Amnesty Hearings — Port Elizabeth — 1997-09-30

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: And it could mean only one thing, the bomb had to 
be attached to a car?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: In other words a car had to be involved as well?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: And the person who had to be eliminated, you had 
to get them into the car in one or other way?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: That detail also had to be finalised before you 
came to Pretoria, or perhaps you had good ideas regarding this?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes.

ADV JANSEN: You see, it is clear that shortly after these 
discussions on the 13th, definite plans regarding a certain plan B had 
been made.
	Vlakplaas operatives Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen were given 
Makarov pistols or they took their own Makarov pistols, is that 
correct?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: You knew about that?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV JANSEN: So at that stage you wee aware what plan B 
entailed?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember that it was explained to me, 
but what I know is that they had to support this operation should 
not bomb not explode.

ADV JANSEN: What support would these three people be able to 
give at that stage?   In other words the morning of the 13th, what 
did you think their role had to be?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember regarding what they thought 
or what Mr De Kock thought by sending them with, but all I know is 
we have already cleared it out at the technical division.

ADV JANSEN: All right, I want to tell you what Mr Ras says.  Mr 
Ras says  regarding that aspect in the first place, it was clear to him 
that the detail of the plan already had been finalised, because they 
were aware that the technical division would become involved.  You 
won't have a problem with that statement?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: No, that is correct, that is how I accepted that.

ADV JANSEN: Once again he says he can't remember where he 
was told this, but he did know that their support would entail firstly 
that they would put these explosive devices on the scene.  Because 
all three of them completed the explosives course?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: And furthermore, they would be part of this plan B 
if the explosives device did not work, they had to eliminate these 
people by shooting them?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.

ADV JANSEN: Would you then at least agree that all this detail 
had been finalised to a great extent before these three people were 
called in and told that they had to become involved?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: And they were not in a position to change the basic 
planning?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: The consideration of which operatives had to be 
chosen for a specific operation, depended on the type of planning?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: It was certainly also at a very early stage clear for 
these people, that this operation entailed the elimination of police 
officers?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: So this was an extraordinary situation?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says in the first place that he can 
specifically remember that the morning of the 13th, he was with 
Brigadier Van Rensburg in his office together with Eugene de Kock, 
that was for a very short time, and he was then told that he had to 
go to Port Elizabeth for an operation.  Do you wish to comment on 
that part of his evidence?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember before we left to Port 
Elizabeth, that Mr De Kock had left Vlakplaas.

ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says it was the habit of the Commanding 
Officer of Vlakplaas and some of the other members, that had to do 
business at head quarters to go there early in the morning, round 
about seven o'clock and to go to head quarters at Wagtehuis.  I 
suppose you don't really have knowledge about that, but I want to 
just put it to you because there is this difference in evidence?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I don't have personal knowledge about 
that, but that specific morning I accompanied Mr De Kock to the 
technical division in Rebecca Street.  I don't know that Mr De Kock 
and Martiens went to head quarters.

ADV JANSEN: Furthermore Mr Ras states that he then, it appears 
from his application, that he then went to Vlakplaas.  He made 
preparations and he met in De Kock's office?  You would agree to 
that?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.

ADV JANSEN: Can you remember which detail of the operation 
were given to the operatives at that stage?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: No, I can't because Mr De Kock talked to them 
all alone.  I was standing outside.

ADV JANSEN: Mr De Kock surely knew how long they would 
remain in Port Elizabeth?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I assumed he did know.

ADV JANSEN: How did Mr De Kock know how long they would 
be in Port Elizabeth?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I have no idea.

ADV JANSEN: You see one of the most important things of this 
operation was that as few as possible people should know about 
this?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: You see Mr De Kock at that stage, was not the 
Commanding Officer of Vlakplaas, Mr Dave Baker was the acting 
Commander of Vlakplaas?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: I can't deny that, I don't know.

ADV JANSEN: The point is Mr Nieuwoudt, even some of the 
senior colleagues were not told the detail of why these operatives 
were absent, in other words it is important to know how long these 
people would be absent, so should enquiries be made about where 
the people were, that these questions could be answered, is that 
correct?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: In other words you should have told De Kock at 
which stage, for when this operation was planned and when the 
operatives would be back?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: As far as I can remember, we were in Du Toit's 
office when we discussed the method and then he could have made 
the observation or drew the inference how long this would take.

ADV DE JAGER: In Du Toit's office did you discuss that Du Toit 
and them had to go to PE that same afternoon?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And was it discussed there that it was planned 
for the night?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: It was planned for the following day.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes.

ADV JANSEN: And you must have been relatively sure that the 
targets would be available for elimination the next day?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is like that.

ADV JANSEN: You see, Mr Ras says that although he did not 
know all the detail, but his general impression of the whole 
operation was that it was very urgent.  Was that a fair observation?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: Secondly that it was extraordinary circumstances 
because there was a security breach in the Eastern Cape?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.

ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras also says in the journey to Port Elizabeth, 
because the two of you were in the same vehicle, is that correct?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV JANSEN: Snyman and Vermeulen were in another car, is that 
correct?

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: Yes.

ADV JANSEN: And he says the merit of the operation was 
discussed in broad terms, but he can't remember the detail.

GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: That is correct.