Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-07-26

MR PRINSLOO: Is it correct that that person did not have any knowledge of what had been planned by the Security Branch, specifically with regard to the background?  He only knew that he had an order to indicate whether or not the persons were armed and if they were armed, he had to switch on an indicator light, jump out of the vehicle and run away?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, the signal upon which we would react, would be if he jumped out of the vehicle and ran away past the front of the vehicle into the bushes and on the same side as us so that he did not end up in the line of fire.  However, he didn't know that we were going to eliminate these persons.

MR PRINSLOO: And in the first case a Makarov was placed next to the person who was known as Naidoo?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And handgrenades were placed in the carry bags of the women, two of the women.  That is Mr Pienaar's recollection, if it is correct.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether they were in the bags or if ...(intervention)

MR PRINSLOO: There were bags in the vehicle.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I did not deal with any pieces of evidence or any evidence, so I cannot give any independent evidence about that.

MR PRINSLOO: With regard to the second incident, Mr Deetlefs whom I represent says that his recollection is that he arrived in Piet Retief after the persons had already been given the order apparently to cross the border.  These are the persons that you sent ahead.  He was not present when this was said to them.  Can you recall this or not?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot, I will have to concede to that.

MR PRINSLOO: It is not such an important point.  And the impression which Mr Pienaar, as well as Mr Deetlefs have is that with regard to the second incident, there was gunfire from the other vehicle, that somebody jumped out of the vehicle and opened fire.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I have already given an answer regarding that.  I will not aim to be obstructive or disputive with regard to this, but I have been fired at quite often and I have been involved in fights with persons who have fired at me.  I have experience thereof.

MR PRINSLOO: The information that you also had was that at that stage a large infiltration of MK members would take place from Swaziland, into the Republic.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: And that the Swazi Police also applied pressure to the members who were in Swaziland.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I don't know whether it was so at that specific time, but upon a previous occasion the Swazi Government did apply pressure.  I don't know whether it was also the case with this infiltration.

MR PRINSLOO: Regarding the preceding events approximately in 1986, can you recall that there were various incidents during which MK members planted landmines and during which many people were injured and killed, specifically in the Eastern Transvaal?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, I recall that specifically.

MR PRINSLOO: So at that stage there was a high level of intensity on both sides, with the ANC as the infiltrators, who aimed to topple the government of the country?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.  Perhaps just to give you a
broader idea, I think that 1987 led to the shooting at the Nersden border post.  I don't want to deal with that too elaborately, but I've stated that example to give you an idea.

MR PRINSLOO: And according to information which was later obtained, the person Naidoo would have been involved in an incident during which an explosion took place at Rasjbansi here in Natal, do you know about that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we operated on national level and the level of detail was sometimes almost too much to take in.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.  Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: I have, thank you, Mr Chairman.
	Mr de Kock, the complete evidence of the operation of Vlakplaas has been contained in a bundle which has been submitted upon a previous occasion.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Your objective was also to combat the SACP/ANC alliance.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Correct.  And your information was that Charles Ndaba had planned to bring in 30 people and you identified him as a very strong MK leader, is that correct?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: He was effective, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So you had no doubt when the information came to your knowledge, that these would be armed persons, dangerous persons who were entering the country?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You had no reason to doubt the information that you received from security reports?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And the persons who worked below you and executed your orders, operated on a strict need-to-know basis?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: So there was no expectation that any of your foot-soldiers would dispute any order that you had given?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Or question your political motive as such?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, all of us shared the same political motive, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, and your motive was to prevent these persons from infiltrating the country?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: With the first incident you stated that the windows were misted up, so you couldn't see into the vehicle.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And when you noticed that the left-hand passenger window was being wound down, you expected that fire would be opened upon you immediately?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes.  Well if it had not been fired that would have been my observation.  I must say that the situation was an ambush situation and it was strange to hesitate in any such kind of a situation.

MR CORNELIUS: That's correct.  And there could have been no doubt to the passengers in this vehicle, that this was a military or a police operation as a result of the searchlight which was present at the scene?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I cannot say what they thought, Chairperson.  I believe that because it was an ambush the shock effect would have been that which an ambush would achieve.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes.  And the placing of the Makarov pistol would have eliminated very unnecessary questions during any investigation or inquest?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: It would just have made it look better, that's all.

MR CORNELIUS: And then finally, an ambush, it was an ambush?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the doctrine of an ambush is to kill.  And to give you a broader concept, in ambushes groups would be placed depending on the geography of the terrain, to ensure that nobody escapes.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Cornelius.
	May I ask the photographers please to finish their photo-taking, it's really disruptive.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.
	So the objective wasn't to arrest the persons, it was to eliminate them?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was that the intention, Mr de Kock?  Why not have an intention to arrest them?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, we had trained MK members and according to all indicators which we had at our disposal, they were armed.  There was no way that I would expose my own people or expose the Security Forces to either death or injury.  They were our enemy, I cannot allow any one of them to escape and to sow further terrorism.  And that is why the ambush had to be as effective as possible.