Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1999-07-26

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, he would not have had any detail, he had to deliver the people to us.  And it was a high risk because one would not know who would recognise him at the border.  But that we would shoot them all, he did not know that.

MR MOERANE: Let's examine that.  Sgt Manzini was stationed at Piet Retief at the Security Branch offices there, not so?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: No, he was with the Detective Branch.  The Detective Branch did share offices in the same building, but they were divided by gates.  They may have met with each other, but there would not be daily interaction.

MR MOERANE: Well he must have worked very closely with W/O Pienaar.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: I would accept that, Chairperson, but I cannot give direct evidence about that.

MR MOERANE: And he must have been aware of the events of four days earlier.  In other words, the first incident.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is possible, but I am speculating now.

CHAIRPERSON: One would have thought an event like that would have been the talk of the town at Piet Retief.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if he did have knowledge.  I would not know to what extent.

MR MOERANE: Well at the mortuary there were four badly shot up bodies, not so?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: And the staff at the Charge Office must have been aware of these bodies at least.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: And there must have been talk amongst the police officers about the incident that had occurred.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would accept that.

MR MOERANE: Isn't the position Colonel, that as you sit there now today, you cannot say that Sgt Manzini did not know, you cannot positively say that he did not know that this was an ambush?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would be very difficult to give a definite answer.  I will go with my memory.  I believe when he saw the four persons with their AKs, he could have foresaw or expected a combat situation, whether it be at a roadblock or anywhere else.  I want to ensure you that I'm not trying to be evasive.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Moerane, just on this.
	Mr de Kock, there must have been a fair amount of detail given to Sgt Manzini because he was driving down an empty road at night.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you and your group were to be positioned at a particular spot on that road.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There wouldn't be a roadblock, he wouldn't know where to stop at the precise place, unless there was some sort of a rehearsal or precise decision that when you get to this particular point, it's important that you flick your lights or do whatever and make your signal and stop right here.  He must have known where to stop or where to give the signal.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, his instructions would have been clear, Chairperson.  I can however not speak for him and say with conviction that he knew that all four would be killed.

MR MALAN: Excuse me.  So you cannot speak for him that he did not know?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: You see you are involving Sgt Manzini in a very, very dangerous escapade, not so?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: His life might have been in danger.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: His life was in danger, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: And surely it must have occurred to the persons who were planing this operation, that Sgt Manzini's life might be in danger, either from the persons that he was going to pick up, or from the ensuing fire if you decided to fire at the vehicle.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, I concede, Chairperson, and I would go as far as to say if he could not climb out of the vehicle in time, there was a great risk to him.

MR MOERANE: I suggest that it was important to let him know what the plan was, for his own safety.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: And the plan being that this was a planned ambush.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MOERANE: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOERANE

ADV GCABASHE: Just clarity on that very point.  Mr de Kock, are you then saying that he was indeed informed that these people would be armed, that as he ran off you would be shooting at these people?  Just specifically.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would concede because his signal to us that the persons would be armed is the fact that he would climb out of the vehicle and run around the front of the vehicle, so that he gets to our side of the line of fire.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.  Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MS LOCKHAT: Yes, thank you, Chairperson, just a few brief questions.
	Mr de Kock, you were informed by the Piet Retief Security Branch to assist them in the operation, who at Piet Retief actually informed you?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: It was Mr Pienaar, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: How many days before the 8th of June were you informed to plan this operation?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was the same day.

MS LOCKHAT: You mentioned Island Rock.  There was a workshop there?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Was the second incident discussed at that workshop there and the first incident?  Can you just clarify that?  Or was it discussed, if at all?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, it may have been mentioned that there may be other infiltrations, but I don't have an independent recollection thereof.  It may be possible.

MR MALAN: Was the first incident discussed?  I think the question is with regard to both.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, insofar as I had discussions with Brig Schoon, yes.  It was however as I say, not a major topic.

MS LOCKHAT: Who was all present at this workshop?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: The whole unit, C1 and C2 as well as - I'm not sure whether C3 existed at that stage, but if they did exist then they would have been there, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just mention the names of the people that were there?  It's just very broad, C1, C2 and C3.  Can you just be more specific?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: It would have been Brig Schoon, Maj Martin Naude, myself, there was a Gen Beukes, who was the staff officer of the security chief and then the rest of the members of Vlakplaas and of C2.  In total I would say we were approximately 40+ people.

MS LOCKHAT: Were they also informed of the incident, the second incident?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain because there was no clarity as to when the next infiltration would take place.

MS LOCKHAT: Did Schoon know that this was going to be an ambush or a roadblock?  What was his impression of the mission?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Chairperson, no I did not say there would be a roadblock or an ambush, it was just that we would stop the terrorists in their tracks.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just explain, would Schoon know that what you meant by "stop the terrorists in their tracks", would he know what you meant by that?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one could interpret it in many ways, but in this case it would be that they would not give another step forward or backwards after that.

MS LOCKHAT: Would Schoon have authorised it if he had known that this was going to be an ambush?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, Ms Lockhat.  Did he in fact authorise, not just have knowledge of, authorise your intervention?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: Well intervention in which ...?