Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

LEON WESSELS: I have no question in my mind, I have no doubt in my mind 
but whatsoever, that that was the policy that you had to know what you had to 
know. In other words what you did not have to know did not concern you. Let 
me give you a simple example, for the better, for the better, I was interviewed 
recently by a gentleman called Jonathan Malanski, he is busy with his 
doctorate at the London School of Economics, he is busy with research in this 
country at this particular juncture. He questioned me about a resolution taken 
at the State Security Council dealing with the release of Mr Nelson Mandela. I 
believe it was taken in June 1988 and it is minuted as follows that a document 
was circulated and the document was then drawn in or drawn back and was 
then destroyed and he asked me what had happened there, because directly or 
indirectly my name appears in and around that document.  
 The fact of the matter is the following That the ..(inaudible) 
Werkgroup the executive of the working group was charged to work a strategy, 
to establish a strategy to try and facilitate the release of President Nelson 
Mandela. Now in that discussion it was clear that everybody was not pulling, 
pushing all the information that they had, it was clear in my mind that Mr 
Kobie Coetzee, Dr Neil Barnard, Mr Fanie van der Merwe were engaged in 
their own strategy over and above what we were busy with, that was none of 
my business. 
 Dr Neil Barnard was not obliged to report to me neither was Mr Fanie 
van der Merwe, neither was Mr Kobie Coetzee. It was none of my business, I 
did not want to know they were reporting to Mr P W Botha on that issue and 
that was how it functioned. My job was to manage the state of emergency and 
all the information I had to have to manage the state of emergency I was 
entitled to and over and above that I was not entitled to that. I operated as a 
Deputy Minister and function under regulated or (help my met die - Engels 
man) regulations, delegated powers and regulations, over and above that it was 
not my line function. I was not in the authority to detain people or to release 
people, and in that sense I didn't know and I did not want to know, because I 
was charged to do something else, to manage the state of emergency and the 
national management system and I did that.  And therefore I am saying in 
conclusion there was such a policy, Mr Pik Botha mentioned it yesterday as 
well, that was a statement of fact.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Wessels, you have also had the benefit of being present 
for the last two days, you weren't present at the previous hearings, but in 
essence some of the testimony that we have heard has been to the effect that 
there were certain policy guidelines formulated and there was obviously never 
any intention that that should mean, that unlawful action should flow from it. 
Unlawful actions did flow from those policy frameworks were in consequence 
of misinterpretations and we have had discussion about how to interpret the 
word elimineer and so on and so forth. I don't want to get into a semantic 
debate about it. 
 The Security forces fought a war in the country and in certain respects 
they fought a dirty war and that is evident from a number of the amnesty 
applications, the benefit of having fought that war including the dirty aspects 
was that the revolution as envisaged did not occur, the revolutionaries did not 
wrest power from the National Party government as it was. Is it not too much 
to expect that the Commission should accept that this benefit, that benefit was 
merely the happy result of a set of mistaken interpretations, a coincidence?

LEON WESSELS: I must tell you I will not try to duck the answer, to duck the 
question but I have difficulty in fully comprehend that and I won't blame you 
for the way you formulated it, I will, maybe I am not on top of the question, 
but the following occurred.
 It was a dirty war on all sides. I sat in discussions where I was 
defending, so to speak, people who were allies of the government, I am 
referring to councillors, and no, I am not arguing the legitimacy, the non-
legitimacy of the fact, they were councillors and what had been done to them 
and I had listened to arguments where they had told me in the presence of 
others what they thought of our policies. None of them were supporters of 
apartheid, and yet they were subjected to but fierce intimidation. Serious 
intimidation. And I sat alongside South African policemen being accused by 
them for not protecting them.  So that was the predicament, that was the 
cleftstick, John Citizen found himself in. 
 I have somebody who has just been decorated for reporting on the work 
of this Commission and somebody I hold in high esteem who had first 
educated me about this predicament, John Citizen being called upon to not 
disclose the whereabouts of an infiltrator, a revolutionary, being forced to 
remain silent by those people who wanted him to play a specific role, and yet 
on the same side also being the subject of attacks by the security forces for 
not disclosing that particular event, that was the difficulty.
 But let me not run away from the issue, the issue is the following, the 
Chappies Klopper whom I happen to know, Chappies Klopper told me who he, 
why and how he and others had attacked the house of Ivor Jenkins, and I said, 
why did you do that, and I speak very good Afrikaans, just like Markgraaf, I 
have a very good repertoire of Afrikaans words to explain my anger, I was 
really the hell in, and I asked him, why did you do that?  And he said well we 
did it because we thought they were giving you a hard time, not me 
personally, the government.  How and why did he believe that?  Because we 
had been making those speeches, the speeches Mr Pik Botha had referred to 
yesterday, National Party rallies. If you wanted to have an applause from the 
gathering, then you must see how we try and mobilise people and how we stir 
them up at meetings, we will really speak to them and get them to react, we 
will climb every mountain in this country.....used by us and the Chappies 
Kloppers' of the world interpreted what we were saying, he thought it was 
just, it was legitimate to instil the fear of hell into Ivor Jenkins and others by 
attacking his house and shooting his house and never ever did I or anybody 
give such, never did I, let me speak for myself, did I give such an instruction, 
never ever, and that is what I said, can I condone that, but I cannot shy away 
from the fact, that those men and woman and I were on the same side and that 
was the difficulty we're in. 
 That is why I am not sure, I mean we run glibly over this, I am not sure 
whether the people of South Africa and I say this with respect, the 
Commissioners and others appreciate that silent feeling of relief when the 
epilogue was agreed to. There are people who are picking it up, but that 
epilogue was not agreed to at the World Trade Centre in November of 1993, 
but it, we had to go the extra mile, we had to go to the Cape of Good Hope 
Centre in December of 1993 to Cape Town, that is how difficult it was to get 
that in, that is why I said I will be continuing tomorrow, I have a lot to say Mr 
Chairman - now I am not biased against this Commission, I think my conduct, 
my interaction with you displays that, but I implore you, don't squander the 
opportunity that we negotiated for you, in the epilogue, to ensure that this 
County will be at peace with itself after you have done your job.

MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you.