Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-14

MR DE VOS: Can I refer to one aspect?  In this telex dated the 8th of April reference is also made to a document that was sent to the Chief of the Army.  It says - well, that's dated the 3rd of March 1986.  But then, if I can remember correctly, there was another document.  Oh yes, here it is.  You will see in paragraph 4 of this telex that I - we'll make a photocopy of that for you.  It refers to,
"Indien suksesvol kan dit dan ook dien as magtiging vir 'n implementeringsgesprek met Khumalo soos gesien in u voorlegging STIG 310/4/Marion."
dated the 7th of March '86 - '86.  Now, all of us during the Msani trial wanted to get a copy of that telex of March '86 document.  We couldn't find one, and the State didn't find one.  Nobody knows exactly what was said in that document, or why it was said, or on what basis it was said.  
 /Now, can
Now, can I also refer - sorry, may I also add the evidence of Mr Malan about Cabinet approval is on page 3480 and 3489 of the Msani trial. 
I continue then.  I am now going to deal with the telex of the 8th of April.  My learned colleague is going to make a photocopy in the meantime to assist this Commission.
Now, Varney in the first place alleges that this document was sent by Geldenhuys to Pitter.  This is not correct.  We submit that this is also an explicable distortion of the facts which came to the fore during the Malan trial, and we refer this Commission to page 1635, 2164 and 3529 of the record.  It was explained to the Court a quo that the abbreviations MV and MS means Ministerie van Verdediging, and in English, Ministry of Defence, and militere sekretaris, military secretary.  Now, when one looks at the document itself one will see that this document clearly proves, firstly, that until that day no final decision was taken, and secondly, that General Geldenhuys wasn't the person who sent this telex to somebody else, it came directly from the Minister's secretary addressed to Pitter.  That's also what Geldenhuys testified in the court a quo, that he wasn't responsible for sending down this document.
Now, together with this document one should read the letter dated the 7th of April '86, by Minister Malan to Minister Heunis, and if one studies one document - you will see there's a note on that letter written to Heunis that makes it absolutely clear that Geldenhuys had nothing to do with the telex of the 8th of April, because there's a note made by the Minister's secretary on the first page
 /referring
referring to - referring to this telex.  I don't know, do you have a copy of the letter written by Malan to Heunis?  Now, on the first page of that letter there's a note made by Opperman, who was then the military secretary, confirming that he, on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force, sent a telex to Pitter.
Now, may I then go on - I've already dealt with it to some extent, and that is the letter dated the 16th of April '86 from CSI to the Chief of the Defence Force.  Now, Varney alleges that this letter was sent by Pitter to Geldenhuys.  We submit this is also incorrect.  It appears that this letter wasn't sent to Geldenhuys or to anybody else, simply because of the reason that on the morning of the 17th there was a meeting with Minister Malan where Pitter was present.  There was no need to contact Geldenhuys.  
On the 16th of April Pitter had a meeting with Buthelezi according to this document.  This document sets out the differences between Chief Minister Buthelezi and the proposals of the task group.  This is set out in paragraph 9 of this document.  Now, after a mutual understanding was reached it was stated in paragraph 2 of this document, and I quote in Afrikaans,
"That they then proceeded with oral authorisation with the concentration, recruitment, selection, transport and construction of bases for the 200 Inkatha members.  The supposition is that formal authorisation will be obtained, and certain principles regarding the training, the application,
 /the finance,
"the finance, etcetera, would be cleared with Minister Buthelezi during the above meetings between HSI and the Minister of Defence, and this should be done before 16th June 1986, when basic training would have ended."
Now, we submit that the reference there to "mondelinge magtiging" clearly indicates that this whole procedure was legal, otherwise it could not be implemented at all.
Then I am going to refer to the meeting of the 17th of April 1986 between Minister Malan and Buthelezi.  Minister Malan testified that there was a meeting on the 17th of April '86 in Durban between himself and Chief Minister Buthelezi, where Admiral Pitter and Brigadier Cor van Niekerk - if I remember correctly, it might be van Tonder - were present.  Final approval was given by Minister Malan on this date for this training to proceed.  Pitter testified during a section 29 inquiry that it was his task to determine whether the Chief Minister was satisfied as to how the paramilitary force would be constituted and trained.  He confirmed that he was satisfied subject to the amendments mentioned in paragraph 9 of this document.
Now, one must remember one thing.  At this stage there was - it wasn't decided how this force will be applied at a later stage.  The only important thing was at this stage that they needed training to come and do a job.  So, one should read it in the time space of what happened, and nothing more can be read into any other - into the document.  
Then I am going to jump a little bit and I am going
 /to refer
to refer to the SSC meeting of the 12th of May '86.  Now, Varney states on page 26 and 27 and 28 of his report that Operation Marion is an example of various projects set up in terms of appendix 6 attached to the minutes of this meeting.  He further states that Operation Marion falls within the parameters of paragraphs (a) to (f) of bylae 6, appendix 6.
Now, I don't want to reiterate what was said by my learned colleague, de Jager, yesterday afternoon, but many of these arguments are the same.  Now, we submit that Varney's attempt to qualify Operation Marion as part of so-called - let's call it so-called third force activities, is another example of his distortion of the true facts.  At that stage permission was given by Minister Malan to proceed with Operation Marion.  In other words even before the final decisions were taken in the State Security Council Operation Marion was already - they were already being trained, so it could not have anything to do with what was discussed at the SSC meeting.
Secondly, his reference to paragraphs 8 (a) to (f) is irrelevant as the proposals contained in paragraphs 8 (a) to (f) was never accepted by the SSC.  It's pages 34 and 35 of his report, if I remember correctly, where he makes a big thing of paragraph 8 (a) to (f).  But then if one reads the document properly you'll see that (g) was accepted, and (a) to (f) was totally ignored.  We say this because the State Security Council decided to accept option four, as set out in the discussion document, with significant amendments, as a basis for the establishment of a third force.
Now, Mr Varney was cross-examined on this aspect. 
 /The contents
The contents of option four were read out in Afrikaans to Mr Varney.  The Commission's record is in English, and, with all due respect, the English translation is a far cry from the Afrikaans version.  We refer to the record of the proceedings before this Commission, volume 3B, page 299.  Paragraph 3 (ii), for example, in the Afrikaans refers to a "situasie kamer."

INTERPRETER: Situation room.