Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-11

MR VISSER: We know from history that on the 21 July 1985 there was a limited state of emergency proclaimed and that was lifted in March and from 12th June 1986 there was a general nationwide state of emergency that was renewed every year until it was lifted on the 8th June 1990 except for here in Natal where a few months later on the 18th October 1990 it was lifted.  Is that correct?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now during that time you were here in Natal as chief of MK Intelligence Unit and you combated this struggle?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now during this time of the state of emergency powers were given to the security forces, is that correct?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Especially the security branch of the police and then especially in regard to detention without trial?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then I could ask you the question because these incidents for which you apply for amnesty falls within the time frame when there was constant state of emergency and the solution would be here, why do you not just detain the people than to kill them, what would the reaction be to that?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Chairperson, the detention would not necessarily stop the terror campaign, the information that was available to us according to the arrests and changes to the state of emergency came from another department in South Africa.  Our own input from the security branch Port Natal was limited to the people we knew and whose activities we were aware of but the acts of terror was handled outside the framework of the state of emergency and we simply - to take an individual out of the system did not stop the acts of terror because the network was far broader than that, even right into Swaziland and during the same time information was available to us with the codenames Operation Mother, Burning Forest, Grey Clouds, Blue Seas.  This was an ANC strategy and not only a strategy but a real implementation of infiltration of terrorists, political as well as military throughout the whole South Africa from the far North Transvaal to the Eastern Cape and you have referred to the Terrorism Act, that you also acted in terms of the Internal Security Act?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Mr Botha, many people in this country believed that in the state of emergency you could just take somebody and detain them.  Was it done in that manner?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: No Chairperson, you had to have enough evidence as to the involvement of a particular person when this person was detained.  His detention had to place a damper on the activity as well the role that he fulfilled in society where he would further these activities.

MR VISSER: Please excuse me maybe our roads left here, but is it not correct that - and the regulations that was applicable was available but you could not detain a person indefinitely but there had to come a time when one had to make a submission to the Minister and then a Minister had to authorise such detention, I think it was after 30 days?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: After 30 days, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: However that may be, what did this experience teach you?  These additional capacities that was given to you by the state of emergency, did this succeed in stopping the violence or eliminating the violence?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Definitely not Mr Chairperson, the contrary was true with the proclamation of a state of emergency with the arrests of prominent individuals it influenced the broader masses in such a manner that they were more incited.

MR VISSER: Yes and what you are referring to now is it also true in that certain movements were established in particular with regard to these detainees?  We think of the Release Mandela Campaign that was not only concerned with the release of our current President but with other persons in detention as well and the Release the Children Campaign  and these were all campaigns against detention, is that correct?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Mr Chairperson

MR VISSER: Was this also the experience in Durban?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes we also experienced it in the same manner.

MR VISSER: And during this process Mr Botha, you were also obligated to protect the public?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That was our priority, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: All members of the public?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: All members of the public, yes.

MR VISSER: Was it possible for you to not only for the security police but for normal policing - I think it's going to be held against me if I say normal policing - but for the police persons outside the security branch, could they not enter freely into the townships and to patrol there, was it possible, to protect those members of the public?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Chairperson, policing in general and specifically black areas became more difficult, entry was limited and our movement was limited and in some instances there was a cordon, specifically Lamontville.

MR VISSER: This was also referred to as a no go area?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is true Chairperson?

MR VISSER: And if police had to enter there at night, what would happen?  What was your experience?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: We would be the target of an attack.

MR VISSER: And this all added to the fact that you could not properly protect the civilians of these areas?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And in this process Mr Botha, did you get the impression that anarchy reigned or was on the increase and could take over in this area?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes Chairperson.  At the end of 1986 that was definitely the feeling that we were losing the struggle and something had to be done to stop it before the country was enveloped in chaos.

MR MALAN: Can I just return to the previous question, you said that in certain areas it was more difficult to get into some places and you said "cordon sanitaire", what do you understand by that?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: This referred to a specific black area, Lamontville,  where police sealed off the whole area in order to re-establish order in that area and we did everything in our power, we delivered bread, milk and this was one of our attempts to establish order.

MR MALAN: Do you refer to it after that as a no go area, I don't think it was quite like that, I think the Advocate put it as a no go area, but I don't think that you meant it as that, I just wanted to clarify this?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: I think what we are trying to say here or what I am trying to say is, the no go area stretched so far that we had to put up a cordon in certain areas so that we can do normal policing.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Commissioner, you have just exposed my ignorance of the French language, thank you for the correction.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought it was Afrikaans, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I thought it was Russian, my Attorney has just told me that it's French.
	Mr Botha, in your attempts do you believe that you were indeed capable of combating attacks on civilians, buildings, holiday places etc through your actions?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Which actions were these?