Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MR GOOSEN: I accept that a climate may be there but would you not accept 
that political leadership, I mean we are dealing here now with State Security 
policy and for that reason not concentrating on organs of the State and the 
people that were involved in that, but that politicians, senior leadership of the 
security forces sustained a particular climate, a climate which rendered it 
reasonable for members of the security forces to act unlawfully, including the 
killing of political opponents of the State in certain circumstances.

MR MEYER: I would be hesitant to make any specific deduction in that 
regard.  I want to again emphasise what I have stated there in paragraph 2 that 
I am not aware of any specific such situation and that it definitely didn't 
happen in these organs of State.  What happened of course amongst 
individuals and what happened in line function departments I can't witness 
for.

MR GOOSEN: But we are talking about the creation of a framework, a policy 
framework, an approach to the resolution of the problem and that that included 
statements and policies which when interpreted by the people who were 
required to implement those policies and reasonably interpreted that they 
could establish their authorisation for unlawful actions.  In those 
circumstances do you not accept that political responsibility would have to 
attach?

MR MEYER: I am trying to put forward a framework here within which, well 
for which I am trying to be helpful in trying to find a way forward because 
truly these questions come up on an on-going basis.  I mean just this morning 
one heard them but I can imagine that the Commission itself is on an on-going 
basis confronted with these questions and I am trying to put forward a 
framework that hopefully can be helpful in analysing the situation, but I don't 
have the detailed information available to make conclusions of that and 
therefore I think one has to, if this kind of framework is being adopted one 
will have to go to the details and ascertain.  And it's also for that reason under 
bullet 2 that I suggest it remains a grey area and I don't think it's possible to 
make a single conclusion on that.

MR GOOSEN: I too am trying to deal at the level of the framework because I 
think that that's where we are.  What I am trying to establish is whether in the 
framework that you are putting forward you accept that the policies, the full 
ambit of counter-revolutionary policies and approaches adopted by the State 
Security Council, the Cabinet, whether that framework reasonably interpreted 
by an operative on the ground could be interpreted to mean that that person 
has authorisation to commit unlawful acts on behalf of the security forces?

MR MEYER: Well I guess that is where the concept of an implied mandate 
can come in, and it's for that reason that I am suggesting that there is a moral 
responsibility.  But to the extent of which there is such a possibility I can't 
judge because that is not within the framework of my knowledge.

MR GOOSEN: Perhaps just to put the question in this way maybe we can 
deal with it then conceptually.  In your view how could a person, or is it 
possible that a person could have reasonably interpreted and acted bona fide 
in that interpretation, in killing a political opponent?  
 And is it possible for you to give an example in which you would 
regard such action as a reasonable interpretation of events or a bona fide 
action on the part of the member of the security forces?

MR MEYER: I can't think of a good example, it's not one that I would have 
reached that conclusion on before but in relation to what has been testified, 
and this is not necessarily in a political context, but in a relationship between 
the official concerned and his minor, is what became clear through the Ribeiro 
case.  But I don't have other examples that I can think of immediately.

MR GOOSEN: On that basis then, I mean we can, I don't particularly want to 
do it, but we can run through a number of instances that we now know were - 
involved the killing of political opponents of the former government and we 
can list many of those and we can ask whether in each one of those instances 
you would regard that as possibly a reasonable interpretation of State policy 
in that regard, but we can leave that aside for the moment.   The question 
then is if, if it is possible in the schema that there could have been a 
reasonable interpretation which permitted the commission of an unlawful act, 
is it not then necessary that political responsibility should be accepted not 
only on the basis of omission but on the basis of commission, the creation of 
circumstances in which operatives on the ground could reasonably interpret 
policy to authorise the unlawful killing of a political opponent?

MR MEYER: I won't necessarily come to that conclusion because I believe 
there is testimony before the Commission from at least some of those that 
were politically responsible that would definitely indicate that they have not 
given such instructions or that if it was implied that they have given such 
instructions on the basis of a commission, then it's not a correct version, it's 
not the truth.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Meyer I am not talking here about commission in respect 
of a specific instance, I am talking about commission on the part of members 
of participants in organs of State such as the State Security Council and 
Cabinet, commission, collective commission of the creation of a climate in 
which it was reasonable for a security force member to kill a political 
opponent.

MR MEYER: I don't think one can say that it would have gone beyond the 
possibility of what I have been stating there in bullet two, I don't think so.

MR GOOSEN: So do I understand that you say you would not agree that 
political responsibility should be assumed then on the basis that a set of 
circumstances were created by the State Security Council in which operatives 
could act unlawfully?

MR MEYER: As far as the State Security Council is concerned, as far as my 
knowledge is concerned, definitely not.

MR GOOSEN: Would the same apply in respect of statements made, 
positions adopted by politicians serving in the State Security Council or in the 
Cabinet in respect of what needs to be done in order to combat the 
revolutionary onslaught?

MR MEYER: Again I don't have knowledge of that kind whatsoever.

MR GOOSEN: I think you would agree that you served in a senior position 
on the State Security Council from 1986, as a member of the State Security 
Council, you certainly were party to discussions which occurred at that level.  
You also were as a serving politician in the country at the time must surely be 
aware of a significant number of statements in which politicians made it very 
clear, very clear that a revolutionary onslaught and revolutionaries in 
particular had to be combated with all means at the disposal of the State, and 
that every possible effort should be made to crush the revolutionary onslaught, 
not so?

MR MEYER: Well I think it's like Pik Botha was saying yesterday, I've read 
through his testimony and I guess it's like he has indicated in that, that there 
were probably statements of a general political nature that might have created 
different impressions but it all depends on how people who have received 
those messages have interpreted it within the scope of their authority.

MR GOOSEN: That's precisely the point.  I mean the fact of the matter is we 
know from a whole spate of amnesty applications that they were in fact 
interpreted to authorise killings.  What I am asking you is if you can comment 
as to whether you regard that as reasonable interpretation?  If you do regard it 
as a reasonable interpretation should you not accept political responsibility 
for that?