Amnesty Hearings — Pietermaritzburg — UNKNOWN

UNKNOWN: I think Mr de Jager is asking you how would these people, being strangers, identify this particular house?

WITNESS:   Mr Gabela was the one that knew the area.  He was present with us when we were discussing this.

WILSON J: Can I intervene again at this stage?  My recollection, Mr Mitchell, is that this was a rural area, the houses weren't close together, they were down this road or that road.  It wasn't a question of going up into an entirely built-up area to pick out a house.  And there were trees growing there and things of that nature, weren't there?

UNKNOWN: Ja, but still I don't understand.  A stranger, how would he - I mean if it is more than - even if it is more than three houses how would a stranger be able to identify the house in question?

WITNESS:   From the proximity of the shop, because there's only one shop there, and the house - and there was a house next to it.  But there was a house behind it, and the houses that were, let's say subject of the discussion, was the house behind the shop.

UNKNOWN: Are you saying that it was described to them as to how the house was located in relation to the shop, etcetera, etcetera?

WITNESS:   Yes, but in the dark it looks

UNKNOWN: /- they

UNKNOWN: - they went too far.  In other words - I think sometimes in my own experience if you walk in the dark you're inclined to go further than what you should, or you get a little bit disorientated.  I think that's the only thing that I can - as I've sat and tried to think about it over these years.

UNKNOWN: Mr Mitchell, I am trying to follow your evidence.  Are you saying that earlier on that day there was a pointing out made by Gabela in your presence and also in the presence of the constables?

WITNESS:   No, no, that is not correct.  No, there was a different operation earlier on in the morning.  It was a different operation.

UNKNOWN: So you also had not been aware of the location of the house?

WITNESS:   No, I didn't go and see where the house was.  I personally didn't go and see where the house was.

UNKNOWN: Mr Mitchell, let me just take you to page 30 of your document just to correct one thing.  That is with regard to the date when the meeting at Morawa House took place.  That's paragraph 129.  I think this point was raised earlier on, and your counsel stated that that meeting must have taken place about the 29th of November.  But I think - I don't know whether you will agree with me that it in fact appears to be the 30th of November in accordance with the date reflected at paragraph 129.  That's on page 20.  Is that ... (incomplete)

CHAIRPERSON: The last sentence of paragraph 129.

SISI KHAMPEPE: At paragraph 128, Mr Mitchell, you state that there was a second visit by Captain Terblanche - the date is not reflected, but one can presume that it was immediately after the 24th of November - wherein he instructed that violence had to be stopped at all costs.

SISI KHAMPEPE: /---   Yes,

SISI KHAMPEPE: ---   Yes, that's correct, you've got the right place there.  On the 29th was his second visit, so his first visit was around about the 24th, if I recall it.  The second visit was on the 29th, and it was the following day that we went to Morawa House, so that would have been the 30th.

SISI KHAMPEPE: I just wanted to correct my facts there.  The gruesome killing at House TF83 could be viewed as having been intentionally carried out with a view of galvanising the Inkatha into action against the UDF or the ANC, and thereby significantly increasing the black on black violence.  Would that be the correct view?

WITNESS:   Yes, that is what happened, yes.

SISI KHAMPEPE: If that is so then, Mr Mitchell, is it possible that there might have been an intention on your part to mislead the special constables, or not to pay due regard in making sure that they went to the right place, because it was intended that in any event the attack should be launched on the Inkatha members in order to galvanise such a response from the Inkatha people against the ANC?

WITNESS:   No, no, no, that - no, no, that was never - it was never the - my alliance or my allegiance and my loyalty to Inkatha and the special constables' loyalty to Inkatha would never have allowed us to do that.  No, it was never in any way to reflect that it was something - it wasn't - our loyalties was to Inkatha.  That's why I say they would never have gone and killed their own people, and I would have never deceived them, no.

SISI KHAMPEPE: The operation which was carried out on the 2nd of November, the crime prevention operation, you say there were about 40 policemen who took part in that operation.

SISI KHAMPEPE: /---   Yes,

SISI KHAMPEPE: ---   Yes, really I am taking a big guess now because I -we're going back many years now and I can't remember.  I am just trying to picture how many people were there.  It could have been roughly 36 people if I divide them into groups of six.  It may be a little bit less.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Were that number aware of why that operation was being carried out?

WITNESS:   Were they aware of what they were doing?

SISI KHAMPEPE: Why they had to clean up the area.  Were they aware that it was in preparation of a plan to direct an attack against the UDF?

WITNESS:   Well, they - no, they weren't privileged to that meeting, and they weren't privileged to that information, because it was done on a higher command structure.  But they know - obviously they'd been told the morning that it was a UDF area, so there was quite a lot of allegiance within the ranks of the SAP on the side of Inkatha generally speaking, from your divisional commissioner structures where I was right down through the ranks.

SISI KHAMPEPE: You have stated in your document and in your evidence that Mr Ntombela in fact ordered the attack against the UDF on the 30th of November.

WITNESS:   No.  No, the reason that Mr Gabela was taken to Morawa House was that he be schooled into - because he was seen as a very weak leader, and it was the idea of putting more - telling him and getting him to take a more stronger hand in the area, and then launching the attack because the special constables would have been put at his disposal.

SISI KHAMPEPE: At that stage had a decision to bring in these special constables - had that decision been taken?

WITNESS:  I was told at that meeting that special constables would

SISI KHAMPEPE: /be sent.

SISI KHAMPEPE: be sent.

SISI KHAMPEPE: That decision was taken after the meeting at Morawa House, is it not correct?

WITNESS:   Ja, basically the meeting was taken - well, it was at the same time, because from there we went to the Riot Unit, because I was in the company of Major Terblanche.

SISI KHAMPEPE: Mr Mitchell, according to paragraph 133, which is on page 30 of your document, you state that on your way back to New Hanover Gabela confirmed that he had been told to launch an attack against the UDF after the police operation on the 2nd of December 1988, and you go on to say he was told by David Ntombela, and he was further told that offensive assistance - and I presume that also military assistance - would be provided in the form of armed special ... (incomplete)

WITNESS:   Yes, that is correct.  That is correct.

SISI KHAMPEPE: So in fact it was Mr Gabela who ordered the attack on the UDF according to what you are stating.

WITNESS:   Ja, I think that is narrowing it a little bit too much, because I think the presence of Captain Terblanche and myself and David Ntombela - I think it wasn't something that we could have told him, and said to him, "You must go and attack."  It had to come from within his own party.

SISI KHAMPEPE: That's page 30 to 31.  You were also requested by, I think Captain van den Heever, to make sure that you picked up any shotgun doppies left behind by the special constables.  Did you in fact do that after the operation had been carried out by the special constables?