Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-11

MR VISSER: Very well, continue please.
MR VORSTER
"And with our arrival at the college, Labuschagne and I in the vehicle behind the minibus ..."
...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Refer to it as the kombi, we will know what you are talking about.
MR VORSTER
".. we were behind the kombi.  The kombi stopped close to the college and Verwey was in a vehicle in front of the kombi.  Sikhakane climbed out of the kombi and met Cele after he had attended his classes and he led him to the kombi."

MR VISSER: So they climbed into the kombi?  You don't know what happened there?

J A VORSTER: I don't know what happened there.

MR VISSER: Did the kombi move away from there?

J A VORSTER: Yes, it did, Verwey with his vehicle in front, the kombi in the middle and Labuschagne and I the last in that row.
"We crossed the border back to the RSA and went to the prearranged point where we found Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks.  And from there we travelled to Amsterdam ..."

MR VISSER: Where was Sikhakane?

J A VORSTER: Sikhakane was left behind in Swaziland close to Manzini, just after Cele was grabbed.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you say you went to Amsterdam.
MR VORSTER
"After we had crossed the border fence and were safely back in the RSA, Verwey and Labuschagne went back to Middelburg.  At the house in Amsterdam interrogation took place of Cele, between myself, Col Taylor and Col Botha.
		My chief purpose in this regard was to recruit Cele as an informer because this was the reason why he was abducted and the information which was given as such to me by Sikhakane.  So I was in the process of recruiting him as an informer."

MR VISSER: Did you assault him?

J A VORSTER: No, I did not assault him, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So you spoke to him?

J A VORSTER: Yes, I just spoke to him.

MR VISSER: What was his attitude?

J A VORSTER: His attitude initially after he saw that he was in enemy hands, to put it as such, he gave us information which he certainly knew that we had knowledge of because we had Sikhakane as an informer and the information which he gave us we could verify.  He gave us that information.

MR VISSER: And was he prepared to be recruited as an informer?

J A VORSTER: No, at that stage he was not prepared to co-operate.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?
MR VORSTER
"The following day we transferred him to Elandskop, or to a farm near Elandskop which was used by me as a safe premises, where we further interrogated him and attempted to recruit him to be applied as an informer.
		Col Botha, after we had arrived on the farm near Elandskop, departed that afternoon approximately 1 or 2 o'clock to return the kombi which was a hired vehicle and Taylor and myself and Wasserman remained on the farm with Cele.  Brooks didn't even go to the farm, he went directly to Pietermaritzburg."

MR VISSER: And what did you do there on the farm with Mr Cele?

J A VORSTER: We were still busy trying to obtain his co-operation.

MR VISSER: And what did he say?

J A VORSTER: Cele said when he realised what this was really about, that he would have to betray his cohorts and that his life could be jeopardy.  He said that he was not prepared to work with us.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 11 that it became clear to you that you had been misled by Sikhakane regarding Cele's alleged willingness.

J A VORSTER: Yes, it true, I was surprised that this is how matters turned out.

MR VISSER: And then you refer to the Cele bundle, page 60 to 64, and that is a reference to the combating of terrorism as well as research into terrorism with regard to Capt Dietrichsen(?).  What is your intention with this reference?

J A VORSTER: I'll be with you in a moment, Chairperson.  Yes, I have it, page 60. Which paragraph?

MR VISSER: No, I just want to know why you have referred the Committee to that document.

J A VORSTER: These are orders with regard to terrorism, the combating and research of terrorism and that everything had to be applied in order to resist the onslaught.

MR VISSER: And on page 62 there is - or at least, page 61, there is an affirmation of the importance of collection of information from informers.

J A VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then my attorney has just referred me to page 63, paragraph 3, of the Cele bundle and at the end of that paragraph it says
"Due to limited numbers it wasn't always possible to favourably evaluate all the divisional requests, therefore the Security Branch had to attempt to deal with terrorists in detention and the recruitment of such persons.  Every member of the Security Branch had to attempt to recruit terrorists in detention should circumstances allow this in any way."
So basically you are just emphasising the necessity of informers?

J A VORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue with paragraph 12.
MR VORSTER
"The same evening that we had arrived on the farm at Elandskop, due to Cele's refusal to co-operate with us in his application as an informer, Col Taylor and W/O Wasserman and I decided on the options that we could consider in dealing with Cele and after the consideration of all possible options, it was decided to eliminate him.
		Col Taylor then gave the order that we had to continue with it - or at least before we reached our final decision, we considered the following relevant options and information.  Firstly, that Cele was an ANC/MK terrorist, he was involved in terrorist activities in Natal, he was responsible for the insurgency of ANC trained MK terrorists to the RSA, specifically Natal, he was also responsible for the smuggling of weaponry to the RSA, for the commission of acts of terror, he was instrumental in the recruitment of ANC recruits for internal and external training.  It was clear that should he be released he would continue with his activities and should he be released he would report Goodwill Sikhakane's co-operation with the SAP to MK and Sikhakane would be in danger, he would be killed.  He could not be charged because he had been abducted from Swaziland and thus his detention was unlawful and if this came to light it would cause a great embarrassment for the government."

MR VISSER: So you had a dilemma?

J A VORSTER: Yes, we definitely had a dilemma.

MR VISSER: And Col Taylor then gave the order, and what did you and Wasserman do?
MR VORSTER
"Wasserman and I dug a grave near the house on the farm.  It was approximately 50 to 60 metres away from the house within a pine plantation or at least a section of a plantation."

MR VISSER: Now that place, did you identify this to anybody after the amnesty process was initiated?

J A VORSTER: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: And was this identified to the Investigative Team of the TRC?

J A VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Well I don't think there can be any dispute about that, Chairperson, but there is reference in the Report to the fact that these were pointed out.

MR LAX: We have a report on the exhumation.  That was part of an additional bundle that was handed to us.

MR VISSER: I must confess that I have not had the opportunity - I notice that some bundles were given to us this morning, I have not had the opportunity of perusing it, but thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.
	Very well.  You say that you dug the grave in a pine plantation near the house, approximately 60 metres away from the house.  What did you do next?
MR VORSTER
"Col Taylor was still busy in the house attempting to obtain Cele's co-operation, but with no success.  After we had dug the grave, Wasserman and I returned to the house.  We took Cele outside and placed a material bag over his head ..."
...(intervention)

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 15 that you bound his hands behind his back.  Can you recall whether he was cuffed when you transported him from Amsterdam, or whether you specifically cuffed his hands there on the farm?  What was the position?