Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: 3B dealt with and in a sense the chicken has now come home to roost in 1988.  Even senior officers at the level of Vice Admiral are concerned that they may be charged with offences carrying the death penalty.  Under the heading, "Approval of targets and criminal follow up", it is no coincidence that Opperman's October 1988 duty sheet in its reference to offensive actions, referred to trained cells, the strict clearing of targets and significantly criminal prosecution of participants must always be taken into account.  So contrary to the claims I am sure will be made that this duty sheet is somehow out of place, it doesn't fit into the story, it in fact fits like a glove into the unfolding story.  And I would argue that those types of operations are no different from other operations executed by the SADF, was notably the CCB and they raised similar concerns that they were aware would flow from the elimination of targets and in fact an enquiry was directed to General Geldenhuys by CCB members who were concerned about their liability and Geldenhuys was asked what in fact was elimination of specific target all about and I'm quoting now from a document that emerged in the Goniwe Inquest and in fact was authenticated by General Joep Joubert, Head of Special Forces.  Geldenhuys was reported as saying ... (intervention)

MR LYSTER: MR   {?): Sorry to interrupt, Mr Chairman.  That document by General Joep Joubert doesn't form part of the papers before us.  It wasn't sent to us at all.

WITNESS:  Chairperson, that's only an affidavit authenticating the document I'm quoting from.  I don't believe it's absolutely material to my learned friend's objection.

MR LYSTER: Please don't make any reference to it then.

MR LYSTER: /---  To

MR LYSTER: 3B

WITNESS:   To General Joubert's affidavit?

MR LYSTER: Yes.

WITNESS:   I won't.  General Geldenhuys was reported as saying that -

MR LYSTER: "He did not see the steps taken by the CCB as 'murder', but rather an attack on an individual enemy target with ..."

MR LYSTER: MR   (?): Sorry, Mr Chairman, I must interrupt again.  This question was raised in the Kwa Makutha trial.  General Geldenhuys denied that what is said in that document was said by him.  I don't know on what basis - he's not here and Geldenhuys denied that and this can have a very serious implication for my client.  I submit he is going to be severely prejudiced on the basis that there's not proper notification given, not proper documents given to us supporting this view and my client will be prejudiced.  I ask for a ruling that this not admissible, similarly on the basis that the Katzen documents are not available.  We haven't been given any documents about the Goniwe Inquest.  It contains thousands of pages.  It's an investigation that continued for 18 months.  We don't know in what context anything was said;  we haven't prepared on that.  I ask for a ruling that ... (intervention)

MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, I think in the interests of getting on with this thing and the fact that documents haven't been given to interested parties relating to the CCB, please don't make any reference to these documents.

WITNESS:   Chairperson, may I just say the following?  The Section 30 notice has been in the possession of my learned friend now for six weeks or more.  Presumably he read the document in great detail several weeks ago.  He must have read this particular reference.  He must have read that

MR LYSTER: /the

MR LYSTER: 3B the document was authenticated by General Joep Joubert.  An authenticating affidavit is of no real consequence to this particular hearing.  It was submitted at the Goniwe Inquest and I don't intend to deal with the CCB in any greater detail than I have.  It will probably be taking me about 15 seconds to conclude my remarks on it.

MR LYSTER: MR   (?): Well, with all due respect, Mr Chairman, if he is going to be allowed to do that he is going to prejudice my client and that's the intention of the witness.  Since when are a witness allowed to argue if - as if he's a lawyer?  He's a witness here.  The Commission has made a ruling.

MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, please go ahead and don't make any reference to the document or to the CCB.

WITNESS:   As the panel pleases.

MR LYSTER: Ja.  We will take cognisance of the Goniwe Inquest.

WITNESS:   The next heading is titled, "The SAP Commissioner and cover-ups".  The security concerns that I referred to earlier, that of trainees engaged in offensive activities being arrested by the normal SAP - there were in fact a number of conscientious and courageous South African policemen who investigated crimes and who arrested a number of people for political actions including these, these politically motivated crimes and this produced a problem for Inkatha and the military.  The military were, of course, concerned that these people would spill the beans following their arrest and unless steps were taken to assist them and prevent justice from taking its course, there was the great danger that these people would come clean and one thing would lead to another and ultimately the SADF would be implicated.  A meeting was then held, a

MR LYSTER: /top

MR LYSTER: 3B top level meeting with various representatives of the South African Police during November 1988 and meetings were held with the Commissioner of Police, Johan van der Merwe, Basie Smit and several other senior police officers in a series of three meetings during that month.  Attempts were secured in the first meeting to get greater police intervention in the cover up of crimes committed by Caprivi trainees.  The Commissioner of Police, Johan van der Merwe explained that they couldn't do much in a pro-active sense, but they gave the following advice that the members concerned must be given bail and then they must simply be taken away.  And that, Chairperson, really I think points to the modus operandi of the Security Forces at the time to intervene and obstruct the course of justice when it was getting close to people involved in such operations.  As a result of this meeting and the somewhat depressing outcome for the military officers concerned, a decision was then taken that somehow they must get these people into the KwaZulu Police and steps were then taken to demobilise the paramilitary unit and most Marion members were ultimately placed into the KwaZulu Police during June 1989 and according to the documents, Buthelezi and Khumalo reported opposed the withdrawal of military support for offensive steps and this is - the security reasons was the reason in fact why these men were placed into the KwaZulu Police some two and a half years later, not because of any plan that was hatched at the outset.  I also draw your attention to the covering letter of the November 1988 meeting, which referred to a movement away from offensive actions to mobilisation steps and I pose the question, why, if

MR LYSTER: /offensive

MR LYSTER: 3B offensive steps only involved plainly lawful and protective measures, that the military wants to move away from support for offensive steps, particularly in the light of the deteriorating situation for Inkatha and it's also evident from the documents.  These so-called protective actions should have been stepped up, not phased out and indeed Buthelezi in subsequent documents did just that, he called for the stepping up of offensive steps.  So it makes little sense, unless of course the offensive steps were plainly offensive steps and the military were concerned about being implicated.  Under the heading, "Buchner and the choosing of targets".  In one of these meetings I referred to in November 1988 which was held between Security Branch Commanders and DST officers, Brigadier Jac Buchner of the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg was reported saying that -

MR LYSTER: "Inkatha must not know that we are choosing targets".