Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1998-02-10

MR JANSEN: Would you say that I'm wrong if I say - and that my submission is going to be, that it seemed as if it then became clear to you that Kondile wasn't giving you this extremely important information and that you were going to detain him under such circumstances that he would not have a choice, other than to give you the information?

MR DU PLESSIS: I can assure you that if go through all the documents you will see quite clearly that there were two people at that stage who were responsible for the bomb attacks in the Eastern Cape, it was a man by the name of Walk Tall and a man by the name of James and I'm now referring to Port Elizabeth.  They were responsible for the bomb at the Constantia centre and they per say were responsible.
	At a later stage James blew himself up at the administration offices.  And I can say further that with the arrests of other terrorists, this information was confirmed.

ADV GCABASHE: ...[inaudible]

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.  Just a point on clarity, you are saying you got this information from Kondile after these bombings - as to who did it, after the bombings?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, that's not what I'm saying, I said that he gave us information as to who was responsible for bomb attacks in the Eastern Cape.

ADV GCABASHE: Were you able to ask him about these specific ones after they had occurred?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I did not ask him.

JUDGE PILLAY: Why not?

MR DU PLESSIS: I do not know why I didn't, I can't think why I didn't.  I don't believe that he would have known because he was in the cells, how would he have known who had planted a bomb on the 8th?

MR JANSEN: Now we come to the recruitment of Kondile as an informer.  Would you conceded that the recruitment of informers was a specialised task?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Part of the process was the so-called debriefing?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Debriefing is a very long process, usually it takes place where various specialists on various fields ask question in order to realise or to find out whether this person really is who he says he is.

MR DU PLESSIS: That thing was only started in the security branch much later, at that stage we did it ourselves.  We only got experts in at a later stage and it also doesn't always work.

MR JANSEN: No, of course it doesn't always work.  I want to put it to you but perhaps - I do not have specific instructions, but you will agree that Mr Coetzee was not in the security police after '81, his security police career ended at the end of 81?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: And his understanding thereof was that that this was a specialised department.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, his opinion is his opinion. I do not know how many informers or agents he dealt with, perhaps he can tell us.

MR JANSEN: At least he had training in that so he understood the theory.

MR DU PLESSIS: That depends when he had the training.

MR JANSEN: Well he did an officer's course in '75.

MR DU PLESSIS: And officer's course does not do intensive informer training.

ADV DE JAGER: Where did you learn to deal with informers?

MR DU PLESSIS: Security courses and follow-up courses.

MR JANSEN: When do you say - when was this debriefing done by the experts or specialists?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot recall the year but they brought in psychologists later to do psychometric testing etc.

MR JANSEN: Forget about that.  What I'm referring to is specific persons who were part of the security branch who had knowledge about specific matters, lets say ANC activities in Swaziland, ANC activities in Northern Natal, who knew which persons were involved and where, who could test someone's knowledge as to what he said was correct or not - whether he was giving disinformation or not.

MR DU PLESSIS: In that case we did it ourselves.

MR JANSEN: Was that function ever taken over by experts?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not in the Eastern Cape.  In later years - I think it's after I left the Eastern Cape, they brought in specific or created a specific intelligence section, I do not know what year it was and then the intelligence section dealt with certain information but the normal person still dealt with his own informer.

MR JANSEN: Would you also agree with me that one of the biggest dangers with the recruiting of an informer, is that such a person can actually be a double agent or become a double agent?

MR DU PLESSIS: That is so.

MR JANSEN: So any person who recruits an informer would at all times be acutely aware of that fact?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: And a person such as Kondile and any person from the security forces surely also trained in counter-interrogation techniques?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's possible, yes.

MR JANSEN: You say it's possible, isn't it true that it's a fact?

MR DU PLESSIS: I cannot say that it's a fact.

MR JANSEN: Would you at least accept that someone such as Kondile or any person working for the ANC or who worked for the ANC at least knew that at any time he could fall into the hands of the South African Police, whether it be as a result of arrests within the country or abduction from a neighbouring state, correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct, yes.

MR JANSEN: So you should surely have thought that while you interrogated Kondile, that he was possibly busy with counter-interrogation techniques?

MR DU PLESSIS: I did not think of that because the way in which he answered his questions and told me what had happened did not make me suspicious in the first place, and I could also test his information.

MR JANSEN: It did not make you suspicious that when he gave you names about people in the Transkei, that you arrived there and these people escaped the arrest?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, because we knew exactly what had happened,  one of the intelligence people from the Transkei warned them.

MR JANSEN: I'm putting it to you that your version that you gave the name to Kondile of your principle agent, is totally untrue, no security person would be so stupid to do that.

MR DU PLESSIS: I think that is a very broad statement.  Either you have information regarding that or you were in the security police yourself, I don't know how you can make a statement like that.

MR JANSEN: I'm saying this based on the assumption that it is inherently untrue.

MR DU PLESSIS: It depends on the circumstances, it depends on what you want to achieve.  If I don't have access to a place I have to make use of you or somebody else, this was the only alternative, it was an emergency.

MR JANSEN: My further instructions are that a principle agent would - in his identity, would initially not be made known to an informer even if you knew you could trust him - you can't work otherwise, I don't know how he handled it.

MR JANSEN: In other words, such an informer would be told: "Place your information in such a place and be at a certain place at a certain time because a person with a newspaper and dark glasses will there", is that the type of spy stories?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, these type of spy stories do not work, we based our activities on ordinary principles.

MR JANSEN: And you stuck to the basic principles and probably it did not work?

MR DU PLESSIS: Some of it worked, some not.

MR JANSEN: Where according to you, would Kondile work, in Transkei or in Lesotho?

MR DU PLESSIS: Worked as?

MR JANSEN: As your informer.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, he would have worked in Lesotho but the information vacuum was in Transkei.  The information Transkei was amongst others in Transkei and from Lesotho to the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape, Transkei etc.

MR JANSEN: But you had a well established structure in Lesotho?

MR DU PLESSIS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Where would Kondile provide you with Transkei information?