Human Rights Violation Hearings — Bisho — 1996-11-19

MR POTGIETER: Thank you very much Colonel Nel.  Before I ask the panel whether they have got any questions, what is your present position?

UNKNOWN: I am working at Army Headquarters as a senior staff officer in Army Intelligence.

MR POTGIETER: In Army Intelligence?

UNKNOWN: That is correct.

MR POTGIETER: Thank you.  Are there any questions to the Colonel?  Mr Sandi.

MR SANDI: Thank you Mr Chairman.  Mr Nel seeing that we don't really have much time on our side I would request that you try and answer the questions which we'll be putting to you as briefly as possible.  Now can I start off by asking you when you say,
"For reconciliation to succeed it is important that the victims be cared for".
is that something that you have always thought, is that something you have always believed?  Is there something that has recently made you believe that it is important for victims to be taken care of?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair through you I know one of the victims personally.  Meeting him afterwards, Mr Petros Vantyu and I personally believe if somebody suffered pain and suffering due to a mistake by somebody else which was part of the government surely he's entitled to compensation.  But also for the purposes of reconciliation if people, if children are suffering today, and due to their suffering, they ask themselves why am I suffering, because my dad is not here.  Why is he not here - because of the Bisho
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massacre and if we don't do something to relieve the plight of those people this incident will remain in the minds of the people every day while they are suffering.  That is how I feel.

MR SANDI: Thank you.  When you talk about the Ciskei Military Intelligence are you referring to the International Researchers of the Ciskei Intelligence Service?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair the International Research was a bank account name.  The Ciskei Intelligence Service was an organisation that existed from early 1990 to October 1991 when it was officially closed down by Deputy Minister Wynand Breytenbach and the then South African Chief of Defence Force General Kat Liebenberg when they came to Ciskei, discussed the whole issue around the existence of Ciskei Intelligence Services and it was jointly decided to close that organisation down.  The members of the Ciskei Intelligence Services, of which I was one, then left the Ciskei and two of us remained, myself and Colonel Swanepoel who were then employed by the Ciskei Defence Force, October 1991.

MR SANDI: The Ciskei Military Intelligence Service, how did it relate to the South African Military Intelligence Service?

UNKNOWN: The Ciskei Defence Force Military Intelligence or the Ciskei Intelligence Service, I am not sure about the question Mr Chair?

MR SANDI: The Ciskei Defence Force Intelligence Service, how did it relate to the South African Military Intelligence Service?

UNKNOWN: Mr Chair there was continuous and good cooperation between the Intelligence Services in the Eastern EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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Cape, that included the Army Intelligence in East London, the Military Intelligence also in East London, the Security Police in King Williamstown and East London, and the National Intelligence to a lesser extent.  But there was an official body called the Allied Intelligence Centre which came together from time-to-time to discuss matters of mutual interest, cross-border effects and there were constant liaison between the two bodies, between the different bodies.

MR SANDI: Can you try and give some clarity as to what those matters of common interest are?

UNKNOWN: Normally in events like this specifically the 7th of September, where an activity or a build-up for an activity takes place in the RSA and then moves into the Ciskei there are different parties involved here. The Ciskei Police and the South African Police would liaise on their equal level, but from Intelligence levels we will also liaise and then from time to time come together as a total group, and discuss the total situation as such.

MR SANDI: Generally speaking what would you say, putting it in a nutshell, what would you say is the function of a Military Intelligence Service?  Would I be correct to believe that that is the kind of an arm of the State to protect it against what the State perceives as its enemies?

UNKNOWN: No, Mr Chair the Intelligence Community has no operational capacity.  It cannot protect the government other than by giving knowledge.  The function of the Intelligence Service is to collect information on such an individual, grouping, person, who are, according to the definition of somebody endangering State security, that is the function of the Intelligence organisation.  To identify
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threats against the government.

MR SANDI: When you became a staff member of the Ciskei Military Intelligence network had you been involved in any military intelligence work before?

UNKNOWN: Yes I have been involved all my life, since I left school.  I was in the Infantry for one year and then after that I joined Army Intelligence and I am till today in Army Intelligence, that's what I did all my career.

MR SANDI: If you were to put it briefly what was the mission of the Ciskei Military intelligence during the years you were there?  What were the major challenges facing this body?

UNKNOWN: The main challenges facing ...(tape ends)  ...task that was laid upon the Intelligence community is to let the State Security Council know in time about any body, any organisation that poses a threat or plans to do anything that poses a threat to State security, as I said to you earlier.  Within this definition surely the Ciskei Intelligence Services and later the Ciskei Defence Force Military Intelligence they concentrated to a large extent on the activities of what was perceived to be a military threat, Umkhonto weSizwe, Apla, dissident elements maybe from those groupings.  We concentrated on the ANC.  We concentrated on Sanco.  There were numerous incidents, more than 300 incidents directed against the Headmen System.  We had to investigate and see who were behind it and what the causes were.  All the violence that was defined as political violence, we had to find answers for these things.  We had to know where they came from and who were behind them.  That is the function of the Intelligence.

MR SANDI: Did you during that time identify any particular EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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organisation that was spearheading violence or in any way causing problems that needed the attention of the Military Intelligence Service?

UNKNOWN: To be honest the situation Mr Chair at that stage was almost at a level of, I don't want to call it civil war, but in rural areas the fights between headmen and the Residents Association was in some places almost turning into war.  I can remember incidents where people were decapitated and people were shot at, houses were burnt down, there are long, long lists of these incidents, and that kept us busy for most of our time, to investigate where there were shooting incidents get closer to the bone but we had no executive powers, we could not arrest anybody.  Whenever we found information that leads us closer to evidence we handed over to the Ciskei Police who will then carry it out in terms of arrests, charge people and bring them in front of the court of law.

MR SANDI: Thank you Mr Nel so far.  Mr Chairman I don't want to appear as if I am putting the witness under cross-examination.  We are not cross-examining people who appear before this Commission, we ask questions simply to get clarity and I hope Mr Nel will give us more information as members of the panel pose questions to him.  I may have to come back to Mr Nel to ask a few other questions.  I am handing over to you.