shouldn't they normally deal with the uniform and detective branch members?  Why only the Security Branch?  And if I just pause briefly on the question of targets.  Presumably the claim will be made that this simply relates to the connection of Intelligence.  Well, if it does, then it makes no sense,

MR LYSTER: /because

MR LYSTER: 3B because why would the collection of intelligence of lower level targets make less waves?  It was all secret anyway.  And, of course, before target selection and actions carried out, you needed to collect intelligence in any event and I would argue that the targets referred to there were targets in the normal sense, targets for elimination.  Under the heading, "Offensive actions and hit squads".  On the 31st of October 1989 two senior officers, Colonels Van Niekerk and Van den Berg met with Buthelezi and a report of this meeting was produced in November 1989 and according to a paragraph in this meeting -

MR LYSTER: "The Chief Minister expressed his concern over the situation in Mpumalanga and the fact that he was losing the 'armed struggle'.  He referred to the 'cell'- idea for offensive action which did not get off the ground".

MR LYSTER: Now you will recall my earlier references to the security problems and one way of preventing these security problems was to carry out offensive actions in small offensive groups or small cells and here that particular theme plays itself out where Buthelezi reportedly says, "Well, this was an idea that was raised for a way of carrying out offensive actions without incurring the security problems" and he wants this particular proposal implemented.  And at the same meeting, according to another document drawn up on the 2nd of May 1990, Buthelezi reportedly expressed concern that he was -

MR LYSTER: "... losing the armed struggle and in that regard emphasised that 'offensive steps' were still a necessity;  meaning

MR LYSTER: /"the

MR LYSTER: 3B      "the deployment of 'hit squads'".

MR LYSTER: I'll come back to that briefly.  There's also a further reference where M Z Khumalo is reported as saying that at the very least Buthelezi still required -

MR LYSTER: "... cells which can take out undesirable members".

MR LYSTER: Now here is the reference to offensive steps in its unadulterated form, "offensive steps" being hit squads and one is at a loss to see how can interpret "offensive steps" in an innocent light when such references are there in such blunt and obvious form.  Attached to that particular document was a memorandum titled, "Subject for discussion" and one of the subjects was, I quote -

MR LYSTER: "Offensive capability (cells) for Inkatha:  In Oct 89 CM Buthelezi asked that Int Div reconsider the training of offensive cells for Inkatha seeing that an urgent requirement for these exists".

MR LYSTER: So just to recap the story here, the military are getting cold feet.  They are withdrawing support for offensive actions;  they still have to deliberate on whether to, in fact, take forward this idea for carrying out offensive actions through these offensive cells.  So Buthelezi's request was taken to Malan who maintained, and I quote -

MR LYSTER: "... that the violent option was a difficult matter".

MR LYSTER: The security risks were simply too high and to bring this home to Buthelezi, it was decided to take the South African Police Detective Branch Head, General Basie Smit, to talk to him.  Malan's explanation was put to Buthelezi by Van Tonder at a meeting with him held on 9th May 1989

MR LYSTER: /sorry,

MR LYSTER: 3B sorry, 1990.  Now, Chairperson, these passages that I have been referring to, they speak for themselves.  They set out the essential nature of offensive actions in very crisp terms and needless to say, the documents do not reflect a crisis or surprise from military officers, from the senior people there, following the reported remarks of Buthelezi and if indeed the military felt that they had been duped here, they had supplied a purely protective lawful force to Inkatha, then surely they would have been alarmed.  They would have called for an immediate investigation ... [break in recording]

MR LYSTER: (END OF CASSETTE NO 3B)

MR LYSTER: (START OF CASSETTE NO 4A)

MR LYSTER: /[Break in recording]

MR LYSTER: 4A [Break in recording] ... The person to whom it was supplied is equating offensive steps with hit squad activity it would have produced a crisis of calamitous proportions and it didn't, and indeed, it took some months for them to deliberate on the particular request around the cells.  It took them months to get back to Buthelezi and they tried to sweeten the pill, so to speak.  They said they would take along Basie Smit.  Presumably he would explain why it was difficult to cover up each and every action carried out by the offensive element.  It is hardly surprising that the military have no way of explaining away such crisp references.  It says volumes about the attempts to portray the taking of offensive steps as protective in nature and, under the circumstances, the description of the offensive capacity in the much-vaunted 14th February 1986 document, which talked about preventing attacks on Inkatha members, that document could only have been referring to actions in an initiative-taking or preemptive manner.  Seen in that light, the documents are not contradictory and the same goes for the 16th October document, dealing with Buthelezi's concerns around the paying of legal costs.  If we were to interpret that particular document as Buthelezi would never authorise or tolerate anything unlawful, how do we reconcile that document with this document?  It simply cannot be reconciled.   Therefore, I believe it that can only be read as Buthelezi not wanting to be seen or not wanting to deal with the repercussions of paying the legal fees of those committing unlawful actions, and I don't believe the interpretation can be taken any further than that.  And if one looks briefly at the nature

MR LYSTER: /of offensive