Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

UNKNOWN: Through you, Mr Chairman, and we will continue responding and trying to answer and clarify the question as demanded by TRC. I must also emphasise that more than any other, we are one of the - amongst the groups or the organisations that support fully the efforts of the Government and the establishment of that, even if we express our fears, our concerns, et cetera. I think we are on record of coming last year to see the chairman of the TRC, just to see, to get to know what is it all about, and I express my appreciation, because this is the only process that assuage our hearts, our - of those who suffered.  And even ourselves,  I mean it is a psychological process to help some of us. So that please, let us not be mistaken in this regard. We appreciate this process.  That's why even some others, other people do perceive or sometimes thinks that if you are from war, if you have killed people, you ultimately run mad, et cetera and so on. But basically, the essence is that if you have been involved in war or in killing, et cetera, obviously there must be a process where through church, through whatever, et cetera and so on. So we are supportive of that.
 In as far as the APLA responsibility, I think it is in black and white - let me read that again -
"The APLA forces who carried out these operations followed the directives from their commanders, and these directives were from the highest echelons, that is the high command of the military leadership."
And we do not regret of such operations having taken place, and we are taking the full responsibility.  
 I think we have described, we have explained as to how until to the lowest unit, APLA forces operated. It will be a sin for us to run away or to shed responsibility in this regard.
 In as far as APLA, we take responsibility, whether it was bad or good. Somewhere I said we will be pouring cold bath of reality. It is reality, it is hard, it is painful and we will not be in a position to change history.  We must put it as it is. 
 I will call upon Mr Mlambo, in as far as the political answer is concerned.

J P MLAMBO: Honourable Commissioners, I would want to also underscore the fact that there were members of the military commission who comprised, particularly the chairman, who was the head of the organisation, and other leading personnel, who were members of the political leadership, who served in the military commission.  They were the link between the political leadership and the military leadership. I want to say, therefore, that it has been indicated here that we entered a new situation, particularly of increased violence, in the 1990s.  Particularly Third Force violence, maybe unexplained type of activities.
 Obviously, because fine tuning our broad objectives of saying we want to see political, I mean, armed activities taking place in this area or want to say armed activities being intensified, et cetera, which were being worked out, ultimately, by the people with the technical expertise, professional training.  The leadership of the high command.  They are the people who did the selection of targets.
 Even here, we have emphasised in the August submission, and it has not been in any way challenged even by the high command, that selection of targets was done, particularly in the context of a guerilla warfare, by people nearest some of the targets.  People nearest the environment which you wanted to influence, perhaps in a particular direction.
 We should indicate here, that it should therefore come as no surprise if at any stage your investigation unit were to produce that well, so-and-so in the leadership of the PAC had an interview and he was a little taken aback with the events as the then had unfolded in this particular incident or in that particular incident.  
 Obviously the correct thing that happened, was we talked about some of those incidents because as they have indicated, that is the military leadership as indicated.  In many of these or in many activities, the actual selection of targets was done by the military commanders including the Commissariat who were the representatives of the party, putting across the political line within the military structures.  
 Now, this new type of thrust of emphasis, if for instance we were to look at some of the things that Tom Lodge often wrote.  He wrote at one stage that the APLA commanders say their main point of attack, that was in the 80s, is principally aimed against the police, the army, the armed forces, the protectors of White domination.  They seem to be actually carrying it out in terms of their operations inside the country and we cited several operations within the period of the 1980s.  So, in the 90s a new form of emphasis or adaptation of the thrust or struggle did emerge and it did take us a little off-guard, we were surprised and we did discuss and I am sure that initially with the question of King William's Town, for instance, we were completely at a loss and we discussed and certain explanations were made to us by the high command.  Some of those explanations and the context of the changing environment and they needed to carry, with us, the constituencies that were the main pillars of support of Apla, did, those explanations filtered through to us and we understood.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, could you be quite brief now,  please.  I think we want to move on.

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Thanks a lot.  Could I have the privilege.  As a member of the delegation I still feel the question is not answered.  This is why I take the liberty to respond.

CHAIRPERSON: I am grateful to you.

MEMBER OF DELEGATION: Yes.  I think the question is simple.  After the leadership had been informed about these operations, did they condone them or not and I do not think my colleagues I have answered the question.  The answer is simple.  When we reported these operations to the leadership, I indicated it earlier on, that the 90s created a political problem for us, because we had parallel leaderships where those who were inside who were now trying to use the support to also try to project themselves.  You see, really, I would not like to be asked further about this, but it is a fact I am only putting here.  So, when we reported this matter to the leadership there were individual members of the leadership that felt that this was an error, but the leadership, as a collective, never came up with a position to tell Apla that you were wrong.
 I think it is important, therefore, for us to draw a conclusion that they condoned it or not, because we as Apla, if we were told that we had committed an error and then we would have had the task to sit down and review our operations and, therefore, try to follow a new pattern, because the previous operations were wrong, but this instruction never came to Apla to say you were wrong and, therefore, review your operations.  So, it is up to this body to conclude whether the operations were condoned or not.  I hope I have answered the question.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, indeed.  It has taken a little while, but we got there.  Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much, Mr Chairperson.  On page three of the submission that you made earlier this morning, Brigadier Mofokeng, dealing with this same paragraph which we have been debating for some time, the issue that I want to raise with you is there raised by you and your delegation and that is the question of proportionality.  You indicate there,
"... that the decision was aimed at carrying out legitimate reprisals and forcing the regime to end the killings of South African civilians and this was done both in reprisal and self-defence and the only requirement was proportionality ..."
What do you mean by "proportionality" and who determined proportionality?