Special Hearings — Chemical And Biological Warfare Hearings — 1998-06-12

MR VALLY: Well, very simply this, a whole programme is instituted, a Chemical Biological Warfare Programme and we have heard that at least a hundred million rands was spent on it.  We want to know what do you see as having been the positive achievements of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, as short account in the period that you were Surgeon-General.
 Mr Chair, it's General Knobel who is testifying and he is under oath and Mr du Plessis is there to assist him but not to answer on his behalf.  Now this is not the first time that he is talking to General Knobel and giving him answers before General Knobel answers.

MR DU PLESSIS: I want to put it on record that at no stage did I supply answers to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, let's not fight about this.  I don't want to testify from the bench and I didn't hear what you were saying but you were saying something in his ear.  You may have been giving him legal advice. Let's play it this way, give the witness an opportunity.  I know you may have been - I don't want to dampen the enthusiasm of legal advisors from making sure that their clients' interests are safeguarded but give him is first opportunity.  If you feel that the question that is put is unfair, then you must immediately say: "No, I believe that question is unfair".

MR DU PLESSIS: I will do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.  We have been fighting all day long, we now want to get peace.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is there some ecstasy in it Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we need ecstasy or may, what's it, dagga.
 Mr Vally - oh, General?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: I'm eager to answer the question Mr Chairman.
 Mr Vally, in order to assess what has been achieved one would have to go back to what the original aims and objectives of the programme was.  I will now in respect for the Chair, try and deal with that without referring to the document.

MR VALLY: Thank you General Knobel, but I would like to just help you streamline your answer in view of the fact that we have still got potentially Doctor Mijburgh and Doctor Basson to deal with.
 Maybe if you'd start off by telling us what the elements of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Programmes was but I accept the one element was to make protective clothing, gas masks etc., we know that was one element.  Other than that element, can you tell me what the other elements of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme were?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Mr Chairman, I will certainly come back to those elements which Mr Vally thinks are not, or indicates are not important, it's extremely important but I will say this:  In the first place intelligence was obtained about Chemical and Biological Warfare that is now on record and which is considered to be a national asset, which gives information about the Chemical and Biological Warfare capabilities of very many signatory states as well as non-signatory states in the world.  That is of vital importance in my opinion to our country.
 Secondly, the primary reason for the project, which was to develop a defensive capability, was in my opinion totally achieved but then you must allow me to analyse what I mean by a defensive capability, and the situation changed after '93.  
 Before 1993 and before South Africa was a signatory to the New Chemical Weapons Convention and was still a State's party to the 1925 protocol, a defensive capability meant that not only did it have all the necessary equipment to protect, to decontaminate, to support it's own troops in the field that might have been exposed to either Chemical and Biological weapons but it also meant that in terms of the way in which South African signed that protocol, it had the right to retaliate, it had the capability to hit back if necessary.  The conditions under which that would have been done is well described in the 1925 protocol.
 It must be understood that a defensive capability does not exclude the possibility of going over into the offensive when you have to ensure that enemy troops may be using chemical weapons against you and therefore forcing you into your defensive equipment and therefore giving you a major disadvantage on the battlefield, must also in turn be forced to go into a similar situation where they are also in their defensive equipment and therefore then again equalising the battlefields.
 I'll summarise it in that fashion, that I'm saying that that capability was fully developed.  But I want to say something else about defensive.  Defensive is possibly better ...[intervention]

MR VALLY: I'm sorry General Knobel, I just wanted, on that point when you say that capability was fully developed, can you tell me this capability to retaliate, to strike back, can you tell me what you are talking about there?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Yes, I can.  The choice of retaliation depends on the signatory state that have exceeded to the convention.  In the development of this capability the philosophy was spelt out very clearly, that in this project we would not embark in creating an offensive capability with classical lethal chemical weapons and therefore I can declare quite emphatically to you that at no time were classical chemical, or for that matter, biological weapons developed, weaponised with delivery systems and there was no intent ever to use any of those weapons on the battlefield.
 The philosophy allowed us to consider a second category namely incapacitating agents and a third category namely irritating agents.  As the project developed, the capability of producing a highly effective irritating agent which could be used in a dual use situation, either as an anti-riot control agent or as a conventional agent on the battlefield, arose and the choice was then made that that would be the ideal chemical substance to weaponise to put into delivery systems with the intent of using it in retaliation in terms of the signatory requirements of the 1925 protocol.

MR VALLY: Can you tell us firstly, which capacity was developed?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: The capacity I'm referring to is the ...[intervention]

MR VALLY: I'm talking specifically, was it some biological capacity, was it a chemical capacity?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: No, no.  Let me clarify the point immediately and very emphatically.  At no time was it ever considered to develop a biological warfare offensive capability, at no time.  I just emphasis that.  And therefore all the organisms and toxins that were studied were never considered either for weaponisation or for delivery systems and there was no intent ever to use them.
 South Africa is also a signatory of the Biological  Weapons Convention which has been in existence since 1975, so there is no way that South Africa could embark on any such an action.  Therefore I repeat and I say it emphatically, only an irritating agent which is dual use agent for anti-riot purposes but also could be used in a conventional offensive capability, was developed, it was produced in large quantities, was weaponised and was put into delivery systems with the clear intent to use it under the conditions which prevailed in terms of the 1925 protocol.

MR VALLY: Are we are talking about CS gas and CR gas?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Well CS gas existed long before that, CR is what I'm talking of Mr Vally.

MR VALLY: And that is all?

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: That is all.

MR VALLY: Can I refer you to ...[intervention]

DANIEL PETER KNOBEL: Can I - sorry Mr Vally, you asked me to give the total capability.

MR VALLY: Sure.