Amnesty Hearings — Benoni — 1997-06-23

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I cannot at this moment recall any such instances.

UNKNOWN: You cannot recall a single armed terrorist who had been arrested.  Can you recall any single armed terrorist who would have shot during that period of time?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I cannot recall Chair.

UNKNOWN: Brigadier would you be able to recall, apart from arrests which you cannot recall, you cannot recall any single terrorists being arrested, you cannot recall an armed terrorist having been shot, can you recall any actions whatsoever, give us an example of action against armed terrorists infiltrating the country?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair I do not have details available to me at the moment.  I cannot refer you to any particular instances which I can tell you about that yes this occurred or that occurred.

UNKNOWN: General van der Merwe has also given testimony before this Committee and I want to work through his testimony to some extent with you and I would appreciate your comment on some aspects.  Have you read his testimony, may I enquire?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: No I have only read a short or brief section of his testimony.

UNKNOWN: I will read some sections to you.  And for purposes of the Committee I will refer to the exact page and lines Mr Chairman of General van der Merwe's evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Put them to him.

UNKNOWN: Thank you Mr Chairman.  General on page 69 General van der Merwe says,
"The South African Police came to experience harsh practical problems in communicating with their sources or agents and even being able to ensure their personal safety.  In cases where the slightest suspicion existed the suspected informer or agent was eliminated, sometimes in the most brutal fashion.
		Incidents such as car bomb explosions, limpet mine and handgrenade attacks and other acts of terror which members of the Police and their families, as well as ordinary civilians, were exposed to over a lengthy period of time would lead to a hardening of attitudes and that a creation of a climate of hate, both within the ranks of the Police as well as that of the civilian population".

UNKNOWN: Would you agree with this testimony?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Yes Chair I could agree with this testimony.

UNKNOWN: At the bottom of the particular page in line 30 General van der Merwe says,
"The fact that both MK and eventually the Azanian People's Liberation Army, APLA, members started using neighbouring frontline states as a springboard for launching their armed attacks against the Republic led directly to the establishment of a cross-border capability aimed at eliminating or neutralising this very real threat.
		A counter-revolutionary intelligence task team was created and comprised members of the National Intelligence Service, the South African Police and the South African Defence Force.  It was their task to proper evaluate and coordinate all intelligence regarding the revolutionary threat facing the Republic and especially with regard to identifying and prioritising political targets which posed such a threat".
	Can you recall this, can you agree with this testimony?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair I have already given testimony that I do not know of any organisation such as TREVITS, because I believe that this is to what you are referring.

UNKNOWN: Let me ask you this in a different manner then.  Have you ever heard of a counter-revolutionary strategy?  Have you ever heard of the existence of a  counter-revolutionary strategy?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Yes there had always been mention of the so-called "total onslaught" and of counter-strategies to this.

UNKNOWN: Where would such mention have been, could you maybe expand on your testimony?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I would claim Chair, that in the Police as such, in one's workplace there would have been discussions with regard to this as I have already mentioned.  "Total onslaught" as you know was a political statement which you've heard of all day, which you heard every day and all day in all parts of society there was this mention of total onslaught and the counter-revolutionary strategies.  I believe in every department where there would have been sittings, such as in the JMC's there would have been discussions how the revolution could be countered, turned back.

UNKNOWN: Did you ever understand there to have been a counter-revolutionary strategy accepted as policy by the government of the day or by the security forces at that time?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I could not comment on this Chair.

UNKNOWN: Do you have any knowledge or do you not have any knowledge in regard to this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I have no knowledge with regard to this.

UNKNOWN: I just want to make sure that I understand you correctly General, you are saying that you bear no knowledge of any policy of the government of that day which had anything to do with a counter-revolutionary strategy?

MR VISSER: That is not what he said Mr Chairman, he said,
that he did not bear knowledge of the "existence" of such a policy.  There is a minute difference here.

UNKNOWN: Could you explain this difference for us?  Could you indicate as to what the difference is?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I do not know to what the Advocate might refer to, what the difference is.  You've referred to a counter-revolutionary strategy.

UNKNOWN: Well then I withdraw Mr Chairman.  General let me ask you the question again.  Do I understand your testimony correctly that as far as you can recall you never bore knowledge of a counter-revolutionary strategy, you had no knowledge of the existence of a policy referred to as a counter-revolutionary strategy?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I did not know of this as having been an official policy which had been declared at a government level.

UNKNOWN: Was there any mention or discussion in the Counter-Insurgency Unit with regard to a counter-revolutionary strategy or was this never clearly mentioned?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: As I've mentioned earlier in Police circles we did indeed refer or discuss this.

UNKNOWN: Well what then did you discuss with regard to it?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair, as I have already mentioned, in institutions such as the JMC's, the Joint Management Councils it is widely known that there was a revolution, every department had to make some effort to counter this revolutionary effort.

UNKNOWN: Ja, good.  Allow me to refer you to a document which had been handed in the applications of the five applicants as Z, a piece of evidence Z, on page 9 there is reference to the Simon's Town summit, do you know anything about the Simon's Town summit in 1980.

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I know nothing of that.

UNKNOWN: As a consequence of the Simon's Town summit there was a visit from the then Prime Minister to Taiwan and an additional visit of a number of senior officials to Taiwan at the end of 1980 and as a consequence of these visits there was a document on the 15th of March 1985 presented to the State Security Council, do you know anything about this document?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: I bear no knowledge of this document.

UNKNOWN: This particular document claims that there should have been use made of a counter-revolutionary doctrine ...(intervention)

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: That is military language.

UNKNOWN: Good.  And in view of this Captain van Jaarsveld said TREVITS was then founded which was the Counter Revolutionary Information Task Group known as TREVITS, which was linked to the counter-revolutionary strategies and documents of the government and there was then a new phase in the efforts to counter the revolutionary onslaught, do you bear any knowledge of this?

JOHANNES JACOBUS VIKTOR: Chair I have already mentioned that I bore no knowledge of TREVITS.  If I look at the names in the record of the members these would have been Security Branch members.