Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1998-04-15

ADV SANDI: I am sorry Mr Prior, I think we will have to be careful and get out facts clear on that one.  Are you suggesting that as early as March 1993 there was already a talk of elections?  Wasn't that only decided in December 1993, on the 5th of December 1993 that there could be elections in April 1994?

MR PRIOR: Certainly, I am not clear precisely on the dates of everything, but there certainly was a TEC that had been established, and there certainly was political movement, there was dialogue between most of the parties.
	The PAC had bought at joining the dialogue, and only at a very late stage, December the 5th, did they agree to come aboard, but the question is ...

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Prior, just to be fair to this witness, you have just sketched a picture in which the PAC wasn't part of that process.

MR PRIOR: Yes.  But my question is was he aware that there was political change, there was dialogue, there was movement, despite the fact that his party had not joined?  Was he aware of that reality, that is my question?

MR MTEMBU: Mr Chairman, in fairness to the witness, even if the witness had been aware that there was political movement, but if the PAC had not joined, how would that have affected his reasoning at the time?

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that for him to answer?

MR MTEMBU: I will leave it at that Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We are interested in his political feelings.

MR PRIOR: It is not a trick question Mr Diaho-Monaheng, were you aware that there was a movement, there was a beginning, there was a start to some form of new political dispensation, despite the fact and I accept that the PAC at that stage, weren't very keen in joining that process, but were you aware that there was this change?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: Yes, that is correct.  I had that knowledge, there were negotiations between political parties.  They were negotiating with the Nationalist Party.

MR PRIOR: Yes, all right.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it is very fair to say that the PAC was not very keen to join.  Wasn't this the year of Operation Great Storm?

MR PRIOR: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't the PAC totally opposed to those negotiations?

MR PRIOR: Well, I don't know.  We have heard conflicting versions.  Certainly APLA weren't keen to participate in the political and there was from the submissions that we have heard, there was some difference of opinion between the political leaders and the military leaders.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but is it not a question of a historical fact that the PAC was totally opposed to those negotiations at that stage?

MR PRIOR: Yes, the purpose of the question was simply to find out whether he as an individual was aware of the political change in the country, and I think I have conceded that the PAC or his instructions from his political party, was somewhat different.
	I don't have the facts at my disposal, and I don't wish to maybe distort those facts, but whether they were all totally opposed or not, if one just look at the press clippings that we have seen in these amnesty applications, and listen to the, read the submissions given by the delegation in October.  Even there they said that these attacks took the political leaders by surprise.
	I don't know if the Committee wants me to refer specifically to those passages, I have referred to them in other amnesty applications, the last two weeks.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior, are you referring to the major submission by APLA leadership?  Are they not saying in that submission that they were surprised and they would make enquiries and explanations would be given?

MR PRIOR: Yes, that is correct, but the witness has answered the question.

MR LAX: Shall we move on Mr Prior?

MR PRIOR: Yes, I would like to move on.  I have lost my train of thought.  Mr Diaho-Monaheng, yes, if I understand your evidence correctly, and the evidence of Mr Madasi, you were part of the struggle, we understand that.  We understand the philosophy behind that, we understand the training that you received, but you attacked Yellowwoods Hotel because you had been given orders to do so, is that the bottom line?
	It was part of your training as a soldier, you were part of a specially selected unit from the Phokela regiment.  These were your orders to attack Yellowwoods Hotel and you carried out the operation pursuant to those orders?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: Mr Madasi explained yesterday he was given orders by his seniors, that is the High Command of APLA to and attack that place.  He was given a reason why specifically that place.
	The reason was that the people who entertained themselves there on Friday and Saturday, are members of the Security Forces.  I believe that explanation answers your question sir.  I don't know whether you are satisfied.

MR PRIOR: Just to follow on and wrap that aspect up.  I think one of the Committee members put it to Mr Madasi yesterday.
	So in terms of your mandate in respect of that operation, there was no room, there was no space for any changes?  For example if you had discovered that the hotel was full of elderly women, you could not have aborted the attack, you had to go through with the attack, because those were your specific instructions?
	You had no discretion to break off the attack if you discovered that the true target was not what you had been informed about?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: Mr Madasi answered that question yesterday, he said you do not question an order, you only seek clarification and you carry on with your order.
	I don't know whether I answered your question.

MR PRIOR: Is that your position as well, is that what you believed and you knew at the time?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: The instructions were carried out that your target has been selected and it has to be attacked in one of these two days, either a Friday or a Saturday.

MR PRIOR: I think from that ...

MR LAX: Sorry, sorry, can I just come in here.  I just want to be clear in my own mind, because you are relying on what Mr Madasi said.  We want to know what you think.
	You are here an a applicant yourself, as well as Mr Madasi and we want to know what is in your head and what ideas you had when  you were doing this thing.  The question that was put to you was, you as an individual, as an individual APLA soldier, did you think you had any leeway if you realised that your Commander was wrong, to do anything about it?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: I had no alternative or to bring any other change, I had to carry on with the work.  I don't know whether you are answered.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR PRIOR: Thank you, I have noticed from a ballistic report that was attached to the papers, at page 57, that the Police found 28, 7.62 mm or calibre cartridges at the scene.
	You said you had an R4, do you know the calibre of the R4?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: I know it sir.

MR PRIOR: That is not 7.62 isn't it, isn't it 5.56 calibre, is that right?
	Tell us the calibre, as you know it, of your R4.

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: Sir, if you bring me an R4 calibre, I will tell you that this is the one, it is written here at the back.

MR PRIOR: All right, I just want to make the point that there were 28 7.62 cartridges and 20 of 5.56.  My understanding is that the R4 and the R5 rifle fires the smaller calibre, the 5.56.  The 7.62 is an R1.  Could you maybe just assist us, could there have been an R1, it really doesn't alter the situation, whether you used an R1 or an R4?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: There was not an R1 sir, it was an R4 that I used.

MR PRIOR: All right, and did you have a full magazine?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: Yes, two.

MR PRIOR: And did you use both magazines, did you empty both magazines?

MR DIAHO-MONAHENG: I did not use them both.