Human Rights Violation Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-06-11

ULRICH SCHELHASE: By Mr Prince Ngobincqwa and it was important because then the violence would most probably be totally uncontrollable, it was uncontrollable as it was.  And we specifically took Mr Ngobincqwa with us and I was, in a sense, embarrassed, because afterwards Mr Ngxobongwana said to me that I should ignore that person and I should not help him or work with him in any way.
 So that was actually why strategically I deemed it important that Mr Ngobincqwa went along and that he should get the message that not to try any tricks in Crossroads because it's going to worsen the situation.  And Mr Ngxobongwana must come back and face the music.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And were you present in the conversation between Mr Ngobincqwa and Mr Ngxobongwana?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: No Ma'am, I and Mr Lawrence personally have spoken to Mr Ngxobongwana and then there was a big meeting which we excused ourselves, and in any event the people spoke in Xhosa, so we left.  We went for lunch or something, I can't remember.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: What is very confusing to me is that you knew that Prince Ngobincqwa was planning a coup ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Well that was what we thought at the time.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And yet you took him to ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes it was part of the strategy.  If it was so he had to tell whether he wanted to do it or - I mean it was part of the revelation of the situation, of the - to bring these parties together and listen to what Mr Ngobincqwa's assessment was in the presence of Mr Ngxobongwana.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: But, but then you leave when Mr Ngxobongwana and Mr Ngobincqwa are talking ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: With others, yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: But wasn't that information important to you.  You say you wanted to expose Mr Ngobincqwa to Mr Ngxobongwana but you leave at that crucial moment?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Because I didn't think that it was my business Ma'am to get involved in internal struggles and power struggles amongst the leaders in Crossroads, so I left.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Sir I find that very difficult to believe, that you took this man all the way to East London to expose him because you heard that there was going to be a take-over and yet you don't even mention this - you don't sit for the discussion between him and - I find it very difficult.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: It may be to expose him is a little bit hard, but I wanted - I mean the reason why is that I would have liked Mr Ngxobongwana and Ngobincqwa to discuss the problems of Crossroads so that if anything comes out of the discussion which could make Mr Ngxobongwana suspicious or pre-warned that they would sort it out there, at the spot, and not bring the problems back to Crossroads and worsen the situation.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: So you were often invited at the government level to talk about the Oil Spot Strategy?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: And this document that we just identified actually supports the Oil Spot Strategy?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Which document Ma'am?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: The one that you translated.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: The paragraph 9?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Yes.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: This document went to a very high level, State level.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: I believe so, if I look at the stamp on the document, yes.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Would you then say that the strategy was supported by Cabinet?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Obviously.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: I want to repeat this question but in a different way.  You surely are aware of the on-going - you are aware of the on-going allegations even today and a court case that investigated security force complicity, and the attacks of the squatter camps by the Witdoeke, what again are your views on this?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: If I understand you correctly what was my ...(intervention)

MAPULE RAMASHALA: Ja, I mean what ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: What are my views on the attack?

MAPULE RAMASHALA: We've already established that the Development Board, the security forces and the police and the Witdoeke were working together, maybe not directly with the Development Board, as you said you did nothing to stop it.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Ja we were - our function was basically a support function in this whole strategic McEwan Strategy Ma'am.  I mean it would - I mean what could we have done to stop it?  I mean what could I, as an individual working in Crossroads, do to stop that type of violence.

MAPULE RAMASHALA: But you didn't want to stop it.  I mean the point is ...(intervention)

ULRICH SCHELHASE: It was convenient for me not to try and stop it, although I didn't agree with it necessarily but that's besides the point.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Burton.

MARY BURTON: Thank you Chairperson.  As I understand the Strategy, part of the McEwan Strategy, part of the plan would be to identify the Oil Spots where one could pacify and have an island of calm one might say.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes Ma'am.

MARY BURTON: Another part of it would also be to identify sources of dissatisfaction, possible sparks that might ignite conflict or perhaps more major things, and I would guess that one of the areas that would have had to be considered was the whole question of the pass laws and how they impacted on people's lives, would you say that the abolition of the pass laws was part of a strategy in a way?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: No Ma'am, I think practically the whole apparatus of State collapsed and that they couldn't uphold the pass law administration any longer.  It was ...(intervention)

MARY BURTON: Yes I think that's true that the very existence of Crossroads demonstrated the inability of the State to sustain it.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Absolutely, yes.

MARY BURTON: But perhaps nevertheless the strategic decision to abolish the pass laws at about that time fitted in quite well with the rest of the strategy.
 Now another of the potential sparks was the threatened move to Khayalitsha.  On the one hand that could have provided causes of conflict and did so.  On the other hand, from your point of view it was also going to create the capacity to develop Crossroads by making more space.

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Yes.

MARY BURTON: You've talked about your passion for developing Crossroads, would the needs of Khayalitsha have also fallen under your jurisdiction?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: At first yes Ma'am, until 1986.

MARY BURTON: So there should have been a parallel pressure to develop Khayalitsha?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: Well from 1984 onwards Khayalitsha was - they developed it yes.  I mean I still escorted and assisted the first 67 persons from KTC who moved to Khayalitsha.

MARY BURTON: I think we can see this, the various different strands of the thinking coming together in a way, in this whole incident, but the thing that is perhaps difficult to explain is the very senior attention that was paid to it.  You had high powered delegations of people coming down from Pretoria to be briefed about the situation.  I'd like to ask you about that in a moment, but why, in your opinion, was it the focus of such very high level interest?

ULRICH SCHELHASE: To be honest with you Madam, I think there was a paucity in government thinking about how to address the revolution, and that once this McEwan strategy was presented by the military it made sense in a way, but to uphold such a system as I explained just now needs all the resources one can muster.  The first, most important resource, is a decision.  I mean if we talk about R18 million worth of housing development as part of a pacification scheme then we need people who can make decisions of R18 million, which wasn't me.  But you needed -and in that context it became important that top level management should become involved in the system and that they know about it which would probably make their decision-making easier.