Amnesty Hearings — Port Elizabeth — 1997-10-01

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Not as far as I am concerned.  Because of the uniqueness of the Vlakplaas unit, I had an open door policy, and I was accessible for all my men.  But I did not foresee that Snyman would say no.  This does not mean that he wanted to commit murder, but in the context of the interests of the country and of the country's security, this whole unit would have agreed to become involved.

MR LAMEY: I referred specifically to Snyman. You knew him and you did not assume that he would question these actions?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just take instructions from my colleague.
	Mr De Kock, were your men at Vlakplaas also thoroughly aware of the true position? In other words, irrespective of the image to the outside world that you were on special leave or you were suspended, that you were still truly the commanding officer from whom they would receive orders?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if you don't mind, may we adjourn now for a few minutes until 11 o'clock.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (Still under oath).

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

MR LAMEY: (cont)
	Thank you, Mr Chairman.  
	Mr De Kock, in Mr Snyman's application he says that you mentioned it at Vlakplaas, when you gave the orders, that Mr Nieuwoudt would later provide more details regarding this incident, that they would be involved. I specifically refer to page 68(f) of his application in which he says Maj De Kock mentioned that Deon - referring to Nieuwoudt - would tell us everything later on.  Was it possible that you could have said that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.  I just want to expand on this, and it could be related to this matter, that what would happen on the scene in Port Elizabeth. In other words, other preparations and arrangements for that.

MR LAMEY: You cannot remember whether Nieuwoudt was present at that stage?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And if Snyman did testify that he was present, you can't deny that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Snyman also specifically refers in his application to the involvement of an askari.  Is it possible that an Askari was mentioned?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, it could be possible, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: He also says in his application that mention was made of money which was stolen, and that it was a danger for other security branch members.  This is referring to the Askari, and they mentioned that he wanted to defect to the ANC.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, no, they might have mentioned an Askari, but regarding the ANC part of that, I can't say.
The summary I would have given them, was of a professional nature and it would have been short, but of defecting to the ANC, I don't know.

MR LAMEY: Would it have been possible that Nieuwoudt who was at Vlakplaas at that stage, mentioned that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I can't say, Mr Chairman.  Perhaps we should ask Mr Nieuwoudt himself. Would you agree to that?

MR LAMEY: Well, I don't want to speculate.  Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius? Oh, sorry, Mr Jansen.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN
	Thank you, Mr Chairman.  Jansen on behalf of applicant Ras.
	Mr De Kock, I assume that you are aware of the applications of the other applicants regarding this incident?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras says that on the morning of the 13th he accompanied you to Van Rensburg's office, where he for the first time heard that he had to go to Port Elizabeth for an operation. I know that you are saying that you can't remember that pertinently. Could something like that be possible?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman, if he was there I would have taken him with, because he would be leading this group.

MR JANSEN: It would not be strange or appear strange or it was not a strange phenomena that you as a commanding officer, and some of the group leaders, in the morning, round about seven or just before seven, would meet at head office?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, it was a standard procedure for all members. If he did not go to Vlakplaas directly to go to head office first, and then there was an instruction that all officers, especially the commanding officer of Vlakplaas, must be at head office at seven o'clock.

MR JANSEN: If we could expand on this further, is that the reason was that there should have been reported on a daily basis to the head of the C Section?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct, and also to receive new instructions or to discuss operations which were completed.

MR JANSEN: You are also aware that the head of C Section and other heads of divisions, met on a daily or a regular basis, to report back or provide information to the head of security police himself?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: After seven o'clock, between seven and eight, there was usually a meeting referred to as the Sanhedrin, and then all heads of groups met to report to the security head.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras also says that according to what he can remember, or let me rather put it in this way.  The practice at Vlakplaas would have been that you would have identified the operation to them, told them the reason for the operation and more specifically, told them under whose command they would be or who would lead them in that area?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: At that stage Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen have already been for a long time part of covert operations?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, they were involved in many operations.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras says that there was a very good relationship of trust between the members of the security police and especially the members at Vlakplaas.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Because of his previous involvement in covert operations you accepted that you would have no objections to his involvement?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, he was a dedicated member of the Force and also a dedicated member of the security branch.

MR JANSEN: And Mr Ras also says that during the time he was stationed at Vlakplaas, he never got the impression that Vlakplaas and the security police just launched operations. His general impression was that the orders he got, were related to his work and were well-considered?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman, just to explain. If you wanted to go rogue, like Mr Coetzee did, they would transfer you or remove you by means of other methods.

MR JANSEN: To a certain degree your activities your actions and those of the other officers would have been to a certain degree, automatic.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras also states that apart from the fact that there was the possibility of an ambush, the issuing and the carrying of Makarov pistols, was a standard procedure for covert operations.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, depending on the situation, you could have considered other weapons.  But the issuing of East Bloc weapons was a standard procedure.

MR JANSEN: I have no further questions - I'm sorry ... Just one other aspect.   There would have been no doubt with Mr Ras and the other officers, that you indeed were acting as their commanding officer at that stage?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairman, they would know that.

ADV DE JAGER: And they would have automatically realised that what they were going to do in Port Elizabeth, was within the context of your duties?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes.

MR JANSEN: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

ADV POTGIETER: Mr De Kock, when you were put on leave, was there an acting head?