Special Hearings — Trojan Horse Hearings — 1997-05-21

MR NTSEBEZA: But you were aware that there were meetings of that ...(intervention)

SALMON PIENAAR: I was aware of the meetings.

MR NTSEBEZA: Did you ever get any briefings from people who had attended meetings of the State Security Council?

SALMON PIENAAR: The only briefings that we really got was when, I think you handed out one this morning, that gave an extended briefing on the planning of, say for instance, the GBS, that must have been a decision up high, or on Intelligence Reports that cover the whole country, yes that was given to us.

MR NTSEBEZA: Oh I see.  For instance one of these documents which appears to have been a briefing is a document called Nationale Bestuurstelsel?

SALMON PIENAAR: That's right.

MR NTSEBEZA: And I don't know if you have a copy of that particular document.

SALMON PIENAAR: I have a copy, is it no. ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Ja AM32 is that it Mr Ntsebeza, it was marked for us by Mr Khoisan?

MR NTSEBEZA: Well this one - I don't know it doesn't seem to have a ....

ADV DE JAGER: Can we perhaps approach you and compare because it would be nice if we can follow what you are talking about?

MR NTSEBEZA: It is Annexure 41.

ADV DE JAGER: Sir we are ad idem, we know which document you are referring to if you can show us the page which you would like to, we will page to it.

MR NTSEBEZA: Thanks Advocate de Jager.  I am on page 4 actually.

ADV DE JAGER: We haven't got a page 4 but can you give us a moment.  Ours starts on page 7.

MR NTSEBEZA: Oh no, well I don't know.  It's where it talks about statistic ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Ja, we've got it.

MR NTSEBEZA: Now ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: We are with you Sir.

MR NTSEBEZA: When was - was this thing ever discussed at the JOC meetings, the contents of this particular page in terms of what we identified as the aims of the enemy, (...indistinct), the enemy targets and the "omvang", the total onslaught, were these ever discussed as part of your JOC meetings?

SALMON PIENAAR: This was never discussed at the JOC meetings but I was fully briefed on this by South African Defence Force Staff.

MR NTSEBEZA: And was it, I am just trying to find out the sense of what the thinking was at the time, was it to your knowledge the thinking of people in the South African Defence Force that the enemy, or the enemy targets from the perspective of those who drew this document where the population, especially the Black and Brown people and communities were the targets, now was that the perspective of also the SADF?

SALMON PIENAAR: Maybe I will describe and Mr de Jager will follow-up on what I am saying.  Whenever you receive a briefing you get it in writing, you deduct your own perspectives on that.  I would say to you in terms of my understanding, yes, let's agree to it, that the philosophy behind what was going in South Africa is, is that you must organise the masses and truly or not truly but my perception was that the basis of the masses was within the Coloured and Black communities, because of political structures etc, etc.  But there were also many Whites who were seen, as within this philosophy of who is the enemy and who is not the enemy.
Can I say it to you this way, my perspective is you couldn't identify the enemy within a racist bracket, but I do say to you, yes my perspective was also that most of it was going on in the Black and the Coloured areas, yes because they were the people who suffered under the regime of apartheid. I must agree to that.

MR NTSEBEZA: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Excuse me.  Mr Ntsebeza just to avoid a misunderstanding I don't know whether I understood you correctly but there may be a misunderstanding as to the contents of 32.   The first time I read it it sounded as though the Vyandelike teiken in Afrikaans, refers to a target of the Defence Force, but reading it in context it appears to me that what it says is that the target of the enemy in Afrikaans, "die vyandelike teiken", and so it explains that is the enemy of the State is the bevolking vir al die Bruin en die Swart woongebiede, is that the way you understand it?

MR NTSEBEZA: And who would be the enemy?

ADV DE JAGER: Pardon?

MR NTSEBEZA: And then who would be the enemy?

ADV DE JAGER: Well the enemy would be those who attacked the State and their target would be the Black people and the Brown people to organise them in revolution, that sounds to me that ...(intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes, ja ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Do we agree on that.

MR NTSEBEZA: In fact I think there is something to be said about that interpretation when one basically ...(intervention)

SALMON PIENAAR: Can I just add that we can quote from previous things being said that where does our strength lie, that is in the masses.  It's been said, you know about it and I know about it, as far as the Defence Force perspective was that those people who wanted to revolutionise the State that was their target to mass them up against - that's how I understood it.  I do understand it even today like that.

MR NTSEBEZA: Yes it may well be that that is an interpretation.  Now in other words are you saying that the aim of this document was to say the population is targeted by the enemies of the State?

SALMON PIENAAR: Let's not do shadow-boxing.  We know who the enemy of the State at that time was and we know who the State was.  Those people identified by the State as the enemy, they had a target between them and the State and those people were the masses and unfortunately it was connected to Black and Coloured people. Yes it is so.

MR NTSEBEZA: Is it then your evidence, if I understand you well that in October on the 15th when you came to an ordinary meeting with JOC yours was to see in what way your troops or the people who were under your command were in the ordinary course going to supply a supportive role to the daily operations of the bullies and the members of the South African Railway police?

SALMON PIENAAR: That's correct.

MR NTSEBEZA: Is it your evidence, if I must understand it well therefore that there wasn't ever a situation where the planning of any operation would be by your unit and the unit from the Railway Police and the Police?

SALMON PIENAAR: Let me explain to you this way.  I, in my time remember of one such an operation that was done in the area where we're sitting at the moment.  The South African Police identified at that stage that there were people who were precisely doing what we suggested as vyandelike teiken earlier, in other words, organise the masses against the State, and there was decided on an operation, it is called in military terms, a cordon and search operation.   In other words you cordoned the area off and you send in search teams to see if you can find the guilty people.  That is a joint operation, but that was normally not planned within the JOC, that was planned in the higher hierarchy and I was given my command from high commanders, how I should partake in it, the police received them from theirs, there is a commander but I'm not responsible to them.  I will liaise with them if I find any problems but I am under command of a higher commander.  If I was in charge, I was supposed to report on the part that I fulfil, but in the JOC we never had an operation in my time with the same characteristics as the one I've just explained to you.

MR NTSEBEZA: But did you ever meet as heads of these operational units to discuss matters of joint operations on a daily basis because it seems to me that in, this is the impression that you created certainly in some of the statements that you gave earlier in connection with this matter?