Special Hearings — Political Party Recalls — UNKNOWN

MR GOOSEN: Thank you. During 1986 the Eastern Province Command, the self-same Brigadier van der Westhuizen initiated a proposed operation which had at its heart the creation of a Xhosa resistance movement to act as a bulwark against the revolutionary onslaught of the ANC. Critical to the successful implementation of the operation, which took place under the direction of the Chief of Staff, Intelligence, of the South African defence force, was the unlawful freeing of Charles Sebe from prison, the recruitment and training of a group of Transkei defence force special forces' members, the overthrow of Lennox Sebe and the elimination of certain key individuals. Operation Katzen, as it was known, involved the paramilitary training of a group of persons in offensive actions and in the use of sophisticated weapons. The operation was a covert project of the Directorate of Special Tasks of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: and fell directly under the operational command of Chief of Staff, Intelligence of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: . 
Amnesty applications have now been received from very senior military personnel which would tend to confirm this. Would you regard this operation as merely the actions of a handful of operatives?

MR DE KLERK: Can I, before I reply to the question, just make the point that I don't think that one could accept, as the truth and the whole truth and nothing but the truth each and every statement made by each and every person applying for amnesty. It has been proven, what I am just saying, in the case against General Malan and the other generals, with regard to Operation Marion, where those who perpetrated the deeds advanced evidence that they had authority and they had orders to do so. After proper testing, in thorough cross- examination, the persons who made those allegations, or the person who made it was found to be a liar, and a totally untrustworthy witness. 
Therefore, in my reply I want to qualify it and say, I'm not prepared to accept that merely because something is said in an amnesty application that that is true where that which is said implicates others who have not had the opportunity to fully state their views in that regard. Within those qualifications I would say that planning counter-strategies to meet the revolutionary onslaught of the ANC was the order of the day, in many ways. There was a tremendous propaganda onslaught. There was infiltration of people who were active in terrorist deeds and the like, and yes, there were counter-strategies. You cannot fight that type of thing just in the normal way. You have to infiltrate, you have to have knowledge, etc, etc. But if such a strategy involved the set of circumstances releasing somebody then assassinating somebody that would be against the policy and it cannot be interpreted as a reasonable interpretation of the policy and decisions which have been taken. 
And that would remove it once again from anybody who initiated that from the top, remove it from the first two categories. Once again it would be possible that those lower down, who received specific orders and who might have been assured that these orders are okay and you are in duty bound to do so might qualify for the other two categories.

MR GOOSEN: The former Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe, has stated that he acted under the instructions of the then State President, P W Botha and Law and Order Minister Adrian Vlok, in ordering the bombing of Khotso House in 1988, under what category would such an incident have fallen?

MR DE KLERK: Before I reply to that, can I just say about this trend of questioning Mr Chairman, I am not in a position to pass specific judgement on each and every specific case. Each case would have to be judged on its merits, so I am giving you off-the-cuff opinions here without the benefit of every little detail surrounding the matter, who were involved, who says what, so it's extremely difficult for me to pass an informed judgement, and really give you a fully informed opinion in this regard.
In the case of Khotso House, to the best of my knowledge and I'm not justifying the bombing of Khotso House, nobody was killed, nobody was murdered, there was serious damage to property and that would put it in a different category. No doubt those who applied for amnesty in that regard will put all the facts before you. I am not aware that my predecessor has, as yet, accepted responsibility in the sense that he acknowledges that he actually did authorise it. I've read in the press that he has been presented with a set of questions and surely he's in the best position to inform you about that.

MR GOOSEN: Yes. Would the same apply Sir, to the COSATU house bombing involving a similar change of command and operatives; the bombing of the Early Learning Centre in Cape Town which also involved CCB operatives or the so-called Cry

<UNKNOWN>: reedom bombings which were directed at cinemas scheduled to screen the movie Cry

<UNKNOWN>: reedom?

MR DE KLERK: About most of those I don't have any details, whatsoever, and I cannot right at this moment place it, exactly when it took place, where it took place, how can I be asked to pass a judgement on something where I don't have full information at my disposal.

MR GOOSEN: The primary purpose of putting these, as I indicated at the outset, Sir, is to evaluate the categories which you, on behalf of the National Party, put forward as an explanation of where responsibility should lie. I will move on.

MR DE KLERK: Can I just say that the last category, the mala fide category, in my original submission I went further and I was specifically also referring to the latter years of the conflict and more specifically during my presidency when another factor came to the fore, namely that the fundamental change of direction I and my colleagues initiated, which involved the opening of negotiations, the termination of secret operations, we closed them down and the lifting of the state of emergency were not supported by some elements, a small element in the security forces. We were then accused, along the grapevine, of being soft and of being traitors. And there was a time when the security people who had to guard me feared for my life that I might have been assassinated by such elements. They were as much against the reforms as they were against the ANC.

MR GOOSEN: Sir, TREVETS, the counter-revolutionary intelligence task group was reportedly initiated in January 1988. According to Brigadier Jack Cronje a former commander of Northern Transvaal Security Police, in this organisation, drew up hit lists of prominent activists for elimination. All intelligence on targets internally and externally had to be channelled to TREVETS where planning for action would take place. Representatives of security branch, military intelligence, national intelligence met under the chairpersonship of the security branch. Cronje gave the example of the murder of the Robeiros which he claimed was an operation of the SAD

<UNKNOWN>: special forces. Cronje was the commanding officer of security branch, as I've indicated, in the Northern Transvaal, and recently received amnesty applications from former special forces' operatives would tend to confirm his allegations. In the light of this would you regard these operatives and the security force and intelligence personnel involved in TREVETS as a handful of individuals who engaged in unauthorised operations or would you place them in another category?

MR DE KLERK: What they were doing, if they actually did it, would definitely have been unauthorised. It was never part of the policy and I totally distance myself from that and I would say that they were acting not within the framework or anything which comes near a reasonable interpretation of the policies of the government.

<UNKNOWN>: ormer SAP Captain, Brian Mitchell, who was convicted for his role in the Trust