Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-23

J A STEYN: Chairperson, if I say, with all respect, keep it under observation, what I mean by this is that he would put in place all possibilities to take this matter further.  It was difficult to discuss it with wider people because at that stage we, in the Security Branch, had knowledge that of our Intelligence Services had been infiltrated by the ANC.

MR LAX: Carry on, Mr Wills.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask one more thing before we let you -  As I understand what I was told, I haven't checked up and my memory confirm it, but Mr Visser told me that Col Botha was in charge of the Intelligence in Natal.

J A STEYN: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now wasn't it probable that people like Mr Maharaj, Kasrils and others might be elsewhere in the country?

J A STEYN: It is possible Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Surely if there's information about what appears to be a very important ANC structure, one wouldn't leave it to Natal to inquire into it?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, the only answer that I have to this is that myself and Botha handled this matter.  We were infiltrated.  We had the information at our disposal and it was difficult at that stage to discuss it widely with other instances, with other intelligence units.  On the one hand because we were not sure of the seriousness of this matter and on the other hand, the possibility of who in our office would become aware of this and if facts had to be contained in this.

MR WILLS: The why did you go and see Mr Basie Smit and those other number of generals on the 10th and the 11?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, this was after Col Botha had spoken to Ndaba and had gained more information and this is after they illegally had broken into houses at places of the ANC and had gained further information and this placed the matter in a completely different light.

MR WILLS: The point is, is that you obviously trusted your seniors and that's why you went to them, on your evidence, you had the full information.  What I'm saying to you is why didn't you go to your seniors whom you trusted when you got the information about the senior people being in the country?

J A STEYN: We were not sure about this information Chairperson, we probably as it seems, we underestimated it.

MR WILLS: Mr Maharaj was arrested outside of Natal, is that correct, to your knowledge?

J A STEYN: If I can remember correctly, in Jo'burg.

MR WILLS: When were you informed about the fact that Ndaba had been arrested?  On the same day, the 7th?

J A STEYN: That's correct.

MR WILLS: And how were you told?  What was said to you?  I know that there was a telephone conversation between you and Mr Botha.  What did he say to you on the phone then?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, he said that Ndaba had been arrested, that it created a situation which was problematic and that he would handle it and I told him to continue and carry on and see how you can handle this matter to the best of your ability in the light of the fact that at that stage he was an informer.

MR WILLS: Did you tell any of your seniors that this important informer had now been arrested?

J A STEYN: No, not that I can remember, not at that stage.

MR WILLS: Did you ever tell any of your seniors that this person was an informer?

J A STEYN: No, Chairperson, I cannot remember.

MR WILLS: Why not?

J A STEYN: I cannot remember what the reason for this was.  I might have done it at a later stage, I'm not sure.  I will have to think about it but I'm not sure at this moment.

MR WILLS: Because it would seem to me that if your evidence is correct and Mr Ndaba was an informer, that clearly his accidental arrest would have created problems for your further source of information in regard to Operation Vula and you would have had to have brought this to the attention of seniors to get advice on how to deal with the situation?

J A STEYN: No Chairperson, when we spoke to Head Office, this was a couple of days later, this was two or three days later, in other words we said that we had received information but we did not inform Headquarters about the real facts.  At that stage Shabalala had already been arrested.

MR WILLS: Now we have the evidence of Botha that he told a number of people including Col Taylor, that Ndaba was an informer at the time he was arrested on the 7th, this is at CR Swart Square.

J A STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.  He did give evidence to this effect.

MR WILLS: So not why - it struck me from the evidence of Col Botha and it seems from your answers that you hold a similar view, why did you try and contain this information when it was already out the bag that this person was an informer?

J A STEYN: It was in a small group, Chairperson, that's, we'd given this information with the request that this was to be handled confidentially and this is according to Botha.

MR WILLS: So you trusted Col Taylor and the four or five members from C20 more so than you did your superiors?

J A STEYN: No, it was not the case that I trusted them more, the fact was just that at that stage I trusted these people and I hoped that it would stay within our circle.

MR WILLS: Now you go to Pretoria on the 10th with Mr Botha?

J A STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: And according to Mr Botha you consciously hid the fact that Ndaba and Shabalala were arrested to your superiors.

J A STEYN: Correct.

MR WILLS: Why did you do that?

J A STEYN: We told Headquarters that we had received the information.  At that stage Mr Shabalala had been detained unlawfully and I would not give this information to Headquarters.

MR WILLS: I know that you would not, I'm asking why you would not.

J A STEYN: The fact is that we wanted to keep his detention a secret.

MR WILLS: Why?

J A STEYN: He was unlawfully detained.

MR WILLS: Are you telling me that you would have got a crack on the knuckles from Basie Smit or been reprimanded because you'd unlawfully detained somebody?

J A STEYN: Yes, there could have been repercussions from their side.

CHAIRPERSON: Well had you decided by then that you were going to kill him?

J A STEYN: Chairperson, during the week, the exact date I cannot recall, but I could have realised at that stage that the detention of Shabalala was a problem for us.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, you've told us, he was unlawfully detained.  You didn't want your superiors to know he was unlawfully detained.  You couldn't release him because he would tell people he had been unlawfully detained.

J A STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you had only one option - to kill him to cover up  your unlawful detention.

J A STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.  I say that we had early in the week, this thought had been considered by me.  I cannot arrive at a date or tell you exactly what day it was but that is the case.  That possibility had already existed.

CHAIRPERSON: He would be eliminated to cover up his unlawful arrest?

J A STEYN: Amongst others, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR WILLS: I've heard and possibly you'll be in a position to confirm this, that at the time the arrests were going on of the other people, or should I rather say, from the time of the arrests of the other persons that occurred from the 13th onwards, sorry the 12th onwards and you were, and there was this investigation team set up and it was leading to the so-called scam prosecution of these people, they were going to court, there was a bail application.  At that time members of the police, other members of this investigation unit were looking for Ndaba and Shabalala, they didn't know what had happened to them.

J A STEYN: No one would have known, apart from our small group.  No one would have known where they were at that stage.

MR WILLS: So you were hiding this information from everybody, even the members of the investigation team that were set up on national instructions in order to investigate this Operation Vula.

J A STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.