Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-02-10

MR DU PLESSIS: I've already said that the idea with Kondile was, the vacuum which was in Lesotho had to be filled with him.  We knew that people were infiltrating, we didn't know when and what their targets were and that vacuum we had to use him for.

MR JANSEN: So it was not specifically a Transkei vacuum, it was a vacuum regarding infiltrations from Lesotho?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is correct, but in the Transkei we had almost no informers.

CHAIRPERSON: When you talk about infiltrations, are you talking about infiltrations from Lesotho or into Lesotho?

MR DU PLESSIS: From Lesotho Your Honour.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR JANSEN: [Transcriber's own translation] Look at page 15 of the bundle, it is page 3 of your application and the last paragraph.  I want to read to you
"The danger surrounding operations and especially the possible exposure of informers flow from this"
What operations are you referring to?

MR DU PLESSIS: Information operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Just let me clear, is that Volume 3?

MR JANSEN: No, Mr Chairman, that's Volume 1, page 15.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry.

MR JANSEN: Volume 1.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR JANSEN: I don't understand, is that the information he was involved in or other information operations?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, he was - he knew about all the information operations.

MR JANSEN: He has knowledge about the fact that he was an informer?

MR DU PLESSIS: And who the principle agent was.

MR JANSEN: And who the principle agent was.  And what is the following step then?

MR DU PLESSIS: The following was that if he had certain information, they identified the principle agent and all his other associates were identified and all the other handlers were identified.

MR JANSEN: In other words, operations should be seen as information operations.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: I want to put it you, where you discuss your political motive, and I quote from the same paragraph
"The protection and maintenance of the government and constitutional dispensation be hampered and the community as a result of that and the accompanying danger and intimidation, could lose their trust in the government"

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, this is a Commission, my learned friend is here to represent Mr Dirk Coetzee in his application, how can Mr du Plessis' political motivation - good or bad, affect what Mr Dirk Coetzee said in his amnesty application?  Doesn't this cross-examination really go a bit wider than is necessary here, with respect?

CHAIRPERSON: I agree with that.
	Mr Jansen, I think that there must be some limits on your rights to cross-examine.  You are here for a specific purpose and that is that your client's evidence in a previous hearing is being questioned to some extent by present applications and I don't think that you should traverse the entire spectrum of this witness's evidence.

MR JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should confine your questions to where you want to put your client's version or challenge this witness's evidence where it differs with your client's.

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I accept that maybe the political motive as such is a bit subjective.  However I'll continue on another course.
	Mr du Plessis, do you have any reason why Mr Coetzee was contacted for the purposes of this operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: As I've already given evidence in the discussions between me, Mr van Rensburg and General Erasmus, one of the voids was that we did not have a place and we did not know how.  And it was suggested by General van Rensburg that he heard from Dirk Coetzee that he had the necessary infrastructure.  And that according to my opinion ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Jansen, in your client's own statements didn't he say that he came with the suggestion - with the proposal?

MR JANSEN: Sorry.

ADV DE JAGER: It is in one of the statements and I can refer you to that, and he said that he said: "We know how to do these things".

MR JANSEN: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So, the initiative had come from his side.

MR JANSEN: And not only that but the circumstances when it took place when they were in the Eastern Cape on the 13th of September and that's what is relevant.

ADV DE JAGER: Your client says himself that he took the initiative in this regard.

MR JANSEN: No, I accept that.

ADV DE JAGER: ...[inaudible] contacted him.  [Transcriber's own translation]

CHAIRPERSON: Well at least you see, he says that they also took the initiative because they wanted Dirk Coetzee.

ADV DE JAGER: ...[inaudible]

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, I think the argument at the end at the end of the day will be that on the 10th of August - perhaps if I could just put one other question it will be clear what I'm trying to achieve.
	Were you aware of a letter coming from headquarters concerning Vlakplaas Division C1 that was a newly established structure?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I can remember that letter.

MR JANSEN: And it was that division which would co-operate with the various divisional structures?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Would you accept that that letter was dated the 11th of September?

MR DU PLESSIS: I accept that.

ADV DE JAGER: Is it the 11th of September 1981?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, that letter is found - apparently page 165, unfortunately it's that copy that's not too clear.
	You see, Mr Coetzee's version is that Vlakplaas only became operational by the end of August 1981.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know.

MR JANSEN: There were various incidents before then but regarding highly organised actions, it became operational the end of August.

MR DU PLESSIS: I just want to comment regarding this, Brigadier Schoon can establish if it's true what I'm saying.  We in the various regions had many difficulties with people who came to our regions to work there all by themselves.  It created a lot of problems and there were some divisional managers or commanders who posed requests that certain guidelines should be established because those people came and they worked in your divisions, they left all the bodies behind and then you had to pick them up afterwards.
	In the last instance the commanding officer was in charge of the division and when those people then came there they had to work under the command of the people in the region.  This perhaps - this documentation was dispatched at a later date because of problems.

MR JANSEN: It would be fair ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody have a truer copy than the one that we have, it's a particularly poor copy.

MR JANSEN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And for example, large parts of paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 - 3(a) and 3(a)1 make no sense at all, they might as well not have been there.

MR JANSEN: Yes.  Mr Chairman, unfortunately - I remember the history of this copy, is that it came from the Harmse Commission documents and the ones - the original copies if I may call it that, from which these copies were made, was in a terrible state.
	 However, that letter was read into the record of the Harmse Commission and that content or the content of the letter then appears in a part that was handed in as an exhibit in Mr Coetzee's application and I will make sure that that's available by tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, thank you very much.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.
	One can accept that you or somebody like General van Rensburg at that time or then Colonel van Rensburg, were aware of the problem that people came to work in other people's areas and that was unacceptable practice.  What is strange for me is that you and Mr van Rensburg go on an operation in Komatiepoort a few kilometres from the bases of Major Flemington, without contacting him.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know whether Dirk had contracted him, I don't know.  I did not handle that operation, General or then Colonel van Rensburg liaised with Coetzee.