Amnesty Hearings — Kimberley — 1997-10-29

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I'm not aware of any other list, this was the final written submission.  The only documents that are there connected to two submissions, the first last year and this year, are Appendix 8 and I don't know what the contents of Appendix 8 are - whether it will include what is being said here but I'm not aware of any other list.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, you must have heard their response.

PROF DE KOKER: Thank you Mr Chairman, but in the light of the response - and it seem to me that this particular document is not of particular relevance to this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Which document?

PROF DE KOKER: The particular document referred to as the: "Green Book".

CHAIRPERSON: I think we must distinguish between points for argument which you can argue at the end after the evidence, and leading evidence and not interrupt the flow of evidence with arguments and start being engaged in arguments about that.
	I'm not so sure - even on that argument of yours, I'm not so sure whether you're right in saying so you know.  I'm not so sure whether we are on the same wavelength as to the purpose of the: "Green Book" because as I understood the situation yesterday, the purpose of the "Green Book" was not to try and show that this incident was listed, that was not the purpose for which it was referred to.

PROF DE KOKER: Mr Chairman, I agree on that score but ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose for referring to the: "Green Book", what was the purpose as you understand it?

PROF DE KOKER: As I understood it, it was led as evidence to show that a certain command initiative was allowed but the specific passage is linked to the appendix and the appendix only deals with incidents from 1960 to 1989, so it seems it is open to interpretation that it pertains only to command initiatives during that period, during a period of intensive struggle.  And then we reach the end of the page and there's no further information regarding the ambit of the command initiatives once the peace ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying any applicant coming to apply for amnesty in respect of an incident which is not listed there, would not be entitled to rely on the "Green Book" to show that there was some discretion allowed on their part?  And any such applicant seeking to rely on the: "Green Book" to show that as regional commanders they were allowed some discretion, is not entitled to rely on that book and in his application this: "Green Book" would be irrelevant?

PROF DE KOKER: I would certainly like a more clear indication that the same ambit of the command initiative as existed during the height of the struggle, was also existing after the peace process had started in 1991 and at the moment when this particular act was perpetrated in 1993, 11 months before the elections.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you will argue that because you have a different perception as to when was the height of the struggle and somebody may have a different perception.  You may believe that the struggle must have ended at a certain point, somebody might say that the struggle was not yet over so all these are questions for argument you know and I think it affects the relevance of that: "Green Book".

PROF DE KOKER: Thank you Mr Chairman, I take your indication then I will return to it in argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, please proceed, I'm sorry.

PROF DE KOKER: Thank you Mr Chairman.  I would like to continue with the cross-examination of Mr Walter Smiles.
	Mr Smiles, yesterday ended with a number of questions regarding your HRV application, specifically - or your HRV evidence, specifically your evidence that when it was time to hand over the third petition: 
"Then there was a sign that I must throw this grenade and he lay down at the same time"
You were unsure yesterday and you were given time to reconsider, can you please explain your evidence given last year?

WALTER SMILES: Mr de Koker, to explain this now - the signal that we were talking about, I was a bit frightened yesterday but now to explain it today - when we got out of the car, I got this instruction and the instruction was that when the march was returning home, then I would have to throw the hand grenade.   Unfortunately I saw the hand grenade striking this man in his face and then I went and lay down because I knew what the hand grenade could do.

PROF DE KOKER: You're now saying that this signal to which you referred last year wasn't a signal as such but rather the instruction which you got.  Unfortunately at that same occasion - page 40 of the documentation, a little bit before you told the Committee
"When I got out of the car there, I wasn't informed of any grenade or anything, I was just given a piece of paper"
And then you continued and it made sense - you didn't get complete instructions, you came and then that signal was given to you that you had to throw this grenade.

WALTER SMILES: Mr de Koker, I understand what you're explaining but on that day I was very scared and it was the first time that I was in a crowd,  it was very big crowd and I was a bit confused.

PROF DE KOKER: But yesterday you said when the Committee asked you, you felt
totally at ease when you made this statement and today you're saying you were scared and what you said there was wrong.  How is this possible?

WALTER SMILES: Just explain to me again.

PROF DE KOKER: Yesterday you were asked by Commissioner Khampepe, whether you felt at ease, whether you felt comfortable when you were making this statement - when you gave this evidence, today you're telling us that you were scared and that's why you said things that weren't true.

WALTER SMILES: People can get a fright, today I feel better able to explain it.

PROF DE KOKER: Mr Smiles, you said you got out of the car with a white bag with the hand grenade inside it, when did you take the hand grenade out of the bag?

WALTER SMILES: During the march.

PROF DE KOKER: What did you do with the bag?

WALTER SMILES: I gave the bag to someone, I can't remember who it was.

PROF DE KOKER: So, you handed the bag to someone else and what did you do with the grenade?

WALTER SMILES: I walked with the grenade right up to the Bophuthatswana Consulate building.

PROF DE KOKER: Did you have it in your hand?

WALTER SMILES: No, I hand it under my T-shirt, under my skippa.

PROF DE KOKER: Under the T-shirt?

WALTER SMILES: Yes.

PROF DE KOKER: How did you keep it inside your T-shirt?

WALTER SMILES: I used my own initiative to keep it inside the T-shirt.

PROF DE KOKER: And what was this initiative?

WALTER SMILES: I couldn't be seen with this hand grenade.

PROF DE KOKER: I just want to know - this heavy grenade, how did you keep it under your T-shirt?  What did you do to keep it from falling out?

WALTER SMILES: I had a belt like this one I'm wearing in my trousers.

PROF DE KOKER: A belt?  Did you hook it on the belt?

WALTER SMILES: No.

PROF DE KOKER: Can you then perhaps just explain to us?

WALTER SMILES: You must please explain to me very clearly.

PROF DE KOKER: You're talking about a belt which kept the hand grenade from falling out underneath the T-shirt, is that correct?

WALTER SMILES: Yes, that's correct.

PROF DE KOKER: Where did you wear this belt?

WALTER SMILES: Like you're wearing this belt around your waist to keep up your trousers.

PROF DE KOKER: Did you hook it to the belt?

WALTER SMILES: No.

PROF DE KOKER: How did you use the belt to hold the grenade?

WALTER SMILES: So it can't fall out - you see, I put in the bottom like this so it was lying like this at the bottom and the belt was keeping it - you see, that's what I'm explaining.

PROF DE KOKER: A hand grenade which is worn like this isn't really hidden, that big bulge under your shirt is quite obvious.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, this is not the Skippa he put on, is it?