Amnesty Hearings — Pretoria — UNKNOWN

JEREMY CRONIN: That's correct, he was no longer the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe from which he'd resigned.  He says he was no longer in the leadership of Umkhonto weSizwe but he regarded himself as a rank and file member of Umkhonto weSizwe, along with all of those who'd been trained in MK and where called upon he offered his service to assist in the process the impending reintegration or integration of MK forces.
	He was an MK member and he was certainly an ANC member as are most SACP members, but he no longer was a ranking member of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR PRINSLOO: So he didn't resign from Umkhonto weSizwe?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, he resigned from his leadership position.

MR PRINSLOO: I may have misunderstood your evidence, didn't you say he resigned from Umkhonto weSizwe?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, if I said that - what I intended to say - and I don't think I did but if I did, what I was saying or was intending to say was that he resigned as Chief of Staff of Umkhonto weSizwe.

MR PRINSLOO: So, if that's the position Mr Cronin, then Mr Hani was still active in the ranks of Umkhonto weSizwe?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, he was not.  Well, he contender to be an MK member but his activism was not particularly in this area after December 1991.

MR PRINSLOO: So Mr Cronin, it would be unfair for you to say that the other people viewed it differently - if that was the case, they perceived he was still involved with MK?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, I can't answer for other people's perceptions, I'm telling you the facts.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, what you told the Commission in your evidence - there was a low-intensity warfare going on and what you said is
"Negotiations were taking place over the table and underneath they were kicking you"
Is that correct - that's now the Communist Party and the ANC?

JEREMY CRONIN: Absolutely correct.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.  And the people you referred to were in fact the Nationalist Party at the time?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, but in particular the intelligence and security structures of the apartheid State.

MR PRINSLOO: So at that stage the Nationalist Party was governing the country and this was their organs that had to keep them in Government?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.  Now, at that stage there was a lot of violence taking place - as  you set out, violence perpetrated by various people on the trains, hostels, etc.?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, I agree.

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.  So, in the minds of the people at large, there was not peace at that stage?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, there was certainly no peace, there was peace process, there was National Peace Accord and there was a negotiations process but parallel with those, was a twin track policy - strategy, which ultimately a political strategy - in our view, led by the National Party Government, designed to destabilise it's opposition while at the same time negotiating with it.

MR PRINSLOO: So, it was indeed - if I may put it that way, as far as you perceived it then, it was false negotiated settlement at that stage - that it was perceived in the minds of the Nationalist Party?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, they were serious about negotiating but they wanted to get the best deal possible across the table and felt that the best way of doing this was to weaken their principal negotiating partner, which was clearly the ANC.

MR PRINSLOO: According to your version Mr Cronin, Mr Hani was aware that the Nationalist Party was speaking to them over the table and yet kicking them under the table by killing people and derailing the process that way, is that correct?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: So, at that stage you knew that the Government was not sincere in a settlement?

JEREMY CRONIN: No, we believed that they were sincerely committed to a settlement but they wanted a settlement on their terms as much as possible and the only way in which they could bring about such a settlement was to try and weaken the ANC.  	The principal strength of the ANC was not State power - we were not in Government, our principal strength was our mass support and therefore this low-intensity conflict was principally directed at cutting the links between negotiators and the mass constituency of the ANC and the means of doing that was one, to sow confusion and terror in Black townships through random violence, to assassinate key leaders at the community level and also to assassinate key links between the negotiation process and that mass constituency and I would regard Chris Hani as one of those key links.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, this particular view that prevailed at that stage - as you summed it up on page five is
"To assassinate key ANC and alliance, second and third layer leaders"?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, that's what Chris Hani said, correctly so, yes.

MR PRINSLOO: If Mr Hani perceived that, that same perception could have prevailed among the people at large, would that be correct to say that?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well we were trying to get that across, we were trying to say that this is a twin track policy, it's not the old war that we were fighting up until 1991.  	What we've got now is a complicated situation, we are in a negotiations process, the regime realises it cannot continue to rule in the old way, so it's sincere in that sense.  These are not dummy talks, they are real talks and they are real negotiations but in the process of those negotiations they are seeking to bring pressure to bear upon us - to weaken our demands, to make us back down, to qualify, to moderate and to modify our demands just as we were.
	We were using the weapon of mass mobilisation, of mass organisation, of protests, of demands, to bring to bear on the negotiations process our perspectives.  And what Chris Hani was saying and what we were saying was: "For heaven's sake, don't fall into the trap of violence - that is their strong card,  they've got an army, we have an MK that is much smaller - tiny, that has returned from exile - don't fall into the trap.  
	Our strength is politics, our strength is our moral position and our moral perspective, let us play to that strength.  We have to somehow deal with the violence that's being visited against us and therefore we have the right to defend ourselves but that isn't our strong card, so for heavens sake, don't make the political error of thinking that a return to the bush - a return to armed struggle, is going to carry our cause forward, it's not going to", so that was his position - that was our position.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Cronin, you believed and so did Mr Hani believe - at that stage, that they intended assassinating key leaders and members of the ANC?

JEREMY CRONIN: He was deeply concerned about that and had escaped - narrowly escaped an assassination attempt the year before on his own life.

MR PRINSLOO: And for you to say that, you must have had good reason to believe that?

JEREMY CRONIN: Sorry?

MR PRINSLOO: There must have been reason for you to believe this in order for you to say this?

JEREMY CRONIN: Well, we knew ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: ...[indistinct] key leaders?

JEREMY CRONIN: Our reasons for believing this was that we knew what those apartheid dirty tricks departments were capable of and everything that we've heard of since - in the TRC process and other processes, confirms absolutely that view - that there were very nasty networks in operation seeking to destabilise the negotiated settlement or to bring pressure on the ANC and it's alliance, so yes, we had very good reason for fearing that this might happen.

MR PRINSLOO: The point you're also making in your statement is that - ...[indistinct] describe nowadays as a kind of a third force activity that prevailed at that stage?

JEREMY CRONIN: Yes, indeed, there're third force activities - as we know now today even better than we did then, third force activities were rife in this period.

MR PRINSLOO: But at the time of the negotiations that was prevailing Mr Cronin?