Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

MR BRINK: On page 85 there is reference to a press statement of Mr Nzo, then the Secretary-General of the African National Congress on 5 July 1986, with reference to how there was a call to make the country ungovernable, how the one apartheid structure after another collapsed, the emergence of street committees, the embryonic people's power, and the strategy is to move from ungovernability to people's power through such structures or alternative structures.  That's how the author of this document saw it, is that correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR BRINK: /In the

MR BRINK: In the following pages is it correct that the UDF strategy is set out - that is on page 89 - and that is basically the setting up of these structures, the alternative structures, from within communities and from within the country.  Is my summary correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR BRINK: It says that there is mass movement, which caused the Community Councils and certain other structures to collapse.  The document then deals with alternative structures, which brought about the collapse or the limiting of third tier government, as can be seen on page 92 of annexure A, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR BRINK: And, although it is not necessary to deal in detail for purposes of your application in my humble opinion with these, I think it must just be mentioned - is it correct to say that the document then deals with almost every aspect of community life in South Africa, the media, alternative media, education, alternative education ... (inaudible) ... solidarity with the ANC/UDF, etcetera.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR BRINK: And on page 208 of Volume I there is the conclusion after this study and overview were done.

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR BRINK: And on page 211 is it correct that the conclusion is that the ANC/UDF constitute a political rather than a military danger?

WITNESS:   That is correct, yes.

MR BRINK: And you will notice that on page 208 to 212 the conclusion is that in fact the biggest danger constituted is the ungovernability, and is also the political danger, winning the hearts and the mind of the people, as it is

MR BRINK: /called.

MR BRINK: called.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is right.

MR BRINK: Now, from the application's point of view of more importance would be the suggested counter measures.  Is it correct that the statutory document then goes over and it actually sets out a range of counter measures to counter the revolutionary struggle, the ungovernability, the various alternative structures?

WITNESS:   That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Where does that appear?

MR DU TOIT: This would be from page 224 of the document to 256, and I will refer more particularly to page 240, and could I ask the Chairperson and the Committee Members to please page to 240.  One of the counter measures announced or suggested is the strategy of employing special constables, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: The first new paragraph on page 240, and the second sentence I've roughly translated.  Is it correct that it says, "An effective physical wedge against the tyranny of the Comrades must simply be created from the ranks of the blacks themselves through special constables and community courts."

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: The strategy seems to be that from within the ranks of the blacks, as it is called here, there would be created a physical wedge which would be effective, and which would come about in the form of special constables and community courts.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: On page 241, if I could ask you to page there, the idea is that, as I read the document, the underlying portion, is that the moment the local perception exists that the Comrades do not physically dominate they would

MR DU TOIT: /become

MR DU TOIT: become rather ineffective.

WITNESS:   That is right.

MR DU TOIT: The special constables must dominate physically.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: And therefore the Comrades would, by way of perception, not be effective.

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: On page 242 there is now the actual suggestion that an auxiliary force or a special constable force be created.  In paragraph 2 on page 242, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is right.

MR DU TOIT: And in (iii), that's the last paragraph, again there is the suggestion that an effective physical wedge against - or for the tyranny of the Comrades would be created from within the ranks of blacks themselves, as it is stated there.

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: On page 243, in the paragraph marked 2.2, there is the reference now to what happened in Rhodesia, where there were Security Force Auxiliaries used at a late stage of what is called the revolution or counter insurgency in Rhodesia, is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: We do not have time to go through this quotation which appears from page 243, but there are certain important moments to which I would like you to draw the Committee's attention.  Would you see that in paragraph (ii) on page 243 the Security Force Auxiliaries there initiated by the Special Branch in Rhodesia created own local militia?  Do you see that?

WITNESS:   Yes, that's correct.

MR DU TOIT: And the idea was, as can be seen from the next page 244, to regain and consolidate their hold on the tribal trust lands.  That would be the first new - the second new

MR DU TOIT: /sentence

MR DU TOIT: sentence on page 244, and in the third sentence from the top.

WITNESS:   Yes.

MR DU TOIT: To consolidate and hold the tribal trust lands.  And what is important, two sentences downwards there's reference to a clear and hold type of operation.  You clear the area of anti-Government elements and then you hold the land by putting the militia in there.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.

MR DU TOIT: We will not deal with the full quotation, but I think it's perhaps necessary that you should also draw attention to what is said on page 245 at the bottom in (vii), that,

MR DU TOIT: "Land would be dominated, but when the Security Forces leave the terrs ..."

MR DU TOIT: referring to the terrorists,

MR DU TOIT: "... would then return."

MR DU TOIT: ---   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: And over to the next page on 245, the second sentence,

MR DU TOIT: "Allegations that they use their position ..."

MR DU TOIT: this would now be the militia employed there to retain areas,

MR DU TOIT: "... to intimidate the rural folk to vote for the Bishop are probably true, but the auxiliaries do present a degree of stability which the trust lands have not known for some years."

MR DU TOIT: Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Yes, that's right.

MR DU TOIT: There are two remaining important observations here which I would like you to just draw the attention of the

MR DU TOIT: /Committee

MR DU TOIT: Committee to.  The very last two words on page 246, the same page, underlined,

MR DU TOIT: "Thus by the time the auxiliaries were proving a viable scheme the whites in Rhodesia had run out of time."

MR DU TOIT: Is it correct that the document at a later stage warns that these special constables be brought - must be created as a force quickly before the same happens, before it is too late?

WITNESS:   That is correct.

MR DU TOIT: Now, there is then a discussion as to where this auxiliary force to be created in South Africa was to be situated, is that correct?

WITNESS:   That is correct.