Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

MR KNOETZE: Page 119, paragraph 6 to 9
"Revolutionary war.  This became the major form of conflict in the post-world war 2 period, and can be described as a modern adaptation of total war, with the progressive application of political, economic and psychological resources combined with varying degrees of violence and military action.  There are numerous definitions for revolutionary war, which in essence all describe it as a conflict in which wide-ranging and radical change in the political, social and economic field are brought about through the use of violence.
	Basically, revolutionary war is the pursuit of the policy of a politically inspired and organised group inside a country by all means available, also with outside support.  Success is obtained by the creation of a situation of instability and political intolerability through a war of attrition, thus producing a climate of political collapse or acceptance of a negotiated solution, without necessarily defeating military opponents on the battlefield.
	Strategically, revolutionary war is aimed at a total indirect strategy where the revolutionary forces as the weaker side, assume the tactical offensive at selected times and in selected forms and places.  Armed action is used, but on a lower scale than in previous wars.  The psychological weapon is a major factor because the conflict is essentially a struggle for the allegiance and active support of the populations."

MR KNOETZE: What is your comment on this definition of revolutionary war?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: I think it's very accurate, a very correct and concise definition of a very difficult concept, namely revolutionary warfare.  It indicates once again that the State, the power base of the State, those are the targets of the revolutionary forces.  That is the area which the counter-revolutionaries then try and protect and try and keep out of the hands of the counter-revolutionaries.
	It is not like in a conventional war, a war where direct strategies are used, it is a war where the offensive is constantly in the hands of the attacker, the revolutionary, and the State and its forces are then reactive, they resist, and it's a war which directly affects the whole country and all its institutions and all its people.

MR KNOETZE: Do you think that with reference to this definition, that during the Katzen period there was a revolutionary war in the Eastern Cape?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Could you please elaborate?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Revolutionary war is there to try to replace an existing dispensation.  It's mostly politically inspired, and that is aimed at the constitutional leg because the State is the ruler on constitutional grounds.
	During the time of Katzen in the mid-80's alternative structures had already been established, especially at local level.  There were major intimidation campaigns waged against the population, especially those who were not part of, or not seen as part of the revolutionary onslaught.  There were incidents of terror in the province, there were skirmishes with terrorists, there was training given in a clandestine way to trainee terrorists and there was a whole diversity of revolutionary statements, which we have already touched on.
	In certain areas, in the mid-80's, especially in the command which I was responsible for, there were already certain liberated areas which according to the statements of the ANC had to be made ungovernable.

MR KNOETZE: Yes, that's the one side of the picture, the revolution.  Now what about the other side of the coin, the counter-revolutionary forces?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As we've already mentioned, the SADF was used to try to counter these attacks and operational areas were declared.  The civilian forces and the commandos were placed on the alert.  I may just add that those were the forces we were supposed to use in the counter-revolutionary war.  A state of emergency was declared, I think in 1985 for the first time and it was renewed in '86.  I think there was also a partial state of emergency declared before '85, in which only certain districts were declared to be in states of emergency.
	Then according to our information, counter-revolutionary actions were waged by means of cordoning off of certain areas, roadblocks, searches etc.  It was also in this period that we as the Defence Force started training people in all seriousness, in counter-revolutionary warfare - perhaps it was a bit late.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then on page 122, paragraph 16
"The situation that therefore confronted South Africa from the '60's onwards, was that of a Soviet backed revolutionary war with the aim of overthrowing the existing government and structures and the seizure of power by means of armed struggle.  The continued pre-positioning of Soviet, Cuban and surrogate forces and heavy armaments in South Africa, posed for the first time the potential threat of conventional war on the northern borders of the subcontinent."
Was that also the position?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  You will recall that many of our Defence Force units were deployed in Namibia and Angola and by that deployment it was also seen that there was an external conventional threat against the RSA.

MR KNOETZE: Then on page 127, paragraph 34
...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We don't have that page, Mr Knoetze.

MR KNOETZE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: I say we don't have that page.  We don't have page 127 or 129.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I'll make mine available the moment that I have read it into the record, if you agree.
	137, paragraph 34:
"While the SADF was involved in South West Africa/Namibia, the ANC was also active in furthering its plans for actions in the internal struggle in the RSA.  The ANC applied a new strategy based on the four pillars of the revolution, a strategy for people's war, which emphasised four major categories of action namely
(a)	The allround activity of the underground structures of the ANC.
	(b)	The un-united mass action of the people.
... I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman:
The united mass action of the people, mass mobilisation.
	(c)	The armed offensive.
	(d)	The international drive to isolate South Africa."
What is your comment on that exposition there?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, we knew the four pillars of the revolution, the strategy for people's war.  The first pillar was manifested by MK, to a lesser extent by APLA.  This was more aimed at the ANC/SACP alliance.  Those were the soldiers of the revolutionary forces.  We call them terrorists.
(b)	The united mass action was aimed at mobilising the population, because what is concerned here is the control over the population, and the aim was to get the people to take part in the struggle on the side of the ANC/SACP.  No revolution can succeed if you don't have the population on your side.  Perhaps that was the strongest pillar.
	(c)	The armed offensive.  That joins up with (a), which dealt with acts of terror not only against the opposing forces but also against those institutions and bodies and people seen as collaborating with the opposing forces. 
	(d)	And then I think everybody is well familiar with the international drive to isolate South Africa which affected South Africa on all levels, the economy, sport, even as far as diplomatic ties with other countries were concerned.  It was to the great disadvantage of the Republic at the time.
	These four pillars, even before they were announced and after they were announced increasingly so, formed a very strong basis for the revolutionary onslaught.  And I think it once again indicates that revolutionary warfare, apart now from the ANC/SACP's contact with that, that revolutionary warfare is based on these pillars.