Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-11

MR MARITZ: 2A time and this appears from the documentation, Dr Buthelezi insisted upon the covert nature of this operation, because he thought it would do him political harm if it will become known that he was receiving assistance from the South African Government.  You are aware of that?

WITNESS:   Ja, I am.

MR MARITZ: Now are you also aware of the fact - and this evidence was given in the Kwa Makutha trial that I think in a place called Jozini, I think it's Jozini.  Where?  Jozini, yes.  There was a Zulu battalion, known as Battalion 121, which was once again, for political reasons and if I use the layman's term of rejected, don't quarrel with me, but the effect of it was that he didn't want anything to do with that battalion.  He rejected it for his own political reasons, whatever they were.  Are you aware of that fact?

WITNESS:   I'm aware of the existence of a battalion, but my reading of the evidence that was presented that he saw that as the nucleus out of which a defence force of his own could be created.  I may be incorrect.

MR MARITZ: No, I think you're incorrect, because you see, that's one of the points I want to make, that I think it must be conceded for any purposes that a battalion such as Battalion 121, was a formidable force, military force with very, very handy fire power.  You would have to concede that?

WITNESS:   It was a - it was a standard rural counter insurgency battalion.

MR MARITZ: Yes and the advantages of being able to employ Battalion 121, would far outweigh the creation of a force of 200 people trained in Caprivi in a very basic manner, wouldn't it?

WITNESS:   If you could employ them, I mean, I

MR MARITZ: /don't

MR MARITZ: 2A don't think it's as simple as that, I mean, first of all they resorted under the SADF for purposes of command and control and as such they were known.  The declared intention of actually fielding the force that was subsequently fielded, was that it be unknown, of a covert nature and presumably arising out of this its efficacy.  You wouldn't be able to do that with 121 or any other rural counter insurgency battalion you wanted to use, because they were known, their members were known and your ability to conceal the activities of a unit like that would be immensely difficult, both politically and practically.

MR MARITZ: No, no, no, I'm not talking about a covert operation at all.  I'm talking about overt protection, barring political difficulties or hurdles which notionally they could have been bridged(?), but in a perfectly overt manner, there is no reason, save some political reason or another, that I can perceive, why one couldn't say to Dr Buthelezi, "But there is Battalion 121.  Use it to protect yourself".  There's no earthly reason why that couldn't have happened.

WITNESS:   It would depend very much on what you wanted to use it for, because bear in mind again that this is a general rural counter insurgency battalion and a lot of the type of functions that you're looking at and the type of force that Buthelezi requested, Dr Buthelezi requested ... (inaudible) ... very specific.  So you could - you could use a battalion like that in a protective role, but depending - at this stage it wasn't as big as it subsequently became.  Depending on really what other tasks this unit was being mandated with.  I mean it's also instructive(?) to bear in mind that this

MR MARITZ: /was

MR MARITZ: 2A was a time when defence force manpower was overstretched as a result of the state of emergency, the successive states of emergency, so it's not as though one had the ease really to - to pluck out a unit simply like that, but certainly, you could have used elements of it in that role.

MR MARITZ: Yes, and probably one would have been doing much better and by training people up in Caprivi, giving them basic training.  Not so?

WITNESS:   You would do better if you linked it again to the type of operation that you were looking at.  If this was a clear open operation ... (intervention)

MR MARITZ: That's the ... (inaudible), is it not?

WITNESS:   ... overt ... (intervention)

MR MARITZ: That's the ... (inaudible)?

WITNESS:   That scenario, yes, but this was a covert operation.

MR MARITZ: Yes.

WITNESS:   So you're bedeviled there in terms of doing that.

MR MARITZ: Yes, but now I have explained why it was covert.  If one were to assume that it could be done perfectly overtly, one could have employed the battalion, which was much better equipped and much better trained than the fellows up in Caprivi.  As a matter of fact the Caprivians were never equipped at all.

WITNESS:   (No reply)

MR MARITZ: They were supposed to have been equipped by KwaZulu.  Do you follow?

WITNESS:   Certainly.

MR MARITZ: Will you bear with me one moment, please?  Mr Chairman, I think I've asked all my questions, but there was a request that we just have a little bit of a rethink.  If we can have a smoke break for say 10 minutes I'll be grateful?

MR MARITZ: /

MR MARITZ: CHAIRMAN

MR MARITZ: 2A

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  Thank you, Mr Maritz.
BRIEF ADJOURNMENT
ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Have you had time to consider your position?

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, thank you very much, thank you for the adjournment.  I have no further questions, thank you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARITZ

CHAIRPERSON: Any other parties?

MR WILLS: Yes, one or two matters, thank you, Mr Chairperson.  Dr Williams, a lot of what has been said and understood by me in any event in your - during your cross-examination by my colleague, it's understood by me to represent a sort of a normal army scenario and I can understand - my understanding of a normal army scenario would be that people would be trained, but then not only would they be trained, they would eventually utilise their skills and their training under normal army conditions where they'd have immediate commanders possibly and the command structure would go up.  Is that your understanding of how things ... (intervention)?

WITNESS:   Certainly(?).  No, that - I mean, the way - I think that the nature of the points we've been discussing presupposes a normal, inasmuch as you can get a normal ... (intervention)

MR WILLS: Yes.

WITNESS:   ... (inaudible) environment presupposes that.

MR WILLS: Now my understanding of the evidence so far and my colleagues will be quick to correct me if I'm wrong, but these people were in fact trained and then apart from a remnant of control from the SANDF people, they were allowed to operate their skills effectively independently

MR WILLS: /from

MR WILLS: 2A from the normal army controls.  Is that your understanding of the matter?

WITNESS:   That is correct.  They were deployed in support of a particular organisation, which is itself - becomes in itself problematic in terms of your classic principles of war.

MR WILLS: Now that's what I'm getting to.  How does that affect the theory of the - the theory of the strategy of the army - sorry, that's not entirely accurate.  Let me try and rephrase it.  In the theories that we've been debating over the last couple of hours, is it consistent with those theories that such people are effectively trained and then allowed to operate independently as it appears that these trainees were or did in fact operate independently?