Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is the document of the Secretariat of the State Security Council.  It was usually compiled for the State Security Council and then on departmental level it was then given for execution or to take note of.
	I could perhaps just add, it was also then given tot he different chairpersons on the national level.

MR KNOETZE: And then page 797, paragraph (e) to (h), could you perhaps just read that for us.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Paragraph (e)
"The RSA already has to do with a national revolution and cannot lose its power base internally.  Something must be found that will be against the alternative structures, or then to establish it in the absence thereof.  Should the current unrest not be brought under control, it would lead to open revolution where the youth would play an executing role.  The RSA is busy losing the struggle.  Black leaders say that in which they believe and it also has the necessary support.
(f):	In the absence of an acceptable political structures for black people then makes the task of the enemy easier should structures such as Inkatha perhaps not be established for black people as a political way of expressing themselves and to act against radical action.  The revolution is about power and the question is, if there are any credible black leaders who are still prepared to discuss the sharing of power on our terms.  If that should not succeed the alternative would be an escalation in the physical power struggle.  The security community's view is that the position has deteriorated in the past six months and the RSA cannot counter the revolutionary onslaught with physical power.  The constitutional option should now be preferable in order to make this constitutional development process more visible.  The accent should be placed on the role of the parliamentary political power so that they cannot then increase their power outside of the parliament.  It is important that action be taken now because it can now still be done from a position of power."

MR KNOETZE: That is quite a bit.  Let's look at paragraph (g) and the reference made to credible black leaders.  Now did you try with your plans to involve such people?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, yes.  There were quite a few Xhosa leaders in the Ciskei and the Transkei.  Kaizer Matanzima, even in the period where he had retired he still had tremendous influence.  His brother George as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence also had that kind of support.
	Then in the Ciskei there were members of the blue blood chiefs such as Chief Lent Makoma, Ray Mali.  I can remember Deputy-President Kaba, Namba Sebe, the brother of Charles Sebe.  Now they were all political exiles. They had been accepted in the Transkei and they were figures of power for the Xhosa people.  We considered them to be credible leaders.  I can also include Charles Sebe on the security terrain.

MR KNOETZE: Now just to put it all together.  Should your Plans Strelitzia or Katzen have been executed then these people would have been able to govern the Xhosas.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes I believe that, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: Just for interest's sake, the people that you have referred to now, have you seen any of these people here?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, Chairperson, I greeted  Chief Lent Makoma outside of the hall earlier this morning.

MR KNOETZE: If we can go to paragraph (i) on page 798, it says
"There must a distinction made between the prevention of conflict in the management or handling of conflict, or solving the conflict.  Opportunities must be identified and used."
Once again, is that what you tried to do?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  Strelitzia was primarily focused on the prevention of conflict by establishing the necessary structures.  When Katzen was compile a year later, conflict had already escalated.  And that was not only in trying to prevent it, but also managing the existing conflict.

MR KNOETZE: Now the first part of that paragraph is then confirmed, the ordinary actions of the Security Forces were not sufficient anymore.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: If we can turn to the next document that starts on page 799.  Once again, could you perhaps just tell the Committee what the nature of this document is?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: This is a document from the Secretariat of the State Security Council, April 1986.  It refers to the guidelines for a strategy against the counter-revolutionary war in the country.

MR KNOETZE: More specifically page 802, paragraph 15
"Then in the final analysis concerning the strategic situation, two aspects are clear and that is that the RSA is caught up in a spiralling threat and it cannot be contained by applying security aspects."
Does that confirm what you had already said?  How did you have to get out of the spiral?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at that time we told one another that in our terminology we had to think outside of the fire to address the situation in the Eastern Cape.  I can now perhaps think that it was quite desperate perhaps that we thought that we had to think radically different to address the problems that were in existence then.

MR KNOETZE: And then once again, Katzen is the result of that radical thinking.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I would also add Strelitzia to that, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: And then on the same page, paragraph 18(a)(1), the last part there
"The government also does not have a political model which would compete with the so-called freedom charter."
Do you confirm that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR KNOETZE: But then again, those plans of your then had the aim to provide a workable alternative?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, on regional basis, yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then page 805, paragraph 4 and 5
"Neighbouring States then provide political and moral support to the revolutionary organisations and the ANC, and then also makes it a springboard for terror actions and the bringing in of weapons and equipment.  The ANC as well as the PAC plans to develop Transkei and Ciskei as bases, whilst Boputhatswana would be used as a thoroughfare for both of them."
Is that correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it is.  It can also be linked to what Modise had said, that the black had to be the bush for the revolutionary.  Now we had the fear that States such as Transkei and Ciskei would become part of this bush and then bases would be developed there for revolutionary action against the parts closest to them in South Africa.

MR KNOETZE: Page 806, 19(a).1
"The fact that at the moment there is not an overarching constitutional model within which the political aspirations of the majority of black people can be accommodated in an acceptable way does not take away the fact that there is a measure of friendliness among the blacks.  Now this does not give the opportunity for this constructive development."
Now were there black people who had goodwill in your area of command?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Chairperson yes, there were people who had goodwill, they could understand the propels that I had made and to a large degree they had in fact co-operated insofar as we could then carry out these aspects.

MR KNOETZE: Now what were their constitutional aspirations with regards to the Xhosa nation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: The life ideal of especially Kaizer Matanzima, the President, but also that of his brother George, was to unite the Xhosa people, to make it one nation.  That was a threat continuing to all the different Chiefs.

MR KNOETZE: Just to state that once again, your plans would have assisted them in expressing their ideals?