Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1998-04-06

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  I don't whether you want me to give an eight figured reference of the DLB which, because I do not have a map of the area, it will not be possible but the arms were kept right in the location.  A DLB, I think everybody here is acquainted with the language, DLB, the letter box where you dig up, make it safe so that you can store some arms there.  That is where the arms were kept and constantly checked for ...[indistinct].

MR LAX: Sorry, the last part of what you said was very indistinct because you were quite far away from the mike, just repeat it please.  You explained what a dead letter box was and then you just said something at the end which I couldn't hear at all.

CHAIRPERSON: You said that's where the arms were kept, I don't know if you said anything after that.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: I said that's where the arms were kept and checked constantly for purposes of cleaning and checking serviceability.

MR LAX: That's what I didn't catch, thanks.

MR MBANDAZAYO: You have already confirmed that these were the arms that were used on the day in question, now can we go to paragraph 18
"For the first time on the day of the operation I presented the plan, briefing the members of the unit on the target.  The operation was as follows:  We were a unit of five operatives, Bheki was appointed as a commander and was carrying an AK47.  He was deployed outside the building within the hearing distance of comrade Vido.  Vido was deployed outside the building at the back and was armed with molotovs and an Uzzi submersion gun.  Myself and comrade Skumiso deployed inside, comrade Skumiso at the bar and myself at the party hall.  I was carrying an R4 assault rifle and on offensive M26 grenade and defensive M26, all reinforced.  Comrade Skumiso carrying an R5 rifle and same types of grenades and the drive, Togela Mkangwesa was at the car"
	Now my first point will be, how was it possible - can you explain to the Committee, that as you have explained the organogram of APLA that there was a regional commander and comrade Skumiso according to you was a senior member and also you were senior, how was it possible that you were commanded on this operation by comrade Bheki?  And also that the driver of the car, comrade Togela Mkangwesa, can you explain how he was armed?  Can you take the Committee through that paragraph and explain the details of the operation as you brief them?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Okay.  Let me rather take the Committee through in this format.  The way I drew up the operational plan was as follows:  There was a reconnaissance party and the commotion of the reconnaissance party was all the operatives although they were to go there in different timings and we had to consider the security of the operation or the security of the target, but every operative, all the operatives were part of the reconnaissance party.
	I have already indicated that they only became part of the reconnaissance party during final reconnaissance.  Then there was also a security part.  The security party were those people where there was also a command post, a command post, that means that was the commander for the operation had to be stationed, somebody who can be able to have a full view of whatever development is happening during the operation and be able to give commands.  
	That composed of comrade Bheki, he was appointed commander, comrade Vido and the driver.  Then there was also lastly the execution party.  I think that is where you get it finally.  The execution party actually composed the most senior people, myself and comrade Skumiso.
	The reason why we appointed or the reason why I think comrade Skumiso appointed comrade Bheki as the commander is that we were building our forces for leadership and the fact that, I think some 5 months thereafter, he was promoted from the position of being an ordinary force into an area commander.  It's quite indicative of the fact that we are right on track.  
	And simply because we had trust and confidence over the plan, operationally speaking and that each and every force understands the role that is going to be played by each and every operative in the operation.  And therefore, equipped with that knowledge, equipped with that information and coupled with the training that he had received from APLA, it was possible that given a change, he can command.  And the success or the failure of the operation, I think it proves me correct.
	So if I may add, comrade Bheki was to command, as soon as we entered the gate he takes over the command and as soon as we go out of the gate I take over the command, went to the RV, as soon as we reached the RV comrade Skumiso takes over the command.  That was the circumstances.

MR LAX: Just for the record, the RV is your rendezvous, is that correct?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you then take the Committee through what actually happened in the golf club?  Where were  you positioned and what did you do, why the other deed?