Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-11-13

MR BOTHA: That is correct, and that Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen, according to that information, went to Montclair railway line to have a look and to see if he could find the limpet mines and also if he could find the people.
	When they got there, the explosion already took place.  If I remember correctly, this was after dusk that evening.  The explosion already took place.

MR VISSER: Can we just make sure we are not confused here.  You told us Mr Botha that Pumeso was arrested on the 4th of November?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it is on the 4th of November that this explosion took place, is that correct?  That same afternoon?

MR BOTHA: That same evening, yes.

MR VISSER: But you also said that you interrogated him further that evening, which carried on until the next day?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct, I carried on with him the next day.

MR VISSER: But this information was already received on that day when you arrested him?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen then rushed off to Montclair and you say when they got there, in order to try and find these two people, that they realised the explosion had already taken place?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR BOTHA: They returned to the safe house.

MR VISSER: Maybe we can cut this short.  On the 5th of November you continued with your interrogation?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Who interrogated him on the 5th of November?

MR BOTHA: It was shared between me, Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen.

MR VISSER: What was Van der Westhuizen's rank?

MR BOTHA: He was a Sergeant.

MR VISSER: And you said Du Preez was a Lieutenant?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was there any other information which came to the light during this interrogation?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson, the fact that at the Allan Taylor where he stayed, there was a store room which was known as the suitcase room, where they kept all their suitcases and there was a trunk there with arms in it.

MR VISSER: Very well, what did you do with that information?

MR BOTHA: Before I acted according to that information, maybe just to put everything in a chronological order and to treat it as such, Taylor, Du Preez and Wasserman arrived at the safe house.  They were absent from Durban because of work and when they got back to Durban, they popped in at the safe house where we were.
	I informed Taylor about my decision as well as the circumstances Pumeso's so-called arrest and his detention and his interrogation by me.

MR VISSER: And you say on page 9 that you and Taylor discussed options about what to do with Pumeso, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: I informed Taylor about what Pumeso had already done.  He was aware of what Zandile already said with regards to Pumeso.
	My decision regarding Pumeso's elimination was shared with Taylor and the options as is mentioned here, were discussed even though it wouldn't have been really crucial when it came to the end of Pumeso.

MR MALAN: Mr Botha, why would you have discussed it if it was standard practice, you didn't try to turn him any more?  Would you really have discussed it again if you went through this whole thing a few days before, haven't you testified that this was indeed practice?

MR BOTHA: Yes, we would have.

MR MALAN: Was it a formal exercise or was it a serious consideration of options?

MR BOTHA: Circumstances would determine whether it was a formal consideration.  In his case it was a fact that we discussed it informally, what are we going to do with him?
	The best option is he is responsible for these acts of terror, he is the Commander and in order to stop this wave of terror, the best option would be to eliminate him.
	Our informers could have been in trouble, so it was very informally discussed, but yes, we did discuss it.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would your informers have been in trouble?

MR BOTHA: We had informers at different levels within the structures in Durban.  An appointment was made with Pumeso for a specific place and time.  Who he shared information with at that place, we did not know.
	Although he said with no one else, one couldn't rely on that.  There was a very highly placed informer in Swaziland and his name was used in order to lure him.  He went and he went to that appointment, and in order to protect all those people in the process, it was necessary.  Also with the consideration of elimination, we had to consider their positions.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen went to hunt for him?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Page 7 at the bottom Mr Chairman, the last paragraph.

MR MALAN: I just want some clarity regarding this please.  You testified this morning that with his arrest, the idea was already in your mind that he would be eliminated?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Shortly after that you said you took the decision?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And then you said that you then arrested him, you interrogated him and you assaulted him a little bit and you got information from him, and when you were finished using this information, you discussed the options with Taylor.  You never considered recruiting or turning Pumeso, you did not try that and you testified to that extent, is that correct?

MR VISSER: With respect Chairperson, we are busy with dealing with this in a chronological fashion.  He does say that in his application, that he tried to recruit him.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, with respect, he already testified that him and Taylor after the interrogation, considered the information.  He informed Taylor about the decision and the circumstances and then he said and then we discussed the options about what to do with him.
	He has never given evidence about an attempt to turn him.  He does give it in his reasons in his application, that he was not willing to become an informer, but he hasn't testified to that.  I am asking you once again Mr Botha, did you try and convince him or persuade him to become an informer for you?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson, I did not.  Yesterday I tried to describe to you that his attitude was such that I would not try to turn him.

MR MALAN: So you did not consider it?

MR BOTHA: No.

MR MALAN: Secondly, and this is my question.  When you spoke to Taylor, could you not seriously discuss with him what are our alternatives?   You said to him and you knew that if you used informers in order to arrest a person, you cannot compromise them, so you cannot release him.
	You did not consider to use him as an informer or to recruit him, so why  would you go through this whole thing with Taylor, as you described on page 9 like an extensive exercise.  You can look on page 27 of your application, me and Colonel Taylor discussed the following options about him.

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.  And this is the way I wrote it down when I wrote my application.

MR MALAN: I am not asking you whether you have written it down, I am asking you what happened?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Is this what happened?

MR BOTHA: Whether it was extensive or whether it was less formal, I informed Taylor because he was my senior at that stage and I did discuss these options with him, as they are written down.

MR MALAN: Did you discuss with him the fact that as you put it here, he was not willing to become an informer?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I informed him that in my opinion he is not the quality of an informer.  He does not have it.

CHAIRPERSON: So you knew he was not the quality of an informer?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You used informers to arrest him?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So you knew then that you would have to kill him?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So when you went out to arrest him, it was knowing that you would then kill him?