Amnesty Hearings — Kimberley — 1997-10-28

SISI KHAMPEPE: Would you not have owned up to that action if it had been committed after hours - to make sure that it didn't lose any political meaning?

LAURENS MBATHA: At that stage, as I've said Madam, that because of the incidences, that element of uncertainty - I'm sorry to go back to it, for reasons that I felt best - security.  Normally with an action of that nature you keep it and you file it up.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Now, you've valued it to the brutal action that was being perpetrated by the Bophuthatswana Government against ANC members, what in fact did the Bophuthatswana Government do to your membership?

LAURENS MBATHA: We had actually members - Madam, I must start in the ...[indistinct] area, it was an area at that time when I started preparing my structures, those members were picked up, severely tortured, kept in cells.  I can refer to one old man from the very same area who can relate his own personal experience, who went through a terrible torture - sharing his experience with me.
	Hence as a result when you have gone through their hands, that was the point at the time of all the comrades who were tortured by the security branches of Bophuthatswana that they don't like to go through that experience again.  That was the type of situation in the area, the element of fear.  I had a contact member in the ...[indistinct] area Madam, who also basically because of my visits in the area  because at that time it was the restructure - the structures there, the member also subjected to interrogation, picked up.  Marches actually Madam, like I'm referring to, were stopped, you could not hold those marches.  
	And in terms of their torture system Madam, if I might openly say it, they were really good at it because all those people who have gone through it ...[intervention]

SISI KHAMPEPE: But that was precisely the reason why a march was organised, isn't it?

LAURENS MBATHA: Yes, Madam.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Didn't you think that the marches organised would achieve the same purpose that you ultimately found it necessary to launch a grenade attack?

LAURENS MBATHA: Madam, at that time the adamant approach of the Government which remained clear - that it was there to stay and not to move because of the nature of torture that I've just referred to, is the one actually which influenced me - not excluding the role the march would have played, that the nature of this initiative that I took would serve the purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we should go back to Mr Visser now.  Unless you seek to disillusion us, we are of the view that as matters stand you have not brought your clients within a position where they would be entitled to cross-examine the witness bearing in mind the fact that you are representing a certain Mr so and so and so and not representing the police.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to re-examine Mr Tsholanku?

MR TSHOLANKU: Only on a few points Mr Chairman.   Mr Mbatha, a question was asked by Advocate de Jager pertaining to the ultimate reaction of the ANC to this particular incident
 (1)  Whether were they aware of this - at a later stage made aware by yourself? 
(2)  Did they associate themselves with this either by retrospectively condoning it and you then alluded to submissions that they made 
pertaining to particular actions by their commanders and that commanders would then allude to those acts.  Now, you then mentioned a document that is here present, can you safely say that the document you're referring to is this green book that is in front of me?

LAURENS MBATHA: Yes, Sir.

MR TSHOLANKU: Mr Chairman, I don't if the Committee would allow me to read the particular submission in this particular green book pertaining to the response of the ANC insofar as it relates to this particular response that was afforded to Advocate de Jager or would you like the applicant himself to read the particular response?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what is that book about?

MR TSHOLANKU: These are submissions and responses by the ANC to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.  The reason why - if I understood the response of the applicant, the reason why he alluded to these submissions - it was after a question was asked whether retrospectively so or any point in time the ANC associated itself to this particular blast, whether impliedly or explicitly.
	And he then in response said the ANC has come out to say there are acts that they are not aware of to which each and every commander that is aware or that is involved in that particular act, will then shed further light and that they impliedly associated themselves with those if those were committed by members of MK.  I'm inclined to believe that that information is necessary pertaining to what seemed to be a ...[indistinct] issue when it comes to the ANC accepting responsibility for this particular act, either impliedly or explicitly.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that that document constitutes submissions made by the ANC to the TRC?

MR TSHOLANKU: Yes, the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.

CHAIRPERSON: I see, well you can read it to him and ask him whether he solicits his comments or whatever - his response to that in line with the point that you want to make.

MR TSHOLANKU: As it please you Mr Chairman.   I'll read on page 70 of the ANC's second submission to the TRC, paragraph 5 - these submissions were apparently made on the 12th day of May 1997, it reads as follows Mr Chairman
"It is not possible"
Appendices, MK Operations and other Armed Actions:
"It is not possible to give a detailed account of every MK operation as requested by the TRC, we did not keep records of this nature mainly for security reasons.  More detail will forthcoming in applications for amnesty by various commanders and combatants"
	There are two lists of armed actions attached to these submissions, Appendix 4 provides information on operations carried out by members of MK, arranged chronologically and according to the nature of the target in each case.  It is drawn from reports, recollections from the MK commanders, press reports and SAIRR ...[indistinct] surveys.  There are probably omissions and some mistakes may have occurred due to incorrect reporting or a range of other reasons.
	The incidents and attacks listed in Appendix 5 fall into the grey are described above.  We are not certain that all these attacks were carried out by MK personnel or by people trained by MK personnel.  We cannot state with certainty what the objectives of these were but it is probable that many were carried out in good faith in that belief - incorrectly at times, the cadres were acting in accordance with the injunctions by the leadership to intensify the struggle at all costs and carry the struggle into wide areas.  In other cases, we strongly doubt that our cadres were responsible but do not have sufficient information to substantiate this".
Now, Major Mbatha, I have read out an extract from the submissions by the ANC and my emphasis is on this particular paragraph where it said:
"We cannot state with certainty what the objectives of these attacks were but it is probable that many were carried out in good faith in the belief - incorrectly at times, the cadres were acting in accordance with the injunctions by the leadership to intensify the struggle at all costs".
Now, you have mentioned what you referred to as your command initiative pertaining to this particular attack, can you safely say that that command initiative can be associated to this particular injunction by the leadership of the ANC that is mentioned in this particular submission?

LAURENS MBATHA: Yes, Sir.