Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 1997-11-18

UNKNOWN: Would you agree that that could have provided motivation as well for the fact that there are no survivors in this incident?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I do not see it that way.  Some people did get away.  If we look at the encoded message and what, also what I heard from the askaris, some of the people actually got away that morning.  Once again I refer to Max du Preez's television programme on Sunday nights, I cannot remember the exact date of the broadcast, because we would like to view the video and we have requested that that happen, because on one of those videos, one of the freedom fighters who got away actually said on television that the askaris were not very competent and they were actually very critical of them and they said that they were better than the askaris.  So, some of them did get away on that day.

UNKNOWN: All right, if we can look at the question of the arrest.  Now, I have dealt with that extensively yesterday.  You maintain that there was absolutely no way you could arrest people?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Now we have actually been to the scene this morning.

UNKNOWN: I am not talking about the scene, I am talking about beforehand, Mr, Captain Bellingan.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Oh, thank you.  A week elapsed between the time that Mbane gave us the evidence or the information, so we did not have their fixed addresses.  We did attempt to find them at several addresses, but we could not actually find these people beforehand.  So, there was a week between Jimmy's information and the actual incident.

UNKNOWN: You see, because in your "kripto berig", dated the fourth of March, for the benefit of the Committee, I am not sure if that is in a separate bundle.  It is a thin batch of documents headed "Secret".

CHAIRPERSON: What number is that bundle?

UNKNOWN: I think that would be B6, if I am not mistaken, Mr Chairperson, B6.

CHAIRPERSON: B6.  Should we not restrict B to photographs?

UNKNOWN: That may be a good idea, Mr Chairperson.  Let us call this C1 for the ...

MR HUGO: Wasn't Minister Vlok's statement C, sir?

UNKNOWN: If I may proceed, Mr Chairperson?
	Now, Captain Bellingan, there is a "kripto berig" from yourself and it is addressed directly to Captain, the then Captain Eugene de Kock, it is from yourself, Sergeant Bellingan, dated the fourth of March 1986.  In other words, a day after the incidence.  You will notice that in that "kripto berig" you have extremely detailed information about each particular individual deceased, about where they were trained, what they had been involved in over a period of years.  Can you explain to the Committee how it is that we should accept that you were unable to obtain information before these people were deceased, but upon their death, and in fact a day later, you are able to obtain their life history as guerrillas or as terrorists, as you would have it?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Just a second please, Chairperson.

UNKNOWN: Captain Bellingan, could you answer the question?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: This message was written by me, my name appears on it.  Lieutenant Liebenberg and I would have been jointly responsible for this kind of statement.  So, it was a joint effort between us and the security police and the information which I have here is the information which we  obtained from the askaris infiltration, from Lieutenant Liebenberg's information, so it was a joint operation as far as the information was concerned.  That is why it is so detailed.  A week before the incident I sent a message to head office in which I gave more or less the same information, which we also got from the askaris.

UNKNOWN: Yes, that is precisely my point, Captain Bellingan.  You say that yourself and Captain Liebenberg co-operated within 24 hours to obtain these individuals life histories and, yet, you could not arrest them beforehand.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: We did not have the addresses.  We did go to certain addresses, there were many, many addresses and names and we did check them out and efforts were made to arrest these people.

UNKNOWN: Captain Bellingan, would you not agree that the inference is inescapable that this information must, you must have obtained this information beforehand?  You could not have obtained this information only on the fourth of March?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: A lot of the information came from Jimmy Mbane and other people beforehand.  You must remember, as I said earlier, I had a whole file in which all the documents, all my briefing and debriefing documents were kept in this file, so all the information was gathered over a period of time, so that when the incident actually happens, one already possesses an entire file to substantiate the information.

UNKNOWN: So, you will concede then that you had extremely detailed information on all these deceased before this operation occurred?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Jimmy Mbane gave us information about these people before the incident.

UNKNOWN: So, any suggestion, therefore, that there was vagueness about who would be involved, what their histories were as alleged insurgents or, or guerrillas is incorrect?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Please repeat the question, Mr Williams?

UNKNOWN: Any impression that you tried to create that there was a vagueness about who these individuals were and what their histories were as guerrillas and what they participated, what conduct they participated in on the ground is incorrect?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: I do not agree with you.

UNKNOWN: Perhaps I can put it more clearly.  You would have the Committee believe that your information about these individuals was so limited that it was impossible to effect arrest, not so?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: The information was vague as far as their whereabouts were concerned, but after a debriefing session with an informer during which the informer writes down everything he knows, you go and you verify the information and in co-operation with Lieutenant Liebenberg, we then put it down on paper and sent it to head office.  So, this is information which came from sources.

UNKNOWN: And you maintain to this day that despite 1
this very detailed information that you must have had before the incident happened, which is indicated in this "kripto berig", you could not affect any arrest, that remains your position?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: We did have many, many addresses and we checked them out.  I refer here to Crossroads, Mr Jamele's area.  So, we checked out many addresses with no success.  So, we could not actually trace these people.  We were told that they slept over at certain addresses and so on, but this changed from day to day, so we actually did attempt to find them and to arrest them.

UNKNOWN: All right.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Before you leave that point, Mr Williams, may I interpose again.  Mr Bellingan, why then do you say in your application, which appears at page 31, at paragraph 22, towards the end, that you did not know who the insurgents were and what they looked like.  Was that a mistake?  Page 31, paragraph 22, towards the end of that paragraph.

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mrs Khampepe, what I mean is, we did not have photographs of them, we had descriptions, we had names, but no addresses.  We did not know where they actually lived.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Thank you Mr Williams.

UNKNOWN: If I may proceed, Mr Chairperson.  The video team which filmed this video, that we have had sight of, when did they arrive on the scene?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I think they immediately arrived there or during this incident.  They were on standby at one of the police stations and they were near.  They arrived there at one or other stage.  The people who made the video could give an explanation.

UNKNOWN: All right, do you have any idea who would have called them to the scene?

W RIAAN BELLINGAN: We have to ask Dolf Odendal that, he was in charge.  I think it was a normal practice to make videos of all scenes.