Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE JAGER: Yes, I am at the right point now.
"The Chairman says that the proposed third force should be supplementary to other security forces so that the security forces do not get underfoot."
I then skip (c) and (d), Mr Chairman, which obviously is available for your scrutiny.
"(e)  the third force should be moveable, with a well-trained capability to effectively counter terrorism."
Now, Mr Chairman, that is very simple Afrikaans.  They
 /intended
intended to go for terrorists and to wipe them out.  There is definitely no intention of employing this against the normal citizen population.  But I will develop that further, because in fact this - I just say in the passing, because if one goes on you see what the intention really is when you look at the documents.
The abovementioned is tendered to illustrate - that is now by Mr Varney - the State President and the State Security Council's unlawful motives.  By giving this order our client was prepared to act unlawful - sorry, Mr Chairman, by giving this order it is now indicated that the intention of our client was to act unlawfully.  He purportedly sanctioned the creation of a hit squad, and was thus involved in, and accountable for, the ensuing violence in Natal.  One should pause here to note that since the early 90s the word "third force," in this country at least, has become synonymous to the other sinister colloquial term, ie, a hit squad.
Perceptually, by the selective quotation of these passages from a minute of the State Security Council, held under the chairmanship of our client, the public must, even through this Commission - although I believe you do not intend that - by necessity gain the impression that this was precisely what the State President ordered on that day.  That would have been my first impression if I was not fully acquainted with all the facts, like people like yourselves is supposed to be, and which I think you will still have a long way to get to.
We say that selective transparency is worse than total secrecy.  To put this before the public without giving the fully history of the aims, content and final
 /result of
result of the so-called third force envisaged in this minute is unfair, and could even have misled this Commission.  Nothing new is contained in these particular State Security Council minutes, especially not as far as the intention to wipe out terrorists is concerned.  This is consistent with the attitude of the Botha government towards terrorism and terrorists throughout its tenure.  Mr Botha and other members of his Cabinet repeatedly, both on public platforms and in Parliament, stated that terrorists would be wiped out wherever they were found.  No reference is made to innocent members of the public, or in regard to the assassination of political opponents, especially not civil political opponents.
May I remind you that your own deputy chairman, Dr Boraine, was a Member of Parliament for many a year, and present during these debates where this was said by National Party politicians.  
These viewpoints were widely published, both in the printed and electronic media.  To elevate the minutes of the State Security Council on this specific occasion and in this respect to that of a great discovery of the true intentions of the Botha government is simply ludicrous.  But I pause here to say it is obviously done so because it is found in conjunction with the words, "derde mag," third force, which, ie, then is hit squad, and that makes it all so simple, Mr Chairman.
Now, I am now going to take you through the history of what happened with this so-called third force.  Before I do that what should immediately be added hereto as a result of the decision taken by the State Security Council as aforesaid, a thorough research was done, by structures
 /to which
to which I will refer hereinafter.  This is clear from the documentation, which are all available for your inspection.  A bona fide research in respect of - and I wish to stress, Mr Chairman, because it is - the papers are full of it in those two files, and also in the State Security Council minutes - it was a research in respect of a lawful, openly-structured, uniformed third force, which we find in many other countries, and which was intended to act against terrorism.  That was the research that was being conducted, not the one Mr Varney is looking at.
It was the clear intention of our client that the creation of such force would enable the police to continue with their normal policing duties, on the one hand, and the military to be employed only in true military combat and supportive roles.  It is important to note that General Malan informed the Court during the Malan trial, and also did so during his appearance before this Commission, that he was a staunch opponent to this concept.  
The sequence of events and salient features concerned the assumed creation of this supposedly sinister third force were the following.  During 1985, as a result of increasing intensity in the onslaught against the State, various alternatives to resist the onslaught were investigated, and were debated even in public.  A good example of this is an article by Otto Krause in the newspaper, Die Vaderland, of the 22nd of October 1985, in which the establishment of a special unrest police force was debated.  In a meeting - that's a State Security Council meeting with the number 18/85, dated the 4th of November 1985, a decision was taken to investigate the
 /possibility
possibility of the creation of such a third force.  On the 4th of December 1985 Brigadier M S Verster, in his capacity as the secretary of the State Security Council, required the Chief of the Defence Force to task the military attaches to collect information of such third forces in other countries all over the world.  This was done.
We may pause here to indicate that our client's personal instructions to us are that he first became aware of the efficacy and the advantages of such a third force when Mr Franz Joseph Strauss introduced him to the concept of the Bunders Grensch Schutz(?), which is the border police in Germany, and is a typical third force, albeit lawful and uniformed. 
Mr Adrian Vlok was then - sorry, Mr Chairman.  Mr Adrian Vlok was then appointed, in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Defence, to chair a special SSC committee to co-ordinate the investigation and research in this respect.  The first meeting held by this committee was on the 13th of February 1986.  The decided that they will create an even larger chief committee, and they did so by co-opting other people from different department.  The actual work was however to be done by this subcommittee.
On the 20th of February 1986 the working group, that is the subcommittee, had a meeting where extensive discussions took place, and it was decided that all the interested parties should put down their ideas on paper.  And interesting, Mr Chairman, if one looks at those documents available, they did so.  Of great importance was the meeting then held by the chief committee on the 28th
 /of February
of February 1986 under chairmanship of Mr Adrian Vlok.  A long, technical discussion took place, from which it clearly appears that no sinister motive could ever have been contemplated.  If by the wildest stretch of imagination Mr Varney, or any other person, wishes to make out that the contents of these documents were aimed at the creation of what is now known as a hit squad, it goes beyond our comprehension.  And I invite you, Mr Chair, please, do yourself the favour and read that discussion that took place there.  They were talking about what kind of uniforms should be taken, what should the definitions be, etcetera, etcetera.  Now, if this was to be intended a hit squad it must have been intended to be the first uniformed hit squad in the world.
The input of academics from faculties such as law and criminology were obtained.  One common denominator emanating from all these reports and advice is, however, the resistance of the people participating in these deliberations, or their disagreement with the whole concept, and those were for tactical reasons.  Not only tactical - technical reasons, tactical reasons, and policy considerations, Mr Chairman, which I do not have the time to elaborate on - save if you want to hear me on that.
Meanwhile it should be indicated that whilst these investigations were in progress, and specifically on the 3rd of February 1986, Operation Marion, which involved the training of a paramilitary unit, was approved by the State Security Council.  To simply suggest that this has now become the third force, or was intended to be the third force, or a third force of a kind, is irreconcilable with all the available documentation which are on that file. 
 /We wish
We wish to remind you that these document were drafted - and I am referring now to those two files that I have drawn your attention.  Those were drafted at a time when top secrecy prevailed, and when nobody ever anticipated that a Commission such as yours will be scrutinising the contents thereof.  To ignore them just to make a point in order to contaminate honourable members of the then State Security Council, and especially our client, with sinister and unlawful motives, illustrates bias and/or ulterior motives.
The work group - and then, Mr Chairman, I am referring not to your Commission when I said that.  I am referring to the people making such suggestions to you, because I don't know whether you ever had the opportunity of looking at those.
The work group brought out its final report on the 13th of March 1986.  They embarked, inter alia, upon the formulation of an elaborate definition - have I got your attention, Mr Chairman?  Upon the formulation of an elaborate definition of a third force which describes anything but a hit squad. It's a long definition, Mr Chairman.  I did not see fit to include it in this submission.
Finally the Committee recommended that such a force should not be established, and that the existing capabilities of the SAP - now, very important, not the South African Defence Force, neither the KZP, but the SAP,  - be restructured to fulfil these tasks envisaged in the definition of the third force.  On the strength of this report the SSC took its decision on the 12th of May 1986.  From the papers it is clear that the decision of the State
 /Security
Security Council then took its normal course.
Now, Mr Chairman, you will recall that was the decision that Mr Varney was referring you to.  That's the decision of the 12th of May.  They've chosen the option that, rather than to create a separate third force, you will recall, they will now extend the capabilities of the police.  Now, the immediate and the general rumour going around about that is, "Yes, yes, and then we got Vlakplaas," etcetera, etcetera. 
Now, as far as my client is concerned, Mr Chairman, I don't know what happened on the ground, but I want to show you what happened in respect of my client after this decision was taken.  He was bluntly ignored.  I'll show you why.  This appears from the minutes of the working commission - oh, just a moment, Mr Chairman, I've slipped one sentence.  
From the papers it is clear that the decision of the SSC then took its normal course, ie, it was referred to the working committee of the State Security Council for implementation.  This appears from the minute of the working committee dated the 21st of March 1986, and you will find that under item 2.1.  You will find that in all the decisions of the working group of the State Security Council particular functionaries were then tasked to perform the relevant duties.  It is significant that in this particular instance - that is now the third force - such tasking is ... (inaudible) ... on first blush the seeker of sinister matters would clearly have found it upon this feature also, in order to prove that some other dark point or other some dark reason why this was not assigned to a functionary.  However, if one continues the
 /research
research such an avenue is not open, and for the following reasons.  On the 2nd of June 1988 the secretary of the State Security Council reports back in writing, under item 4, and he says as follows - and this is important, Mr Chairman.  I have to quote to you in Afrikaans.
"The idea of a third force in the RSA. The Chairman, in response to a suggestion that intimidation be combated, referred to a thought that a third force, additional to the SAP and South African Defence Force, was necessary in the RSA to continue ..."
May I pause here, Mr Chairman, to say  you see the same sentiments that my client raised on the first meeting in November 1985, and which went through this decision in 1986 - we're now in 1988, and what does the State President, my client, says about his third force.  It's very important the next sentence.  I read in Afrikaans.
"In this way both the SAP and the Defence Force hands can be released to concentrate on their primary functions."
And then he says a very strange thing for a person who already has a third force.
"He expressed his regret that this matter was smothered in the past by someone and was never properly investigated."
Now, Mr Chairman, those were the words of the State President to the State Security Council, who, according to Mr Varney's submission, already supplied him with his third force in the form of the Caprivi trainees.  Everyone, even Mr Varney, then knew that my client already
 /got what
got what he asked for, so indeed if one looks at this quote Mr Botha must have been a stranger in Jerusalem.
Then, Mr Chairman, on the meeting of the Cabinet of the 22nd of June 1998, the State President - this is now a further occasion - raised these same sentiments again to Cabinet.  This appears from the Cabinet minutes of that date, which are also available for scrutiny by the investigators of the Commission, and hopefully by the Commissioners themselves.  
This saga however continues, and the plot thickens, Mr Chairman.  On the 5th of April 1988 - 1989 - we have now travelled yet another year in history, the secretary of the State Security Council again writes to the working committee of the State Security Council, informing them that there are still certain matters which had not been attended to, or which had not been implemented.  One of these was the third force.  This appears from item 1 (c) of this letter.  The letter refers back to the State Security Council's minutes numbered 18/85, 7/87 and 12/88.  From all this it is clear that no third force had yet been created, at least not in the mind of the secretary of the State Security Council, or in the mind of my client, and the working committee was required to give its attention to this neglect.
On a meeting of the working committee now, who again - that is now in 1989 - is seized with the implementation of this scheme or plan.  Now, on the 8th of May 1989 the matter was dealt with, and this was done under the term described as "Outstanding matters."  That is my free translation, "Uitstaande saake."  The minutes of this meeting reads as follows, and I have to quote in
 /Afrikaans.
Afrikaans.
"Regarding subject 9 (third force), General de Wit sketched to the Committee the financial and legal technical problems around the creation of such a force.  At the same time he said that the foundation of Municipal Police and the extension of the South African Police Riot Unit, absolved the creation of a third force.  The Committee accepted the explanation."
Now, Mr Chairman, this was now in - as I pointed out to you in 1989, and shortly after that my client became inactive in politics in South Africa, but nevertheless this was the last word ever spoken in this regard.  And for obvious reasons.  De Wit came back to the working committee, who puts this on as outstanding matter, and it was never attended to.  
In any event once again one must take cognisance of what happened at the same time, or in the same time span.  In 1988 Operation Marion still existed.  If what Mr Botha initially intended for this third force was to be Operation Marion the entire contents of these documents becomes supercilious.
Finally we wish to point out to you that one of the documents which forms part of the whole research effort in connection to the so-called third force was the input of a certain Brigadier Ferreira on behalf of Chief of the Army.  And if I may pause here, Mr Chairman, you will remember that I told you now in my submission, which you can go and check for yourself, that inputs were obtained
 /from many
from many people - the police, the army, the attaches which were attached to Military Intelligence, from academics, etcetera, etcetera.  Now, what bothers me, Mr Chairman, and in fact it annoys me as counsel, for obvious reasons this specific study document was singled out to put before you as part of Mr Varney's submission.  Mr Varney selected this document to illustrate his point on page 9 of his written submission.  We are not going to deal with these arguments at length, but simply wish to state that it appears that the reader did not understand the Afrikaans language.  Ferreira never indicated that the third force already existed within the Security Forces.  He was dealing with the capabilities which a third force should have, and he simply indicated that these capabilities, separate capabilities, Mr Chairman, which such a force should have, do to a lesser or greater degree already exist within different branches of the security forces.  Which is so.  If one looks at it technically - and if I may refer you back to Mr Rocky Williams' evidence, as far as I am concerned in my submission objective evidence, you will see that all these different aspects must have existed at the time, but to create a hit squad you have to get this clandestine little group and you have to put all your capabilities and effort in them in order to assassinate and do all other evil things which is attached to that.  If you want to have a true, uniformed, legal third force, then you will have to have all the mobility and other capabilities be centralised in that force, and that's what Ferreira is arguing in this document.  And in fact it doesn't - it's not open for a different interpretation, it's simple Afrikaans.
 /Then he's
Then he's simply indicated - Mr Chairman, Mr Varney's interpretation of this document is patently wrong, and we concede that the incorrect interpretation does go some way to prove his point.  If this document is read properly, and if the status of thereof is evaluated in the greater context of the other documents, there is simply nothing in this point. 
Then, Mr Chairman, I go over to the next issue, and I now give you the good news.  I am nearly at the end of my submission.  The next item that I am going to deal with is the doctrine of counter-revolutionary warfare.  
Now, Mr Varney's argument, it appears, simply boils down to a conclusion that the anti-revolutionary doctrine adopted by our client, and accordingly by the South African Defence Force, was to promote the concept of counter-terrorism.  This was then to be decided on the highest level, which would for obvious reasons, have been our client.  To develop this argument he had to go a long way, and he is again dependent upon selective quotations in order to fit the point into his complicated puzzle.  The book of General Frazer signed by our client specifically deals with so-called "weerwraak maatreels" and you will find that on pages 18 and 19 thereof, and it therefore clearly rejects it as untenable if one subscribes to the principle of winning the hearts and minds of the people.  The so-called Frazer document which Mr Varney latched upon was an old version which was never subscribed to by the army or the Defence Force or by my client.  Uncontested evidence to this effect was given at the Msani trial.  In the same vein Mr Varney has to postulate and deduce far-reaching conclusions, based upon
 /our client's
our client's reference to McEwan in the preamble of Frazer's book.  Immediately a quote in paragraph 98 of the summary of McEwan, which we don't know what the status is of.  Now, this is now exploited to illustrate that some sinister, counter-revolutionary, guerilla force was to be created, and that our client subscribed to that.  
His reference to McEwan, that is my client's reference to McEwan, was indeed a specific reference, but was done in the context of a broad reference to all the other books which appear in Frazer's list of bibliography.   And it says so in that preamble, Mr Chairman.  It says so clearly.  I would like you to read this McEwan book, but there are many other books which he refers - that is Frazer now - which you can read so to understand the revolutionary warfare.  That was very clear.  That was what it was intended to do.  Now, Mr Chairman, this list includes books authorised by, inter alia, Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara.  So, if that argument must go through one must also now deduce that Mr P W Botha must have been a communist.
Now, the true facts are that our client, as well as the military, rejected State terrorism advocated by McEwan or otherwise.  To have adopted those proposals would, of necessity, have destroyed law, order, and any measure of much-needed good will in the theatre of battle, or the prospective theatre of battle, ie, the areas of unrest.  The principle is inherently self-destructive, and was appreciated as such by our client.  And therefore, Mr Chairman, we reject this strange line of attack on our client.
Then, lastly, the secrecy of the operation.  I must
 /concede not
concede not much is made out of that by Mr Varney, and we also know another thing, that everything was about secrets in those times.  But let me deal with it in any event.
We do not wish to go into detail as regards the secrecy of Operation Marion.  The reasons for the secrecy of the training, and of the Caprivians, was fully explained in the trial of Peter Msani and others.  The political relationship between Dr Buthelezi and the South African Government, and the embarrassment that would flow from the training of this paramilitary force by the SADF, with whom he, for obvious political reasons, did not want to be associated with, are clear.  General Malan's evidence in this regard appears from the record of the Msani case from page 3483 and further.  The documents procured as evidence in the said trial also clearly indicate the reasons for the secrecy.  
Mr Chairman, that brings me to the end of my submission on behalf of President Botha.  We appreciate that we had this opportunity to address you on these issues.  The accusations levelled at our client clearly do not appear from the evidence available to you, and we hoped that through the research that was being done that we could add something to also give you the opportunity to look at the other side, which are clearly and elaborately documented.
Mr Chairman, we say that the attack on our client was unwarranted, that the Commission needs not hear this type of attack if there are no evidence available, and we say that it was the result of wild conclusions and illogical deductions by Mr Varney, which flies in the face of all available evidential material available to you, and
 /probably
probably already in your possession, and which we strongly reject on behalf of our client.  
Mr Chairman, we thank you for the opportunity.