Amnesty Hearings — Boksburg — 1998-09-15

MR PRINSLOO: In order to create the psychology of fear and the anxiety around the election, in order to force people, not only the government but also the broader public, to stay away from the ballot boxes soft targets had to be attacked.
	This had been proven to us by history that this type of modus operandi was very successful in the past.  The only MK's proved it, it worked.

CHAIRPERSON: When you decided to use black people as targets, did you not think that black people at the first democratic elections would be afraid to go and vote?  Why did you have the impression that black people would be afraid of the right-wingers?

MR PRINSLOO: It's not as much the fact that they would be afraid of the right-wingers but we had to create the psychology of fear and the government had to take notice of it.  Whether we were successful in our purpose is something that I'm not very sure of, however the anxiety had been created at a certain stage by attacking soft targets.  We believed at a certain point during these bombings that it would be successful.

CHAIRPERSON: That the black people would stay away from the ballot boxes?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, why did you think that?

MR PRINSLOO: We had hoped that somebody else would also stand up from other ranks and say: "Listen to these people, these people have to be accommodated somewhere within this new dispensation".  Well that was our hope.

MR MOTLAUNG: Mr Prinsloo, would you agree with me that there were certain innocent civilians that were killed or maimed during your explosions?

MR PRINSLOO: Correct.

MR MOTLAUNG: I want to submit to you that you would sleep better if you have killed, through these explosives, innocent black civilians than if you were to kill innocent white civilians.  What do you say to that?

MR PRINSLOO: We were in a process of warfare, whites were killed indeed.  As it has been put, by means of attacks on soft targets we aimed to create the psychology of fear whether or not whites were involved, but the fact ...[intervention]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR PRINSLOO: The fact that I would slept easier or not was not the major idea behind this for me, and I don't believe that that's the same with fellow members and accused.  I don't think that that is what it was about.

CHAIRPERSON: You had the hope that somebody would stand up and say:  "We must listen to the right-wingers"?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.  At that point we had hoped that it would be a prominent figure from within the current government who would stand up and say: "Okay, let's sit down and discuss it".

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: There has been evidence before us that at that stage there was an undertaking by the leader of the ANC at that time, he was also the leader of the alliance, he is the current State President, there was an undertaking that was given at that stage that he would appoint a committee to investigate this matter.  Do you remember that?

MR PRINSLOO: I remember that.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't it enough?

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, that was after the Johannesburg bomb if I remember correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm talking about the undertaking.  After the elections he passed the law and the committee was appointed.  I don't know about the level of progress that they had reached, but before the election an undertaking was given.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, whether or not the undertaking was given I would believe what you say, I accept that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that has been the evidence of some of your fellow applicants.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, you must realise that at that stage the right-wingers, and specifically the AWB, in its alliance with the CP and other parties was not or at least I don't believe that they would have accepted something like that permanently from the committee.  Somebody would have had to do something effectively with immediacy, especially because of the fact that CODESA didn't work.  They had very little confident at that stage in any committee or in any group which had been compiled in order to deal with such an issue.

ADV GCABASHE: I'm sorry Mr Motlaung, because there's a bit of a delay on this I'd just like to follow up on that.
	As a member of the generals staff, are you saying that you did not discuss a possible undertaking or the possibility of further talks just before the election, and I'm talking about your group as the general staff?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all.

ADV GCABASHE: So you are saying, in all the strategic planning forums you had as the general staff and knowing that you wanted your Volkstaat, and from what you are saying you wanted to disrupt the elections, you did not consider the overtures or the approaches from the other side at all, however weak they may have been?

MR PRINSLOO: Well that would only have been a decision of the generals in staff and it would have been up to the political participants at that stage, Mr Terreblanche and his fellow political speakers.  They would have had to sit down and discuss it, which at that stage according to my information was never done.  Whether they did it or not would be impossible for me to answer, but my specific instructions were from the staff and I was to proceed.

MR MALAN: Just in terms of the structure I would just like to achieve some more clarity.  With regard to your final answer it would appear to me that the generals in staff didn't discuss politics but that Mr Terreblanche and others were responsible for politics, is that what you are saying?

MR PRINSLOO: No, that's not what I'm saying at all.

MR MALAN: Then why do you say: "I mean that Mr Terreblanche was the political stage persona"?

MR PRINSLOO: He was the person who held political discussions with other groups or other interested parties.  It wasn't the generals in staff who, for example, would enter the stage in order to make political statements.  It was discussed with the generals in staff beforehand in certain cases.

MR MALAN: But the entire issue of the Volkstaat Council, do you know whether or not that was discussed at generals and staff level?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes, it was.

MR MALAN: And were any decisions made?

MR PRINSLOO: Yes.

MR MALAN: What were the decisions?

MR PRINSLOO: With respect to the Volkstaat?

MR MALAN: No, the Volkstaat Council.  The Chairperson has just said to you that overtures were made by Mr Mandela and at that stage the Volkstaat Council had already been written into law, and that is why General Viljoen moved over in order to participate.
	The idea of the Volkstaat Council, which would be a committee which would have meetings in order to investigate the possibilities of establishing a Volkstaat.  Do you remember anything about that?

MR PRINSLOO: No, not at all because that was after the elections.

MR MALAN: Yes, it was compiled after the election but before then it had been written into law.

MR PRINSLOO: At the time of the bomb explosions and approximately one to two weeks before the time there had been absolutely no mention that we might be accommodated on a Volkstaat Council, it was only mentioned after the election.  We were invited to participate after the elections.

MR MALAN: That's entirely correct that the invitation came after the elections but Mr Viljoen's participation in this was on the basis that part of the constitution would include the establishment of a Volkstaat Council which would begin to operate in terms of the constitution after the election.  Can't you remember anything about that?

MR PRINSLOO: I can't remember that specifically.

MR MALAN: Why did you think General Viljoen participated in the elections then?

MR PRINSLOO: Power.

MR MALAN: Could you just repeat that?

MR PRINSLOO: In order to occupy a position of power, that is why he participated.

MR MALAN: Did you still regard him as someone who was on your side or someone who was now against you?