Amnesty Hearings — East London — 1998-10-08

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: As I've given the structure before, that we had unit commanders and we have got area commanders.  At times - I mean let me put it this way, an area commander will give an order specifically to the unit commander and there were no - you know in the conventional arrangement before any attack there should be order group arrangement where the orders will be given to the entire unit, but in the case of a guerrilla unit there are not those order group arrangements.  You simply deal with the commander and arrange, and give him orders.  	The other unit members will not know what is going to happen for just to secure and protect the information because it can leak and the entire unit get arrested before the operation could take place.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let me put it this way.  There have been instances, and if I'm not mistaken in very APLA application with the exception of this one, your name has been mentioned.  In all, St James, Golf Club, Eikenhof and all this.  In what instances where an order comes from the top where it has been said that you have sanctioned those operations, where it comes from the top, an order comes from the top, from the Director of Operations or from yourself as a deputy.

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Can you repeat your question again?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let me put it this way.  There are instances, if I may quote it: (1) Eikenhof incident.

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Where it has been alleged that - it has been confirmed that you ordered the Eikenhof incident and also you were involved in Heidelberg Tavern, you ordered it and also you supplied arms.  Also at St James your name has been mentioned many, in almost in every application of APLA on all the major incidents.  What happens in those incidents where an order comes from the top, from yourself where you've given approval that an operation should be carried out?

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, how does it get down to the bottom, to the activist?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Okay.  Though it's very difficult to answer this question but I'll try to answer it to your satisfaction.
	Let me take for instance the question of Eikenhof.  In the Eikenhof I deployed Pila Dolo in the Vaal. Pila Dolo was a regional commander there and before he left for the Vaal I gave him orders to go to the Vaal to conduct the operations and there was no specific operation that was given to Dolo to execute in the Vaal.  So he was there to look for targets and to make plans on his own without getting any further instructions from myself.
	So the only thing I did there was to supply Dolo with weapons.  It was to supply Dolo with weapons and everything he was going to be, anything that could be used for that operation was to be taken or to be taken from the masses on the ground.  He was going to work with the masses on the ground.  It don't know whether it is that clear.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, you would give a general instruction and the operation would be determined as those people on the ground deemed it able and fit?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Come again?

CHAIRPERSON: You would give a general order and it will come down and they will execute the order as they think fit and as circumstances allow.

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Yes, that is correct.  We were just giving broad guidelines as to: "No, you go to your certain place".

MR MBANDAZAYO: Just for the sake of ...[indistinct] let me come to almost home, to this incident.  Let me first ask you, do you know Mbulelo Dlamini?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Yes, I know Mbulelo Dlamini.  Mbulelo Dlamini we used to call him Hlogoza or Madoda.  He was the National Assistant Director in training department.  He died in combat in Port Elizabeth, no, no, in Port St Johns in 1994 in a skirmish between APLA fighting the TT, ja it was a TTF/MK joint operation.  There was a problem between TTF and APLA, so MK joined forces with TTF.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, when was that?  When did he die?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Pardon?

ADV DE JAGER: When did he die, 19?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: He died in 1994.

ADV DE JAGER: '84?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: 1994.

ADV DE JAGER: Oh, '94, okay.

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Now Mr Xyma, you listened to the applicants and what happened at Fort Beaufort at Mr Franciscato's house and you heard what they did.  Can you comment whether what happened on the day was in line with your guidelines from APLA and also tell the Committee what was the relation between APLA and the task forces.

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Ja, the Fort Beaufort attack, as far as I'm concerned, was in line with the APLA strategy.  Fist of all let me give this task force thing.
	Task force as it was, it was APLA auxiliary force.  Its briefing mandate was to defend the party internally and at times it was given extra duties like defending the party and we also using it in intelligence gathering.  Because as you are aware there is no organisation or any institution that can function and survive without intelligence and security.  
	So it was very difficult at the time to use externally trained cadres to come and protect the party.  Then it developed to be APLA recruitment pool and later directly involved in combat.  
	Another thing that I want to stress here is that the strategy of APLA was basically a liberation war.  What we referred to as the PAC and APLA as people's war.  And that people's war was based on the premise that ours is the struggle of the people as a whole, of the oppressed.
	I can say people's war is the involvement of the people in every front to wage the struggle, to destroy the settler regime.  So I want to also answer that question of using the ...[indistinct].  I think when we deal with the question of crime, whether to take these comrades as criminals or whatever, you must first of all take into account the structural causes including the socio-economic causes that can force one to become involved in those acts before.
	But when we recruit them we recruit them consciously because we were quite aware that they were used to, they were used in combat or let me put it, ja, in combat, whatever and they were brave and courageous.  I firmly believe they were the part and parcel of the oppressed community of this country.  So they had a right to fight for the liberation of the people of South Africa.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MBANDAZAYO

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mapoma, have you got any questions?

MR MAPOMA: No questions, Chairperson, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR MAPOMA

ADV DE JAGER: Did Mr Duma hand you any money received from these operations?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Come again, Sir?

ADV DE JAGER: Did Mr Duma hand over any money to you received from these operations?

SIPHO BULELANI XYMA: Normally when a repossession operation is carried out the money was taken to our headquarters in Umtata and handed over directly to the front HQ administrator, the late comrade Mandla Djikilala(?).  	So I should think - I must put it on record that that money was handed over to comrade Mandla.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, you are excused.
WITNESS EXCUSED

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that is the applicants' case.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got anymore witnesses?

MR MBANDAZAYO: None, Mr Chairman, that's the applicants position.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got anything to add to what you've already said?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Not at this stage, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any further submissions to make?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairperson, I'm not sure about, unless Mr Chairperson can through some light as to what that entails.  Maybe I'm a little bit out when it comes to that.  What normally happens is that after we have closed the applicants' case if maybe the Leader of Evidence has anything.