Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — 1998-08-04

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can you continue with your statement at paragraph 7?
MR DUMAKUDE
"It was decided that the unit operated on a broad mandate.  As the commander of the Special Operations Unit I was responsible for maintaining communication with as many of the units deployed inside the country.  I communicated with the units in order to give them the latest information from M.K. command.  This related primarily to the identification of targets and the undertaking of operations.  I also communicated with the units in order to meet their material needs both logistically and otherwise.
	Ellis Park was identified as a legitimate target in terms of the policy of the ANC to take the struggle into the white areas"

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I interrupt you there Mr Dumakude?  Can I refer you to the further submissions, that document we referred to earlier and to page 66 thereof.  Again Mr Chairman there are copies attached to the statement that we've handed up.  Page 66, Mr Dumakude and in the first column about halfway down the page is a paragraph which starts "By the end of 1985".  Could you read that into the record please?
MR DUMAKUDE
"By the end of 1985 a special pamphlet titled: 'Take the Struggle to the White Areas' was distributed inside the country.  Targets were identified as follows: The Racist Army, Police, Death Squads, Agents and ...[indistinct] in our midsts and the call to take the war to the white areas is defined as follows
	For strengthening our working organisation and engaging in a united action in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs. Spreading the consumer boycott to all areas of the country.  Organised and well planned demonstration in the white suburb and central business districts.  Forming underground units and combat groups in our places of work and taking such action as sabotage in the factories, mines, farms and suburbs and to disrupt the enemy - all energy, transport, communication and other vital system.  Systematic attack against the army, police and the so called area Defence Unit in the white areas.  Well planned raids on the armouries and ...[inaudible] of the army, police, farmers and so on.  To secure arms for our own units."

MR VAN DEN BERG: Could you read the next paragraph as well please, Mr Dumakude?  The next paragraph on page 66, the one that starts "The ANC Leadership."
MR DUMAKUDE
"The ANC leadership had called on all members and supporters of the ANC to intensify the struggle at all cost, to move towards creating a situation of ungovernability and peoples war."

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you Mr Dumakude.  Bearing that in mind Mr Dumakude can you explain what your motivation was when you identified Ellis Park as a legitimate target?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: Here what motivated me, it was a place where a large number of white people will be gathered.  These were the people who had the vote to make a change in this country.  To bring that struggle closer to the white community, to dispel the belief that they were immune from change.  I wished to emphasise to them that it was better to change now rather than later.  The operation was conducted in terms of a normal modus operandi of the Special Operations Unit.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I interrupt you there, I'm sorry.  I'm not sure that you're working from the same document that I have.  There's a paragraph 11 in that document, that's the paragraph which reads "The intention was" - would you carry on from there Mr Dumakude?
MR DUMAKUDE
"The intention of this operation was to use the spectators to spread the message of the struggle.  It was not our intention to kill civilians.  I did however foresee that civilians could be killed.  The operation was conducted in terms of normal operation, modus operation of the Special Operations Unit.  Reconnaissance was carried out, the area was reconnoitred days before Friday and on Friday before the attack, which was on Saturday, we ensured that the situation was as reconnoitred.  The material used in the attack was contained in a DLB.  I obtained the material from the DLB."

CHAIRPERSON: Is that a dead letter box?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: ...[inaudible].  The unit was instructed by myself to get a vehicle for the operation.  I recognised myself as a specialist in the manufacture, assembly and operation of explosives and explosive material.  The explosive device was planned to detonate towards the end of the rugby match.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude, could I interrupt you there?  Did you receive any special training, specialised training in the use of explosives and if so, where?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: During my training in exile from 1978 I was trained by the Cubans.  One of the periods during those years I went to the Soviet Union also to specialise in the usage of explosives.  Based on the training that I received and the experience that I gained during the struggle I recognised myself as a specialist in the field of explosives.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt you for moment just to make sure, perhaps save time, we've been told that on the Saturday morning you went to buy gas cylinders, battery and a clock which was to be used to, as part of the explosive device.  Do you agree with that?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: I fully agree, Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: One other question in respect of that, Mr Dumakude, is that were you assisted by any of the other applicants in the preparation of the explosive device which was used?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: Here I'll mention Harold Matshididi was always next to me during the assembling of this device.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Did he have any experience or was he simply your assistant?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: I will say simply the assistant.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Dumakude could you continue, I think we got to paragraph 16 of your statement?
MR DUMAKUDE
"The explosive device was planned to detonate towards the end of the rugby match and I had taken the precaution of inserting three separate detonating devices.  This included a timing device which was the primary device, the watch and a remote control.  The device was set to explode prior to the end of the rugby match.  I did however foresee the possibility that civilians could be killed.  It sometimes happens that people leave a match before the end of the game.  It was for this reason that I used three separate detonating devices.  This could assist me or allow me to react to the situation as it unfolds."

MR VAN DEN BERG: Is there anything which you wish to add to this statement in terms of what happened on the day in question?

LESTER DUMAKUDE: On the day in question specifically where the bomb was placed, we went before placing the explosive to confirm our reconnaissance.  According to the situation it was as expected.  I then went with one of my colleagues, which is Harold, to fetch a car with the explosives, driving towards the identified place.  I dropped him metres away from the area to provide protection.  I went and placed the car with the parked explosive material.
	During my withdrawal, I think my action attracted attention which I will say now it was positively identified by myself to be the victims.  Due to the planning to try as much as possible to avoid civilian casualties, there was no way but to trigger it on time which was the time according to our plan before the end of the match which was five o'clock.  The delay in doing that was going to cause many civilian lives.  Like I've stated the policy of the movement was to try to avoid civilian casualties.  This was as far as I could go.  
	After the triggering of the material - after the explosive, I retreated, I joined Harold.  We moved to our pick up point which was Checkers and that's what happened on that particular day concerning the Ellis Park.