Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-18

MS GOBODO-MADIKIZELA: Thank you Chairperson.  Roelf Meyer, I would like to refer my comments to you.  You, in your submission, you make reference to the fact that all parties were involved in the negotiations and you frame your debate in a particular way which reflects a specific perspective suggesting that putting the blame of responsibility on the shoulders of the ANC and suggesting that the ANC should have trusted Gqozo's commitment to the process of negotiation.  I think that perspective ignores an important context which is that within the Ciskei itself there was a lot of heavy anti ANC culture which was reinforced, seems to have been EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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reinforced by the visible presence of the South African 
Defence Force secondments within the management of the Ciskean Government.  So I think that is a very important context to remember even though all these parties were involved in negotiations and the ANC should have, theoretically, trusted the commitments by that process and by Gqozo especially.  But what was happening on the ground, there were state of emergencies, there was a very anti-ANC culture, so those factors should also be considered, I think.
 The second comment I'd like to make is around your submission that the South African Government, the then South African Government made every effort to ensure a peaceful and free exercise of political rights in the Ciskei.  I am wondering whether the ideas, your ideas to achieve that peaceful and free expression of political rights was then reinforced or not by bringing on board of people like Major General Victor who used to be the head of the ANC/PAC desk in the headquarters, security branch headquarters, who was also in charge of Vlakplaas activity according to the dossier that we have of him, and in fact Dirk Coetzee who is supposed to have reportedly told by the dossier that Dirk Coetzee reported to Victor, now Victor was the Commissioner of Police at the time in Ciskei and he was seconded by the South African Government, I am wondering if those strategies, you know bringing somebody with that kind of background to the Ciskei whether that in fact assists your ideas, would have assisted your ideas of ensuring peaceful and free expression of political will within the Ciskei?  I am just wondering what the relationship between bringing a person with that kind of background, with the Vlakplaas 
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background like Victor to that situation in Ciskei, whether 
it helped in fact bring about peaceful change or whether in fact it achieved the opposite.  And what the South African Government's role in bringing that kind of mentality within the governance of Ciskei was.  Those are the comments that I would like to make.  
 The final comment is about your submission and how in fact it seems that the South African Government at the time remains blameless, totally blameless, and it's either the Ciskei Defence Force or the Ciskei Police or the ANC.  One of the documents that we have makes reference to the involvement of the South African Embassy in the planning of the deployment of forces around the march.  And generally the involvement of the South African Embassy in appointing former South African Defence personnel to the Ciskei to manage departments like Finance, the Army, the Police.  And I am really wondering what exactly was the role of the South African Government in maintaining a certain kind of mindsets within the Ciskean government and in fact in encouraging the anti-ANC thinking, or even in encouraging a certain kind of management of policing within the Ciskei.

MR MEYER: Thank you Chairperson, thank you Commissioner for the comments.  Maybe Mr Kriel would like to respond to your second comment in regard to the specific gentleman that you have referred to.  Can I say....(tape ends) ... the right to organise the march.  I think there's sufficient proof of the fact, through our submission now, but also through what Mr Pik Botha has early on testified before the Commission, namely that both on the 4th of August and again on the 7th of September the then South African Government, definitely, was not against the taking place of such a march EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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and the demonstration, and that it was a sort-of ongoing type of event at that stage.  I can recall that between June and September of 1992 many such demonstrations actually took place right through the country because it was quite clear that the ANC wanted to make a point very clear to the nation as a whole at that stage, through demonstrations, and in support of their demands to get negotiations going again.  And what we are actually saying is that by the time of this tragedy on the 7th of September we were in fact very close to come to agreement on the Record of Understanding and that it was practically not necessary for the ANC actually to proceed with the demonstration at that stage because the point, so to speak, was already made and that we were on the conclusion, almost, of the Record of Understanding.  
 So, yes, the ANC had the right, no doubt about that, to organise the march and one might even say that the reason why they selected Bisho as the venue for that demonstration, one can also, from the perspective, if one has to be objective, understand.  But on the other hand, as Mr Radue has clearly indicated the way in which it was conducted that led to the shooting was quite clearly going too far and that was the problem that we believe the Goldstone Commission has already concluded on.  
 That is why we are saying in our submission it is not for us now, in any event a person like myself was not present, and one can only judge from the facts that were presented to, for instance, the Goldstone Commission.  And we believe, on the facts that were presented to the Commission, right then, during the month of September 1992, because the Goldstone Commission report was actually delivered before the end of that month, so the facts were 
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very clear in everybody's mind at that stage, and on the basis of those facts the Goldstone Commission came to certain conclusions and we are saying maybe that would be the best to stick to those findings and take that as the acceptable factual basis to come to any conclusions.
 On the last comment the question of responsibility, it would be difficult for me to actually respond to that, maybe Mr Pik Botha might have been in a better position to respond on behalf of his department, the then Department of Foreign Affairs.  But I think what became clear from the evidence presented to the Goldstone Commission as well as the information available to us, that the then mission of the South African Government under Ambassador Goosen, actually tried to do its level best to find a way forward as far as peaceful handling of the situation was concerned.  I have no evidence available to me that indicates that there was actually any form of cooperation to assist and support the Ciskean Government in what they have done finally on that particular day in planning for that and whatever, but of course I have to speak in terms of information available to me and therefore it would be difficult to respond specifically to any other alleged information.