Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1999-04-06

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Then page 132, paragraph 45
"The strategy set out, the philosophy of total war and total strategy.  It also included details on the threat analysis, the national aims, objectives and policy, as well as the political economic, social, psychological and security policies of the RSA, the independent homelands of Southern Africa.  The strategy emphasised the need for coordinated action on all of the above terrains and recognised the 80/20% requirement of the conflict.  That is, that the greater accent should be placed on the political and other spheres, while the security aspects only made up 20% of the solution."
What is your view of this approach?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: If I may, Chairperson, the 80/20% principle is connected to the power bases of the State, the power bases of the State which are the targets of the attacker, of the revolutionary attacker.  There are five of these power bases and psychologically or the psychological power base is the most important overarching one.   The second power base is the security of the State.  The third one is the integrity of the State itself, it's also called the political power base, the constitutional power base.  The fourth one is the economic power base that deals with everything that gives a country its political impetus and growth.  The fifth one is the social power base which deals with human beings in their daily life.  The last three, so-called "sem" power bases are also known as the prosperity power bases.
	As far as the 80/20% principle is concerned here, this principle was for the first time used by a Frenchman in the war in Algeria.  It was identified by him as on the hand indicative of the fact that the counter-revolutionary effort as well as the revolutionary effort should be aimed at the 80%, namely economic, political and social, and that the security power base only rates at a 20% degree of importance.  And in conventional war it is totally different because there the integrity of the Security Forces will be the most important power base.  Here the issue is to gain control over the State and the economy and the entire social environment of the State.

MR KNOETZE: Were you at the time already aware of this approach, this 80/20% approach?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, yes, I was.

MR KNOETZE: And was that also manifested in Katzen and Strelitzia?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  If we look at the chief objective of both plans then we'll see that both plans were striding for normalisation as its end result.  Perhaps if I may just define normalisation and stabilisation.  Normalisation deals with the social area and you talk of a normalised community or civilisation where the whole populace is economically active and where there is an organised social system, then you can say such a whole system is normalised.  Stabilisation on the other hand is a term which is used in connection with the security terrain.  Stabilisation then indicates that a man or person and all his bodies and institutions are safe and secure and that he has freedom of movement.
	There is another term which is used as far as the psychological power base is concerned, and that is dependability and lack of vulnerability and that indicates how prepared a country is to prepare itself.  That is something we had to look at as well.

MR KNOETZE: Thank you.  Paragraph 47
"The area of responsibility included the RSA and South African/Namibia and was therefore the main focus of defence and the base area for all military activities.  The area of influence, also referred to as the tactical area, included the immediate neighbouring territories, some of which provided base facilities for hostile action against the RSA and Namibia.  According to the national strategy the SADF had to have the capacity of conducting preventative and preemptive operations in those areas."
Now this principle, was this embodied in Katzen?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.  Transkei and Ciskei was within my sphere of influence, and the surrounding commands of Natal, Free State and Southern Cape were also within my spheres of interest and influence.  The Southern Cape later became part of my area of responsibility.  The area of responsibility was the Eastern Province, from East London, Aliwal North and later as far as Graaff-Reinet.  The areas of responsibility also included the territorial waters of that area.
	I was responsible for, as far as the area of influence was concerned, to also put place certain normalisation and stabilisation programmes in conjunction with those countries' Defence Forces.

MR KNOETZE: On page 134, paragraph 52 and 53
"This all developed at the stage that the ANC was vigorously applying its new strategy.  The Regional Political Military Committees (RMPCs) with their machineries or military task groups were being established in Maputo, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Lusaka and later Zimbabwe.  Violence in the country escalated.  MK cadres played an important role in intensifying the internal onslaught, and the political and military training of MK members inside the country and in the neighbouring areas was ongoing.  MK began to establish military structures and political cells in some of the township areas, which developed into base or so-called "no-go" areas.  From 1984 onwards the internal conflict in the RSA started entering its worst and most uncompromising phase.  There was a shift in emphasis from hard to soft targets.  This shift saw the degeneration of the armed struggle and the destruction of the lives and property of innocent civilians.  In the ensuing five years nearly 400 persons were necklaced and another 370 died, when their persons or homes were doused with fuel and set alight.  More than 7 000 private homes and 1 700 schools were destroyed or severely damaged during rioting over the same period.  In one year alone, between 1985 and 1986, damage of approximately R90-million was caused through rioting."
You've already referred to this before, but do you confirm that this was also a manifest in the Cape, in the Eastern Cape?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: And you ask the Committee then to also take that into consideration when Plan Katzen is evaluated?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR KNOETZE: The same then also goes for paragraph 54
"It was also during this time that the SADF had to accept more responsibility for internal operations in support of the SA Police, and the Minister of Defence reported to parliament as follows
	"The present situation in the RSA in which unrest is occurring on a larger scale than before, has made the employment of the SA Defence Force in  support of the SA Police in the prevention and combatting of unrest inevitable.  It is essential to create and maintain peaceful conditions in which the government's constitution initiatives may be developed."
You also ask the Committee to bear that in mind?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes.

MR KNOETZE: Then I'd like to take you to page 138, paragraph 62
"From the above paragraphs it should be obvious that the national and departmental planning process was ongoing and of a dynamic nature, with constant adaptations according to the actual and perceived threats."
Now could one regard Plan Katzen also as a plan of a dynamic nature?

CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN: Yes, definitely.

MR KNOETZE: In what regard, in what way?