Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 2000-01-17

MR VISSER: Which you didn't?
		MR WASSERMAN:  I left it in Col Taylor's vehicle."
And he says that is the reason why he stated, that as far as he was concerned, there was no intention to get involved in a skirmish with them.  That was never Wasserman's intention.  So that's just an additional probability, we say, Mr Chairman, that should be taken into account.
	My learned friend, Mr Webster, then also suggested that it can't be correct, or it is hardly true that it was a Task Force operation because if it had been, why then did Botha and/or Steyn and/or Wasserman not first obtain the permission from Breytenbach before they acted at all?  Now, first of all we wish to submit, Mr Chairman, that this proposition does not take account of realities, the realities on the evidence as you have heard it.  Secondly, you have heard that there were different radios with different wavebands and Botha at least told you that there was, as far as he can remember, no communication with the Task Force.  In any event, it would hardly be necessary for a policeman, under the circumstances where he wants to stop a car, to first permission from the Task Force Commander whether he may stop the car, in circumstances where the whole purpose was to stop the car and to arrest the occupants.  We say, Chairperson, that the applicants were thrown into a position due to circumstances where they first observed this car for no other reason than fortuitously, clearly, and where they had to act and had to act rapidly and quickly and we say it's unreasonable to suggest that in those circumstances they could do nothing without orders from Breytenbach.  
	Now, Chairperson, Mr Webster put to Botha that in 1986, September or October of 1986, the level of violence in the country had subsided considerably.  That's at the record page 507 line 5 to 508 line 21.  Well, Chairperson, we submit that that is altogether an incorrect statement of what we know the situation was.  In the Cronje Decision at page 3 line 8, the original Amnesty Committee made reference to the war by referring first of all to the 1970's and then by saying by 1980 a full-scale revolutionary war had broken out.  We also know, Chairperson, that the Kabwe Conference of the ANC was held at Gorongoza in June 1985 and it's old news, Chairperson, that at that Conference the important decision that was taken was to intensify the war and you will recall that the ANC came under heavy criticism because so much was the feeling of intensifying the war, that there were pronouncements made that innocent bystanders who were injured or killed, had to be accepted as part of the war.  We say, Chairperson, that all that, together with the statistics which we know of, the ones given by van der Merwe in the Khotso House matter and the ANC, the ANC statement of August 1996, from page 52 to 53, gives you the stats for 1986 and 1987.  And Chairperson, for each of those two years, there were around 70 serious incidents of violence.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the date of the ANC Decision to intensify the war?

MR VISSER: June 1985.  Yes, that was the Kabwe Conference at Gorongoza and Chairperson, you will find reference to that in the ANC's Submissions.  I believe it's page 56.  May I just check quickly, Chairperson?  Yes.  Sorry, sorry Chairperson, I gave you the wrong - no its August, yes it's the August statement, Chairperson at page 52.  Yes, in the right-hand column, it starts in the middle
"By the end of 1985 an official ANC pamphlet titled 'Take the struggle to the white areas' was distributed..."
and then it goes on from there and then it says, the next paragraph or two paragraphs later:
"The period between 1985 and 1988 witnessed unprecedented violence, overwhelmingly directed at black civilians."
So there was violence, Chairperson and my attorney just wants me to point out also to you, the ANC's Submissions of 12th May 1997 at page 15, a quotation from an interview with the late Mr Chris Hani.  It says:
"This is a quote from Chris Hani, at the time MK Commissar, from a speech broadcast on the ANC Radio Freedom on March 1st 1986"
and it quotes, I'm not going to read the first sentence.  The second sentence reads:
"Umkhonto weSizwe, instructed by the leadership of the ANC, is gearing itself to step up activity in white areas, so that the entire country should be ungovernable."
It's quite clear, Chairperson, that all the information certainly which we have and that we know that the Committee has, seems to indicate that 1986 was a watershed year and the violence only subsided in 1988, only again to increase, I believe it was in 1990, after the Pretoria and the Groote Schuur Minutes.  So, Chairperson, we submit with respect that my learned friend is incorrect with his facts in that regard.  	Next, Chairperson, my learned friend then did two things.  First he suggested to Botha that he was not making a full disclosure because, said he, that some of the injuries of some of the occupants of the car were from the left side, were fired from their left side.  This starts, Chairperson, at page 559 of the record.  I must just indicate a correction to you, Chairperson, in the middle of that page, after:
"

MR VISSER: Yes he gave that answer".
The next indicates that it's Mr Webster but that was 
actually Chairperson, according to my notes.
"

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  So there was firing from other police vehicles, plain and simple, isn't it?
		MR BOTHA:  That is correct, Chairperson."
And then it goes on, Chairman, over page 560 and I'm not going to read all of it, 560, 561 and 562 and then we come to 563, after some discussion was taking place between the Chair and Mr Webster and what was really going on, what was he getting at and Chairperson then says, in the middle of the page, rather line 7 of page 563:
"

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm not saying you must jump into the post mortems, you know, I don't have a clear picture.  I got the impression you were going to put to this witness that there was in fact another vehicle to the left of the suspect vehicle.  That is the point of your questioning.