Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1998-04-06

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  In answering that question let me first refer you to the last part of paragraph 12
"The strategy is quite normal, give the modus operandi of APLA, in order to secure the operation, operatives and the target.
Now, we didn't inform our forces anything about the target so that we can prevent information leaking, I mean it is quite normal within the APLA.  Now the way that I designed the plan for the operation, if I may come to that so that your question is at least answered, by that we had three elements which I will explain when we are at paragraph 18, the reconnaissance party, the security party, execution party.   
	Now at the end of the day, although we had to secure information from leading, we also had to be fair to our forces so that they can see the place which they are going to attack, confirm deployment areas and see the practicability and workability of the whole operational plan.
	Now we took them in the last hours, just on the day of the operation, for final reconnaissance.  Now to acquaint them with the place - well, like you see here is how the golf club stands and after that we will present the plan, did you see on that particular spot, that's where you will be deployed, you would be required to this, this and this, that is actually in a picture of what is going to happen, where what is expected of you.
	And also the question of - one of the things which APLA saw as very, very important, which is retreat.  We used to have about three or four options for retreating.  	So the forces must be, for purposes of command and control during the operation, the forces must know thoroughly that is we take option A, they do not go that way and that way and that way, we do one uniform thing, option B etc.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, am I right in understanding you to say that the unit was also given an opportunity to discuss and confirm the practicality of the plan, they could make suggestions as to different methods of doing it?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  If that is the way you want to interpret it, but I mean I will not agree with you.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not the position?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: That's not the position.  Though they have an input when the plan is being discussed, they do not have the final say, the command section has the final say.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just that they have an input and they knew the commander evaluates and then has the final decision?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Can you come again?

CHAIRPERSON: If you're at the scene, looking at the thing, they can have an input, they can make suggestions but they have not final decision, it is the person in charge of the operation who has the final decision?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Sorry, your last answer wasn't into the mike while it was one, could you just repeat that please, the: "yes".

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you repeat: "yes" on the mike.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Sorry, the problem, just so that you understand, is that the machine is recording and if you say: "yes" and the mike is switched off, it won't be picked up on the record.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Mr Chairman, I want to explain to him so that he can be able to hear it.
EXPLANATIONS ABOUT MICROPHONE

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Mbandazayo, please don't let him switch it off, his mike should stay on all the time, it's designed to stay on all the time.  Okay?  We'll switch our on and off as we work.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman.
	Let's go to paragraph 15:
"As I have indicated in paragraph 10, the arms and ammunition used in this attack was supplied to me by comrade Skumiso.  I arranged for their transportation route from Umtata to Thembasa.  They were brought to me by comrade Malusi Morrison"
	Can you explain the transportation part, the road from Umtata to Thembasa until they were brought to you by comrade Morrison?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  As part of my functions as a regional commissar by then, it was my duty to see that the movement of personnel, the movement of arms, was through the safe channels and through the safe route.  So the route that I established was via, I think it was the turn just before you reach Queenstown to Cathcart, Cathcart, Stutterheim and then Thembasa.
	And then to say I arranged for that transportation, is that it was myself who put in a requisition with comrade Power, the administrator by then, that I would need transport and recommend the type of transport, a bakkie or a sedan car to do this and that so that he can spare one bakkie for me if I want a bakkie on that particular day.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let's proceed to paragraph 16
"We disclosed on the day of the attack, that we were to attack the King William's Town Golf Club.  A day before I commanded a crack unit consisting of comrade Bheki and  Togela Mlangwesa which went on a mission to take a car to be used in the operation, which was found in Butterworth.  We took the car by force, we did not harm the owner and we promised to bring it back.  The car was a white Jetta"
	Can you take the Committee through what you did in Butterworth in order to secure this car, to get this car and use it in the operation?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: If we take a closer look into the way APLA operated, obviously there was supposed to be some transport used for the operation, and it could not be for instance, a car that we know is known by the police, those cars which moved around Umtata and Butterworth, it must be a car which was not known that it was being used by APLA operatives.  So it was in that light that we went to Butterworth.
	We couldn't take that car from King William's Town, we couldn't take that car from East London for obvious security reasons.  You see, we regarded King William's Town, East London, as the heart of the security forces in the Eastern Cape.  I mean, the situation security was a witness for me, there was, I think their headquarters were based in East London, there was also group 8 which was the army base here, so there was a heavy concentration of security forces.
	And to take a car in East London or in King William's Town, we will just be alerting the security forces that they must be hunting for that car and then we couldn't operate in that particular area where they are busy looking for the car.  So those are the facts which drove us to go to Butterworth and find the car.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you explain to the Committee how you took the car from the owner?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes, we took the car by force, in the sense that it was not through the concern of the owner, it was unexpected but because we are not criminals we were doing that for the sake of getting transport so that we can be in time with the operation of the golf club.
	We explain that we are going to try, make means to bring back his car and we were very much committed to that undertaking, it was not just a sugar coated concession.

MR LAX: Sorry, you haven't told us precisely how you took the car from him, did you point firearms at him, did you threaten to beat him us, did you point knives at him, what exactly did you do?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  I pointed a firearm at him and asked for the key, he gave me the key, took him into the car, ordered the drive to drive, which was comrade Togela Mlangewesa.  Then at some point in time, I can't remember, we dropped him off.  We made sure that he had enough coins to take the nearest transport to Butterworth and off we went.

MR MBANDAZAYO: May I proceed Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.

MR MBANDAZAYO: After taking the car you went back to Thembasa.  The arms were kept in a DLB in Nxesa location
"I took them two days before the operation and kept them in a suitcase"
	Now can you explain to the Committee, the area where the arms were kept and the place where they were kept?