Amnesty Hearings — Pietersburg — 1997-07-02

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman, the next witness will be Mr Erwee and his is the first application in your bundle, starting at page 1 of B.  Before, or while the witness takes his place, my attorney - I don't know how he managed to do it so quickly, has prepared bundles, although I must tell you he lied to me about the number of pages, Mr Chairman, it is not 400, it is only about 220.  So can we hand these up to you in the meantime, with an apology that it is not properly bound, Mr Chairman, but it is bound together so it won't fall apart.  That is now the presentation of the Stigting van Gelykheid voor die Reg.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. You will convey our thanks to Mr Wagner.

UNKNOWN: Mr Chairman, while we are on the issue of binding, I just wish to draw your attention to the fact that typed versions 9 and 10, I think in all three Committee members' bundles, are incorrect, not in the proper sequence. So you will note that - I haven't had a chance to take your bundles apart, but you will note that I have marked it, it goes from paginated number 10, then you will get possibly 12 and then 11 after that.

END OF TAPE 2 - SIDE A: (TAPE 2 - SIDE B (ENGLISH ONLY - BLANK)
TAPE 2 - SIDE B

UNKNOWN: ... of Wagner Muller Du Plessis are concerned.  Because this will obviously be applicable in other applications as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, can I take the prerogative. I can't remember what Judge Mall said the other time, but I think I am going to exercise my prerogative and say that for the purpose of these proceedings, if you don't mind ...

UNKNOWN: It is ANNEXURE D, EXHIBIT D.
EXHIBIT D HANDED IN

CHAIRPERSON: D.

UNKNOWN: Exhibit D.  Thank you, Mr Chairman.
A J G ERWEE

UNKNOWN: You are referring to Exhibit D, and that is the statement on behalf of the Foundation for Equality before the Law and also as a mission made by Genl J W van der Merwe, the previous Commissioner of Police, who on the 21st of October 1996 in the application of Cronje & 4 Others, and you asked that this be incorporated in your application.  Is that correct, Mr Erwee?

A J G ERWEE: Yes.

UNKNOWN: And as far as the political motivation is concerned, which is set out in your application, you confirm that that is also your motivation during your conduct?

A J G ERWEE: Yes, that is correct. If I may be allowed the opportunity, there are a couple of aspects which I would like to add, if it pleases the Commission.

UNKNOWN: Please continue.

A J G ERWEE: Additional to my political objective ... (intervention).

UNKNOWN: Are you reading something now?  Are those notes which you made yourself just to ensure that you give a full version of matters to the Committee?

A J G ERWEE: Yes, that is my conviction.

UNKNOWN: Please read it.

A J G ERWEE: Additional to my political objectives, as I have set them out in paragraph 10(a) and (b), I would like to inform the Committee that since 1970 I was a member of the security branch, and that is approximately for 26 years. Since my first year until my last working day in December, last year, I was primarily tasked with the task of protecting and maintaining internal security and stability.  This meant the monitoring of individuals, organisations, movements, et cetera, which directly wanted to confront the political dispensation in a violent manner.

UNKNOWN: I am sorry to interrupt you.  You are going too fast.  Please remember that it must be interpreted and they don't have a copy of what you are now reading.  Would you please just go a little bit slower.  I interrupted you and I am terribly sorry.

A J G ERWEE: I will repeat it. This entailed the following: the monitoring of individuals, organisations, movements which directly and with political objective wanted to resist the current political dispensation by violent means.
	My training, my formal courses which I completed, lectures and informal training, dealt with the dangers which this violent political opponents could pose to the government and all the residents of the country.
	It wasn't so much to protect the so-called apartheid system, but was rather aimed at protecting all the citizens of the country of all races, within the so-called capitalist system.   In my 26 years of service, I can define as a collective ideological process of awareness or a programme of awareness, aimed at ensuring that the intelligence component was constantly using methods and techniques to combat violent political opponents of the government and to undermine those violent political opponents.   I would like to add that to my application, and added specifically to paragraph 10(a) and (b).

UNKNOWN: Now you have already said that you are no longer in active service in the police force.  Can you confirm when you left the service?

A J G ERWEE: It was December 1996.

UNKNOWN: 1996?  And you left the service with what rank?

A J G ERWEE: As a full colonel.

UNKNOWN: Mr Erwee, let's turn now to the incident itself.  As an introduction, let us say that you were in command of the operation on that day in the area of the low water bridge in the Breslau/Alldays Road.  You were in charge of the security component of the police. Is that correct?

A J G ERWEE: That is correct.

UNKNOWN: You were assisted, we have already heard, by 5 Reconnaissance Commando of the South African Defence Force, stationed at Phalaborwa.

A J G ERWEE: Correct.

UNKNOWN: They were under whose command?

A J G ERWEE: Under Capt Mike Hall.

UNKNOWN: Now I want you to describe fairly thoroughly to the Committee how you got involved in the planning for this operation, and what exactly happened.

A J G ERWEE: Mr Chairperson, on the 9th of July of that year, in the early morning, Brig Coetsee called me to his office.  He informed me that some of his staff members had extracted information to the effect that six ANC MK insurgents were to infiltrate the RSA on the next day, the 10th of July from Botswana and that I would l take command of the security force members that Capt Mike Bourne from 5 Reconnaissance Command would support us wherever we needed it, and this was a reference to vehicles, radio contact, and any other form of assistance that we might need.
	Col Willem van der Merwe, Brig Coetsee, myself and Capt Mike Bourne did some planning in broad terms.  Brig Coetsee told me that Sgt Sehlwana would be provided with a mini-bus and that that was the property of the security branch, to transport these six people.  Sehlwana would pretend to be a taxi driver and that he would be willing to transport these people.  We realised during the planning phase that there was a major risk in transporting these six people in this manner, namely by Sehlwana, because his life would be in great danger, should the insurgents later on find out that he was actually a member of the security forces.
	For this reason we decided to remove the right rear window of the mini-bus, and a member of 5 Reconnaissance would then hurl a gas-grenade. In order to cause confusion in the bus and to reduce the risk inherent for Matthews, as well as to cause panic and disarray in the bus.  This would of course facilitate our objective, namely arresting these people.
	I was also told that observation points had already been created, and that these posts would be responsible for monitoring these people from the moment that they entered the Republic, or the moment they crossed the border and that was across the Limpopo River.
	I was also told that there was also to be a Defence Force fixed-wing plane which would also assist us in communicating with each other and possibly also assist us with the orientation aspect.

UNKNOWN: Whilst you are on this point, was there any mention of a helicopter?