Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-07

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: However, Chairperson, if I may just deal with it.  Mr Richard, you started out by formulating a hypothetical proposition.  You then go on to relate to a specific proposition and can I finish?  We get to a position now, in the first proposition you do not contextualise any civilians and I don't know where that suddenly flew away to in your questioning.  However you then come and make a supposition about the kind of information or intelligence that existed with regard to the Why Not bar.  Now Mr McBride and previously Mr Gordon Webster have said they spoke to people and they had information from those people that Security Force personnel frequented that bar.  My experience of Security Force personnel is that they usually go back to the same bars night after night.  That becomes their watering hole.  That's the first thing.  To simply try to create some kind of theoretical perspective when we are dealing with specifics here, now we've got to decide, we can test a whole series of them from 0 to 100, we can talk in every percentage and we can go on for days like this.  The issues before us are that Gordon Webster had obtained certain information, he had then said to Mr McBride it was infested with Security Force personnel.  They then tried to check that out, perhaps inadequately, but in their minds, they understood that Security Force personnel frequented that place.  They struck it, in the furtherance of a political motive.  The African National Congress was asked this question and Mr Chairperson, if you'll bear with me, I'm now going to read this into the record with regards to this, because they say, the African National Congress said quite clearly, tactical intelligence was the responsibility of the units on the ground.  Even if they did that reconnaissance badly, it is the way they did it.  Unfortunately I, as Commander, may have failed in my duty to check out that information, to push them on it, but on the basis of all the operations that they'd carried out in the past where they operated meticulously, struck at all their targets etc, I accepted that when I was told there is a concentration of Security Force personnel, I accepted that and authorised the operation to go ahead and that is what is important to us, but I would like to read this into the record, Chairperson and this occurs on page 57 of the MK Hearing in Cape Town on day 1, that is the bundle that, I hope that now these bundles have been put before you, Chairperson.  The question is then raised by Mr Valley and I quote
"I just want to follow this thought through because I want to refer to the first submission of the ANC on page 60, the second last paragraph, left-hand column 60. "The much publicised case of the car bomb explosion at the Magoo Bar and the Why not Bar on June 14th 1986, provides another example of an operation in which civilians were victims in the context of the intensification of the armed struggle.  Three civilians were killed, 69 injured" and it talks about McBride (that's Mr Valley that says that).  I want to go on to the next column, the second paragraph.  "This attack was in line with the ANC's attempts to take the struggle out of the black ghettos and into the white areas."
Then he talks about the Why Not Bar.
"How does this accord with what you were saying?  And I also defer to  Dr Boraine now.
We then have a response from Mr Mac Maharaj and I'm quoting
him:
		"I thought I had indicated that the enemy forces were often located in the commercial or civilian areas.  In this particular case, whatever was the actual outcome, the fact of the matter was that the comrades who acted on this target, had intelligence, tactical intelligence, suggesting that the Security Forces, when off duty, congregated at this venue.  So that was the basis on which they had acted and if they had acted on that basis, then they were in line with the practical problems that I had outlined that we were facing in the country."
And he goes on:
"The same problem, Chairperson, is highlighted in Church Street because it was the Air Force target.  Had the bomb gone off at 16h30, it would have caught the majority of the people, the overwhelming majority would have been from that place, but it went off prematurely and it had been carefully reconnoitred, so there was our problem and the target was selected, not directed at the civilian population but at the Security Force members."

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  Now what I did was outline evidence that I will lead in due course.  Chairperson it's not usual for me to argue with a witness, because what I think the witness has largely read into the record is argument, not evidence.  My reason for ascertaining and locating this evidence, is that we have this undercurrent going on that the figure of 69, 74 and 68 is some sort of propaganda figure which was created at the time to achieve some other purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: I wouldn't say that, that's not the impression that I got, the impression I got was that the figure, the exact figure is not known because various figures have been given at different times.  I don't recall having heard any suggestions in the evidence that the figure was bloated for propaganda purposes.  It was suggested that it has been fluctuating so therefore it's not certain.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, my impression from what Mr Ismail has now read out, that in the evidence tendered at the Security Force Hearings in October 97, the ANC's position was, civilian casualties were 3 dead and 69, that was the position they accepted.

CHAIRPERSON: But I'm just saying what Mr McBride said.  He wasn't sure of the numbers, because he's seen so many different numbers in his trial, in reports etc, so I wouldn't go so far as to say that the suggestion here has been that there's been an over-bloated number given for propaganda purposes.

MR RICHARD: Thank you.

ABOOBAKER ISMAIL: Mr Chairperson, if I may.  I think when we consider amnesty applications, one needs to understand intent.  What was the intention of what anybody intended to do and what was the outcome?  Mr Chairperson, we, in the African National Congress that fought for the liberation of this country, would rather nobody at all had died.  We would rather that there wasn't any struggle to be fought, but when we engaged in the arms struggle, we accepted that there would be casualties.  In this case, the intention was to strike at Security Force personnel and for me, even if the figures were 40/50 Security Force personnel and the remainder civilian personnel, to me it is still sad, it is unfortunate.  Even if it was only 1 civilian person that died, it is sad and it is unfortunate.  It is regretted.  The African National Congress has said: "We never targeted civilians, but we accepted at some point in our struggle, that we had to act because the Security Force personnel were using the civilian population as a buffer"  and I want to state and I'll quote you from page 59 of that Hearing, Mr Maharaj again says
"In case there is any misunderstanding, the African National Congress unreservedly apologises to all civilians who lost their lives, whether in cross-fire or any other circumstances, as our aim has never been to attack civilians and whatever the intensity of the struggle where civilians have died, we believe that it is appropriate in our country today and in the interests of reconciliation and unity, that we should apologise and we do so, and that is done so unreservedly."

MR RICHARD: Thank you.  I go back to the question I was asking you.  I've outlined the factual situation at the time.  Do you want me to outline it again?

MR BERGER: What was the question?