Special Hearings — Armed Forces Hearings — 1997-10-08

MORTIMER: The principal problem with interpretation is that we have no authority to speak on behalf of the SADF.  There is no commander of the SADF to give me an order, do the task and interpret, give me your opinion.  If I was to interpret this then former members of the SADF would be entitled and they have already done so said you do not have my authority to speak on my behalf.  You Mortimer can go and stand there and speak but you do not speak on my behalf.  Therefore I cannot interpret because then I would be taking rights to judge other people's actions which they do not want me to do.  That is the principal reason.  What do we want people to think about about our presentation.  I think principally we want people to think that we were a professional force that as professionals soldiers we had certain responsibilities to the State.  The responsibilities that are not only written in law but are part of a professional ethic.  The professional ethic says that you must give the government of the say your loyalty.  If you cannot live with their policies then you must resign.  If you can live with their policies even if you don't agree with them in all detail it is your responsibility to give the government your honest advice and so too the soldier must give his commander his honest advice.  That staff officer who gives advice to the commander must give what he believes not what he thinks the commander wishes to hear.  However the ethic goes further.  Once the commander has made the decision even if the decision goes against your advice then it is your absolute professional duty to carry out his decision to the very best of your ability.  I think we would like to tell the nation that we did that.  We had the question did we never disagree.  We did disagree but working on the professional ethic having disagreed once your commander has made a decision then you must carry out his decision.
Wildschut :  Thank you for that insight.  I think that's the kind of insight that we would really like to have.  My second question is related to the issue, I may have missed it in the submission, which may not have been alluded to or mentioned and that's the issue of chemical and biological warfare.  Has there any been plans in relation to such warfare, and perhaps eventually as my other colleagues have mentioned it might be something that you would like to tell us about.  Could you tell us if there was such strategies?

MORTIMER: The reason there is no mention of chemical or biological warfare in this document is that again in the time available and in the study of the available records we have not come across it if specific info is required on the subject then we could zoom on it but we have not to date come across any evidence of it.
Wildschut :  Just for clarity, so then do we assume that there was no strategy around chemical and biological warfare and hence asking questions around that would be stupid because it did not exist or did it exist and that we need to be quite specific about its existence.

MORTIMER: The SADF did pursue studies into chemical and biological warfare from a defensive point of view.  We were relatively sure that chemical weapons had been used on occasion by the enemy in Angola and therefore we studied it defensively.  We have not addressed the Angolan situation in this paper.  So, yes there was study of chemical and biological warfare and we have not come across any information indicating investigations in chemical and biological warfare for offensive purposes on the part of the SADF but I wouldn't like to say that it would be futile for you to question, it might produce something but I certainly cannot at this stage give you any assurance that there will be anything available.
Boraine :  General Mortimer as you know I made a couple of preliminary remarks, I'd now like to follow that up with quite specific questions.  On page 50 part 3 paragraph 11 c2 you refer to clients.  I'd wonder if you could help us by telling us who were the clients of the directorate of covert collections.

MORTIMER: Well, firstly of course the SADF as a whole.  Should an operation be planned at the chief of the defence force level then he would be the principal client.  Should an operation be planned at army level then the intelligence available to the chief of the defence force would be made available to the chief of the army either on the request of the chief of the army but also almost as an automatic action that you push your intelligence down to your lower level.  If I could now skip the command level and say an operation is planned at group level, group could be conceivably a client of covert collection but it would now have to go up the whole channel of command so group would request information or intelligence from command who would request from army headquarters who could then eventually request it.  So really theoretically at any rate any person who has to carry out an operation somewhere in this organisation could request intelligence and could in that sense be applied.  It is however might more likely that it would be the higher headquarters who would be the client.

BORAINE: Just so that I understand this completely, so the clients would be not outside of the SADF, private organisations, political parties, anybody like that.

MORTIMER: No, it would be as we've put it here, clients within the SADF.

BORAINE: Thank you very much.

MORTIMER: Sorry as my colleague has pointed out me it would also be what I described as the department of defence, armscor could possibly also have requested but not political parties.

BORAINE: On page 73 where you are dealing with the sort of neighbouring states you make reference to Angola and as I think you made in a comment you really haven't dealt with that in any detail in this presentation but you or people that you have consulted who can go back a few years, that operation was actually unlawful in a sense that Parliament which ought to give its final authority was never consulted.  In fact it was lied to, that's general facts, I am not asking you to accept it, just saying that for the argument accept that because this has now been well established.  I just happened to be there at the time, I know what was told to me and what actually was happening at the very time it was told to me by the then Minister of Defence.  Was the SADF at any time aware or did they assume that because instructions were given orders were given that they were legal and that they had to be obeyed.  Was there any debate at all, did you recall all, only the people you consulted.

MORTIMER: I presume you are speaking to, referring to, the original operation in Angola in 1975.

BORAINE: That's exactly right.

MORTIMER: I was a good bit further down on the scale on things in 1975 and so I cannot from personal experience say anything about it.  I am not aware that there was any questioning of the legality or otherwise of the operation from military personnel but I certainly cannot speak with any degree of confidence when I say so.

BORAINE: On that same page, page 73, referring to the support of Renamo.  In your knowledge or that the people that you have talked with when compiling this report did the SADF or any of its substructures continue to supply support not to influence them in terms of the peace agreement but to supply support to Renamo in defiance of the .... Accord and if so under whose orders.

MORTIMER: I cannot answer the question.  I am not aware of anything of that nature occurring but I base my answer on what is here before us.  So, no I am not aware of anything like that happening and again it is something that could be examined further.