Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, just to take the story back a little bit, these two people, Maluleka and Barney were infiltrated by me, they were already there and then those days we did not have cell phones, we used this radio tracking device.  They would contact me and we arranged certain meetings in certain places.  They would come there and tell us what the situation was like.  In this particular case Jimmy and, I think, Eric was present as well, I am not sure, we usually met each other one by one, we, I, we spoke to him at the Holiday Inn in Bellville and he told us that there was a plan to attack a police van on a Monday morning.  He gave us more or less the area where it would take place and we told him that he should try and get back to us as soon as the information was confirmed.  He said that would be very difficult, because this group was particularly radical and they did not actually very lightly trust anybody else and I said it does not matter what happens on that morning, please just try and retain control of the operation.  It is very difficult to plan such an operation a week ahead of time.  I said keep the arms and the weapons and the van or the bus under your control and we would do whatever we could from our side.  Then Jimmy went back, yes, that is our discussion in the Holiday Inn with Liebenberg and myself.

MR BOOYENS: Now, the arrangement was that he would try and get back to you?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: However, he did not do that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: So, the information which you had at, on Friday was that the police bus would be attacked at this particular crossing?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is it correct that Liebenberg and yourself then realised that you were more or less in a situation where you would start to take steps, have to take steps to prevent something from happening?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Correct, we realised that with this information on the table we would, actually, have to act, we would have to inform the other units to try and prevent whatever was going to happen and we would try and arrest these members and we contacted the various departments.  Lieutenant Liebenberg had another informer who informed him that there was, indeed, such a plan to attack the police van.  I did not speak to that informer myself.

MR BOOYENS: Liebenberg's informer, although you did not speak to him, what did this man tell Liebenberg or when did Liebenberg receive the information from the informer?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I believe it was the day before the incident, on the Sunday, yes.

MR BOOYENS: So, as far as you were concerned, that was enough confirmation or it was confirmation of Mbane's information?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now, Mr Bellingan, people will surely ask you the following, you receive information on the Friday, a week before this planned operation, why did you not just simply go out and arrest these people who were planning this operation?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: These people, according to the informers and the people that we had infiltrated, did not stay in the same place, did not sleep at the same place night after night, houses were not marked, addresses were not clear in those areas.  Sometimes we did react on certain information, we tried to arrest people, but we were unsuccessful.  We did not have photographs of the suspects.  So, it was rather difficult to try and arrest them, because the information related to about ten to 17 suspects.  So, it would be very difficult to go round to ten to 17 addresses in these circumstances.

MR BOOYENS: On the other hand, you also had to face the fact that if you did not react in any way, took no steps and the information proved to be correct, then innocent policemen would lose their lives?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And what was then decided was that you would plan an ambush action at this crossing?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct, we met at a place in Wingfield, there were senior officers of the Riot Squad and Detective Branches and there we planned what we were going to do.  We allocated certain groups to wait in the bushes and allocated vehicles to wait in the area to apprehend these people as soon as they crossed the bridge.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as the police bus and its occupants were concerned, what happened to that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: The staff, it was said that, the instruction was given that the staff who were supposed to be in the bus on the Monday morning, should not be in the bus, but to  be replaced by policemen wearing bulletproof jackets, so that if an attack was launched, these men could protect themselves.

MR BOOYENS: Now, it would also possibly be said, and I want to place it on record, paragraph 23, there was also the alternative simply not to allow the minibus to travel that morning.  Why did you not do that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If we did not allow the minibus to travel at all, then the liberation fighters would simply find another target for another day and we still did not know what exactly was going to happen, we did not have full control.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, very shortly, you were at the time a Sergeant.  Is that correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Your situation in the Cape was the following, you were actually in control of the askari group, if we can call them that, but you were under the command of the local security branch.  Is that correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And the operation which Mr Liebenberg finally launched, what was the objective of this operation as far as you were concerned, what were they trying to do?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Lieutenant Liebenberg was a very, he worked strictly according to the book, the Letter of the Law, and he decided to arrest these people that morning.  So, they were in command of that planning of the operation, him and Dolf Odendal and they decided to arrest these people.  Odendal was the Commanding Officer of the Riot Squad for the Peninsula area.

MR BOOYENS: Now, then on page 32 in paragraph 24, you describe the way they had thought about these or about this operation, that is now Liebenberg?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, you have, you had experience of this type of thing, what did you personally think was going to happen?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: My personal feeling was almost that it was a situation similar to having to foil a bank robbery.  If you know that the people are armed and the situation in the Black townships was ungovernable at the time, I was of the opinion that this was not going to be a Sunday School picnic and that we would be shot at and we would not allow a single policemen to be killed that morning.  So, I might have said to my juniors, look, we are going to actually shoot them dead if they should raise their weapons and aim it at us, because I did not want to have a sort of a Trojan Horse situation to the detriment of innocent people.  We would  have shot them dead.

MR BOOYENS: Now, what did you think as far as the probabilities that this would degenerate into a shooting incident?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: The information from the askaris was to the effect that there would actually be a fight, there would be shooting back and forth that morning and there would be loss of life and I was totally satisfied in my own mind that this would not just be a normal arrest procedure.

MR BOOYENS: So, as far as you were concerned, in any way, you thought that the theoretical attempt to perform these arrests would probably not work and you expected a shooting?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, I did and, perhaps, I should mention, I cannot remember so far back, it was 11 years, but maybe I said, as a Sergeant, look guys, we are not going to get hurt this day, today, we have lost enough innocent people and informers and policemen.  If the situation calls for it, will then fight to the bitter end.