Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-07

BRIG PHITLA: I think in the command structure of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the most decisive department was that of the commissariat.  The political commissar for a very long time in our structure, created confusion, vis-a-vis the chain of command.  Reason being the fact that we always ensured that politics led the gun, and when I talk about confusion, it is because at the end of the day when we had to command, the position of the political commissar had always to be consulted.  In military terms this may create problems, because a commander has got to issue orders as he deems fit and as he sees the situation.  But the command structure was such that the commander at the end of the day has got to be politically accountable. And he had to be politically accountable through consultation with the political commissar.
 Hence, the political commissar played an important role in determining the life of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.  So whatever we did had to enjoy the blessing of the commissariat, because at the end of the day all our actions had to be politically justified.
 I hope I have answered that question.

UNKNOWN: Ja, to continue on that, of course, as a former chief political commissar for almost 20 years in the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the existence of that body as I also indicated earlier on, was to ensure that APLA acts according to the PAC's political line and objectives. It was very important as Brig Phitla is saying.  We inculcated political and ideological indication in the minds of the cadres and members of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, so as to see that the ultimate objective of our war is political, is political freedom and liberation. It was really important because in our view, if anybody was not given political education nor training, will basically be a bandit and criminal and he will not be in a position to justify his actions at the end of the day.
 This basically, we drew it from - we were influenced in the majority of the cases by our training, from the Eastern Bloc, from the Red Army, from the Chinese People's Liberation Army, from the Cambodia, from Vietnam, from Yugoslavia and other areas.  The political commissariat was basically playing a very decisive role. 
 If we are to refer to the Second World War, Hitler had to go to an extent of issuing an order or Catel, Marshall Catel issuing an order that if he arrests the members of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, and if you identify a political commissariat must be immediately executed. Because he recognised the decisive role that was played by the political commissar. Even more than that of the commanders.
 So that is the outlook, that is the approach, that is the military line of the Azanian's People's Army, to ensure that cadres don't go astray.  Go anywhere, even in the jails of South Africa or anywhere, and you discuss the political line of the PAC, you will get - that will be confirmed, that we insisted on the political objective and the political nature of the struggle as waged by the Azanian People's Liberation Army.  Thank you.

MR GOOSEN: Would it be possible for you to give us a practical example of how that played itself out in the organisation or guerilla units and for example, in the determination or the identification of targets, the control and accountability that a political commissar would exercise in those circumstances?

UNKNOWN: For instance, in the lowest unit, there is a commander, there is a political commissar, there is logistics. Which means, that even at the lowest unit, we ensure that there is somebody playing a role of the political educator. Can somebody add on that?

BRIG PHITLA: Basically when we gave this responsibility to the commissariat, the whole aim was that every unit that was to be deployed must have the three which Brig Mofokeng has mentioned; the political commissar, the man responsible for logistics and a commander.  But unfortunately, with time we realised that we couldn't afford to have this system, because firstly, we were short of political commissars.  That is a fact. Because political commissars had to be people with a certain level of acumen.  People with a certain level of education, because it was supposed to be people at least who could be able to read and study and teach politics and ideology. In the process of development of our army, we ran short of political commissars. And hence, the majority of the units that were deployed, it didn't have political commissars.
 But wherever there were political commissars, political commissars consulted with commanders for whatever operation that was supposed to be undertaken.  And if the commander had decided to implement that programme, he would have done that with the consultation of the political commissar.
 But there was another aspect that intervened as well. Because to a certain extent the element of security had to come in.  And the element of security dictated that if the commander decided that only him would know about the target, then that would be so.  And the political commissar would not be informed. But this would be sorted out after the operation itself, because at the end of the day, we had to account to the political leadership.  So this is basically how it worked.

MR GOOSEN: Could I just follow up on that one, Brig Phitla, while you are up.  In circumstances where the majority at a certain point the majority of units deployed did not have political commissars, or in circumstances where the political commissar would not be informed, because of security considerations as to what the target was, how in those circumstances was political control and accountability maintained for the operations conducted by APLA units deployed on the ground?

BRIG PHITLA: These were compensated, that aspect, that at least the commander should be an individual that is politically matured, who could also play the role of political commissar.

MR GOOSEN: And again, just to follow up. I know that Dr Boraine wants to come in, but I think that this line might prove to assist us later.
 In units that would have been recruited and assembled inside of the country, would those units have or those personnel have benefited from the political education process provided by political commissars, inside the country as well?