Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-09-29

CHAIRPERSON: But, you are talking about people now being the target, if you struck at an electric installation, electrical installation in a suburban area, that is not Military or Security Force, but that would have been a legitimate target?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: That is seen as part of infrastructure and it will blacken out an area or something.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is what I am saying.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: It is acceptable.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because to use the words civilian targets, it might include electrical installations.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Thank you Mr Chairperson.  Civilian personnel.

ADV PRIOR: I think we were just limiting the ambit of the question even further, that and I was coming to the car bomb situation, the instruction there was that a car bomb would be aimed at killing as many enemy personnel as possible?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And that was part of, one of the objectives?  It seems to me that it is conceded that the very nature of a car bomb is that it causes indiscriminate damage and one cannot always control the direction or the extent of the blast and of the damage?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, it depends on the way it is placed, where it is placed, etc.  You may find that a car bomb could actually be more accurate than for instance a rocket, depending on the distance from where it was launched, where it was launched from, etc.  A car bomb as I have previously described, was seen as a mechanism for delivery.  Just as in rocket, you have other mechanisms for delivery, in this case the car was seen as a delivery mechanism.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, it could arrive at a particular spot under its own steam as it were?  Yes, that is conceded for example if the car bomb was placed next to a bus full of Military personnel, the affects would be as desired?   Would you agree that if one wanted to take out personnel in a particular area, for example a room, for example like the Why Not bar, possibly a more efficient way was to have the explosive device in that locality?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: If one could get it in there, yes.

ADV PRIOR: It seems from the Second Submission of the ANC that a concession has been made that - and they call it the MAGOOS and not the Why Not bar - but the explosion at the Parade Hotel, there seems to be a concession that that, because of what was learnt subsequent to the explosion, there were problems with that operation, would that be a too loose a description?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, a bit loose.  I think the ANC said that they understood that Intelligence or information existed which was that off duty Security personnel were there, it seems from the outcome of it, that there weren't perhaps as many as were thought at the time, but that is not something that could have been controlled.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: And for that, they sought to explain that.  But they still took responsibility for it.

ADV PRIOR: Yes.   As the Commander of Special Operations at the time, did you receive any report back from Mr McBride as to the extent of the attack and the success rate, in other words how many Military personnel or Security personnel were injured, as in the case of the Chamberlain Road where Col Wellman was killed, or subsequently died?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Unfortunately not.  Comrade Robert was arrested before he was able to come out of the country after that operation, and subsequent operations, and we never then had the opportunity to talk about it.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Ismail if we, and there has been some doubt as to whether any actively serving Security Force personnel were in the pub at the time, but on the supposition and on the hypothesis that there were in fact no Security personnel, would you agree that the operation then had been seriously compromised by a lack of proper Intelligence or information?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, again, I must state, there is no reason why we would doubt the information that Mr McBride had and that he said to us look, he had information where Security Force personnel were concentrated.

ADV PRIOR: And you accepted that he had done diligent reconnaissance?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, all the operations indicated they were diligent in all the work that they did.  They were very successful, a very capable unit, highly respected.

ADV PRIOR: Was the emphasis as I understood your evidence, that the legitimate target would be a concentration of enemy personnel?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, that is so.

ADV PRIOR: And just by way of example, five policemen in a pub of 100 civilians, would that be an acceptable concentration to attack in those circumstances?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: No, I would say a much larger number.

ADV PRIOR: All right, that would be relative to the - the political objective was important and paramount at all stages throughout the armed struggle, was it not?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And the political impact of any operation or I want to rephrase that, not only the military success was important, but it had to serve a political objective?  In other words it had to achieve something, is that correct?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: Because like the Chamberlain Road incident, that was almost used as a blueprint for future operations, I think as you had alluded to yesterday?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Yes, it was instructed to us.

ADV PRIOR: And it was a success, it had achieved the desired objectives and it could be used also to bolster, muster support, popular support?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Certainly so, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And obviously something that was calculated at not reaching those objectives, would not have been easily countenanced by the upper command or the high command?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, if they had problems, they would have raised them.

ADV PRIOR: Finally, when I referred to the record of Mr McBride's trial, it seems that the tack that was taken there, was to disclaim any involvement or instruction or knowledge on the part of the ANC?  It seems from my reading of the evidence, is that it was something that he decided to do in collaboration with Mr Lecordier and there are varying views as to who actually decided on the end, or the target, being the Parade Hotel.   Can you think of any reason why he would not have, why he would have disclaimed that the ANC, that this was part of the armed struggle?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, perhaps because when it concerned ANC members, etc, if anything, they got stiffer sentences.  It is one possibility, I mean these are all on the terrain of suppositions, etc.  Nothing really turns on it.

ADV PRIOR: Lastly, he had indicated to the Court that he could by acting as he did, face disciplinary steps by the ANC?  Would that have been in line with what usually happened, should an operation not have conformed with ANC or MK policy?

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Well, comrades were called in, they were talked to, people were asked to explain what they were doing, what their objectives were, etc.  In this case, had comrade Robert come back, we would have spoken about it, looked at the way he went about it, what were the failures, what did he look at if there were any, what was he trying to do, what was the outcome of it, how could we have improved it?  Any suggestion that  you know we would simply mete out punitive action against operatives who in good faith went out to carry out an operation, is not so.  I don't think this was the style of the ANC, certainly that was not my approach to command.

ADV PRIOR: And lastly, would it have been difficult for yourself or the ANC as a whole, to have reproached Mr McBride for the Parade Hotel incident particularly in the light of the fact that he had already established himself as a legend, a hero as you put it?  In other words what I am saying is, would it not have been politically expedient to take him on board as it were, rather than reproach him?