Special Hearings — State Security Council Hearings — 1997-12-04

MR LYSTER: We'll take a short break, about 15 minutes. Thanks very much.
HEARING ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION

MR LYSTER: Thank you, photographers and others can please take their seats, we are going to start now.  Thank you Mr McAdam if you would like then to proceed.

MR MCADAM: Thank you.  Doctor  I was informed that you were not regarded during the 80's or that you were regarded during the 80's as one of the best Intelligence Services in the world.  Would that be correct?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes, the task that was described in the affidavit was very competent and cannot be classified as such a wonderful Intelligence Service, but it did its job.

MR MCADAM: The quality of selection of members of NI training, what kind of selection and training was that people who would then act as operatives and people who dealt with Intelligence?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: .  NI had a training academy known as National Intelligence Academy where training was given on all aspects of Intelligence.

MR MCADAM: During this period, that is during the mid-eighties, did you have any indications of actions by your members that were illegitimately unlawful?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: No. There was no such indication.

MR MCADAM: As I understood your submissions, the primary aim of the SSC was the countering of the revolutionary onslaught on the country?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes, the State Security Council was brought to life by the Act on State Intelligence.  The activities are set out in that Act.  It was not only about the countering of the revolutionary onslaught, but the Council had to discuss any threat to the State, it was therefore not only to do with revolutionary onslaught but anything to do with the safety of the State.

MR MCADAM: Would you regard NI as an important role-player in the State Security Council?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes, it definitely did play a role, an important role.

MR MCADAM: Was there close co-operation between the NI, the Military and the Police in directly combating terrorism?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: I think in my statement I spent sometime on that to indicate that the Safety Departments, the Military and the Police worked closely together in various matters. I also indicated that due to the cultures in these departments they often disagreed about the nature of the security threat and we often disagreed quite sharply about the actions to be taken by the Government to combat the onslaught.

MR MCADAM: Would these differences then be minuted during these meetings where NI for example said that it cannot support the views of  the Military or the Police?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: In the documents of the SSC no such disagreements were reported.  The differences between departments were not necessarily minuted because of practical considerations but there were such differences.

MR MCADAM: If we look at your submission where you dealt with the decision of the Defence Force to participate in operations in the neighbouring countries you indicated that it had been necessary to act against armed terror groups who resided in those neighbouring States.  Did I understand your submission correctly?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Mr Chair, I think I made it quite clear in my submission that I'm of the opinion that there can be no dispute regarding the fact that the neighbouring countries of South Africa were used by revolutionary fighters as safe houses and I made this very clear that it was the true facts of the matter.  I also said in my submission that there can be no dispute on that.

MR MCADAM: I understand that you made a certain remark on the Defence Force can you please repeat that.

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: The operations launched by the Defence Force, I just want to make sure that these actions were purely military actions against terror groups.  The operations of the Military that I was aware of, with respect, were operations without any doubt, exclusively planned against bases of terrorists and terror groups. And Mr Chair, I indicated in my submission that it was also the case that "innocent", as I called them, non -combatants died, but that the planning as far as my knowledge or to my knowledge, was never aimed at anything else than terrorist groups. I have no information of anything like that and I have no knowledge thereof.

MR MCADAM: These innocents would then be people who were in the same house as terrorist and it would then be impossible to tell them to leave the house before the attack is launched?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: I think that this is one of the sad realities of a revolutionary conflict when one operates in such an area that that is necessarily the case, yes.

MR MCADAM: These operations would then necessarily exclude political and not military targets?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: To my knowledge there were never any political targets only military targets.

MR MCADAM: I would also then assume that it would also exclude elimination of people by means of poisons or assassinations or car bombs?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Yes that would be excluded, to my knowledge.

MR MCADAM: And the cross-border operations that were done by the Military by the Defence Force, were they ever discussed and approved by the State Security Council before they were executed?

LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD: Mr Chair,the documentation that was supplied to me by the Commission does not contain any indication whatsoever, that any operation, at any stage was authorised by the State Security Council outside of South Africa.  What happened was that the principle, that is the document that you supplied me with, perhaps I should use it.  You supplied me with a document marked D.  It is about an Extraordinary Meeting where a point of discussion had been Lesotho.  I think it might be necessary for me to read to you what it says. It says
"Lesotho - Minister Botha reports that Lesotho was warned about the presence of ANC terrorists in the country. Only a refusing answer was received".
 The next paragraph says:
"The Meeting approves that stricter actions be taken against Lesotho and that stricter measures be taken against Lesotho and six steps were envisaged.
 1) Diplomatic negotiations; 
 2) Selective border control measures;
 3) Intensifying these measures; 
 4) Practical closing of the border;
 5) Repatriation of workers;
6) What is here formulated as, violence across the  border.
   Then there's a further paragraph which is important to the answer.  It's important to read this as well.  
"Furthermore, it must be publicised what the situation in South Africa's neighbouring countries is with regards to the latest terror actions against South Africa, initiatives have to be used.  The Meeting herewith approves that a strongly worded notice by Ministers Botha, Le Grange, Malan and Minister Malan with regards to the terror actions planned from the neighbouring States and executed from there had to be formulated and sent".
It was approved after lunch by the Meeting and then it says:-
"Furthermore the Governments of neighbouring States had to be informed by telex".
 If one reads through this specific example it is clear to me that the State Security Council acted in a very responsible way and in a responsible way maintained and wanted to manage it's relationships with Lesotho that it remained within the boundaries of inter-state politics.  It wanted to convince them by means of political pressure not to allow its territory to be used as safe houses.  The point of departure was supported that actions could be taken, that would be my interpretation of point number 6, the use of violence.  
 The principle therefore that the South African Government in principle would allow the Defence Forces to act against the military targets in neighbouring States was in principle approved by the State Security Council but individual actions was for security reasons never discussed by the State Security Council.