Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-07

MR KNOETZE: It then says that a report which was drafted by General Coetzee regarding this matter is attached as Annexure B.
	Mr Chairman, I must indicate that at the stage when this document was drawn that annexure was available, but we couldn't get a copy of it when this amnesty application was prepared.  People are still trying to determine where it went, but we haven't been able to.  It doesn't really to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's too vital that we don't have it.

MR KNOETZE: I agree, thank you, Mr Chairman.
	And then paragraph 40 or page 40, paragraph 49.  It says that there were certain payments made to Major-General Holomisa.  And in paragraph 50 it says that, or it refers to Major-General Holomisa and the ex-Rhodesians.  You have no knowledge of that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, accept what I heard afterwards.

MR KNOETZE: Mr Chairman, I must just indicate there are documents in the bundle, reports by various Staff Officers, dealing with what we've just dealt with.  I don't intend to go through that.  I would suggest it would be a duplication, but they are there for the Committee to read.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Knoetze, we've got the documents, we'll read them.

MR KNOETZE: And they appear on 887 to 913, Mr Chairman.
	Generally, if we can return to your amnesty application which we deviated from actually.  If we could please go to page 4 thereof, paragraph 10(a).  You are asked to indicate the political objective with which you committed these actions to which we've just referred.  It says:
"As a member of the South African Defence Force, and in terms of the South African Government's counter-revolutionary strategy, to conduct the counter-revolutionary war, to prop up the RSA's constitutional dispensation and to protect it.  The political objectives were
(a)	To prevent by means of military action internal and abroad, to prevent the revolutionary forces overthrowing the RSA Government violently and damaging or destroying their constitutional dispensation."
Would you like to comment on that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: It is a technical point, it's not quite technically correct to refer to the constitutional dispensation as I referred to yesterday.  That was not the only issue at stake, also the economic and psychological aspects.  In other words, the entire picture of the power bases of the State were involved.  So I think technically you can replace constitutional with the State's power bases.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then page 5, paragraph 10(b).  It asks you to indicate what your motivation was, why these acts or omissions or offences are regarded to be as being in connection with a political objective.  Could you then supplement this with what we said yesterday regarding the documents which were marked Annexure C?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Well broadly, what it was concerned with was to improve the ability to defend yourself and dealt with all the processes having relevance to the power bases of the State and trying to promote and strengthen those power bases.  It deals with population in this part of the country and getting them on our side, winning the hearts and minds and to combat and to stabilise the instability which reigned here, and to attempt to create a more normal environment in the Eastern Cape.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then page 6, paragraph 4.  You say
" I was very much against the revolutionary onslaught against the Republic, and I saw it as my duty to support the South African Defence Force counter-revolutionary war."
And that also follows very clearly from everything that was referred to yesterday.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, yes.

MR KNOETZE: And the same with (b), which says
"I saw it as my task to oppose the revolutionary onslaught and to confront the people were carrying out that revolutionary onslaught.  In many such cases this meant that in an attempt to protect the populist, both white and black, against these acts of terror, I participated in the planning and carrying out of operations or actions where military violence was actually used."
And Plan Strelitzia and Plan Katzen on the other hand as we'd seen, were not primarily aimed at killing people.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR KNOETZE: And then reference is made to the support of friendly organisations, and this would include for instance, the XWB to which we've referred.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Is it correct that you wanted to add a third point there, namely territorial protection?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  In the Eastern Cape our troops were present mainly to protect the territory and territorial protection is nothing other than the presence of troops by means of patrols, roadblocks, searches, etc., in an area.  That is how we utilised the military, apart from the confrontation with terrorists which actually led fights, real battles.

MR KNOETZE: Paragraph 5.  There is reference to an additional document or documents, and you are requesting that those documents in Exhibit C are also incorporated into this particular application.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have nothing further at this stage.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KNOETZE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Knoetze.  Mr Avenant, do you have any questions that you would like to ask the witness?

MR AVENANT: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
	General, I'd like to deal with Annexure A to your application.  Yesterday you said that this was not drafted by yourself personally.

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, correct.

MR AVENANT: Who actually drafted this annexure?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: As I said yesterday, this annexure is a result of a team effort.  There were a group of people who were involved to some extent or another in the Katzen Plan.  The group of people were brought together at the request of my attorney, Mr Jan Wagener in Pretoria and what you see here is a version of what was said by the various parties there.  I also made a certain contribution as to the parts where I was involved, and I think all the other people did exactly the same.  I'm not exactly sure who this group of people were.

MR AVENANT: In other words, this was a piecemeal compilation?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR AVENANT: But the end result, in the end product you checked it and you endorse that?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, I think where there's a slight deviation or a change I indicated it as such, but I did go through the end result and I think it is probably the only full and complete picture of all the many different components of Katzen.

MR AVENANT: Page 20 of the document, there you refer to the fact that General Magnus Malan and PW Botha visited the Eastern Cape and that they gave the instruction that the situation be stabilised in the Eastern Cape.  You say that General Malan, or it says here that Mr PW Botha made the same demand, namely stabilisation, and indicated that it should be done even if it amounted to the Security Forces springing Charles Sebe from prison.  Was that an instruction given to you personally?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: No, I knew about it, I can't remember that either General Malan or former President, PW Botha told me that I should liberate Charles Sebe from prison.

MR AVENANT: So where would this remark have come from?