Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Well it was a question of influencing them, talking to them and I think most of the white South Africans are tired of the whole business and they realised and that's the reason why negotiations started. Because it's a political thing. They were influenced to realise it's not separate groups living in South Africa, we're a nation here, we're one nation and we've got to build that nations. So I think it was automatically accepted by them.

MS MADIKIZELA: Thank you Chairperson.

MR LYSTER: Thank you. I'd like to just break for a couple of minutes just to ask my colleagues whether there are any other areas which they think is important enough to?

MR MARITZ: (...indistinct) eventually you'll be (...indistinct) thank you.
(break)

MR LYSTER: I think we just have literally probably one question to ask before we close, General Malan. And it relates to something which hasn't been covered yet and that is the  civil co-operation bureau, the CCB. This was something which you testified to yesterday when you started late in the afternoon that it was something that was established very much at your initiative. And it was headed by a former head of the special forces, sorry it was headed by a former special forces head, Mr Joe Verster. People in the CCB were also recruited from special forces and you have agreed with Mr McAdam what sort of operatives, what sort of skills training people in special forces had. It was a highly clandestine operation, it cost the state an enormous amount of money. Can you tell us what, bearing in mind what I've said and where these people were recruited from, what was your expectation that these people would do? Or that this bureau would do?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairperson. In my presentation the previous time I was before the Truth Commission I reported on the CCB. The question was already dealt with there. I will just very briefly (...indistinct) special forces was approved in principle by me. Special forces was the integrated and supported part of the South African Defence Force. The role envisaged by CCB was infiltration and penetration of the enemy and gathering of information and the disruption of enemy. This is basically all that I know about the CCB. I saw in the Defence Force's submission they also included the CCB and special forces. It is probably what they know about the CCB. I never directly worked with the CCB. I, in other words never went to them. I knew the commanding officer or the director of the CCB because he was a commanding officer of a reconnaissance unit. I never received any reports from them. I do not know where they operated, how they operated. You must keep in mind as Minister I did not get involved in operations in the sense that the CCB was consisted of approximately 150 men. If I were to become involved and if I had to expand my expertise to those operations then I would have to give my attention to all such operations in the country. That's why I never had anything to do with the CCB.
 When the bomb burst the Harms Commission was appointed. Judge Harms did not invite me to testify before him and he came to certain conclusions, he made certain findings. They were brought to my attention as you have seen in the press and those were crimes. This matter of planting a foetus in a man's house, in blowing up houses, attempted murders are completely contrary to what I have testified here today. I cannot allow certain organisations to break the laws of the land and to have double standards and tell others that they cannot do that. That's basically all I can tell you. I expected that after the Harms Commission's report I expected that the AG would automatically take certain steps. It might be because of the Truth Commission being created that those steps weren't taken. But I accept that those deeds and offences were, where people applied for amnesty with regards to them I never approved any actions of the CCB. And that is basically what I can tell you about the CCB.

MR LYSTER: You seem to be suggesting that it was a plan that was entirely lawful and even benign in it's inception but that people did things that were unlawful and you express regret therefore but we, Colonel Joe Verster has given evidence and he, and there's a document, I don't have it available and I apologise. But I can assure you that the contents and the short extract from the 1987 year plan of the CCB is that they express a view, he expresses a view, Colonel Joe Verster that the purpose of the CCB was: To disrupt the enemy to maximum. It means to kill, it means "dood, dood te maak." And that would support the view that far from being a plan that went a bit wrong because of some misguided, the actions of some misguided individuals that it was basically the purpose of the organisation was to in a clandestine or covert or secret way, was to identify enemies of the government or opponents of the government within the country. And to kill them. And people, that's what they did. That's what operatives of the CCB did and they've asked for amnesty for that. And that view, I'm not saying it's a view that this Commission has excepted, that view is in direct contrast with the view that you have given us. And the question I ask you is whether you had absolutely no control over this organisation to the extent that you didn't know what they were doing? Or whether you knew what they were doing and you kept an arms length view away from what they were doing? Or whether there's another explanation which you want to put forward and ask us to consider?

ANDRE MARANDOM MALAN: Mr Chair if we talk about disrupting I do not visualise killing but killing might be included as well. In that sense I mean this, I do not want to tell you that it does not mean it at all but disrupt means lots of other things as well. Disruption of the ANC towards the South African Defence Force was exactly what was the, exactly the same as what was expected from the CCB. It did take secrets of the Defence Force and channelled those secrets to the ANC. I have the greatest respect to them for that. One has to know one's enemy. One has to know what the enemy thinks. That's what they thought. That is the name of the game. The one towards the other.
 But there are other factors of disruption as well. I mentioned as an example the matter of if there is an ANC vehicles one can put sugar in the petrol because they can't leave at the moment that they are supposed to arrive. There are various such things that can be done. One can take it's information and pass it on. One can influence them. Do not ask me now to give any examples of that because I only know of one such example where this took place. But it is good that I don't know anything about it. Because it is on a need to know basis. 
 If one comes to the control of units, for example the medical general or the air force, special forces, infantry or whomever who were four or five times as big as this one who played an equally important role, a Minister can't be involved with that because then I would take over the Defence Force. Then it would be better for me to be head of the Defence Force and to take over control of that again. The Defence Force was delegated according to the Defence Act. I am not saying that I kept them at arms length on purpose. During this discussion we've had today and yesterday we are talking about the Defence Force. The bigger part of my budget was not for the Defence Force but it was for Kruigkor, for ARMSCOR. And the affiliates thereof. I visited all of those affiliates at least once just to show my face there but if things went wrong there the nuclear situation in the country I went there once. I did not have any time to go and look at nuclear bombs. I just informed myself I did not regard it as important. The Minister of Defence has to have his finger on the pulse of all these things.