Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: 4A of offensive actions, here we are dealing with a tiny offensive group - no more than 30 persons - and then later in the documents we see it's reduced to 10 persons.  We are then told that this group is going to cover - is going to provide blanket protection to Inkatha members throughout the region.  They are going to respond to attacks.  How can a group of 30 and at a later stage 10, based up somewhere in Northern Natal, respond to attacks unless, of course, they are taking preemptive or retaliatory strikes?  So the practice, the size is consistent with a group that takes initiatives.  It is consistent with a group that is, in fact, a hit squad. Under the heading, "Do not admit or deny.  The spike", or the nail.  At the 9th May 1990 meeting, Buthelezi was advised by the Chief of Intelligence Operations, General van Tonder, not to admit or deny anything relating to Inkatha/SADF hit squad allegations made in the "Vrye Weekblad".  Now, if, in fact, the operation was entirely above board, entirely lawful, why the advice, "Don't admit or deny"?  In the same meeting, Buthelezi reportedly expressed concern that his nephew had gone over to the ANC/UDF, provides great propaganda value to the enemy and he requested to see "Spyker" in secret.  Spyker is translated as spike or nail.  There are certain suspicions that arise from such a reference and I believe that that passage in that document ought to be investigated.  We need to know who is this Spyker and why did the Chief Minister wish to see him in secret if, in fact, that is the case, as it appears on the face of this document.  "The closure of Operation Marion".  This took place - the operation started to wind down, as I said - certainly

MR LYSTER: /offensive support

MR LYSTER: 4A offensive support was wound down towards the end of 1989.  Most of the Marion members were put into the KwaZulu Police in the middle of 1989.  Certainly mobilisation and other support continued.  The documents talk about courses that were supplied - organizational-type courses and so on and so forth, and it's evident that the final meetings with M Z Khumalo were held on the 4th December 1990 - or rather Khumalo was advised on the 4th December 1990 that the operation was being closed down and they met with Khumalo finally on the 23rd January 1991.  General van Tonder himself continued meetings with Buthelezi up until the 16th July 1991.  So, in wrapping up this section of Operation Marion, it was an aim of Operation Marion to supply Inkatha with the capacity of self-sufficiency, and I am now going to argue in the next section that Inkatha's offensive actions continued under the cover of the KwaZulu Police and that the actions of the Esikhaweni hit squad in the early 1990s is a case in point.

MR LYSTER: Mr Varney, could you just take a break there.  I just want to consult with the rest of the panel.  No evidence has been given at all yet about the Esikhaweni hit squad.  We've held this over and we may well request you to stop your evidence here and evidence over the next few days will be led relating to Esikhaweni.  But if you could just bear with us for a minute.  [Break in recording] ... evidence on Esikhaweni.  We would rather hear evidence from those who will be giving evidence later this week and possibly next week and draw our own conclusions relating to their deployment and actions in Esikhaweni Township.  So we'd like you then to wrap up your submission, if that's what you intend to do, by way

MR LYSTER: /of some sort

MR LYSTER: 4A of some sort of closing remark.

WITNESS:   Thank you, Chairperson.

MR LYSTER: You can briefly mention that allegedly unlawful actions continued to take place through the 1990s, but don't make any reference to the - any detailed reference to Esikhaweni.

WITNESS:   Chairperson, I think I've already made that point.

MR LYSTER: I think you have made the point in the beginning.  Thank you.  If we could just have some closing remarks.

WITNESS:   Yes.  Before I close, just two - or rather one final point, just dealing with the practice and nature of this particular squad.  There were two entities which operated  - concern to us (?), the protective and the offensive capacity.  It will no doubt be argued by my learned friends that, in fact, they acted in concert together in hostage and other type situations.  The protective unit would protect and the offensive group would retaliate, as such.  I have already explained how unlikely that was - how impossible.  In any event, in order to seal that particular proposition or rather the incorrectness of it, following the return of the Caprivi trainees to South Africa almost immediately the protective unit was removed and placed into the KwaZulu Police and so not only was their training in offensive and protective techniques quite separate, they didn't act in concert in practice.  They were physically not together.  In conclusion, I believe that the Commission should have no difficulty ... (intervention)

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, I want to object against the conclusions being addressed to this panel.  Firstly, for the very simple reason that it appears that those
 /conclusions are
4A conclusions are in direct conflict with the provisions of section 39(a), I think, of the Act, which requires that the Commission in its findings should not be foreshadowed by anybody.  Sorry, it is 39(a).  If I can just read 39(a) to you briefly.  It's very short.  39(a) says,
"Offences and penalties.
Any person who,
(a) Anticipates any finding of the Commission regarding an investigation in a manner calculated to influence its proceedings or such findings is guilty of an offence."
Now, these conclusions are doing precisely that, and we object to those conclusions.  We want them struck out.

MR LYSTER: Just by way of a quick response, Mr Maritz, if you were, on behalf of your clients, to put certain conclusions to us or suggest we should see matters in a particular way, would that not be contravening the same thing?  With respect, we can hear any opinion from anybody.  That doesn't affect our conclusions.  It's just that person's opinion, in the nature of an opinion and any Commission is at liberty to hear such evidence or such statements, read any documents, articles and so on.  So it would simply make our job absolutely impossible if we were to adopt the very strict or kind of interpretation you are suggesting.  Accordingly we will continue to hear Mr Varney on this issue.

MR MARITZ: Mr Chairman, may I just reply to that very briefly?

MR LYSTER: Yes, Mr Maritz, please, briefly.

MR MARITZ: No 1, Mr Varney, as a witness, is not
 /representing anybody
4A representing anybody as counsel or as an attorney.  Secondly, I represent parties, who have been given notice and, for that reason, I can do my job in that respect and I can ask you to make certain findings and conclusions in argument, but it ill behoves a witness to suggest to the Commission which findings it should make and it so done explicitly in the very first paragraph.  Thank you.

MR LYSTER: Thank you, Mr Maritz.  We have received thousands of submissions from individuals, from organizations and from lawyers and we treat those as submissions and we attach to them the weight that we think they deserve.  We feel that it's completely appropriate for Mr Varney to make - to come to opinions, subjective as they are, and we will, in due course, consider what weight they deserve, in the same way that we will listen to arguments from everybody present here and draw conclusions as to what weight they deserve as well.  So we will allow Mr Varney to make some brief concluding comments.  Thank you.