Amnesty Hearings — Pretoria — 1976-07-19

MR RHOODE: Thinking back on it today could you say whether he for example whether he deliberately tried to develop you into the position you occupied at this stage?

MR VAN WYK: I cannot say that Mr du Plessis(Snr) had an inherently evil plan, not according to my understanding, but that he definitely believed in what he believed and what I also believed in at that time we believed that it was the absolute truth. As a result it was very important to him that the people around him should be converted to his beliefs.  Yes it was very important that people believed what he believed in.
	I also think that he deliberately, as a result of his views, and remember his views were that he had made those around him aware of the absolute terror that awaited them and the world-wide plot that was being brewed and I think that it was out of this view that he won me over.

MR RHOODE: So one can say in summary that he was a person with a pleasant personality and a tremendously convincing manner?

MR VAN WYK: Absolutely.

MR RHOODE: Just one or two other factors.  At a stage when the National Socialist Partisans were now inaugurated where was your base and from where did you operate?

MR VAN WYK: We had no fixed base at this stage. We operated form a plot in Pretoria North in Pyramid which served as our base for a long time but we basically decided to go underground at the time of the negotiations and we operated from various holiday resorts.  And should we have left the country shortly thereafter who would disappear altogether from civil  society and to begin with founding a base in Namibia.

MR RHOODE: Now can we just briefly take you to the abortive attempt to break into the Louis Trichardt Command. Who were initially present at that operation?

MR VAN WYK: It was myself, du Plessis and Grobler who were present.

MR RHOODE: Who eventually took the decision, who was responsible for the decision to abandon the attack?

MR VAN WYK: Du Plessis was responsible for that.

MR RHOODE: Why do you say this?

MR VAN WYK: Du Plessis had the overhaul say about what happened.  I think that White indeed during that operation held the view that the information was no longer what it had been and he wanted to continue with the attack but du Plessis persuaded him to abandon the operation because the information was no longer reliable.

MR RHOODE: Were there any internal disagreements between any of the figures in the NSP?

MR VAN WYK: There was now and then a hiccough. I know at one stage I too had my doubts about Operation 32 because it was a very large base.  I did not think it was a viable plan but I managed to reconcile myself with it eventually. There was also at one stage a struggle, a type of leadership - not leadership - but White was the military leader and I think that at a stage there was a disagreement between him and du Plessis because I think that White had become too militaristic and his ability to make judgements started to weaken gradually with time.

MR VAN WYK: Now regarding the murders at Louis Trichardt can you tell the Committee how long it was before you got to the farm and when you had last seen Mr du Plessis?

MR VAN WYK: I think we left on the Sunday for Louis Trichardt.   Mr du Plessis, if I remember correctly, I last saw him on the Friday.

MR RHOODE: And how long after you returned from Louis Trichardt did you see him again?

MR VAN WYK: We saw him the morning or the afternoon of Monday the 13th or the 14th, but it was Monday afternoon.

MR RHOODE: Now with the planning, did you take part in the planning of the operation on the farm?

MR VAN WYK: Yes I did. I did not do the planning myself but they indeed passed the planning on to me. Du Plessis wasn't there, it was only White who did the planning and passed it on to me, he was indeed a thorough military planner as a result of his training as he had been in the army.

MR RHOODE: At what stage do you say that Mr du Plessis let his son know about this operation?

MR VAN WYK: It was earlier, we were on our way to Durban to the Shebeen which we intended to rob but which didn't materialise when White started to talk about the operation which we would undertake at Oudtshoorn and then he basically made the proposition of which du Plessis also told his son in respect of stealing the weapons, and White, if I remember correctly, had asked du Plessis for his weapon, the 9mm pistol which du Plessis handed over to him.

MR RHOODE: Would you agree with me if I put it to you that what concerns Mr du Plessis and yourself too, that at no stage was it seriously considered or anticipated that there was a possibility of a shooting developing?

MR VAN WYK: No I didn't think that there would be any possibility of shooting taking place which would involve civilians.  In the back of my mind I knew that at one time or another that there would be a confrontation with one of the security forces as happened with mini-patrols.

MR RHOODE: There is one matter which you mentioned in passing, the attack on Battalion, what do you call it, 32, that's at Pomfriet?

MR VAN WYK: That's right.

MR RHOODE: But that's an immense military base?

MR VAN WYK: It is. That's precisely why we wanted to get the weapons in the beginning and what the Oudtshoorn operation was for in order to equip 24 to 30 men who could attack 32 Battalion.  But you are correct it is an immense base where thousands of people were stationed permanently.

MR RHOODE: Is it so or can you inform me, I understood from the court documents that the commanders or the soldiers at Oudtshoorn or at Potch did not even know about the break-ins until you came to point them out.

MR VAN WYK: That is correct, they did not even know about them.

MR RHOODE: Would you say that months after that a mass of weapons were stolen from the army that the army didn't even know about that?

MR VAN WYK: That is true, they did not know about it.  In contrast with the Potchefstroom operation we laughed about it at the time to think that it had been so easy, we could have driven in in a truck and stolen the contents of the entire depot or ammunition depot without anyone being aware of it.

MR RHOODE: But it was a time of strife in the country and many guards and a great awareness of danger, how could you have achieved such activities?

MR VAN WYK: I think that we did some good planning but apart from that the military were absolutely slack with regard to this aspect, particularly in Potchefstroom.

MR RHOODE: Is this what motivated you to think that you could tackle one of the strongest Battalions and steal their weapons, like 32?

MR VAN WYK: Yes that would have been the planning and also to undertake the operation at night time when they were asleep.  I think the only obstacle we considered when planning the operation would have been the removal of this large quantity of weapons, which must have been tons of weapons. This was the only obstacle which still required detailed planning and I at one point thought this was a too tall order, but in the course of time I agreed with them that it was possible.

MR RHOODE: Only one personal question Mr van Wyk, are you in any way uncomfortable in a prison where you are now in a constantly hostile environment?

MR VAN WYK: No I have no such problems.  I live in harmony with the people whom I'm associated with and I also associate with many Black people and I talk to many of them and even give classes to a number of Black students. I teach them mathematics for standard four at this stage and I do not experience any problems. On the contrary, one of my very good friends is indeed a Coloured and we get on well.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR RHOODE

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the adjournment now and resume at 14:15
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

CORNELIUS JOHANNES VAN WYK: (s.u.o.)

MOKOTEDI MPSHE: Mr van Wyk in your party did you have a written policy whereupon you were operating?