Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-10-14

MR R F BOTHA: Thank you, thank you Sir.  Then the second series of questions which the TRC forwarded to me was on Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.  In the first instance the questions centred around military assistance in 1979.  Mr Chairperson I am not aware of any decision of the State Security Council to interfere militarily in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in 1979 or subsequently until their independence in the sense that we would send troops to participate in the conflict.
 It was known at that time that the South African government assisted the Rhodesian government for a long time in many ways.  My department and I were fully occupied with efforts to bring together the warring factions in Rhodesia for discussions on a settlement of the conflict.  
 My best witness, Mr Chairperson, as to the role we played is Mr Ian Smith himself, who recently published his memoirs and made no secret what he thought of my efforts.  The discussions in the Security Council concerning the Rhodesian situation emanated from a realisation that the Rhodesian forces were losing the fight and that we should concentrate on strategies to put pressure on Mozambique to curtail its support for ZANLA guerrillas.  
 I believe it might be of assistance to the Commission if I briefly describe the South African position, vis a vis the Rhodesia conflict as from 1975 onwards, but as it is documented, it is there, I appeal to the Commission to read it, I know you have a lot of reading matter.  I would skip then that page 16.
 I then come to the point which really matters - you will see there how the British government approached us and that the only troops we had were a unit stationed at Beitbridge.  The British government was fully aware of it.  When Lord Soames arrived here towards the end of '79 he was aware of it, but Mr Mugabe complained bitterly about it and said he would pull out of the cease-fire if our troops remained at Beitbridge.  Government's point of view was Beitbridge was an important link to the north and unless the British government would substitute our troops with British troops this important link to the north might be jeopardised.  
 The British government then came back and said no, the combined Rhodesian forces would be able to replace our troops and we then withdrew our troops or indicated we would, but then the British government came and asked us for quite a number of mine-resistant vehicles, helicopters and other equipment.  Then we said to them, yes, we would consider it if the British government can guarantee us that we have an inalienable right to take them back.  After a while they agreed to that.  
 So our equipment went there, the elections went well and this meeting to which the documentation refers Mr Chairperson, took place a few days before the Zimbabwe elections.  And I can assure the Commission here today, I am already here with B, on the elimination of political figures, when I say this, and I will just read it to you to refresh your memory.  This was in the agenda of the State Security Council at the meeting of 18 February 1980.  Elections in Rhodesia took place 27, 28, 29 February.  I am not aware of any programme of the South African Government to eliminate in the sense of killing any Rhodesia leader. 
 The relevant recommendation of the State Security Council, a meeting of 18 February is unfortunately susceptible, I admit to such an interpretation.  It reads -
"The implication of elimination of political figures in Rhodesia must constantly be borne in mind and it's accepted that it's pointed out that the botched attempts to assassinate Mugabe was busy making a martyr of him, and after another attempt he became a hero".
Let me explain.  The discussion which took place on 18 February, nine days before the election in Zimbabwe, all the other recommendations, as you will notice Mr Chairperson, clearly indicate the tenor of the discussion in the State Security Council which was to the effect that nothing should be done which would upset the course of peaceful democratic elections.  Remember the British Governor was there; the British Intelligence Service was there; the American Intelligence Service was there, they might deny it, and I believe the Soviet Intelligence Service was there, and the French one and the German one, and even if you had no sense of proper conduct it would simply have been foolish for the South African government at that stage to try and upset the events there.  
 I can assure you that what happened there was, I think either Dr Neil Barnard or one of the Security personnel reported that elements in Rhodesia were endeavouring to kill Mr Mugabe, and what we then reacted to was, said look, tell those people they are playing with fire, it's in no-one's interest, least of all ours and if they carry on like this and succeed in killing him he will then become a hero and a martyr.  That is, I guarantee you what happened that day in that discussion.
 As regards the operations in Matabeleland I, in my document, took some trouble to indicate to the Commission how the era of - I call it the "era of charges and counter-charges" set in.  Immediately after the elections in Rhodesia, end of February, Mr Mugabe made realistic, rational and reasonable statements, from our point of view, there's always another side, but from our point of view, and I gave a very positive report to the Cabinet on the future outlook of our relations with Zimbabwe.  
 But then as so often happens things happened which we in Foreign Affairs, never, never thought of, and this was one of those events, the killing on 18 August 1982, was a question put to me by the TRC on this issue, in which three members of the South African Defence Force were killed, and that Mr Chairperson brought the deteriorating relations between us and Zimbabwe almost to the boiling point.  
 The Department of Foreign Affairs and I learned of the killing of the three South African troops in Zimbabwe when Mr Mugabe made an announcement to that effect on 21 August 1982.  My Director General obtained as much information as he could about the incident from our Trade Representative in Harare and then we sent a letter to the Chief of the Defence Force in which we told him look, we have now heard this has happened and this is going to be very bad for South Africa, we told him, it is quoted there, you can read it, in which we say -
"This incident will give renewed impetus to Mr Mugabe's constant allegations that South Africa is responsible for the sabotage attempts in Zimbabwe in the past two years.  The Trade Representative is of the opinion that any hope or progress in bilateral relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe has now been defeated and that even if it could be proved that the incident took place in Mozambique the damage has already been done.
 He is further of the opinion that South Africa's credibility has been further damaged by this incident and that attempts to reopen channels of communication with the Zimbabwean Government will be made very difficult by this".
 And then we asked -
"Please inform us, what is your information?"
And on 26 or 27 August General Constand Viljoen who was then the Chief of the South African Defence Force reacted to the press conference and admitted that the three men killed in Zimbabwe were troops of the Defence Force who went on an unauthorised mission to free political detainees.  
 And then General Viljoen, here it is, gives a whole explanation that - I think the man in charge was saying to the others it was a patrol, a unit of 17 men, three white, fourteen black, but many of them formerly served in the Rhodesian forces and this is what made it bad.  It doesn't matter what we say, it might be quite correct that they were genuinely recruited, signed up in our Defence Force, but if you kill a troop dressed in a foreign uniform on your territory and on top of it you discover that that troop was formerly in your service, then Mr Chairperson, listen there is no way - we have not yet discovered people how to - to persuade people to believe that easily.  So I do not know what the truth is.
 But the other question that was put to me concerned then the return of their bodies.  That was also a question put to me by the TRC and I thank the TRC for doing that, because I think you've opened up a matter that has never been resolved and might perhaps in the present atmosphere of better and good relations between the present government and the Zimbabwe Government be taken further and in that way perhaps help the relatives and family of the people concerned to come to rest with their anxiety.  But the three persons killed were Sgt R T Beech, Sgt P D Barry and Sgt J A Wessels. And on 15 October the Defence Force wrote to us that -
"As a result of a misunderstanding the whole aspect of the repatriation of the remains has now also not taken place.  It would be appreciated if, by means of your diplomatic channels, contact can be made with the Zimbabwean Government in order to effect the repatriation of the remains of these Defence Force members".
We forwarded the request to the Zimbabwean authorities, received no reaction.
 And then Mr Chairperson, the records available to me do not disclose what transpired for the next years after these attempts to have the remains of the three soldiers returned to South Africa.  I assumed that the relatives of the men continued with their efforts to have the remains returned to South Africa, but without success.  But I did find a record that in February 1988 the parents of Sergeant Robert Beech approached the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist Sergeant Beech's parents who refused to accept that he was dead.  The hope that he might be alive somehow, somewhere, lingered on in their hearts.
 The International Committee of the Red Cross approached the Zimbabwean Government in the matter and the Red Cross reported to us on 7 February '89 as follows:
"Following one official written representation to the Zimbabwe Government and three reminders over the past seven months, it has to be assumed that the matter will not be given any attention".
 Then on the internal conflict inside Zimbabwe, that question concerning a recommendation of the State Security Council, "to keep the pot at boiling point" - I am giving the facts of how the internal tension inside Zimbabwe, Mr Chairperson with respect, between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU.  It means between Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, our, with respect, it didn't really need much outside encouragement for that pot to boil, it was boiling.  I don't want to dwell too long on this here today and give the impression that we are now you know dishing up Zimbabwe's past here, but with respect, if you read the records, the newspaper reports, there was internal turmoil and turbulence inside, and I suppose in that background it suited the South African government.  The attitude being well at least there is this internal trouble for them so it suits us and "let us keep the pot boiling", "let us keep the pot boiling".  I think that is what that sentence meant, no more, no less.
 Mr Chairperson towards the end of 1981 it was clear to me that the prospects of improving relations with Zimbabwe were bleak.  The chances were better to pursue a solution to the Namibian issue within the framework of UN Security Council resolution no.435.  The Cuban presence in Angola, as I saw it then, was a matter of great distress to the USA.  There was a possibility that the solution could be negotiated on a balance of interest between opposing forces on the basis of Namibia's independence and Cuban withdrawal from Angola.  Mozambique also offered an opportunity to negotiate a better relationship despite the heavy obstacle posed by our assistance to Renamo.  
 Progress in the work involved in these objectives, however, was often hampered and on occasion almost brought to a standstill by preposterous events which I could not even accommodate within the ambit of my worst fears.  One such an event was the attempt to overthrow the Seychelles Government in November 1981.
 Early on the morning of 26 November 1981, and of course I am dealing here now with the response to TRC questions, early during that morning I was woken by a telephone call from the late Mr Louis le Grange, who was then the Minister of Law and Order, it was still dark.  He told me that an Air India aircraft had been hijacked in the Seychelles and that the aircraft had been ordered by the hijackers to land at Durban.  He thought that I would not mind being informed of the event so early in the morning as I would no doubt wish to prepare myself and my department for the expected international reaction.  
 I immediately asked him who the hijackers were.  He said he did not know, but it was possible that at least some of them were South Africans.  I asked him why on earth South Africans would hijack an aircraft in the Seychelles.  He said he did not know.  He was relaying to me information from the South African Police which came from the Air Control officials at either Johannesburg or Durban airport.  At that stage I could not recall, Mr Chairperson, any event which stunned and jolted me more than the news conveyed to me by my colleague.  
 As he was talking a gut feeling took hold of me that there could only be one reason for hijackers to want the aircraft to land at Durban, they did something terribly wrong in the Seychelles and Durban offered them the best chance of escape or survival; that would mean South Africans were involved; and that would mean an international outcry; and that would mean the heat was on again on Foreign Affairs.
 I responded to my colleague in a way in which he considered somewhat insulting.  I told him that this "bugger-up" would once and for all establish South Africa as the haven for terrorists and pirates.  A day or two later when the matter was discussed with the Prime Minister in Cape Town, immediately before a Cabinet meeting, I was then in Pretoria, the Prime Minister severely castigated me in the presence of my colleagues for my disgraceful behaviour towards a Cabinet colleague who was merely conveying to me news about the hijacked aircraft.  
 After the meeting and before the commencement of the Cabinet meeting I asked the Prime Minister whether, in the light of his remarks about my behaviour he would excuse me from attending the Cabinet meeting.  His reaction was that if he wanted to fire me he would say so in clear, unambiguous terms, as he did not say so I should pull myself together like a man and carry on with my work.
 I attended the Cabinet meeting.  I assure you Mr Chairperson that the Seychelles coup was neither discussed nor approved by the South African Cabinet or the State Security Council.  I then give you a very useful summary of the Attorney General of Natal, Advocate Reises(?), a summary of the basic facts.
 Needless to say the incident created an international uproar resulting in extremely negative media reports all over the world.  The UN Security Council appointed a commission of inquiry into the Seychelles coup.  Generally there was a strong suspicion throughout the world that the South African government was involved in the coup in some way or another.  In its report to the Security Council in June 1982 the Commission of Inquiry indicated that it had no concrete evidence that the South African authorities were implicated in the affair, however, it expressed the view that there was a strong presumption that the authorities were at least aware of the preparations.  
 It is possible that the matter would have been left at that, ironically, were it not for the evidence given by Colonel Hoare, it was a gentleman called Mike Hoare, shortly before the Security Council examined the Commission's report, to the effect that he, that is now this Colonel, had received assistance from the Department of Defence.  In the event the Security Council decided to prolong the mandate of the Commission for submission to the Council by 15 August.  So more problems for us.  The mercenaries were found guilty on 27 July '82.
 The supplementary report of the UN Commission of Inquiry was submitted to the Security Council towards the end of November.  I am giving you the extracts from the reports findings and conclusions which were of relevance to South Africa and I won't read all of them, I will just read 78 -
"The Commission wishes to draw attention to the following which it considers as clearly established regarding South African involvement
A. The arms, ammunition and other equipment were supplied by South African Defence Force personnel;
 B. An army officer participated in preliminary discussions;
 C. The government was generally aware of attempts by Seychelles exiles seeking support for attempts to overthrow the Government of Seychelles;
 D. The National Intelligence Service was aware of Hoare's plans (that's Mike Hoare's plans), from the inception;
 E. Members of the 2nd Reconnaissance Commando and a lead unit took part in the operation.
 79. The Commission notes that while admitting certain facts the Prime Minister of South Africa in his statement of 29 July '82 said that neither the South African Government, the Cabinet nor the State Security Council were aware of the coup.  
 In the light of the facts as set out above the Commission must conclude that if responsible Ministers were not at least aware of what was going on this indicates both a remarkable lack of control by the South African Government over its own agencies and a lack of awareness that is hard to reconcile with the tight and effective control exercised by the security authorities in South Africa to which the Commission referred in its first report".
 And then the Commission's recommendations, there was only really one that affected us, not really a tough one, it said -
"In the light of the conclusions it has reached on this issue the Commission considers that South Africa has a particular obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure that mercenary operations are not launched from its territory".
 The point I want to make Mr Chairperson is, although the South African Government came off fairly lightly in the UN Security Council immense damage was done to the country internationally.  
 I was not, as regards the other questions of the TRC, I was not directly involved in the negotiations which led to the release of the six participants who were captured in the Seychelles operation but I strongly supported the idea of obtaining their release.  I wanted to normalise relations with Seychelles again.  I succeeded in doing it later when I personally, when I was personally received by President Rene.  
 But at that stage my recollection is that the National Intelligence Service and/or Defence Force, I cannot say which, were certainly involved in the attempts to obtain their release.  I can remember that an amount was paid, yes, an amount was paid, but I can't tell you what the amount.  The figure in my memory and I speak please under correction, is between three and six million dollars, but I stand to be corrected.  It was not really my task Mr Chairperson.  
 I've been asked whether I knew what the reasons were for the State Security Council at its meeting of 20 December '82 accepting the recommendations submitted by Mr F W de Klerk that the foreigners released are acquitted after the trial not be deported.  I vaguely remember, I remember the discussion but only vaguely, and I remember an argument was put forward to the effect that the persons concerned stood trial in South Africa, if they were acquitted further action then, in addition to the court action against them would be unfair and would amount to punishment meted out by the government.  But I suggest, Mr President, that Mr de Klerk be asked to furnish you with that information.
 Now I am at the subject, Assistance to Renamo, and I am giving here full details of my efforts to conclude the Nkomati Accord, which I considered, with respect, as one of the great events in my career. The signing of that accord on 16 March 1984 reverberated throughout the world and was acclaimed by all the governments that count in the world, including the Soviet Union's government and President Reagan, and Margaret Thatcher, and our African governments, all of them.  The surest indication to me that it was a major success was that the other day an ANC friend of mine said, you know Pik we considered that as one of the greatest setbacks, and that was to me one of the greatest achievements.  It was not aimed at the ANC of course, I wanted the turmoil to end.  I give you the facts there in the document that you have.  
 I explain to you about my meetings with President Samora Machel whom I often met.  Often we had very long meetings and I will deal with that in the book I'm going to write Mr Chairperson, but on 16 September '85 President Machel informed me of a raid that his troops made in the area of Gorongoza and there they captured a diary, a diary kept by Mr Was, a secretary of Mr Dhlakama(?) who was the leader of Renamo, and the President then arranged for me to meet with his Ministers that same day.   
 I telephoned from Maputo that day the office of President Botha and asked for an appointment that very evening because I could see here was really big trouble coming, because the entries in that diary, if they were to be believed, and on what basis could you not believe, then it was bad stuff.  
 The entries in the diary in short - I can furnish all that information if it's required, but some of them are here, indicated that the Air Force undertook regular flights into Mozambique and delivered equipment and that this was done, apparently, also on the instructions of General Constand Viljoen and some of his officers.  
 The part that personally affected me Mr Chairperson was some rather derogatory remarks about me in the diary attributable to General Viljoen and his senior officers.  It was not very pleasant to read how fellow South Africans talk about you in Mozambique to the henchmen of Dhlakama.   But let's leave that, maybe Dr Viljoen or General Viljoen, he might get a doctor's degree soon or have one, can explain that position better than I can.   As far as I am concerned I phoned, I met the President that evening and present was the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force.  The President at first said to me look that book is a fake.  I said no, no go, it's not a fake, you can't fake a book like that, you can't fake a diary, not like that, because there are too many things that are true, too many things that are true and to which the man Was could not have been privy to.  And then I asked for a Commission of Inquiry.  The President said no, we can have a committee not a commission, and due to the fact that I promised President Samora Machel that I would be back in days to his Ministers, he was going on an overseas trip but he wanted me to meet his Ministers soon, we then agreed to appoint General Rogers who later I think became a colleague of some of the members of your present Commission here, and - an excellent man and then a Dr Gilleland, a Dr J Gilleland, I think he died about a year ago, but Dr Gilleland was, although he was Director General of one of the Houses of Parliament was also a civil aviation expert.  They brought out a report Mr President, within a day, day and a half.  
 I arranged a meeting a Komatipoort on 19 May with a senior delegation from Mozambique.  I gave them the report of our committee.  I took with me Dr Gilleland who at length explained to them, and was ready to reply to their questions. I also then made use of the occasion to give them particulars of the presence of ANC activists and operatives in Maputo, in Mozambique who operated from Mozambique into South Africa.  The Mozambique delegation thanked me for those particulars indicating that for the first time they have now received firm, firm - hard facts, they would go into that, etc.  
 As regards Mr Nel's position may I just say that he was never a member of the State Security Council.  The Act establishing the State Security Council did not provide for the appointment of deputy ministers, but he was asked by Mr P W Botha to attend the meetings so that he could be kept fully informed of policy, of decisions as he was responsible for the information office.  And as regards his unauthorised visit to Gorongoza when I asked him at that time why did you do it, his answer was that he knew I would have disapproved.  So he was honest.  
 And on top of it he then said to me but look Mr Minister you asked me, because the Soviet Union approached us about two Russians that had disappeared in the bush, and I said to Louis Nel, look try to get to Dhlakama because maybe they are holding these Russians, but then when you get to the Russians please take with you a newspaper with the date on so that the two Russians hold the newspaper and then we photograph them with the newspaper, because that would then prove to the Russians that we really saw their men.  And he said to me, Pik how did you expect me to be photographed with two Russians holding a South African newspaper without going to Dhlakama.  So I said but Louis I did not authorise you to go behind my back in a military aircraft under those circumstances, and that he admitted.
 Mr President, the part I am getting to now is of great importance, that is the last part.  Sir, respectfully, if you would think that we rather take a break now I would appreciate it, but if you decide differently I am ready to go ahead.