Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-09

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, fine, thank you very much.  Please proceed.

JOHANNES FELDE VAN DER MERWE: On three occasions I appeared, I testified before the Amnesty Committee about several aspects which are being raised again today.  I would like to give my perspective again, repeat some of these statements.
 In my evidence to the Commission I confirmed that since the SACP decided to overthrow the government, the police were faced with a superhuman task.  On the one side they were expected to maintain law and order in a legal way and on the other hand to protect the society against terror and violence in circumstances in which the other side followed no rule and even where the boundaries of ordinary warfare were exceeded.  So it was the point of departure from the government of the day that for all practical purposes we were in a war situation and that the enemy had to be defeated at all costs.
 The armed struggle went through several phases.  At the beginning MK and other organisations concentrated on sabotage of State buildings and other assets.  The Soweto uprising in 1976 placed them in the forefront and the SACP/ANC alliance involved youth in its revolutionary struggle.
 With the foundation of the United Democratic Front in 1983 a new phase was entered.  Many organisations joined the UDF and although it could never be determined exactly to what extent the SACP alliance governed the UDF there was very close cooperation. A large portion of the black community followed the UDF and the South African Council of Churches also played an important role.
 Under guidance of the UDF resistance to the government and government institutions increased sharply.  This was followed by civil disobedience in order to make the country ungovernable.
 In 1985 the SACP held a conference in Zambia where it was decided that the difference between hard and soft targets no longer applied. Violence increased and many civilians, women and children were wounded or killed.  The SACP, UDF and other bodies following the same aims tried their best to make the country ungovernable and to alienate the black community from the police.  Large scale intimidation was used to try and prevent the SAP from operating efficiently. 
 The notorious necklace method, which is even more cruel than anything the Nazis did, was used to kill many people who were seen as collaborators.  The police were regarded as hard targets which could be killed at will.  More and more people became victims of violence.  People in black townships lived in fear of their lives.
 To counter this attack by the SACP alliance the former government used all the forces at its disposal and combined these under the State Security Council.  I have already testified about these structures and I am not going to expand at this stage.  I would like to concentrate on the influence of these structures on the SAP and how these structures operated. 
 From 1 January 1986 to '88 I was head of the security branch of the SAP.  I only served in the coordinating committee which consisted of members of various branches of the security services.  Some months ago I asked that the minutes of these meetings be made available to me but I have not been able to have these.  I think that these minutes should throw material light on the circumstances at the time.  
 The joint management committee and its structures and the counter-revolutionary force I served, a member of the security branch also served in the Security Council, the security forces and various State departments were to be united. From the viewpoint of the SAP and the special branch the government was - the aim was to ensure law and order and to ensure the security of the civilian population.  This was so closely allied with the activities of the police that the police regarded itself as an ally of the government inevitably.  Since 1948 an intimate relationship developed between the police and the Cabinet and this was influenced by many factors - the attitude of the Afrikaans churches and other organisations.  The National Party was the natural home of most Afrikaners and the top echelons of the SAP agreed fully with the policies of the National Party.
 Since 1948 the NP government saw itself as an ally of the West which, as it was then seen, was involved in a cold war with the East bloc.  The ANC/SACP saw themselves as part of the East bloc countries.  And the struggle between the SA government and the SACP/ANC was seen as an East-West conflict.  
 South Africa with its mineral wealth and strategic location was seen as the last bastion of civilised Christian norms of the Western world, and the government used everything in its power to convey the message that if South Africa should fall prey to Communism it would be a disaster for the Western world too.  
 For most of the people in the SAP it was about more than just law and order.  The promotion of the interests of the former government was an important consideration and there was a close relationship between the Commissioner and his Minister and this attitude played a very important role in which the planning occurred in the various structures.
 On the 1st of January 1990 I became Commissioner of Police and up to my resignation in '95 I served in the State Security Council and other bodies.  I am not aware that the State Security Council during this period issued any instruction or gave any approval for any action which could be seen as a serious violation of human rights. I have not applied for amnesty regarding this period although this perception has been raised.   As Mr de Klerk said that the South African Police should not move in the political terrain but the security forces were still trapped into the political struggle in which the interests of the former government were the most important aspects. 
 Insofar as to the extent to which other ministers became involved would have to be analysed, what they said and the request they may have issued, the role of these people still needs to be determined in these various bodies.  
 All the powers were to avoid the ANC/SACP achieve their revolutionary aims and often with the approval of the previous government we had to move outside the boundaries of our law.  That inevitably led to the fact that the capabilities of the SAP, especially the security forces, included illegal acts.  People were involved in a life and death struggle in an attempt to counter this onslaught by the SACP/ANC and they consequently had a virtually impossible task to judge between legal and illegal actions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you General.  Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson.  General I am going to put the questions in English.  Thank you very much I appreciate that.
 General did I understand, just towards the end of your opening statement you indicated that from when you - after you were appointed as Commissioner of Police you took up a permanent seat on the State Security Council, did I understand you correctly that you said that as far as you are aware at no stage, at any stage that you participated did the State Security Council or any of its sub-committees or sub organs, I think you used the word "doelbewus besluitgeneem", deliberately decide that any unlawful actions should be carried out?  Did I understand that part of your submission correctly?

JOHANNES FELDE VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Mr Chairman. While I was Commissioner and served in the State Security Council I was not aware of any occasion when such a decision was given or such an instruction was given which could deliberately be interpreted as acting unlawfully.

MR GOOSEN: I take it from that that you would leave open the possibility that the decisions of the State Security Council or any of its sub-organs would when communicated to the various departments may have been interpreted as authorising particular action, unlawful action in the circumstances?