Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Mr Chairman I accept that at a certain stage we're going to talk about terminology. I'm going to use this as an example. When we refer to terminology we should not generalise. Yesterday when Barnard was here the military was meant to be policed. I'm not here for the security forces. I'm here for the military and for the Defence Force. The Defence Force during that time supported the police. The police, and this analysis could be done better by the police. You are quoting from what van der Merwe and Vlok said. I can't contradict that because I don't have firsthand knowledge. I did not concentrate on that aspect.

MR VAN ZYL: In that period urged members of the SADF to take strong measures in order to bring the situation under control. It's that you were asking members of the military to perform, to stabilise the country. You urged them to take strong measures?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Mr Chairman it's very difficult for me to say what are strong measures. Does it mean that you are hitting him harder every day? I did not do that. I did something else. I tried to look at a co-ordinated plan and with that I don't mean that stronger measures should be taken by the security forces. They should have acted in a more co-ordinated way. I want to refer to the Springbok rugby team now they are playing much better because they play in a co-ordinated way, as one team. I did not tell them to take stronger measures. We went along in a normal way and we had our normal guidelines, namely first to stabilise and then to normalise. Those were actions taken which were normal. And it's not a question of stronger measures.

MR VAN ZYL: About the mid-1980's and yesterday you gave us a very good account of the military's approach to the conflict that was being conducted that at one stage the threat analysis being generated particularly through the military, was that the threat was emanating. Particularly from frontline states where the ANC had established bases where they were stockpiling weapons, where people were undergoing training and people were then infiltrating into the country. But that at a certain stage in the mid-eighties the threat was no longer exclusively external to the country. That in fact terrorist bases or groups of terrorists began to be established internal to the country. And that the threat was also emanating internally?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: This is a very difficult question for me and I'm going to try to my utmost best to remember. I just want to ask Mr van Zyl, you must put your microphone a bit nearer. I can't hear very well. No, no I don't want it, it's better this way that we can communicate on eye level, eyeball to eyeball. Thank you.
 I want to put it in this way, I don't know if terrorist bases were established internally in the country. There might have been but it was just a temporary measure. some people would come into the country and then leave later on. That's what I would have done if I were in their position. There were the so-called liberation movements. Those were not armed forces. Here I just want to repeat what I've told the previous meeting if I refer to the ANC, to the AC, I refer to the MK. That is a problem regarding terminology. 
 To come back to this point I think Alexandra in Johannesburg was the one liberation area. It does not mean that there necessarily were armed persons. There were certain obstacles round this township and the security forces especially the police were driven out. And the police stayed outside this area. This can be described that there were internal bases. I don't know of any bases from where operations were launched but from outside the country, definitely. There's no question about that.

MR VAN ZYL: General Malan at some stage in 1985, P.W. Botha began the State Security Council meeting and I don't want to refer directly to the minutes. He just expressed a sentiment which I'd like you to comment on. He starts by saying, it's an opening address. He says he is now convinced that the brain behind the unrest is inside the country. And I take that, would you say that, that would be illustrative of a growing awareness by people in the State Security Council, that in fact whereas previously people were based exclusively outside the country and were infiltrating in. There was now, I agree not armed ANC camps inside the country but the ANC was beginning to establish cells inside the country. That they were beginning to establish a presence in certain places in the country. Not necessarily formerly armed bases but they were internal to the country as well.

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: I'm not sure whether that was the way he mentioned that but I want to give you my standpoint. If I want to refer to the ANC, MK. I would say the MK was on the inside. Perhaps just certain individuals who came in and then left the country again. But I want to put it in this way that politically the intensity and that was during the time of the UDF and the mass democratic movement, this whole situation was intensified. The comrades were there, there was a situation where certain pressure was exerted on the communities. And revolutionary concept developed and it could have been that he perhaps referred to brains inside and perhaps referred to these people. I'm not sure. This was how I could explain it.

MR VAN ZYL: (...indistinct) be that at a certain stage in consequence of the deteriorating security situation that a broad and principled decision was taken that whereas in the past, the SADF would confine itself to by and large to protecting the sovereignty of South Africa. Particularly dealing with matters, security threats to the country which occurred external to it, outside of the country. That in consequence of the fact that in fact the threat was emanating as well from inside the country, the SADF would cooperate closer with the South African police in restoring law and order and combating terrorism within the country.

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Mr Chairman that is correct. During that time in the middle 1980's a state of emergency was declared. The Defence Force operated internally and the Defence Force had a task internally and outside the country. It had to ensure or protect the sovereignty of the country and it co-operated closely with the police in support of the police. And I want to put it in this way. I'm not always sure whether you regarded the Defence Force at that time are as a lot of conscripts were used in the urban areas but the commandos played a very large role in this regard. If we refer to the commandos, they were situated especially in the rural areas. And like they covered the whole country and they could act country wide and assist the police country wide.

MR VAN ZYL: I quote, I think it was by George Schultz, the former US secretary of state who talked about at certain times it was necessary to act pro-actively in order to be defensive. And I thought that was an important articulation of a concept which I think perhaps has been misunderstood. Do I understand you to be saying that in certain points in time the SADF would, for example if they acquired knowledge that a terrorist base in Mozambique was staffed by members of the ANC and that information was brought to your attention that they plan to infiltrate into the country or launch an attack there, it would acceptable to launch a military attack against that base in a proactive way. But with the ultimate aim of being defensive. Would that be a fair comment?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Just the last portion, the last sentence?

MR VAN ZYL: It would be acceptable to launch a proactive military attack against such a group of individuals in order to be defensive?