Special Hearings — Political Party — 1998-05-06

AZHAR CACHALIA: Thank you then chair.  The first cluster of questions deal with the issue of political tolerance and the issue is here that in as much as the UDF and the ANC argued, the state was guilty of political intolerance and the violent suppression of decent, was the UDF not to some extent also guilty of a measure of intolerance?  Now in line with our founding statement it was UDF's policy to be tolerant of all political and different views pursuant to this policy it attempted to effectively unite all forces who were genuinely opposed to apartheid.  Since its inception the UDF sought to bring together the broadest possible coalition of anti apartheid organisations under a single banner and it was known to be the broadest coalition of anti apartheid forces in South Africa's history.
     The coalition was brought together on the basis of a shared commitment to ending apartheid and actively striving for a non racial democracy where we all had the vote.  Membership was therefore inclusive based on a very broad set of principles.  However the UDF worked actively with some organisations who were opposed to apartheid but which did not affiliate to the Front, examples of such organisations for example were the Federation of South African Trade Unions, the Council of Churches, the UDF also sort to co-operate with other political organisations which had fundamentally divergent political points of view such as AZAPO the IFP and INYANZA.  It is however true that there were public occurrences from some UDF leaders and particularly from our youth and student sectors which revealed attitudes of intolerance. This had to be seen against the background of a climate of suspicion and intolerance that was created by the regime.  
     Chairperson people who are constantly fearful of attack or arrest, not surprisingly develop attitudes that are not only intolerant but also undemocratic in such a climate. An example of this I think was in December 1986 when false pamphlets issued by the state in the name of the UDF called upon AZAPO members to be eliminated, this caused considerable tension between our organisations at the time.  Another example was in the UDF's relationship to Inkatha. Initially the UDF adopted a somewhat ambivalent attitude to Inkatha, on the one hand there was a strong view within the UDF that we should not work with those such as Inkatha who worked within bantustan structures.
 On the other hand the UDF refrained from making any public criticisms of Inkatha so as not to antagonise the thousands of what we believe to be honest Inkatha supporters who genuinely wanted change.  The violence which exploded in Kwazulu Natal area and intensified in the later nineteen eighties fuelled intolerant attitudes on both sides.  The UDF leadership recognised the danger in these developments and with both these organisations attempts were made to resolve these conflicts through discussion and negotiation.  Political education of UDF activists was another means through which the tendency towards political intolerance was addressed.  Political education programs pointed out the dangers of factionalism among our affiliates and emphasised the need to find potential areas of unity with non affiliated anti apartheid organisations.  
     I want to quote from a statement from one of the UDF publications at the time, it read as follows:  
"As far as other political tendencies are concerned our most serious consideration should be those which have a mass base.  By now we should be able to be realistic about the areas and nature of co-operation which is possible.  It is our task to ensure that we and those non affiliates never lose sight of the fact that the apartheid state is the enemy and if any ideological differences do exist we should respect those and not allow it to undermine the potential areas of unity".
     The Commission then asks us whether it is true that such political intolerance provided fertile grounds for the emergence of vigilante groupings?  Again Sir it is important to emphasise that the emergence of vigilante groupings was in the main part of a state strategy to suppress the democratic movement.  We don't want to go into the detail it was very, we believe well covered and explained in the ANC submission to the commission in 1996 on pages 36 and 37.      In general, vigilantes represented conservative forces in black communities who benefited from apartheid such as councillors and their friends.  These people were obviously threatened by the struggle for a democratic order and were therefore susceptible to be recruited as apartheid vigilantes.  There were however isolated instances of political intolerance on the side of UDF aligned youths which also fuelled vigilante activity.   These tended to occur where UDF structures were weak and where the leadership was unable to enforce the necessary discipline.  This can be illustrated by an incident in the squatter camp in Cross Roads where a consumer boycott of goods took place in 1986.  The boycott was physically enforced by UDF aligned youths which resulted in tensions between the community and consumer boycott activists.  The situation was then exploited by a Cross Roads war lord called Mbongwana who was assisted by the security forces in mobilising residence against the youths and their allies by physically attacking them.  
    In summary it would be inaccurate to assert as a general proposition that political intolerance on the part of some UDF affiliates provided a fertile ground for the emergence of vigilante activities in the nineteen eighties.  It is true however that there were instances where a measure of political intolerance on the part of our members may have contributed to this phenomena.  We then sir, deal with the question of a tax of perceived informers, collaborators and peoples justice.  The question you ask us is whether the political vilification of community councillors in the earlier UDF campaigns did not lay the basis for the wave of physical attacks on them and other perceived collaborators in 1985 and 1986 in particular?  We say that the basis for the physical attacks on community councillors arose from popular anger to what the councillors stood for and what they were actually doing such as increasing the rentals to finance bankrupt councils and evicting people who could not pay their rentals.  
     A study by Nicholas Huissen notes that it was in this context rather than in the straightforward political campaigning that physical attacks on councillors and on their property were launched by angry crowds of residents.  Political reservations about community councillors would not have touched ordinary residents and not the worsening economic situation forced residents into direct conflict with community councils.  Allegations of corruption levelled at community councillors became numerous and wide spread at the time so the UDF's legitimate criticisms of the role of the community councillors in maintaining black local authorities may have contributed to popular anger but in the circumstances we believe that this was fair and robust criticism and protest.  
 Is it not true, you ask, that many of those who became victims of UDF supporters were not really dangerous enemies but rather the most accessible and least able to defend themselves such as the wives, girlfriends and children of councillors and policeman?  We accept that some of the victims of township violence, we don't have the figures you have the figures with you, but we accept that some of these victims would have been the wives, girlfriends and children of councillors and policeman.  It was probably mob violence rather than the deliberate targeting of such people that resulted in many of them becoming victims.  It is very difficult however to say how many of these attacks were initiated with a clear political motive and even more difficult to attribute these to UDF members and supporters but you go further and say that you have many statements concerning many UDF supporters who were wounded or killed while engaged in attacking persons regarded as collaborators.  Should these UDF supporters you ask in such instances be regarded as victims as defined by the TRC Act?  It is a difficult question.  We say that we have little hesitation in regarding such people as victims of apartheid.  The definition of a victim in the TRC act however is wide enough to cover people who were wounded or killed while attacking people who were regarded as collaborators. 
     It is our view that the TRC should not as a matter of principals exclude persons from being defined as victims merely because they were engaged in offensive actions. However the fact of each case would have to be analysed carefully so as to establish whether there was a clear political objective associated with the act in question.  
    You then under the set of questions finally ask whether collaborators had the right to defend themselves, their families and property?  And really our answer quite simply is, yes the right to self defence is an inherent right.   
     The next cluster of issues deal with the issue of necklacing in particular, again Chairperson I should refer you in particular to pages 77 and 78 of the ANC's first submission in 1996 and then it's further submissions at pages 11 to 12 which really sets out, we think very well the whole context within which this took place and we are not going to repeat that here we will simply answer the questions fairly briefly.             
 Firstly was the issue of necklacing discussed by the UDF national executive committee during the nineteen eighties?  We've looked at the minutes, we have not been able to find a specific example of this but we say that the issue would have been discussed within the structures of the UDF and its affiliates given the fact that it had received considerable publicity at the time.  Our position was that we disapproved of this practice and condemned its use on several occasions.   This was communicated through the media and no doubt in discussion among affiliates.  
     You then asked how the UDF responded to the well known statement by Mrs Mandela regarding the use of matchboxes and necklaces for the goal of liberation?  Sir there is no record of a formal response from the UDF to this statement,  but I can recall that it was a statement which caused acute embarrassment for us because the government at that point used the statement extensively to try and portray the struggle in a negative light, while it is interesting that at the time when comrade Oliver Tambo gave a full interview distancing the ANC from necklacing, the government chose to prohibit the publication of that particular statement in the media at that time.  So yes it caused embarrassment to us but we did not specifically speak out on it.  
 Then you ask what questions around the UDF course of action 
regarding necklacing, in particular what steps did the UDF take to curb the escalation of the problem?  We say that the UDF had very little direct control over the development of this phenomenon, its capacity and ability to intervene was limited due to the negative impact to the state of emergency on our organisations. We made public statements distancing ourselves from the conduct.  
     Then you ask whether the UDF, what we did about these violations that were committed by its supporters, were any instructions issued regarding these attacks and were any disciplinary actions taken against persons or affiliates?  Sir we have really no accurate information at the time and even now as to who was committing these acts, the only information at our disposal was anecdotal.  It was also unclear to what extent there was a clear political motive behind the development of this phenomenon.  The UDF support during this period was much wider then its membership and therefore its span of control of its supporters was weak and even non existent during the period in question.  We were hampered by a lack of resources and clearly did not command the resources of machinery of the state.  The emergency made it virtually impossible for us to function and leadership locally, regionally and nationally could not operate openly and were not able to intervene and monitor the situation effectively.  The problem was compounded by the fact that there were official restrictions on the reporting in the media of such incidence after 1986 unless such reports were officially sanctioned by the government and that is an important point to emphasise.  
     Despite the repressive conditions under which we operated at the time we still attempted to address the escalation of the problem, we spoke out against it but I think we must concede that we did so somewhat belatedly.  There were never instructions from the UDF regarding these attacks we have no information as to whether such instructions were issued by any of the affiliates however or whether in individual cases disciplinary actions were taken.  
     There is then a set of questions dealing with our failure to condemn.  Was the UDF leadership reluctant to intervene, afraid to intervene or unable to intervene, if so should the violence be explained in terms of mob violence or random acts by crowds who were stirred up?  The UDF we say was not reluctant to intervene, it was hampered by the restrictions on its ability to operate freely and only by its limited capacity.  I should at this point, point out, Chair that we did face a genuine dilemma and I have alluded to the fact that we had no accurate information but we felt that those who were committing these acts may be supporters who were not directly under our discipline and I think we have to capture what was happening at the time. For our publicity secretary to issue a statement in the media saying UDF condemns necklacing, in many instances we felt these people had been brutalised, young kids who have emerged from detention and our problem was it may make some people look good, it may make the organisation look good if you condemned it but in effect if you were not able to create any sort of disciplined intervention that would not be heeded and in fact those people, the limited influence that we may have had over them would have been lost.  So I think we had to take that into account and from our point of view that was a genuine dilemma.  We would be happy to engage into further discussions with this later on.  We did in general at the end condemn such killings and did not silently condone it not withstanding the dilemmas that we faced.  
     Would an ordinary UDF member you ask, or supporter have any reason to believe that such practices were not approved of.  If such members or supporters apply for amnesty for having committed such acts saying they acted in the name of the UDF, does the UDF think they should be granted amnesty?  
 We say that an ordinary member or supporter ought to have known that the UDF's policy was one of non violence as this was public policy. There were occasions when some activists of the UDF and occasionally even agents provocateur made reckless statements that did not accord with our policy and this could have contributed to some members or supporters even being confused or unsure as to what our attitude was to these practices.  
 We do not believe however that the mere assertion by an amnesty applicant, that he or she was acting in the name of the UDF, should entitle as a general proposition to such a person being granted an amnesty.  The applicant would have to prove why he or she believed that violent act was carried out with a clear political objective and that the behest of the UDF or one of its affiliates.
 At the same time however we want to emphasise that the fact of a necklacing, even though gruesome should not disqualify a person from being granted an amnesty.
 Around questions of support to violators you ask us whether by critically supporting those who had been convicted of certain offences, some of those who were on death row, did the UDF not lend legitimacy to such actions and was this not post facto endorsement of the violations.  We say that these actions were legitimated by the fact that the apartheid government had not allowed any peaceful or democratic which fundamentally challenged its basis.  
 The right of the State to prosecute our people, coupled with the absence of any real legitimacy for the judiciary was seriously questioned by us.  The support that the UDF rendered to such people then exhibited an  understanding as to why they had either consciously resorted to such actions or found themselves sucked up in violent situations.  
 While this did not amount explicitly to an endorsement as such, we do accept that it is difficult in practice to draw a line between rendering support on the one hand and an endorsement on the other.
 The next cluster of questions deal with the enforcement of resistance strategies.  You ask us whether - and the broad questions here pertain to implementation, monitoring and enforcement of labour and consumer boycotts, how do we explain these acts and was the UDF involved in physically enforcing boycott strategies?  If not, who were the people who did so?
 The second and related question is whether any actions taken - were any actions taken to get enforcing boycotts to stop such activities?  Again, these acts took place against a background of an emergency when most of the UDF's leadership was in detention or on the run.  The acts were committed by youths acting on their own even though some may have believed that this was being done in the interests of the struggle.
 It is probably safe to assume that many of these youths had been severely traumatised by their detentions and resorted to these acts really as a result of their own experiences that they had gone through in the previous one or two years.
 The UDF often emphasised its opposition to this form of coercion and there were instances when activists who had acted in a disreputable way was subject to disciplinary action.  A UDF publication at the time described the problem in the following way.  I have not doubt that comrade stone would be able to expand on this, but the UDF publication said:
"But as the struggle has intensified so has the opportunity, so have the opportunities arisen for unorganised youth to parade as comrades, highjacking cars or demanding money in the name of the struggle.  The solution to such problems lies in political education and organisation.  Marshalls or members of organisations who have mistreated people are also disciplined.  In Port Elizabeth members of PACO were isolated by being pretenders from attending meetings and from wearing a PACO T-shirt"
Which emphasises what was the most severe penalty we could impose at the time.
"The extent to which discipline can be enforced depends on the level of organisation. In some areas, especially where detentions have removed the more senior leadership of  civic structures involving all the people are weak, discipline is a more serious problem"
 Sir, you then go on to popular justice where we look at people's courts as quote: "organs of people's power" and your questions are twofold.  Were people's courts organs of people's power as articulated by the UDF?  And secondly, the issue of necklacing, burning and certainly many other violations including lashings took place at the behest of people's courts?  You ask whether there are instances where the UDF intervened and halted the operation of people's courts. 
 People's courts were a spontaneous development in out townships and a response to the virtual breakdown in any form of state authority.  The formation of people's courts as quote: "organs of people's power" never became official policy of the UDF.  We did however see it as a potentially positive development in that these courts could resolve community problems such as petty cases of assault or theft without having to rely on the State.
 We sought to direct this development by emphasising that such courts should be under proper political discipline and refrain from engaging in acts of violence.  On of the UDF publications at the time conceptualises and describes people's courts in the following way:
"In Uitenhage for example, on the basis of a well development organisation at an area committee level the youth under the discipline of community organisations now maintain ordinary law and order functions previously the domain of the apartheid police and army.  Peoples volunteers, the amabutu, now investigate crimes related to people's complaints.  They are strictly instructed to use no violence against the people and that their political task is to help in resolving disputes and thus to build unity within their community.  Similar local of organisation in places like Attridgeville, Fort Beaufort, parts of Port Elizabeth, Cradock, Queenstown and Kagiso form a basis for a people's system of law and order.  Our people's courts are not meant to punish people but rather to politically educate people for active involvement in the national struggle against apartheid.  There would have been instances where UDF at an area level rather than a regional or national level intervened to halt operations of people's courts that were functioning like kangaroo courts"
 We then, before the last section of the political climate and the responsibility, deal very briefly with inter-organisational conflicts.  And you ask whether we can explain conflicts that occurred between the UDF and AZAPO in Soweto, the Eastern Cape and Paarl and other places from 1985 to 1989.
 And secondly you ask what steps were taken to resolve the matter and to prevent bloodshed?  Were UDF affiliates disciplined or expelled or any individual members disciplined?
 Again Sir, there is very extensive documentation that you already have, puts ...[indistinct] in both submissions from the ANC and again we are not going to repeat that but merely to try and point to examples of the way this matter, how we understood it and how we dealt with it.
 Looking at the Eastern Cape is one example.  We say that in mid 1985 there were a proliferation of violent clashes between supporters of the UDF and AZAPO in the area.  These occurred at the time, you must remember, the murders of the PEBCO 3 and the CRADOCK 4 had occurred.  It was widely believed at the time that they had been murdered by the State, a belief that was to be proved true more than a decade later.  There was a climate of great fear and suspicion.
 At the same time the black consciousness group in the Eastern Cape was led by the self-styled Reverend Ebeniza Maklena.  The organisation which he led was called the: "Ama Africa National Front" and was closely linked to AZAPO.  He was widely believed to be working for the State and fermenting violence in the area.  He was subsequently expelled from AZAPO.  We believe that he was principally responsible for the violent clashes that occurred between the UDF and AZAPO in the Eastern Cape. Indeed his Ama Africa National Front was indeed set up by the State to counter the influence of the UDF and you have the documentation to show that.
 The State repeatedly distributed leaflets all around the country in the names of various organisations with the aim of causing confusion and fermenting violence between the UDF and AZAPO.  Unfortunately we say that this sometimes succeeded in doing precisely that.  We issued statements condemning them as the work of the State and appealing to our affiliates to be vigilant of this.  We wrote letters to AZAPO and met with its leadership in an effort to stop the problem from escalating.   We were not however able to find a record of any disciplinary action which may have been taken against any member of an affiliate within the UDF.
 With reference to Inkatha you as that we answer in the following way:  We say that the relationship that the UDF had with Inkatha was an ambivalent one.  On the one hand we were opposed to what was considered to be Inkatha's collaboration with the State, while on the other hand we were reluctant to criticise it because of its considerable rank and file support.
 But as the first clashes between UDF and Inkatha supporters took place, starting with the Engoia massacre at the University of Zululand where UDF supporter were attacked and killed by Inkatha supporters.  Increasingly hostile statements were then issued by both sides which resulted in further polarisation on the ground, which in turn resulted in further clashes.
 It was against this background that the UDF leadership was concerned about the conflict and certainly did not encourage it.  But it is true that the linkages between the leadership and rank and file structures in the townships of KwaZulu Natal were weak.  The UDF sought to resolve the problem with Inkatha by peaceful means and its leaders played a key role in trying to get peace initiatives off the ground.
 In the Natal midlands we worked with the Chamber of Commerce to try to broker a peace deal while in other parts of Natal the UDF supported Cosatu and worked with the churches in trying to find mechanisms for dispute resolution.  That was in the later '80's.
 Again we must remember that this occurred in a climate where the State deliberately sought to build support for Inkatha while at the same time making it impossible for UDF leaders to operate, by detaining and banning them.  There's extensive documentation on the State's covert support for Inkatha at the time.
 The full machinery of the State, particularly the KwaZulu police was used to bolster Inkatha in its effort to physically annihilate the UDF's presence.  The full array of both legal as well as illegal means was used to achieve this objective.  It is therefore not surprising that we were not able to make very real progress towards finding a peaceful solution with Inkatha before 1990.
 The last question Deputy Chair, relates to political climate and responsibility.  And you ask I think the probing question which says that former government officials have acknowledged that the use of certain language provided a reasonable basis for those at lower levels to infer that killing was acceptable,  does the same reasoning not hold for the UDF?
 We say that the usage of militant language within the front took place against a background of increasing struggle and general escalation in violence.  We were concerned about this development and discouraged the use of militant rhetoric.  There are publications, political education publications for example of the UDF which emphasise that because of our security concerns activists were discouraged from sounding very revolutionary all over.  We felt that their emphasis should be on disciplined organisation building.
 But I think, having looked at this question hard and for a long time among us, we conceded that the language used by some of us from time to time could have provided the reasonable basis for some of our members to infer that violence and even killing was acceptable.
 The next set of questions with a political responsibility for comrades.  Does the UDF accept responsibility for this particular socio political grouping, amorphous as it may be?  You say that further several persons have applied for amnesty for violations, claiming broad UDF endorsement of their actions.  How do we as a leadership view such claims? 
 You ask further whether the UDF can claim credit for organising and mobilising people and then deny any responsibility for actions arising out of this process of mobilisation.  I think we want to state simply Sir, that we accept both political and moral responsibility for the actions of those who genuinely considered themselves to be our comrades even though they were not accountable to the structures of the UDF.
 We accept that in organising and mobilising our people for freedom, some of these comrades committed acts which violated our policies but these were the  unintended consequences which inevitably resulted from our campaigns.  
 We say that the TRC in evaluating the amnesty applications should view their actions with sympathy and understanding of the political context within which their actions occurred.  We also wish to submit that the sympathy and understanding should be extended, not only to the members of the UDF but also supporters who believed that their actions were contributing to the struggle for freedom.
 The last set of questions deal with mass actions.  And you ask whether the UDF should not have foreseen the violent consequences of such actions?  Was it not obvious you ask, that the State would act against unlawful initiatives?  Should the blame be squarely put on the actions of the security forces and is there any responsibility that the UDF can claim in this regard?
 Civilians were placed in situations where they were obviously injured.
 We say that for the UDF mass action was our most viable and effective weapon in advancing our struggle.  When organising marches we often took into account the danger that the security forces would attack us.  We were not reckless in organising many of our demonstrations.  Within the limits of our capacity we tried to ensure that marches proceeded as peacefully as possible, organising marshalls from our structures to assist in crown control. 
 In organising these marches we also tried to take into account the unpredictable behaviour of the security forces and therefore took as many precautions as possible.  While it was obvious however that the State would act against unlawful initiatives, it was not always obvious that they would respond violently to a peaceful demonstration. 
 There were occasions when prominent clerics for example were part of that demonstration and then they backed off when they felt that they were able to move in without the glare of the media as an example, and then they may have broken up the demonstration violently. 
 So in apportioning blame in this area, clearly the government which prohibited democratic activity such as protest marches and the security forces that violently broke up demonstrations must bear the primary responsibility for the violence which ensued during some of these actions.  After all the right to peaceful protest is an inalienable universally recognised human right.  But we must accept that there is a measure of moral responsibility for the fact that marches and mass actions were embarked upon, where there was always a danger whatever precautions we may have taken, that civilians may be injured during such protests.
 We feel however, that even though there is a moral responsibility that we accept for it, that we would have abdicated as comrade Terror has pointed out, a greater moral responsibility if we sat back, an acquiesced in our own oppression and applied really the peculiar logic which says: the State would be unhappy if we organise a march so let's not organise the march.
 In conclusion we do say and we say this in all sincerity and honesty, that we do deeply regret the loss of life and the trauma that many people suffered, not only members and supporters of the UDF but those who were our opponents but we regret any loss of life and injury that resulted in the cause of us waging our just struggle.
 Chair, that ends our questions and our answers.  We'd be happy to take questions at this point and which comrade Popo will direct us to answer, thank you.