Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-10-06

MR MCBRIDE: It's not a simple answer because they made statements during evidence-in-chief, under cross-examination, in which there was perhaps a specific answer required from them, by you for example, and where I felt it was not sufficient or not sufficient in-depth questioning.  I asked my lawyer to ask the question and we got satisfactory answers.  So from the answers I got - yes, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR MCBRIDE: ... from my lawyer, I didn't see a need to ask further questions.  When I was satisfied as to their answers, which differed in depth or whatever other grounds, then I asked the question.  Or when people's memory was not to my knowledge, not how I remembered it, then I checked with my lawyer and afterwards I was satisfied.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps, I was just going to say it's quite a broad question, Mr Richard, because there was a lot of evidence.  Maybe you can be a bit more specific as to what Mr McBride agrees with or doesn't agree with.

MR RICHARD: Well let's start again with a purely hypothetical proposition of a hundred people in a particular room and without relating it to the facts on the ground on the 14th of June 1986.  If five of those hundred were police of no particular rank or stature, in other words general, in your opinion as you understood the policies at the time, would it be an appropriate target to attack?  That was the proposition I put.

MR MCBRIDE: In response to your hypothesis I just want to extend it a little bit.  If a hundred people in the bar, and I had firm knowledge were all policemen, were all generals and I hit the bar and they all died as enemy personnel, I would still not be happy about it because those would have been fellow South Africans I'd been injuring or killing.  But if I had known for sure that there were no police in a place, I had firm evidence of that, that there's no police in the place, I would not have gone to my Commander and said should we go ahead with the operation, I would have said this is the situation, there are no police there, it would not have been a target.

MR RICHARD: So I take it that on my example and my hypothesis of five out of a hundred, you would have not have proceeded with the campaign or the plan.

MR MCBRIDE: Coming back - in response to that question, you asked the same question of one of the co-applicants, the same figures you used and you were relying just now on their evidence.  And I will remind you what one of them said "If there were five people and they went in the bar, it's a target".  If there's five police amongst a hundred civilians, it's a target.  I'm not saying that is necessarily my position, I'm saying on your reliance of that evidence, for whatever you want to achieve now.

MR RICHARD: My question is of you, not of them.  How ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: I can't work on hypothesis, I worked from the opposite direction, not from the one you are doing.  I know ...(intervention)

JUDGE PILLAY: No, Mr McBride, you didn't know when you plated the bomb there, how many policemen would be there when it blew.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, Sir, I didn't know.

JUDGE PILLAY: And technically there could only have been five at the time.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, there could have been, yes, Sir.

JUDGE PILLAY: I think that's the question.  If there could be five, do you regard it as still a legitimate target?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, because even if there was one only, even if there was none, if my reconnaissance indicated to me there was an infestation of police there and I went ahead and did the operation only that for some reason they were not there on that day, it was still a legitimate target.

MR RICHARD: What I'm hearing you to say is if on the basis of your information you perceive there to be a concentration of policemen or soldiers at a particular point ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: I believed there to be police and other Security personnel at that place.

MR RICHARD: ... you would proceed even though you didn't know the facts at the time.

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct what I'm saying.  Based on the preponderance of intelligence that was gathered.

MR RICHARD: Now - and the fact that 95% innocent civilians might get injured, wouldn't stop you.

MR MCBRIDE: I think I've answered the question already.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr McBride did say that even if on that night there weren't any policemen there he would still regard it as a legitimate target because of the reconnaissance.  So I think it would follow that your question will be answered in the affirmative.

MR RICHARD: This issue did concern you, and at page 22 of Exhibit C there's a phrase which goes
"When I raised this issue with my Commanders I was referred to the Kabwe Conference decision about crossfire."

MR MCBRIDE: Can you just - there's a problem with the page number, Sir, can you just ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mine's on page 22, but there is problem with page numbers, Mr Richard, I don't know why but - it's on page 23 I'm told.

MR RICHARD: I do not understand it, I'm quoting a printed number.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I know, but there seems to be two different transcripts of the same evidence.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, may I venture to suggest, I know it doesn't really add anything.  I think this evidence was taken off the server and it's just a page difference.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's certain expletives used in the evidence, just below them.  Do you get it?

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, I have that one, Sir.  I don't know if that's the one ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON
"When I raised this issue with the Commanders I was referred to the Kabwe Conference decision about crossfire."

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, that's it.  Mr Richard?

MR RICHARD: My first question is, what did you raise with your Commanders?

MR MCBRIDE: I raised with the Commanders the possibility that people other than the intended target could be killed and probably would be killed or injured.  I just want to draw your attention to A1, 76, the same things are raised in the affidavit by my Commander. - and in his evidence-in-chief.

MR RICHARD: Now it was you, as you pointed out, that was on the ground.  Now I then get to the next question.  It's correct for me to say that you foresaw civilian casualties and wanted guidelines on it.  Now did you discuss what proportion or number or collateral civilian casualties would be acceptable as to unacceptable?

MR MCBRIDE: Proportionality was never every part of my discussions with any of the Commanders on the number of policemen or Security personnel to civilians.  That was never ever discussed.  Because we didn't prepare instructions and operations in anticipation of a Truth Commission.

MR RICHARD: Now earlier in your evidence today you used a word "less", do you remember that?

MR MCBRIDE: That's correct, yes.

MR RICHARD: From the 1983 people's war position, did it mean that concern was ...(intervention)

MR DEHAL: Sorry, Mr McBride and I didn't hear the first part.

MR RICHARD: There had been a progressive change in police from 1970-something through to 1983 and then again in 1985.  Now Mr McBride became active in '85/'86.  My question is, when he used the word "less" as opposed to no or much less or a little less, how much less emphasis was being placed on civilian targets?

MR MCBRIDE: I specifically used "less" because it doesn't mention number and it indicates generally an idea.  That's why I used it.  It's not a clear-cut thing, it didn't come down to percentages.

MR RICHARD: Very well.  Now I've made mention earlier that you received various documents and papers and literature while in Botswana, now at line 17 on the same page ...(intervention)

MR MCBRIDE: The same page of what, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: The same page of Exhibit C that was referred to when we were talking about the Kabwe Conference.  It's either page 22 or 23, depending on which copy you have.

MR MCBRIDE: Yes, I have that, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Richard.