Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-23

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may it please you. You, having come into the matter fresh, it might be helpful if you were told some of the background to the application and I'm now referring to the Ndaba and Shabalala incident so as to be able to follow better perhaps the evidence as it unfolds before you.
	Mr Chairman, you are acquainted with a document which since the 5th of February, we have been handing in to the Amnesty Committees.  It's a document under the heading  General Background to Amnesty Applications.  In the applications in which we have appeared, fortunately Mr Chairman we have appeared before you after the 5th of February and you are therefore conversant with that document and no more has to be said about that,	Mr Chairman, also, we are fortunate in this sense that in November of last year, you yourself headed a Committee who heard some of the incidents which took place in Natal and there is a record of that evidence and I specifically refer to the evidence of Col Botha.  You will recall that he gave evidence for some three days before you on the violence in Natal which included Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula, Mr Chairman.  The pages, Mr Chairman, in that record run from page 516 to 611 and that is just the background, Mr Chairman. 
	What we have done in order to be of assistance to the present Committee which was under the Chairmanship of Justice Mall, was to hand 2 further documents to this Committee.  These you perhaps have not seen yet.  The one was handed in as Exhibit B and Chairperson, what this comprises, is simply an extract from the book of Gen Stadler, The Other Side of the Story, where he deals with Operation Vula, the reason for that being that in Ndaba and Shabalala's incident it really concerns Operation Vula.  Apart from that Mr Chairperson, we also handed up an Exhibit C.  Now this exhibit would probably not be new to you because this was a document handed to us in November when last we appeared before you here in this hall, by Ms Gail Wannenburg and it also concerns Operation Vula and that is also before you, Mr Chairperson.
	Now without much further ado, what has happened in the meantime since this hearing has commenced, was that we have handed up statements of evidence of the witnesses as we have progressed thus far, the first witness having been Col Botha and that is Exhibit D, Mr Chairman and I will address you on that in a moment.  After Mr Botha, Gen Steyn has given his evidence and he is yet to be cross-examined.  Mr Chairman, with your leave, the facts that unfolded before the Committee from the evidence of Col Botha are these.
	He says that in 1988 he was the Head of the Intelligence Section of the Terrorist Unit of the Security Branch of Port Natal.  Col Andy Taylor was the head of a different unit within the Terrorist Unit in that he handled the askaris and his function was the identification and arrest and interrogation of terrorists with the help of Askaris.  Mr Chairman, apparently during the year 1990 there were something like 9 askaris under Col Taylor and Col Taylor accommodated them at a farm that you'll hear about at Camperdown, Chairperson, where they were - you know about that.
	Now Mr Chairman, the story begins in 1988 when Botha says he approached Mr Ndaba in Swaziland, who was then fairly high up in the hierarchy of MK, in order to recruit him as an informer of the Security Branch, which he succeeded in, according to his evidence.  Mr Chairman you will recall that evidence was given before you in November of some changes that took place in the top structure of MK in Swaziland and these were, very briefly Mr Chairman, that Mr Tami Zulu was recalled from Swaziland.  I must say Mr Tami Zulu who was the head of the or the Commander of MK Natal machinery in Swaziland, was recalled in 1988 to Lusaka in Zambia.  As a result of that Mr Chairman, Mr Ndaba who had been second in command at that time, became the Deputy Commander of the MK Natal machinery in Swaziland.
	Botha gave evidence, Mr Chairman that when this happened and Ndaba being his informer, he became apprehensive that Ndaba might be targeted by the Security Forces or the Intelligence components in the Republic of South Africa.  He says and explains that to mean that whenever a person became the Commander, he automatically was placed on a target list by ...(indistinct).  Having become thus apprehensive, he spoke to Ndaba and suggested to him that he should try to manipulate it that he be recalled to Zambia, which apparently happened, Mr Chairman.  We don't know how but in fact Mr Ndaba was called to Zambia and someone else took over from him.
	Mr Chairman on the 7th of July 1990 Mr Ndaba was arrested.  Botha told us that approximately 4 to 6 weeks prior to the 7th of July, Mr Ndaba made contact with him, that was with Botha.  It then appeared that he was in the country.  Botha was told that Ndaba had infiltrated the RSA during the beginning of the year, January or February of 1990 and Ndaba gave him certain information.  Over the period of the 4 to 6 weeks, Botha recalls that he saw Ndaba on two or three occasions during which information was received from Mr Ndaba.  What that information was is not really relevant at this stage, but is relevant Chairperson, is that Mr Ndaba referred to a project, to which he referred to as the President's Committee and it was clear that it involved infiltration of highly placed ANC leaders into the country.  It involved the setting up of safe-houses, it involved the importation of armaments of war and it involved the setting up of structures for purposes of a hands-on command situation.  Am I going too fast Mr Chairman?  And most importantly a sophisticated communications network with computers and a radio, telephone etc. etc.
	If, Mr Chairman, you would have regard to Exhibit C, the second page, the third paragraph, you will see a fairly accurate summary of what I am attempting to tell you.  It says:
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were to relocate senior and middle level leaders from the ANC external leadership into South Africa, to create a nation-wide underground network to co-ordinate and support a general insurrection against the apartheid state and to penetrate the South African governmental and security structures for the purposes of intelligence collection and covert disruption.
		That for Vula to succeed, it had to create an underground organisation far more sophisticated, secure and secretive than the ANC and it's military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe had been able to achieve to that point in the arms struggle.  In addition it had to create or obtain a secure means of real time communication between the external leadership at the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka, in Zambia and the Vula Operational Command inside - I'm sorry, I repeat - in Zambia and the Vula Operational command inside the country.  It's existing communications system with internal underground operatives consisted of an operation of one time inscription pads, air flight couriers, cross-border smuggling messages etc."	
	Now Mr Chairman enough said about that.  That is basically in our submission all you have to know to place you against the background of what was to transpire later.  I might just add, Mr Chairman, that during the course of time, prior to the 7th of July, Mr Ndaba had told Botha of certain persons that had already been thus infiltrated into the RSA.  They consisted of Mr Kasrils, Mr Maharaj and Mr Slovo and as well as others of which he mentioned Mr Gordhan, Mr Patel, Dipak Patel and his evidence was clearly Mr Shabalala as well.  There's no dispute about the fact that Mr Shabalala and Mr Ndaba were working together in the same unit under the auspices of what later became known as Operation Vula, Mr Chairman.  Now all of what I've told you thus far is briefly summarised in Exhibit D, the evidence of Mr Botha. 	Now Mr Chairman, Botha gave evidence to say that on the 7th of July, that was a Saturday, he was telephoned by Maj du Preez and he was informed that a high-ranking terrorist had been arrested and was held at C R Swart Square.  It is common cause among the applicants that du Preez also telephoned Col Taylor, I'm sorry not Col Taylor, terribly sorry, phoned Wasserman and van der Westhuizen as well as Col Botha.  All of these persons then went to C R Swart Square where of course they found Ndaba.  At the time Col Taylor was present and it is perhaps relevant to note, Mr Chairman, that Mr Ndaba had been arrested by an askari, Mr Vusi Ninela.  It later appeared that another askari was also involved in the arrest, but nothing much turns on that.  The fact of the matter is Ninela and/or one or more of the other askaris arrested Mr Ndaba.
	At C R Swart Square, Col Botha then took the other members, Taylor, Wasserman, du Preez and van der Westhuizen into another office and then explained to them that Ndaba couldn't be held because he was his informer.  We know from the evidence of Gen Steyn, that Steyn and Botha were the two people who were aware of the status of Mr Ndaba as an informer and nobody else.  When Botha intimated this news to the others, Col Taylor got upset and he and Ninela, who was also present, withdrew.  Botha then instructed du Preez, Wasserman and van der Westhuizen to take Mr Ndaba to a safe-house which they used, which was situated at Verulam.  The reason and the purpose of that was that, first of all to lie low for a while and secondly to work out a "dekstorie" in case the ANC got wind of the fact that Mr Ndaba had been arrested.  All of this happened during the late morning of Saturday the 7th of July 1990.
	Mr Chairman, soon after arriving at Verulam, are you looking in Exhibit D to find where I am now, Mr Chairman?  It's at paragraph 22.