Amnesty Hearings — Durban — 1998-12-01

MS THABETE: Can you give us an illustration or an example of your involvement in the communication links from the stage where someone telephones you and say go and collect a letter at a fax, can you just give us one example where this happened?  A practical example?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: I remember at a particular time, immediately following the record of understanding that was signed between the ANC and the National Party which was viciously rejected by the  IFP at the time, there was a massive surge of violence in a number of communities, including around here, but particularly down in the South Coast area.
	And at that stage something happened, resources dried up.  There had also been a great deal of police activity, I recall confiscations and that type of thing, and Mandla had come to me and indicated that we need something.
	My reference was straight through to MHQ, this is by the end of September 1992 or something like that, to indicate that help, we need some weapons, things are actually in a sensitive and difficult position, can you do something?
	I can't remember specifically, but it must have been about two or three days later, the call came through to say we have been able to do something, here is the communication, it is coming through.  I passed that straight on to Mandla, and that was it.
	But I mean, these again by saying that there was no written record, I don't have a diary that actually notes these things in any particular manner, but the - I suppose the point I am making ultimately is that the acquisition of weapons in my own mind and recollection, were distinctly related to particular periods of very intense conflicts in certain communities.
	That was - and ammunition in particular.

MS THABETE: I asked you this question because I needed a practical example of what you were telling us generally.  Maybe my last question is you say you were dealing with Mr Sithole.  Was he responsible for the whole region of KZN or the southern region or also the northern region because in his application it looks like he was also very much involved in the northern part of KZN?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: Well, Mandla's official position with MK as confirmed by the little message from General Nyanda to the Chairperson of the Region, was as an MK officer within Southern Natal.
	That doesn't mean to say that there is a wall around Southern Natal and the other regions, but at an operational level as an MK operative, he is responsibilities were Southern Natal.  From his application, the other stuff, there is different time periods and whatever, but I am sure Mandla would be able to talk about that.

MS THABETE: Yes, okay.  Thank you, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabete.  Mr Wills, do you have any re-examination?

MR WILLS: No re-examination Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions to ask Dr Phillips?

MR SIBANYONI: Just one question Mr Chairperson.  Dr Phillips, maybe to kick on the questions which were asked by Ms Thabete, suppose this Committee is satisfied with the evidence you have given to it, etc, in your own words, what would you say the Committee should give you amnesty for?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: Amnesty for dealing unlawfully in weapons of a particular nature at that time, that is all I would be able to suggest.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.  That is my only question.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Sibanyoni.  Mr Lax, do you have any questions?

MR LAX: Just one quick question Mr Chairperson.  Dr Phillips, you spoke of being involved in classes and political education and so on, one understands that your life wasn't made up of this kind of work alone.  You have indicated that you were involved in a whole range of activities, of which this work was just a facet.
	But you would visit areas and so on, and in the process of that, requests would be made.  Did you - what I am trying to understand is, you'd obviously come back to your office with Mandla sometimes, perhaps with Mr Radebe, did you sit down and try and do an assessment of what these needs were and how you might meet those or do an analysis of the information that was coming in?
	Clearly there must have been some need to debrief that intelligence, if I could put it in that sense?

IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: Yes, absolutely.  I think you can divide it into two categories as well.  One incident I remember particularly, I think it was the 2nd of December 1992, where another comrade who was at the University and myself, called to investigate a massacre that had occurred in Bambai.  We went to Bambai, midmorning, the incident had apparently taken place in the very early morning, four or five o'clock, however the bodies were, about eight or nine bodies of people, mainly women and children, were laying where they had been shot.
	It hadn't been removed, because the police were waiting for the SABC TV cameras to arrive first, so they told us.  In that particular instance in Bambai, was a very specific case, the members of the community who spoke to us, as an official ANC delegation, we were joined by other comrades, indicated quite clearly who the perpetrators were, where they were, and they were still across the little valley which separates Bambai from the IFP settlement at that stage.
	The request was very simple, here is the evidence, we have been telling you for months and months that we are under attack, do something.
	In that very personal thing, I can come back to the office and the evidence is very clear to me, yes, something needs to be done, and I can make a direct recommendation to comrade Mandla by saying we need to get something for that community so that it can defend itself in future.  It is very, very, absolutely necessary.
	However, there would be other instances where less directly involved with a particular incident.  You would get in the course of meetings wherever, (indistinct), Umkababa, whatever, again people and appeals would be made from the floor, in a public meeting that we need assistance, we are being massacred.
	From the position of an REC member, we have got direct links into the ANC structures of those particular areas.  When you come back as a political leader, obviously you need to address the intelligence structures and the military structures and say it seems to me that something is required in this particular area, what needs to be done?
	The military side of things, the people involved in the SDU's, the people who know what type of things are needed to counteract the type of attack that is being waged against you, they are the ones that can come up with a more proper assessment of what is required in terms of arms and ammunition in an area.
	When that decision is taken or assessed, and they of course do their own assessments, I am merely an instrument of communicating that request north, I do not have a veto power on it, and I would never have exercised a veto power on it either simply because I didn't think it was necessary in a particular area.
	If a legitimate structure operated by comrade Mandla indicated to me we need weapons for a particular area, I would take that message as soon as I possibly could, to military Headquarters.

MR LAX: Okay.  Just the very last aspect of that, when you passed on those messages, were they in code, did they refer to a specific area necessarily?  What I am trying to understand is, how would military HQ know that they had to activate a Dead Letter Box near Macubeni for example as opposed to say Sindumbele, or something like that and how were you able to communicate?