Special Hearings — Caprivi Hearings — 1997-08-06

MR LYSTER: He said if you have a point to make put it to him and he'll agree with it or disagree with it.

WITNESS:   I accept that you're reading out of it.  If you have a version to put to me then I think just go ahead and do it.

MR DE VOS: The version which I want to put to you is that much reliance is placed in the fact that there was a third force.  We experienced that in the Peter Msane trial.  Do you remember that?

WITNESS:   [Break in recording] ... with the interpretation.  Could you just repeat that?

MR DE VOS: You placed a heavy reliance on the so-called third force, which existed.  Is that correct?

MR LYSTER: Sorry, with respect, Mr de Vos, he's not making the point about the third force at all.  What he's talking about is the option that the State would choose to use other methods, used the revolutionaries' methods against them.  That's the point he makes in the document, and that he quotes from this thing in relation to. So, with respect, he's not making the point at all about the third force.  He only speaks about it in reference - in relation to the point that he's trying to make that the
 /State would
4B State would choose the revolutionaries' methods and use them against them themselves.  That's the focus of this particular extract.  And really, I don't see the point you're trying to make about the third force.  This is not an inquiry into the third force.

MR NTSEBEZA: And at the risk of being repetitive to the point of being ad nauseam, it seems to me you are acting -well, it's obvious, you have instructions and even if it was the issue that we are focusing on, the issue is that your instructions have a different view from that that has been presented by Mr Varney and he has given a fairly lengthy reply as to what happened at the State Security Council meeting, as a consequence of which he has drawn the conclusions that he has drawn.  It obviously is not in tandem with what your instructions are.  Given the nature of the sort of exercise we are engaged in, and we are all novices in it, isn't it the preferred route, now that you see and you have heard what he says is the way at which he came to the conclusion that he came, shouldn't you put your instructions - the instructions which you have, in a way that seeks to undermine the premises and the conclusions that he has come to, without having to refer to document so and so, so as to prove that?  That is the occasion - that you will do when you have the occasion to make the detailed submissions in writing which you said you were going to do and in relation to which you have reserved your right?  I would suggest that the way that we should go.  You have instructions which seek to undermine both his premises and his conclusions.  Put those instructions to him.

MR DE VOS: Mr Commissioner, I'm grateful for your input.
 /My problem is
4B My problem is that Mr Varney, in his earlier Varney Report, the so-called very thick Marion Report, relied very heavily on the so-called third force.  Those same facts were debated in the criminal trial, the KwaMakutha trial.  Nothing came of it.  Mr Varney then goes from the KwaMakutha trial and proceeds to make certain insinuations in the submission that even though a statutory third force did not exist between the police and the third force, that there was actually an alternative third force, and it is that third force, according to him, which operated from the highest political levels and authorised cold-blooded killings.  Our point is that if there was no such third force, and there is no evidence in that regard - Mr Varney has himself said that we don't actually know - then all the evidence which was adduced and all those documents are pro non scriptive.  It means nothing.  And that is the point I'm trying to make, because you will see that from here I will move back to the Marion documents to point out certain incorrect interpretations regarding those documents and that will link up with my initial cross-examination of bias, or which related to bias.  May I please continue on this basis?

MR NTSEBEZA: Now, you obviously have got instructions, either to refute the premises and the conclusions and the argument that you are going about is the argument which you have reserved.  Why don't you put to this witness your instructions?  If your instructions are to deny, for instance - I am not acting for your clients - if your instructions are to deny both the premises and the conclusions that Mr Varney has come to on the basis of that State Security Council meeting at which the third
 /force was
4B force was discussed, put it to him that he was wrong, that he drew the wrong conclusions, that he predicated his conclusions on wrong premises, and that he is biased, if you want to say so.

MR LYSTER: If I could just add one aspect, Mr de Vos, if he's biased and you want to put that to him, that's fine, but he may be biased and his conclusions may still be correct and if his conclusions are not correct, then put that to him.  Whether he's biased or not may not necessarily be the point.  So if you think he's biased - you have already said to him he's biased, he's got ulterior motives - I think that's how you put it - that's fine.  We've taken note of that.  Let's rather move on and press the issues.

WITNESS:   If I may say that, almost in defence of Mr de Vos, he now has put the version up and I think I should now respond to that version.  In essence, what he's saying is that the Malan trial found that there was no such thing as a third force.  The State Security Council didn't establish a statutory body as a third force, separate to the SAP and the SADF.  Now I come along and I use these documents to suggest that there is a third force.  I think that is the lines along which he is arguing and I think I ought to respond on that basis.  If that's the incorrect version, Mr de Vos, please tell me.  In the first instance, the Malan trial was not a trial to investigate the third force. Almost no time was spent on it - perhaps 20 minutes.  One can hardly use the Malan trial as some sort of basis for saying what type of force it was, whether it existed or not or - it simply dealt with other issues and it dealt with the third force in passing, but I think what we need to do is we need to look

MR LYSTER: /at the documents

MR LYSTER: 4B at the documents themselves to see what they say about this third force and if you look at, say, for example, the documents circulated, and the same document that you quoted relating to option 4, it defined under the heading, "Investigation, creation, special counter-revolutionary capacity (including a third force)".  So this third force, whether it was set up or not - and I concede a separate statutory third force, a separate body to the SAP and SADF, was not set up and I've said so in my report.  If you read it closely you'll see I say that.  I concede it.  But let's look at the wider special capacity of not just the third force itself.  What is the special capacity?  It's defined as follows.  A special capacity specifically organized, equipped and trained to plan, co-ordinate and set up counter-revolutionary actions to fight internal unrest and terrorism.  So that's the broad umbrella under which the special capacity will operate.  And then, of course, they go into those different options.  Let's look at the 12th May meeting itself.  That meeting perhaps shouldn't have been called, "Discussion of a third force", it should have been called, "Discussion of a special counter-revolutionary capacity, including possibly a third force", because a lot of matters are decided upon before ... (intervention)