Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-17

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I have not read it again, but it was a long time ago, but I think, yes, there was such an allegation.  What I must add here is that I accept full responsibility for the person that I shot.  If I shot him whilst he was lying on the ground I would have said so, if I could remember it.  I am applying for amnesty for several other incidences which I believer are far more controversial than this one and I do not, I cannot see why I would try and conceal something here.  He was not lying on the ground when I shot him, that I can remember, but I cannot recall, perhaps, how his head was turned when I shot.  Details like those I cannot recall.

MR B WILLIAMS: The point is very simple, Mr Bellingan.  The man looked at you and you looked in his direction and you shot him.  That is the basic point, that is what you can recall.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If you say so, then that is correct.

MR B WILLIAMS: Now, Captain Bellingan, the problem that one has with that concession and bearing in mind what is, in our opinion or in the opinion of the families, a poor attempt to arrest these individuals and bearing in mind that in the opinion of the families, you had set out to counter-ambush these individuals, it would appear that you, in fact, succeeded in doing so.  What do you say about that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: If, after we set up the original ambush for them, we then withdrew from the operation, thereafter they shot at us first, they attacked us and we were simply just a lot more successful in actually countering this attack.  That is the way I see it.

MR B WILLIAMS: Yes, Captain Bellingan, that is one perspective.  The other perspective is that these individuals were simply unaware of the fact that you were going to launch this attack on them.  What do you say about that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I cannot comment on that.  Whilst I was running towards the intersection both sides were shooting and there was, it was a major drama.  So, I actually cannot recall the finer details.

MR B WILLIAMS: You see, in your Section 28 application you said the following and I quote at page 128 of the first bundle,
"Technically, yes, technically speaking, I suppose, yes, it would amount to an ambush."
Do you recall having stated that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, I said that, but I cleared it with my legal team later and they explained to me that our original ambush which we had planned, if one can call it an ambush, that that was not successful, that we withdrew and they then launched an attack on us.  Therefore, it no longer constituted an ambush by us.

MR B WILLIAMS: So, you will agree that your counter-attack was, in fact, ... (intervention).

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: More effective.

MR B WILLIAMS: ... a counter-ambush.  You concede that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I cannot get too technical, I think we were simply more effective, that is all.

MR B WILLIAMS: But, Captain Bellingan, that is what you said at the time.  You said,
"... technically speaking, I suppose, yes, it would amount to an ambush."

MR B WILLIAMS: Yes, but after speaking to my legal advisers ... (intervention).
MR BOOYENS OBJECTS

MR BOOYENS: My learned friend should read this in context from page 127,
"Why did you put armed people inside the bus and allowed it to drive through the intersection at that particular time?  No, but why.  Major Dolf Odendal (...indistinct).  Why was it an ambush scene?  Technically speaking, I suppose, yes, it would amount to an ambush."
That answer related to the initial plan with sending the Kombi with the policemen in it through.  That was that technically, it would amount to an ambush.  It does not relate to the shooting incident.  That is the context I see it in, Mr Chairman.  I do not know whether my learned friend sees it differently.

MR B WILLIAMS: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I am afraid I do not agree with my colleague and I would like the witness to actually answer that question as to whether he considers that it was, in fact, let us leave aside the contentions made in the Section 29 application.  Does Captain Bellingan consider that he had counter-ambushed these individuals?  What is his answer to that?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: What stage are you referring to now?

MR B WILLIAMS: If one can take you back a second.  You said that you had received information that an ambush was being planned on the police.  Can one assume that your response, that your planned response was effectively a counter-ambush?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Let us compare it to the case where you are actually trying to apprehend bank robbers.  It is not actually an ambush, it is a counter-operation and if the operation is not successful and you withdraw, then you actually have to face their ambush.  So, the one group then falls into the ambush of the other group.

MR B WILLIAMS: Do I understand you to be conceding that it was, in fact, a counter-ambush then?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: No, I think we went over to the attack.  I do not think it was an ambush.  They attacked us and we then returned fire.  It was not an ambush.

MR B WILLIAMS: What else would you call it?  Captain Bellingan, you have been in combat, what do you call it when you know of an attack or the enemy, as you would call it, coming to a certain position and you position yourself, heavily armed, around that position?  What do you call that?  I mean in combat terms, I think it is called an ambush.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: As I said, our first group did sort of take up position and it was a sort of an ambush, but we withdrew, because the Kombi did not pass us at the exact time and place, things were not going according to plan.  So, we withdrew and as a result of that we then entered their ambush and then there was a counter-attack and we attacked each other.  I think these are all technical points.

MR B WILLIAMS: I will not belabour the point, Mr Chairperson.  So, you have planned an offensive response to the information that you were, that an ambush was going to take place, you also anticipate, in terms of your information and your evidence, that these individuals are trained insurgents or, at least, some of them are trained insurgents and some of them are kits-insurgents.  Am I correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR B WILLIAMS: You arm yourself and all your colleagues and all those who are on the scene to the teeth.  Is that correct?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: That is correct.  Members chose their own weapons, as those in the bush had R1's and shotguns, some of the Murder and Robbery people only had their pistols.  So, each and everyone was not actually armed to the teeth.  I think I was fairly well armed and some of the people with their shotguns were well armed.

MR B WILLIAMS: If I remember the scene on the video, Captain Bellingan, I think that you were wearing an ammunition belt around your waist?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Yes, we call it a chest webbing.  I was very fond of wearing that and I carried four R1 magazines in it plus a hand grenade plus, possibly, a smoke grenade, because I came from a culture where we were always well prepared for whatever could happen.  I did not ever wear a bullet-proof jacket.  This is what I wore instead.  That was my normal practice whenever I went out at night or whenever during the day.

MR B WILLIAMS: And you will agree, then, that at that particular point where you are about to respond to your information that there is going to be an ambush, when you are in position, at that stage there is absolutely no question that these people are going to be arrested.  Do you agree?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I agree.  I knew that if a shooting erupted then based on the information which I got from Jimmy Mbane, that the chance of actually showing your appointment certificate and saying this is an arrest, well, that would have been ... (end of tape 3A) a miracle.