Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — UNKNOWN

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I was not in the position that I recruited or talked to this person myself, but this specific person, Mr Kondile, I've worked with many trained people during my career, or with liberation fighters, freedom fighters, and I can assure you it differs from person to person.  In the one instance you have no problems with the person right from the beginning.  He provides the information immediately he co-operates. You recruit him easily.  And then you find others would never be recruited, never, ever.  So it differs from person to person.
	It is not strange that it happens in that way.  Taking into regard that he had been in Bloemfontein for a while and he had provided them with information there also, important information according to me.  And that he came to the Eastern Cape to provide further information.  According to my experience in the Security Branch the person who provides information so quickly can be bought and can be recruited easily.

MR MOOSA: I wasn't talking about the information he allegedly provided to you, I am talking about the information you allegedly provided to him.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that just be more specific, I don't think there is any evidence that he provided information.

MR MOOSA: No I am talking about you in the plural.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now you see du Plessis had provided information.  This man had nothing to do with it.

MR MOOSA: Yes Mr Chairman.  What I am talking about there is a report that comes to him from Mr du Plessis and I am going to come immediately to the reaction that he had to that report.  Did that surprise you that Mr du Plessis had given this young such sensitive information about the operations in the Eastern Cape?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No not at all.  During my career I also had cross-border agents.  I handled them and at certain instances I also had to decide quickly whether I would expose this information or not; whether I was going to trust this person or not.  It was an option you had to consider.  You could make a mistake.

MR MOOSA: And if you made a mistake what would the option be if you discover that the person was a double agent?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well it depends, it depends on what the consequences would be.

MR MOOSA: Now it wasn't just the question of the principal agent, as I understand both your statement and Mr du Plessis', there was other very sensitive information that was already in Mr Kondile's hands, isn't it so?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't know of any other sensitive information.  What I was told is that the name of the principal agent was told to him and he had to cooperate with this person.  That was the type of information provided to him.

MR MOOSA: So it was just the identity of the principal agent that he would know, would I be right about that?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR MOOSA: Just explain to me because you did an assessment together with Mr Erasmus of the situation, how that would endanger all covert operations in the Eastern Cape?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman I think Mr du Plessis had already explained it to you.  This agent does not handle only one informer.  In other words if I can give you an example, if Mr Kondile for example would get reach the ANC he could tell them who the agent was.  If they put this agent under observation by the MK Intelligence people they could determine precisely who the other informers were handled by this agent.  Or they could abduct him, they could torture him till he provided that information.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence was that they disclosed the network as well, some portion of the network apart from the principal agent.

MR MOOSA: That is what I thought Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you've got that evidence.

MR MOOSA: Taking the cue from your counsel who was telling me about Lesotho, I think he meant that I should have asked about Lesotho, it seems to me though that your statement and Mr du Plessis' statement really emphasises the security situation in the Eastern Cape with particular reference to the Transkei or am I wrong?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so.

MR MOOSA: And that this morning when Mr du Plessis really emphasised Lesotho, that was a different tack on your statements, I didn't understand the statement in quite that way.  What's your comment on that?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No I don't understand, I really don't understand what you are trying to ask me.

MR MOOSA: Let me do it again.  This morning Mr du Plessis gave evidence that what was really important was the situation in Lesotho and that was what was in fact going to be endangered by Mr Kondile still being alive, not being eliminated, is that correct?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes the withdrawal of information from Lesotho, the destroying of that Intelligence network, yes.

MR MOOSA: And would it be right to say that the security network in Lesotho was quite sophisticated but where you emphasised gaps in your information is particularly in the Transkei area?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes that is so, that is correct.

MR MOOSA: Which it, more-or-less together with the Border region be in your particular interests of the Eastern Cape and Border regions, would that be right?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Ja, but the Transkei and the Ciskei were also of great importance to us.  But if there was no information available about the Transkei and the Ciskei regarding the infiltration  of Freedom Fighters etc, we wouldn't know that those people were already in Transkei or Ciskei.  It was also of importance for us what were their movements, what is the Intelligence about Transkei and Ciskei.

MR MOOSA: This note that was found allegedly by Mr du Plessis, did he actually show it to you?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No he did not.

MR MOOSA: Did he say what had happened to that note by the time he spoke to you?

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he said that he had left the note there.

MR MOOSA: Now Mr Chairman I notice it is almost one o'clock.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman just before we adjourn, something you yourself just mentioned Mr Chairman and I think it is something I will have to correct at some stage.  I have been listening to the direct sound and I've been listening to either English or Afrikaans, and my recollection of the evidence that was given was not that du Plessis' evidence was that they said they disclosed part of the network to them as well, he said they disclosed the principal agent to them and then part of the network could be disclosed in other words.  So I think, I am not sure what got through to you Mr Chairman, but that is certainly my recollection of Mr du Plessis' evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: We will put that right.  Thank you.  We will now adjourn and resume at two o'clock.
HEARING ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o.)

MR MOOSA: (cont)
	Mr van Rensburg I would like you to look at page 5 of volume 1 of the documents, that is your statement, also page 5 of it.  Look at the first paragraph there.  I wonder if you could read out the first sentence to us.

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: "Die...."  ...(intervention)

MR MOOSA: Sorry the paragraph beginning "Kapt du Plessis".

NICHOLAS JACOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay.
"Captain du Plessis expressed the fear that if Kondile were to be released he would be able to harm the whole Security branch with the information he had and his task as well as his knowledge of communication and handlers".