Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

GEN VILJOEN: My apologies Chairperson, but we regard this as very important.   Chairperson, if you come to the cold war, then what happened in the post-world war two situation, is that it was no longer acceptable to have wars between - for example the USSR and the USA because of the destructiveness of a nuclear war.  In other words the nuclear power became a deterrent in itself.
 The cold war situation developed and eventually we had in South Africa, on the one side the USSR block as a super power combining within the possibility of internal blocks such as for example, Angola, Mozambique and the liberation movements.  In 1970/75 round about, this was opposed by another super power, the USA, and they gathered around them the ability of some other groups or proxy forces such as Unita, such as South Africa, such as Renamo etc.  
 So we had a situation developing where it was not possible or where it was not likely that there would be a complete total war situation.  The people sort of followed the concept of fighting through proxy wars.  And this is what happened in South Africa, we had the interests of big or major powers, super powers amplified and cared for by the proxy wars in situations such as this.  So here we had the two opposing groups.
 I'm now trying to speed up Mr Chairperson. 
 Most revolutionary wars were thus not only wars of liberation in Africa but also proxy wars for the super powers.  The revolutionary war situation in Southern Africa was therefore not only a war of liberation, it was part of a bigger struggle in the world - the USSR and their satellites versus the USA and their satellites.  There was a major conflict of ideologies such as communism and interests such as economic interests and this was complicated in Africa by the anti-colonialism situation and also by the anti-apartheid sentiments that existed in the world.
 Soviet policy had some explicitly declared objectives in Southern Africa,  firstly to establish and improve relations with the front-line States of Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia.  Those were strategic political objectives.  The USSR also tried to support and strengthen the national liberation movements in South Africa.  That was the indirect war idea, the idea of proxy wars.  And the USSR also decided to support progressive programmes adopted by African Governments which had embarked on non-capitalist development.  That was the economic side of the war.
 I'm now referring to the idea of a total war and I'm just listing the different aspects of participating.  Then the reaction of the United States and the reduction of the United States and the Western European influence.  That was another objective that they could achieve by proxy wars instead of a direct confrontation, USSR / USA.  And then to obtain the right to bases and reconnaissance in the area, thereby establishing their influence, thereby also make it possible for them to eventually dictate a presence in specific areas.
 The USSR also had the idea of limiting American and West European access to mineral resources in the region which considering the mineral wealth of the countries in Southern Africa, is a very important factor - that's an economic part of the total war or the cold war.   And then the threatening of oil supply routes of the United States and Western Europe around the coast, is another economic and military strategic aspect.  So this was a good example of major power interests served by the proxy war situation to keep yourself as a major power into a position - into a favourable position.
 The USSR therefore gave military aid and weapons and pre-positioned weapon systems, such as the anti-aircraft system in Angola, they gave technical assistance such as operating these, such as flying sophisticated aircraft.  They gave economic aid and they supplied the intelligence and the intelligence training. And through this they established in Southern Africa, socialist orientated States such as Angola with the MPLA as the main instrument in 1975, such as Mozambique with Frelimo in 1975, which followed the idea of Marxism communism and it was intended for South Africa too.
 So in this way the USSR was for us a conventional threat, a real physical conventional threat because they were actually present and they had their proxy agents present in Southern Africa.  And there was the revolutionary threat that is, the assistance to the liberation movements fighting against us.  So South Africa saw itself on the side of the West as an ally in the cold war conflict.  They worked with the international anti-Communist forces and they had to counter the internal insurrection or revolution within their own areas.
 I would just shortly go through the development of this strategy.  The threat did materialise, South Africa became only to feel the full effect of the threat when we had the Soviet intervention as a dominant feature in anti-colonial revolution such as ...[inaudible], Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, from the late '60's to the early '70's.  Prior to this, the South African defence force had actively begun to study revolutionary wars and we did so because we realised what the opposing side was going to use in South Africa.  We used the cases of Malaysia, Kenya, Algeria and we studied the works of Bufre, CA Frazer, John McKewan, Mao Tse Tung, etc.  This is how the was developed or the revolutionary war developed in Southern Africa.
 So just quickly to remind you that in Angola, the South African defence force started with helicopter support to the Portuguese when they were still there. In Rhodesia, the police assisted the Rhodesian security forces - the SADF's involvement was very small, only regarding some aircraft and especially helicopters.  In the case of Mozambique, the South African defence force involvement was very limited, logistical support, military liaison and exchange of intelligence.
 During 1975, the SADF had taken over responsibility from the police for counter-insurgency operations in South West Africa/Namibia.  It was our responsibility to do this in terms of the mandate of league of nations and we did actually do this for the sake of the defence of South Africa too, because it will be come clear to you with my further arguments, that we had a strategy of keeping the attacking forces as far away from the home or the heartland's of our territory as possible.
 The Cuban involvement which was part of the USSR block, started in 1974 with - no it was already in the '60's, with some 200 instructors to the train MPLA in the Congo Republic and Russian aid to the MPLA between '74 and '76 - estimated by the Western military sources, had been in the area of 400 million US dollars and it grew to 4 billion dollars by 1987.  
 The 200 instructors that we started off with in 1965 eventually grew later on to 7.000 troops in October '75, 14.000 in February '76, 17.000 in March '76 and at the end of the war in '76, the number of Cuban troops increased gradually to counter the military threat of Unita and Kabinda and separate movements and to maintain the MPLA in power.  At the height of this level in 1985, it reached the top of about 50.000 troops in December 1988.  I mention this to give you the idea as to what developed in our perception, as a real threat towards the security of not only South Africa but the whole of Southern Africa.
 This caused the Vorster Government - the then Vorster Government, to become involved in a total war situation and I was personally involved in this.  I was the representative of the South African defence force that first negotiated with the idea of giving support to Unita and FNLA and this was because of the Vorster's Government's expansion of their ideas of defence of South Africa - their participation in a total war.  
 This was a significant change in our defence strategy and to side on the side of FNLA and Unita against a Soviet backed MPLA in Angola, was a step in a direction which associated the South Africans with real Africans because previously we had been involved with colonialist forces.  I'm referring to the Portuguese situation in the Angola/Mozambique situation, I'm referring to Rhodesia too, now Zimbabwe.
 In 1975, we found it necessary - at that stage the situation had collapsed totally in Southern Angola and we found it necessary to protect the economic interests by taking the ...[inaudible] Ruakana scheme and protecting it and keeping it in operation for the purpose of supplying electricity and water to South West Africa.  
 So the aim of this operation by the Vorster Government was to have a political, economical and military enforcement.  It was therefore a start of a limited war and it started actually with the problems of the Alvor Agreement that was not kept by the forces within the Soviet block.  
 On the 5th of December the US Congress voted against further covert assistance and the amounts that I've mentioned on US aid, was the maximum that could have been given without Congress authority.  And when it was taken to Congress for the increase of this, the Congress voted against this mainly because of the Vietnam syndrome and the other problems at that stage within the United States.
 We were involved in the Angola war for the specific reason to enable Unita and FNLA to enforce the ALVOR Agreement which they thought would be enforced by the OAU and it would only be enforced if they could recapture their traditional areas after the occupation of these areas by the MPLA backed by the Cuban forces.  And they could only recapture that with some assistance from us because Unita and the FNLA forces were forces trained in guerrilla warfare and they did not have the ability to do some kind of conventional attack.  
 This is why we were involved as instructors and also assisting them in recapturing their traditional areas.  And that we had done exactly according to the plan and by the 9th of November 1975, we were in a position that the OAU could then enforce the ALVOR Agreement.   And the ALVOR Agreement basically determined that there should be a Government of national unity, there should be a Government of all the different groups in Angola participating.
 This we had in position by the 9th of November 1975 but the OAU failed politically until about 26 January 1976.  On 26 January 1976, the OAU eventually had a vote on this and it was 22 versus 22, so this then caused the collapse - the political collapse or what we tried to do in Angola.  Although we succeeded every inch of it militarily, we failed politically.
 What is important is to realise why we had to eventually withdraw in March 1976.  It was never the intention to capture Angola, it was a limited war enforcing the Agreement and the political siding with the anti-Communist forces of Unita and FNLA.  It was also because of very strong political pressure that the USSR exercised through the United Kingdom.  That was then eventually decided that the operation had failed because of the OAU failure to apply the principles of the ALVOR Agreement.
 We had certain lessons learnt from that.  Firstly, we had to update our armaments package, which we did.  This led to a very major or great development in the armaments industry inside South Africa.  Secondly, it was established that the build up of surrogate forces and Soviet armament on the South West Africa/Namibia borders was continuing at an alarming rate.  This was also aimed at providing SWAPO with secure bases in Angola and inhibiting any large scale intervention by South African forces.
 The South African defence force's need for intelligence reconnaissance and a widespread covert capabilities made it essential to continue with the development of special forces these specific reasons.  And I'll come back to special forces just now.  The third lesson emphasised the value of the link to the anti-Communist movements such as Unita, after which the revolutionary take-overs in Angola and Mozambique became one of the remaining buffers against the further east block expansion in Southern Africa.
 So eventually - if we now think back, we have learnt some valuable lessons but what the final contribution we feel that we have made - and I say this because of the discussion of motives and perceptions, we feel that the downfall of communism in 1989 was actually caused by a number of Vietnam's of the USSR of which the Southern Africa theatre was one and we were one of the major role-players in the Southern Africa theatre.  The other theatres are of course Afghanistan and the Middle East.
 I'm sorry Chairperson, I have to skip over a number of very important points but I will have to do this otherwise I will not come to the real crux of the matter.