Amnesty Hearings — Boksburg — 1998-09-15

MR PRINSLOO: Well at least a day or two before the elections or the evening before the elections we would determine that he was definitely going to participate and at that stage we hoped that this was only political talk but I personally - unfortunately I cannot speak on behalf of the applicants, but I personally viewed this as strictly some sort of trick which he was playing in order to occupy a position of power within the new dispensation which was to follow.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you agree with that tactic?

MR PRINSLOO: General Viljoen's tactic?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all.

CHAIRPERSON: As they saw it, that it was simply a ploy in order to occupy a position of power within the new dispensation, however he didn't really sell the right-wingers out.

MR PRINSLOO: I don't really understand what you mean.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, you thought that he was still right-wing oriented, however he participated in the elections simply to occupy a position of power in the new dispensation so that he could continue with his right-wing politics.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you believe him, did you think that that was the right thing to do?

MR PRINSLOO: Well it was too late by them.  There were those who believed, those who worked narrowly with him.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you realised that this was a possibility - let me put it to you this way, did you accept this as a tactic which was something that you could live with?

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage nobody who I knew trusted him.  The right-wingers on ground level at that stage didn't trust any right-wing leader anymore.

CHAIRPERSON: So could he have been killed during the elections and if he had, would that have affected you at all?

MR PRINSLOO: He still enjoyed quite a bit of support and popularity amongst his army command members and large areas in the rural areas.  I don't know what the consequences of such an occurrence would have been.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, I just want to follow this up.
	At that stage you said, if I heard you correctly, that the right-wingers on grassroots level didn't trust any right-wing leader anymore, is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, on that evening.

MR MALAN: Before the election?

MR PRINSLOO: That evening.  Well that is my personal view and that is what I picked from within the field.

MR MALAN: Was Mr Terreblanche one of those right-wing leaders who the right-wingers on grassroots level couldn't trust anymore?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, to a certain extent.

MR MALAN: Were the generals in staff part of the right-wingers on grassroots level?

MR PRINSLOO: The generals in staff were definitely members of the right-wing.

MR MALAN: On grassroots level?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, at that stage.

MR MALAN: Are you trying to tell me or am I inferring that there was a split between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche, that there were tensions?

MR PRINSLOO: There was tension indeed.

MR MALAN: Did the generals in staff determine the police of the AWB or attempt to determine the policy of the AWB from time to time, against Mr Terreblanche or what was the nature of the tension?

MR PRINSLOO: Not in all cases.  Regarding the military it remained external.  What I mean by tensions is that there were political tensions, should attempts be made to negotiate or shouldn't there be attempts to negotiate, should we contact other groups or not.

MR MALAN: Let's just take the issue of negotiation or not, you said that that was part of the political tensions between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche, who took up which opinion?

MR PRINSLOO: Specifically with regard to negotiation, Constand Viljoen and Ferdie Hartzenberg.

MR MALAN: No, I'm speaking about the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche.  You said that there were tensions between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche and you said that these were political tensions.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MALAN: And then I asked you about the nature thereof and you said that one of the issues was to negotiate or not.

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

MR MALAN: Did the generals in staff have a different position to Mr Terreblanche regarding this issue?

MR PRINSLOO: When I mentioned negotiation I meant that at that stage we were reassured by General Viljoen that large numbers of his army command or former army command supporters in the rural areas, and more specifically in Western Transvaal, would have wholeheartedly supported us and the other means which were promised to us, it was assured to us.
	At that stage during the elections or the day before that or the evening before that, it was no longer certain, the certainty wasn't there anymore, whether we could still rely on his promises.  That is where the tension was.

MR MALAN: Were you angry at Mr Terreblanche because he wasn't sure?  What was the nature of the tension between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche?  Did you blame him because you were not certain about the support of Viljoen?

MR PRINSLOO: No, ...[end of tape]

MR MALAN: ...[inaudible] the tensions between the generals in staff, leave Viljoen out of this, what was the differences between the generals in staff and the leader, Mr Terreblanche that created this tension?

MR PRINSLOO: You must realise that at that stage I just moved in and out between the game farm, the members, ...[intervention]

MR MALAN: No, no, Mr Prinsloo, you are talking about tension between the generals in staff and Mr Terreblanche and you had knowledge of this otherwise you would not have mentioned this.  What was the reason for this tension?

MR PRINSLOO: Sometimes there were small things, for example, if a person would co-operate with a leader of another group or the availability of logistics and equipment, then he would deny it or disapprove, then it had to be discussed by the generals in staff, and that is where the tension was created at certain times.
	The right-wing was also afraid because they knew that some of the members and the applicants, the people were scared.  They knew that there were arrests to come ...[intervention]

MR MALAN: At that stage did the generals in staff not trust Mr Terreblanche anymore?  Were they not satisfies with his judgement, is that what you're saying?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all, it's not that.  I believe that in any para-military movement there would always be tension in a war situation.

MR NEL: Between the head of the military unit and its soldiers?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.

MR MALAN: Do you honestly believe it?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, I was in the Defence Force.

MR MALAN: Was there tension between you and General Viljoen or General Meiring or whoever?

MR PRINSLOO: One cannot always agree with a general or commander or brigadier's viewpoint, with regards to an instruction or an operation that had to be executed.

MR MALAN: i'm going to ask the last question concerning this and then I'm going to leave it there.  What you are talking about now, about men that do not agree is not, you cannot compare this, we are talking about the top structure in this para-military unit, the AWB.   Where there was tension between the leader and this top-level structure.  That is what you've told us.  In other words the tension is amongst the generals in staff as a body and the leader.
	For the last time, would you like to try and explain to us what the nature of this tension was?  It means that the generals in staff had a view of something and where the leader had a different view.  This is how I read you, otherwise I'm reading you completely incorrectly.

MR PRINSLOO: It was just that - let us state an example, if we wanted Mr Terreblanche to make contact with Mr Hartzenberg or Viljoen and he said no, he is not interested in it, then some people in the generals in staff would then have said: "But why, what is the reason, let us discuss this".  I am talking about that tension that sometimes appeared.