Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR NTSEBEZA: Mr Varney, is your simple answer that even though there was not created a special separate force, as a consequence of the discussion there was a third force, even if it was not a third force as a separate force?  And are you saying in reply that you are not agreeing with the proposition put to you?  (Inaudible) ... that, you know, we are not about investigating the third force and even

MR NTSEBEZA: /you alluded

MR NTSEBEZA: 4B you alluded to the third force by the way.  I'm trying to find a way in which you can express what you want to say in the shortest possible time.

WITNESS:   No, I'm aware that you're trying to short-circuit these proceedings and we don't have much time left, but since the matter has been raised and since it's before the attention of this committee I think I ought to draw the attention to specific passages which related to what the special capacity, which may include a third force, ought to achieve and of particular importance is the fact that it was the existing security forces that were to take certain actions.  There was certainly discussion about certain options that may end up co-ordinating such actions and even seconding military and special forces people to do specific actions under this co-ordinating body and we don't know whether that was implemented or not and we certainly know that no separate third force was set up, but what I do argue in my paper is that this special counter-revolutionary modus operandi, as such, this is one of the meetings that did send a direction for such actions and if one looks at some of the decisions taken at this meeting the ... (intervention)

MR DE VOS: After your long answers, the point is very simple.  Item 11 was discussed in the meeting and there were quite a few points.  You mention all these points but, at the end of the day all these points mean nothing, because the last point, the meeting decided to adopt option 4.  All the other points regarding the establishment of a third force and who should assist whom was irrelevant.  They were ignored.  That is the point I'm trying to make.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   Mr de Vos, that

MR DE VOS: /isn't the

MR DE VOS: 4B isn't the correct reading of this document.  If you look at it carefully, the document sets out certain items and certain resolutions and decisions that are taken and in the column next to it it says, "Optrede deur", "Steps by".  You can't look at the bottom of the page and say that the decision at the bottom of the page cancels out the decisions at the top of the page.  If one looks at ... (intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: Mr Varney, with respect, do you agree with his proposition or don't you agree with it?  The fact that you can just look at the - that the bottom line is that option 4 was opted for.  Do you agree with that?

WITNESS:   I obviously don't agree with it.  It's an incorrect reading, but, Mr Commissioner, I think I ought to point out that the point that I'm trying to make is that direction to use the methods of the revolutionaries against them was, in fact, tasked to existing ministers, namely that of Defence and Law and Order and that these objectives had to be carried out by, in fact, the existing security forces and that is the direction that went down.  ... (inaudible) ... (intervention)

MR NTSEBEZA: That's the point you made in your document.  That's the point you have already made in your document.

WITNESS:   Yes, I'll let the matter rest there.

MR DE VOS: Let us continue, otherwise we'll never finish.  Let us have a look - you mentioned the highest political authority and I want to devote attention before coming to the military.  The highest authority, according to you, is the Cabinet, the State Security Council and the State President of that time.  Is that correct?

WITNESS:   That's partly correct, Mr de Vos, and this term, "Highest

MR DE VOS: /level",

MR DE VOS: 4B level", "Highest political level", is a term that is bandied about in certain of the documents and it's unfortunate that I wasn't able to refer to the 79 document, because I think that would have been quite elucidating.  That question, in fact, was also put to Former State President de Klerk, and he conceded that at times it meant different things, but what he did say, if I recall correctly, was that it generally constituted the State President himself and, depending on the particular circumstances, it would also have included certain other key ministers.  Now, in these circumstances, I only speculate, because there is no definition of, "Highest political level", that it would have been, certainly in terms of Operation Marion, it would have been the State President himself, in consultation, I suspect, with ministers holding security portfolios.

MR DE VOS: Let us go on to the State Security Council meeting of the 20th December 1985, where assistance to Minister Buthelezi was discussed for the first time.  Do you know who put this subject to the State Security Council?

WITNESS:  That isn't evident from that particular minute, which is very skeletal in nature.  We don't know what was the actual subject matter of what was discussed or who tabled it.  What we do know is that the document dated 19th December 1985, and this, you as a counsel who attended the Msane matter will recall, was placed before Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, I believe either the day before or on the very same day that that State Security Council meeting was going to take place.  So I think one can again speculate, but I think quite good speculation that it must have been Minister Malan that either put before or played

MR DE VOS: /a significant

MR DE VOS: 4B a significant role in placing that matter before the State Security Council.  After all, it was one of his subordinate officers of defence that brought the matter to him.

MR DE VOS: You are speculating.  Before you give a long answer, is that correct?  Are you speculating?

MR LYSTER: He said so.

MR DE VOS: Can you remember the evidence in the Msane matter?  Can you remember that it was referred to that Mr Heunis approached this matter?

WITNESS:   Mr de Vos, I'm not going to dispute such things.  Presumably you have looked it up, and I accept that.  I had no doubt that Mr Heunis must have played a significant role.  After all, his department was on that was going to play a significant role in supplying certain support and - so that doesn't come as a big surprise to me.  Heunis was one of the people tasked to give the wide-ranging support.  The support wasn't only for military assistance.  There was wide assistance and Heunis' department was going to play some role.  So Heunis and Malan certainly were key players, but I would be very surprised if you were to tell me that Malan played no role whatsoever in that meeting.  In fact, I don't believe I could believe you.  If you look at the November 1987.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, can I just interrupt here, please?  I represent General Malan here and this speculation about General Malan and the role that he played without any factual basis whatsoever is totally worthless and this cannot continue in this way.

MR LYSTER: I don't think - if you want to say in passing that you believed it may have been General Malan, because

MR LYSTER: /he was the

MR LYSTER: 4B he was the holder of a security portfolio, I think just leave it at that.  We can't - I agree with Mr Maritz that one can't start taking that much further, because it simply is just speculation.

WITNESS:   All right.

MR LYSTER: Although it may be correct or it may be incorrect.

WITNESS:   I will leave it at that with the further piece of information that either that morning or the day before Minister Malan was briefed with a substantial report dated 19th December 1985, dealing with support to Minister Buthelezi.  I say it's very likely that Malan played a role in that meeting.