Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1998-02-11

NORMAN ARENDSE: Would it be at that meeting where you were introduced to each other, that you were told about the Newcastle operation?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Were you told specifically what you were to do in Newcastle and how you were to go about doing it?  Were you given any detailed plan by Umzala?

ANDILE SHICEKA: Yes, he did give us details, that's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Can you tell us about those details?

ANDILE SHICEKA: In the meeting that we had with him together with Tanda, he told us that we should go to Newcastle.  When we arrived in Newcastle we have attack places where we can find white people.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Were you given any other details?

ANDILE SHICEKA: No.

NORMAN ARENDSE: You were also - you then travelled from Umtata to Newcastle and there were four of you, you and Tanda, Sitenbele and Funani, is that right?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: And according to Tanda he was appointed commander of that unit?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: And on the night of the attack it was the four of you together with the driver Dube, who carried out the attack on the crazy beat disco, is that correct?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct, however we were five together with Dube.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Yes, that's right.  Now, who decided on attacking the Crazy Beat Disco?

ANDILE SHICEKA: The decision was taken by Tanda.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Yes?

ANDILE SHICEKA: The reason was because two targets were selected, a restaurant and the Crazy Beat Disco, if we failed to attack one we had the option to attack the other one, either the restaurant or the Crazy Beat.  The person who selected the Crazy Beat Disco it Tanda because he's the one who did the recognises.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Can you tell us why the restaurant and the disco were identified as targets to be attacked?

ANDILE SHICEKA: It is because it's a place where you normally find white people in numbers.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Did you see that for yourself, that there were - as you put it, white people in numbers and the restaurant and at the disco?

ANDILE SHICEKA: The times I will go to the place in Tanda's company and I've seen when going to town that it was frequented by white people.  As his deputy I had to know what kind of place we are going to carry out the operation.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Why did you not attack the restaurant?

ANDILE SHICEKA: The reason why we didn't attack the restaurant was because there were many african people on the streets and we realised that if we start attacking the restaurant some african people might be injured, therefore Tanda decided that since - if we start attacking this place people may get injured and therefore we should avoid it and then we went straight to the Crazy Beat.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Can you provide us with reasons why the decision was taken that the target should be where you find whites: "in large numbers", as you put it?

ANDILE SHICEKA: I won't be able to know because we were given an order, an order which was coming from the Transkei which said that we should go and attack white people.  I think that's the main reason why we ended up attacking the Crazy Beat Disco, because it's a place where white people normally frequent.

NORMAN ARENDSE: I ask the question because it would appear from your various amnesty applications that you have applied for amnesty in respect of attacks on for example, police stations, army bases and so on and they would appear to be what you can call: "hard targets" and what's also been referred to as: "legitimate targets".
	Now there seems to be a shift from attacking those: "hard targets" to what is referred to as: "soft or civilian targets" where there are people involved, ordinary civilians presumably innocent civilians.  Can you explain whether there was in fact that shift?  Were you aware that there was that shift in strategy?

ANDILE SHICEKA: I personally, I'm a soldier, I had to carry some orders from my seniors.  As to the question of whether we were shifting from one target to another target, I'm not part of the decision making in such APLA operations.  I'm only given instructions to attack.  Whether APLA was shifting from defence force and South African Police, I won't be able to answer that.  I think our seniors are the people, the relevant people who can answer that questions.  I personally had to carry the orders as it was given.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Did you not question the order?

ANDILE SHICEKA: During my training I was taught that you don't question an order or instruction.  If you are a disciplinary member of the army you have to carry out the instruction as it's given.  After carrying out the operation you can ask questions.  Therefore it means that if I defy an order I'm causing a mutiny within the ranks army and a mutiny in something that's not wanted in any army situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, causing what?  Mutiny or meeting?

ANDILE SHICEKA: Mutiny.

<UNKNOWN>: I think he said mutiny.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Have you ever defied an order given to you by your commander or someone in the APLA high command?

ANDILE SHICEKA: I never defied any orders since from the time I joined the army.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Do you know of any of your comrades in the APLA army who defied an order and if so, what happened to that person?

ANDILE SHICEKA: What I know is, for example if you had a small dagga it's not allowed and if you're seeing doing so you're out of the principle of the army therefore the commander has to punish you.  Those were the petty things that I saw people getting punished for them.  For example they will take off your clothes and let you crawl and put you in the mud and water to bring you back to your senses. Those are the petty things that I've seen as I've said.  For example, when you're drinking a lot or smoking dagga.  Those are the things that I saw.

NORMAN ARENDSE: And these forms of discipline which you describe to us, did you see that here in this country or did it happen outside of the borders?

ANDILE SHICEKA: It was outside the borders.  I haven't seen that with in the country.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Is that while you were staying in camps?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Now the arms and ammunition which was used during the attack, where did that come from?

ANDILE SHICEKA: I don't have an understanding to that regard.  I think comrade Malevu said they were in Transkei but I don't know how they came to be in Newcastle.  I was that ammunition is already available in Newcastle, I don't know how it was carried to Newcastle.  I wasn't told that answer with Bongani.  They told me that I'll find arms in Newcastle.

NORMAN ARENDSE: And did you find the arms in Newcastle, you obviously did.  Where did you find the arms and ammunitions and the grenades?

ANDILE SHICEKA: At Miki.

NORMAN ARENDSE: At Miki's house?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's Miki's house, yes.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Did you take all the arms and ammunition with you in the car that evening?

ANDILE SHICEKA: That's correct.

NORMAN ARENDSE: The car that you used during the attack was a Cressida, we know that and that Cressida was high-jacked.  Were you part of the group that high-jacked the car?

ANDILE SHICEKA: I wasn't.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Were you waiting at that time at Miki's house for ...[intervention]

ANDILE SHICEKA: I wasn't in Miki's house.  We're not staying at Miki's house, we were staying in Skumbuza Shomba's house.  It was an ...[indistinct] as Maskopazin.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Now, ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Who is Miki?

ANDILE SHICEKA: Miki was one of our contacts.  As comrade Malevu was in Sweden we had to arrive at Miki's place.

NORMAN ARENDSE: Thank you.  Now, when you were in the Cressida and you went towards the target, you went first to the restaurant, is that correct?

ANDILE SHICEKA: We started at the restaurant.

NORMAN ARENDSE: And you got out of the car and you actually went to the restaurant, is that right?