Special Hearings — Mandela United Football Club Hearings — 1998-01-28

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, once more, we were compartmentalised.  There were divisions and areas which people worked.  The impression it would appear is created that we with all due respect sir, had Mrs Mandela only to monitor, that is not a fact.
 We had many, many people that we had to monitor.  With all due respect, I think we are being given credit here beyond the abilities we had at that particular time.
 It is a fact that Mrs Mandela was an important person, yes.  It is also a fact that she had access to legal counsel which was not available to anybody else, readily available.
 It is also a fact I think, that it was mentioned on occasion around the morning table, that Mrs Jana had again approached the Commanding Officer stating Dear Sir, you have approached so and so, offered him such and such money to inform on the Mandela household, would you please desist.  That happened on regular occasions, I remember that.
 But the fact of the matter is sir, nobody in Soweto, bar this particular one source, was ever able during my time, to infiltrate or penetrate the structures under which Mrs Mandela operated.
 She operated on a totally different level than your basic run of the mill cadre or SYCO or who ever.  I have no doubt as it has been said, and I have read in the documentation, that she did actually harbour cadres, that she might have given them other assistance, I will not deny that.
 The fact of the matter is at that time we did not have the ability to determine that timeously and take the necessary action as the gentleman there said, maybe to try and save human lives.  We did try with that which we had available at that time, thank you sir.

MR VALLY: The fact was that the disruptive activities of the Mandela United Football Club suited the goals of the Security Branch, wasn't that true?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: No, I would not say it suited, I would deny that sir.  It certainly did not suit me, the little bit that I knew about.
 As I said I cannot be explicit as to certain actions.

MR VALLY: Was it also not true that through your bugging of her telephone and through that her house, that you were aware of a lot more than you are admitting?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: May I just explain the procedures here please Mr Chairman.
 Bugging a telephone was common practice in those days in terms of the law, it was done legally.  But Mrs Mandela also being a very clever lady, with all due respect, I am sure she was aware that he phone was bugged.  One often found in the transcriptions don't speak, the Boere are listening or whatever.
 So bugging of a telephone is limited to a particular conversation that one might have.  As far as placing a bug in a room in those days, I don't know what the abilities are now, that was limited to the room in which that particular bug was placed.  It did not encompassed the whole house, that would be totally impossible.
 So yes, sir, we did glean some intelligence I think, but not as much as I think you would like to think that we in fact did, sir.

MR VALLY: And where people have laid criminal charges like Mr Sono, like Mr I think it was Mr Ikaneng?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: That is a strange name to me sir.

MR VALLY: You don't know Mr Lerothodi Ikaneng?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Not at all, sir.

MR VALLY: Mr Jerry Richardson was in fact convicted of attempted murder in relation to Mr Ikaneng.
 What you are telling me is, you didn't have co-ordination within your own department, the Security Branch, you didn't know what was happening regarding the placing of informers which was your department, your unit's specific role, but in your statement sir, paragraph 10, page 5 you talk about good co-operation between the Security Branch and other units of the South African Police such as Murder and Robbery.
 You go on to say on an ongoing basis, information was exchanged, although you don't have personal knowledge.

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes sir, there was co-ordination, there was co-operation, but handling informers in those days, I don't know what it is like now, worked on a strictly, strictly need to know basis.
 A person would apply to his immediate Commander to register a person as an informer.  That would then be put before a more senior person, it would be okayed or vetoed, whatever the case might be.  Should that person then in fact be recruited, he would be allocated a number either by Head Office depending upon the profile of the person, or at the Branch itself and that person would be dealt with as a number which is international standard practice.
 The protection of the identities of sources was one of the primary aspects that were also always borne in mind when information or intelligence was put on the table.  I think I read in Paul Erasmus' documentation that they would play spot the agent those days.
 Yes, it was so.  One would try and determine through reports the contents thereof, maybe whose agent was what.  But I would, there is no way that I could have known who every intelligence informer in Soweto was or which, who handled each person.  That would have been totally impossible.
 The Commander at the end of the day might have been, but I think it would have been a mammoth task because we are talking many, many informers.

MR VALLY: Who was Mr Jerry Richardson's handler?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Subsequent to the death of Fanie that afternoon, I think at a debriefing session in General Coetzee's office, it was mentioned that he was indeed the source of Fanie Pretorius.

MR VALLY: Although you were the Major in that unit, you didn't know that before then?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: I was not in that particular unit.  Colonel Claassen, then a Major, was in overall charge of the sub-unit which Lieutenant Louis Watermeyer was the Commanding Officer.

MR VALLY: Did you work closely with Vlakplaas at all?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes.

MR VALLY: Can you tell us in which activities specifically did you work closely with Vlakplaas?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Not inside Soweto per se, certainly outside.  My knowledge of Vlakplaas in Soweto was within the context  where they periodically send a team leader with askaris to move through Soweto with the Soweto Terrorist Tracing Unit if I can call it that, in order to possibly identify at railway stations etc, where known return cadres might be.  That is the extent of knowledge that I have of Colonel de Kock's Vlakplaas people in Soweto.

MR VALLY: And activities outside of Soweto?  Co-operation between the Security Branch of Soweto and Vlakplaas Unit of Colonel de Kock?

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Might I at this stage mention Mr Chairman, that I have applied for amnesty and this question pertains to my application and I don't know if this is the correct forum to voice that.  If I might be advised by counsel there.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, I think you should reserve that until you are before the Amnesty Committee.

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VALLY: Mr de Jager, what you are telling us sounds a lot like what Mr Coetzee, Mr Kritzinger told us.  We know nothing, we saw nothing, we heard subsequently.
 Yet, you pointed out there was a state of emergency and in terms of states of emergency people had a lot more legal and practical freedom on the ground than you had at other times.

LODEWYK DE JAGER: Yes sir.

MR VALLY: So you would have had more freedom to make enquiries and get to the bottom of issues, yet there isn't a single bit of information you can give us today, other than the name of Jerry Richardson, which was out here in public, regarding information surrounding the activities of the Mandela United Football Club.  Does  this mean that the Police, specifically the Security Branch of Soweto were just incompetent?