Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-16

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Steyn, could I just ask you this, once again with regard to what we said earlier, there is no doubt that there was a tremendous level of pressure, you have referred to the politicians' statements.  Did you understand the political statements of that time, as the expectations of politicians that they had of you, to eliminate people?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: It was the answer to the pressure.  I understood that we had to combat the struggle at all costs.

MR MALAN: You see, it is quite a comprehensive term this term at all cost, because in the first place, that would be in the framework of your capacity and your mandate?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: So then, what else would this at all costs phrase include within this context?  I think that we should just have understanding of this.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: It may be the incorrect choice of words, but ultimately we had to do everything.  To put it briefly, we could not allow that another dispensation be established here by a revolutionary takeover.  And we Mr Chairperson, and myself, were indoctrinated in the sense that we felt and I heard Mr Vlok testify earlier where he said the following.  We created a climate, we created a situation in which the Security Forces and especially the Security Branch of the police, did these things.
	And Mr Vlok said a terrorist in the hands of a Security Branch, was not far from an action that fell within the parameters of the normal police activities.

MR VISSER: And he also said, is it not true, that in these circumstances, members of the police acted and believed that they were even authorised or that it was expected of them to act illegally?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is true.

MR MALAN: I am sorry, you are asking a general question.  It is true that he said it, but I would just like to come back to you.  Did you expect that it was expected from you to act illegally?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: In certain instances, I believe it was the case, yes.

MR MALAN: And you believed that it was expected from you to eliminate people by killing them?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, by implication.

MR MALAN: Or with abductions and murders?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is true.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, I have received an indication from the Committee for which we are thankful Mr Chairman, that we can go a lot quicker and that we need not repeat the evidence already given.
	We will therefore confine ourselves to a larger extent Mr Chairman, to that which is new.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in that regard too Mr Visser, it would be sufficient if the applicants merely confirm the contents of their application, they need not repeat it.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless there are specific points that you want them to enlarge on.

MR VISSER: We are indebted to you Mr Chairman, and it certainly will contribute to us going a lot quicker.  Mr Steyn, we were at the point concerning the pressure.  You talked about the politicians.
	Is it not true that there was pressure from the police structures and security structures that existed during the struggle, that they also put pressure on you?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.  We received, continually received instructions from Head Office to face this onslaught and together with the management structures and security structures, where the main theme was these acts of terror or the terrorism.

MR VISSER: On page 41 you referred to the evidence of Gen Johan van der Merwe, whose evidence you asked to be incorporated in your evidence.
	It is from page 127 of volume 2.  You refer there to attacks on police, on page 41 and you confirm the contents of page 41, 42, statements made by the ANC that connects with what Mr Botha gave you on page 43, 44, 45, 46 up until page 47, the second last paragraph, is that correct?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the reference at page 45 to the Exhibit which is referred to as JAS3 in the second paragraph, refers to page 412 of volume 2.  My Attorney tells me it is volume 3 now with the renumbering.  I am sorry, it is then volume 3, page 412.  The next paragraph refers to a JAS4, which is page 413 - page 418 of volume 3 and in the next paragraph MK in Combat, JAS5 refers to volume 3, page 405, Mr Chairman.
	According to yourself, I have just checked Mr Chairman, it is volume 3, my Attorney is correct, Attorneys are always correct it seems.  With the elimination of Ndwandwe, in your opinion, was there any effect with regards to the Durban area?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson, there was acts of terror, it lessened.

MR VISSER: In other words it worked?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 47 of volume 2, you also go to Pumeso.  You already dealt with that and you also dealt with the kwaMashu 3.
	Mr Steyn, you told me that you would like to say something or get it off your chest about your situation and the Security Branch members and what the situation was in this political struggle.  Would you like to tell us about this?  You said that you were sorry.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I would like to say that a person is sorry that these things happened,  but what I would like to say is I am sorry that the government of the day, of that time, the National Party did not have the vision to solve the problems in the country by political means.
	I am furthermore sorry that because of this, the revolutionary onslaught was increased, continued, during which time a lot of people were injured and killed and property was damaged.  The emphasis of what I would like to say, I am sorry about these two aspects that I have just mentioned, that the South African Police and then especially the Security Branch was caught between these two poles.
	We indeed stood between the government on the one side, and the revolutionary onslaught on the other side.  While we were caught up in this, this problem situation, we committed certain acts that I believe under normal circumstances, would not have realised.
	I think we were placed in a position where we ultimately broke the law.

MR VISSER: You confirm then in conclusion paragraph 19(a) and (b) of form 1 of your application, where it has something to do with you?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Christo Nel, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Prior, Evidence Leader.  General Steyn, if you could look at Exhibit H, the first page, do you accept that with the additions of what Botha told us that Raymond Lala was involved as the link between the internal and external and there was a fellow, a chap, Chappies Morabe, do you agree in broad outline that the structure of Operation Butterfly was as is depicted on the first page?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I would say as far as it was explained by Mr Botha, because he knew the finer details of this.  I was not well informed about the finer details.

ADV PRIOR: Now, but you were the Officer Commanding of Port Natal, the Security Branch, is that correct?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And would you not by virtue of that position have been up to speed with the events taking place within the area of your jurisdiction or are you saying that men under your command like Botha, were able to keep information away from your ears?

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: No, he would not withhold any information.

ADV PRIOR: All right, you knew then when Operation Butterfly had been penetrated that the Commanders were Thami Zulu and Ralph Lawrence, also known as Fear, you knew that?