Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-03-24

UNKNOWN: I think I would be amiss in my duty if I did not make submissions on behalf of the Gerling family.  The tragedy in this matter is that we know that Mr Gerling, a young man who was tragically shot in the bar, was not a member of the Defence Force, he was a 19 year old man who had recently left school.  We heard his mother give evidence that he was well liked in the community by both white and black people alike.
	The other tragedy is that the Yellowwoods hotel was not a military-type installation, it was something in the minds of the applicants.  There was no evidence presented to this Committee.  In fact, Mr Nel who testified, I think he said the nearest army base was about 60 or so kilometres away.  There's certainly no reliable evidence before this Committee that the Yellowwoods Hotel was a place frequented by the members of the Defence Force at the time.
	The other tragedy of the matter is that when we look at the submissions made by the representatives of the PAC, their position was fairly clearly stated by Brigadier Fitla, and I refer the Committee to page 49 of the PAC's submissions, the Armed Force submissions dated 7th of October 1997, towards the bottom of the page.  Brigadier Fitla was discussing the command structure of APLA, and I quote.  He said:
"The political commissar for a very long time in our structure created confusion, vis a vis the chain of command.  The reason being the fact that we always ensured that politics led the gun.  And when I talk about confusion, it is because at the end of the day when we had to command, the position of the political commissar had always to be consulted.  In military terms this may create problems because a commander has got to issue orders as he deems fit and as he sees the situation.  But the command structure was such ..."
... and he was referring to the command structure of APLA.
"... that the commander at the end of the day has got to be politically accountable and he had to be politically accountable through consultation with the political commissar."
And at page 50 he went on to conclude:
"So whatever we did had to enjoy the blessing of the commissariat because at the end of the day all our actions had to be politically justified."
	Now the understanding there, Mr Chairman, with respect, is that there was a structure in place where APLA being the armed wing of the PAC would give military voice to the political decisions of the command structures, of the political leaders.  And as we've heard in other matters like the Heidelberg Tavern and the St James Church and the King William's Town Golf Club attacks, the Crazy Beat Disco in Newcastle, that there appeared to be a breakdown in that structure where the decisions to identify targets were left to the local commanders who were fairly far removed from the political commissar as described by Brigadier Fitla, and that led to a situation where APLA and the PAC in particular were at a loss to explain certain of these attacks.  If I may refer also to the submissions at page 84 of the same submission, also towards the end of the page, the quotation was - and that was Mr Mlambo who was giving evidence:
"So in the '90's a new form of emphasis or adaptation of the thrust or struggle did emerge and it did take us a little off guard.  We were surprised and we did discuss, and I'm sure that initially with the question of King William's Town for instance, we were completely at a loss and we discussed and certain explanations were made to us by the High Command. Some of these explanations in the context of the changing environment as they needed to carry with us the constituencies that were the main pillars of support of APLA, did, and those explanations filtered through to us and we understood."
Then at page 85, also towards the end of the page he goes on to say:
"So when we reported this matter to the leadership there were individual members of the leadership that felt that this was an error, but the leadership as a collective never came up with the position to tell APLA that you were wrong."
And then at page 87, which with respect, underpins the entire motivation of the APLA cadres as we have heard them over these various months regarding these applications, that when we come down to the wire, Mr Chairman, we've heard political rhetoric that it wasn't a racist attack and it wasn't hatred against the whites.  It is spelt out at page 87 on behalf of APLA, as follows:
"This is one of the things ..."
Sorry, let me go a bit beyond that.  It was under the heading:
"Member of delegation:  Yes, I just want to add, comrade Chairman, that during this time when our people were being killed in the townships, members of APLA whose commanders were inside the country were very angry, to the extent that they thought that maybe our people will say they are not protecting them properly of successfully.  That is one of the things which made them to take this decision of mounting these operations.  They feel that, they feel guilty that if the war was is being taken to the black townships, they must also take the war to the white areas.  That was one of the reasons.  Thank you."
	If we look at that submission in context then it is abundantly clear, with respect, that one of the underpinning factors of these type of attacks, if we can call them soft targets which APLA does not draw a distinction with soft targets and hard targets, but it seems clear that it was simply a type of reprisal, black people were dying in the townships, there was the allegations and the rumours about third force activity abounded, it was clear that black people were being targeted and they were being killed.  And for that reason APLA commanders felt that white people should similarly be killed.
	Then we come back to the actual fact of the attack.  The evidence of the applicants leading on from their motive that, or their political objective to strike at a venue where military personnel would be in attendance, was specific.  The evidence specifically referred to a planned attack, there had been surveillance and reconnoitring of the target, and that the bar area was in fact the specific target.  
	The Committee has also heard evidence and seen photographs and sketch plans of the area that was under attack, and it was clear that the applicants simply did not target a specific area, but attacked the buildings surrounding the main structure of the hotel, it would seem almost in a random manner.  Possibly one could explain that by saying that their intention was to create  as much panic, destruction,  damage, as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Well wasn't it, Mr Prior?  Wasn't this typical, where you want to go and cause alarm to the white community you shoot the whole place up?

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the target - their evidence was was it not, that the target had been selected and told to them in Lesotho?  They didn't walk around looking for a target, they had been given a target.  I'm not sure if it was Lesotho, but they - Umtata, they were sent as a unit to attack this target.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, Mr Madasi I think indicated that one Xhomiso had indicated to him to go to Fort Beaufort, but that was - if the Committee could just bear with me - and they were to meet at King William's Town, but that was certainly ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

ADV PRIOR: Yes, you're quite correct, that it may not have been Umtata/Lesotho, but it was certainly at a place other than Fort Beaufort that the attack was to take place, that the orders were given to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, at page 871.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was never challenged seriously, was it?

ADV PRIOR: No, it was never challenged seriously, Mr Chairman.