Human Rights Violation Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — 1996-11-20

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  That's precisely the point I am trying to make, with all due respect, Director.  Whether it was 14 or 10 is irrelevant.  The fact of the matter is that your personnel were grossly and totally outnumbered, and the fact of the matter is that you were simply unable to contain the situation.  In a few places you were successful.  You couldn't be everywhere at the same time.  We understand that.

WITNESS:   I agree.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  The issues is, why didn't you call the military in immediately?

WITNESS:   Chairperson, on day one we were more or less in control of things.  On day two we were still reasonably three.  On day four we were no longer in control.  Apart from that - I am talking now of Monday morning, the 26th, the 27th and the 28th - on those mornings.  In the mornings the Defence Force and police had joint meetings, so there was definitely consultation between the two groups.  The specific reason for not calling in the Defence Force I would say is not correct, because we did use the Defence Force.  But we must also realise that if we are talking about a company of Defence Force members we're looking at about four platoons.  We're looking at 120 members ... (intervention)

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  We've heard 100 people maximum that was available.

WITNESS:   That is so.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  But the point I am trying to make is this.  Ladysmith is an hour up the road.  You've got a battalion at Ladysmith.  You've got Civil Defence - you've got Commando units situated all around Pietermaritzburg - Umkomaas, Umvoti, Camperdown area, further down towards Kloof, Pinetown, you have civilian force units.  Estcourt you have civilian force units.  Not one of those units was mobilised to come in and prevent what in reality was a major emergency.

WITNESS:   I hear you.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  You can't give us a single explanation.  Why?

WITNESS:  I can't speak on behalf of the Defence Force, but as far as the calling up of the forces is concerned that is not for the police to decide.  That would have been a Defence Force decision, not a police matter.  We did have contact with the Defence Force to call up more people, and that request and report did go through.  I don't know who the contact person was, so unfortunately I can't comment any further.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  You see, what Brigadier Swanepoel told us was that they weren't called upon to go into the area other than patrol the road.  He said the only role designated to them was to patrol the road, they were not required elsewhere.  He made that absolutely clear.  The other thing he made absolutely clear - if you'll just let me finish the question - is that the Defence Force was under your control at that time, so the prerogative to call them in was your prerogative.  And when I say call them in I am not talking about patrolling the road, I am talking about calling them in to contain the hundreds of acts of violence that were going on around you that you couldn't control.

WITNESS:   I hear what you say.  As far as liaison between the police and the Defence Force was concerned I didn't have that much to do with it, but what I can say is that when I was operating in the field and needed manpower I did make use of the Defence Force.  Once again the Natal Witness, 29 March ... (incomplete - end of Side A, Tape 1) ... mostly concentrated on Edendale road.  I don't deny that

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  I want to move to another area, and that is just the last issue of the specials.  Your submission and your replies to questions indicate that the specials under no circumstances formed part of the Amabutho.  That's correct?

WITNESS:   No, I don't think that's correct.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  (Inaudible) ... the point I am trying to make.  No, no, the issue is that you conceded they may have been there without your consent, but under no circumstances was it sanctioned.

WITNESS:   It wasn't police policy, but I don't think it's a state secret that special constables was one of the single biggest mistakes made by the police in KwaZulu Natal.  I don't think that's a secret.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  (Inaudible) ... happy to hear that admission as part of an official police submission.  It doesn't appear in your actual submission here.

WITNESS:   Chairperson, once again I just want to rectify something.  A lot of what I am saying now is my own personal opinion.  You must understand this is a submission from the police.  I was there on the ground, I worked with these people, and I think my views might be different to other peoples' views, and in my opinion it was a huge mistake.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  I just want to take you back to Mr Shabangu's evidence, and - you heard that evidence?

WITNESS:   Once again - I heard his evidence, but once again there was a specific lie which he told, and I will point that out later.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  (Inaudible) ... now please, rather than later.

WITNESS:  All right, let's discuss it.  Mr Shabangu made an allegation that Constable de Wet, on the day of the Seven Day War, was present when they loaded a police vehicle full of stolen goods.  And then we go further. Mr Harrington told the Commission that they wanted to hear something regarding the Seven Day War.  Mr Harrington wasn't even here during the Seven Day War, and he told the Commission what the Commission wanted to hear.  I am sitting here with documentary proof in front of me in which Harrington and de Wet, as from 26th of March 1990 to the 5th of April of that year - which proves that they were on a course in Newcastle at the time.  I have the document here, and I may hand it in.  And it's a specific reference to their course results in the course which they completed.  I am not saying that everything that they have said is wrong.  Maybe they're simply mistaken as the facts, or they might have had other motives, but I don't believe that their entire story was accurate and true.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER: That's precisely why I am putting it to you, so we can hear whether you have another version, because we want to hear the truth.  Chairperson, I'll leave it to other people to ask further questions.

DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER:  Director, you said that the deployment of special constables was one of the biggest mistakes the police ever made.  Now, you heard evidence yesterday, and evidence has been given to this Commission by other policeman, about the role of special constables working together with the Riot Unit.  And we heard evidence yesterday from Constable Harrington, Madlala, Shabangu, saying that they were deployed with the Riot Unit.  They always moved around with Riot Unit members.  You heard Constable Harrington say that it was commonplace before, during and after the Seven Day War, for Riot Unit vehicles to be used to transport Inkatha people into UDF areas to launch attacks; it was common for the Riot unit and the special constables to confiscate weapons from UDF areas and to give them or to sell them to IFP people;  that it was common for shots to be fired at passers-by in UDF areas by the special constables, not knowing whether those people were left alive or dead, and so on.  What is your response to that?