Amnesty Hearings — Johannesburg — UNKNOWN

GEN VAN DER MERWE: As a direct result of this particularrevolutionary climate the South African Police and the South AfricanDefence Force were compelled to pool their various resources tocombat the ever increasing tide of unrest and violence.  Jointplanning was undertaken in terms of the various structures ofthe national management system which functioned under the authorityof the
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State Security Council and which also incorporated the constitutional,economic and social affairs cabinet committees.  All governmentdepartments were eventually drawn into the national managementsystem in an all-out effort to find solutions to the ever-increasingsecurity problem.  However, despite all these efforts describedabove the security situation in South Africa continued to deteriorateand the climate of violence and unrest increase.   Members ofthe security branch of the South African Police came to experienceharsh practical problems in communicating with their sources oragents and even being able to ensure their personal safety. Incases where the slightest suspicion existed the suspected informeror agent was eliminated, sometimes in the most brutal fashion. Incidents such as car bomb explosions, limpet mine and hand grenadeattacks and other acts of terror which members of the police andtheir families as well as ordinary civilians were exposed to overa lengthy period of time were to lead to a hardening of attitudesand the creation of a climate of hate, both within the ranks ofthe police as well as that of the civilian population.  Thesefeelings of emotion reached new peaks every time innocent anddefenceless women and children were the victims and this was furtherexacerbated by the feelings of frustration which existed amongstmembers upon realising that their ability to protect both theircolleagues and the community against such terror attacks was becomingmore and more limited.
 The fact that both MK and eventually the Azanian People's LiberationArmy, APLA, members started using neighbouring frontline statesas a springboard for launching their armed attacks against theRepublic led directly to the 3A establishment/...
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establishment of a cross-border capability aimed at eliminatingor neutralising this very real threat.  
 A counter-revolutionary intelligence task team was created andcomprised members of the National Intelligence Service, the SouthAfrican Police and the South African Defence Force.  It was theirtask to properly evaluate and coordinate all intelligence regardingthe revolutionary threat facing the Republic and especially withregard to identifying and prioritising political targets whichposed such a threat.  These threats could be in the form of anindividual, a group, an organisation and accommodation or logisticalfacility and were prioritised in terms of the level of potentialdestabilisation each target posed.  
 In this particular regard another aspect which must be bornein mind is the fact that this task team were of necessity alsorequired to look at the internal situation as the revolutionaryactivity of the insurgents escalated.  This included situationsregarding ...(indistinct) who assisted the insurgents with accommodation,storage facilities, transport, financial assistance as well asproviding active assistance in the establishment of arms cachesand in some instances the actual transporting in a clandestinefashion of such arms and explosives.  Armed attacks my MK andAPLA insurgents were therefore often followed by cross-borderraids aimed at utilising the intelligence provided by the taskteam referred to so as to neutralise the facility of your concern.
 The prevailing circumstances which I have sketched up to thispoint would have a further dimension, perhaps already alludedto namely, both the lowering of the morale of the community andthe security forces and the hardening 
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of attitudes amongst both groupings.   This was accompanied bythe belief that the enemy had to destroy no matter what.  Thisoutlook was in turn aggravated to a great extent by speeches andpronouncements by ...(indistinct) and commanding officers in varioussectors of the security forces.
 It is undoubtedly so that militaristic and political inspiredspeeches often made it difficult for the security forces becomingmore and more emotionally involved to be able to distinguish betweenthat which was normally justifiable in terms of the law and thatwhich was not.  This status quo led to members of the securitybranch who had to deal with the most horrendous manifestationsof violence on a day-to-day basis ultimately becoming equallydisillusioned and negatively influenced regarding these matters.
 During 1986 I personally became involved in a situation wherecertain drastic measures had been implemented in order to protectand save the lives of Black members of the South African Police. At this juncture I was a commanding officer of the security branchand certain reliable properly evaluated information had been receivedto the effect that a group of activists were planning armed attackson the private residence of Black members of the South AfricanPolice who resided in a number of townships on the East Rand. I may point out at this particular stage many of the townshipson the East Rand, including Thokoza, Katlehong, Deduza, Daveytonand Vosloorus were amongst the most politicised and destabilisedin the Province of Transvaal.  This situation was to continueinto the 1990's and the activities of the SDU's in these areaswere eventually to be 3A subjected/...
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subjected to intense scrutiny and investigation by various sub-committeesof the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry.
 It is unquestionably so that since the implementation of thepeople's war strategy during 1984 the South African Police wereexperiencing greater and greater difficulties in both maintaininga proper presence in the townships on the East Rand and Vaal Triangle,carrying out effective policing in the said areas. 
 At the time it was the declared intention of the ANC/SACP alliance,assisted by such organisations as the ANC Youth League, Cosatuand various civic organisations to literally drive the policemenfrom the townships.  This was to be accompanied by utilising anymeans of violence specifically at policemen which is clearly illustratedby the steadily increasing death rate amongst policemen over aperiod of time.  For example during the period 1973 to 1979, 76policemen were killed, the period 1980 to 1990 270, and 1991,161, '92 224, in 1993 267.
 In regard to the instances referred to in the preceding paragraphit became very obvious that any attempt to arrest the activistsconcerned and bring them before court would be futile to say theleast.  Primarily due to the high intimidation factor which precludedany witnesses from coming forward.  It also became equally obviousthat the life of the informer concerned would also be in the gravestdanger should any such action be taken.
 It was also abundantly clear that other preventative measureswould have to be taken so as to protect the lives of the policemenconcerned who by now were very frightened and totally demoralised. Information to hand indicated very clearly that the group ofactivists concerned were only 
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awaiting the delivery of a consignment of hand grenades from anarms cache before launching their attacks against the homes ofthe policemen.
 After due consideration of all the relevant facts I decided thatthe only way the Black members could be protected against suchattacks was to ensure that the activists were provided with handgrenades which had been suitably modified.  Modifications to thetiming mechanism fuse of the grenades would ensure that any personthrowing such hand grenades at the home of a policeman would beaffected first due to the shortened time delay.  I then made arecommendation to this effect to the then Commissioner of PoliceGeneral Johan Coetzee who in turn presented the recommendationto the Minister.  Louis Le Grange was then the Minister of Police. Mr Le Grange approved the relevant recommendation.  I thereafterdiscussed the matter with Brigadier Jack Cronje and duly delegatedthe execution of the task to him.  He was pertinently instructedto ensure that the modified hand grenades reached the group ofactivists under the guise of having been furnished by the ANC. Under no circumstances was any incitement to commit an offencetherewith to take place.  They were merely to be handed over tothe group and any further action by utilising the grenades wasto be left to the group themselves.
 A number of hand grenades and a limpet mine were later channelledto the group of activists through a certain person who had contactwith them.  It later transpired that a number of these activistswere killed and injured when they launched a series of armed attacksagainst the homes of policemen resident in the area.  Anotheractivist was also killed when attempting to sabotage an electricalsubstation 
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by using a limpet mine.
 During 1988 I received an instruction from Mr Adrian Vlok thenMinister of Law and Order to the effect that the building knownas Khotso House was to be damaged by explosives to such an extentthat it could no longer be utilised.  According to Mr Vlok thisinstruction had come from President P W Botha personally.  Itwas common knowledge within security circles at the time thatthe building concerned served as a sort-of internal headquartersof the ANC where resistance campaigns, unrest and violence wereplanned and where financial and other assistance was providedto MK members who had infiltrated into the country.  Accordingto information explosives were also stored in the basement ofthe building.
 Despite being in possession of a great deal of information regardingcertain unlawful activities taking place within Khotso House thePolice were powerless in putting a stop to it as no informer oragent was prepared to give evidence in court regarding such activity. Mr Vlok was emphatic in stating that the maximum effort mustbe made to ensure that no lives were put at risk when carryingout the operation.
 I then delegated the instruction to Brigadier Willem Schoon,who at that stage commanded the Vlakplaas Unit and once againemphasised the question of not putting lives at risk.  The instructionwas duly carried out at a later date and the building was so badlydamaged it was rendered no usable.
 I am fully aware of the fact that the actions of various membersof the security branch and other members of the South AfricanPolice, as defined in certain instances 
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which may be placed before this Committee, as well as that ofthe Human Rights Violation Committee may in present circumstanceswhere proper knowledge and awareness of the background to theviolence and ...(indistinct), as well as the emotions involvedis gradually fading appear to be cold-blooded and murderous ofnature.
 I am also equally aware of the fact that there are many membersof MK and Apla who were directly involved in the conflict whoare currently wrestling with identical problems to those beingexperienced by serving and former members of the South AfricanPolice and services.  Because of the variety of individual andgroup perceptions and problems the said members of the South AfricanPolice and the services as well as those of MK and Apla are decidedlyunwilling to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commissionor to give evidence.  
 For this very reason under the guidance of Deputy President ThaboMbeki various discussions were held between former members ofthe security branch, the South African Defence Force and MK inan effort to start a process to convince those concerned to presentthemselves to the Commission so as to be able to place the pastin its proper perspective.
 Thank you Mr Chairman.