Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-02-11

MR NYOKA: Mr Erasmus, you were reporting to security branch head office, you were working hand in hand with the JSMC : Joint Security Management Forum and indirectly accountable also to the National Commissioner not so?

MR ERASMUS: Indirectly, yes.

MR NYOKA: My query is, why did you not report the problem once it was given to you about the Kondile matter, that he was an informer and he turned against us?  Why did you not report the problem to all these command structures before taking the decision to kill?

MR ERASMUS: This was a clandestine operation and we made the decision seen from my position on grassroots level.

JUDGE PILLAY: But the question was that after the decision - as from the time that the decision was made, the question is directed at finding out why you didn't ask head office before you took the decision to kill him?

MR ERASMUS: I thought that we had sufficient knowledge and facts to make the decision ourselves.

MR NYOKA: I do not understand how that is clandestine but I'll move on.  Are you saying to me that you trusted your juniors more than your seniors or your immediate senior like the Regional Commission to whom you regularly reported - than your juniors?

MR ERASMUS: Are you referring to security head office if you speak of Regional Commissioner?

MR NYOKA: I will use the phrase that was - the phrase that was used in Mthimkhulu and Madaka.  People who were informed on a need to know basis, not so? - those that weren't involved, is that correct?  Need to know basis, that was the phrase that you used then.

MR ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR NYOKA: What I'm saying therefore is that the need basis applied to juniors rather than to your immediate seniors to whom you regularly reported and trusted, like the regional commissioner.  You trusted more your juniors, some of whom were not even involved, you never met, like Dirk Coetzee and Jan Raath - about this matter.  Is that what you are telling us?

MR ERASMUS: I trusted my people and that is the only comment I have.

MR NYOKA: Why did you require that summary, why did you want a summary if you trusted them because Mr du Plessis had already verbally told you what happened.  Why did you want a summary?

MR ERASMUS: This was only to get the whole picture because you know how things go at the divisional head office of a security branch, hundreds of reports passed through my desk some things you forgot about. So, I just wanted to look from the beginning at how this picture developed and how it ended up, that's the only reason why I asked for it.

MR NYOKA: We have been given a bundle of security reports here, I'm amazed that neither that summary nor the note is not amongst them because that summary was very important, a decision was taken on the basis of it.

MR ERASMUS: That's correct, the operation was executed and this summary was destroyed later.

MR NYOKA: When did you destroy it?

MR ERASMUS: After the completion of the elimination.

MR NYOKA: And you said that there was a war situation but there was no state of emergency at the time, no suspension of the illegal process, how can you could have come to that conclusion that it was a war situation then?

MR ERASMUS: There was insurgents or infiltration of terrorists, they were shooting at one another backwards and forwards, not only here.  This was taking place in Rhodesia, Ovambuland, in our own country as well and everywhere.  If you do not regard that as a war situation, then I don't know.

MR NYOKA: The only inescapable conclusion that we can come to is that some, if not all of the people high up in command must have known or been informed of the decision to kill Mr Kondile and that there is a great scheme collusion or conspiracy to suppress the truth, any comment?

MR ERASMUS: I would not say that from inferences and possible discussion later on that people, even in the political arena knew about this operation.

MR NYOKA: Finally, that 1960 incident affected you traumatically because someone unarmed and defenceless was attacked and I would have expected you to be the last person to authorise such a mission because Mr Kondile was in captivity, unarmed and defenceless, ...[inaudible] you should have been the last person to authorise that, not so? - and say: "No guys, we can't kill, I have suffered for 30 years a bout an incident like this".  Any comment?

MR ERASMUS: I want to comment on that, yes.  He became involved in the liberation movement, he himself according to his story smuggled bombs into the country.  Those same incidents or the incidents which occurred at the Johannesburg station which happened there, I had to prevent those.

MR NYOKA: At the time he was not found - he was not in armed conflict or found with arms, he was a captive and according to the rules of international law, you could not have done what you did.

MR ERASMUS: We've already conceded to that, that's why we are here today.

MR NYOKA: And you reign as the commander in the Eastern Cape was relatively short, 1980 beginning up to 1983 but during those three years you authorised two killings, '81, Mr Kondile, '82, Mthimkhulu and then you got transferred.  I'm wondering why did you get transferred.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I don't know whether that's relevant for this case.

MR NYOKA: It was just in closing Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR NYOKA: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NYOKA

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
	We will take the short adjournment at this stage.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

UNKNOWN: You are still under oath.
G.N. ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, any questions you wish to put to this witness?

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, thank you.
	Mr Erasmus, you were a Colonel when this incident happened.

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR JANSEN: And Mr du Plessis was a Lieutenant Colonel.

MR ERASMUS: I think he was a Captain at that stage.

MR JANSEN: I'm sorry, I'm referring to Mr van Rensburg.

MR ERASMUS: Yes, he was, he was a Lieutenant Colonel.

MR JANSEN: When they mentioned the name Coetzee to you, did it ring a bell, did you know who this person was?

MR ERASMUS: Mr Chairman, I've already said I've met him once before and that was in that Lady Grey matter, that's the only time I've had any contact with him.

MR JANSEN: How do you know when that Lady Grey incident happened?

MR ERASMUS: I think this was before this, I think it was before this incident, yes.

MR JANSEN: You are reasonably sure about that?

MR ERASMUS: Yes, I don't know.

MR JANSEN: Yes, I accept that. Did you ask no questions whether this Coetzee person could be trusted with such a kind of operation?

MR ERASMUS: I can't remember exactly but they would have told me that he could be trusted otherwise Mr van Rensburg would not have told me that he could be approached to assist them.

MR JANSEN: At all times you were worried that something could go wrong with such a clandestine operation?

MR ERASMUS: That is correct, yes.

MR JANSEN: And you've also posed questions where this operation would happen, what the broad planning would be etc?

MR ERASMUS: That was conveyed to me, yes.

MR JANSEN: So, one of the things they had told you was what they planned to do with Mr Kondile's body?

MR ERASMUS: I think they told me that.

MR JANSEN: Can you remember what the contents was?

MR ERASMUS: I think, according to the original planning, they wanted to leave the body somewhere in Mozambique near the border.

MR JANSEN: You can remember that, that that was said?

MR ERASMUS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: You also knew that it was planned that it was to happen in a place which was under the control of Mr Flemmington, he was the commander there?

MR ERASMUS: That I can't remember.

MR JANSEN: Did you not find out in which command region it was?

MR ERASMUS: I did not ask that.  Because I've appointed a senior officer to be in charge of this operation, I did not ask those type of questions.