Amnesty Hearings — Cape Town — 2000-03-13

GEORGE BIZOS: I have appointed an assistant for the purpose, Mr Chairman.  He says he expects a fee.
	Mr Chairman, the details in relation to Botswana are not to be understood to concede that the witness has the right to refuse to answer questions in relation to external matters and it will become apparent as to why  we do that, Mr Chairman.  What we say in these Heads, Mr Chairman, is that we deal with the question of the extent to which evidence concerning the Commission of crimes in respect of which no amnesty has been sought is relevant and accordingly admissible.  In terms of Section 20 (i)(b), the applicant must satisfy the Amnesty Committee that the offence is an act associated with a political objective.  Section 20 (ii) provides that whether a particular offence is an act associated with political motive, must be decided with reference to the following criteria and we set them out.  The motive of the person who committed the offence, the context in which the offence took place, the object or objective of the offence, whether the offence was committed in the execution of an order if the proportionality of the offence to the objective pursued.  
	Regard being had to the activities of the CCB and the factors referred to above, it is submitted that the following evidence must be said to be relevant to a proper determination of the context in which the acts were committed, the motive of the offender and the further factors referred to in the section.  If several other politically inspired criminal acts, besides those in respect of which amnesty is sought, were committed on behalf of the same organisation by the same individuals, during the same period of time, then evidence concerning these events is relevant to the proper determination of context, motive, objectives and proportionality.  Context surely concerns the overall activities of the CCB and the applicants' knowledge, this in the way in which their applications have been drafted albeit they omit, so we would submit significant details.  Taking this argument further then, the following.  
	If the applicant says he committed an act or orders, he does not make full disclosure of the relevant facts if he fails to state that he received further orders at the same meeting or at a subsequent meeting, for that matter, or a previous meeting, to commit further offences.  Evidence to this effect elicited under cross-examination would clearly be relevant ordinarily and permissible but may I ask you to turn back to page three?  On the authority of the Appellate Division and on which we are making these submissions, by way of finality we say - note 1, Mr Chairman.  We note that even in the sphere of criminal liability, relevant similar fact evidence is admissible despite its dangers.  And it is dangerous and this is why it is, generally speaking, excluded.  Something that does not apply to as large an extent as it is here because certain offences are admitted, which are dealt with in the cases that we quote.  The submission however that such evidence is clearly admissible in the context of an amnesty application, when it impacts on the factors enumerated in Section 20 (ii) which we set out above and we rely on the case of R VS MATTHEWS AND OTHERS, 1961 SA 752, in the Appellate Division as it was then known concerning the question whether evidence which tendered to show the Commission of crimes not charged, was admissible.  An issue in that case whether the members of the Msomi gang had the motive to attack members of a rival gang, evidence was produced of the gang's criminal activities unrelated to the actual charges in the case.  Schreiner J A, after noting that the test for relevance is based on the blend of logic and experience, held as follows at 759(a) to (c):  
"In order to estimate properly the strength of the motive that might lead the members of one gang to murder a member of another, it is clearly relevant to consider the scope of the gang operations and the extent with which it might render probable the resort to extreme violence in the furtherance of gang interest."
To understand the nature and depth of their rivalry, there had to be an appreciation of the fact that the strength of each gang depended ultimately on its terrorising the public  more effectively than its competitors and so at the end, evidence of the Msomi gang outrages could properly be adduced and in ...(indistinct) LETSOKO AND OTHERS, evidence concerning the commission of other crimes is admissible where there is sufficient ...(indistinct) and this is the case.  In proximity of time in method or circumstance between the evidence sought to be led and the issue in respect, it is sought to be led.
	May I return to 3.22 page 4, Mr Chairman?  If the amnesty applicant says the objective of the attack was to disrupt the ANC, has he disclosed all relevant facts, where he fails to state that in addition to the one deceased's name in the application, or intended deceased, it makes no difference, he in the same attack shot four additional people who were in the same minibus taxi as the deceased named in the application, but in respect of whom no amnesty is sought and who were killed in consequence of a person's vendetta harboured by the amnesty applicant.  The answer must surely be in the affirmative.  The submission is accordingly that where an amnesty applicant has committed a series of criminal acts, on behalf of the same organisation in pursuit of that organisation's political objectives, full disclosure of relevant facts implies that he must put the Amnesty committee in the position where it can properly apply its mind to the criteria in section 20(iii) and this in turn implies that all evidence pertaining to motive, context, proportionality, absence of personal gain, absence of personal malice etc, is relevant to the determination and accordingly admissible.  It follows from the above that the question whether the relevant facts to be elicited in evidence pertaining to a non-prosecutable extra territorial offence in respect of which no amnesty is sought, would be immaterial for purposes of determining whether such evidence is relevant to the proceedings.  If, as Mr Joe Verster suggests, the murders of Evans and Omar constitute a proportional response in order to combat the threat posed by individuals to the State, then evidence concerning the methods employed to select other actual or intended victims, is clearly irrelevant.  This would also be so, whether the victims were to be killed in RSA or elsewhere.  	A further reason why evidence concerning the commission of crimes in respect of which no amnesty has been sought, may be relevant, is to be derived from the meaning of the word offence.  In paragraph 7, Section 21 (c) obliges the amnesty applicant to make full disclosure of all relevant facts with regard to the "offence" for which amnesty has been sought.  This is an additional and both joined and alternative ground, Mr Chairman.  It is our submission that there is evidence that the CCB's command structure formulated a conspiracy to murder a considerable number of persons who were identified as the perceived enemy of the State.  Among these intended victims were Gavin Evans and Minister Dullah Omar.  There were however other intended victims.  Had the accused been charged with conspiracy to murder, it is our submission that the likely offence with which the CCB members or the Board of Directors of which Mr Verster was the Managing Director, would have been charged - was a conspiracy to murder all the intended victims selected or identified during the relevant period.  Accordingly that is the offence for which amnesty should have been sought by the participants in the conspiracy.  Cross-examination to detail - to elicit details of the full extent of the conspiracy, is accordingly relevant and permissible.  A summary of the relevant case, nor dealing with the formulation of an indictment in circumstances where the State wishes to prosecute a wide range of conspiracy is set out as follows:
"The starting point would be following a general principle where two acts are committed of which each standing alone would be a criminal offence, but there is a single intent, then the accused shall only be charged with one offence because the act constituted one criminal transaction.  The further consideration is the principle set out in R v HEINE AND OTHERS, (with the references given) practical considerations must decide whether it is permissible to charge a person with a course of conduct when what he has done consists not of an unbroken spell of uniform behaviour, but of a series of closely followed similar acts.  Those considerations require that in the proper case, a planned course of fraudulent conduct may be charged as a single crime of fraud even if it might be possible to analyse it on a series of separate frauds.
Further at 6.2.6. Schreiner J.A. states the following:
"Where there is a series of acts done in pursuance of one criminal design, the law recognises the practical necessity of allowing the ...(indistinct) with due regard to what is fair to the accused, to charge a series of criminal course or conduct, that is as a single trial."
Following this approach, the court in R VS ADAMS AND OTHERS in 1959, generally known as a treason trial 1956 - 61 held that at last as far as treason is concerned, a series of treasonable overt acts in pursuance of one criminal design to overthrow the State, is chargeable as a single offence, as a single indictment."