Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-09

UNKNOWN: The political support for Renamo never stopped, material support for Renamo changed dramatically from the time, and even after the Nkomati Accord, before I fulfilled the role that I spoke about in the previous answer, I sat as an official with General Coetzee on the Joint Security Management System that was between Mozambique and Angola established by the Nkomati Accord, and one of the - every single meeting we had I, as an Intelligence officer, had to go away from the meeting with another ten, twenty or however many claims by Mozambique of violations and radar trackings and all sorts of things and support for Renamo.
 I personally was in charge of an investigation into support for Renamo after Nkomati Accord.  I was told investigate where is Renamo getting the support from, and I know exactly where it was coming from, it was still coming from Military Intelligence.  And then it was almost embarrassing because when we presented that sort of evidence you know it had to then be disappeared again.  And I remember asking the question at the time, well if you didn't want to know the answer why did you ask me to find out the answer?  You know then you should have told me in the beginning look we don't really want to know the answer, just pretend you are finding the answer. So the support, political support went on.  The material support changed in the way it was managed.

MR GOOSEN: But material support was still rendered?

UNKNOWN: Yes.  And you must also understand the semantics of the Intelligence world, because an Intelligence officer can go to his commander and say I am no longer supporting the counter-revolutionary aspects of Renamo, I am now just doing my line function which is to gather intelligence about the ANC in Mozambique, and to gather intelligence about the ANC in Mozambique I have recruited a whole lot of sources who just by the way happen all to be Renamo and I'm paying them but I'm now not paying them to subvert the Mozambican government I am now paying them for information about our common, our enemy the ANC.  And if they then take that money and use it to continue the same activities they were doing before well that's not my responsibility.  And the politicians can say oh well yes of course so we are not any longer supporting the subversion of the Mozambican government, we are just carrying out normal intelligence-gathering operations.  But the sum effect was that exactly the same activities continued.

MR GOOSEN: And just a further aspect to pick up on an earlier question you indicated that to your knowledge in every front line state then, other than Swaziland and I think you said Botswana, the South African security forces were assisting, providing support to other forces in those other countries, did that include Zimbabwe?

UNKNOWN: Yes.

MR GOOSEN: Are you aware as to whether the South African Defence Force, or for that matter the South African Police perhaps, but the South African Defence Force were involved in arming and training Zimbabwean dissidents for operations in Matabeleland in the 1980's?

UNKNOWN: I have no documentation but they were.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax.

UNKNOWN: Sorry may I just make a point, not the police, the defence force.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.  Closer to home, for example what other surrogate forces would the security forces have supported and how would that have been done?  For example say Lesotho, you didn't mention Lesotho in that.

UNKNOWN: Political support was given to opposition groups in Lesotho.

MR LAX: You see I am - there was a special project of DST which was known as Operation Endeavour, do you have any knowledge of that?

UNKNOWN: No I don't, that's the first time I've heard the name.

MR LAX: It entailed the training of Lesotho Liberation Army cadres based in South Africa. ...(intervention)

UNKNOWN: And the carrying out of attacks in Lesotho which were then attributed to the LLA.

MR LAX: Correct.  Internally in South Africa one of the standard measures in a counter-revolutionary war is to use surrogate forces internally as well, what surrogate forces were used internally?

UNKNOWN: To my knowledge Inkatha or - I don't know how to phrase it whether units of Inkatha, but certainly elements related to the Inkatha Freedom Party were given weapons - what I was referring to earlier where it was felt that if the ANC was giving their supporters weapons the South African government should give weapons to the opposition or to the opposite forces, you know my enemies' enemy theory.  And I know G3 at one time, I know specifically of some G3 rifles that were issued as - to some type of home guard or chief's guard.  I was never specifically involved, I just knew broadly that there was such a policy.

MR LAX: Did you know of Operation Marian, have you ever heard of Operation Marian?

UNKNOWN: Not until afterwards.

MR LAX: Would that fall within, in your - I am asking here as an expert in these matters, would that form within the classical mode or a counter-revolutionary type operation?

UNKNOWN: Ja I said in the beginning that I didn't wish to testify as an expert, but in my experience I regarded what I saw later about Operation Marian as being the culmination of what I knew to have begun with the distribution of those first G3 rifles which I think even came from the police, the first arming of these anti-ANC forces.

MR LAX: Well it won't surprise you then that Military Intelligence paid the Caprivi trainees and elements of those people right until the 1990's.

UNKNOWN: No.

MR LAX: What other sorts of surrogates would the State have used at that time?

UNKNOWN: Any force, any - not only military, political, economic, any element of society which would be useful in countering the revolutionary onslaught within that area of society, so that this could be from military or paramilitary forces through to political forces, to economic groups who pushed capitalism as opposed to socialism, any area where the revolutionary enemy was active we would try to establish and nurture and support and develop counter forces.

MR LAX: So for example the kinds of organisations that we have heard about, say in the Free State, the A-Teams, the Three Million Gang, the Eagles, which was a so-called youth movement, all these organisations are alleged to have been involved in gross violations of human rights of one kind or another and appear to have, in many ways, had support of police elements and defence force elements, would those be classic examples for example?  The Witdoeke is another example.

UNKNOWN: Yes again Mr Chairman I don't have any specific knowledge of these things but they fall within the normal ambit of counter-insurgency operations, and would be based on the theory that divide and rule and let other people do your dirty work for you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson.  Perhaps just one further question.  I am going back to the earlier one I asked.  The Gorongoza Diaries reveal that Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, visited Renamo camps inside Mozambique after 1984, do you have any knowledge of what he might have been doing there at the time?  Who he was representing?  Whether he had any relationship with DMI's covert support for Renamo at the time?  And whether his presence in Mozambique, according to the diaries, whether the Minister of Foreign Affairs would have had knowledge of that?

UNKNOWN: Sorry Mr Chairman I don't have any direct knowledge.  I obviously remember the incident.  It caused a huge - it gave the Mozambicans a huge propaganda victory and we spent a lot of time trying to explain it, but I was not never put into the picture as to why it happened.

MR GOOSEN: Major Williamson thank you very much, I have no further questions at this stage thank you.