Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

ADRIAAN VLOK: That was not my experience because what happened in practice, let's take the case of Piet Ntuli, I'm actually hesitant to refer to specific cases, but I will refer to that one case, the one of Piet Ntuli. I don't know whether anybody's applied for amnesty in that regard but on my table as minister there was an information, there was a note stating that he was dead and there was information that the ANC had said that the should be eliminated and he was blown up.  Now what must a minister do?  You sit there and you receive this information. The case of for instance, the Cradock Four, Goniwe and I can refer to that as well.  We asked questions about it. I answered questions in Parliament but what did I receive?  Information which was submitted to me and I deal with it on that basis as it's submitted to me. And that case for instance there was an inquest and the inquest also brought out a certain finding.  So you must understand the mechanism of the Department, how things worked there.  In the Department you had a case of a line being drawn.  There was a line of command and if I wanted something done, if I had a query, if I had to answer a questioning Parliament, you then give it to the commissioner.  He would then convey it to further people down in the line of command and then the response is then conveyed back to you.  There was no way in which I would speak to a constable and said, now what did you do in this black township?  That's not the way it happened and they didn't talk to me about that.  So a minister was in actually an unenviable position.  He's sitting in his office, he has to react on information which is given to him, and that was the situation as I've sketched it to you in these two cases.  I had many queries and I got many responses and answers back. Memoranda from people containing certain information and there was testimony.  You know that people applied for amnesty about certain cases where people admitted that they gave me the wrong information, so that's what happened there, but once again, I must say that I have understanding for that because for security reasons and other reasons, and Pik Botha also referred to that this morning, the concept of need to know figured very very strongly in the system of the State Security Council and the Cabinet.
 In one of the minutes which was given to me there was a paragraph in which the former State President makes reference to the fact that people must ensure that there is security in respect of documents and information conveyed to other people.  So the need to know concept figured very very strongly and I didn't tell them everything which I knew and I will accept that the man on the ground who did certain things also decided that he wasn't going to tell anybody higher up.  I got the impression that that was also the evidence of General van der Merwe the other day before the Commission when he said that he couldn't tell the minister because he didn't himself know and if he had known, it was his decision whether he would tell the minister or not.
 So we were in an unviable situation.  I don't want to complain about it.  That's why I said I will assume responsibility and I will not run away from my responsibility.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Vlok you will appreciate the difficulty that we may have in these circumstances.  Firstly we have from the level of the State Security Council, ministers and senior members on the police, exhortations to combat the revolutionary onslaught, applying pressure on commanders on the ground, responding to political pressure from the community out there that's affected by the actions of revolutionaries.  Recognising the limitations of the legal system, hence the necessity to expand the state of emergency and try to expand the laws which allow for detention for prolonged periods and so on and so forth. An ever increasing call on more ammunition from the legal system as it were.  All of that pressure applied, the desperate need, the recognition that there's a life and death struggle that one is waging here.  Policies formulated which are misinterpreted in consequence of systematic misinterpretation, enemies of the state are dealt with broadly in accordance with the objectives defined by the politicians in the first place, that firm action be taken, that the revolutionaries be stopped in their tracks and on the one hand, the politicians can say we didn't give that order because they didn't give that order, it's nowhere stated that we said so should be killed, we said so and so should be eliminated but we meant that that person should be  detained.  And then never having any real knowledge about or real appreciation of the effects of that misinterpretation. It places the politicians, would you agree in the lucky, enviable situation, that they can formulate an approach to a problem but not bear the immediate consequences of that policy in the way in which it's carried out?

ADRIAAN VLOK: I wouldn't describe my position here today as lucky or fortunate but I want to say this.  This document in which eliminate and take out and so on appears, this document comes from eleven years ago and eleven years ago we didn't think that we would sit here today and have to explain the use of those words. There was no way in which we could foresee that.  We couldn't have put those words in there in those days, bearing in mind that one day in the future we would have to explain the use of those words. So we simply didn't think in that way.
 So I'm saying to you that that was a mistake that was made and as a politician, and that's why I'm saying that's it's not a particularly fortunate situation to come and accept the responsibility for other peoples' actions but I was the responsible minister and that's why I'm saying what I said.
 And then Chairperson we tried very hard and placed pressure on the security forces to normalise the situation so that we could achieve a permanent settlement.  We tried so hard, we detained people and people were eliminated in the process, but in the process of detaining people, you must remember we detained thousands of people and you will recall Chairperson, you were also involved in the hunger strikes which we had to deal with, you will recall how we struggled to get them out and deal with the situation to prevent another person dying in prison as a result of a hunger strike.  And though we had sympathy with those people, you know what my views were on that.  So I really have to say to you that ten years ago there was no way that we could have foreseen us having to appear before that Truth Commission and to explain the use of these words and that we left ourselves a little back avenue just to slip out.  That's why I'm saying it was bona fides mistake which we made and we have to live with it.

CHAIRPERSON: Ilan Lax.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.  Mr Vlok, I just have one problem with this whole line really.  That is if people gave an instruction that someone should be eliminated meaning they should be detained, and that was what was in peoples' minds one understands and I see you nodding which implies you're sort of agree with me on that.  When the person then pitched up dead instead of being detained, what did you do?  Didn't you say but I said they should be detained, not killed and what did you do about it?  It's in that sense that one's asking these questions.