Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: No, in anticipation, because you must remember on the 8th of April the fax was already sent by the Minister to Pitter, that portion that I read.  He received instructions from Malan to go and sell the covert section of the organogram to Buthelezi.  And in the meantime, between the 8th - this document was sent to Pitter.  Obviously there was communication between Buthelezi and Groenewald, or no, not Groenewald, van Niekerk, because van Niekerk was by then already appointed to be the project leader.  And it was already anticipated, and arrangements were made, that on the 16th they will start off the training.  Because they were quite convinced that they have reached this agreement, and on the basis of this telex of the 8th, where it says - let me just get that portion again.  (Pause)
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This is a document that you haven't got.
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CHAIRMAN

CHAIRPERSON: So who would have authorised the recruitment and the sending of the people then to Caprivi to start training on the 16th?

MR DE VOS: These discussions took place a long time before, or some time before the 16th.  There were discussions, you recall, when Groenewald went to see the Minister, the Chief Minister.  There were discussions about training, how many people would be trained, and it was anticipated that at a certain date so many people would be transferred for training.

CHAIRPERSON: So who - where did final authority come from, because you've referred to several documents in January and February as discussion documents and planning documents.  Does - I mean I am not suggesting that you're keeping anything from us, I am just - we are very interested to know where, and at what level, and by whom, these people were recruited and sent to Caprivi for training to start on the 16th of April.  I mean that is something which seems to have eluded everybody.

MR DE VOS: I must say Minister Malan testified that the whole process of assistance to be given to Buthelezi was discussed by Cabinet, and that permission was given therefor.  That was his evidence in the KwaMakutha trial.

CHAIRPERSON: But there are no Cabinet minutes to that effect.

MR DE VOS: I haven't seen any.  We didn't - at that stage we couldn't get any minutes of Cabinet meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, do you - look, we can dig up the reference to General Malan's evidence later, but would it - unless you've got it easily available.  Okay, would it be fair to then say that clearly the authority for this
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operation had already been given by Cabinet, but that what was being worked out here were the finer details?   (End of Side B, Tape 2)

MR DE VOS: On the 7th Minister Malan wrote a letter to Minister Heunis which is referred to in the telex dated the 8th, and he informed Heunis about a certain portion of the Marion project.  He didn't say anything about the paramilitary aspects, because he said that was interdepartmental.  Now, one must I think accept, on the basis from my client's point of view, they got instructions within the military, and you carry it out, especially as the Minister testified at a later stage to state it was discussed and permission was granted.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, no one's suggesting your client, as far as I can see, in this regard acted unlawfully specifically, but the issue is simply - we all know that any organisation takes some time for logistical things of this nature to happen.  For these people to have been in the Caprivi by the 16th, and start their training on the 16th, a whole range of other things would have had to have been approved way in advance of that, and that's just a  matter of plain logic.

MR DE VOS: But you will recall - I think was it the meeting that Groenewald had with Buthelezi, when all Buthelezi's needs were sort of spelled out - how many - I saw some document at some stage, I think also prepared by - I am not sure whether it's van Niekerk, where he also dealt with all the requisites and various other aspects.  So there was planning, but one must remember in those days the army were quite capable of doing such things in a very short period, in the sense that they could plan and
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execute within a couple of days.  And it was obviously a matter of high priority because the State Security - or the security situation was such that there was a problem.

CHAIRPERSON: You see, what couldn't have been done within a few days, and this is the evidence we've heard, is the actual recruitment of the individuals.  That took a couple of weeks for people to be told, and to assemble at that same place, the Nhlongwane camp, to be selected, be spoken to, be assessed in some way for their - the evidence we have is that they spent two weeks there before they left, so at the very least by the end of March these people already knew that they should come for training of some kind.