Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

WITNESS:   From what one hears and from what one reads in the document - and I'm venturing, this is my opinion - is it looks as though the type of strategy adopted was very much consistent with the principles and the strategy of counter revolutionary warfare.  Here was an organisation that perceived itself to be under direct attack and direct threat.  It had consolidated itself to a certain extent politically, but it required the ... (inaudible) ... to consolidate itself further and extend its influence and actually neutralise its perceived political opposition and so the whole process of mobilisation of the masses is reflected in the way this unit was trained in the counter mobilisation component.  The equipping of this organisation with the military capability to both protect itself and respond more proactively is reflected in the organisation of the defensive, the VIP and the offensive components.  Its need for a thorough understanding and ability to anticipate the situation was reflected in the request for an intelligence capability and that's largely consistent with classic counter revolutionary and counter insurgency strategy, so that would be my reading of the

MR MACADAM: /way

MR MACADAM: 2A way State planners at the time were responding, via the provision of this type of assistance.

MR MACADAM: Now you've had an opportunity for the last three days to be in attendance and listen to the evidence of firstly the Political Commissar of this group and then a member who was trained and who was placed in the contra-mobilisation group and a member who was trained and was placed into the offensive group and the two trainees both indicated in their evidence that they were unaware as to who their instructors were.  Can you comment specifically on that?

WITNESS:   I'd require a bit more detail to ... (intervention)

MR MACADAM: They indicated when they were questioned, there were indications that they thought they were a private security company or the last witness said he simply didn't know at all, but clearly at no stage was it explained to them they were being trained by the South African Defence Force.

WITNESS:   Well, I think clearly that refers to the desire of the organisation, in this case the South African Defence Force providing the support to conceal.  It's a covert operation.  It's to conceal the nature of the support being provided to them, the true origins, hence the need for a private security company.

MR MACADAM: And if we go back to the conflict which prevailed in KwaZulu-Natal at that stage, which Inkatha said there was the killing of their leaders, destruction of their property, disruption of their rallies.  How does the training that these persons claim they received correspond with what would be a proper response to that situation?

WITNESS:   In some sense - I'll answer that at two levels.  In some sense it's not an easy question to answer, because

MR MACADAM: /one

MR MACADAM: 2A one has to really specify what the precise political objectives of the organisation were at the time, but if one takes the training itself, in some senses the training is pretty generic.  For instance the basic training provided to these people is the type of basic training you'd receive in any military organisation.  It's PT, it's drill, it's musketry, it's field craft and, I mean, that's done throughout the world, at least in the 20th century.  The type of training that they begin to receive in terms of weapons corresponds in my reading more to what would be called basic infantry weapons training or platoon weapons training.  That includes both small calibre and heavy calibre weaponry.  Once again, if you're going to train a standard infantry unit, that's the type of weaponry that they'd actually be exposed to at the end of the day, although if these units were going to be trained for more defensive purpose, I would submit that training them in mortars, in this case the small mortars, 60mm mortars, training them in rocket launchers and that, may be a useful exercise, but if the declared purpose is simply VIP protection and defensive, it's a moot point why they were actually being trained in that, but be that as it may.  Maybe that type of exposure is of benefit to the creation of military culture and a military mind.  The training in plastic explosives, in home-made explosives as was confirmed over here, is a bit more difficult to comprehend, because it's difficult to see where that actually fits in.  It's a very wide training base that you're actually providing to people, but if the declared intention was simply to train them for defensive purposes, as you mention now, then I would say two things need to be

MR MACADAM: /made.

MR MACADAM: 2A made.  It becomes puzzling why they - if I could just make the following point before I go any further.  No type of weaponry or equipment is inherently offensive and defensive bar obvious examples like intercontinental ballistic missiles and aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons.  It's very much the intention, the doctrine and the anticipated deployment behind the armed forces.  They tell you what, whether the nature of the training is offensive or defensive or for what purpose it's going to be oriented.  So that's why I say they received training in this, but the moment one starts speaking of training like house penetration, attacks, ambushes, concealment of evidence and the other things that were actually referred to, one is moving into a much more grey area, into a much more offensive, one would read, if one is training people for those type of purposes, in which those weapons would be less used in a defensive role.  I think the Liebenberg Report, the former Chief Army General Liebenberg, refers to the type of training that a defensive element should receive and he says so in the report, it should be in basic military procedures, crowd control, protection of installations and he mentions a couple of other - I can't remember them off-hand, but - small calibre weapons, but here you're speaking about heavier calibre weapons;  you're speaking about the ability to plant and detonating - make explosives;  you're speaking about, at a tactical level, a more offensive role.  So one would read into that that regardless of whether we actually look at whether it was an offensive or a defensive unit, you're reading into that a much more proactive role for the personnel who had been trained and who you intend deploying.

MR MACADAM: /I have

MR MACADAM: 2A I have been informed by the panel that there is a witness that is only available to give evidence today and that person must be heard and ... (incomplete)

MR MACADAM: (END OF CASSETTE NO 2A)

MR MACADAM: (START OF CASSETTE NO 2B)

MR MACADAM: 2b

MR MACADAM: ... and the other aspect, it came out, I think in the first witness' evidence specifically, is that he placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that the weapons which he handled appeared to be mainly of Soviet Block origin.  Can you comment specifically on that?

WITNESS:   It wasn't unusual in basic infantry training, both in the 1980s and in the 1990s, to equip infantry platoons with Soviet made weapons, with RPDs, with RPGs, but to totally equip a force with foreign weaponry without using R4s, R1s at the time, would seem to confirm the covert nature of this operation and that's a desire to actually conceal the true nature of this unit and its origins.  That's the reading that in my opinion I would make or something like that.

MR MACADAM: And there was also evidence of manoeuvres to attack houses where the occupants of the houses would be killed.  Now can you comment on that?