Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it wasn't anything new, there were different thoughts expressed by the different leaders concerning one Xhosa State, one nation, one country.  It was tried - they formulated and tried to carry it out, but in a counter-revolutionary sense it would have been to our advantage because it would have created a partner for us in this counter-revolutionary struggle.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then on the same page, 19(a).3
"The existence of anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha, a so-called cultural organisation or the ZCC that is religious, as well as the ethnic factor in the South African community makes the preparation for and the denial of a coherent revolutionary onslaught difficult."
Now you have already referred to it in Plan Katzen.  In Plan Katzen there's also such organisation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is what we called the XWB, that is the Xhosa movement.  There was also the name Ilizalomsa added to that or linked to it.  And Chief Makoma also formed a party, that is the Ciskei People's Protection Rights Party and we also saw that as possible counter-revolutionary fronts.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 809, paragraph 20.  There is states
"The aim, based on everything said above, was to win the revolutionary war."
Now what did you want to do there?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now at that stage, Chairperson, it was perhaps a bit ambitious because the revolution had progressed quite far but we still tried.  And I think it was in Katzen that this aim is also expressed, and that is then that this war had to be won.  I think it was in '86.

MR KNOETZE: The following document, page 821.  On that page, item 4, the second part, the guidelines are approved and one has to read it then in conjunction with that which is said on page 822 and 823, and that is the strategy that is encountering the ANC.  Now who gave this approval?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Now this page 821 is taken from the minutes of the State Security Council, a meeting that was held.  Item 4 just states that the guidelines to follow have been approved and it had to be sent to the different departments to be carried out.

MR KNOETZE: If we can then continue to 823, paragraph 3, the second part.  It refers to the TVB States, the national States.  Now these States are being identified as targets and as springboards and thoroughfares used, and that is to increase the terror actions and unrest in the RSA, so it also refers to Transkei and Ciskei.  Can you just confirm that that was the situation at the time?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct, especially with regard to the Ciskei.  In comparison to the Transkei, it was more disorganised with regards to the Security Forces but also in the government.  President Lennox Sebe got rid of several senior Ministers, many of them got asylum in the Transkei.  But not only with regard to security but also constitutionally the Ciskei had problems in their whole balancing of the system, so it created opportunities for the ANC to establish itself there.  The Transkei on the other hand was controlled by the Army as well as the State itself.  So this more directed towards the Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: Page 825, paragraph (i) says
"The existence of the extension of the black political parties or groups, moderate parties, could be seen as a counteraction against the ANC."
Now that is then referring to those aims referred to earlier.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct.  Our perception in the Eastern Cape at that time was that Inkatha and the then Natal Indaba could have been seen as partners for the counter-revolutionaries, the RSA Government.  And on the smaller regional base the idea was then to establish the Xhosa Resistance Movement and then also to link that with Chief Makoma's party that he established.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then on page 829 there is an appendix to this document that we have just referred to.  Can you go to page 832 of that annexure, paragraph 13.  It says
"The ANC views the TBVC States as part of the RSA and then also tries to increase its revolutionary actions in the short term in these States.  Although limited in scope there was also then an increase in the ANC activities in the TBVC States."
Do you agree with that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.  The basic idea was to establish the Xhosa nation as a counter-revolutionary base against the ANC/SACP.

MR KNOETZE: Now at the bottom of the page, paragraph 14, the last sentence
"It is also envisaged that the ANC's onslaught in the TBVC and the national State will be increased."
Did that happen?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, it also happened, even before this was stated.

MR KNOETZE: Then we continue to the next document, page 837.  Once again there is a document which appears to be minutes, Item 6 says
"With reference to the draft national strategy against the revolutionary onslaught against the RSA, that this document, Schedule 2 to the Agenda, is handed in and is also accepted with certain changes and its also accepted by the meeting."
Is that correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And the document referred to is on page 838, that specific document.  And then also there is one on page 839, is that correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 2, in the middle
"Through that normality and stabilisation should be established wherein the other components then of the power base should be applied with great efficiency and then also used on the longer term."
So it does seem as if they are now starting to think of the things that you referred to earlier?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  That is also the purpose and aim of this plan, that in '86 the whole issue concerning stabilisation had started disappearing and the view was that you could only win this on the social side.  So the idea was that the social welfare departments or these departments of the government should also play their role and do their bit, and that you can only contain and counter this revolution if you also have or pay attention to the social welfare aspect.

MR KNOETZE: Now this links to paragraph 4.  And the government then also committed itself to political power-sharing with all the groups in South Africa and they also have then this specific that they give there.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.  So Plan Katzen and Strelitzia would then on regional basis create power-sharing.

MR KNOETZE: And then if we have a look at paragraph (a) on page 841, it says
The political aspirations of black nations in the RSA and the exclusion of the current constitutional dispensation is a strong base which is used by the revolutionaries.  And that is then against the RSA government."
Is that correct?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And paragraph (m) also says
"With hard intimidation and the development of alternative structures the revolutionaries had already succeeded in establishing free areas in certain black communities."
Were there such areas in the communities?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, there were.  At that time there were already some of those, especially where the local councils were then substituted with other structures where there were school boycotts.  And these so-called free areas were well established.  Now our fear was that these areas would then also extend to the Transkei and Ciskei.

MR KNOETZE: 842, paragraph 8(b) refers to the RSA's ability to counter the revolution.  It is summarised by saying that
"The existence of anti-revolutionary groups such as Inkatha and the ZCC as well as the ethnic factor in the South African community makes the preparation for a coherent revolutionary onslaught difficult."
Did you also experience it in such a way?