Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-08-11

H J P BOTHA: Yes, with regard to Mo Shaik's involvement it was a continuation of an activity in which they had been involved a year previously regarding the infiltration of a high profile ANC personality, Ebrahim Ismail, and they were involved with the DPMC.  Information had been conveyed to the DPMC, which could be used by them in the establishment and accommodation of infiltrating terrorists.

MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA
"Directly after the Amanzimtoti bomb on the 24th and the 25th of December 1985, within 48 hours 52 persons who were connected to the DPMC were arrested.  Among others, Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela.  Approximately half of the arrested persons were later charged in the Ramlakan matter, including the latter-mentioned three persons."

MR VISSER: Very well, and in '93 you say that Robert Ndlanzi, alias George Fakude who we have referred to previously, had been in Natal for a week or so from Swaziland when these arrests took place and he was also arrested.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And he was also found guilty and sentenced with his involvement in Operation Butterfly.

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: And with regard to Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela, who were charged as you have stated in the Ramlakan matter, they along with a fourth person were discharged before the completion of the matter.

H J P BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 95 it is stated that Ndwandwe had managed to recruit the remaining members who had managed to escape and created new units under her control, with which she continued to commit acts of terror within the Republic.

H J P BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that she left the Republic in 1987 and went somewhere overseas where she obtained military training.  Is that correct?

H J P BOTHA: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that after Tommy Zulu and Charles Ndaba had been transferred from Swaziland, she became the de facto commander of MK in Swaziland and she was also in control of the Natal operations of MK.

H J P BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I haven't been able to catch up.  What is Ndwandwe's first name?

MR VISSER: Phila.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell that?

MR VISSER: P-H-I-L-A.  Now it's either Porta or Portia.  I think it's P-O-R-T-I-A.  Commissioner Lax agrees with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it should be.

MR VISSER: And Ndwandwe is N-D-W-A-N-D-W-E.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you I have that.  Thank you.

MR VISSER: And then you refer to the evidence that you have given in this regard, with reference to the Ndwandwe matter, volume 3 page 466 to 467.  Could you then briefly address us regarding Operation Vula, on page 30, paragraph 97 and following.

H J P BOTHA: Yes.
"Operation Vula, and as it appeared from the document which was compiled by Ronnie Kasrils "Politics on the Armed Struggle - the Revolutionary Army, appeared to have the following ideas as its basis.  Kasrils' idea was that the internal bases of power had to be established by advanced attachments of MK.
'The development of the armed struggle is dependent on its being rooted among the people.  Our MK combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a people's war.'
		Trained MK cadres had to activate the masses politically:
'The armed struggle must compliment mass struggle and we seek to combine all forms of struggle, violent and non-violent, legal and illegal.'
		The underlying strategy was:
'Political and strategy determines military strategy and our combatants and organisers must be imbued with political theories and ideas, must understand politics guides the gun.'
		The central concept for the operation was that a power basis had to be established within the borders of South Africa, which would replace the necessity to leave the country to obtain training and swallows the necessity of receiving orders from outside the country.  
		Kasrils' idea of a basis of power within the country was accepted by the ANC/SACP alliance, but the viewpoint was that it was ANC leaders and not MK cadres who would have create the basis of power and politicise the masses.  There would have to be an abbreviation of the communication from the front of the struggle to the head office in Lusaka.
		The operation would have three corner stones, namely: a) political combat work, military combat work and the intelligence work, specifically aimed at the SAP, the South African Defence Force and National Intelligence Services, as well as other targets which would be identified.
		Vula was launched during December 1986 and would be a five year operation.  The ultimate objective was a violent revolution.  Vula's origin was preceded by a preparation phase which had already been initiated in 1984/1985.  Legends were created for the prominent members who were involved in Operation Vula, namely Mac Maharaj played the key role in Operation Vula.  He would have cancer and would have to be treated for five years in Russia."

MR VISSER: Yes.  There are various deviations or other perspectives which have been offered by other persons.  For example, that he would have had kidney problems or whatever the case may be.  The fact of the matter remains that the legend that was created for him would have indicated that he needed five years of medical treatment in Russia.

H J P BOTHA: That's correct.  "Dit sou verduidelik sy afwesigheid binne die strukture van die ANC in Lusaka". ...(no English interpretation)

MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA
"Siphiwe Nyanda as his cover, would have to obtain five years training in Russia and other legends were also created."

MR VISSER: Now this information can be found in an issue of the British MI5.  We don't have that document available to us.  Is that correct?

H J P BOTHA: No, we don't.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR BOTHA
"High profile ANC/SACP members had to operate covertly in the RSA and establish an infrastructure for the establishment of underground structures, DLBs, once again for the purpose of weapons stockpiling, safehouses, transit facilities, as well as a communications network.  The plan was that the armed struggle would fall under the direct internal command of the MK commanders who were present in the country.
		Within the ANC itself it was a secret movement.  It was only in selected groups.  Only selected groups were aware of it and acted supportively for this.  The initiative for this came from the SACP.  And one could draw the golden thread from the involvement of individuals within operation Vula, that all of them were registered members of the SACP and/or that they were considered for action within the SACP."

MR VISSER: I wonder if we could just pause there and just refer to Exhibit C, where on page 4 reference is made to the secrecy - in paragraph 3, from the top of the page.
"The authorisation for implementing Operation Vula was a "Top Secret" NEC resolution, taken in 1986, working out of the ANC headquarters in the Lusaka.  The operation was placed under the President's project, chaired by ANC President, Oliver Tambo and included Joe Slovo as principal planner, Mac Maharaj as principal recruiter and in-country commander, Siphiwe "Kebusa" Nyanda, as deputy in-country commander, Ivan Pillay as administrator responsible for project co-ordination and a few others."
Would you agree with that summary of Exhibit C?

H J P BOTHA: Yes, it is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR BOTHA
"Initially these persons were applied within the country.  They acted under the Durban Political and Military Committee.  And here I must just qualify that this is not the same Durban Political and Military Committee which was referred to in Operation Butterfly.  Durban, in the establishment of Operation Vula, was divided into districts and zones for the politicisation of the masses as well as the identification of individuals for training."