Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — UNKNOWN

MR GOOSEN: I think Mr Chairperson the idea is simply to - I've been 
operating on the basis of the framework presented in the submission and I am 
simply interrogating that and I think obviously Mr Wessels' submission, whilst 
it may overlap with in some respects it's formulated in a different way and I 
want to deal with him separately.
 Mr Meyer I am not asking you to comment on individual interpretations 
and I will take issue with Commissioner Malan about the external construction 
of this, it's not a philosophical debate.  You put forward a schema which is the 
basis upon which accountability and responsibility should be adjudged.  
Central to that second bullet point is a recognition on your part that 
individuals may have been under the impression that they were authorised by 
implication.  Now yes, accept that when you deal with a specific instance we 
are going to have to determine whether in that particular instance it was, 
whether that person in fact was under that impression, was not acting on some 
other motive.  We are not talking about the motive of the person here.  
 We are talking about whether it is possible, as a matter of principle, 
whether it was possible for security police operatives or security force 
operatives to reasonably interpret State Security Council and Cabinet National 
Party policy statements and so on, to authorise unlawful activity, whether it 
was reasonable?  Whether you accept, as a matter of principle that it was 
reasonable?  If you say no, well then the consequence attaches to that in terms 
of the schema that you've raised.  But if you say yes, another consequence 
attaches.  I want to know whether you accept that in principle it was 
reasonable that such misinterpretations could occur or not?

MR MALAN: Chairperson may I just - look really I am not sure that I 
understand the question. If the question is could have then that's something, 
but was is a different question then we need to look at the facts.

MR GOOSEN: The question was could have.

MR MEYER: I was just going to say as one of the possibilities for 
consideration surely, and that certainly then depends on the specific 
circumstances, if you say could have.

MR GOOSEN: Then in those instances where it is established that it was a 
misinterpretation, okay, do you accept that collective political responsibility 
attaches?

MR MEYER: Of a moral and political nature, yes.

MR GOOSEN: Okay.   Thank you.  We are going to move on to another 
element of your presentation.  I want to deal with paragraph 5.  Let me just 
check something.
 Perhaps the panel want to pick up on any questions whilst I am doing 
the - if the panel wants to pick up on a question to save time.

CHAIRPERSON: He has been very disciplined and was waiting to be guided 
by you.

MR GOOSEN: That makes a change Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you ready.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Meyer, can I refer you to the 
document which was also provided to you, that's the Concept National 
Strategy, the Revolutionary War, Strategy No. 44.
You indicate that part of the total counter Revolutionary Strategy was that a 
tremendous amount of effort was put into utilising the force of the state in a 
counter mobilisation plan. In the document, reference is made to at Page 4 of 
the document.  The existence of the anti-revolutionary group loss such as 
Inkatha or ZZC or the...(intervention)

MR MEYER: Can you just help me with the exact reference, I am on Page 4 
and I don't see this.

MR GOOSEN: I beg your pardon it is Page 4, it's 8B. Paragraph 8B on Page 
4 of the document. The paragraph there reads anti-resistance of anti-
revolutionary groups such as Inkatha, ZZC as well as the Ethnic Factor in the 
South African Society, makes the preparation for a coherent revolutionary 
onslaught difficult and states that it is one of the factors to take into account.
And then under Objectives, 6 at the top, there is reference to Groups and 
individuals to mobilise them and to protect themselves and to assist the 
Revolutionary actions. 
 Do I take it that that doelstelling is a reference to the fact that 
grouping such as Inkatha and or the ZCC and perhaps other anti-revolutionary 
groups could be mobilised to resist revolutionary activities and to protect 
themselves against those revolutionary activities.

MR MEYER: Thank you, it is kind of fun to go through all these old 
documents and to refresh one's mind. Thank you for making this available.
 If one looks at the first paragraph that you quoted on Page 4, 8B, I 
think it refers to what they call Analysis of Capacity under Paragraph 7 you 
have Analysis of the, what one can say the Revolutionary elements, analysis 
of the capacities of radical organisations and under Paragraph 8 you there see 
an analysis of, let us call it the strong points inside of the South African 
government society and then 8B, is then mentioned as a strong point because 
there were allegedly certain anti-revolutionary groups that could have been 
helpful and could have assisted in combating revolution and if you follow that 
up and look the schedule, I think you will find the answer there in the quest 
for looking at what the specific actions were that arose from those and if you 
look at this document it is a schedule, it is unfortunately not numbered.
The schedule says objectives and overall conduct and actions against the 
revolutionary war and if you go to paragraph 6 thereof, I think the last two 
pages of that, you there find more or less an indication of the kind of actions 
proposed and contemplated, in order to strengthen and secure society and to 
help society to resist the revolutionary onslaught. I think that's the context in 
which it must be seen.

MR GOOSEN: If we go to paragraph 8 on that Annexure where the 
Delstelling and the Oorhof se optrede are then set out in columns and what 
corresponds with the objective to mobilise groups and groupings to encourage 
them to resist which then go through onto the following page. No. 2 there, 
Counter Revolutionary Organisations must be developed along ethnic lines in 
order to prevent the political vacuum being exploited by the radical elements 
and one of the actions under 4, black parents must be organised and supported 
in order to prepare parental authority and to counter the manipulation of the 
youth by the radical elements.
 You were present when I raised some questions in regard to these 
matters to Mr Vlok, would you say that it was on the basis of these, this 
policy's framework, this approach to contra-mobilisation that it was policy of 
the government and the Security forces then, because it falls under Safety, to 
manipulate differences that occurred within communities, exploit tensions that 
existed within the communities, to specifically organise and prompt the 
establishment of organisations based on an ethnic basis and to utilise through 
that support, those organisations, to engage in active resistance against efforts 
by revolutionary organisations as defined at the time within communities in 
which those organisations were organising.