Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-19

BONGANI FINCA: Thank you Chairperson.  My second question is of course on your comment on Colonel Chris Nel who is going to come before the Commission this afternoon.  There is a ...(tape ends)   ....which are called International Researchers, which was later called the Ciskei Intelligence Service, we have information that Anton Nieuwoudt, who was the chief of this organisation actually confirmed in the Supreme Court in a case between himself and the RSA government, that this International Researchers was in fact an SADF undercover operation with an aim to use Ciskei as a base to attack Transkei and the ANC.  What you are saying in your page 6 is that in fact this Colonel Chris Nel supplied you with information which you now doubt is confirmed in this allegation by Anton Nieuwoudt.  Could we have your comment on that scenario?  And also if you can tell us how many people got killed with the information that was supplied to you by these gentlemen with this kind of background?

UNKNOWN: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Mr Chairman I must say that I was also warned many times, of course I knew that Pretoria had various agencies planted all over the Ciskei administration and even in parastatals, some were even having a front offices in places.  It's unfortunate that you never find that information when actually it is gnawing and undermining your administration until late when you start hearing these things.  For instance Nieuwoudt I knew him personally as one of my captains at 21 battalion when I was still a corporal or a sergeant.  He was a very good instructor.  So I liked him and when I wanted a serious-minded, highly trained intelligence officer I called for him.  I knew where he was because I was a military attache in Pretoria and I'd met him in places, and I was shocked when I heard this, after they had resigned, after they actually they had to disband, I was shocked, but that was confirmed through various other things, and through various other things which in retrospect we looked at.
 But I must say also, answering both your questions on this one, when they were working with me they were very loyal to the extent that while we were on a job they gave me all the assurance, and I got the impression that they were doing what I wanted them to do.  When Chris Nel, after I resigned in 1994, when he made various disclosures that he was actually responsible for toppling me through feeding me, you know, various untruths and propaganda to infuriate me or to make me leave other people and so on, I was shocked but I was not surprised because I expected that, in many cases intelligence officers are called, in Afrikaans they are called "hore?", they work for this and they work for that for money.  So what I want to say here is that even if they worked against me they never showed in my presence, and all the time that I was working with them they gave me all the necessary respect and cooperation, but I know of the potential of damage that many, many planted agents of Pretoria did to me.  They undermined my relationship with certain people for fear that should I have connections with these people their agendas would either be exposed or we would be a strong foe against them, but even in that scenario they knew that I had an original mind, I wanted things originally and from the heart.  I believe that what my spirit tells me in terms of way forward, I must follow  it.  So in many cases they had trouble with dissuading me from doing what I wanted to do.  I would agree that there is many things that I didn't know that were being fed through my system for the ends of the South African Government, and to destroy whatever initiative that would have perhaps impacted positively on the Ciskeian people, and the development of political development of South Africa.

MR POTGIETER: Thank you very much.  We want to wrap up in the next minute or so.  Mr Sandi?

MR SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Mr Gqozo can you please be more specific about the Ciskei Military Intelligence, when was it formed?  How was it formed?  Who was involved in its formation?  What was the role of the Military Intelligence of South Africa?  And I would like to know specifically what strategies and tactics were adopted in relation to political organisations and in particular the African National Congress which in your testimony you've made it very clear that you were not getting on well with them?  Thank you.

UNKNOWN: Thank you.  Mr Chairman the Military Intelligence is usually formed immediately after the whole defence force is being formed, it's part of the factions or the departments within the thing.  So the Military Intelligence was formed ...(intervention)

MR SANDI: Perhaps Mr Gqozo if I can interrupt you a little, in the interests of time can I ask you to be very brief and straightforward the way you answer questions, and please leave out all peripheral issues which have nothing to do with the questions I have raised.  Thank you.

UNKNOWN: The Intelligence was part of a structure of a defence force whose task was to collect information and intelligence.  There was two types of information,
information relating to friendly forces and information relating to hostile forces of the government and of the military ...(intervention)

MR SANDI: Who was classified as hostile forces?

UNKNOWN: Any organisation which opposed the government at any point in time would be classified hostile forces, traditionally ...(intervention)

MR SANDI: At that particular point in time which organisation was opposing your government?

UNKNOWN: When I took over?  When I took over we didn't regard, because I was happy that President Mandela was released, I was happy that the ANC and all the other liberation movements were operating, they were not enemies.  Our enemy both for all of us was crime and elements which hijacked the liberation struggle to actually perpetrate crimes.  So I wouldn't say they were enemies but traditionally, within a government context any organisation which seeks to overthrow that government by subversion, by propaganda or by disinformation will be regarded as information worth targeting to bring to the attention of the government and to see what areas the government can improve to ensure that there is harmony in that area.

MR SANDI: Mr Gqozo, Mr Chairperson maybe you will bear with me just for a minute, I am talking specifically about the time when somehow and for some reason or another there were problems between the ANC and your government ...(intervention)

BONGANI FINCA: Mr Sandi is still continuing with questions, will you please just bear with us and sit down.

MR SANDI: Mr Gqozo the questions I intend to put to you revolve around the existence of the Military Intelligence in the Ciskei.  I am talking about the time when there were problems between the ANC and your government, I will not go into those problems and say what they were, but what tactics and strategies were adopted by your military intelligence advisors as to how those organisations should be dealt with?