Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: No, you're not quoting correctly.  You must quote
"An offensive ..."
(incomplete)
/
INTERPRETER
INTERPRETER
"An offensive capacity (or a protective element) through which the UDF, ANC and SACP can be prevented from disrupting Inkatha meetings and destroying property and terrorising Inkatha members, to injure or to murder Inkatha members.  This element would also have the capacity of protecting important Inkatha persons.  This capacity will, however, not clash with the functions of NI and the SAP Security Branch."
See Exhibit E2, page 45, in the Msani trial.
At page - and now I am referring - I am going to refer to the Msani evidence, the case record, the trial that was held last year.  At page 3063 and 3064 of the Msani record Groenewald testified the following about this incident.  I quote in Afrikaans again.
"I told you before that nowhere in any of my discussions with the Chief Minister did he indicate that he wanted anything else as a capacity for protecting his own people against ANC hit squads.  That was the connotation.  I indicated by way of a remark at one place that he said at a particular moment that if he had the capacity he would be even prepared to attack the ANC in Lusaka.  I never got the impression that he wanted to do anything else than to protect his own people in a legal fashion, but I repeat
 /again, in
again, in the sense that offensives be used for attacking innocent people, no."
Groenewald also explains why the term "offensive element" was used.  He describes that it was explained by Dr Buthelezi that when either himself or one of his other Cabinet Ministers or Chiefs were attacked, or meetings being disrupted, he didn't have the ability to counter this attack at the stage when it was executed.  See the record of Msani trial, page 3065.
We submit that except for Mr Varney's allegations there is no evidence to contradict what General Groenewald said.  One must therefore accept that from the military viewpoint no unlawful intentions could be inferred from Mr Buthelezi.  The capabilities he requested was simply a protection capacity.
I am now going to refer to another meeting that took place on the 17th of February 1986.  It was a meeting between the Minister of Defence, Mr Malan, and the following military personnel was also present - General Geldenhuys, as Chief of the South African Defence Force, General Groenewald, and I am not sure whether there was any other military personnel, and then there was also involved Mr Kobus du Toit Bosman, whose name appears as a member of the subcommittee.  
Now, before dealing with the contents of this letter and the information contained therein we wish to point out that neither Pitter nor Liebenberg were aware of what transpired at this meeting.  Now, you'll remember that the information contained as to what transpired at this meeting comes from a letter dated the 18th of February written by Groenewald to Pitter, sort of a report-back
 /letter, and
letter, and in that letter certain information is contained. Now, before that, before that meeting took place, neither Liebenberg nor Pitter knew what was going to be discussed or what was going to be decided.
Now, two main issues were apparently addressed during the meeting, (a) the possible friction between Special Forces and Military Intelligence, and how far they, that is now the military, have progressed with the assistance to Chief Minister Buthelezi.  
Now, as to the friction between Special Forces and Military Intelligence, it appeared that Mr du Toit Bosman - and let me interfere here with myself.  He was appointed by Chief Minister Buthelezi to do his translations from Afrikaans to English.  Now, at that stage it appeared that Mr du Toit Bosman had already had discussions with Special Forces to do the training.  That's now according to his version.  Mr du Toit Bosman was also of the opinion that Special Forces should be in command of the project.  Groenewald, on the other hand, said that is was a task to be conducted by DST.  The friction, however, was not between Special Forces and the Military Intelligence group, but between Bosman and Military Intelligence.
Now, before dealing with the paramilitary assistance, the Minister wanted to know from Groenewald why Groenewald negotiated directly with the Chief Minister as it was the task of the Minister itself.  This Commission will remember on the 3rd of February Malan and Heunis was tasked to go and discuss it with Buthelezi, and now the Minister enquires from Groenewald why did he do it because it was the Ministers' task.  It was then explained by Groenewald to the Minister that the purpose of the
 /meeting was
meeting was to determine the needs of the Chief Minister subject to the final decision to be made by the Minister. Then a discussion took place, and the Minister gave an instruction that he needed a detailed report about the paramilitary assistance, and that Colonel van Niekerk should lead the project.  Now, the detailed report eventually comes in when General Liebenberg and his committee wrote the report.  That's the report that the Minister requested at that stage.
Paragraph 6 and 7 of this document sets out that the Minister then instructed the Chief of the Defence Force, Geldenhuys, to handle the matter further.  According to the evidence a separate meeting was then held later that same day in Geldenhuys' office, and Geldenhuys then appointed a task group under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Liebenberg, the Chief of the Army.  Now, the reason for appointing Liebenberg was that he had first-hand experience in South-West Africa - Namibia at that stage - that the Ubombos have been attacked, and the other members that were appointed were General-Major Groenewald - because of the reason that he was already involved from day one in the request of Buthelezi, General-Major Joubert, and Mr du Toit Bosman.  The reason why Joubert was appointed was because Bosman alleged he already had discussions with Special Forces, and on the basis that certain deliberations already took place it was necessary to have - to appoint Joubert there, and to find out what his attitude were so that General Liebenberg could make a final decision, being the senior of all these military personnel, and he could make a final decision.  And they were then instructed to draft a detailed report
 /as requested
as requested by the Minister.
Now, on the 17th of February - actually on the 18th, Pitter - Groenewald then reported back to Pitter as to what transpired at the meeting with the Minister.  It's part of one of the letters in your file.  
I am now moving on to the Liebenberg report, because it's actually the next document in this scenario.  After the meeting with the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force, Geldenhuys as stated above, appointed a task group as referred to.  The investigation by the task group was completed - I am not sure about my date here.  I think it should be the 27th of February 1986.  
Now, the most important aspects of this report are the following.  What was discussed was the implementation plan, and an implementation plan and an organogram was proposed.  According to this plan the paramilitary force should be under the direct control of the President's representative, Khumalo, who would in turn be directly responsible to the Chief Minister Buthelezi.  
Now, while I am at the organogram - it's not in my heads, I just - I am going to jump to something else.  Page 47 of Mr Varney's original report gives an organogram of the South African Defence Force.  We submit that that document is totally incorrect, and that this Commission should have regard to the documentation handed in at the Msani trial portraying the proper organogram of the Defence Force at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, we'll just remind you that we do have that already from you, as you will recall.  Thanks.