Amnesty Hearings — White River — 2000-05-02

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is because we were targeting mainly patrols of the whom we regarded as our enemy then, that is the South African National Defence Force, the South African Police and as I indicated, part of what we regarded as their support structure, farmers who would also patrol, Commandos who would also patrol the roads which we targeted with these landmines and not people walking, or even farmers walking.  We targeted vehicles that were patrolling.

MR BERGER: Now you said in the main you didn't have direct contact with the soldiers.  What sort of discretion, how wide was the discretion that was left to the particular cadres on the ground as to where to plant a landmine, when to plant the landmine, which particular farmer or military establishment to target?  What sort of discretion were they given and how did you control that?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well, Chairman, in this regard, the modus operandi was no different from other activities that we engaged in as Umkhonto weSizwe, whether it was in the urban areas, or in the rural areas, we gave our operatives general guidelines, what sort of targets to attack and what targets not to attack.  The cadres of the African National Congress were trained also to think strategically, they were not just trained to use the equipment that they were given and left to operate that equipment, because in many instances they operated not under guidance, no under direct supervision, so we had to rely on them because of their training, their political training, their political equipment, to be able to exercise their own minds.  We gave them general guidelines about what targets to attack and what targets not to attack.  In the case of the landmines, they knew too what our targets were, that our targets were mainly patrols of the military as well as the police, as well as farmers connected to the Security network.  Where possible, they had to avoid also attacks on ordinary farmers and ordinary workers on the farms, although that was going to be difficult, but these were the guidelines that we gave them, Chairman, because we knew who our targets were and these people then went to carry out this reconnaissance themselves and they made the decisions on the spot, on the basis of the guidelines, the political guidelines that we had given them.

MR BERGER: ;   Subsequent to an operation, would you have received a report-back?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: In some instances yes, in some, no, because I indicated earlier on Chairman that some of the people, or some of the operatives were based inside the country, that we relied on people who were in the areas where they operated and communication was not direct.  We gave them the guidelines and they carried out the operation and sometimes they remained inside without coming to report and remained to carry out other operations internally, so it was not always the case that we received reports.

MR BERGER: In those instances where you did receive reports, were you satisfied that the cadres on the ground were following the guidelines of the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Yes, Chairman.

MR BERGER: General, in your Further Particulars, you've listed certain incidents of landmine explosions in this area, but you also say in your Further Particulars that you don't purport these incidents to be a complete list, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: This is correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: And that even today, you say there may be incidents that you are unaware of that were carried out on the basis of your instructions, would that be correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: It is correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: And is it correct that you assumed responsibility for all landmine explosions that were carried out pursuant to your instructions from 1985 onwards, all landmine explosions, I beg your pardon, in the former Eastern Transvaal?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I do, Chairman.

MR BERGER: Now, at a point, the campaign "Kletshwayo" was called off by the military leadership in Lusaka, is that correct?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I heard so.

MR BERGER: You were no longer involved at that stage?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: That's correct, Chairman.

MR BERGER: When did you cease being in command of "Kletshwayo"?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: I was recalled to Lusaka in early 1987 and never went back to Swaziland to continue command of the special project "Kletshwayo".

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Berger.  Ms Mtanga, any questions?

MS MTANGA: I just have one question, Chairperson, thank you.

MS MTANGA: Mr Nyanda, as a Commander at that time, were you in a position to know the units that operated inside the country, that is the members of those units?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Even those, I didn't know even those that operated from outside the country, I only knew people by their pseudonyms.  Gen Shoke, I didn't know he was Gen Shoke until he came into the country, I knew him as Jabo and I still call him Jabo.

MS MTANGA: Were you involved in the selection of the operatives?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Not in this instance.  Yes because I had been a Commander in Umkhonto weSizwe for a long time and this was just a project that I was given, I used to go to Angola to select people for work inside the country.

MS MTANGA: So are you saying in the landmine explosions, you were not involved in the selection of operatives?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: No.  No Chairman.

MS MTANGA: And was your structure involved in actually deciding the areas that must be - were you aware that you targeted the borders, let's say in those border areas, did you decide which areas were your problem areas and would you have known which areas were those?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Well my area specifically was the area, parts of Mozambique, Southern Mozambique as well as Swaziland, the whole of Swaziland border.

MS MTANGA: Did you, or were you specifically aware of where these landmines would be placed?  Would you be given the exact details?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: In most instances, no.

MS MTANGA: We have an incident here which took place between Barberton and Diepgesit, where four people were killed and one injured and from the statements given by the victims, it appears that this was very close to a residential area, so what I would like to know is, would your office or your structure, be aware of these exact locations of these landmines and I take into account the fact that there were people living around where they were placing the landmines.

SIPHIWE NYANDA: Mr Chairman, as I said, most times we relied on people who resided in those areas to take the initiative themselves, based on the general guidelines we gave them and if people who stayed in any area where people resided thought that they would target a particular army patrol or so, then I think the discretion was left to them to do so and sometimes of course, it wouldn't be the case that the landmine would be triggered by the military, but by civilians, but the discretion was left to the people based on the general guidelines we gave them about what to do and what not to do.

MS MTANGA: You also mentioned that the weight of a landmine that you used was about 850 kg.  I'm not well-versed on landmines... (intervention)

MR BERGER: No.  No, no, that wasn't what the General said.

MS MTANGA: I beg your pardon?

MR BERGER: That wasn't what the General said, he said that was the weight of the vehicle that had to be on top of the landmine, not the weight of the landmine.

MS MTANGA: Oh yes, alright, you're correct.  In your - with this in mind, what sort of vehicles would have triggered this landmine?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: If a vehicle is over 1 000 Kg, it means it's not an ordinary sedan.

MS MTANGA: Would this include ordinary bakkies, in your knowledge?

SIPHIWE NYANDA: A bakkie, yes, it would be triggered by it sometimes.