Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

GEN VILJOEN: Mr Chairman, I would like to start by saying that my status today is the following
 After having completed the first submission, we decided on a higher level - this first submission was done by Mortimer, we decided to become involved and my colleagues asked me to present them here today for specific reasons.  I'm the oldest here today and they all served under me but a very important reason is that I was involved in the development of the strategy of the South African defence force and was involved in cross-border operations in Southern Africa.  And probably I'm the best suited to talk about this very important matter.  
 I've taken an oath to speak the truth and I will do just that.  I will refer to the matter that it had been a long time ago, it's a very broad scope, many things had happened, I consulted widely, I consulted with my colleagues because I'm going to make remarks on certain period after I've retired.  My colleagues are all present here and I've asked them - should I make any mistake in my presentation, they should bring it under my attention but I will remind you that it was a very big organisation, it stretched over a long period and many things happened.
 Regarding this document, it's a very huge thick document and I did not provide it to you or the press because I am not going to talk according to a specific order, I'm going to jump to and fro because I can't address this whole thick document.  I want to suggest that you could rather study the document at a later stage and rather listen to what I am saying.  The scope of my presentation will firstly be to make a few introductory remarks.  
 Immediately afterwards I will pay attention to the third force activities, then to the Steyn Report, then I will come back to Chapter one of the thick document in which I want to address the fundamental matter of the perceptions and motives of the defence force.  And I would like to assist you because you have a very important task without having military background and I want to put it as simplistic as possible then.
 In Chapter one, I want to discuss the context, the strategic context discussion of trans-border or cross-border operations and South African defence force involvement in the South African theatre.   I wish to start then by certain introductory remarks.  The purpose of our submission is to assist the Commission in it's investigation regarding gross violations of human rights.  It is not our purpose today to use this time to criticise the other side against whom we acted and to put ourselves in a better light.
 Today we wish to assist you in your task because we have reason to believe that we can make a contribution to provide a more balanced final report in the end.  A one-sided report will harm reconciliation and will do no good to our predecessors if this is not placed in the right perspective.  This is why we wish to assist you in this regard, not only today but even when you write the report and need further assistance.
 Our collective group, the old South African defence force - we still have strong ties.  The solidarity and ...[inaudible] which you find a defence force can't vanish overnight when it's changed into a new defence force, therefore we as commanders are dissatisfied especially under old members, people who served in a dedicated way and tried to follow a career in a dedicated way.  It's in the interest of our country that this feeling will not run out of control and this is why we wish to provide better perspective to the Commission.  Many lies are told in this process which is rather a process to tell the truth and wrong perceptions are created.  
 The first submission made by the ...[inaudible] of the defence force was criticised by many of your Commissioners, even you yourself.  We realise that there was prejudice and there were also main articles written in newspapers in this regard.  We tried out utmost best from that time up till now to find what your needs are and to determine what we should submit to be complete.  We've written a lot of letters to you, you did not answer these letters and we still do not know what exactly you expect from us.  In August, we took the initiative to say - and in August that in the interest of - in the national interest and in the interest of the army, we will make the presentation.  
 A few days before this presentation, it was cancelled and this was followed by this process for which we were subpoenaed.  This submission which is important for your task - we still want to present that.  It is clear to us that none of the Commissioners have an insight in military operations.   In the first instance or the first submission, we perhaps made a mistake using military terminology and that is why we want to assist you.  And we request that you will treat us fairly and that will be the path to reconciliation and peace.  That is just as important for us as for any other political party.
 One of the problems which became clear during the previous presentation was that there's a difference in political culture.  The previous defence force was politically neutral while the Commissioner and our previous political opponents were politically highly motivated.  Our first submission was clean from politics with the exception of General Magnus Malan who was a previous minister.  This problem was ...[inaudible] that no political party handled the interest of the previous defence force.  The previous Government, they did not support the interest of the previous defence force. 
 General Malan was the most senior member and I'm nearest the active politics and I'm assuming responsibility to talk here today, not as a politician but as a former head of the defence force and I've given this undertaking to my former colleagues.  In the first place, I request the Commission to try and understand the reluctance which there against the previous defence force, it comes from our ...[inaudible] - we served the former State with effectiveness.  During this transition period we also served effectively.  
 After '94, this same group formed a core to handle the assimilation of the other security forces into the army.  This we also did with dedication.  This dedication and effectiveness came from the patriotism which we felt for South African and from our professional approach to the noble task of a soldier in uniform.  If we look to the previous constitutional dispensation, I would just like to make a few remarks.  The previous defence force served the sovereign State with a legal Government and not political parties.  
 The State's international defence was handled by us and the State's obligation to act according to it's mandate to protect the people and also to protect South Africa in this regard.   Our internal behaviours was according to the previous constitution of South Africa.  The old defence force was during the previous dispensation, a builder of bridges - I'm sorry, I've omitted one paragraph.  The old defence force strived to - in a practical way politically and on a racial basis, to incorporate everybody into the defence force.  We've developed a defence force from the nation.
 It was under difficult circumstances when the political policy of the past made it difficult and the defence force's acceptability was not good but we achieved some success.  During the previous dispensation, the defence force was a builder of bridge who promoted good relationships between all peoples in the country.  This approach corresponds with our strategy would not have been possible.  The old defence force, due to it's professional approach served the Government of the day without fear and even acted outside our mandate to inform the cabinet about the necessity for making political adjustments for the sake of peace.
 We often and honestly warned that the defence force operations were only gaining to time to achieve political stability.  Then there was a change of Government in a very dramatic way, the defence force still kept on acting professionally.  If there was any complaint against the defence force, it was that it was so effective that the politicians gained a false sense of security instead of realising the necessity for political change and to retard this political change.  The eventual stability during the political negotiations must be due to the effectiveness and loyalty of the old defence force.
 It remains an open question whether the opposing military forces would have worked out better peace time proposals than the politicians did.  As an old defence force and if MK and other forces opposing us, it seems as if we're finding it easier to establish reconciliation as we can in the political sphere.  Despite the virtually faultless service of the defence force and during the transition period, it did not avoid political suspicion.  We as representatives of that organisation feel alienated by what we consider to be the unjustified hostility of the Government and organisations against us.
 Firstly, the previous Government, when a new dispensation started becoming possible and which served the Government of the day was ignored and at the same time the previous Government - without any valid reasons, started discrediting the old defence force.  One example was the Steyn Report which I will deal with later.  An incredible list of allegations were investigated, assassinations, destabilisation, train murders, gun running, illegal training, manipulation of the negotiation processes and general criminal activities were some of these allegations in this report.
 A police investigation by three senior policemen and various internal investigations were undertaken and even 5 years after, no proof could be found of any of these allegations and no legal steps have been taken to substantiate these.  Yet the previous defence force - Government allowed the services of 23 of our colleagues to be ended.  This incident and additional to the other untested evidence of third force activities contributed to discredit this highly regarded organisation of ours.  We regard these as scurrilous allegations.  
 These attacks were followed by you Mr Chairman of the TRC.  Just after the first submission you - I want to quote from the media:
You referred to the SADF as our military machine.
We were not this and we were not the military wing of the National Party.  
"This submission flies in the face of facts".
We don't know which facts you refer to.  This hurt us very deeply because it created the impression that we have distorted the facts and that is not our intention.  You used the words:
"It was breathtakingly one-sided and audacious in it's failure to acknowledge culpability"
You also used the words:
"That that defence force, thank God, no longer exists"
 We want to ask you that this - we want to tell you that this creates a perception of our organisation and that we are not being trusted, that we are not being honest in our actions.  Apart from this, the decision to hold the Kwamakuta trial in Durban brought further discrediting of the defence force.  Various previous heads of the defence force and other officers were humiliated for more than a year.  All of them were found not guilty but the discrediting of the old defence force continued.  During this incident a lot of pressure was applied to me personally from Government circles to convince these accused to change this whole trial from a judicial trial to a TRC trial.  They did not accept this because they said they were not guilty and they wanted to prove it in court.  
 A year after the finding, the TRC have again tried to do that which could not be proved in court - to prove it with untested evidence here.  These incidents, especially in the absence of investigations into other parties, which creates the impression of a witch-hunt.  That the new Government is allowing this is also proof of antagonism at Government level against the old defence force which served the country so loyally and of which most of the members are still the most important part of the new defence force.
 We will work with the new stated aims of the TRC.  We are also interested in putting the past behind us.  We want to assist with gaining better insight but not in the sense of persecution.  We don't want to be used as a group for propaganda purposes and to be victimised.  We don't say that we're the angels of the past, what I do want to say is that we as the former defence force believed with integrity and our knowledge of this sort of war, of which many case studies were studied to find the best methods.  We discovered that it was all about the hearts and minds of the people and therefore these violations of human rights would have been contrary to our aims.  Therefore, we deliberately avoided these and trained our forces accordingly because the battle was about the hearts and minds, there was a lot of propaganda on both sides and this propaganda is aimed at changing people's perceptions.  It changes facts to achieve it's purposes and all these accusations against the old defence force is an example of this sort of propaganda.  
 What I want to point out is that the nature of the operations of the old defence force were determined by the strategic actions of our erstwhile enemies.  We referred to the ANC's strategy which was instituted after visits to Vietnam. The ANC then looked for, developed and recommended a strategy:
"The combination of a political and military struggle, the mobilisation of the whole of the people to fight the army, the unity of the internal situation and the international solidarity and the party's leadership role over the armed forces"
 The underground ANC actions led to various results such as the isolation of South Africa.  With some exceptions the politicians showed little appreciation of these elements and it was in fact the old SADF which played a leading role in developing this security service of the State - you must adapt or you must die.  The State security system also poses questions which we will try to answer.  We say that the old SADF did not act without authorisation, it always acted with the sanction of the Government.  The strategic sterility of the previous dispensation drew the defence force closer to the political centre of things but this was only to oppose the revolution.  
 It was therefore the ANC which devised the international role of this battle, this struggle.  There was involvement with the USSR and the use of neighbouring countries basis and this also led to joint operations with other countries against this tendency.  The TRC cannot give international amnesty for cross-border operations, so there's general agreement that cross-border operations and the details of these cannot form part of this amnesty process.
 Regarding your investigations, it is very risky to investigate these cross-border operations but to help you to extend or expand your report, we would like to explain how in theoretical terms, the SADF conducted it's operations.  Our legal advice is not to get involved in the details of cross-border operations.  I saw the Minister of Justice, Mr Omar and I approached you and Bishop Tutu and nobody could supply a solution to this dilemma.   I fixed your attention on the negative factors which are unproductively acting on us.
 Now, the rest of the presentation will deal with several subjects which will answer some of the questions that you have put.  We hope sincerely that the misperceptions about the SADF and it's operations will be cleared up and we are pleased to be able to help in this.  I want to say a few words to draw a conclusion - I'll do this in English.   To sum up, let me put the following submissions on the table Mr Chairman.
 The intention of our defence force in Southern Africa and South Africa, was just in that it was to maintain peace for the sake of a peaceful negotiated settlement under stable conditions.  The force that we used was well trained and well disciplined and we were justly proud of this force.  
 Secondly, all our actions served the purposes of the international self-defence, mainly against Soviet expansionism and the maintenance of internal order.  
 Thirdly, the proportionality of force that we applied was always in accordance with what was the minimum needed for the self-defence of our State or for the maintenance of internal disorder.  
 Fourthly, we are satisfied that in the context of the cold-war situation, force was the only resort as both sides politically were not initially politically prepared to negotiate.  Ever since 1975, we the SADF advised the then Government to explore other solutions too.
 Fifthly, the production of non-...[inaudible] has always been respected by us.  We were faced with the most difficult situation when the war was taken to the "human bush" by our opponents, using them as human shields.
 Sixth, the conflict ended in a negotiated settlement, there was no military victory nor a military defeat.  The constitutional accord which followed we all should respect, states on national unity of reconciliation that there should be understanding, not revenge, reparation, not retaliation, ...[inaudible] victimisation.  For this Chairperson, we will settle and be part but not for less.  The SADF was the legal instrument of a legal Government.
 Seventh, we specifically request that your report should be fair and even handed.  For this reason we offer our co-operation and offer to give further assistance if you require some to put our part in the conflict for your sake, in the right perspective.  As former leaders Chairperson, we accept the moral responsibility for the conduct of our subordinates in the execution of our command.  That by means of the preliminary remarks by way of introduction.
 Chairperson, I now wish to switch over to the important aspect of the accusations of a third force.  There was a general concept of a third force and in our position today there are actually two concepts applicable.   Firstly we have the tuitional concept of a third force being the kind of force running parallel between the SAP and the South African defence force.  In other words, it's a third force much the same as you have in Italy of the Carabanarian.  
 Now the Oxford dictionary defines a third force as a political group or a party acting as a check-on between two opposing parties.  A specialised force - it's a specialist force parallel to the police force and defence force with para-military functions, specifically organised, equipped and trained to plan, co-ordinate and execute counter-revolutionary actions and to quell civilian riots and to combat internal terrorism.
 Chairperson, the SADF's disposition towards this third force is very clear.  There was on 4 November 1985 - four days after my retirement, the State Security Council issued an instruction to a working committee to launch an investigation into a possible establishment of a third force.  And I can understand because I could remember in the last months of my service, I could remember the problem of the internal situation building up.  And I can recall that the SADF was not really looking forward to this and I think the South African police also had the problems of dealing with this because they had their own normal police functions to carry out.
 And there was a discussion as to whether a third force to deal with the internal situation to take over from the police, to take over from the defence force, whether that would be necessary.  So this commission was established and eventually it reported back on the 8th of May 1986 and the commissioner of the then SAP informed a committee of the State Security Council that it was not feasible to establish a third force because of legal and financial implications.
 The Vlok Committee consequently recommended that a third force should not be established but that the capabilities of the South African police should be expanded to cope with the internal situation because that was the prime responsibility of the South African police.  So the third force in that sense of running parallel between the defence and the police was never established but there had been some discussions in this regard.
 I think it was the discussion in this regard that eventually led to the discussion of the other kind of third force that will be available.  There is apparently another commendation attached to the idea of a third force, that is when perpetrators to incidents of violence, murders and atrocities, cannot be identified or traced and it is suspected that such perpetrators or organised, managed and employed to promote hidden and sinister objectives to the benefit of organisations that handle them.  
 I want to refer to Commissioner Listner in the Kwamakuta investigations, actually came to the conclusion that the third force of which the accusations were made was not part of a third force that was considered by the State Security Council for implementation, as a parallel force between the police and the defence force.  So regarding the other kind of force, I can say that there is no indication whatsoever of any official sanction for actions within the defence force in line with this paragraph 12, that is sinister actions of operations.  It was certainly not sanctioned at any level and I can say that categorically for my period and I've also consulted with my successors and they have also given me the assurance that there is no such force.
 Can we now turn over to the Steyn Report and the Steyn Report was actually a report which started off as the main accusation against the idea of this sinister kind of third force that people suspected, or the people thought that we were guilty of.  I am aware that this Commission has had discussions with the Steyn Report, so I assume that it will not be necessary to read out again all the details but it is well known that Lieutenant General Steyn was appointed to conduct an investigation.  
 This was the result of certain indications from within the defence force - the counter-intelligence within the defence force, became aware of certain actions of certain actions of the ...[inaudible] collection that might have involved criminal or other dubious activities.  They then reported it as just a function of counter-intelligence to make such a report but another organisation, the National Intelligence Service which had the responsibility for analysing the political spectrum and regular briefing to the State President, they also carried their own investigations in this regard.
 This National Intelligence Service was of opinion that the South African defence force could stage a coup if the negotiations went the wrong way.  This opinion was conveyed to both the Government and members of foreign intelligence agencies.  The NIS also conducted it's own investigations into the activity of the directorate of ...[inaudible] collection.  The South African defence force's role in the national management system has already been substantially reduced by their - at this stage and in the light of the views expressed by the NIS, National Intelligence Service, the perception seems to have been created in Government circles that the South African defence force could not be trusted.
 It is believe that this was discussed at cabinet level too.  So that led to the Steyn appointment and this followed after the 16 November '92 raid by the Judge Goldstone Commission of the ...[inaudible] office in Pretoria and they thought that they had now discovered the heart of third force activities in South Africa.  Lieutenant General Steyn made use of the information of the investigations internally within the defence force and also the National Intelligence, what they were prepared to give to General Steyn.
 Available information indicates that Steyn's various reports rely heavily on NIS material and not on the internal material of the defence force.  Allegations in the Steyn Report alleged that various elements of the South African defence force were involved in the planning and the execution of such acts as - and I mention them all, assassinations, inter-organisational conflict, ...[inaudible], train massacres, discrediting - I've mentioned the lot of them.  
 The important aspect of the Boipatong massacre - a terrible incident, destabilisation of internal and external situations, stockpiling of arms abroad, training of resistance movements, internal military training, arms smuggling, manipulation of the negotiation process, setting up CCB type of organisations as a resistance movement, involvement in right-wing activities, chemical and biological warfare programmes and general criminal activities.  A formidable accusation of which many of them were on the ideas of the third force accusations.
 Then General Conradie of the police investigated this and he went through 200 files at the Directorate of Covert Collection.  Their conclusions - Brigadier Blignaut and Lieutenant General Conradie, was no illegal activities had taken place, the methods of the handlers and the performers were professional, DCC was well structured and no evidence of hidden agendas, there was an overlap in domestic intelligence collecting functions, there was no evidence that the DCC was operating outside it's line function, all evidence indicated that the DCC personnel were engaged in their professional tasks.
 There was a briefing then of the State President after General Conradie's Report had become available but apparently the General Conradie Report was not submitted.  General Steyn then briefed the State President using the unconfirmed information from NIS and NID investigations.  Media reports indicated that he reported the following:  
 Firstly, definite signs of a third force activity or an unofficial revival of the CCB.
 Secondly, a number of individuals within the structures investigated had an influence to the top management - on the top management of the SADF, thus by implication the South African defence force could be construed as being involved in the creation of violence and intimidation.
 Thirdly, there was a need for encompassing action at all levels including the top, personnel should be dismissed, strong control should be instituted and where possible court action should be instituted.  He recommended that Generals Liebenberg, Meiring and CP van der Westhuizen be confronted for various misdeeds and that they be requested to take early retirement or be forced to do so if necessary.  He recommended simple action or prosecutions should be applied to sub-ordinates within this organisation.  He recommended also new appointments which should be made and new operational and financial control procedures to be instituted.
 General Steyn also recommended that some issues be referred to the South African police, the Attorney General, the Auditor General and the Goldstone Commission.  In January '93, the documents used for the briefing were handed over to the Attorney General of the Transvaal and to date, no prosecution has been pursued.  In the meantime we had the dismissal of 23 of our colleagues.  In General Steyn's opinion the revelations had caused an embarrassing problem to both the defence force and the State.  A decision was thus taken to purify the SADF, apparently before the cabinet was briefed. 
 General Liebenberg was produced with a list and told to select the names of personnel against whom immediate action should be taken in the light of the Steyn documentation.  General Meiring and van der Westhuizen assisted in this selection.  General Steyn also sat at the first meeting in this connection.  In the meantime Mr Roelf Meyer who was then a Minister, was in the United States on an official visit and he apparently phoned the State President on two occasions and probably emphasised the United States requirement to see the State President acting forcefully.
 The names selected were presented and negotiations took place on the dismissal of these people - the early retirement of these people and others were placed n compulsory leave.  General Liebenberg was given one week to advise the personnel concerned but on arriving back in his office the news had already been broken in the media.  Apparently it was leaked in the United States.  The following investigations were also conducted in pursuance to the Steyn Report:  the SA police and the Attorneys General, the finding of which indicated that there was not a shred of evidence that could be found.  
 Although requested on various occasions by various people, the NIS, National Intelligence Services were not in a position to provide any further information or they refused to make available their sources.  By the ...[inaudible] Committee to investigate and the re-appointment of CCB members which cleared DCC of all allegations.  The ...[inaudible] Committee oversaw the termination of the DCC front companies and the restructuring of the DCC.  
 And then there was a Gleeson Board of Enquiry appointed, also to investigate the allegations against certain individuals.  This board was terminated because of the pending investigation by the Attorney General of the Transvaal.  So Lieutenant General Steyn persisted with his own corroborated allegations and suggested to the Minister of Defence that the Goldstone Commission investigate allegations in connection with taxi and train killings.  Following this the SAP spent 14 days of intensive investigation at 5 Reconnaissance Regiment, allegedly one of the main perpetrators but could find no evidence that the unit had been involved in instigating violence.
 We have a doubt about the role of National Intelligence Services in this regard.  In October '92, Judge Goldstone raised his concern about the role of the National Intelligence Services, with the State President.  The Commission only had access to two MID source documents dealing with alleged criminal activities.  The allegations relating to the involvement in violence, the train violence, the IFB violence etc., emanated mainly from the National Intelligence Services and the Goldstone Commission had failed to obtain access to their source documents despite the seriousness of the allegations.  The National Intelligence Services could thus not substantiate them.
 Further developments - a senior officer in the group whose services had been terminated, wrote to the State President requesting a court martial to clarify the aspects on which was being accused in this whole case but despite several reminders he received no reply whatsoever.  In addition, civil applications were instituted by three individuals in connection with their dismissals - all these cases were settled out of court by the payment of relatively large sums of money to the applicants and their names were cleared.
 In conclusion, no written report by General Steyn could be found.  He appeared to have made use of unconfirmed and uncorroborated allegations supplied by NIS and MID, the counter-intelligence of the defence force themselves.  General Steyn did appear before your Commission - we tried to get a report from your Commission but it was impossible, so we are not informed about anymore information that might have come to your knowledge in this regard.  
 I have made this report on this situation but there are now a number of unanswered questions.  Firstly, in this briefing of the State President, General Steyn suggested a further investigation because none of the allegations had been confirmed, yet the State President went ahead with his action.  The question is, why?
 The Conradie Report, secondly, was available before the briefing of the State President, yet not mention was made of it's findings - why?  The rules of natural justice state that a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty, yet these were not followed - why?  Much of the information used in the decision to terminate the services of the 23 officers emanated from the National Intelligence Services who could or would not substantiate it or disclose their sources, yet it was acted upon the to the detriment of 23 of our colleagues.
 Now some 5 years later after numerous investigations - I think this case has been over-investigated, no prosecutions have taken place, no concrete evidence has come to light.  It seems the major role players and the 23 officers were the victims of actions based on unsubstantiated reports and rumours, more likely emanating from dubious perceptions that from hard realities.  It appears from an objective evaluation that the conduct of dismissal of the officers concerned was arbitrary and arose from a subjective perspective.  Whatever the motives of the main role-players, the facts appear to indicate that a gross injustice had taken place.  In fact I think if ever there is something possible such as a gross violation on the damage or the violence supplied to the minds of people, it must have been to these 23 officers and I know most of them personally and I was completely taken by surprise when I learnt from the press what had happened to these people.
 Chairperson, this has been the main accusation of the third force activities and this has been as I said, over investigated and there is no substantiation of such an allegation.  I realised that there are some thoughts regarding the idea of  false flag operations and that the false flag operations could be coupled with the idea of the third force activities.  
 If you consider the way in which our opponents operated within the townships - they also operated in civilian clothes, they also pretended to be civilians, I would say that must also be a false flag.  So, if we operated in civilian clothes too, it cannot be regarded as a false flag type of operation but I end off by saying that we categorically deny that this kind of allegation has been part of our policy within the defence force.
 Chairperson, I would like now to switch back to document 1 of the document here and that is the development of the South African National and Defence strategies.  The background of these external operations of external involvement, the background of the internal strategies that now developed, we think are aspects of great importance to the Commission when you have to write your report regarding what happened in the past.
 I'm sorry that I will not be able to deal with this in all the detail that I would have like to because of the time limit but I still regard it as very, very important.  In dealing with the South African National Defence from 1960 onwards, it is necessary to place the development of the military conflict in Southern Africa during that time, into the right historical context so as to review the motives and perceptions for military activities in the proper perspective.
 Politicians of the previous Government and senior officers of the South African defence force often publicly referred to a term: "total onslaught".  This term comes actually from Andre Bufre who is a French strategist and the terms used to describe the situations that existed at that time.  The term: "total onslaught" actually contains two sub-terms: "total war" and  "revolutionary war" and this is actually in my opinion, the essence of the conflict of the past.
 Let me first deal with the concept of the: "total war".  We had the first and the second world wars.  Wars are good examples of total conventional war,  total in the sense of involving just about the entire population of the entire economical activities of a country such as Germany, such as the UK and total in the respect of great violence being applied in trying to coerce the opposing group to surrender.
 I would like to refer to the strategic bombing offensives that was taken in these wars, from Germans on to the UK and from the UK on to the Germany side of it.  And also towards the final developments in the second world war when we had the application of nuclear power in the battlefield.  The strategic bombings as well as the nuclear power application, led to heavy loss of civilian life.  
 Further characteristics of these kinds of war as they developed was that of the psychological operations which was a new introduction to war. These operations were aimed at encouraging the one side's population and the forces and discouraging those of your enemy.  This resulted in dislike and hatred of the enemy and this was the inevitable result also in the case of our own conflict.  
 Another feature of: "total war" was that military resources were often used for the purposes other than primary aims, for example the air bombardment to effect economic warfare to destroy the armaments productions capability of a place such as Germany.  Objectives such as the destruction of industry and for psychological objectives such as the destruction of civilian moral.  So war has always been - in the last two world wars, also very much directed against civilian populations too.  
 "Total war" can be defined as a conflict in which political, military, economic and psychological resources of at least one belligerent State are fully engaged and the survival of one or more of the belligerent States is at stake.  For South Africa it is well known that we had in this conflict, political, military, psychological and economic factors ever since we started the war in 1960.  So that is the concept of the idea of: "total war" as it developed in the second and the first world wars.
 Now the: "revolutionary war".  I think one must accept the fact that there was a total rejection within the feeling of especially the Western world but I think in mankind, that the destruction of civilians and the number of casualties, considering the destructiveness of nuclear weapons was a fact no longer acceptable to mankind.  And therefore we had new kinds of war developing especially after the second world war.
 One of those revolutionary wars - and this became the major form of conflict in the post-world war two period, can be described as a modern adaptation of total war with progressive application of political, that's ideological, economic, for example sanctions, psychological, the application of the factors of fear, allegiance etc.  And those were combined with varying degrees of military action and violence.  Military action and violence in our case for example, mass action, intimidation, bombs, mines and attacks.
 Basically "revolutionary war" is the pursuit of the policy of a politically inspired and organised group in the country, by all means available, also by outside support and the success is obtained by the creation of a situation of instability inside the country and political intolerability through the war of attrition.  Thus producing a climate of political collapse which is exactly what happened within South Africa with and the acceptance of a negotiated solution  without necessary defeating military opponents on the battlefield.  In this kind of war the objective is very seldom, it's hardly ever that of a military victory but rather of a political collapse.
 So in the South African situation, we had the situation developing that there was never a defeat on the military side, there was also not a victory on the military side but the instability and the war of attrition and the political collapse eventually had caused the developments in 1989 to 1994.  The key ingredients of the South African war therefore, I would say was violence, the military side of it, the mass action side of it, the terror side of it.  The terror aimed at non-combatants became a very important ingredient.
 The terror aimed at non-combatants is actually coupled to the concept of psychological war because war still remains a means of coercion and the idea was that through terror and through the actions also against civilians, the other side would be coerced in order to surrender.  Another key ingredient of the South  African war was that of propaganda and I'm referring to Radio Freedom, Sishaba and also to the own forces papers and the SABC.
 Then another key, the last key or the second last key ingredients that I want to mention is that of intimidation.  The kind of revolutionary war we had is a war directed at the minds of people, it influences people to think and act a certain way.  And the intimidation factor through necklacing, burning, threatening etc., and discipline within especially the townships, that factor of intimidation was a very important key ingredient of the South African war.
 So if you add to that, the concept the "total war" aspects of political initiative and also economical isolation and the idea of killing the opponent economically - the war of attrition idea, if you add that that gives you the concept of the kind of war which we've had up to now.
 The intention therefore was, to promote fear, instability and mobilisation of the masses.  Fear, instability and mobilisation of the masses then would add to psychological situation and that would add to the political collapse or be the final coercion that would be sought in this way.
 As there has been news during world war two, the intensive use of psychological operations bred dislike and hatred or creates sympathy on the one or both sides.  External support as well as the need for external manoeuvre and freedom of action is of vital importance to the revolutionary movements.  The external areas must also be chosen so as to inhibit and paralyse the external freedom of action of the Government forces, compelling them to be on the defensive, thus creating a scope for the revolutionary forces and making their opponents commit vast resources on the protection of the population and infrastructure.
 So this is where the external operations came from.  It was not possible to apply the key ingredients of the war from the liberation side without having external support in the South African situation.  The external support of the ANC came mainly from the USSR and it also came from external areas within the front-line States where they operated.  The Soviet attitude to such conflicts, the conflicts - the revolutionary wars was originally defied by Lenin who stated that they could only develop effectively in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic.  
 This became the permanent strategy of the Soviet block which saw the solidarity with the liberation movements of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as a permanent area of collective action of communist parties.  Thereby revolutionary struggles were made an integral part of the Soviet global strategy during the cold war era.  And that brings me to the concept of the cold war era.